Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00018-CR

Charles Anthony LHERAULT,

Appellant

v.

The 

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR10281

Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: September 30, 2015

AFFIRMED

BACKGROUND

Charles Lherault was charged with the offenses of assault-family violence by choking or 

strangulation and continuous family violence. Prior to trial on the merits, a jury was empaneled 

to determine whether Lherault was competent to stand trial. That jury found Lherault competent 

to stand trial. Subsequently, another jury convicted Lherault and assessed punishment at 

confinement for twenty-six years and ten years, respectively. 
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In one issue on appeal, Lherault contends the first jury’s finding that he was competent to 

stand trial was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Lherault’s argument 

is construed as a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the first jury’s competency determination. 

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Standard of Review

In reviewing a defendant’s factual-sufficiency challenge to a jury’s competency verdict, 

the appellate court must consider all the evidence relevant to the issue at hand, and determine 

whether the judgment is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence so as to be 

manifestly unjust. Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Lasiter v. State, 

283 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. ref’d). The appellate court “views the 

entirety of the evidence in a neutral light, but it may not usurp the function of the jury by 

substituting its judgment in place of the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the 

witnesses’ testimony.” Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see 

Musgrove v. State, 422 S.W.3d 13, 17 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref’d). In this neutral light, 

the appellate court determines whether the evidence supporting the jury’s finding is “so obviously 

weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination,” or the proof supporting the jury’s 

finding, “although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.” See Johnson 

v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A clearly wrong and unjust verdict occurs where 

the jury’s finding “shocks the conscience,” or “clearly demonstrates bias.” Santellan v. State, 939 

S.W.2d 155, 164-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The appellate court may disagree with the jury’s 

finding even if probative evidence exists that supports the finding. Id. at 164; see also Johnson, 

23 S.W.3d at 7. However, “it is the exclusive province of the jury to resolve conflicts” in the 

evidence presented. Williams v. State, 191 S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). 

As the arbiter of conflicting evidence, the jury may accept or reject any part of a witness’s 
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testimony. Lasiter, 283 S.W.3d at 917; see also Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000).

ANALYSIS

Lherault contends the evidence presented to the jury proved he was incompetent to stand 

trial. Lherault argues the evidence showed he became so fixated and obsessed over minute and 

unimportant details that he lost the ability to engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and 

options. This, Lherault argues, left him unable to consult with his attorney with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding. Lherault bases this argument on the testimony of the expert 

witnesses and on his own testimony. 

A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and holds the burden to prove 

incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(b) 

(West 2006). A defendant is not competent to stand trial if the defendant lacks: “(1) sufficient 

present ability to consult with the defendant’s attorney with a reasonable degree of rational 

understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the 

defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a).

In the event a defendant utilizes an expert to demonstrate or evaluate competency, the Code 

of Criminal Procedure sets out the factors experts should use to conduct this evaluation. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.024 (West Supp. 2014); see Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 

286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). These factors include whether a defendant can (1) rationally 

understand the charges against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal 

proceedings; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events and states of mind; (3) engage in a 

reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the adversarial nature of criminal 

proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and (6) testify. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 46B.024(1)(A)-(F). 
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At the competency trial, the jury heard the expert testimony of forensic psychologist Dr. 

Jack Ferrell and Brian Skop, M.D., a psychiatrist, who both evaluated Lherault for competency 

using the factors set out in article 46B.024. Both Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop testified Lherault had 

an above average understanding of the charges against him, the adversarial nature of the 

proceedings and of the potential consequences he faced. Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop testified Lherault 

had no difficulty discussing the facts and events surrounding his case. Both experts believed 

Lherault could exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior and testify if the need arose. Further, Dr. 

Ferrell and Dr. Skop declined to diagnose Lherault with any mental disease or disorder, although 

both concluded Lherault exhibited narcissistic personality traits. According to both experts, 

Lherault held a superior belief in his opinions and did not take criticism or disagreement well, 

which manifested itself in stubborn and insistent behavior. However, Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop 

differed in their conclusion as to whether this behavior rendered Lherault incompetent to stand 

trial.

In Dr. Ferrell’s opinion, Lherault’s narcissism prevented him from engaging in a reasoned 

choice of legal strategies and options. According to Dr. Ferrell, Lherault had spent a great deal of 

time studying the facts of his case and researching the law and had very specific opinions about 

how he wanted his defense to be handled. Dr. Farrell testified that Lherault would become fixated 

on his defensive theories or thoughts on a detail of the case, and when fixated, Dr. Ferrell had 

difficultly redirecting Lherault to a different topic.

Dr. Ferrell expressed concern this fixation created a bad working relationship between 

Lherault and his attorney. Dr. Ferrell testified Lherault had grown to distrust his attorney because 

Lherault did not think his attorney was following through with the defensive strategies Lherault 

wanted accomplished. Dr. Ferrell testified that while observing Lherault and his attorney 

conferring, he saw this distrust and opined that Lherault’s tendency to fixate impaired their ability 
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to communicate. Dr. Ferrell opined this impairment was directly related to Lherault’s narcissistic 

tendency to place his own opinions—particularly those regarding legal strategy—over those of his 

attorney, and for this reason, Lherault did not have sufficient present ability to consult with his 

attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.

Conversely, Dr. Skop testified that although Lherault’s narcissistic tendencies created 

difficulties, he possessed sufficient ability to consult with his attorney. Dr. Skop testified that 

Lherault would engage in “diatribes” about details of his case, but Lherault was “interruptible,” an 

indication of his ability to control himself. Dr. Skop testified Lherault could communicate 

effectively if provided the ability to “give his two cents.” Dr. Skop also watched Lherault and his 

attorney confer and observed the same insistence and stubbornness described by Dr. Ferrell. Dr. 

Skop agreed this behavior could negatively impact Lherault’s ability to collaborate with his 

attorney; however, in his experience it is common for a defendant to be frustrated with or distrust 

his attorney. Dr. Skop opined distrust of an attorney, by itself, is not a factor in determination 

whether a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Skop concluded that although Lherault’s 

behavior would make communication with his attorney difficult, he did not lack the capacity to do 

so. 

Additionally, Lherault testified at the competency trial. Lherault testified he believed he 

and his attorney could communicate most of the time, including the ability to discuss legal strategy; 

however, Lherault said he could not get certain questions answered and this left him distrustful of 

her. Lherault testified he had researched the law and determined the charges against him should 

be dismissed, but felt his attorney was not working adequately to have the charges dismissed. 

Lherault complained his attorney would not file the motions he had written for her to file. Lherault 

expressed his belief that because his attorney was appointed, she would not do what he wanted. 
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Lherault denied ever receiving any mental health treatment and described his personality as 

“quirky” and “very strong headed.”

We have reviewed in a neutral light all the evidence presented to the first jury to determine 

competency. With regard to the first factor to indicate competency, the jury heard conflicting 

evidence on the issue whether Lherault had the present sufficient ability to consult with his attorney 

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. As discussed, Dr. Ferrell and Dr. Skop 

provided differing testimony about whether Lherault’s narcissistic personality traits rendered him 

unable to consult with his attorney. Because the jury is the arbiter of conflicting evidence, this 

court will not substitute its judgment in place of the jury’s. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671; 

Lasiter, 283 S.W.3d at 917. Given the testimony presented, the jury could have weighed the 

conflicting evidence and reasonably found Lherault was sufficiently capable of consulting with his 

attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. See Lasiter, 283 S.W.3d at 917. 

With respect to the second factor to indicate competency, Lherault concedes he held a 

rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Further, Dr. Ferrell and Dr. 

Skop’s testimony supports the conclusion that Lherault had such an understanding. 

Upon review of the evidence in a neutral light, giving deference to the jury’s determination 

of the conflicting evidence, we conclude the jury’s determination that Lherault was competent to 

stand trial was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be 

manifestly unjust. See id.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we overrule Lherault’s sole issue on appeal and affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

Jason Pulliam, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH