COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

MICHAEL R. McELROY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0481-96-4 PER CURIAM 

 OCTOBER 1, 1996 

SANDRA W. COOKE, F/K/A 

 SANDRA McELROY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Marcus D. Williams, Judge 

 (Harvey H. Perritt, Jr., on brief), for 

appellant. 

 No brief for appellee. 

 Michael R. McElroy appeals the decision of the circuit court 

awarding an increase in child support payable to Sandra W. Cooke. 

 McElroy raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the 

trial court erred when it failed to impute income to Cooke 

following a voluntary reduction in her work hours; (2) whether 

the trial court erred when it failed to impute income to Cooke 

for rental income; (3) whether the trial court erred when it 

failed to consider the tax consequences to Cooke of a negative 

cash flow attributable to the rental property; and (4) whether 

the trial court erred in finding Cooke no longer owned the rental 

property. Upon reviewing the record and McElroy's opening brief, 

we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 Cooke sought an increase in child support following a 

reduction in insurance coverage for the costs of psychological 

counseling for the parties' two children. The trial court found 

that a material change in circumstances had occurred which 

warranted an increase in support. 

Voluntary Reduction of Hours

 McElroy contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

impute income to Cooke following her reduction in work hours. 

Under Code § 20-108.1(B), there is a rebuttable presumption that 

the amount of child support computed under Code § 20-108.2 

guidelines is correct. However, after computing the presumptive 

amount, a court may determine that "application of such 

guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular 

case." Code § 20-108.1(B). Such a deviation 

 shall be determined by relevant evidence 

pertaining to the following factors affecting 

the obligation, the ability of each party to 

provide child support, and the best interests 

of the child: 

* * * * * * * 

 3. Imputed income to a party who is 

voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily 

under-employed . . . . 

Id. "In setting an award of child support, the 'primary issue 

before a trial judge is the welfare and best interest of the 

child, not the convenience or personal preference of a parent.'" 

Brody v. Brody, 16 Va. App. 647, 651, 432 S.E.2d 20, 22 (1993) 

(citation omitted). "The guidelines include voluntary 
 3 

underemployment as only one of several factors to be considered 

in adjusting the presumptive child support amount." Barnhill v. 

Brooks, 15 Va. App. 696, 701, 427 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1993). 

 Cooke reduced her work hours "basically based on my children 

and on the advise of [their therapist]." Both sons have serious 

emotional and learning disabilities which require therapy at 

least every week. The therapist testified that "99% of the 

effort involved with the children [was] carried out by Mrs. 

Cooke." Cooke testified that she also cared for her elderly 

parents who had suffered strokes, but McElroy failed to point to 

any evidence that this care was the reason Cooke reduced her work 

hours. 

 The trial court found a change in circumstances due to the 

limited number of therapy sessions covered by Cooke's insurance. 

 The testimony relating to Cooke's reduction in hours indicated 

that it was based upon her children's needs. Those needs were 

established by credible evidence, including the testimony of the 

children's therapist. Based upon the record before us, we cannot 

say that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to 

impute income to Cooke based upon her reduced work hours. 

Rental Property

 McElroy argues that the trial court erred when it refused to 

impute income to Cooke arising from rental property formerly 

owned by her and her new husband. We disagree. 

 Cooke testified that she and her new husband no longer 
 4 

owned the rental property and that its rental income had never 

exceeded its expenses. While McElroy contends that Cooke did not 

prove they no longer owned the property, Cooke's testimony 

concerning the negative income was uncontested. 

 The trial court found that "the sale itself appears to be 

one that is not adequately explained by [Cooke or McElroy], but I 

don't doubt the credibility that she's not receiving income from 

that property." The trial court heard the testimony of the 

parties and determined their credibility. "The weight which 

should be given to evidence and whether the testimony of a 

witness is credible are questions which the fact finder must 

decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 

S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). We will not reverse the trial court's 

credibility determination. Therefore, as the trial court found 

credible Cooke's testimony that there was no rental income, it 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impute additional 

income to Cooke on this basis. 

 Moreover, as the court found there was insufficient evidence 

concerning Cooke's ownership of the property, the court did not 

err in refusing to determine ownership or any related tax 

consequences. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.