Overview of Alaska Fisheries Manageme

Gunnar Knapp

Professor of Economics

Institute of Social and Economic Research

University of Alaska Anchorage

Prepared for

Economics 300: The Economy of Alaska

Updated March 2006
“Fisheries management” refers to all the rules that affect wh

how they can fish, where they can fish, and how much they 
Fisheries management goals

• Fisheries management has multiple goals:

– To protect fishery resources– To promote a profitable fishing industry– To achieve social goals (equitable distribution of bene

cultural traditions, etc.)

• Fisheries management is very complicated and difficult be

– There are multiple goals, some of which conflict

– Not everyone agrees about the goals– There is lots of scientific uncertainty
What matters for a healthy seafood industry?

• Resources, prices, costs and allocation all matter for a healthy 

industry.

• Some of what matters is beyond our control• But how we manage our fisheries affects all of these factors

Nature Markets Fishery Management

Resources Prices Costs

What we 

can’t control

What we 

can control

Allocation of Catches and Benefits 

What we 

can’t control

Nature Markets Fishery Management

Resources Prices Costs

What we 

can’t control

What we 

can control

Allocation of Catches and Benefits 

What we 

can’t control
The State has management authority for Alaska fisheries occurring primarily 

and 3 miles from shore. The federal government has management authority for Alaska fisheries occ

primarily between 3 and 200 miles from shore.

Most Federal governmentgroundfish

Federal government (crab management is partiallto the state)

Most shellfish

Federal government (quotas set by International PHalibut Commission)

HalibutHerring StateSalmon StateSpecies group Management Authority
Important management decisions for federally managed fisher

waters are made by the North Pacific Fishery Managemen

• The members of the Council are appointed mostly from the fishin

by the Governors of Alaska, Washington, Oregon

• The Council meets six or more time each year, most frequently in

Anchorage. Hundreds of people attend these meetings to testify attempt to influence policy

• The Council carried extensive analyses of management issues, b

biological and economic

• This “Council System” was set up to provide for fisheries manage

which is sensitive to the concerns of the fishing industry

• But some people criticize the Council because of the potential fo

of interest as industry members decide about management issueaffect their own businesses—and also because they think having members decide how much fish to catch is like having the fox guchickens.

• Other areas around the country also have “fishery management c

for example, there is a “New England Fishery Management Coun“Gulf Fishery Management Council.” Most people think that the NPacific Fishery Management Council has been the most successCouncils in establishing good policies to manage fishery resource
Important decisions for fisheries managed by the State of 

are made by the Board of Fisheries.

• The Board of Fisheries is a citizen board appointed by t

Governor of Alaska (subject to confirmation by Legislatu

• The Board manages not only commercial but also sport • The Board meets several times per year to hold hearing

vote on policies. Hundreds of people attend the meetintestify to try to influence the Board’s decisions.

• Unlike the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, t

has no research staff and no budget to analyze issues.

• Many of the decisions made by the Board are about ver

controversial issues, such as how to allocate fish betwecommercial and sport fishermen
An Alaska Board of Fisheries Meeting
Throughout the long history of the Alaska fishing industry, fishery mhas been very controversial. One main reason is that how a fishery managed determines—either directly or indirectly--who catches how and who makes how much money.Often people argue that a particular regulation is needed for “consepurposes (to protect the fish resource from over-fishing) when their to affect “allocation” (who gets to fish and how much fish they can cAlaska has many restrictions on the kinds of fishing gear that fisheruse. Many of these deliberately limit the efficiency of fishing—they cost of catching fish. The basic goal for these restrictions is to creafishing opportunities for Alaskans. The less efficient the gear—the fisherman can catch—the more fishermen there can be. Many people (including myself) have pointed out that limiting efficieas long as the fishery is profitable—because it spreads the wealth apeople. But it is hard to justify when the fishery is no longer profitabnow the case in much of the Alaska salmon fishery.
One example of a restriction which deliberately reduces efficiency 

ban on the use of salmon traps.

A salmon trap can catch a lot of fish using very few workers. Bas

net is stretched across an area where the fish migrate, leading th

small opening, which they swim into and then can’t get out of. 

statehood, a large share of Alaska salmon were caught in t

An old picture of an 

floating salmon 

I took this picture of a painting of a Russian salmon trap 

from a mural of Russian fishing gear types at the 

Fisheries Technical University in Vladivostok. 
Salmon traps have a lot of advantages as a fishing ge

• They are efficient: fish swim to the trap

• They are good for quality: fish can be kept alive until read

processing

• They can be good for the resource:

– They allow fishermen to catch exactly the number of fi

managers want to allow them to catch (and then let th

– They allow fishermen to release live species that they 

fishermen to catch (for example, king salmon that migvaluable for sport fishing)
However, the traps used in the Alaska salmon fishery before 

were extremely unpopular. 

• Most of the traps were owned by “Outside” (non-Alaskan) 

processors

• Alaska fishermen resented the traps because the traps ca

of the fish—leaving less fish for Alaskan fishermen to catc

• Resentment of traps was an important factor in the politica

Alaska statehood during the 1950s. Many Alaskans suppstatehood because it would allow the state to manage the fisheries, which would allow them to get rid of the fish trap

• Traps were banned when Alaska became a state in 1959• The ban on salmon traps continues to this day.• Some people (including myself) are questioning whether i

sense to ban the use of one of the most cost-effective waycatching salmon.
Another example of a restriction which deliberately limits ef

the limits on the size of boats which may be used in variou

salmon fisheries. 

• For example, in the Bristol Bay salmon drift gillnet fishery, 

not allowed to be longer than 32 feet.

• People are smart. When you restrict how they do someth

often figure out another way to do the same thing. In Brisbecause the boat length has been restricted, over time pebuilt boats that were wider and taller.

• Fishermen have an incentive to invest in bigger boats so t

can catch a larger share of the resource. But if everyone boat that is twice as expensive, they end up all doubling thwithout any change in their total value (because more boamean any more total fish available to be caught). This mafishery less efficient and less profitable. 
This is a 32’ Bristol Bay fishing boat typical of those built in t

Photograph by Norm Van Vactor
And here, with it, is a Bristol Bay fishing boat that was built i

Photograph by Norm Van Vactor
In the 1970s, the State of Alaska introduced a new system of fishermanagement for the Alaska salmon fishery called “limited entry.” P

anyone who wanted to fish was allowed to. As a result, more and mwere fishing for salmon, resulting in less and less fish for the averagfisherman to catch. The “Limited Entry” system put a cap on the maximum number of pallowed to fish. There were a fixed number of permits in each area. people with a limited entry permit were allowed to fish.The permits were originally given out for free to people with a historparticipation in the salmon fishery. After that, the only way to get a to buy one (or inherit one or be given one). In the late 1980s, when prices were very high, permits became very valuable—sometimes sseveral hundred thousand dollars. In the 1990s, as salmon prices ddid permit prices. Limited entry was very controversial at first, because many people twasn’t right that only some people should have the exclusive right tsalmon in Alaska—since the fish are a public resource. 
Total Earnings and Average Permit Price:

Bristol Bay Salmon Drift Net Fishery

$0

$20$40$60$80

$100$120$140$160$180$200

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

Total gross earnings ($ millions)

Total Gross Earnings ($ millions) Average Permit Price ($000)

This graph shows the dramatic decline in the value of the Bristol Bay salmon harvest 

the 1990s, and the corresponding decline in Bristol Bay limited entry permit price
A problem that persisted 

in Alaska salmon fisheries 

despite limited entry was 

that there were still too 

many boats in some 

fisheries—as illustrated in 

this picture from the 

Bristol Bay salmon 

fishery. When prices 

were high everyone could 

still make money, but now 

most people think that 

having so many boats 

competing with each 

other is an inefficiency we 

can no longer afford. 

Photograph by Bart Eaton
“Restructuring” and “Rationalization”

• “Restructuring” is significantly changing the management 

to reduce costs, increase value of achieve other objective

• The introduction of limited entry in the Alaska salmon fish

represented a major “restructuring” of the salmon fisheries

• In recent years, there has been a lot of debate about restr

other Alaska fisheries—and more restructuring of salmon 

• Very significant changes have occurred in the manageme

Alaska’s halibut and sablefish fisheries, Bering Sea pollocand crab fisheries.

• Some people think that the new management systems wh

been introduced in those fisheries are more “rational” than systems they replaced.

• For this reason, “restructuring” is also referred to using the 

“rationalization” (but not everyone likes this term!)
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs)

One of the most important examples of “restructuring” or “rat

of an Alaska fishery occurred in 1995 in the halibut fis

Prior to 1995, the halibut fishery was “open access”—any

wanted to fish was allowed to. As more and more boats be

for halibut, the managers had to make the seasons shorter a

By the mid-1980s, the halibut fishing season was reduced 

24-hour fishing periods per year.

In 1995, the management was changed to an “Individual Fis

or “IFQ” system. Under the IFQ system, individual fisherm

allocated specific shares (percentages) of the total quota or 

based on how much fish they had caught in the past. They 

only as many fish as their individual quota allowed

Fishermen received their original IFQ shares for free. If fi

wanted to catch more fish, they could buy more quota fro

fishermen. Or if they wanted to get out of the business, they 

their quota—which quickly became quite valuable
Arguments For IFQs

Under the IFQ system, instead of looking for ways to catch fish fast

look for ways to catch fish more efficiently. 

When the IFQ system was introduced for halibut, the number of boa

halibut was greatly reduced because fishermen could save a lot o

fishing for a lot of quota from a single boat rather than fishing for sm

of quota from a lot of boats. This saved a lot of money which wou

have been spent on fuel and fishing gear.

The fishing season was extended from two days to nine months. S

fishing season out greatly increased the value of the fishery beca

the fish could be sold fresh—which was impossible formerly when 

were caught at the same time.

The IFQ system also made the halibut fishery safer. Fishermen co

when the weather was good, rather than having to fish during the s

season even if the weather was bad.
Arguments Against IFQs

Even though IFQs make fisheries more efficient, many fisherme

dislike them, for a number of reasons.

Many fishermen don’t like the way the quotas were allocated, bas

much fish people had caught in the past, before the IFQ system. 

worth a lot of money, and some of the people who received quot

made a lot of money by selling their quotas.

Other people don’t like the fact that with IFQs, fishing is no longe

anyone who wants to fish. Before you can fish, you have to buy 

someone, which is very expensive. This makes it hard for young p

into the halibut fishing business.

Other people don’t like the fact that IFQs reduce the number of fi

because there are many fewer boats (fishing for a longer period 
Another major change in Alaska fisheries management which in the 1990s was the Community Development Quota, or “CD

program.Under the CDQ program, a portion of the Bering Sea fishing (currently 10%) is allocated to six groups of villages in westewithin 50 miles of bhe Bering Sea Coast (known as “CDQ groAt first these CDQ groups did not own any of the large fishing needed to catch Bering Sea fish such as pollock. So they fopartnerships with large fishing corporations under which the paid the CDQ groups for the right to catch their fish.Under the CDQ program, the CDQ groups have earned tens of dollars, which they have used (as required by law) for ecoinvestments in western Alaska. Several of the CDQ groups hinvested in their partners’ corporations. In this way they have important players in the Bering Sea fishing industry. 
These are the six CDQ groups:

• Aleutian Pribilof Island Community Development Associat

communities)

• Bristol Bay Economic Development Corporation (17 comm• Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Association (1 communit• Coastal Villages Region Fund (20 communities) • Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation (15 

communities)

• Yukon Delta Fisheries Development Association (6 comm
This map shows 

the six CDQ 

groups and the 

villages they 

represent.
Effects of the Alaska CDQ Program (as described in a 2002 report by the economic co

Northern Economics): “Over the duration of the CDQ program, annual pollock CDQ royalties have consistentl$13 million. In 2000, the CDQ groups received nearly $33 million in pollock CDQ royalt

royalties from the multi-species program provided the groups an additional $7.4 million

The revenue stream from the lease of CDQ allocations has permitted the CDQ groups 

substantial fisheries related investments. The value of CDQ group assets in aggregate 

from nearly $15 million in 1992 to over $152 million in 2000.

All six CDQ groups have acquired ownership interests in the offshore pollock-processin

addition, some CDQ groups have invested in inshore processing plants, motherships, a

processors that operate in the crab, halibut, and groundfish fisheries.These investments have significantly increased the participation of Alaska residents in 

dominated by Seattle-based companies. A number of CDQ groups have also promoted local, small-scale fishing operations targeting salmon, herring, halibut, or other species

CDQ groups have channeled significant resources toward local fisheries-related infrast

development.”
Crab Rationalization

The most recent restructuring of a major Alaska fishery bega

the Bering Sea crab fisheries. Under the new system, cra

owners received IFQs for crab, similar to those in the halib

A very controversial new feature of the crab management s

that fish processors also received “Individual Processor Quo

Fishermen are required to sell most of their catch to proces

own IPQs. Most fishermen strongly dislike this feature 

rationalization.

In the very first year of crab rationalization, the number of bo

for crab fell by almost 2/3—from about 250 boats to less t

resulting in a loss of about 900 crab fishing jobs. Many 

fishermen are vehemently opposed to the changes which oc

crab rationalization.
Businesses which sell supplies and services to fishing bo

also affected by rationalization.

Business which store a

crab pots are directly af

the decline in the numb

pots fished which occu

rationalization

The number of pots reg

the 2005 Bristol Bay R

Crab fishery fell by