UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT PATRICIA E. DELANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. THE CITY OF HAMPTON, VIRGINIA, A Municipal Corporation; ARTHUR No. 97-2393 PARKER, Individually and in his capacity as Senior Public Works Foreman for the City of Hampton, Department of Public Works/Operations, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior District Judge. (CA-96-90-2) Submitted: January 27, 1998 Decided: February 11, 1998 Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSELPatricia E. Delaney, Appellant Pro Se. Stanley Graves Barr, Jr., Stephen Edward Noona, Richard Mark Feathers, Ashley Lionel Taylor,Jr., KAUFMAN & CANOLES, Norfolk, Virginia; Arthur Parker, GREENSVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Jarratt, Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding pr ecedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: Patricia Delaney appeals the district court judgment dismissing her claims against the City of Hampton, Virginia, and Arthur Parkerunder Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). Delaney filed suit after Parker allegedly sexually assaulted her while both were working for the City of Hampton's Department of Public Works. Following a jury trial, the district court dismissed Delaney's claims against the City pursuant to a jury verdict and dismissed Delaney's claims against Parker as a matter of law. We affirm. Delaney's brief expresses her dissatisfaction with the outcome of her trial but assigns no legal error to the proceedings below. Although this court liberally construes the claims of pro se litigants, 1 our review is limited to those claims discernible from Delaney's informal brief. 2 Delaney's primary claim is that her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. However, b ecause c ounsel was not constitutionally mandated in this civil action, even if counsel was ineffective, this is not grounds for reversal. See Sanchez v. United States Postal Serv. , 785 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986). Her remedy, if any, is to bring a legal malpractice action. Id.

_________________________________________________________________ 1 See generally Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Noble v. Barnett , 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). 2 See 4th Cir. Local R. 34(b).
2Delaney also questions why counsel allowed a witness for the City, Diane Bohlman, to sit with the City's attorney when witnesses were supposed to be excluded. This apparent expression of dissatisfactionwith her counsel's performance is not a ground for reversal. Moreover, under Fed. R. Evid. 615, a non-natural party may designate a representative who is not subject to a party request for the exclusion of witnesses. The City of Hampton states that it designated Bohlman as its representative at trial which would explain why she was not excluded. Finding no merit to Delaney's claims, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED 3