Opinion issued September 7, 2023

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 0 1
- 2 2
- 00 325
- CR

——————————— JUAN JOSE NAVARRO , Appella n t

V. T HE STA T E O F TEXAS , Appell e e
On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Tex as Trial Court Ca se No. 1686011

MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found appellant, Juan Jose Navarro , guilty of the f elony of fense of vi o lation of a protect ive order , with two or more prio r convictions

. 1 After finding true the allegation in enhancement that app ell ant ha d been previously convicted of

1 See T EX
. P E NAL C ODE A NN
. § 2 5.07 (a)(3 ) , (g)(2)(A)

.2

a felony offense , the tria l court assessed his punis h m ent at confinement for sixteen
years. In his sole issue , appell ant c ontends that t he evidence is legally insufficient
t o support his conviction

. W e affirm. Backg rou nd The complainant, Raul Navarro, testified that he li ve s at 1127 Louise Street, Houston, Harris Co unty, Texas. Appellant i s his son. The complainant ha s a n active protective order against appellant , which prohibit s appellant fro m coming to the compla inan t ’ s hous e . Appellant knew that he was not allowed to come to the complainant ’ s house. On August 13, 2020, appellant came to the complainant ’ s house in the middle of the night. Appellant “ started banging at the window ” and “ yelling and screaming [that ] he had los t his [cellular] [tele]phone. ” The complainant was

as leep , and appell ant wo ke him up. Appellant wanted the complain ant to get him a cellular tele phone, and the complainant told appellant to “ wait [un] til

. . . the morning ” and he w ould “ go to Wal

- Mart or somet hing. ” This made appellant mad. The co mplainant called for emer gency assistance b ecause he was scared of appellant

. The complainant was worr ied that appellant might “ break the window ” or the air condition ing unit or that appellant woul d “ come in ” i n the house and

“ may be hurt [him]. ” The complainant ’ s neigh bor also called for emergency3

assistance. After law enforcement officers arrived, the complainant u nlocked the gate to his home for them. The officers found appellant under the comp lainant ’ s house. Accordin g to the complainant , appellant did not have permission to be at the complainan t ’ s house on the night of Augus t 13, 2020 , and the complainant did not tell appellant to come to his house. Appellant was not allowed at the complainan t ’ s house because doing s o would “ break the p rotective order. ” The complainant stated that appellant had “ climbed over the ga te ” at the complainant ’ s house that night

. The complainant noted t hat sometimes he met appellant at fast food
restaurants and he w ould give appellant money so that appellant coul d buy something to eat. A n d sometimes appellant would call the complainant when he needed clothes to be washed. The complainant would “ help [appe llant] out with whatever [he ] could ” and he felt “ bad that [a ppellant] was hungr y. ” T he complainant would me et appellant in public places because he knew that appellant could not com e to the complainant ’ s house “ on account of the protective order. ” The co mplainant further testified that he previously had a protecti ve orde r against appellant , w h ich was issued in June 2003 and last ed for two years. The protective order prohibited appellant from coming to the complainant ’ s home. The4

compla inant stated that he and his wife got the prote ctive order because if th ey did not, th ey would “ be in danger. ” The complainant was afraid of appellant. According to the complainant, appellant came to the complainant ’ s home on July 4 , 20 03 , and the complainant called for emergency ass istance. Although appellant left the complainant ’ s home, law enfo rcement officers eve ntually located him, an d appellant was charged with the offense of vi olation of a protective order. Appellant was convicted of the offense and “ spent some time in the ja il. ” O n A ugust 6, 2003, appellant again came to t he complainant ’ s home. The complainant called for emergency assistance that day as well. During the complainant ’ s testimony, the trial cour t admitted into evidence a

co py of a protective order dated June 18, 2003 , which states that the complainant had ap p lied for a protective order against appellant. In the protective order, the trial court finds th at the complainant and appellant are members of the same family, family violence has occu rred, and family v iolence will likely occur again i n the future. The trial court also finds that appellant ha s committed f amily violence and that the protective order i s necessary for the “ safety and w elfare and in the best inter est ” of t he complainant and “ necessary f or the prevention of family violence. ” Thus , the trial court, among other thi ngs, order s that appellant i s prohibit ed , under chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, from “ [g]oing to or near the residence or place of employment or business of [ the complainant], specifically , ” appellant i s5

prohibited “ from coming w ithi n 200 feet of [the complainant ’ s] place of resid ence located in Harris County at 1127 Louise, Houston , Texas 77009, or any f uture residential or employment address o f [the complainant ]

. ” (Emphasis omitted.) The protective order states that it “ shall continue in effect for a period of two
years . ” It is signed by the trial court and appellant.
Houston Po lice Department Sergeant D. Flores testified that on A u gust 13,
2 0 20, he was on patrol during the night shift when he responded to a call about a

s us pi cious person . The call was received a t 12 : 3 7 a.m. , and Flores arri ved at a house located at 11 27 Louise Street in Harris County at 12:41 a.m. The complainant came out to the gate of the ho me and met Flores and the other law enforceme nt officers who had a rrived at the s cene. The complainant had to unloc k the gate for the officers. He appeared concerned. Law enforcement offi cers then searched the complainant ’ s property to look for appellant. Ev entually, law enforcement officers found appell ant under the

com plainant ’ s house. After appellant came out f rom under the house, the officers arrested him. Sergeant F l ores noted that another la w enforcement had “ checked [appellant ’ s] record ” and found th at appellant had an active prote ctive order against him , whic h p rotected the home located at 1 127 Louise Stre et . T h e complainant provided law enforcement officers with a copy of the protective order6

that night. As to appellant, Sergeant Flores testified that appellant “ ha[d] an alias of Jose Ju an Navarro. ” During S er geant F l ores ’ s testimony, the trial court adm itted into evidence a copy of a protective order , dated May 29, 2019, which states that the complainant had applied for a protective order against appellant. In the protective order, the trial court finds th at the complainant and appellant are members of the same family, family violence has occu rred, and family v iolence will likely occur again i n the future. The trial court also finds that appellan t ha s committed f amily violence and appellant “ has engaged in co n duct toward [the complainant] that would be a felony if charged. ” (Emphasis omitted.) F urther, th e trial court finds that there have been two o r more previous prote c tive orders rendered to protect the complaina nt from appellant and those protective o rde rs ha ve expired. Finally, the trial court finds that the protecti ve order is for the safety and welfare and in the best interest of the complainant and is necessary for the prevention of family violence . Thus, t he trial court, among other things, orde r s that appellant i s prohibit ed , under chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, from “ [g]oing to or near the residence or place of employment or business of [ the complainant], specifically , ” appellant i s prohibited “ from coming withi n 200 feet of [the complain ant ’ s] place of resid ence located in Harris County at 1127 Louise,
Ho uston , Texas 77009, or any f uture residential or employment address of [the7

complainant ]

. ” (Emphasis omitted.) The protective order states that it “ shall continue in e ffect for [appella nt ’ s] lifetime

. ” It is signed by the trial court

. As to the May 29, 2019 protective order, Sergeant Flores testified that the complainant applied for the protective order against appellant , and it was issued on May 29, 2019. T h e protect ive order prohibit ed appe llant from “ coming within 200 feet of [the complainant ’ s] place of residence located in Harris Cou nty, 1127 Louise Street, H ouston[,] Texas 77009, ” and law enforcement officers found appellant at th at address on August 13, 2020. (Internal quotation s o mitted.) T h e May 29, 2 019 prote ctive order was “ a permanent lifetime protective order, ” with

“ no end date. ” Blanca Avil ez testified that she is a latent print examiner with the Harris County Sheriff ’ s Office. As part of her job, A vilez review s “ known pri nts , ” also known as “ inked print[s], ” including those found on court judg ments. According to Avilez, a court judgment “ memorializes a conviction from the court , ” and it often contains a fingerprint. Avilez can determine whose fingerprint appears on a

cou rt judgment

. On the m orning of trial, A vilez took appellant ’ s fingerprints. 2 A vilez then compared appellant ’ s inked fin gerprints to the fingerprint s on a 2003 jail car d. According to A vilez , a “

jail card ” is created “ [w]hen a person gets booked into t he

2 A copy of appel lant ’ s inked fingerprints t aken b y A vilez on the m orning of trial was admitted into evidence by the trial court.8

jail system

. ” It contains “ the person ’ s descriptors, wh ich are things such as name, date of birth, SPN number, [ 3 ] and s heriff ’ s office number, along with whatever offense they ’ re being arrested fo r, along with their fingerprints. ” During A vilez ’ s testi mon y, the tri al court admitted into evidence a copy of the jail card, which i s dated August 6, 2003. It list s app ellant ’ s name as “ Jose Juan
Navarro ” and includes other identifying information , including a physical description of appellant , appellant ’ s SP N n umber , and appellant ’ s social security number

. It also lists the complainant as appellant ’ s father and lists appellant ’ s trial
court ca u se number as 1187299

. Further, i t states that on August 6, 20 0 3, appellant was arrested for the offense of violatio n o f a protec tive order. Appellant

s igned the 2003 jail card as “ J uan Navarro. ” A vilez testified that the fingerprints

o n the jail card were appellant ’ s fingerprints. During A vilez ’ s testimony, the trial court also admit ted into evidence a copy of a judg me nt of conv ic tion rendered in trial court ca u se number 1187299. T h e judgment lists appel lant ’ s name , and states that on August 7, 2003 , appellant was convicted of the offense of violation of a protective order and the trial court

3 A n SPN number is a un ique number assigned to an individual house d in the jail. See Degrassa v. State , No. 01

- 12

- 00162

- CR, 2014 WL 458 983, at *1 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [ 1s t Dist.] Feb. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ; Bund ick v. S tate , 14

- 12

- 00568

- CR, 2013 WL 1352339, at * 4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dis t.] Apr . 4, 2013, no pet.) (mem . op., not designated for publi cation)

. No two people have the s ame SPN number. See D egrassa , 2014 WL 458983, at *1, *4.9

assessed appellant ’ s pun is hment at c onfinement for ninety days . The judgment lists appellant ’ s arrest date as August 6, 2003. A vilez t estified that she was able to identify the fingerp rint on the August 7, 2 003 judgment of conviction as belonging to appellant. Additionally, dur in g A vilez ’ s testimony, t h e trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a nother judgment of conviction rendered in trial court ca u se number 1181781. The judgment shows that , on July 11, 20 03, “ Jose Juan
Navarro ” was convicted of the offense o f violation of a protective order , and the trial court assessed his p unishment at confinement for eight days. The judgment lists the date of the offense as July 4, 2003. 4 A vilez testified that the copy of the
2003 jail card, which c ontained appellant ’ s f ingerprints an d which the trial court admitted in to evidence , also l ist s appellant ’ s name as “ Jose Juan Nava rro. ” Appellant signed the 2003 jail card with the name “ J uan Navarro. ” Stand ard of Review We review the le gal suffi ci ency of th e evidence by cons i dering a ll o f the evidence in the light most f avorable t o the jury ’ s verdict to determine whether any “rat io nal trier o f fact could h a ve found the e ssential elements of the crime beyo nd a
reasonable d oubt.” Jackson v. Virgin ia , 443 U.S. 307, 318

– 19 (1979 ) ; Willia ms v .

4 A vilez sta ted that she was unable to identify the fi ngerprint on the Ju ly 11, 2003 judgment of conviction as belonging to appellant bec ause “ [t]here was not suff icient ridge detail [in the print on the judgment] for [her] to [be able to] c ompare [it]

. . . to the known fingerprint ” for ap pellant.10

Sta te , 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App . 2007). Our role is that of a d ue process safegu ar d, ensurin g only the rati o nality of the trier of fact ’ s finding of the elem ents of the offense beyond a reas onable do ub t. See Mo reno v. State , 755 S.W.2d 8 66, 8 67 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We de fer to the responsibility of the fact finde r to resolve conf li cts fairly in testimony, w eigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences fro m the facts. Williams , 235 S.W.3 d at 75 0. That s aid, our duty requ ires us t o “e n sure tha t the evidence presented actu ally suppo rts a conclusion that the defenda nt committed” t he crimina l offense of which h e is accused. Id. We note that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evide nce, a co urt m us t consider both direct and c ircu m stan tial evidence and any reasonable inference s that
may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. Sta te , 235 S. W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 200 7); see also Wise v. State , 364 S.W .3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 2) (e vi dence

- suff

iciency standard o f re v iew same for both direct and circumstantial ev idence). Circumstantial evidence is just a s probative as di rect evi d ence in establishi n g the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evide nce alone can be sufficien t to es tabli sh guilt. S ee Clayton , 235 S. W.3d at 7 78; H ooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex . Crim. Ap p. 2007). For evidence to be suf ficient, the St at e need n o t disprove all rea s onable alterna tive hypotheses that are inconsiste nt with a defendant ’ s guilt. See Wise , 364 S.W.3d at 903; Cantu v. Stat e , 39 5 S. W .3d 202,11

207

– 08 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1 st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref ’ d). Rather, a cou rt considers on ly whether the inferences nec e ssary to estab lish guilt are reasonable based on the cumulative force of all th e e viden ce when cons idered in the ligh t mo s t fa vora b le to th e jury ’ s verdict. See Wise , 364 S.W.3d at 903; Hooper , 214 S.W.3d
at 13 ; see also Murr

ay v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448

– 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder
resolv ed the confli c ts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.”)

. The jury, as t he judge of t he facts and c r edibility of t he witnesses, could choose to belie ve or not to believe the witness e s, or a ny portion of their testimony. S harp v. St ate , 70 7 S.W. 2 d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986 ); Jenkins v. State , 870 S.W.2d
6 26, 628 (Tex. App

. — Housto n [1s t Dist.] 1994, pet. ref ’ d). Sufficiency of Evidence I n his sole issue , app el lant argue s t hat the evidence is legally in su fficient to support his c o nviction for v iol ation of a protective order, with two or more prio r convictions , because the evidence did not link one of the alleged prior conviction s for the offense of violati on of a protective order to appellant

. Specifically , appellant asserts that t he State “ fa i l ed to prove ” appell ant ’ s alleged prior conviction on July 11, 20 03 for the offense of violation of a protect ive order in trial
court ca use number 1181781.12

A person com mits the offense of violation of a protective order, if , in violation of an order issue d un der c hapte r 85 of the Texas Family Code, 5 the person knowingly and intentionally goes to or near the resid ence or place of employment or business of a protect ed individual

. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 25.07(a)(3)(A). T ypically, the offense of violatio n of a protective order is a Class A misdemeanor offense. See id. § 25.07(g) ; see also Pullis v. State , No.
1 0

- 13

- 00135

- CR , 2014 WL 31423, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Waco Jan. 2, 2014, pet. dism ’ d ) ( mem. op., not designated for publication ) ( “ Violation of a protect i ve

o rder witho ut the prior convictions is a class A misdemeanor. ” ) . B ut the offense of violation of a protective order constitute s a third

- degree felony offense if it is shown at trial that the defendant was “ previ ously convicted two or more times of

an o ffen se ” under Texas Penal Code sectio n 25.07. See T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
. § 25.0 7 (g)(2)(A) ; see also Ramsay v. State , No. 13

- 09

- 0033 0

- CR , 2010 WL 2967066, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg July 29, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publica t ion ) (noting enhancem ent for t wo or more prior con v i c tions for violation of prot ective order).

5 Under the Texas F amily Code, “ [a] court shall render a protective order a s provide d by [ s] ection 85.001(b) if the co urt finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to oc cur in the f uture. ” See T EX
. F AM
. C O DE A NN
. § § 81.001 , 85.001(b) , 85.0 22 ; see also Rogers v. State , No. 09

- 15

- 00270

- CV , 2017 WL 2698038, at *2 (Tex. A p p.

— Beaumon t June 21, 20 17, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publicati on).13

To establish that the def endant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and (2) the defendant is lin ked to that conviction. Flowers v. State , 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ; Kinnett v. State , 623 S.W

. 3d 876, 896 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, p et . ref ’ d ). T here is no spe cific document or mode of proof required to establish that a prior c onviction exists, and that the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flo wers , 220 S .W.3d at 921; Kinnett , 623 S.W.3d at 896. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated: There is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires t h at the fact of a prior c onviction be proven with any document, much less any specific document. While evidence of a certified copy o f a final judgment and s entence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove both of these elements in a n u mber of different ways, including (1) the defendant ’ s admission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a person who was present when the pe rson was convicted of th e specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof (such as a judgment) that contain s sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant ’ s identity a s the person convicted. Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 921

– 22 (internal footnotes omit ted)

. “ Any type of evidence , documentary o r testimonial, ” may suffice to prove a prior convictio n . Id. at 922; see also Kinnett , 623 S.W .3 d at 896. The fact finder looks at the totality of evidence ad mit ted concerning the prior conviction to determine (1) whether there was a prior conviction and (2) whether the defendant was the person convicted. Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry v. State , 509 S.W.3d 915,14

919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ( fact finder “ must look at the totality of the evidence adduced ” and “ must consider the evidence as a whol e , as each piece of evide nce may provide little meanin g if considered in isolation ” ). Here, the indictment alleged , as enhancements, that appellant had two prior convictions for the offense of violation of a protective order , namely: ( 1) a conviction on J u ly 11, 2003, in trial court cause number 1181781, in County Criminal Court at Law No. 13 of Harris County and (2) a conviction on August 7, 2003, in trial court c ause number 11 87299, in County C riminal Court at Law No. 12 of Harris County. On appeal, app e llant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence link ing him to the first alleged prior conviction

— the July 11, 2003 conviction for the off

ense of violation of a protective order.
As evidence relevant to the July 11, 2003 conviction, the complainant
test i fied that he lived at 1127 Louise St re et , H ouston, Ha rris Cou nty, Texas. O n July 4, 2003, the complainant had a protective order i n place against appellant. Tha t protective order was issued in June 2003, and it last ed for two years. The protective orde r proh ibited appellant from c oming to the complainant ’ s home. The complainan t stated that he and his wife got a protective order against appellant because if they did not , th ey would “ be in danger. ” The complainant was afraid of appellant.15

During the com p lainant ’ s testimony, the trial cour t admitted into ev idence a copy of a protective order , dated June 18, 2003 , which states that the complainant had applied for a protective order against appellant. In the protective order, the trial court finds th at the complainant and appellant are members of the same fam ily, family violence has occu rred, and family v iolence will likely occur again i n the future. The trial cour t also finds that appellant ha s committed f amily violence and that the protective order i s ne c essary for the “ safety and w elfare and in the best
in ter est ” of the complainant and “ necessary f or the prevention of family violence. ” Thus , the trial court, amo ng other things, order s that appellant i s prohibit ed , under chapter 85 of the Texas Family Co d e, from “ [g]oing to or near the residence or place of employment or business of [ the complainant], specifically , ” appellant i s prohibited “ from coming withi n 200 feet of [the complainant ’ s] place of resid ence located in Harris County at 1127 Louise, Houst o n , Texas 77009, or any f uture residential or employme nt address of [the complainant ]

. ” (Emphasis omitted.) The protective order states that it “ shall continue in effect for a period of two
years . ” It is signed by the trial court and appellant. The com p lainant further testified that on July 4, 2003, appellant came to the compl ainant ’ s home, and the complainant called for emergency assistance. Although appellant left the complainant ’ s home, law enfo rcement officers eventually located him, and appellant w as charged with the offense of vi olation of16

a protective order. Appellant was convicted of the offense and “ spent some time in the jail. ” See Henry , 509 S.W.3d at 920 ( explaining “ a defendant may

. . . be
l inked to prior convictions through the t estimon y of a witness who personally knows the defendant and the fact of his prior conviction and identifies him ” and concluding witness ’ s testimony that “ he knew [def e ndant] went to pri son fo r
aggr avated assault in 1989 ” was “ a s olid link between [defendant] and the 1989 aggravated assault ” prior conviction (internal quotations omitted) ) ; see also Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 922 (testimonial evidence may suffi ce to prove prior conviction) ; Arrambid e v. State , No. 13

- 20

- 00135

- C R , 2022 WL 619148, at *4

– 5 (Tex. App.

— C orp u s Chri sti

– Edinburg Mar. 3, 2022, pet. ref ’ d ) (mem. op., not designated for publication ) (defendant ’ s mother testified that she was aware of his 1995 and 20 06 incarcerations and that “ h e served a ten

- year and eight

- year sentence respectively ” ) ; Batts v. St a te , 673 S.W. 2d 666, 668 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1984 , no pet.) (complainant ’ s testimony standing alone is sufficient to support conviction). The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of a judgment of conviction rendered in trial court cause numbe r 1181781. The judgment shows that on July 11, 2003, “ Jose Juan Navarro ” was convicted of the offense of violation of a protective order, and the trial court assessed his punishment at17

confinement for eight days. The judgment lists the date of the offen se as July 4,
2003. 6
A vile z, the latent print examiner with the Harris Cou nty Sheriff ’ s Office , testified that a copy of a 2003 jail card, which was admitted into evidence, contained appellant ’ s fingerprints

. Like the July 11 , 2003 judgment of conviction
t hat document list s appellant ’ s name as “ Jose Juan Navarro. ” The jail card also include s a physical descriptio n of appellant , state s that the complainant is appellant ’ s father, and shows that a ppellant signed it with th e name “ Juan
Navarro. ” See Martin v. State , No. 14

- 21

- 007 36

- CR , 2023 WL 3 1 15779, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, no pet.) (me m. op., not designated f

or publication) (physical description of named person in record allows fact finder to compare physical appearance of defen dant with person described in

recor d )

. Sergeant Flores testified that appellant “ ha[d] an alias of Jose Juan
Na varro. ”

6 Although the Ju ly 11, 2003 judgment of conviction d oes not contain a fingerprint clear enough to compare to the known finger print of appellant, this is not dispositive of our analysis. Cf. Kinnett v. State , 623 S. W.3d 876, 896

– 97 (Tex

. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 20 20, pe t . ref ’ d ) (h olding jur y could have found beyond reasonable doubt de fendant had prior convictions even though judgment of conviction did not contain defendant ’ s fingerprin t) ; Hall v. State , No. 06

- 20

- 0 0023

- CR , 2020 WL 72685 84 , at *5 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana Dec . 11, 2020, pet. ref ’ d ) ( mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling defendant ’ s argument evidence was “ insufficient to establish that he was the person [previo usly ] convicted in cause numbe r CR

- 16

- 25700 because the State was not able to match hi s thumbprint to the judgment ” ).18

Regardless of the type of evidentiary puzzle pieces the State offers to prove the e xistence of a p rior conviction and its link to a def endant, it is the fact finder who d etermines if the pieces fi t together sufficiently to complete the puzzle. Se e F lowers , 220 S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry , 509 S.W.3d at 919. Notably, t he fact find er consi ders the to tality of the admitted evidence to de termine whether there was a previou s conviction and whether the def endant was the person convicted. See Flowe rs , 220 S.W.3d at 923 ; see also Henry , 509 S.W .3d at 919. Here, v iewing the totality of th e evidence admitte d in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we must when conducting a sufficiency review , we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable do ub t that (1) appellant ’ s pri or conviction for the offense of violation of a prote ctive order on July 11, 2003 exists and (2) a ppellant is li nked to that convic tion. See Flowers , 220 S.W.3d at 921

– 23; see also Henry , 509 S.W.3d at 919 (fact finder “ must look at the totality of the evidence adduced ” and “ must consider the evidence a s a who le, as each piece of evidence may provide little meaning if considered in
i solation ” )

. Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appel lant ’ s conviction for the offense of violation of a protective order, with two or more prior c onvictions.
We overrule appellant ’ s sole iss ue .19 Conclu si on We af firm the judgme nt of th e trial court.

Julie Countiss Justice Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss

. Do not publish. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47.2(b)

.