## NOS. 12-07-00045-CR 12-07-00046-CR 12-07-00047-CR
IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

BILLY JA CK WR

IG HT , § APP EAL S FRO

M T HE APPELLANT
V . § CO UN TY CO UR T AT

LAW
TH E ST ATE OF TEX AS, APP ELL EE § AN DE RSO N C OU NTY, TE XAS

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION B ill y Jac k Wr ig ht a

pp e a ls h is c on vic tio ns fo r t hr e e c ounts of

ha ra ssm e nt. I n tw o is su e s, Appellant ar g ues that the e vidence is insufficient to support the ver dicts. We rever se and r ender

.

B ACKG ROUND Appellant had been friends with A nita and J err ell Marsh. That fr iendly relationship ended sometime in the 1990s. The ex act starting point and the contours of the enmity betwee n the par

ties

are not perfe ctly

clea r, but a rif

t betwee n the families beg an ar ound the time that Appellan t won elec tion to the school boar d, defe ating J err ell. The e lection was he ld in 1995, although Jerre ll dates the schism to 1993 when Appe llant had a f alling out with a mutual f riend. Th e par

ties never

rec onciled. Ar ound the end of 2001, someone stabbe d two of Appe llant’s horses, killing one . When

a s k e d w h o m i g h t h av e d o n e i t , A p p e l l an t t o l d t h e p o l i c e a b o u t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t he Ma rs he s, causingthe police to interview them. Appar ently their son Todd was identified as a suspect, but heW e r ef er t o t he eac h of

t he t hr ee cha r ges ag ai ns t Ap pel l ant as coun t s f or e as e of

r ef er enc e. H e wa s 1 charged by i nf

o rma t i o n i n t hree s ep arat e cause numb ers wi t h t he m i sdem eano r of f ense of haras sment. E ach chargi ng info rm a tio n a lleg e d a sing le vic tim . A ll thr e e c h a rg e s w e re tried in a sing le trial. 2 had an a libi and was not cha rg ed. I nea rl y 2 0 0 2 , t h e M ar s h es b ega nt o re ce i v e l et t er s an d n o t es t h at t h ey t o o k t o b e t h re at en i n g. The notes we re va g ue, wr itten i n b roken English, and spe akingg ener ally about the wr iter’s assessment as to whether the Marshe s, including their son Todd, would g o to heave n when they died. The letter s also contained sugge s t i ons, including that they should tit he, conf

ess, and a sk for forg iveness. Other

letters sug g ested that Anita had sinned, that a heinous c rime had be en committed, that J err ell should be baptiz ed , an d fi n all y , that there was a law enf orce ment operation underwa y targ eting their prope rty

and that this operation would net more “g ame thieve s” t han did a previous one. The letters included one with what appe ars to be a stick–sty le dra wing of a hor se and a

nother addre ssed to the Marshe s’ son as Todd “ Stick Horse” Ma rsh. The Mar shes re ported these letters to t h e poli ce. T he police did a n investigation, which inc lud e d anana ly sis of

the ha nd wr iti ngon

the no te s, and

de te rm ine d th a t App e lla

nt h a d s e nt t

he m. He wa s char g ed with thr ee separ ate counts of hara ssment, a ll misdemea nors. Appellant plea ded not 1 g uilty , and a jur

y found him g uilty

of all three counts. The a ppeal f ollowed.

S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE I n tw o issu e s, Ap pe lla

nt co mpl a ins that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o support the jury ’s ver dict. Stand ards of Review The due pro ce s s gu arantee of the Four teenth Amendme nt require s that a convic tion be supported by leg ally

sufficie nt evidence

. See Ja c ks on v . V irg inia , 44 3 U. S. 30 7, 31 5– 16 , 9 9 S. Ct. 27 81 , 278 6– 87 , 61 L . E d. 2d 56 0 ( 19 79 ); Ros s v

. St ate , 133 S.W .3d 618, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2 0 0 4 ); Wi llis v. State , 192 S.W .3d 585, 592 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2006, pe t. ref’ d). Evidenc e is not leg ally sufficie nt if, when viewing the evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the verdic t, no rational trier of fac t c ould have f

ound the essential e lements of the of fense beyond a re asonable doubt. See Jackson , 44 3 U. S. a t 31 9, 99 S. Ct . at 27 89 ; se e als o Rol le rso n v . St ate , 2 2 7 S. W. 3 d

7 1 8 , 7 2 4 ( T e x.3

Crim. App. 2007). Whil e leg al sufficie ncy revie w is a ll that is r equire d by the U.S. Constitution, the Te x as Court of Criminal Appea ls has deter mine d th at the Te x as Constitut ion require s further revie w of the f

actua l sufficie ncy

of the e vidence

. Cle wis v . St ate , 922 S.W .2d 1 2 6 , 1 2 9

– 3 0 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Fa ctual suff

iciency revie w diffe rs from leg al suffic iency revie w only

slightly

. See Ma rsh all

v . St ate , 210 S. W. 3 d 6 1 8 , 6 2 5 ( T e x. Cr im

. A p p
. 2 0 0 6 )

. I n a f a c tu a l s u f f ic ie n c y r e v ie w , w e r e v ie w the evidenc e without the light most favor able to the ve rdict and w e ar e author ized, “albeit to a ver y limit ed deg ree ,” to disa g ree with the jury ’s re solution of contested fa ctual issues. See id .; Watson

v . St ate , 204 S.W .3d 404, 414, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). I n a re view of the fac tual sufficie ncy of the ev i d ence, we w ill conclude that the e vidence is insufficient only if the g reat weig ht and prepo n d e r an c e o f th e e v id e n c e c o n tr a d ic ts th e ju r y ’ s v e r d ic t o r th e v e r d ic t is c le ar ly w rong and manifestly

unjust. See Rollerson , 227 S.W .3d at 724; Watson , 204 S.W .3d at 417. Under either standa

rd, our r ole is that of appe llate re view, and the fac t finder is the princ ipal j u d g e o f t h e w e i g h tan d

c r e d i b i l i t y o f

a w i t n e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. We sb ro ok v . St ate , 29 S.W .3d 103, 111–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The fa ct finder may ch o o s e to believe all, some, or none of a
w i t n e s s ’ s t e s t i m o n y. Shar p v . St ate , 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Th e su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e is m e a sure d a g a ins t th e of fe ns e a s d e fi ne d b y

a hy po the tic a lly

corr ect jury

char g e. See Wo ole

y v . St ate , No. PD-0861-072008, Te x . Crim. App. L EXI S 762, at *1 –* 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. J un e 25 , 200 8) ; Ma lik v . St ate , 953 S.W .2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 199 7 ). A h y

pothetically

corr ect jury

char g e “a ccur ately

sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnece ssarily incre ase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessar ily restric t the State’s t heorie s of l iability , and adequately descr ibes the par ticular off ense f or which the defe ndant is tried.” Ma lik , 953 S.W .2d at 240. As authorized by

the information, the State wa s require d t o prove that Appellant, with the intent to haras s , an n oy , alar m, torment, or embar

rass a nother, thre atene d in writing, in a manner
re a so na bly lik e ly to a larm the pe rs on

re c e ivi ngthe thr e a t, to inf lic t bo dil y inj ur y on the pe rs on

or to commit a fe l o n y

ag ainst the person, a

member of

his family

or household, or his prope rty . T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 42.07(a) (2) ( Ver non 2003).4

Ana lys is Appellant ar g ues that the letter s do not contain threats and that there is no evidence that he

c omm un ic a te d w ithTo dd

Mars h b y

le tte r at a ll. Th e State or g anize d its a c c us a tio ns in su c h a wa y that e a c h c ount a lle g e d th a t a sp e c if ic no te or letter thr eate ned a specific victim. The writing alleg ed to have thre atene d Todd Marsh r eads a s fo llo ws :

A n ita

f o r t hi s hei no us C ri m e y o u a nd your son wi l l ne ver receive sal vat i o n f rom Jesus and yo u w i l l suf

f er e t ern all y unti l l [si c] yo u a nd he co nfess and ask fo r f o rgive ne ss. Jesus i s watchi ng Y o u. / s / N ei g h bor
To commit a crime, the person must threaten another in writing a

nd there must be a “pe rson
rec eiving the threat.” T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 42 .0 7( a )( 2)

. Ac c or din g to t he e vid e nc e , T od d d id

no t r e c e ive thi s le tte r. To dd ne ve r te sti fi e d that he sa w thi s le tte r, and

it w a s n ot a dd

re sse d to him

. Another le tter wa s addre ssed to him. That letter wa s offe red into e v i d en ce , but the court did not admit it. Todd’s mother testified that she rec eived the other letter and that it sc are d her. She did not testify that she showed T odd the other le tter. Todd identified yet another letter, this one a postc ard, with a stick draw ing on it that looked like a horse. I t is not c lear whether Todd had see n it before trial. The State doe s not dispute that it had to prove Todd re ceive d the threat a nd argues it did so. The State’s a

rgument is not supported by the rec ord. The State say s Todd testified that he r ece ived

se ve ra l c ard s and le tte rs
. He did no t so test if y , an d the c itatio ns to t

he re c or d p ro vid e d b y

the State in its otherwise well org anized brief a re to Jerrell’s testimony . Fur thermore , we disag ree with the State that J err ell’s testimony that “[w]e rece ived seve ral [letters]” and “. . . that’s when we started

rec eiving the ca

rds and the le tters . . . .” is eviden ce t h at T o d d rec eived the le tter alleg ed to be a threat ag ainst him. There is no conte x t behind the use of the pronoun “we ” to a llow the conclusion that J err ell was re fer

ring to all three of

the Marshe s as havingseen this par ticular letter

. We ha ve revie wed the entire rec ord. Even in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t, t h ere is no evidence to allow a rational jury to c onclude be y ond a re asonable doubt that Todd was a pe rsonT o d d tes tif ie d a b o u t t w o inc id e n ts w h e re A p p e llan t p u b licly u p b ra id e d him , i n c lud ing o n e inc id e n t i n 2 whi ch A pp el l ant t hr eat ene d t o as s aul t T od d when T od d t ur ned e i gh t een y ear s of ag e. T her e wa s no ev i dence t hat T o d d to ld his p a re n ts o f t h e se inc id e n ts.

J e z e b e l wa s to b e e a te n b y d o g s. See I K i n g s 21: 22–26. 3
5 who re cei v ed a thr eat. F urthermor e, the letter may contain a va g ue thre at of “ suffe ring ” to Anita. But with re spect to Todd, it say s only that he “w ill never re ceive salvation from Jesus.” This is not

a thr e a t by its e lf

, an d the re is no co nte xtua l evi de nc e that allo ws the inf e re nc e that th is i s a

thr e a t to inf lic t bo dil y

inj ur y or c omm it a

fe lony
. Th eref

or e , w e c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt o n th is c ount. The other two counts alleg ed that Appellant made written threats to Anita and J err ell. The

a lle g e d thre a t to An ita

wa s a po stc ard that r e a ds , “ Th e lig ht f

ro m th e Al te r [sic ] say s g ive in

a bund anc e and

re c e ive te n f

old . T ith e and

su ff e r n o mo re . / s/ Th e S is ter s. ” Th e a lle g e d thre a t to J err ell is a postcar d that rea ds “Ge rald, You’ re g oing T o Hell WI TH JEZAB EL E [si c] /s/ P RAYI NG FOR you.” On the ir fa c e , n e ith e r of the se po stc ard s a pp e ars to c on ve y

a thr e a t. T he State argue s th a t, in the context of the relationship betwe en t h e p ar t i es, t hese postca rds ar e a thr eat to extort money from Anita a

nd a thre at to kill or cause bodily injury to J err ell. The c ontext ual evidenc e put forw ard by the State is that Appell an t t h re atene d to assault J err ell in 1993, tried to run Anita off the roa d, drove by their house ve ry

slowly on a number of occasions, made an obscene g esture to J err ell ever y time he saw him, made clicking noises in A nita’s prese nce whene ver he saw her in public, a nd sent them the other le tters, which include simil ar state ments about tithing and r edemption. 2 Whether a pa

rticular s t at em en t may

proper ly be conside red a

threat is gove rned by

an objective standa

rd. Ma ne mann v

. St ate , 878 S.W .2d 334, 337 (Tex. App.–Austin 1994, pet. ref ’d). That standar d is whether a reasonable person would fore see that the statement would be inter prete d by those to whom the maker communicates the statement a s a ser ious ex pression of intent to har m
or assa ult. Id

. Th e State argue s th a t th e le tte r t o Jer re ll w a s a c tua lly

a thr e a t “ to b ri ng a

bo ut [Je rr e ll’ s] pr e matur e de a th, ” and

tha t th e re fe re nc e to t

he bib lic a l figur e Jeze be l w ou ld s umm on “ ho rr e nd ou s” mental imag ery

of the judg ment imposed upon J ezebel. But ther e is nothing in the context of the 36

relationship between the pa rties to sug g est that the statement that Jerre ll was going to hell was a ny kind of a thre at to injure Jerrell. To be sur e, a thr eat of phy sical harm need not be directly expressed, and it may

be conta ined in v ei led statements nonethe less imply ing injury to the rec ipient when viewed in all the circ umstances. Ma ne mann , 878 S.W .2d at 337. The jury was c erta inly

entitled to infer that Ap p el l an t wi s h ed il l on J err ell, or that he did not have high hope s for his eter nal
sa lvatio n. B ut t

he re is n oth ingin t

he e vid e nc e that sug g e sts the state me nt t hat Jer re ll w a s g oin g to hell was c ode for

violence that Appellant was threatening to visit upon J err ell. Appellant had, mor e than a de cade prior, threat en ed t o as s ault J err ell. And he made that threat directly , unlike the po stc ard he re inf or min g Jer re ll that he wa s g oin g to h e ll. We are mindful that the jury has a principal role in dra wing infere nces f

rom fac ts. Id . at 338. Ho we ve r, e ve n in

the c on te xt of

Ap pel lant’ s o the r a

nti so c ia l be havio r d ir e c te d at Jer re ll a nd his family , there is nothing in this post ca rd that would ca

use a r easona

ble per son in J err ell’s situation to conclude that Appellant was thre ateninghim with bodily injury

. To be c riminal, a threat must be

ma de in a mann e r r e a so na

bly lik e ly to a larm

the pe rs on

re c e ivi ngthe thr e a t, b ut i t mu st a lso c on ta in a thre at to inflict bodily

injury on the re cipient. T EX
. P EN A L C ODE ANN
. § 42.07(a) (2). Appe llant’s statements would ce rtainly alar m any rec ipient. But a state ment that J err ell was g oing to he ll, in the context of this case, is not a threat to inflict bodily injury . There fore , we c onclude that the e vidence is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt o n th is c ount. The post ca

rd sent to Anita suff

ers f rom the same defe ct. The thrust of the post c ard is the statement “tithe a

nd suffe r no more.” The State a rgues that i t wa s es s en tially a re quest for compensation for the loss of the horse, and threat of continuing suffe ring if compensation was not paid. Even acc ep t i n g t h at construction, the post card is not a thre at of bodily injury . There is no evidenc e that Appe llant h ad i nflicted a ny suffe ring that included, or a lluded to, bodily injury or a felony following the killing of the horse. There fore , whateve r suffe ring that would be alleviated by

a c c e p t an c e o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o r

p aym e n to f

a t i th e w a s n o tb o d i l y i n

j u r y. As the c ourt

of c ri min a l a

pp e a ls r e c og nize d r e c e ntl y in a n a ssa ult by thr e a t c a se , th e c ours e of c on du c t be tw e e n th e thr e a te ne r a nd the vic timis i mpo rt ant t o und e rs tandin g wh e the r t he re is sufficie nt eviden ce o f a t hreat. See Ol iv as v . St ate , 203 S.W .3d 341, 349–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In that case , the defendant shot at t he victim ’s car whil e she was drivingdown the roa d. The vic timkn e w the de fe nd ant h a d d on e so me thi ng —s he tho ug ht h e thr e w r oc ks a t her c ar— but she did not rea liz e that he had s hot at her until she stopped. Id. at 343. The c ourt conc luded that, base d onT he Stat e al so argues t hat t he l et t er i s ext o rt i o n and t heref o re a t hreat t o co m m i t a f el o ny be cause t he 4 fed e ra l m a ils we re us e d

. See 18 U

. S. C. § 1341. T wo pr obl ems a r e pr es en t ed. Fi r s t , t h e mai l f r au d s t at u t e h as n ot b e e n inte rp re te d to c rim ina lize thr e a ts o f vio le n c e , w h ic h is ho w the S ta te c h a ra c te riz e s the lete r. See Uni t ed St at es v. P en d ergra

ft , 29 7 F.3d 11 9 8 , 12 0 9 (11 t h C i r. Fla. 20 0 2 ) ( ci t i ng F asul o v. Uni t ed St at es , 272 U

. S. 620, 628, 47 S. C t. 2 0 0 , 2 0 2 , 7 1 L . E d . 4 4 3 (1 9 2 6 )) ; see a lso H am m er s chm i dt v. Uni t ed St at es , 265 U

. S. 182, 188, 44 S. Ct

. 511, 5 1 2 , 6 8 L . E d . 9 6 8 (1 9 2 4 ) (“ [T h e w o rd s ‘to d e fra u d ’] d o no t ex te n d to the ft b y vio le n c e .” ). S e c o n d , ev e n if e x to rtio n is a T e x a s c rim e a n d the fed e ra l m a il fra u d sta tute a p p lies to this c o n d u c t, the lette r is n o t a th re a t t o com mi t t he f

el ony of f eder al mai l f

r aud. T he har as s ment s t at ut e c r i mi nal i zes t hr eat s t o com mi t f el oni es
. T hi s l et t er e ithe r is m a il fra u d o r it i s n o t, b u t i t i s n o t a th re a t t o c o m m it the felo n y o f m a il fra u d

. 7 the previous interac tions be tween the parties, which included violent thr eats, the vict i m was threatened at the time of the shooting e ven thoug h s h e d i d not perc eive that the de fenda nt was shooting at her. Id. at 349–51. This case is differ ent because the course of Appellant’s conduct following the kill ing of the horse did not include thre ats of violence . The jury was e ntitled to credit Anita’s testimony that Appellant attempted to e ng ag e her in a traf fic a ccide nt. Howeve r, there is no evidence to show that this incident occurr ed af

ter the killing of the horse or to link the word “suf fer ing” to an attempted traff ic ac cident. We a

re mindful that the jury

is entitled to draw re asonable infere nces, a nd that an objective standard g overns, but the c onstruction advanc ed by the State would cr iminaliz e almost any utterance. T he “suf

fer ing” Appellant inflicted on A nita following the killing of the horse did not include the threat of bodily injury , bodily injury , or a f elony . There fore , the statement that Anita’ s suffe ring would continue abse nt her pa ying a tithe is sim ply

not a threat to inf

l i ct b o dily

injury or
c omm it a fe lony in t he c on te xt of

thi s c ase. Th e re fo re , w e c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly

4 ins uf fi c ie nt o n th is c ount.

D I S P OS I T I ON Havingfound the e vidence leg ally insufficient in all three case s , we re v e rse and re nde r a judgme nt of ac qui

tta l in ca us e numbe rs 12 -0 7- 00 04 5- CR, 12 -0 7- 00 04 6- CR, and 12 -0 7- 00 04 7- CR. 

### BRIAN HO Y LE J ustice
Opinion delivere d November 26, 2008. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.
(DO N OT PUBL I SH)