IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-10928

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee 

v. 

MIKE ROBERT SALINAS, 

 Defendant - Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas 

USDC No. 6:16-CR-11-1 

Before SMITH, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Mike Robert Salinas appeals the eighteen-month term of imprisonment 

imposed against him following the revocation of his supervised release. The 

revocation sentence exceeds the range set forth in the nonbinding policy 

statements of the Sentencing Guidelines. Salinas argues that his sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to provide 

sufficient reasons for imposing a sentence above the advisory range. For the 

reasons explained below, we AFFIRM. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

FILED

April 4, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. Background 

In 2006, Salinas pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute and was sentenced to thirty-seven months of imprisonment to be 

followed by a three-year term of supervised release. His supervised release 

commenced on July 1, 2013. On March 9, 2016, Salinas was arrested after 

methamphetamine was discovered in his vehicle during a traffic stop. The 

United States subsequently filed a motion to revoke Salinas’s supervised 

release, alleging that Salinas violated the terms of his supervised release by 

unlawfully using and possessing methamphetamine and marijuana, failing to 

comply with required drug testing, and leaving the judicial district where he 

was being supervised without permission. Salinas admitted to using 

methamphetamine on a regular basis for nine months prior to his arrest and 

on one occasion following his arrest. 

At the revocation hearing, Salinas admitted that the allegations were 

true. Salinas’s counsel read a letter from Salinas’s pastor regarding his church 

membership and attempts to rehabilitate his marriage, obtain legal 

employment, and separate himself from the drug culture. Salinas’s counsel 

further described Salinas’s employment history, his attempt to remain drugfree prior to his arrest, and his reason for traveling out of the judicial district. 

Salinas also briefly spoke to the court and apologized for his conduct. 

The district court subsequently granted the motion to revoke Salinas’s 

supervised release. It found that Salinas committed a Grade C violation and 

had a criminal history category of VI, which yielded an advisory range of eight 

to fourteen months, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). The district court departed from the 

advisory range and sentenced Salinas to eighteen months. The only 

explanation provided for imposing an above-range sentence was the following 

short statement: “I believe this sentence does address the issues of adequate 

deterrence and protection of the public.” Salinas made no objection to his

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sentence at the revocation hearing. Salinas now appeals the sentence as 

procedurally unreasonable. 

II. Standard of Review 

We generally review revocation sentences under the “plainly 

unreasonable” standard. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 

2011). As Salinas acknowledges, however, he did not object to the adequacy of 

the district court’s reasons for the sentence imposed, so our review is for plain 

error. See United States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 259 (5th Cir. 2009).1 Under 

plain error review, Salinas “must show an error that is clear or obvious and 

affects his substantial rights.” Id. at 260. If Salinas makes such a showing, 

we have “the discretion to correct the error but only if it seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. 

III. Discussion 

Salinas argues that his revocation sentence was procedurally 

unreasonable because the district court offered no meaningful explanation for 

imposing a sentence above the advisory range. Specifically, the district court

did not explain how the goals of deterrence and protection of the public apply 

to Salinas’s circumstances. 

The sentencing judge need only “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate 

court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis 

for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 

551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). When imposing a sentence above the advisory range, 

the district court commits clear or obvious error when it fails to provide an

 

1 Salinas concedes that any argument challenging the requirement to preserve an 

issue by specific objection is foreclosed by our decision in Whitelaw, but he nevertheless 

challenges this requirement to preserve the issue for future review. It is well settled that we 

may not overrule a prior panel decision absent an en banc or superseding Supreme Court 

decision. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 n.34 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999)). 

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“explicit statement setting forth ‘the specific reason for the imposition of a 

sentence different from that described’ in the guideline range.” Whitelaw, 580 

F.3d at 262 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)). However, it need not engage in a 

“checklist recitation of the [sentencing] factors” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006). We may infer the 

district court’s rationale for the sentence from the record. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 

at 263–64.

Under circumstances similar to Salinas’s, we have repeatedly affirmed 

above-range revocation sentences where the district court, without any 

additional explanation, explicitly identified deterrence and protection of the 

public as the reasons for imposing the sentence. See, e.g., United States v. 

Valdez, No. 16-10223, 2016 WL 4487661 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016), cert. denied, 

No. 16-6872, 2017 WL 856214 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017); United States v. Taylor, 630 

F. App’x 350 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2456 (2016); United States v. 

Priestley, 618 F. App’x 222 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 922 (2016).2 

Indeed, in another revocation case against Salinas stemming from a different 

predicate conviction, we recently upheld an above-range sentence involving the 

exact same conduct and statement at issue in this case. See United States v. 

Salinas, No. 16-10966, 2017 WL 444798 (5th Cir. Feb. 1, 2017). 

As in Salinas’s other case, here, the record reflects that the court 

explicitly considered deterrence and protection of the public in imposing the 

above-range sentence and implicitly considered Salinas’s history and 

characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The factual basis supporting the 

district court’s stated reasons is implicit in Salinas’s admission that the 

 

2 Although Valdez, Taylor, and Priestley are not “controlling precedent,” they are cited 

as illustrative of how we have handled similar situations involved appeals from judgments 

signed by the same district judge. Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) 

(citing 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4).

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revocation charges were true, namely, the district court’s concern that a person 

who uses methamphetamine and marijuana, avoids required drug tests, and 

travels outside the judicial district in violation of his conditions of supervised 

release needs an above-range sentence to deter him and protect the public. See 

Whitelaw, 580 F.3d at 264 (“The factual basis supporting [the district court’s 

reasons] is implicit in [its] findings that most of the revocation charges were 

true.”); see also United States v. Ontiveros, 584 F. App’x 236, 237 (5th Cir. 2014)

(“The court’s reasons reflect its concern that an individual who drives while 

drinking 12 beers, while on supervised release from a prior conviction under 

conditions prohibiting such behavior, needs a sentence sufficient to deter and 

to protect the public.”). While the better practice would be to give a more robust

explanation, in this context, the district court’s brief statement was not plain 

error. 

Accordingly, Salinas has not shown clear or obvious error. He also has 

not shown that any potential error affected his substantial rights or seriously 

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the court proceeding. 

The record of the sentencing proceeding allows us to conduct a meaningful 

appellate review, and there is no suggestion in the record that a more thorough 

explanation would have resulted in a lower sentence. See Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 

at 262–64.3 Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the district court 

considered an improper factor or would impose a lighter sentence on remand. 

See id. at 264–65.4 

 AFFIRMED. 

 

3 Salinas suggests that we overrule Whitelaw and hold that a judge’s failure to explain 

a sentence necessarily deprives the defendant of meaningful appellate review. However, as 

previously noted, we may not overrule Whitelaw without an en banc or a superseding 

Supreme Court decision. See Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 313 n.34. 4 For these same reasons, we would not exercise our discretion to correct any such 

error. 

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