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80–289PDF 2002

NATO AND ENLARGEMENT: A UNITED STATES

AND NATO PERSPECTIVE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 19, 2002

Serial No. 107–89

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

VALERIE VAN BUREN, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

FRAN MARCUCCI, Staff Associate 

KATHLEEN RALSTON, Acting Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, Commander–in–Chief, United States European 

Command .............................................................................................................. 4

Robert A. Bradtke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 15

Ian Brzezinski, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and 

NATO Affairs ........................................................................................................ 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

Joseph W. Ralston: Prepared statement ................................................................ 7

Robert A. Bradtke: Prepared statement ................................................................ 20

Ian Brzezinski: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 27

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NATO AND ENLARGEMENT: A UNITED STATES 

AND NATO PERSPECTIVE 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call the hearing to order. Today the Subcommittee holds its third hearing on NATO’s future and enlargement. On several occasions, United States Government officials 

have stated that in preparation for the summit in Prague in November, the United States has identified three goals to be accomplished: 

One goal was to address the need to redefine a new relationship 

between NATO and Russia. On may 28, in Rome, the Heads of 

State and Government of the NATO Alliance met with Russian 

President Putin and formalized that new relationship in the form 

of a new NATO/Russia Council. We certainly welcome that development and support its intentions. 

A second goal for Prague was to address NATO’s missions and 

capabilities, especially in light of the new emerging threats to 

Euro-Atlantic security as demonstrated in the event last September 

11. At the NATO ministers meeting in Iceland in May, the Alliance 

partners affirmed the need to make the Alliance more flexible in 

addressing threats such as global terrorism and weapons of mass 

destruction and to develop the capabilities necessary to meet those 

threats from whereever they originate. This was welcome news and 

I believe reaffirmed the U.S. Commitment to the Alliance and what 

it stands for. 

A final objective for the U.S. at Prague was to welcome new 

members into the Alliance. At our last hearing in May, we had the 

Ambassadors of the 10 candidate nations come before this Subcommittee to make their case for why their countries valued membership in NATO and what they were doing to meet NATO’s entry 

requirements as outlined in the MAP process established. I have to 

admit, the enthusiasm and commitment I saw demonstrated by 

most or by all those Ambassadors at our hearing was very gratifying. The progress they have made thus far seems to be significant, and the contributions many of them are currently making to 

NATO and the U.S., both in the Balkans and Afghanistan, should 

be recognized and appreciated. However, as I told them, the procVerDate May 01 2002 13:53 Jul 29, 2002 Jkt 080289 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061902\80289 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
2

ess of joining NATO does not end at Prague for those who receive 

an invitation to join the Alliance, but really just begins, and so 

they must continue to work diligently to meet their MAP criteria. 

I know the Heads of State of each of these candidate countries 

meet in just a few weeks at Riga for that last major summit before 

Prague. I hope they will pledge to continue to refine and improve 

upon the good efforts they have made to date. 

Today we have asked SACEUR General Joseph Ralston and representatives from the Departments of State and Defense to share 

their thoughts on NATO’s future; to tell us how the Administration 

and NATO view the MAP application process as an indicator of 

how well the applicants for NATO membership are shaping up; 

and, finally, how adding new members will impact the Alliance in 

its ability to carry out its missions. 

As I mentioned at our first hearing on NATO back in April, we 

hope to conclude these hearings by introducing legislation which 

would address NATO’s future and enlargement issue. A draft of 

that legislation has been circulated among several interested parties and it would be my intention to introduce the resolution sometime next week before the recess begins, and I look forward to the 

testimony of our witnesses today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EUROPE

Today, the Subcommittee holds its third hearing on NATO’s future and enlargement. 

On several occasions, United States government officials have stated that in preparation for the Summit in Prague in November, the United States has identified 

three goals to be accomplished. 

One goal was to address the need to redefine a new relationship between NATO 

and Russia. 

On May 28, in Rome, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Alliance 

met with Russian President Putin and formalized that new relationship in the form 

of a new NATO-Russia Council. 

We certainly welcome that development and support its intentions. 

A second goal for Prague was to address NATO’s missions and capabilities especially in light of the new emerging threats to Euro-Atlantic security as demonstrated by the event of last September 11. 

At the NATO ministers meeting in Iceland in May, the Alliance partners affirmed 

the need to make the Alliance more flexible in addressing threats such as global 

terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and to develop the capabilities necessary 

to meet those threats from wherever they originate. 

This was welcome news and I believe reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Alliance and what it stands for. 

A final objective for the U.S. at Prague was to welcome new members into the 

Alliance. 

At our last hearing in May we had the Ambassadors of the ten candidate nations 

come before this Subcommittee to make their case for why their countries valued 

membership in NATO and what they were doing to meet NATO’s entry requirements as outlined in the MAP process established. 

I have to admit, the enthusiasm and commitment I saw demonstrated by those 

Ambassadors at our hearing was gratifying. 

The progress they have made thus far seems to be significant and the contributions many of them are currently making to NATO and the U.S., both in the Balkans and Afghanistan should be recognized and appreciated. 

However, as I told them, the process of joining NATO does not end at Prague for 

those who receive an invitation to join the Alliance but really just begins and so 

they must continue to work diligently to meet their MAP criteria. 

3

I know the Heads of State of each of the candidate countries meet in just a few 

weeks at Riga for their last major summit before Prague. I hope they will pledge 

to continue to refine and improve upon the good efforts they have made to date. 

Today, we have asked SACEUR General, Joseph Ralston and representatives from 

the Departments of State and Defense to share their thoughts on NATO’s future; 

to tell us how the U.S. Administration and NATO currently view the MAP application process as an indicator of how well the applicants for NATO membership are 

shaping up and finally, how adding new members will impact the Alliance and its 

ability to carry out its missions. 

As I mentioned at our first hearing on NATO back in April we hope to conclude 

these hearings by introducing legislation which would address NATO’s future and 

the enlargement issue. A draft of that legislation has been circulated among several 

interested parties and it would be my intention to introduce that Resolution sometime next week before the recess begins. 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. GALLEGLY. And at this time I would defer to my good friend 

the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief because 

of the delays in getting started due to Floor votes and quorum 

calls. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I appreciate very much 

the hearings that you have held. No subject that has greater interest for me in foreign policy and security issues than NATO and 

NATO expansion. We have with us today three men who are extraordinarily well-qualified to discuss NATO and NATO expansion. 

I want to mention two in particular. Ian Brzezinski had been the 

foreign policy adviser to Senator Bill Roth who served as the President, eventually, of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and as Secretary of the Senate delegation. We met with Mr. Brezinski many 

times and we appreciated his capabilities and his good sense of 

humor. We know he is qualified for his position in an outstanding 

fashion. 

And, General Ralston, I would say no SACEUR has ever spent 

more time in helping the House and Senate delegations to the 

NATO Parliamentary Assembly and all of us interested in NATO 

than General Ralston. He has given us advice when we requested 

it for places to visit, facilities to visit after or before our NATO 

meetings, and we are very proud of his service. 

And the same is undoubtedly true of Secretary Bradtke who we 

are just getting to know better, and I want to thank you for bringing such outstanding witnesses in the third hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska. At this 

time I will defer to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith, for 

a brief opening statement. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to start, Mr. Chairman, by commending 

you and the Subcommittee for holding this important hearing. You 

know, the potential for NATO expansion certainly is a cause for 

celebration. Two decades ago, who could have imagined or foreseen 

the collapse of the Soviet Union, much less the integration of the 

Warsaw Pact Nations, and now even some of the former republics 

of the Soviet Union, into NATO, the EU, and the club of Western 

democracies. To be able to talk today about adding these countries 

to NATO shows how far we have come from the confrontations of 

the Cold War. 

We should not, however, let these successes blind us to the serious obligations we undertake bringing new countries into NATO. 

4

We are binding ourselves to their defense, and vice versa. For the 

moment none of these countries faces an imminent threat, but that 

doesn’t mean that they will not face threats in the future that 

could require the United States and other NATO countries to wage 

war in their defense. 

Is it really so far-fetched to imagine that the world could change 

in the next several decades like it has changed in the last two decades? Let me say for the record that I tend to favor NATO expansion. Certainly all of these countries have worked extraordinarily 

hard to establish democracy, recover from Communism, and certainly meet the various requirements for NATO membership. If the 

issue was merely that of these countries’ worthiness to join the 

family of Western democracies, I would unhesitatingly support and 

welcome them all into NATO. 

But I want to take a hard look in this hearing and in the future 

at the obligations we undertake, the costs associated with the expansion, the military readiness of these countries to participate in 

the military Alliance, and the consequences and feasibility of defending some of these countries. We do our taxpayers and citizens 

no favor by making serious commitments lightly. 

Again, let me commend Chairman Gallegly for holding these 

hearings. I look forward to the testimony. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank the gentleman from Michigan. 

And now I would yield to the gentleman from Illinois, our Chairman of the Full Committee, a fellow that we have followed to the 

ends of the world, Mr. Hyde. 

Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will waive 

any opening statement other than, again, to join in commending 

you for holding these very important hearings and for arranging for 

a superbly knowledgeable panel to instruct us, and I am going to 

listen with great interest. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank the gentleman. 

Our first witness I first of all want to thank very much for making the tremendous effort that he did in flying in all the way from 

Belgium to be at this hearing today. We recognize the effort that 

it took to be here, and we appreciate that, and I think it should 

be made a part of the record. General Ralston. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER–IN–

CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND 

General RALSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished 

Members of the Committee. It is my privilege to appear before the 

Committee today. I have provided a written statement that, with 

your permission, I will submit for the record and be brief in my 

oral statement. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection. 

General RALSTON. I would like to begin by telling you how grateful the service men and women of the European Command are for 

the resources that you authorized for fiscal year 2002. Your support 

of programs such as the foreign military financing and the international military education and training, as well as NATO, is absolutely critical to our security cooperation efforts. Without those efforts, we would be hard-pressed to develop the military-to-military 

5

relationships needed to respond to both regional and global crises 

and elicit support for U.S. actions in current conflicts. We are genuinely appreciative and hope that you will continue your support for 

this year’s President’s budget requests for security cooperation programs and activities. 

As you know, the European Command encompasses a vast geographic region. EUCOM is somewhat misnamed because, as you 

can see from the map on the two screens, our area of responsibility 

includes not only Europe but also two thirds of the African continent and the Middle East countries of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. 

Currently there are 91 countries included in the European theater, and with the changes to the Unified Command Plan, our area 

of responsibility will become even larger, including all of Russia, 

Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, and approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean this October. 

To respond to regional threats to our national interests and to 

conduct security cooperation activities throughout this area, we 

typically have about a 117,000 service members. That is just 8 percent of U.S. active duty military serving in the European theater. 

I think you would agree that that is a relatively small investment 

for the activities with roughly half of the world’s countries. 

As I address the Committee today, EUCOM is involved in five 

ongoing combat operations. Three of these are NATO operations, 

and NATO allies are playing a critical role in the other two. With 

support from the United Kingdom and Turkey, EUCOM forces patrol the skies over the northern no-fly zone in northern Iraq, and 

they are enforcing the U.S. Security Council resolutions against 

Iraq as part of Operation Northern Watch. 

In Bosnia and Kosovo we contribute with our NATO allies in operations Joint Forge and Joint Guardian to ensure security, promote stability, and allow those fragmented societies to rebuild their 

civil institutions and restore the rule of law. 

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we are providing 

on-call support to the international communities monitors working 

there as part of Operation Amber Fox, and we have made and continue to make substantial contributions to Operation Enduring 

Freedom and to the global war on terrorism in general. 

Most recently, we deployed a small force to the Republic of Georgia to train and equip their forces to more effectively protect their 

own territorial integrity, to include combatting terrorist activity 

and instability in the Pankisi Gorge. 

EUCOM represents the standing U.S. Contribution to NATO and 

promotes U.S. leadership within that organization. This leadership 

includes my own position as the Supreme Allied Commander of 

NATO military forces in Europe. NATO remains a vibrant, strategically relevant Alliance, playing an exceptionally important rule in 

maintaining greater European regional stability and security, while 

also making vital contributions to the global war on terrorism. 

In terms of regional stability, NATO has made significant 

progress in its efforts in the Balkans, and as a result we have been 

able to reduce our military presence there. Every 6 months we take 

a look at the situation on the ground and we adjust the force levels 

to suit that situation. When we went into Bosnia 6 years ago, 

6

NATO forces consisted of 60,000 troops; 33 percent of that force, or 

a full 20,000, were Americans. 

As you can see on the chart that I have there, and I think you 

may have in front of you, by January of last year, U.S. Forces were 

down to 4,400. By April of this year we were at 2,500, and by October we will be down to 1,800. That is less than 10 percent of the 

troops that we started with in Bosnia in December 1995, and instead of 33 percent of the total force, Americans will comprise 15 

percent of that force. 

In Kosovo the story is similar. NATO began the effort in Kosovo 

with 47,000 troops assigned to KFOR, and by this fall we should 

have less than 30,000. The U.S. Contribution to KFOR, as this 

chart indicates, will fall to about 4,000 troops, or 15 percent of the 

total force. 

These are good news stories for the Balkans and they represent 

real progress on the ground. But I don’t want to mislead you. We 

still have much left to do. The fundamental challenge that remains 

in both Bosnia and Kosovo is to establish the rule of law and to 

promote confidence in the indigenous judicial and law enforcement 

institutions. This will take time, and until it is complete, some 

level of international military presence will continue to be needed. 

NATO’s actions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 

represent another good news story. Although the situation there remains tenuous, it is significantly better than it was a year ago. 

NATO applied lessons learned in Bosnia and Kosovo to recognize 

the key difficulties in Macedonia: Get involved early, employ the 

right combination of diplomacy and a very modest military presence to curtail the violence. In the last year, the Macedonian government has made significant progress in terms of constitutional 

change, and although we are not out of the woods yet, the situation 

there is manageable, with the conflicting parties communicating in 

a constructive manner. 

NATO’s commitment to maintaining stability in the Balkans and 

its prompt September 12th invocation of Article 5 for the war 

against terrorism clearly demonstrate the strategic flexibility that 

makes the Alliance as valuable today as it was 50 years ago. It is 

ironic that after more than 50 years of perfecting plans to move 

U.S. Forces east, and to reinforce our European allies, the first 

time NATO actually invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 

it sent NATO AWACS forces west to help secure the skies of the 

United States in the aftermath of 11 September. Until recently the 

NATO AWACS actively patrolled the skies over North America. 

They replaced the U.S. AWACS that deployed forward for Enduring Freedom. NATO standing Naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean to deter terrorist movement and impede the ability of 

terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the 

U.S. or our allies. 

Several NATO allies, as well as other nations within our area of 

responsibility, have provided intelligence, frozen terrorist financial 

assets, detained suspected terrorists in their respective countries, 

provided basing and overflight rights and other forms of key support in our global efforts to combat terrorism. 

Some NATO nations provided cargo aircraft, manpower, and expertise to prepare and load cargo pallets for shipment in support 

7

of the humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan. Some contributed directly to the strike missions in Afghanistan, and several NATO allies are contributing to the international security assistance force 

there today. Without an aggressive and continuous Security Cooperation Program, many of these contributions would not have 

been possible. 

NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, for example, laid the 

groundwork for the current cooperative relationship we have with 

Uzbekistan, a key contributor to Enduring Freedom. The Partnership for Peace Program allows the U.S. To develop active bilateral 

and multilateral relationships across Western and Central Europe 

as well as the area formerly within the Soviet Union. The security 

cooperation contributes to the extraordinary democratic process 

many nations have achieved both militarily and politically. 

Furthermore, by ensuring access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, our efforts have dramatically expanded the 

range of options available to our Nation during times of crises. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening comments. Thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today, and I 

would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, General. 

[The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER–IN–CHIEF, 

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, my job is to ensure USEUCOM fulfills 

its missions to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, promote regional stability, advance U.S. interests in the Theater, and enhance transatlantic security through support to NATO. These tasks are interdependent and mutually supportive. 

USEUCOM’s support to NATO encompasses an array of activities. Beyond providing forces to NATO, we also participate in Partnership for Peace (PfP), a multilateral program that promotes interoperability and cooperation between 19 NATO 

allies and 27 non-NATO partners. Far from a Cold War relic, NATO demonstrated 

its continued strategic relevance by invoking Article 5, the mutual defense pledge 

in the Washington Treaty, for the first time in its history—the very day after the 

horrific attacks of September 11th. Furthermore, it has continued to adapt to the 

changing global security environment by adjusting its command and force structures, expanding its membership and developing new relationships with Russia and 

other former adversaries. NATO’s continued success in preserving stability in and 

around Europe, its evolution in the face of the changing global security environment, and its determination to counter emerging threats ensure that NATO will 

meet future challenges as successfully as it met those of the past. 

NATO’S PAST SUCCESS

The North Atlantic Treaty established an alliance that has endured over half a 

century. During its first forty years, NATO manifested the political will and military 

capability to deter the Soviet threat; provided for the rearmament of Germany within a framework acceptable to her wartime foes; and linked, through capable, forward 

deployed forces and nuclear deterrence, the United States to the security of Western 

Europe. This stable security environment, combined with the Marshall Plan, facilitated a rapid economic recovery and the subsequent growth of Western Europe into 

our largest trading partner. Eventually, the Soviet Union, its planned economy overtaken by the vibrant markets of the Alliance, collapsed along with the Warsaw Pact. 

Without a common foe, some argued, NATO would lose its reason for existence, 

yet the member nations chose to continue their Alliance, and to transform and 

adapt it to new circumstances. Like the original 12 signatories of the Washington 

8

Treaty, numerous newly independent nations looked to NATO as a source of stability in an uncertain world. The newly independent nations were linked to NATO 

through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, followed by the establishment of 

PfP in 1994, and, later, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 

NATO’S CONTINUED CONTRIBUTIONS

The attacks of September 11th, NATO’s rapid response immediately thereafter, 

the commitment of its members, and NATO’s stabilization of ethnic conflict in the 

Balkans affirms its continued relevance in the face of new threats. Also, NATO’s development of new relationships and preparation of new members for eventual entry 

into NATO through PfP provide a critical foundation for the future. 

War on Terrorism 

The last 50 years of NATO cooperation ensured that despite speaking different 

languages and relying on different equipment, allies could successfully operate together in armed conflict. This success comes from the multinational experience afforded by training, operating and participating in NATO’s various joint commands 

and military exercises. This interaction has been key to bringing a number of commitments to fruition, and has provided the U.S. with the network of relationships 

needed as a foundation to coordinate an international response to terrorism. 

Although Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is not a NATO operation, 

NATO nations as well as non-NATO partners are providing substantial equipment, 

capabilities and personnel to the fight against terrorism. NATO nations, not including the United States, have contributed approximately 18,000 allied troops in support of OEF and other operations in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). 

Fourteen NATO nations are currently operating in Afghanistan, and young men and 

women from seven of these nations are involved in armed combat. 

These allies are providing invaluable air reconnaissance, air refueling, cargo handling, close air support, mine clearing and medical capabilities to the effort. All of 

the NATO allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases 

and refueling assistance, and all have stepped up their individual intelligence efforts. Less visible but equally important are the cooperative intelligence efforts and 

information sharing occasioned by the invocation of Article 5, which has provided 

numerous leads in the campaign against terrorism. Allies such as Germany, Spain, 

Turkey, France, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom have assigned liaison officers to the USEUCOM Counter-terrorism Joint Planning Group (JPG). The JPG is 

playing a critical role in developing and executing the Theater Counter-terrorism 

Campaign Plan to include the on-going maritime interdiction operations and the 

Georgia train and equip program. Throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility, 

Allied nations have provided increased security around U.S. facilities. They have improved our security in time of crisis while reducing our costs. In sum, the Alliance 

continues to play an enormously valuable role for the United States. 

A dramatic manifestation of NATO’s relevance and commitment to the GWOT 

was the deployment of part of NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control System 

to patrol America’s skies. This deployment constituted the first time NATO forces 

crossed the Atlantic to defend the United States. Some 830 crewmembers from 13 

allied nations contributed to this successful operation. Allied aircrews logged over 

4,300 total flying hours while patrolling the skies over American cities in support 

of Operation NOBLE EAGLE before returning home on 16 May. NATO’s standing 

naval forces are making another important contribution to the war. These forces are 

patrolling the Mediterranean to detect and prevent terrorist and terrorist support 

movement and thereby impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our European allies. Up to a dozen ships have 

simultaneously taken part in this operation, titled ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. This force 

routinely shares important information with the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which often uses 

the information in the conduct of maritime interdiction operations. 

Balkans Operations 

The operational employment of NATO forces to solve a major European security 

problem in the Balkans, outside the territory of NATO member nations, confirms 

the enduring value of the Alliance in quelling threats unleashed by nationalist, ethnic or religious violence. While NATO’s multinational effort in the Balkans continues to enjoy success, many hurdles remain before this troubled region can be considered safe and secure. NATO is involved in two distinct and unique missions in 

Bosnia and Kosovo, each with its own successes and challenges. In Bosnia we have 

a political framework through the Dayton Accords. In Kosovo we do not have a similar political framework. Bosnia is complicated by an ethnic reality that has three 

highly dispersed and intermingled groups with few common interests; Kosovo, on 

9

the other hand, is overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian with a small number of non-Albanian minorities, mostly Serbs, in numerous enclaves throughout the province. In 

Bosnia the police forces have in many ways remained separate ethnic fiefdoms, 

while in Kosovo, there is an effective police-training program that provides an increasingly effective, internally recruited force on the street. 

The success to date of the Allied effort in bringing stability to Bosnia is reflected 

in the ongoing reduction of Allied forces needed, from a high point of 60,000 in 1996 

to today’s total troop strength of approximately 16,000. In 1996, 33 percent of those 

troops were U.S. Within the last eleven months alone, we have reduced U.S. forces 

by 1,850 troops. U.S. forces now total approximately 2,500, or about 15 percent of 

the Stabilization Force’s (SFOR) total strength. One of the ways we have been able 

to reduce the American footprint is by capitalizing on rapid reaction combat service 

support units from neighboring NATO countries. For example, the Hungarians are 

keeping an engineer unit ready to respond to contingencies in Bosnia, thereby freeing a similar American capability to return to its home station. The U.S. force will 

be downsized even further by the end of the year, in conjunction with an overall 

reduction to SFOR. 

The fundamental challenge that remains in Bosnia is to establish the rule of law 

and promote confidence in indigenous law enforcement institutions. Consistent with 

this objective, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that met in Brussels in December 2001, underscored the importance of a seamless transition from the United 

Nations (UN) International Police Task Force (IPTF) currently facilitating the development of a professional police force in Bosnia to a more robust, follow-on mission. 

There is widespread acknowledgement in the international community that the follow-on police effort should be part of a larger mission that would address all elements of the rule of law, including prosecutorial, judiciary and penal system reform. 

The creation of an indigenous police force, backed up by reformed prosecutorial, judiciary and penal systems, will enable the Bosnian government to effectively assume 

responsibility for maintaining a safe and secure environment that currently depends 

largely on SFOR’s presence. On 18 February 2002, the European Union General Affairs Council (GAC) took the first step in meeting this requirement by adopting a 

resolution for a Police Mission (EUPM) to replace the IPTF at the end of the latter’s mandate on 31 December 2002. 

While we do not have an agreed political framework in Kosovo, progress is measurable and the security and economic indicators are generally moving in the right 

direction. Thirty-three contributing nations maintain approximately 35,000 troops 

on the ground in Kosovo (KFOR), with the U.S. contributing 15 percent of the force 

on average, or approximately 4,800 troops. Military progress promises to allow us 

to reduce U.S. and NATO forces in the near future. The UN International Police 

Force continues its efforts with 51 nations contributing approximately 4,500 police 

officers. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Kosovo 

Police Service (KPS) School graduated its 18th class on 30 March 2002, and has 

placed over 4,600 new multi-ethnic officers on the beat since opening its doors in 

September 1999. This latest class graduated almost 300 cadets, including 32 from 

smaller municipalities as well as 19 women. The next class of 307 cadets should 

graduate on 29 June 2002. The ultimate goal of the KPS effort is to replace the UN 

contract force, turning police responsibility over to the citizens of Kosovo entirely. 

The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has published more 

than 100 regulations with the force of law. They have also appointed more than 400 

local judges and prosecutors, with five district courts and some lower courts in operation. Additionally, 11 international judges and five international prosecutors have 

been appointed to the district courts, and an international judge now sits on the Supreme Court. With the effort to restore the rule of law, we can commence the process of transferring the internal security of Kosovo back to civilian authority where 

it belongs. This is where the military exit strategy begins. 

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is also an area of ethnic 

turbulence in the Balkans. In late August 2001, following a NATO-European Union 

brokered settlement with the country’s four leading political parties, NATO conducted Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST, facilitating the voluntary disarmament 

of the National Liberation Army (NLA). The international community (IC) moved 

expeditiously on post-ESSENTIAL HARVEST activities in an effort to continue support for the peace process and FYROM security. As part of this effort, NATO deployed approximately 700 personnel this past September as part of Operation 

AMBER FOX. These 700 personnel, known as Task Force Fox, are now in place, 

with Germany serving as the lead nation. The Netherlands will assume leadership 

this month, on 27 June. These forces provide support to the IC monitors who are 

working with Macedonian police and military forces to reenter villages that suffered 

from last year’s conflict. Following a request by President Trajkovski to NATO’s SecVerDate May 01 2002 13:53 Jul 29, 2002 Jkt 080289 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061902\80289 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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retary General Lord Robertson, the North Atlantic Council recently authorized an 

extension of AMBER FOX until 26 October 2002. 

Task Force Fox’s mission is limited. It provides select intelligence, roving monitor 

liaison teams, Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and a force to conduct emergency 

extraction operations should an IC monitor team get into trouble. It does not guarantee a specific safe and secure environment, provide close protection for the IC 

monitors, or serve as a buffer between ethnic groups. Task Force Fox is not responsible for the implementation or enforcement of any agreements between the FYROM 

government and any other party. In addition to Task Force Fox, the 2,000 NATO 

soldiers manning the National Support Elements also remain in and near Skopje, 

along with the NATO Coordination and Cooperation Cell (NCCC). Recently merged 

into one NATO office located in Skopje, these forces have proven their worth over 

the past year in providing liaison, operational coordination for border security, and 

information sharing with the FYROM government. 

Much has changed since NATO sent troops to the Balkans. Thanks to an improvement in the security environment in the Balkans, the North Atlantic Council recently approved a plan to further reduce NATO forces in Kosovo and Bosnia. SFOR 

in Bosnia will be reduced from 18,000 troops to approximately 12,000 by the end 

of 2002 (U.S. forces will be reduced proportionately with other nation’s forces at that 

time). KFOR, too, will undergo force reductions in Kosovo, and the U.S. contribution 

will decrease by 20 percent, from a current force of approximately 5,000 to an end 

of year strength of 4,000. Over the next 12 months, NATO will also develop an overthe-horizon reserve force concept to complement the Alliance’s in place forces. These 

changes should be complete by mid-2003 and will create lighter, more mobile and 

more flexible forces that are both cost effective and able to maintain security and 

stability in the Balkans. 

Partnership for Peace (PfP) 

PfP is NATO’s primary military tool for enhancing stability and security in Europe. The PfP program has been a key contributor to the significant democratic 

progress many nations have achieved both militarily and politically. The inclusion 

of Partner nations in Balkan operations underscores the payoff of PfP, both in the 

reform of former communist militaries, and in the relief of the manpower burden 

on NATO. Partner nations have also made important contributions to OEF and the 

GWOT. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have provided basing and overflight 

rights. Uzbekistan, a PfP partner in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, 

has also provided critical support. USEUCOM’s Security Cooperation efforts established the framework to gain and coordinate this support. By improving access, 

interoperability and intelligence cooperation, our PfP efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to the U.S. and to NATO. 

CHALLENGES

NATO’s core mission remains the collective defense of its members. NATO must 

continue to adapt to ensure that it can continue to successfully carry out this mission in the face of new threats. 

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) & NATO Interoperability 

In 1999, the member-nation Heads of State recognized that NATO needed to focus 

on improved capabilities. The Defense Capabilities Initiative was given impetus by 

the ongoing allied operations in Yugoslavia. Similarly, the events of the last year 

compelled a renewed focus on interoperable defense capabilities, as several members 

of the Alliance went to war in Afghanistan. Following the events of September 11th, 

the Alliance clearly recognizes the need to adapt to deal with 21st century threats. 

NATO has seen what unarmed airliners can do to a city, and none of the NATO 

member-nations want to see what weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands 

of transnational terrorists can do. Therefore, it is urgent that the Alliance develops 

ways to better defend against these weapons and their means of delivery. The best 

defense is sometimes a good offense, and members have agreed to develop their lift 

capabilities to get forces to wherever they are needed and sustain them for as long 

as they are needed. These forces must be able to communicate easily yet securely 

with one another. And crucially, these forces must be effective, which means they 

must have adequate stocks of precision-guided munitions. Precision-guided munitions have made it possible for a few aircraft to accomplish the destructive effect 

of an entire squadron of World War II bombers with substantially less losses, less 

collateral damage and less logistics. Finally, air defenses are a real threat. Allied 

aircraft must be able to suppress them to accomplish that precise destructive effect 

with minimal losses. In summary, NATO should renew their efforts to focus within 

DCI on missile defense, chemical-biological defense, strategic and operational lift 

11

and mobility, command, control and communications systems, precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses. 

A critical linkage exists between capability and interoperability. The United 

States would like allies to be able to operate alongside its forces. To do so, they need 

the capabilities enumerated above, and this is the main thrust of DCI. But these 

alone are not sufficient. Interoperability is also needed. Interoperability allows those 

forces to exchange services, like communications and navigation signals, data, fuel 

and weapons. It also allows them to have a common understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures. Interoperability increases the effectiveness of a multinational force on the battlefield, and is the fruit of long years of effort establishing 

common technical and doctrinal (and linguistic) standards within NATO. Interoperability is not glamorous, and it is not tangible, like a C–17 or missiles, yet it is the 

glue that makes several national forces able to operate in a coherent way—and it 

is relatively inexpensive. In an era of flat European defense budgets, this bears 

mentioning. 

There has been some mention of asking allies to specialize in capabilities the Alliance needs. For example, NATO has abundant fighter and attack aircraft, but limited airlifters. While NATO as a whole should increase its airlift capacity, that does 

not mean that each nation should buy airlifters. It is not cost-effective for smaller 

nations to buy limited numbers of airlifters because they must also purchase the 

associated overhead at disproportional additional expense. Finally, some nations 

have already specialized in certain areas and established themselves as world-class 

experts, and it makes sense to build upon these accomplishments. The challenge lies 

in convincing a sovereign nation that its security is better served by not having the 

full spectrum of capabilities, since its options could be limited. Nations would need 

assurances that the capabilities they agreed to forego would be made available to 

them in case of need. This adds new relevance to the fundamental Article 5 commitment to collective defense. 

Emerging Threats 

NATO plays a key role in ensuring transatlantic security in the face of new 

threats. Since September 11th, NATO has acted on its core commitments to deter 

and defend against threats of aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Members have responded 

to the most immediate and serious threat we face—national and transnational terrorism—and are contributing, as individual allies, to the fight in Afghanistan and 

around the world. The threat of terrorism since the attacks on New York City and 

Washington, DC has galvanized the organization, and the North Atlantic Council’s 

Communique ́ of 14 May following the Reykjavik Ministerial confirms NATO’s ‘‘determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as necessary.’’

Even prior to September 11th, the strategic projection for the global security environment involved increasing uncertainty due to dangerous conditions from the convergence of negative global trends no less threatening to national security than terrorism itself. Organized crime and drug trafficking, ethnic and religious violence, attacks on our infrastructure, and the proliferation of fissile material and missile components are threats that are an increasing part of the security environment in Europe and around the world. While such threats will require novel solutions to meet 

unfamiliar challenges, NATO must also be prepared to deter continuing military 

threats posed by the strategic and regional forces of other nations, including conventional forces and WMD. 

NATO countries are working together to deal with the threat posed by WMD, and 

the means of their delivery, either by nations or terrorists. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of 

WMD, along with deterrence and defense. The Alliance is now working on proposals 

to develop more effective defenses against biological and chemical weapons. NATO 

will continue to adapt its military capabilities to both face these emerging threats 

and be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks. 

NATO Relationship with the European Union (EU) 

As NATO’s relationship with the EU continues to evolve, it is particularly critical, 

given resource constraints, that the two organizations develop mechanisms to coordinate each other’s efforts at ensuring peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. 

The EU clearly has political, informational and, predominantly, economic tools of 

international power that can complement NATO’s own political, informational and, 

primarily, military tools. The EU remains committed to developing a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) among its members, and the attacks of 

September 11th have enhanced that commitment. In our view, ESDP can strengthen Europe’s security posture as long as it is achieved in a manner that is comVerDate May 01 2002 13:53 Jul 29, 2002 Jkt 080289 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061902\80289 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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plementary to NATO, not in competition with it. Both U.S. and NATO interests are 

best served by a relationship with the EU that results in transparency and cooperation. 

Accordingly, U.S. leadership must continue to assist efforts to harmonize NATO 

and EU policies and avoid duplication of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) structures and processes. NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) should continue to play the central role in 

military planning to meet crises and contingencies. If the EU were to create a duplicate planning headquarters, it would only serve to make it more confusing to develop coherent plans and hence, complicate the process of gaining the consensus 

needed to act. The EU should also seek to avoid investing limited resources in ESDP 

capabilities that are redundant with, as opposed to complementary to, NATO capabilities. Equally important is avoiding the imposition of dual mission requirements 

on units and resources already stretched thin. The best way to do this is to give 

the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe a robust role as strategic coordinator for both NATO and EU-led operations. 

FUTURE OF NATO

Efforts to evolve NATO’s forces to execute new missions, accept additional members to further enhance European stability, and develop strategic relationships to 

advance NATO’s principles of peace and stability ensure that its effectiveness continues and its values endure. The Prague Summit will further define the NATO Alliance for the 21st century—its new capabilities, new members, and new relationships. The enlargement of NATO is ultimately a political, not a military decision— a country whose military still has a way to go with reform may still be a productive 

addition to the Alliance. A case could also be made where a country with a strong 

military may not be a productive addition due to a lack of adherence to democratic 

principles. There are nevertheless valid military considerations bearing upon an aspirant nation’s ability to contribute to NATO’s missions. 

Three New Members 

At the time of the 1999 accession, an interagency review estimated 10 years 

would be required for full integration of the new members. The integration processes that we would expect to be accomplished in the first three years have been 

largely successful; the new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, are 

fully engaged in the NATO defense planning process, manning the majority of their 

NATO staff positions, and are committed to making progress toward providing the 

forces and resources that NATO is asking of them. Despite the progress to date, 

some long-term efforts, such as development of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) 

corps or major weapons systems acquisitions, will take longer, perhaps even a generation, before success is fully realized. 

NATO’s new members have made significant contributions to ongoing operations 

in the Balkans since joining the Alliance. They supported Operation ALLIED 

FORCE by providing bases, airfields and transit rights for NATO troops and aircraft 

and their contributions to Balkans operations continue. The combined SFOR/KFOR 

troop contributions of the new members have historically averaged nearly 2,000 

troops. In response to NATO’s April 2000 call for additional reserve forces, Poland 

quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This planned 60-day KFOR rotation lasted 

more than five months. More recently, the Czech Republic contributed an additional 

120-man contingent to support Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST in Macedonia. 

The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, thanks to their similar backgrounds, 

have also proven to be excellent mentors to the current round of NATO aspirants. 

They are working to extend peace and security eastward. The Poles are particularly 

active with military-to-military contacts with Lithuania. The Czechs are active with 

the Slovaks and Lithuanians, and plan to contribute an artillery battalion to the 

2,500-strong Slovak-Polish-Czech Peacekeeping Brigade, which is expected to be 

ready for duty by 2005. Similarly, Hungary has worked in close cooperation with 

Romania and Bulgaria. 

The defense budgets for each of the new members have remained strong since accession, despite domestic economic challenges. For example, the Czech Ministry of 

Defense was the only ministry to be spared cuts during their recent two year-long 

recession, and Poland’s six-year defense plan guarantees defense spending at 1.95 

percent of gross domestic product (GDP). According to the Secretary of Defense’s 

2001 report on allied burden sharing, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, respectively, are ranked 6th, 8th and 11th in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in relationship to the other NATO members. While all defense budgets 

of all three new members will continue to face pressure from competing needs, they 

have clearly demonstrated the will to support national defense. 

13

The three new members are making hard choices about where to spend their limited defense dollars, while maintaining the momentum they have established. We 

are watching their progress closely, and find significant challenges lie in areas such 

as developing a viable NCO corps, implementing an integrated planning, budgeting 

and procurement process, and modernizing their inventory of Soviet-era equipment. 

Meeting these challenges will require significant monetary investment over an extended period. Equally important, but not as costly, is continued exposure to Western schools and training, which will help them adapt to Western style thinking, 

leadership and especially decision-making. 

Costs Associated With Enlargement 

With each round of enlargement, the issues of cost and military capability are justifiably debated. As reported by the Congressional Budget Office, the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO reduced the U.S. share of the civil 

budget from 23.3 percent to 22.5 percent, and the military budget from 28.0 percent 

to 26.2 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) 

budget fell from 28.3 percent to 25.2 percent. The allies share the common costs of 

the 1999 enlargement, which NATO has estimated at $1.5 billion over 10 years, 

through the military budget and the NSIP. Of those costs, $1.3 billion is for infrastructure improvements to be paid by the NSIP. The U.S. share would be approximately $400 million—or roughly one-fourth, over 10 years. The payoff resides partly 

in having airfields and logistics facilities able to support NATO and U.S. operations 

and exercises. Readiness also improves given the greater freedom of maneuver allowed our forces exercising in these countries. 

An additional, discretionary cost borne by the United States is the financing of 

purchases of U.S. equipment and training through Security Assistance. The President’s request for FY 03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) combined for the new members is just under 

$41 million. These grant funds, managed by the Department of State and authorized by this Committee, support important Department of Defense initiatives to improve new member defense capabilities and enhance interoperability with U.S. 

forces, while providing U.S. access to new member militaries, governments, and 

bases. Thus, this sum could be seen as an investment, especially since the FMF 

funds return to American industry in the form of equipment purchases. I have provided some preliminary considerations, but other DoD organizations will provide authoritative cost forecasts for the upcoming round of enlargement. 

Military Considerations for Enlargement 

The aspirants have a common legacy of inflexible operational doctrine and authoritarian Communist defense planning that was unaccountable to the public. They 

have dedicated considerable effort to producing new national strategy documents in 

a transparent way, to garner public and parliamentary support. The aspirant militaries can be broken down into two main categories: those who inherited a burden 

of obsolete Warsaw Pact equipment and imbalanced personnel structures, and those 

who had to build armed forces from scratch. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania fit 

clearly into the first category. Slovakia, to a lesser degree, also fits into the first 

category since it began its existence as an independent nation in 1993, obtaining 

a disparate mix of one-third of the Czechoslovak armed forces. 

The Baltics fit clearly into the second category, having been stripped bare of all 

equipment and infrastructure upon the departure of Soviet forces. Similarly, Slovenia and Macedonia did not inherit any part of the Yugoslav armed forces upon 

independence. Aspirants with legacy militaries have struggled to downsize equipment and personnel while restructuring their forces according to their new strategic 

situation. Aspirants without legacy militaries have concentrated on recruiting sufficient qualified personnel and acquiring a coherent mix of equipment. 

Areas of concern common to both categories, on which they have made good 

progress, include English language capability, legal arrangements in support of operations, the ability to secure classified information, infrastructure to support NATO 

deployments, NCO corps development and quality of life for troops. All are financially constrained in their reform efforts by small defense budgets, which compete 

with other national reform priorities. 

Aspirant Military Capabilities 

As U.S. European Command’s military contribution to the decision making process regarding which aspirants the United States will support for admission to 

NATO, we have been tasked to provide the Secretary of Defense with an assessment 

of each aspirant’s current military posture. In making our assessment of their 

progress and current status, USEUCOM focused on four primary areas: strategy 

14

and force structure, defensive capabilities, legal and legislative issues, and security 

procedures. 

Strategy and Force Structure. Sound national security and military strategy documents, effective interagency resource management, rationalized force structures, 

personnel management, and English language capability are top-level indicators of 

military potential. The aspirants are currently revising their military force structures to combine immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and main/territorial defense 

forces, with national resources, to include funding, focused on the first two. In all 

cases, transition requires painful personnel restructuring, and its success will be indicative of a sound National Military Strategy. Personnel management includes accession, knowing what specialists you have and need, a balanced rank structure, an 

effective NCO corps, quality of life and professional education. These are the building blocks of a quality force. Similarly, English language proficiency is the foundation of NATO interoperability, since proper communications depend upon common 

language. 

Defense Capabilities. Defense capabilities, aligned according to the NATO DCI categories, are the heart of preparedness and proof of sound planning and budgeting. 

The bottom line is: can they deploy a reasonably sized force, sustain it, communicate 

with it, protect it, and fight effectively with it? USEUCOM assessed the aspirants’ ability to deploy a small (company-sized) light infantry unit in support of NATO and 

their ability to sustain, protect, communicate and fight with that force. We consider 

this size effort to be the smallest reasonable capability expected of any NATO aspirant. We evaluate each aspirant’s effective engagement ability, which includes a 

basic ability to fight, on the offense and defense, in varying conditions of daylight, 

weather, terrain, etc. The aspirants have focused funding on equipping and training 

elite units in the short-term, expanding to the entire force in the long-term. In evaluating an aspirant’s ability to engage effectively, we closely examine the capabilities 

of their land, air and maritime forces. We also measure the survivability of the aspirants’ forces and infrastructure to ensure the military can continue to fight once attacked. Finally, we evaluate each aspirant’s Consultation, Command and Control capability (a NATO term synonymous with the U.S. term ‘‘Command, Control, Communications and Computers’’ or C4), through reliable and secure communication 

and information systems strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of forces. 

Aspirants have been investing in this area and have benefited from comprehensive 

C4 studies accomplished by USEUCOM and the USAF Electronic Systems Center. 

Legal and Legislative. Aspirants are aware that legal obstacles to reinforcement 

of, or transit by NATO forces, as well as to deployment of national forces in support 

of NATO, can be prejudicial to accession. Accordingly, they each have goals oriented 

at easing restrictions in this regard. Their progress in this area is important if they 

are to contribute appropriately to the Alliance. 

Security. Finally, USEUCOM looked at each aspirant’s ability to protect classified 

information, both physically and within electronic systems. The appropriate internal 

security mechanisms must be in place to prevent the compromise of Alliance intelligence and information. 

The military assessments of the aspirants, based on the criteria in these four 

major areas, continue to be updated and provided to the Department of Defense. It 

would be imprudent to view the information obtained from these assessments in isolation. Rather, they will be combined with other inputs from a number of other organizations both inside and outside of DOD to determine the President’s recommendation on which aspirants the United States will recommend for an invitation to NATO membership. 

New NATO Relationships with Russia 

As NATO transforms its military capabilities and enlarges its membership, it is 

simultaneously redefining its relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia relationship was originally based on the 1997 Founding Act, which outlined broad areas of 

political and military consultation and cooperation, and when mutually agreed, joint 

decision-making. For the past five years, NATO and Russia have developed annual 

Work Programs involving a wide array of issues to include nuclear confidence and 

security building measures (CSBM), defense reform, terrorism, arms control and regional security. In the military sphere, NATO-Russia cooperation and consultation 

has centered on the two peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and advancing Russian participation in PfP and ‘‘In the Spirit of PfP’’ training activities. Over the past 

three years, there has been a measurable improvement in Russian willingness to 

cooperate in these NATO-related military activities as evidenced by the Russian 

Navy’s participation in BALTOPS 01 and Russian participation in a five-day RussiaU.S.-U.K. war game last month. Over the past few years, high-level consultations 

by NATO and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense and Chiefs 

15

of Defense have improved mutual understanding and advanced our military to military cooperation in SFOR and KFOR. 

After September 11th, the shared threat of international terrorism has been an 

impetus for further political, diplomatic and military cooperation among the allies. 

After six months of negotiation, on 28 May, NATO Heads of State and Russian 

President Putin signed an agreement in Rome to establish new NATO-Russia Council. This new council will replace the Permanent Joint Council, but does not alter 

the goals, principles and commitments set in the 1997 Founding Act. The new council will identify and pursue opportunities for joint action, but will not impact on the 

Alliance’s ability to act independently. The NATO-Russia Council provides a new 

mechanism to enable broader political and military consultation, cooperation and 

joint actions. The new council will specifically address enhanced cooperation in the 

struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and 

confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, 

military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergency cooperation, 

and assessing new threats and challenges. It is hoped these political developments 

and areas of enhanced cooperation will open a new chapter in NATO-Russia military relations and significantly advance European security and stability. 

CONCLUSION

NATO is evolving its military capabilities, enlarging its membership and developing new relationships to meet future challenges. NATO’s members recognize that 

past success does not guarantee future relevance; all organizations must adapt to 

changing circumstances and NATO’s Cold War victory does not, in itself, justify its 

continued existence. Thanks to 50 years of day-to-day military interaction between 

NATO allies and non-NATO partners, these militaries now share common languages, doctrine and techniques. This military interoperability helps ensure NATO’s effectiveness, and sets the groundwork for NATO to realize its potential in the future. 

The strong integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed, given the needed resources. 

As for the next round of enlargement, it is important to consider the potential cost 

of not enlarging. The aspirant nations have put forth a strong effort in good faith 

toward becoming members, and have taken political positions in support of the Alliance in recent conflicts. Their elected officials have made membership an important 

part of their public agenda and sought to increase public support for NATO. From 

a military standpoint, we should continue to foster and promote the outstanding cooperation and support we have enjoyed in terms of troop contributions to ongoing 

operations and the use of infrastructure and transit rights. 

NATO’s overarching objective of opening up the Alliance to new members is more 

than just an expansion of NATO’s military influence or capabilities, or altering the 

nature of its basic defense posture. Rather, NATO seeks to enhance stability in Europe as a whole. NATO’s prompt invocation of Article 5 for the campaign against 

terrorism, the contributions NATO has provided to this protracted war, the benefits 

to be realized from its new members, and new relationships now being developed 

demonstrate the strategic flexibility that makes NATO as relevant and viable in the 

post-September 11th world as it was during the Cold War. Transformation of its capabilities, enlargement of its membership, and continued development of new relationships will ensure that NATO’s best days are yet to come. I will be pleased to 

provide the Committee with any additional information it may require on these or 

any other matters of concern.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Our next witness will be the Deputy Secretary of 

State, Bureau of European Affairs. Secretary Bradtke, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 

Mr. BRADTKE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Members of 

the Committee, I would like to begin by thanking you and the other 

Members of the International Relations Committee and the House 

for your strong and continuing support for NATO enlargement. The 

International Relations Committee support for the Freedom Consolidation Act last fall helped to advance the debate on how bringing new members into NATO can strengthen the Alliance and promote American interests. 

16

In inviting me to testify, you asked that I address how the Administration views the process of enlargement and the progress of 

candidate countries in preparing themselves to be invited to join 

NATO at NATO’s summit in Prague in November. To address 

these issues, Mr. Chairman, I would like to first answer briefly another more basic but very important question: What kind of Alliance do we want in the 21st century? 

The Administration believes that today we face new and grave 

threats, but NATO’s original and fundamental mission to defend its 

members and deter attack on them remains the same. As President 

Bush said in Berlin, and I quote:

‘‘NATO’s defining purpose—our collective defense—is as urgent 

as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win 

the war against global terror.’’

This means that we want as many allies as possible in the struggle against those who would attempt to destroy our way of life and 

who would threaten with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We need allies who share our values, who will work with us 

to shut off terrorist financing, who will join us in diplomatic and 

political actions to promote security and stability, who will be vigilant about the export of sensitive technologies and, when necessary, who will go with us into battle. 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, we 

have been discussing intensively with our allies how NATO should 

adapt to the new threats we face. The United States proposed that 

at the Prague Summit, NATO’s leaders make the decisions that 

will prepare NATO for the 21st century. We want to put enlargement of NATO in the broader context of what capabilities NATO 

needs, and how to develop these capabilities, and how NATO can 

build new relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and the other countries of the Euro-Atlantic partnership. 

This integrated vision of NATO in the 21st century, new capabilities, new members, new relationships, was strongly endorsed by 

NATO’s Foreign Ministers at the Reykjavik ministerial meeting in 

May, and it will be the agenda for the leaders meeting in Prague 

in November. 

Let me now turn more specifically to the process of enlargement. 

NATO has, of course, enlarged several times in the past. In fact, 

four times: First, Greece and Turkey in 1952; then the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; and then Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999. 

When these last three countries formally joined NATO at the 

Washington Summit in 1999, NATO’s leaders reflected upon the 

experience of these members and recognized that preparing for 

NATO membership was a difficult task. They decided to create a 

tool to help aspirant countries to understand better what was expected of them and better prepare themselves for membership. 

They created the Membership Action Plan, or MAP. 

In creating the MAP, NATO leaders acknowledged a basic fact 

about NATO: One size does not fit all. NATO’s membership is highly diverse, from the United States to Luxembourg, from Turkey to 

Iceland. When it comes to selecting new members, Article 10 of the 

Washington Treaty states only that—and I quote:

17

‘‘The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 

European State in a position to further the principles of the 

Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic 

area to accede to this Treaty.’’

So when the MAP was created in 1999, NATO’s leader stated 

specifically that MAP, and I quote, ‘‘cannot be considered as a list 

of criteria for membership.’’ Instead, MAP is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall, under the MAP, aspirant countries develop an annual national program to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms are focused in five key areas: Political and economic development; defense and military issues; security of sensitive information; budgets; and legal issues. In the 

spring, each aspirant meets with the North Atlantic Council in a 

19-plus-1 format to review the progress and receive feedback. 

The nine aspirant countries for this round of enlargement—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia—have just completed their third cycle of 

MAP and have begun the forth round. In this round, they will be 

joined by Croatia, whose participation in the MAP was welcomed 

at the NATO ministerial in May. However, Croatia will not be considered as a candidate for invitation at Prague to join in NATO enlargement at the Summit in November. 

In February, Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to visit all the 

MAP countries as part of an interagency delegation headed by Ambassador Burns, our Ambassador to NATO. In the meetings we 

had, we stressed that NATO members would be asking themselves 

two basic questions in the weeks and months before Prague: 

First, can we be confident that a candidate country’s commitment 

to democracy and the support of allied values and interests such 

as rule of law, human rights, and a free market economy will be 

enduring? 

And, second, will this candidate country strengthen the Alliance’s 

ability to protect and promote its security, its values and its interests? 

We found that all nine aspirant countries have taken the MAP 

process seriously. The goal of NATO membership has helped their 

governments to propose and push for reforms, and the MAP has 

provided a clear focus for a critical dialogue between the allies and 

aspirant countries. The success of the MAP is reflected in the real 

progress that all the aspirants have made in addressing difficult 

and sensitive issues. They are demonstrating their commitment to 

real political and economic reform. They are all working hard to 

consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen judicial 

systems, to promote good relations with their neighbors, to improve 

the treatment of minorities, and to privatize state enterprises. 

To cite a few examples, Estonia and Latvia have done well on 

minority rights issues, eliminating their language requirement for 

electoral candidates. Lithuania and Slovakia have worked with the 

Jewish community representatives to address property restitution 

issues. Slovenia has taken steps to reduce the role of the state in 

its economy. Romania has moved ahead on the establishment of a 

national anticorruption office. Bulgaria has adopted important legislation on export controls and the protection of classified information. Albania has made important advances in political reform. And 

18

Macedonia has made progress in completing the legislative requirements associated with the framework agreement. 

The aspirant countries have also undertaken difficult tasks of reforming and restructuring their military establishments, including 

strengthening their defense capabilities. And my colleague, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Brzezinski, will address those. 

We have also seen a commitment by all the aspirants to act as 

de facto allies, even before joining NATO. We have seen that by 

their contributions in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism and 

also to KFOR and SFOR in the Balkans, and I have cited some 

specific examples in my written testimony. 

While the record of accomplishments and contributions by the aspirant countries is impressive, all of the members, all of the aspirant countries, need to do more to prepare themselves to join the 

Alliance. None can afford to become complacent. As you mentioned, 

Mr. Chairman, the process of reform will not and cannot end with 

Prague. The commitment to reform is one that will be needed after 

Prague, which is why the NATO Foreign Ministers agreed at Reykjavik that the MAP should continue for countries invited at 

Prague until they formally join the Alliance. 

As we have told the aspirant countries, no NATO member is perfect and we do not expect aspirant countries to achieve perfection. 

Rather, we are looking for the strongest possible commitment to 

dealing with problems, some of which are found in NATO countries 

themselves. 

Let me share with you a number of problem areas we have discussed with the aspirant countries, and again I will leave the military and defense reform issues to Mr. Brzezinski. 

First is the problem of corruption. This is a problem not just for 

NATO aspirants but for many countries that are in transition. Corruption’s highly corrosive effect on democracy, public confidence, 

and trust can undermine democracy. Corruption also opens the 

door to the influence of organized crime and creates an environment in which NATO members cannot be confident that classified 

information will be protected. The aspirant countries need to 

strengthen their legal and judicial systems, toughen enforcement of 

existing laws, and put in place laws on conflict of interest and 

transparency decision-making. 

A second area of reform that we have stressed in our dialogue 

with aspirants is the treatment of minorities. While the situation 

varies from country to country, history and conflict have left many 

of the aspirant countries with substantial groups that may be ethnically different, speak different languages, or practice different religious faiths. Allies will look closely at how a government treats 

its own people, including groups, such as the Roma and Sinta, and 

will want to be assured that countries seeking to join the Alliance 

are promoting the values of tolerance and diversity. 

A third area that is featured in our dialogue is how governments 

treat their oppositions. There are few better indicators of the longterm strength of democracy than the acceptance by a government 

of the legitimacy of opposition views. We have encouraged open, 

honest, political debate with broad participation by all groups in a 

society. 

19

A fourth area of our dialogue with aspirant countries is dealing 

with the legacy of the past, including the issue of the Holocaust. 

Again, the situation varies from country to country, but we have 

urged all the aspirant countries to be as positive and forthcoming 

as possible in addressing issues such as property restitution and 

educating their publics about the Holocaust. The willingness of the 

aspirant countries to address the injustices of the past is a sign of 

how successful their democracies will be in the future. 

Finally, we have told all the aspirant countries that membership 

in NATO brings with it serious commitments, commitments to 

fight for each other’s defense, and the ability of members to carry 

out these commitments rests upon the public backing that the public in the aspirant countries gives to membership in the Alliance. 

So we have urged them all to strengthen the outreach to their 

publics in gaining public support from NATO membership. 

Mr. Chairman, as I have mentioned, all the aspirants need to do 

more in these and other areas. Since we favor admission to NATO 

for as many of the candidates as are qualified and ready to assume 

the burden of membership, we want to give the aspirants as much 

time to prepare as possible. For that reason, the Administration 

plans to wait as long as possible before making a decision, in consultation with Congress, on which of the aspirant countries should 

be invited to Prague. 

The decision to invite new members, however, is not just a decision for the United States alone. The United States will have a 

voice, but not the only voice within NATO. The United States and 

its allies must come to a consensus on the candidates. I would not 

expect that NATO selection process would be completed until the 

eve of the Prague Summit. 

Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me, I would like to end on a 

personal note. Over the more than 29 years of my career in the 

Foreign Service, there are naturally some memories that stand out 

quite strongly. I recall my first visit to Bucharest in 1979 and seeing the grim conditions of daily life under the Ceausescu dictatorship. I also recall a visit I made in the winter of 1991 to Estonia, 

Latvia, and Lithuania. This was a time of great tension with Moscow, of Soviet troops ringing Vilnius’ TV towers, parliamentarians 

barricaded in the buildings, and new martyrs in the cause of freedom. The future at that point appeared bleak in the Baltics, as it 

had appeared to me a decade earlier in Romania. 

However, history and the people of those countries proved us 

wrong. In recent months I have returned to Bucharest, and 

Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. I have seen changes that I could not 

have imagined during my earlier visits. The process of change is 

not complete. None of the aspirants is perfect, but as we try to 

measure how far the aspirant countries have to go, we cannot forget how far they have come as we prepare over the next 5 months 

for Prague. 

I firmly believe in the wisdom of the words that President Bush 

used in his speech in Warsaw when he said of NATO enlargement:

‘‘We should not calculate how little we can get away with, but 

how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.’’

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

20

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradtke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I would like to begin by thanking you 

and other members of the International Relations Committee and the House for 

your strong and consistent support for NATO’s enlargement. The International Relations Committee’s support of the Freedom Consolidation Act last fall helped advance the debate on how bringing new members into NATO can strengthen the Alliance and promote American interests. It is in the spirit of wanting to continue our 

consultation and dialogue on NATO enlargement that I appear before you today. 

In inviting me to testify, you asked that I address how the Administration views 

the process of enlargement and the progress of the candidate countries in preparing 

themselves to be invited to join NATO at the NATO Summit in Prague in November. To address these issues, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a step back and 

first answer briefly another more basic, but very important question: What kind of 

Alliance do we want in the 21st Century? 

The Administration believes that today we face new and grave threats, but 

NATO’s original and fundamental mission—to defend its members and deter attack 

on them—remains the same. As President Bush said last month in Berlin:

‘‘NATO’s defining purpose—our collective defense is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror.’’

This means that we want as many allies as possible in the struggle against that 

those who would destroy our way of life and who would threaten us with terrorism 

and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We need allies who share our 

values, who will work with us to shut off terrorist financing, who will join us in diplomatic and political actions to promote security and stability, who will be vigilant 

about the export of sensitive technologies, and when necessary, who will go with us 

into battle. 

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, we have been discussing 

intensively with our Allies how NATO should adapt to the new threats we face. The 

United States has proposed that at the Summit in Prague, NATO’s leaders make 

the decisions that will prepare NATO for the 21st century. We want to put the enlargement of NATO in the broader context of what capabilities NATO needs and 

how to develop these capabilities, and how NATO can build new relationships with 

Russia, Ukraine, and other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 

This integrated vision of NATO in the 21st century was strongly endorsed by 

NATO’s Foreign Ministers when they met in May in Reykjavik. The Ministers 

agreed that in the world of new threats to our security, NATO needs:

• new capabilities, such as strategic lift, precision-guided munitions, and secure 

communications, to enable NATO to carry out the full range of its missions 

and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed;

• new members, who demonstrate a commitment to the basic principles and 

values of the Washington Treaty and the capability to contribute to collective 

defense and the security of the Alliance; and,

• new relationships, with Russia, Ukraine, and other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, who will work with NATO in the common effort 

to promote security and stability.

New capabilities, new members, new relationships: this is the Prague Summit 

agenda, and this is the context for the decision that NATO’s leaders will make about 

which countries should be invited to join the Alliance. 

Let me turn now more specifically to the process of enlargement. NATO has of 

course, enlarged several times in its past—in fact four times previously: first Greece 

and Turkey in 1952, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and then 

Spain in 1982. 

But when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join NATO 

in 1997, it marked an historic first: inviting former members of the Warsaw Pact 

to join the Alliance. When these countries formally joined NATO at the Washington 

Summit in 1999, NATO’s leaders reflected upon the experience of the three new 

members, and recognized that preparing for NATO membership was a difficult task. 

They decided to create a tool to help aspirant countries to understand better what 

was expected and to prepare themselves better for membership. They created the 

Membership Action Plan or MAP. 

21

In creating the MAP, NATO’s leaders acknowledged a basic fact about NATO: one 

size does not fit all. NATO’s membership is highly diverse, from the United States 

to Luxembourg, from Turkey to Iceland. When it comes to selecting new members, 

Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states only that:

‘‘The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State 

in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.’’

So when they created the MAP in 1999, NATO’s leaders stated specifically that 

the MAP ‘‘cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership.’’ Instead, MAP 

is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall, under the MAP, aspirant 

countries develop an Annual National Program (or ANP) to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms are focused in five key areas: political and economic 

development; defense and military issues; budgets; security of sensitive information; 

and legal issues. NATO reviews the Annual National Plans, and each Ally provides 

comment and feedback. In the spring, each aspirant meets with the North Atlantic 

Council in a ‘‘19 plus 1’’ format. The nine aspirants for this round of enlargement— Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Albania, and 

Macedonia—just completed their third MAP cycle and have begun their fourth 

round of the MAP. In this MAP round, they will be joined by Croatia whose participation in the MAP was welcomed at the May NATO ministerial. However, Croatia 

will not be considered a candidate for this round of NATO enlargement. 

In February, I visited all the MAP countries, as part of an inter-agency delegation, headed by Ambassador Burns, our Ambassador to NATO. In meetings with 

Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign and Defense Ministers, military officers, and 

parliamentarians, we stressed that NATO members would be asking themselves two 

basic questions in the weeks and months before Prague:

• Can we be confident that a candidate’s commitment to democracy and the 

support of Allied values and interests—such as free market economy, rule of 

law, and human rights—will be enduring? And

• Will this candidate strengthen the Alliance’s ability to protect and promote 

its security, values, and interests?

We found that all nine countries have taken the MAP process seriously. The goal 

of NATO membership has helped their governments to propose and push for reforms, and the MAP has provided a clear focus for a critical dialogue between the 

Allies and aspirant countries. The success of the MAP is reflected in the real 

progress that all of the aspirants have made in addressing difficult and sensitive 

issues. They are demonstrating their commitment to real political and economic reform. They are all working hard to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to 

strengthen judicial systems, to promote good relations with neighboring countries, 

to improve the treatment of minorities, and to privatize state enterprises. 

To cite a few recent examples, Estonia and Latvia have done well on minority 

rights issues—eliminating their language requirement for electoral candidates. Lithuania and Slovakia have worked with Jewish community representatives to address 

property restitution. Slovenia has taken steps to reduce the role of the state in its 

economy. Romania has moved ahead on funding for a national anti-corruption office. 

Bulgaria has adopted important legislation to strengthen export controls and ensure 

the protection of classified information. Albania has made significant advances in 

political reform and continues to boast the highest level of public support for NATO 

membership among the aspirants, and Macedonia has made progress in completing 

the legislative requirements associated with the Framework Agreement, including 

laws on election and equal rights and opportunity for all its citizens. 

The aspirant countries are also undertaking the difficult tasks of reforming and 

restructuring their military and defense establishments, including strengthening 

their defense capabilities, as my colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski 

will describe in greater detail. 

We have also seen a commitment by all of the aspirants to act as de facto allies, 

even before being invited to join NATO. After September 11, all of the aspirant 

countries opened their airspace and ports in support of Operation Enduring Freedom; many of them offered to send troops. 

Bulgaria allowed the United States to base refueling aircraft on its territory, and 

has provided a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical decontamination unit to support 

the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. Romania, using its own air 

transport capability, has sent military police to Afghanistan, and the Romanian parliament recently authorized the deployment of an infantry battalion. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have offered to deploy forces to the region as part of a Danish 

contingent. And, Slovakia will send an engineering unit to Kabul in August. 

22

Other aspirant countries continue to make valued contributions to KFOR and 

SFOR in maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. Macedonia and Albania 

have provided essential use of their territory and infrastructure to support NATO’s operations in Kosovo. And, Slovenia, which already provides troops to KFOR and 

SFOR, will deploy a motorized infantry company to SFOR this fall. 

While the record of accomplishments and contributions by the aspirant countries, 

working with their Membership Action Plans, is impressive, all of the countries 

need to do more to prepare themselves to join the Alliance. None can afford to become complacent. Indeed, the process of reform will not and cannot end with 

Prague. The commitment to reform is one that will be needed after Prague, which 

is why NATO Foreign Ministers agreed at Reykjavik that the MAP should continue 

for countries invited at Prague until they formally join the Alliance. And as the current members of NATO know, the process of reform continues even after membership. 

As we have told the aspirant countries, no NATO member is perfect, and we do 

not ask that the aspirant countries achieve perfection. Rather we are looking for the 

strongest possible commitment to dealing with problems, some of which are found 

in NATO countries themselves. 

I would like to share with this Committee some of the areas that we have discussed with the aspirants as requiring more attention. (Again, my colleague, Mr. 

Brzezinski will address areas of military and defense reform.) 

First is the problem of corruption, a particularly acute problem for many countries 

in transition, not just the NATO aspirants. Corruption’s highly corrosive effect on 

public confidence and trust can undermine democracy, which is essential to NATO 

membership. Corruption also opens the door to the influence of organized crime, and 

creates an environment in which NATO members cannot be confident that classified 

information will be protected. The aspirant countries need to strengthen their legal 

and judicial systems, toughen enforcement of existing laws, and put into place laws 

on conflict of interest and transparency of decision-making. It is not realistic to 

think that corruption can be completely eliminated from any country before Prague, 

but NATO Allies will need to see a strong degree of commitment at the highest levels of government to combating corruption and will need to be convinced that NATO 

secrets will be safe. 

A second area of reform that we have stressed in our dialogue with the aspirants 

is the treatment of minorities. While the situation varies from country to country, 

history and conflict have left most of the aspirant countries with substantial groups 

that may be ethnically different, speak different languages, or practice different religious faiths. Intolerance is not a problem exclusive to the aspirant countries, but 

NATO Allies will look closely at how a government treats its own people, including 

groups such as the Roma and Sinta, and will want to be assured that the Alliance 

is not bringing ethnic conflict into NATO. 

A third area that has featured in our dialogue with many of the aspirants is how 

governments treat their oppositions. There are few better indicators of the long-term 

strength of a democracy than the acceptance by a government of the legitimacy of 

opposition views. We have urged the aspirants to ensure that opposition parties 

have fair access to the media, and that opposition groups are not subjected to unfair 

pressures or tactics. We have encouraged open, honest, political debate, with a 

broad participation by all groups in a society as a demonstration of the fundamental 

strength of a democracy. 

A fourth area of our dialogue with aspirant countries is dealing with the legacy 

of the past, including the issue of the Holocaust. Again, the situation varies from 

country to country, but we have urged all of the aspirant countries to be as positive 

and forthcoming as possible in addressing issues such as property restitution and 

educating their publics about the Holocaust. These issues are inevitably complicated, but the willingness of the aspirant countries to address the injustices of 

the past is a sign of how successful their democracies will be in the future. 

Finally, another key area has been public support for NATO. We have told all the 

aspirant countries that membership in NATO brings with it serious commitments, 

commitments to fight for each other’s defense. The ability of NATO members to 

carry out these commitments and ensure that adequate resources are available to 

contribute to Alliance security rests upon public backing for NATO. So, we look 

upon public support as a sign of the aspirants’ future ability to contribute to Alliance’s security, and we have encouraged all of the aspirants to build public support 

for NATO membership. 

Mr. Chairman, as I have mentioned, all of the aspirants need to do more in these 

and other areas. Since we favor admission to NATO for as many of the candidates 

as are qualified and ready to assume the burdens of membership, we want to give 

the aspirants as much time as possible to prepare themselves and make their cases 

23

for an invitation. For that reason, the Administration plans to wait as long as possible to decide, in consultation with Congress, on which of the aspirant countries 

should be invited at Prague. This is also the reason why the Administration has resisted the ‘‘naming the names’’ of the countries we think will be invited, or expect 

to support. We believe that all nine aspirants should receive fair and careful consideration. We want to see the candidate countries work together, as they have in the 

Vilnius-10 and not compete or engage in some kind of ‘‘beauty contest.’’

The decision to invite new members, however, is not just a decision for the United 

States alone. The United States will have a voice, and a strong voice, but not the 

only voice within NATO on this issue. The United States and its Allies must come 

to a consensus on the candidates. I would not expect NATO’s selection process to 

be completed until the eve of the Prague Summit. 

Once new members are invited at Prague, the Administration supports a straightforward enlargement and accession process. At the NATO ministerial in Reykjavik 

last month, the foreign ministers agreed that all invitees should accede on the same 

date before the next Summit. In common enlargement parlance, this means the Allies do not support ‘‘the regatta approach’’ of staggered accession. Or, as Secretary 

Powell has said, there will be ‘‘no purgatory’’ after Prague; Prague will not set new 

conditions to be met. 

‘‘Historic opportunity’’ is a term that has been used in conjunction with the coming Prague Summit and with this round of enlargement in particular. This is not 

an over statement. Developments, particularly over the past nine months, have created conditions that are even more favorable to NATO’s enlargement. As President 

Bush said in Berlin:

‘‘The expansion of NATO will also extend the security on the European continent, especially for nations that have known little peace or security in the last 

century. We have moved cautiously in this direction. Now we must act decisively.’’

To enable us to act decisively at Prague, as the President has urged, all of the candidate countries must undertake a renewed commitment to reform. 

If you will allow me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to end on personal note. Over 

the course of my more than twenty-nine years in the Foreign Service, there are naturally some memories that stand out. I recall my first visit to Bucharest in 1979, 

and finding the grim conditions of daily life and repression under the Ceausescu dictatorship to be deeply depressing. I also recall a visit to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the winter of 1991. This was a time of great tension with Moscow, of Soviet 

troops ringing Vilnius’ TV towers, parliamentarians barricaded in their buildings, 

and new martyrs in the cause of freedom. The future appeared bleak in the Baltics, 

as it had appeared a decade earlier in Romania. 

History, however, and the people of those countries proved us wrong. In recent 

months, I have returned to Bucharest, and Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. I have seen 

changes that I could not have imagined on my earlier visits. That process of change 

is not complete; none of the aspirants is perfect. But as we try to measure how far 

the aspirant countries have to go, we cannot forget how far they have come. As we 

prepare over the next five months for Prague, I firmly believe in the wisdom of the 

words of President Bush in Warsaw when he said of NATO enlargement: ‘‘We 

should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to 

advance the cause of freedom.’’

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Now we welcome a gentleman that we are all familiar with from the other side of the table, and we welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, 

Secretary Brzezinski. Welcome, particularly as this is your first 

time as a witness on the other side, we welcome you. 

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity 

to discuss with you NATO’s future, including the next round of enlargements, an issue that involves very significant obligations and 

commitments. 

24

First I would like to thank Congress for the passage of the Freedom Consolidation Act, also known as ‘‘the Gerald Solomon Act.’’ That legislation is an important statement of the purpose and vision driving NATO enlargement. 

On a personal note, I would just like to add that one of my personal and professional highlights in my career was the time I got 

to spend as a Senate staffer working with Chairman Solomon, with 

his responsibilities on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He 

strongly believed in the transatlantic community. He worked to 

strengthen it. He was a man of firm and honest convictions and 

boundless enthusiasm. He was a great leader. 

When approaching the issue of NATO enlargement, I think it is 

useful to step back and remember what are the fundamental purposes of the Washington Treaty. Its preamble states: The parties 

are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and 

civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 

individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. 

NATO accomplished these objectives during the Cold War. Over 

the last decade it has furthered these goals in Bosnia. It has 

stopped brutal ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And over the last decade 

it has adapted itself to play an important role in supporting the 

current war on terrorism. 

General Ralston enumerated the many contributions our allies 

are making today, and indeed there are over 18,000 allied troops 

supporting OEF and ISAF in the war on terrorism. And I believe 

that in the future, an expanding list of NATO members will continue to promote Euro-Atlantic stability and strengthen NATO’s 

ability to promote and protect other values and interests. 

One important point to remember is that our ability to respond 

as effectively as we have with our allies and partners in the war 

on terrorism rests on 50 years of joint planning, joint operations, 

joint training, joint deployments which have all occurred through 

NATO. Nonetheless, there is room and a need for change in NATO 

so that NATO can continue to fulfill its responsibility in promoting 

peace and to perform and serve other purposes. 

For this reason, the Administration has emphasized three 

themes for the Prague Summit: New capabilities, new members, 

and new relationships. 

I am going to touch briefly on new capabilities before I address 

NATO enlargement. NATO’s integrated forces are the essence of 

the Alliance’s core mission of collective defense. But we still face 

a capabilities gap between the United States and its allies, and this 

gap is growing. If this divergence is not reversed, it will increasingly impede the Alliance’s ability to operate, and it could ultimately weaken the Alliance’s political cohesion. 

For this reason, the Department of Defense has been a forceful 

proponent of a new and more focused capabilities initiative that 

will enable allies to fight more effectively together. And our top priorities in this initiative are beefing up the Alliance’s defenses 

against nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, enhancing strategic lift and logistical support capacities. Allies have to have the 

ability to transport their forces and equipment rapidly and to support them. 

25

Third, we need to strengthen the Alliance—we need to beef up 

the Alliance’s ability to communicate with each other through 

deployable and interoperable communication information systems. 

And, fourth, we still have a gap among our allies with modern 

weapons systems; namely, precision-guided munitions, jamming 

systems, and other operations necessary to have success on the battlefield. 

The United States has also emphasized to its allies that NATO’s 

ability to carry out its agreed missions will depend not only on the 

hardware it has but also on how it structures and commands its 

forces. Just as the United States is revising its Unified Command 

Plan to reflect current circumstances in the world, NATO must also 

assess its command structure for relevance and effectiveness. And 

at the recent defense ministerial in Brussels, allies did agree on 

the need for an urgent and comprehensive review of NATO’s command and force structure. 

The Prague Summit will have three themes: New capabilities, 

new members, and new relationships. NATO enlargement as one of 

those elements doesn’t just complement the two other goals, it reinforces our ability to accomplish them. Enlargement reinforces 

NATO’s capabilities by introducing into its ranks allies committed 

to contributing to the full spectrum of Alliance missions and responsibilities. On a broader level, NATO enlargement will help Europe become more effective in dealing with new global challenges. 

Enlargement works to eliminate the still existing and destabilizing residues of the Cold War. I believe a Europe that is whole, 

free, and secure will be less encumbered by these Cold War 

vestiges and therefore more able to direct its attentions and military assets to the new and urgent challenges of the post-9/11 era. 

NATO enlargement has also demonstrated that it reinforces our 

efforts toward rapprochement within an evolving and more cooperative Russia. Despite the predictions of some, relations between 

Russia and Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary have actually improved dramatically since their accession to NATO. This 

is a significant historical fact that should not be overlooked. 

The integration of NATO’s three newest members is going well. 

All three have contributed to the ongoing operations in the Balkans 

from the day they joined the Alliance in 1999, and they are making 

significant contributions to the war on terrorism. As NATO’s new 

West members, they are also serving as important mentors to partner countries. The Poles have established joint battalions with 

Lithuania and Ukraine, and the Polish Ukrainian battalion is serving well in the Balkans. Hungary has created a joint infantry battalion with Romania, and the two are developing another joint unit 

with the Ukrainians. 

I would like to add that the defense budgets of Poland, the Czech 

Republic, and Hungary as a portion of their GDP is higher than 

the non-U.S./NATO average. 

Looking forward to the next round of enlargement, alliances are 

built on the experience of these three new West members, and has 

developed, as Bob pointed out, an extensive engagement program 

with each aspirant. Moreover, I would add that through their participation in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, these 

26

aspirants have attained real experience and knowledge in how 

NATO conducts 

Its military operations. 

In addition to the MAP, the United States has conducted an extensive bilateral engagement program with each of the aspirants. 

Since I joined the Department of Defense, I have led bilateral 

working groups that focus on defense reform, with a particular emphasis on what is needed to meet NATO requirements with Ministries of Defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. My 

deputy has led similar groups in Bulgaria and Romania, and I plan 

to have a bilateral working group with Slovakia in July for the 

same effort. 

Each aspirant brings a different set of challenges in the military 

reform area, and each require different approaches to defense reform. While each aspirant has made significant progress to date, 

we continue to emphasize to them that more reforms need to be accomplished before the Prague Summit, and we recognize that the 

process of reform must continue well into the future, especially if 

that country is able to accede to the Alliance. 

Today, no aspirant should rest on its laurels, expecting a positive 

answer at Prague. Our reform work with aspirants has covered the 

full spectrum of defense policy and operations. Let me emphasize 

that when measuring a country’s commitment to Alliance values 

and its commitment to live up to the responsibilities that come 

with NATO membership, defense policy is in some ways the most 

tangible way to measure that commitment because it involves 

plans and resource projections that go well into the future. 

When I have conducted these bilateral working groups, I have 

emphasized a number of areas, and I would like to list a few of 

them for you to give you a sense of the reforms that were encouraging further progress by each of the aspirants. 

One is the development of sound national strategy documents, 

documents that lay out the groundwork for determining defense 

needs and that lay out the maps for resources that will be allocated 

to ensure that partnership goals, and eventually maybe NATO 

force goals, are addressed. 

We also emphasize the need to have systems that will enable 

these aspirants to have effective command, modern command control and communication systems. Indeed, secure deployable and 

interoperable communications is an absolute requisite for participation in NATO missions. 

We are pressing them to develop their host nation support capacities, as NATO needs the ability to deploy to any allied territory. 

And we have had some success. Bulgaria has had a NATO interoperable airfield at Krumovo, and last November and December it 

supported six U.S. KC–135 tanker aircraft that supported operations, flights into Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes. 

Personnel reform and training is another area we continue to 

press hard. Collective and individual training is paramount to 

fielding effective fighting forces, especially training at the collective 

level; company and battalion level training, not just individual—

training of individual soldiers. 

Downsizing a large Warsaw Pact military, as in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, or creating a force essentially from scratch, as 

27

in the case of the Baltic States, all require sound personnel planning to ensure that that force structure is affordable and correctly 

sized and well prepared for NATO missions. 

Information security is another issue of great concern to us. The 

ability to safeguard NATO classified material is essential for planning and executing NATO missions. And, overall, the aspirants 

have made progress in this area, but more progress must continue. 

As we consider these reform priorities, it is important not to just 

emphasize these reform areas and the need for more accomplishment, but also to recognize the important contributions that these 

aspirants are making in NATO operations in the Balkans and in 

the war on terrorism. 

Let me address the latter, just briefly. Bulgaria, in addition to 

providing support for our tanker aircraft, has sent a 40-person nuclear/biological/chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan. Romania has delivered one military police platoon, which it did on its 

own with its own C–130 aircraft, and it will soon deploy an infantry battalion to Afghanistan. 

Three Baltic States have offered personnel to augment a Danish 

contingent deployed to Manas. Slovakia will deploy an engineering 

unit to Afghanistan, and has offered a special forces regiment, NBC 

units—that is, the nuclear/biological/chemical warfare units—and a 

mobile field hospital. 

Most of the aspirants have offered equipment and personnel over 

and above what I just mentioned. Through such concrete actions in 

the war on terrorism and in the Balkans, NATO aspirants have 

conducted themselves as de facto allies. Not only have they demonstrated the military capability to add positively to NATO operations, they have demonstrated the political will to accept the risks 

and responsibilities of NATO missions. 

To conclude, let me end with one final thought: NATO is here to 

stay. It is healthy. Without NATO, I don’t think the Euro-Atlantic 

community would be what it is today. And the growth of NATO, 

the process of enlargement, is a sign of the Alliance’s vitality and 

its political attraction. As the Administration looks forward to enlargement, I look forward, the Administration looks forward to 

working with you and other Members of Congress in this next 

round. 

Thank you. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 

with you NATO’s future, including the next round of NATO enlargement, as we approach the Alliance’s summit meeting in Prague this November. 

I would like to thank Congress for passage of the Freedom Consolidation Act, also 

known as the Gerald Solomon Act. This legislation, recently signed by the President, 

is an important statement of the purpose and vision driving NATO enlargement. 

Allow me to add that one of the personal and professional highlights of my career 

was the privilege I had as a Senate staffer of assisting Chairman Solomon with his 

responsibilities in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He strongly believed in the 

transatlantic community. He worked to strengthen it. He was a man of firm and 

honest convictions and a great leader. 

When approaching the issue of NATO enlargement, it is useful to review the fundamental purposes of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Its preamble states:

28

[The parties] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 

civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 

liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in 

the North Atlantic area.

NATO accomplished these objectives during the Cold War. Over the last decade, 

it has furthered these goals in Bosnia and halted brutal ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 

It has adapted itself to play an important role supporting the current U.S.-led war 

on terrorism. In the future, an expanding list of NATO members will continue to 

promote Euro-Atlantic stability and strengthen the Alliance’s ability to promote and 

protect its values and interests. 

In his recent remarks to the German Bundestag, President Bush reminded us 

that ‘‘NATO’s defining purpose—our collective defense—is as urgent today as ever. 

America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror.’’ The horrific attacks of September 11 and the war on terrorism have underscored 

the continued, if not increased, relevance of NATO to America’s security. Today, 

more than 18,000 Allied troops are conducting missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the war on terrorism. NATO Partner countries are also making 

significant equipment and personnel contributions. 

One must not forget that our ability to respond effectively with our Allies and 

partners in the war is in no small way the result of over 50 years of joint planning, 

joint training and joint operations within NATO. 

Those contributions have entailed great sacrifice. America is not the only NATO 

Ally to have lost soldiers in Operation Enduring Freedom. The forces of our NATO 

Allies also have suffered losses, as have other coalition states. 

As President Bush said, NATO’s core mission remains the collective defense of its 

members. But there is room and need for change in how NATO fulfills its responsibility to promote and protect Allied values and interests. NATO needs to transform 

itself to handle new threats and serve its other purposes. 

Hence, the Prague Summit will stress three themes: ‘‘New Capabilities, New 

Members, and New Relationships.’’

New Capabilities 

NATO’s integrated military forces are the essence of the Alliance’s core mission. 

But the ‘‘capabilities gap’’ between the United States and its European and Canadian Allies continues to grow. If this divergence is not reversed, it will increasingly 

impede the Allies’ ability to operate with U.S. forces and will, ultimately, weaken 

the Alliance’s political cohesion. So our first goal at Prague must be to begin to remedy the capability deficiencies within NATO. 

The Department of Defense has been a forceful proponent of a new, more focused 

capabilities initiative to enable Allies to fight more effectively together, capitalizing 

on the special strengths that each can contribute. During their June 6–7 meeting 

in Brussels, NATO Defense Ministers agreed to prepare for approval by NATO 

heads of state and government at the Prague Summit an action plan to remedy 

shortfalls in four top-priority areas:

• First: Enhanced defenses against nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks 

against Allied forces.

• Second: Strategic lift and Logistical Support. Allies have to have the ability 

to transport their forces and equipment rapidly to wherever they are needed, 

and to supply them until their mission is completed.

• Third: Secure, deployable, and interoperable communication and information 

systems that will connect Alliance forces.

• Fourth: Modern weapons systems—such as all-weather precision guided munitions, jamming systems, and air-ground surveillance platforms—that will 

enable Allies to make first tier contributions to combat operations.

NATO Ministers of Defense issued a Statement on Capabilities affirming these 

four priority areas and that the new action plan ‘‘should be based on firm national 

commitments, with specific target dates, that our countries will make.’’

To best achieve success in improving Alliance capabilities in these priority areas, 

Defense Ministers also agreed that this initiative should lead to increased multilateral cooperation and role sharing. The pooling of military capabilities, increased role 

specialization, cooperative acquisition of equipment and common and multilateral 

funding will be encouraged. 

The U.S. also pointed out to Allies that NATO’s ability to carry out its agreed missions will depend not only on its military ‘‘hardware’’, but also on how it structures 

and commands its forces. Just as the United States revises its Unified Command 

Plan to reflect current circumstances in the world, NATO also must assess its ComVerDate May 01 2002 13:53 Jul 29, 2002 Jkt 080289 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061902\80289 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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mand Structure for relevance and effectiveness. In Brussels, Allies agreed on the urgent need for a comprehensive review of all elements of the NATO command and 

force structure. NATO heads of state and government will be presented for their approval at Prague clear guidelines and a firm timeline for completing this review, so 

that decisions on command arrangements can be taken by the summer of 2003. 

New Relationships 

It is our intention at the Prague summit to strengthen NATO’s relationship with 

Russia, Ukraine, and other members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. 

President Bush’s top priorities include creating a new, cooperative US-Russian relationship. This effort is integrated with NATO’s effort to forge a closer relationship 

with Russia based on specific, practical joint-initiatives. The goal is to erase vestiges 

of Cold War hostility. Fostering improved NATO-Russia cooperation can prompt further democratic, market and military reform in Russia and contribute to improving 

Russia’s relations with its neighbors. The NATO-Russia Summit on May 28th, 

which created the NATO-Russia Council, was the first step forward on this path. 

NATO Defense Ministers and their Russian counterpart convened the first NATORussia Council for Defense Ministers on June 6th. 

As we move forward on this path, NATO will take care to retain its independent 

ability to discuss, decide and act on security issues as its members see fit. Protecting Alliance solidarity and effectiveness is of the utmost importance. The North 

Atlantic Council will decide, by consensus, on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia will not have a veto over Alliance decisions. And, we 

shall ensure that NATO-Russia cooperation does not serve to discourage or 

marginalize other Partners. 

NATO’s relationship with Ukraine has begun to deepen. Ukraine recently announced its aspirations to join NATO. We welcome and encourage Ukraine’s decision to move closer to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Through more intensive interactions with NATO, Ukraine will receive guidance and recommendations on such 

issues such as defense and political reform. However, Ukrainian aspirations can 

only become a reality if Kiev is able to accelerate the pace of its political, military, 

and economic reforms. 

The Partnership for Peace began in 1994. It has been an invaluable tool to foster 

reform in the countries of Central Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia and to 

build bridges between them and NATO. The importance of NATO’s exercises with 

its Partner nations was not fully understood until the war on terrorism began. The 

ability to base coalition forces in Partner nations has paid off in spades. Through 

the Partnership for Peace, these nations knew NATO, its values, and its procedures 

well enough that our requests were treated as favors asked for by neighbors, not 

strangers. 

New Members 

President Bush defined our goals for enlargement last year in Warsaw when he 

said that he believes ‘‘in NATO membership for all of Europe’s democracies that 

seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings.’’ He also said, 

‘‘As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away 

with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.’’ The President reiterated his strong commitment for enlargement in Berlin last month. 

NATO enlargement does not just complement the other two goals for the Prague 

Summit; it is a key element of the Prague summit agenda that will reinforce ‘‘new 

capabilities’’ and ‘‘new relationships.’’ Enlargement reinforces NATO capabilities by 

introducing into its ranks Allies committed to contributing to the full spectrum of 

Alliance missions and responsibilities. 

On a broader level, NATO enlargement will help Europe become more effective 

in dealing with new global challenges. Enlargement works to eliminate the still existing and destabilizing residues of the Cold War. A Europe that is whole, free and 

secure will be less encumbered by these Cold War vestiges. Such a Europe, therefore, will be more able to direct its attentions and military assets toward the new 

and urgent challenges of the post-September 11th era. 

In addition, NATO enlargement has already demonstrated that it reinforces our 

efforts toward rapprochement with an evolving and more cooperative Russia. Despite predictions by some critics of the last round of enlargement, senior Polish, 

Czech, and Hungarian officials have told us that, since joining NATO, their relations with Russia have improved dramatically. This significant fact should not be 

overlooked. 

The integration of the newest three members of the Alliance is going well. All 

three have contributed to the ongoing operations in the Balkans from the moment 

they joined the Alliance. They are also making significant contributions to the war 

30

on terrorism. For example, The Czech Republic deployed its 6th Field Hospital, consisting of 150 men, to Bagram, Afghanistan to support the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF). Polish Combat engineers and logistics forces have also deployed to Bagram and a Polish Special Operations Forces unit is assisting in Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO). 

Even though they are the newest Allies, the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles serve 

as mentors to Partner nations. For example, Poland has joint battalions with Lithuania and Ukraine. Hungary has created a joint infantry battalion with Romania, 

and the two are developing another joint unit with the Ukrainians. 

In addition, defense budgets of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as a portion of GDP average 1.93%, above the non-U.S. NATO average of 1.90%. 

Looking forward to the next round of NATO enlargement, the Alliance has built 

on the experience of its three newest members, developing extensive engagement 

programs with each aspirant. Compared to the last round of enlargement, we have 

had a much greater role in assisting the current aspirants to reform their defense 

establishments, and we have a more detailed understanding about them. Moreover, 

through their participation in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the 

aspirants have attained real experience and knowledge in how NATO conducts its 

military operations. 

NATO’s Membership Action Plan (or ‘‘MAP’’), adopted in 1999, created a framework to assist aspiring nations. The MAP covers five main areas: political/economic, 

defense/military, resources, security, and legal. It works on an annual cycle, beginning with each aspirant submitting an Annual National Program to NATO in the 

fall. This aspirant-developed program lays out plans and expectations for the five 

areas. The key to the Annual National Program is that it is realistic and achievable. 

Throughout the year, the NATO International Staff and the NATO Allies meet with 

each aspirant individually to review and make recommendations. However, each aspirant decides on a national basis the areas on which it wants to work. The MAP 

culminates with an Individual Progress Report for each aspirant drafted by NATO, 

reviewing the aspirant’s accomplishments and deficiencies. 

The MAP has been a success story. All aspirants have made progress in implementing their reforms to meet their MAP objectives. Even if an aspirant is not invited to join NATO at Prague, participation in the MAP will have been a positive 

step for both that country and the rest of Europe. The MAP gives that country a 

deeper understanding and appreciation of NATO’s values and how civil-military relations should work for democracies, as well as facilitating transformation required 

in any case to make its armed forces more modern and effective. 

In addition to the MAP, the U.S. has conducted an extensive bilateral engagement 

program with the aspirants. In February, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, 

Ambassador Nick Burns, led a team, including Bob Bradtke and me, to all nine 

MAP participants. Since then, I have led Bilateral Working Groups with the Ministries of Defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. My deputy has led 

similar groups to Bulgaria and Romania. I plan on visiting Slovakia in July for the 

same effort. EUCOM has sent teams to the aspirants, and General Ralston has visited them all in his role as SACEUR. 

Each aspirant brings a different set of challenges, which require different approaches to defense reform. While each aspirant has made significant progress to 

date, we have emphasized that more reforms should be accomplished before the 

Prague Summit. We recognize that the process of reform must continue well into 

the future, especially if a country accedes to the Alliance. No aspirant should rest 

on its laurels, expecting a positive answer at Prague. 

Our reform work with aspirants has covered the full spectrum of defense policy 

and operations. The following are a few of the priorities our engagement with MAP 

countries has emphasized and some of the progress that has been accomplished in 

each area. These examples are not meant to be exhaustive. 

National Strategy Documents. Such documents lay the groundwork for determining defense needs and the resources that will ensure Partnership Goals (and 

eventually NATO Force Goals) are addressed. All the aspirants have adopted national security concepts/strategies. To implement these national security concepts/

strategies, Bulgaria is spending more than 3% of GDP on defense; Estonia 1.99%; 

Latvia 1.75%; Lithuania 1.96%; Romania 2.38%; Slovakia 1.90%; and, Slovenia 

1.6%. Lithuania has committed to reach 2% of GDP as a goal for defense spending 

by 2002; Estonia and Latvia by 2003; Slovakia by 2006; and Slovenia by 2008. 

Command, Control, and Communications—Secure, deployable, and interoperable 

communications are essential for participation in NATO missions. Romania has 

made improvements in its command and control systems at all levels and has made 

this area a top modernization priority. Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia 

have functioning Air Sovereignty Operations Centers (ASOC). Lithuania has adVerDate May 01 2002 13:53 Jul 29, 2002 Jkt 080289 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061902\80289 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
31

vanced radios at the battalion level and is updating its command and control structure. Estonia approved a command and control development plan in 2001, including 

plans for integrating advanced radios into its units. 

Infrastructure for host nation support—NATO needs the ability to deploy to any 

Allied territory. Bulgaria has a NATO-interoperable airfield at Krumovo and has 

made significant upgrades to the Graf Ignatievo air base, which will be NATO-interoperable later this year. During November and December of last year, Sofia provided basing in Burgas for six U.S. KC–135s aircraft supporting humanitarian 

flights into Afghanistan. Estonia’s force structure review includes plans to establish 

two airfield security companies, one ground-based air defense company, and an airfield engineer company, thereby enhancing Estonia’s ability to provide host nation 

support. 

Training—Collective and individual training is paramount to fielding effective 

fighting forces. Slovakia is transitioning to a decentralized training management 

system and plans to establish a Training and Support Command this year. Latvia 

is developing a Baltic Diving Training Center and plans to have a Training and Doctrine Command established by 2004. Romania has established a Non-Commissioned 

Officer (NCO) Academy that produces Western-quality NCOs with the assistance of 

the U.S. Marine Corps. 

Logistical Support—Allies need to sustain their troops during deployments. Estonia established a logistics center in 2001 and is producing a new logistics doctrine, 

scheduled to be completed this year. Slovenia’s logistics system will support a company’s deployment to Bosnia in October. 

Personnel reform—Whether downsizing a large Warsaw Pact military (as has been 

the case for Bulgaria and Romania) or creating a military force virtually from 

scratch (as in the Baltic states), personnel planning is required for an affordable and 

correctly sized force. All aspirants are expanding the percentage of professional soldiers in their ranks and developing clearer career paths for them. Some of these decisions are painful: Bulgaria amended its Law on the Armed Forces in April 2002, 

lowering the mandatory retirement age for military officers, thereby forcing the 

early retirement of senior officers. However, this effectively sped up the necessary 

downsizing of the Bulgaria’s officer corps. The peacetime strength of the Slovak 

Armed Forces has been reduced from 45,000 in 1999 to 27,520 in 2001, and will 

reach 19,320 by the end of 2006. While this has included the closure of a significant 

number of bases, Slovakia has developed a transition assistance program for troops 

that are leaving. 

Information Security—The ability to safeguard NATO classified material is essential for planning and executing NATO missions. Overall, the aspirants have made 

significant progress toward meeting the legislative, physical, organizational, personnel and procedural requirements necessary to handle sensitive NATO documents 

and information. 

As we consider these reform priorities, we should not overlook the fact that each 

of the aspirants has made very real contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans and to the war on terrorism. 

With regard to the latter, Bulgaria, in addition to the basing it provided U.S. KC–

135 aircraft, has sent a 40-person Nuclear, Biological Chemical (NBC) decontamination unit to Afghanistan to support ISAF. Romania delivered one military police platoon and one C–130 aircraft for ISAF and will soon deploy one infantry battalion 

to Afghanistan. The Romanian Parliament recently approved the deployment of a 

405-person motorized infantry battalion and 70-person NBC company. The three 

Baltic States have offered personnel to augment a Danish contingent deployed to 

Manas. Slovakia will deploy an engineering unit to Afghanistan and has offered a 

special forces regiment, NBC units, and a mobile field hospital. All aspirants have 

granted overflight rights for the war on terrorism. Most of the aspirants have offered other forms of specific capabilities, equipment and personnel. 

Through such concrete actions, the NATO aspirants have conducted themselves 

as de facto Allies. Not only have they demonstrated the military capability to add 

positively to NATO operations, they have demonstrated the political will to accept 

the risks and responsibilities of NATO missions. 

To conclude, let me end with one final thought: the Alliance is here to stay. Without NATO, the Euro-Atlantic community would not exist. Its growth—the process 

of NATO enlargement—is a sign of its vitality and political attraction. The Administration looks forward to working with Congress on this next round of NATO enlargement. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

32

Mr. GALLEGLY. At this point, the gentleman from California will 

be recognized for the purpose of making an opening statement. Mr. 

Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make an 

opening statement at this point in our hearings. NATO expansion 

is most important precisely where it is most problematic. If you 

were talking about Ireland and Sweden joining NATO, should they 

wish to do so, these hearings might be unnecessary. But, instead, 

we are talking about the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

That raises some questions with our allies. 

And perhaps the greater problem raised by this is the reaction 

in Russia. Just because Russia has shown itself willing to swallow 

quite a number of things that were beyond what any of us could 

have imagined that Moscow would swallow does not mean that we 

now have to pile on more and more to see just how acquiescent the 

world’s only former superpower can be. 

The Baltic States continue to have issues dealing with their Russian-speaking minorities and the ability of the Russian people to 

accept, and their government to accept, the new world in which a 

country has gone from superpower to a country that does not have 

that level of power this. This is one of the few times in history that 

has ever occurred without a country facing defeat in battle, usually 

in a long war. 

The Germans, both after World War I and World War II, recognized that they had declined in world power, but that was a lesson 

they had a chance to learn over a long period of time. And I would 

say that little would be lost to America’s defense capacity if Latvian battalions were unavailable to us in the next conflict, wherever that might be, and that perhaps we might allow this to move 

slowly, because this NATO enlargement is, for the most part, symbolic. 

As you have demonstrated, as all three speakers have demonstrated, we can cooperate with the aspirant states quite well 

while they remain aspirant states. Their joining NATO just may be 

pouring one more spoonful of salt into wounds that are just under 

the surface in Russia. 

But I would like to raise another issue, and this was the issue 

that I had called the Chairman about and we have exchanged 

phone calls, and it directly relates to our role in NATO, but with 

our traditional allies, and that is Europe’s policy toward Iran. We 

may want to have hearings on this before this Subcommittee, but 

it does relate to this hearing as well. 

The President of the United States has not been fooled. The government in Tehran, while it has a few titular, allegedly moderate 

leaders, is actually run by those who bring the most extreme hatred to the United States. That is why the President identified Iran 

as part of the axis of evil and the State Department identified it 

as the number one state sponsor of terrorism. That government 

takes the minimum revenues and economic strength that it needs 

to hold power and shares that with its people. Everything else is 

available for terrorism and to develop nuclear weapons that could 

be smuggled into the United States, perhaps into the Los Angeles 

area, perhaps even into eastern Ventura County. So, preventing 

33

Iran from having resources is an important national policy of the 

United States. 

Yet our traditional friends in NATO announced this week that 

they are going to begin a new very important round of trade negotiations with Iran for their own economic benefit. They announced—or, rather, the World Bank leaked 2 weeks ago that, 

chiefly with the votes of our friends in NATO, up to $755 million 

of World Bank funds, roughly 29 percent of them from the American taxpayer, are likely to be loaned to the Islamic Republic of 

Iran. 

And so the question arises: What can we do about it? Well, I will 

tell you what the last Administration did about it before September 

11th: They sent strong letters, and said we don’t agree with this, 

shrugged their shoulders, and let the World Bank loan $200 million 

to Iran in the year 2000. My fear is that we will learn nothing from 

September 11th, that we will go on and do business as usual with 

our European friends as they finance the development of nuclear 

weapons that can be smuggled in to destroy American cities. And 

then, after we lose not 3,000 people but 3 million people, we may 

ask who financed the nuclear destruction of American cities. 

Perhaps we should be exploring turning over all responsibilities 

in the Former Yugoslavia to those Western European countries 

that are financing the attacks, the future attacks and the current 

attacks against the United States, as perhaps the only thing that 

I can think of to drive home to our European friends that friends 

do not finance the destruction of their allied cities. 

So, I would hope that as we go forward with these hearings, 

there will be some comment on this, and that you gentlemen would 

explore what it would take to drive home to Europe that their new 

relationship with Iran and their hijacking of some of our taxpayer 

money for that purpose is simply unacceptable. A strongly worded 

letter, a protest press release, or a vote to get outvoted in the 

World Bank is unacceptable and will certainly not be successful in 

driving this point home. And Mr. Chairman, I hope that this Subcommittee will have hearings on Europe’s new relationship with 

Iran. 

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman from California. I yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman, for 

the purposes of an opening statement. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Chairman Gallegly for holding this very important hearing, and I welcome our expert witnesses who are here today. 

It is one of a series of hearings on the critical issue of the next 

round of NATO enlargement. We appreciate the distinguished panelists who are here before us today and we welcome their view. 

Mr. Chairman, I was an early supporter of NATO enlargement, 

before it was fashionable, as we addressed this years ago, and I 

think it is critical we keep the doors open. The last round’s entrants are among the most dedicated friends of our own Nation. We 

need their voices in NATO’s councils, and I very reasonably believe 

that this pattern will be repeated in the next round. And, of course, 

we also welcome the views of our experts with regard to Russia’s 

involvement. 

34

I am sure that some of our colleagues will have some questions, 

but, Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me to ask one question now, 

as I have to go on to another meeting in a moment. 

Is there any evidence of pressure being brought on recent NATO 

entrants or current aspirants to change their political positions on 

security matters as a way of advancing their EU membership applications which are being presently considered? In other words, 

are there EU aspirants being held hostage to decisions on military 

purchases, positions on the international criminal court, or any 

other matter in the security realm? And I would welcome, Mr. 

Chairman, if you would allow the panelists to just answer that one 

question for me. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, I assume that is a unanimous 

consent request. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BEREUTER. And, without objection. 

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

General RALSTON. Mr. Gilman, first of all, I think that is a subject that I would defer to my State Department and OSD colleagues on. I can only tell you that from a military point of view, 

I have had nothing but the absolute finest support from all three 

of the new NATO members, being the Czech Republic, Poland, and 

Hungary. I have no complaints whatsoever in that regard. 

Mr. GILMAN. Secretary Bradtke. 

Mr. BRADTKE. Mr. Gilman, we believe that NATO membership 

and European Union membership should be compatible. We support the enlargement of the European Union. We think that the 

dual enlargements that will take place this fall, NATO’s enlargement in Prague, the enlargement of the EU in Copenhagen, can do 

a great deal to strengthen the political and economic stability of 

Europe, to build this Europe that is whole and free. 

At the same time, in regards to the specific question you raise, 

I am not aware that the aspirant countries have come under direct 

pressure to make certain decisions on the securities side to advance 

their aspirations with the European Union. 

Having said that, they obviously do want to maintain good relations with the European Union. And I am sure they are looking at 

a range of their decisions, just as they are looking at decisions they 

make in their relations with us, in light of their aspirations to join 

these organizations. But I am not aware of specific decisions, specific pressures in the security area that they have come under. 

Mr. GILMAN. Secretary Brzezinksi. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I will just repeat what my colleagues have 

said, which is that we don’t see any real collision or competition between the EU and NATO. In fact, the enlargement of both organizations to Central Europe is a dynamic that reinforces security stability by promoting greater integration, political reform, military 

reform. 

Mr. GILMAN. You don’t see or hear any pressures being brought 

on any of the aspirants? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No, sir. 

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the panelists, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to intervene. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. 

35

Before we start the questions, I want to welcome representatives 

from the candidate states who are here with us today, including 

the Ambassadors from Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Latvia. Also, I want 

to welcome Albanian armed forces delegation which is here as well. 

We welcome you, and appreciate your interest and participation. 

Secretary Bradtke. Well you know, I didn’t mean to demean you. 

I can see a slander suit issued against me. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Secretary, Transparency International rates Romania as the 

region’s most corrupt country, followed by Latvia, Slovakia, and 

Bulgaria. For them, corruption discredits free enterprise and undermines the very rule of law needed in these countries. Is the Administration confident that these countries are doing all that they 

can to address this issue and this assessment? 

Mr. BRADTKE. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my statement, 

the issue of corruption is a very important one. It is an area that 

we have raised in our dialogue with all the aspirant countries, not 

just the ones that you mentioned there, because it is so damaging 

to the long-term prospects of democracy. 

We believe that the countries you mentioned—all the countries 

that are aspiring to join NATO are working very hard to deal with 

this issue. When I visited the nine aspirant countries in February, 

we had very good discussions on this issue. We urge d them all to 

continue the work they are doing. Realistically, they are not going 

to end all corruption by November in their membership in Prague. 

But what we need to see from all of them are actions, specific actions that show that they are committed at the highest level to 

dealing with the problems of corruption. 

You mentioned Romania, for example. Now they have established 

and have sought our advice on the setting up of an anticorruption 

unit to try to focus specifically on the problems of corruption. We, 

with Bulgaria, signed an agreement to provide some assistance in 

setting up a national audit office, because corruption cuts across so 

many different areas. It is in areas like licensing, regulatory issues, 

judicial systems, prosecutors. It cuts across so many of these areas 

that we are working with all of these countries to try to strengthen 

their capabilities to deal with this issue. 

So, again, I would say that they are making progress, but I 

would like to see more progress in this area, particularly before we 

get to Prague, and then beyond Prague; because, as I say, we will 

not have solved this issue by November. This is an issue that will 

need a long-term approach. But we need to see that strong commitment to dealing with this issue. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mister Secretary. 

General Ralston, again I want to thank you for your extraordinary effort to be here today. 

General, some NATO skeptics have said that global challenges 

require global security, and thus a global NATO, if the Alliance is 

to remain relevant. In your professional opinion, does NATO need 

to deploy to places like the Philippines, Sudan, or even Kashmir, 

to be relevant? 

General RALSTON. Mr. Chairman, I would answer the question 

this way. It does not need to deploy to the Philippines to be relevant. But at the same time, NATO needs to have those capabilities that, if the 19 nations decide that a threat is emanating 

36

against a NATO country, they should have that capability to go 

counter it. And I think if 11 September taught us anything, a 

threat to a nation doesn’t necessarily have to come from an adjacent nation. We had a case where a plot was hatched in Afghanistan, planned somewhere else, and executed against the United 

States, And that was an attack against a NATO country. 

So NATO, in my view, needs to have the capability to get wherever they need to go in order to counter the threat to NATO. But 

it doesn’t necessarily mean that they have to go to every place 

around the globe, only where the 19 nations would decide that 

their interests are threatened. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General. 

Secretary Brzezinski, in your estimation, how well have the candidates performed with respect to the MAP sections on defense and 

military assessments? Have the applicant countries been able to 

clearly define what capabilities each will be expected to provide to 

the Alliance? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, in terms of fulfilling the MAP, it is important to remember, one, that these are nationally defined programs. 

They set the goals for themselves; and that is an important point, 

because they are not meeting an imposed NATO requirement. 

My second—to answer your question directly, they have made 

progress. And these countries, as part of the MAP process and part 

of our bilateral dialogue, have identified forces that they are developing to make available for NATO reaction forces, and in particular—and each of them have identified units that they are focusing their resources and attention: For example, professionalizing 

the ranks so that they will be ready for NATO deployment, if not 

next year, then at least in some cases, 2006, 2007. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mister Secretary. I yield 

to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to 

thank the panel also for your presentations, which I think were 

very clear, very succinct, and very straightforward in terms of what 

to expect out of NATO enlargement. 

I guess a couple of questions I would just like to ask. I believe 

General Ralston talked about the mission as being essentially the 

same: Defending member states and deterring attacks. 

And I am wondering, with the enlargement now, is NATO looking at its enlargement within the context of its ability now to help 

reduce tensions throughout the world, such as in the Middle East 

or Africa, given some of the historical relationships? Or are we still 

looking at the mission in its narrowest terms at this point, even 

with the enlargement? 

I guess Secretary Bradtke, would you be able to give us some insight on that? 

Mr. BRADTKE. Let me respond in this way. When I said that the 

fundamental mission of NATO was to defend its members and 

deter attack on them, that is the same mission we now face on new 

threats. And how we carry out that mission is the challenge that 

NATO will face at Prague, how we carry out this fundamental mission. 

NATO needs to be able to respond, as General Ralston said, to 

threats to NATO members that come from anywhere in the world, 

37

and that is why we need some of the capabilities that Secretary 

Brzezinski mentioned. At the same time, I don’t think we see 

NATO as a global policeman, going and inter vening anywhere in 

the world, taking on any crisis. We see NATO’s fundamental mission still as defending its members and deterring attack on them. 

Now, NATO has been able to do things, and I think the General 

alluded to some of them, through the Partnership for Peace to help 

build democracy, help promote reform in areas in Central Asia 

through the Partnership for Peace. 

So again, I see NATO’s mission in those terms of function in defending and deterring attack on its members and in focusing on 

how we do that in the atmosphere we have today of new capabilities—of new threats. Excuse me. 

Ms. LEE. Just to follow up with that. But I guess now with Russia and its alignment now with NATO, I think it presents NATO, 

and really the world, with an opportunity to utilize that relationship in terms of just where conflicts may be brewing in the world. 

And is that just a role that NATO cannot play, more of a political 

conflict resolution role prior to attacks and threats and all of the 

horrific kinds of events that we don’t want to see to occur? Or is 

it strictly a reactive kind of mode that we are in with NATO, or 

that NATO is in? 

Mr. BRADTKE. I think one of the questions, whenever it comes to 

outside involvement in any conflict, is the desire of the parties to 

that conflict to have out side involvement. And so I think that 

would certainly be a question for some of the areas of the world 

that you mentioned. And we certainly work with our NATO partners to exchange views on how we can coordinate our political and 

diplomatic strategy in dealing with conflicts. Our closest partners 

in dealing with, for example, the crisis in South Asia have been our 

NATO allies, and we have tried to work very closely with them to 

coordinate our diplomatic strategies. 

But if you were talking about deploying forces using troops in 

some fashion, I don’t see a role in some of the areas that you mentioned right now. 

You mentioned our work with Russia. That is certainly very important. And if I may just come to the point that Mr. Sherman 

raised here, which I think is an important one and I feel I should 

say something about. He mentioned concerns in Russia about the 

enlargement of NATO. And I would simply say that we are in the 

process of building a very different kind of relationship with Russia, both bilaterally and with NATO. We have made the point to 

the Russians that they should not see enlargement as a threat to 

them. That it brings security and stability to their western border 

is actually in Russia’s interest. And we have established this new 

NATO/Russia Council to see how we can work cooperatively together to address issues, but working on very specific projects to 

build a pattern of cooperation. 

So to address his concern, I think that this new relationship with 

Russia is a very positive development. I do not think that we 

should delay or slow down the enlargement of Russia because—of 

NATO because of concerns in Russia. We have made clear, and the 

Russians understand this, that they have no veto over the enlargement of NATO; and I think they have reached the realization that 

38

the NATO enlargement is going to go ahead, and that we should 

concentrate our efforts on building this new relationship on the 

NATO/Russia Council. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Ms. Lee, if I may add to your question. And let 

me give you a real world example of where NATO acted 

proactively. Fifteen months ago we had a war about to erupt in the 

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. But here was a case 

where the European Union, OSCE, and NATO acted together to 

bring diplomatic pressure, economic pressure, backed up by military, if necessary, to preempt an active conflict. And as I said in 

my statement, we are not out of the woods yet, but we are a lot 

better off today than we were 15 months ago. And this was a case 

of NATO acting proactively. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. BEREUTER. The time for the gentlelady has expired, and I 

think it is my turn in any case. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony. It is very 

helpful to the Subcommittee. Several of you made mention of the 

Gerald B.H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act which I introduced, called the General Consolidation Act. But I do want to say 

to Mr. Brzezinski that your effort on behalf of bringing us great bipartisan, idealogically diverse support from the Senate when you 

were a staffer there was crucial to its passage, too. It did, however, 

take an upcoming visit of President Bush to Europe to finally remove the last holds on the legislation so we could move ahead with 

that authorization bill. 

NATO countries must focus much more effectively, through coordination and changes in their legislation enforcement, on two 

subjects: The war on terrorism, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I am hoping that in fact this is one of the 

focuses of the Administration’s intention when they are assessing 

the aspirant countries’ commitments and capabilities. 

Secretary Bradtke, you highlighted the problems of corruption, 

and I think the strengthening of the legal and judicial systems, 

dealing with conflicts of interest, and the transparency of decisionmaking really are crucial. For many of the aspirant countries, this 

is the major challenge. It is not too much on those two gentlemen’s 

shoulders; it is on the State Department’s shoulders to bring the 

resources of Justice, USAID, and your own resources to bear there 

to assist. 

In some aspirant countries the majority of the judges, who really 

are not committed to dealing with the problems of corruption, of 

inter national criminal syndicates, the drug problems, that make 

economic growth in those countries and the attraction of foreign direct investment difficult, if not nearly impossible. 

Additionally, I hope that the State Department will focus a lot 

of attention on Slovakia. It was part of the Visagrad. Slovakia fell 

out at the Madrid Summit, for reasons that we don’t need to make 

explicit here. This is a very sensitive issue as to how you avoid 

having that same thing happen again because if they are committed to democracy and all the attendant kinds of attributes of 

such a system, then we certainly want Slovakia to be a member of 

NATO. 

39

A special degree of attention needs to be given to this country in 

the upcoming months, but I understand how sensitive it is. 

Finally, Mr. Brzezinski mentioned the percentage of GNP devoted by the three most recent new members and compared it to 

the non-U.S./NATO countries. However, if you subtracted out of 

that group Turkey, Greece, and the U.K., the levels of support as 

presented through GNP from those other European or Canadian 

members is pretty pathetic, and that capabilities gaps keeps enlarging, which has all the attendant problems of inoperability. 

My questions to you, gentlemen, are to what extent are you assessing the problems and the capabilities that deal with terrorism 

and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and what can 

you do to address the Secretary General’s continued concerns about 

the lack of commitment for reducing this capabilities gap by some 

of our European allies? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, your point on terrorism and the need to 

focus more on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is 

when it hits home with the Administration. The first element of 

our new capabilities initiative is defenses against weapons of mass 

destruction. And if there is a silver lining, if one can be found on 

the war on terrorism, is that it has heightened, I believe, European 

awareness of the need to be more prepared to deal with this new 

threat, this increasingly urgent threat. 

And Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was at the MAP–D in Brussels 

gave a very hard-hitting briefing on the nexus of weapons of mass 

destruction and terrorism and states that support terrorism. And 

there was a briefing that I think I can say hit hard on allies and 

it was well received by allies. That is why it gives me cautious optimism that their willingness to move forward on a more focused capabilities initiative, emphasizing improvements in those four areas 

I mentioned—defenses against weapons of mass destruction, communications interoperability, weapons systems, and strategic lift—

is something that we have I think reason to believe that the Europeans will make more of an effort than in the past to upgrade 

those areas so that they can be more prepared themselves to work 

with us in the war on terrorism. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. 

Secretary Bradtke, do you wish to respond? 

Mr. BRADTKE. If I could just add a couple of points on the nonproliferation question as well. 

We have made clear to all the aspirant countries, there is probably nothing that could damage their candidacy more than for us 

to learn that their country had either provided or been a transit 

country, a willing transit country for some weapon of mass destruction or some exportation of sensitive technology. We have made 

this point, as I say, to all the candidate countries, and we have 

seen some positive steps in that regard, countries that are 

strengthening their licensing procedures, that are beefing up their 

customs and their border controls. We saw in the case of Bulgaria 

a passage of a new export law and, in the case of Bulgaria, an 

agreement that they have reached with us to dismantle their old 

SS–23s that could have become a proliferation of concern. 

40

So we see some positive development there. But we have made 

very clear that this is a priority issue, and this is one where these 

countries must take their responsibilities very seriously. 

I again will just reiterate that on the corruption issue that we 

share very much your point of view. This is a critical issue and one 

that will receive very close attention as we get closer to Prague, 

and that all the candidate countries need to do as much as they 

can in that regard. And on Slovakia, I would simply say that we 

obviously will watch very closely the course of events there prior 

to Prague. 

Mr. BEREUTER. General Ralston, my time has expired; but we 

would welcome your response to any part of the question. 

General RALSTON. Yes, sir. If I could just add on the need for the 

European allies to do a better job in contributing to their defense, 

Lord Robertson, as the Secretary General, has been unrelenting in 

every meeting that we have had with the nations on the problem 

and how to fix it. 

I might add that the aspirant countries in many cases are doing 

a better job than some of the older members are doing in that regard, and I think that is a cause for optimism. But we never fail 

to try to bring that point home every time that we have meetings 

with the various nations. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General. And, Secretary, the General 

has reminded us that we need to reform our Export Administration 

Act, too, as part of our element in this bargain. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SMITH. Did I understand in your testimony that you said 

that the NATO agreement was instrumental in the support of 

many of these NATO countries coming in with their assistance, 

their help after September 11th? 

General RALSTON. Mr. Smith, that is exactly right. And one of 

the things that NATO did on September 12th was invoke Article 

V, meaning an attack against one member was an attack against 

all. The NATO allies then did everything that the United States 

asked. The United States asked specifically for eight things, and all 

eight were immediately granted in terms of overflight rights, in 

terms of basing rights. 

Mr. SMITH. And this is by all 19 countries? 

General RALSTON. This is by all 19 countries. In terms of port 

visits, the NATO AWACS which came back to the United States, 

which was more than a symbolic and more than a political statement, it was real combat capability. The United States of America 

can only deploy about 11 AWACS when you talk about our test airplanes and our schoolhouse and the ones that are in depot and so 

forth. NATO sent seven deployed NATO AWACS back to the 

United States. They flew over 4,000 hours. 

Mr. SMITH. As we look at this new, if you will, broader challenge, 

rather than the original goal of protecting European security, is 

NATO becoming obsolete in terms of having more countries involved and being directed against such things as terrorism? Help 

me understand. Is there a treaty in—between the United States, 

Canada, Mexico, South America? Do we have a treaty obligation if 

Canada is attacked in some way, or vice versa? 

41

General RALSTON. Let me try that slightly—Canada is a member 

of NATO, so it is one of the 19 nations and is a member of the treaty in that regard. Canada is also involved as part of NORAD. They 

are one of the two countries, the United States, for the defense of 

North America. But we work very closely, and I think it is fair to 

say that the 19 NATO nations are part of the treaty which we work 

not only that—the standard defense, if you will; but today in this 

war on terrorism, 14 I believe of the 19 countries are involved with 

us in Afghanistan using NATO doctrine, NATO procedures. 

Mr. SMITH. How about Mexico? No, no. 

I am just saying, do we have alliances in other parts of the world 

that have the similar protection and potential of helping each other 

that should be expanded? How about Mexico? How about South 

America if they are attacked? Are there treaties that exist there? 

Mr. BRADTKE. We have a variety of arrangements, bilateral arrangements with different countries and regional arrangements. 

There is through the OAS a certain kind of regional security arrangement. I would be honest with you, the last thing I want to 

do is make statements about our regional security arrangements 

for Latin America. My colleagues in that part of the State Department would probably not forgive me. 

But I think the point I would make is that NATO is very important in the war against terrorism, is very important in dealing with 

these new threats. But there are other organizations, other relationships, that will contribute to this effort. We have heard discussion of the idea that the mission will determine the coalition. We 

will look to other countries. I think our NATO allies, as General 

Ralston said, we are going to find are very frequently at the core 

of that coalition. But we want to bring in other countries. We want 

to have the help of countries in other parts of the world. This is 

not a NATO against——

Mr. SMITH. I mean, we are looking at expansion other than 

threats from neighboring countries. So, therefore, it is reasonable 

to look at a broader NATO, not just the North Atlantic nations, it 

would seem like. 

Mr. BRADTKE. NATO as a treaty is bound geographically to Europe. But that doesn’t preclude arrangements with the Philippines, 

with countries—— Mr. SMITH. Let me an ask a question. Will reported corruption 

in Romania and Bulgaria preempt those countries from being accepted into NATO if it isn’t somehow resolved or significant 

progress isn’t made? 

Mr. BRADTKE. I would reiterate what I said in my statement; 

namely, that this is a problem in not just Bulgaria and Romania, 

but in other aspirant countries; that it is a serious problem, and 

in many ways, in my view, one of the most serious problems. All 

the countries need to do more in this regard. The Romanians and 

Bulgarians, since you mentioned them, have been working with us 

after the visit that we made in February to Sofia and to Bucharest. 

Both governments came to us with kind of an action plan, things 

they know they need to do, not just because they want to become 

members of NATO, because it is the right thing to do for their own 

countries. And so they recognize the seriousness of this problem. 

They have out lined steps that they want to take to deal with this 

42

problem. And we need to see progress, we need to see real genuine 

commitment at the highest levels of their governments. 

As I said, it is probably not realistic to think that all corruption 

in Romania, Bulgaria, any other country, including some NATO 

country, could be completely eliminated in 6 months. But we need 

to see that genuine progress and resolution and determination to 

deal with this problem. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Cooksey. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we are glad to 

have all of you here as witnesses. 

General Ralston, I was an Air Force captain when you were an 

Air Force captain. You got a few more promotions than I did. I am 

most impressed that you were a Wild Weasel pilot. That means you 

were either a very brave, a very skilled pilot, or else you were very 

crazy and very lucky, or all of the above. But, anyway. 

As the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, I would like you 

to address this question. There is obviously a large gap between 

the military capabilities of a lot of the original members of NATO 

and these aspirant members. And my question is, and in reviewing 

your statements, your written statement, you addressed this partially. But do you think that this gap can be overcome to the point 

that these new members or aspirant members can be effective 

members of NATO in carrying out the original mission of NATO, 

will they just be takers or will they be givers? If the answer is no, 

what will it take to bring them up to the level of military preparedness capability that the U.S. is at, that some of the other original 

NATO members are at? 

General RALSTON. Yes, sir. First of all, let me emphasize that the 

United States, in a bilateral sense, and the military European 

Command is working with each of the aspirants to try to help in 

every way we can for them to reform their military and to do a better job. And before I get too critical of the others, let me say, by 

the way, that we are working very hard to reform the military of 

the United States as well. So this is something that we all have 

to do. It is not just the new members. 

Let me give you a couple of examples of why I believe that the 

aspirants can add capability to NATO. Let’s talk about Bulgaria. 

Bulgaria volunteered to guard the NATO headquarters in Bosnia. 

Now, before I automatically accepted that, I said let’s go and evaluate this outfit that Bulgaria is going to send forward; and, are they 

capable of doing that? We did the evaluation; they were very good. 

Today, Bulgaria has a company guarding that headquarters. Lieutenant Jones Sylvester, the S–4 commander, the NATO commander 

there, who is on his third tour of duty in Bosnia, by the way, wrote 

me a letter that this Bulgarian country that is guarding the S–4 

headquarters is the finest company he has seen in Bosnia in three 

tours there. That says something to me. 

Let’s talk about Latvia for a moment. We think of Latvia as a 

small country with a small military, but one of the things that I 

think we need to work hard is on NSH capabilities. Latvia has a 

unique capability. Because of history, they have had to deal with 

unexploded ordnance their entire lives because of previous wars in 

43

the area. They have a world class explosive ordinance disposal capability. That is something that I think they can contribute to the 

Alliance. Whenever we need explosive ordnance troops—and we always need them—then here is a capability that a small country, 

because they are very well trained professionally, can offer real capability to the Alliance. 

I could go around each of the aspirants and give a capability 

similar to that; but they are contributing, every one of them today, 

in the Balkans using NATO doctrine, NATO tactics, and NATO 

procedures and doing an extraordinarily good job. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, that is reassuring. But for some of those of 

us that were in the military during the Cold War, it is too easy to 

remember that Bulgaria did a lot of the dirty work of the KGB. 

Hopefully, that era is passed and it is over and they are on our 

team. 

For the State Department, the two of you from the State Department, you know, it is my understanding that the original mission 

of NATO was to defend its members and deter attacks on them or 

on us. Is there a mechanism to exclude or to kick out or to reform 

or to punish a new member of NATO, or even an old member of 

NATO, if they give up these basic tenets of private property rights, 

democracy, rule of law, or worse yet, if they should prove to be involved with some of these terrorists and terrorist activities and terrorist-supporting nations, such as Iraq, Iran, and even some of 

those that are supposed to be our allies that had 15 of the 19 people flying those planes that day? 

Mr. BRADTKE. The NATO Treaty does not have a provision that 

provides for members to be expelled from the Alliance. And I think 

that there are actually some good reasons why that is actually the 

case. The countries that join NATO make a truly fundamental commitment to each other’s defense, and it is a commitment that I 

think is—in my view needs to be made without some mental reservation that, yes, we will take you in, but we might kick you out 

some day later. It is such a fundamental commitment that, in making that commitment, we need to be sure when we bring those 

countries in that they are confident that they will stay on the right 

path, that they will remain democracies, that they will carry out 

their responsibilities as allies. 

So, the treaty, as I say, does not allow for this. And it is partly 

the nature of the Alliance itself that I think would make that kind 

of provision difficult and controversial. 

I would also say that I wouldn’t want to see us weakening the 

standards, if you will; that if we knew that we could expel a member, that then we might be tempted to say, well, that country is 

not quite there, or we have some doubts; but so what? Let’s take 

them in, and then we will worry about it later. We can always kick 

them out later. As I say, I think this would undermine the strength 

of the obligations that NATO members make to one another. 

I would also say that there are cases in the past where a NATO 

country has run into problems. And I don’t necessarily want to get 

into them here, but I think what the experience that we had 

showed was it was better to have the country in the Alliance, 

where we could try to deal with the problem, so to speak, within 

the family, than to have pushed them out and isolate them. 

44

So, again, this is a problem we don’t want to see happen. It is 

a problem we need to avoid by having the highest standards we 

can when we bring Alliance members in, and to see that we don’t 

bring in a member that we will find later has some problem which 

will cause us to have difficulties with the Alliance. 

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Cooksey. I know Mr. Bereuter 

has a couple more questions. I made a commitment we would be 

wrapped up by noon. I do have one quick question, if I could ask 

General Ralston, and then we will defer to Mr. Bereuter who has 

some important questions to ask. 

General, some strategic thinkers of NATO are advocating that 

NATO create its own rapid reaction spearhead force of some 25,000 

deployable mobile troops, trained and equipped to react to external 

threats anywhere in the world, basically at a moment’s notice. Do 

you believe this is a necessary force to deploy? 

General RALSTON. Mr. Chairman, let me answer the question 

this way. I believe that NATO needs to improve its capability to 

move troops rapidly wherever they need to be moved, whether it 

is within the area of the Alliance or should it be somewhere else. 

Now, NATO has taken some steps to do just that. Several 

months ago, the NATO member countries started standing up highreadiness force headquarters. These are land core headquarters, 

deployable combined air operation centers, and deployable highreadiness force maritime headquarters, all under a combined joint 

task force, should it be necessary. We are in the process of evaluating these land headquarters now. One of them has already met 

and been certified for its final operational capability. We have five 

others that will be certified by the end of this year, assuming they 

pass their evaluations. And I believe this is a very positive step forward for the Alliance so that you can rapidly deploy combat forces 

wherever you need them and do it quickly. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. But you don’t see an exact number, an arbitrary 

number of 25,000? 

General RALSTON. No, sir. I think the Alliance needs to have 

whatever forces we need. And I wouldn’t restrict it to 25,000. We 

have got over 50,000 serving in the Balkans today. So, I think we 

need to have the capability to have the proper command and control and the proper headquarters to do that, and we’ll add those 

forces as necessary. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, General. 

The gentleman from Nebraska. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Chairman. I noted with some interest 

that Amber Fox is being extended through October, and I am glad 

that the North Atlantic Council has decided to do that. It was at 

the request, of course, of Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia 

and the President. 

I am wondering to what extent that may be the assessment that 

the European Union’s force, the ESDP, is not ready. If you want 

to comment on that, that is fine. However, I think the most important question that I need to address to you relates to the new 

NATO-Russia Council. 

As we debate the legislation that Chairman Gallegly will be introducing in this Committee, and as the Senate takes up its ratifiVerDate May 01 2002 13:53 Jul 29, 2002 Jkt 080289 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\061902\80289 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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cation responsibilities for the decisions on accession for the amendment of the NATO Treaty, I think this is a subject that will be of 

some controversy and debate. We need to establish at this hearing 

a legislative record of what you three experts believe we should 

consider with respect to the creation of the new NATO-Russian 

Council which formed in May. I might say that I am supportive, 

based on my experience, but I do think we need a record of your 

best thoughts about this subject. 

That would be my last question, but I think it is one we need 

to address from you. 

General RALSTON. Mr. Bereuter, let me address it from my perspective this way. I have watched for the last 5 years, when we had 

the Permanent Joint Council from the NATO/Russia Founding Act 

of 1997. And I might say that while from a military perspective, 

our relationship between NATO military and Russian military has 

progressed quite well and we are serving side by side, as you know, 

in Bosnia and Kosovo and have been for a number of years, and 

I am very pleased with that activity, and I have a Russian general 

at my headquarters, and we work very closely together. 

On the political side, the Permanent Joint Council I think came 

up short of where its intentions were. And I use as a measure of 

merit that in every Permanent Joint Council meeting that I ever 

attended, when people left the room they were more upset than 

when they entered the room. And if you do that for 5 years, that 

is not good in the long term. 

So I think the attempts at the NATO/Russia Council at 20 certainly is a step in the right direction, and I am hopeful that it will 

be in the right direction. 

I would like to add one other thing, though, to put it in perspective. And let me go back to a meeting that we had 2 weeks ago of 

defense ministers in Brussels. We started that meeting in the 

morning by setting the table for 18 people. And those are the 19 

NATO members, minus France, because France, as you know, is 

not a member of the integrated military structure, and we discussed military issues among those 18. 

Once that was completed, we reset the table at 19 places. France 

rejoins, and you discuss the political issues and the issues of the 

Alliance. 

We then reset the table at 20, and Russia joined. And the agenda 

had already been agreed by the 19 NATO members or else the subjects didn’t come up, and the issues were discussed at 20. And, I 

might add, it was done in a much better atmosphere than the Permanent Joint Council had been done before. 

And then the table was reset at 19, plus 27, with the 27 members of the partner—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council had 46 

ministers of defense around the table discussing the issues. I think 

it was a very positive development. 

So the NATO/Russia at 20—and the reason for my long story 

here is not just every time that NATO meets, it meets at 20; NATO 

meets at 18, it meets at 19, it meets at 20, it meets at 46. And each 

of those are, I think, useful forum—a useful forum for discussion. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Secretary Bradtke. 

Mr. BRADTKE. I would just add a couple of points on the NATO/

Russia Council. I think one of the things that impressed me in the 

46

process of negotiating the NATO/Russia Council, and that makes 

me somewhat optimistic about the prospects for it being a productive council and doing some important work, is the spirit in which 

it was negotiated. 

The ministers in December of last year tasked themselves with 

putting this Council together. That, I thought, was a very ambitious tasking. And for some of us who were involved and worried 

about how we were going to carry out this tasking, we were wondering whether they had put too short a deadline in, saying it will 

be ready by the ministerial in May at Reykjavik, and in fact, because of the constructive approach on the NATO side and the Russian side, we were able to come up with the formula for the Council, its organization, a work program, and its rules and procedure. 

So I think that is a very good sign for future accounts. 

I will just echo some of the General’s comments; namely, that 

NATO still, of course, protects its rights, its prerogatives to act at 

19. It still has the ability to carry out Article V without a Russian 

veto. The subject of enlargement that we have talked about here 

today is not a subject that will be discussed by the NATO/Russia 

Council or decided by the NATO/Russia Council. 

So the focus of the NATO/Russia Council and the measure of its 

success will be how well we work together on specific projects. And 

we have a work plan that was agreed at Reykjavik and then formally approved in Rome, in areas like counter-terrorism, weapons 

of mass destruction, missile defense, civil emergency preparedness, 

search and rescue. And if we can make progress in working together on these specific areas, we can build those patterns of cooperation that I think will serve very well the development of 

NATO and Russia relations. 

You raised Macedonia. I would just touch on it briefly to say that 

at Barcelona earlier this year, the European Union said it would 

be prepared to take on the mission of Amber Fox provided—or on 

the understanding, I should say, that the elements that are in 

place for cooperation between NATO and the European Union. As 

we sit here today, those elements are not in place. There needs to 

be more work on those elements. 

We also from our perspective—and General Ralston is certainly 

in a better position to address this point, but we need to be sure 

that if there is an EU mission in Macedonia, that the command arrangements are such that it fits seamlessly with the fact that 

NATO has a presence in Macedonia. So that is another concern of 

ours that we would want to see satisfied before we would be prepared to see a NATO—an EU mission in Macedonia. 

Mr. BEREUTER. I think that is a proper step to take, to be sure 

that it is ready. It is not a very auspicious start for the European 

Union. 

Secretary Brzezinski, you have probably heard about and 

thought about Russian-NATO relations all of your life. What are 

your thoughts on this? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I guess I would add to my two colleagues 

the emphasis that Bob put on practical initiatives. And what I tend 

to do when talking about the NATO/Russia Council and the new 

relationship that is evolving between NATO and Russia is compare 

47

what was signed at Rome last month to what was signed back in 

Paris in 1997. 

Back in 1997, it was a well-intentioned initiative, but was an initiative that focused on, I guess, priorities that are global in nature. 

They generated expectations that were extraordinarily high. You 

may recall the long list of some 56 issues that were going to—or 

initiatives that were going to be undertaken by the NATO/Russia 

relationship. And the resolve was expectations that rose high, but 

there was very little follow-through, particularly on the Russian 

side. And this whole cathedral collapsed into a ruin of disillusionment, disappointment, and resentment. 

And what is different about the initiative undertaking this time 

around is the Administration and the Alliance is trying to focus it 

very much on a limited set of practical bits of cooperation. My colleague mentioned a number of them. It is only about a dozen. And 

the idea is to have projects that have a beginning and an end, have 

been accomplished, and that are measurable; because, if you can do 

that, you can thereby have the foundation blocks for a relationship 

based on accomplishment, and accomplishment can lead to more 

trust, and then maybe on to higher end issues. 

That is why I am somewhat more optimistic about this initiative 

than the previous one. 

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, gentleman from Nebraska. 

I want to thank all the Members of this Committee for their participation today. It certainly was better attended than our others. 

We have had three very informative hearings on NATO expansion, 

and the participation of the Committee was much appreciated 

today. Particular appreciation to the gentleman from Nebraska. I 

look to him for counsel on a regular basis. 

I want to thank the witnesses. General Ralston, again, thank you 

for the trek. Secretary Bradtke—and I am going to have to live 

with that one for a while. Secretary Brzezinski, it is an honor to 

have you on the other side of the table. Thank you very much for 

your participation. And, with that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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