Special Report 1

INSS Special Report

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

www.ndu.edu

April 2009

Relations between Pakistan and the 

United States are today defined by a 

paradox. Never have ties been more 

vital for both countries. But never has 

the relationship been so mired in mutual 

mistrust and suspicion.

Both countries acknowledge the 

crucial importance of each other for the 

attainment of their respective national 

objectives. Pakistan is pivotal for the 

achievement of the key U.S. national 

security goals of defeating terrorism and 

stabilizing Afghanistan. But its importance goes beyond that. Pakistan is the 

world’s second largest Muslim nation and 

its newest nuclear power. It has a critical role to play in many of the pressing 

issues of our time, such as countering 

violent extremism, bolstering democracy 

and development, addressing issues of 

international peacekeeping (as the largest contributor to United Nations troops), 

encouraging nuclear nonproliferation, and 

improving relations between the West and 

the Islamic world.

For its part, Pakistan needs the help 

of the international community, especially 

the United States, to enable it to stage a 

strategic recovery from the twin, interconnected crises of security and solvency, 

and to contain rising militancy in its 

regions bordering Afghanistan.

Despite sharing a number of common 

goals, the Pakistan-U.S. relationship is 

characterized today by mutual frustration 

and a growing trust gap. While the leaderships of the two countries place a high 

value on their ties, and acknowledge the 

dangers of a collapse of their relationship, 

their publics and legislatures do not share 

these perceptions and increasingly view 

the other with suspicion and depict one 

another as an unreliable ally. In a recent 

poll, most Pakistanis did not believe the 

Pakistan-U.S. security cooperation had 

benefited Pakistan. According to a Gallup 

Poll, Americans view Pakistan as among 

their five least favorite nations, along with 

Iran and North Korea.

Burden of History

These mutually negative perceptions can 

be ascribed in part to the burden of history. This, 

after all, has been a rollercoaster relationship, 

characterized by an erratic stop-go pattern in 

which Pakistan has swung between being America’s most “allied ally” and “most sanctioned 

friend” to a “disenchanted partner.”

Three things stand out about the troubled 

relationship from a historical perspective. First, 

relations have lurched between engagement and 

estrangement in almost predictable cycles. Second, these swings have occurred under both U.S. 

Republican and Democratic administrations, 

and on the Pakistani side, under democratic and 

military governments alike.

Third, the episodic nature of ties has 

reflected Washington’s changing strategic priori- s changing strategic priori- s changing strategic priorities and shifts in global geopolitics, which in 

turn have reinforced the popular perception in 

Pakistan that the country is seen from a tactical 

perspective, and not in terms of its intrinsic importance. When U.S. geostrategic interests so dictated, relations with Pakistan warmed, and aid 

and support followed. But when U.S. priorities 

shifted or when Pakistan pursued an independent stance, as, for example, on the nuclear issue, 

it led to long periods of discriminatory sanctions. 

This entrenched the view in Pakistan, at both the 

official and public levels, that Washington has 

pursued relations with Islamabad on a transactional and not a consistent or predictable basis.

The post-9/11 transformation in ties, after 

over a decade of multiple sanctions, opened 

up a new chapter of intense engagement and 

cooperation. But in a repeat of the past pattern, 

the relationship continued to have a single focus 

(that is, security). The scope and nature of relations remained narrow. The imperative of building a longer term and broad-based relationship 

was not addressed. Even though official-speak 

The Future of Pakistan-U.S. 

Relations: Opportunities 

and Challenges

by Maleeha Lodhi

Introduction
Special Report 2

often referred to the strategic nature of ties, there 

was a large gap between declaratory statements 

and operational reality.

Window of Opportunity

This leads to the present state of PakistanU.S. relations. A new administration in Washington and a democratic government in Islamabad provide a rare and opportune moment 

to redefine and reset the relationship, learn 

from past mistakes, and empower the bilateral 

relationship with the capacity to negotiate 

common challenges. Changing the terms of the 

engagement may in fact determine the extent 

and quality of cooperation that Washington 

and Islamabad are able to mobilize to address 

complex regional problems.

Relations have a bilateral dimension and 

a regional dimension that relate to Afghanistan. 

Both dimensions have to be addressed to recraft 

and strengthen relations. There is need for a 

Pakistan policy that is not just a function of 

Washington’s Afghanistan policy. Formulating 

policy only through the prism of Afghanistan ignores the reality that Pakistan is a much bigger 

and strategically more important country.

President Barack Obama’s enunciation of 

his administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan after a 2-month interagency review 

seeks to address both of these dimensions but 

places greater emphasis on the role that Pakistan 

is expected to play in eliminating al Qaeda and 

stabilizing Afghanistan.

This urges the need for the two countries 

to jointly frame common objectives and fashion concrete plans to implement them while 

launching efforts, in a spirit of candor and 

openness, to reconcile their differences and 

remove mutual suspicions.

The two countries share a number of common objectives. These include defeating terrorism and eliminating violent extremism from 

the region, strengthening peace and stability in 

nuclear South Asia, and promoting the economic 

and social development of Pakistan to strengthen 

its long-term stability as a strategic priority.

Terrorism and Extremism

President Obama’s new strategy acknowl- s new strategy acknowl- s new strategy acknowledges Pakistan’s pivotal importance in achieving 

the goal of defeating terrorism and its stability as 

the key to regional and global security.

Before considering the implications of Washington’s policy review, it is important to examine 

how and why Islamabad’s security challenges 

have intensified over the years. This will help to 

highlight the different narratives of the two countries about how we have reached the present point. 

The years 2007 and 2008 were the deadliest in 

Pakistan’s history, with a record number of suicide 

bombings and casualties from terrorist violence. 

According to one unofficial estimate, 6,000 lives 

were lost last year alone in bombings and terrorist 

attacks. Since 2001, 15,000 people have been 

killed in terrorist violence.

The deterioration of the security situation 

in Pakistan’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan 

and the challenge of rising militancy are the cumulative outcome of the double blowback effect. 

First was the blowback from the post-1979 joint 

struggle that Pakistan waged with the U.S.-led 

international coalition against the Soviet occupation. This famously relied on Islamic fighters 

to eject the Russians from Afghanistan. This 

war of unintended consequences bequeathed 

to Pakistan a witches’ brew of problems that 

continue to plague the nation today, weakening 

the traditional fabric of society in its western 

provinces. The explosive legacy of the Afghan 

jihad included militancy and violent extremism, 

millions of Afghan refugees, and the exponential 

growth of madrassas, narcotics, and proliferation of arms. The most dangerous aspect of this 

legacy was that some 40,000 Islamic radicals 

were imported from across the Arab world to 

fight alongside the Afghan mujahideen. They 

later became the core of al Qaeda.

The second blowback followed 9/11 and the 

U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan. The 2001 

intervention relied on the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance to oust the Pashtun Taliban regime, 

which provoked opposition from the Pashtun tribes 

that straddled both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan 

border known as the Durand Line. The way the 

war was waged in Afghanistan, and especially the 

lack of any hammer and anvil strategy during the 

crucial military attack on Tora Bora, increasingly 

pushed al Qaeda militants and Taliban fighters into Pakistan’s frontier regions, where many 

melted away into Afghan refugee camps.

The overmilitarized approach pursued in 

Afghanistan involved heavy reliance on aerial 

bombings and high collateral damage of civilian 

casualties. This fueled support for the growing 

insurgency and gave the Taliban a rationale to 

rally traditional resistance against foreign occupation. The slow and under-resourced reconstruction effort stymied any significant campaign to win hearts and minds while corruption 

and ineffectual governance widened the gap 

between Kabul and the countryside, especially in 

the Pashtun south and east.

Lack of clarity about the goals pursued by 

coalition forces in the past 7 years and the inability to distinguish between al Qaeda and Taliban 

began to result in the growing confusion about 

the aims of the war effort. It also led to the growing fusion between Pashtun nationalism and 

Muslim radicalism, which in turn strengthened 

the insurgency. The fatal distraction of the Iraq 

War and the consequential diversion of resources 

and attention compounded all these problems.

The downward trajectory in Afghanistan 

caused a devastating fallout on Pakistan, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 

(FATA) where it spread militancy and radicalized some of the tribes in South and North 

Waziristan. This in turn accentuated the threat 

of the Talibanization of Pakistan. Much like the 

war in Vietnam was pushed into Cambodia, the 

escalation of the military campaign and failure 

to contain and subdue the Taliban in Afghanistan pushed the conflict into Pakistan’s tribal 

formulating policy only 

through the prism of 

Afghanistan ignores 

the reality that Pakistan 

is a much bigger and 

strategically more 

important country

Dr. Maleeha Lodhi is former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States. This Special Report was derived 

from her presentation at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, on April 7, 2009.
Special Report 3

belt. Meanwhile, intensified missile strikes by 

unmanned U.S. Predator drones inside Pakistani border territory not only killed a number 

of al Qaeda targets, but also inflamed public 

opinion in the country, undercut Pakistan’s own 

counterinsurgency efforts, and further reinforced 

support from local tribes for the militants.

The deterioration in the security situation in FATA has been a consequence and not a 

cause of the collapse of security in Afghanistan. 

It follows that containing the insurgency in 

Afghanistan, together with Pakistan’s help in 

curbing the support it receives from militants 

using its territory, would have a salutary effect 

in FATA and on its ability to defeat the Pakistani 

Taliban. Once a disparate group, the Pakistani 

Taliban are now united by the goal of assisting 

the Afghan Taliban against the U.S. military 

surge expected in the coming months.

Against this backdrop, the new strategy for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan unveiled by President 

Obama on March 27, 2009, presents a number of 

challenges. Several aspects of the strategic review 

are from Pakistan’s perspective consistent with 

its views and are welcome shifts in approach. But 

other elements are worrisome for Islamabad.

Washington’s new strategy defines the 

core goal as to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” 

al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to 

prevent its return. This refocusing of the U.S.-led 

mission, with its emphasis on a civilian surge 

in Afghanistan to step up reconstruction and 

development; willingness to negotiate with the 

Taliban; expansion of Afghanistan’s army and 

police to enable them to shoulder their own 

security responsibilities; commitment of more 

economic assistance to both nations; offering to 

help build their security capacities; and addressing narcotics are all objectives that converge 

with Pakistan’s thinking.

Islamabad’s long-held view has included a 

number of key elements. First, insurgencies cannot only be addressed militarily but also have to 

be neutralized primarily by political means. Second, an adequately resourced development surge 

is essential to win hearts and minds. Third, the 

reconcilable Taliban should be separated from al 

Qaeda and brought into the political mainstream. Fourth, the Afghan security sector must 

be strengthened while ensuring that the security 

forces reflect Afghanistan’s ethnic balance. And 

fifth, the narcotics trade must be curbed because 

it fuels the insurgency.

Certain aspects of the new strategy, how Certain aspects of the new strategy, however, are problematic for Islamabad. The military 

escalation dimensions of the strategy pose 

the greatest anxiety. They suggest that despite 

Washington’s new emphasis on “soft and smart 

power”’ and the claim that the region’s security 

problems cannot be addressed in military terms 

alone, substantial reliance is still being placed 

on military means by the U.S.-led mission.

President Obama’s decision to send an 

additional 21,000 troops to Afghanistan not only 

contradicts his stated aim to talk to the Taliban, 

but it is also fraught with risk for Pakistan. The 

bulk of the troops will be deployed in the insurgency belt in southern and eastern Afghanistan. 

Increased military engagement on Pakistan’s 

border would escalate rather than diminish 

the threat of instability in Pakistan for several 

reasons. A military surge could lead to an influx 

of militants and al Qaeda fighters into Pakistan 

and increase the vulnerability of U.S.–North Atlantic Treaty Organization supply routes through 

the country, as supply needs will likely double. It 

may also lead to the influx of Afghan refugees as 

they seek to escape the worsening fighting. And 

finally, all this could produce a spike in violence 

with terrorist reprisals expected to intensify.

An even more significant worry for Islamabad is the military escalation signaled by the 

focus on rooting out “safe havens” in Pakistan’s 

border region and redefining the war as a 

regional conflict. President Obama’s suggestion 

that if Pakistan did not take action, the United 

States would step in, implies a widening of the 

war into western Pakistan even if the President 

later explained that he would consult Pakistani 

leaders before terrorist hideouts were pursued.

All this has still left open the prospect of 

increased U.S. Predator strikes against targets 

in FATA, a risky course since this action will 

only inflame public opinion in Pakistan 

and have destabilizing effects. Drone attacks 

have already evoked condemnation from the 

National, Frontier, and Balochistan Assemblies. 

Any policy that is vehemently opposed by the 

people will ultimately be unsustainable. The 

tactical gains claimed from these strikes must 

be set against the costs in terms of undermining strategic goals.

Such a perilous approach should be 

abjured in favor of the only viable one, which is 

based on the sharing of intelligence and technology, to enable Pakistan and its forces to address 

the terrorist threat in its own territory. The 

United States should show strategic patience as 

well as respect for a sovereign country’s red lines 

in deeds, and not just in words.

Moreover, an approach that attempts to 

deal with al Qaeda only militarily ignores the 

fact that the organization has to be defeated in 

the ideological battle because it is ideology that 

finds followers who are ever ready to replace 

those “taken out.” A counter–al Qaeda strategy must attempt to neutralize the network’s 

ideological appeal in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 

other parts of the world where it finds recruits 

and allies. Al Qaeda is now more of an idea. 

Terrorist operations are increasingly conducted 

mostly by self-generated “affiliates” drawn from 

young men in various countries who have been 

radicalized by al Qaeda’s ideology. The notion 

of fighting al Qaeda only militarily will remain 

only a partial response.

Islamabad and Washington will also need 

to close the gap in their perceptions over how 

they identify the strategic center of gravity of 

the threat that has to be addressed. Islamabad 

has long argued that the core of the problem 

and its solution lies in Afghanistan while 

acknowledging that support for the insurgency 

is provided by fighters using Pakistani soil. In 

Washington’s view, it is the safe havens in Paki- s view, it is the safe havens in Paki s view, it is the safe havens in Pakistan that are now the central front of the battle 

to defeat international terrorism. Islamabad 

believes that U.S. strategy downplays the fact 

that the situation in FATA is the consequence of 

the collapse of security in Afghanistan and not 

the other way around.

Islamabad also finds the notion of treating 

Pakistan and Afghanistan’s border region as a 

the notion of fighting 

al Qaeda only militarily 

will remain only a 

partial response
Special Report 4

“single theater of combat” unsettling, not least 

because the security trajectories, causes, contexts, 

and capacities are so different and because it 

would be a grave error to think one size fits both. 

If the flawed concept of “AfPak” has achieved 

anything so far, it is to unite the militants on 

both sides of the border in a new alliance to 

resist the troop reinforcements in Afghanistan 

ordered by President Obama.

The United States recognizes that the attainment of its redefined goals depends critically on 

Pakistan’s stability. That is the rationale for the 

economic and security assistance that President 

Obama has pledged to give Pakistan. He has urged 

Congress to pass the bill sponsored by Senators 

John Kerry and Richard Lugar that authorizes $1.5 

billion in nonmilitary aid over the next 5 years.

But Islamabad has taken strong exception to 

the proposed conditions and benchmarking of the 

aid, linking this to its counterterrorism performance. In stating that Washington will not provide 

a blank check to Pakistan, President Obama struck 

a note that is counterproductive. This stance reinforces the transactional nature of the relationship 

that Pakistanis resent, and it strengthens rather 

than breaks from the paradigm of treating Pakistan as hired help rather than a valued ally.

The metrics that U.S. officials say are being 

developed in consultation with Congress for such 

benchmarking are already a source of friction in 

the relationship, recalling an unhappy history 

of legislative-driven sanctions. Senator Kerry’s 

remarks in an interview that these metrics might 

include checks on whether Pakistan is moving 

its forces away from its border with India to 

concentrate on the insurgent threat in the west 

will raise hackles in Islamabad. Any effort to 

impose conditions that aim to change Pakistan’s 

national security calculus would be misguided 

and doomed to fail. No country’s national secu- s national secu s national security priorities or structures can be reconfigured 

from outside.

The only way to change the country’s 

security paradigm is to engage with the sources 

of longstanding Pakistan-India tensions.

Peace and Stability

While the threat from terrorism and 

militancy is a clear and immediate danger to 

Pakistan, Islamabad cannot ignore the more 

enduring strategic threat that emanates from 

the adversarial relationship between itself and 

Delhi. There are three reasons for this threat 

perception: a history of conflict (three wars and 

four near-wars), unresolved disputes including 

that over Kashmir, and India’s military posture, 

with the vast bulk of its land, air, and sea forces 

deployed against Pakistan. These assets can be 

quickly mobilized, as they were in 2002, for military action or for exercises in coercive diplomacy.

Historically, tensions between the nuclear 

neighbors have been shaped by military threat 

perceptions and postures. The heightened 

tensions in the wake of the terrorist attack in 

Mumbai last year was a reminder that, in order 

to address violence on a durable basis, a solution must be found to underlying disputes. How 

easily relations can revert to confrontation was 

dramatized by the immediate suspension of what 

seemed a promising, 5-year-old peace process.

Pakistan recognizes that peace with India is 

essential to achieve its goal of economic stability and to address the security threat posed by 

violent extremism. For the United States as well, 

peace in South Asia is essential to a number of 

its strategic objectives, including defusing the 

most proximate nuclear flashpoint.

President Obama often spoke prior to his 

election of the need to address Pakistan-India 

relations, asserting that the road to a stabilized 

Afghanistan runs through a Kashmir solution. 

But he later dropped any suggestion of an initiative on Kashmir in the face of Indian opposition. 

His new regional strategy excludes the IndiaPakistan equation. The portfolio of his special 

representative Richard Holbrooke omits this 

although his original mandate was to encompass South Asia.

This does not mean that the interconnectedness of regional security issues will disappear. 

Policies have to respond to realities and not the 

other way around. The success of Obama’s strategy will be contingent on how calm relations are 

between Delhi and Islamabad. Unless Pakistan’s 

security concerns on its eastern frontier are 

addressed, it will not be able to act decisively in 

fighting militancy on the western border.

This should urge the United States to 

consider diplomatic engagement to help 

promote strategic stability in South Asia. Such 

a regime needs to be built in three dimensions: finding an acceptable Kashmir solution and institutionalizing both nuclear and 

conventional military restraints. The India-U.S. 

nuclear deal represented a lost opportunity in 

not promoting such a regime when Washington had the leverage. Instead, the deal aroused 

grave misgivings in Islamabad, which saw this 

as another example of iniquitous policies followed by Washington. This does not, however, 

prevent the United States from future efforts to 

promote strategic stability, using the window of 

opportunity available prior to the execution of 

the nuclear agreement.

On Kashmir, tangible progress toward a 

settlement can provide Pakistan with the context 

and rationale to move decisively against groups 

allied to violent extremists and foreign fighters. 

This means, at minimum, India’s willingness 

to accede to meaningful self-governance by 

Kashmiris, significant drawdown of the over 

half-million-strong Indian security force in 

Kashmir, and an end to human rights violations 

against the Kashmiri people. An interim settlement based on these elements can pave the way 

to an eventual final solution.

Reduction of the threat perception also 

requires putting in place two other components 

of strategic stability: nuclear and conventional 

military restraints that are based on the concept 

of minimum deterrence. At first, India and 

Pakistan should translate minimum deterrence 

into an operational understanding involving a 

number of measures for mutual restraint. These 

could include:

■ turning the unilateral moratorium on 

further nuclear weapons testing declared by 

both nations into a formal bilateral agreement

■ maintenance of nuclear weapons on 

de-alert status

the success of 

Obama’s strategy will be 

contingent on how calm 

relations are between Delhi 

and Islamabad
Special Report 5

■ acceptance of a moratorium on the 

acquisition and deployment of antiballistic 

missile systems

■ additional confidence-building 

measures to reduce nuclear risk and avoid a 

nuclear and missile race.

The other element of strategic stability relates to the maintenance of a balance in 

conventional weapons and forces. Any move that 

disturbs this balance can increase the danger to 

peace and security by changing nuclear thresholds. The two countries should therefore consider 

steps to reach an understanding on conventional 

military restraint, accompanied by, or leading 

to, an agreement on the non-use of force or a 

nonaggression pact.

Economic and 

Social Development

The best means to tame and reverse the 

growing tide of militancy in Pakistan is to 

strengthen its capacity to deliver economic 

and social progress to its people, especially to 

generate employment in the context of rising 

demographic pressures and the “youth bulge.”

Although the new Obama strategy recognizes the importance of investing in Pakistan’s 

future, the resources it plans to marshal are 

modest in relation both to the challenges Pakistan confronts as well as the central importance 

the administration assigns the country in its 

regional policy.

There are short-term solvency and longterm development needs for which Pakistan 

needs support. The urgent priority is financial 

stabilization that will require $20 billion from the 

international community over the next few years.

In the near term, preferential trade access 

by the United States to Pakistan’s textiles and 

clothing would be a bold and substantial step 

to help the country. Textiles are the lifeblood of 

the Pakistani economy and its largest industrial 

employer. Preferential access would be a transformative measure as enhanced trade would create jobs and durable income streams. Aid often 

does neither. Present U.S. trade policy imposes 

higher tariffs on Pakistani goods than that from 

many developing countries.

The proposed Reconstruction Opportunity 

Zones legislation that President Obama has 

urged Congress to adopt envisages designated 

areas to be mainly established in the North-West 

Frontier Province. This has a trade component 

in that certain categories of goods produced 

there will have duty-free access to the United 

States. Its impact on the country’s textile indus- s textile indus- s textile industry would be modest, in sharp contrast to the 

substantial effect a Free Trade Agreement would 

have. According to some studies, this would 

enhance trade by 35 percent.

To implement a comprehensive and 

bold program of economic and social revival, 

Pakistan needs international help. Such a plan 

should entail addressing the internal energy 

deficit and critical infrastructure needs as well 

as restore a positive climate for domestic and 

foreign investment. The cost involved would 

be what the United States spends in Iraq in 4 

months. Given that the economic cost Pakistan has incurred since 2001 is estimated to 

be around $35 billion, such investment would 

signal to the Pakistani people that the international community has a stake in strengthening 

the country’s long-term stability.

For its part, Pakistan has to more purposefully meet the challenge of good governance and 

manage its economic and security issues with 

greater energy and competence, while building 

public consensus and support for its goals of 

economic and political stability. This requires 

something from the politicians that they have 

shown little of in the past year, consumed and 

distracted as they have been in power plays and 

political confrontation: leadership.

Pakistan has to put its own political house 

in order and seriously address the three interconnected challenges of governance, security, 

and economy to inspire confidence within the 

international community. Islamabad needs to 

evolve a credible roadmap for the stabilization 

of its tribal agencies to replace the firefighting 

approach of the past few years. Its counterinsurgency policy must be consistently and coherently 

executed and anchored in a set of interlocking 

political processes and aim at rebuilding civilian 

administrative authority at the local level to 

ensure that security objectives are sustainable.

In this endeavor to restore internal stability 

and countermilitancy and to meet regional challenges, Pakistan and the United States need a vastly 

improved relationship. This requires addressing:

■ the trust deficit

■ mutually negative public perceptions

■ lack of political and public consensus in 

both countries to support common objectives

■ tactical divergences on how to achieve 

shared goals.

Reconciling policies and tactics on key 

topics is essential given the urgency of the issues 

at hand. In the process of enhancing mutual 

confidence, each side must show greater understanding for the other’s security concerns. And 

Washington must demonstrate in practice and 

not only in words that it will no longer pursue 

an “America only” approach.

preferential trade access 

by the United States 

to Pakistan’s textiles 

and clothing would 

be a substantial step 

to help the country

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by members 

of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists in national security 

affairs from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of 

the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at 

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/nduhp. INSS also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal 

can be accessed at www.ndupress.edu.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

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active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Patrick M. Cronin

Eugene Rumer Director David H. Gurney

Director of Research Director, NDU Press
Special Report 6

Breaking the Yardstick: The Dangers of 

Market-based Governance

Don J. DeYoung

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 67, 

forthcoming)

Cyberpower and National Security

Edited by Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and 

Larry K. Wentz

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, April 2009)

Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the 

Evolving Character of Modern Conflict

Frank G. Hoffman

(Strategic Forum No. 240, April 2009)

The United States and the 

Asia-Pacific Region: National 

Interests and Strategic Imperatives

James J. Przystup

(Strategic Forum No. 239, April 2009)

Saddam’s War: An Iraqi Military 

Perspective on the Iran-Iraq War

Kevin M. Woods et al.

(McNair Paper 70, March 2009)

A 21st-century Concept of Air and 

Military Operations

Robin F. Laird

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 66, 

March 2009)

Ukraine Against Herself: To Be 

Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral?

Jeffrey Simon

(Strategic Forum No. 238, February 2009)

From Sputnik to Minerva: Education and 

American National Security

Sean Kay

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 65, 

January 2009)

Challenges to Persian Gulf Security: 

How Should the United States Respond?

Judith S. Yaphe

(Strategic Forum No. 237, November 2008)

Lessons of Abu Ghraib: Understanding 

and Preventing Prisoner Abuse in 

Military Operations

Paul T. Bartone

(Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Defense Horizons 64, 

November 2008)

NATO’s Uncertain Future: 

Is Demography Destiny?

Jeffrey Simon

(Strategic Forum No. 236, October 2008)

The Absence of Europe: Implications for 

International Security?

Steven Philip Kramer

(Strategic Forum No. 235, October 2008)

Other titles from 

NDU Press For on-line access to NDU Press publications,

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