alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 73.865 Assignment and transfer of LPFM permits and licenses. ( a ) *Assignment/transfer.* No party may assign or transfer an LPFM permit or license if: ( 1 ) Consideration promised or received exceeds the legitimate and prudent expenses of the assignor or transferor. For purposes of this section, legitimate and prudent expenses are those expenses reasonably incurred by the assignor or transferor in obtaining and constructing the station (e.g., expenses in preparing an application, in obtaining and installing broadcast equipment to be assigned or transferred, etc.). Costs incurred in operating the station are not recoverable (e.g., rent, salaries, utilities, music licensing fees, etc.);
( 2 ) The assignee or transferee is incapable of satisfying all eligibility criteria that apply to a LPFM licensee; or
( 3 ) For a period of time commencing with the grant of any construction permit awarded based on the comparative point system, § 73.872, and continuing until the station has achieved at least four years of on-air operations: ( i ) ( A ) The assignee or transferee cannot meet or exceed the points awarded to the initial applicant; or
( B ) Where the original LPFM construction permit was issued based on a point system tie-breaker, the assignee or transferee does not have a “locally established date,” as defined in § 73.853(b), that is the same as, or earlier than, the date of the most recently established local applicant in the tied mutually exclusive (MX) group.
( ii ) Any successive applicants proposing to assign or transfer the construction permit or license prior to the end of the aforementioned period will be required to make the same demonstrations. This restriction does not apply to construction permits that are awarded to non-mutually exclusive applicants or through settlement.
( b ) *Name change.* A change in the name of an LPFM permittee or licensee where no change in ownership or control is involved may be accomplished by written notification by the permittee or licensee to the Commission.
( c ) *Holding period.* A construction permit cannot be assigned or transferred for 18 months from the date of issue.
( d ) *Board changes.* Notwithstanding the other provisions in this section, transfers of control involving a sudden or gradual change of more than 50 percent of an LPFM's governing board are not prohibited, provided that the mission of the entity remains the same and the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section are satisfied. Sudden majority board changes shall be submitted as a *pro forma* ownership change within 30 days of the change or final event that caused the LPFM permittee or licensee to exceed the 50 percent threshold.
[85 FR 7889, Feb. 12, 2020]
Document Number FAA-2012-0593 

 Contacts. With whom outside the FAA has this proposal been discussed? 

Organization Person Contacted Date Response 

National Business Aircraft Association Eli Cotti 11/4/11 

Regional Airline Association 11/4/11 

Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association Robert Hackman 11/4/11 

ATA Joe White 11/4/11
#### NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. JOHN DEERE PLOW CO.

No. 13178.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Feb. 13, 1951.

Andrew P. Carter, Atty., New Orleans, La., David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Assistant General Counsel, N.L.R.B., Washington, D. C., for petitioner.

Ralph Williams, Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and McCORD and BORAH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The order, enforcement of which is here sought, requires Respondent: (1) to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees, in violation of Section 8(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(1); and (2) to cease and desist from refusing, in violation of Section 8(5) of the Act, to bargain with the union, and to bargain with the union upon request.

The finding of Sec. 8(1) violations is concurred in by all the Board members, and Respondent does not deny that the evidence credited by the Board supports it. Indeed, they do not resist enforcement of paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b) of the order based on this finding.

The finding of Sec. 8(5) violations is concurred in by three, and dissented from by two, members of the Board, and Respondent vigorously contests its correctness and resists enforcement of the order based thereon.

In agreement, as we are, with the views ol the dissenting members, it will serve no useful purpose for us to do more than say that the contested finding is not well based, and the order based on it will not be enforced.

*27Of the supplemental contention put forward for the first time in the Board’s brief that our opinion in Holmes Company v. N. L. R. B., 179 F.2d 876, requires enforcement, it is sufficient to say that that case is not in point on the facts and that what was there decided does not support the enforcement contended for.

The enforcement prayer will be granted as to paragraphs 1(b) and 2(b) and (c), but denied as to paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a).

Enforcement granted in part and denied in part.
Merrimack,

No. 4533.

#### Louis C. Wyman, *Attorney General v.*Willard Uphaus.

November 15, 1957.

*Louis C. Wyman,*Attorney General, *pro se,*for the motion.

*Nighswander, Lord & Bownes*for the defendant, opposed.

Per curiam.

In *Sweezy*v. *New Hampshire,*354 U. S. 234, 254, 255, less than a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States was of the opinion that “use of the contempt power, notwithstanding the interference with constitutional rights, was not in accordance with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment” because of “a separation of the power of [the state] legislature to conduct investigations from the responsibility to direct the use of that power.” However the judgment of this court was there reversed because other members of the court sufficient to make a majority were of the opinion that there should be reversal for other reasons which appear to us inapplicable to the facts presented by the case now pending. We therefore con-*140elude that *Sweezy*v. *New Hampshire*is inconclusive of the issues in the pending case.

It is difficult to determine from the several opinions in *Sweezy*v. *New Hampshire, supra,*the full implication of the decision of that case. However, it appears to rest substantially on the ground that our Legislature did not desire an answer to the questions asked the defendant Uphaus by the Attorney General. With due deference we are compelled to state that this concept is erroneous. The legislative history makes it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did and does desire an answer to these questions. Laws 1957, c. 347, approved July 11, 1957. We believe that the Legislature was entitled to the information sought. How this error on the part of the Supreme Court may have affected its opinions we do not know.

We are loath to believe that under the Federal Constitution a state does not have the right to protect itself against subversion by inquiry of the sort provided for by our Legislature. The implications of such a conclusion are so grave and so at variance with what we have considered to be the settled law that we feel any ruling to this effect must come from another tribunal than ours.

Prior to the order of the United States Supreme Court, the defendant herein moved for a rehearing in reliance upon *Sweezy*v. *New Hampshire, supra,*which motion was denied on July 9, 1957. We have again reconsidered our opinion in the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the *Sweezy*case and we adhere to our original ruling in *Wyman*v. *Uphaus, supra.*The order is

*Former result affirmed; case remanded.*

Duncan, J., dissented to the extent and for the reasons indicated in his former dissenting opinion reported in *Wyman*v. *Uphaus,*100 N. H. 436, 448-451, but otherwise concurred.
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Melissa Jean Pool, Appellant

No. 06-15-00131-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

of McLennan County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 

2015-0550-CR2). Opinion delivered by 

Chief Justice Morriss, Justice Moseley and 

Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Melissa Jean Pool, has adequately indicated her inability to pay 

costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED APRIL 14, 2016

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
No. 10-10426.

#### West *v.*Breslin, Superintendent, Arthur Kill Correctional Facility.

C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA DA 20 - 0464

_________________ JOSEP H RICHARD GOSS,

Plaintiff and Appellant, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and DOES A - D, Inclusive,

Defendant and Appel lee . O R D E R

_________________ Pursuant to the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for submission on briefs to a five - justice panel of this Court. The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to all counsel of record an d to the Honorable Gregory R. Todd , District Judge . For the Court,

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 21 2021

04/21/2021
Case Number: DA 20-0464
DEC, 8,2010 3:06PM f A A REGIONAL COUNSEL, AEA-7

To: ChiefAdministrative Law Judge Ronnie A. Yoder Fax: 202-366-7536

To: Paul A Lange, Esq, Fax: 212-608-1216 From: Christian Lewerenz

Title: Attomey Date: 1218/2010 Pages w/cover. NO, 2799 p, 112 Federal AViation Administration
Office of Regional Counsel 1Aviation Plaza Jamaica, NY 11434 718-553-3273 718-995-5699 Email: Jeanine,Gonmer @faa.gov Facsimile 718-995-5699



# o u.s. Department of**Tr~nsportlUon**DEC, 8,2010 3:06PM F A A REGIONAL COUNSEL, AEA-7 NO, 2799 p, 2/2

U,S, Department of Transportation FederalAviation Administration Eastern Region Regional Counsel

Telephone Facsimile andFirst-Class Mall December 8, 2010 (

The Honorable Ronnie A. Yoder, ChiefAdministrative Law Judge U.S, Department ofTransportation Office ofHearings, M-20, Room B12-320 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.B. Washington, DC 20590 Fax: 201-366-7536 1Aviation Plaza Room 561 Jamaica, NY 11434 Telephone; (718) 553-3273 Facsimile: (718) 995-5699

tc; t;5 o r"'"l ('"l

\ (j)

Re: Agreed Proposed Procedural Schedule, In the Matter ofPolar Air Cargo, Inc., CP09EA0006 Judge Yoder:



# . This is to confirm that the parties agree to the filing ofan agreed proposed procedural schedule, including proposed dates for exchanging exhibits and discovery (January 31, 2011): and f1ling stipulations, and alist ofwitnesses, and a summary oftheir proposed testimony (February 28, 2011). The parties agree to propose the hearing site be New York, New York. Finally, the parties are engaged in settlement discussions buthave not agreed to a settlemellt as ofthis date. Sincerely, Alfred R. Johnson, Jr. Regional Counsel By:

### .i~ 

# J}<**~h** J ChristIan Lewerenz Attorney for Complainant Cc; Paul A. Lange, Esq., Fax: 212-608-1215 c'

### ;B~d!~?)**""~-** , i-r; ,
EXHIBIT 23.2 

 

**CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement No. 333-61054 on Form S-3, in Registration Statement No. 333-43790 on Form S-3, in RegistrationStatement No. 333-112361 in Registration Statement No. 333-82283 on Form S-8, in Registration Statement No. 333-16935 on Form S-8 of BriteSmile, Inc. and in the related Prospectuses, of our report dated March 8, 2002, except for Note 1 as to whichthe date is March 28, 2002, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of BriteSmile, Inc. included in its Annual Report (Form 10K) for the year ended December 27, 2003. 

 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

 

Walnut Creek, California 

March 22, 2004
#### § 90.1312 Assignment and transfer.

Licensees may assign or transfer their non-exclusive nationwide licenses, and any fixed or base stations registered under those licenses will remain associated with those licenses.
No. 11-5800.

#### Slovinec *v.*Meisburg.

C. A. D. C. Cir. Cer-tiorari denied.
- ND 1971
#### § 90.809 License grants.

MTA licenses pursued through competitive bidding will be granted pursuant to the requirements specified in § 1.945 of this chapter.

[67 FR 45376, July 9, 2002]
No. 11M29.

#### Carter *v.*United States; and *940Davis *v.*United States.

No. 11M31.

Motions for leave to ñle petitions for writs of certiorari under seal with redacted copies for the public record granted.
§ 51-11.3 Definitions. As used in this part: *Committee* means the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled.
Committee employee or employee means: ( 1 ) Any current or former officer or employee of the Committee;
( 2 ) Any other individual hired through contractual agreement by or on behalf of the Committee or who has performed or is performing services under such an agreement for the Committee; and
( 3 ) Any individual who served or is serving in any consulting or advisory capacity to the Committee, whether formal or informal.
( 4 ) Provided, that this definition does not include persons who are no longer employed by the Committee and who are retained or hired as expert witnesses or who agree to testify about general matters available to the public, or matters with which they had no specific involvement or responsibility during their employment with the Committee.
*Demand* means a subpoena, request, or an order or other command of a court or other competent authority, for the production, disclosure, or release of records or information related to, for the appearance and testimony of a Committee employee that is issued in a legal proceeding.
*General Counsel* means Committee General Counsel or Committee employee to whom the General Counsel has delegated authority to act under this part.
*Legal proceeding* means any matter before a court of law, administrative board or tribunal, commission, administrative law judge, hearing officer, or other body that conducts a legal or administrative proceeding. Legal proceeding includes all phases of discovery, litigation and informal requests by attorneys or others involved in legal proceedings seeking interviews or the like.
Records or official records and information mean all documents and materials, however stored, that is in the custody and control of the Committee, relating to information in the custody and control of the Committee, or acquired by a Committee employee in the performance of his or her official duties or because of his or her official status, while such individual was employed.
*Request* means any informal request, by whatever method, for the production of records and information or for testimony which has not been ordered by a court or other competent authority.
*Testimony* means any written or oral statements, including depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, declarations, recorded interviews, and statements made by an individual in connection with a legal proceeding.
# NDU's new introduction video 

/ Published Aug. 15, 2017

Check out NDU's new introduction video on creating strategic advantage. 

&feature=youtu.be
§ 54.519 State telecommunications networks. ( a ) *Telecommunications services.* State telecommunications networks may secure discounts under the universal service support mechanisms on supported telecommunications services (as described in § 54.502(a)) on behalf of eligible schools and libraries (as described in § 54.501) or consortia that include an eligible school or library. Such state telecommunications networks shall pass on such discounts to eligible schools and libraries and shall: ( 1 ) Maintain records listing each eligible school and library and showing the basis for each eligibility determination;
( 2 ) Maintain records demonstrating the discount amount to which each eligible school and library is entitled and the basis for such determination;
( 3 ) Take reasonable steps to ensure that each eligible school or library receives a proportionate share of the shared services;
( 4 ) Request that service providers apply the appropriate discount amounts on the portion of the supported services used by each school or library;
( 5 ) Direct eligible schools and libraries to pay the discounted price; and
( 6 ) Comply with the competitive bid requirements set forth in § 54.503.
( b ) *Internet access and installation and maintenance of internal connections.* State telecommunications networks either may secure discounts on Internet access and installation and maintenance of internal connections in the manner described in paragraph (a) of this section with regard to telecommunications, or shall be eligible, consistent with § 54.502(a), to receive universal service support for providing such services to eligible schools, libraries, and consortia including those entities.
[63 FR 2131, Jan. 13, 1998; 63 FR 33586, June 19, 1998, as amended at75 FR 75415, Dec. 3, 2010]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                       1,971,614
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  154,235
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,117,578
<PP&E>                                         172,703
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              37,700,950
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,413,798
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                 19,816,686
<COMMON>                                         8,235
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,443,532
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                37,700,950
<SALES>                                      2,796,037
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,796,037
<CGS>                                        1,767,714
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,767,714
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             7,448,615
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,247,205
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (6,671,906)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     3,200
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (6,675,106)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              3,489,803
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,185,303)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.59)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.59)


</TABLE>
1

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1246

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Nebraska.

Hector Curiel-Galindo, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 21, 2005

 Filed: September 27, 2005

___________

Before MELLOY, MAGILL, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Hector Curiel-Galindo pleaded guilty to illegal reentry into the United States,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). In a written plea agreement under Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) (authorizing parties to stipulate to specific

sentence; stipulation binds court once it accepts plea agreement), the parties agreed

Curiel-Galindo should be sentenced to 6 months in prison for the violation. After

accepting Curiel-Galindo’s guilty plea and plea agreement, the district court1

sentenced him to 6 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release. On appeal,
-2-

counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that Curiel-Galindo’s 6-month sentence is unreasonable.

We find that Curiel-Galindo cannot properly challenge his sentence because

he stipulated in his plea agreement to a sentence of 6 months. See United States v.

Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1995) (defendant who explicitly and voluntarily

exposes himself to specific sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U. S. 75,

80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we

also grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 

______________________________
§ 5.313 Innovation zones. ( a ) An innovation zone is a specified geographic location with pre-authorized boundary conditions (such as frequency band, maximum power, etc.) created by the Commission on its own motion or in response to a request from the public. Innovation zones will be announced via public notice and posted on the Commission's program experimental registration Web site.
( b ) A program experimental licensee may conduct experiments in an innovation zone consistent with the specified boundary conditions without specific authorization from the Commission. All licensees operating under this authority must comply with the requirements and limitations set forth for program licensees in this part, including providing notification of its intended operations on the program experimental registration Web site prior to operation.
NO. 07-11-0459-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

DECEMBER 4, 2012

MICKEY PATTERSON,  

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,  

Appellee

_____________________________

FROM THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2009-424,725; HONORABLE JIM BOB DARNELL, PRESIDING

***Memorandum Opinion***

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

Mickey Patterson was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.  Though he perfected an appeal, both his counsel and the attorney for the State represent that Patterson has died.  So too do they jointly move to permanently abate the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.1(a)(2).  Per the latter, “[i]f the appellant in a criminal case dies after an appeal is perfected but before the appellate court issues the mandate, the appeal will be permanently abated.”  Tex. R. App. P. 7.1(a)(2).  Given the motion before us, appellant’s death, and the fact that mandate has yet to issue from this court, we permanently abate the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

Do not publish. 

2
**Exhibit32.2**

 

Interactive Intelligence,Inc.

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Interactive Intelligence, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the period ending September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Keith A. Midkiff,Chief Financial Officer, Corporate Secretary and Treasurer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of section13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Keith A. Midkiff                                                                                |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Keith A. Midkiff  Chief Finacial Officer, Corporate Secretary and Treasurer  November 14, 2003 |

 

----