SHARPENING 

THE 

COMBAT EDGE 

THE USE OF ANALYSIS TO REINFORCE MILITARY JUDGMENT 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

VIETNAM STUDIES 

SHARPENING THE COMBAT 

EDGE: 

THE USE OF ANALYSIS TO 

REINFORCE MILITARY JUDGMENT 

by 

L ieutenant Genel"al Julian ]. Ewell 

and 

Majm" Geneml h"a A. Hun't, ./L 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D.G., 1995 
Librnry of Congress Catalog Number: 74-1 '1649 

First Printed 1974-CMH Pub 90-20 

For M I.· hy ~hc U.S. Go\"crl1t1lCn~ Printing Offirc 

Sup<:rintcndcn~ of llocumclll$, Mail S~OI): SSQI'. Washinglon. [).c. 20402 
Foreword 

The United States Arm)' has mel an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjuncti on with the oth er services, 

the Army has fought in support of a national policy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmental processes of its own 

choosing, free of olltside ('ocrc ion. In addition lO the usual problems 

of waging armed con niet. the assignment in SomheaSl Asia has 

required superimposing the illlmensely sophistica ted tasks of a 

modern army lIpon an underdeveloped environment and adapting 

them to demands covering a wide spectrulll. These involved hel ping 

to fulfill the basic needs of an agrarian popul ation, dealing \"ilh 

the frustrations of antiguerrill a operat ions, and conducting COIlvelllional campaigns agai nst well-tra ined and determined regular 

units_ 

Although this assiglllllelll has officially ended, the U.S. Army mUSt 

prepare for other challenges that may lie ahead. Wbil e cognizant that 

history never repeats itse lf exactl y and that no army ever profited 

from trying to meet a new challenge in terms of the old one, the 

Army nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its 

experience. its shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that some years must elapse before the official histories 

will provide a detail ed and o bjective analysis of the experience in 

Southeast Asia. we have sought a foruTll \vhereby some of the more 

salient aspects of that experience can be made avai lable now. At the 

request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior officers 

who se rved in important posts in VietTlOun and who still carry a 

heavy burden of day-to-day responsibil ities has prepared a series of 

monographs. These st udies should be of grea t va lue in helping the 

Army develop fUlUre operational concepts whil e at lhe same time 

contrihuting to the historical record and provid ing the American 

publi c with an interim report on the performance of men and 

officers who have responded. as others have through Ollr history, to 

exacti ng and trying demands. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on official 

records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing repol'ls and intervieh's with key 

particip<1.llts. and from the personal experience of the authors. To 

'" 
IV FOREWORIJ 

facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibli ogTa phy 

have been omitted from th e published version; a fully documented 

accoun t wi th hibl iography is filed with the Office of the Chief of 

Mi litary Histo!')'. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writin g was 

accomplished whi le the wal" in Vietnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently rdel' to events of the past as if they werc 

Laki ng place in the present. 

Lieu tenant Cencral Julian J. Ewell . one of the coauthors of th is 

mon ogra ph , h;15 been a combat infantryman during his emire 

Army caree r. H e served as a haualion and regimental commander 

in the I01s1 Airborne Division in World War II. H e ended the 

Korean '~ ar as a regimental commander in the 2d Infan try Oi· 

vision . Aft er a tOur in Comba t Developments Command, where he 

ga ined insigh ts into the lise of opera tions research , he commanded 

the 9th Infantry Division in the delta area of Vi etnam in 1968 and 

1969. He then commanded II Field Force Vi elllam in the area 

around Saigon until April 1970. 

Major Genera l Ira A. I-hUll, Jr., \\'as assigned to th e Corps of 

Engineers upon graduation from th e United States Milita ry 

Academy ill 1945. H e has served as an engi neer battalion commander in th e 8th Infantry Division in Europe and as a Military 

Assistant in th e Office o f Organ iza tion and Management Planning, 

Office of the Secretary o f Defense. In Vi etn am. he served l\'ith 

General Ewell as Chi ef of Staff of th e 9th Infantry Division and as 

the 1st Brigade Commander. He is clinentl y assigned as Deputy 

Chief of Sta ff for Train in g and Schools. H eadquarters. U nited 

States Army Training and Doctrin e Command, Fort Monroe, 

Virginia . 

WashillglOIl, D.C. 

15 OClOber 1975 

VERN[ L. BOWERS 

l'\'lajor General. USA 

The Adjutant Genera l 
Preface 

This monogra ph focuses 0 11 th e use of anal ysis in wmbat 

opcrat iolls alld conCC11lralCS on th e utili zation of techniques in 

situations \\'lll1 \\'hich the au thors were personally famili ar. IL covers 

primarily the systematic blending of military judgment, data colleeLion , and simpl e problem solving techniques as utilized in lhe 9th 

Infantry Division and II Firld Force, Vielllam in 1968, 1969 and 

1970. The approach is ra ther tentative hecause it was not possible 

in many cases to determi ne exactly what factors made the operations 

go so we ll. Rather we have laid Oll t lhe TlIost impon:lm and interest· 

ing factors in the hopes th al the n!aders \."i ll be stimula ted and 

perhaps decide fo r thell1~e ves what the critical poin ts we re. 

Fonunately. a large amoulll of hasic da ta was aV:li l:lble to support 

th e In alillSCripl. On th e OIl1el' hand. some basic data has been lost. 

III these cases we drew on memor)' and tri ed to double check th e 

accuracy of OU I" recollections. \ \le thin k an y general statements are 

reasOllahl y accurate. 

III order to hold th e k ngth of th e manuscript down to reasollable limits. the authors foun d it necessary to assume that the reader 

was genera ll y familiar with the Vielllalllcse \\'ar ;lnd had a good 

grasp of the operations. tacti cs :md techniques of lhe combined 

arms. A knowledgea bl e professional mili ta ry rea der should fin d the 

Ill;l teria l (;lid y easy to b"·as p. A reader with Illore limited military 

hackground ma y find it rather hanl goi ng-. 

The anal ytic approach whe n tried o n th e battlefield seemed 

to help produce si7.ahle increase~ ill hoth overa ll performance and 

efficiency. \ Vhether these improvements were due more to good 

basic concepts or to good e:o:ecllt ion or hoth is difficu h to determine. 

\Ve can say that first class officers :lIHI first class soldiers are 

capa bl e of outstand ing h:lttleficld performance. Tu list the thou· 

sa nds of people who contributed to this tremendous team effort 

would he impossihle. H O\\·cvcl'. th e monograph is dedicated to all 

those Tllembers of the !lth Infalllr)' Division and of II Fie ld Force 

Vietnam who acquitted th emselves so \\'ell in Vietnam. 

To :lssiSl the reader in placi ng the events discllssed in this 

monograph in proper time perspective. a chronological list of 

milestones is included as an Appendix. 

, 
VI I'REFACE 

We wish to thank Colonel Charles Hay\"ard, who did much of 

the original work on rhe II Field Force Vietnam portion of this 

monograph, and Colonel Archibald W . McFadden, Colonel Leonard 

Spirito, Lieutenant Colonel James Lindsay, Lieutenant Colonel 

Fred Mahaffey, Dr. David Wigdor, and Mr. Alfred Beck for their 

assistance in the pre para tion and review of the manuscript. 

Washington. D.C. 

15 October 1973 

JULIAN J. EWELL 

Licmcna lll General. U.S. Arm)' 

IRA A. H UNT, JR. 

Major General. U.S. Army 
Contents 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Strnl cgic Ullcklr'O rl1lri . 

Tlte k l oll/II oflhe /)1'(18011 

II T w%ld Quesl 

I'ngt' 

3 

7 

9 

13 

II. UN IT MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ACTI ONS 15 

Refilllrlg the OrganiUllior, . . . . . 

The Four-Rifle Company Conll('l"siOll 

Th e W indfall .. . 

Paddy Sirength . ..... . 

01)CI"Olion S(I/e St ep . ... . 

Mum/gement of Unit M Issions 

The M athematics of T ronl) M ll nflgemell' 

Tiger (Kit C{II"SOll ) SeOliis ... . 

Th e PfI),OO . ....... . 

Ill. O PTIMIZI NG A RM Y AVIATION ASSETS AND 

16 

18 

18 

19 

23 

36 

37 

11 

43 

SU PPORT FACILIT IES 44 

MlI j"lclIlI11ce 44 

AI/oca/lons 5 1 

Improvelluml-l In Combal Efficiency Hel l//l i llC from 

AddiliQlwl AItifl linn Asse ll' . . . 54 

h/ll()v(l live A vwli07r Tartirs . . . . 58 

UtiliUlfiQII of Army 1111111/;011 A.lwl.\ . 60 

Tlt e Payolf . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

Optlmixing SIIPIJfIIl /-rlrililin . . . 70 

IV. GEKER AL BACKGROUN D FOR UATTLEFIELD 

ANALnm u 

TIlt' Prob lem 76 

Th e .sOll/lioli . 77 

The COlIslnll1 ~,.e~~ III't: Cm/repl . 78 

Til e Tileoreliral lJasis of lite COlls((I1I 1 Prt:sstm: COllcept 82 

hlCreasi,lg Emf/hasis on Onensivc a,/ern lions 86 

CompallY Level Opertllimls 89 

Enemy Niglll Alla ck~ . . . . . . . . . 90 

"" 
V111 CONTENTS 

Loud of the So/diu . , ' , 

Preparation 0/ Landing Zonl!! 

f1lSerlion I.~ tance 

Dlscl/ssion , , , 

SUfIltll(llY 

V, THE I NTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 

hltclligulCt! Support . . . . , . 

The Di"isioPl Intelligence f llnnion 

Use of In/emal llcsOllrces 

SOllt h Vic/rl(JmeSt! Army Sources 

Operntionnl Analysis , . , .. 

The f1l1l1ili"r I.eader ..... 

Summary 0/ Intelligf'1/Ce Opel'lltions 

90 

92 

92 

9! 

94 

96 

96 

98 

100 

102 

102 

104 

105 

VI. TACT ICAL REFI N EMENTS AND INNOVATIONS . 106 

.Jitterbllggirlg ... , , . , .. 

IJ llsl/masle' IInfi Checkerboard 0 pero /itms , 

Ambushes ..... 

Sniper ~rogram 

The I )·Seemlll War, 

Whars Besl 

Night H lHl ter 

Nigh t Scorch 

Night Raid . 

Dny or Nigh" 

Mirl es and /J ooby Traps 

The People SlII'Uer . . . 

VII. T H E ANALYTICAL APPROACH 

Performance Orientntion 

Statistical Review 

IYukly Opt:ralional llroiew fmd Analysis 

Combat OPerations 

Pacifica/iorl £Oorls 

Pit/ails 

Summary 

VIII. PACIFICATION 

Psychological OperatioTlJ 

Assistance to the Victims 0/ the IYal' , 

Assistance in Hea lth Ma ttets . 

£dllca timlIll A55islan ce ..... 

R epair and ConslYlution 0/ Facilitiej 

106 

117 

11 9 

120 

12! 

125 

129 

I!O 

132 

13. 

1!6 

147 

150 

152 

152 

153 

155 

159 

161 

163 

164 

164 

169 

172 

176 

178 
CONTEN TS 

Limiting Valllage find (.'/ullllltlt:~ /(1 Ciuilians 

Summary ..... 

IX. DIVISION WRAP·U I' 

X. CORPS LEVEL OPERATIONS 

!VOI'king on tile Enemy System. 

Inventory of Communi.11 U"it.1 

Sub·Region I .... 

/) ong Tie" Program . . . . . 

Helicopter A Iloct!l on~ .... 

f ull Re5jJo,ue 10 Antl/m allil Fire 

Til e Nighl H aw#( Kif . 

AR C: /.lGHT Prqgmlll 

In dical or~ . . . . . 

P.syc/iQlogil·,,1 '!'flffart· 

PIICi{iClllioll 

Secomllll)' UOlld I'rogrlllll 

Anlll)'5is of n ome Plow OpcratlOlIS 

The O"e Wm' Concept . . 

Corps I.evel Wrap· Up . 

XI. ON CONTROLLI NG THE W/\R 

Tile Altrilio" SIJ"fIteg), ... . 

Body Count .. ... ... . 

Thc S(ml"ch ami IJesll"o), OI'CI"fIIIOIl 

Conll"lllling Ihe iVar . . . . . . 

X II. LIMITATIONS AND PROBLEMS IN THE USE 

IX 

/'''/;.<' 

lSI 

IS3 

IS' 

191 

196 

200 

201 

20' 

206 

20S 

209 

210 

212 

214 

2 16 

217 

21S 

22 1 

22 1 

225 

225 

227 

22S 

230 

OF ANALYSIS ...... 233 

XIII. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 

APPENDIX : MILJ::STON ES 

INDEX 

237 

240 

241 
x CONTENTS 

Charts 

No. flg~ 

I. Combat Mall-Days Lost. ~bnclL\'Cr Ibttalions. 91h Infa lliry 

Division, 1968- 1969 . 25 

2. Fung:d Disease (Fool ;111(1 Boot Arca) . 29 

g. Tropical [mme.-siau Foot Syndl'Omc . 32 

'I. P),o<icl'lna- BotClCria] iufcCiioll (FOOL :Old Boot Area) . 33 

5. Combat Man-Days Lost Due to Dermatosis. 3d Battalion, 

47th Infantry, July- Decembe r 1968 . . . . . 34 

6. Comparison Actual vs. Computed (Base Period ,\Iarch-;\ugusl 

1968) Viet Cong Eliminated in Airmobile Operations Dccember 19fi8 Ihrt! May 1969 . . . . . .. 7 1 

7. Paller" o f [nclll} Lom.'S Resultill!; from S",ccps. . . 80 

8. Pane rn of Enemy Lossc\ Rcsult inK from RC("Ollnai,.sa ncc 

Mode . . .. ... . 81 

9. The Commullist Structure . 85 

10. Timeliness of ntclli ~c lI (e Reports 97 

11. Simplified J illcrhug Flol>' Ch,lI'l 115 

12. Sniper Kills. 9th Inf:ullt') Di vision, No\'ember 19li8-July 196!} 122 

13. Fire Power vcrsm T illle Conception . ' . , . , 127 

14. Time Distributiou of Booby trap Incidents, 9th Infantry Divisio n , 1- 30 April 1969 . , .. , .. .,.,. 139 

15. N umber of Chieu rl ois in !hh Divisio n T :,ctica l ,\ rca 168 

16, Grou nd l.oudSpC.!;lkcl HOllr, . . . 169 

17. U.S, 1.ahor t1~t.'d on C:i\it ,\n ion l'rojeth 171 

18. Moneta .'y Gifts , . , . . 172 

19. Orph lIla~cs Assisted . . 17'1 

20, i\fedc:, p 1~ 1tien s Trc.IICti . 176 

2 1. Education Classes .. , . 178 

22, Bridges Constructed 01 Re p;lired 179 

23. Roads Constructed 01' Rcp:,ired . . ... , 180 

24. Activ it}' evels 9th Division. August I!J6B- .lune 1969 ,. 185 

25. South Victnam<.'SC Arm} Contributions 10 II I Corps TaClica l 

Zone Combat Load . , . . . . , , . ,. .. . ., 206 

26. Exchange Ratios. III Corps Ta ct ica l ZOlIC, .lIlly 

1970 ., ,.,', .. ". 

Maps .'\'Q. 

I. 9th Di\'isio n T :tctic:tl Are: •. 1%8- I!J69 

2. III Corps T .. cticd ZOlle, 19118- 1970. 

3. The Enemy System, 1!l(iR 

1. Sub-Regioll One. 1%8 

1968"':April 

223 

I''',;e 

10 

192 

197 

202 
CONTENT S 

T ables 

X u. 

I. Padd y !:i u·c nJ.; th Rc p0rl ........ . , . 

2, Combat ~b ll )~ Losl. i\ /allClL\'cr Balta liolls , 

3. Weckl)' DCl'Ill:l tology Sick G;dl Rc port !:i ll lllm;l1')' 

'I. Daily .\ irn·;lft Avai lahi lit} , . 

5, Aircrafl Distribution . . . , . . . 

6. Comba t St;J tistics rch Aug \l t In68 

7, Utilization Sta tistics. Air Crlvalt y Troop 

8. Uliliz,Hiol1 Statistics. Assa ult I lcli co PICl Company. 

9. Util il.rl tioll Stat istics Orga ll ic Div isioll Avia tion Asscts 

10. Opcra tiona l Req uircmcnt'. Iloun / ;\ lo lllh / Aircrafi . 

II. Brigade· lb ), wit h :\ ircnft Asseh , Co mpu tation o f Vict 

eong Elimi nrl tccl . . , .. ' 

12. Actu;t\ Vict Co ng Li irnirl;ltcd ..... 

13. Comba t EfficiellCY Exchange Rat io 

1'1. Ila rtial Li t o f I:.xt cl l1;1I Intcll il-:c lll e Sil uriC' 

15. Rclirlbility of Imc lligcU( c Resou rcc, . 

16. Aircraft Drl llugcd by Hostilc Firc 

17. T otrl l Ambushcs Conductcd 

1R. Comparison of T :tctica l C~ II It . COll ta ~ l:lCi Opcrat ion, 

April 1969 ... , ..... 

19. Results of Night Search 0 1:lCra tions . . 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

Excha ngc Ratio. J une 1968 thru .J une 191i9 . 

Vi et ConI{ Eliminat c<1. Day.Night Op lli otl ~ . 

.\Icthod of Detcction of Enemy " lines a nd Iloobytra p\ . 

Locu ion of Enemy Dc"ice\ .. 

T ype Firing Dev itc . 

Origin of Ma nu fa cture of oo )' tr: lp~ 

Mille a nd Hoob)tra p C:1SlW it ), Statistics 

Opc ra tion;tI !:iu rn m;1ry. Go COllI-: Prov ince. Reg io na l Force 

ri nd Popul ;1 r Force 

2d Brigade Statistic, , . 

Contact History , ... 

Excha ngc Ratio. II Ficld Furce Vicwalll. Apri l 196!I- '\/ a rch 

1970 ... . ... . 

31. Se lected Co mbat Statistio.. III Cor ps T a ctical Zone . . 

XI 

21 

2. 

35 

46 

47 

56 

63 

65 

66 

fi7 

69 

69 

70 

98 

104 

11 7 

120 

128 

132 

13' 

1M 

138 

140 

140 

141 

143 

156 

187 

188 

195 

224 
XII 

The Leader il l Actiot! 

The Plai n of Reeds 

Typical Delta T errain 

The Combat Edge . . 

Paddy SlI'cngth 

CONTENTS 

Illustrations 

The Deha Environmcm- FimlinJ.\ ;1 (.;Ichc . 

Taking Ten 

Immersion Foot? . 

Defensive Vigi l 

Ri,'crinc Force 

Tiger Seoul . . He licopter ,\ Icc-ha ni" 

(Drawing) 

Pickup Zone 

Minigum (Painting) . . 

"Slicks" . ..... . 

Team of Air or hol'Sc~ Dong T:lI11 Before and D

ong T:lln r\ fler 

Encirclement 

Keeping the Pressure 011 

Firefighl ... . 

Load of Ihe Soldier Viet Cong nfra~trunu c 

.I ittcrbugging 

Tiger SCOUl Pcrsu;lding the Encm} 

On a "scar' Operation . . . . 

Sniper at Work (Sgt. W:ddl'Oll) 

IS·Second V,!ar . , . , 

;'-"lort;II' at Night 

j\'!inc Detection. the h;ml W;I)'! 

The Deadly Enemy Hooby Trap 

MEDEVAC Breaki ng the 

l.anguagc nan ic .. 

Chris ma~ wi ll i the l' art~ .. I)crsonal P:lcificatiOIl . . . . . Providing Aid to the Populatioll . 

Medica l Civic t\ction Program 

Bridge Builders 

Patrol (Dr:'wing) 

River Patrol 

Dong Tien 

4 

II 12 

17 

19 

22 

28 30 

36 

40 

41 

49 

50.5 1 

59 

Ii I. 62 

64 

73 

79 

87 

89 91 

101 

108 112 

lIS 

124 126 137 138 142 145 165 

170 

173 

175 

177 

182 187 189 

205 
CONTENTS 

Transporting Artillery Firing I'latforms 

The Inscrul<Illle E<Ist (I';linling) , 

Road Buildinv, 

Rome Plow Oper.ltion 

I)ursuit (Painting) 

Negative Control 

Positive Control , 

T he Authors Listen lO Colonel Geraci 

Xlll 

fl ~ 

208 

215 

218 

219 

226 

23 1 

232 

238 

Illustrations arc from DcpartlllClll of the Army files except lor the 

live pieces of artwotk b)' members of the Comh,1I An Team of the 19th 

l'\hlitary HisLOry Detachment: the phol<>graph on page 19 of an ink 

drawing by Sergeant Thomas Sherwood, the photograph on page S9 of 

a pai nting by Speci:liisl [dw:ml Rohrbach. the photo~'l' .. ph on page 

187 of a pencil drawing by Specialist Rohrbach, the photograph on 

pllge 215 of an oil pai nting by Specialist Donald Orosz, and the photo-

&'1'<lph on page 226 of another oil pai nting by Specialist Orosz, 

SHARPENING THE COMBAT 

EDGE: THE USE OF 

ANALYSIS TO REINFORCE 

MILITARY JUDGMENT 

CHAPTER I 

Introduction 

1\( its ince ptioll this lIIollograph was vis ualized <lS a brief trealmelll of "Operat ions Research Techniques :IS Applied to the 

Battlefield in Vietnam:' Inili:1I1 )" it was assumed tba t there was 

little doc umented lise of th ese techniques in Vi elIHun. However, 

initial re~carch di"c[osed th;'!( th ere was a fairly common use of th e 

simpler types of !ouch techniques and consequently more malerial 

than cO llld he managed use full y. The primary difficulty lay in 

eva lua ting ~cc()ll d hand the cxtCIH 10 which military judgment on 

the one hand and anal),ti('a l techniques un the Olher contributed to 

the final 1'(,,,1111 of various studies and opera tions. 

It \\'as therefore dedded that this monograph should be n<ll'-

rowed to focu s UII the use of analysis in combat operatio ns and to 

concentrate on IIle use of such techniques in situations with which 

the auth ors were per~()lla ll y famil iar. The mon ogra ph therefore 

covers primarily the sY~le mal ir hlending of military judgment, data 

("ollecti(lIl, and sinlple problem-solvillg lccll iliques as perfornlcd 

in the !lth Infantry Di vision and II Field Force Vietnam in the 

period 19fiR- 19iO, Considerahle success was achiel'cd in improv'ing 

combat cffectiveness fairly rapidl y hy th ese means. Howcver, this 

usc of anal ysis wa~ ne ither ~)'stc mati c nnr sophiqica ted. A more 

organized cffon miglll have had a grea ter payoff, 

rl here is a tendency in th e Army to distrust operations research 

du e to some rather unpl easa nt experiences \\·ith its lise (or misllse) 

during the Rohert S, il. lcNamara-Dr. Alain C. Enthove n regime, 

Ho\\'c\'e r. IInc call take little exception tn th e definitio n of operations research contained iu AR :1 20- 5, Dictionary of Unit ed States 

Arm} Tcrm~: "The analytical qudy of military problems, undertaken to prm ide re~po ~i hl c (,(Jlu mau ders and Slaff ap;encies with a 

scientiric lJa~is for derision on ;tniol1 lO improve military operations. 

,\ l~ () kll{)\\'t! as opera tio na I n:~ca l'rh, opera t ions :I na I ),sis." 

Quite ~impl}', operations analysis is an approach to problem 

solvinA' tbat t1lakc~ it pos!\ihk to lise systemati c logic and often 

mathematical techniqtte~ to arrive at a decision which will o ptimize 

atl o peration or ohjel'liH', rhe kcy fal'lor in a decision problcm is 

to determine the ohjective, The task of th e decision maker then is 
4 S I-I .... Rl'ENI:-.'G fil E COM IIAT EDGE 

to choose a course 01 action wh ich o ptimizes this objective lu nction. 

E,'cry decision problem in volves one or morc in pUI S which arc 

subject to lhe comrol of the dec ision maker. An y combination of 

controllable variabl es is called a co urse of acti on . Therefore, the 

essence of decision maki ng is the selection of the appropri ate con-
I:-"-TROIlUCIION 5 

trollable inputs. As we I\'ill discllss later our most important inputs 

were infalllry units and ;1\'ialiOI1 assets. There may often be uncontrollabl e variables also. This ca n lead to real problems. 

Quite often a prohlem has cunflicting objectives. In Vietnam , 

almost all decisions had at least these three objectives: (I) to 

protect 0 111" 0 1\' 11 personnel and material r esources. (2) to damage 

the enemy, and (3) to assist in th e pacification of an area . These 

objecti\'es werc almost a!l\'ays in conflict in greater or smaller 

proportion. Therefore. one had to rely to a grea t ex tem on the 

judgment and skill of commanders.! 

Although the element of judgment is crucia l, perhaps the most 

critica l of all attributes for decision making is the intell eclUal 

toughness to make a decision in a (imely fashi on. In the Vietnamese 

environmem with its grea t amOIlUl of ris k. un certainty, and conAiel, where ;m improper decision cost human lives, decisions \\'ere 

difficult. 

We, like the other lOlIlbat units. determined O UI" objectives, 

gathered as hest \\'e ('oL lld the data required, anal yzed the data, 

considered ahern,ni,·es. and made decisions. These analyses were 

as detai led as one might expect in :I combat environmeUl. but th ey 

were not sophisticated. We harel y scratched the surface of combat 

analysis techniques. In this monograph we do 1101 elaborate 0 11 the 

lI ormal miliIrH)' (lecisioll "wkhlg metho(ls which are well Iw(lerstootl (llId were IItilizeri "I:/"Iuiveiy. \Ve stress th e extension of th ese 

more nOl"mal decision makin g devices by analytical methods. It is 

0\11' contenti on that when these ,mal ytic.-.l methods were properly 

used in Victn:1tl1 the)' were very helpful. 

Dr. Entho\'en has d ill his lat est book, H ow Mil ch Is 

£tlolIgM. th at "perations research was used I'ery liule in Vietnam. 

I-Ie is prohahly correct if he \\":,\ referring to systems a ll:llysis and 

COSt e ffectiveness h'hich al"e normally used to analyze high-level 

problems. The Vic ltl amese I\'al" was so compl ex. so va ri ed . and so 

changeahle th at th ese high-Ie\'el approaches tended to he very 

diflicult to Lise with :1tI }' confidence. H oweveJ". simple. strai ghtforward operat ions analysis, while not easy to lise. posed less of a 

prohl em :Ind was used extensil'e l),. The Army Com hat Opcrations 

Vietnam study was a good exampl e. By comhining military judgment . dat:1 coll ection. and use of ope rations resea rch met hods, it 

was able to rationalize a standard infantry battalion orga nization 

I\'hi ch saw good servi ce during the latter Slages of th e Vi etnamese 

I This I)(IUlI has been ~mllha~i/<. ... t 11\ mIlS! anah<t"S of oJK'r.ltions. rdClcnc(' Ih.-

Artn ) Combat 0JK'ralions Vietna m amI crhani/~d alKl Armornt Comhat 0Jl<'Ta!IOIU 

Vicmam st1ldi~ citcd sul»cquently. 
6 SHARI' Ei\' I:"Ir. ril E COi\lllAT EDt, E 

war (see tb e Four-Rifle Company Conversion, page 18) . The 

Mechanized a nd Armored Com hat Opera tions Vietnam study con· 

ducted in late 1966. slLId ied annored <lnel mechanized organiza tion, 

equipmcm, lactics and lcdllliqllCS and served as a ve hicl e to update 

knowledge in these areas. Both of these lIsed operations research (or 

operations analysis) tech n iques to a ccrtain ex tent. Major General 

George L. I\labry. Jr. . th e Army Combat Operations Vietnam study 

chief. sla led : 

I found Ihal: 

;1. Ann]),lir:!] mc(hod~ u~cd dw it l).!, the \ RCO V ,wei), were vcry 

useful up [0 a poi nt. 

b. Results o f :111 :lI1alr~i, (Quid :l.~ i~l ol1e ill IC:1chi llj:; co ncl\l ~iol h 

:1 1lc! dcvCiOI)ing alternative cOline, of aelio ll. 

1', Res\! IS of :111 ;Hl d\'si~ ("ould lIot re pl:lce Illilitar) judgment. 

Major General Arthu r L. West. Jr.. th e Mechanized and Armored 

Comb.n Opera ti ons Vietnam sLUdy leader. concluded: 

.\J y m:tjUl puim i~ dldt l1IiliLII ~ judgmcl1t \\':1\. :1\ all ~[:tJ!.C~ 01 ,\ I ACOV. thc col1tro ll illg LllLOr .... \IACOV W:l' ~tr lur cd from thc 

oUlsel to ("07llU;III' milit:ll·y judgmclll wi th thc Icchnilltlcs of operation ~ 

research :t nd s}stcms :lIlalysi, . . . . III ~tllllln:'r}. I ~uhlllit that military 

judgment. though being· thc (ollll"Ollillg L,nol". mmt oftcn lime~ be 

validated b) an:ti }li cal mcthod,. 111 the (";I~C of ;\ IACOV the :mal ytic;d 

thod alag- c~ lIIili/cd wcrc esscn tia l far thc uppa n of one military 

judgment :tgaillSl :I U opp ~il1g luili t:ll) judgment. 

Perhaps o ne of the earli est ll bli.~ hed accounts o f Operations 

Research in Vietnam \\"<1" th e \I"ar gaming directed by General 

Vli lJiam C. W estmoreland and conducted hy II Field Force 

Vietnam tinder comllland of Lieutenant General J onatha n D. 

Seaman. The ttld y was initi ated \\·hen ~enior personne l became 

concerned about the ade£]ua q ' of the defense o f Tan Son Nhut Air 

Base and oth er key areas in th e spring of 1966. The pmpose of the 

war ga mes was to determ ine the capahilily inherent in a maximum 

effort by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army against U.S. 

Forces in the late ~pri ng anc! su mmer of 19(;11. Actual tacti cal 

changes. made a~ a res ul t o f these wa r games. later paid o ff in an 

impressive fash ion. 

The 25th Infantry Di vision LInd er Major General Ellis W. 

·Will iamson carried 011 a great ,l 1l1 0U Ill of o perations an<ll)'sis duri ng 

the period August 19(i8 to September 1969. which almost parallels 

the period of this monograph . The 25 th Division also utilized 

romputers to a great ex tent to stud y slIch problems as countennine 

warfare. target acquisition. and o pera ti o nal planning. 

In additi on to th e analyses conducted by in·country military 

units and by Department o f tlte Army support agencies excellent 
I NTROUUC"I JO~ 7 

I'esearch was also sponsored by rhe Olhce of the Assistant Secretary 

or Defense for International Affairs a nd the Advanced Research 

Projects Agency. Some of these sLUdies. such as .. A Look at th c VC 

Cadres: Dinh Tliong Province . 1965- 1966:' I\'cre conducted by 

th e Rand Corpora tion and had a d irect and specific applic<lt ion to 

the 9th Di vision area of opera ti ons ill the delta. 

The Arm)' Concept Team in Vietnam consistently Llsed Ihe 

soldier-scien tist team a ppn><lch to solve mililary problems. 

From this small sam pl e of th e more prominent studies it can be 

seen that the use of low le\-el operations anal pi:. II'as fairly wide· 

spread th rougholll Vietnam. This monograph gives exampl es of 

o rga nized critic;1I a llal ysi.> of operations in a slllall sector of the 

Vielllalll War- the 9th Infant!') Di visioll area of operations in Ihe 

Mekong Deha and al:.o in th e !:Irgel II Field Force and III Corps 

area around S:ligOIl. As this appro,H h lIas not. stri<:lly speaking, a 

classical lISC nf operations rc,cal'ch Ill' all<1l),sis. we have described it 

as combat anal ysis. This i, a reasonably :lCcurate description of the 

actual process. 

.\lraleJ!,/f Hili kf!./OI/1/(f 

1 he r:ltC~n and p;la lld tartir:. 01 the Vietn;lIuese war will 

probably not hc well IIl1(lerSloncl fo~' )Cah. In general. the wal and 

its total enviro nment \\'cre .. u foreign tn classical western expericuce, 

mili tary and (il'il iall. that ollc'clluld not grasp il well :It the lime 

Illilch less IIllderst:md it. III additi on Illllch of th e writing concerni ng 

the war h:l\ toncentr;ltcd O Jl specific a~pec :. to the extent that 

genera l le~s()n .. have lUll been dearly deduced. The prcss. in parlieular, II'a .. greatly handiGlpped h) the dispersed and obscure 

nature of the war and . wit h ~o lll e prai ~ell onh}' exceptions, fou nd it 

dinicu ll to report ilcmratciy ,\'1,,11 \I <l~ anna)))' taki ng place, Ohjeclive works on th e Vietnam IV;lr are I'el\ and far betwee tL 

Howel'er. rccngni/ing tl1("(:' pitfalls. on e might conclude tent:!-

lively that thc Com munist strategy in Vietnam followed the traditional i\I,lOist three stage theory. \ Vhen it bcc:!m{' apparelH, after 

the Ceneva agreements, that South Vielnam would not submit 

to th e Lao Dong (North ViclIlamesc Communist) part) of it ~ (m'n 

accord, th e first or organi7:nional phase w(!.s pllt in high gear by th e 

North Vietnamese anel th c Viet COllg. In the cham following th e 

Ol'erthrow of th e ~g() Dinh Di em regime, the ~ecolld or guerrill a 

phase came 0 11 stro ng, and hy IfJ64 th e Ihird or open warfare phase 

was well undef\\·a) . The Nort h Vietn<1mese interventioll with 

regular un its in 1964 and thereafter was probahly designed to top 

the third phase off with a rapid viCtor),. 
8 SHARI'E NIN(; n",: COM UAT EnGE 

On the South Vielllamese and Allied side the strategy \\'3S very 

uncertain and experimclllal. The succession of co ups necessaril y 

led to a ra th er spasmod ic approach. After many false slarts. the 

effective organi zation of th e govcrnment and lhe peopl e began in 

1967 and 1968. The defensive operations aga inst the North 

Vietnamese Army and the Vi et Cong main force units hegan to 

take effecL wit h th e imrodllClion of U.S. units in 1965 and was 

goi ng well by 1967. T he general rn ohilization of South Vi etnam to 

Aesh out the seriously underslrength army and to form hundreds of 

ncw Regional and Popttl:n' force units did nOl Slan until the 

summer of 1968 and was not flilly effect ive until 1970. 

However. the Allied strat egy became fairly dear at this slage, 

The Communist main force units were progressively fTagmellled 

and dri ven ah'ay from th e populat ed areas ill the period 1965- 1969, 

Starting ,\'ill1 the acceler:tted pacifi ca tion campaigns of 1968 and 

[969, the control of lhe rural population \\'as largely taken away 

from the Communists. By [;ltC 1969 the Commun ist sea borne supply 

mUles had heen CUL and their in,coU1llry suppl y TOllles heavil y 

int erdicted. The Camhodian operat ion in earl y 1970 cut the 

Sihanoukloille seabome supply mute. leaving the 1-10 Chi Minh 

trail as th e onl y route faT support of in,coulllry Communist fOTces. 

The Victnamization program to turn the primary responsibility fOT 

the ir own defense over to the South Vi etnamese people \\'as 1'1'0-

essi g well in 19iO. 

\OVith this overview a~ a backdrop Jet tiS look at th e ground 

tactics of the wa r in recent yea rs. In th e hig unil period of th e 

Vi etn;un ese war (l96rJ- 1967). the North Vi etnamese evidenLly felt 

that th ey could defeat United States ;lIld South Vietn;lI11ese ullit ~ in 

face-to· fa ce combat in engagements of their own choosing. During 

th is pe riod. whil e it \\'a<; not e:li;) LO hring the enelll)' to combat. it 

was ;1 manageahle problem. During this phase the Communists 

Sllstained a continuous series of major de feats and, as a result . in mid 

or [ate 196i. went to grounci alld changed th eiT approach to a 

degree. The CommuniSlS devoted the bulk of th eir energics LO reo 

bui ld ing while aWlid in g: co nt act. and accepled combat onl y when 

cornered or ,\'hen the odds [(Joked particularly favorable . During 

this period th e tacti cs which had worked we ll for U.S. unil.s for 

several years became less effecli ve. The enemy. then , shifted gea rs. 

changing their tacti cs hy adoptin g a "h igh point " policy which reo 

suited in weeks or months of "('vasion" followed by a " high point" 

of .macks. The hest known " hi gh po in t'· was, of course. th e T el 

196K ;Ht:lcks. It gradually bccame dearer thatlhe situati on ca lled for 

a change in tacti cs b), the fTiendl y tTOOpS. 
1~ IIt ODUCTION 9 

Thus. in 1~6M the prohlem hc<.:ame one of bringin~ c\"acli ll g 

enemy units to battle during th e quiet periods, and limiling their 

damage during the high x' int ~ ~() Ihat the} could not interfere \\'ith 

the pacification prugram, which was JUSt going inLO high gea r. This 

was p:lrticlIlarl }' truc at divi ~i oll level. 

Til e M O/lt lt of th e J)mgo ll 

I>rior w the move of the !lth Division Headquarter ... to the Delta 

at DOllg Tam. the Division had a tani!'al area uf interest ahout th e 

size of New Jersey both south and C;1St of Saigon. This large area 

was very difficult to handle hec Hlse of its size and compl exity and 

th e rather light friendl y troop density. The move to the delta greatl y 

reduced our Tactical Area of Interest giving U5 prima ry responsi· 

hility for onl y four provinces: Long An in sotllhwestern III Corps 

Tacti cal Zone sOl llh of Saigon anti Dinh Tliong, Ki en Hoa and Go 

Cong in north eastern IV Corps Tactical Zone , th e Tl Ol'thcl'll delta 

region. Dinh TlI n~ is one of th e most heavil y populated or the 

Vietnamese provinces h'ith allllost 700.000 inhahitants. (Mal) I) 

1L is closely followed hy Kiell Iloa with well over iI half million. 

Both of these provinces had (IId y approximately one·third of th eir 

people under the control of th e Vietnamese goverllment in 1968. 

Long An with over 400.000 people has .long been a key provi nce 

because of its rich rice crops, its closeness to th e capital. Saigon. and 

its control of the highway rmlles to the della . The lot,,1 population 

of the four provinccs is I )llr,.ooo. ahOllt 18 percent of the country's 

population. of \\'hich almoSl 80 perrellt '>1' 1.470.000 :Ire Hirai and 

mostly farm ers. 

The land surface ~ c'-:tr('mely low and nat. averaging' ahout t\\"o 

meters above sea level. The main crop is rice, hm palm. coconut, 

and assort ed fruit rec~ arc growll around the ca nals "nel qreams. 

The slll'face drai nage is poor due to the lack of gradiellts llecess:lJ'Y 

to create a good rIln off conditioll. Six major ri\'ers cunst;lllle the 

major drainage network. A great numher of canals and streams con· 

nect th ese ri\ er~. There are four major highways: QL--4 running 

thc length o f Dinh TuonR ami l.ong .\11 Provinces is one of the 

major highways of th e delta. c lrr yi ng produ ce from the della to 

Sa igon : TL- 24 COllllects i\ ly Tho city ,,·jth Go Cong city: TL- 26 

connects with Ben Tre cit)' and Ba T rj cit y in Kien 11 001 Province: 

and L TL- 5A connects Go Cong \\'ith Saigon. although it wa~ not 

usable for much of its length at thaI lime because of ferr}' and 

hridge destruction by the Vc. 

The most common relief fe,ltures in the area arc the rice p,add y 

dikes which are O.!\ to 1.0 meters high and 0.3 to 0.6 meters wide. 
10 

( 

, ,-

\ 

) 

/ 

SUARI'''.:>'I't, II I~. CO.\IIlAT EI)(..l'-

, ~L""" or I"nos 

"" .. '~ "" 

I _________ '.~.' , ' ,",,, 

t-- P.y 

9TH DIVISION TACTICAL AREA .~, 

1968 -1969 

" , " ''' 1'''' 1 "0 "n '0 

MAl' I 

, 

" 

10 00 YO." , , .~ . , .. o .. U(". 

'\:: 

eN/Nit 

seA 

Scattered Ihroughullt the ;lIea arc TII.IIlY slllall higher areas that have 

localilcd e le\atiolh from 1 to :\ lIleters ahO\'c the (erraill. The 

hamlets and villages are gcncrall} localed 011 these higher areas. 

Cover and w ncealmcnl arc determined by the interplay of 

land forJllS and vegetation aud for the lllOSt part concea lment is 

best in the palm grove .. generall), found spotled across the country· 

side in the vic inity of canals and rivers. fost of the palm canopy 

provides fair concealment from aerial ohservation. Ground oh~cn a· 

lion i .. limited h} light undergrowth although lhe rice fields offer 

tittle mmealment. The Illain of Reeds. !llrerching from northern 

Dinh "I llong to Camhodia. offCh excellent ground concealment 

cver)whcre due to tall reeds alld grasses. By Vietnamese standards. 
INTRODUCTION II 

the country is relatively open, but the Viet Cong were 1110st skillful 

at utilizing what cover and concealment were available. 

The suitability of this area for military operatiolls varies 

seasonally. Contrary to popular be li ef, light infantry can operatc 

yea r round within the area although their capabilities are limited 

in the marshes and mangroves near the coast. During the wet season 

small boats (sampans) can be used widely. The canals and Streams 

are usable for sampan movement year around. Airmobile operations 

are facilitated during the dry season by numerous helicopter landing 

zones. During the wet season the excess surface water and mud 

hamper heliborne operations somewhat. Tactical air operations are 

hampered h)' early morning low cloudiness and fog during both 

seasons. Armored operations are nOt possible. i\.lechanized vehicles 

(a rmored personnel carriers) can be utilized with care in the dry 

season and h'ith extreme ciiffintit)' in the wet season. 

Thc climate is characterized by IWO major seasons: the southwest 

(h'et season) monsoon from mid·May through October and the 

northeast (dry season) monsoon from early November to mid· 

i\.larch. The a\'erage rainfall from May to October is abollt fi\"e 
I 

" 

TYPI CAL D ELTA TI:.II.II.,\IN 
I,'TRODUCTION 13 

inches a month, bm the number of days with precI pitation in th e 

six-month period from November through April is normally less 

than a dozen . Thunderstorlll activities are preva lent Ma y through 

October and ca n be accompanied by gu sty winds strong enough to 

hamper helicopter oper:ltioIlS. Thc tcmperature varies hut sli ghtly 

throughom the }'car, thc average monthly mean high temperature 

is about 90° Fahrcnheit and the mean low tcmperature is about 75° 

Fahrenheit. 

The major wa terways. ca nals. and streams offer excellent routes 

for sampans and thus facilitate rapid movement of communist 

troops and suppli es. The tidal range is as mu ch as six to seven feet 

and its effcct 011 military ope rat ions must be taken into consideration. 

In SIIIlHllar}. th e l1ppe l' Delta is a densel y IXlpulated, flat . almost 

swampy area with a dense w:nerw:l)' network and limited concea lment. Beca use of iLS rmal nature. closeness to Cambodia and good 

water tra nsponation it fal'ililale~ enemy com hat operations and 

resupply. On the other hand. the level. open terrain enhances 

Alli ed airmobile operations. The climate is divided into a wet and 

a dry season. 1)I I1'ing th e wet season overland movement is extremely diflit'ull , wherea~ in dry season the b" 'ollnd is ca pahle of 

supporting :1 rmored pcrsonnel carriers of the M- 11 3 type (but 

not medium tanks) . 

This thcll was the arc .. of operations of the 9th Infantry Division . unusua l perhaps in the annals of " 'arfal'e for ll.S. forces in 

sustain ed cOlllbat and unllsllal even in Vi e tnam.: This Dell .. region 

of the Mekong (The Ni ne Dragon) Ri ver is so meti1Tle~ referred 

to as "The I\lolllh of the Dragon." 

A T WO/filii QIIt'~1 

From th e beginning wc initi:lled a doubl e barrelled effon to 

enh ance th e operat ional capa hilities of the 9th Infantry Division . 

One effort \\'<lS directed to\\'ards providin g the maximum number of 

lit . motivated. well-equipped and pro perly supported infantry 

soldi ers 10 th e field on a dail y ha si~. night ami day. In oth er words. 

we wallled to optimi ze O UT· working assets. In fundamental or basic 

terms, 0111' success in resources management could be mea t1red 

by the numher of figh ting men in the paddy on a daily basis. This 

depended lipa n good personnel. logistical. and unit management 

and included such items as strength accounting. aircraft availability. 

'Such terrain "'a$ cncoulllcn:d ill Ih" Seminole Indi al1 Wa r and al limes during 

World War II in the Sollth"'e5t Pacihc. 
14 SHARP EN ING THE COI\l Ill\T EDGE 

and the lise of facilities. Aircraft availability was a most important 

factor. Concurrently. another effort \\'as directed towards making 

these figh ting infantrymen in the field as efficient as possible in the 

performance of th eir missions. The enhancement of combat capa· 

bilities depended upon the improved performance of units and 

derived from OUT intelligence , tactics. combat activities and pacification efforts. 

In ou r twofold quest to optimize Oll r assets and improve combat 

efficicilq. \\'C used opera ti ons ana lysis to reinforce our military 

judgmclll and thus "Sharpen the Combat Edge" 
CHAPTER II 

Unit Management and Personnel Actions 

In a counterinsurgency environment commanders rarely have 

all the resources required. One can always use morc men to secure 

and pacify an area, or air assets to Glrry on operations. or morc 

supplies, and on and on. Nevertheless, assets arc of necessity limited 

and therefore commanders must ohen choose between conflicting 

goals and most of the lime must settle for suboptimization in their 

courses of action. We re;liized early that it was impossible to 

optimize the thousands of facLOrs thal enler into funning an infantry division. To stay on LOp of the game, decisions had to be 

satisfactory and timely ralher than optimal. \Ve scllied for sa tisfying 

a large number of subsystems: awards and d ecorations, leaves. repair 

pans, sensor devices, POL (petroleum, oi ls, and lubricants) storage, 

vehicular transportation. guard, pOSt exchange support, artillery, 

and hundreds of others. However, tWO areas were identified that 

had sllch an impact on the combat effectiveness or the division that 

we sought to optimize rather than satisfy these areas to insure that 

the total system was maximized. These areas were: <I) the number 

of infantrymen in the field on a daily basis; and (2) the number 

of aviation assets ava ilable to suppOrt the infantrymen in the field. 

The first pan of our doubl e barrelled effort was to provide the 

largest number of healthy. motivated , \\'ell-equipped. properly supported infantry soldiers to the field commanders on a daily basis. 

In this chapter are described unit management and personnel 

actions: in the next ch;lptcr maximizing army aviation assets and 

support facilities will be discussed. These will tell the story of how 

we optimized Ollr assets. 

The 9th Division in the late spring of 1968 found itself with 

its fighting edge somewhat dulled as the consequences of an extensive area of operatiom . slatic missions. its table or organization, 

the tempo of operations, a split Division Headquarters and the 

losses sustained in T el and the Mini·T el of May 1968. The factors 

which reduced the number of infantrymen in the field were 

the result of an organiZ'!.lional situation and the severe combal of 

T el and were 1l0l controllable at the lime by the able commanders 

who had preceded us in the 9th Infantry Division. However, as 
16 SHARPEN I NG THE COM nAT EDGE 

mentioned earlier in OLIT strategic analysis, the post-Tet situation 

was different. We \oJere in a position to take advantage of restructuring of the division along the lines recommended in the Army 

Combat Operations Vietnam stud y as well as completing the final 

phase of relocati on to the delta envisi oned by Genera l Westmoreland several years earli er. This move ena bled us to reduce our 

stati c missions and to operate much more efficiently on interior 

lines with a smaller area of responSibility. In all, th ere were six 

major actions involving unit management and personnel that 

materially increased the number of infantrymen in the rice paddies 

on a daily basis: changi ng th e mix between straight-leg and 

mechanized infant!'y battalions: converti ng h'om three to fOllr company rine baltal ions: obtain ing a tenth riRe battalion; getting a 

handle on stren gth accountability: attacki ng am foot disease prob· 

lems: and unloading stati c missions. All of these efforts jelled in the 

winter and spring of 1968- 1969. grea tly increasing the combat 

power and Rexibility of the d ivision. With a greater number of 

well·equ ipped and suppon ed infantrymen in the paddy, we were 

able to forge a much longer and keener cutting edge to our combat 

sword. 

Re{illi7lg fhe Orga1l i zalio11 

The 9th Division \\'as initially organi zed wi th seven rifle (foot) 

battalions and two mechan ized infantry batta lions. This was proba· 

bly the correct mix for its ori ginal mission and area around 

Sa igon. As the division moved south into the delta and as the 

enemy was broken up and bega n to evade. the need for two mecha· 

ni zed batta lions became less pressing. In fact. it became more and 

more difficult to employ two such units usefully. The muddy tenain 

affected their mechanized vehicl es too much. This was particularly 

true after the enemy gave up try ing to ambush on the highways 

and mechani zed highway patrols were consequentl y no longer 

needed. The last time that the mechanized battalions fu ll y ea rned 

their keep was during the j\'fin i-T el attack on Saigon when both 

batta lions made forced marches into the southern Saigon suburbs 

and really hurt the enemy du e to t heir firepower and shock action. 

After that. the mechanized units were almost more of a hindrance 

than a help. These battalions were also handicapped by onl y having 

three riRe companies. whi ch reduced th eir abil ity to control large 

areas and their staying power. In fact, we fi nall y had to keep them 

parti ally unhorsed in order to force th em into learni ng to conduct 

effecti ve offensive small-unit foot opera tions. As it became obviolls 

that we needed more fOOl infantry, ,\'e were able to swa p one of our 
UN IT M /\NAGEMENT ANO I'ERSONNEL ACfION 17 

mechanized battalions for a foot battalion of another division and 

settled down with nine foot battalions and one mechanized. (\Ve 

had in the meantime gained a tenth batta lion from the Continenta l 

U.S. base.) In late IgoR and 19fi9. tell foot battalions would have 

been pre(erable in Ihe delta . blll il was too late in the Vietnamese 

operation for force structure changes, however desirable. 
18 SHARPENING THE COM nAT EDGE 

Tht! Four-Rifle CompmlY Conversion 

The 9th Infantry Division was brought to Vietnam under a 

personnel ceiling that made it necessary to hold all the rifle battalions to three·rifle companies. This triangular organization, while 

quile workable in Europe and Korea. with their essentially linear 

wars, was very awkward in Vietnam. The need to cover terrain 

and the desirabilit)' for constant pressure on the enemy were hard 

to accomplish with a triangular organization. Many of the diffi· 

culti es were rather hard to quantify but the Army Combat Opera· 

tions Vietnam eva luation conducted in 1966- 67 pinned the 

problem down and clearl y demonstrated the need for a square 

(four-rifle company) battalion . 

Having been exposed to the £u ll effect of triangular battalions 

for some months in Vietnam. we will limit ourselves to saying that 

it is a miserable orga nization for semi-guerrilla operations. (As a 

matter of interest, one diffi culty that most South Vietnamese Army 

divisions mUSt overcome is that their battalions are triangular. Only 

the "el ite" units-airborne. ran ger. Marines, and partS of the 1st 

South Vietnamese Army Divisions-are square.) Fortunately, the 

desirability (or necessity) o£ "squaring" the 9th had been recog· 

nized and the program had been set into motion for the fall of 

1968 and spring of 1969, Thus. the 9th Division during this period 

gai ned about 33 percent in rine strength and somewhat more than 

that in Aexihility and stayi ng power. 

The Witl(lfnll 

In earl y 1968 the Ca\'alry Squadron of the 9th Division (3d 

Squadron, 5th Cava lry) was moved to north ern I Corps (Quang 

T ri area) to give more armored weight to that area. While the 

cavalry was quite useful in the division's orginal area east of Saigon , 

its usefulness somh of Saigon was limited due to the rice paddy 

terrain. However, its transfer to I Corps resulted in a net loss of 

th ree compan)' size (troop) maneuver units. In the spring of 1968, 

a new infantry battalion (originally earmarked for the Americal 

Division , we believe) was arriving in·th ea ter. Due to the tremendous geographical spread of the 9th Division and possibly the loss 

of its Cavalry Squadron. th is battalion (6th Battalion, 31st Infantry) 

was assigned to the 9th Division. At the time. the increase of one 

square battalion mealll an II percent increase in rifle battalions and 

a 14 percent increase in rifle companies for the division. More 

importantly. when the division settled down in lhe delta , it allowed 
UNIT MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ACTION 19 

each brigade to have three battalions (3 X 3 = 9) with one left 

over to secure the rather exposed division base at Dong Tam. 

Brigade organization is an imeresting subject in itself. In our 

opinion, a two-battalion brigade in Vietnam was of marginal usefulness. A three-battal ion brigade handled reasonably well (from 

the brigade commander's poim of view). From occasional experience, a four-ba ttalion brigade seemed the most effective arrangemenlo 

As an important afterthought. when the 3d Squadron, 5th 

Cavalry was detached, its Air Cavalry troop remained with the 

division. Th is was fortunate, as a div ision in Vietnam without an 

air cavalry troop was blind.. In addition, the absence of the Cavalry 

Squadron. perforce, placed the air cavalTy troop under division 

control, which was a very responsive 'Irrangement. 

Ptuldy Strength 

In March of 1968. it was not readily apparent thaL the rifle 

company strength of the 9th Division was critically low. although 

it in fact was. The overall strength of the division and even the 

battalions was quite high. but on critical examination. it could be 

seen that the shortages were concentrated in the rifle companies. 

The division had seen hard fighti ng during the Tet battles as well 

as in the post- Tet. counteroffensive in Dinh Tuong Province. The 

average loss per company may have heen higher than in other 

PADDY STRENGTH 
20 SHARP EN ING T HE COM BAT EDGE 

divisions as the 9th was one of the few units in the theater with 

three-rifle company battalions. In hard fighti ng, the exposure rate 

of each company LO losses tended to be higher than in a four-rifle 

compan y battalion. Also, the number of replacements available per 

division dropped due to the overall losses throughout Vietnam so 

that losses outweighed ga ins by an appreciable amount. ru a result 

of all of these faClors, man y companies ended up with a ·' paddy 

strength" of 65 or 70. ("Paddy strength" is the term we used in the 

wet delta for the number of riflemen present for du ty on the balllcfi eld.) A compan y this size did not handle we ll in combat and 

could not stand lip well to constant pressure. 

Although the men and their commanders did their gest without 

grumbling, it was read il y apparent that the strength situation of the 

division at the combat level would have to be improved markedly 

if the combat effectiveness of the units was to be increased. 

Once we found that our offensive strike capability had been 

severely bluilled by lack of combat infantrymen in the fi eld, we had 

to establish procedures to increase the paddy strengths of the tactical 

un its. We d id not have to look far for improvem~ nt because it 

became obvioLis that the division headquarters was too fa t. First . 

we eliminated all augmented strengths and temporary duty personnel, except for the Division Headquarters and Headquarters 

Company and the Division Administration Company. T hen we 

hacked away at these two headquarters units. \Ve pruned the temporary duty personne l by more than half until they totaled about 

300 personnel. or less than two percent of the total division strength. 

Since U.S. Army Vietnam tried to keep all divisions at approximately 102 percent strength . this enabled all of OUl" divisional units 

to remain at their fu ll Table of Organization and Equipment authorizations-an imponant factor. 

In attacking the problem, we started llsing the normal personnel 

reports based on the i'o'rorning Report. Unfortunately. this system 

has a bui lt-in lime lag of several days which is aggravated during 

combat conditions and, while going into gai ns and losses in detail, 

does not show exactl y how many men are aClually in combat. We 

therefore devised a rather simple daily report suitable for radio 

reponing, ca ll ed the Paddy Strength Report, which reAected in 

rea l time, on a dail y basis, exactly how many men were in the 

paddy. Initially, this information was a rather bitter brew to take, as 

it showed that Ollr fighting units were much lower strength.wise 

than our more normal repons suggested. 

There were four major problem areas. First, unit losses due to 

rotation and baltle casualties were not being replaced in a resJXlnsi ve 
UNIT MANAGEMENT AN D PERSONNEL ACT ION 21 

fa shion. Second, there \vere d iversions o f infantry soldiers from 

line units to brigade and batt alion headquaners. Third, there were 

diversions to nm fire support bases where the necessary security and 

morale act iviti es sllch as gua rd. clu bs, and post exchange, soaked up 

enlisted men in alarming amOllnlS. Fourth, there were unexpectedly 

large numhers of enlisted men attending sick call or with permanent physica l profil es which precluded their use in fi eld combat. 

To get a handl e on these probl em areas. the Paddy Strength 

Report, requ iring all maneuver units including brigade head· 

q uarters to report their comba t strengths on a daily basis, was 

revised. A very simple format \\'as evolved IItilizing morning report 

data 1O the maximum ex tent possible and a se t o( guidelines was 

established. The following tabl e and discllssion sllccinctly summari zes the paddy strength reportin g procedures and goa ls: 

~."hi"K hen" (;"i"' elln~ Rine RepOrtttl .\[o"(1o'$hil> • \I>ximllm Con>r>anl ( Nomen • 

I'Tobletn Re.pO".ibHil, [-«way S""ns'h ,blUr .. ) 

,&\ Authorized 

Strengrh 

Replacements nor G-l. Di,·ision '1'70 or 7 1.~7 "ssigned 

properly assigned. Headquarlers enlisted men StrenF;th 

Oh·eT$ions 10 Bri· Brigade 10% or 16 14' Presenl 

gadc and IlJltalion Ileadcp,arrer$ en listed lIlen forDlil y 

Headquarters. Strength· 

lea"e. and 

T emporary DUI)'. 

Oi'·enions 10 cover JlJII ~Jion J!>'7o or 2J 120 Paddy 

unil o\"erheads, HeadquarleT$ cnl isrcd men Stre"gth 

$ick. ca ll. phl·sicaJ 

profiles. guard. etc. 

The Division G- I was responsible for insuri ng that all maneuver 

batta lions had assigned at least 96 percent of their authorized 

stre ngth. The Brigade Commander was then responsi ble for insuri ng that brigade and battalion headquart ers did not siphon off 

too man y assigned personnel. His guideline was that on ly JO percent of assigned personnel could be absent from duty. Th us. the 

present·for·duty strengt h per rifle company should have been ap· 

proximately 141 enlisted men. 

The Battalion Commander was responsible for insuring that 85 

percent of the present.for·dulY personnel were ava ilable for combat 
22 SH AR PEN ING THe COi\IIlAT EDGE 

THE D EL"-,\ ENVI RONMENT-Fn":OING ... CACH t; 

ope rations. This mea nt that a maximum of 21 enlisted men could 

be diverted to un it overhead. The ballal ion and compan y commanders had to kee p a tight re in on sick ca ll and physica l profi les. 

Thus th e padd y strength of th e rifle compan ies should be at or above 

120 enlisted men. This was Ollr key strength fig ure-one wh ich every 

compan y comma nder kn ew well. 

Acrually, the first l)add y Strength Repons were real shockers. 

They sho\\'cd, as slaled earlier. not only the ex pected diversions to 

headquarters units but, more imponallll y, tha t there were a large 

number of com bat infantrymen hitting sick caJl almost daily or 

wa lk ing arOllnd wi th permanent profil es which barred them from 

fie ld dut y. Some units had a.~ man y as 50 percent of their unit 

strength non-ava il able for combat d uty hecause of foot problems 

alone. Although it was recogn ized th at foot disease had been a 

severe medical problem in the wet delta , it had no t dawned on 

anyone that the problem was as widespread or as imponalll as the 

Paddy Strength Reports ind icated. Two actions were immediately 

initiated. The first was to reassign th ose combat infantrymen with 

long·term or permanent profiles. In this respect, U.S. Army Vietnam 
UNIT MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ACTION 23 

was extremely he lpful because they accepted the transfer of II 

Bravos (riflemen) to other uni ts in Vietnam such as depots, where 

the soldiers would not be required to work constantly in water and 

where they could perform their jobs adequately in sandals if 

necessary. The second elTon \\'<lS the initiation of "Operation Safe 

Step" for the purpose or controlli ng and minimizing foot problems. 

This mcdical research efrort proved to be the most impoftalll single 

fac tor in increasing lhc paddy strength of the 9th Division. 

By hold ing our feet to the fire. literally and figuratively, our 

strength situation began to correct itself. After some months the 

ritle comp<lnies were putting 120 men in the paddy routinel y and 

the problem became se lf-solving and needed only occasion<ll reo 

emphasis. 

OI)emlioll Salf' Step 

The Paddy Strcnglh Report indic<lted tha t thcre was a significant 

loss of manpower d ue to sickness that was not being reported 

through medical channels. Upon investigation. it was fo und that 

th is loss was du e to skin disease. large ly of the feet and lower leg, 

and that not only W<lS the medic<ll reponing system inadequate to 

measure the losses. but medical personnel lacked the special ized 

training to make accurate diagnosis or to develop effective preventive meas ures. 

As noted previollsly. the 9th Di visioll Area of Operations ill the 

delta of Vietnam consisted primaril y of inundated tenain includi ng 

rice paddies and swamp land cut by an intricate complex of canals 

and streams. As a consequence, skin disease \Vas consistentl y the 

m<ljor single med ical cause of com hat noneffeclhreness in the 9th 

Infantry Division. During Fiscal Year 1969. skin diseases of the 

foot and the boot area accounted for an average of 47 percent of the 

total combat man-days lost. 01" an average of 2.238 man-days lost per 

month. (Tnble 2 (I/If/ Chnrt 1) These sta tistics. although alarm ing, 

follow the nonn to be expected. because in wars disease usually 

incapacitates far more soldiers than wou nds. Historically. in the 

tropics. skin disease has been II lead ing cause of morbid ity <lnd 

lost man-days. During World 'Val' II . about I Ii percent of the soldiers 

evacuated from the South Pac ific were sent back to the United Sta tes 

for diseases of the skin. In the tropical SOlltheast Asia area in the 

British Malayan campa ign, skin diseases were the largest single 

cause of hospital admissions. During their nine years in Indochina (1945- 1954), the total French force of 1,609,987 soldiers 

suffered 689,017 hospital admissions for skin diseases. In Vietnam 

overall, the four leading causes of noneffectiveness from disease in 
24 SIIARPEN ING THE COl\HlAT Elxa: 

TA m .1:: 2-CoMBA'\ i\ fAN·D AYS LoST, 91'11 I NFANTRY DIVISION i\fANEun. k 

BATTALIONS. 1968- 1969 

<>t~1 

I)>! ~ \1~(linI S" •• jnl U~f::,ml~~n' I~~~~':;,,'':!r¥~~~, 

1968 

JUU' ... ........ ~147 

'''' 59% 

AUCUST ........ ... '~8.5 ]953 54'7" 

SEI'TEMIIER ... '901 264] M% 

OCTO IlER ..... .... 5472 ~'16 iO% 

NOVEMBER .... 3952 2119 5-4% 

DECEMBER ... . <1 85 1584 "% 

1969 

jANUAR\' ... 6237 ,06, <19'1" 

fEBR UA RY ........ ,,8< 3 125 46'7 .. 

"',\ReB ....... ..... 55 10 2227 40% 

AI'RII, ...... . -1812 1811 ~8% 

MAY 4845 1482 31% 

JUNE .... . .. ... ..... :1605 11 67 32'1" 

the U.S. Army were acute respir,llory infections. diarrhea , skin 

diseases. and malaria . 

Once the crippling loss of combat strength due to skin diseases 

was fully appreci ated. this factor received strong command illlerest. 

We in itiated Ilwhipl c approaches to a\'e time-slud),ing this com· 

pl ex problem on severa l fronlS concurre ntly. \Ve needed a quick 

fi x. Medical pe rsonnel uuder Colonel Archibald W. fcFadden 

investigated three areas: the nature and ca uses of these diseases. the 

actual manpower lost, and simple yet e ffective control measures. 

From th e o utset two facts were obvious. First. onl y infalllry soldi ers 

developed severe incapacitating- diseases of th e foot and lower leg 

area and second. it was almost impossihle to avoid when operating 

in thc wet terrain of the Mekong Delta. 

Qllr three prouged attack on skin d isease was ca lled " Operation 

Safe Step." It included a controlled series of experimental testing of 

different models of foot gear. skin protec tive oi ntments. and timed 

exposure to padd y wa ter by a group of enlisted volunteers within 

th e perimeter of th e Dong Tam Base. The latter was a most 

intcresting aspect of the in vesti gations. and probabl y unique in an 

infantry divisio n in an active comba t zone. During the period 

Aug ust 1968 thro ugh ,Iune 1909, approximately 100 infantrymen 

were detailed for \·arying periods to th e Division Surgeon for this 

project in three separate increments. These volunteers included 

men fresh in th e COllntry. experienced paddy soldiers with up to 

10 months in the fie ld , combat veterans without skin problems, and 
UN IT MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ACTION 25 

CHART I- CoMBAT i\."iAN·DAYS LOST, MANEUVER BATIALIONS, 

9TH I NFANTRY D IVISION. 1968-1969 

'''''' 

7"'" 

6000 

6000 9 

.. 

~ 4000 

Z 

< .,"'" 

'''''' 

'''''' 

I , 

1 ·''' 1 /' .. " 

""I ...."-

J, \ ;; ? ~ , . .,1 ""' .. " t "" ~l ~-. Jl .. '·'/ 4\ .~ 

, " , 

"1 ' , , "" , ... I 

-- ." ... ';".... I 1"---::-... ~/ " , .. D., ... _ , •. ,.,,_ .. ,- .. -

T"- , JUL AUG SE OCT NO , 0 EC JAN FEB M" 

68 68 68 68 68 68 69 69 69 

____ Total Man.Days Lost fo' Medlcal/Surs lcl1 Reasons 

- _ - _ - _ Man·D.ys Lo. t DUI To Footl8ody DarmatOils 

I 

I 

. --

.... .. "

-j " _. 

,. .. , , ....! ~ 

...... ."" 

I 

... MA> WN 

69 69 " 

men newly recovered from severe skin d isease. T his experiment in 

practical research was suggested by Colonel William A. Akers, Chief 

of Dermatology Research Division , Letterman Army Institute of 

Research, and Professor David Taplin, Dermatology Department, 

University of Miami. and was conducted by the Division Surgeon, 

assisted by personnel from th e 9th Medical Battalion . This was 

extremely interesting research, and personnel who are knowledgeable in medical research techn iques could well afford to inquire 

into this approach in more de tail. Overall , it was a multi .. disciplined 

analysis and, and because of Professor Taplin's pragmatic approach. 

we rapidly delved into wha t the diseases actually were and determined more efIeClive treallnents. 

Through "Operation Safe Step" we initially tried to discover the 

single "magic" solution to this serious skin disease problem. which 

would solve it without in terfering with the standard infantry tactics 

of five or more days of unrelenting, aggressive pressure on the Viet 

Congo Imaginative and ingen ious varia tions of th e standard tropical 

boot, wh ich were suggested by th e Division Surgeon and developed 

by the U.S. Army Laboratory, Natick, were extensively tested. Un-
26 SHARPEN ING T H E COMBAT EDGE 

fortunately, th ese experimental boots were not too helpful. The 

testing proved that no easy answer existed and thilt we mUSt experiment wi th modifications of standard infantry tactics and troop 

management. 

The ex periments were conducted in rice paddies. banana groves, 

and swamp areas within Dong Tam Base, which exactly dupl icated 

the inundated tcrrain of the delta witho ut the hazards of combat. 

These tests continued throughout this period and yie lded valuable 

resuhs and confirma ti on of suggestions from the field . Utilizing 

volunteer soldiers, six experimental boot models. fOUT experimental 

boot socks and three protecti ve ointments and lotions were 

eva luated. The average skin tolerance to water was tested and 

several anti-leech and mosquito repellanls were tested. Experiments 

were cond ucted by vol unteers barefooted. wearing standard boots 

and socks. and weari ng different boots and socks under controlled 

timed conditions. Detai ls of the testing of footwear are indica ted 

in the repon below: 

HEADQUARTERS 9th INFANTRY DIVISION 

OFFICE OF THE DI VISION SU RGEON 

APO SAN FRA NC ISCO 91i370 

TESTING OF FOOTWEAR FOR THE I\ [[ KO NG DELTA 

OPERATION SA FE STEP: I)HA5E II . 1%9 

In an effort to decrease the ski n ;md foot problems which result from 

extensive ta ctical operatiom in the wet terrai n of the Mekong Delta. 

several new it ems of footwear were assigned to thc Office of the Division 

Surgeon for testing under simulated comb;u conditions. Experimental 

testi ng of a new Zipper Boot. ;1 100% Nylon sock (stretch) :lnd a Ny lon 

mesh sock. and a Comfort Slipper has becn carried out since early 

February. T he testi ng :Iud ev;tiu;uioll of th ese items has rece ntly been 

concluded and the resu lts arc disl"m~ed helow. 

In the first of fo ur sc!>ar:tlC experimctlls. the lIew Zipper Boot was 

compared to the st:lIlc!;tn iss ue T ropic;tl Boot when WOI"l1 with regular 

issue 0.0 . wool soch. No cli nical difference in the progression or 

severity of foot diseilse W;tS detected bctween the two boots. However. 

the volu nteers felt Ihilt thc Zipper Boot cll-ai ned :Ind dried fa ster than 

the Tropic.a l Boot. The thin synthetic· material of the Zipper Boot 

tended to "givc·· in tensio n :lrC:I~. e~pe("i<llly arou nd the seilms. 

The second test comp;tred the IUO% Ny lon ~Irct h sock with the 

regular issue wool sock. worl1 with the stand ard issue Tropical Bool. 

The 100% Ny lol1 sock W:IS fou nd to he definitely superior in retarding 

foot disease due to its fast drying qualities. T he tHcn ;1150 felt the Ny lon 

sock to be much more comfortable because it didn·t hold water or 

"bunch up·· under the foot. They suggested 111:1t if the Nylon sock were 

thickcr. it might offer protection from ahrasion inside the boot. although 

this problem was not significa nt. 
UNIT MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ACTION 27 

The third test comparetl the Zipper Hoot to the Tropical Boot when 

worn wi th 100% Nylon stretch socks. The Zipper Boot was fOllnd to 

be on ba lance superior to the Tropi cal Boot in th is test. Ilresumahly. 

the increased velllilation of the Zipper nOOt became more effective in 

combi nation with th e fa st.drying IIlI,liities of the Nylon sock. It was 

agai n noted that th e material of the Zipper lioot frayed easily in stress 

areas of the Boot. A few men complained Ihat the Nylon sock permitted 

fine sand to elll er bel"'cell the ock and fOOl. causing all abrasive cffect. 

The fo urth experime nt compared the 100% Nylo n stretch sock to 

the Nylon mesh sock. hoth WOI"lI with the Tropical Hoot. The mesh 

sock was fon nd to be in ferior 10 the stretch sock in preventing foot 

problems. The mesh sock permilled alld :l1ld grit to enter easily, and 

the abrasive effeci o f the S:tlltl a nd grit was prob:dlly responsible for 

the earl y bre:lkdowl1 of the )<. k;n. The rIledl ock also tore in several 

cases. 

Comfort Slippers T ypes I and II (lace type and velcro fastener type) 

have been given initial field tests. T he b ee type Comfort Slippe.· proved 

to stay on the foot hetter when actua lly running through paddy type 

terrai n. The fastener ty pe was easier to take on and off. and thus more 

suitable for base camp cond itions. When the fastencr type Sli pper was 

laced through the auxiliary eyelets. it too remai ned on the foot during 

the paddy run. 

Long range field stud ies of the Zipper Hoot. the 100% Nylon stretch 

sock. the Ny lon mesh sock.. and the COmfort Slipper are now in progress 

among the maneuver haltalions of the Di vision. These stud ies sho uld be 

concluded wi th in one month. 

A. \N. Me FADDEN. MD 

COL. MC 

C. DC"'&C H CS 

A summa ry of findings of "Operatio n Safe Step" follows: 

(I) Nonnal health y skin ca n to lerate abo llt 48 hours of can· 

tinu ous exposure to paddy water and mud before developing 1m· 

mersion FOOL Syndrome. 

(2) Funga l infec tion of th e severe inAammatory type due to 

Trichophyton i\femagrophYlCS did not develop until after about 

three months of paddy duty. 

(3) Nylon boo t socks were marked ly better th an the issue 

wool boot socks in red ucing skin disease. quick drying. comfon and 

troop acceptance. 

(4) Soft, tennis shoe·l ike NOMEX comfon shoes were va luable 

in replacing combat boots in base camp for th e same reasons as 

no ted above. 

(5) No experimental boot tested was compl ete ly suitable for 

use in the j\'feko ng De lta terrain . Suggestions for improvement in 

th e standard boot included the adoption of the " Panama Sale" 
28 SHARI'EN I.'<G THE COM "AT EIJG~: 

design, red ucti on of the amount of leather, replacement of canvas 

with strong NOMEX fabric and l ippers instead of laces. 

(6) Misce ll aneous experiments resulted in the following conelusions OJ' recommendations: 

(a) Sil icone protecti ve ointments were use less due to discomfort and troop rejection . 

(b) A prolccth'c lotion supplied by Colonel Willi am A. 
UN IT M ;\ NAGEMENT ANIl PERSONNEL ACTION 29 
30 

>0, 

90 

80 

w " • 

~ 

• c 

" <" 

" z " , 

• 

" z 

w " u 

• w 

• " 

" 

>0 

SHARPEN ING T 11 1:: C01l.-1IiAT EI)GE 

CHART 2-F uNGAL Dlst::ASE (FOOT "Nil B OOT AREA) 

/ SIGNIFICANT 

DISEASE / % 

'"'' "% "M'\MS ' % 

, , • , • DAVS IN PAODY 

-0-0- 9th Inlentry Division E.perienc.-No GriHolulwln 

3/.711. Inf.ntry_72% Grl.eofulvin Prot.clio" 

, 

-

Akers, MG. showed promise in delaying the onset of Immersion 

Foot Syndrome. 

(c) The ami-leech lotion was nOt acceptable to the troops 

and th erefore not effective. 

Three important diseases Ivere identifi ed through investiga tions 

in the fi eld and practical research in " Operation Safe Step." These 

diseases all affected th e fOOL and boot area; yet, each required a 

specific trea tment; 

<I> Fungal Infection. In the tropics fungal infections on the 

body usually begin as small reddish sca les around the ankles. on the 

top of the foot, on the bUllOCk and on (he groin. Itchin g is mil d at 

first but can become unusually severe. Tin)' vesicles appear and 

when the pa tient scratches off the top of the vesicles bacteria 

invade, causing secondary infecti ons. Although the patient with 

extensive or very inflamed fungal infection may be quite miserabl e 
UN IT MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL ACTION 31 

and incapacitated for severa l weeks, his general hea lth is unharmed 

and he will fully recover. Fungal infection can be both treated and 

prevented, to a substantial degree, by Griseofulvin, an anti·fungal 

anti biotic. The graph in chan 2 indicates the disabling effects of 

funga l infections. 

(2) Immersion Foot. Immersion foot in its classic form is unique 

to the 9th Di vision in the delta. It almost inevitably develops in 

approximately 95 percenl of all personnel ex posed. Its late results 

are similar to cold weather trench foot o f World \Var II with 

damaged circulation and illlolerance to cold wea ther. It is caused 

by prolonged exposure to rice paddy, water, and mud in the 

tropical environments of the delta while wearing the standard 

issue tropical boots plus the issue wool cushioned socks. To cl arify 

this point-the native rice farmer rarely develops the condition 

because he wears sanda ls or goes harefooted and dries out his feet 

periodically during the day and at night. Its earl y symptoms are 

swelling of the entire boot area. The sa les of the feet are dead 

white and soggy with deep wrinkles assoc iated with moderate 

pain on walki ng. The ra ther severe symptoms resemble the foot 

of a drowning victim- the foot has swelling and is dead white 

in appearance. There is a painful burning surface when the fee t 

hang down and they arc exquisitely tender to touch. Frequently 

the top layer of skin comes off in silver dollar size patches where 

it is rubbed off at boot friction points. The entire sole is hardened. 

swoll en and pa inful to wa lk on. The best treatment of this d isease 

is prel'enlion. Soldiers need bed rest and then gradual ambulation 

wit hout boots. No med icine used internally or on the skin will 

influence immersion foot. Tbe effects appear to be cumu lative and 

several moderate episodes will result in the inability to wear boots 

and lhe men lhen requ ire a pcrmal1ent profil e and are lost to 

infantry dULY. Chan 3 shows the disabling effects of tropical im· 

mersion foot syndrome. Th is chan indicates that shortl y after two 

days in the rice paddies a unit could genera ll y become as mllch as 

50 percent disabled. Thus the syndrome can be almost completely 

avoided by limiting exposure to 48 hours. 

(3) I)yoderma Bacterial Sk in Infections. T here are always 

bacteria on the skin and the heat and humidity of the tropics is 

an excell ent incubator. Minor skin injuries under these conditions 

are prone to secondary infections. No reall y effecti ve solution was 

found to treat or to prevent bacterial skin infections, although a 

Walter Reed Army Institute of Research team had developed some 

very promising infonnation just before the 9th Division departed 
32 

c 

• 

• " 

< • " " z 

• u 

• • • 

ARI' EN G T I·I£ C0 1\H \AT EDG E 

CHART 3-T ROI·IC .... 1. I MMERSION FOOT SY N OROME 

>0, 

" 

80 +------------~1" ,' ---------~ 

70 

.. 

" 

" 

" 

,,'--

>0 

, 

V first Symptoms ..... d Sll "ifiunt Disuse 

, • 5 

DAYS OF IMME'RSION 

--0-0- Prof .. so. Ollvld Tapli n', up.", ... ents 

, , , 

Vietnam. Chart 4 is an indi cation of lhe disabling effects of 

pyoderma bacterial infection . 

The results of the tests for the 3rd Baltalion. 47th Infantry arc 

indicated in chart:; for th e pe ri od Jul y th rough December 1968. 

It ca n be seen that once th e 48 hour rul e was initiated the incidence 

of immersion fOOL dropped to almost zero and that at no lime did 

fun gal infections hecome a major probl em. However, th e incidence 

of pyoderma t:olllinued to risc and became the major ca use of lost 

lime due to dermatological diseases. (The onset of the dry season 

also tended 10 depress the end figu res). 

The medi ca l reporting system \\'ithin the 9th Division was 

in itiall y found to be defective in three major as pects. First, statistics 

refl ecting time lost from d ut y because o f disease were grossly inaccurate since they normall y illcluded onl y soldiers sick in quarters 

in rn edical ba llalion fac iliti es and hospital admissions. Secondl y, 
UNIT MANAGI-: l\fENT ANI) PERSONNEL ACTION 33 

CHART <1 - PYODUMA- HACTUIAL INFt:CT10N (FOOT AND BOOT AREA) 

.OO·r----------------------------------------, 

" 

" 

0 

• " 

• " " < 

• c 

" 

~ " u " • • • SIGNIFICANT 

" DISEASE 

" 

.. FIRST 1 SYMPTOMS 

~ 

, , • • , , • • 

DAYS IN PADDY 

these reports were tabulated monthly and were not suited for the 

dose day by day monitoring of a serious disease problem. Finally, 

the infonn:lIion often was based on inaccurate diagnoses because 

of the lack of dermatological experience in the physicians. To overcome these shortcomings a daily Dermatological Sick Call Report 

was required from each divisional medica l treatment facility. This 

material was tabulated (Taule J) and forwarded to Division Headquarters with comments in a lVcekly Dermatology Sick Ca ll Summary. The same information in a shorter form was presented in the 

Weekly Administrative Briefing. These reports accomplished 

several important functions: the y pro\'ided an accurate measure of 

the loss of combat strength due to skin disease. they provided a 

timely monitoring system for the commander, and served to increase 

the interest of medical officers and unit commanders in this serious 

problem. 

The complete pre\'entive dermatology program was interrelated, 

including medical diagnosis and treatment, administrative reporting 

and monitoring, and the most important componclll of command 

support. The single IllOSt important contribution to the solution 

of the problem was a directive on 28 October 1968 which limited 
34 

l;; 

0 

" • > 

~ 

z 

c 

> 

!i 

• > 

0 

u 

SHARPEN ING TH E CO:'! HAT EDGE 

CHART 5-Co1llKAT MAN-DAYS LoST DUE TO DUMATOSIS, 

3D BA1TALION, 47TH I Nf'ANTItY, J U LY- DECEM8ER 1968. 

"" 

"'" 

"" 

"'" 

"" 

."" 

"" 

''''' 

"" 

"'" 

"" 

''''' 

'" 

w, 

" 

AUG 

- .- .- .- FUNGAL (

" FOOT) 

... . PYOOERMA 

.. 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

I 

, 

I I , I 

I I 

I I 

I I 

I I 

I I 

I 

, 

I 

\ 

\ 

\ 

I " ... ". .... 

/\ 

..........•. / . \\, .......• " 

.... 

, 

, 

, 

, 

-......• 

, _.---_.--_._ ........ _-- " -'-._' 

00' 

.. '0' " 

<>EC 

50 

___ ''''''''EIISION FOOT 

___ TOTAL DERM .... TOSIS (fOOT) 

combat opera tions to 48 hours (except in real tactical emergencies) 

foll owed by a 24·hour dryin g out period. This was a radical departure from normal Vietnamese practice which favored longer 

periods in the field for various cogent reasons. 

"Operation Safe Stcp" proved that command supported practical 

medical research of significant medica l problems was feasible in a 
TABU: !-N I NTH INf"A l''TR Y DIVISION WEEKLY D.:RMATOLOG

PATIENTS / M AN DAYS LoST -

PERIOD 19-25 J U N.: 1969 

TOOl Di 

,. •• 

Sind, .\IOL All iktrna.ology 

I)iviw<ln \ledJs... •• ..., r~~.m. F"nR~1 

Uni •• c."~ rl> MOl I'" MOl. ,,, \I 01. 

6/51 Inr 9 ., , 

2/59 '"f 175 10 15 I. 20 

5/59 Inf .. ......... 52 

• 10 10 

4/39 Inf ..... .... .. 99 

I' ,. 10 

2/ 47 In! .......... 159 

" 16 7 7 7 

5/ 17 In! 139 II 24 12 17 '1 • 

... . ..... 

4/4i In! ........... 157 7 , " " 16 I' 

-- 

2/ 60 Inr .. . ..... .. . 

" 12 • • 

516(j ' n! 52 10 • 2 

5/00 In! ........... ., 15 II 

Man Sn T ot .... ... '56 188 106 76 67 51 

" 

""('ngf: 93.6 18.8 10.6 7.6 6.7 5.1 3.5 ....... . 

O.h . . ,,. '" 64 • • 5 

Div TOlab ......... ln6 391 170 80 67 

" 40 

• \1." O,)" 1m. ( Mill.) '"llO''' urh d~r • !Oldi". " mnlially Unfil .0 I>nf' ... m 'n hi' \IOS. inc
36 SHAR1'ENING THE COM HAT EDGE 

combat division ill the fie ld. The 9th Infantry Division rapidly 

developed a highl y successful in tegrated program to manage the 

serious skin disease problems in the i\lekong Della that had eluded 

control in previolls conflicts in tro pical SoutheaSt Asia. 

i\1rUlllgenJt:1I1 0/ Utlil J\1issio1lS 

As we began to gel QUI' unit strengt hs under control through 

use of the Paddy Strength Report. it became apparent th at we had 

defensive missions assigned which were adversely affecting our 

ability to conduct offensive operations. For exampl e, at one lime, 

we had th e foll owing diversio ns: protec ting U.S. Army, Vietnam, 

ammunition unl oading poilll. I company; defending signal rclay 

sileo ( I platoon). Vs company; de.(ending POL lank farm (I 

battalion) . !i companies; defending a remote artillery position. 1 

compan y; defending two major bridges. 1 compan y: and convoy 

protection , 1 company-a tota l of 71,/s companies. 

These missions had accumulated over a period of time and were 

necessary. Initi ally. th ey were not too burdensome. as units which 

were tired or cut up could be di ve rt ed to th ese tasks and while 

DEFESSIVE VICIL 
UNIT l\IA NAGEMENT ANI) P ERSONNEL ACTION 37 

performing the defensive missions could rebuild and retrain. How· 

ever, we began to see that regardless of the way it was handled that 

slightly over one·quarter of our divisional infantry units (7.3 / 27 = 

27+ percent) were defending critical installations and not carrying 

the fight to the enemy d irectl y. Fortunately, the division. in the 

spring and summer of 1968, was shifting into the delta, and some 

of these tasks were passed off to other units. As the overall security 

situation improved. some were simply terminated as no longer 

necessary. When the Government of Vietnam mobilized in 1968, 

regu lar South Vietnamese Army units or Regional Force and 

Popular Force units became availabl e and took over some of the 

remaining tas ks. lI ffic~ it to say that after about six months, they 

had all been closed out. and the di vision was able to concentrate 

practica ll y all of its units on offensive operations. 

The effect of these efforts was most dramatically brought out in 

Long An Province. In early 1968 there were six rifle and three 

mechanized companies in Long An Prov ince (three battalions). 

Three o[ these companies were on these defensi ve operations. As a 

result, each battalion had only two companies avai lable for mobile 

offensive operations and all other missions. In effect, they .were just 

barely keepi ng the enemy off balance and worried. During the 

Mini·Tel offensive agai nst Sa igon. the enemy was able to move 

three or four of the five Main Force batta lions in Long An against 

Saigon and to put on a fairl y creditable attack. In addition, Long 

An while the IllOSt po pulous and richest (rice.wise) province in 

all of III Corps was the least pacified. We decided we had to do 

better in Long An, and as a result in late J une 1968. we moved our 

best brigade inlO the province with two very good "strike" ba ttalions 

(2d Baltal ion, 39th Infan try and 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry) 

plus a mechanized battal ion, Due to the previous culling out of 

defensive missions, these two battalions were able to devote almost 

100 percent of tbeir effort to mobile offensive operations and were 

able to break lip tbe enemy battalions in Long An over a period of 

months. 

The Mathematics of Troop Management 

Each of the efforts mentioned previously achieved measurable 

results in isolation. However, taken all toge ther, the increase in 

unit or troop availability was most impressive. 
38 SHARI'ENII\'G THt: COMBAT EDGE 

Inbnlry 

March 1968 

Unit nase 

Companies 7 X , = 2 1 

MtchaniKd 

Companies 2 X ,, = 6 

6111 Battalion , 

j to" Colllpan) 3ls1 Infantry 

RL'Organi/.alioll Addition 

2 X 3 = 6 

Mechanized 

Uallalioll 

Swap 

x' = , 

27 Cos. 

100% 

!4 Coo. 

125.9% 

58 Cos. 

140.7% 

39 Cos. 

144.4% 

In looking at it from this point of view , the Division ga ined 44 

percent in rine companies, the majority of which (26 percent) resulted from the "squaring" reorganization based on the Army 

Combat Operations Vietnam evaluation, with the remai ning 18 

percent due to the other changes. 

Bya combination of refining unit missions and concentrating on 

the offensive we were able to reduce defensive effort and increase 

offensive effort. The mathematica l improvement on a division basis 

was impressive. 

Spring 1968 June 1968 Spring 1969 

Available Cos. 27 31 39 

Offensive Effort 50 percent 66 percent 66 percent 

Companies on 

Offense 13.5 20+ 26 

It can be seen that from a purely mathematical point of view the 

increase in offensive effort fronl both organiz."1tional and manage· 

ment improvements was in the neighborhood of 100 percent. 

Before the Tel baules. the 9th Division was sca ttered over a 

large area. Its Tactical Area uf Interest, the area which it over· 

watched, included all or pan of at least eight provinces, and its 

Tactica l Area of Responsibility included all or part of fOllr large 

provinces. By late 1968, as the division moved sOllth to the Upper 

Delra, both of these areas had been reduced to more manageable 

proportions_ The following gives an indication of this concentrating 

effect: 

Pre-Ttt TAOI Pre-Ttl TAOR l...all' -68 TAOI Late '68 TAOR 

(provinces) (provin(n) (provinces) (pro"inces) 

long An Long An Long An Long An 

n inh TuonFC I)inh Tuong Dinh Tuong Iliuh Tuong 

Go Cong Go Cong 

Bien Hoa Bien H03 

(e.utem) 
UNIT r-,·fANAGEl\lENT ANI) PERSONNEL ACTION 39 

Pre· T t l TAOI l're· Tet TAO R La le '68 T AOI Late '68 T ,\OR 

(provinces) (provinces) (prol'inces) (prm'inces) 

Long Khanh Long Khauh 

(western) 

phlloc Tlly 

Binh Thlly 

Cia Dinh 

(paru from time to time) 

Kien Hoa Kien Hoa 

Strategic Reserve Strategic Resen 'e Strategic Reser-'e <;tra tegic Resen'e 

IV Corps IV Corps IV Corps IV Corps 

It should be noted that the geographical assignment of missions 

was not as simpl e or lidy as suggested. However, the chart does bring 

out that the division's geograpbical responsibilities became much 

more limited, thus permitting it to essentially focus ten battalions 

on three provi nces. (Go Cong req uired I iul e effon.) The psycho· 

logi cal and intellectual foclls \I'as probably of equal imponance. 

With more manageable areas and missions all commanders felt 

more confident and became more able to inAuence their situations. 

As a result, the impact of the brigades \\'a5 improved markedl y. For 

example: 

L01'g An Brigade 

In early 1968 bel:;llISC of static details onl), six companies out of 

the three ba ttalions in Long An were o ffen sively oriented. After 

squaring the battalions and shaking olilth e defensive missions about 

8 of the II compani es were comm illed offensively. The actual improvement was more than the figu res would suggest, as the brigade 

commander was able to put on more and constant pressure and to 

react more quickly with his 0\\' 11 resources. 

The Riverine Brigade. 

The historica l Riverine method of operating can be described 

as three days of full effort and fi ve of I"est , rehabilitation, and training, or 37 .5 percent offensive effort for six companies. After we 

understood paddy foot better and changed to the 48·hour exposure 

rule and added one battalion , the brigad e effort was increased and 

Auctuated be tween a 66 and 75 percent operating rate fOI" twelve 

companies with a quadrupling of offensive effort. Quite a jump! 

The Din" T UOfJg Brigade. 

In the spring of 1968 this brigade could muster 2 battalions 

totalling 6 companies with 4 on offensive effort. By late 1968 it had 
40 SHARPENING TIU: CQMUAT EDGE 

RI VERI NE FOItct: 

3 battalions totalling 12 companies with 9 on offensi\'e operations. 

This m OTC than doubled their offensive effort. 

In summary. by a combination of reorganizations. tight personnel comml, emphasis on offensive operations, "Operation Safe 

StCP," and a morc managea bl e mission . the divisio n was able to 

increase its offcnsil'C effort at least one hundred percent across the 

board. These increased resources \\'cre then devoted to a m OTC concentrated effon duc to the small er area or respo nsibility. 

If one were to draw tip a se t of rul es for the 9th Division arc:!, 

it might be that the optimum solution would be: 

A reasonable con figuration for effective operations in a manage· 

able arca wou ld be len 4-company rine baualions at fu ll strength . 

Three-company rifle battalions resulted in a marked loss of 

efficiency. 

Seriously understrengt h rifle companies resulted in a loss of 

eniciency. 

A thinecn-ballal ion division would probably be the best al'-

ra ngemelll for opera tions gi\ring a good balance between foxhole 

strength , fl exibility, and effective control with a low overhead ratio. 
UN IT l\I/\NAGEME:'><T AND PERSON NE.L ACTION 41 

Th is is partially an intuitive judgment although based on good 

results obtained with four-ba ttalion brigades from time to time. 

It might be added that our experience in this area was that tight 

management, plus a cOlllinuing anal ysis of missions, areas of operation and orga nization brought about a ma ximizing of effon and 

very good control of operations. 

T igel' (Kit Carson) Scouts 

An important element of our program for strengthening our 

units and improving their effectiveness was the Ki t Carson SCOUl 

or Tiger Scout program. This prOJ:,r)'am impinges on many aspeCts 

of our overall strengthening process and it is cOl'cred here only as a 

matter of convenience. 

The Kit Carson Scout Program (which for unknown reasons 

was called the Tiger SCOUL Program in the 9th Division) was well 

known in Vietnam. It consisted of hiring Viet Cong or North 

Vi etnamese Army sold iers who had ddected (and were known as 

Hoi Chanhs), and integrating them in U.S. units. These defectors, 

who invariably were strongly an ti-Communist once they had deserted, were used in rifle squads as riflemen 0 1' scouts. T heir guerrilla sk ills, their local knowledge. ramiliarity with the local language. and their ability to communicate with the Vietnamese people 

made them invaluable. Unfortunately. their command of English 

was usually very limited, hut after some contact with the unit in 

which they lived and fought, they were able to communicate reaTICUI. SCOUT 
42 SHARI'ENING THE COM BAT EDGE 

sonabl)' well. Aflcr having the adv:Ul tage of good food, good 

medical care and the superior training of the U.s. units, they made 

first class soldiers. 

In the spring of 1968, the 9th Division was authorized in the 

neighborhood of 250 Tiger Scouts. In theory, that put about two 

Tiger SCOIIlS in each rifle platoon, but in practice we did not have 

as many as authorized. It had been Ollr experience. heretofore, that 

it was difficult to recruit as many scouts as we were authorized. 

After assessing the advantages of the program and making a few 

trial runs, it was determined that the recrui tin g possibil iti es were 

actuall y quite good, but the program suffered from a combination 

of lack of attelllion by lower commanders and a certain subconscious 

uneasiness at having Communist defectors in frontline units. In 

any case. we started an organized recruiting campaign and \.,.ere 

very rapidl y able to ha ve our authorization raised to somewhat over 

400 scouts in the division . The direct cost to the U.S. Government 

was quite low as their pay sca le. although attractive in Vietnamese 

terms, was quite modest. 

The increased authorization and recruitment allO\.,.ed liS to put 

one Tiger Scout in each rifle squad . as \\'ell as specialists in intel· 

li gence and recon naissa nce units and prisoner of war interrogation 

teams. One very direct bonus from this arrangement was that it 

automatically increased Ollr riAe strength by ten percent, and 

counteracted the effect of U.S. soldi ers being absent du e to rest and 

recreation, sick call, and wou nds. Not onl y did this device increase 

our riAestrcngth , hut it had man y indircct honuscs alludcd to above. 

It obviollsly hroke down the language banicr to a certain extent as 

the scou ts could talk 10 prisoners. the loca l population, or to memo 

bers of the Vietnamese armed forces. Not only could they converse 

with these peopl e. bu t due to their knowledge of the country, they 

were able to soli cit information from them that an American could 

never obtain in any case. They were also very good scouts-they had 

an intimate kno\\'ledge of Communist tactics and could. as a result, 

feel out situations by instinct which the inexperienced among the 

U.S. soldi ers had to figure out the hard way. Interestingly enough. 

the Tiger Scouts provcd to be extremely able and loyal members of 

the team. Although some of them were diSCharged due to illness or 

lack of ability, the number of scouts who d eserted or were suspected 

of rejoining the Communist forces was extremely low. perhaps a 

handful at most. All in all , this was a most successful program as it 

not onl y strengthened our own units, blLt helped to soften some of 

the major difficulties inherent in a U.S. unit working in a strange 

country. 
UN IT MANACEl\rE~T AND PERSONN EL ACT ION 43 

The Pay Off 

A recapitulation of the aforemClllioncd six actions indicates the 

terrific impact tha t close management of units and personnel can 

have upon the operational effecti veness of a Division. After the May 

offensive against Saigon we reoriented our thinking towards the 

Delta. Our movement from the Bearca t area to Dong Tam commenced in early June 1968 and was completed in Jul y. When we 

started our reorientation we had 21 stra igh t-leg and 6 mechanized 

infantry compani es avai lable for combat operations: of these, seven 

and one-third were tied up on stat ic missions and each company 

could fi eld not more than 80 rifl emen. Our infa lllry companies 

operated in the delta environment and in the jungle areas around 

Bearcat fifty percent of the time. T his amou nted, then, to about 780 

infantrymen aggressive ly seek ing the enemy on a da ily basis. 

After our reorganiza tion to four-rifle company battalions, the 

\vi ndfall of another infantry battalion and the exchange of one of 

our mechanized ballal ions for anot her infantry ba llalion we ended 

up with 39 infantry companies. Additionall y, as the resu lt of intensive personnel management by the lise of the Paddy Strength Report these companies had a minimum combat strength of 120 men. 

T he flexi bility afforded by the reorga nization pillS improved techniques in night operations allowed liS to increase the tempo of operati ons to th ree companies per battalion in the field on a daily basis. 

T his amounted to abou t 3,500 infantrymen breath ing down 

Charlie's neck every day and night of the yea r-an increase of about 

350 percent in the resources available for comba t operations. 

This rather slo\v and difficult process took from six to nine 

months to bring to completion . Obviollsly. the di vision \"'as more 

effective. However, the rea l gai n was to get the division up to its 

design Table of Organization and Equipmelll strength where it 

became a responsive and effective fighti ng machine. 
CHAPTER III 

Optimizing Army Aviation Assets and 

Support Facilities 

In the Mekong Delt:. combat capability was directly correlated 

with Army Aviation assets. We soon found that we had little tactical 

success withollt helicopters. They provided mobility and fire power 

as well as surprise. The Air Cavalry troop was the eyes of the 

division and the "slicks" gave us om maneuverability. Since the 

tactical success of the division hinged so much on aircraft suppOrt, 

great command emphasis was placed on this vital area. \Ve SliCCessively analyzed five major aspects of aviation: maintenance, combat 

effectiveness. aircraft allocations. 1:lelies. and aircraft utilizat ion. 

Operations Analysis was utilized to maximize each of these aspects 

or air operations. 

Maitl/etllmce 

We knew we needed more aircraft on a daily basis if we weTe 

going to ilnprove our operational success. But hefore going to 

higher headquarters for assistance we decided to get our own hOllse 

in oTder, This meam maximum utilization of organic aiTcraft, and 

you can't fly them unless th ey arc flyable, Appl ying the mainten;IJlce 

lessons learned in mechanized units in Europe we attacked our aircraft maintenance problems. LillIe by lillie, th ese efforts proved 

successful and by .July 1968 an integrated maintenance program had 

evolved. Ho\\'ever. we had to h'ait until alxmt November 1968 fOT 

the completion of some of the maintenance hangars at Dong Tam 

to put OllT total program illlo effect. \Ve formalized what we were 

doing as an "Eight Poilll L\tailllenance Program," consisting ()f; 

(I) Direct Supervision by the Oi"lsion Aviation Officer. 

(2) Decelllralized Maintenance, 

(3) Reorganized AiTcraft Distribution. 

(4) Expanded Prescribed Load Lists. 

(5) Aggressive :\ Iallagcmelll of Authorized Stackage Levels. 

(6) Weekl y Maintenance Stand·down. 
OI'TlMIZING ARMY AVIATION ASSETS 45 

(7) Night Maintenance. 

(8) Aggressive Management of Assets. 

In actuality this proved to be the basic formul a for the successful 

utilization of our aviation assets, both organic and atlached. Since 

the program was so successful for our own aircraft. we later utilized 

it for attached and most supporting aircraft. 

Direct Supervision by the Division Avi(ltion Officel·. 

The opera tions of an infantry division are so diverse and there 

are so many decision-making centers that the organization almost 

violates the basic rule of sound management- manageabl e span of 

control. Under the normal division organization the commander 

must deal with many officers on aviation matters: the Aviation 

Officer. the Armored Cavalry Battalion Commander, the three 

brigade commanders. the Di vision Artillery Commander, and the 

Maintenance Battalion Commander. We decided early to place all 

our aviation assets under the supervision of the Division Aviation 

Officer for maintenance matters and to hold him responsible overall 

for the maintenance of aircraft. This did not include operational 

control which was retained by those units to which the aircraft 

were aSSigned. Every evening around 2200 hours the Division Aviation Officer was requ ired to give a complete rundown of the status 

of all aircraft assigned to the division as well as his maintenance 

plans for the night. Since tact ical planning depended to a great extent upon the availability of aircraft, this procedure allowed the 

G-3 to revise plans for the next day if necessary. Then aga in at 

0700 hours at the morning hrie fing the Division Aviation Officer 

again provided a complete rundown of aircraft availabi lity. in· 

corporating all changes res ulting from the night's maintenance. 

The summary chart utilized at the morning briefing is shown in 

tabl e 4. Operational plans were again adjusted. iF necessary, based 

on this information and on the intelligence picture. 

DeCt!lIlraiiz.ed Ma;'ltt!lIallCt!. 

Direct supervision by the aviation offi cer was greatly Facilitated 

by attaching Company B. 709th Maintenance Battalion . the aviati on maintenance company. to the 9th Aviation Battalion . We 

did this as part of a Department of the Army test that was supervised by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam. However. had there 

been no tests this step would have been taken because of the necessity to combine as much opera tions and maintenance as possible. 

We also ex panded the maintenance operations of Delta Troop, 
46 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

TABLE 1-9'J'II I N FANTRY DIVISION DAILY AuteNAFT AVAILABI LITY 

Opera- ,;o n~ny U" ~ Sur,""''' Unl! T,~ h.ig,, d Rudy Mall" ~ aim ,h.il.ble 

A, 9th Aviation ..... UH-ID/ H 28 24 , .. B, 91h A¥iation .. U H-IC • • 0 0 

AH-IG 6 , 0 

toH • , , 0 

U&-A 2 2 0 0 

L6 L4 2 0 87 

D Troop. 

3d Ballalion . 

5th Cavalry ...... UH- ID/" 7 6 0 

AH-IG 9 7 , 

LO H 9 7 2 0 

25 20 , 2 80 

1st Brigade ........ LOH • , 0 

2d Brigade ... .. .... LOH " • , 0 

3d Brigade . . ...... . toH " • , 0 

Division Artillery ... LOH 7 6 0 86 " 

9th Division ........ TOTA l. as " 10 5 " 

3rd Battalion, 5th Cava lry and A Company, 9th Aviation Battalion 

so that they could perform third echelon maintenance. This 

decentralization of third echelon maintenance to three units was a 

real shot in the arm-the two major users maintained their own 

aircraft and B Company. 70!hh Ma illlenance Battalion provided 

maintenance for all the other uni ts. 

Reorganized Aircraft DistriiJ llrio11. 

We soon learned that maintenance of a proper prescribed load 

list or au thorized stackage leve l in a combat situation with the 

high turbulence in personnel and aircraft was a herculean task. 

T o fa cilitate this task the aircra ft with in the division were redistributed to have, as far as posible, only a single type aircraft assigned 

to each unit. Table 5 indica tes the final aircraft distribution. Of 

the nine units involved, six ended up with only one type of aircraft, 

one unit had no aircraft. and two units had multiple type aircraft 

assigned. This redistribution facilitated ma intenance, since most mechanics needed to familiarize themselves with only one lype of aircraft and most prescri bed load lists reHected only the parts of one aircraft type. Only Bravo Company, 9th Aviation Battalion and Delta 
T AlU.i'.: 5-A IRCRAFT D ISTRIIlUT

Un it TY

UII _ID/ H UII-IC An Ie 

TOE TOE TOE 

AUTH A$GI) AUTII A>GO AUTII ASC

Co A. 9th Aviation Baltalion 

" " 0 0 0 0 

Co 8 , 9th Aviation Battalion 2 0 0 • • • 

Bf709 th Maintc:mlll<:e Ballalion ..... . 2 0 0 0 0 0 

D Trp. 3d 8alla lion 51h Cavalry . . . .. • 7 2 0 9 9 

In Brigade: . .. , ............. ... ... .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 

2d Brigade ....................... , . 0 0 0 0 0 0 

ld Brigade . .......... ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Division Artillery . .. ....... ..... .. . . 0 0 2 0 0 0 

3d Battalion. 5th Cavalry ..... ... . . ,. 0 0 0 0 0 0 

TOTAL .................... .. ... ... 

" " • • " " 
48 SH AR I'I:::N I NG THE COM HAT EDGE 

Troop. 3d ilallaiioil, 51h Cava lry ended up with morc than one 

lype of aircra ft. 

Expanded Prescribed Load Lists. 

Our l\\'O highest density units were Co A, 9th Aviation Baualion 

and Delta Troop. 3d Baltalion, :Jlh Cavalry. We received permis· 

sion 10 expand thcil" prescribed load lists to double the normal 

slockage. These expanded prescribed load lists went hand and hand 

with third echeloll maintenance capabil iti es and insured Ihe di vi· 

sion the ca pability of performing most of its sophisticated maintenance rig ht in these units. The ex panded prescribed load lists cut 

Ollf maintenance down-time in half in these units. 

A,tthorized Slockllge tis/s. 

The Aillhoriz.cd Stockage L.ist fot ain.raft pans was broken out 

from the card deck of the 709tl1 Mai lllenance Batlalion, The COII -

ce pt was to have two separa te decks, hoth supported by the single 

repair pans dedicated NCR 500 computer. Ideally both decks 

(avia ti on and general pans) should ha ve been run through a daily 

cycle hut bec.1use the NCR 500 was overloaded and because we 

were running so many resea rch programs on the machine it was 

possihle to cycle onl y the aviation repair pans deck on a daily 

basis. Every day of the \\'eek pans funs were made by helicopter and 

by wheeled vehicle. We mailllained a liaison sergeant at the Aviation Maintenance i\lall agement Center run by the !\4th Ceneral 

Support Group. The liaison th us established was inva luable and the 

support provided hy the 34 th Croup was of the highest order. 

Weekly Mo infe1w11ce Stond-flown. 

From the aforementioned one might presume that repair parts 

were Ihe guts of maintenance, That is the truthl Yet even with 

enough repa ir parts we found nul that operat ional necessit y generally overrode maintenance procedures and aircraft were not gelling 

their period ic inspections as schedul ed. Therdore. \\'e initiated an 

inviolate weeki)' maintenance stand-clo\\'n-Ihus one-seventh of the 

choppers in the division stood down every day. This paid off handsomely because it enabled maintenallce to be performed on minor 

faults before they became major problems. The weekly sland·down 

kept ollr choppers flying Ollt of all proportion to the down-time losl. 

Night Maintenance. 

The majority of aircra ft were utilized in daytime opera tions. 

The Light Obse rvation Heli copler (LOH) , for example, was 

genera ll y not useful at night and unless there was a night raid 
OPTIMIZING ARMY AV IATION ASSETS 49 

I-I£LlCOI'TER MECHANICS 

scheduled, very few Huey UH- ID or UH- IH models were utilized 

at night. Since the LOH's and Huey's were about 80 percent of Ollr 

aircraft it was apparent we had to perform maintenance at night 

in order to fl y more during the day. However, withou t adequate 

faci li ties nigllllimc mai ntenance was impossible. Therefore, the 

first order of priority in the construction of Dong Tam was the 

provision of adequate hangars. The lights in these hangars burned 

all night every night-mortar attack or not. Naturally this twentyfour-llOur-a-day maintenance took careful personnel scheduling but 

the morale of the mechanics was high and the pride they took in 

their work was extraordinary. \.ye re\\'arded the fine work of the 

aviation mechanics by various forms of recognition, but few people 

in the division realized how much they owed to this dedicated 

group of soldiers. 

The aforementioned Eight Point ;vfaintenance Program boils 

down to just common sense: centralized control , reorgani za tion as 

required, efforts placed at critical points. and firm and aggressive 

managemem. Not apparent in this discussion are all the extremely 

complex operations required to milk repair parts out of a sluggish 
50 SHARPENI NG THE COM BAT EDGE 

• ~ .. --

• 

PICK UI ' ZaN": 

system, to insure Ihal reports were proper. to schedule periodics 

so that maintenance was performed, LO keep Prescri bed Load Lists 

up to date, to amicipalc problem areas. and to inspire the men who 

performed this around-the·clod:. repetitive day·to-day maintena nce. 

The l1et result of the Eight I)oitll Maintenance P rogram was to 

raise the availability of aircrafl in the 9th Division from around 

50 perccnt to a level consistentl y above 80 percent. This increase in 
OI'TI1\IIZING ARMY AV IATION ,\ SSETS 5 1 

" , 

I'I CIO II' ZONF 

aircraft availability provided commanders with a degree of Rex ibi lity that enabled several new taCtical Icchn iques requiri ng aviation support to be tested. 

Aggressive MllIlllgemtmt of Assets. 

The 9th Division did a lot of pre-planning but it also mailllained 

maximum (lexibilil)'. 'We reacted qui ckly to good enem)' intelligence; these reacti ons had to be swift to be effecti ve. Most reaCtions 

were dependelll upon aviation assets. Therefore we established 

with in the Division Tactical Operations Center an organization 

with the responsibility for controlling every aircraft , both organic 

and attached. at all times. \Ve ca ll ed th is our Air Control T eam , 

whose acronym ACT was the essence of their responsibilities. They 

were provided with the best communications equipmellt ava il able 

as well as sharp and aggressive o(Jicers. Through the ACT, aircraft 

could be divened on a moment's notice from any portion of the 

division's area of operations to a new mission and we could expect 

thaL the subsequent mission woul d he accomplished rapidl y hecause of the tight managemen t of assets. Although Hueys were 

Il$Sig'ICri (Illd utilized 0 11 II tiet'tmtra fized vasis it was understood 

that any aircraft could be reca ll ed 0 11 the order of the Air Control 

Team. No aircraft was held in reserve or on standby. 

A ilOCllfions 

It ""as natural that ollr first anal yti c e fforts concerning aircraft 

availability should be directed toward maintenance, because initi-
52 SHARI'EN I NG THE COM HAT EDGE 

ally it affected Olll' organic assets the most. However, the preponderance of OUT tactical aviatioll support was allocated to us by higher 

headquarters and our combat efficiency was in great pan tied to 

these allocations. During the summer and fa ll of 1968, II Field Force 

Vielnam normall y allocated us two ass:1ulL heli copter companies and 

an air cavalry troop daily. ConSidering stand-downs and diversions 

to other units this averaged approximately 53 assault helicopter 

compan y days per month and 22 air cavalry troop days per month. 

When the II Field Force Vietnam air cava lry assets were combined 

with the organi c Della Troop 3d Battalion, 5th Cavalry it gave us 

about 48 air cava lry days per month. Thus with three brigades in 

the field at all times this meant that every day at least one of the 

brigades was without helicopter support. ''''e had found that the 

best combination was to provide a brigade with both an air cavalry 

troop and an assault hel icopter comp:lIly under its operational 

control. During the summer of 1968 the main thrust of all om 

tactica l planning was to determine the greatest enemy threat or the 

most lucrative intelligence target so that we could allocate our 

scarce air assets to obtai n the maximUIll results. The brigade in 

Long An Province because of its strategic location somh of Saigon 

and its nearness to the Cambodian Border received the lion's share 

of the helicopter assets-25 days a month . The brigade in Dinh 

Tuong Prov ince had hel icoptcr assets an avcrage of 17 days a month 

and the Ri verine Brigade operating in Kien Hoa Province received 

helicopter assets an average of ani), 8 days per month . Although 

the Vi et Congcapabilities in Dinh Tuong and Ki en Hoa were about 

the same, the riverine force had some "built-i n" mobility due to 

their naval assault craft whil e the hrigade in Dinh Tuong was on 

foot- thus the differencc in the alloca tion of assets. 

In mid-August 1968 we found that the lise of the "People 

Sniffer" (Airborne Personnel Detector) was giving us good results 

in finding Viet Congo At the time we were prohabl y onc of the few 

uni ts in Vietnam that thought highl y of the People Sniffer. In 

retrospect the reason was undoubt edl), that the terrain in the delta 

was ideal for the device as compared to jungles and hilly country 

throughollt most of the rest of Vietnam. Consequently. in the rail 

of 1968 we began to distribute People Sniffer equipment to each 

brigade on a daily basis to assist them in locating the enemy. In our 

normal tactical configura tion the People Sniffers were carried in a 

slick belonging to the supporting Air Cava lr), Troop and tbe 

Peopl e Sniffer runs were an illlegra l part of the search techniques 

of the troop. To give each brigade a dail )' People Sniffer capability 

meant simply that we had to make up a reconnaissance team from 
OPTIMIZING ARMY AVIATION ASSE.TS 53 

organic aviation assets. This additional team paid off handsomely in 

operational results-it gave us an additional nose and pair of eyes but 

we were still limited in troop carrying assets and gunships. Thus, 

we foll owed up lucrative targets by divening our scarce aviation 

assets to the hottest target. 

It became obvious to any casual observer that when a brigade 

had aircraft assets, particularly both the ail' cavalry and the slicks. 

that its tactical success was greatly enhanced: consequently, we made 

a systematic study of the efl'ecth'eness of the helicopter in combat 

operations. This stlldy. which is discussed in the next section , proved 

conclusively that a brigade with chopper assets was much more 

successful than one without chopper assets. So, we started beating 

the drums with higher headquarters to get more air assets. 

Fortunatel y. we received a welcome break from IV Corps Tactica l 

Zone. Major General George S. Eckhardt, the IV Corps Sen ior 

Advisor, had conceived a " Dry "Vealher Campaign" whose purpose 

was to make an all out push during the dry weather season in the 

delta to deal a decisive blow to the Viet Cong in this heavily 

populated and rice rich area of Vietnam. Military Assistance Com· 

mand, Vietnam, agreed to the major aspects of this program, including the proviSion of additional air assets. Commencing in 

January 1969 the 9th Division thus received a third Assauh Helicopter Company and a second Ail' Cavalry Troop (for a total of 

three) on a daily basis. Thus. for approximately 26 days a month 

every brigade had the optimum helicopter support-an Ail' Cavalry 

Troop plus an Assault Helicopter Com pan y. Th is roughly amounted 

to a 40 percent increase in gross supporting assets. In our opinion, 

receipt of these additiona l aircra ft was perhaps the most important 

factor in increasing the combat efl1ciency of the division. 

In addition to our attached helicopter support, by the fall of 

1968 we had improved our aircraft maintenance to the point that 

om organic assets could provide sli cks as well as additional im· 

provised air cavalry to Ollr brigades on the days that we did not 

rece ive our full ration of attached or supporting aviation. This gave 

us an additional 15 percent push in the use of av iation assets. On 

top of that it enabled liS to increase Ollr stand-by aircraft for coulllermortar alerts at night and it gave us the ca pability ,\'ithin division 

resources 1O implement some very sophisticated night tactics which 

evolved in the early part of 1969. 

Commencing in January 1969, then, we had maximum coverage 

of Ollr area of operations in every brigade area utilizing Ollr daytime 

intensive reconnaisance and air assault techniques. Additionally, in 

at least two brigade areas we had night coverage which enabled us to 
54 SHARPEN ING THE COM lIA'1 EI)GE 

interdict Viet Cong movement of supplies and personnel. As a result 

of this continuous day and night pressure Charlie became un glued 

in March 1969 and we took him apart completely in April 1969. 

The increased availability of aircraft as well as our finely honed 

lactical concepts were keys to these tactical successes. 

ImlJYovements ;11 Comba,' Efficic11CY 

Rc,wfthlg from Additional AviatiotJ Assets 

As we began to get a good feel of those areas affecting combat 

operations that needed systematic analysis we decided to bring a 

sharp officer into the Command Section to perfonn opera tional 

analysis on a full lime hasis. During a period of little over a year 

we sliccessively utilized three outstanding officers. ajor Edwin A. 

Deagle. Jr .. Major J ohn O. B. Sewall. and Major Jack O. Bradshaw. 

Becausc of the importance of av iati on assets we set 1'. fa jor Deagle on 

thc problem of measuring thc improvcments in combat efficiency 

which could be dircctly related to the input of "innobi le resources. 

Major Sewell performed several studies. one of \\·hich. ".Jitterbug. 

ging Opemlions:' he has prescnted at Fort Benning. Major Bradsh"w produced an outsunding compendium of combat sta tislin 

and also docu mented historica l (bt:l to support a I)residential Unit 

Citation submission. 

The stl.1d y concerning improve lllellt ~ in combat effici ency resulting from airmobil e asscts wa~ p"nicul"rl y informative. \Ve 

defined our comba t en vironment "s one in which the enemy sought 

to avoid contact. This was Ollr 1I 0rmai situation "fter the high point 

of T el 1968 and with few exceptions after that lime did the enemy 

ever mass for nujor sustained attacks. \Vc conc! udcclthcn. and continned to beli eve. that the most d irect statistical index of comh", 

effiCiency whi ch cou ld he isol"t ed W;15 the d;llll"gC me"stLred in the 

Humber of enemy losses (prisoncrs of \\'[1 1'. Hoi Chanhs and killedin-action) infli cted on the enemy hy a unit in the fi eld. 

We recognized th"t comba t effici ency. as defined here, provided 

no indica ti on of the number of our own battle casu;li tics sustained 

while infli cting losses on the cnemy: thereforc . \\'e also included an 

analysis of Ollr own casualt}" rates. 

T he term "a irmobil e assets" required precise dcfinition . III 

litera l terms, it would h"ve to include "ss3tllt lift elements, airhorne 

and "ir transported fire support. comlTland and control aircraft. 

reconnaissance aircrah. "!ld airmobile logistiC support elements. To 

simplify the anal ysis. it was assumed that the provision of all types 

of airmobile resources except assau lt helicopler units and air cavalry 

un its was reasonably uniform :md thus did not materiall y in· 
OPTIMIZING ARMY ,\VIATIQN ASSETS 55 

fiuence combat performance from day to day. "Airmobile assets" 

was therefore defined to include Assault Helicopter Companies and 

Air Cavalry Troops only. 

II was the policy in the division to give commanders maximum 

control of their combat assets. As a result the Assault Helicopter 

Companies and Air Cavalry Troops were allocated to the brigades 

on a daily basis and placed under the ir operational control. There· 

fore, it was only natural to use the brigade as a basic maneuver unit 

in a measurement of combat effectiveness of air assets. The study 

included a total of 313 brigade.days of combat during the period 

7 March through 15 August 1968. We hasten to point out that this 

was an early period of operations before our paddy strength was up 

and long before we had perfectcd our tactical innovations. The 

period was good for sta tistical purposes lUll in subsequent months 

we refined our operations to the poin! that we expectcd and received 

much better results than were obtained during this period. 

With no airmobile or air cavalry support. the three brigades 

averaged 0.21 significant enemy contacts per day spent on field 

operations. \\Then su pported by either an Air Cavalry Troop or an 

Assault Heli copter Company. brigade performance did not change 

appreciably. or in ally case was Ilot statistically consistent. However, 

when supported by both an Air Cavalry Troop and an Assau lt 

Helicopter Company, average brigade performance more than 

doubled. to a figure of 0.49 contacts per day. In other words, \\'ith 

no air assets, a brigade averaged a significant cOntact with the enemy 

only once every five days: with an Air Cava lry Troop and an 

Assault Hel icopter Company. it developed contact every other day 

on the average. 

Analysis of Viet Cong losses per field day produced more defini· 

tive inferences. With no air assets. brigade performance averaged 

1.6 Viet Cong losses per field day-hardly a creditable return. With 

an Air Ca\'alry Troop, this figure rose to 5.1 Viet Cong per day: 

an increase in performance of 21870. \-Vith an Assault Helicopter 

Company, perforrmmce a"eraged 6.0 Viet Cong losses per day. It is 

doubtful that the difference in performance hetween operations 

supported by an Ail" Cavalry Troop and those supported by an 

Assault Helicopter Company are statistically sign ificant. However. 

when a brigade was supported by both an Air Cavalry Troop and 

an Assault Heli copter Company, hrigade performance rose to 13.6 

Viet Cong losses per day-an increase of 75070. The striking rise in 

effic ienc), when both assets \\·ere preseot supports the idea that 

performance \\'ith both assets tends to be somewhat more inde· 
56 SH AR l't: N ING T H E COMUAT EDGE 

pendent of th e le:ldership styles of the hrigade commanders t han 

with either asset alone. 

Enemy losses are Illost meaningful as an indiCa tor of performance when they are compared with friendly losses. It was o ur desire 

in th e 9th Infantry Di vision to ma ximize our capabilities to damage 

the enemy. with heavy emphasis on prisoners and H oi ChanllS. and 

to minimi ze QlIr 0 \\'0 person nel losses. The ratio of enemy losses 

to friend ly losses, then , was considered to be an excell ent measure 

of combat o utput. 

The foll owing table compares the total Viet Cong eliminated 

with U.S. Killed by Hostile Acti on as we ll as U.S. Killed by H osti le 

Actio n and WOllnded by Hostil e Action during the period of th e 

study in th e spring a nd smnmer of 1968. 

TMIU: 6---CO.\ IIIAT TAT1~TlCS MARCH- At'c UST 1968 

10 ..... 

With 110 air ~ssel$ 

With an Air.Cavalry Troop only ............ . 

Wilh all AMauh Helicopwr Company on\\' .. 

With both Air Cal'all)' T roop and 

Assault Hel icopter Company .... 

Ratio of 

lMmv r.o. .... to U.s 1(11" 

8.2 

10.5 

0.~ 

12.9 

Rallo of 

En.my I ........ to U.s. KII " 

ph" U.s. WII" 

0>< 

1.60 

1.70 

2.50 

It is obvious that air assetS 110( onl y enhanced th e resultS of 

brigade o perations. but they also ell:lbl cd liS to reduce our own 

caSll:lllies rei:ltively thereby increasing our combat effic iency. We 

could nOI be insensilil'c to 10lal U.S. cas ualties and Table 6 shows 

that th e overall cost in wounded and kill ed U.S. personnel was radica ll)' reduced when ail' assetS were available as compared to slugging 

it o ut ol11he gro\lnd. This is nOI particularl y startling because the in· 

crease in maneuverabilit y, fire power and obsena tion was bound to 

make o perations more e ffective and enable us to protect o ur troops 

to th e utmost. Thus in terms of inflicting damage to the enemy as 

well as protecting our own personnel. th e capability o[ an infantry 

brigade in Vi etn am was gre:llly enhanced by th e use of a irmobile 

assetS. (L1.ter on it was possihle to reduce fri endl y KHA absolutely 

as well as rela tively.) 

The brigade's statistics ca n be extended into a measurement of 

d ivisiona l effectiveness simply through an additive process. Using 

the situati on in which no air assets are available as an index, the 

division's combat resu ltS would be: 

1.6 + 1.6 + 1.6 = 4.8 Viet Cong losses per day 
OJ>TIMI7..ING ARMY AV IATION ASSETS 57 

With one Air Cava lry Troop it would become: 

1.6 + 1.6 + 5.1 = 8.3 Viet Cong losses per day 

Similarly. with two Air Cava lry Troops the Viet Cong losses would 

increase to 11 .8 per day, and with three Air Cavalry Troops the 

division could be expected to average 15.3 Viet Cong losses per 

day-an improvement of 218 percent over resu lts with no aviation 

assets. 

Similar ca lculations can be made for any combination of Assault 

Helicopter Companies and Ajr Cavalry Troops- up to three of 

each. h is pertinent , given the apparent complementary nature of 

the two assets, to look at the rate of increase in performances for 

increments of both assets: 

One Air Cavalry Troop and one Assault Helicopter Company 

16.8 Viet Cong losses per day 

Two Air Cavalry Troops and twO Assault H elicopter Companies 

28.8 Viet Cong losses per da y 

Three of each: 40.8 Viet Cong losses per day 

From the 9th Division's point of view, the last figure is the most 

significant. During the periods examined, the division was allocated 

on the average slightl y less than two Air Cavalry Troops and two 

Assa ult Helicopter Companies per day (including the organic Air 

Cavalry T roop). Had the allocation been three of each (one for 

each brigade), it is estimated that the division's combat effecti veness 

for that period would have increased by approximately 10 percent. 

Moreover. brigades could have been expected to improve furth er 

over time since planning would not have been disrupted by last· 

minute Changes in support priorities among the three brigades. 

Daily operations with the same supporting air units greatl y en· 

hanced co-ordination and professionalism- the brigades in effect 

moved rapidly up the lea rnin g curve (a phenomenon wh ich reo 

portedly is inherent to airmobile division units). It is difficuiL to 

imagi ne how similar inputs of any other type of resources (artillery. 

infantry. etc.) wou ld ha ve generat ed an equivalent improvement 

in combat performance. 

It is probable that not all divisions in Vietnam would have 

achieved statisti cal improvemenlS si milar to those of the 9th Divi· 

sion. The inundated flatlands of the Mekong Delta have a double 

edged impact on the Illutual effectiveness between foot and air· 

mobil e opera tions. Marshy swamps and flooded rice p.:1.ddi es severely 

penalize ground troops. Units f-requently are able to move no 

more than 500 meters per hour or less. On the other hand, the 

broad stretches of virtuall y nat delta country provide an ideal en· 

vironment for the unrestricted employment of Army aviation. Pre· 
58 SHARPENING THE COM BAT EOGE 

sumabty sti ch wo ul d not be the case in other areas of Vi etnam, blll 

unquestionabl y the allocation of additional ainnobUe assets to 

provide each combat brigade (III a daily basis with an Assa ult 

Hel icopter Company and an Air Cavalry Troop would have in· 

creased com hat resu lts by a meani ng rul amount. The actual increases in combat efliciency resu lting ITom the assignmclll of an 

Assault Hel icoptcr Compau), and 3 n Air Cavalry Troop to each 

brigade have heen measured for 9th Division operations and will be 

discussed in a subsequent section Oil the payoff of increased Army 

aviation assets. 

hmovalive AvifltiOlI T actics 

T he 9th Division, largely d ue to a tat'ge number of very skillful 

combat leaders, was particu larly innov:.ti,·e in adapting standard 

tactica l tcclmiques to the del ta terrain. \Vilh respect to the use of 

aviation asse ts ,,·c fostcred several tactical techniques. hUl they all 

stemmed from two fundamental changes that materially enhanced 

our operational capabilitics. 

As was stated previously. by the rail of 1968 the Viet Cong in our 

area had broken down into small groups aod were avoiding combat 

at all costs. Consequcntl y. ou r airmobile assault techniques utilizing 

an entire Assault I-Ielicopter Compan y with supporting air cava lry 

elements were pr()\,jng ponderous. \Ve wa llled to break down into 

smaller morc fl exible units in ordcr to be able to cover a larger area 

and to apply more constant pressure on the enemy. However. airmobil e doctri nc dictated that cach assa ult be accomplished by 9 

or 10 slicks covered by two light fire tcams (4 Cobras or other 

gu nships) , Consequclltl y. wc mustcred o ur thoughts in this matter 

and bricfcd Major General Robert R. Williams. the 1st Aviation 

Brigade Commandcr. Oil the desirab il ity of switching to ri ve slick 

inserti ons instcad of the IIsual tcn. This had drawbacks for the 

aviation persollnel since it required t\\'ice as mally trained lead ship 

personnel. Howevcr. Genera l \Villi ams gave us the go ahead on a 

trial hasis and \\'c commenccd Jitt erbugging with five slick inserti ons. The immediatc effect was dramatic. We were able to check 

Ollt twice as many intellige nce largets. \Vc \\'ere able LO cover 

broader areas there by almost doubling Ihe amount of pressure 

brought to bear on the Vi et Congo Later on. in 1969. when we had 

chopped up the Vi et Cong e,'cn worse and scattered them to a 

grea ter degree it was commonplace to make 2, 3 and 4 slick insertions withom fear of undue casualties in either aircraft or infantry 

personncl. The single tcchnique of breaking down into smaller 

assault groups in late October 1968 had extremely far reaching 
OI'T[l\flZING ARMY AVIATION ASSETS 59 

implications for om tactical success. Like many new ideas it had 

been done before bllL on a rather selective basis. The new idea was 

to do it all the lime. 

The second fundamental change in techn iques involved our Air 

Cava lry Troops. perhaps the most important ingredient in strike 

operations. As our maintenance improved and the availability of 

aircra ft became greater we split om organic 3d Battalion, 5th 

Cava lry Troop into two teams. Initially the purpose was to provide 

daylight recon naissa nce for all three brigades when one of our 

normal SUPlxming Air Cavalry Troops was standing down for 

maintenance. Subsequently, we evolved night tactics tailored to the 

i\ I INIGUNS 
60 S I'IARI' EN ING TI·I E COMllr\T EDG E 

lise of air cava lry which proved tremendously effective. Our Night 

Search, Night HIIlHer and Night Raid techniques, combined with 

infantry night ambushes. " Bushmaster" and "Checkerboard" tactics, 

enabled liS to keep an around Ihe clock press ure on the enemy. 

These tactical techniques will be disclissed in detail l:ll er. Because 

of OUT day and night operations we need ed two air cava lry lcamsa day team and a night tcam. The nucl eus of the day team weTe the 

scouts (LOH 6's) . There was much 31'gument over whether the 

scout.s should work in pairs under the protection of one Cobra or 

should work as a Scollt·Cobra team. h was 0 111' ex perience in the 

delta that scouts working in pairs gave o ptimum coverage and due 

to the na ture of the ten ain and sparseness of vegetation that one 

Cobra could more than adequately provide cover for two SCOlltS. 

There were others, however. who were in favor of the uSllal ScoutCobra Team. Our day teams. then, normally consisted of I Command and Control ship, 2 Cobras and 4 Scouts. 

On the other hand the Night Search and Night Hunter technique required I Command and Control copter and a light fire team 

(2 Cobras and a Huey nare ship if the ambient light was insufficient to activate our night vision devices) . The Night Raid reo 

quired a Command and Control copter and a li ght fire team plus 

2 or 3 Hueys to insert a small eleme11l of combat troops. The total 

requirements for the Air Cavalry Troop, night team plus day 

team, amounted to approximately 50 percent of their assets and 

was met easily on a daily basis. 

When our organi c as \\'ell as supporting units (we cannot speak 

too highl y of the 7th Battalion . 1st Air Cavalry Squadron for their 

ability to support night operations and the 2l4th Aviation Battalion 

for their all·around SUppOrl) had broken dm ... n into the twO team 

concept it literally took the night awa y from the Viet Congo This. 

coupl ed with the expanded daytime air assault capabililY. optimized 

Ollr tactica l use of Army aviation air assets. 

The two aforementioned simple bUI highly effective techniques 

revolutionized airmobil e operations in the delta and allowed us to 

appl y relentless pressure. heavil y interdicting Viet Cong troop and 

supply activiti es as we ll as weakening his forces to the maximum 

degree. 

Utilizatio n of Army Avialioll Assets 

As we improved Ollr maintenance and got locked in on our new 

tactical techniques it appeared as if our major unresolved problem 

\\'ith army aviation was " How much average nying time does it 

take to adequatel y support tactical missions? " T o get a handle on 
OPTIMIZING ARM V AVIATION ASSETS 61 

this question we did a rather exhaustive analysis taking into consideration the tactical techniques and actual aircraft support provided the division by organic and assigned aviation assets. The 

premise underlying our analysis was that we would have one Air 

Cavalry Troop and one Assault Helicopte r Company per brigade 

daily plus our organic divisional aviation assets. We considered that 

maimenance was such th at at least 70 percent of the aircraft would 

be "mission ready" daily. ,"Ve wem about the study on a mission 

oriented basis, ;malyzing optimum daily requirements. 

Air Cavalry Troop. 

We ,onsidered a day team and a nigh t leam as previously 

discussed. We fclt that the day team should be augmented at least 

15 days per month by either the Air Cavalry Troop aero rifle 

platoon 0 1' by 4 Air Cavalry Troop slicks to carry our own infantrymen since some of the ail' cavalry squadrons were not organ ized with 

an aero rifle platoon while others were. On Jitterbugging Operations th e lise or 4 slicks h'ith aero scoms or organic troops would 

give us a 50 percent additional troop carrying capability, thus increasing area coverage. 

With respect to night team operations we felt that we could 

conduct eight light Raids a month when slicks would be required 

to transport the raiding troops. On the other hand th e Night Search 

and Night Hunter would require only one Command and Control 

copter and a liglu fire team (two Cobras). The results of our 

analyses arc shown in Table 7. 

SLICKS 
--

.............. U r'· . , 

. f 

-- SLICKS 

'tt 

I 

I . 
OI'TIi\'III.ING ARMY AVIAllON A~Sil.T!> 63 

TAIII..E 7 - U TILlZATION STATISTIC." A I R CAVAI..II.Y TII.OQI' 

Day T eam ......... ... . 

Night Team ............. . . . 

TOlal Requ irement ....... . 

Assigned .... . ....... . ... . 

% Aircraft utilized ......... . 

~ 15 daTl/ mo,,'" 

b-8 ni&lou/ n1omh 

U II- III/ II/ II 

ClC ~hd.~ 

• 62'70 

4 • 

2 • 

4 

AIt_ ICo 

, 

, 

4 

• 

50'70 

(-Only I ClC . "., ~ .1,<10 "efl\ 10 I ... ,,,Inio,, rudy 

Day Team . . ... . ......... . . 

Night Team 

Day Team .......... .. Night Team ....... .... ... .. 

T otal H oul'$ ........ . .. . .... 

Aircraft Assigned ....... HouT'3 Per Aircraft .......... 

T Olal Aircraft I-Iou,", . . . . 

No. of Pilot! ... 

A"g 1-11'5 per pilot ... 

11 011" '~. ,\,.=1. I'c. I} ~r 

UII- 11l/ 1)1II 

ClC Slich 

AH- I(: 

8 

" 

6 

, 

TOI~I lloun 1' .... \I onlh 

UII_ I B/ I}III ,\I' 'G 

O<C SH<~, 

240 "" 480 

120 .. 240 

"" 4,. 720 

• • 96 90 

1'1101 Ito"" P~l \I nmh 

1111- 18/ 1)/ 11 • AII - IG· 

'" 720 

" 15 

8" 96 

8 

4 

OIl-6A 

4 

4 

9 

""% 

011-6.\ 

960 

960 

9 

101 

0 11 -(1,\ 

960 

9 

'00 

". 

25 

52% 

Oll-fiA 

• 

'1'010' 

2040 

408 

2H8 

25 

98 

TOI>I 

21>18 

42 

96 

It can be seen that on the average onl y 52 percent of the Air 

Cavalry Troop aircraft are committed on a daily basis and that the 

maximum flying time for any aircraft is 8 hours. The total hours 

per aircra ft per l110mh averaged out to approximately 98 hours. 

Pilot time averaged 96 hours per month, \".eIl below the 140 maximum stipulated by regulatiOns. 

Assault Helicopter Compatly. 

The mission of the Assault Helicopter Company is rather cut 

and dried at first glance; they transport the troops and supplies to 
64 SHARPEN ING THE COM UAT EDGE 

TEAM OF AIR \VOR"1I0RSEJi 

the target area. When utilized as a single entity, the Assault Heli· 

copter Company normally provides one Command and Control 

copler, ten slicks, and (\\'0 light fire teams comprised generall y of 

four Charlie models (in 1968) . However, the Jitterbugging tactics 

of the 9th Infantry Division normally involved five slick insenions. 

Under these circumstances it became ro utine to break the Assault 

Helicopter Com pany into two teams o[ five slicks each. However, 

the Command and Control copter and the light fire teams normally 

accompanied each insertion of the five slicks. so that in reality there 

was a shuming effect with the troop-carrying choppers. 'When insenions weTC made ill two dispersed geographical areas. it proved 

advantageous to have the Air Cavalry Troop cover one insenion and 

to ha\'e one Light Fire Team from the Assault Helicopter Company 

cover the other. The Bounty Hunters of the 19 lst Assault Heli· 

copter Company did this with extraordinary results. In such a 

situation . the ten sli cks and th'O Charlie models would set down 

awaiting a new insenion while the Command and Control copter 

circled overhead with the Assault Helicopter Compan y and infantry 

ballalion commanders and the other Light Fire Team provided 

troop cover. The aircraft and hour requirements for an Assault 

Helicopter Company are indicated in table 8. It can be seen that 

daily aircraft requirements for the Assault Helicopter company are 

slightly above those for an Air Cava lry Troop, both in percent of 
OPTIM IZINC AR l\I Y AVIATION ASSETS 65 

TABLE 8 - UTILIZATION STATISTICS ASSAUI.T H ELICOPTER CoMPANY 

D~il, Ai.craf. II,fqui .. mtnu 

Requiremenl ........ .. . 

Au igned . ... . 

% Aircrart lJIilized .... . .... . 

UH - I B/ D/I1 

ClC Slid ... 

19 

58% 

10 

H O .... P~r Airn-af. Pt. I)a, 

UIl- I B/ DtH 

U H- Ie 

• 

7 

57% 

ClC SHd. 

H OIII"$ .•.. ••••... ...•... • ... 10 

a Two a' ew 1>0 .... and ''''0 II 51-1. 1>0 ..... 

Houl"$ .. ... .. ...... . 

Aircraft Assigned ........... . 

Hours per Aircrafl .. . ...... . 

Total Aircraft Hours ....... . 

No. of Pilot.! .. . . .... .... .. . . 

Avg Hrs per PiiOl .... . 

b-T ... o pllou lin" ~ircuh . 

To.al 110 .... ~r ~I n.h 

UII- 1811>1II 

ClC Sllct. 

19 

107 

1725 

rilo. 11 0 .... r~. Mon.h 

U II- IB/ Df ll • 

,." 

.. 

" 

'" 

uti- Ie 

720 

7 

103 

UII- IC ' 

720 

" " 

To.al 

l' 

,. 

58'70 

UH_IC 

6' 

TOI.I 

2745 

26 

105 

2745 

" 82 

aircraft utilized and in total hours per month, although the average 

pilot hours per month are less. It is interesting to note that about 

October 1968 higher headquarters au thorized the Division to use 

its supporting Assault Helicopter Compan ies 2700 hours per 30 

day period. This gave the Di vision mllch greater flexibil ity in that 

Ollr commanders could lise lhe assault aircraft for long periods 

when there was a good COntact and could Cllt the fl ying short when 

the enemy was not to be found. In order to do this we used a 30·day· 

moving-average of 2700 aircraft hours which smoothed Ollt humps 

and vall eys. Our own ana lysis showed that under optimum cond itions the average mOlllhl y req uirement per Assault Helicopter 

Company was 2745 hours. Quite often intuitive judgment hit reo 

quirements right on the head even at higher headquarters. 

Orga'lic Divisiotwl Aviation Assets. 

The missions of our organic divisional aviation assets vari ed 

greatly. By and large, slicks were used as Command and Control 
66 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

TABLE 9-UTILll.A,'ION STATISTICS ORGANIC DIVISION AVIATION ASSETS 

Requiremt'1II ............ . 

Assigned . . . . ... . ........ . 

% Airc;rar, mililetl ........ . 

Houn 

a :,\,;,Iu " and.by 

Da ily Aircnft Req.mcmcnn 

UII. 18/ 0 ( 'I 

18 

" "% 

UII_ Ie 

2 

4 

50% 

lI.,u" I'cr A/reul, "c. Ih~ 

U II- ID/ D/II U II- Ie 

6 , " 

AII- IG 

, 

6 

66% 

011--6" 

15 

" 65% 

AII _ IG 

5" 

b-Nirht ... arch. n flhl hu"u. R.llit. in ... llion. and unaclion. 

To,.1 lIo u .. Pcr ~I n,h 

U II- 18!01It U II- Ie I\I IG 0 11--6,1. 

Houu ....... ............... 3240 24. 600 225. 

Aircraft ,,!.Signed " .......... " , , 

HOHI"!! per Aircuft ......... . 115 60 100 " 98 

Plio< HOII,. Pu Month 

UIl- III/ Dm· UII- I C' AH- IG ' 0 1'1-6.0. 

TOlal Aircnfi fl ours ...... ,.". 24. 600 2250 

No. of Pilou " 8 18 24 

,hg H. I~' Pilol \0, 60 67 .. T",o p ilots , ... aitenl, 

" ",. " 

OIl-6A 

5 

TOlll 

"'" 61 

11>1 

TOlal 

,,, . 

"' " 

aircraft and perronned essential maintenance and administra tive 

functions incl uding courier rUIiS. day and night utility runs, and 

night radar repair ship. The gunships and Cobras genera ll y were 

utilized on night standby to react immediately to enemy initiated 

incidents and as a night air cavalry team in support of the brigades 

on either Night Search or Night Raid operations. Because of the 

diversity of tasks. ollr assessment of utilization was based on a 

reasonable slice of assigned aircraft. We thought that about twOthirds of all assigned aircraft should be operationally committed 

on a daily basis. The aircraft and our requirements are indicated in 

table 9. It can be seen that 64 percent of the aircraft were utilized 

and the total hours per aircraft per month were lO4. 

SlImmary. 

Table lO summarizes operational requirements and hours per 

month for aircraft for all type units: 
OPTIMIZI NG ARr-.IY ,\VIATION '\ 3SETS 67 

TABLE I lI--OI' I:;RATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. H OURS PER MONTII 1'10 11. 

AIRCR" .. - r 

UH - IB/ D II U II- Ie AII- IG OH-{iA ,'1>-8 

Total 

Air Cavalry Troop . . . 96 90 107 98 

,\ssault Helicopter Companies. 107 1" 105 

Organi( ..... 115 60 100 98 104 

USARV Avg (Feb 69) ... 74 64 " 68 67 

The total average requirements varied between 98 and 105 hours. 

We took a standard of 100 hours/ aircra ft/ month, then . as a utilization rule of thumb. The U.S. Army Vietnam average was much 

below this-approximately 67 hours per month. The utilization 

standard we established would require a 50 percent increase in 

general aircraft utilization over the U.S. Army Vietnam figure. As 

a matter of interest. a detailed test was conducted in II Field Force 

later on, wh ich demonstrated that effic ient aircraft usage peaked 

at about 103 or 104 hours per plane per month. as contrasted to 

the 70 hours per month previollsly considered as optimum. 

Actuall y, the utilization of aircraft for the months of February 

and March 1969 in suPPOrt of the 9th Division amounted to 93. 1 

percent of this established standard. The only major shortfalls were 

in the use of SCOUl aircraft by the Air Cavalry Troops and in the 

lise of organic H lIey assets. The theoretical standard was based 

upon proven tactical usage and reasonable aircraft availability 

factors (about 60 percem daily) . Since actual performance compared favorably \\'ith the standard. we fel t that the aircraft utilization in the 9th Infantry Division , ... as about optimi zed with respect 

to fiying hours. 

A review indicated that by December 1968 the flying hours were 

also about optimi zed. We got a big shot in the arlll when our 

organic and support aviation moved to Dong Tam. enabling liS to 

operate from a central base loca ti on. We also improved our techniques in pre-positioning fu el and ammunition at outlying base 

camps in order to cut down on aircraft refueling and rearming time. 

Therefore. our aircraft assets were operating as efficiently as we 

knew how by making every flying houl" count towards tactical 

operations. 

The Pa yoff 

T o improve our taelical effectiveness we knew that we had to 

increase Ollr aviation assets. We started out in our own baCkyard 

by implementing the " Eight Point Ma in tenance Program." The 
68 !o>IIARI'J::NI'\(" 1 HI::. COMBA'I U>Gl:. 

result was an IIlcrc:ase of our ain;ra[t availability. both organic and 

attached, from 50 to 55 percent to .. bOUl 80 to 85 percent on a dai ly 

basis. enabling liS to split our air cavalry assetS, forming a day l ea rn 

and a night leam. Initially, however, until we obtained a third Air 

Cavalry Troop we used both organic teams for daylight operations. 

Fortunately. the IV Corps Dry Weather Campaign which commenced in J3uuary 1969 gave liS an additional Assauh Helicopter 

Company and all Air Cavalry Troop. This optimized our tactical 

a ircraft support. allowing an Air Cavalry Troop and an Assault 

Helicopter Company to support each brigade 0 11 a dail y basis. 

Again , improved maintenance of OliT Hucys allowed us to parcel 

Ollt" or 5 slicks 10 one of the brigades on those days when a supporting Assault IIc1icopter Company was standing down. thus keeping up the operational momenlum. 

In the late fait of 1968 \\'C ohtai ned permission from the 1st 

Aviation Brigade tu split OUl' supporting Assault Helicopter Companies so that we could have twice as many insenions and thus cover 

;t broader area hringing more pressure to bear on the enemy. 

Throughout this period we \\'erc refining our tactics. increasing our 

aircraft availability and upping our flying hour utilization so that by 

Febnlar} and ;\brch 1969 we were a\·eraging over 93 hours per aircraft per month. As a reslIlt of the move to Dong Tam and the prepositioning of fuel ami ammunition we wcre ahle to insure that our 

Oying hour.;; were most produClive in supporting combat assaults. 

All of this increased our com hat performance. Recalling our 

study which me:.sured the com hat efficiency directly related to the 

inputs of airmohile resources. let LIS compare actual results with 

predictiom. \Ve found:m app reciahle increase in the efficiency of a 

hrigade depending on the amOllnt of aircraft under the ir operational control. In terms of actu,d results achieved by a brigade: 

with no air assets 1.6 Viet Cong \\'ould he eliminated per day: with 

an Air Cavalry Troop only 5.1 should be eliminated (we have projected that this figure is valid for both daytime and nighttime 

operations) ; Wilh one Assault Helicopter Company only, 6.0 Viet 

Cong should he eliminated daily: and with an Air Cavalry Troop 

and an Assault Helicopter Com pan y 13.6 Viet Cong should be 

eliminated daily. 

The table below indicates the brigade days 01 available assets for 

the period December 1968 through illay 1969. 

There was little increase in assets between Jul y 1968 and 

December 1968 when we had Air Cavalry Troops 48 days (I mOlltll 

and Assault Helicopter Companies 53 days a mOil til. However, as 

explained above, th is changed dramatically in January 1969 with 
OPTIM IZING ARMY AV IATI ON ASSETS 69 

TA8Lt: II-BR.LGA1)E-DAYS \ViTH ALRCII.AFT ASSETS, T H t:ORt:l'ICAI. 

COMPUTA1-[ON OF VIET CONG EI.lMINATEIl 

".cto •. VC D.ig.dc·l)~r' Montll El[n,in t~d 

pt. brigade ,uL n" '00 f., u Ao' ~I.r 

A...". pt, day " " " " " " " Air Cavalry Troop 

"AHG .. ... .. .. 13.6 48 48 " 87 90 70 65 

Assault Helicopter 

Company Only .. 6.0 5 , 0 0 0 " ,. 

Air Cavalry Troop 

Only 5.1 0 0 '" " 60 ., 60 

No A~e15 1.6 " 37 , , 0 0 5 

Computa. 

tion of VC 742 742 1213 137i 1530 1291 1318 

Eliminated 

the addition of I Air Cavalry Troop and 1 Assault Helicopter 

Company. In the months of February and March we improved our 

aircraft availablity so that we could fill lhe stand-down gap of the 

Air Cavalry Troops and Assault H elicopter Companies with organic 

aviation. Additionally. we were flying an average of 20 night missions per brigade. In April we lost an air cavalry troop and this 

began to have its effect on combat effectiveness. The Viet Cong 

el iminated shown in the total at the bottom of table II was computed by multiplying the brigade-days by the factors shown. 

The actua l Viet Cong elimina ted per month in combat operations involving day cavalry, night cavalry. and day infantry is shown 

in table 12. These were the only type operations that were directly 

affected by aviation asse ts. The Sniper Program, night infantry, and 

artill ery were not influenced to any appreciable degree by aviation 

assets. 

Note that for the mOl1lhs of July 1968, December 1968, J anuary 

1969, and February 1969, the enemy losses computed were roughly 

the same as the actual enemy losses attributable to those operations 

utilizing aircraft. The exceptions were lhe sizable improvements 

T ,\8LE 12 - AcTUAI. V I t:T CoNG ELI M I NATED 

u.s. Un'" ) ,,]68 n"" J. n 69 Fd> 69 .'hr 69 '\1" 69 ~ra.· 69 

Nighl Cavalry " I., '" 580 3M; 266 

Day Ca\'alry ,., '41 '" 572 429 5t6 

Day Infantry ,,, ", 539 726 1I!8 129' 1034 

TOTAL 735 '" 102' 1454 2290 2077 1816 
70 SHARPENING THE CO:o.IBAT EDGE 

over the calculated figure for the months of MaTch and April 1969. 

In these two momhs everything jelled for the division. The Viet 

Cong apparalUs became unglued and we capital ized on the ir shock 

at being taken apart both day and night. After two months of 

intensive nighttime opera tions the Viet Cong reacted and partially 

lumed us off and we were never as effective as we were during the 

initial period of OUl" ste pped up night operations. 

One might presume that with our improved tactical innovations 

and optimi zed flying hour IItili zation thal there should ha ve been a 

greater improvement in tactica l success: yet, except for the ex ploitations in March and April, the increase in Viet Cong el iminated was 

directl), proportional to the assets available. 

But there was in faCl a larger payoff. It came in the savings of 

American lives. (See TalJle n (mel Chart 6.) 

While the enemy eliminated remained directly proportional to 

Oll r aviati on assets. our exchange ra tio-the ratio of enemy e liminated to U.S. killed-increased drama tica lly, reaching its peak also 

during j\·rarch and April 1969 when the Division-wide ratio was 

over 80 to I. This compa res to a ra tio of around 16 to I prior to 

honing Ollr airmobile techniques. Although we were pleased with 

our increased efficiency in eliminating th e enemy it was this dramatic red uction in the relati ve (a nd absolute) loss of our own 

personnel that was the most satisfyi ng aspect of Ollr improved 

utiliza tion of aviation assets (and improved tactics). 

Optimizing Su/,porl Facilities 

In the Spring of HISS th e three brigades of the divisi on were 

located in the Delta area: the 3rd Brigad e was loca ted in Long An 

Province in lhe III Corps Tacti ca l Zone, a very rich province south 

of Saigon; the 2<1 Brigade (Riveri ne Force) was loca ted primarily 

aboard ship hut was headquartered at Dong Tam with its primary 

focus lO\\'ard Kien I-I oa Province. IV Corps Tactical Zone. long a 

Viet Cong stronghold ; and the 1st Brigade was loca ted in Dinh 

TlIong Province. IV Corps Tactical Zone. with the job of keeping 

open H ighway 4, the cri ti ca l life line for food suppli es between th e 

delta and Saigon. On the othe r hand, the Di vision Headq uarters 

with the majorilY of the Suppo rt Command an d almost all of the 

TABLE J3-CoMBAT En' ICIENC\' EXCHANGE R ATIO 01-" TOTAL ENEMY 

ELIMIS,\ TED TO U.S. KILU.U I:" ACTIO:" 

J"II%8 1>« 1%8 J,n 196'1 'lor 1969 Al'r 1969 

t3.6:1 18.6: I 15.6:1 80.9: I 84.8:t 43"':1 
O PTIM IZING ARMY ,\VIATION A!lSETS 71 

C H ART Co~II'AIUSO"" ACTUAL \'S CoMI'UTW ( BASE PERIOI) AII.CII

A UGUST 19G5) Vu:.' Co;o.;G EU.\II:"1ATEI) 1;0.; AIII.~I08ILE OI>ERATIONS 

DECEM8ER 1968 T l lkU ..\'lAY 1969 

2~r------------------------------------. 

1:10 

.... . - \ ..... _.... . . 

"'ool-----+__ ---'-\ 1:20 

II 

\ 

, 

, 

\ -+ 

COMPUTED 

VC ELIMINATED 

I ..... ~", / , . / , \...... , .. , ..... ( \ :0 , . » , . 

" .........-. i .. I I . 0 , • I 

1:30 

o 

• 

btO " :!: 

, • 

• 

~ 

" 1:50 iii: 

• , I /1 "5 i----:' 

I . • / j I. ~ .' ~ I I. ~ __ ----! - 1:60 II: 

I \ ~ I 

i. i I 

I .- ____ ;- ~ 1:10 

'.--- -!.------11:90 

L __ ...L __ -' ___ .l.. _________ ..J1:90 

'"' .. 0" 

.. "" " '" " 

M" 

" '" " 

M" 

" 

aviation assetS were located at Bearcal some 15 miles northeast of 

Saigon. This presemed major di ffiCII lties. The overl and supply 

rou te !;el\\'een Beareal and Dong Tam took 5 to 6 hours since all 

ve hicles were required to go through Saigon. Even by air it was a 

45 mi nu te helicopter flight. Thus our logistica l and support op· 
72 SHARPEN ING TH E COMBAT EDGE 

erations were very inerlic ient in that we were operating on anything 

but interior li nes. 

In lhe summer of 1966, long before the 9th Division arrived in 

Vietnam, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, became convinced of the need for a base camp to be establ ished in (he Mekong 

Delta to support tactical operations in order to deny th e use of the 

area as an established refuge to the enemy. 

Specific criteri a with rega rd to site selection were esta blished. 

The base camp had to be deep within Viet Cong territory to allow 

ma ximum disruption of enemy operations. The land, abOllt 600 

acres, had to be sparsely poplilated so as to be readily available to 

the United Slates with minimum reseulement. Ready access to the 

system of waterways, which are the Delta's major lines of communications, was req uired for plan ned' use hy the Riverine Forces. 

These criteria could not be mel by existing areas, so it was 

decided to constnlct an adequate area by hydraulic fi ll utili zing 

pipe line dredges. The site chosen was a rice paddy located at the 

junction of the Kinh Xang Canal and t he Song My Tho. 8 kilometers west of My Tho. The Objecti ves of the dredging operation 

which commenced ill August 1966 were to dredge a 54 acre turning 

basin ca pable of handling up to LST type naval craft and to provide 

hydra ulic fill ca pable of elevating the 600 acre tract an average 2.8 

meters. Both of these requirements were met by 29 November 1967 

by which lime 17 million cubic yards of !ill had been dredged. 

Actual construction of the cantonment area began in J anuary 

1967 concurrent with the construction of <l 1500 foot stabilized earth 

la nding stri p. After T et 1968, everything was accel era ted so that by 

July 1968 there was enough construction available at Dong Tam to 

move the 9th Division Headquarters from Bearcat. 

The move of the division from Beal'cat to Dong Tam took place 

over a two month period. Each step was well planned, with 

sOllnd programm ing techniques to insure that operations at both 

locations could be carried on with out any loss of combat effectiveness. ' '''hen the division closed at Dong T am in Jul y 1968, a new 

phase of operations was hera lded. By October. when the heli port 

facilities were finished. we were able to opera te almost compl etel y 

from this centrall y located base. No longer were the Assault Helicopter Com panies and air cavalry units wasti ng approxi matel y two 

bours a day fl ying to and from Bearcat in order to conduct combat 

opera ti ons in the delta. The construction of the port faciliti es enabled ammunition , petroleum and other supplies to be brought 

directly to the Division Support Command and 1st Logistica l Command units supporting the division at Dong Tam. Army and Navy 
OI'TIl\IIZ I NG ARMY AVI ,\TIQN A~SET~ 73 

""'" .. --- ---

logistical back-up in lhe same area enabled beuer (;ommunicat ions 

and enhanced Riverine Operations. Th is relocation to Dong Tam, 

as much as anyth ing else, enhanced lhe division's combat posture. 

The port facilities initially consisting of lhe turning basin 

project, stal'led in March 1967 and completed in December of the 
74 SHARI'ENING THE COl\lUA'I EI)(;I-; 

same year, were ex panded by 1969 to include a sheet pile seawall, a 

LST ramp. a LeU ramp, a pontoon barge finger pier, and storage 

facilities. 

Equally as importalll as the port facilities was the construction of 

th e huge heli copter faci lity which included 21,000 square yards of 

maintenance apron: % I ,000 ga ll ons of fuel storage with a 595 

ga llon pump feeding 24 rdueling points, fully ca pable of handling 

two Assauh Heli copter Companies at once; and 174 helicopter 

revetments sufficient to park two Assault Helicopter Companies and 

two Air Cavalry Troops. The most important aspect of th e new 

heliport was th e five large hangars which enabled our around the 

clock maintenance to he performed. Considering the 2700-hour 

3D-day Assault Helicopter Companies limitations imposed by 

higher headquarters, the move to Dong Tam resulted in an 18 percent increase in fl yi ng hours a\'ai1:tble for comba t operations. 

The 12.500-man Dong Tam cantonment area was officially completed on 15 Jllne 1969. The total expendilUre by Army and Navy 

construction agencies involved approximatel y S8,000,000. The majority of the vertical construction was done by the combat troops 

themselves who. during the period. expended 572. 148 man hours to 

complete 1.005,600 sq uare feet of buildings while at the same lime 

ca rrying on extensi,'c combat missions. The more complex buildings and storage facilities were constructed by Army Engineers who 

also installed a 6,000 kilowatt hardened power plant and distribution system. a 27.000 gallon per hour water purification plant and 

distriblilion system a protected Medi cal Unit Self-Contained 

Transportable (MUS1) hospital faci lit}' and 13.5 miles of cement 

stabili zed roadways. 

The farsightedness o[ General Westmoreland. who personally 

decided to construct this base C,lInp and helped choose the site as 

well as th e name Dong Tam whi ch means "Friendship" in Vietnamese, materiall y assisted the 9th Division in its efforts to help pacify 

the Upper Delta Region. 
CHAPTER IV 

General Background For Battlefield Analysis 

We have mentioned earlier that analytical techniques are useful 

to sub-optimize elements of operati ons. For exampl e, one cannot 

readily describe the major functions involved in pl anning and 

executing a daylight compan y reconnaissance. This would require 

pages of checklists and if done would probably res ult in a mechanical 

operation. However, one could ideal ize and simplify the actual cootact and sub·optimize thal panicu lar sub-program. As one begins to 

move up the scale and improve an opera tion as large and compl ex as 

the opera ti ons of a rei nforced division one has to concentrate on 

essentials or the effort becomes so d iffused that progress is slow and 

erratic. 

The rough rule we used was to concentrate on matters that improved operations, tactics, and intelligence and to let other matters 

go at their own speed. This concentration was pursued with considerable intensity. We also insisted on rapid results. If an area 

needed improvement we would quick fix it on the basis of avai lable 

information and as our data and undcrst;lnding increased kept recycl ing the operation and anal ysis until we were satisfi ed. This 

resulted in a rapid surge of impro\'ement that was very encouragi ng. 

This was somewhat comparable to painting a moving train-instead 

of stabilizing a probl em for analysis we would analyze it dynamicall y. The Operation Safe Step research program previously discussed 

was a good example in that we were able to compress several years 

of normal sequential experimentation and research into a period 

of months hy Illeans of multipl e approaches and plowing panial 

kno\\'ledge back into the project. 

This is a subtle process but most profitable when one gelS the 

hang of it. It depends on /OCIIS and sl)ced-which ill our case meant 

emphasis on operations and tactics. pursuing them with illlensity 

and in a timely manner. 

Of course there is an ever present danger that the analytic 

approach may stifle innova tion. Il is inherently a structu red approach wh ich tends to keep thinking and alternatives within certa in 

frameworks. One can only attempt to keep an open mind on the 
76 SHARl'ENING T HE COM BAT EDGE 

one hand whil e closing in on the more spec ific problems through 

analysis. 

Th is was what we attempted to do as we strove to increase our 

combat efficiency. We wan ted to optimi ze Ollr resu lts by providing 

maximum security withi n OUT area of operations at the least cost in 

lives and equi pment to the soldi ers of the division. These efforts 

d irected towards making Oll r fighting men in the fie ld as efficient as 

possi ble in the performance of their missions depended upon our 

intelligence. tactics, combat operations. and paCification efforts. 

The Problem 

ru mentioned ea rlier, in the big un it period of the Vietnamese 

War (1965- 1967), the North Vie tnamese (and to a lesser extent the 

Viet Con g) evidently felt that they could defea t United States and 

South Vietnamese units in face·to·face combat under favorable 

conditions. During this period, while it was not easy to bring the 

enemy to combat on our terms, it was a manageable problem. In 

mid- or late· 1967 . the Communists went to ground and began to 

re build their units for the T et offensive. This resulted in "evasive" 

tactics by which the Communists devoted the bulk of their energies 

to avoid ing contact. accepting combat only when cornered or when 

the odds looked extremely favorable. During this period the tactics 

whi ch had worked we ll for U.S. units fo r several years became less 

effective. This "evasive" period appeared to end with the T et attacks. 

However, it became apparent later on after T et that the enemy had 

adopted a " high point" policy which ca ll ed for weeks or months of 

"evasion" followed by a short " high point" of attacks. It became 

more and more evident that this enemy tactic or strategy ca ll ed for 

a change in tactics by the friend ly troops. 

In January of 1968. orientation cou rses at Forts Benning. Sill , 

and Rucker still featured ba ttal ion·sized operations. clover lea f 

patrols.' heavy firepower, digging in every night. large (10 to 20 

ship) airmobile assa ults, and so on. It was recogn ized that changes 

were d ue but there was no coherent doctrine nor overa ll concept for 

changing to a more delicate approach. Upon arriva l in Vietnam in 

the Spring of 1968 we intuiti vely sensed that we should change our 

doctrine. but had no clea r·cm idea of \\'hat to do. In February and 

March, the enemy was still tryi ng to capitali ze on the T et attacks, 

so it was relati vely easy to come to grips with him. T here \.,.as 

another high point in May and June. but therea rter (south of 

Saigon at least) the enemy emphasized evasive tactics even more, 

• A Iype of palmi used in jungle growth which fUIUn:d a clover lea l IlOlnern lor 

.urch ing OUt the enemy :lnd ensu ring thorough coverage of Ihe terrain. 
GENERAL BAC KGRO UN D FOR BATTLEFIELD ANALYSIS 77 

and it became most difficult to maintain contact with him. With this 

as a backdrop, the 9th Infantry Division went into the spri ng and 

summer of J 968 looking for a solution-how to bring the enemy lO 

battle on our terms rather than on his terms. ''''e were willing to try 

anything within the limits of common sense and sound military 

judgment. 

If one studi ed the enemy situation pessimistically and realistica ll y, one cou ld theorize that it would take several years to defeat the 

enemy badly enough to render him unable to threaten the security 

of the Vi etnamese people. This phenomenon was mOSt apparent in 

the 9th Division area in Long An Provi nce. Here, U.S. units had 

been weakening the enemy modestly for several years. During T et 

of 1968, however, the enemy was able to attack the province ca pital. 

Although enemy losses were fairly high and the damage to the 

capital minimal, he still had the psychological advan tage of having 

been abl e to mount an allack. In March and April of 1968 he 

avoided contact, rebuilt his units to some degree and in May put 

el ements of fOllr or five battalions into the Mini·T el attacks on 

Sa igon. His casualties were again quite heavy. and in late May and 

June he avoided contact again. controlled his losses, and started to 

rebuild. \-Ve obviously had a real problem-unless we could get hold 

of and damage the enemy, he would come out of hiding every six 

months or so and achieve some successes-hopefully onl y psychological but successes none the less. 

Th e Solutio1l 

The solution arrived at, which took mo nths of trial·and·error experimentation, was to find, encircle, and heavil y damage the enemy 

main force and provincial hattalions. The enemy reacted by 

dispersing into company and platoon sized elements. These were 

then dealt with by lowering the sca le o f friendly operations to 

compan y and platoon size and attacking these small enemy units on 

a continuous basis. This dispersed style of combat led to frequent 

day and night engagements. By stressing light infantry tactics and 

techniques, it was possible to inflict heavy Clllllulative losses on 

these small enemy units with low fri endl y casualties. This favorable 

exchange ratio became more pronounced as the enemy lost experi. 

enced leaders. An unexpected b},.proouct of the dispersed style and 

the constant pressure was that enemy uni 15 at all levels were weak· 

ened, thus reducing their ability to generate replacements from local 

guerrilla units. As a resu lt of the constant heavy military pressure, 

rallier (Chien Hoi) rates also skyrocketed-thus further weakening 

the enemy forces. As the paCification program advanced, the Com· 
78 SHARPEN I NG THE COl\18AT EDGE 

munislS progTcssively lost comrol of the people. South Vietnamese 

territorial forces also became more aggressive. The cumulative effect 

of all these interacting defeats was that the enemy lost strength and 

combat effecti veness geometricall)' rath er than arithmetically. 

All of the above sounds very simple but was achieved only by a 

concerted applica ti on of hard work, professional skill, tight man· 

agemelll, lots of guts. and some luck. Illook from six to nine months 

of tight management to gel the infantry companies in lOp fighting 

shape. Optimum utilization of aviation assets required abOllt six 

months to develop. Aggressive and effective small unit operations 

req uired two months of on-the-job retraining and so 011. The two 

major breakthroughs were the result of sheer professional artistry. 

The rapid breaking down of the enemy battalions was the res ult of 

the perfection of both the Jitterbug and the seal-and·pile-on technique (the rapid build-up of combat power to surround and destroy 

an enemy force) by Colonel Henry E. "Hank" Emerson. These 

highly complex tactics. in the hands of a master, shattered many large 

enemy units. The effective use of aggressive small unit opera tions 

was demonstancd as feasible hy Captain fi ael Peck J r., an 

infantry company commander. By capitalizing on his example. we 

were able to hreak the enemy compan ies down. Thereafter. hy 

close observation and analysis of results, we were able to vary our 

tactics and techniques and continue to plll heavy pressure 011 the 

enemy. 

The CO/ulan I PreJlllre CUI/Upt 

""' hen one first observes the fighting in Vietnalll. there is a 

tendency to assume that lhe current tactics arc about right and that 

previous tactics were rather uninspired ir not wrong. The first 

conclusion is probably correct. the second is probably wrong. For 

example, one hears much criticism of lhe Search and Destroy Opera· 

tions which were extensively IIsed in 1967 and before. However. if 

one looks at the situation then existing and what \\'as actually done, 

the tactio; were pretty well chosen and did the job. Any reasonably 

effective commander. after observing the enemy operate a while, 

can cope with him reasonabl y \\·cll. The difficult task was to dec ide 

how the enemy was going to change his operations. to anticipate his 

change, and then keep driving him down . and thereby preserve the 

initiative. T his requires very clear thinking. some risk-ta king, and 

a fl exible approach. 

Our experience in the 9th Division illustrates the process well. 

When our uni ts were first introduced into the delta. the practice 

(for a variety of sound reasons) was to make strong battalion or 
GENERAL UACKGROUI\:D FOR BATTLEFIELD ANALYSIS 79 

multi-ba ttal ion sweeps followed by periods of lower level friendly 

activity. The enemy was pretty cocky and would attempt to block 

these s"'eeps into his long-time base areas and suffered heavy losses 

in the process. By the spring of 1968. he had decided to evade such 

sweeps whenever possihle and as a restlll became more difficuh to 

bring to battle. However. by a process of vigorous reconnaissance 

through both Jitterhugging and ground patrolling, we were able to 

find these evading units. encircle them, and deal them vcry damaging blows. 

''''Ilile the division was spread Ollt over a large area and largely 

made up of three company battalions. each encircl ement required a 

peaking of effort (with all availabl e compani es committed) followed by a stand-down period to rest and refit. This allowed the 

enemy to regroup somewhat. and his losses were damaging but 

manageable from his viewpoin t. To put it differently. while his 

losses in trai ned personnel were damagi ng. he was able to replace a 

sizable proportion of his losses wit h new recruits. On the other 

hand. as he dispersed his units, his command and control mechanism 

was red uced in efliciency. alld resupply hecflme 1IIore difficult. 

When the division reached its full strength , it was possible to put 

the pressure on the enemy continuously and conduct small encirclements with tl'OOpS on hand. This resulted in man y small contacts and a constant dra in on the enemy. both in qual it)' and quantit), with wh ich he could not cope. The loss of leaders was particuENCIRCLEMENT 
80 SHARPEN ING THE COMBAT EDGI:-: 

Jul y crippling. Eventuall y, the enemy became so disorganized that 

small friendly units could just overrun the enemy and encirclements 

were no longer necessary. [For some unknown reason, enemy 

artillery (mortar) units were much morc difficult to neutralize than 

the infantry.] 

T his process sounds rather mechanical; however, the decision to 

break down to company and pl atoon level operations took real 

courage. One Tall the risk of having a company overrun occasionally 

by an enemy battalion. However. luckil y for us, by the time the 

enemy realized what was happening to him, he had been too badly 

damaged to do anything but break down further into platoons and 

ultimately into squads. 

CHART 7-PAITERN 01<' ENEMY LoSSES R ESULTING FROM SWEEPS 

l.llI. I I 

hlll.l, 

,UII,I .. II' 

Ulirl 

"nl 

IIIUI 

'n 

'" 

'n 

I I •• 

'" 

'n 

WUII IF FIlEULY mUTIus 

I .... 

SIII'·'III 

ml' LUSES [IHE.IIUI 1(fE1SE 1 

ml' LISSU [mSlY( leTI .. 1 

1I" ll h,1 
CENERAL BACKGROUND FOR BATfLEFIELD ANALYS IS 81 

This process is graphically ponrayed in Charts 7 and 8. The first 

chan indicates the friendly offensive effort associated with large 

sweeps. Because of the large numbers of troops participating in a 

sweep, there were periods of intense activity followed by prolonged 

stand·down periods. If during a sweep the enemy chose to stand and 

fight, his losses could be high. Naturally enemy losses would fall off 

during the periods or stand·down. J{ the enemy chose to evade, he 

CHART 8-1)ATJ"ERN OF ENEMY LossES RESULTINC FROM 

RECONNAISSA"'CE rO OE 

'IIHIM I f fIIEUl' mUTlus (J c,l,m IIIIILIII( 

'Iillll, 1111 

1111111" 

lUll! 

."., I.,." 

'" 

1., ___ .-

1111 ml'lInES 

\ ,,,.. r I/< ,-----~ 

~ 

PlIIln If fllUILI IPEUTlm Arm flltE IlmnlUIS 

1,,, 1t.. .0II;

II " 11 11 I L ________________________ _ 

Will r-

,., 

'n L ________________________ _ 

II" 

EIEI' lIms 

I III 

'" I 

h . L ___________ -,-____________ _ 

to,1 
82 SH ARPENI NG THE COM HAT EDGE 

normally could side-step large unit opera tions and his losses even 

at the peak of the sweep would not be very high. On the other hand, 

when we went to the reconnaissance mode of operations (Chari 8) I 

covering large areas on a daily basis. friendly offensive efforts were 

generally mail1lained at a mediu m intensity, although from time to 

time in an encirclement lhe level of activity peaked. The enemy's 

losses were also about medium level. As we refined OUT tactical operations, fighting night and day. and gained our full strength through 

force improvements, the level of frien dl y offensive effort became 

constan tly high with few perturbations. As a consequence. the level 

of the enemy losses went even higher and they were constant, 

damaging the enemy so rapidl y that his units deteriorated steadily 

and could not recover. 

The Theoretical Basis 0/ the CO'lslatlt Pressure Concept 

The Constalll Pressure Concept paid off in cold results: however, in retrospect, its real strength was that it largely disru pted a 

Commun ist conce pt of operations which had proven successful 

since the early days of the Indoch inese 'Var. 

The classic method of operating for a Communist unit (North 

Vietnamese Army or Viet Cong) was to take refuge in a relatively 

secure base area and spend sOlll e wee ks reorganizing. retraining. and 

replacing losses of men. materiel and supplies. During this period, 

it would c..'Ire full y plan a set-piece attack on a government unit or 

objective and then execute the attack with the aClUal movemelll to 

the attack. the attack itself. and the wit hdrawal taking place in a 

short peri od of three or four nights 01' Jess. If the attack, du e to this 

careful preparation or other reasons, was reasonably successful. the 

government strength and con fidence dropped and the more confident enemy recycled the whole procedure. 

,"Vith the Constant Pressure Concept, fri endl y un its upset this 

enemy timetable. By means of constant reconnaissance, sma ll engagements with enemy units and pressure on their bases. the Communists were no longer able to rest 25 days a month ; they could not 

refit and retra in and eventuall y could not even plan new attacks very 

well. much less execute them. 

This process is ,'ery d ifficult to measure in any finite way. 

However, as a rough estimate. if the fri endl y forces (all types) in 

an area can diminish the enemy about 5 percent a month and achieve 

a friendly-initiated to enemy-initiated contaCt ratio of 3 to I, the 

friendlies have the initiative and the enemy slowly goes down h ill. 

In this situa ti on. pacification proceeds and compounds the enemy's 

difficulties by separating him from the people who had previously 
CENER/\L IJACKCROUND FOR 8ATrL£FIELU ANALYSIS 83 

helped him (willingly or unwillingly) by fmnishing recruits, food, 

labor, information, etc. 

The best performance ever seen to my knowledge was in Long 

An Pro"ince where in 1969 and 1970 the friendly forces were able, 

months on end, to weaken the enemy about 10 to 15 percent a month 

and achi eve a contact ratio of about 6 to I. This paralyzed and 

eventually almost d isintegra ted the enemy, even though the Cambodian sa nctuaries were nea rby. This mi.litary pressure, coupled 

with a dynamic and most effective pacification program led by 

Colonel Le Van Tu , a superb prov ince chief. hrought Long An 

from a highly contested to a relative ly pacified arca in about two 

years. This was the pcrfect strategy-excruciating direct military 

pressure coupled with strong pacificati on hilling the enemy from 

the rear. The Cambodian operation , by denying the enemy a 

secure base, \\'as the coup de grace. 

Thus. by adopting tactics which not only bled the enemy, bUl 

worked against his classic method of operating, one could make 

impressive gains. This approach, while vcry obvious in retrospect, 

was not clearly seen at the time and was arrived at by trial and 

error. It required a high degree of tactical skill by the regu lar 

units (U.S. or South Vi etnamese). When coupled with a substantial 

increase in Regional Force and Popular Force units to maintain 

reasonable and continuous loca l territorial control and security. 

the Communists steadil y lost grou nd. 

In all fairness it should be admitted that we rather backed into 

this solution. Prior to om beginning to keep detailed sta tistics on 

combat results. we thought that our larger engagements were the 

payoff and the smaller just a bonus. However. as one observed the 

statistics dose ly. it became apparent that the aggregate results from 

small Contacts were quite important. Once we began to stress sma ll 

unit operations. it \vas established that the great majority of the 

enemy losses (80 percent to 90 percent) came in very small contacts 

with medium or la rge contacts amounting to a smaller percentage 

(20 percent to JO percent). We then began to realize that the 

supermarket approach of la rge lUrno\'er with small unit profit paid 

off much more than the old neighborhood grocery approach of sma ll 

turn over with a large markup. This particular solution was even 

more necessary in the upper delta than might have been the case 

elsewhere. as the enemy was constantl y in motion over the open 

terrain rather than hidden in large jungle-covered secre t base areas. 

This made constant press ure a necessity. 

It is interesting to observe the South Vietnamese experience by 

way of contrast. The South Vietnamese were rather cautious (with 
84 :'~IA Rl' EN NG TH E COMBAT EDGE 

good reason-they and the Viet Cong had historically taken turns 

decimating a battalion or two every six months or so). They 

planned big multi-ba ttalion sweeps and coordinated them with 

all agencies. As a resuh the Viet Cong not only had general knowledge of their plans due to leaks. but the tactica l plan was usually a 

highly stylized attack of the French staff school variety. As a result 

the Viet Cong could usually sidestep the operation. (We sometimes 

obtained moderate returns by sending units along the edges of a 

South Vietnamese operation to pick up the evading Viet Cong 

units.) We avoided similar security problems by obtaining large 

operational areas for periods of lime and telling no one what we 

had in mind. Once a South Vietnamese unit changed to a looser 

style and minimized leaks, its effectiveness rose perceptibly. 

A more fundamental reason for the success of the Constant Pressure Concept plus pacification was thal it upset the entire Maoist 

method of organizing the "masses" and if done we ll over time 

forced them to reverse the traditional Maoist three phase concept. 

If one looks at Chart 9 of the Communist structure, one can 

visualize the way in which the Viet Cong made the people (the 

sa.called masses) support the bulk of the war effort. The people 

were forced to do all the work, furnish the food , intelligence, labor, 

and the raw recru its. Each Communist level supported the one 

above, and if a lower level unit such as a district company was in 

trouble , a larger and higher level un it was hrought in to rectify 

the situation. 

Historically, after 1954, the Communists organized the people, 

went into gu errilla war, and in 1964 and 1965 went into the open 

warfare stage and with North Vietnamese help were making real 

progress until U.S. units were introduced and began regularly to 

defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army main forces. In an 

effort to stop this series of defeats. the enemy attacked the cities in 

Tel of 1968. The Tel battles were supported in many areas by drawillg hea vil y on the lower levels for replacements for main force 

units. The heavy losses incurred seriously weakened the underl ying 

structure. 

By usi ng the Constant Pressure Concept to inflict losses through· 

out this wea kened strllcture, Commun ist ability to u pgrade units 

and personnel was hampered. The heavy military pressme generated hundreds of ralliers (Chieu Hoi) who primarily came from 

the linking layers of local (village and hamlet) guerrillas and 

sympathi zers and helpers. The linking mechanism then began to 

fray. As the pacification program weill imo high gear (in 1969) and 

provided more constant loca l security. the people in general were 
GENERAl.. BACKGROUN D FOR UATrl..EFIELD ANALYSIS 85 

CHART 9- TIIE CoMMUNIST STR UCTURE 

DISTRICT COMPANIES 

VILLAGE AND HAMLET 

GUERRILLAS 

vc Int.aSI'u~tU ••. s ympa th in.s. helpl",. etc. 

THE PEOPLE 

able to draw away from the Viet Cong or in the case of traditional 

Communist areas were prevented from helping them. This was a 

drastic shift from (he Communist point of view. ' '''hereas previously 

the Communist units only rested, (ra ined and fought, they now had 

to support themselves. Th is resulted in a .seri ous drop in their combat capabil ity. If military pressure was heavy and pacification 

dynamic at the same time. the enemy structure underwent a 

collapsing effect. If the pressure was maintained for a year or two, 

the structure almost disintegrated. It took considerable skill and 

patience ( 0 bring this development about. 

The first sign of enemy trouble was the introduction of North 

Vietnamese Army fill ers into Vi et Cong battalions; large numbers of 

ralliers was another sign of trouble, fri endly pacification progress 

another, and rapid erosion of all units was a very bad sign. Central 

Office of South Vietnam Resolution Number 9 which stressed a 
86 SHARP EN ING THE COMBAT EOCE 

ret urn to low-level operations (terror, anti-pacification, etc.) was 

the formal admission by the North Vietnamese High Command 

that they were in real trouble , as it reversed the Maoist doctrine. 

Man y Westerners cannot understand why the SOllth Vicnamese 

situation should have been greatly different in 1970 than in 1967 

or 1968. However. if one assumes that the CommunisLS controlled 

half the rura l population . no matler how imperfectly, in 1967 and 

the SOllth Vietnamese government, which was just organ izing, to 

some extent controlled the other half-we can sec that the power 

balance in the l"lITai areas was fairl y even. In 1970 the Communists 

were in some disarray and had lost control of most of the rural 

population. T he government had made considerable strides, had 

gone to ge neral mobi li za tion, and con troll ed most of the TUTal 

people plus the ci ti es reasonably well. As a res ult the government was 

some millions of people stron ger and the enemy the same number 

weaker. 

In summary, the Constalll Pressure Concept \"hile inflicting 

heavy damage on Ihe enemy struck directly at the basic Communist 

concept of operation and at their method of orga ni zing their entire 

apparatus. It thus caused many problems for the Communists when 

well exeCl! ted. 

ltlcretlsillg Emphasis ~I OUemive OPerations 

It is. of course. a military ll'llism that offensive operations are 

more effective than defensive operations. However. this principle 

was somewhat blurred during the earlier years of the Vietnamese 

war by the willingness of the enemy. particularly the North Vietna· 

mese, to try to overrun fire snpport bases. thereby losing several 

hundred men in a few hOUTS. In the delta aTea, however, the enemy 

was less prone to attack fortified positions (particularly U.S. ones), 

so this situation did not exist to the same extent. 

After some informal checkin g around . it was found that the gen· 

era l pattern in late 1967 to early 1968 was that offensive operations 

produced modest results and defensive opera tions little, except for 

an occasional defense of a fire support base aga inst a strong attack. 

After some thought and analysis. a vcry simpl e report was devised 

which allowed the division and brigade commanders to keep a 

running accounl of the number of compan y days and nights of 

effort on offensive and defensive operations. This report confirmed 

that about one·hal f or more of the combat troops in the division 

were on security, stand·down, tra ining. OT other missions which 

did not contribute positively to finding and defeating the enemy. 
K EEPI1\'<> T HE P RESSURE ON 
88 SI-IARI' EN I:-':G TI-IE COr. II ~AT EDGE 

The night percentages of defensive effort were even higher. These 

results were quite understandable since the average unit was assigned, either directly or indirectly, a number of missions such as 

find-and-a ttack the enemy, guard a bridge. secure a road, protect a 

fire support base, Test tired troops. perfoml training. etc. There was 

a tendency to assign a reasonable force to each defensive mission to 

lessen the risk. As a result, the offensive missions got what was left, 

unless a big operation was underway. The tendency towards defensive effort was even more marked at night due to the proclivity 

of the Communists for night ;m acks. By lumping all of the missions 

toge ther in a continuing report, the degradation of offensive effort 

became more apparent and all commanders and staffs began to work 

to optimi ze the offensive effon. Correcting this defensive tendency 

required deliberate defensive risks in order to increase offensive 

effort. An atta inabl e goal (and floor) of 60 percent of all units 

committed to offensive operations was set. Units tended to float 

between 60 percent plus and 75 percent-66 percent being a reasonable average figure for offensive operations. After several months. 

this control measure was not rea ll y necessary for daytime operations 

but was retained to impress the concept on new commanders and to 

permit the night rate to be observed. The night offensive rate took 

much longer to bring up. 

Some people thought this approach was so basic as to be ri· 

diculous. however the technique was adopted by a division which 

had too few men committed to offensive operations and was having 

extreme difficulty in find ing the enemy. At first, the di vision offensive rate was between 40 and 50 percen t; after corrective action it 

rose to over 66 percent. In more concrete terms. it had previously 

averaged about 17 companies per day 0 11 offense and rose to about 

26-al1 increase of 50 percent in offensive effort hom the same force. 

Obviously. th is change alone did not necessaril y solve its problems 

but it helped. 

The end result was that the rifle compani es of the 9th Division 

spent approx imately two-thirds of their time in the fi eld on offensive 

operations. Everything else-security, rest, care and maintenance of 

equipment, training. etc.--came out of the remaining one·third. 

This kept the men very busy but still allowed them sufficient rest to 

be fresh for operations. It must be admitted that we could not confirm that this measure in itself led to better results. However. the 

principle involved was obviously so sound that it was retained to 

point us in the right direction. 
GENERAL UACKGRO U-" U FOR BATI'LEFIELU ANALYSIS 89 

Company Lt:vt:l OPt:ntliOIlS 

In the spring of 1968 in Dinh Tuong Province, one of the 

companies was commanded hy Captain Peck-a superb small unit 

tactician and leader. As he began to fragment, and the enemy battalions and contactS were more difILcult to come by, he-mainly on his 

own initiative-started aggressive company and platoon sized operations with dramatic results. Not onl y did he terrorize the enemy and 

dea l them heavy casua lties. but his own casualties were quite light. 

This suggested the need to ex pand such techniques and the 

resul ts were promising. Occasionally, a company or platoon was 

roughly handled, hUl as we developed more skill and the enemy's 

skill level dropped , we were ahle to employ aggressive or even auda· 

cious small unit operati ons with almost total success. 

By March of 1969 we never. or almost never, lIsed battalion level 

sweeps or encirclements but used company or platoon level opera· 

tions. This, of course, multiplied our coverage of the grou nd. our 

reconnaissance effon, and our contact possibilities by an order or 

magnitude of roughly:~ (I battalion equals ~ companies on offen· 

•• 

FLlU:FIGIiT 
90 SHARPENI NG THE COMBAT EDGE 

sive effort). In addition, the enemy seemed unable to figure out 

this dispersed styl e of operations and he was never able to cope with 

it. If he concentrated to strike a compan y, we encircled him: if he 

dispersed. th e platoons Qvenan the small enemy clements. 

Obviollsly. this approach was very sensitive to the level of tactical 

skill , and we 50011 found that some platoon leaders or company 

commanders did not do well with iL. By a combination of observation and analysis, we found th at the utilization of artillery was 

critica l. The Standing Operating P roced ure approach for developing 

a contact was to bring in artill ery fire and then start a nanking 

maneuver. This resulted in a five to ten minute delay during which 

time the enemy was able to slip away. ' Ve finally hit on the idea of 

starting the maneuver at once (ba ttl e drill style) and then bringing 

in the artillery. if necessary. This very simpl e fix was most effecti ve. 

It. in effect. reduced the enemy's escape time fTom five to ten 

minutes to two to five minutes. whi ch was not enough for his 

purposes. 

Etlemy Night AUflcks 

It was customary in Vietnam. particularly in the jungle. to stop 

moving in mid or latc aftcrnoon . resupply. and dig in a hastil y 

fortified position . We noted relatively few night attacks in the delta. 

and it was almost impossible to dig in due to the high water table, 

so we changed. We either did not resupply or did it in late afternoon. kept going until dark, and shifted to night ambushes after 

dark. This simple trick eliminated enemy night mortar attacks and 

almost all night au acks. In a few tough areas, it did not work quite 

as well until we guessed the enemy was tailing our units. After we 

made stlre to shake or kill the tails by stay-behind ambushes, this 

stopped. 

Loar! oj Ihe ~oldier 

It was apparent that an infantryman in the delta mud and 

hea t suffered terribly from bo th heat and fatigue. The Aak jacket 

was a primary cause. After anal yzing wound data and flak jacket 

saves, we determined we were not saving man y casualties by their 

lise and, as a result, made the wea ring of Rak jackets optional. Some 

ex perts felt that the gai n in mobil ity paid off in beller results with 

few consequent casualties although this was never clearly estab· 

lished. E\'en in hea\·jly booby-trapped areas, one could get by with 

using jackets on lead men anI)'. By rotaling lead men, the fatigue 

elemenl could be held down. ' Ve did 1I0 t direcl the abandonment 

of Oak jackets. however, as some peo ple derived considera bl e 
G£N£R,\L lIACKGROUNIl FOR IIATrL£FI£LI> ANALYSIS 91 

psychological assurance from them. Due to the fact that our men 

were only out twO days and could usuall y be resupplied easily. we 

also reduced the individua l load to a bare minimum by reducing 

ammun ilion loads and other paraphenalia. The theory was to get 

the men to the battle fresh. Perhaps not all individual riflemen 

would agree. 

'It·., , 

'Y" "', .. ' 

;. 

LoAU 0"- TilE SOLUIEN. 
92 SHARPEN ING THE COMB,\T EDGE 

We also reduced the unit loads somewhat. Due to the muddy 

delta terra in , the heavier crew-served weapons were very difficult 

to utili ze and actually were not really necessary as artillery support 

was almost always avai lable. Eventually, we did away almost entirely with 4.2·inch (I07-mm) mortars and SI-mm mortars. This 

made the foot elements more mobile and fre ed heavy weapons men 

for other missions- usuall y as members of a reconnaissance unit. 

Preparatiml 0/ La"ding Zones 

Il has been customary in Vietnam for some time to deliver heavy 

preparatory fires on the vegetation cover around a landing zone in 

order to reduce the amOllnt of enemy fire at the choppers and at the 

tToops. This practice was essential in some places. desirable in 

others. and questionable elsewhere. The preparation might involve 

gunships. tactical air, and artillery and took from five to fifteen 

minutes, depending on th e amount considered necessary and the 

compl exity of the fire pl an. As our contacts began to drop in 1967 

and 1968, we examined this practice critically. We finally judged 

that th e enemy had \'ery few .50 ca liber machine guns in any case 

and intuitively guessed that the lime used for th e "prep" was 

alerting the enemy and a ll owing him to evade. So we cautiously 

experimented with airmobile operations without llsing preps. After 

finding we received very little fire, we changed the Standing Operating Proced ure 1800 • No preps were used unless the commander felt 

the situation demanded it. This worked well- we had to go back to 

standard preps only in one place-a very tough area where we had 

one whole lift shot up due to a sloppy light prep. Not only did the 

no-prep policy increase our element of surprise , but it saved artillery 

ammunition, air strikes, and gunships for more lucrative targets. 

The biggest bonus was to relie\'e the air cavalry gunships so they 

could work with their parent troop. The lift ship gunships initially 

overwatched the insertion so they could inten'ene if necessary. After 

some weeks, we noti ced that the enemy was "leaking" out of the area 

as soon as the lift ships bega n to land. \Ve then shifted the gunships 

to watch th e outside rather than th e inside of the insertion area. 

This not onl y cost the enemy casualties, but held them in place. As a 

result we had, over a period of months, essentially turned the landing zone preparation around. 

Inse rtion Distance 

The original approach in open della terra in had been to land 

our assa ult hel icopter lifts 600 to 1,000 meters from the objective 
GENERAL UACKGROUN I> FOR ~A nL FI LU ANA LYSIS 93 

In order to minimize the effect of direct fire on aircraft and infantry. This meant that it took the troops an apprecia ble time and 

physica l effon to make their way th rough the rice paddi es to the 

objecti ve. A{ter observing the low incidence of enemy .50 caliber 

machine guns, we cut the distance to 500 to 600 meters and observed 

no problems. After a few weeks, we reduced it to 300 meters (based 

on effcctive rifl e fi re and light machine gun range) and had few 

problems. Th is reduced the approach mal'ch time by two-thirds to 

one-half and increased surprise. By the combination of eliminating 

preps and reducing the standoff distance. we increased surprise and 

lessened troop fa tigue. 

L1 ter on in 19(i9 the 3d Brigade of the 9th Division in Long An 

reduced their standoff distance to as little as 15 meters. T he enemy 

by that time had little but AK-47 rifles to work with. This short 

distance W;'lS ideal, as surprise was almost total and only one or two 

enemy could fire at a panicular chopper. Usua ll y, they elected to 

hide instead. 

D iSCIIJJi011 

Wh y did it take us so long to decide on va n atlons that were 

obviollsly such good ideas? T he situati on was not crystal clear at the 

time. T o begin with . the previous Stand ing Operating Procedure 

(liberal prepping and substantia l stand o ff distance) was adopted 

duri ng ;1 period when the enemy res ponse to all airmobi le assault 

was a withering ha il of fire from nil weapons, and a vigoro us defense 

until nightfall. when he made good his escape. When the enemy 

changed to evasive tactics. he began to lie doggo and try to avoid 

COlllaCt with a view to escaping in daylight or at nighl depend ing on 

the amount of concea lment :l\'a ilahle. If the friendl y unit made 

contact. the enemy opened fi re at very dose ranges (perhaps 15 

feet) which usuall y led to a costly. difficul t. and time·consuming 

orga niza ti on of an attack from a different direction. An examination of exchange rat ios dn ring the spring and summer of 1968. 

ratios wh ich were around 10 to I. shows thaI we were having difficulty with these cnemy tactir_'i. If one drove head on into a heavily 

bunkered position. (riendly Glsllaiti es were high: and if one maneuvered . the ell emy slipped a\\'ay. Fortunately. al this junctu re, the 

Jitterbug technique. which had a high success rale in finding enemy 

units. and the seal and pil e·on tnctic which prevented escape and 

inflicted crippling losses on enelll y units were perfected. The overall 

result was that the enemy un its hegan to fragmen t. At that point. 

the changes in landing zone prepping and insertion distance began 

to be more adva ntageous and paid off in increased enemy elimina-
94 SUARI'ENING THE COl\UJ/\T EI)G ~ 

lions and higher exchange ratios. So, as we have stated earlier, the 

solu ti on to a tactical problem was not necessarily simple or straight. 

forward. 

One difficulty encountered in analyzing such complex operations 

was that olle did not understand the critical points involved. The 

whole desired effect of cbanging the prepping and standoff Standing 

Operating Procedures was to increase surprise and consequently the 

closure rate. If one assumed that the tola l closure lime was sixty 

minutes originally and was able to reduce it to thirty minutesnothing in particu lar happened. ,,,That was overlooked was that the 

enemy only needed an escape envelope of tell to fifteen minutes. It 

was not Ullli l we achieved the technical skill and took the risks to 

effect lightning fast fromal aLlacks that the critical enve lope was 

penetrated and the sliccess ratio climbed to high levels. There were 

man)' other fa ctors involved. discussion of which must be omitted 

due to length. 

SI/mmary 

The foregoing ge neral discnssion gives you some feel of the 

problems faced , some of the solutions. and our thinking behind 

these actions. To summarize succinctly the 9th Division evolved 

differing tactics and techniques which basica lly involved the theory 

of conSlam pressure through offensive actions using small units 

operating night and clay. 

T he key to ground tactical success was hreaking down into sma ll 

unit operations. panicularly at night. "Ve passed 0 11 this formula to 

the 7th ARVN Division which operated with us in the delta. It 

proved at that time to he a shot in the arm for their combat effi· 

ciency also al though they were more reluctant to break down into 

small units because of some hiller experiences earlier in the war. 

Finally, the key to alt of ollr tactical success was good intelligence. 

without which even the most refined techn iques would have been 

substantially less productive. 

In all of oLlr operations we applied as best we could the analytical approach to 0111' prohlems. The technique employed was to 

isolat.e those pieces of the prohlem which could be analyzed. The 

remainder had to be allacked primarily by means of professiona l 

skill . experience. judgmclll and often intuition . The overa ll integrati on always had to be done Oil this basis. Even in areas such as small 

unit techniques which on the surface responded we ll to analysis. the 

actual cause and effect relationShips could not be traced with any 

real confidence. However, as has been mentioned earlier, the Vietna· 

mese 'Var was, and is rather complex, murky, and difficult to under· 
GENERAL BACKGROUNI) FOR 8A'ITL EFIELD ANALYSIS 95 

stand. It should also be recogn ized that man y aspects of the war are 

too compl ex to be suscepti ble to operations analysis. Fi eld force, 

division. brigade and battalion operations, for example. are juSl too 

compl ex to completel y comprehend by analytical methods. These 

comments should not d isco urage au empts to improve opera tions 

by ana lysis or otherwise: wc merely make the obvious po int that the 

human mind Co1 1l gras p large probl ems by some means which are 

difficult or impossible to dupli cate on paper. 

Straightrorward collection of statisti cs has its pitfalls also. This 

approach leads toward optimizing the o perati on hcing studi ed. 

While this is obviollsly desirable as a rule, it may tend to stifle in· 

novation and IIncoll ventionalthinking. For example. one good way 

to improve the effectiveness of da)'li ght opera tions is to improve 

night operations. The theory is that the cnemy is thereby forced to 

opera te more frequently in the daytime. However, this cannot be 

proven. III defendi ng aga inst booby traps one rapidl y getS up in the 

Aa t ponion of the learn ing curve. A good way to fin esse the problem 

was to rei), heavil y on night ambushes. The overall outcome was 

better results with less booby trap casualties. However. this alterna· 

ti ve obviously did not stem from a close anal ysis of the bobby trap 

problem. A simil ar lOm around of interest was the reversa l of roles 

of airmobile operations and ground operations. In mid 1968 the 

Jitlerbug (intensive small un it airmobile reconnaissance) was 

drh'ing dayli ght operations with ground patrolling a poor second. 

However, by early 1969. ground patrolling became more and 

marc importa nt and the J illerbu g less so. Similarl y. the air cavalry 

role switched from one of findi ng targets fot' the Jitterbug to that of 

attacking targetS flushed out b)' the ground patrols. It is theorized 

that the Ji tterbug became so feared that the enemy would never 

break cover unless physicall y cont:lcted whereas the ground p,ltrol 

was so unexpected (a nd more thorough) that he could not accommodate to it. 

To give a hetter insight into our approaches to improving opera· 

tional efficiency through anal ysis. we wi ll subsequentl y discuss 

several of our fundamental bu ilding blocks, i.e .. intelligence. tactica l 

innovations and operational reviews. 
CHAPTER V 

The I ntelligence Function 

Our tactical operations were at all times oriented on the enemy. 

his political as well as his military organizations. with less emphasis 

on terrain or geographical consider,niolls. To maintain this ori en tation all division tactical opera tions were undertaken with intelligence operating as the pivotal point. Int elligence was and remained 

the chief targeting device ror the employmclll of combat assets. 

This concept had two major sal utary effects: first, th e application 

of unremitting military and psychologic .. ! pressure on tlt e enemy at 

;tHlevels; and second. the econom ica l employment of limited tactical 

assets on enemy units without dissipating them on a mechanic..11 

area coverage b<lsis. 

Within the division the illlelligcnce theme initially was the 

centra li zation and control of 311 intelligence assets followed subsequently by decentralization to the lowest echelon capable of operating the asset. Initial control of these assets at division level was 

necessary to bring a particular inte lligence source into operating 

harmony with the division wncepL Once this was accomplished the 

source was turned over to the appropria te brigade or battalion. In 

all cases a req llirement was maintained for rapid and accurate 

reporting up and down the intelligence chain. 

/ lIlelligplIl' SIi/Jporl 

External intelligence support for the division was received from 

the SOllth Vietnamese Arm)' and U.S. intelligence units in III and 

IV Corps Taclic.'il Zone. depending 011 the area in which these units 

provided dedicated coverage. External sources while pl entiful in 

Ilumber and diverse in nature were. in many cases. not co-ordinated 

in their activities and lIot always oriented toward satisfying the 

intelligence needs of tactical units. The reason for this problem was 

that the systems in lise were not initi all)' designed for passing "real 

time" intelligence bllt rather for reporting enemy activity which 

was hours and even days old. (Chari 10) The thrust of the division 

intelligence eHon became one of co-ordinating and managing all 

of th ese sources 10 respond to the tactica l requirements of the 
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98 SHARPENING THE COMIl/\T EDGE 

division and to pass their highly perishable intelligence as close to 

real time as possible. enabling the division to operate agai nst valid 

targets. Although these efTons resulted in substantial improvements in the system, th ey \\'crc never completely successful. The 

large number of intelligence units involved made compl ete coordi nation a nearly impossible task. (Table /1) T he detection and 

compression of intelligence lime lags through analysis is much more 

important than generally realized. Unquestionably. real lime inte l· 

ligence information really pa ys off. 

The Division '"lelfigefl ce FllnctiOll 

One of the best tools for orchestrating the intelligence and 

operational functions of the division was the dail y Command and 

Staff Briefing. The briefing, conducted twice daily at 0700 and 

1700. consisted of a graphic and oral presentalion of all divisional 

aClivities which had occurred dllring the prcviolls period. I)TCSenl 

duri ng the briefings werc the Commanding General. the lWO As· 

TAHU: 14-PARTIAL. LIST OF EX'I U.NAL INTt LI G.:~C.: SOURCES 

SOlilit ';c/mmr~Jf: Arm)' 

C·21$enior AdviJOr C·2 IV Corp$ 

Tacl ical ?..one 

C·2, 7th South Victnaml"5C ,'mI\' 

Division 

25th South Viclll~mcse Army 

Division 

S·:!, Province: 

Long An 

Dinh TuonJo; 

li.iclI Hoa 

Go Cong 

S,2/ District Intclligcnce Opcr.lliolls 

Co·ordinatioll Ccnten 

I'hung Uuong{ Phocn i:o: Committccs for 

each I' m" illce. (4) 

Pro,ince Ch ien 1I0i umer' (4) 

Pro,-ince Intcrrog:uion Cemc!'< (4) 

Pro. illee N~rional fi eld I'oliec (4) 

Chid Milil~'1 Scenri" Scniee. 111 & IV 

Corps Taclical Zone 

';;·2, Hth ';;pccial Taetial Zone 

G·2, II Field force , Vietnam 

G·2, Capital Mililary "uislallce 

Command 

C·2. 25th I)i\'isioll 

S·2. 199th Brigade 

CO, 3n1 Combat Intelligence lIallalion 

IIf Corps Tactical Zone 

CO, 4th Combat Intelligencc lIattalion 

IV Corps T~Clical Zone 

CO. 7~1 SUT\'cillauce A"iarion Company 

(Mohawk) , III Corps Tactical Zone 

CO, 2Hth Snr\'eilbucc A.-iation Com· 

pany ~Ioha ... k) IV Corps Taclical 

Zone 

Mililary Auistance Command. Vieln am, 

J3O-I (Unattcnded Ground Senson) 

Combined Intelligcncc Center Vielnam 

Combined Military Imerrogation Center 

Combined Oocument Exploitalion 

Celilcr 
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 99 

sistant Division Commanders, Chief of Staff, principal staff officers 

and selected members of the special staff. The intelligence portion 

of the briefing consisted of significant friendly and enemy activity 

in all Corps Tactical Zones with particular emphasis devoted to 

highlighting patterns of enemy activity such as " high points" of 

his offensive campaigns and his current methods of tactical employment. This was foll owed by a presentation of all reported enemy 

activity within the division operational area and in peripheral areas. 

Intelligence reports presented were evalua ted as to their validity. A 

large I :50,000 map display was used for graphic portrayal of all 

enemy activities and reports. The map contained a resume of the 

past 72 hours of reported activity, divided into three 24 hour 

periods. Each 24 hour period was keyed to a color; red, amber or 

green. Each source of intelligence sitch as Side Looking Airborne 

Radar, Airborne Infra Red, Agent Reports. radars, etc., was designated by a distinctive symbol in the proper color to denote the 

appropriate time period in which the event took place. The map 

was mai ntained on an hourly basis as information was received 

and evaluated. It was in essence an intelligence watch over the 

area and was a major tool for achieving a totally integrated intelligence and operational effort for the division. This system made 

enemy patterns of activity more discernible thereby facilitating 

timely operational decisions for the allocation of assets against 

targets with a fair degree of assurance of gaining contact with 

the enemy. The only illlelligence source not covered during the 

open briefings was Special Intelligence which was presented to 

a se lected group following the morning general briefing. The 

Special Intelligence briefing was presented with regard to those areas 

which dovetailed with other intelligence sources. 

The dissemination of intell igence was not restricted to the 

formal briefing l)lll was passed continuously as the information and 

situation wan-anted. The G- 2 and G- 3. working in close proximity 

to each other. coordinated and assessed intelligence targets as they 

developed. This coordination was absolutely essential and evolved 

into a system whereby each hrigade was assigned a minimum of one 

intelligence target per day from division wilh the G- 3 recommending lhe allocation of available tactical resources in accordance with 

the weight or eva luation of the overall intelligence picture. The system of assigning intelligence targets increased the number of contacts 

with the enemy on a division scale. The increased contacts in tum 

resulted in improved illlelligence due to the captured prisoners and 

documents and these in turn produced more targets. An example 

was the apprehension of five North Vietnamese Army prisoners and 
100 .'HARI'EN INC THE COM KAT EOG~. 

some documents taken (rom lhe lead element of a la rge enemy unit 

initially targeted by agent reports. The prisoners and documents 

disclosed the size. strength and assigned operational areas for a 

North Vietnamese Army unit infiltrating from Cambodia to Long 

An Province. This information enabled the division to gain additional and almost continuous contact with other elements of the 

North Vietnamese Army unit resulting in heavy losses and final 

dispersal of the enemy. The same ru le also appli ed to the Viet Cong 

infrastructure. The apprehension of a courier or minor village 

functionary often permitted a roll up operation 011 a portion of the 

local infrastrUClIlre. These arc but a few examples of the maxim 

thaL the more contacts YOIl get the more you improve your intel1 igence and therefore improve your chances of finding the enemy. 

However, even information gained in this manner is highly perishable and must be reacted to immediately or it is lost. An unusual 

feature of the Vielllamese ''''ar was that most of the Communist 

prisoners of war or defectors (Hoi Chan h) "sang like birds." They 

almost seemed to heave a sigh of relief at being captured alive and 

decided that the more information they could disclose the better off 

for everyone. The Communist doctrine taught that one fought until 

death and that the enemy (U.S. and South Vietnamese) would 

slaughter any prisoners. (In fact. at the tactical level. the Com· 

munists themselves ignored the Geneva Conventions.) Due to the 

lack of indoctrination on the realities o f the situation, the average 

Communist prisoner was so overwhelmed by the considerate treatment he received that presumably he lost all sense of restraint. 

Summarizing. we operated on a three phase intelligence cycle: 

reviewing operations and intelligence inputs in the evening; reo 

evaluating again early on the morning of operations; and finally 

reacting to new intelligence as operations progressed. This k.ept our 

commanders finel), tulled to enemy activities and our operations 

were executed utilizing real time intelligence to the maximum extent possible. 

Use of "lIemal Resollrces 

The lack. of agent coverage hy other intelligence organ izations in 

certain critical areas such as eastern Long An Province and all of 

Kien Hoa Province was a shortcoming that required much innovaLion on the part of the division to remedy. Normal close-in early 

warning nets were expanded into collection nets and targeted on 

these and other lightly covered areas. The building of agent nets. 

not normally a division function. was a slow process with an equal 

number of sllccesses and failures: however. coverage was provided in 
THE INTELLlGE!'>CE FUNCTIO~ 101 

areas previolls]} 1I0t cmered. The division nets had one major 

advantage over other agetll operations-the ahility of the division to 

target these nels (111 specific missions. The nets also gave liS the 

advantage of having a finger on the pulse of the population. For 

example. we had a repoTl from one net that the Cai Be CilY Viet 

Cong Intelligence Section Chief would attempt to infiltrate one of 

the division nets. Within 1\\'0 weeks Ihis individual offered his 

services through a principal agent who in turn notified his U.S. 

handler. A decision was made at division to recruit the Viet Cong 

agelll to determine his target and detect his agenls if possible. He 

was operated in isolation from other agelll neLS. He soon offered 

information that he had uncovered a number of Viet Cong who 

wished to Chieu Iini. The 1I.S. h;mcller received nine of these 

Chieu Hois one at a time over the next two weeks; however. instead 

of takillg them to the Chieu Hoi Center he delivered them to the 

Division Prisoner Collection Point where interrogation disclosed 

that their mission ,\'a~ to infiltrate the Province Chieu Hoi Center 

:lnd later be recruited into the South Vietnamese Army and the Kit 

Carson (Tiger ScOlLt) program. When the Cai Be Viet Cong agent 

complained that he was unable to see his friends at the center he 

was taken into ulstoc:l} and confessed to the whole scheme which 

included ascertaining the identity of members of the division net 

which the Viet Cong Province Chief wanted \0 destroy. He also 

disclosed the names of agents of the Viet Cong net operating in 

central Dinh Tuul1g I)ro"ince which the Phung HU30ng ("Phoe-
102 SH ARPENING THE COM UAT EDGE 

ni x") Commiuee was delighted to receive. (The Phoenix Committee was a Vietnamese agency which worked to identify and eliminate 

the Viet Cong infrastructure.) 

SOlllh Vietnamese Arm)' SOlfrces 

Essential to successful in tell igence operations was the maintenance of close and continuous contact with th e Vietnamese forces 

operating in th e area. They had a th orough and detail ed knowl· 

edge of the enemy forces. The rcltlClance of District and Province 

organizations to pass intelligence was overcome when th ey reali zed 

that the dissemination of information was a two way street. When 

the Ph ling HU30 llg (Phoenix) Commillees and District Intelligence 

Operations and Coordin:llioll Centers rea li zed that the division 

wou ld react rapidly to targets which they dcveloped, they "tried 

harder" to develop hetter targets for the division. One excellent 

means of establishing rapport was to require each brigade to 

station a liaison team with the Province Intclligence Operations Co· 

ordination Center with which they were opera ting and to have our 

battalions do the same ;It the District level. Liaison of this sort 

provided ready access to target information and permitted closer 

cooperation with the governmen t forces responsible for the area. 

OlJeI"flliO/l{fi A1H1I.YJiJ 

We subjected ollr intelligence resources to constant analysis and 

appraisal to determi ne their effectiveness ;me! reliahil it y. As stated 

earlier the key lO the use of illleJligence was lightning quick operational reactions. Without the immediate tie·in of intelligence to 

operations and the built-in flexibility of the operational system to 

react to new intelligence at any time-day or night, the 9th Division 

could not have improved its com hat effic iency so markedly. One of 

the most unusual studies concern ing lllclli~e ce that came Ollt of 

the Vietnamese conflic t at a divisional level was one conducted duro 

ing the period I i\larch through O April 1969. During this period 

the total quantity of intelligence reports received in each of the 

hrigade areas was logged and the number of reactions to these intelligence reports was noted :md confirma tions of the correct· 

ness of the intelligence I,'e re listed. From all sources during this 

two month period there were 8. 172 intell igence reports-an astonish· 

ing number-of which 2.559 were reacted to and 709 were confirmed, 

Confirmation is defined as tangible evidence indicating the validity 

of the report. Gencra1Jy confirma tion was interpreted as contact 

with the enemy but we also included documents, caches, and in the 

case of unattended grou nd sensors, trail acti vi ty, 
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION 103 

Concomitan t with our study, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard A. 

Spirito, the C-2, made an ana lysis of the timeliness of our normal 

intelligence resources. \Ve found that there was a tremendous 

spread, from an average of 72 hours for agent reports to not more 

than one-ha lf hour for reports of the People Sniffer, ground surveillance radars and sensor fi elds. The reports of ground surveillance 

radars, which would have added another 20 to 30 da il y sightings, 

were not included in Ollr overall intelligence analysis. 

Over 30 percent of all intelligence reports were reacted to and 

almost 30 percent of those reacted to were confirmed. Consequentl y, 

it is no wonder that once we got the ball rolling the momentum 

carried the division fon\'ard. Th is high level of intelligence activity 

was reached during the months of r-.rarch and April when the division obtained its highest number of enemy eliminated-240 Prisoners 

of War taken and 6.621 Viet Cong killed. Naturally the two phenomena go hand in hand. As the enemy unravelled we had more 

intelligence, more contaCL~. etc. The process fed on itself. 

Analysis indicated the relative reliability of intelligence information obta ined from personnel in the field (Prisoners of War, 

Chieu Hois, friendly villagers) compared to the intelligence ob· 

tained by machines. The overall confirmation from Agent Reports 

(15 percent), Prisoners of War and Hoi Chanhs (11.4 percent) 

and Integrated Civi c Action Programs (19 percent) were much 

higher than th ose recei\'ed from Side Looking Airborne Radar (4.5 

percent).1 Infrared Emissions (4.4 percent) 1 and Usually Reliable 

Reports (7.0 percent). Because of their increased reliability the 

division continued to emphasize the necessity for prisoners and 

Hoi Chanhs. On the other han(!. even though the reliabil ity of 

personnel reports was appreciably higher than the illlelligence obtained from sensors. the quantity of sensor data was so much grea ler 

that the numher of confirmed personnel reports (237) was only half 

of the number of confirmed sensor reports (472). ·(Table 15.) 

The most reliable source of intelligence in the 9th Division was 

the People Sniffer. wherein over 33 percent of all Significant readings were confirmed. \oVithoUl question. the reason for this high 

rate was the fact that People Sn ifTer readings were obtained in real 

lime, with air cavalry on Ihe spot and infantry resources on the pad 

available to react within the haul". The importance of real time 

intelligence cannot be overemphasized and we feel that steps must 

' These figllre5 indicate rather small returns from Side L()()ki,,~ Airborne Radar 

and Infrared. UnfOrlUU3!ely the dis(riminalion of Ihe cquipmeru lind Ihe buill·in 

lime lass of the repoT!ing systems were nOI sui!ed 10 1 he small. $Oft. and elllsi,e large!s 

that were presented. 
104 MIARI'ENI.'\G IHt,. C01'.[BAl EI>GE 

be taken to insure thaI b',-ound sensor terminals for Side Looking 

Airborne Radar, infrared. and other devices are available to the 

combat commander in order to make possible rapid readouts and 

real time reactions. 

One last generality which lIlay be of interest is the facl that 

intelligence gathered frolll friendly personnel generally was worthwhile in static siwaliollS only. Thus these sources rarely enabled 

the division troops to chalk up major contacts. On the other hand 

the sensors often ullearthed targets of opportunity and frequently 

led to major COIlIaCIS where a large number of the enemy could be 

fixed, surrounded. and badly cut up. However. the importance of 

many small (omans must not he tmciCreSlimalcd. The trade off 

between many small contacts \'ersus a few large contacts has been 

discussed elsewhcre. It was also apparent from studying the analysis 

that somc brigade commanders neglectcd usefnl sources of information. 

TAIII. E IS- RELIABILITY 01' SEI. ECTU) S"~I LlC.· SCF Rt".50URCES OIVISIO," 

ACCRI:;GATE TO""L~ OR P~ RIOJ) I i\ I ARCU- 30 AI'RIL 1969 

N"mb." of OvruU 

Q"a""., Rut";o,,! !;o"nrm,'lon' Co"~rm llo", 

So".re- Rl"<C"i" r<1 ~rant) (I>"refm )' ( pC" •• C"n') 

Agent Repons ~ . .... .. -- 885 ~:;7 «0) 1J5 8) 15 

1I5uall) Reliable hlldligencc 

Report! --- 1368 '" (14) " (r, \ ) 7 

I'risoner of War Inlerrogalion 

II< Hoi Chanh Reporu '67 110 (301 12 (38) II 

\llIegraled Ch'ic AClion I'm· 

gram Reportl ' 11111 147 ~6) 60 (41 ) 19 

Co"~'rn •• lon Cri,. ri., ">naiblC" .'irlt'n<. ,h .. . "~rm, .hr ,."Iirlilr of 'h<" '<"I>OIt . • h .. 1<. CO" · 

.au. P ... O" ... of W ••. doc:"rn<""" , u<hn. ,r.n an i' lo y .• "d It> forth 

• Filll,r drllu,t("d h("c."", oor ".I~.d. ,,"'" couta'" ""Iv for Inform."o" 

• $(. "" 11<>" On I' .ri ( .. ion for '1 . ... rll";o" of '''I("II'''' ed Ci, ;< I\Clio" J'r ~ .. '" 

In retrospect we did not realize UTltil late in the game the advantages to he realized hy the systemat ic evaluation of all intelli· 

gence modes a~ tn their cITccli"encss and pay-oITs. This was one of 

Ollr major failures. lInqlle.raiollahly. the key to illlciligence utilization is to obta in the reports on a rea] time hasis and to react immediatel" and vigorolls]" . 

Till' Intllitive Le(jder 

Nevel did commanders have more illlelligence sources going 

for them than they did in Vielilam. On the other hand, since the 
THE INTEL LIGENCE FUNcnON \05 

American Revolution the Army had not been engaged in the type of 

conRict where the enemy was all around, sometimes hiding among 

thc loca l inhabitants. The silliaLion was further complicated by the 

very difficu lt language barrier. It should not be constrll ed that all 

the literatly thOllsands of contacts made by the 9th Division during 

this period resulted from illlelligencc reports. On the contrary, 

many of the lIl ost lucra ti ve res ults came abou t as the result of a 

commander's intuition. Several of our more gifted commanders 

had the abilit y to " feel " the cnemy. Some of our junior leaders 

could literally smell the enemy. Our major contact in the 1968 

Viet Cong Fall Offensivc on Saigon at Phoue L'un, \vhere we 

engaged three enemy battalions for three days in a battle that deci· 

mated two of those batta lions, resulted from a gu t feeli ng. Thus, although it is important that tactical commanders react quickly to 

intelligence reports, it is also necessary to give a good commander 

his head because ilHuilive leaders will fmc! the enemy regardl ess 

of the situati on. ,,yhat was termed intuition usually resu lted from 

a very thorough knowledge of the situation . 

Summmy 0/ hllelligence OperatiollS 

The intelligence function of the 9th Division was primarily one 

of managi ng the diverse indigenolls and U.S. sources in such a 

way as to cause them to operate in suppon of the division mission. 

Constant management was applied to these sources to speed up 

their dissemination of information to overcome the perishability 

factor. Stress was placed on the value of obta ining prisoners as important sources of informa tion. The more contacts. the more pris' 

oners: the more prisoners. the more valid the illlelligence.! All intell igence sources were subjected to constant analysis and appraisal 

to detennine their effectiveness and reliahility. Close and continuous 

li aison with South Vietnamese forces was necessary for maintaining 

a continuous Row of informati on and in instilling trust and confidence for the U.S. on the pan of Vietnamese agencies. The total 

integration of intelligence and opera tions was a major key to success. 

Thel'e is an unavoidable tendel1cy to vieh' intell igence and 

opera ti ons as separate activities. If one can develop a "closed loop 

concept" in which information leads to combat action immediately. 

the overall efficiency of Ihe operati on increases manyfold. 

I A 5(:P31'2.1C 5)5t('fll. quitc di ffcrcnl from the ptisoner of wu C1/3cu31;on systcm. 

was iC:t up fOT $CT~ning and prO«'$lling c:1liti3115. The ci"ilian 5)'5lcm ha! not been 

coI'crw sincc it is ouuidc thc scope of Ihis monograph . 
CHAPTER VI 

Tactical Refinements And Innovations 

As discussed previously. in the spring and summer of 1968 we 

were looking for ways to bring the enemy to ballle on Ollr terms 

and were willing to try anything within lhe limits of common sense 

and sound military judgment. T o do this we adapted known tactical 

techniques to the unique della environmelll. resulting in some 

tactical innovations which proved highl y successful. The first of 

these, ill\'olving the lise of airmoh ile assets, was the Jitterbug. About 

the same time. to complement our daytime airmobile activities. we 

adapted the ground lactical "Bushmaster" and "Checkerboard" 

techniques. Later when the enemy broke down into smaller units 

rendering ollr daytime operations less effective. we turned, of 

necessity, to nighuime techniques including the "Night HUllter," 

the "Night Search " and the "N ight Raid. " 

Throughoul the period we were perfecting sniper techniques 

and as a result of their grea t success. we turned to a "quick kill" 

method of com hat. Suhsequently we will discuss each of these 

tactical innovations. Our discussions of the Jitterbug techniques are 

more detailed to bring Ollt the interpl;}y of intelligence and the 

great amount of coordination required to achieve tactica l success on 

the Vietnamese hattlefield. The discussion also includes examples of 

the Viet Cong reaction to our new techniques. providing an insight 

into the requirements for contin ued analysis of operations if a 

unit is to sta y on top of the situation. 

Jiller!Jltgghlg 

The dense population and the broad expanse of inundated flatlands in the i\ rekong Delta dictated an adaptation of conventional 

airmobile infant!"y operations developed elsewhere in Vietnam. 

Viet Cong units dispersed and blended very effectively with people 

in the numerous villages and haml ets. greatly complicating reconnaissance difficulties and problems of fire control. Flooded rice 

paddies severely inhibited OUI" grouod mobility. The maze of canals 

and streams, genera ll y bordered with dense nipa palm growth . 

presented formidable obstacles. while al the same lime affording 
TACTICAL REFINI':MENTS AND I NNOVATIONS 107 

the Viet Cong a convenient network of very strong defense 

positions. 

On the other hand. the open country permitted virtually unrestricted access by airmobile forces. Land ing zones were readily 

available and could be se lected to conform to the enemy situation ; 

extensive preparation of an LZ with its inherent loss of surprise was 

usuall y unnecessary. Enemy bunker complexes were normally 

linear, with canals and open rice paddies borderin g the long axis. 

Whil e these obstacles deny approaches in two d irections, they also 

channeled Viet Cong escape from the bunker complex. As a result, 

it was technica lly possibl e to surround a Vi et Cong unit by clltting 

the canal and woodlines leading out of the bunker complex and 

interdicting the canals and rice paddi es by fire and aerial observation. 

The environmental characteristics of the delta thus placed a 

premiulll on two particular aspects of wctica l doctrine: reconnaissance and encirclemen t. Intensive. rapid reconnaissance in the 

delta req uired skilled orchestra tion of the capabilities of loca l intelligence. electronic and chemica l sensors, air cava lry. and airmobile infantry. This process appeared complex and rrenetic to the 

uninitiated. and hence was aptly nicknamed "Jitterbugging." When 

most successful it provided an opportunity for airmobile encirclement of a Viet Cong battalion or company. The rapid build-up of 

combat power to sllrround and destroy an enemy force was known 

variously as "piling-on" or establishing a " seaL" 

Command decisions at every stage of Jitterbug and seal operations required a sensiti ve fee l for Vi et Cong tactics and patterns and 

the capabiliti es of Ihe inl elligence system. Therefore. it was vital 

that commanders at every level immerse themselves in the details of 

the intell igence process to insure a thorough understanding of 

enemy movemen ts and patteI'll of opera tions. 

Brigades genera ll y rotated the assignment of air assets among 

subordinate hattalions. The day hefore an impending operation the 

designated batlalion had already been alerted to its mission and 

the assets expected to be avai lable. normally an Assault Helicopter 

Company and an Air Cavalry Troop. The brigade commander 

usually withheld his selection of specific targets until the evening 

before the opera tion in order to make use of the most recent intelligence. His decisions resulted in instructions assigning fi,'e to 

seven tentative targets with priorities to the assault battalion. 

Plann ing at this stage was very flexible. because the targets were 

frequentl y changed the following morn ing on the basis of new 

intelligence. The brigade sta ff made arrangements for night vis ual 
-

./ITrERRUGClN"L 
TACTICAL REFI NEME:-.i l '\ ANI) INNOV,\ T10N$ 109 

reconnaissance. Side Looking Airborne Radar, Red Haze (IR) , 

Long Range Rcconnaissance Patrol and radar coverage o( (he target 

are,IS that night. Tacti ca l air strikes \'Jere plallllcd for the next day 0 11 

likely targets. If the ohjective arca~ were outside existing artillery 

fa ns, arrangements were IlMde for movement of firing batteries 

(ei ther before or during operations) to new fire support bases by 

air, harge. or o\·erland. Ch inook sorties were requested for movement of artillery (CH- 54 for 155'1ll1ll balleries) and logistic resupply. New Areas of Operation were cleared with the Governlllent of 

Vietnam and South Vi~tnamese Army atllhorities, if necessary. 

Provision was made for eslahlishi ng forward aviation fueling and 

reanning paims if needed. Finally. liaison was established with the 

supporting air ca\alry troop and assaul t helicopter company. 

At the ballal ion base call1p, targets were analyzed in conjunction 

with aerial pholOs. photomaps. and pictomaps to detennine specific areas to be searched hv :.erial ;l1ld ground reconnaissance. De· 

tailed information ahollt the area and Viet Cong operatiom \\'as 

secured from the District Chief ami Tiger Scouts familiar with the 

locale. The concept or the opera ti on wa~ del'e loped and ex panded 

and orders were issued 10 the 1\\'0 assa ult compan ies (the remainder 

of the battalion was lIsually engaged in Checkerhoard, Night Am· 

bush. or local secllrity missions). All preparations were completed 

the night hefore th{' operation. 

The air cava lry tl"00P "target detection package" was comprised 

of light observa tion heliwptcrs (1.0 H·s) . AH· IG's (Cohras). and 

Manpacked or Airbol'll c Personnel Delecfors (People Sni ffers) as 

well as E- 15R C'i Canister Cluslers. The Peopl e Sniffer and CS 

canisters were carried in the Command and COlllrol of the Air 

Cal'alry Troop. Once a hot People Sniffer read ing was obtained, 

gas \\'as dropped to assist in l'erif)'ing the Sniffer reading by flushing 

the Viet Cong out of hiding. The LOH 's attempted to pick up the 

slightest indication of movement while the Cobras circled above to 

provide immediate l} responsi \'e firepower should the Sniffer or 

LOH's elraw fire. Once aga in . the use of CS gas in a target confirlllation role illcreased the probahilit) of developing a good can· 

tact before troops were inserted. 

As mentioned previously. the teChnique of insertion was the 

key to the success of the Jiuerbug-and insertions took a great 

amOllnt of tactical judgment on the part of the commander, in 

fact it separa ted the true tactician from the commonplace one. The 

2d Ball<il ion. 60th Infantry hecame q uite skill ed in Jitterbug op· 

erations. Usually the Jitterbug in conjunction with OUf intelligence 

paid off well, resulting in enemy contacts. However, one da y the 2d 
110 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EUGE 

Battalion 60th Infantry dry-holed it all day long (most unusual for 

this hard hitting outfit) . and at the end of the day Lieutenant 

Colonel Jim Lindsay had made 16 insertions on suspected targets, 

sweeping each target. This was a peak in smooth, rapid operating 

and the command and control of troops. It gives an indication of 

the gTcat Humber of targets in a large area that could be covered by 

onc battalion utilizing airmobil e assets. His Sliccessor, Lieutenant 

Colonel Fred Mahaffey, was eq uall)' sk ill ed in the use of airmobile 

assets and fefbed th e operations of the battalion until in Long An 

Province insertions were made no farther from the target th an 100 

meters and in some instances as close as 15 meters. This was pushing 

the ba lance of the risk of a hot landing zone <lgai nst th e ach ievemen t 

of total surprise to its limit. However, the technique paid off as 

during the period or:t year no lift ships were lost. Over 90 percent 

of the 2d Battalion 60th In fantry contacts were over within 10 to 

30 minutes as a result of the speed of the operation and th e aggres· 

sive attitude of the troops. On the other hand when a reconnaissance 

developed a larger enemy force. the battalion W<lS prepared to ex· 

ploit to th e maximum with classic pile·on tactics. 

Once a large cont<lct was developed the encirclement phase be· 

gan with a rapid build.up of combat power or piling.on of all 

available brigade resources. The aim \\'as to completely encircle or 

seal the enemy force as rapidl y as possib le, then destroy it through 

firepower rather than frontal assault. In this manner we assured 

ourselves of minimulll troop casua lties while inflicting tremendous 

punishment on the enemy. 

Artillery fire was registered by the aerial observer. and th e com· 

pany commander employed a rlill ery as necessary to suppon move· 

ment of his elements toward enemy·occupied tree lines and nipa 

JXllm groves. The Ail' Cavalry Troop screened the general area of 

contact and provided responsive fire support to the battalion com· 

mander. As the si tuation developed . the battalion commander 

usuall y moved a second company to a convenient pickup zone and 

prepared to insert it in a position to cut off enemy escape from th e 

point of contact. 

At that time Viet Cong tactics called for del aying action by 

guerrilla or light security forces to allow the main force to escape 

before it was engaged. For this reason additional troops were in· 

serted as rapid ly as possible after a sizab le enemy contaCt had de· 

veloped. Flight routes were carefull y planned to prevent unneces· 

sary check fires and excessive delays in insertions. If th e engagement 

looked promising, the battalion commander also alerted the base 

camp to prepare another company for commitment, if possible. If 
TACTICAL REFINEr..IE NTS ANI) IN NOVAT IONS III 

the situation was beyond the capability of the battalion, the brigade 

commander assumed direction of the operation and established the 

seal with additional brigade units. 

The brigade commander had to be fully abreast of time and 

space factors in controlling the air movement of additional infantry 

units, the shifting of artill ery resources. aircraft refueling and 

rearming. and logistical su pport. The ulLimate goal of the Jitterbug 

was the entrapment of the Viet Cong. For a large enemy unit this 

required commitment of most 01' all of the brigade's resources. The 

secret to successful encirclement of an engaged enemy force lay in 

the accurate positioning of sufltciem fifle compani es to cordon off 

all routes of escape from the area of contact. A gap of as little as 20 

meters in heavy cover would permit the enemy battalion to escape 

almost as soon as night fe ll. The premium therefore was in an 

early decision to commit forces sufficielll for encirclement and the 

rapid accumul ati on of the means to feed major forces into the area 

of Contact and provide them with a continuous. heavy volume of 

fire support. Battalion commanders occasionally made conservative 

estimates of the force confront ing them and as a result developed 

an encirclement that was too small or added reinforcements in· 

crementall y althe poim of contact. The brigade commander had to 

be alert to these possibilities and be prepared to take over control 

of the opera tion early enough to allow commitment of additional 

forces in a large seal. That was aJways a tough decision. for no one 

wanted to commit two battalions 10 destroy a small enemy force. 

lnitiall y artillery fire was brought to bear as needed by the 

compani es and battalions, to fill in gaps in Air Cavalry and Tactical 

Air coverage and to seal enemy avenues of escape. Once the ring was 

tightened by convergi ng infantrymen. fire control was centrally 

supervised to avoid casualties to fri endl y troops. Once night fell 

and if adequate artillery support was available. the Air Cavalry 

Troop was released (a lthough a di vision Light Fire Team remained 

on ca ll) and througholll the night the encircled enemy was pounded 

with artillery. Canals and rivers were sea led with concertina wire 

stretched from one bank to the other on a rope. Troops on each 

bank had to know each other's positions exactly. This was accom· 

plished with small strobe lights. Hand grenades were thrown into 

streams every five to ten mintes to discourage swimmers from 

infiltrat ing through U.S. lines. Rear security was established (nor. 

mall y listening posts onl y) and the artillery periodically fired on 

likely avenues of approach outside the ring to prevent re inforce· 

ment or attack from Viet Cong units not encircled. CS was 
112 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

dropped into the interior of the ring from lime to time. After 

several hours of bombardmelll during daylight, all fire was halted 

for five to ten llIiUUlCS. and Tiger ScOllts (or Hoi Chanh's, if any 

materialized) appealed over airborne and hand·held loudspeakers 

to the Viet Cong to surrender. Pre-prepared appeals keyed to possible platoon tactical situations. and designed to reach individual 

Viet COllg soldiers temporarily se parated from their superiors were 

broadcast by hand-held loudspeakers (AN- PIQ5A's). After a brief 

pause to allow the Viet Cong lCJ " rally" the artillery bombardment 

would be resumed. This denied enemy commanders the opportunity to maneuver their units away rrom areas under fire. The 

possibility always existed that the encircled enemy would attempt 

to break out through the thin U.S. lines. If the enemy knew how 

tenuous Ollr "seals" sometimes were the)' could have broken Ollt 

easily. 

The Jitterbug. seal. ,mel pile·on techniques were Illost effective 

in the hands of a skillful commander and reasonabl) effective with 

the average commander. However. they required an integra tion of 

details that was hard to bring off. For example, the People Sniffer 

had to work well mechanica ll y. This \\'3S ohen a problem with the 

early sniffer equipment. However, by using two sets simultaneously 

riCER SCOUT PERSUADINC Tin: ENEM\' 
TACTICAL REFINEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS 113 

,-\-

, 

ON A "SEAL" OPt:RATION 

(which reduced complete outages) , by having a backup reserve 

pool, and by improving our prevelltive and regular maintenance, 

we reduced on-the·job down time to esselllially zero. This increased 

confidence and operator skill . 

With targets of battalion sizl" aud during wet weather, the 

sniffer worked well. However. as target size reduced due to enemy 

fragmelllation , readings became progressively more unreliable. We 

then conducted a series of tests (discussed subsequently) which 

allowed us to improve flight tactics. operator ski ll and reliability. 

Next, the air cavalry had to work smoothly. It had been 

customary, due to its great utility. to fragment the troop. This made 

it difficult for it to opera te effectively as real cava lry. We reas· 

sembled our air cavalry and it developed a complicated technique 

of taking targets from the sniffer. locating the exact spot, dropping 

CS in the cover to Hush the enemy from bunkers and then hovering 

at low altitude to blow the vegetation about and uncover any enemy 

scuttling away. If the air cavalry and ground commanders felt there 

was a valid target, an insertion \\' 3S started. 

The seal and pile·on required very precise infantry and artillery 
114 SHARPEN I NG THE COl\l8AT EDGE 

techniques to insure an air-tight sea l and "danger close" arti ll ery 

suppon,l The seal also required courage and stamina as the troops 

had to hang on all night in order to insure destruction of the 

enemy. 

Of equal importance, the three-cycle intelligence approach 

(mentioned earlier) maximized the possibilities of the sniffer detecting enemy troops. 

Chart 11 shows the sequential nature of a Jiuerbug. Its strength 

lay in the fact that seven of the operations tended to increase 

the possibilities of a Contact. One can theorize that this increase was 

on the order of 12 times. The difficulty of the technique was that 

poor perfonnance at an y oll e point could break the chain. For this 

reason the technique requ ired a high level of skill and tight supervision. Once the enemy target size became fine grain, the overall 

techn ique was not worth the effort and simpler techniques were 

indica ted. 

We also discovered that some batteries had great difficulty with 

this precision work. By means of rigorolls tests we discovered that 

some were inaccurate due to sheer wear and tear on their howitzers 

after months of shooting and others just hadn't mastered the techniques involved. By systematica lly rep lacing worn Ollt parts and 

retraining batteries. we were able to ga in optimum accuracy in 

most b.'l tteries. 

The enemy desuibed our .litterbug as " Hawk Tactics." As far 

as he was concern ed this was probably most descriptive bec..1 use in 

reality we were s\ ... eeping down and scooping him up. We began to 

perfect our Jitterbug tactics ill J ul y 1968 and it did lI ot take the 

Vi et Cong long to catch on. In the latter part of September 1968 

we captured a Viet Cong letter from Headquarters Mi litary Region 

II to its subordinate regimellls written in late J uly. T his letter 

covered the employment of " Hawk Tactics" by our forces. It admitted that these (aclia had heen successful in loca ting and destroying base camps and inflicting casualties "in the corridor area." 

Interestingly, the letter pointed out several weaknesses in U.S. 

techniques which subordinate Viet Cong regiments should exploit. 

It stated: first. operations were generally conducted from 0900 

'The mention of \'ery dO$C·in ar!illctt· fire brings out t"·o modcst btll interesting 

examples of analysis. In a close scal one could rcccive tWO or thrcc casuall ies from 

friend l)" rtillerr lire. Howel·cr. the constant 3Ttlllert· lire W3~ instrumen tal in 3tl3in· 

ing hca\')" enemy casualtics. By compning the enemt· and fTiclldh 10McS d ue to 

artillery with the 10$$ pattern in normal meeting engagemcnn. wc g~incd a fairl)' 

clear picture that lCS5Cncd our overall (asualtit'$ lor 3cccpt ing the pcnal!t· of small 

losscs duc to artillcrr. The breaking lip of a silcable enem)' unit wa$ tlte bonus 

tha t made this penalty doublt· worthwhile. 
CHART J J-SIMPLIFIED JrTTER8UC FLOW CHART 

I ~ N. rv: 

LN. I va~ 

LN. I va~ 

LN. 

~ 

R .. <;1ion 10 <;urrent inlaillaen<;. 

LN. r,;;-

Taraet handad to air cav.lry 

LN. I Va. 

Low-laval rKonn.'nanc. and d.tKtlon 

LN. I v.~ 

CIS und 

LN. I Vu 

Taraat confirmed 10 around commander 

L l V .. 

N. 

'Inc.ea ... posslblllty of • conilict 
116 SHARPEN I NG THE COM BAT EDGE 

until late afternoon; second, command and control helicopters 

circled suspected landing zones several limes beraTe insertion ; and 

third, the landing force was normally a small unit without support. 

The letter also directed the Milita ry Region II regiments to 

select severa l landing zones ambush squads for training. Each squad, 

armed with one automatic rifle. one claymore, three lO four AK47's. and one sniping rifle wou ld then link up with local guerrill as 

and set up ambushes "in the areas where the enemy has frequently 

landed." The instructi ons to these squads were fairly expl icit: 

I. If the enemy drops his ITOOpS close to the edge of a village 

and the choppers have not quite landed, we will concentrnte 

maximum firepo\\'cr to destroy the enemy force immedia tely. 

The function of the sniping cell will be La shoot down the CP 

chopper. 

2. If the enemy drops his troo ps away from the edge of the 

vill age, we will deploy in combat formations and wait for them. 

\Vhen they are three or four meters from our positions, we open 

fire. 

3. If the enemy drops troops on our position, our efforts de· 

pend on the situation. After we have destroyed the enemy force 

and cleared the battlefield . we will move to an other loca tion 

300- 500 meters from the contaCt area and deploy again. ready 

to fight. 

An analysis of helicopters shot dO\o,'n or hit while entering or 

leaving la ndi ng 70nes in support of the 9th Division during the time 

period Jul y through December 1968 seems LO indicate that the 

Viet Cong we re most effecti ve in their ami·hawk tactics during the 

months o( Jul y and August. In this (\\'0 month period, supporting 

Assa ult Helicopter Companies had ~ I helicopters shot down. 74 hit 

by hostil e fi re. with 131 rounds received. However. we learned to reo 

act quickly 10 Vi et Cong tactics. \Ve stopped reconnoitering landing 

zones with both the Command &: Control and Air Cavalry elements. 

We improved the use of our People Sniffer so that we had good 

verification whether to ex pect Viet Cong or not and we were rarely 

caugta by surprise. The LOH's replaced the OH·23's and every 

time a Viet Cong fired his weapon, unless he \\' 01 5 in a bunkered 

position, he signed his own death warrant because the LOH's 

picked him right off. As a result. the Viet Cong went almost com· 

plelel), defensi\'e and a\'oided contact at all costs. Table 16 shows 

lhe statistics of aircraft shot down for the period J uly through De· 

cember 1968. Less than half the aircraft shot down were tota lly 

destroyed. 
TACTICAL REFINEMENTS AND INNOVATIONS 117 

TARLE 16-AIRCRAFT DAMAC£I) 8Y HOSTIU: FIRE 

1968 

D~mage j .. ly ,,,,,,UI xptfmbrr O(\obn So,ea.brr 

Air<:raft Shot Down " ,. 8 5 , 

Aircrafl Hit ......... " ., .. Rounds Reeth'cd .... 50 81 S4 " 61 ., " 

fI« tmbr. 

" 86 

The aforementioned should give a feel as to the capabilities of 

the Viet Cong to "turn us off" once they grasped our tactics. We 

found much evidence of Viet Cong analysis of our tactics, including 

map studies of actual operations , ... herein they analyzed our ellcirclement tactics. Once they cauglll on to our new techniques they 

dispatched operational immediate messages to all their units describing our tactics and their proposed countermeasures. Consequently. we had to be alert to the need for changes in our operational approach to keep on lap of the situation. This required a 

systematic analytical study of combat operations subsequently 

described. 

Busilmaster (l1Id Checkerboflrfl Operations 

The Jitterbug is an airmobile operation. However, in the summer of 1968 our brigades received the support of an Air Cavalry 

Troop and Assault Helicopter Companies only a little over one 

half the time. Jitterbug tactics required at a maximum one battalion when a good size contact was made. Most of our battalions, 

then. were engaged in ground mobile tactics and we were constantly trying to improve Ollr techniques. 

Colonel Henry E. Emerson, drawing upon his earlier experience 

in Vietnam, began experimenting with "Bushmaster" and "Checkerboard" tactics to supplement the Jitterbug. These proved very 

succ~sful and were implemented division-wide. \"'e continuously 

adjusted and adapted these tactics to the terrain and the enemy of 

the delta. 

Bushmaster O/JeratiotlS. 

Bushmaster operations involved an infantry company broken 

into platoon sized elements. The Bushmaster was used in areas 

where the enemy was strong, and where breaking down into less 

than platoon sized elements risked heavy losses. The Bushmaster 

was normally used to interdict known enemy communicationsliaison routes, and the primary ingredient of the Bushmaster was 

valid intelligence. Once the area had been chosen and the approxi-
118 

Hlate loiles ul ambush determi ned, the Bushmaster force was 

usually inserted using helicopters during the last two hours of daylight. It was insened directly into its area of operations or adjacent 

to it, infiltrating the remaining distance on foot. Under either 

situation, the final positions were not occupied until after dark. 

Once in the arca of operations, a sma ll command group set lip a 

command post. The platoons were spread Ollt and, if possible. units 

were made mutually supporting. located at a distance whereby 

they cou ld reinforce in less than one-ha lf hour. In the rice paddies 

this distance was not o,'cr 750 meters, so thai a company sized 

8ushmaster normall y covered :In area three-follrths of a kilometer 

square. The Bushmaster, although primarily a night time operation, was also effective during daylight. However, during daylighl. 

much more stealth. cunning. ingenuity. and planning were required. 

Checkerboard Operlllio1l.J. 

The Checkerboard concept was an outgrowth of the Bushmaster. and often timcs it paid ofT to lise the Bushmaster one night, 

completely familiarizing the troops with the area and thcn breaking 

up into a Checkerhoard on the second day of a two-day operation. 

""hereas in the Bushmaster a company was broken-down into 

platoon sized elements, the Checkerboard was configured in squad 

sized elements. These elements had fi xed areas of operations comparable to the squares of a checkerboard. and once in these areas 

of operaliom they moved continuously from one terrain feature to 

another in order to interdict the enemy. Checkerboard personnel 

must have increased communications capability and IllUSt be highly 

mobile. Therefore. they were lightly eCluipped and carried only 

basic ammulltion and rations. preferahly long range reconnaissance 

patrol type. The Checker hoard was an offensive operation and 

aggressively sought to estahlish contact in order to find and fix 

enemy positions. The Checkerhoard was also a precursor of the 

"pile-on" hecause once the enemy was found. other troops were 

brought in to encircle and destroy him. Since the Uushmaster and 

Checkerhoard generally were conducted at night. the operations 

were kept within artillery range and a Light Fire Team was kept 

available on standby. Checkerhoard patrols were also mutually 

supporti ng and, becausc they wcre broken into sma ll units, 500 

meters between patrols was the normal distance in the delta. Fifteen 

slick loads of personnel broken down into to to 12 man units 

could easil y cover an area I Y2 kilometers square, or 4 times that 

of a Bushmaster. 
TACTICAL )tEFI NEMENT:t ANU INNOVATIO N~ 119 

Both the Checkerboard and Bushmaster techniques were excellent training vehicles for you ng company commanders. After the 

brigade or battalion headquarters had picked the general area o[ 

operations the company commander could plan the location of his 

unit, the method of movement. and the control required. ,"Vhen 

inserted and left on his own, a company commander took 

intense pride in insuring that his troops were trained and disciplined enough to establish a contact. The key to success on a 

Checkerboard was small unit leadership, flexibility, stealth, and 

aggressiveness. Like ourselves, the enemy had to move to get his 

resupply, his replacements, and to deliver his non-electronic messages. The Checkerboard was ideally suited to interdict these 

activities since it covered a substantial amount of terrain. A 48-

hour Checkerboard could cover an area three kilometers square. 

In a two-day operation , troops were rested during daylight so that 

they were read y La operate at maximullI potential during the nighl. 

Checkerboards were not conducted in enemy base areas with 

known large size opera ting units. Such base areas were better 

handled by Bushmaster or Jiuerbug operations. 

AmbUJheJ 

The importance of keeping constant pressure on the Viet Cong 

was discussed previollsly. By constantl y disrupting his supply and 

personnel infihration ralites, both by air and ground maneuver, we 

strangled his much needed support. One of our best tactical examples of constant pressure were the am hushes conducted by the 

Riverin e Brigade in Kien Hoa Province. Traditionally the Riverine 

Brigade had lived aboard ship-foraying out on Reconnaissance 

in Force missions and upon completion or their operations withdrawing to the large APL's. In the fall of 1968, the 3d Battalion, 

47th Infantry broke with traditi on and established a b;lse camp in a 

coconut grove astride the mai n highway and canal arteries of Kien 

Hoa Province. The resu lts were inStantaneous and dramatic. Because they were on the ground the intelligence pictu re got better 

as lhe result of constalll liaison with the District Chiefs, and others. 

They started running more Integra ted Civic Action Programs and 

established radar and sensor fields. 

Armed with better intelligence. the men of the 3d Battalion 

47th Infantry under the leadership or Lieutenant Colone l Ismael 

Pack went to extraordinary lengths to set up and spring ambushes. The ambushes were planned to coincide with Viet Cong 

movement times and routes. The ambushes were augmented with 

snipers and pink lights and were tied into the radar and sensor nets. 
120 SHARPEN ING THE CO{\JIIAT EDGE 

The 3d Battalion 47th In fantry after initial successes had enough 

confidence to allow the advance Viet Cong elements in a unit to 

pass through the ambush so thal their traps were usually sprung 

against Viet Cong main bodies. They built their fire power around 

claymore mines and M- 79's. When the Viet Cong entered the 

killing area, the ambush was initiated by the detonation of the 

claymore belLS and the area was sealed with M- 79 fire augmented 

by direct fire weapons. Artillery fires weTe adjusted into the 

area of contact and a long likely avenues of escape. Terrain permitting. the infantry mo ved forward to establish con tact. At lhe 

conclusion of lhe ambush new troop positions were occupied in th e 

contact area to amb ush the enemy anew as he allempted to retrieve 

his dead. 

During the period January through March 1969 the Division 

conducted over 6.500 ambushes. (TalJle 17) This table is acti vity 

orien ted indicating onl y th e level of activity reached ; this averaged 

70 ambushes per nigh t in early 1969. The success rate of the am· 

bushes increased even more. Of course the availability or night 

vision dev ices gave Ollr friendly troops a major technical advantage. 

Trained snipe rs provided expertise not previously availa ble and 

gave the infantrymen a new confidence in their weapons and 

capabilities. Thus. using intelligence. stealth. cunning. and aggres· 

sive tactics the 3d Battalion 17th Infan try and other batlalions in 

the division were able to la ke the night a"'ay from th e Viet Cong 

by interdicting his route of communications thus upsetting his 

time schedule. his flow of supplies. and his personnel. 

T ,\lILE 17- !hll I NFANTRl ' Dlvl'IO~ TOTAL AMRUSIU:S CONn 1) 

Qu,,,u 

M Qtr 1968 ...................... . 

4th Qtr 1968 ... ........... .. 

In Qlr 1969 .. . . ......... . 

Stliper Program 

04.461 

5.957 

6:450 

In the Spring of 19690111' most successfu l ambush lactic was the 

sniper mode. Our sniper program was initiated in the Slates and 

was set in motion as resull of a visit to Fort Benning in January 

19G8. The Army i\brksmanship Unit coopera ted with us to the 

fu ll est extent, and funds were made ava il able to increase the accuracy 

of fift)··five 1\-1- 14 rifles and to pro,·ide sniper·scopes. The idea was 

to get 3n outstanding training team rrom the Marksmanship Unit to 

train our soldiers in Vietnam in sniper tactics. 
TACTICAL REFINEMENTS ANI) INNOV/\TIONS 12J 

The Army Marksmanship Unit team led by Major Willis L. 

Powell and consisting of seven non-commissioned officers arrived in 

Vietnam in June 1968. Upon arrival in the country they revamped 

the M- 16 training methods at our division trai ning establishment, 

the Reliable Academy. Su bsequently they supervised the construction of a 500 yard range at Dong Tam and periodically accompanied 

ambush patrols to assimilate the delta tactics. Progress was slow. 

Brigadi er General James S. T imoth y was given the task of getting 

the sniper program off the ground in early August. This gave it the 

needed boost. Eventually the more accurate M- J4 riAes arrived as 

well as special nati onal match ammunition. Our fi rst hand picked 

group of volunteers from each batta lion graduated in early November 1968 and the first sniper kill was registered on 19 November 1968 

north of Binh PlulOc in Long An Prov ince. The second group of 

snipers graduated in early December. giving us a full complement 

of 72 snipers. six per battalion and four per brigade. Notwithstanding all the personal attention that had been given to the 

sniper program, the early performance was ragged with only eight 

kills in November and cleven in December. This was clearly a 

disma l performance. considering the large number of men and the 

effort tha t had gone into the program. 

Therefore. we set about analyzing our equipment, personnel . 

methods and tactics. \Ve hit upon the fla\!J in the system. and wh il e 

the solution was extremely simple. it had an immediate effect. 

Initially snipers had been parcelled out by the ba ttal ions on the 

basis of two per li ne company. The com pan)' commanders. then . had 

the responsibility for the sni pers and most company commanders 

could not care less. They used snipers just as any other riA eman. 

This was the reason \\'e \\'ere not getting results. Consequentl)" we 

d ireCted assignment of the snipers to th e battalion headquarters 

and held the hattalion commanders responsible for the ir proper 

utilization and for emphasis on the program. Once the hattalion 

commanders lea rn ed to assign the sni pel' teams to the ·companies 

going on night operations the problem was solved. Snipers reported 

directly to company commanders. rece ivc-d a briefing on proposed 

tactics. picked the platoon ann the area where they thought they 

could be moSl effective. and wai ted for a target. The nighttime 

sniper teams normally consiSled of two sni pers and tWO additional 

infaillrymen armed with an i\I- 79 and an M- 16 and carryi ng a 

radio. Snipers worked in pairs to offset the eye fatigue which set in 

after long periods of peering through a starlight scope. 

Once the snipers began to gel personal attention and could 

handpick their assignments and fit their talents to the mission, 
122 

'00 

.'00 

:j 

• 

~ .'00 

w 

, • 

, 

z '00 

SHARI' EN ING THE COM hAT EDGE 

CHART 12-SNII'l:'..R KIL1..S. 91-11 I NFANTRY DIVISION, 

NOVEMQ£R 196B-JULY 1969 

the results were extraordinary. Chart 12 shows the steady improvement in sniper results, culminating in 346 enemy killed in the 

month of April and leveling off at about 200 kills per month . It 

was a flat learning curve initially but it soon steepened lip. 

After the snipers began to gain confidence and unit commanders saw that they were a great boon LO the unit, the whole 

nighuime pace increased. To be quite frank, things went slowly 

initially because the ambush units were fearful of drawing attention 

to themselves as the result of snipers engaging the Viet Congo How· 

ever, O UT units soon became more confident and aggressive in 

night operations. primarily as a result of the sniper programa large unexpected bonus that we had n ot considered. 

One of the unusual night sniper employments resulted from the 

6th Battalion. 31st Infantry operating fTom riverine boats along the 

Mekong River. In this case, the snipers working in pairs positioned 

themselves on the helicopter landing pad of Tango boats. The 

Tango boats travelled at speeds of 2 to 4 kn ots moving about 100 

to 150 meters from and parallel to the shore. Often th ey would 

anchor for periods of a half·llOl\l' he fore moving to a new location. 

As the Viet Cong moved a long the shoreline the snipers after positive identification of the enemy, that is detection of a weapon, wou ld 

open fire. During the period 12 April to 9 May 1969 snipers of the 

6th Battalion, 31st Infantry killed 39 Viet Cong. About 1.7 Viet 

Cong were killed per engagement. The average distance to the 

target was 148 meters and it took 6 rounds per kill . The average 

lime of engagement was 0040 hours. 
TACTICAL REFINEr-.IENTS ANI) INNOVATIONS 123 

As an interesting war story, our most successful sniper was 

Sergealll Adelben F. Waldron, III, who had 109 confirmed kills 

to his credit. One afternoon he was riding along the Mekong River 

on a Tango boa t when an enemy sniper o n shore pecked away at 

the boat. While everyone else on board strained to find the 

antagonist, who was firing from the shoreline over 900 meters 

away, Sergeant Waldron LOok up his sniper rifle and picked off the 

Vi et Cong out of the top of a coconut tree with one shot (this from 

a moving platform). Such was the capability of our best sniper. 

We had others, too, with his match less vision and expert marks· 

manship. Sergeant Waldron ea rned two Distinguished Service 

Crosses for his outstanding skill and bravery. 

Space does not permit liS to recount ma ny of the ingenious 

methods that were used in our sniper program. One of the most 

effective was the use of pink filtered searchlights during periods of 

limited ambient illumination. Another was the effective use by the 

4th Battalion, 39th Infantry of daytime sniper operati ons. They 

would insen snipers in the early morning along known trails and 

infiltration routes likely to be lIsed by the enemy. They lIsed sixman teams-highl y trained individuals ca pable of remaining in the 

field for several hours without moving a muscle when the situation 

required. 

The sniper program of the 9th Infantry Division was one of 

the most successful programs that we undertook. It look over a year 

from its inception in the States to its peak of performance in 

Vi etnam. It also took plenty of hard work and belief in the concept 

and in Ollr snipers. But more than anything it restored the faith of 

the infantryman in his rifle and in his OWI1 capabiliti es. Fighting 

alone at night withollt the usually available combined arms team, 

the "rice paddy" soldier \\las more than a match for the enemy. 

T he J5·Seco'ld War 

When snipers (amc into their own, it became apparelll that 

aimed riRe fire was killing Viet Cong. In thinking about this, the 

thought occurred that the Viet Cong basically could not shoot and 

our men could. By that time (December 1968) the Viet Cong were 

beginning to fragment and we had many con tacts wh ich were 

essenti all y meeting engagements between small groups of men. By 

polling the commanders. it was fou nd that the contact ranges were 

much closer than we had imagined in such open terrain-on the 

order of 10 to 25 meters. 

\Ve then decided, more on faith than conviction, that we would 

go for aimed shot kills rather than fire superiority. We devised a 

TACTICAL REFINEMENTS ANI.} INNOVATIONS 125 

very simple training drill to teach men to shoot under these conditions: 

a. Quick kill technique 

b. Short range 

c. Single aimed shots (q ui ck kill) 

d. No full automatic mode 

e. Quick reaction (seconds) 

The battalion commander. after an informal pott of riflemen. 

would determine what his normal opening range was and how 

quickly a soldier must fire to beat the enemy to the draw. We will 

say that a battalion commander sel 25 meters and 8 seconds as his 

criteria. Each company. every third or fourth day during standdown, would have the riflemen shoot at anything (lin cans, targets, 

whatever) until they could gel a first round hit at 25 meters in 8 

seconds. By repetition . this became an automatic renex action. 

This one idea in combination with good night ambushes made it 

possible for our small rifle units to wreak heavy damage on the 

enemy with low friendly casualties. One reason it worked so well 

was that the average Communist soldier was not trained to shoot 

and could nOt afford to expend the ammunition necessary to learn. 

Actua ll y this concept which was formulated at division level received 

more or less attention and implementation at lower leve ls. depending upon the commanders involved. However. there appeared to be 

some key element \\'hich was he lpful. Neverthel ess. it is one of the 

best exam ples we can think of which combined an analytical approach. military judgment, training. execution ;md substantia l results. This idea has been termed the "I S-Second ' '''ar.'' Chart 13 

shows wh)'. 

Il seemed absolutely incomprehensi hle that some hundreds of 

riflemen wandering around could inflict heavy losses on a Communist enemy and seldom use the artiller),. hombs. and so forth 

that were necessary in more formal warfare. (Naturally. if one hit 

a bunkered positi on. one shiftcd to heavy firepower.) Howcver. 

this idea paid off manyfold on the battle field in the Upper Delta 

and III Corps area during al1 of 1969. 

r-Yhal's Besl 

During March. when all of OUl' tactics seemed to be paying off , 

we questioned ourselves as to what were the best methods of operations in the daytime and nighttime environmen ts. Since we normally monitored hl'igade operations by type. size and whether the 

operation was conducted during the day or night, we decided to 
15·SI:.CONU \\' Ait 
f"" POWI' 

TACTICAL REFINEMENTS ANI) INNOVATIONS 127 

CHART J3- Fllu POWt:M VERSUS TI~IE CoSf:EI'TlO1" 

No,m.' rlf, .n<! M.n.uy", ApP,o'I<;" 

T,m. (M,nutn) 

R,/!IOS Mort.", 

Ar1l1ll'Y 

Tim" (Se«Indsl 

keep tabs on their results and to le o ur operations in order to 

be able to reinforce success. T hese sta tistics are shown in Table IS. 

Daytime Opemliom. 

Checkerboa rd and B\lshmaste r operations yielded 0.27 and 

0.22 coutacts per operation respectively. Thus, the choice of these 

ground mobile modes was pretty much a lOSS-Up. On the other hand 

company-sized airmobile Jitterbug operations prod uced I.SO conLaCts per operation as compared with platoon reconnaissances in 

rorce which produced only O.OS contacts per opera tion. \Ve coneluded that daytime company·sii'ed operations pa id off. undoubtedly 

d\le to the better command and control provided by the compan y 

command section. 
128 SU A RI' EN ING T H t: COM ISAT E DGE 

TABLE 18- CoMI' ARISQN OF TACTICAL R.:SULTS Co;';TACTS P ER O"ERATION 

AI'RII. 1969 

Til"'''' Ov<"ta' ion 

Jiucrbl.lg 

Bushmaster ... 

Checkerboard 

t\rllbush ... . .. . 

Total .......... . 

Tn ... " f 

Ol"'u'iol1 

Jitterbug .. . 

Bushmaster ..... . .. . 

Checkerboa rd ........... . 

Ambush •..•••••• • ••••••. 

Total ........ . 

Nighllime O/Jl!l"fllio,u. 

Squad 

1080/37 

1080/37 

Number 01 OP<'. nn./Conl~ U 

1'1>1 0011 

&l0/ 51 

640 /51 

~umbe' of 0"" .. 11011./0.'''3<1 

6S4 /1 ~ 

6!H/ 123 

335/603 

111 1 25 

93/ 25 

539/ 653 

Com""", 

269/88 

65 / 26 

3~ 11<I 

Nighttime operations h:l d :I few slirprises. The Checkerboard 

and Bushmaster operations yielded 0.'10 and 0.33 contaCts per operation respectively. This was exactly 50 perCCIll more contacts pcr 

operation than in the daytime. So agai n the choice between type was 

pretty milch lip LO the unit commander. However. it ca ll be seen 

that over four times as mally Bushmasters were conducted than 

Checkerboards. This was hecause the Checkerboard required milch 

greater con trol and milch tighter leadership than was required with 

a Bushmaster and fe\\' of our baHalions relt confident enough to con· 

duct Checkerboards. Although the company.sized operations pro.. 

duced more COlllacts per operation on a percentage basis than did 

the platoon·size ambushes. for the number of troops in volved the 

platoon ambushes \\'ere 60 percent more effecti ve than the com· 

pany.size Bushmasters and Checkerboards. Squad ambushes did nOt 

produce significant results. aga in prohably because of the security 

problems involved with a sma\1 number of personnel. \Ve concluded 

that squad opera tions did not payoff; whereas platoon ambushes 

were effective. Since the res ults of the Checkerboards and Bush· 

masters \\'ere almost identical, it appeared to be sounder to conduct 

Bushmasters at night because the chance of being overrun by the 

enemy was much less. 

The number of enemy eliminated in April resulting from day. 
rACT1CAL ItEFr l\i'.:o.IENI~ AN]) I~N \T10 N3 129 

time infantr)' tacti~ ( 1768) was about twice those eliminated duro 

ing nightlime infantry operations (847) . However, when the enemy 

elimina ted per contact \\'as computed it was most startling to find 

that the average nigh ttime w nlact resulted in 3. 1 enemy losses 

compared lO 2.5 in the daytime. A comparison of equivalent platoon 

days during the lIlonth of April shows that the number of troops 

in the field was almost identical daytime versus nighttime averaging 

75 platoons per peri od. Therefore. the daytime effectiveness per 

infantryman was douhle the nighuime effecti veness even th ough the 

enemy losses per contact at night were greater. 

By April we had come to rely on the fact that a great number of 

small (:Olllacls o\er a large area literally bled the enemy to death. 

Our uni ls had quit looking for the " hig contacL" hecause by then 

the Viet Cong were entirel) fragmented and in hiding, generally 

without ammunition and food and avoiding contact at all costs. We 

concluded that the answer to " \Vhat's Best?". was more of the same. 

Night Hunter 

Tn the fall ()f 196R when the Viet Cong throughout our tactical 

area of operations we re directed to break down into sma ll groups 

and ordered to ,Hoid combat:tt all costs, it became much more diffi· 

cult to find the enemy. The effectiveness of Jitterhugging declined 

and commanders frant ically sough t belte r methods of employment. 

About this time we received permission to hreak down into five 

slick insertions for our reconnaissance·in·force to meet lhe reduced 

level of enel1l} activity and to (over a much broader area more 

thoroughly. In I.ong An Provi nce, Colonel John P. Geraci of the 

1st Brigade turned to night operations since the daytime targets 

had dried up. l ip unlil this time our radar sightings were engaged 

with lInobsel'\'ed artillery fire and we had no follow-up target 

damage assessment during the hours of d arkness. It was :tssumed 

that Viet Cong were heillg killed but we were unable to confirm 

that assumption. CI)Ilseqllentl y. Ollr radar siglnings were of value 

mainl y as intelligence informa ti on since- we had no way of assessing 

the artillery results. 

Tn an au empt to solve his reduced daytime corllaClS and the 

unknO\\'11 effect of our engagements on radar sightings. Colonel 

Geraci developed what he ca ll ed his "Night Hunter" technique. 

Night Hunter was a \'er} compl ex tactical maneu ver lItilizing radar 

vectored ail' cavalry. The Night HUll tel' task force was comprised of 

three essential elements: a ground surve illance radar. air cavalry 

gunships, and a direct sllppon artillery element. Initially we used 

a ground reaction force also. The maneuver worked something like 
130 !l l-iARI'EN ING THE COM MAT EI>C E 

this. Our AN / T PS-25 radar was monitored by the command and 

control grOllp. When they found a major sighting of 20 or more 

Viet Cong Ihey monitored it for some time and when they were 

assured that it was, in fa ct, enemy personnel lhey started the Night 

Hunter in motion. The artill ery prepared to place a battery volley, 

shell high explosive, fuze variabl e time. on the target as well as two 

rounds of shell illuminating with a 200 meter height of burst. 

Both the hig h ex plosive and ill uminating rounds had to arrive on 

target simultaneollsly. Data were also computed to follow lip the 

initial illuminatio n with continuous illuminating ro unds with a 

600 meter height of bUTSt. 

The air cava lry commander scrambled his gunshi ps and they 

orbited some 5 to 10 kilometers away from the target. Ground 

elements were d ispatched to blocking positions. As the Time on 

Target approached the air cava lry commander vectored his gunships toward the target on a flight path ge nerall y perpendicular to 

the artillery-gun target line and at an altitude below the burst height 

of illumination. Through precise coordination, the artillery fire 

burst over the ta rget as the gunships rolled in to exploit the shock 

effect of the comhined attack. If the ta rget was large enough the 

ground troops were brought up. 

It is amazi ng that this highl y compl ex tactical maneuver worked 

at all-but it did. The first Nigh t Hunter resulted in 22 enemy 

being killed, compl etely surprising a major enemy unit. We tried 

three or f01l1' sllbsequcllI operations. all of which \\'ere sllccessful 

with an average enemy eliminated of about 25. However, this was a 

costl y maneuver. requiring great judgment on the pan of the commander. It needed an air cavalry standby whi ch on maTl y nights was 

never scrambl ed due to lack of lucrative radar sigh tings. In other 

words. we were tied to the hlack hox. thlls limiting the area coverage and the number of targets that could be engaged. However, 

from th is interesting mancuver, the most complex that we know of 

ill the Vietnamese environ ment. we proved conclusively that the 

air cavalry could operate effectively at night. The Night Hunter 

was the precursor to our very successful Night Search operations 

which were developed because of the fo regoing limit ations of the 

Night Hunter. Once the Night Search was impl emented the Night 

Hunter technique was abandoned. 

N ight Search 

Night Sea rch operati ons ("\'olved from the Nigh t Hunter in 

carly December 1968 for the reasons just mentioned. The Night 

Search was a pure nighttime air cavalry operation with a great many 
TACTIC/\L IU. FI:-.t: l\'I ENTS ANIJ INi'o'OVATIO.'\'!'. 131 

twists III techniques. The assets required were minimal-a Command and Control Copter and two Cobras. The opera tion was nOL 

hampered by anything except weather. The key to our Night Search 

operations was again good intelligence plus highly trained personnel. 

Operational areas \\'ere selected predicated upon enemy move· 

ments and cUlTent illlell igence. Search patterns were organized 

primarily focllsing on canals and waterways because this was the 

main method of Viet Collg supply in lhe delta. The operation 

was led by the Command and Control chopper flying 300- 500 

feet over the target area. Our spotters in the Command and Control 

copter initiall y used starlight scopes to scan the ground area below 

the Right pattern of the aircraft. Since spollers were the key LO the 

operation. we ultimately weill 10 our trained sn ipers for this duty. 

Once they idelllified a target they engaged it with a burst of full 

tracer fire. Th is enabled the gunshi ps fl yi ng close to the Command 

and Control copter at about 1500 feet to zoom in for the contact. 

As the Cobras auacked the Command and Control copter patrolled 

areas adjacent to the target to observe the results and to permit the 

snipers to engage any enemy Aeeing the area. This simple technique 

resulted in over I.SOO enemy kills in a six month period. Not only 

did it weaken the enemy hut it completely disrupted his normal 

pattern of nighttime movement. 

\Ve encountered some skeptics concerning the efficacy of such 

a simple operation. The .1 -3 of the South Vietnamese Joint Staff, 

Colonel Tho, visited us one niglll to ohserve the technique in 

operation. Upon his return to Dong Tam he somewhat excitingly 

exclaimed: "''''e kill ed IR of them. YOII could see them as clear as 

day." 

The key was in idelllifying the enemy. To illustrate how small 

things make the difference, our helihonle snipers easily tired of 

scanning the ground through sniperscopes. We then introduced the 

Night Observation Device to identify targets, bUl it vibrated so 

much that it wasn't particularly effective. Some enterprising soldier 

suggested that we suspend it from the chopper doorframe with a 

rubber cord spring. Once we did this, we had a stable platform Ihat 

literally turned night into day. Although we pioneered this operation our techniques were chewing gum and bailing wire modifications. The Night Search techniques reached their perfection later 

on in [he 25th Infantry Division and 1st Air Cava lry Division who 

developed much improved hardware. 

Another innovative method of finding the enemy was developed 

for periods when there was no moon to activate the Night Observa-
132 !>HARI'ENING nn: COMMA"' lL)(a: 

lion Device. In such cases, we would patrol a waterway as far as lO 

kilometers distance from OliT actual target area, covering it with 

artillery illumina tion. \Vc were certain lhe Viet Cong under the 

artillery illumination dug in: bUl we also knew that the Viet Cong 

in outlying areas relaxed. As they relaxed our Night Search team 

barrelled in. using the nares to activate the night vision device. We 

always racked up a good number during those no-moon periods 

which normally were considered no noperational times. 

But good hUOling doesn't last forever. The Viet Cong soon 

caught on and took CQIIIllCn neasures. Table 19 highlights the 

operations of the 1st Brigade. which initiated and perfected OUT 

Night Search operations. as well as the division totals. The efficiency 

of the operations buill up and peaked for the 1st Brigade in March 

1969. Thereafter results tapered off greatly as the Viet Cong learned 

to cope with this technique (or possibly reduced their night 

movement) . 

As our spotter teams hecame more skilled, lhe spollers nOt only 

could mark the area for the Cobras but were actually successful in 

killing the enemy with rifle fire fTOm the aircraft. Approximately 15 

percent of the total kills of the night search operation was attributed 

to sniper fire. IF one has not flown in a chopper at night over the 

delta it is hard to describe how lonely and difficult it is to keep your 

bearings and to operate. All our night activities took a tremendous 

amOllnL of gu ts and those 0 11 the Night Search had their quota of 

them. 

Nigh' Raid 

The mOSt daring of all our tactics was the Night Raid. In late 

February 1969 our liaison with Government of Vietnam authorities 

was hitting on all cylinders and we were obtaining milch more 

TABLE 19 - 9r1/ N''-A~TR\' Dn' ISION R ESUI.TS OF NIGHT SEARCII OPt:RATIONS 

'''' 

JAS nm \ . AR APR \rAY JUN TOTAl. 

1ST IJ/HGADE 

Total Operations . . 12 ,. 20 " " 17 

Total VC Killed . 15' '" '" .07 219 15' " 1.27i 

Kills/Open-lion .. 11 .2 I~ ", 20.4 '5 6.; 2.2 10.7 

DWISION TOTAL 

Total Opcr:llions .. I. " 6() " 60 5/) 269 

Total VC Killed .. 154 575 417 '" ... 141 1.81~ 

Kills/Open-lion 7.' 10. 1 7.' , .• , .• 2.8 6.7 
information about the Viet Congo T he 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry. 

first under one of our most outstanding battalion commanders. 

Li eutenant Colonel Donald B. Schroeder (who was killed by enemy 

fire in early 1969), and subsequentl y under Lieutenant Colonel 

Robert A. Sullivan , had a particularly good intelligence section. 

This ba ttalion was loca ted along Highway 4 north of the District 

Headquarters of Cai Be in Oinh Thuong Province. Their 5-2, 

Captain Joseph W. Hudson, (later kill ed by hostil e fire on 17 March 

1969) had noted that the enemy dispersed during daytime but in 

the evening they reassembled in small isolated groups of abandoned 

houses throughout the District area. Whenever U.S. troops set ambushes. even though we \\·oulcl pick off one or twO enemy. they remained genera ll y dispersed and did not concelllrate. Captain Hudson suggested that it was tOO had we could not raid some houses, and 

so the concept of the Night Raid was initiated. The Night Raid 

combined the techniques associated "'ith the Nigln Hunter and the 

Nigh t Search into a dramati call y daring attack on an enemy stronghold. T he operational team consisted of a COlllllland and Control 

copter, t\\·o Cobras, and two slicks calTying six combat infantrymen 

each. The opera ti on unfolded something like this. 

About midnight when we werc sure the Vi et Cong had settled 

down for the evening the aircraft would become airborne. At a 

prearranged time artillery would fire illuminating rounds ligilling 

up the target hULS. The Cohras would swing in and strafe the peripheral areas and the Command and COlllrol copter would follow 

the Cobras and mark the landing zone with a flare. The tWO Hueys 

protected by the Cobras would I;md. deposit the troops. and circle 

again . After the initial illumination the Command and Comrol 

copter normally provided additional flares but the artillery would 

remain on call if needed for high explosive or illuminating rou nds. 

The troops on the ground were pre briefed as to layout of the area, 

the buildings to be ~('arched ;md what the), expected to find. Each 

Illan had his joh and upon hilling the landing lOll e they set Out to 

accomplish it in a period of 5 to 10 minutes at the most. So sudden 

was the element of surprise ",rai ned on these raids that we have killed 

Viet Cong guards silting lip agaimt a lree reaching for their rifles in 

order to C'ombat the U.S. attack. Most of the times the Viet Cong 

were caught asleep so that \\·e cOllld capture prisoners givi ng 

tremendous intelligence bonuses. The attack ended as fast as it had 

heglln . with the Hlleys coming in to the I>ick-up zone to pick lip the 

troops and depart rapidly. These raids were so successful that in the 

dozens which occurred in the midst of Viet Cong stronghOlds with 
134 !.1-IARI' t:N INL fHI:: CQ MHA'I EU(;}:. 

100 or more Viet Cong on hand we suffered only two U.S. soldiers 

killed. 

The decision to c.:onduct the Night Raids was one of OllT toughest 

decisions. In most people's minds we stood a good chance to lose 

twO choppers and (we lve infantrymen. As it turned Ollt we never 

lost an aircraft, had minimum casualties and maximum relurns. 

The shock to lhe Viet Cong who realized that they were not safe 

c,'en in the middle or th e night in far o ff areas was morc th an they 

could stand. This helped to keep them off balance and when can· 

sidered with all of the other day :md nigh t opera tions that were going 

on was one of the keystones of our constant pressure technique. 

Day or Night! 

Many have asked whether all the planning, training. scheduling, 

mailHenance alld time that \\'enl illto nigh t operations were worth 

the pay off, After the mini-T el in May 1968 the tOlal encmy losses 

(Viet Congo kill ed in action, Prisone rs of War, Hoi Chanhs and V.C. 

Inrrastructure) for the period June through December 1968 averaged approximately 983 a month. At the same time the ratio of 

Viet Cong eliminatcd to U.S. Kill ed in Action was about 13,7 to I. 

(Table 20) Throughout this period \\'c had conducted continuing 

T ,\IIU: 2 0 - R ATIO 0' V,ET (:0:-;(; E 1.l",NAn;u TO U.S. K,LU:O, 

J U:-;I:: 1968 JlI:''':~: 1969 

\·c 

LI\U · 

I'OTAI \,IAT£D 

"C \'CEI,I'" I .S. U~TI KIA I'W '" \'CI' SATPD KIA U.S. KIA 

JUIl 68 BaS 69 7 "" "' 85: 1 

Jill ., . ......... '"' 84 , 735 5'1 13.6:1 

Aug ....... .... 968 108 • 1085 tOl 10.7 : 1 

"'I' 0" ...... '" 104 1:1 85 1 67 12.7:1 

0« ........ 901 92 25 1018 66 15.4:! 

No,' . , . . . . . . . . . 961 140 22 112' .. 25.5: 1 

~ .......... 968 101 26 '" (II) 1108 ;.9 !8.8: I 

Sub·Tolal '''"g ." •• ,. ".7:1 

J 311 69 ....... 129' 95 ,. '.1.'1 , (10) H~r, " 1:;.6:1 

Feh ...... .. 1799 " ,12 26/ ( 8) ,.19 59- 3' .0:1 

Mar ............. ".. 124 7' 201 (21 ) ~12' " 80.9:1 

Ap' ........... 3117 "' 71 6/ ( 15) '''0 " &I.9: ! 

I\h} .... ...... 2677 122 " (2 ) 2&17 65 43.8: I 

Jlln ' ............. 1792 127 '.5 7/ (20) 1981 <; ·4-1.0:1 

Suo,T OIal A" g . .. 2541 " 43.8: 1 

':":um"!'roIO lefl of Ilut. m .. k r.pr ... nt <ilillan, held for Iri.1 by Soulh Vi(ln.m"", '''lh(l.i l~1 

:":umbr ... In p .. ("lhe .... Indlule miln.ry P<'nonncl killed Or held u prloon.ro of ...... 
TACTICAL KEFI~I:.MENTS ,\1\'1> I1\'NOVATIO:"«S 135 

night operations bUl nOt on the sca le that occurred in 1969. Our 

night cavalry tactics commenced in carnest in January 1969, but in 

that month we on ly had 19 Night Search operations. Om Night 

Raids didn't get started until late Febl"Uary and 0111' snipers didn't 

begin to be productive until.lanuary. The influence the snipers had 

in making 0 111" nighttime ambushes more aggressive \.,.as not really 

(elt until Febl"Uary or March. Considering the faCl that we really 

didn't gel moving ill nighttime operations until February there was 

a tremendous change in the statistics between the last half of 1968 

and the first half of 1969. Il must be remembered thal in Jul y of 1969 

the division was alcrted for withdrawal and combat operations 

dropped off sharply as the troops prepared to relocate to the Continental 1I.S. If the month of December 1968 is an)' criteria of the 

nighttimc activities for the last half of 19ti8 the ratio of nightlime 

enemy eliminated to total enemy eliminated during the month \\'as 

17 percent. (Ta/J/e 21) Thi .. compares to an average of 35 percent 

eliminated during night operations in lhe first half of 1969. In 

other words. the perccntage of encmy losses duc to night operations 

in 1969 was t\\'ice thal ill 1968. i\lorcovcr. the absolute increase in 

enemy losses was most impressivc. ntlrill~ January-June 1969 the 

averagc monthly numhcr of enemy climin,lled jumped from thc !l8~ 

previously discLlssed 10 2,541 whi le at the samc time the avcrage 

month" exchanl!e ratio more than tripled to 4~.8 to I. (TaMe 20) 

TAR!.E 21-9T1I INFA",TRY DIVISION Vn:T (:0,,"(; EI. IMINKno D ,\Y-NI(;IIT 

OI'}:RATIONS 

1,.:(' )\, n:R \1 \R '" \IA\' OU' Il" 1 

" ,~! " '" " m " " Da~ ,\ ir Cavall"}' '" ,., ~~i 5-" ,- 42' 5 16 c,fj4 2"" 

Ila)" Infanln ... '''' !>39 726 11311 129.~ 1031 i2·1 1i4 

Olhers .. ... ... .... . 12·1 116 157 ~i7 '" 485 145 '21 

Tot3[ Da\·t;me ...... ." 1026 1220 2087 2002 203;. In3 5'>1 

Nighl Air Cavalr\" . . . ,., 143 '" 580 35[, 266 '13 " 

Night Infant" 145 "" 24[. ~5 ">4i '" 275 17', 

Snipcn ......... ... .. 11 " " 211 3·16 200 '60 ,~ 

Total Nighttime .. ..... . '90 '''' 729 1636 12·18 812 5~8 243 

Total .. . ....... .. .. 1108 1-133 1!H9 3723 3310 2&1i 1981 i47 

R:uio. ~ighl/TOlal ... ... .17 .28 '7 ... .58 .M .28 ." 
136 !oUARI'ENING THE COMBAT EOGI:.. 

While grea tl y increasing enemy losses we had reduced U.S. casua lties 

l'clatively and absolutely. 

There is no question that by breaking down into small units 

and applying continuous pressure day and night. the two building 

blocks of our tactical innovations. we were able to get the Viet Cong 

on the nm and rcally dobber him. His apparatus fell apart. The 

Viet Cong lost his leaders. his followers, his ammunition, and his 

food. Tn shon he hecame ungl ued, resulting in additional enemy 

eliminated. We decimated fOllr or five of his best baualions. 

In Ollr o pinio n . our tactical innovations. p..'ulicularly those a t 

night, were the key to the division's sliccess. 

These innovations came about as a result of improved support 

and an analytical approach to combat operations. To answer the 

question. Day or Night? \\'e can on ly reply. "Day aud Night." 

Mi1les mill 8 00/) ' Tm!}!i 

As the war wound down in Vietnam the number of friendly 

casualties due to mines and boohy traps became more pronounced 

or at least more oln·iOIlS. \"hether this was due to more enemy 

effort in this area or due to less direct combat casualti es overall 01" 

both was nOt detcrmined. 

Howevcr. all units felt com pelled to sLUcl y this problem and hold 

it under control. Olle approach was to try to teach the riAemen as 

much about mines and booby traps as possibl e. The 9th Division 

look the opposite approach: by analyzing the types and setups in 

depth it was determined that aboUl tWO types of devices and three or 

four setups covered the grea t majority of engagements. By concelllraling on th ese it was possible to leach all of th e men Illost of 

what was necessary to know to detect booh)' traps and lO minimize casualties. The !nell who demonstrated a flai r for detection 

were given more training and used as on-the-joh-traininp;- instructors_ 

Statistical records were kept which could be studied hy e\'ery commander so that he, in his own wa)', could seek means to reduce 

losses by enemy booby traps and mines. Our analytical appro.1ch 

allowed 115 to Callie lip with m:llJy changes that he lped reduce 

casualties, Highlights of 0 \11' ;jllalysis are discussed subseq uen tl),. 

How Detected. 

Almost all of thc boob)' traps not detonated were detected 

visua ll y, (TaMe 22\ Very few- less than aile percent- wcre detected 

as a result of informants or SCOU l dogs. Therefore, men Tllust COIlsla ntl y be on th e alert. e),es focused and searching ahead of the line 

of march. In this respect. as mentioned above. training was of vital 
MORTAR AT NICHT 

importance to new men in-country prior to ga ining the ex perience 

that comes only with being ill the ri ce paddies. 

When Detected. 

We found that the peak of booby tfap detection occurred at 

1100 in the morning when the troops were £resh and alert. The 

average peak of detonations on the other hand occurred at 1600 

hours, when the troops were tired and not as alert. (Chart 14) 
138 SllAR1'EN ING T HE COl\! nAT EI)GE 

MINE U.:rECTION, TH E H ARD W ,\V 

T he majority of all casualties from booby traps occurred on recon· 

naissance in force missions. ,"Vhen a soldi er plodded through a rice 

paddy up to his waist in wa ter for severa l hours in the hot humid 

atmos phere he became terribly fatigued, his ability to concentrate 

was low and he was an easy mark for a Viet Cong booby trap . .Just 

the simple faCllhal the commanders were told to rotate units as \\'cll 

as lead personnel as the day progressed in order to always have alert 

troops as poi lll men cut our boohy trap casualties greatly. 

TABLE 22- J\ h ITIIOIJ OF DEn :Crlo:,,< Ot- ENt:Ml' MIN ts AND B oOlw TRAPS 

lI~thod 

Visual ...... . 

DtlOnalion ............... . 

Mine lJet«tor ............ . 

VC Mine Marke r . . ........ . 

ScOIi I 1)0f[ ........... . 

nronn~11L .. 

Other 

TOlal 

~,,,,,bco. 

50' 

22' 

" , 

, 

, 

10 

758 

I'('r(~n' 

66.4 

29.2 

1.7 

0.5 

0.5 

0.' I.' 100.0 
I 

~ f- • • • • , f- , • ~ 

f- ~ • , , • z • • u 

~ z 

" 0 

" z ~ 

• :li 

~ > " ;< • 

~ • " 0 

f- , 

• .i 

f- E E , , , z 

f- I I 

I /" f- I 

I J.,...---" I 

- -......... 

./ 

" ~ 

0 , ./ 

z Z 0 0 § • • 

~o " - > o ~ 

• z 

, < " 

------

I" t---. 

~ z 

I 

.. g 

~ 

:t " U 

:il ~ g 

S.L.N301:JNI c;lO tI]9r.mN 

..-

I , -

.......... 

-' " 

"'. '. 

I 

/ 

/ 

• 

, 

• 

-

/ 

./ 

• I 

• 

: 

" 

r-. 

I 

/' 

"\ 

..-

, 

'0 

• 

- • " , 

o 

• z -. 

• 

-. • -. 

s 

;; 

8 
140 H IAkl'ENh"G Tilt. COi\lnAT E DGE 

' I AIII. E 23- L oCATIO:-: OF [NEMY DEVICES 

", um",". r~, ~n. 

Jungle ..... . ......... ... .....••. 274 ~6.1 

Trail .. .... ... ..... ", .... . .. . 154 20.3 

Rice Paddy Oike ....... .. 101 13.3 

Canal or Stream ~nk ........•. ........ . " 11.0 

Rice Paddy . ...................... . 11 9.4 

Road . . . ....•. . ..••.••.. . .....••.. • ..••. " 4.' 

Open fidd .. . ........ . 21 2.' 

Intersection of 2. 3, oJ. or 6 ... ....... •• .. . ... 10 I., 

Structure .... . ...... . 9 1.2 

Tot~1 ............ . 158 100.0 

Wh ere Detecle(f. 

We found lhal about 34 pcrccm of 0111 booby traps were located 

predominantl y along trails and rice paddy dikes while 36 percent 

were located in th e jungle growth. (Table 2)) At first th is was 

thought surprising hut, then. \ ... hen Viet Cong tactics were considered this boohy lr<lp p<ll1ern appeared plallsible. Prisoner interrogati ons indicated thal the Viet Cong employed booby traps as a 

defensi\'e measure around perimeters or bunkered positions. Their 

booby trap fie lds were 110rmally one or two strings in depth. Con. 

sequently, our infantrymen had to be alert for booby traps throughout the complete perimeter of nipa palm or built-up enemy 

positions. 

Disarming 0/ lJoohy TrfllJs. 

\Ve found lhal approximately three-fourths or all devices were 

trip-wires attached 10 a grenade. ( Tahie 24 ) Generally these were 

detected visually and ;lcti va ted hy heavy objects thrown ahead and 

dragged over the grollnd. \Ve concluded that every squad going 

into the field shoilid have some type of drag- device and found 

Tripwire 

Pressure ... 

Unknown ......•••.• . 

em!! t: lcctric 

Press/ Electric 

Cmd Pull ... 

Other 

Tm:al 

T Abl }: 24- Tl'p}: FIRI"'G DEVIC.~ 

"l",nlN't 

'i-f9 

124 

27 

" • 

25 

158 

P f l (,<"'" 

72.4 

16.5 

,., 

'.2 

1.1 

0.1 

,., 

100.0 
TACTICAL HEFIN E M EN'IS I\NI) I N:\,OVATIQNS 14 1 

tha t 155mlll shi pping piuS'S made excellent dragging devices. interestingly, 94 percent of all the booby traps and mines encountered were not covered by fi re. This did not mean that Viet 

Cong were not in the vicinity, Inll most probably indicated that the 

Viet Cong used them as a measure to keep Alli ed troops away from 

defensive positions. They relied heavily on the detonation of the 

booby traps to divert our movement. Since mines and booby traps 

were not covered hy fire. troops could take their time to neutralize 

the booby traps as they come upon them. In addition to the tripwire booby traps. most of the other (16 percent) were pressure 

activated. One might believe that pressure activated booby traps 

would he located almost completely along dikes and trails. Unfortunately, this was not true; only 35 percent were located along 

travell ed ways, with the rest d ispersed in jungle. open fields, rice 

paddies, and struCtures. We recommended that all mines and booby 

traps should normally he blown in place. 

Origin of Booby T raps. 

The majority of all booby traps were made from Chinese ComIllunist grenades, although 19 percent of the mines and booby traps 

were from U.S. munitions. (T able 2') Chi com grenades were small , 

easily assembled. and in plentiful suppl y. so troops had to ex pect 

them anywhere within the tactical area o f interest. 

Multiple CllJualties. 

Forty·six percent of all mines and booby traps detonated resulted 

in multiple casualties. (Table 26) Th is was caused by the bunching 

lip of troops as they wa lked closed lip in single fil e instead of wa lking as skirmishers wilh the proper distance between elements. A 

prisoner of war commented on thi~ state of U.S. diSCipline when he 

said: 

US. troops were moving fast. so I knew Ihey did 110t ha ve any idea 

Ihe booby Iraps were there. Suddenly I heard some booby Ir:lps explode. 

TAKI E 2 5 - 0RtGIN 01' MANU FACTU kt_ OF BoolW TRAI"; 

-': umi><-' Prt<t'" 

Chicom .... .. .... .. ... .. . . ....... .. ... . . . ..... . '" 56.1 

u.s . .. ...... ...... ....... .. .................... . 145 19.t vc l.ocal ... .. ... ....... .......... . . . . .. . .... .. . M 7.1 

USSR ••.•...•..• ••••••..•.•••.....••.•••.••.• , 0.4 

Other ........... . .......... . .... •........ 9 1.2 

Unknown ........... . . . .• • • _ ........ . 122 16.1 

Total . . .............................. . ...... . 758 100.0 
142 SH ARPEN I NG T HE COMUAT EDGE 

Five U.S. soldiers in the rrOIH clCIlICIlt Went down and were wounded or 

dead. Then the entire U.S. element stOpped. laid <101\' 11 roJ' five minutes 

and started advancing agai n. I think U.S. troops were staying too dose 

together d uring movcmCIH. U.S. troops move single fil e. too dose 

together, ca using many booby trap casualties. 

We could nOt tolerate this sloppy field discipline and rea ll y put 

the pressure on commanders to get better control. We concluded 
T,\Bu: 26-9Tu INFANTRY DIVISION MINt: AND B OOBY TRAP CA

No. 

lJc-,on~'nI t:u .. ~h, 

.'-;0. C.u,inR CHuah

h"~"o!\ ' kIOn>l .... C~",.hin 

'" WI" ""Iona

6-31 Jnr .............. 

'" ,. , 57 15 ~9 101 ....... 

'" ,. • ., I.. 

3-39 l of ..... . ....... . 8 7 • 10 12 

4- 59 lof .............. 16 16 1 

" '.1 

.s--'i 101 ... .. ........ 

" " • 16 I., 

3-60 lof ..... ..... .... 18 18 • 41 2S 

4-47 lof ............. 28 ,. , ., 1.8 

S-(j() Inf . . ... . .... . . , . 

" " 28 , .• 

2-60 Inf ............. , 25 

" .. 1.9 

2-17 [n! .... 28 

" 56 , .• 

151h Engr ........ 

" , • ' .7 

01hers 5 • , " ,,' 

Total 

'''' 206 16 ,,. 1.8 
144 MIARI'ENING T~IE COM HAT EDGE 

that a casualty rate of over twO per incident indicated bunching. a 

casualty rate over about 1.5 indicated reduced distances or interval, 

etc. The advamages of an analytical approach arc demonstrated by 

setting optimum distances between men based on simple field tests 

with the most frequent types of traps. If this distance was maintained, multiple casualties were infrequent. 

The 25th Division elaborated upon this type of analysis by 

placing the data on their computer, thus giving them the ca pability 

to present and study th e problem \\'ith minimum clerical effort. 

We found th al the mine and booby tfap tactics of the enemy 

varied seasonally. For example. when rice planting time came 

around at the beginning of the wet season the enemy did not rig 

booby traps in the rice paddies so as to avoid casualties among the 

farm ers tending to their livelihood. Because of the variations by the 

Viet Cong, divisions in Vietnam had to resort to analytical approaches to stay on top of this most important problem. For us, the 

analytical approach p.1.id uff, In a short period of time our booby 

trap neutralization rate increased from less than 50 percent to over 

70 percent. Not only did we increase the percentage of mines and 

boob)' traps detected without detonation , but by emphasizing 

proper ground formations we were able to reduce th e number of 

casualties per detonation. thereby protecting our most important 

asset-the soldier, 

All of the significant information resulting from our analysis of 

mine and booby trap data \\'as published in a Monthl y Mine and 

Booby Trap Report, Included in the report \\'35 a handout entitled 

"The Story of a Booby Trap Casualty" which \\'35 disseminated to 

all infantry soldi ers, This handout related cold statistics to reality 

and we hoped it would help to prevent booby trap casualties, 

The Story of a lSooby Trap G,lsualty 

The battalion h:IS the ass.ndt helicopter ;lsselS today and membcrs 

of thc 2d Platoon Alpha Company :trC on the PZ waiting for the "slicks," 

Amongst the 1st Squad is PFC .I ones. inf:t nu'Yllia n. in.countfY fOf si x weeks, The assault helicopters arrive and the 2d Pl atoon fills five slicks, 

j\ s the)' lift off the PZ tllcd:!y's rccon naissance in force h:IS slal'ted, AboUl 

20 minutes later the 30 combat infantrymen are insertcd 400 meters 

from a nipa line along a callal 011 the edgc of the Plain of Reeds, Upon 

insertion the men hit the ground behind a paddy dike, hut it is a cold 

LZ. The pbtoon leader is now issui ng illstructiollS to move 10 the north 

and check the nipa linc, It is abom 1100 hOllrs in the morning as thc 

men are closing III toward some dense underbrush in the tall cocon ut 

trees, So faJ' there has becn no fil'c; however. they G ill see bunkers 

illlerspersed amongst the edgc of the foliagc. The Tigcr Scout who is 

walking point raises his hand. indicati ng something suspicious, E\'ery" 
j'S 

> , t 

-! 

TAcrl CAL REFINEMENTS A ND INNOVATIONS 145 

• 

i" IEDEVAC 

r 

.. . . . 

one halt~. ami the M/ llad !cadel Lome~ 101 \"a nl to sec wha t's up. A 

visual inspection indlcatc~ :1 trip-wire grellade IlOOb~ trap carefu lly 

camouflaged amongst the fo liage, 

(T he majorit\ of :1 11 booby trap~ arc dctcltcd ill the ea rl y morning 

when troops are Iresh. Ulr of the boob) tnlps arc detected by the 

several hundred Tiger Scouts, fonner ve themselves with an int imlHC 

knowledge of ve tactic; and tech n iques. which the 9th Infantry Divisioll 

has operati llg with Ihe troops in the field . 70% of all booby traps en, 

countered are detected. 72% arc trip-wire g renade ty pes. 36% of all 

booby traps encou lllelcd :I re in the jungle. On ly fi% of these booby 

traps :Ire covered hy V(: fire: tlwI is, 9-1 % ha \'e no one covering them, or 

if Ihe ve arc coveril.lg them. die} dOIl't fire _ The majori ty o f all h .... enade 

hooby traps arc \.Ill com.) 

Having seen that the pin is still in the Chicorn grenade. the .squad 

leader instructs lhe Tiger SCOll! to Cllt the trip-wire. renderi ng the 

grenade sa fe . This having bee ll done. they destroy the grenade and the 

pl:1tOOI1 moves fon,'anl again and. encounteri ng no more booby traps, 

they check the bunkel'S. Findi ng no VC, they blm ... the biggest bunkers 

and retu rn 10 the rice paddies and .. new PZ. ready for pickup il nd 

additional airmobile inscrlions eleswhere. 

Two more inscrtions follow. onc of which results in <I n enemy 

contact. The troops arc proud of their two VC bodycoullt <l nd the one 

AK-47 captured. Towa rds the end of the d"y. :"It 1600 hours. they are 
146 SHARPEN ING THE COl\I BAT EDGE 

inserted again, this time :I\)proximately 500 meters from another nipa 

line along anOlher cana l w lere intelligence has inclic:tted there may be 

ve. Again they are instructed to move out and check the nipa for VC 

activi ty. By now the point mall h;l$ cha nged three times. and PFC Jones 

is walking point. He is tired. Although during the dry season there is 

not any water in the rice paddies. Jones nevertheless is walking along 

the rice paddy dike where the movement is quicker, because d uring the 

dry season the p.1.ddics arc broken and lhe footing is difficult. His 

buddies are in the same frame of mind and instead of walki ng as skirmishers they follow in a si ngle line. They are bunched u p, tOO, as they 

move forward. They reall y don't expect anything and everyone is as 

relaxed as you can get in the rice p:lddies-which isn't very relaxed. 

Aboul 100 meters from the nipa line, J o nes hears a POP. He realizes 

that he has set off a booby trap. BUI J ones freezes: he can't move: he 

can't speak. The booby IraI' goes off ami J ones and twO buddies JUSt 

behind him are hi t by fragments. 

(9th Division statistics show tha t '10% of all casualties occur to 

soldiers in.country less tha n twO months. 30% of all booby traps en· 

cou ntered during the month of April were ina<ivertelllly detonated . 

. H% of all booby traps found werc on trails and rice paddy dikes. 16% 

of these booby tra ps were pressure Iype. 36% \\'ere buried in the ground.) 

Jones has been sel'iomly wounded. His foot is tOI"l1 up: he has frag- ments in the gut. God! how it hurts! DuslOff is called immedi;lIeiy and it 

arrives 20 minutes laler. taking .Iones and his two buddics to Ihe hospita l 

at Dong Tam. Qlle of his buddies was lucky. He i~ treated :I n(\ released. 

Jones is sent immccli:llely 10 the o per<lting room. 

(During the mOlHh of April 75% of all men wounded by booby 

traps were hospita lized. 16% of all the deton<lled booby traps resulted 

in mUl tiple casua lties. An average of 2.9 men were wounded per mul· 

tiple inCident.) 

J ones, back from the operating room. has had a lot of time to think 

it over. The doctors hope to save his foot. but right now he is awfully 

glad just to be alive. He relives Ihal terrible moment in the paddy. And 

now. 100 late, he rea lizes he should not ha\'e wa lked on the paddy d ike. 

But he was tircd, and he was not paying atten tion to where he put his 

feet. Brown, the other man hospitalized. a veter<l n of eight months in 

the paddies. knows he shou ld nOt have bccn ,,'a lking so close to the 

point man. However. the detonation c:lme wit hout any warning to 

Brown. So as they lay convalesci ng in their hospital beds, he asks J ones 

why he did nOt holler. Jones admits Ih at he frole when he heard the 

pop of the booby trap. Jone ~ feels bad l)' becallse if he had hollered the 

other men probab ly would not have becn wounded. 

(All troops enteri ng the Reliable Academy are given instructions 'to 

holler "HIT IT" and to hil the ground immediately upon hearing the 

pop of a booby tra/). Yet, surveys show that when confronted with 

reality inexpericncc( soldiers sometimcs just don't rcae!.) 

And so it goes, even though A Company had a IWO VC bodycount 

for the day, three men had been wounded. two seriously. 
TAcrlCAL REFINEMENTS AND I NNOV,\TIONS 147 

(In April I96U 41 C>~ of the 9th Divisioll sold icrs killed in action, and 

63% or thosc woundcd wcrc casualties rrom booby Ira ps. Booby Iraps 

are Ihc singlc mosl im ponllm ca,u;dt y pmduccr ill the 9th Division 

area.) 

This, thCII, is the 10101"} of a hooh) tr;lp ca1>uah). The pattcrns. types, 

loc.lIions and encmy rea ctions ;lIe ,ti l predict;lblc. To pre\'ent such 

incidems the 9th nhi ~in n collects Ihc most detailed st:ltistics. disseminates vila I WCliral information. Ic'lI-hes refrcshcr courscs. follows up 

with rCllction tests. and consta ntly cxhol'ls troops to utilizc propcr 

cOTllb;n formations ;'11([ tlistaw·c." betwecn soJdic .... Notwithsta nding, 

in the last an:tl\'~is it is the ;tlliUIl of the indi\'idu;tl soldicr that will 

detect cnemy hooh) II';,!» ;uld i."IIiC hi .. ;11\<1 hi .. huddies' sa fety. 

R D IE:\IBER! 

Ue alcrt 

Utilize the cxpel'lisc of the Tiger SCOlits 

Don't \";llk on trails and rice p~lddy d ikcs 

if you can hclp it 

Probejullgle foliage cOIrefullv 

\Vatch where you step 

Challgc lJ<Jilll men OftCII \,'he ll you arc tired 

Use artificial drag lines 

Don't hunch up 

And whcn the 'Ibove don'l work and you 

hear :1 boob) trap "pop", hollel 

" HIT IT" and hit the ground 

You. the ricc paddy soldier. are the mo~t imponam asse t the 9111 

Division has. Don't be :1 booby trap Clsu:l h}'. 

Th e Pro/)It: SI/iDer 

As d isCllssed carlier o ne of Otlr most reliable sou rces of intelligence was th e Airborne Person nel Deteclor (People Sniffer). Over 

33 percelll o f all significa nt readings were confirmed hy operati onal 

contacts. This hi gh sllccess rate WaS directly associated with the rea l 

time readout of information. Tbe d evice waS normall y mounted in 

a U H - l aircraft and cOllneCLed by a flexibl e hose to an airscoop 

moun ted to the underside o f the aircrafl. Air passing th rough the 

People Sniffer was sampl ed for the presence of carbon and ammo nia , emitted by man and o ther sources. and compound sigma, an 

emission peculiar solely to man. Readings a ll a graduated dia l could 

ind icate the presence of personnel in an area. It should be noted 

that th e Airborne Personnel Detector was mllch superi or in every 
148 SHARPENING T H E COr-f8AT EDGE 

way to earlier models and improvisations. It au tomatically produced better results. 

Although we had great SllCCess with the People Sniffer the turnover of personnel had been such that in the Spring of 1969 the 

newer commanders were nOt completely fam ili ar with its capabilities and were not utilizing it to its fullest extent. Therefore, we 

found it worthwhile to re-emphasize the tactical imponance of this 

valuable sensor. To insure that we refined our tactics to the utmost 

we did a great amount of field experimentation which gave us a 

much better insight illlo the prdcrrcd lise of the People Sniffer. The 

utilization and effectiveness of the People Sniffer was influenced by 

many variables, such as the flight pattern and altitude of the aircraft, 

local climate. wind and precipitation. time of day. population, and 

the numbers and dispersion or enemy personnel. 

Other In{ltle 11 ces. 

From time to time pundits have claimed that the People Sniffer 

was influenced by water huffaloes or other animals. However, repeated structured tests have shown that most animals do not exude 

a scent which is detectable on the People Sniffer. A Viet Cong practice of arraying various human excreta produced an only minor and 

predictable effect on the People Sniffer, and it was not widely encountered. 

Drawing upon past experience and fortified with new experimental information we were able to provide our commanders with 

ideas lO assist units in improving the results obtai ned by the People 

Sniffer. It, like any other intelligence source , required carefu l employment and proper interpretation to obtain maximum benefi lS. 

We provided information concerning the employment of aircraft. 

the employment of personnel and the pattern and lime of searches. 

However. the most important fallout o f aliI' experimentation was 

in the field analysis of read outs. 

The crnx of the situation was the ability to d ifferentiate between 

actual enemy on the ground and Tesidual scents. \ Ve Telied heavil y 

on the air cavalTY to sort out our Teadings. The LOH's would hoveT 

over areas of significant Teadings seeking visual information. The 

LOH's also employed CS gas extensively in attempts to flush out the 

enemy. However, in hunkered areas most of the time the air cavalry 

could not tell whether the enemy Temain ed aT wheth er the bunkers 

were indeed emptly. However, we set up a system where, byon-thespot analysis or read outs. we could differenti ate between Tesidual 

scents and actual enemy. thus giving a high rate of assuTa nce that 

when our units Teacted to People Sniffer readings they would find 
TACTICAL REFI NEMENTS ANO I NNOVATIONS 149 

some enemy. During the months of March and April over one half 

of all significant readings to which we reacted resulted in contacts. 

It is of interest to note that our best test and analysis of this 

device took place in the Spring of 1969 which was pretty late in 

the game. Ideally it should have been done months earlier. We 

would have then gained maximum benefits from it. 

It should be mentioned that this discussion is primarily oriented 

towards the technique of handling the sniffer. It is somewhat handi· 

capped by the security classification of this study. More importantly. 

however, it docs not do justice to the importance of having the 

capability to react at once to favorable reports. People Sniffer readings as intelligence were of academic interest. Readings. leading to 

quick contacts were of real importance. 
CHAPTER VII 

The Analytical Approach 

In any military operation one tries to get hold of what is happen· 

ing by man y standard devices-command and sta ff visits, briefings. 

reports, statistics. and so forth . In Vietnam the operations tended 

to be so repetitive, so far flung, and at such a low tactical level that 

statistics became unusua lly important. 

In 1968 in the 9th Division these statistics were largely activity 

oriented: that is, we conducted so many operations, fired so much 

artillery, and so forth . There was also a tendency to lump results, 

going from daily reports to total results over periods as long as 

weeks or months. 

When lhe enemy began to evade. the re lationship between 

activity and results changed so radically that the previous statistics 

comparisons lost much of their pertinence. We therefore hit on the 

idea of results (or output) oriented statistics. For example, we 

would re£ord: 

Activity level (in pm) as related to ----10 resulls (output). 

This tended to place activity in a useful context as it obviously was 

most meaningful if the outcome was a tangible result. 

The Ilext step was to measure efficiency in a gross way as results 

per unit of in put. Results (output) divided by Activity level (input) 

equa ls efficiency (results per unit of inplll). This, of course, normalized the statistics and made il easier to deduce a rough standard 

of efficiency by compari.son with an accepted norm. 

The final step was to target the enemy and to measure his condition. This gave a rough measure of the total and final effect on 

the enemy: 

AClivit)" (U.5.) --.... OUlpUI (U.5.) - _ efficiency (u.s.) } 

AClivily (ARVN) -~ OUlpUt (ARVN) _ efficiency (ARVN) o"crall SlalllS 

,\ cl ivily (RF/ PF) -~ ompUl (RF/ I'F) _ efficiellcy (RF/ I'F) ... of I'llI'm)" "nilS 

Activlly (Othcr) - .... output (other) _ cfficicncy (other) 

All of this was a rather painful process initially as only fin al 

results really counted. The big talker and little doer took a rather 
THE ANALYTICAL A PPROAC H 151 

dim view of this approach. However, after a while it became obvious 

that these statistics helped each echelon of command get a grasp 

on their operations, and grad uall y acceptance of the approach became fairly general. 

Another refin ement was to keep statistics on a daily, weekly and 

monthl y basis. This enabl ed commanders to keep dose tabs on 

developing trends in operations-both friendly and enemy. If a 

particular type of acti vity began to payoff, more effort could be 

put into it. If an activity or area began to slump, more attention 

could be given to it to determine why. 

On the other hand, there were areas where we did not pay much 

attention to statistics. For example, once it became obviolls that our 

vehicle deadline rates were so low that active operations were not 

affected, we onl y looked at these monthl y. However, we looked at 

bulldozer and generator rates (wh ich were historically poor) weekly. 

As an aside, some observers of the Vietnamese war have been 

critical of the lise of statistics on various grou nds. \oVhaL they have 

overlooked is that the conditions of combat in Vietnam were sllch 

that it was difficult. if not impOSSible, for higher commanders to 

get down and personall y observe the details of combat and straighten 

things Ollt as was done in World War II, for example. Also, progress 

was rarely seen in climactic victories, but rather in the cumulative 

effect of hundreds of thollSands of small sca le engagements. Sta tistics, 

if properly lIsed. in conjunction with more traditional techniques, 

helped one to get hold of and eva luate these small combat events. 

We also tried to keep out of the area of diminishing returns. 

For example, we used highly simplified training approaches. The 

art was to determine a sma ll number of skills that could be taught 

in a short period of time and obtain reasonable results. This tended 

to keep training on the productive area of the leam ing curve and 

minimize gold-plating. It was particu larly suited to the rapid turnover generated by a twelve month (QU I' plus normal attrition. 

Ideally, and this was hard to do, the sta tisti cs should relate 

directl y to the overa ll mission, operational concept, the tactics and 

tech nique of the unit concem ed. Then as one traced through the 

statistics, one measured resu lts and corrected shortfalls within the 

framework of the command system and the operational concept. 

In summary. a good general ru le was to concentrate on measuring activities that culminated in meaningful result'S, to measure 

them periodically, and to stay in high efficiency areas. 

All of these added lip to what might be termed the analytical 

approach-an insistence on results and reasonable efficiency. 
152 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

Per/orm(mce Orientation 

The tremendous surge in results experienced by the 9th Division 

in early 1969 aroused considerable interest and. it might be added, 

some criticism in Vietnam. It was difficult to explain to someone 

that this surge was the cumulative result of many improvements 

and in novations implemclllcd over a period of months. It was also 

due to a complete concentration on getting results. 

This insistence on resu lts was sometimes hard on a brigade or 

battalion commander. If he was in an area where the enemy was 

tough and wily, it was difficult to avoid " skating over the lOp of the 

enemy." To break through this defensive skill on the part of the 

enemy-it was almost like a layer of annor plate-lOok tremendous 

ingenuity and sheer will power. Some people interpreted this determinati on to close with the enemy as an over·emphasis on "body 

count. " It was nothin g of the sort-it was an insistence on bringing 

the enemy to battle and breaking his units up. Occasionally when 

a battalion was in a rea l "dry hole," the consequent lack of results 

had to be accepted as a facl of life and hopefully the battalion could 

be shifted to a more profitable area later on. 

The proper approach was to work for good performance. If a 

unit was dry-holing, aile could on ly ask it to do beuer. We used the 

Vince Lombardi technique more or less-hard tackling, hard blocking and good fllndamelllais would win. Of course , there was no 

doubt that the end result was very hard on the Communists-that 

was am job. However, one had to insist on fair play in combat operati ons and on restraint and care to avoid civilian casualties and 

property damage. The record speaks for itself. Any really professional outfit tends to steer clear of the practices that one reads about 

in the more sensational accounts. If one is reall y concentrating on 

the enemy, combat, while inherently da ngerous, tends to end up as 

a rather clean cut affair. 

Statistical Review 

As we began to get our operations under control. we in itiated 

statistica l reviews. The guts of our rev iew was a series of "operations" charts. Although they varied, in general they listed the 

normal categories of opera tions: ambus h, reconnaissance in force, 

Checkerboard, Bushmaster. pile-on. patrol, raid, cordon and search , 

installation defense , and so forth. They also showed the leve l of 

opera tion (squad, platoon. company and battalion) , the level of 

effort-that is, how many units, the number of contacts, and the 

results (Hoi Chanin, enemy captured, killed, and so forth.) 
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 153 

These very busy charts were difficult lor the newcomer to grasp. 

After using them for a whil e. however. the division, brigade. and 

battalion commanders could determine quickly and objectively 

which operations were gelling resullS and which opera ti ons were 

not. For example. if night operations were not working. one could 

assume that technique was poor and do some retraining. One could 

also determine efficiency in a rough way as the charts also indicated 

what level of operation was most efficient. For example. our subjective judgment was that platoon level operati ons would be more 

efficient than comp.lny level. However, for much of this time, pia· 

toons operating under comp.lny control in daytime gave results over 

ten times as good contact-wise as separate platoon operati ons. When 

the enemy was compl etely cut up. the platoon operations began to 

payoff. 

One could also use these charts to guide night versus daytime 

effort. If the enemy was having difficulty in the daytime, he would 

sometimes shift to night movement. By readjusting effort. one could 

drive him back into the daytime where opera tions were about twice 

as efficient manpower and effon·wise. 

Most importantly. the charts stimulated skill in the various 

standard operations. Il became obvious to the battalion commanders 

that they needed units that were skillful in a spectrum of opera tions 

Over-conce11lration on one type might produce results for a short 

time hut would eventually prove unproductive. A variety of opera· 

tions gave the Communists problems as they found it very difficult 

to decide how to react or even protect themselves. 

Moreover. the enemy deteriorated by phases under heavy pressure. When the pressure was put on initially. he reacted very well 

lIntil altrition ate into his junior leaders: then his units began 

to reaCt in an unprofessional way: this was followed by a detectable 

coll apse when the enemy lost unit integrity and reacted in a disjoimed manner like a flock of chickens followed by mass fragmenta· 

tion to s{luad level 0 1" lower. with the main effon devoted to hiding 

and staying alive. Mopping up these fragmenlS was a long tiresome 

process requiring very skillful operations and a vigorous pacification 

effort. 

W eekly Operatiollal Review and Analysis 

Once we had O UI" military operations under control we began 

to edge into the integration of military o perations and pacification. 

We were anxious to pull all of the releva nt data and key people involved in O UT efforlS into a systematic. recurring process of analysis 

and consultation to insure a cross-fertilization of tactical and pacification concepts and ideas. not only among U.S. unit commanders 
154 SliARPEN I NG T H E COM 8AT EDGE 

(brigade and baua lion) but also between ourselves and the U.S. 

advisory and South Vietnamese Army officia ls representing the 

fOU T provinces and the South Vi etnamese Army units. To do this 

we established a weekly meeting attended by brigade commanders 

and province senior advisors whi ch we ca lled our ""'feekly Operational Review and Analysis." This simple procedure provided the 

statistical base line and the coordination mechanism that were to 

prove central to lhe division operations from October 1968 onward. 

About the time we were gelling a handle on OllT personnel 

stren gths, aircraft maintenance. intelligence inputs and new tactica l 

concepts, twO new campa igns were initiated from on high-the 

Military Assistance Command. Vietnam-South Vietnamese Armed 

Forces Accelerated Pacifica ti on Campaign and the IV Corps Dry 

Weather Campaign. We mentioned carl ier that the initiation of the 

Dry Weather Campaign gave us milch needed additional air assets. 

Additionally, the clear·cut o bjectives of the Accelerated Pacification 

Campaign proved to be a vehicle for much closer ti es with the 

Vietnamese civil authorities and the Vietnamese military, resulting 

in more integrated opera tional plans. We combined combat operations and Government of Vietnam pacifica ti on efforts from the very 

beginning of our Weekl y Operational Review and Analysis. Let us 

face it, the security of an area is the key to pacification for without 

it no lasting overall progress can be made. 

Therefore. the combat operations of the South Vietnamese 

Anny and Regional and Popular Forces were almost as importanl 

to liS as 0\11" own U.S. operations. 'Ve realized early that we could 

not accurately estimate the strength of the enemy unless we took into 

consideration the combined effectiveness of all Allied efforts in our 

tactical area of ope rations. Our accomplishments \\'ere only important in the totality of events. For exampl e, it made little differen ce whether the Viet Cong ralli ed to a South Vietnamese Army 

unit or to a U,S. unit- the importaI1l thing was to get as many of 

the enemy to defect as possible thus red ucing the capabilities of the 

enemy and enhancing the strength and prestige of the South 

Vietnamese Government. 

The req uiremen t to integrate the totality of operations in our 

area rcsulted in the briefing, discussion and analysis of 18 different 

statistical operational summaries during each of our weekly sessions. 

By this means we and the province re presentati ves were able to 

keep our fingers on the pulse of those operations that were paying 

off bcst in a partiw lar area. 'Ve also were able to compare the 

relative performance of each brigade within the division, of U.S. 

units versus South Vietnamese Army units, and of Regional Force 
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 155 

and Popular Force units vis-a-vis both U.S. and South Vietnamese 

Army outfits. Most importantly, our nonproductive efforts stuck out 

and we could take coordinated action to improve or de-emphasize 

them. 

Through evolutionary changes we streamlined our data coHec· 

tion, refined our charts. and systematizcd the presentation to provide an unusual analytical process highl ighting the effectiveness and 

the efficicncy of both our comba t operations and pacification efforts. 

Combat Operations. 

A statistical operational summary, an exampl e of which is shown 

on the follow ing page, was prepared for the U.S., Somh Vietnamese 

Army and Regional and Popular Forces contingenlS operating in 

each of the four provinces of our tactical area of operational responSibility. 

By way of explana ti on. the data on the U.S. forces was main· 

tained by the G-3 and G-5 and was derived fTom daily situa tion 

reports and intelligence summaries. Data on the South Vi etnamese 

Army forces was obtained from the senior U.S. advisen; to the 7th 

South Vietnamese Army and 25th South Vi etnamese Army Divisions and data on the Regional Force and Popul ar Force forces and 

provincial pacification activities was obtained from the Military 

Assistance Command. Vietnam Advisory Teams. For comparative 

purposes all operational efforts were reduced to equivalent company days. The company days available were the max imum number 

of company days which cou ld ha\'c been utilized by a unit opera ting 

in both the nighttime and daytime phases of a 24 hour period. Thus 

each 24 hour period contained two poteTllial compan y days for a 

comp..1.ny sized unil. As an example a brigade with three battalions 

of fOlll' compan ies each would have 168 compan y days avai lable per 

week. 

As mentioned earlier. we expected the U.S. companies to operate 

three days out of four: whereas for the South Vi etnamese Army 

and the Regional Force and Popular Force we felt it would be more 

reasonable if they operated every other day (one out of two). \Ve 

defined "Operational Effectiveness" (for wan t of a better tenn) as 

the ratio of company days used to company days available; thus, the 

goal for Vietnamese units was an operational effectiveness of 0.50. 

When we initiated our statistics no Vietnamese unit in any province approached this. A£ter several months most Vietnamese units 

were operational in the field 50 percelll of the time. This was a 

doubling of the number of the units in the field and the effect on 
T ABLE 27-0PERATIONAL SUMMARY Go CoNe PROVINCE R EC IO

X __ Night 

Comp.ny Iby. Type: of Opcr>Ilon 

'00' I",e A""II.blr U .. Ai, mobile Rive"ne Mobilr 

21 .............. 100 50 / 0 /0 -/,2 

25 .....•........ 100 00 /0 /. '/;: ..

26 .............. 100 <5 /0 /. '/, 

27 ............. 100 

" /0 0/0 /5 

28 .............. 100 50 Yo /0 ~/. 

29 .............. 100 <0 /0 /0 /. 

50 ......••...••• 100 50 

/0 '/0 ~ 

TOTALS ....... 100 550 /0 20/. ~ 

INDICES ' ..... . 

~ 5~ .IS/. . , 09~ ... Overall Operational Effecl;'·encss Index : .SO Ow:rall Opention

'The in diu.. complln\ from d>l' from .e.·er.1 oo",<e ••• u"'m .. l~ 'he enemy dlmin>lW by 'Yl>e of 

nrlou.o .... n'lon •. 
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 157 

the Viet Cong was readily apparent by the jump in enemy eliminated. 

Our initia l thrust, then, was to get both the U.S. units and the 

South Vietnamese Army units to operate more often. Once this 

occurred we set out to increase the operational efficiency of the units 

in the field. No unit likes to go for "walks in the sun"-patrolling 

with no results is very hard on the troop's morale. When gross 

eliminations or the cOntact sllccess ratio of a unit was low for an 

extended period of time we concluded that there most likely was 

something hasically wrong with the unit's operations. We then 

attempted to get a fix on the problem. 

There are several methods of measuring combat outputs-gross 

eliminations, the elimination or exchange ratio, and the contact 

success ratio. However, to give us an indica ti on of how efficient 

various mod es of operations were (that is airmobile, riverine, or 

foot) as well as the tota l effi cie ncy of the conti ngents withi n a 

province. we computed what we ca lled our "Operational Efficiency," Quite simply it was the total number of enemy eliminated (Killed in Acti on, Prisoners of 'Val', Hoi Chanhs) per 

company day in the field . By relating the numbers of enemy 

eliminated to a day's operation, we were able to normalize our 

statistics. It is astonishing to note that if every compan y in a U.S. 

division eliminated only one enemy each company day of operations 

(considering 10 batta lions of four compan ies operating 75 percent 

of the time day and night) . the b'1'OSS elimi nations per month would 

be 1.800. YOIl can see that modest res uh~ under the Constant Pres· 

Stll'C Concept added up in the aggrega te. As we stated prev iously, 

the superma rket approach of a small unit profit with a large turnover could payoff handsomel),. 

We found for example, that as soon as \\'e broke down into small 

units and started operating extensivel), al 1light thal our operational 

efficiencies increased drama ticall y. The same experience translated 

to the South Vietnamese Army units later on. The improvement in 

resu lts of lhe Vietnamese units in Ollr tactical area of res ponsibility 

was quite marked. First. the)' generall y dou bled the number of compan)' clays in the field . On top of that they also improved their 

operational efficienq almost two fold. As a result. for many units the 

number of enemy elim inated pel' month almost quadrupled over 

the six month period be tween October 1968 and arch 1969. One 

of the fa ctors that gave the Vietnamese units quite a boost was the 

fact that we were able to help them with marksmanship training. 

After \\'e had trained a suflicielll number of our own snipers we 

established marksmanship cl asses attended not only by the 7th 
158 SHARPEN ING THE COMBAT EDGE 

SOllth Vi etnamese Army Division but by the Vietnamese ranger 

and airborne troops from other areas of the COllntry. " 'hen the 

SOllth Vietnamese snipers returned to their units and th e units 

worked into a lIiglH opera tional mode the same confidence that 

spread through U.S. units LOok hold for the South Vi etnamese 

Army and they bega n to gel results. Overall the greatest improvements occurred in the provincial Region al Force and Popul ar Force 

units. About the time we were prodding them to gel into th e field 

more often they a lso received much better equipment (M- 16's 

primarily) and they rea ll y took off. 

In the example (Ta ble 27) it can be seen that the Regiona l and 

Popular Forces in Co Cong Provi nce were in the fi eld 50 percent 

of the time. Almost every unit operated during th e day-an Operational Effectiveness Index of .80. On the other hand only l out of 5 

of the units operated at night-an Operational Effectiveness Index 

of .20. The ove ra ll Operal iOllal EOiciency Indcx was .12: thus, for 

every eight compan y days of operations. th e Regional and Popular 

Forces elim inatcd one cnemy. Their most efficient type of operation 

was daytime airmobile. Unfortun ately the Regional and Popular 

Forces rarcly rcceived a ir assets for any opcrations due to shortages 

of lift. Both the airmobile and riverine operations were more 

efficient than foot operations. Also, whenever the Regional and 

Popu lar Forces opera ted at night they were more cfficicnt than tbey 

were in the daytimc. The problcm th en ill this hypothetical case 

would be to atlcmpt to get the Regional and Popular Forces out 

more at night and to raise th e efficiency of the foot mobil e reconnaissances-in-force. Actually, sma ll improvements in operationa l 

eOiciency could result in a large increase in gross eliminations. 

lVhenever lhe results obtained on one type of operation dropped 

off while another type of operation \\'as goi ng great guns. thc 

brigade commanders would go about reinforcing their current successes while attcmpting to an alyzc th e reasons why othcr efforts 

were drying up. Thlls on a weekly basis we were able to see the 

resuits of actual changes in Viet Cong tactics. When one of our 

tactics bega n to dry up we did not always understand what was 

going on at fi rst; but after scveral opera ti onal reviews, the trends 

were apparent and we generall y had determined thc reasons. "Vc, 

in tum. revised our method of operating or cooked up new solllti ons in order to kcep damaging the enemy. In a nutshell th e 

statistic "compan )' days used" was the measure of our constant 

pressure whereas "the enemy eliminated per unit in the field" 

grossed out the efficiency of Olll' intelligence efforts, tactical innova-
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH 159 

tions, individual training and leadership.' Our Weekly Operational 

Review and Analysis tended to keep our combat operations in the 

ball park. 

Pacificatioll Efforts 

When the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was initiated, with 

its clear-cut objectives, we integrated our combat operations with 

our pacification efforts to insure the optimum support of the 

pacification program. Although there were many aspects of the 

Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the most fundamental one was to 

choose key hamlets and villages that were in a contested status with 

the Viet Cong, and through security and civic efforts to raise these 

hamlets to more secure Government of Vietnam status. The selection of key hamlets was quite properly lell to the Government of 

Vietnam authorities and they were chosen for their economic, social 

and political importance to lhe province. In heavi ly contested areas, 

military considerations were also important. Generally speaking, 

the pacification of these key hamlets themselves was primarily a 

Government of Vietnam effort. However. there were a great number 

of things that the U.S. forccs could do to facilitate this pacification. 

Therefore in our 'Veekly Operational Review and Analysis we 

prepared a large sca le map for each of the four provinces and color 

coded the key hamlets in accordance with their pacification classification. Around each kcy haml et we drew circles with a radius of 5 

kilometers (the maximum range of the enemy 82 mm mortars was 

3.0 kilometers) . It was our goal to eliminate the enemy in the 

vicinity of the key hamlets within this radius, thus improving the 

security of these hamlets and selling the stage for pacification. The 

envelope of all of these circles \\'as the area in which we controlled 

all operations--<ombat as well as pacification. Each week, then , we 

ploued all the preceding weeks' activities on this map, including 

combat operations. civic action programs and psychological warfare 

operations. Thus, Ollr pacification analysis included the total 

spectrum of division operational activilies (A more detailed discussion of pacification activities is in Chapter VIII) . 

The basic document fOI" the pacification program was the 

Hamlet Evaluation Survey Report . This report was prepared 

monthly by a Subsector Evaluator on th e U.S. District Team. It 

included eighteen factors, nine of which pertained to security and 

'The usage of the lernl! ·'dfecl h·eness·· and '·e nki cn~y·· was obviousl)· ralhe r 

nbilT;\ry and wu retained only for cOIl\"enicn«, . .As we impro.·ed our analyt ical 

Itthnique:, and gained more: insighl, we could hne de.bed more prc:c:ise te:rminolog.·. 

bUI did not lest it confuse the: many persons iln'olvc:d. 
160 SHARPENING THE COr-IDAT EDGE 

nine of which pertained to what we may generically call Civic 

Action aspeCts (Administrative and Political Activities; Health, 

Education and Welfare: and Economic Development). Each of 

these eighteen factors was rated between E and A in ascending order 

of the degree of Government of Vietnam control and an overall 

rating computed. To be quite frank. we had no faith in the Hamlet 

Evaluation Survey initially. It appeared to us that it could be a 

pencil exercise with little validity. Therefore, we undertook a 

detailed Hamlet Evaluation Survey for all th e hamlets in one 

district in Dinh Tliong Province. We told our G- 2 to be hard-nosed 

in his evaluations. At the conclusion of OUT survey we compared it 

with lhe 1\'lilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam, Advisory Team 

Survey. We were literally amazed to find that there was less than a 

10 percelll difference in evaluations. This gave us new and substantial confidence in the Hamlet Evaluation Survey. Additionally, 

by working closely with the cval uation worksheets we received a 

more complete understanding of the pacification efforts and we 

were in a better position to integrate our efforts in suppon of the 

Accelerated Pacificat ion Campa ign. 

Every week, thcn. we reviewed our total operations in conjunction with the envelope of the key hamlets of the Accelerated 

Pacification Campaign. As a result we directed Olll' efforts to areas 

where suppon seemed to be lack ing and we measured the effectiveness of the joint U.S.-Government of Vietnam efforts. As a rule of 

thumb we seldom conducted combat operations within a kilometer 

of a key hamlet, th ereby making certain that we did not interfere 

with Government of Vietnam p.1.cificalion efforts. 

Every month when the new Hamlet Eva luation Survey classifications hit th e street we reviewed th e progress of the pacification 

campaign. In those areas where the hamlets had returned to government control we slacked off on our operations and conversely in 

the areas which proved hard nuts to crack we increased Ollr tempo, 

generally ste pping up either Ollr com hat operations or civic action 

programs. 

Thus by combining our combat operations with our pacification 

efforts through th e Weekly Operational Review and AnalYSis we 

were able on a continuing basis to achieve a more surgical appro.1.ch 

to tactical operations in the delta and to contribute substantially to 

the ultimate goal of paCification. 

More often than not, units in Vietnam emphasized paCification 

by stressing civic action efforts. In our opinion, this was a mistake 

as long as the enemy retained even a modest military capability. In 

the 9th Division, we always stressed the mi litary effort. While our 
THE ANALYT ICAL A P PROACH 161 

civic action work compared favorably with that of other units, we 

always fe lt that it was a strong military effort and civic action 

ifllegrale(/ with the Govemment of Vielfwm iJocification program 

that achieved results. Later on in 1969 and 1970, wh il e working on 

the broader canvas of the 11 Fi eld Force Vietnam area of operations, 

this conce pt was fun her tested and proved sound. Most areas which 

achieved spectacular progress did so under cover of a strong military 

efforl. Conversely, if. an area was having difficulties pacificationwise, one invariably found a stuttering or ineffective military effort. 

Pitfalls 

The lise of opera tions analysis in Vi etnam was inherently a 

dirfIcult task. For exampl e, one should be able to describe a process 

(that is construct a model) and one should be able to know what is 

happening (that is get reliable data) . Both of these tasks were most 

difficult, Some examples of d ifficult problems are given below. 

One of our real failures was to lip our prisoner intake substantiall y. Real izi ng that prisoners were one of the best sources of intelligence, we tried several elaborate programs to increase the 

number of prisoners. Our results were useful but hardly earthshaking: 

Enemy 

Losses· 

Oct 67-Mar 68 4,541 

Oct 68- Mar 69 10,273 

Percentil e Improvement 126% • Does not include Viet Cong Infrastructure 

Percent of 

LossesPrisoners of Wal'l Prisoners! 

Ho i Chanhs Hoi Chanhs 

301 

848 

182% 

6.6 

8.2 

24% 

One can see that we did belter in the later period and the inte lligence obtained was probably \\'orth the effort, but the improvement was modest. We theorized that the enemy's indoctrination 

program, plus the language and cu ltural barrier, was too great for a 

rea l breakthrough. Although we d id well with prisoners or war 

the average South Vi etnamese Army division did much better. T he 

theoretical potential can be seen in the Hoi Chanh rates. In months 

when we took 25 to 75 ralliers, the provinces in which we operated 

and fumished the basic pressure aggregated overall from 500 to 

1,500 ralliers. (See Chart 15) Obviously, ralliers and presumably 

Prisoners of War preferred to turn in to Vietnamese units rather 

than American, and equa lly obviously, we were unabl e to get hold 

of the critical element in lhis problem area. 
162 SHARPENING TliE COMBAT EDGE 

As a sub-program of QUI' prisoner program, we worked hard on 

using small loudspeakers on the baulefield. This effort, while useful 

in other ways, did not generate a larger percentage of prisoners. 

Viet Cong infrastruClUre was another difficult area. While we 

could and did help the Government of Vietnam with their Phoenix 

effort, it was very difficult to do what was essentia ll y police and 

detective work with American soldiers. Our results were comparable 

to other U.S. and SOlllh Vietnamese Army divisions but in gross 

numbers Ollf returns were very modest. In sum, we were not able to 

break into another culture and iuto the Communist organization. 

We sensed that a quantum increase in qualified interpreters would 

have helped but could not prove it. Our Tiger Scouts were useful 

in sohening these barriers but they were not decisive. 

A general tendency which \\'e could never overcome was the 

ability of the enemy to protect himself against damaging tactics 

after some months. When we first optimized our radar, it was most 

useful. After six months it was only another source of information. 

The Jitterbug and seal-and-pile.on technique dealt the enemy fits 

for about six months. Then it became only one way, albeit a vital 

one, of putting pressure on large areas. Small unit daylight patrolling had its heyday and so on. Even the Constant Pressure Concept 

began to lose its edge. It was quite apparent at that time that the 

war was slowing down. As the enemy began to disintegrate, it became more difficult to inflict cri ppling defeats on his remnants. 

Undoubtedly the people ill Vietnam have developed an answer to 

this change, bllt it may he quite different from the teChniques we 

used previously. ,Ve concluded that a smart enemy could eventually 

protect himself to a certain extent against damaging tactics. 

The biggest pitfall to avoid was the conclusion that one could 

predict with confidence hy any means-judgemental or analyticalwhere the real payoffs were and how to manage the overall effort. 

If one reads this study. one might conclude that we were quite successful in these regards. However. in all humility, these successes 

were achieved by hard work and trial and error. 

Our two most combat effective and cost effective innovations 

were the sniper program and night air cava lry operations. However, 

these were proven effective in the doing. and we had no way or 

detennining in advance thal they would be so. Most of the advantages gained through analysis were d ue to laying out the operation and measuring efficiency. These impressions-and they were 

ohen impreSSions rather than hard conclusions-were then used to 

guide operational emphasis and corrective training. 

However, if one could ever devise a really fiTSt class analytical 
THE ,\ NALYTIC/\L AI'I'KOACH 163 

approach to complex matters which worked, then a skillful com· 

mander could use it to achie\'e spectacular improvements in efficiency and results. 

\Ve are not suggesting that operations analysis is impossible in 

Vietnam: hut only suggestin g that the I1turkiness of the situation 

and the rapid changes pl:lced a high premium on the element of 

military experience and know-how in guiding the application of the 

analytical process. Some areas clearly fell outside the scope of the 

analytical art at thal time. 

Summary 

Our insistence on results and reasonable operational efficiencythe analytical approach-was not limited to operations and tactics. 

It \vas a total integrated approach, including all activities o f the 

division- administrative, logistical, tactical and pacifica tion. To 

improve these large :md complex operations we had to concentrate 

on essentials so that our efforts were not too diffused. We zeroed in 

on weak points with considerabl e intensity and we insisted on rapid 

results. We tried to keep on the steep portion of the learning 

curve-where reasonai)le efforL'i provided major improvements. 

Eventually. our whole analytical system was formal ized. We had 

weekly operational review and analysis meetings. We also had 

weekly administrative reviews, discllssing personnel and logistical 

matters such as enlisted promotions and deadline rates. Each week 

we had an operational planning conference to bring intelligence 

infonnation into perspective. We had our morning and evening 

briefings and relied hea" il), on our daily three cycle intelligence 

review. Yet we tried not to focus too hard on anyone aspect becallse 

obviously overconcentration could lead lO disjointed operations. 

Important factors were emphaSized but coordinated. In summary, 

it was a total integrated approach. 

In the preceding discussion. we have emphasized the central 

effort of conducting effective and efficient military operations. 

Obviously, there were many other areas which were kept under 

close scrutin y. To do justi ce to all of the areas which were examined 

and ana lyzed would be an endless task. Obviollsly. the more areas 

that could be kept on the plus side. the more rapid and substantial 

was overall progress. 
CHAPTER VIII 

Pacification 

As mentioned previously. we attempted to imegrate combat 

operations and pacification efforts in all of OliT planning. To do 

this the G- 2, G- 3 and G-5 worked as a weB·oi led team, sharing the 

same space in the tactical operations center and coordinati ng the ir 

opera tions. To insure the pragmatic integration of intelligence, 

operations an d civic acti on we hand picked two outstanding combat 

leaders to be G-5's- Licutcnant Colonel Tom Leggeu and Major 

Bernard O. LoefIke. Our coordination paid off-there is no doubt 

that by kee ping greal pressure on the enemy we enhanced the 

security of the countryside thereby facilitating the pacification 

mission. 

OUT pacification effons were well t hough t out and integrated 

as much as possible with combat operations. In addition , our pacifi cation program had as its roundation five major civic action themes: (1) 

psychological operations or efforts to win the hearts and minds of 

the dissident people so that they would rally to the side of the 

Government of Vietnam, (2) <lssistance to the victims of the war, 

(3) assistance in health matters, (1) educational assistance, and 

(5) the repair and construction of faci lities. In each of these 

approaches we attempted to innova te and improve our techniques 

in order to bring imaginative and worthwhile programs to the 

people of Vielllam. 

It is not our intentioll to S'o into pacificati on in any detail. It is 

a whole subject in itself. Pacifica tion hecame most important about 

Jul)' 1968 and although the efforts of the 9th Division in the 

subsequent years were innovative and rather broad gauge, they were 

not as concentrated nor as important as later efforts. Therefore, 

we will list onl y a few of ollr efforts in each of the aforementioned 

areas to provide an insigh t into pacification and to indicate how 

these efforts often tied directly into combat operations. 

Psychologico{ OperatiOns 

Psychological operations pervaded the tota l quiltwork of the 

war. They were necessary 10 break down the fabric of resistance of 
PACIFICATION 165 

the active enemy [orces as well as to encourage the villagers :md 

others to return to the Government fold. 

We urged the enemy to surrender or to rally to the side of the 

Government of Vietnam rather than face eventual death. \Ve took 

every opportunity availahle through leaflets, loud speakers, and 

fa ce to face contacts to induce him to give lip his hope less cause, 

and to rally to a more democratic and hopeful way of life. 

\Ve also Iried to reach the hearts and minds of the people who 

had been subjeCled 10 milch CommuniSl propaganda. To do this 

we employed every availahle means of psychological warfare available to LIS. Psychological warfare, then. had t\\'o different aspcctsdestruction of the enemy's will to figlll and the winning of the 

confidence of the civil iall populace. 

Prior to our arrival in Vietnam we set about procuring 100 handheld loud speakers (AN- PIQ SA) in hopes that lhe tactical situation would permit Ollf talking major Viet Cong units into surrendering. While $lill ill the States we even had cards made in 

Engl ish and Vietnamese so that our Tiger Scouts could coax the 

enemy alit of his positions. The emphasis of the 9th Division 

BREAIOl'C THE LAI'CUACE BARRIER 
166 SHARPENING THE COM B/\" EDGE 

throughout the war had been primarily on obtaining Chieu Hois 

and Prisoners of War and secondarily on killing the enemy. We 

wanted the total enemy eliminated to be as high as possible, hopefully by taking as many prisoners as we could. The reasons for this, 

of course, arc rcadily apparenl. In combat operations Prisoners of 

'War and Chieu Hois give a STeal amount of military intelligence. 

Chieu Hois can also be used to talk others into surrendering. One 

of the most valuable assets of the 9th Division in this connection 

were our Tiger Scouts. We assigned at least one Tiger Scout to 

each infantry platoon and later each squad. Because they were 

familiar with Viet Cong thinking and operations they ohen allticipated his moves, thereby giving us tactical advaIHages. They also 

afforded an important psychological and actual link to the civilian 

population. Most Tiger Scouts were inlense ly loyal to their Amer· 

ican unit-tliere is nothing like a convert. Their conversion to the 

Government of Vietnam side was an obvious example to the ir 

countrymen. 

We have previously described how during our "seal operations" 

we would fly aerial loud speaker missions to talk the enemy into 

surrenderi ng. Once the seal was closed the enemy was heavil y 

bombarded with artillery and air strikes. Subsequently, we would 

have a hiatus for the purpose of talking the enemy into surrendering. However, our aspirations were much greater than our resulu. 

For example, one day in Long An along the Vam Co Tay we 

succeeded in talking a Viet Cong soldi er into surrendering during 

the middle of ballie. He came out with his hands up and progressed 

no further than 30 meters from his bunker when he was shot in the 

back by one of his comrades. This so infuriated our troops that they 

laid down a withering suppressive fire and two of am soldiers 

rescued the hapless Viet Congo He was evacua ted and we managed 

to save his life. The thought is, thal as long as there were a few hard 

core Communists in a unit it was dimwIt for any of the Viet Cong 

or North Vietnamese to rally. 

Our psychological operations campaign againSt enemy units was 

relentless. After every major battle we dropped leafle t:s depicting 

their casual ti es by showing graveStones whose headings included 

the enemy unit's losses from previolls battles. ''''e selll messages 

over local radio stations to the effect that the Viet Cong should 

Chieu Hoi 01' they would be killed. We Aew airborne loud speaker 

missions whose purpose was 10 spread dissension and unrest in the 

enemy ranks as they spent lonely, uncomfortable periods deep in 

the hot, humid and mosquito infested base camp areas. They hated 

these loud speaker missions so much that rather than listen to any 
PACIFICATI ON 167 

more propaganda they \\'ou ld stand up and fire their weapons at tbe 

loudspeaker aircraft thus exposing themselves and the ir positions. 

We d ropped m illions of lcaflcts over Vie l Cong positions ilwiting 

the enemy to rally to the Government of V ietnam, (One of o ur sta ff 

officers briefed one night that if all the leaflets dropped in the past 

three years in our tactical area of operational interest remai ned on 

th e ground we would all he up to our "waists" in leaflets instead of 

water.) Man y thought leaAets had no e ffect, T hat was not our 

ex perience. O n o ne occasion \\'e promised the enemy a hot meal 

and a ho t bath if he would rally. One night a Chieu H o i raised the 

dickens because he had not yet had h is hot bat h as prom ised by the 

lea fl ets. 

Yet, no matter how hard we tried we d id not a ppreciably 

increase th e num ber of enemy rally ing to our troops. The language 

barrier was too mu ch. However. wi th in o ur tactical area of o perational in terest as the pressure got hotter the number of raBiers 

(Chieu H o i) to Government of Viet n am au thorities increased 

grea tl y. (Chart 15) Si nce our interest lay in the totality of opera tions 

o ur own lack of results didn't ma lleI' too much. 

P ropaganda was not a Oll c-way strcet. T he Vict Cong had their 

campaigns too. By analyzi ng the ir themes we learned the "big impact ideas" an d reversed the procedu re with the Viet Cong as the 

targets. Their e fforts were no t as sophisticated as ma ny would have 

you thin k, as evidenced by th e leaAet part ially reproduced below. 

ve Propaganda Leaflet 

(pan ia l) 

America II ollicers ami mel! in the US arllled lorces in SVN: 

In Viet N:un lu nar new ye;Jr is old traditiOl1a l CIIS[ool1 and h;lbiL 

The Vielllamese peo ple desire for ,I pC:lceful and exteJ'l1;d for ;111 

enjoyment, in nell' rear days in the ha ppy atmosphere of their family 

reun ion and for the holding of ;1 mOil! oriental ceremony to commenorate their anccstor~. i~ ~Irongcr [11:111 thal of anybody else il is the 

same as the america n people enjoy their merry XllI;JS and happy sol.lI· 

new year in [heir sweet home heside theil- loved Olles. T he US warmongers and their Thieu Ky H uang puppt chique however don't want 

1)C;Jce they not on ly sabo 'H~ed the SVN LF orde collcorivi ng the sllspcnriot! of all milit.u·y allack derring;1 rece nt xmas but also re jccted openly 

to implement [he frolHs solar new ),e,lr tr uce order in the war future 

they will seek ;}11 me;lIIs ;l\'uitab1c to s:thot:tl{e the comi ng iUil<lr new 

year truce b~' pushi n!{ )'011 out 011 oper;tlion all~il1g ~lIrrering momning 

and hare hip to our people. 

!\ merican serim men! 

W in n ing th e confidence of the civilian populacc look integra ted 

e fforts in many areas. ' Ve broadcast I itel'al1y thousa nds of grou nd 

loudspeaker hours (Chart /6) in su pport of pacification. H owever. 
168 SHARI'£="<ING THE COMBAT EDGE 

CHART 15 ~tIIEIt UF Cun:u HOLS I N ~trll D[VIS10N TACTICAL AREA 

Re le for 9th Dow Tattiel l Ar"" 01 Opera tion" , Inte.nl 

TOLD' 8949 Chieu Hois 

face to face actions were morc effective than airborne measures. \,Ve 

distributed almost (\\'0 million hand-delivered leaflets through Ollr 

Medical Civic Action Programs. We cstablished games to play with 

the children of vi ll ages. We famed off chickens and ducks. We gave 

away thousands of children's T·sh irts in the colors of the Government of Vietnam. \Vc produced cards to be passed Ollt tell ing why 

the Americans were there. \Ve taught OlLr soldiers the cuSloms of 

the Vietnamese so that they would not offend the local population. 

\Ve wen I to extraordinary means to assure the Vietnamese thal 

we were there solely to support their Government and to make a 

be tter way of life for them. The visits by U.S. medical teams with 

their friendl y altit udes and accompanying entertainment were 
PACIFICATION 169 

CHART I 6--GROUNIl LOUDSPEAKER HOURS 

00 r---_,----~--_,----~--_,----_r----~--_,--__, 

'00 f-----+----+----+---+--jf----+--

• • 5 . 00 ~---+_----t_----t_----~----

" 

'00 l----J----J----J----£==4 

QUilt" I 

v .. , 6 7 

, 

" 

, 

" 

• 

" " 

, 

" 

, 

" 

• 

" " 

Tllnl hours ,re '" .uppalt o f Ihl ~''',I , c l lOn p' Oe,.,m In .. lacl 10 l.cI ~holo l~. ' 

ope'a Uons 1"01t. Thl~ dO nOI Incl ude at"., lo udspea k • • lIme. 

TOIII lIme 2 580 ho uf'1; 

eve illS to be anticipated and remembered by many. Because of the 

language difficulties Ollr attempts to win the hearts and minds of the 

Vietnamese were not :1 .. polished 11 0 1' as fruitful as we \,·ould have 

liked. But in trying to reach their hearts we showed that our hearts 

were in the right place. 

Assistance 10 th e Vi ctims of the Wa.r 

The individual American soldier has always helped to alleviate 

the suffering and anguish caused b)' wars, and Vietnam was no 

exception. The 9th Division soldier was quick to volunteer with 

both labor and monetar), contributions. \,Ve tried as much as possible 

to initiate coopera ti ve programs whose objectives were to provide 
170 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

.. ' 

• 

-, , ... :.'t I."".' -...... ',\',''':':!\II''- -.... 

I 

•• 

IIRI TMA ~ WI1'I1 TIU: ORPHA NS 

assclS to the Vietnamese so that they could help themselves. But the 

most important of all contributions was the individual soldier's 

willingness to assist in any manner practicable to lessen the Viet· 

namese citizen's plight. Orphanages. churches. leper coloni es and the 

physically handicapped all received his warm support. 

The giving of one's own time and effort is often more meaning· 

ful than giflS of money and material. As our Civic Action Programs 

became more organized the soldi er man-days spent increased greatly 

so that we had on the average of 150 men dail y working on construction activities. Medical Ci"ic Action Programs and staff work 

in support of paCification. (Chari 17) 

l\'fany troops because of the pressure of combat could not personall y participate in Civic Action Programs, so they dug into their 

pockets to help where lhey could. (CharI 18) Charlie Battery, 3d 

Battalion, 34th Artillery undertook to support the Ben Luc Leprosarium. Once a month on payday a collection was taken. The 

soldiers had a one dollar limit but participation was always toO 

perccnt. They felt it was their leper colony and they took a personal 

interest in attempting to provide the patienlS hope for the future. 
~ c 

Z 

< 

• 

PACIF ICATION 171 

CH A RT 17-U.5. LA HO R USED ON C IVIC Acn os PROJECTS 

Qua rte, 

Yea. 

Tt,. to,,' ""mba. 01 ma" .,ays (8 h. dlyl) •• pended In support of c.v.c acl,on prolech • • nelu"'''1 t he I'me upended on cons{tUCllon .cllvll.es. MEOCAPS and II.1f _.k in 

support of 1"1 C'Vle aCI.on p'OBram 

We distri buted almost two million pounds of food. As an 

exampl e, the emergency relief and refugee support mission to the 

My T ho refugee camp stands out. We worked with the Province 

Minister of Social Welfare, and nearl y 70,000 po unds of division 

furnished foodstuffs we re equitabl y distributed to 6,000 homeless 

civili ans and refugee famil ies. Additionall y, 3,000 gallons of potable 

water were deli vered daily to th ree refugee camps, hospitals, and 

orphanages. 

Over 16,000 pounds of clothing and a million and one·half 

pounds of misce ll aneous supplies were also distributed by the 9th 

Division. T he soldiers supported 89 orphanages giving them giflS 

of clothing, food. money. constructi on materials. educational and 

medical supplies, and recrea tional items. (Chart /9) Around 

Christmas time a Di vision medic. after treating one small boy for 

multipl e cuts, presented him with a Christmas toy. The youth left, 

quite happy with his new toy. However, he returned a few moments 

later, tugged at his benefactor's trousers leg until he got his atten· 

tion, then spoke to him th rough the interpreter, telling him, "T o 

give you pl easure gives me pleasure." This about summarizes the 
172 SHARPEN I NG T HE COM HAT EDGE 

CHART IS-M oNETA RY Gwrs 

~ <001--+--+--+--+--- z 

~ o 

z 

• 

~ 

Quarte. I 

Year 67 

, 

" 

, 

" 

• 

" 

, 

" 

, 

" 

, 

" 

• 

" 

, 

This mon.y wa s Cont.lbutad Volu nla.ily By "OOIOS 01 ttoe 9th O,~,slon and oth •• yolun" tary 

o'. I .. ln"onl lor distribution to ,hurchn. o, ph.n II'~ ' and hosp,lal • . 

Tot " lulstanca 2,Ul.735SVN 

feeli ngs involved, the mutual sa tisfactions. and the increased under· 

standings between soldiers and the civilian populace. 

Every unit in Vietnam could quotc chapler and verse concerning 

the generosity of the American fighting man. The wonder is why 

th is steady flow of actions, so open and so discussed, has gone so 

unnoti ced by the casual observer of the war. 

Assistu1Ice hi Health M(ttlers 

The medica l efforts of the division in the delta just had to improve the overall hea lth of the region appreciably. 

We started at the grass roots. The 9th Medical Ballalion in itiated 

a program to train Vielllamese civilian and military personnel in 

basic medical skills. This increased the indigenous medical capacity 

as we ll as the villagers· confidence in the Vietnamese personnel 

working in local dispensaries. But more important it made the 

populace less dependent on u.s. aid. 

Our most important thrust was the ubiquitous Medical Civic 

Action Program. Every day, teams comprised of medical and in-
PACIFICATION 

• 

• 

• 

P.:II.sONAL. PACIFIl:ATI ON 

, . 

173 

., 

• 

" 

.... 

fantry pel1iOnllel, travelled throughout the friendly areas of the 

provinces to provide medical treallnent to Vietnamese civili ans. 

Over 700,000 patients were treated in a two year period. (Chari 20) 

Dental programs were popu lar and well received. The need 

for dental care was great in the more remote areas where ma ny of 

the people had never seen a dentist. Immediate treatment was given 

those who required it-generally extractions. However, instructions 
174 

• 

• " 

, • 

z 

No 

V... 67 

, , 

" 

SH AR PEN ING THE COI\.·18AT EDGE 

CHART 19-0RPIIANAGES ASSISTED 

" 

" " .. .. .. .. " 

Assl'tance h~cluded dIstrIbutIon o f clothinl . fOOd, money. constructIon mMI",ls. 1<I .... ;.I'on 

lind medicil supl'l •• , .nd 'Ie'.atlan "ems 

Total ""sl,nCI 89 D, phan • • a, 

in oral hygiene, including leaflets on demal care along with toothpaste and tooth brushes were d istributed . 

Since our medical program was so well rece ived we reoriented it 

to integrate civic action with psychologica l operations and intelligence activities. The Integrated Civic Action Programs operated in 

contested and insecure areas as differentiated from Medical Civic Action Programs which operated onl)' in secure areas. In addition to the 

humanit'lrian aspects, an objective of the Integrated Civic Action 

Program was to glean such intelligence as: information on the Viet 

Cong infrastructure: the determination o f the status of security and 

pacification : the establishment of li aison with loca l leaders and 

officials in contested areas; and the improvement of our image. 

Most of the Integrated Civic Action Pl"Ograms were joint operations with Regional and Popular forces and were conducted in 

complete coordination with Vi etnamese oflicials, particularly the 

hamlet and village chiefs and other local leaders. The Integrated 

Civic Action Programs paid off with impressive results; some of om 

most mean ingful intelligence was ga ined in this wa)'. 

With the Viet Cong on the run, our Integrated Civic Action 

Program teams began staying overnight, affording us the opportu-
PI\ C IFICATIQN 175 

PROVII>INC All> TO T H E I>OPULATION 

oity to viSi t with the local farmers who were largely absent from 

their homes during daylight hours. It also gave the vill agers a 

feeling of more security and enabled us to double Ollr intelligence 

inputs. All of these visits were tremendollsly helpful to the local 

population because of the medical aspects and the other civic 

actions features, including games, lotteries, and mllSic. The soldier 

guitar players and their country music were a big hit with the 
176 

• • 

~ 

~ "" 

• 

" 0 

• 0 

z 

< 

, • 

0 

z 

• 

SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

CHART 20-MEl>CAP PATIENTS TREATEO 

, 

" 

3 

" 

• 

" 

, 

.. , 

" 

3 

.. • 68 

, 

69 

Th .... PIOI.,nts ... e,. 1 ... led on MEOC,,"PS. leAPS. NIT£CAP$ Ind DENTCAPS b~ medIc.' pe~nn'l 01 the 9th D,vls,on 

Totll uslsunel 708,588 patients 

Vietnamese. It was apparent thal Ihe villagers, like our young 

teenagers in the States, didn't have to understand the words to 

enjoy the music. 

In summary. the medical program with all its many offshoots 

provided more goodwill than any other single ci"ic action program. 

Il reached morc people in more places morc frequently and with 

morc tangible results than anything else we did. 

Educational Assislal1ce 

The importance of education in the Orient cannot be overestimated. Each head of a famil y worked to insure that his children 

obtained the best education possible, Therefore, the efforts put 

forth by American forces in educational assistance paid off a 

hundredfold in good " 'ill. 

During the 9th Division's tenure we distributed 10,000 school 

kits consisting of paper, penCils, ink and crayons, Over 31,000 

students were taught some basic English as well as crafts. skills, and 

other techn ical subjects, (Chart 21 ) We assisted over 356 schools 

with supplies as well as constructi on and repairs, By helping the 
MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM 
178 SHARPEN ING T H E COMBAT EDGE 

CHART 21-£oUCATIOS CLASSES 

'OOO e---~----+----

• " 

~"'. , ~-- l;; 

V .. r " " .. .. " .. Th. mlljo,ily of \t •• elen_. ,eu8h1 ... e,. (nallsh, howe ... , oth,. , ... l;Ijo.:lI ,ncl"ded c,eft., s~lIls end 'ech"IClI subilcts. Clusn we •• usuilly ".,Id Z 1>01,1 " perw .... M 

Tote' nllst.nee 31.1\1 Stude"\5 

Vietnamese in their education we helped the aspirations of the 

Vietnamese themselves. 

Repair (md Constnlcliml 0/ Facilities 

The war in Vietnam has destroyed many public buildings. We 
I'ACIFICATIQN 179 

assisted in the rebuilding of 27 chUTches, 33 dispensaries, 37 market 

places and almost a thousand dwellings. ''''e provided the Vietna· 

mese with 1,600,000 pounds of cement, about 1,600,000 board feet 

of lumber and 11 ,500 sheets of tin to be used for roofing, thus greatly 

assisting the Vietnamese to assist themse lves. 

However, it was with our bridge repair and secondary road 

program that th t: greatest assistance was rendered. During the period 

447 hridges were constructed or repaired and divisional personnel 

repaired over 1.100 kilometers of roads. (Charls 22 alld 2J) 

.~f---t----+----

• " 

, 

> 

z 

Q .... rte. 

Vnr 67 

, 

" 

, 

" 

• 

" .. , 

" 

, 

" 

• 

.. " 

aridees eonstr ... Cled 0' rep.ired w ... lOt foot 0' ve h,el. Ir'lfic. All w •• ., ne.ded to meet loul cIvil/In needs 
180 SHARPENING THE COM BAT EDGE 

CHART 2S- R oADS CoNSTRUCTED OR R EPAIRED 

• 

~ >5'I---+-- -!--- ~ i 

Quart.. I 

Vea, 61 

, 

" 

3 

" 

• 

" 

, 

" 

, 

" 

3 

" 

• 

" " 

AU road work WU 10' ClvlU.n and m ilitary I,' Hic t he reby pravldln. both economl<; and 

'ac t,c.1 advantean. Repa l,. do not include dIlly clu.;na 01 ve ,oadbloo;ks 

Totll ... llIlnca 1107 11m 01 Road 

An almost universal Viet Cong tactic was to cut the existing 

road network, particularl y in rural areas. (hus isolating the people 

in the small hamlets. The Viet Cong then went about systematically 

breaking up the organizational fabric of the village. They installed 

their own Village Chiefs and established a complete infrastructure. 
PA CIF ICATION lSI 

It was this Viet Cong infrastructure, supported by main force 

and loc.1l force troops, that maintained the control of the enemy 

over the people. To counteract this we initiated a program to 

restore the road network. It was not an easy task. Inevitably, 

our road repair and road building efforts drew enemy fire. The 

Viet Cong strongly resisted any efforts to reestablish communications 

to the outlying villages. After we understood th is we would set 

elaborate ambush plans and not only did we improve the roads but 

we took a steady toll amongst the Viet Cong units interdicting our 

efforts. Interestingly enough, once a road was fully established and 

the vill agers were using it again the Viet Cong rarely recut these 

farm to market roads because to do so would nega te the propaganda 

which they continuously passed out that the Viet Cong helped the 

people while the Government Forces did not. The reestablishment 

of communications with the outlying villages also enabled the 

Vietnamese Government Forces to erode the Viet Cong infrastructure and thus reestablish control over more of the population 

of the Northern Delta. 

Limiting Damage and Cawalties to Civilians 

The foregoing civi c actions were extremely positive in nature 

and helpful to the pacification program. H owever, all of the efforts 

put into civic actions could be undone in an area by one destructive 

operation. Qur part of the delta. with a Ii ttle over three percent of 

the country's land surface, had ten percen t of the coun try's population. When we broke down into small unit operations covering 

large areas the possibilities for damage increased. To insure minimal 

possible damage and casualties to civili ans we adopted urban rules 

of engagement as welt as Ollr own 1000 meter buffer zone around 

populated areas to prevent the excessive use of artillery. Although 

we had very heavy combat over an extended period of time in late 

1968 and early 1969, we had on ly mod erate civili an casualties and 

damage. 

In some areas of Vietnam from time to time it has been found 

necessary to relocate civilians to protect them from the Communists 

on the one hand and to den y their services to the Communists on 

the other. In the delta, relocation had never been utilized much. It is 

really hard to say why. Some of the reasons may have been: there 

were too many people, the Viet Cong were everywhere, the country 

needed the rice, the Viet Cong tended to stay far out in deserted 

areas. the people generally did not like the Viet Cong and the Viet 

Cong did not trust the people anyway. 
182 SH ARPE NING THE COMBAT EDGE 

BRIDGE HUILDERS 

We wanted to keep the people in place primarily for economic 

and social reasons. Since the population were kept in place we 

adopted an unusual style of combing through populated areas with 

small patrols. Afler some press ure, Ihe Communists drew back away 

from the people and did most of their fighting from small local 

base areas or from the large remote base areas.' 

'Ch'ilians delainco;l in the cOline of hostilities ,,'cre presumed innocent. unlC$!! there 

W;U c,idcnce \0 the rol1!rary. and were handled s<::pamtdy from priJOne rs of war. 

Civilialls were given good trealme11l and were I'clumed to their h01ll('5 c:xpalitiollsly 

in order to geiler-lit goodwill. i\"u:nilics al the ;"' hllh DhiJion Civiliall Center ,.'cre 

~uer than in the 1)'piCliI pc'aum hornt, .. nd '!('IainC'CS :.&IIIIUCllIly ~pp eci;ued tht 

consider-lie re~lmcnt thcy rcrc;'ed, Whilc Ihcllt civilians probablr "'cre not pro, 

lecu:d under the provisions of Ihe Geneva Com'erll ions, R'gulalions gO"crning their 

ncatmen\ mtl or tlCceeded the standards of tht Conventions. 
j',\CIFICATION 183 

This afforded us the perfect selUp for night ambushes, as we 

have discussed, since the Viet Cong had to come to the hamlets to 

get food , female companionship, and information. By selling up 

ambushes between the haml ets and the hase areas we could seriollsly 

damage the enemy while breaking his line of communications. This 

put the Viet Cong in .. st,He of constant tension. Then when the 

pacifi c.ltion program got into high gear and the haml ets obtained 

Regional or Popular Force garrisons on a permanent basis. the 

people were able to turn their backs on the Viet Cong. 

Summary 

Our pacification efforts were not hit and miss. They were well 

thought out and integrated wilh comba t opera tions. After the 

initiation of the Accelerated Pacifica tion Campaign in 1968 we 

focused on pacification to a larger extent. designing our combat 

operations LO support the key hamlets and critical areas. When our 

effort,> didn 't increase the degree of Government of Vietnam control 

over hamlets we went directl y to the evaluation sheets looking for 

soft spots and then we zeroed in with grea t precision. 'o\Te felt that by 

placing emphasis on pacific;uion we were shortening the war. 

The success we had in integrating combat operations and pacification is best illustrated by a ceremony that took place on a hot 

June day in 1969 at Dong Tam. Genera l Cao Van Vien. Ihe Chairman of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff, had come from Saigon 

to present to Major General Harris W. Holl is, the fourth of the 9th 

Infantry Division Commanding Generals in Vietnam (others were 

Major Ge neral George S. Eckhardt. Major Genera l George G. 

O·Connor. and Major General Julian J. Ewell). the Division's 

second Vietnam Presidential Cross of Gallantry Award and at the 

same time to present 10 the Division the Vietnam Civic Action Unit 

Award. To a casual observer the two awa rds did not seem to be 

compatibl e. Yet. to the soldiers participating there was no problem 

because they had long since learned that combat opera ti ons and 

civic actions were part of the ~a me cloth. Never berore that time. 

we were told. had a milit:lry unit been presented a Civic Action 

Meda l. It was understood that the Vietnamese Government had previously presented the Civic Acti on 1 In;t Award to the two hos pita l 

ships that had served the early casualti es of Ihe war. Here for the 

first time a major unit was receivi ng an award for humanitarian 

interest in the Vietnamese people wh ile at the same time being cited 

for ga llantry in inflicting over 10.000 casua lti es on the enemy during 

a fOllr month period. It was no dichotomy because in our total 

integra ted analytical approac h. comba t operations and pacification 

went hand in hand. 
CHAPTER IX 

Division Wrap-Up 

In January of 1969 the 9th Division experi enced an impressive 

su rge in most areas of performance which lasted six months, after 

which time the Division bega n to redeploy. It is difficult to p in down 

the exact reasons for this surge. H owever, some of the fa ctors involved arc se t forth below. 

In the late fall of 1968. our various management improvemen ts 

began to bear frui t and the Division began to firm up across the 

board. The most important of these was that all of Oli T rifle com· 

panies were up to strength and we had more riAe companies operating in the fi eld on a daily basis. Our battalions for the first time 

were organized on lhe normal square tabl e of organization and 

equipment. In January we fi nally rece ived three assault helicopter 

compani es and two air cavalry troops on what was in effect an auachment basis (permanent or semi-permanent assignment and control) . 

For the lirst time we had the total assets to go into high gear. 

We had ex perienced considerabl e success in breaking down to 

compan y level operations in areas where the enemy had been had ly 

cut up. As ca ll be seen in Chart 24 ou r overall eliminations began 

to drift lip whil e our fri endly losses went down, thus improving our 

eXChange rati o. As a res ult we decided to stress small unit operations 

particul arly at n ight. The res uhs were encouragi ng but not all good. 

We had several small tactical defea ts which under investiga tion 

showed that our night ambushes and daylight patrols in some cases 

were pretty sloppy. 

We therefore tri ed to quick-fix this by very simple. repetitive 

on-the-job training in night ambushes. daylight patrolli ng, combat 

shooting. and booby traps. After about a month this program took 

effect and the results were dramatic. Starting in late January 1969 

everythin g began to cl ick. and the enemy losses and the exchange 

ratios skyrocketed and friendl y losses went down. For a period of 

five months the monthl y gross enemy losses were from 200 percent 

to 300 percent over the average of the previolls period, and the 

exchange ratios were from 150 percent to 500 percent over the 

previolls average. In other words, enemy losses were appreciably 

greater whil e friendl y losses were reduced. (See T able 20.) 
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186 SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

One must give the enemy some credit for this upsurge. They 

had planned an offensive in the winter of 1969 and it ran head on 

into OliT peaking of effort. Most probably the enemy started his offensive in late December or ea rl y J an uary as OUT exchange ratio 

dropped sli ghtl y (18.8 to 15.6) . although ell emy losses went up 30 

percent (1, 108 to 1,435) . It is also apparent that their losses from 

October 1968 th rough J anuary 1969 crippl ed them badly which 

helped the effectiveness of Friendly operations to surge and remain 

high until July 1969. 

One can theorize that this peaking of resu lts was due to a relative 

collapse of the enemy structure, a raising of the friendly skill level, 

an effective integra tion of Oli T effort. a constant rev iew and quick 

fixing of our operations, and possibly the achievement of tactica l 

and technical surprise from wh ich the enemy could not recover. 

If one looks at each of the areas of major activity, the improvement rate was fairly constant bu t definitely weighted towards night 

operations. The increase in Viet Cong eliminated during night 

opera tions between January 1969 and i\.'larch 1969 was 300 to 400 

percent as compared to an increase of 100 perceOl during daytime 

operations. (See TaMe 21.) 

The skill factor is more difficult to isolate. A sampling indicated 

that the infantry exchange ratio went up to about 40 to I. However, 

air cavalry and sn iper exchange ratios were extremely high and night 

infantry exchange ratios were arou nd 100 to 1. We were unable to 

isolate any other sub-exchange ratios. However. it was obvious that 

the cumul ative effect of improved fri endl y skill (and probably 

degraded enemy skill) was very large. 

Although certain techn ica l areas (for example air c.walry and 

snipers) did very well. it was our judgment that the basic infantry 

effort was central- the others revolved around it. 

One might also theorize that the peaking of effi ciency was due 

to the combined efforts of a group of first·class brigade and ba ttalion 

commanders, plus the tremendous morale surge of the infantry 

when they rea li zed that they were cUlting the enemy to ribbons 

(coupled with the consequential loss of mora le on the enemy side) . 

The most gra phic example of the peaking effect was in our 2d 

Brigade. It had traditionally been used to cl ean out difficult enemy 

base areas with riverine operations and, as a result , had a rather 

heavy deli berate style (much like a Marine amphibious assault) . 

However. by much hard work, it was able to shift over to the more 

open smallllnit style. It was put into Kien Hoa Province-a rea l Viet 

Cong basti on, ta ken off its boats, and buckled down to work. 
I' 

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, 

I 

• , 

DIVISION WRAP- UP 187 

.. 

• 

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1'.0\"1 KO!. 

Fortunately. the enemy was numerous and overeonfidelll and really 

did not rea lize what was happening until it was too lale. 

TA8U': 28-2D BIUGAD): STATISTICS 

·rOTAL. ve TIME l' EK101) ve KI A PW " C "c. L.OSSES U.S. KI A U.S. WIA 

Apr-Jim 68 ...... m •• , ." 96 '49 D~ .............. '91 " " 44' 18 136 

Jan 69 ........... '69 " 7 , 51' ~b " '" .............. 704 " 18 6 766 27 191 

Mar ............. 1.185 .. " , 1.26' , 193 

Apr ... ........... 1,254 52 20 • I ,'" " 195 

May ... .......... ... ,. 12 • 1.036 21 20 1 
188 SHAIU'EN ING T HE COM BAT e DG E 

The figures tell the story. (See T able 28.) In the last half of 

1968, under Colonel Ceorge E. Bland, the Brigade began to tighten 

up; in Jan . and Feb . 1969 it hit its stride ; and in the months of 

March, April and Ma y under Colonel Rodman C. Rainville. the 

Brigade reached a plateau of skill and e ffective ness which was really 

amazing. In these three months, the brigade averaged over 1000 

enemy pCI' month eliminated. Its exchange ratios were astronomical, 

peaking at 158 to I. an elimination ratio which is possibly amongst 

the highest achieved in Vietnam. (By contrast, its elimination ratio 

in a somewhat comparable period in 1968 was 4.3 to I.) This 

remarkabl e record was achieved in continuous heavy fighting as 

shown by the friendly wounded rate. which was around 200 per 

month. Turning fTom the figures to more genera l results, the effect 

on the enemy was dramatic. In a period of months. the Viet Cong 

there changed from the cocki est provi ncial force in Vietnam (Kien 

Hoa was the alleged birthplace of the Viet Cong and the site of the 

s~ca lled capita l of the movement) to a remnant of demoralized and 

panicky units. Things were so bad that North Vietnamese cadre 

and fill ers (the best sign of severe erosion) began to be introduced 

and this was in the heartland of Viet Cong strength . The heaviest 

figh ting was generall y confined to a relatively few localities where 

the Viet Cong had establ ished so·ca ll ed "secret base areas" wh ich 

they defended with grea t tenacity. If Kien Hoa is ever pacified, and 

it has been a dissident pirate area for some centuries. March , April 

and May 1969 were the beginning of the process. 

On the negative side, it is of interest to note that our overall 

improvement was much less than one would expect. We increased 

Ollr paddy strength and our effective aircraft eITort appreciabl y. Yet 

our improvement in overall pressure 0 11 the enemy (measured by 

enemy losses) was onl y around 200 percent. 9ne can onl y conclude 

that the enemy was doing his best to cancel out our improvements. 

In facl. by examining the history of contacts. it is apparent that the 

enemy had some success \\'ith his evasive taclics. 

T A8U: 29- CoNTACT HISTOR ... 

'-I,m;n>!io" [M nz,l~' u.s. LoJ~J 

Qu r< ' Conl'U' R.,io '~r nl>( 1 Pu Contul 

'n! ,,.. ............ .. , 16.1 '" , ••• •• , .57 10 , 

<lh ,,.. .. ... ....... '" 19.1 •• , 3.7 to , .19 10 , ,,, '969 ... ... ..... . 2723 31.1 •• , 2.6 10 , .07 10 , 

'od ' 969 ............ 2137 54.5 10 J 3.8 10 , .07 •• , 

Whether some taclical innovation could have kept the enemy 

loss figure per COntact lip is debatable. By sampling the battalion 
RI VER P ATROl. 
190 SHARPENING TI-IE COMBAT EI>GE 

performance records, it would appear that as the overall enemy 

strength in an area declined, b:lttalio n skill levels slayed high but 

gross performance leveled off and th en declined somewhat. This 

seems reasonable. 

These results were somewhat sensitive to the overall capability 

of the commanders conccmcd. On th e o ne hand, Major General 

H arris H oll is who took over th e divisio n in April 1969 was able to 

continue and im prove on the approach: 0 11 the other hand. some 

lower level commanders had varying degrees of success with it. 

Although the record of enemy eliminations pcr contact might 

nOI have been as high as o ne would like. this result was acceptable 

when one considered lhe 88 percent reduction in U.S. losses per 

contact. The dramati c reduction in the loss of American Jives was 

the pay·off of all of our efforts. 

In summary. one might conclude with reasonable confidence: 

(1) A standard {1.S. infantry division at full strength with 

adequate aviation support ("Qu Id operate very efficientl y in Vietnam. 

An increase in infantry ha ttalions was useful. Open terrain such as 

in the delta increased the rel;Hive effect of aviation support. 

(2) T he Constant Pressure Concept coupl ed with aggressive 

small unit tactics was an effecti ve COIITl ter to enemy evasive tactics. 

(3) Heavy military pressure and good pacifica tion effort could 

defeat a solidly entrenched Communist effort over a period of time. 

(4) Good management and sound military judgment were es· 

sential and could he en'la nced hy use of anal ytic tech niques. 

(5) There were many aspects of the war in Vietnam which 

resisted dearcllt ;lIlalysis and assessment. 

(6) T op.notch leaders (U.S. or Vietnamese, military or civilian) transcended tactics. technique and other factors. Good leaders 

instinctively did the right th ing Ill ost of the time. 

(7) The average l !.'\. soldi er 1\'a5 inci il'idually qu ite superior to 

the Communist soldier. With proper organi zation and support. this 

superiority was cnh:mrcc\ man yfold. 
CHAPTER X 

Corps Level Operations 

In April 1969 the focus of this study shifts to II Fi eld Force 

Vietnam at Long Binh . with th e 9th Di visio n portion continuing 

until mid· 1969. 

At corps level we see a much morc complex problem and one 

inherently more difficult to manage and anal yze. However, after a 

peri od of observati on we slowly bega n to institute a simplified ver· 

sion of the 9th Di vision review and ana lysis system at the division 

and separate hrigade levels. Some segmen ts of operations were subjected to straight-on ana lysis with the remainder being handled by 

nOTmal military decision methods but subjected to the general 

philosophy of the "anal ytic approach," While the improvements in 

performance were less dramatic than in the 9th , they were substantial enough to justify the added effort. 

At II Field Force Vietnam leve l. \\'e had the equi valent of five 

U.S. and Free ' ""orld div isions as we ll as operational control of the 

advisory structure for eleven provinces and the eq ui va lent of five 

South Vietnamese Ann)' di visions. (Map 2) 

Our enemy was principally North Vietnamese Army main force. 

What Vi et Cong units were left were, in fact, North Vietnamese 

Army in all hut name, as they survived onl y on the strength of 

North Vietnamese repl acements. 

The true diversity of lIt Cor ps Tactica l Zone Slrikes one when 

you examine lhe kind of warfarc ex peri enced there, There were 

almost as many different wars as there were units si nce the military 

region encompasscd a wide ra nge of terrain and enemy situations. 

(Map 2) 

For example, in Saigon we had what was princi pally a National 

Pol ice and intelligence effon .against the terrorists and the Viet 

Cong Infrastructu re. 

Moving out to Cia Dinh and the outskirts of Saigon, one found 

four Vi etnamese Arm)' regiments and three U.S. brigades engaged 

in screening in the relatively open terrai n aga inst rocket attacks and 

infiltrators into the city. 

To the south . in Long An Provi nce, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry 

Division was effic ielllly engaged in smoking out the Viet Cong 
192 SHARP EN ING TH E COMBAT EDGE 

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE .. __ - :::;:_, _' 

1968 - 1970 " ... /.... V. U 0 .. .. 'e...,. ' , , ,' , \ ,', I ' .,. ,,c'" .. 0 r'

, . .. o .... us ! e~:t 'l.~ 

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............ , ... '--.... / ~~ .. -..J. .... --..) ( dp 

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MAP 2 

. ... L.., 

... 

remnan ts (and 1st North Vi etnamese Army Reginlcm) :md chopping them lip. This was the typical delta-type operation perfected 

by the 9th Di visio n. 

T o the northwest of Sa igoll , the U.S. 25th Division faced two 

different wars. In Hau Nghia. a long-lime citadel of the Viet Cong, 

one faced the combined e fforts of enemy units and of a po pulatio n 

thaL continued to support the Communists either throngh choice or 

necessity. The terrain was wide open- the residclll Communists 

lived in hedgerows and spider holes. There were booby traps and 

mines in abundance. Principal combat was with elements of Sub· 

Region I who were based in the Hoi Loi Woods and the Trapezoid. 

In Tay Ninh there was an entirely different environment. 

Bordered on three sides by relati vely hea.vy jungle and situated only 

four hours walk from the Camhodian border. it existed in a feast or 

famine fashion. At his choosing. the enemy moved from his sanctuaries in Cambodia to attack the popula ted areas. When this happened , one experienced all ra nges of combat, ITom deep jungle to 
CORPS LEVEL OP ERAT IONS 193 

figh ting in built-up areas. When the main forces withdrew to Cambodia, however, there was practically no one to fight since even the 

local forces based themse lves in Cambodia . 

The 1st Cava lry Division which spanned the northern tier of 

War Zone C, Binh Long and Phuoc Long had a particularly 

difficull situation fac ing it. The terrain was deep jungle and in it 

were elements of three Communist divisions plus the rear service 

groups, and Lines of Communication that passed men and supplies 

from the Cambodi an sanctuaries to the sub-regions that ringed 

Saigon. (Sizeable elements of all of these were based in Cambodia) . 

Combat here was typified by all the difficulties inherent to deep 

jungle and bunker warfare. 

In Binh Duong to the north of Saigon, the 1st Infantry Division 

faced terrain that varied from deep jungle to open cultivated and 

built-up areas. In it, they faced local forces, several beat-up and 

elusive one-time Viet Cong regiments (Q yuet Thang and Dong 

Ngai) and parts of Sub-Region 1. To a large extent, the big war had 

gone and left the Big Red One behind. Because of its past success 

in beating down the enemy. it now found little left to fight in its 

traditional area of operation. What enemy remained was highl y 

elusive and consistentl y avoided contact. 

Finally, to the east and southeast of Saigon, the Roya l Thai 

Army Volunteer Force and the Australian Task Force faced a 

rough and durable assortment of one Viet Cong regiment and some 

battalions that habituall y survived in deep jungle bases near inhabited areas. Major contacts were infrequent. 

Because of lhis diverse and different situation, there was initially 

a reluctance to appl y at Corps level the review and analysis techniques that had been so useful at division. Initially. the general 

nature of the 9th Division system was brough t to the attention of 

the subordinate commands of II Fie ld Force Vietnam. By so doing, 

we provided examples of the statistics we had collected and the 

practica l management use derived ITom them. Subordinate commanders were encouraged to anal yze their local situation and if 

they did not already have one, develop a Review and Anal ysis System for their own use. This effort was no t limited to the tactical 

units. For instance , the Deputy for Civil Operations and Revoluti onary Development Support worked out a system which highlighted tlt e key measurable areas in the pacification field. 

This effort started to show results almost immediately. Although 

the divisions in 11 Field Force, Vietnam had previously conducted 

varying types of ana lysis, none had kept books on an input·outpul 

or expenditure of effort versus results basis. Hence, the more adept 
191 SH AkI'ENJl\'G T H E COl\I B/\T EI)(; E 

were quick ly able: to obta ill the bene fi ts we had noted III th e 9th 

Division: 

<I) The abi lit y tu determine morc ra pid ly and dearly the 

types of operations lhal wefe paying orr with res ults and wh ere. 

(2) T he enic ienc), and effective ness of various units. 

(3) An identifica ti on of unproductive expenditllfe5 of time and 

effo rt. 

As has been mentioned throughollt this monograph . th e 25th 

Infa ntf}' Di"i5iol1 em ployed simple opera tions ana lysis consistentl y. 

They also developed the lise of computer assistance in operations 

analysis to a sign ifica nt def,rrce. T he comments of Major Ceneral 

Harris W . 1-I01lis, the 25 th Di\'ision Commander in late 1969 and 

early 19iO, arc of particill ar in terest: 

J fOllnd it \\';,~ extreme ly imponalll tha t I closely exami ne OUI' 

oper:nion:1I reslI lt\ 011 a rontin uing hasis. so th at I cOll ld gain :111 

adeq ua te app1'cci:llioll fo r thc O\'cr:lll p icture of hOl\' the comm:t lld 

was progresslIIg. 

I am cOll vi nced thai operation:1I .1I 1:t lysis techniques have Irc· 

mendous 1)()lc lll i:1I fo r :I pplication in h u ul'e comba l and p:trticu la rly 

in the complex ell \'il'Ollmelll of Ih is type of war. I saw how others had 

us(:d Ih is met hod wi th lI ccess: p:u·licIIl;.rly Gellcr:! 1 Ewcll. whe n he 

comma nded the 9th IlI blill') Divisioll p rior to Illy succession to com· 

ma nd of that divj\ioll. III 110 other war havc we hec n so deluged by 

so ma ny li<lbit.\ of illfOl'l1la liOII . for we havc bee n aCc\l\IOmec! to an 

ordel'li ness S~Oci:IICd wit h C' hl i~ (.'il h:1I iIlC~. Herc. Ihough . \\'e 

h:lvc had to m:l kc 0111' dec isio ll" a~ctl not " I)()n e nemy regimcn t:d 

courses of actiou. but 1;ltliel Iq)()11 the IIILlIIel'OIiS isolatcd act ions of 

communist S<1"ad'siICtI e lemenu. So " ,jt h the ,c:lle down of the level 

of oper:u iom. we h:n'e had 10 ll C'l'e;t~c oIL r rcli:mcc 011 objecti ve 

ll }'~is of a\'a ila l)le ill£01'l\101lioll (0 :lrl'i,'C al logica l cOllrses o f action. 

Armed with this inrormation . the more recepti ve commanders 

were able 10 optimize the ir efforts qu ickl y and put their asse ts where 

Ihey were gelti ng hetter resui L<;. As th ey d id , the 11 Fi eld Force. 

Vi etn am exchange ra tio. \\'hich had "veraged below 10 to I for the 

previolls nine months. began to improve. For five stra ight months, 

the rate was over 20 to I. Du ring OCloher 1969 Ihe ra te crested a t 

30.1 to I. For Ihe 12-month peri od April 1969 through Ma rch 1970, 

the U.S. un its in II Fi eld Force, Vi etn am had an average exchange 

rate of 18.9 to I. (T af/ie 10) Th is improvement came from increased 

efficiency of U.s. units. \\'ho took fe\\'e r c.'lsualties to do the job while 

enemy eliminations gradu all y went down. One of the payo ffs at 

di vision was th e q ui ck indica tion of changed enemy tactics. For example. when things got too hot ror him at night, the enemy oft en 

would change to early morning or earl y evening resuppl y and so 

on. The new insights provided by this system of anal ysis showed 
CORPS LEVEL OPERATIONS 195 

TAIlLE 30-U.S. FORCes, II F IELD FORet::, V IETNAM EX(;HM"CE RATIO 

APRIL 1969-MARCII 1970 

t:.~(h.n~~ 

nale En(my KIA !'.S. KIA 1,,"lio 

Apr 69 .. . .. ... . .. -4014- 270 14.9 : 

May 4128- 202 1M , Jun . . ...... .. .... 1655- 287 16.3 : 

jol ...... .. ..... . ,,&1 180 15.4 , Aug 3726 2'13 18.1 , 5<p 3571 156 21.6 : 

0" ... ...... 2718 91 ".1 , No\" "51 1<8 2-1.7 : 

Dec ...... "'0 130 2-1.1 , Jan 70 2366 III 21.1 , F,b 1750 91 18.0 ; 

Mar 2385 121 18.8 : 

A\"crage .. ....... 32'.,H IiI 111.9 : 

• A period 01 hu vy «Im!>'1 .1011R 'h~ (",,,,bodl.n bo"I". 

commanders when to adjust their tactics to compensa te for enemy 

changes. Much greater efficiencies resulted. 

As each division's data bank grew, we drew on them for certa in 

selected summary data for Headquarters II Field Force. Vietnam. 

Because of the very diverse terrain and enemy situation noted 

above, direct comparison of division·level statistics was generally 

not feasible or profitable. However, these summary statistics did 

provide a valuable insight into what both friendly and enemy forces 

were doing (or not doing) . 

Thus. our analysis was able to confirm our suspicion that the 

Communists were fragmenting fUrlher aher the failure of their main 

force attacks in the spring and Slimmer o f 1969. (See Table 30.) 

Our daily situation briefing gave us the impression of smaller con· 

tacts. Our weekly review of statistics brought the facts clearly into 

focus. We had not fully comprehended the damage done to the 

enemy during the friendly opera tions commanded by Generals 

Frederick C. Weyand and Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., in 1968 and 1969. 

Further. Corps. level statistics gave the commander another indicator on potential trouble spots. 'When the summary statistics be· 

gan to slip, it was time to pay a visit to the unit to see what the 

trouble was. Because of the almost unmanageable span of supervision, this tip-off feature was of great value. 

However, as has been mentioned earlier, it was much more 

difficult to apply analytical methods to this much more complex operation. Review and analysis tended to be of the more conventional 
196 SHARI'ENiNG THE COMII/\T EDGE 

management lype. If one can summari ze the approach, it was to use 

analysis where feasi ble, use tight management overa ll, and to try to 

preserve the questioning. results-oriented analytical approach 

throughout. 

Some se lected examples o f the various uses of analysis follow. 

Workillg 0" Ihe £IIemy System 

Pragmatic and cumulative experience during the Vietnam war 

revea led morc and more dearly that one had to work on all elements 

of the enemy's system to achieve substantial success. This was particularl y true when the Communists weTe operating from Cambodian 

sanctuaries as was the case in III Corps Tactical Zone. 

T his concept was crystallized and articulated by General 

Cre ighton 'W. Ahrams. 'When combined with the lower level constant pressure approach it was most effective. It shou ld be noted, 

however, that III Corps was unusual in that the terrain, the weather 

and troop availability favored the concept. We followed a highly 

successful program of keeping COllstalll pressure on most elements 

of the ellemy system although a few areas were beyond our ca pabilities. Geographica ll y, this meant the Viet Cong infrastructure and 

local elements in the citi es and surrounding populated areas, the 

local forces that operaLed around the populated areas, the subregions and their main force elements that tenanted the close-in 

base areas, the rear service groups that mainta ined the lines of 

communication from Cambodia , and finall y the North Vietnamese 

Ann y divisions which by now clung. more and more, to the safety 

of the Cambodian border were all attacked simultaneously. By 1969 

most enemy un its \\'ere fairly well beaten down. However, from 

time to time, we had to drop what we were doing and turn all hands 

to smothering some Communist aHempt at a high paim. However, 

once the fire was put OUL we immediately weill back where we had 

left off to an overa ll constant press ure approach. 

By September 1969 we had beaten back the final gas p effort of 

the North Vietnamese Army di visions to gel to Saigon and Tay 

Ninh and their consolidati on efforts against Binh Long Province. 

This done. we fine-lUned uur efforts to insure that we had pressure 

on every possible element of the enemy system. Tn line with the improved ca pabiliti es of Regional Forces. we thinned out the regul ar 

forces protecting Sa igon. In accord with the Vietnamization program. every effon was coordinated with Vietnamese forces. Fortunate ly, the Vietnamizatioll program had proceeded to the point 

where many SOUlh Vietnamese Army units could pull their own 
CORI'S LEVEL OI'I-:a,n IONS 

THE ENEMY SYSTEM 

1968 

.~ ... COOoC IH , .. ',OH ..... 

MAP ) 

Booloc 

SOUTH 

CHIN .. 

'" 

197 

weiglll in good fashion. This gave us 50 to 60 more reasonably good 

battalions to work with. 

Across the northern tier of III Corps. (Map J) we deployed a 

coordinated force of seven U.S. and SOLith Vietnamese brigade 

equivalents. They worked against the three essentially North Viet· 

namese Army divisions and the lines of communication that led 

from Cambodia into the interior o[ III Corps. 

In War Zone C a brigade of the 1st Air Cava lry Division and a 

South Vietnamese airborne brigade moved in on top o[ the enemy 

line of communi cations that ran from the Fishhook down the 

Saigon River corridor to the ~Iichelin Trapezoid base area. They 

were in constant contact with and exacted a slow and steady toll on 

elements of the 9th North Vietnamese Army Division and on rear 

service elements on the line of communications. 

To the eaSt, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 9th 

South Vietnamese Army Regiment worked along Highway QL 13 
198 SHAk l'J::N ING T HE COM "AT EDGE 

and west LO Ton Lc Cham and the Fishhook, keeping pressure on the 

7th Division elelllcllls that rota led across the border and denied the 

enemy access to the population in the area. 

Moving further ean, one found a brigade of Lhe 1st Air Cavalry 

Division with its battalions deployed in a linear fashion along the 

Song Be River infiltration route. By intensive reconnaissance it 

sought out the trailloca liolls and operated along them, laking small 

hu t steady bites Ollt of the Communist supplies and people. 

Finally. at Song Be we had the remaining brigade of th e 1st 

Air Cavalry Division and another SOllth Vietnamese Army airborne 

brigade. They kept pressure 011 the elements of the 5th Division 

which were still in SOllth Vietnam and sought out enemy logistics 

movemellls from Base Area 35 1 in Cambodia towards '\far Zo ne D. 

For several mon ths. we achi eved moderate but steady success. In the 

fall of 1969. air cava lry clements discovered that the Communists 

had established a new line of communi ca tions from Base Area 35 1 

along the II Corps- III Corps houndary into War Zone D. (The socall ed J olley trail) QUI' reaction was to immediately put troops on 

top of the new trail to keep up the press ure and attrition. Starting 

from the point where this new trail crossed QL 14 northeast of 

Duc Phong. the cavalry and airborne lea pfrogged battalions along 

the trail scooping up important quantities of supplies and killing 

rear service troops. Of equal importance this effort impaired the 

Aow of supplies and munitions to the sub·regions around Saigon. 

In summary, the combined U.S.·South Vietnamese Army effort 

across the northern tier was designed to accomplish two objectives. 

First. to erode the main force uniL~ and keep them so weak and 

occupied that they could not interfere with the pacifica tion program. Second. to reduce and, if possibl e. choke off the flow of reo 

placements and supplies from Cambodian sanctuary base areas into 

the heart of I II Corps. These efforts were surprisingly successful. 

In the interior of III Corps, we had a force of 18 brigade 

equi valents deployed in a great circl e 30 to 70 kilometers out from 

Saigon . This force was dedicated to the tasks of ma intaining pressure and attri ti on on the sub.regions. the close·in base areas and the 

lines of communi ca tions that came into the sub·regions. 

Northwest of Saigon. the 25th U.S. Division and two regiments 

of the 25th South Vietnamese Army Division were on top of Sub· 

Region I and Sub·Region 2 keepi ng pressure on the main force 

elements and the lines of communication from the Angel's \·Ving. 

This was a parti cularly difficult task because of the easy Communist 

access to bases in nearh)' Cambodia . 

North of Saigon, the U.S. 1st Division and two regiments of the 
CORPS LJ::VJ::L OP ERATIONS 199 

5th South Vietnamese Army Division were focused on Sub· Region 

5 and they participated with neighboring units in a coordinated 

effort against Sub·Region I. 

East of Sa igon, the 18th Somh Vietnamese Army Division, the 

U.S. 199th Light Infantry Brig;l(le, the Royal Thai Army Volunteer 

Force and the Austral ian Task Force combined their efforts against 

j\,tilitary Region 7 and SlIb·Region 4. Typical of their operations 

was a coordinated campaign to wear down the 274th Vi et Cong 

Regimel1l and drive it out of its long·term base area in the H at 

Dich jungle. This involved putting troops. fire bases and Rome 

Plows into the base area and intensive efforts to interdict resupply 

into the base. 

In the Run g Sat SpeCial Zone, a delta area south of Saigon . a 

special U.S. Navy- Vietnamese Navy effort kept continuous pressure 

on the water sa pper elements that formerly had interdi cted shipping 

channels. These efforts were full )' coordinated with and from time 

to time supported by II Fie ld Force, Vi etnam. 

Finally, in Long An Province. the 3d Brigade 9th Division and 

the 46th South Vietnamese Army Regiment combined their efforts 

to control Sub-Region 3 and defeat the 1st North Vietnamese Anny 

Regiment. 

This completed the middle ring. In it we kept full pressure on 

the organi zed Communist forces, eroding them. and creating an 

environment for paCifica tion progress. 

Cia Dinh Province and Sa igon are the heart of III Corps. Because of the biller memories of T et 1968 and avowed Communist 

aims for 1969, we started the year with a force of four South 

Vietnamese Army regiments and three U.S. brigades deployed in 

defense of Saigon. They did their job well. Although the Com· 

munist main forces never got close. these forces kept Su b· Region 6 

under a blanket. Hence. we start ed pulling out forces in June 1969 

and completed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Sub· Region 6 in 

September 1969. The airborne forces were withdrawn next and 

Rangers sta rted soon after. As this occurred. the Regiona l and Pop· 

ular Forces assumed more and more of the load-a graphic example 

of Vielnamization in action. 

Whi le all these acti ons werc going o n. there was a concurrent 

steady improvement in Regional Forces throughout III Corps. This 

resulted from the steps being taken to upgrade their trai ning and 

equipment, the gradually improv ing leadership at distri ct and 

province level, and the improved environment which we provided 

hy keeping the main forces on the mn and away from the populated 

areas. This freed the Regional Forces to work on the loca l Com· 
200 SHARPEN I NG THE COl\1 HAT EDG": 

munist elements h' ithout fear of being engulfed by a main force 

unit. 

As they enjoyed increasing success, they began to deny the enemy 

access to lhe popu lation. The COllllllunists were thus able to extort 

less and less support from the people. This, of course, put m OTC of a 

burden on the already strained Communist supply system. '''hat 

they could not get loca ll y, they had to bring in ITom outside. 

It was a vicious cycle-by keeping an unrelenting pressure and 

a ttrition on all elements of the enemy system, we pushed him 

closer and closer to the breaki ng poinl. He reached a point where 

most of his effort was devoted to his own survival. This entire operati on required exquisite W-fJfdination and delica te emphasis. 

By March of 1970 the enemy in III Corps was very weak. The 

Cambodian operation then destroyed his bases in the Cambodian 

sanctuary. dealing him a staggering blow. 

We have remarked elsewhere on the positive effect of gifted 

commanders. 1l seems appropriate here LO mention that an "aver. 

age" or less commander during the 1969- 1970 period found it diffi· 

cult to do damage to the enemy in a useful way. Not onl y did the 

situation require considerable techni cal and tactical proficiency but 

also a complete determination to come to grips \\'ith the enemy. 

hlVelllory of l.omUIIIII;S/ Ul1ils 

In QUI' elfol'l against the enemy system, we wamed to insure Ihal 

we were not missing any Communist units. H ence. we made a 

systematic invemory of all Communist elements of an y size known 

or suspected to be in III Corps. Next. we stratifi ed the units hy 

their known 01' suspected geogra phi ca l area of operation. Agai nst 

this list we arrayed the South Vi etnamese and Free \\forld Forces 

who operated in th e area . Finall y, we analyzed our past operations 

to determine how effecti vely \\'e were doing the job. 

This systematic in ventory was a refinement which was initiated 

late in th e game. It almost immediately focused Ollr allemion on 

an unusual problem area. 

As one migh t expect we found Oll t that the main force units 

were getting most of our atlention . They were, after all . the most 

obvious threat and the ones who could inAict a small tragedy all us 

in an aftel'lloon. The loca l rorce battalions were also systematica ll y 

pursued by our side. Shifting to the very base of the Communist 

pyramid . th e Viet Cong infnstl'uctul'e was the Object of a forma l 

program designed to e liminate it. Although spott)' in e ffect iveness, 

the Phoung Huang program showed promise. 

H owever. in the middle or the pyramid (See Chart 8.) we found 
COR I' ~ LEVEL OPERATIONS 201 

an entirely different pit:lure. In many instances, local-level Viet 

Cong elemClll.'I h'cre existing relatively unmolested under the very 

noses of fTiendly units thal were keying on bigger game. There was 

no systematic effort to search a lit and eradica te these local peSts. 

They suffered attrition only when they were caught by a reconnaissance-in-forcc. a ni ght ambush, or while they were attempting 

an offensivc action. No one was keeping the press ure on them . 

Armed with this information, we went one step further. We 

charged subordinate units \\'ith responsibility for the specific small 

elements known or suspected to be in their area .. of operation . This 

was a com hi ned Free World-SoUlh Vietnamese Army program resultiug in close coordination of all forces down to district level. 

Periodic reporting on resul ts was required so as to assess progress. 

The 25th Di,rision refined this process to a high art. 

\Vithin seve ral months, we could see positive results from this 

effort. Marginal Viet Cong units tha t had stll'vived at minimum 

strength when they were Icfl alone began to fold lip under pressure. 

Many were simpl)' inactivated because of ineffective remaining 

strength. 

This was all accomplished without flash or fanfare. Allrition was 

hy twos or threes. \Vhen the word got out that we were looking for 

locals by name. the pressure caused them to move out, hide deep. or 

Chieu Hoi. 

The overall result was to hasten the dec."!)' of loca l forces and to 

further weaken the link hetween the Communist apparatus and 

the peopl e. T his devi ce instiullionalizcd the Constant Press ure 

Concept and allowed one to keep tahs on ilS sll ccess. 

SII/I·Regiml I 

On a multi-division scale. our effort aga inst Sub-Region I was 

an excellent exampl e of the COllstant Press ure Concept. For a peri od 

of years. this ke}' suh-region had surv ived under the noses of two 

U.S. and two South Vi etnamese Army divisions. It did so by being 

slippery and alert. During these )'ears. it had suffered enormous 

casualties bllt relyi ng 0 11 North Vietnamese Army replacements. it 

always managed to survive and to rebuild. The North Vietnamese 

Army headquarters was Llsuall y underground in the deep jungle of 

Ihe TrapclOid. (MIlP 4) Its subordinate elements holed up along 

the Saigon Ri ve r in secondarr gro\\'th Rome-plowed areas, in the 

Boi Loi Woods, and in the TrapelOid. They li ved off two se parate 

lines of communication-one across Hau Nghia Ilrovince to the 

Ange l's Wing in Cambodia and the other from the Fishook sOllth 

down the Saigon River corridor. (MIlP 4) 
SUB-REGION ONE 

1968 

• • • • • • • • • 

.. 

• • • • • • 

~ 

MAP ., 

• • • • • • • • • 

, 

• • 

, 

• ! 

,0-

.................. 

AN LO C 

......... ; .. ~ '-!!r ............ - .. 

• 

~ 

• " • • mJ 

TRAPEZOID 
COR"!> LEVEL OPERATIO NS 203 

Aiding Sub-Region I's survival was the fact that it was lleaT the 

boundaTY betwecn our divisions and as press uTe mounted on one 

side il could slidc away. Qur units tended to concentTate on what 

was in their area of opera tion . CToss-boundaT)' co-ordination was 

not a strong point. 

Starting ill J uly 1969. we hit the problem head on with a fullcourt press by all U.S. and South Vietnamese Army forces in the 

area. First, we movedlhe divisional bo undary to the Saigon Riverthe 1st U.S. Division and 5th Sot\th Vietnamese Army Division to 

the northeast of the river and the 25th U.S. Division and 25th 

South Vie lilamese Army Division to the southwest. U.S. Navy and 

Vietnamese Navy boats wOTked the Tiver. A Aoating boundary was 

established on either side of the riveT to enable rapid exchanges of 

territory and responsi hilit y. 

To kick off the effon. a co-ordinatiOIl conference was held by all 

participants to exchange intelligence and co-ordinate opera tional 

details. The Commanding General. 1st InfantTY Division. was designated co-ordinator for the operation. He maintained the books on 

currelll openltions. insuTed an exchange of information with all 

partiCipants, hosted weekly staff co-ordination meetings, and 

monthl y commanders' conferences. Within th e first \\'eek, Sub· 

Region I. \\·as on its \\'ay dowll . Co-ordinated effort by ground forces 

and Navy element.s alon g the river staned exacting a nightly toll on 

resupply efforts across the river. At the same time . a South Vietnamese ATmy airborne battalion and a U.S. battalion moved in on 

top of the 268th Viet Cong Regiment in Boi Loi Woods and the 

1st Division and 5th South Vietnamese ATm)' started a major 

tacti cal effort supported by Rome plows in the Trapezoid. Although 

not a forlllal elemelll of the Sub-Regional I effort. the 1st AiT 

Cavalry to th e north choked down on the enemy and impaired his 

Tesupply via the Saigon Rh'er corridor. 

PTogress was not spectacular. There were no big fights but every 

day there \\'a<; a steady toll of the enemy_ Prisoners told ta les of not 

wanting to go on rice resuppl y details because it was sure death. 

In addition. major headquarters type elements of both Sub· Region I 

and th e 268lh Regiment were overrull and captured. The pressuTe 

was so great that the IOlst North Vie tnamese Army Regiment 

moved completely out of the area. 

\,Ve were, of course, very pleased with the erosion that SubRegi on I su ffered in this opera ti on as it was the strategic link pin 

or th e entire Comlllunist effort towards Saigon. There was an im· 

portant bOil LIS. This was our first real test of the Dong Tien (ProgTess Together) program. The improved perFoTmance or the 8th 
204 SHARPEN ING TI-I E. COM BAT EDGE 

South Vietn amese Army Regiment working with the In Infantry 

Division showed us clearly th al we had chosen the right path in 

that th e South Vietnamese Army was ready to assume a major combat load. 

While we we re keeping full pressure on Sub-Region I, pacification in nearby populated areas was proceeding in a very satisfactory 

fashion. Sub-Region 1 units were fully occupied in self-surviva l and 

could not interfere. Under th e umbrella of our press ure. Regional 

Forces, I)opuiar Forces, and Popular Self Defense Forces gained 

strength and capability. 

By early 1970, when th e first sizabl e U.S. troop withdrawa l look 

place, Sub-Region I was so debilitated and the South Vietnamese 

Army and regional forces so improvec! there was no noticeable 

cha nge in security r:ltings. 

Dong T ien Progmm 

In June 1969 we started a major effon lU upgrade South Vietnamese forces in III Corps as pan of th e Vietnamization program. 

The program, announced joilllly hy the Commanders of 111 Corps 

Tactical Zone :lI1d II Field Force Vietnam , was called the Dong 

Tien (Progress Together) I)rogram. It paired U.S. units with South 

Viet namese Army and Regiona l and Popular Force units for opera· 

tions-the objective being to allow each force to learn something 

from the other. Because of the key imponance of airmobile skills in 

the Vielllamization program, we put panicular stress a ll combined 

ainnobile operations. Each U.S. commander sha red his air assets 

with Vietnamese units. At first Vietnamese clements merel y wenl 

along on U.S.- planned and managed operations but progressively 

the Vietnamesc took ovcr and rail their own operations. 

There were t WO \'er)' obvioLls benefits that accrlled from this 

effort in short order. First. Vietnamese commanders and units developed real sk ill in using airmobile assets (without depending on 

U.S. advisors as in the p'1St). Secondly, Vietnamese units usi ng 

air assets foll owed th e U.S. example anel started operating in areas 

they had avo ided for man y years. 

The program was th en ex tended to operations as a whole. The 

pa yoff here \\'as substantial. The Vietnamese began to operate continuously-both day and night- and in some cases performed as well 

or belter than th e ir U.S. p<lrtners. As a battalion or regiment showed 

that it was really effective, it was "graduated" ITom the system and 

took over an independ ent mission. 

T his program was nOlhing new. Il was directl y copi ed from I 

Corps where we concluded that an important element in the suc-
~. " I 

COR!'!'> LEVEL OJ'ERATI ON!'I 

l 

• 

.,.- "

,, I ... 

, . 

_, 

~ I, :. .: 

Do:-;c TII~N 

205 

I 

) 

cess of the 1st South Vietnamese Army Division was an informal 

arrangement of the same sort. The only "new" element was to 

formalize the system as a command directed program. This was 

done be£allse the South Vietnamese Army in the III Corps area had 

historically resisted combined opel':1tions. It also gave the program 

more status and visibility. 

The upshot and fin:1l test of the system came as U.S. units began 

to withdraw from III Corps. The success of the Dong Tien program 

was attested to by the manner in which Vietnamese units were able 

to pick up the load and effective ly keep the pressure on the enemy. 

Throughout mid-1969. U.S. and other Free ' ""arid Forces were 

carrying about 80 percent of the combat load in 111 Corps as 

measured by the numbers of enemy killed in action. Beginning in 

November 1969 South Vietnamese units began to increase their 

share. until by April 1970 the si tuation had changed dramatica ll y 

with the South Vietnamese Anny carrying almost one half of the 

combat load. T his was partially d ue to the redeployment of some 

U.S. units. Chan 25 indicates one way in which we pragmatically 

measured the actual progress or the Vietnamization Program. The 
206 HARI'I:: NING TUE COMIII\T EDGE 

CHART 25- S0UTII Vlt rSAMF-S~ ARMY CoNllUBUTIO:-'S TO III CoRPS 

TACTICAL Zo.", .: COMUAT 1...0,\0 

~ U 

-

zOO 

Z 

> • < 

> • 

< 

i 30 

> 

• • z 

• 

• 0 

> 

z " ::: 20 

• • • 

Qu~rtet NOV y... 69 

" 

DEC 

" 

,. 

MN 

" 

'EO 

" 

M" 

" '" " 

SOllth Vietnamese Army uniLS thaI ope,'ated so effectively in Cambodia with no U.S. advisors were Ihe products of this Dong Tien 

progTam. 

Helicopter Allocalions 

Following the defeal of Communist main force efforts in the T et 

period of 1969, \\'C look a hard look at our method of allocati ng 

assault helicopter company and air cavalry support. The purpose 

was to see if we were getting all that was possible from these 

relatively scarce and valuable units. 

At the lime. our Standing Operating Procedure was to make a 

daily allocation of assault helicopter companies to U.S. and SOllth 

Vietnamese units. Units thal wan led air assets for a particular day 

put in their bids. We sorted oul the requests and assigned use of the 

assets based on our evaluation of the Corps-wide situation and the 

unit's part in it. Since there were never enough helicopters to fill 

all valid requests. some requests always weill unfill ed. Because of the 

dynamics of the silUation, a unit could not plan very rar in advance. 
CORPS LEVEL O P ERAT IONS 207 

Until all req uests were considered, a unit did not kn ow if it would 

gel the air assets which it had requested. This was, of course, the 

standard system of allocating from a central pool when requirements exceed resources. 

To gel a handle on the problem, \.,.e tllrned to our basic set of 

statistics a ll combat results. '-\Ie found that certain of Ollr units 

consistently achieved more enemy eliminations on airmobil e operations than did others. However, these units did not necessaril y 

receive priority in the alloca ti on of air assets, since allocation was 

based on what a unit sa id it \\'a5 going to do without consideration 

of its past ach ievements. At the same time, t he unce rtainty of getting 

assets impaired the units' eniciency in keeping full pressure on the 

enemy. 

In an effort 10 improve res uhs, we stopped daily alloca tion of 

assets and \\'ent to a monthly allocation, which was weighted in favor 

of the uni ts that were producing res ults or had a high priority 

mission overa ll. For instance, the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, 

our most proficient user of air assets, which worked Long An 

Province-the first priority 1)'1.ci fi ca ti on target nationwide-received 

15 Assault Helicopter Company days per month, while a likesized unit and area with a poor track record and a less important 

mission, received only 2:) Assault Helicopter Company days per 

month. 

For planning purposes the alhx;a tiOll was spread over the month, 

and a tentative schedule is..'i tled. Thus, a unit knew in advance what 

it would have for air assets 011 a given day and could plan the 

rhythm of iu uperations accordingly. This schedule was not set in 

concrete , however. ' Vhen the situation d icta ted, we pulled the 

assets and put them where they were needed at the moment. 

In announcing the new system , \\'e made it clear that allocations 

were "resul ts" oriented and that those units which used asse ts most 

efficien tly would continue to receive a proportionately grea ter share 

of ava il able assets. However this \\'as more of a gambit to stimulate 

good perfOnllanCe thall a factual description of the actual allocation 

process. 

Qur experience proved that this change was both timely and 

beneficial. Coming at a time when the enemy was changing his 

tactics (breaking dO\\'n to small units), it allowed uni ts to plan 

effectively for fu tu re operat ions and gave them incentive to try 

more imaginati,'e ways lO employ their assets. It also allo\.,.ed us to 

assign the same air units to the supported ground unit, thus facili · 

tating the deve lopment of closer coordi nation and teamwork. In 

other words, the units could work the ir way up the learning curve. 
208 SHARPEN ING TliE COMBAT EDGE 

TRANSPORTI NG A,nU.U:RY FIRING !'I,ATFOkMl> 

This is cited as an example of departure from the "standard" or 

"reasonahle" system to achieve better results. 

Full Iles/Jo"se /0 Alltiaircm/L Fire 

In the Slimmer of 1969 the three Communist main force divi· 

sions in lhe I II Corps Tactical Zone north of Saigon wefe in the 

process of being driven lip against the Cambodian sanctuary areas. 

In flying over 'VaT Zone C. it became apparent that we were receiving rather heavy .50 cal iber an tiaircrah fire. 'We soon found Ollt 

from captured documents that the Communists had initialed an 

illlensive c.-.mpaign 10 shoot down American choppen. As a result , 

0 111" aircraft losses went up, although modestly. After observing the 

enemy tactics, it was theorized that they were selecting an area along 

the upper Saigon River logistical and infiltration corridor which 

they wished to protect. po iti nin~ an an tiaircrah battalion in it and 

then letting ny. 

The nonnal U.S. response in the past had been to aLtack an)' 

guns which were a problem and detour around the rest. However, 
CORPS l.EVEl. O l' ERATlON3 209 

in this c.:ase. it was decided, 101' la rgely psychological reasons, to try to 

defea t the tactic head on. 

lt was decided to: 

(I) Report and record all firings. (Maximizing our information.) 

(2) Attack all loca ted guns with max imum firepower (gun· 

ships, arti\1ery and Tactical air) . 

(3) '~ork the area over on lhe ground when feasihlc and 

desirable. 

After a peri od of weeks, our aircraft losses went back LO nonnal 

or below. It was found that it took onl y a malleI' of days to either 

destroy or neutralize an en tire battal ion (say 9 to 15 guns). Whethcr 

th is was due to destroying the guns. killing off the crews, or ex hausting their ammun ition supply was not known. However. it was quile 

app.ucnt that they were cycl ing in fres h battalions to repl ace the 

old. After some months the enemy gave up, but the full response 

technique on a less generous scale was retained against an y fire 

(light machinegull 01' rifle) . Eventuall y the enemy anti aircrafL lire 

su bsided to normal proportions or less. Unfortunately, the statistics 

on this imeresting operation could not be loca ted. 

Tht: Ni/!.I11 H ll1vk K it 

In retrospect. it is ohserved that most of lhe improvements or 

innovations descri bed in this monograph \\'ere ideas which usuall y 

involved people- wh ether concepts. management. tactics. techniques 

or training. T his was it surprise- that doi ng something a little dif· 

feren t or a Iittlc better with peopl e could res ult in su bstantial im· 

provements. However. the Night Hawk Ki t was an example of a 

hardwa re solu tion developed hyanalysis. 

Earli er we descrihed the success of the Night Search technique, 

Although very profi table. a Night Search operation in volved a 

major investment of two Cobras and one Huey plus add iti onal back· 

up helicopters and required a high degree of skill on the part of 

the sni per spotters. 

The 25 th Infalllry Division stud ied this techniquc and. over a 

period of time. developed a kit consisti ng of a coaxiall y mounted 

mini.gun , Night Observation Device, and a small pink and white 

searchlight. T his was idea l as the Niglll Observa tion Device gave 

maximum efficiency for nonna l night observation. the pink search· 

light could be lIsed for very dark night conditions. and the min i· 

gu n had ample firepower for the job and repl aced both Cobras. 

Being a "plug-in" kit for a Huey. it could be removed in the day 
~lO HJ\RI't: :\" N(. lll~: COMBAt EUGl-. 

and installed in any operational plane at nighl. The coaxia l feature 

allowed one man La operate il, IhllS removing the need for " handing 

off" largeLS. The filial refincmeIH was the lISC of both a l'iglH and 

Jert hand kit which etimiml.lcd the effect of stoppages. 

This clever development with on-hand components aJlo\\'cd one 

plane to do the job of three or morc and ga\'C bener results with 

less highly lJ'ained operators. This program \\'015 SO successful that 

U.S. Army, Vietnam c\'cnLUally fabricated the kits and issued them 

to all units. LhllS providing all improvised night gu nship which 

could perform fairly sophisti('ated tasks HildeI' uight light conditions. 

!In" 1.iJ!,11I Prog1'fl1ll 

In Vielllam. ARC LIGHT (13- 52) strikes were one of th e most 

valuable and effectiv(' w(';lpons available to higher commanders. 

However. as with man y good things. they were limited in number 

and hard to come by. Demand ah,'ays exceeded availability. During 

the period co,rered hy Ihis report. available sorties per day varied 

from (iO down to 47 for the entire theater. Allocation of sorties 

rested at Headquarters l\lilitary Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

There was no suhallocatioll of strikes. Rather. subordinate units 

nominated targets 10 Cummander. U.S. i\lilitary Assistance Com. 

mand, Vietnam who ;Ipproved strikes based on th e overall situation 

in Southeast Asia and the <Iualit), of the target. Hy quality, one 

means the imponance of the target. plll~ the reliahility of the in· 

telligence concern ing it and its lo(:atiOIl . 

At Headquarters II Field Force. Vietnam. we utilized a very 

thol'ollgh system of analysis to insure that we represclIled accurately 

the importance of our nominations and at the same lime did not 

misuse this asse t. To perform thi~ task we created an ad hoc ARC 

LIGHT element in 0\11' G- 2 and (:- :l A I R shop. They systematical ly 

collected e,'ery fragment of infonn<ltion available on high priority 

Communist units and rea~ in which the), were known "I' suspected 

to operate. This included: 

- Red haze' and side I.Hlkillg airhorne radar relUrns 

-Ground firings at aircraft 

- Visual reconnaissance rC~lIlt~ 

- Aerial photo readout 

- Reports frolll agents. prisoners of war. and Hoi Chanhs 

- Results from grounri recollnaissance and ground contacts 

-Sensor activations 

-Other specia l somces of illlelligence 

L Airborne rteonnai$sancc flights to ..tettel heat ellll,sion) frollt rhe Rround. 
l.ORI· ... LEVEL O I'UtA I ION.\ 2 11 

- Histuric pallt:rns ul enemy activity-what had he done before 

and where? 

These data were collCCled alld plotted un receipt. res ulting in a 

tactica l temperat ure chart on key areas of t he battlefield. 

Information from this data bank was avail able on re<luest to 

suppl ement that coll ected by subord ina te units but \"'as used 

principall y at Field Force leve l w evaluate subordinate un it nominations. On occasion, where a lucrative ta rget escaped the attention of 

subordinate levels or a target of opportunity emerged. this data 

bank was used to develop Field Force leve l targets. 

What this system did in parti cular was to play down the elemem 

of emotion and subjectivity in the target selection process. This was 

particul arl y important in evaluating targets nominated by South 

Vietnamese Army units. since they often did nOl have as much 

good current techni cal intelligence avai lable as did we. Their nominati ons may have heen qu ite val id, hu t did not always stand up 

under an anal}'tic.'I1 screening. Although certainly not foolproor. 

our system could address the prohability of Ollr fi ndi ng enemy in 

a target box. 

Because of the perishahility of intelligence. this data hank could 

never guarantee the ex istence of a target in a specific hox- particu· 

larl y since at this po int in the war the enemy was full y alen to the 

1\-52 threat and practiced effecti ve pa ssive defense measllres. 

T he &Teat \'alue of the system was t hat it \\'as rati onall y organi zed . so that it could rapidly provide facts to the commander to 

assist him in targe t appraisal. 

Successful tactics and targe ting still depended in STeal measure 

0 11 the ski ll. instinct. and intu itioll of a commander who knew his 

enemy. This data hank \\'as e~ (' d 10 assist the commander in 

fine-tuning the loca ti on of targets. In addition the natu re of the data 

bank was such that the add itioll of CIne neh' fragment of information 

oft en gave LIS the opportunity for a highl y lucrative last minute 

diversion of an alloca ted strike. 

The test of any system is th e res ults obtained by it. By this 

measure ollrs full y justifi ed the great all10 u nt of \\'ork that went into 

it. 

\Ve did lI ot nominate targets unl ess we believed them to be 

worthwhil e. In the grea t ma jority of cases, we gOt what we requested. This was because we had organi zed facts to back up ou r 

nominations and because Ollr active program of ground bomb 

damage assessment confirmed ollr prediction of targe t nalllre in a 

high percentage of strikes. 
212 SHARPEN I NG THE COMBAT EDGE 

As a maller 01" historical interest. the lise of ARC LIGHTS in 

the 9th Division area in the delta was almost nil. The populated 

areas were almost automatically excluded and suitable targets elsewhere were quite infrequent. In the II Field Force Vietnam area in 

1969- 1970. practically all strikes were way Ollt in deep jungle. 

However, one can ass ume the strikes were bothering the North 

Vietnamese, as their propaganda campaign had as a primary theme 

the concocted idea that tremendous damage was being done to the 

South Vietnamese people by indiscriminate use of ARC LIGHTS. 

'tI(licaIO f 

With the passage ot time in Vietnam, we developed a [eel for our 

operations and the enemy. which enabled us to pi ck up strong 0 1' 

weak poin ts by focusi ng on certain elements. These elements varied 

from individua l areas to hroad spectrums of activity. Some illus· 

trations follow: 

Gross eiimifWliOlls were important but highl y variable as to 

significance. A good unit in an area with lots of enemy consistently 

did a lot of damage. A unit in such an area that didn't cut lip the 

enemy needed expert help to determi ne what it was doing wrong. 

Obviously, some unitS were in a dry hole (not mllch enemy around) 

and showed low el iminati on rates. h look considerable skill to determine the unit's kn owledge of the enemy situation and its hasic 

ski ll level in order to ascertain if their lack of results was due to 

lack of knowledge and skill or lack of enemy. As the enemy strength 

in an area decl inecl this faClor became more and more un reliable. 

Th e exchange ratio (kill ratio) was of considerable value in 

assessing the professional skill of a unit. The matrix below gives 

a general idea: 

Exchange Ratio 

I to 50 and above 

I to 25 

to 15 

to 10 

I to 6 

Skill Level of Unit 

Highl )' skilled U.S. unit 

Very good in hea vy jungle 

Fairly good U.S. unit in open terra in 

Very good for ARVN in open terrain 

Low but accepL"lhle for U.S. unit 

Good for South Vietnamese Army unit 

Histori ca l U.S. average 

Historica l SOlLih Vietnamese Army average 

These exchange ratios applied to combined arms teams, including 

of course, airmobil e and air cava lry support. The figures were highly 
CORPS LEVEL OI>t \T'O N!- 2 13 

variable due to local w nditions. Also as the enemy strength declined, they became more erratic and of less utility. 

In connection with the above. we made seve ral effons to reflect 

th e greater importance of prisoners. H o i Chanh and ViN Cong 

Infrastructure eliminations bul \\'ere never satisfied with our approach. QUI' final solution was to include them in gross eliminations 

but with no weighted value_ We did not include them ill exchange 

rati os but cal'l'ied them separately and tried to maximize our intake 

directly. The figures were inherentl y unstable over a shon period of 

time but cumulativel y fairl y stabl e and showed trends. A low prisoner figure probably indicated lack of strong command emphasis. 

The Hoi Chanh figure was a val uabl e measure of overall military 

press ure although it varied widely according to the stage of progress 

of military and pacification operati ons in which one found one's self, 

As a result. it took much knowledge to interpret correctly. The 

Viet Cong infrastructure figure was highl)" erratic and was used 

only to focus command atlention on th e area, Although Viet Cong 

Infl'astructi ve operations were primarily a Government of Vielllam 

operation. military suppon hy U.S. and South Vietnamese Army 

forces was often an imponant assist in gelling the Viel Cong inFrastructure (or Phoenix) machinery moving. 

Coulacl success l'al;o. 

In dispersed . small unit warfare. the success of a unil was la rgely 

dependent on the skill with wh ich small uniLS handled each individual contact. If one visualized a CO ntact as a sighting and a 

success as one or more enemy cas ualti es. the foll owi ng matrix gives 

th e general idea: 

Con taCI Suct:ess 

Ratio 

75 percent 

65 percent 

50 percent 

40 percent 

Below 40 percelll 

Skill Level o( Unit 

H ighest skill observed 

Very profeSS ional 

Unit is beginning to jell 

Un it has pl'Oblems hut correctihle 

Unit has se rious defici encies in 

mall unit techniques. Prohably 

does many things wrong. 

Night CO'l lacls a"d elimilwt;Olls. 

A unit cannot control Ihe hattlefield without effective night 

operations. It was easy to tell how a unit was doing at night From 

looking at th eir statistics, However. if th eir nigh t results were poor 
214 SH A RI'l-. N ING TIU: CO,\II\AT EUGt-: 

it was most diflicult to dClcrmilic why. One approach was to bring 

ill a skillful tactic ian to observe thcil' operations and determine 

what the trouble was. For example , one of o ur units cooled off in 

heavy jungle at ni ght. After milch thrashing around, it was determined by sensors and other means th at th e enemy had been forced 

to Stop moving at night. This, of course , was good and allO\\'cd the 

unil to ease off at night and thereby generate morc daylight effort. 

Most !light prohlems. howevn. were fail ures in basic tactics or 

technique or poor intelligclH:e appreciation . 

1>.I)'IlwJugilfll Wm'I,m: 

Psychological warfare was an area \\'here we wa nted very much 

to improve nul' performance. \Ve gave it lhe filII treatment ho ping 

to find a handle Ihal would allow us 10 improve our performance 

thm ugh anal ysis. 

Theoretically. OIIC shuuld he able lO develo p a matri x between 

input and UlllpUi in Ihe form of people who did what the leaAet 

or broadcast urged thcm to do. In actual practice. however. this 

pmved impossihl c 10 do. There were jllst too mall)' vari a hi es hearing on the system. 

Instead of a diret:t (ause-c ll et:t rcl atio nship hetween input and 

o utput. there wa~ a great pong")' gloh hetwee n th em. Sometimes a 

qui ck-reacti on ph)'schological warfare effort hmughl immediate 

res ults. re of len. it achieved no apparent rcsuh at all. Onc JUSt 

t:ollid lIot predict or dctcn the rel ations h ip. 

'''hat may ha ve blunted the e ffort was the moral e a nd SL1le of 

disci plinc in the targetcd units. The Communists. th cmselves 

masters 01 the art of psychologi cal wa rfal'e, mounted a rigorolls defense campa ign against our lise of it. Be fore hattie. they told their 

men th al they would he tonured and killed if they surrendered. 

They forbad e their tmops to read pro paganda ca eL.~. At all times, 

they practit:cd imernal surveillance where o ne was a l\\':lys wa tChing 

someone and being \\'au'hed in tum. 

Thlls. whe n Ihings were goi ng \\'e ll and th e chain of comma.nd 

was intact. a Commu n ist un it was genera.ll y impervi ous to psycho logical warfare efforts. Indi,·jdllals might rece ive th e psychological warfare mcs~ gc hut do nothing about it hecause of fear of 

punishment of themselves or their families in North Vie tnam. 

However. when a Communist unit was beal up and sca ttered so 

lhe chain of command t:Oldd nut functi on, individuals, who may 

have heen considering the step for months, would slip away and 
COR I'S I.J::VJ::L Ol'i- RATIU~S 215 

rally. The illPUt-OlilPUl relation which resulted frOJII these illIluences was LOu WlllpleX for analysis at field level. 

Faced with this impasse, instead of analysis, we relied on a 

vigorous program brokcu out in general themes, responsihle fTiendly 

units, enemy larget units and areas. \Ve raised our activity level and 

insured coverage hy this management device . \Ve hoped that the 

operators \\'ould \'ary the theme and specific content accord ing to 

the sit uation in order to get heller results. \Nh enever 0111" intelligence told liS a uuil was down or heat up. we zeroed in on him and 

turned up the \'olume. \Ve sta yed with the IInit as long as we cou ld 

fix its location. 

One significant observation emerged from our efforts-the more 

co-ordinated the tactical and psychological warfare effort was on Ollr 

pan, and the more active. the better the overall program. The actual 

resu lts were diflicu[l 10 assess, much less measure. 
216 

Puc; {leu/joll 

The pacification program in J II Corps was developed to a very 

high level of overall effectiveness by earl y 1970. A full discussion of 

this development is beyond lhe scope of this paper as it was mainly 

achieved through COII,'cnli onal management techniques. However, 

a key element was a thorough analysis of each of the main sub·programs to isolate the pacing sub·elements. particularly those which 

could be measured. Ill' means of standard formats and frequent 

Governmelll of Vietnam- U.S. combined reviews, these key factors 

were scrutinized carefully and kept moving ahead. Progress in these 

key factors appeared to pull the whole pacification program along 

with them. Of equal importance was frequent cross·coordination 

with military operations which enabled us to focus the military 

effort to hreak key log jams in pacifi cation. Of Iranscendent importance was the general philosophy that heavy military pressure to 

bring security was the best way to develo p an atmosphere in which 

pacification really look hold and forged ahead. 

The tremendOtlS progress made in Vietnam overall in 1968, 

1969, and 1970 was due to defeating the North Vietnamese Army 

and the Viet Cong remnants militarily. continuing the military 

pressure to improve security. the development of a governmental 

structure with vitality. strength and growth potential. all of which 

made pacification possihle. Pacification, in turn, reinforced success 

in the other areas. The poim at which pacification develops its uwn 

dynami c.s could never be determined. However. it seems logical 

that the developmelll of local forces. p:trticularly police. strengthening of local government and economic and social ga ins over a long 

period of time. would rorge a struClllre strong enough to smother 

or convert local dissidence. Of course. the North Vietnamese 

strategy was to prevelll this by applyi ng military power to arrest or 

tI pset progress. 

As an aside. the Ham le t Evaluation ~} Slem has been consistently 

criticized as a cosmetic device. Whil e onc can concede that the absolute meaning of the figures was hard LO establish. it is an absolute 

fact that the Hamiel Evaluation System was an in va luable managemelll tool and a meaningful measure of relative progress. Needless to say, its lIsefulness varied directly with the knowledge and 

insight of the IIser. Most press comment was highl y critical. How· 

ever. slLch comment tended to be quile hiased and uninformed as 

well. 
CORL'." LI:.VI:.L OI·EH.AJ'JON~ ~17 

Set:umlfH)' RUfld Progmm 

Major engineer eH'on in Vietnam was put on upgrading the 

major lines of communication. The end result was a good network 

of paved roads lying together the lIlajor population centers and 

making possible broad economic progress. This work was done 

mostly by construction engineers and contract civilian effort. Division and some corps engineers normally worked on military roads 

and other projects which supported combat operations and sometimes extended this major Line of Communication network. 

On the other hand, starting years before but increasingly 50 

from 1964 to 1965 and on, the Commun ists began to "liberate" large 

areas in Vi etnam. The classiCal method was to blow up all the 

hridges and cul the local roads, thlls making it dinicult for the 

government forces to move and holding the peasants on the land 

where their rice. lahor and snns could he appropriated by the 

Communists. 

In the spring ami SUIlIIlU!!' of 1968, we were forced by various 

considera ti ons to repair;1ll east-west lateral road in Long An Province he tween National Routes 4 and rl. The enemy at first resisted, 

was gradually driven away from the rood, and eventually decided 

to Jive with it. HO\\'e\,er, in observing the area, it was apparent that 

the people who had fled the land were returning. normal life was 

resumed, and pacification muved ahead. 

Based on this experi ence we hegan a deliberate secolldary road 

program which marshalled all ava ilable bits and pieces of engineer 

effon left over from other key projects. The road construction 

priorities were worked Olll lO w nsidcr all reasonable factors. with 

the province chief being the final decision-maker. 

Although the figures avai lable were rather sketchy. it was esti· 

mated thal in 1968, 1969 and 1970 we repaired as many roads and 

bridges in Long An Province as the Communists had destroyed in 

1964-68. Expert opinion has it that this road program was an 

import ant clement in the rapid decline of Communist strength in 

the province. Aside from the reasons given above, it also seemed to 

opera te by drying tip the small loca l base areas. 

An imponant element of the prog-ram was to design our own 

criteria and rebllild the rnost austere road possible which would 

mee t the need. For example. a Toad which would (ake biqcles, 

oxcarts, motorbikes and very small tl"llcks was entirely adequate in 

many areas as a staner. This "bare hones" approach allowed us to 

squeeze maximum mileage out of" vel')' modest engineer effort left 

over from priority projects. 

This same approach was tried in Hall Nghia Province with less 
~18 SH,\RI'E1\rNG TI-IE COMUA!" EJ)G~: 

specta<.:ular result.';. The reasons are lIot kn own- possibly because the 

farm land was less fertile. possihl y because the overall illlcgration of 

military ope rations, pacification and infrastructure was less intimate. 

Our final conclusion was th at th e secondary road program was 

more importalll to pa<:ifi<.:ati oll than previollsly real ized. Complete 

conCClllralion on line of communication upgrading was not necessarily th e hest sollllion, 

Alwlysis vI Home Plow OIJt:mliom 

Historically. Rome Plow2 units were one of o ur most va luahle 

assets. They performed a very important funct ion in the earl y days 

in cl eari ng the Aanks of highways to remove concealmelll From 

possible ambush sites. This all owed tiS to utilize grotlnd lines of 

communicalion and got ci vilian traffic hack on the roads. This 

'The Rome Plow is a big bulldozer with a ~p«;aliz.-d wuing: blade dtsignc<l IV cieH 

heavy brush and jungle vegetation. 
CORPS LEVEL OPERATIONS 219 

.. , .' 

, '1 

ROM.: P LOW OI'I::IlATION 

worked directly aga inst the Communist efforts tu isolate the I)()pulatioll. 

Their second importan t function was the dearing away of traditi onal Communist base areas. This denied the enemy the jungle 

concealment [hat he had long enjoyed in proximity to vi tal areas. 

In III Corps Tactical Zone prior to 1967 the Rome Plow effort had 

been limited to certain key highwa ys such as QL 13 and QL I and 

massive area Cllts in places such as the Iron Triangle, the Ho Bo 

Woods. the Filhol Plantation. the Bien Hoa-Long Binh complex, 

and the heart of Binh Duong Prov ince. These were all very lIseful 

in the situation that pertained at that time. 

We opened 1969 with a highly successful effort to reopen the 

road from Phuoc Vinh to Song Be. This section of road had been 

closed for four years because of constant Communist presence in the 

area. Because of this threal. there was interest in making as wide a 

Cll t as possible. In an effort to make Ollr effort more efficient, we 

conducted a simpl e analysis of enemy ambushes and determined 

instead that a 200·meter cut on each side o f the road would give good 

visibility. keep effecti\"c rine fire off the road, and inhibit infantry 
220 SHAR P EN ING THE COl\ ltiAT EOGE 

assaults or ambushes. The project was completed at this width and 

proved to be completely adequ'lle. 

As 1969 progressed, aggressive tactica l opera tions wore down 

the enemy and pushed him back towards his Cambodian base areas. 

To exploit our Sllccess, we pushed teams of Armored Cavalry and 

Rome Plows out to open the roads in "Var Zone C which had been 

abandoned to the enemy for years. 

Because of the deteriorating enemy capabil ity and the purely 

tactical nature of Ollr operations. we elected to further reduce the 

width of our cuts to 50 meters on each side of the road. This automatically gave liS foul' limes the road mileage per day of effort. ''''e 

found that the resulting 100 meLer swath allowed adequate aerial 

surveillance of the road and did not unacceptably expose vehicles to 

ambush. Although it allO\\'ed the ambusher to get closer to the 

road, it also narro\\'ed down the observa tion and exposure zone of 

the ambush. 

Base areas were a more difficult problem. Traditionally. they had 

been cleared completel y. In the case of a large area, this took months 

of effort. In studying this problem. it was determined that the enemy 

response to a massive clean cut was to move farther out to the next 

suitable area and set up for business there. It was, therefore, decided 

to use a lane clearing technique which would open up the base area 

for friendly operations bllt would not automatically drive the enemy 

out. Initiall y, a l,OOO·meter lane was used with the uncleared in· 

terval being left to judgment. If, for example, one diced up the 

:Irea into 2-kilometer squares of jungle, a 36 percent saving in 

cutting was achieved. By using a quick and selective cutting technique which bypassed the largest trees and went around difficult 

areas more rapid cutting was possible and the saving time-wise was 

greater. As we became familiar with this technique, the Janes were 

reduced to 500 to GOO meters. thereby increasing the savings. 

The most successful use of this techn ique \\las in the Trapezoid 

area south of the Ii helin Rubber Plantation and east of the 

Saigon River. As lane cutting progressed. Sub-Region I Headquarters. the IOlst North Vietnamese Army Regiment and a coterie 

of odds and ends evidently decided they would stay in place. As a 

result. three to four U.S. and South Vietnamese Army battalions 

were able to decimate them over a period of months by day patrolling and night ambushes. When they finally had to move further 

away from the poplliated areas they were so decimated that they 

could no longer resist or even affect the Government of Vietnam 

paCification program. 
COIU'S LEVEL OI'ERATIQNS 221 

The Q,lt: 1'1'/11' Concel)t 

The key to operations in the I I I Corps was General Abrams' 

One War conce pt, which in simplest terms meant that all military, 

pacification and governmental resources and activiti es worked in 

coordination towards the same goals. Like most powerful ideas it 

was very simple. Also. like most ideas in Vi etnam it was rather 

difficult in execution. 

However, as has been brought out previousl)', there were various 

programs and concepts--constant presSllre. working on the enemy 

system, accelerated pacifica ti on, Dong Tien-\\'hich in themselves 

facilitated qualitative and quantitative improvement, ""hen these 

were all stitched together by divisional. provincial and Corps.wide 

reviews, the overall result was a rather ponderous but fairly effective 

coordinated effort. Fortunatcly, the Communists were not very ef· 

fective themselves and a fairl y cffective government effort made 

steady progress, 

Corlls·!..elld W1'II/l·UI) 

As oll e \\'ould ex pect, the conduct of operations at the Corps 

level was much looser and more diffuse than at the division level. 

Although we resorted to considerahle fine'LUnin g (as in the 

Sub-Region-I operation) , the main energy of the commanders was 

devoted to crisis management. ' '''hether it would have been possi bl e to have devised a s)'stem whereby one kept track of hundreds 

of enemy units and thousands of friendly units in a systematic 

and analytical manner is hard to say. The Working Aga inst the 

Enemy System concept combined with coordinated Regional 

attacks and the in ve ntory of enemy units- Constant Pressure concept- were efforts in this direction. It should be noted that these 

th ree conce pts plus a ll integrated approach to pacifica tion made 

the Abrams' One War str<tlegy a reality in III Corps. One senses 

that a red hot review and analysis section with scientist participation and access to a good compute .. could have systematized 

many matters whi ch we dealt with in a more informal manner. 

One concrete way of stimulating the necessary co-ordination and 

support was lO require all the responsihle commanders and officials 

to keep track of the entire situation-enemy and friendly. military 

and civilian-h'ilh stress on paCifi cation, These rather volumi nous 

statistics, once one became lIsed to lIsing them, gave a clear picture 

of shortfalls, weak and strong areas, and so forth. It also helped the 

Vietnamese to get light control over a complex operation, We are 

convinced thal this approach materially assisted both military 
222 SHARPEN I N(; T H E COMII,\T El){a: 

operations and pacification in lhe 9th Division and later in the III 

Corps. Rather than dealing \\'ith subjective impressions, the tom· 

manders were dealing with cold (fairly reliable) facts. 

The Vietnamese Oriental way of Jooking at things tended lO 

avo id facu. Once the facts were brought Ollt, the Vietnamese approach to a problem tended to be quile logical and decisive. The 

pitfall here was that the Oriental mi nd often overlooked lhe factua l, 

pragmatic approach for various cultural reasons. H one could gel 

them to lise hard facts, th eir effectiveness gained almost automati· 

cally. 

This illlcgralion gimmick illustrates how olle could gel hold of 

complex problems by reviewing elaborate statistica l fo rmats. This 

process of statistical review had liltle overall logic in an analytical 

sense-it only poillled everyone in the same d irection and un· 

covered log jams. Once the log jams \\'ere cleared, forward progress 

ensued. It was the best way we could make the One "Var concept 

really work at all levels. 

""'hereas one senses we wen: able to make iI sizable dent in 

analyzi ng division-level operations. the feeling persists that we only 

scratched the surface at th e corps level. In any case, they both constittlte illlcrcsting problems for fu turc comma nders and staffs. 

In spite of the fact th at the c..:orps level is more difficult to managc 

than the division. the wmbi natioll of the ana lytic approach , normal 

command supervision methods. and seleCted analysis did produce 

results. As had becn mentioned earlier. thc excha nge ratio o f the 

U.S. units was increased from two to three times (8 : I average to 

19: I average Ivi th a high of !l0. 1 : I) . At the same time. the attrition of the enemy by U.S. units (not cOll nting prisoners of war and 

H oi Chanhs) was increased appreciably and fri end ly losses (Killed 

by H ostile Action and Died of Wou nds) decreased markedly. In 

other words. the U.S. units in fl icted 70 percent more damage on the 

enemy at a casua lty cost 56 percent less for an efficiency improvement of 3.8 limes. (See Cllart 26.) As the South Vietnamese Army 

un its "'ere brought up to strength . re·equipped, and adopted more 

flex ible tactics, th eir performance improved , but more slowly than 

the U.S. Chart 26 also illustrates the South Vietnamese Army·s 

steady and encouraging increase in cfliciency. The improvements in 

the performance of all un its ill III Corps (Sollth Vietnamese Army. 

Free World Military Alli ed Forces and U.S.) can be noted in Table 

!I I. All of these ILnits can we ll be proud of this record as lhe enemy 

at the same time was do ing his hest to evade tacti ca ll y and was 

progressive ly sh ifting units into sanctuary in Cambodia. As could be 

expected, pacification proceeded at a rapid rate protected by this 
CHART 26- E.xI.U"'NGE R,\'rIOS. III CoRPS T ... CTIC,\I. ZONE. J UI.Y 1968-

APRIL 1970 

" , 

IS: , 

" , 

" , /'-. 

" , ) ,6 

/ 10 N /\ 'v '-. .J 

~ ~ \ 

"- / 

I I1 1 1II III I 

lin 1111 

\ 

/ 

I 

A 

~ 

1\ 

II 

/\ 

v-----

'-

I I I I 

~ 

f-J\ 

;-

, , , 

UII 

, 

, IIUl 

11 111 11 

un 
224 3 tl A RI'EN INL 1111:: COt-. I IIAT t"I)(;.E 

TAIIL~ 1S1 - 111 COlI.ps "' M .. 1'ICAL ZONE SEU:CTEU CO~tIIAT S 'l ATrSTlCS 

J UL-DEC 68 ANI> J UI.-DE(; 69 

Iblc fntm) 1(1" 

f rluully ". ');>Ie tntm>' 1('" friendl y KIA 

JUI (>II 1~7 ,,. Jul '" J;,(H 12~ 

.... ug 4053 ;66 ,\ug ... . 4965 -162 

S<p M-I2 727 S<p ... -1:'25 -122 

0" """ r,H 0" 354 ... 299 

No\' :''988 74 .• No, ·182 1 307 

~ 260'! -,!)~ "" 125>; 3" 

A,'erage: 2757 Gil ''''cragl': ·1269 3i9 

ExchanJi:c Rat io: -15 : t: xchanR~' Ra tio: 11.3 : 

pressure. The 1st Cavalry lJi visiull ,,'orking h'ith three South 

Vietnamese A rill)' hrigades (regiments) aud th e II th Armored 

Cavalry Regiment did a superh job in deep jungle. The 25t h Infantry Division essentiall), worked itself OUl of a job by dri ving the 

9th Viet Cong Division (actuall y North Vietnamese Army) into 

Cambodia. T he 1st Infalllry Division. in a very quiet sector. by 

painstaking efforts. \\'as ahl e to achieve a very fine exchange ratio of 

55 to I. (T he best division performance seen in a quiet sector.) 

The 25th South Vielll amese Army Di vision . under an able commander. was able lo work up to a 2:, (0 I exchange ratio- a :\00 

percent improvemcnt. 

There are man y problem areas remaining which space does not 

permit listi ng. But, hy late 1969 01" early 1970. the naturc o[ the 

war began to change and the Cambodi an operations ushered in a 

new phase. 
CH A PTER X I 

On Controlling the Wa r 

T he problem lat:illg Amcritan units in the Spring of 1968 and 

subsequently, the period of this Monogrnph, was one of bringi ng 

evading enemy units to battl e during the quiet periods in between 

his "high points" of allack and of limiting the damage during these 

high points so that the pacification program was not interfered with. 

T he situation clearly called for a change in tactics by friendly troops 

in order to bring the enemy to battle on OIlT terms as has been 

mentioned earl ier. rat her than on his terms. The solution arrived at, 

as a result of analyses of combat operations and experimentation. 

was to find, encircle and break up the enemy main force and 

prOVincial battal ions and as lhe enemy broke down into small er 

sized ctemcnrs to lower the sca le of friendly operations to att.1ck 

the small enemy units on a contin uous day and n ight basis. T he 

unexpected by-product of this d ispersed style and constan t pressure 

was that enemy lInits at all levels were weakened , redUCing their 

ability LO generate replacements from Ioc.-li guerrilla un its. and resuILing in large n umbers of ra lliel'S and the progressive loss of control of the people. The net effeCt of these interacting defeats on all 

elements of the enemy system was that the enemy lost ca pa bility 

geometrica ll y rather than arithmetically. The genera l philosophy 

that unrelenting military pressure to bri ng security was the most 

important way to deve lop an atmosphere in which paCification could 

flou rish was lranscendelllai. It was the hest pragmatic way to control 

the war. 

T he At/rilion Strategy 

Some observers of the Vietnamese war have criticized its "a ttrition" strategy. pal'licu larly in its ea rli er phases. It could have been 

more properly termed a strategic defense initiall y and gradually 

became more and more active as the Sout h Vietnamese government 

and forces became more organized. It ended lip as an offensive defense. 

It is interesting to nOle that most wars. si nce the "nat ion in 

arms" concept of the French Revolut ion, have relied heavily on 

attrition- World War I and II and Ollr own Civil War being prime 
226 

P llItSI IT 

examples. \Vars which have been \\'011 pl'jmarily by maneuver have 

been the exception rath er than the rul e. Usually maneuver, attrition , interdiction , and direCl attacks 0 11 the enemy's base have been 

combined, according to the nature of the war itself, to gain a victory 

or a draw. The Vietnamese war has been no exception-direct pressure, that is allrilion, was appli ed to neutralize the enemy units and 

to strain his personnel and logistic support organi za tion. Interdiction of seaborne suppli es was made effective and efforts were made 

to Clit off landborne suppl y lines by in-country operations and by 

bombing the 1-10 Chi Minh Trail. Bombing of the enemy's home 

base was conducted within certa in limitati ons. Pacifi cation completed the circle by progressivel)' cUlling the enemy off fTom ill-

(Ountry resources. It could be theorized t hat attrition was more important than in \Vestern European wars because enemy units. if 

out-maneuvered, would nOl surrender and in many cases could 

avoid encirclement or enve lopment hy slipping awa)' in the dense 
ON CON "ROLLI NG THE WAR 227 

jungle. As a result , they had to be rendered ineffective over a pe riod 

of time through the cumula ti ve loss of mnnpower. equipment and 

supplies. In summary. the Vielllamese strategy by 1969 and 1970 

was reasonabl y classical considering the pro blems posed hy political 

limitations (sa nctuary. bombing hal t. and so forth) , but allrition 

did ass ume an important central role. Qur concl usion. considering 

the circumstances. is that it \\las not an attrition strategy, although 

anriti on waS importalll. but a fairl y compl ete strategy. This complete strategy was nOl fnll y effecti ve until late in the war as it took 

considerable time to organize some aspects of it. However, it should 

be recognized that the many constrain ts 011 operations in Vietnam 

made the allied operations most diflicult to cany out effectively. 

The bombing pause, the pa rtial Laotian sanCtuary. the complete 

Cambodian sa nctuary, the inherent difficulties of a semi-guerrilla 

situation. the instability of Vietnamese society and government. the 

tremendous will and ruthl ess ness of the Communist North Vietnamese, the dif/icilit cond itions of terra in and jungle, made the 

Vietnamese War all uphill strllggle all the way. 

/fotly (;0//111 

The 9th Infantry lJi\·ision and II Fie ld Force. Vietnam ha ve been 

criticized on the grounds thal " their obsession with body COllnt" was 

either basically wrong 0 1' else led to undesirabl e pr:lctices. While the 

basic inference that they were "obsessed with hod y count" is not 

true. one could adva nce the thought that keeping tabs on enemy 

killed and kill rati os might lead to a more cold blooded approach 

than would otherwise he the case. It ~ee lll s desirable to take this 

criti cism head-on lest some readers ass ume that the general approach 

inevitably leads to undesirable practices. 

In the first place. th l' COfl "tant Pressure concept and \Vorking 

0 11 the Enemy system were based on the reasoning that the best way 

to defea t the enemy auelta protect the South Vietnamese people was 

to utilize maximum force against the entire Communist system. This 

theory has been proven COHeet man y times and in man y places in 

Vietnam. The soft approach has heen tried man y times with a 

noticeable lack of success. The decepti ve <lspect of the soft approach 

was that it worked well on the surface fol' a period of months until 

the enemy organized a response and then l'elra&ression set in. 

The alay n experience tended to su pport the soft approach 

as it was quite successful in that case. l Vhat the casual observer 

missed was that the Malaya insurrection was a relatively weak and 

soft Communist effort, whereas the Vietnamese effort was a real war 

made possible by massive external support and intervention. As a 
228 !o. H AK I' EN INL I H E COMI~A I EllGE 

result the rules ill Vielllam were almost the opposite from Malaya. 

This was graphically iJlllstrated by the ex perience of the Australian 

Task Force. This fine outfit, one of the best in the th eater. had every 

advantage. fl had Malaysia n experience ill the jungle. stabilized 

uni u, extensive traini ng and so on. Yel its sliccesses were based on 

innova tion and its least pnxlucLi,'c e fforts were based all Mal aysian 

type operations. 

Once one dec ided to appl y maximum force, the problem became 

a technical o ne of doing it efficientl y with the resources ava ilable. 

In mall)' areas this required real skill :md iron determination as the 

enemy was usuall y ahle to stay alive imd at least Slay even for years 

under moderate pressure. However. th e Constan t Pressure conce pt. 

well applied. did no t lead l(} a hrutalizing of th e conflict. In fact. 

th e reverse was tl'lIe. It \\'as a provahle fact Ihat it led to more 

prisoners of war ;md Ho i Chanhs th an a soft approach. It also led to 

less ch'il ian caslI<l lti es and damage. II resulted in fewer friendly 

casua lties in hoth killed and wou nded. More importantl y, pacifIcation progressed more rapidly. Thus \\'e see a system which entail ed 

maximum force a nd hi gher enemy cas ualties initi ally. hilt. in th e 

long nm. wound the \\',11' down and facilitated ;111 the deve lopments 

necessary to defea t the enemy and protect th e people. The avo idance 

of civilian casualti es and body collnt padding was more a matter of 

train ing and sta ndards regardless of th e approach involved. 

Thus, it ca n he sa id th at th e 9th Division ami II Fi eld Force 

Vi etnam approach which emphasized maximum damage In the 

enemy ended up by "u n bnllalizing" the w<tl". so far as the South 

Viel11amese peopl e and 0 111' own forces were concerned. The Com· 

mun ists took a difren'lH view, ~ co uld be ex pected , 

The S('flrrh fIIlff /)('\ / 111), Opemlioll 

It will be noted thai there is little Il1Clllion of the Search and 

Destroy Operation in this ouogra ph . This omission was not de· 

liberate hut incidental. In th e first place. the Search and Oestroy 

Operation was rap id ly falli ng in to disuse dllring this period . and we 

perso nall y had vel"y lilli e ex pe rience with it. In th e second place. we 

did not wish to di scu~s ope ratiuns with which we were not persona ll y 

fami liar. 

As we unde rstand it. the uriginal idea uf the Search and Destroy 

Operation was a multi-ha ttalion reconnaissance in force which 

sought o ut large enemy units and th en attempted to encircl e and 

destroy them. IL no t o nl )' ga"e good ground coverage in jungle 

terrain , hut during th e pe ri od when enemy units were stro ng and 
0 ,\ CON III.OLLING I ~I i'. WAI{ 229 

wmbill dleCli\e. it enabled Iriendly battalions to be kept in hand 

in order to rendel support to a hard pressed unit if necessary. As 

the enemy units were grou nd down, the fri endl y units spread out 

andcondllcted indepClldent ba ttalion reconnaissa nce in force operations (sometimes c.1lled sh'ceps) and thell grad uall y worked down 

the sca le to sma ll unit reconnaissance operations. Unfortunately, the 

tenn hung on longer than the operation and tended to become a 

blanket ternl for any offensive operation. T o the best of our recollection, the term was caSL into limbo by tVli litary Assistance Command , 

Vi etnam during this period, but it d ied hard due to the tendency of 

returnees to lise terms that h'ere current during their previolls toUTS. 

In 1968, in the 9th Division. the Search and Destroy Operation 

had been overtaken hy eve nt ~ ahhough the ba llalion reconnaissance 

in force was used 10 dea l wi th reall y tough base areas. 'Ve grad uall y 

worked ill(() the company reconnaissance in force coordinated at 

hattalion level, foll owed hy the platoon reconnaissance coordinated 

at compan y level. 

In II Field Foru~ . Vietnam, \\'ith large enemy units ,md heavy 

jungle. the phaseout of the operation was not as rapid. The last large 

scale Search and Destroy Opera ti on that can he identified was a 

sweep through the ;"Jichelin Rubber Plantat ion in the winter of 

1969. As the enemy hega n to deteriorate. the friendl y units spread 

Ollt . even in the ju ngle. and hy the wi nter of 1970, company level 

reconnaissa nce wa~ the rule even up ag:.in st the Ca mbodian harder. 

The Search and Destroy Operat ion described in the press as a 

~ort of scorched earth tactic was beyond Ollr experience. 'Ve have 

read that Search and Clear Operations, particularly those involving 

the destru ction and resettlement of a tou gh Communist fortified 

village. were resorted (0 earli er in the war. We can recall no instances of such oper:ltions in our area of responsibility. either actua l 

or played up in the press. ' Ve do recall a few very small resettlement 

operati ons which were undertaken . most reluctantly, at GovernInent of Vietnam initiati ve in areas where the Government of 

Vietnam could not generate adequate security forces. These required high le\'el approval. both V.S. and Government of Vietnam. 

In connecti on wilh the above dis{. lIssioll. the Vietnamese Army 

was slower to abandon Illass s\\·eeps. It was difficult for a Vietnamese 

t:ommander to send a company into a pl ace where a regiment had 

been dec imated four or five years earl ier. (T he American commanders had the advantage of not being aware of the earlier 

catastrophe.) However, the Vietnamese finall y worked their way 

down the sca le also. 
230 SHAlU'EN ING 'I B E COt-. I IiAT EI.)(;E 

In examining the Vietnamese \\'ar, particula rly in its early stages, 

one could see many--situ<llio ns in which the Commun ists, although 

not necessarily successful. \\'erc ahle to give the Alli es a ha rd lime. 

The set-piece ambush, the set-piece attack on an isolated post, the 

se izure and defense of a populated area. and the development of a 

fortified village or haml et werc all examples of operations wh ich the 

Communists cxecUled man y limes and were difficult to handle \."ith· 

Ollt incurring excessive friendly military casualties and, in some 

cases, undue civi lian casualties or damage. The Communist style 

of making war was inhcreml y destructive to the people and 

ph)'sica l resources of a ('ountry. The Communisls " liberated" the 

countryside hy destroying mads alld hridges. They controlled the 

country hy hreaking up it~ social and governmental structure and 

applying force and terror aga inst the people. By fonifying vill ages 

or by se izing inhabited area~. they forced the govern ment into heavy 

combat which harmed the people and rlestroyed civilian resources. 

Their organization of the masses to suppon the Comm unists ab· 

sorbed the tota l manpower and financi al resources of the count!")'. 

leaving nothing for econom ic progress. I\l any other exampl es can be 

cited of the inherel1l destructiveness of n Communist inspired war. 

It was that way hy philosophy. dOClrine. and choice. 

On the other hall el. an aggressive and skillful Allied effort could 

se ize the initi ative and damage the enemy se,'erely with low casual· 

lies and littl e. if any. harm to the civilian population. T he casual 

observer of the Vietnamese 'Var would resist this conclusion . He 

has been so conditioned hy readin g dramati zed newspaper accotl t~ 

of the war that he visualizes Vietnam disn ppearing ullder the smoke 

and flame of bombs. :Irtillery hell ~. and unnamed nefarious devices 

even at this late stas·e. l-I owevt:1". if one looked at the facts. it was 

quite apparent that the more the Alli ed side ga ined control of the 

\",a1". the less destruCtiv(, the war became. If one studied the III 

Corps Tactical Zone (a round Saigon) in 1968- 1970. the pi ctu re was 

quite clear. The enemy units hecame weaker and weaker. friendl y 

military losses declined. civitial~ casual ties declined. damage lO 

houses and crops was rel,lti ve ly rare. 1\- 52 and Tacti ca l air sorties 

declined markedly. and were delivered in uninhabited jungle areas, 

artillery usage decli ned. rice and oth er crop production increased . 

roads and bridges were rebui lt. economic and social conditions 

improved. the government operated more effectively, and so on. 

Inherentl y, the Allied effort tried to protect the people and rebuild 

the coulltry. 
ON CONTRO LLI NG TIiE WAR 23 1 

Nu. \1'1\11:.: CoSTltOL 

An interestin g theor), Gill be developed from these observations. 

If the Communists were able to seize the initiative and conduct the 

war according to their own ru les. Communist successes would have 

been more frequent, friendl), losses higher and the genera l damage 

to and disruption of the civilian community more widespread. On 

the other hand, if the Allies had grasped the initiative and imposed 

their own rules, the reverse would be tru e. 
232 SHARI'ENING THE COMBAT EI.>GE 

I 

POSITIV}: CoNTROL 

This theory was dillu.:ull for the Government side to apply. In 

the Vietnamese context. at least, there seemed to be some basic 

superiority of force r:Hio that had to he reached. While it was not 

th e classical 10 to I ratio, it did seem to he somewhere in the 4 to 6 

to I area. Then, of course, the friendly government had to gel itself 

organized well enough to function while being subjected to Communist attacks and interference. There were also innumerable 

localized prohlems-geography. terrain. the nature of the people, 

and so fonh. The proper taclics werc not easy to define- heavy 

firepower, light firepower, large orsmall unit operations-there were 

many possible approaches. 

However. with all these cxplanatiom if one observed (he 

Malaysian experience ,md thc Vietnamese experience. it appears 

possible over a long period of lime to defeat a Communist insurgency if th e resou rces ,mel will ca n be assembled. H owever, and of 

c(lual importance. if the government side and its allies can se ize the 

initiative and control the war, it can "win" with fewer losses and 

less damage to its civili;,U1 structure than otherwise. 
CHAPTER XI! 

Limitations and Problems 

in the Use of Analysis 

The use of operations analysis was inherently a difficult task 

in Vietnam. As mentioned previously. to analyze a problem one 

should be able to describe the process in some detail. obtain reliable 

data inputs, and establish an adequate feedback s)'stem. These tasks 

varied widely in diRiculty and seemed impossible in some areas. 

Combined arms operations <tl all levels (that is Corps, division, 

brigade and c\'en batlalion) wcrc too large and complex to sllIdy in 

toto by analytical methods. Pacification was similarly complex. The 

technique employed was to isolate pi eces of the probl em which 

could be analyzed. The remainder had to be aU<lcked by means of 

judgement, professional skil l. experience and sometimes intuition . 

The overall intergratioll always had to be done on this basis. Even 

in areas such as small unit techniques which responded well, on the 

surface. to analysis. the aClllal cause and effect relationships could 

not be traced out \dth confidence. These comments should not 

discourage attempts to improve operations by analysis and otherwise: they should merely underline the obvious poim that the 

human mind can somehow grasp large problems by means which 

are dimwit or impos'lible to duplicate on paper. 

Il should also be understood that many "new" doctrinal concepts (such as the constant pressure idea) were aClUally Ilot "new" 

but well-estahlished doctrine which proved to he more pertinent in 

a particular phase of lhe war. Some concepts were implemented 

because the necessary organizational measures had finall y heen taken 

(for example. pacification) . others because a real technical breakthrough had heen made (for example. the .litterbug) . In sum. 

Vietnam was full of people \\'ith good ideas: hill people who could 

select lIseful olles and implement them wcre not as easil y found. 

A confusing element in the Cfluation \lIas and is that outstanding 

leadership (military OJ' civilian ) transcends or overrides the standard 

rules. One must always ask \\'hether something works because it is 

executed by an artist. whether it is basica lly a good idea. whether it 

is too diflicult for general use , and so on. T o the artist with a deep 
234 SHAlU'!:.:'\I .... L lilt: CUMIlAr EL>GE 

knowledge of the war, a decision may appear simple and logical. 

To a less gifted person. the decision may ~eem illogical or based on 

intuition. One man's knowledge is another mail's intuition. 

The process of analysis and improving en1ciency while desirable 

tended to confin e one's thinking in a set framework. This could be 

prejudicial to change :lIld innovation. The Comm unists were fairly 

clever at evenlua lly devising' defensive measures aga inst a new tactic 

and as a result 11 could be expected to he less and less profitable as 

time weill on. This placed a premium 011 changes to kee p ahead of 

the C:ommunisl<t and to retain the initiative. The Communists' 

reaction to continuollS changes anc! innovation was relatively slow 

and ullcert;lin ~o the cUTlIulative effeclS of many innovations was 

quite productive. In SIII11, while using anal ysis. one should foster 

change and innovation. 

One should avoid working on the HOlt pan of th e learn ing curve 

and "gold plating" projecl5. This could lead to large effort for small 

return. If one stayed on lhe ~teep p.1.rt nf the efficiency curve, a little 

extra effort could hring brick moden but wonhwh il e returns. This 

idea of doing a fairly good joh \\'ith rea~onable effort was hard to get 

across to Americans as their nature was to try to do the best job 

possible. 

Statistics were effc( lite and necessary. However. lhe quantity of 

repons and the amount of detail had to be watched. so lhe chain 

of command would not hecome a reporting machine. 

Computers were quile IlSefUI. (Infortunate ly, the division leve l 

compllter~ availahle were glorified husiness machines with th e usual 

handicaps of slow speed. low ca pacity, and oversc hedul ing. More 

advanced cnl1lputers would ha\'e heen helpful. A more general prob· 

lem was the rigidity of computer data hases and programs. As the 

situation changed, thev tended to hecome omdated. 

Some specific examples of these iTllernal probl ems Illrl y serve to 

illustrate them more dearly. 

The standard mines and booby tfrll' approach was to progreso 

sively elaborate and sophisticate the overall program. The anal ytical 

approach was to isolate Lhe few most imponanl clements and to 

focus a simpler program 0 11 thc individ ual soldicr. The innovative 

approach was to partially finesse the prohlem by emphasizing night 

ambllshes. 

The use of ;lIlalyses and its factual approach was useful in de· 

Aating the idea that th e Commun ists wcr e "six feet tall. " There was 

a tendcncy to assign to them many capahilities. as a malleI' of course, 

which were quite rare or almost non·existent. The U.S. tendency, 

at leasl, was to assume that th e Communists were tricky and skillful 
LIMITATIONS AND I'ROBLEr-.-IS OF ANALYS IS 235 

adversaries. Actually, they were prelly dull and pedestrian, and if 

one faked them out of their standa rd approach, they were almost 

helpless. 

Problems involving social. sociological, cultural and language 

patlems were very diffic\llt to handle. Our Prisoner of 'Var program 

produced satisfying results. both absolutely and relatively, but we 

could never break the language and indoctrination barrier. The 

South Vietnamese Army was more successful than we, probably due 

to a minimal language and racial obstacle. Psychological Warfare 

was a most difficult area in which to pin anything down. 

As previollsly mentioned , pacification and combined arms operations were primarily managed by normal civilian and military 

rnanagemelll techniques ;mel anal yzed on the fringes. 

The Vietnamese 'Var was replete with other examples \~here the 

reasons for success or failure were not completely understood. 

This lack of knowledge or understanding was the greatest problem in Vietnam for hoth sides. Olle cOllld speculate that five honest 

men cou ld study ally aspect of the war and prove to their sa tisfa cti on 

that five different things \\'ere tfue. A hiased person could always 

find enough information to prove his point to his own satisfaction. 

A good rule in Vietnam was to assume that a study which clearly 

proved something was either superficial or loaded. This difficulty 

worked both ways- the Commun ists \,'erc so captive to their own 

doctrine that their opera tions were sometimes quite unproductive. 

The Central Office for South Vietnam, th e North Vietnamese headquarters which esselllially ra n the war in southern South Vietnam, 

both politically alld mil itarily-was vcry dogmatic ;Ind hidebound. In 

III Corps at least. our greatest all y was the Central Office for SOllth 

Vietnam- thcir reaction or action was quite predictable. They were 

completcly locked on to a big uni t war approach which played into 

our hands completely. Even thc South Vietnamese \\'ho really understood the war required tremendom mental flexibility. \oVesterners 

had a similar problem in sloughing off their westCITl ideas. The end 

result was that a relatively small percentage of people had the insight 

and grasp to dea l with the war constrllcti vely and creatively. 

We are not suggesting (hal opera ti ons analysis was impossi ble 

in Vietnam. ''''e are ani)' suggesting that the "fog of war" and the 

rapid changes placed a high premium on the clement of mil itary 

experience and judgment in guiding the application of the analytic 

process. Some areas clearly fell outside the scope of the analytical 

art at that time. 

One cou ld question whether the approach described here would 

be readily transferable to a more classical "western type" conflict. 
236 SHARP EN ING THE COMBAT EDGE 

In Vietnam , with all its ambiguities, one was dealing with a highly 

repetitive operation. h was somewhat comparable to an assembly 

line-whereas one cou ld visualize a "western war" as an episodic or 

climactic affair with periods of intense decisive activity followed by 

longer periods of low activity. It would appear that this type of 

conflict might require a different approach from an analytical point 

of view. 
CHAPTER XIII 

Overall Conclusions 

This Monograph covers primarily the systematic bl ending of 

military judgment. data coll ection, and the simple problem-solving 

techniques as performed by the 9th Division and II Field Force, 

Vi etnam in the peri od 1968 to 1970. We d id not elabora te on the 

nonnal military decision.making methods which are well understood and wh ich were utili zed extensivel y in Vietnam. However, we 

have stressed the extension of these mOTe normal decision-making 

devices by analytical methods. We have felt obliged to adhere to the 

standard military modus operandi, and, consequently. have drawn 

the following overa ll conclusions: 

I. Normal military command and ma nagement techniques, 

aggressively pursued. \\'ere adequate in Vietnam to keep military 

and paci fi ca tion operations working reasonably well . T he "analytic 

approach" was a useful complementary technique. 

2. The j udicious use of opera tions analysis and analytical techniques when melded with military j udgment was l'Juite effective in 

improving performance in man y areas of acti vity. 

3. T he 9th In£antry Division's anal yti ca l results·oriented efforts 

to optimize resources and increase combat effectiveness (which had 

as a base the goal to provide the maximum number of fit, motivated, 

well equipped and properly supported infantry soldiers to the field 

on a dail y basis, night and da y) worked. 

4. The combination of the Constant Pressure concept. pacification, worki ng agai nst the enemy system, and Vi etnami za tion made 

the One-War concept a reality and proved to be very effective tacticall y and strategica ll y in the III Corps Tactical Zone around Sa igon 

in 1969 and ea rl y 1970. 

5. Analysis worked best at division level: it , ... as more difficult to 

apply wit h precision at Fi eld Force or Corps level. 

6. The individua l commander's ability. skill and kn owledge 

tra nscended the more tangible faCtors. 

7. In novation and changes in tactics had to be aggressively 

pursued whil e continuing the optimiza tion of ongoing operations 

which were well understood. 

8. Many aspects of the situation resisted analysis. 
SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 

THE A UTIIOkl> LISTEN TO CoU}NEL GERACI 

There is no doubt that the overa ll system described in this 

lIlonograph worked. The $64 question is, why? Was it due to the 

way the war was developing in Vietnam at that particular time, or 

was it due to the use of combat analysis or to some other reason? 

Most objective observers would agree that the Allied policies, 

strategy and grand tactics improved as the war went on. The improvements in the organization and effectiveness of the Government 

of Viemam, the national mobilization o f 1968 and thereafter, the 

increaSing military pressure on the enemy system, and the accelerated pacillcation campaigns all contributed. Not all was done 

that should have been done. but for any imperfect world, the 

cumu lative effect was one of impressive gains. 

There was also a concurrent improvement and tightening lip in 

the tactics and techniques utilized in Vietnam. As a body of doctrine 

solidified and was refined by battlefield experience, our operations 

became more effective. 

Linked with the above was a definite deterioration in the 

strength and quality o( the enemy units. The Viet Cong losses during Tel were substantial-in lIlany areas the Viet Cong began to 
OVt:RALL CONCLUSIONS 239 

disappear. As their combat requirements expanded and combat 

losses of the North Vietnamese began to accumulate, their expe· 

rienced cadre became fewer and fewer. In the overall balance. 

their gross ca pability and their skill levels both declined. 

A not inconsiderable factor in our favor was the high quality of 

the peopl e involved. Down through the major level at least. prac· 

tically every position was filled with lO)H10tch people. These high 

quality leaders. from battalion level up, enabled us to come rapidly 

to grips with an unfamiliar type of war and to succeed. 

The usc of a system for coordinating all military and civil 

aspects of the struggle was widespread. However. in the III Corps 

Tactical Zone around Saigon. this system was elaborated and 

strengthened to a poilll that the One \Var concept became a reality 

in man y areas. This focllsing effect was very imponant. 

A tremendous intensity of operations or concentration of effon 

was a factol'. If olle realizes that infantrymen were in the field abollt 

100 hOllrs a week and lhatllni ts from baualion up were in operation 

24 hours a day. seven days a week. the physical. mental and nervous 

demands on the commanders can be visual ized. If one superimposed 

on this a tremendous will to damage the enemy and move the war 

in a favorable direction. substantial progress ensued. This intensity 

of effon had to be achieved and maintained at a very high level. 

Whether this intensity is feasihle across the board is debatable. 

The analytic approach helped to put all this together. Its concentration on results rather than activity was important. Its assistance in understanding the key as pects o f complicated operations 

was valuable. Comba t analysis helped to guide and control the 

myriad small engagements which added together meant progress. 

A measured and rational development of combat analysis as a 

lool of cOlllmand deserves emphasis in the future. 
November 

August 

March 

May 

September 

October 

April 

August 

December 

February 

December 

January 

May 

June 

July 

J anuary 

1anuary 

February 

April 

.June 

June 

August 

APPENDIX 

Miles/oPies 

1963 

Presidelll Diem assassinated. 

1964 

(;ulf of Tonkin incident 

1965 

First comm ilment of U.S. combat units 

I nd Airhorne Brigade arrives 

1st Cava lry Division arrives 

1st Infantry Di vision arrives 

1966 

25th Infantry Di vision anives 

4th Infantry Division arrives 

9th In (<'1II1 I"Y Di vision arrives 

1967 

Elements of the 91h Infantry Division begin 

Delta oper<'1tions from Dong T<'1m 

IO lst Airborne Division arrives 

1968 

T el· 19fi8 enemy offensive 

Min j. T et enemy offensi ve against Saigon 

9th Infalllry Division Headquarters moves 

from Bearcat to Dong Tam 

Operation Safe Step commences 

1969 

IV Corps Dry '~ ather Campaign COlllmences 

9th In falHry Division Night Cava lry Tactics 

commence 

9th Infantry Division Night Raids commence 

Peak of 9th Infant!")· Division sniper program 

success 

Construction of Dong Tam completed 

Dong Tien Program commences 

Majority of 9th Infantry Division returns to the 

U.S. 
I 

Index 

Abrams, General Creighton W.: 196, 22 1 

Administration: 16' 

Advanced Research ProjeclS Agency: 7 

Advisors: 15~-55,]60 

Agenu, use of: ~IO , 103-104.210 

Agriculture: 9,230 

Air assaulLf. Su Airmobile opera tions 

Air Cavalry Squadron . ht: 60 

Air cavalry uniu: «,52,55,51-64,67-69, 

72,74,95,101, 107, 109- 11 , " '. 116-

17, 129-52, \'5. 148, 162, 184, 196. 

198, 200, 2 12 

Air Control Team: 51 

Air ddensc. enemy: 208-209 

Air support. See Tactical air support 

Airborne personnel detector. See Peopl!! 

Sniffer 

Aircraft. Silt: Helicopters 

AirJi({J, of troops and supplies: 63-&1, 

71-12,92-93 

Airmobile operations: II , 13, 55. 58-60, 

71, 92-94, 106-17, 127-34, 156-58. 

162. 204-208, 212. See Il/SO Jitterbug 

tlcti cs 

Akers, Colonel William A.: 25,28-29 

Ambush "'Iioll': 60,90, 95, 109, 11 9-20. 

125. 128, U" 135. 152, 181-84,201, 

220.23" 

Ambush aClions, enemy: 16, 116. 219-20. 

'50 

Ange rs Wing area: 198.201 

Amiaircnft defense, enemy. Stt Air de· 

fense. enemy 

Approach mareh : 92 9~ 

ARC LIGHT program: 2 10-12 

Armor uniLS: 11 

Armored Cavalry Regiment, 11 th: 197, 

220,224 

Armored personnel carrien: II , ~ 

Army Combat Opera tions Vietnam stud)': 

5-6,16,18, .sa 

Army Concept T eam in Vie tnam 

(ACT1V): 7,~5 

Amly Marksmanship Unit : 120-2 1 

Art illel')' fire support: 69, 90, 92, 109, 

11 1- 12, II , 118. 120, 125, 129-50. 

1 ~~, 166, 209, 250 

Artillery, 34 th: 170 

Assault Helicopter Company, 191n : 54 

Assault helicopter nnlLS: 5~, 55, 57-61, 

6~, 67~9, 72, 74, 107, 109, 11 6-17, ,.. 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Interna· 

tion al Mfain): 7 

Attrition stra ttg}': 225-27. Stc (l{JO CU· 

Ua ll ics 

Australian forces: 19~, 199, 228 

Aviation unilJ 

h t Aviation Brigade: 68 

9th Aviation Battalion: 45-48 

214th Aviation Battalion : 60 

709th Avia tion Battalion: 45-47 

7~ Aviation Company: 98 

244th Avialion Company: 98 

Aviation Maintenance Management Cen . 

ter: 48 

Sa T ri : 9 

Barbed·wire, use: III 

Barradts shipt (APL): 119 

Base ca mps: 72- 74, 109--10, 119 

Bases, enemy: 188, 198, 200,219-20 

Bearca t: 43, 71 -'72 

Ben Luc Leprosarium: 170 

Ben T re: 9 

nien H oa: 219 

Bien Hoa Province: .sa 

Binh Duong Province: 193,219 

Binh Long Province: 19l, 196 

Oinh Phuoc: 121 

Minh Thuy Province: '9 

Oland, Colonel George E.: 188 

Body (Ount: 152,227-28 

Roi 1.oi Woods: 192,201. 203 

Bombardment, urial. Stt Strategic air 

support 

24 1 
242 INDEX 

~by traps. enemy: 90,95, 156-47, 184. 

192, 254. S~e /lbo Mining opcr.uions. 

CI1<'III)' 

600u. Su FOOtwear 

Bradshaw, Major J ack 0.: 54 

Bridge C()nSII'lIction and repair: 179-8 1, ,,. 

Brielings: 98-99, 15~, 163 

Brigades. Sec hlfan\ry Brigades 

Hul1dolcn: 218-21 

Ihlllkcr systems, enemy: 107, 113, 140. 

,<8 

Bushmaster taclia: 50, 106, 117-19, 127-

28. 1.52 

Cai Be: 101, I" 

Cambodia: 8, 10.52,83, 100, 192-93, 195-

98, 200, 206. 208. 220. ZZ2-24, 227. 

m 

Canals. See Waterways 

Canislcrc]IlSlcrs (CS). See ChcmiC3i agents 

Capital Military A5!listance Command: 98 

Casualties 

Allied: 2<l, 54, 56, 114, 1S+-!8, Hl--i7, 

184-90, I9-I-95,212-1'.228,2SO 

civilian: 181-83,228,230 

enemy: 54-57, 68-71, 77. 79-85, 105. 

114, 122, 127-28, ISO-52. 13+-.36. 152. 

156-58, 161. 18$-88, 194-95,207,122-

24,227-28,2*39 

Cavalry Division (Ainnobilc). lSI: 1'1. 

193. 197-9S. 20'. 224 

Ca"alry Regiment. 51h: 18-19. 46-4S. 52. 

CentDI " Office of Somh Vietnam (COSV). 

NVM: Ss-B6.235 

Checkerboard laelia: 60. 106. 109. 117-

19. 127-2S. 152 

Chemical agents; 109. II I- I ll. 14S. 156 

Chiell floi /1rogrnl1l: 7i, 84-85. 9S. 101. 

103, 166-67 

Civic action prognms: 10,...,104. 119, 159-

61. 1&1,170, IS3 

Civil War. U,S.: 225 

Civilian Irregub.r Defense Groups: 2Q.I 

Civilians 

assi5lance 10; 1&1. 169-72 

casuailics; ISI-S3. 22S. 2~ 

center; IS2 

educational programs: 1&1. 176-78 

food and clothing supplied: 171-72 

health programs: 1&1. 16S-70. 172-76 

Civilbns-Continued 

hOliling. constrllction and repair: 1&1. 

170.178-81 

rcscnlement programs: 181-8'.229 

Climate. Su Weather. eff~t on opera, 

tions 

Clothing. for civilians: 171 

Clover·leaf patrol : 7611 

Combat IntelHgence Battalions. ~ and 

oIth: 98 

Combined I)ocumellt Exploitation Cen· 

tcr: 98 

Combined Intelligence Center. Vietnam: 

98 

Combined Military Interrogation Center: 

98 

Command and control: 45.49,55.60-61. 

64-65,107.109-11.116. liS. 127, 1.50-

31. I II",. 195, 2'7. Set tI/JO Leadenhip 

Commalld and control enemy: 79 

Communications c:t]uipment and operations; 5t. Jl8 

Conlputc:r systems; 6.48, 144, 19-4. 2M 

Constant pr<'5Sure concept: 78-86. 94-95. 

157.162. 190.196-204 .221.225.227-

28,232.2",7 

Contr:actors. civilian: 2 17 

Cordon-and-search oper.niolls: 152 

Corps, operations b): 191-24 

Corps T actical ZOllO 

I: 18,2Q4 

II: 198.221 

111 : 7,9.70,96.98.125. 191. 196-200. 

2CH-206. 208, 216, 219-24, 2~, 2.55. 

237,2S9 

I V: 9. S9, 5S. 68, 70, 96. 9S, 154 

Co"er and concealment: 10-11 

Deadline ntcs: 151 

Deagle. Major Ed"';n A .. Jr.: 54 

Decision-making. elements affccting: 5. 

Odecton. '" use of: -11 -"12. S~~ tll~o Chi~u 

H oi; Htli Chtlnh 

Defensi\"C~ opention,. reliance on : 86-88. 

'52 

Diarrhea. incidence of: 24 

Diem. Ngo Dinh: 7 

Oillh TuolIg Province: 9, 10, 19. 38-39. 

52, iO. 89, 98. 101. 153. 160 

Disciplille.combat: 1011.144. 146 
I 

.... H ARI'ENIN(; TH E COM BAT EDG E 243 

District lmelligena: Operations Coordination Centers: 98, 102 

Doctrine, implementing: 233. 238 

Documenu. cap tUI'C and eKploilation: 

100. 102. 114-16, 208 

Ilofp. combat use: 156. lSI! 

Dong Tam: 9, 19, 24. 26. U -H . 49. 67-

GB. 70. 72- 74, 121. 146. 183 

Dong Tien (Progress T ogelher) program: 

203--206.221 

Dredging opera tions: 72 

nuc Phong: 198 

Eckhanh. Major Geller.lll George S.: 53. 

Educ'" ational programs: 176-78 

Emerson. Colonel Henry E.: 78. \I i 

.:ngineer Ib nal ion , 151h : 143 

• :ngineer operations: 72-7'1. 179-81.217-

21 

[ lIlho\·en. Alain C.: 3.5 

Equipment. personal. See Soldie r. US" 

load carried 

Ewell . Major General J ulian J,; 183.I!H 

Field Force. II: 6--7.52, 67. 98. 161. 19 1-

95. 199, 2(H. 21()-12. 227- 29 

" Fifteen·second War," See ksmanshi p 

training 

Filhol Plantation : 219 

Fire support ba5dl: 21 

Fishhook area: 197- 98. 201 

Flak jackeu: 90-9 1 

Flares. Stt: lIalllefield illuminat ion 

f ood distribu tion : 17 1- 72 

Foot aihncrH5, overcoming: 2'1- 56 

Footwea r. tests of: 25-26 

Fort !knning: 76. 120 

Fort Rucke-r: 6 

Fort Sill: 76 

Frtt World forces: 191 . :lOO-20 I, 20:' 

Fuel suppl)" Set Pctroleum. oil ami 

lubrica nts 

Fungal infections: 27. 29 ~2 

Gene- rd! Support Group . ~th : 48 

Ge- ne- rators. deadline r:u es: 15 1 

Gene,'a agreeme-nl.'. 1954: 7 

Geneva Con'-cmions: 100. 182 

Ge-taci. Colonel J ohn p,: 129 

Gia Dinh Province-: 39. 191. 199 

Go Cong: 9 

Go Cong Province: 9,38.98. 156. 158 

Gre-nade assa ults: L II 

Grenade launcher, M79: 120-21 

Guerrilla operatiol15 lUlCI units. e-nemy: 

7.84 , 110. 116 

llamlel e n luation sptem: 159-60, 216 

Ilang:a f5, construction of: 49 

!l at Dich : 199 

Ih u Ngh ia Province-: 19'1. 20 1. 21i 

lI e-alth p rograms: 164 . 168-70, 172- 76. 

S tt: (1150 Medical e-vacuation and 

treatment 

Helicople-rs 

Ah- I Huey Cobra: ~6-4 7. 50. 63. 66-

67, 109. 131- 33, 209 

CH--47 Chinook: 109 

CII-.'i4: 109 

LOH: -16--48. GO. 63. 66~7, 109. 116 . 

148 

OH-23: 11 6 

U-6 Ika"cr: -16--47 

lJI'I- ID Iroquois: 46--49.51, 60. 63. 65-

67. 133, 147. 209 

allocation . 3nilability and distribu· 

tion : 13. 15. 19. -1-1- 55. 57. 67-69.78, 

107 . 18-1, 190,206- 209 

armament and e-qui pment : 209-10 

a$ll au ll lacties: !J8-00, 6$-6!J, 68, 70. Su 

(1150 }\ irmobile- ope rat ions 

asse ts de-fined : 54-55 

combat eiIect;"e-ness. contribu tion to: 

54-58. 67- 70 

combat emplo)'me-nt : II. 13, 4-1 , ~8-49 . 

52- 70. 106-12. Sn (11.10 Airmobile 

ope rations 

tl h·isiona1. mi$llions of: 65- 6; 

inspection programs: -1 8 

Jillerbug tac ti es: 5-1,58. 61. 64, 78. BO, 

93. 95, 106-17, 127-29. 162 

main le-nance- and repair: 44-51. 53, 6 1. 

67-68, 7-1 , 154 

ope rationa l requirements: 66-67 

vulnerability, !osset and recovery : 116-

17. 13-I.2Q8-209 

Heliports, const ruc tion of: 74 

Highway I: 2 19 

I·\ighwa,· 4: 9, 70, 133. 217 

H ighwa y 5: 2 17 

Highway 5A: 9 

H ighway 13: 197.2 19 

High way 14 : 198 

Highway 2-1 : 9 
244 D~X 

Highwa)' 26; ~ 

Ho Bo Woods: 2 19 

Ho Ch i Minh Tnil: 8,226 

Noi C/tanl! program; 41-42, 5~, 56, 100, 

103-104, 134. 152, 154. 156-57. 161. 

210,2 13. 228 

Hollis. Major Gene r .. 1 Harris W.: 18'. 

190. 194 

Housing. COllstruclion ~nd repair: 164 , 

170.178-81 

I'h,dson , Captain JO$(: ph W,; 133 

Ill umina tion. haulelield ; 00. 130. 152- 3' 

Imllle rsion foOl; 51 - 52 

Indochina War expe rie"ce: 23 

Inf:lIury 8a!lalions 

2d.391h Infanu)'; 3i. I3 ~. IU 

2d. 471h InfantT)': 145 

2d, ooth InCarmy: :'Ii. 100J- 1O. 14 ~ 

'd. ,91h Infanuy: '013 :Id . 4ith Infantry; 32. 119-:!O. 143 

3d . 60th Infantry: 145 

·lIh . 59th Infantry: 125, '45 

'Ilh . 471h Infantry: 145 

5th. 60Ih Infantry: 14 3 

6th . 31st Infantry: 18. 38. l2'l. 143 

[l1 f:lI1tr)' Brigades 

organization: 19 

1st, 9th Division: 4i. 70, 1~ . HI2 

2d. 91h Dh'i, ion: S9. 47.52. 70. 72. 186-

88 

3d . 9th Division: 47. 70.9'. 191. 199. 207 

199th Light: 98. 199 

]nfautry Divisions 

headquarters org:miz3tiou : :.!U 

1$1 : 193. 198, 20S--204. 22·1 

25th : 6,98. 13] . 144 . 192. ]94. HI8. :lOJ. 

205. 209. 224 

Infant r)' units 

arrivals: 8 

combal. 3vai labilit), for: 15. ]5-16. to-

~, 57--fl. U-41 . 184 

com hat Clfcclh·eneH. im proving: M -

58. 68. 125-29. 15!'-59. 184. 190. ]94 . 

253.257 

<: nem)' COntacts. incidence: 55. 83. 89-

90. 110. 127- 28. 157,21 3-14 

dh'ersion of !TOOps: 21. 23. 36--31 

organiza tion and strength : 16--23, 38-

U. 151, 184. 190 

rcdeploymelll progr.lln : ]84,205 

,~ithd wals from combat : 204-205 

Inlihraron, enelll)': 191 

Informers: 156, 140, Set II{JO Agents, 

use of 

Infrared dCI'ices: !)9, 10S-- I04, 109. 210 

IUS«1 rcpellauts: 26. 29 

Integrated Ch'jc Action Programs: 17+-75 

Intelligence operations and repom: 51, 

94 , 119. 151 . 154-55. 158,161,203 

from agenu and informers: 9. 156. 140. 

230 

ei"ilian sou rces: 174,210 

commandenr. reaclion to: 104-105, 107. 

II. 

dh'ision fun ction : 96. 98-100. 105 

from documcnts: 100. 102. 114- 16. m external support: 96--98 

illlernal support: 100-102 

uperations analysis: 102- 104 

prisoner $Ources: 100. 105, I~O, 161. 16ti. 

210 

ltV;'" SOIlTCC$: 102 

rimeliness ~nd ccmlirlllat ion : 96--98. 

100. 102- 104 , 163 

Inre ''Preters. usc: of: 162 

Iron T rian/{h:: 219 

Jitterbug tac ti cs: 54, 58. 61. &I, 78. 80, 

93. (15, 106-17. 127- 29, 162 

Join t Gf'ne ral Sia lr, RVN: 131 . 183 

Jolley Trail: 198 

J udgmcllI. as f'IClllf' nl ill decision.malting: , 

"erwill, l .encral Waltet T ., Jr,: 195 

"ien Boa !'roYince: 9,52,70,98,]00,]19, 

186.188 

" inh Xang Canal : i2 

"it Carson Scou ts: 4 1-42. 109, 112. 144-

45.147,162, 165 

L;u,tI·dearing operations: 218-21 

Landi ng ship, tank: i2 

Landing strips. I':On5t rllCI;on of: 72.74 

Landing loncs. prcpararion &: insctlion 

into: 92- 94 , 107 

Lao Dong: 7 

Laos: 227 

Language ba rr;er: lOS. 161, 167. 169.235 

L~rge un it operations: 95. 191·224 

Leadership, value of: 190,200.2 11 .253-

3'1,237. 239. See II/SO Command and 

control 
SHARPENING THE COMBAT EDGE 245 

L.ufletll, distribution to enemy: 165-68 

Leggett, Lieutenant Colonel T om: 164 

Leuons lurned: 2!7-!9 

Liaison procedures: 102, 105, 109, 119, 

152-35, 154, 174 ,196, 205 

Lindsay. L.ieutenant Colonel Jim: 110 

Lines of communication : 72- 75,217- 18 

Lines of communication, enemy: 117, 

120, 183, 19S, 196-98, 201 

Loeffke. Major Bernard 0 .: 164 

Logistical Command, ist: 72 

Logistical systems and operations: 71-73, 

1" Long An Province: 9, 37-59, 52, 70, 77 , 

83, 95. 98, 100, 110, 121, 129, 166, 

191,199,207, 217 

Long Binh: 191. 219 

Long Khanh Province: S9 

Leng Range Reconnaissance Patrols: 109 

Lotions. protective: 28 

Loudspeakers. use of: 162, 165-66 

Mabry, Major General George L., Jr.: 6 

Machine guns, enemy: 92- 95 

~hhaffey, Colonel Fred: 110 

Malaria, incidence of: 24 

Malaya experience: 2S. 227- 28. 232 

Managemen t methods: 15-n, lOS, 184. 

190,216, 23S, 237 

Maoin docnine: 7 ,M, 86 

Maps, compilation and use: 109 

I\hrlumall3hip training: 106.12S-25, IS7, 

1" McFadden. Colonel Archibald W.: 24,27 

MeNamua. Robert S.: ! 

Mechanics, role of: 49 

Mechanittd and Annored Combu Op· 

erations Vietnam ltudy: 6 

Mechanittdunits: 11 , 16-17, 38 

Medical Battalian, 9th: 25, 172 

Medical civic action program (MEDCAP). 

See Civilians, health programs; Medi · 

cal evacuation and treatment 

Medical evacuation and tn:atmen t: 146. 

164, 168-70, 172- 76 

Medicall'esC'arch and n:porting: 2S-!6 

Medical unit. sell·contained (MUS"!): 74 

Mekong Ri\'er and Delta: 7, 9-13, 16, 

2H4, S5, 57, 70, 72-74, 85, 86, 90, 

94, 106, l22-2!, 125, 212 

Michelin Plantation: 197,220,229 

Military Regions, VC 

II: 114- 16 

VII: 199 

Mining operations: 120 

Mining operations, enemy: 136-47, 192, 

2!4. See aLso Booby traps, enemy 

Miu ions, management of: 36-41 

Mobility, maintaining: 92, \18. Su abo 

Offensive operations, nms on 

Monsoons, effect on operations: 11-12 

Morale: 20-2 1. 157, 186 

Monic, enemy: 214--15 

Morning reports: 20-21 

Morlan 

enemy assaults: 90 

usc discontinued : 92 

My Tho: 9 

Nation·in·arnIS concept: 225-26 

National Police: 98, 191 

Nighl Hawk kit : 209- 10 

Nighl H unter: 106, 129-30 

Night operations: 45, 4~9, 55, 59-61, 

66, 69-iO, 88. 90, 95, 117- 21, 128-56, 

155, 157-58, 162, 182-84, 186, 201, 

2C»-10, 2U-14, 220, 2S4 

Night raids: 106, U2- !5, IS2 

Night Search: 106. U0-52, U5,209 

Night·vision devices: 60. 120, lSI-52, 

209--10 

Norch Vietnamese Anny: 6.8-9,41,76, 

82, 84-86, 100-17, 191. 196-97, 201, 

212, 216, 227, 2S9. Set aiJo Viet Cong 

5th Division: 198 

7th Division: 198 

9th Division: 197. 224 

I$t Rq:iment: 192,199 

JOist Regiment: 205,220 

274th Regiment: 199 

Obje:ctive:, as element in decision·making: 

5 

Observation, aerial: 110,220 

O'Connor, Major eral George G.:183 

Offensive operations, streu on: 78-90, 

94-95, 118, 157. 162, 190, 196-2()4, 

220-21. 225, 227- 28. 252, 2!7 

Ointments, protttth'e: 28 

On.the:·job training: 78,IM 

One·Wa r Concept: 221·22,2Si,2!9 
246 INDEX 

Operations analysis anti researclJ 

app oa~h" 10: is-i6. 15()..65 

of combat operations: 54-58. 68, 125-

29, 155-59, 184, 190. \94 ,2".257 

computers. use in: 6,48, ]44, 194, 2~ 

at corps level: 191-224 

of enemy units: 200-204 

gains from: 258-59 

inlqntion of efforts: 165 

limitations, problems and solutions; 

76-78,93-95, 161-63 

purpose: 3-7 

reviews: 154-55, 158, 163 

statistics, value in: 234 

Orientation courses: 76 

Pacification program: 8-9, H, 77, 82-83. 

85, 153-55, 163-83. 190, 195. 198-204, 

216, 221-22. 225-26. 228. 235, 257 

Pack, Lieutenant Colonel I.mad : 11 9 

Paddy strength: ro, 23. 36, 43. 55. 188 

Patrols 

3erial: U I-52 

ground : 16.79,95,109. 11 8, 152, 157. 

162.182. 184,220 

'>ed:, Captain Michael. Jr.: 78,89 

'>tople Sniffer: 52-55. 103, 109, 11 2-13. 

116. 147--t9 

I'enonncl actions: 15-43. 163 

Personnel dClCClor, Su People Sniffer 

Pctrolcum, oil and lubricanu: 109-11 

Phoenix (Phung Huaong) Commiucn: 

98,101- 102,162,200 

Photogr.l.phy, acrial: 109,2 10 

Ph ung Huaong (f'h oenix) Commiu en: 

98, 101-102, 162,200 

Phuoc Lam: lOS 

I'huoc Long Province: 193 

Phuoc Til)' Provincc: 39 

Phuoc Vinh : 219 

Pile-on tactics. SU Seal·and·pile,oll 

tactics 

l'i1ots, combat timc: 6$-65 

!'Iain of Reeds: 10 

I'opillar Forces: 8, 37, 85, 154-55, 158. 

174 , 18S, 199, 204 

Population 

control of: 8-9, 78. 8f-86, 160. 165. 18 1, 

200,230 

dcnsity: 9,18 1 

POrlS, construction and repair: i2-74 

Powell, Major Willis L.: 12 1 

PO"'cr plants, construct ion of: 74 

f'rC$S rcports: 7.230 

I'ri.wners, enemy: 54, 56, 99- 100. 105-

lOS, ]U-!4, 140, 152, 156-57. 161-62, 

166, 187, 203, 210. 213, 228, 235 

ProgrcloS Togcther (Dong Tien) program: 

20.5-206,221 

Propaganda. Su Psychological operations 

PrO\'illCC Intelligence Operations Coordi· 

nation Cemcr. 102 

J>ro\'i nce Interrogat ion Centcrs: 98 

PS)'chological operations: 112. 159, 162, 

161-69.214-16,255 

I's),cho]ogical operat ions, Cllcm)': 167 . 

212,2 14- 15 

Pyoderma baClc rial skin infutions: 31-36 

Quang Tri Prol'ince: 18 

Qllick Kill progr.am, Sec Marksmamhip 

tni ning 

Rada r s)'5tems: 99, 105- 104, 109, 11 9, 

129-50,162,210 

Ra ids: 106, 152-55, 152 

Rainfall : 11 - 15 

Rainville. Colonel Rodman C.: 188 

Ralliers. Su Ch icu H oi program; Oi:fec· 

IOrs; H oi CllllUiI progr:.m 

Rand Corporation: 7 

Recon nainance 

aerial: 55,59, 129,210. Su afJo Jiller. 

bug tactics 

ground : 79, 82, 89, 107- 10, 127, 138. 

152, 158. 198.20 1. 2 10. 22S-29 

Redeployment program: 184.205 

Refugees, Stt: Civilians 

Regional Forces: 8. ]7,85, 15 ...... 55, 158, 

174, 185, 196, 199-200,204 

RcpatriatCll. Stt: Cllicu H oi program; 

Defcctors; H oi Chtmll program 

Replaccmen t program: 20 

Republic of Vietnam Amly: 8, 18, 57. 

8.5-&4,96.98, 102, 105. 109. 154-!l7, 

161. 191, 196-98. 200-201. 204-206, 

21\. 215, 220, 222. 224, 229 

airborne and ranger lin it.; !l8, 197-99, 

conccpt '" of war: 250-52 

lst Division: 18.205 

!lth Dil'ision: 199,205 

ilh Division: 9,1,98, 1!l5, 1!17-!l8 

9th Division: 197 

18th Division: 199 
SH ARP EN ING T H E COMBAT EDGE 247 

Republic of Vietnam Army-Continued 

25th Divuion: 98.155.198,20',224 

8th Regiment: 203-204 

46th Regiment: 199 

Republic of Vietnam Navy: 199,20' 

Rescukmenl programs: 181-8',229 

Respiratory infections: 24 

RC'Supply. See Supply systems and opera· 

tions 

Reviews, of operational lIalislio: 15 .... 

55.158,16' 

RiftC'S, MI4 and M16: 120-21 

Riverine forces and operations: '9, 47. 

52,70.72, 119. 156-~8, 186-87 

Rivers: Stt Waterways 

Rnad neu: 9,217 

Roads. construction and repair: 74, 179-

81,217-18,230 

Rode! assault" enemy: 191 

Rome Plow operalions: 199. 20~. 2 18-21 

ROI~tioll program, ellecl of: 20 

Rung Sat Special Zone: 199 

Safe Step, Operation: 2.!!-36. 40, 75 

Saigon: 9. 16, 18. '7, 4', 52. 70, 76-77, 

105, 191 , 193. 196, 198-99,203, 237, 

Saigon '" Rh'e r: 197,201-205.208.220 

Schroeder. Lieutenant Colonel Donald 

B.: U, 

Scientbu, employment of: 7 

Sea1.and·pile.on tactio: 78, 93. 107, \ 10, 

112- 14, 118, 152, 162, 166 

Seaman, Lieutenant General J onalhan 

0 .: 6 

Search.and·deslto)· opentiolls: 78, 228-

29 

Searchl ights, combat use: 123, ZOlJ 

5«u rily measures: 21.84, 109. Ill. 154. 

159. 164, 17 .... 75.216 

Self·defense forces: ~ 

Seminole War experience: 13" 

Sensor devices: 52-53.98, 102-104, 107. 

119,210,214 

Sewall, Major John O. n.: 54 

Sickn~, effecl on st rength: 2 1-56 

Sihanoukville: 8 

Situation reporU: 155 

Skin infeclions: 2.!!-56 

Slippers. See Footwear 

Small·unit operations: 89-90,94-95,184. 

'''' 

Snipers: 69. 106. 119-23. 151. I!IS, 157-

58, 162, 186 

Snipers. e nem)': 116 

Snipenoopn: 131 

<;OCks. SCt Footwear 

Soldie r. U.s. 

gener~ity 0(: 168-7 1 

load carried: 90-92,118 

gcnerOlh yof: 168-71 

Song He: 2 19 

Song Be River: 198 

Song My Tho: 72 

South Vietnam Army. See Republic of 

Vie tnam Anny 

'::' ~cial Tactical Zone, -I4Ih: 98 

Spirito. Lieu tenant Colonel Leonard A .: I., 

Starligh t scope. Su Night·vision devices 

Statistics 

collecting: 95 

rnults·oriented: 150-63 

value in analysis and research: 2'4 

~lOrage fac ilitin: 74 

Str:lIegic ai r support: 226.230 

Strategy, Allied: 7-8 

Strategy,enemy: 7 

Sub· Regions, VC 

1: 192- 93. 198-99. 201-2(H, 220-21 

2: 198 

3: 199 

4: 199 

5: 199 

6: 199 

Sullivan , Lieu tenatll Colonel Robe rt A.: 

Supervision. '" See Command and control; 

Leadership, value of 

Supply 5}'Stems and operations: 67-68. 

71-72.90, 109. 111 

Supply s)'StemS and operations, enemy: 

8, 1!I.84-85, 119-20, 151, 198-200. 

20', 226 

.'wrprisc, application of: 9.!!-94. 11 0, 130, 

IS', 186 

ractieaJ air suppon : \1,68, 109-11. 125. 

166,209-]2,230 

Tacllea I Operations Cc:nter: 51 

Tactics 

Allied: 8-9, 77-90. 92-95. 106-19, 125-

29. 154, 158-59. 162-63, 190, 196-

204, 225. 228-29. 250, 237. See also 
248 INDEX 

Tactics-Continued 

Allied-Continued 

Bushmaster tao::tics: Checkerboard 

taclics; J iuerbug tactics; Night operations 

c:nemy: 76-77,79,82.85--86,93, 110-

II, Jl4-17, 129, 158, 180, 186, 188, 

194-95,207. 251, 2~ 

Tan Son Nhut: 6 

Tango boats: 122-25 

Taplin, David; 25 

Targcr.s. nominating: 210-12 

Tay Ninh Province; 192.196 

Terrain, effeCt 011 operations: 9-10. 16, 

18,23,57,92, 106-107, 190-93, 195-

96,227,252 

Terrorisu: 191 

Tet and mini ·Tu offensives: 8, 15-16, 

19,37.54,72,76-77,84, 1M. 199,206 

Thai forces; ]93, 199 

Tho, Colonel, ARVN: 131 

Tides. dlet( on opcr.uions: 13 

Tiger S<OUIS. SU Kit Carson Scouts 

T ime·anti·space factors: 11 1 

Time-on-target fire: 1M! 

Timothy. Brigadier General James S.: 

' 21 

Ton Ie Cham: 198 

Train ing programs: 13-14, 78, 119-25. 

151,184,204-206 

Trapezoid area: 192, 197.201,205, 22Q 

Troop uniL1. Su Amlor units: Infantry 

units; Mechanized units 

Til. Colonel Lc Van, ARVN : 85 

Uni ted Sta e~ Anny Laboratory, Natick : 

25 

United States Anny, Vietnam: 20,22-25, 

56,67.210. See (liso Westmoreland , 

General William C. 

United States Military Assistance Com· 

mand, Vietnam: 53,72,98, 154,210, 

m. See also 'Vestmoreland, General 

William C. 

United States Navy: 72-74,199,203 

Vam Co Tay: 166 

Vegetation: 10-11 

Vien , General Cao Van , ARVN : 185 

Viet Gong: 6,8,37,41,52,58,76,82,84-

85,100. 106-107,112-49,156-59,162. 

166, 180-86, 191-95, 200-201, 2 13, 

216,238--39 

Vietnamization program: 8, 196, 199, 

204-206, 237 

Wa ldl"On, Sergeant Adelbert I' , 111: 123 

WalteT Reed Army Institute of ~arc : 

WaT.o::ontrolling: " 225-32 

War gaming: 6 

War 7..ones 

C: 193, 197,2Q8.22Q 

D: 198 

Water supply plants: 74 

Waterways. effect on operations: 9, II, 

13.23. 72. 106,131 

Weather. effect on opentions: 11-13,196 

West. MajoT General Arthur L., Jr.: 6 

Westmoreland, General William C.: 6, 

16, 74. Su (lisa United States Anny, 

Vietnam: United Slates Military As· 

sistance Command 

Weyand, General Frede rick C.: 185 

Williams, Major Genenl Robert R.: 58 

Williamson. Major General EllUl W.: 6 

World Wars, experience from : I3n. 25, 

31,151,225 

Q- u.s. GOVERNMEIff PRINTING OFFICE: 1995 382..J.32 



PIN : 039673-000