J-S01031-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

C.G. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

J.L.G.

Appellee No. 1677 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decision May 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): OC0619638

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2016

Appellant, C.G. (“Father”), appeals pro se from the order entered in 

the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied Father’s 

petition to modify the child custody order. We dismiss the appeal. 

The trial court outlines the history of this case as follows: 

[Father] is currently incarcerated at SCI-Somerset for 

arson. [J.L.G. (“Mother”)], the mother of [Father’s] son 

has sole physical and sole legal custody of their son, 

[D.G.]. 

By correspondence dated January 15, 2015, [Father] 

requested to be present by way of telephone conference at 

the February 4, 2015 [custody] master hearing. To 

facilitate this request, [Father] provided the name and 

number of his institutional contact.... On February 4, 2015, 

participating pro se by phone, [Father] presented his 

petition to modify custody. In essence, [Father] requested 

that his son visit him at SCI-Somerset a few times a year, 

and further, that he have video time with his son. Custody 

master Daniel Alvarez denied [Father’s] modification 
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stating the following reasons: the distance of SCISomerset to Philadelphia (approximately 31⁄2 hours); 

[Mother] not having a car; and [Father’s] failure to 

articulate why it would be in the best interest of the child 

to visit him in prison. 

On February 4, 2015, [Father] filed exceptions to the [] 

proposed custody order and a hearing was held on May 13, 

2015, before the [trial court]. [Father] did not request 

that [the court] afford him an opportunity to be present by 

way of phone or video conference. As such, [Father] was 

not present in person or via conference call to represent 

himself pro se. [Mother], however, was present, pro se. 

The trial court denied the exceptions and entered an order 

granting [M]other...sole physical and sole legal custody of 

the child, [D.G.]. 

On June 2, 2015, [Father] filed a motion to reconsider the 

order of May 13, 2015, on the grounds that he was unable 

to be present in the courtroom via conference call or video 

conference. He also argued that [Mother] has been noncompliant with the custody order. 

On June 9, 2015, [Father] filed a notice of appeal of the 

court’s May 13, 2015 order followed by a June 29, 2015 

filing of a [concise] statement of matters complained of on 

appeal [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)]. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed July 20, 2015, at 1-2).1 Father filed two motions 

for extensions of time to file his brief, which this Court granted on August 6, 

2015, and September 11, 2015, respectively. In the September 11, 2015 

order, this Court gave Father until September 18, 2015, to file his appellate 

____________________________________________

1 The certified record consists only of the trial court’s opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) with the original custody order and the May 13, 2015 

order attached; thus, we are unable to verify the factual and procedural 

history contained in the court’s opinion. Nevertheless, our disposition of 

Father’s case remains the same. 
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brief; it also informed Father that no further extensions would be granted 

and that Father’s failure to file his brief by September 18, 2015, would result 

in the immediate dismissal of his appeal. On September 30, 2015, this

Court received Father’s appellate brief, which he hand-dated as September 

1, 2015. 

Father raises the following issues for our review: 

HOW CAN THE COURT IGNORE THE CRIES OF A FATHER 

AND SON WHO WANT A RELATIONSHIP? 

HOW CAN THE COURT NOT TAKE CAUTION OF THE FACT 

THAT OUR SON MISSES ME AND WANTS TO SEE ME? 

HOW CAN THE COURT SIDE WITH A HOSTILE MOTHER 

WHO OBJECTS TO [SON] AND [FATHER] HAVING A 

RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT CAUSE OR REASON? 

HOW CAN THE COURT NOT WANT TO CHALLENGE THE 

LETTER FROM THE THERAPIST, ANDRIA DEVRIES, WHEN 

THE STATISTICS SHOW A CONTRADICTION OF HER 

CLAIM? IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MOTHER HAD FABRICATED 

THIS PERSON BECAUSE THERE IS NO DATE AND ADDRESS 

ON THE LETTER. FOR THE RECORD, [FATHER] HAD 

ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THIS PERSON AND [HAS] NOT 

BEEN ABLE TO (SEE ATTACHED)[?] 

WHY IS THE COURT PROTECTING MOTHER WHEN OUR 

SON MAY BE AT RISK OF DANGER? 

HOW CAN THE COURT ACCEPT THAT IT IS IN THE BEST 

INTEREST OF THE CHILD FOR MOTHER TO SABOTAGE THE 

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FATHER AND CHILD WHEN 

FATHER AND CHILD HAD A RELATIONSHIP SINCE BIRTH 

UP UNTIL MY INCARCERATION? 

HOW CAN JUDGE FORD BE COMFORTABLE WITH THE 

LIMITED ORDER THAT SHE GAVE THAT ISN’T PROMISING? 
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HOW CAN THE COURTS NOT ENFORCE A CONTEMPT 

ORDER AND IGNORE ALL OF MY EXHIBITS AND 

PETITIONS? 

MORE THAN ANYTHING, HOW DOES JUDGE ROGERS TAKE 

AWAY THAT MINIMUM CONTACT ORDER FROM JUDGE 

FORD? 

IF THE COURT KNOWS THAT OUR SON MISSES [FATHER] 

AND WANTS [FATHER] TO BE IN HIS LIFE THAT IT IS 

HURTING [SON] THAT [SON] AND [FATHER] ARE BEING 

ALIENATED FROM IT, DO THEY NOT KNOW THAT [SON] IS 

GOING TO KEEP HURTING IF THEY DON’T THINK OF 

[SON’S] BEST INTEREST? 

HOW CAN A COURT OF LAW SUPPORT/CONDONE ACTS OF 

TERRORISM BY JUSTIFYING A MOTHER HOLDING A CHILD 

HOSTAGE FROM THE FATHER? 

(Father’s Brief at 2). 

Preliminarily, we observe:

[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially 

conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. This Court may 

quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to conform 

to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Id. Although this Court is willing to 

liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se

status confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To 

the contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a 

legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume 

that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his 

undoing. 

Wilkins v. Marsico, 903 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 591 Pa. 704, 918 A.2d 747 (2007) (some internal citations omitted). 

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide guidelines 

regarding the required content of an appellate brief as follows: 
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Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant

(a) General Rule. The brief of the appellant, except as 

otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the 

following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in 

the following order: 

(1) Statement of jurisdiction. 

(2) Order or other determination in question. 

(3) Statement of both the scope of review and the 

standard of review. 

(4) Statement of the questions involved. 

(5) Statement of the case. 

(6) Summary of the argument. 

(7) Statement of the reasons to allow an appeal to 

challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence, if 

applicable. 

(8) Argument for appellant. 

(9) A short conclusion stating the precise relief 

sought. 

(10) The opinions and pleadings specified in 

Subdivision (b) and (c) of this rule. 

(11) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement 

of errors complained of on appeal, filed with the trial 

court pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that 

no order requiring a statement of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) was 

entered. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2111. 

Additionally, Rule 2119(a) provides: 

Rule 2119. Argument 
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(a) General rule. The argument shall be divided into as 

many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in 

type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated 

therein, followed by such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly: 

The argument portion of an appellate brief must include a 

pertinent discussion of the particular point raised along 

with discussion and citation of pertinent authorities. This 

[C]ourt will not consider the merits of an argument which 

fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority. Failure to 

cite relevant legal authority constitutes waiver of the claim 

on appeal. 

In re Estate of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203, 209 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 A.3d 603 (2013). 

Instantly, Father is pro se on appeal, and his appellate brief falls 

woefully short of the requisite standards. Specifically, Father’s brief lacks a 

statement of jurisdiction and the order in question. Additionally, Father 

failed to divide his argument section into distinct parts for each of his eleven 

issues raised on appeal. See PaR.A.P. 2119(a). Further, Father’s brief 

presents no cogent arguments for his issues raised on appeal or appropriate 

citations to supporting legal authority. See In re Estate of Whitley, 

supra. The substantial defects in Father’s brief preclude meaningful review 

and constitute sufficient grounds for this Court to suppress his brief and 

dismiss the appeal. 

Moreover, on September 11, 2015, this Court ordered Father to file his 
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appellate brief by September 18, 2015. In its order, this Court informed 

Father that his failure to file a brief by September 18, 2015, would result in 

the immediate dismissal of his appeal. Nevertheless, this Court did not 

receive Father’s brief until September 30, 2015. Although Father handdated his brief September 1, 2015, Father offered no proof that he mailed 

the brief before September 18, 2015, to invoke the prisoner mailbox rule. 

See Thomas v. Elash, 781 A.2d 170 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding appellant 

bears burden of proving that he delivered document to prison authorities for 

filing within appropriate time period). Specifically, Father failed to include a 

certificate of service with his brief or otherwise demonstrate when he handed 

his brief to prison authorities for filing. Thus, Father’s failure to file his brief 

by the September 18, 2015 deadline also requires dismissal of his appeal. 

(See Order Granting Second Extension, filed September 11, 2015, at 1). 

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. 

Appeal dismissed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/2/2016