Hon o r a b le A rth u r J. T ar n o w , U n it e d

St a te s D is tr ic t Ju d g e f

o r th e E a s te r

nD is tr ic t of * Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0162n.06 F iled: Marc h 25, 2008 No. 03-6566 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. JAYDONTA WASHING TON, Defendan t-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On App eal from the United St at e s D ist r ic t C our t fo r th e Weste rn District

of T ennessee O P I N I O N

BEFORE: M OORE an d GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; and TARNOW, District Judge. * TARNOW, Distric t Judge. Pur su ant t o a g uil ty ple a to t he c ha rg e of bei nga

fe lon in possession of a fir ear

m, the district court sentenc ed def endant Jay do n ta L avar

Washington to 15 y ear s' imprisonment, the s t at u t o ry minimum under the Armed Car eer Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) . On appeal, t he defenda nt's appellate counsel fil ed a motion to wit hdraw , acc ompanied by a brie f in ac corda

nce w ith An de rs v . Ca lif

or nia , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The An de rs brief r aises thre e
are as of c oncer

n: ( 1) whether the defe ndant was proper ly sentenc ed as an arme d car eer criminal; (2) whether the def endant wa s competent to proc eed with sentenc ing; and (3) whe ther the de fenda nt had proper consultations with trial counsel b efore plea ding guilty . Be cause we c onclude that none of these issues has me rit, we g rant c ounsel’s motion to withdraw and aff irm the judg ment of the district
c ourt
.No. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 2 - I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound On J anuar

y 23, 2002, a conf

idential informant wor

king w ith the Ba

rtlett Poli ce D epar

tment Na rc oti c Di vis ion

in B art le tt, Te nn e ssee p ho ned the de fe nd ant, Jay do nta

L a va r Wa sh ing ton , to
arr ang e a dr

ug buy . ( See Presentenc e Investig ation Report 5.) W ashi ng ton ag ree d to sell the confide ntial informant o n e- ei gh t h o f a gr am of c ocaine for $100. ( See id. ) The two ma de the exchang e in per son, which the confide ntial inf ormant rec orded by use of a body wire. ( S ee i d

. ) The purcha sed drug s tested positive for c ocaine and we ighe d 1.6 g rams. ( See id. ) Th e fo llo wi ngda

y , o n Jan ua ry 24 , 200 2, po lic e se arc he d th e de fe nd ant’ s h ome in M e mph is, Tenne ssee pur suant to a search w arr ant. ( See id. ) The police found Washington smoking marijuana i n h i s bedroom with three other men a nd arr ested him for the drugtransac tion that occurr ed the previous day . ( See id. ) U nd e r t he mattr e ss o f t

he de fe nd ant’ s b e d, po lic e fo un d a .3 57 c a lib e r p ist ol, model Sentinel MK I I I , serial number H11061. ( S

e e id. ) Washington explained that the g un belong ed to his sister, and he was mere ly holding onto it for he r. ( See id. ) Also discover ed during the sea rch of the def endant’ s bedroom we re e ight rounds of .357 caliber ammunition, one round of .38 specia l caliber

ammunition, a set of sca les, and a small amount of marijuana . ( See id. ) On April 10, 2002, a f

eder al g rand jury

in the Western District of Tenne ssee returned atwocount indictment. ( See R.1, I ndictment at 1-3.) Count One char g ed the de fenda nt with being a fe lon in po s s es s i o n o f a firear m, and Count Two char g ed him with being a fe lon in possession of ammunition, both i n violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) . ( See id. ) W ashing ton ag ree d to enter into a ple a a g re e me nt w iththe g ov e rnme nt; in exc ha ng e fo r a ple a

of g uil ty to C ount O ne of

the ind ic tme nt,No. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 3 - the g overnme nt ag ree d to drop Count Two. ( See R
. 3 7 , P l ea Agr ee m en t at 1 -2 ; R
. 3 9 , Or
. o nC h an ge of Plea at 1.) On Aug ust 30, 2002, the defe ndant pleade d g uilty to Count One. ( See R.36 Minutes Aug . 30, 2 0 0 2 ; R
. 5 6 T ra n s cript of Chang e of Plea at 16.) Count Two wa s dismis sed by way of motion at the sentencinghear ing. ( See R.77, J udg ment at 1.) Prior to Washington’s sentenc ing he aring , a probation o ff i ce r prepa

red a Presentenc e I nvestig ation Report (PSI R) detailing Washington’s off ens e conduct, criminal history , and other rele vant information. The PSI R list ed 23 prior a rre sts and convictions as well as three pe nding char g es, beg inning whe n he wa s 16 y ear s old, and noted that three of his prior state c onvictions qualified a s predica

te offe nses under the Armed Caree r Criminal Ac t ( ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). ( See PSI R at 7-16.) Two of these pre dicate c onvictions were for bur g laries a nd the third was f

or
rec kless homicide. ( See id. at 8-9.) At the s entenc ing he aring , Washington’s total off ense le vel was c alculate d to be 30, base d
on an in iti a l of

fe ns e le ve l of

24 , a fo ur -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt f or the us e of

a fi re arm or a mmunit ion

in
connec t i o n wi t h another felony offe nse, an e nhance ment to level 33 for be ing a n arme d car eer criminal under

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b) (3)( B) , and a thr ee- level re d u ct i o n for a cce ptance of responsibility . ( See id. at 6; Transc ript Sentencing Hea ring , Nov. 19, 2003 at 5-8.) This calculation, toge ther with the de fenda nt’s criminal history

cate g ory of VI , resulted in a Guidelines rang e of 168 to 210 months’ ( 14 to 17 1⁄2 year s’) imprisonment. ( See P S I R at 1 4 ; T ra n s cr i p tS en t en ci n g He ar i n g, Nov. 19, 2003 at 8.) B eca use t he plea ag ree ment indicated that “the United States and the def endant ag ree that the def

endant will be sentence d to a term of i mprisonment of fifte en y ear s or the low end of the a pplicable se ntencing g uideline rang e, whichever is highe r” (R. 37, Plea Agre ement at 2, ¶ 5),No. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 4 - the district court sente nced Washi n gt o n t o a term of 180 months’ imprisonment followed by five y ear s of supervise d rele ase. ( See Transc ript SentencingHea ring , Nov. 19, 2003 at 11-12.) This timely

appea l f ollowed. On October 4, 2004, Washington’s orig inal appellate counsel fi le d a mot ion to w ith dr aw w ithan a c c omp anyingbr ie f c on c lud ingtha t no re lie f i s w arr ante d in
acc ordanc e with An de rs v . Ca lif or nia , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). That motion t o withdraw w as g rante d on J une 20, 2006. The court appointed repla ceme nt counsel, who entere d his appea ranc e on Jul y

5, 2006. On Octobe r 6, 2006, Washington’ s replac ement appe llate counsel filed a motion to wit hdraw , acc ompanied by

an An de rs brief.

II. Discussion A. Ar m e d Ca r e e r Cr im ina l St at us The fir st issue identified by Washington’s ap pellate c ounsel is whether the def endant wa s proper ly sentenc ed as a

n arme d car eer

criminal under the Armed Caree r Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 92 4( e ). Th is c ourt re vie ws de novo a

d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e te r

mi n a ti o nth a t a

d e f e n d ant qualifies as a

n arme d car eer

criminal. Se e Un ite d S

tates v . S awy e rs , 409 F.3d 732, 7 3 6 (6 t h Cir. 2005). The ACCA prov i d es t h at an a rmed c are er c riminal shall be fined a nd imprisoned for a minimum of 15 y ear s. See 18 U.S
. C
. § 9 2 4 (e )( 1). Unde r the Ac t, a per son is deemed a n arme d
car eer c r im in a l i f

h e v io late s 1 8 U
. S. C. § 9 2 2 ( g ) an d h a s thr e e p r e v io u s c o n v ic ti o n s f o r a v io le nt felon y , a s er i o us drug offe nse, or both, provide d that these off enses we re c ommitt ed on diffe rent
occa sions. See id. The ACC A defines the t erm “ violent felony ” as a ny crime punishable by

moreNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 5 - than one y ear

in prison that either includes as an element phy sical force ag ainst the person of another or is b u rgl ar y , arson, or

extorti on, involves the use of e x plosives, or otherwise involves conduct prese nting a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B ). An act of juvenile delinquenc y

may constitute a “violent fe lony ” if it involves the use or c arr ying of a firea rm, knife, or

destructive de vice a

nd would be punishable for a pr ison term exceedingone y ear . See id. The Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report (P SI R) rec ommended that Washing ton be sentenc ed
as an a rmed c are er c ri m i n al b ased on three of his previous convictions. ( See PSI R at 8-9.) Two convictions wer e for

burg laries c ommitt ed in Cross County , Arka nsas, on Marc h 12, 1995 and May 1, 19 95 ; th e th ir d w a s f or re c kle ss h omi c ide c omm itt e d o n F e br ua ry 25 , 1 99 8 in

Me mph is, Tenne ssee. ( See id. ) The district court prope rly considere d these c onvictions as predic ate of fense s qu a lif yingWas hin g ton

fo r a rm e d- c are e r- c ri min a l st a tus
.

“ B ur g lary” is i nc lud e d in the de fi nit ion

of vio le nt felonie s th a t ma y c on sti tut e pr e dic a te offe nses under

the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii). In Taylor v. United States , 4 95 U. S. 575, 599 (1990), the Supre me Court held t hat “burg lary ,” as used in the ACCA, refe rs to burg lary in the “g ener ic” se nse, t hat is “any crime . . . ha

ving the basic e lements of unlawf ul or unprivileg ed entr y in to , o r r e ma in in g in , a b u il d in g o r s tr u c tu r e , w it h in te n t to c o mm it a c r im e . ” I n 1995, howeve r, Arka

nsas’s cr iminal code def

ined burg lary

more b r o a d ly

th a n g e n e r ic b u

r g la ry by including place s other than buildings, such as vehicles. See A RK . C ODE ANN . §§ 5-39-101( 1), -101( 2), -201 (West 1995). As thi s court explained, the Supreme Court in Taylor he ld t hat “ [a] d e fe nd ant’ s p a st convictions under a

non-g ener ic burg lary

statute may

be counte d for pur

poses of § 9 2 4 (e ) if theNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

B e c a us e the PSI R is ne ith e r a

n in dic tme nt n or

an in fo rm a tio n, it d oe s n ot q ua lif y a s a va lid 1 document to s how t hat t he defenda nt was c harg ed with burg lary of a building
. See Taylor , 4 95 U. S. at 602. Nonethe less, Washington’s trial attorney made no objec tion t o t h e P SI R, and the An de rs b r i e f d o e s n o t e v e n m e n t i o n t h a t A r k an s a s ’ s 1 9 9 5 b u r g l ar

y s t a tu t e w a s b r o a d e r

t h ang e n e r i c b u r g l ar

y. Se e U. S. v . R e lif

or d , 471 F. 3 d 9 1 3 , 9 1 6 (8 th Cir. 2006) (“if the defe ndant fa ils to obj ect to fa ct statements in the presentence investigation repor t
. . . establishing that a prior of fense was a

violent felony conviction, the g overnme nt need not introduce at sentenc ing the documentar y evidenc e” r e qu i r e d b y Taylor ). - 6 - conviction was, in e ssence , for g ener ic burg lary .” Un ite d S tates v . P lut

a , 144 F.3d 968, 975 ( 6th Cir. 1998). De spite the brea dth o f Ar k an s as’s burgla ry statute, the PSI R indicates that both of 1 Washington’s burgla

ry convictions wer e for

g ener ic burg lary

beca use they involved buildings rather tha n v e hic le s: o n M arc h 1 2th , h e burg lari zed a sto re , J & D D isc ount C e nte r, and on Ma y 1s t, h e sto le speake rs from a

churc h. ( See P S I R at 8
. ) Washington’ s two burg lary convictions qualify

as pr e dic a te of

fe ns e s un de r t

he AC CA be c a

us e the y we re fo r g e ne ri c burg lary , th e y we re punis ha

ble by more than one y ear

in prison, see A RK . C ODE ANN . § § 5 -3 9- 20 1, -4 -4 01 (a )( 3) , - 4- 40 1( a )( 4) (We st 19 95 ), the y

oc c ur re d o n tw o d if

fe re nt o c c a sio ns , and Was hin g ton wa s c on vic te d a s an a du lt d e sp ite being only

16 y ear s-old at the time of the of fense . ( See PSI R at 8.) Was hin g ton ’s thir d c on vic tio n, fo r r e c kle ss h omi c ide in M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , q ua lif ie s a predic ate of

fense under the ACC A o n l y i f i t constitutes a “violent fe lony .” See 18 U. S.C. § 9 2 4 ( e ) ( 1 )
. B e c a

u s e r e c k l e s s h o m i c i d e i s n o to n e o f t h e s p e c i f

i c a l l y n a m e d

o f f e n s e s ( b u r g l ar

y,
ars on , or exto rt ion ) an d doe s not inv olv e the us e of e xplos ive s, it o nly

qu a lif ie s a s a pr e dic a te of

fe ns e if it “ has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of phy sical forc e ag ainst the person of anothe r; or . . . otherwise involves conduct that pr esents a se rious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B ).No. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 7 - Th e Sixth C ir c uit takes the c a te g or ic a l a pp ro a c h to de te rm ine wh e the r a pr ior of fe ns e constitutes a pre dicate of

fense under the ACCA, see U nited States v. Montanez , 442 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir. 2006), which mea ns “looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior of fense s, and not to the particula

r fa cts underly

ing those convictions,” Taylor , 495 U.S. at 600. Tenne s s ee d ef i n es
rec kless homicide as “ a re ckless killing of another ,” and it is punishable by imprisonment for more than one y ear . T EN N . C ODE ANN . §§ 39-13-215, 40-35-111( b)(4) (West 1998). Under Tenne ssee law, “Rec kless” re fer s to a person w ho acts re ckle s s l y wi t h respe ct to circ umstances surroundingthe conduc t or the re sult of the conduct whe n the person is awar e of but consciously

disreg ards a substantial

and unjust i

f iable risk that the circ umstances e xist o r t he re su lt w ill occur. Th e ri sk must b e of su c h a natur e and

de g re e that it s disreg ard c onstitut es a g ross deviatio n fr o m t h e standa rd of c are that an ordina

ry person would exercise under all the circ umstances as viewed from the ac cused pe rs on ' s st and

po int
. T EN N . C ODE ANN . § 3 9 -11-106( a)( 31) (West 1995) (e mphasis added) . We conclude that the

“ su bs tanti a l and un

jus tif ia ble ri sk ” of inj ur

y un de r Te nn e sse e ’s re c kle ss- ho mic ide law f a lls wi thi n th e me anin g of

a “ se ri ou s p ote nti a l r isk of ph y sic a l in

jur y to a no the r” un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 924(e) (2)( B)
. See United States v. Adams, 51 F ed. Appx. 507, 508 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (K e ntu c ky

re c kle ss h omi c ide is p re dic a te off ens e un de r A CCA ). Was hin g ton ’s 19 98 re c kle sshomicide conviction constitutes a pr edicate offe nse under the ACCA. Recklessne ss might not be an a dequate mens rea fo r a c on vic tio n to c ount a s a p redicate offe nse under

the ACCA. As explained, the statute offe rs two subsections to expl ain what a violent felony is. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (B ). The f irst subsection states that a cr i m e t hat “ha s as an
e le me nt t he us e . . . of ph y si cal fo rc e a g a ins t th e pe rs on of ano the r” c ounts a s a

fe lony . Ac ri meNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 8 - committed rec klessly

might not satisfy

this fir st subsection’s definition of “violent fe lony .” See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales , 4 6 6 F. 3 d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 3 0 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Le oc al v . A sh c ro ft , 125 S.Ct . 377, 383 (2004) ( interpre ting identica l lang uag e that def ines a “ crime of

violence” which ca

n
serve as a predic ate for deportation of aliens))
. Howeve r, the languag e in the sec ond subsection, § 924(e) (2)( B) (ii), is so broad that e v en a cr i m e of reckle ssness can c ome under the umbrella of “conduc t that presents a

serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” Se e U. S. v . M c Cal l , 439 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting the Supreme Court’s distinction in Leocal , 125 S.Ct
. at 383 n.7, betwee n these two de finitions, and expl aining that the “potential risk” definition focuse s on the eff ect of the conduc t, not the intent of the offe nder)
. There fore , beca

us e t h re e of Washing ton’s prior convic tions were f or violent felonies, the district court prope rly

sentenc ed him as an a

rmed c are er c riminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
. B. Com petency The sec ond issue raised in the An de rs brief c oncer ns whether

the def endant wa s competent to go f orwa rd with sentenc ing. “ A def endant’ s competenc e is a que stion of fac t, which we r eview for c lear err or.” Ha rri es v . B e ll , 417 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) . To be a djudge d competent, a defe ndant must have “ sufficie nt present ability to consult with his l awy er w ith a rea sonable de g ree of ratio na l un de rs tand ing ” and “ a ratio na l a s w e ll a s f

a c tua l un de rs tand ingof

the pr oc e e din g s a g a ins t him.” Dusky

v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Be fore sentenc ing Washing ton, the district court gra nted a defe nse m otion for e valuation as to his mental competenc y . ( See R.63, Or. fo r Mental Evaluation of Def .) The e valuation was completed on August 22, 2003, an d a second revie w was pe rfor med on Octobe r 7, 2003. ( SeeNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 9 - Appellant’s B r. 10-11 ( citing R.91, Sea led Doc. - For ensic Eva luation R. & Adde ndum).) Ac cording to disc u s s i on at the sente ncing hear ing on O ctober 20, 2003, both reports found not only that W ashing ton was compe tent to go f orwa rd with sentenc ing but a lso that he was mali n ger i n g. ( See Transc ript Sentencing Hea ring , Oct. 20, 2003 at 11-12.) Despite these finding s, t h e dis trict
c ourt g ra nte d d e fe ns e c ouns e l’ s r e qu e st f or an in de pe nd e nt e va luatio n, no tin g : [H] e does a

ppear to me to be maling ering . And I believe the re is strongsupport for that in the reco r d

h e r e an d in th e s e r e p o rts
. H o w e v e r , Ia ls o b e li e v e In e e d to g ive him the benef

it of the doubt befor e I

– he is fac ing a l ong period of inc arc eration and Ithi nk pr ob a bly a se c on d o pin ion

is a pp ro pr iate un de r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s. Id. at 25. Howe ver, thre e day s after the district court g rante d the re quest for f urther c ompetency evaluation, defense counsel withdre w the motion, expl aining only that he “me t ext ensively ” with the defe ndant “a

nd it is now Couns el’s re prese ntation to this Court that Mr
. Washington is competent to proce ed to sent en ci n g. ” (R.73, Mot . to Wi thdraw Reque st for F urther Compete ncy Evaluation at 1-2.) Be cause Washington with d re w h i s reque st for fur ther e valuation, he wa ived any rig ht of appea l as to whether

additional ev al u at i o n should have be en per formed. See U nited States v. Denk ins , 3 6 7 F. 3 d 5 3 7 , 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (de fenda nt waived his rig ht to appeal district cour t’s denial of motion to withdraw his ple a, wher e motion asse rted lack of competenc y b u t d ef en dant subsequently

stated t hat he no longe r wa nted to pursue incompe tency claim); see also United States

v . S he pp ar d , 149 F.3d 458, 461 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (def endant wa ived suppression ar g ument when he filed motion to suppress evidenc e but then withdre w the motion).No. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 10 - Although the defe ndant may no t ch al l enge the district court’s fa ilure to order additional evaluation, he may

appea l the court’s c ompetency finding
. At the sentenc ing he aringon October 20, 2 0 0 3 , t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt d et erm i n edt h at W as h i n gt o nwa s co mp et en tt o go fo rw ar d wi t h s en t en ci n g, concluding “I am absolutely cer tain that he is c apable of understanding the proc eeding s and assisting his counsel, if he w ants to . And it is appare nt that he doesn’t wa nt to.” (Tra

nscript Sentencing He ari ng , O c t. 2 0, 20 03 a t 14 .) I n o rd e r t o o ve rt ur n th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s c omp e te nc y fi nd ing , w e wo uld have to f ind it clearly

err oneous. Se e Ha rri es v . B e ll , 417 F.3d at 635. Ac c or din g to t

he Sup re me Court , “ e vid e nc e of a defe nd ant’ s ir

ratio na l be havio r, his de me ano r at tr ia l, a

nd any pri or med ic a l op ini on on c omp e te nc e to s tand

tr ia l are a ll r e le va

nt i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r

f u rt h e r i n qu i r y i s r e qu i r e d , b u t
. . . e v e no n e o f t h e s e f a c t o r s s t an d i n g a l o n e m ay, in some circumstanc es, be suf ficient.” Drope v . Mo. , 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). The district court relied on these fac tors to de termine Washington’s competenc y to proce ed with sentenc ing, c iting the fore nsic eva luation as well as its own obser vations of the def

endant. Notingthe hig h quality of the fore nsic eva luation, the court de scribed its re asoning for a dopting the evaluators’ opinion a s its own: [V] ery seldom will I rea d [an evaluation] in which the evaluators have suc h a cle ar pe rc e pti on

and su c h a c le ar o pin ion

a bo ut a patie nt o r a

pe rs on be inge va luate d. B oth the thoroug hness and the c larit y of their c onclusion are very compelling for the C o u rt
. An d

t h e c o n cl u s i o ni s t h at h e i s m al i n ger i n g. (Tra nscript SentencingHea

ring , Oct. 20, 2003 at 13-14.) I n addition, the court found it sig nificant that the eva luators’ finding s comported with its own obs erva tions of the de fenda

nt: “I n looking at the his tor y of thi s c a se , I

have ha d th is c a se fo r o ve r a y e ar n ow . M r. Was hin g ton ha s b e e n in

thi sNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 11 - court re peate dly . Ihave ha d the opportunity to o b s er v e h i m . There have be en no sy mptoms of mental illness.” (

Id. at 14.) N o r i s i tm a t e r i a l t h a tt h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt d i d n o th o l d a h e ar i n g a s t o d e f

e n d an t ’ s c o mp e t e n c y, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d). Althoug h such a he aringwould have a ffor ded Washing ton the chanc e to exercise c erta in rig hts, su ch as t he opportunity to testify , or to prese nt evidence , Washington’s trial c ounsel o n l y moved for a

psy cholog ical eva luation, not a hear ing. ( See R.62, Mot. for psy cholog ical and/or psy chiatric evaluation). The district cour t gr anted the motion for evaluation, but failing to find “r easona ble ca use” under § 4241(a) to believe that Washington was incompetent to sta

nd trial, the cour

t did not need to conduct a competenc y

hear ing. See M

arkham v. U.S. , 1 84 F .2 d 5 12 , 5 13 (4 th C ir. 19 50 ) (i f psyc hiatr ic e va luatio n s ho ws that de fe nd ant i s competent, not nec essar

y for tria l court to hold competenc y hear ing)
. Ther ef o re , b eca use the district cour

t relied on prope r fa ctors to deter mine Washington’s
co mp e t e n c y a n d

b ec au s e t h e r ec o rdl ac k s ev i d en ce t h at t h e d ef en d an twa s n o tco mp et en tt o go fo rw ard wi th s e nte nc ing , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fi nd ingwa s n ot c le arl y e rr on e ou s. Although not a ddresse d in the An de rs brief, Washing ton’s co mp e te n c y to e nter his g uilty

plea
was ra ised ea

rly in the proce eding s. After Washington plea ded guilty , he filed a motion to wit hdraw his g uil ty ple a , c la imi ngtha

t he wa s una

ble to ma ke an inte lli g e nt, kn ow ing c ho ic e du e to e xtre me pain ca used by an injury he sust ained to his right legwhile detaine d. ( See R.50, Mot. to W ithdraw Guilty Plea at 2-3.) Howeve r, 15 day s later, he filed a motion to withdraw the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, e x plaining only

that “[a]fter extensive consultations with counsel, Mr. Washington ha s d e c ide d to pr oc e e d w ithhis ple a of g uil t.” (R .5 1, Mo t. t o Withd ra w M ot. to Wi thd

ra w G uil tyNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 12 - Pl e a a t1
. ) B e c a

u s e W a s h i n g t o nw i t h dr e w h i s m o t i o n , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtw a s n e v e r c a l l e d u p o nto decide whether to allow him to withdraw his plea on the g round of incompe tency and, thus, the defe ndant waive d any

rig ht of appe al on that issue. See D enkins , 3 67 F .3 d at 54 4; Sh e pp ar d , 149 F .3 d at 46 1. Th e re fo re , he may no t c ha lle ng e his c omp e te nc y to e nte r a ple a on a pp e a l, a nd he wo uld fa i l an ap p ea l b as edo nl ac k o f c o mp et en cy

t o go fo rw ar d

wi t h s en t en ci n g. C. P roper C onsu ltations w ith Law yer The final issue raised by

the An de rs brief is “whethe r or not Mr. Jay donta L avar Washington ha d p ro pe r c on su ltatio ns wi th h is atto rn e y in h is case .” (Ap pe lla

nt’ s B r. 7. ) A lth ou g h a

pp e llate counsel fa iled to specify

the leg al sig nificanc e of this issue, presumably he meant to examine either whether the def endant’ s g uilty

plea wa s valid or whether trial counsel re ndere d eff ective a ssistance. Ne ith e r, ho we ve r, ha s me ri t. A g uilty plea must be e ntere d knowing ly , vol u n tarily , and intellige ntly
. Brady v. U nited States , 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The only potential impropriety

indicated in the An de rs br ie f i s a state me nt i nc lud e d in

the de fe nd ant’ s motio n to wi thd ra w h is guil ty

ple a , w hic h w a s su

bs e qu e ntl y wi thd r aw n , t h a t “ M r . W a s h i n g t o n an d c o u n s e l h a v e n e v e r d i s c u s s e d h i s g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e i n th is matter.” (R.50, Mot. to Wit hdraw Guilty Plea at 5.) This statement is irre levant to the validity of Was hin g ton ’s ple a , h ow e ve r, be c a us e the de fe nd ant a dmi tte d in the wr itt e n ple a a g re e me nt a s w e ll
a s und e r oa th dur ing the c ha ng e of ple a he ari ngtha

t he ha d b e e n f

ull y a dv ise d o f t

he ple a a g re e me nt, that he had ample opportunit y to discuss the case wit h counsel prior to pleadingg uilty , and that he
was satisfied with counsel’s a dvice a nd repr esentation. ( See R.37, Plea Ag ree ment at 1-3; Tra nscript of Chang e of Plea

at 4, 6, 11). There fore , the defe ndant has no basis to argue that his plea w as notNo. 03-6566

U.S. v. W ashington

- 13 - enter ed knowing ly , voluntarily , and intellige ntly b as ed o n a lack of consultation or improper consultation with his lawy er. Although the An de rs brief may have attempted to argue that the de fenda nt was denie d eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel prior to enter ing a g uilty plea, c laims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel a re be tter addr essed in a ha beas c orpus motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. I n g ener al, ra ising ine ff e c tiv e ne ss c la ims on dir e c t re vie w is a pp ro pr iate on ly wh e re “ tr ia l c ouns e l’ s in e ff e c tiv e ne ss i s so appar ent from the r ecor d that appellate counsel will consider it advisable t o raise the issue on direc t appea l.” Massaro v. United States , 5 3 8 U
. S. 5 0 0 , 5 0 8 ( 2 0 0 3 )
. H e r e , th e r e is virtually no
e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d r e g ard ingpr e -p le a c on su ltatio ns be tw e e n th e de fe nd ant a nd tr ia l c ouns e l. Be cause “[s] uch fa cts are more appropr iately develope d at the district court leve l,” United States v. Valdez , 362 F.3d 903, 913 ( 6th Cir. 2004), the pane l need not addr ess ineff ective a ssistance of counsel on dire ct appe al. There fore , there is no viable issue for a ppeal based on a lack of

proper consultation betwee n W a s h i n g t o nan d

tr i a l c o u n s e l b e f

o r e t h e d e f

e n d an tp l e a d e d

g u i l t y.

III. Conclusi on Th e re are no le g a lly no n- fr ivo lou s issu e s for c on sid e ratio n on ap pe a l. We G RA NT de fe ns e
c ouns e l’ s mo tio n to wi thd ra w a nd AF F I RM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ou

rt
.