Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Wednesday, June 18, 2003 BORDER SECURITY 

New Policies and 

Procedures Are Needed to 

Fill Gaps in the Visa 

Revocation Process 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-03-908T 
Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process was not being fully 

utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process broke down 

when information on individuals with revoked visas was not shared between 

State and appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke 

down even further when individuals had already entered the United States 

prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to 

investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the 

United States after their visas were revoked. In our review of 240 visa 

revocations, we found that 

• appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive 

notifications of all the revocations; 

• names were not consistently posted to the agencies’ watch lists of 

suspected terrorists; 

• 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds had 

entered the United States and may still remain; and 

• INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate, locate, 

or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States 

after their visas were revoked. 

These weaknesses resulted from the U.S. government’s limited policy 

guidance on the process. None of the agencies have specific, written policies 

on using the visa revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. 

Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System 

a On March 1, 2003, INS’s various functions transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.

The National Strategy for 

Homeland Security calls for 

preventing the entry of foreign 

terrorists into our country and 

using all legal means to identify; 

halt; and where appropriate, 

prosecute or bring immigration or 

other civil charges against 

terrorists in the United States. 

GAO reported in October 2002 that 

the Department of State had 

revoked visas of certain persons 

after it learned they might be 

suspected terrorists, raising 

concerns that some of these 

individuals may have entered the 

United States before or after State’s 

action. Congressional requesters 

asked GAO to (1) assess the 

effectiveness of the visa revocation 

process and (2) identify the 

policies and procedures of State, 

the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS), and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that 

govern their respective actions in 

the process. 

GAO makes recommendations to 

the Department of Homeland 

Security, in conjunction with the 

Departments of State and Justice, 

to develop specific policies and 

procedures for the interagency visa 

revocation process to ensure that 

when State revokes a visa because 

of terrorism concerns, the 

appropriate units within State, INS, 

and the FBI are notified 

immediately and that proper 

actions are taken. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-908T.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact Jess T. 

Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-908T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

June 2003

BORDER SECURITY

New Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation 

Process 
Page 1 GAO-03-908T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report1

 we are issuing today on the 

need for new policies and procedures to fill gaps in the visa revocation 

process. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, in the National Strategy for 

Homeland Security2

 the President said that the U.S. government has no 

more important mission than protecting the homeland from future 

terrorist attacks. Our report calls for new policies and procedures to 

ensure that when the Department of State revokes a visa because of 

terrorism concerns, homeland security and law enforcement agencies that 

protect our country are promptly notified of this information and take 

appropriate action. Since the September 11 attacks, State’s Bureau of 

Consular Affairs has been receiving an increased volume of information 

from the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and other 

sources on suspected terrorists. In some cases, the department decided to 

revoke visas of certain individuals when it received potentially derogatory 

information on them after issuing the visas. This issue was raised in our 

October 2002 report on strengthening the visa process as an antiterrorism 

tool.3

 In that report, we found that the State Department had revoked the 

visas of certain individuals after learning that they might be suspected 

terrorists, raising concerns that some of these people may have entered 

the United States before or after their visas were revoked. 

At your request, Mr. Chairman, and that of Senator Grassley, we evaluated 

how the visa revocation process is being used as an antiterrorism tool. We 

(1) assessed the effectiveness of the visa revocation process, specifically 

(a) the steps State took to notify appropriate units within the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS),4

 which is now part of the Department of 

 1

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Needed to 

Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process (Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003). 

2

Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, 

D.C.: July 2002). 

3

U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as 

an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002). 

4

On March 1, 2003, INS became part of three units within the Department of Homeland 

Security. INS inspection functions transferred to the Bureau of Customs and Border 

Protection; its investigative and enforcement functions transferred to the Bureau of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and its immigration services function became part 

of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Because our work focused on visa 

revocation cases that took place before the March 1 reorganization, our report refers to the 

U.S. government’s immigration agency as INS. 
Page 2 GAO-03-908T 

Homeland Security, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of 

revocations and the procedures used by the three agencies to post 

lookouts on these revocations to their terrorist watch lists; 5

 (b) whether 

any of the individuals whose visas had been revoked were able to enter the 

United States before or after the revocation; and (c) the actions taken by 

INS and the FBI to investigate; locate; and, where appropriate, clear, 

remove, or prosecute the individuals who did enter the United States and 

may still remain here after their visas have been revoked; and (2) 

determined the policies and procedures of the State Department, INS, and 

the FBI that govern their respective actions in the visa revocation process. 

Our work focused on all 240 of State’s visa revocations on terrorism 

grounds from September 11, 2001, through December 31, 2002. 

Our analysis shows that the visa revocation process is not being fully 

utilized as an antiterrorism tool. The visa revocation process could be 

more aggressively used to prevent suspected terrorists from entering the 

country and to alert homeland security and law enforcement agencies that 

individuals who entered before their visas were revoked might be security 

risks. However, we found that, in practice, the process broke down when 

information on visa revocations was not shared between State and 

appropriate immigration and law enforcement offices. It broke down even 

further when the individuals in question had already entered the United 

States prior to revocation. INS and the FBI were not routinely taking 

actions to investigate,6

 locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who 

remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. Depending 

on the results of the investigations, the cases could be resolved by clearing 

persons who were wrongly suspected of terrorism, removing suspected 

terrorists from the country, or prosecuting suspected terrorists on criminal 

charges. 

 5

These watch lists are automated databases that contain information about individuals who 

are known or suspected terrorists so that these individuals can be prevented from entering 

the country, apprehended while in the country, or apprehended as they attempt to exit the 

country. Specific entries on watch lists are sometimes referred to as “lookouts.” 

6

The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and 

Terrorism Enterprise Investigations provide for graduated levels of investigative activity 

by the FBI, allowing the bureau to act well in advance of the commission of planned 

terrorist acts or other federal crimes. The three levels of investigative activity defined in the 

guidelines are (1) the prompt and extremely limited checking of initial leads; (2) 

preliminary inquiries; and (3) full investigations. In this testimony, we are not prescribing 

which level of investigative activity is appropriate for persons with revoked visas who may 

be in the United States. 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-03-908T 

In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found numerous cases where 

notification of the revocation did not reach appropriate units within INS 

and the FBI and cases where lookouts were not posted to the agencies’ 

watch lists of suspected terrorists. We also found evidence that 30 

individuals whose visas were revoked because of terrorism concerns 

entered the United States and may still remain in the country.7

Additionally, INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to 

investigate, locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the 

United States after their visas were revoked. I would like to expand on 

these weaknesses in the process, and then comment on the U.S. 

government’s lack of a specific policy on visa revocations. Finally, I will 

outline the recommendations we have developed to strengthen the visa 

revocation process as an antiterrorism tool. In general, we recommend the 

development of specific policies and procedures to ensure that persons 

whose visas have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns 

be denied entry to the United States and those who may already be in the 

United States be investigated to determine if they pose a security threat. 

In our review of the 240 visa revocations, we found examples where 

information on visa revocations did not flow between the State 

Department and appropriate units overseas and within INS and the FBI. 

State Department officials from the Visa Office told us that when they 

revoke a visa in Washington, they are supposed to take the following 

steps: (1) notify consular officers at all overseas posts that the individual is 

a suspected terrorist by entering a lookout on the person into State’s 

watch list, the Consular Lookout and Support System, known as CLASS; 

(2) notify the INS Lookout Unit via a faxed copy of the revocation 

certificate so that the unit can enter the individual into its watch list and 

notify officials at ports of entry; and (3) notify the issuing post via cable so 

that the post can attempt to contact the individual to physically cancel his 

visa. Information-only copies of these cables are also sent to INS’s and 

FBI’s main communications enters. State officials told us they rely on INS 

and FBI internal distribution mechanisms to ensure that these cables are 

routed to appropriate units within the agencies. 

 7

This number is based on our analysis of data we received from INS as of May 19, 2003. On 

May 20 and 21, the INS and FBI, respectively, provided additional information related to 

this matter. Because of the nature and volume of this data, we were not able to fully 

analyze it in time for this testimony. The data could show that the number of persons is 

higher or lower than 30. 

Weaknesses in 

Notification and 

Watch List 

Procedures 
Page 4 GAO-03-908T 

Figure 1 demonstrates gaps that we identified in the flow of information 

from State to INS and the FBI, and within these agencies, as well as the 

resulting inconsistencies in the posting of lookouts to the agencies’ 

respective watch lists. 
Page 5 GAO-03-908T 

Figure 1: Diagram of Gaps in the Visa Revocation Notification System and Watch 

List Procedures 

a

Now within the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. 

b

Now within the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
Page 6 GAO-03-908T 

The top arrow in the diagram shows the extent of communication on visa 

revocations between the State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs 

and State’s overseas consular posts. We found that State had not 

consistently followed its informal policy of entering a lookout into its 

CLASS lookout system at the time of the revocation. State officials said 

that they post lookouts on individuals with revoked visas in CLASS so that, 

if the individual attempts to get a new visa, consular officers at overseas 

posts will know that the applicant has had a previous visa revoked and 

that a security advisory opinion on the individual is required before issuing 

a new visa. Without a lookout, it is possible that a new visa could be issued 

without additional security screening. We reviewed CLASS records on all 

240 individuals whose visas were revoked and found that the State 

Department did not post lookouts within a 2-week period of the revocation 

on 64 of these individuals. 

The second arrow depicts the information flow on revocations between 

State and the INS Lookout Unit, which is the inspections unit that posts 

lookouts on INS’s watch list to prevent terrorists (and other inadmissible 

aliens) from entering the United States. Officials from the INS Lookout 

Unit told us they had not received any notice of the revocations from State 

in 43 of the 240 cases. In another 47 cases, the INS Lookout Unit received 

the revocation notice only via a cable; however, these cables took, on 

average, 12 days to reach the Lookout Unit, although in one case it took 29 

days. An official from the INS communications center told us that, because 

State’s cables were marked “information only,” they were routed through 

the Inspections division first, which was then supposed to forward them to 

the Lookout Unit. He told us that if the cables had been marked as “action” 

or “urgent,” they would have been sent immediately to the Lookout Unit. 

In cases where the INS Lookout Unit could document that it received a 

notification, it generally posted information on these revocations in its 

lookout database within one day of receiving the notice. When it did not 

receive notification, it could not post information on these individuals in 

its lookout database, precluding INS inspectors at ports of entry from 

knowing that these individuals had had their visas revoked. 

The third arrow on the diagram shows the communication between State 

and INS’s National Security Unit that is responsible for investigations. This 

broken arrow shows that the State Department did not send copies of the 

faxed revocation certificates or cables to the unit. Further, in cases where 

the INS Lookout Unit received the revocation notification from State, INS 

Lookout Unit officials said that they did not routinely check to see 

whether these individuals had already entered the United States or notify 

investigators in the National Security Unit of the visa revocations. Without 
Page 7 GAO-03-908T 

this notification, the National Security Unit would have no independent 

basis to begin an investigation. In May 2003, an official from the Lookout 

Unit said that her unit recently established a procedure in which, upon 

receiving notification of a revocation, she will query the Interagency 

Border Inspection System to determine if the individual recently entered 

the country. She will then give this information to investigators in the 

National Security Unit, which is now part of the Bureau of Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. 

The bottom arrow on the diagram shows the information flow on visa 

revocations from State to the FBI’s Counterterrorism units. We found that 

that these units did not consistently receive information on visa 

revocations. FBI officials said that the agency’s main communications 

center received the notifications but the officials could not confirm if the 

notifications were then distributed internally to the appropriate 

investigative units at the FBI or to the agency’s watch list unit, known as 

the Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit. The Department of Justice said that 

to add a person to its watch list,8

 additional information must be provided 

to the FBI, such as the person’s full name, complete date of birth, physical 

descriptors, and watch list-specific classification information. The 

revocation notifications did not include most of this information. 

Our analysis shows that thirty individuals with revoked visas have entered 

the United States and may still remain in the country. Twenty-nine of these 

individuals entered before State revoked their visas. An additional person 

who may still be in the country entered after his visa was revoked. INS 

inspectors allowed at least three other people to enter the country even 

though their visas had already been revoked, largely due to breakdowns in 

the notification system. These three people have left the country. 

Despite these problems, we noted cases where the visa revocation process 

prevented possible terrorists from entering the country or cleared 

individuals whose visas had been revoked. For example, INS inspectors 

successfully prevented at least 14 of the 240 individuals from entering the 

country because the INS watch list included information on the revocation 

action or had other lookouts on them. In addition, State records showed 

that a small number of people reapplied for a new visa after the 

 8

This watch list, known as the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, is accessed by 

local and state law enforcement officials via the National Crime Information Center. 

Individuals with 

Revoked Visas May 

Be in the United 

States 
Page 8 GAO-03-908T 

revocation. State used the visa issuance process to fully screen these 

individuals and determined that they did not pose a security threat. 

The INS and the FBI did not routinely attempt to investigate or locate any 

of the individuals whose visas were revoked and who may be in the 

country. 

Due to congressional interest in specific cases, INS investigators located 

four of the persons in the United States but did not attempt to locate other 

revoked visa holders who may have entered the country. INS officials told 

us that they generally do not investigate these cases because it would be 

challenging to remove these individuals unless they were in violation of 

their immigration status even if the agency could locate them. A visa 

revocation by itself is not a stated grounds for removal under the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Investigators from INS’s National 

Security Unit said they could investigate individuals to determine if they 

were violating the terms of their admission, for example by overstaying the 

amount of time they were granted to remain in the United States, but they 

believed that under the INA, the visa revocation itself does not affect the 

alien’s legal status in the United States—even though the revocation was 

for terrorism reasons. They and other Homeland Security officials raised a 

number of legal issues associated with removing an individual from the 

country after the person’s visa has been revoked. Our report discusses 

these issues in detail. 

FBI officials told us that they did not routinely attempt to investigate and 

locate individuals with revoked visas who may have entered the United 

States. They said that State’s method of notifying them did not clearly 

indicate that visas had been revoked because the visa holder may pose 

terrorism concerns. Further, the notifications were sent as “information 

only” and did not request specific follow-up action by the FBI. Moreover, 

State did not attempt to make other contact with the FBI that would 

indicate any urgency in the matter. 

INS and the FBI Did 

Not Routinely Take 

Action on Individuals 

with Revoked Visas 

Who Had Entered the 

United States 
Page 9 GAO-03-908T 

The weaknesses I have outlined above resulted from the U.S. government’s 

limited policy guidance on the visa revocation process. Our analysis 

indicates that the U.S. government has no specific policy on the use of visa 

revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide 

State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism 

grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of 

visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI has written internal 

procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific 

actions on visas revoked by State Department headquarters officials, as 

was the case for all the revoked visas covered in our review. While State 

and INS officials told us they use the visa revocation process to prevent 

suspected terrorists from entering the United States, neither they nor FBI 

officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, 

and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already 

entered the country. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the visa process could be an important tool 

to keep potential terrorists from entering the United States. Ideally, 

information on suspected terrorists would reach the State Department 

before it decides to issue a visa. However, there will always be some cases 

when the information arrives too late and State has already issued a visa. 

Revoking a visa can mitigate this problem, but only if State promptly 

notifies appropriate border control and law enforcement agencies and if 

these agencies act quickly to (1) notify border control agents and 

immigration inspectors to deny entry to persons with a revoked visa, and 

(2) investigate persons with revoked visas who have entered the country. 

Currently there are major gaps in the notification and investigation 

processes. One reason for this is that there are no specific written policies 

and procedures on how notification of a visa revocation should take place 

and what agencies should do when they are notified. As a result, there is 

heightened risk that suspected terrorists could enter the country with a 

revoked visa or be allowed to remain after their visa is revoked without 

undergoing investigation or monitoring. 

State has emphasized that it revoked the visas as a precautionary measure 

and that the 240 persons are not necessarily terrorists or suspected 

terrorists. State cited the uncertain nature of the information it receives 

from the intelligence and law enforcement communities on which it must 

base its decision to revoke an individual’s visa. We recognize that the visas 

were revoked as a precautionary measure and that the persons whose 

visas were revoked may not be terrorists. However, the State Department 

determined that there was enough derogatory information to revoke visas 

for these persons because of terrorism concerns. Our recommendations, 

Systemic Weaknesses 

Were the Result of 

Limited Guidance on 

Visa Revocation 

Process 
Page 10 GAO-03-908T 

which are discussed below, are designed to ensure that persons whose 

visas have been revoked because of potential terrorism concerns be 

denied entry to the United States and those who may already be in the 

United States be investigated to determine if they pose a security threat. 

To remedy the systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who is now 

responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing 

provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance, work in 

conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to: 

• develop specific policies and procedures for the interagency visa 

revocation process to ensure that notification of visa revocations for 

suspected terrorists and relevant supporting information are transmitted 

from State to immigration and law enforcement agencies, and their 

respective inspection and investigation units, in a timely manner; 

• develop a specific policy on actions that immigration and law enforcement 

agencies should take to investigate and locate individuals whose visas 

have been revoked for terrorism concerns and who remain in the United 

States after revocation; and 

• determine if any persons with visas revoked on terrorism grounds are in 

the United States and, if so, whether they pose a security threat. 

In commenting on our report, Homeland Security agreed that the visa 

revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool. State 

and Justice did not comment on our recommendations. 

I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the 

subcommittee may have. 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Jess Ford or John 

Brummet at (202) 512-4128. Individuals making key contributions to this 

testimony included Judy McCloskey, Kate Brentzel, Mary Moutsos, and 

Janey Cohen. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(320197) 
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