N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
JOSEPH D. ANDER SON,

Pe t i tione r-Appe lle e , v. DW IGHT NEVEN, W arde n; ATTOR NEY GENER AL FOR THE STATE OF NEVADA, R e sponde nts-Appe lla nts. No. 18-16502

D.C . No. 2:14 c v-2015 JAD
M EM OR ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da Je nnife r A. Dorse y , Distric t Judge , Pre s iding Argue d and Subm i tte d Nove m

be r 13, 2019 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : THOM AS, C hie f Judge , TASHIM A a nd WA RDLAW , C irc uit Judge s. The Stat e of Ne va da

a ppe a ls the distric t c ourt’ s gra nt of Josep h D. Ande rson’ s 28 U.S.C . § 2254 pe tition for a writ of ha

be a s c orpus on theground of ine ffe c tive a ssista

nc e of c ounse l. W e hav e jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C
. 

# F IL ED
DEC 19 2019 M OLLY C. DW Y E R, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.§ 2253(c )(1)(A). W e re vie w de novo, se e Bae ta v . Sonc hik , 273 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th C ir. 2001), a

n d we a ffirm
. Ande rson wa s involve d in a fa ta l a utom obile a c c ide nt. He initia lly wa s
c ha rge d with a

nd c o nvic te d of m isde m e anor fa ilure to y ie ld. Se e Ne v. R e v. Stat. § 484B
. 2 57. He wa s la

te r c ha rge d with fe l ony

driving under the influe nc e (DUI)
c a using de a th, whic h

ha s a s a n e le m e nt proof tha

t the de fe nda

nt “ d oe s a ny a c t or
ne gle c ts a ny duty im p o se d by la w.” Id. § 484C .430(1). To sa tisfy this e le m e nt, the i nform a tion re lie d on Ande rson’ s pre vious fa ilure -to-y ie ld offe nse , c ha rging that Ande rson “ d i d ne gle c t his duty im pose d by la

w to y ie l d from

a stop sign to
onc om ing tra ffic ,” proxim a te l y c a using de ath to a

nothe r. Ande rson m ove d to dism iss the indic tm e nt on double je opa rdy grounds, but the sta

te tria l c ourt de nie d the m otion. Thetria l c ourt m a de c l e ar, howe ve r, tha t it would dism

iss the DUI prose c ution on double

je opa rdy grounds if, a

t tria l , the sta

te re l ie d on the fa ilure to y ie ld a s the pre dic a t e offe nse to e sta blish theDUI offe nse . Ande rson’ s c ounse l the n a dvise d Ande rson to ple a d guilty , and he did so,
a lthough re se rving his right to a ppe a l the de nia l of his m otion to dism iss the indic tm e nt on double

je opa rdy grounds. TheNe va da Supre m e C ourt re je c te d the double je opa

rdy c l a im on dire c t a

ppe a l. Ande rson’ s tria l c ounse l la te r a pologiz e d for having a dvise d Ande rson to ple a d guilty , writing tha t Ande rson’ s “

je opa rdy
2c la im

m a y we ll ha ve suc c e e de d” if Ande rson ha d disre ga rde d c ounse l’ s a dvic e and take n the m a tte r to tria l. Ande rson subse que ntly

sought postc onvic tion re lie f in sta te c ourt, a rguing that his tria l c ounse l provide d ine ffe c tive a ssista n c e of c ounse l by

a dvising him

to ple a d guilty . He argue d tha t, if he ha d gone to tria l, the prose c ution would ha ve
re lie d on his fa ilure -to-y i e ld c onvic tion to sa tisfy the “ doe s a

ny a c t or ne gle c ts a

ny duty im pose d by la w” e le m e nt of § 484C .430(1); he nc e , tha t he would ha

ve ha d a
va lid doubleje opa

rdy c la im . The Ne va da

Supre m e C ourt re

je c t e d this c la im , but the fe de ra l distric t

c ourt a c c e pte d it a

nd gra nte d Ande rson ha

be a s re lie f. The State
now a ppe a ls.

“ A c onvic te d de fe n da

nt’ s c la i m tha t c ounse l’ s a ssista

nc e wa s so de fe c tive a s to re quire re ve rsa l of a

c o nvic tion . . . ha s two c o m pone nts.” Stric k

land v

. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). “ First, the de fe nda

n t m ust show tha

t
c ounse l’ s pe rform an c e wa s de fic ie nt.” Id. “ Se c ond, the de fe nda nt m ust show tha

t the d e fic i e n t pe rform a

n c e pre judic e d the de fe n se . ” Id. In orde r to sa t isfy the pre j udic e re quire m e nt whe re , a s he re , a de fe nda nt a rgue s tha t his tria l c ounse l pe rform e d de fic ie ntly

by a dvising him

to ple a d guilty , “ the de fe nda nt m ust show that the re is a re a sona ble proba bility tha t, but for c o unse l’ s e rrors, he would not have ple a de d guilty

and would ha

ve insiste d on going to tria l.” Hill v . Loc k

hart , 3474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). “ [W ] he re the a lle g e d e rror of c ounse l is a

fa ilure to a dvise the d e fe nda

nt of a pote ntia l a ffirm ative de fe nse to the c rim e c ha rge d, the re solution of the ‘ pre

judic e ’ inquiry w i ll de pe nd la rge ly on whe t he r the a ffirm ative de fe nse like ly would ha ve suc c e e de d at tria l.” Id. He re , in de ny ing Ande rson’ s m otion to dism iss the inform ation on double je opa rdy grounds, thesta

te tria l c ourt m a de c le ar that it would dism

iss the c a se if,
a t tria l, the sta

te re lie d on the fa ilure -to-y ie ld offe n se a s the pre dic ate to e sta blish the “ doe s a

ny a c t o r ne gle c ts a

ny duty im pose d by la w” e le m e n t of the DUI offe nse . Ande rson’ s tria l c o unse l none the le ss a dvise d Ande rson to ple a d guilty
. The distric t c ourt c o nc l ude d tha t “ [n] o re a sona

ble attorne y would ha

ve a dvise d Ande rson” in this m anne r, noting tha t, “ ha d Ande rson goneto tria l, the re is a high like lihood tha

t he would ha

ve be e n a ble to ra ise the double -je opa rdy de fe nse
suc c e ssfully .” W e a gre e . The Stat e sugge s ts tha

t Ande rson c annot e sta

b lish pre judic e be c a

use , ha d the
c a se proc e e de d to tria l, the State c ould ha ve e sta blishe d the “ doe s a

ny a c t or
ne gle c ts a ny duty im p o se d by la w” e le m e nt of the DUI offe nse through som e pre d ic a te othe r tha

n the fa ilure -to-y ie ld offe nse for whic h Ande rson ha d a lre a dy be e n c o nvic te d. The inform a t i on, howe ve r, re l ie d sole ly on fa ilure to y ie ld a s the pre d ic a te offe nse and, a s the distric t c ourt re c ogniz e d, the re c ord is de void of a ny
4e vide nc e re ga rding a ny othe r the ory

upon whic h the Stat e c ould ha ve sat isfie d this
e le m e nt a t tria l . The m e re possibility tha t the State m a

y have be e n a

ble to re ly

on
an a l te rnative pre d ic a te offe nse doe s not ne g ate Ande rson’ s showing of like ly
suc c e ss. In sum , be c a

use Ande rson’ s double je opa rdy de fe nse like ly

would ha ve
suc c e e de d at tria l, the distric t c ourt c orre c tly c onc l ude d tha

t Ande rson ha s
e sta blishe d both de fic ie nt pe rform anc e and pre j udic e unde r Stric k

land and Hill
. The distric t c ourt the re fore did not e rr by granting ha

b e a s re l ie f. This c onc l usion is not unde rm ine d by

the Ne v a da

Supre m e C o urt’ s
c onc lusion on dire c t a

ppe a l tha t “ [f] a ilure to y ie ld is not a le s se r-inc lude d offe nse of DUI c a using de a th be c a

use e a c h re quire s proof of a n e l e m e nt the othe r doe s not.” Although we

de fe r to the Ne va da

Supre m e C ourt’ s c onc l usion tha t, a s a
m a tte r of sta

t e la w, fa ilure to y i e ld is not alwa y s a le sse r inc lude d offe n se of DUI
c a using de a th, this is not the e n d of the fe de ra l c onstitutiona l inquiry . The sta

te
c ourt fa ile d to re c o g niz e tha t:
an of f ense n e e d not alw ay

s b e a le sse r inc lude d offe nse o f the othe r i n orde r for the two to be tre ate d as the “ sam e ” offe nse un de r Bloc k

burge r [ v . Unite d State

s , 284 U.S. 299 (1932)]
. If one offe nse , am o n g m any possibilitie s, se rve s i n a partic ular c ase a s the pre d ic ate for a gre ate r o f f en se like fe l ony m

urde r, the n the d e fe nda

nt c annot be prose c ute d or punishe d t

wic e for both offe nse s, be c au s e t h e gre ate r

5offe nse in that c ase ne c e ssa rily re q uire s proof of the le s se r, and the two a

re in tha t se n se one c rim e . Unite d State s v . Hatc h e tt , 245 F.3d 625, 637 (7th C ir. 2001) (e m p ha se s a d d e d). 1 Although fa ilure to y ie ld is not alw ay s a le sse r inc lude d offe nse of DUI c a u sing de a th, it wa s a

le sse r inc lude d offe nse in Ande rson’s partic ular c asebe c a use it wa s spe c ific a lly

c ha rge d in the inform ation. Fina lly , a lthough the

State doe s not distinc tly

c ha lle nge the distric t c ourt’ s
c onc lusion tha

t the Antite rrorism

and Effe c tive De ath Pe n a lty Ac t of 1996 (AEDPA) is sa

tisfie d he re , we re a c h the que stion sua sponte , s e e He rnande z v . Holland , 750 F.3d 843, 856 (9th C ir. 2014) (“ [E] ve n if the W arde n by sile nc e
c onc e de d tha

t AEDPA doe s not ba

r issua nc e of the writ, suc h c onc e ssion c annot bind us.” ), and hold tha

t 28 U.S.C . § 2254(d) is sa tisfie d for the re a sons sta

te d by the d istric t c o urt. AFFIRM E D.

1 Hatc he tt , in turn, re lie d on a trio of Supre m e C ourt c a se s, Unite d State s v . Dix on , 509 U.S. 688, 698, 707 (1993) (Sc a l ia , J., a nnounc ing the judgm e nt of the C ourt); id. at 717 (R e hnquist, C .J., c o nc urring in pa rt a n d disse nting in pa

rt); W hale n v . Unite d State

s , 445 U.S. 684, 693–94 (1980); Harris v . Ok lahoma , 433 U.S. 682, 682–83 (1977) (pe r c uriam ). 6