COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KENNETH WAYNE MORRIS, S/K/A 

 KENNETH WAYNE MORRIS, SR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1606-96-2 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 APRIL 1, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE 

Jay T. Swett, Judge 

 (Paul H. Schwartz, on brief), for appellant. 

 Appellant submitting on brief. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Kenneth Wayne Morris, Sr. (appellant) was convicted in a 

bench trial of grand larceny pursuant to Code § 18.2-95 and 

sentenced to four years in prison, with three years suspended. 

On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in (1) 

determining the value of the motorcycle to be $200 or more, and 

(2) finding appellant had the intent to permanently deprive 

Gloria Walters (Walters) of her motorcycle. Finding no error, we 

affirm. 

 On the morning of August 12, 1995, appellant knocked on 

Walters' front door. When she answered the door, appellant 

inquired whether a motorcycle located in "the rear of the house" 

was for sale. Although initially Walters told appellant that she 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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"wasn't really interested in selling," she agreed to give 

appellant the motorcycle as payment for doing work on her house. 

 Walters and appellant examined the motorcycle after unlocking 

it. Appellant then produced a blank contract form and listed the 

work to be done on Walters' house.1

 The parties agreed that the 

work was to be started within approximately two weeks from the 

date of the contract. 

 Later that day, after appellant left the property without 

finishing the lawn as agreed, Walters noticed that the motorcycle 

and the key to the motorcycle were missing. She contacted 

appellant, who admitted having them. She requested that 

appellant return the motorcycle to her at that time and on 

several subsequent occasions. Appellant never returned the bike 

nor did he complete any of the work under the contract. 

Appellant gave the motorcycle to his cousin. 

 At trial, the evidence established that Walters purchased 

the motorcycle in 1988 for $3,200-$3,300, that it was a limited 

production model which had been specifically customized, that it 

had less than 750 miles on it, and that she "wanted about $4500 

 1The contract listed the "Service(s) to be rendered" as 

follows: "to do gutters on house facial boards if bad brick to 

be filled in holes and replace if bad and to paint outside of 

house and scrape old paint off porch boards replace in front of 

door and ceiling fix in dining room and door on celler [sic], 

clean shingles of roof." Payment was described as follows: 

"Total Amount Due on Completion of Work: $ for 88 Honda 

Inttersceter Bike." Both parties signed the contract beneath the 

line reading, "PAYMENT WILL BE DUE IN FULL UPON COMPLETION OF 

WORK." (Emphasis added). 
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for it, if [she] were to sell it. [She] would have, perhaps, 

settled for at least over what [she] paid for it, . . . at least 

$3500 at the very rock bottom." The evidence also established 

that the motorcycle had been damaged in 1991, and had been left 

outside since 1991-1992. 

 Appellant testified that he would "get the bike for partial 

payment" and that after he "finished the work [he'll] come and 

get the title," that both he and Walters loaded the motorcycle 

onto his truck, that she was aware he was taking the motorcycle, 

and that she did not contact him during the following two-week 

period to ask for the return of the motorcycle. 

 In overruling appellant's motion to strike at the close of 

the evidence, the trial court found as follows: 

 I find, listening and observing the 

witnesses, coupled with the defendant's prior 

criminal conviction, which is something which 

the court considers as to the defendant's 

credibility, that the version of events is 

far more likely to have occurred and far more 

credible as explained by Ms. Walters. I find 

it very difficult to adopt the version 

described by the defendant . . . [which] 

stretches this Court's reasonable grounds of 

credibility. I find that the version 

happened essentially as Ms. Walters testified 

to. . . . [U]nder these circumstances, absent 

any permission, absent any discussion about 

taking the motorcycle, coupled with the 

subsequent explanations and refusals to 

return the motorcycle that [appellant], it's 

fair to conclude, and the Court does so, that 

when he went back on August 12th to take the 

motorcycle that he intended to permanently 

deprive Ms. Walters of the motorcycle, 

particular[ly] in light of his own testimony 

that he was simply going to hold it as down 

payment yet it turns up in the hands of 

somebody else when he never does the work. 
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 "On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 

4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987); see also Gooden 

v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 565, 571-72, 311 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1984). 

 The inferences to be drawn from proved facts are within the 

province of the fact finder as long as they are reasonable and 

justified. David v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 1, 3, 340 S.E.2d 

576, 577 (1985) (citing Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 457, 

177 S.E.2d 618, 624 (1970), cert denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972)). A 

conviction will be affirmed unless plainly wrong or unsupported 

by the evidence. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 

218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 

 VALUE OF THE MOTORCYCLE 

 It is well settled that the value of the stolen property is 

an essential element of the offense, and that the burden is on 

the Commonwealth to prove the statutory amount. Knight v. 

Commonwealth, 225 Va. 85, 88, 300 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1983); Wright 

v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954). 

 When the value of goods taken is at issue, "the facts and 

circumstances proven [must be] such as to permit an intelligent 

and probable estimate of the amount of damages or loss 

sustained." Gertler v. Bowling, 202 Va. 213, 215, 116 S.E.2d 

268, 270 (1960). Value may be shown from direct or 

circumstantial evidence. Veney v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 805, 
 5 

806-07, 188 S.E.2d 80, 82-82 (1972). As the owner of the 

motorcycle, Walters was competent to testify as to its value. 

Haynes v. Glenn, 197 Va. 746, 750-51, 91 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1956). 

 "While the original purchase price of an item may be admitted as 

evidence of its current value, there must also be 'due allowance 

for elements of depreciation.'" Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 

704, 705, 284 S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981) (quoting Gertler, 202 Va. at 

215, 116 S.E.2d at 270). 

 The evidence sufficiently proved the value of the motorcycle 

to be $200 or more. "There was sufficient evidence before the 

[trier of fact] for it to intelligently and fairly estimate with 

reasonable certainty the quantum of damages at the time of the 

loss" and to conclude that the motorcycle was worth $200 or more. 

 The testimony of the owner, Walters, established that she was 

knowledgeable about the value of the motorcycle which she 

purchased as a specially customized, limited production model 

with a present value of at least $3,500. The trial court was 

entitled to reject as incredible appellant's testimony of the 

value he assigned to the work he was to perform in exchange for 

the bike. 

SUFFICIENCY 

 The trial court, having the opportunity to see and hear the 

witnesses testify, was entitled to credit the Commonwealth's 

witness and to disbelieve appellant. See Schneider v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 383, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 
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(1985). "The weight which should be given to evidence and 

whether the testimony of a witness is credible are questions 

which the fact finder must decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 

Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). 

 "To prove that a defendant is guilty of larceny, the 

Commonwealth must present evidence that the defendant took the 

property with the intention to deprive the owner permanently of 

his possession of the goods." Welch v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 

518, 524, 425 S.E.2d 101, 105 (1992). "Intent may, and most 

often must, be proven by circumstantial evidence and the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from proven facts are within 

the province of the trier of fact." Fleming v. Commonwealth, 13 

Va. App. 349, 353, 412 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1991). 

 The trial court rejected as incredible appellant's claim 

that he had a right to take the motorcycle and properly inferred 

that appellant's intent was to permanently deprive the victim of 

her motorcycle from the wrongful taking of the property. See

Bryant v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 179, 445 S.E.2d 667 (1994); 

Saunders v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 825, 447 S.E.2d 526 (1994). 

 The victim testified that she requested the return of her 

motorcycle and appellant refused. Appellant's testimony 

established that he had converted the motorcycle to his own use 

by giving it to his cousin. From appellant's refusal to return 

the motorcycle and his subsequent conversion of the same, the 

court was entitled to conclude that he intended to permanently 
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deprive the victim of her property. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.