United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 27, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 06-10664

Summary Calendar

_______________

CATHERINE J. MILLER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

m 4:04-CV-789

______________________________

Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, 

Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

*

Catherine Miller applied for disabilityinsurance and supplemental security income benefits, but the Commissioner of Social Security

determined that Miller was not disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act. Because the Commissioner’s decision isin accordance with law, we affirm.

I.

Miller filed applicationsfor disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits in 2000, alleging pain in her neck, shoul-

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2

ders, and left hip; carpal tunnelsyndrome; major depression; panic disorder; and anxiety.

The Commissioner denied her applications.

A hearing was held before an administrative

law judge (“ALJ”) at which Miller, her husband, a medical expert witness, and a vocational expert witness testified. The ALJ reviewed the Commissioner’s decision and determined Miller was not disabled, and the district court affirmed.

As part of his determination, the ALJ gave

little weight to the opinion of Miller’s treating

physician, Charles Marable, that Miller was

disabled and could not work. The ALJ stated:

In reaching my conclusions, I have considered the opinions of Ms. Miller’s treating

physicians, including Dr. Marable, that the

claimant is disabled. I am familiar with Dr.

Marable in particular, and I know him to be

a constant advocate for his patients. Accordingly, I therefore carefully examine his

opinions and the remaining evidence ineach

case. While I decide each case based on

the evidence before me, I am mindful that I

need to look closely at any opinion rendered by Dr. Marable. In this case, I did

not find his opinions convincing or supported, to the degree he has found that the

claimant is unable to engage in any work

activity. Hence, I gave his opinions little

weight. 

II.

We review the Commissioner’s decision to

deny socialsecurity benefits only to determine

whether the final decision issupported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal

standards were used to evaluate the evidence.

Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir.

1999); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232,

236 (5th Cir. 1994). Miller argues the ALJ

erred by according little weight to Marable’s

opinion, claiming it should have been given

great weight because it was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, she urges that

the ALJ erred by using information outside the

record in determining the weight to accord

Marable’s opinion. Miller does not contend

that substantial evidence does not support the

Commissioner’s decision,so we reviewthe decision to determine whether it isin accordance

with law.

The ALJ did not err by according little

weight to Marable’s opinion; the ALJ’s decision was in accordance with law. Miller is

correct that treating physician’s opinions

should be given great weight. Martinez v.

Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237

(5th Cir. 1994)). Also, “[a] treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity of a

patient’s impairment will be given controlling

weight if it is‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques and is not inconsistent with other

substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d)(2)).

We have distinguished, however, between

the weight given to a treating physician’s medical opinion on the nature and severity of an

impairment and his opinion on whether the patient is disabled and cannot work. We do not

require that an ALJ justify a decision to give

little weight to a physician’s opinion that a patient is disabled or unable to work, because

such decisions are reserved for the Commissioner. Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 620

(5th Cir. 2003). An ALJ need not give special

weight to treating physicians’ opinions if they

have no special significance. “Among the

opinions by treating doctors that have no
3

special significance are determinations that an

applicant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work.’ 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). These determinations are legal conclusions that the regulation

describes as ‘reserved to the Commissioner.’”

Id.

The ALJ gave little weight to Marable’s

opinionsthat Miller was disabled and unable to

workSSthe two opinions that Frank states

have no special significance and need not be

given any weight. The ALJ specifically explained that he gave little weight to Marable’s

opinion “that the claimant is disabled” and that

“the claimant is unable to engage in any work

activity.” Because Frank makes plain that an

ALJ need not give special weight to conclusions about disability or ability to work, the

ALJ did not err. Even if Marable’s opinions

were supported by substantial evidence, as

Miller stresses, the ALJ was not required to

give them special weight.

Miller’s argument that she was prejudiced

because the ALJ looked to evidence outside

the record to reject Marable’s opinion on disability also fails. Even if the ALJ considered

an extrajudicial source, the consideration did

not result in a decision on the merits on that

basis, because the ALJ was not required to

give Marable’s opinion about Miller’s disability any special weight and because disability is

an issue reserved for the Commissioner to decide.1 Whether Miller was disabled was never

Marable’s question to answer.2

AFFIRMED.

1 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S.

563, 583 (1966) (“The alleged bias and prejudice

to be disqualifyingmuststemfrom an extrajudicial

source and result in an opinion on the merits on

some basis other than what the judge learned from

his participation in the case.”).

2 Miller cites Oshkeshequoam v. Barnhart, 274

F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (C.D. Ill. 2003), to support

her contention that she was improperly prejudiced

as a result of the ALJ’s bias. That court, however,

did not hold that an ALJ’s bias improperly prejudices an applicant. The court rejected the ALJ’s

finding that a treating physician was biasedSSit did

not even involve an ALJ’s being biased. See id.

(“ALJ Welsch reiterates ALJ Lipe’sstatement that

Dr. Mack should not be found to be credible because he ‘tries to give his patients a break.’ However, there is no evidence in the record that Dr.

Mack is biased in favor of Plaintiff, other than the

fact that Dr. Mack has concluded upon his extensive, long-care treatment of Plaintiff that she is

disabled.”).