Building 

Productive 

Relationships 

with the Media

Dealing with New Media 

Culture During Crisis 

Situations

Stephen Handelman

Director, Center on Media, Crime and Justice

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY

Joe Domanick

Associate Director, Center on Media, Crime and Justice

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY

Lecturer in Journalism, USC School of Journalism and 

Co-Instructor, CA Post Command College

Building Productive 

Relationships with 

the Media

Dealing with New Media Culture 

During Crisis Situations

Stephen Handelman

Director, Center on Media, Crime and Justice

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY

Joe Domanick

Associate Director, Center on Media, Crime and Justice

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY

Lecturer in Journalism, USC School of Journalism and 

Co-Instructor, CA Post Command College
This project was supported by Cooperative Agreement Number: 2007CKWXK020 awarded by the Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do 

not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, 

companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of 

Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of December 2011. Given that URLs and websites are in 

constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity.

ISBN: 978-1-935676-53-9 

February 2012
Contents

About the COPS Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 .       . .                                                                          

1

Acknowledgments 2

Introduction 3

PART I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Dealing with the Media in a Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Silence is Not Golden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Keep the Chief Front and Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Ten Do’s and Don’ts of Using Social Media to Communicate with the Press . . . . 5

PART II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Case Study: “A Perfect Storm” May Day, Los Angeles, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

The Pre-Crisis Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The LAPD and its Metropolitan Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Community and Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Defusing the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Taking Control of the Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Emphasizing Transparency 15

Lessons Learned . 

Last Thoughts: Operating on the New Media Frontier . 

Further Reading . 

Appendix A: Police-Media Roundtable List of Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Letter from the Director

Dear Colleagues,

In an effort to examine the many issues of concern and the current trends in regard to community policing 

and media relations, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, through its Leadership Academy and the 

Center on Media, Crime and Justice, conducted a police-media roundtable for the Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) in 2010. This roundtable discussed the emergence of new 

media and social networking technologies that have dramatically changed law enforcement relations with 

the press. In addition to the police–media roundtable, John Jay College of Criminal Justice conducted a 

case study on police–media relations featuring the Los Angeles Police Department and the 2007 “May 

Day” confrontation.

The COPS Office understands that the Internet and social networking technologies have dramatically 

transformed the way the press interacts with law enforcement. The emergence of a constant stream of 

news—at any time of the day—has prompted law enforcement to adapt community policing to the 

web. They’ve had to achieve a better understanding of how the “new media” environment can help law 

enforcement improve relations with the communities in which they serve, and a window has opened for 

law enforcement to use social networking on the web for their own media purposes. 

By developing effective strategies in media relationships, law enforcement will gain the advantage of 

strong relationships with internal, external, and political audiences. The discussions and observations 

at this roundtable and the case study (presented here in this report) are important steps toward 

institutionalizing effective change within policing. I am proud to be able to share this resource with you 

now, and hope you all reap its benefits.

Sincerely,

Bernard K. Melekian, Director

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component 

of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community 

policing by the nation’s state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies 

through information and grant resources. 

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support 

the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively 

address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, 

social disorder, and fear of crime. 

Rather than simply responding to crimes once they have been committed, community 

policing concentrates on preventing crime and eliminating the atmosphere of fear it 

creates. Earning the trust of the community and making those individuals stakeholders 

in their own safety enables law enforcement to better understand and address both the 

needs of the community and the factors that contribute to crime.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement 

agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy 

cutting-edge crime fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing 

strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to 

community members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement. 

The COPS Office has produced and compiled a broad range of information resources 

that can help law enforcement better address specific crime and operational issues, 

and help community leaders better understand how to work cooperatively with their 

law enforcement agency to reduce crime.

•	 Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested nearly $14 billion to add community 

policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support 

crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help 

advance community policing. 

•	 By the end of FY2011, the COPS Office has funded approximately 123,000 additional 

officers to more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies across 

the country in small and large jurisdictions alike.

•	 Nearly 600,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government 

leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.

•	 As of 2011, the COPS Office has distributed more than 6.6 million topic-specific 

publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs. 

COPS Office resources, covering a wide breath of community policing topics—from 

school and campus safety to gang violence—are available, at no cost, through its online 

Resource Information Center at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This easy-to-navigate website is 

also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms. 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the support and advice of Robert Harrison, course 

manager, California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training Command 

College (CA POST Command College); William Bratton, former chief of the Los 

Angeles Police Department (LAPD) 2002–2009; and Frank Straub, public safety 

director, Indianapolis. This report is based in part on a symposium, “The Police and 

the Media: Building Trust and Mutual Understanding: A Conversation between Cops 

and Journalists,” held June 8, 2010, co-sponsored by the COPS Office; the Center 

on Media, Crime and Justice (CMCJ) at John Jay College of Criminal Justice; and 

the Indianapolis Public Safety Department, at Indiana University–Purdue University, 

Indianapolis, Indiana. A list of participants in the symposium can be found in the 

appendix to this report.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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Introduction

The emergence of new media and social networking technology has dramatically 

changed law enforcement relations with the press. Not only has it added a new 

dimension to the skills already needed in today’s 24/7 “all-news-all-the-time” media 

culture, but also it increases the chances of missteps—particularly in crisis or 

emergency situations. 

At the same time, it has created new opportunities for police managers in furthering 

police/community/media relations. 

Part I of this report offers general guidelines designed for police executives and public 

information officers operating in this new environment. It focuses on (1) dealing with 

the current media culture during crisis situations and (2) offers “do’s and don’ts” for 

using social media in communicating with the press. Both sets of guidelines should 

be considered essential components in any long-term strategy for building productive 

relationships with the media in your community. The guidelines are based on the realworld experiences of senior police managers and on research by media technology and 

law enforcement experts. For more detailed information and further reading, this report 

also provides a list of references and additional resources. 

Part II provides a real-world example of crisis management, which involved the use of 

both traditional and new media by then Los Angeles Police Chief William J. Bratton 

following the “May Day” 2007 confrontation involving LAPD officers, media, and 

demonstrators at Los Angeles’ MacArthur Park.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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PART I

Dealing with the Media in a Crisis 

Silence is Not Golden

Standard Public Information Officer (PIO) 

responses to media inquiries when a crisis 

occurs have typically included: “that’s under 

investigation;” “we’re looking into it;” or “it’s 

ongoing.” These work poorly in an age when 

the media is able to tap a wide variety of nonofficial sources online almost instantly. A lack 

of transparency breeds mistrust and is seen as 

hiding something. 

Instead, a more productive and proactive approach is to gain control of the story as 

early as possible, emphasizing that the information is preliminary. Such a response 

should follow the general format of: “this is preliminary information, it may change, 

but here is what we believe to be true at this time.” By being frank and repeatedly 

emphasizing the preliminary nature of the operation, a police department can avoid 

any appearance of cover-up, and be perceived as working with the media, rather than 

at cross-purposes to it.

Establishing a media strategy aimed at taking control of the message should be among 

the first steps in a crisis. Senior staff should be involved from the beginning of an 

incident—mapping out a strategy, determining what information can be safely revealed, 

and identifying and targeting key media sources in the community, as well as others 

with an interest or stake in the incident. 

As the story proceeds through various investigative phases, police managers and 

executives should make themselves regularly available to media inquiries, perhaps 

through the establishment of a crisis line, an online forum or FAQ page, or periodic 

press conferences that use interactive web conferencing technology such as Skype. 

The least desirable result is to leave a vacuum. If the police are not talking to the 

media, they will get a story from somewhere—even if it is the wrong story.

Keep the Chief Front and Center

A key part of the media strategy mentioned above involves establishing the proper 

roles to be played by individuals in the department’s command structure. The chief 

should be the principal spokesperson at major junctures of the investigation, from the 

very beginning (as opposed to reacting to events or revelations). His or her comments 

to the media will inevitably lead coverage and will often be the headline as well. The 

chief should also be a visible figure on the department’s web page. Using the chief’s 

primary position in this way provides extraordinary leverage for ensuring that the 
 

 

 

 

Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations 

department’s position remains front and center, as well as balancing negative comments 

from other sources. In most cases, this plays well with the media’s sense of professional 

responsibility to provide both sides of the story. 

An important element in reducing tensions is reaching out to all stakeholders with a 

variety of meetings—and letting the press know you’re doing it. Stakeholders include 

all organizations, groups, agencies, and individuals concerned about, or impacted by, a 

negative police incident. Insofar as possible, making the press aware of these efforts 

will reduce the emphasis on tension and conflict. It may also be useful to open some of 

those meetings to press coverage. 

Ten Do’s and Don’ts of Using Social Media to Communicate 

with the Press

 Many of the guidelines noted above take on special 

importance, and require extra skills, in an environment 

where social media tools such as Twitter, Facebook, and 

other networking technology can have a larger and more 

immediate (and sometimes negative) public impact than 

traditional media outlets such as newspapers, radio, and 

TV. Proactive police executives need to be well-versed in 

these tools—and be willing to learn from younger 

members of their department who may have 

greater facility and familiarity with them. 

1. Do Your Research 

The long-term loss of advertising, readers, and viewers has combined with the current 

deep recession to cause a crisis in the traditional news industry. Staff layoffs and 

shortages, in turn, have placed a premium on superficial or sensational crime news 

coverage in the “mainstream” media. In particular, the loss of veteran beat reporters 

has contributed to a fall-off in consistent, in-depth coverage of criminal justice in many 

communities. Meanwhile, the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated interactive 

websites, such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, Tumblr, and Twitter, has enabled police 

personnel and public information officers to avoid the “traditional press” in trying to 

get their message out. 

But an increasing amount of good journalism is now on the web. Many professional 

journalists have gravitated to local or national websites. An increasing number of 

cities and communities have online news sites, either funded commercially or with 

non-profit support. 

Some examples: 

◾ The Voice of San Diego 

◾ The St. Louis Beacon 

◾ The Texas Tribune (www.texastribune.org) 

— 5 — 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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There are similar sites which post video or broadcast reports, such as Current TV, and 

a number of non-profit centers for crime and general reporting, such as: 

◾ The Center for Investigative Reporting in California 

(http://centerforinvestigativereporting.org/); 

◾ The Wisconsin Watchdog of the Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism. 

Some sites are supported at schools of journalism or universities devoted to Criminal 

Justice, such as The Crime Report of the John Jay Center on Media, Crime and Justice. 

And more are added every day. A new national network of such sites was formed this 

year—the Investigative News Network—which has 40+ members, and is still growing. 

Pay attention to these sites and other similar groupings as they emerge. Make contact 

with those in your community and state. Such sites are often training grounds for new 

reporters, and can provide useful information about evolving approaches to coverage 

and media issues. Researching the principal new-media players (and sites) in your 

community and state will enable PIOs and managers to develop ongoing partnerships 

that can strengthen credibility, and enable the development of long-term relationships 

with the next generation of journalists. 

2. Do Get Hyper-Local 

One of the newest trends in the online community is the “hyper-local” site. Established 

by a media, church, or community organization, it focuses on neighborhoods 

(sometimes block by block) or community-level coverage of events. The “granularity” 

(specificity) of such sites often encourages citizens themselves to act as reporters, 

providing news, provocative opinions, photos, videos, etc. Many are oriented toward 

specific ethnic communities. They are important message-deliverers at the front lines 

of public safety issues, and are a crucial connective opportunity for your department. 

A proactive media relations unit will seek out such sites and develop informational 

links with them. A local precinct, for example, could post a link or regular feature on 

such issues or ideas as “questions about local policing,” relevant crime trends in the 

neighborhood, opportunities for local youth, etc. 

3. Do Use Niche Sites, Discussion Forums, and Tweets to Generate 

A skillful use of new media entails generating wider coverage by identifying key target 

audiences that form spontaneously around specific stories or topic areas. The following 

example shows the potential: a traffic accident investigator became a media focal 

point by simultaneously tweeting reporters about the accidents he was investigating, 

including when and where he’d be doing the investigations. This saved him from having 

to answer individual phone calls asking the same questions, and kept the reporters 

better informed and up-to-date. 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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It turned out that the public was also interested. More than 4,000 of them followed 

his tweets, enabling him to supplement his media outreach; go directly to the public; 

to generate his own news; and to localize and organize different populations. It 

also presented the potential for quick information gathering—enabling him and his 

department to tap into what people were saying about the job local law enforcement 

was doing in general, and in specific areas like traffic control, Neighborhood Watch, and 

graffiti abatement. This information can give departments valuable clues about how 

they might want to shape their message, their policing strategies, and their conduct. 

4. Do Build a Social Network

Frontline police officers can attract 

positive and informed coverage by creating 

their own “interactive communities” or 

“fans” on public safety issues crucial to their 

community. A Toronto police officer used Twitter 

to build a network with local youth, focused 

on graffiti control and legal graffiti events. It 

was an effective part of community policing crimeprevention, but it also helped him get reporters 

to write about his efforts. He also acted—in effect—as a reporter and videographer, 

sending out press releases on Twitter to the media and the kids at the same time. 

The stories he generated were picked up by local media—even though they were not 

traditional “news.” A department should consider allowing officers to develop social 

media networks with suitable policy guidelines.

5. Do Fight Fire with Fire 

The old police adage, “be careful out there,” now has a new corollary, “be careful what 

you do out there, because everybody’s watching and recording.” A 2010 confrontation 

between Los Angeles police officers and bicyclists gathered to protest the Gulf of 

Mexico oil spill was caught on citizen video and posted on YouTube under the title 

“Hollywood Cops Attack Bike Riders.” Viewed over 73,000 times, it inflamed the 

cycling community and brought a public apology by LAPD Chief Charley Beck during 

appearances at a number of local bicycle clubs. This was good proactive community 

oriented policing—but in the new media age, when each minute can bring a new 

online headline development, Beck could also have considered bringing a video camera 

crew with him and posting his meetings and remarks immediately on MySpace and 

other outlets. Exploiting the new social media’s “always-on” status to develop a media 

response strategy can defuse a crisis, thereby making a positive out of a negative.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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6. Don’t Be Virus-Susceptible

Everyone knows that viruses can create an epidemic. That’s especially true of social 

media today, when a sensational (or wrong) story publicized online can quickly go 

“viral”—often making it impossible to “walk back” a story, or correct misperceptions 

and errors. Police agencies should therefore anticipate the inevitability of noteworthy 

or critical incidents involving their organization making headlines, and/or going viral, 

and develop policies and procedures appropriate to meet the emerging demands and 

news cycle. Policies should include “what if” scenarios to help guide the actions of 

field personnel who will most likely be the initial representatives of the agency in a 

crisis response.

7. Don’t Let the Mob Get the Upper Hand

Another example of learning to adapt to emerging norms in the use of social media is 

provided by the “flashmob” disorders experienced by the city of Philadelphia, as well as 

many other cities, beginning in 2009. Flashmobs are large groups that were originally 

intended for fun—people would spontaneously gather in public places (train stations, 

public squares, etc.) to dance to amplified music, and then dissipate. Flashmob dance 

events, announced on the Internet and through other social media, were usually 

peaceful. But Philadelphia marked one of the first major incidents of violence. Crowds 

disintegrated into groups and blocked traffic, harassed others, fought, and prompted 

a police response. Arrests were made and city authorities asked the FBI to help 

identify those responsible for the incidents. Police should train personnel to monitor 

trends in social media in their communities, with a view to staying alert to potentially 

problematic situations emerging on social platforms that could impact public safety, 

and work with online media to defuse them.

8. Don’t Forget: Nothing Is Private on the Internet 

Nothing is lost or invisible on the Internet. When using social media tools, or posting 

on a web page, it must be assumed that exchanges and comments can be accessed 

publicly—and can be searched by the media. It is therefore crucial to avoid posting 

anything that could embarrass a department or compromise an officer’s ability to do 

his or her job. Department policy should make this clear. Serving officers should also 

be aware of the danger that they may be creating unwanted perceptions of bias in the 

community or press if they belong to discussion groups and forums, or “friend” persons 

that advocate particular points of view. 

9. Don’t Throw Web Tantrums 

 Anyone who spends more than a few minutes online knows the web is an attractive 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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concept should be to remind public safety employees that a tactful, honest, direct, and 

informative approach is always preferable to an angry response, inappropriate humor, 

or statements that could be interpreted as demeaning, dismissive, or condescending. 

The policy design should be simple and direct—a structured guide for appropriate 

agency members to use to respond in a concise, logical, and systematic manner. It 

should include option guides on whether to respond or not; how to respond should you 

so decide; how to share your agency’s successes relevant to the topic; and how to rectify 

a situation with a reasonable solution. (See notes in the “Further Reading” section to 

access a matrix model.)

10. Don’t Cover Up Failure 

There are few secrets in today’s media environment. 

Anything can and will be leaked. The chief and 

senior managers should make plain that trying 

to sweep things under the rug to protect the 

department or avoid potential lawsuits will turn 

out to be counterproductive. 

Admitting mistakes or errors of judgment, when 

applicable, should be a conscious strategy, since 

it will strengthen the long-term credibility of 

the department, especially in an environment 

where other opposing sources have equal and 

instantaneous access to media online. In the 

words of former LAPD Chief William Bratton, 

“You’re not going to be able to cover things up or 

hide anything, so why try? Go where the truth takes you.” An open-media strategy can 

enable the command leadership to turn negatives into positives by creating widespread 

public support and boosting department morale—as well as strengthening rank-and-file 

support for any internal changes deemed necessary. 

A Special Tip: Develop an Online Image

An important issue the department’s online policy should consider is how the agency wishes to define 

its “virtual identity.” Each member of staff “is” the organization when he or she posts; so policies must 

consider limitations, depictions (visual presentations of the agency, city, uniforms, etc.), and how to 

separate personal opinion from department policy in statements, posts, or tweets made to others. 

The agency should consider establishing formal responsibility to manage its web presence. This 

should include procedures created to ensure accurate information is posted, that traditional and 

emerging media are informed, that the public has access to desired information, and that there is 

consistency across the spectrum with regard to what is posted, to minimize instances where the 

“agency” might disagree with itself from post to post, or from division to division.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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PART II

Case Study: “A Perfect Storm” May Day, Los Angeles, 2007

On May 1, 2007, between 15,000 and 25,000 demonstrators protesting U.S. 

immigration policies staged a peaceful march in downtown Los Angeles. About 7,000 

of them marched west to MacArthur Park, an island of tranquility located in the gangplagued, poverty-stricken Central 

American immigrant neighborhood of 

Pico Union. The crowd, accompanied 

by a contingent of Spanish-language 

and other reporters, reached the park 

about 5:00 PM, when a small group 

broke away and began an impromptu 

mini-march. A team of Los Angeles 

Police Department motorcycle officers 

immediately forced the marchers back. 

In response, about 15 to 20 people 

started throwing sticks, bottles, and 

pieces of cement at the officers. At 

about 6:17 PM, with only a barely 

discernible dispersal order being 

given to the crowd from a helicopter 

overhead, and then only in English, 

the LAPD Metropolitan Division, an elite crowd-and-crime-control unit of helmeted 

officers dressed in full riot-control gear and specially equipped with “non-lethal” 

rubber bullets, beanbag rifles, and 3-foot-long batons, formed a wide skirmish line. 

They then waded into the crowd, with a show of force, as they fired off rubber bullets 

and beanbag rounds. 

According to the LAPD’s special report to the Los Angeles Police Commission on the 

incident, there were “more than 100 uses of batons” (baton strikes), “146 less-thanlethal impact rounds” fired into the crowd, and “246 individuals [who] claimed injury 

from...broken bones to bruises and...emotional distress.” Although a number of the 

injured were taken to local hospitals, there were no life-threatening injuries or deaths. 

Eighteen officers were treated for abrasions and contusions.

The media and community uproar over what was called by some the May Day 

“police riot” and by others the May Day “melee,” forced Los Angeles Mayor Antonio 

Villaraigosa to return quickly from a foreign trip. And it put into question the leadership 

of LAPD Chief William J. Bratton, who had taken over the force just 5 years earlier as a 

reformer (and who was widely expected to be rehired when his term expired in June). 

Over the next several weeks and months, Bratton’s management approach, primarily 

his emphasis on transparency and accountability, helped defuse the crisis. 

© 2000–2009 Los Angeles Independent Media Center

May Day 2007, Los Angeles.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

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The following case study examines Chief Bratton’s response to the crisis, and draws 

lessons and best-practice strategies that are applicable to other police forces and 

public safety bureaus around the country in dealing with the media when faced with 

similar crises. It is based primarily on interviews with Bratton, as well as with senior 

LAPD police officials and “The Los Angeles Police Department Report to the Board of 

Police Commissioners ‘An Examination of May Day 2007.’”

© Jose Gil / Shutterstock.co

Chief William Bratton being interviewed in 

Los Angeles.

The Pre-Crisis Background 

Despite his success in transforming the Boston Police 

Department, the New York City Transit Police, and the 

New York City Police Department, William J. Bratton had 

not been welcomed by some of Los Angeles’ most powerful 

political players when he was hired as an outsiderreformer in 2002. Nevertheless, after almost 5 years as 

chief of the LAPD, he’d managed to turn skeptics into 

believers by forging alliances with many of department’s 

best-informed and most respected critics, including 

constitutional and civil rights attorneys, the ACLU, and 

prominent leaders of LA’s African-American community 

who’d been highly critical of the LAPD for decades. He 

also hired Gerald Chaleff, a liberal defense attorney and 

former president of the Los Angeles Police Commission, 

to oversee compliance with 100 mandates of a federal 

“consent decree” overseen by a federal judge (see The 

LAPD and its Metropolitan Division on page 12). 

Bratton had walked a tightrope between forging ties with 

the African-American community and activist groups 

like the ACLU, and improving troop morale. He was able to rejuvenate officer morale, 

and build a trusting working relationship with the LAPD’s union—the Police Protective 

League—which had been in a bitter political battle with his predecessor.

Crime, moreover, had dropped dramatically on his watch. From 2002 through 2006, 

serious crime in LA—homicides, rapes, assaults, and robberies—declined 34 percent. 

Murders dropped nearly 39 percent, and gang killings by almost 30 percent. 

The result was that when he attended his last public confirmation meeting for 

reappointment to a second 5-year term as LAPD chief on the eve of the incident, there 

was no real opposition. 

Bratton was at home during the incident, and initial reports he received from his 

commanders about the rally did not raise any suspicions. But he quickly changed 

course after he received an urgent call from Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, who was 

on an official trip to Central America and had been pressed by local reporters with 

questions about live video of the rally showing police officers shooting into the crowd. 

After checking the situation, Bratton called the mayor and advised him to cancel 

the remainder of his trip and return home. He also lost no time in holding a press 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 12 —

conference and holding separate interviews with key media outlets. In remarks that 

irritated members of his own force, he told Los Angeles’ KNX-AM Newsradio, one of 

southern California’s most widely listened-to stations: 

Quite frankly, I was disturbed at what I saw. Some of the officers’ actions...were 

inappropriate in terms of use of batons and possible use of non-lethal rounds fired.

The LAPD and its Metropolitan Division 

At the time of the incident, the LAPD was in the fifth year of a federal “consent decree,” 

overseen by a federal judge, which the U.S. Department of Justice had imposed in 

2000, alleging a “pattern and practice of police misconduct.” Bratton had devoted an 

enormous effort to convincing the judge overseeing compliance that the department 

was making substantial progress—particularly in setting consistent use-of-force policies, 

a key concern of the decree. He needed more time to comply with the 100 mandates of 

the decree, but fully anticipated successfully doing so, when disaster struck. The police 

attack in MacArthur Park would make convincing the judge that much harder.

Bratton had also paid special attention to the 

often-difficult relationship between the LAPD 

and the media in his first term as chief. In 2000, 

during the Democratic National Convention, the 

LAPD’s Metro Division had battled demonstrators 

and reporters. The MacArthur Park incident 

showed there was still work to be done, 

particularly in the LAPD’s Metropolitan Division, 

which had achieved a fearsome reputation under 

one of Bratton’s predecessors, the late Darryl 

Gates, who had once described Metro’s mission as 

going out to “roust anything strange that moved 

on the streets.” Bratton would later describe 

Metro as “the heart of the LAPD culture that people complained about: the insensitivity, 

the brutality, the idea that they could use force without consequence, and the feeling 

that they were divorced from and not part of the community.” Busy with more pressing 

reforms, Bratton had never gotten around to transforming the division.

The Community and Media

The reaction of LA’s press, public, and political establishment was outrage and 

incredulity. Press commentary and political opinion was united in raising the question 

about why there had been such a brutal and arbitrary response to a relatively minor 

and limited provocation by a few individuals in the crowd. The reform-minded Los 

Angeles Police Commission, the mayor, and members of the City Council, felt they had 

been blindsided by a police force that most everyone assumed had learned its lessons 

from previous controversies. 

© Bruce C. Murray / Shutterstock.c
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 13 —

The MacArthur Park events particularly raised alarms in the city’s influential and 

vocal Latino community. National immigration policy was already a combustible 

issue in the Los Angeles area. A year earlier, on May Day 2006, the city’s immigrant 

communities came together in what observers described as one of the largest political 

demonstrations in American history. An estimated 500,000 people had staged a protest 

march against proposed congressional measures that many immigrants felt were not 

only deeply threatening, but also racist. Although the 2007 march drew considerably 

smaller crowds, tensions were still high. Representatives of every Los Angeles Latino 

immigrant group were present at the march; so the police action virtually united the 

entire community in opposition to the LAPD. Even worse, since videos of the police 

response had been widely broadcast in Los Angeles, the nation, and around the world, 

MacArthur Park became an international and national headline story (as the mayor 

had discovered on his trip)—to the discomfort of the city’s political leaders. Decades of 

careful work on building trust with the Latino community threatened to fall apart. 

There was also a serious impact on media–police relations. The fact that members of 

the media had suffered some of the more significant assaults meant that they were now 

reporting a story in which many of their own had been victims. During his first 5-year 

term, Bratton had implemented a careful media strategy that described the rights of the 

media and the obligations and responsibilities of officers to respect those rights. That 

strategy appeared to be in ruins.

Defusing the Crisis

Chief Bratton, as the responsible law enforcement executive, was faced with a set of 

three immediate and virtually simultaneous challenges, making the crisis—in Bratton’s 

own words—a “perfect storm, a crisis at every level.” These challenges were:

1) Responding to, and healing of, community and political tensions.

2) Rebuilding trust with the media in order that, among other goals, it could be used to 

address challenge 1.

3) Motivating senior police commanders to address the structural and policy problems 

raised by the incident, while rebuilding shattered morale among rank-and-file 

officers who again felt embattled in a hostile community. 

Challenge 3 represented a particularly trying task for Bratton, since it was crucial 

to demonstrate that the LAPD was prepared to acknowledge the errors in policing 

demonstrated at MacArthur Park—and to remedy them—in order to have any hope 

of successfully addressing the first two challenges. Many officers, particularly in the 

Metro Division, had been unhappy when Bratton publicly responded to the incident 

with an unequivocal condemnation of their actions. There were, as a result, calls for a 

vote of no confidence in his leadership—which would not only have been personally 

embarrassing, but also would likely have further divided the community and the police.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 14 —

During his first 5 years, Bratton had cultivated an excellent relationship with the 

Los Angeles Police Protective League, the police union. That relationship now faced 

rupture. Historically, the union was accustomed to the LAPD presenting a united front 

to defend itself in response to previous use-of-force incidents. Hearing their own chief 

publicly condemn a large group of officers was an unpleasant break with “tradition.” 

And there was an additional factor: the early evidence suggested that the use of force 

against the demonstrators was not the result of a few officers breaking ranks, but 

instead had apparently been authorized and supervised by sergeants, lieutenants, and 

a deputy chief who had been on the scene. Mid-level police management’s apparent 

disregard of the community oriented police strategies that Bratton had brought to 

Los Angeles raised questions about the effectiveness of his leadership, and re-opened 

doubts about whether federal supervision had made any real headway on reforming 

department practices. 

Taking Control of the Message

The nature of the “perfect storm” crisis meant that Bratton had to deal effectively with 

a number of constituencies at the same time: the media; rank-and-file cops; their union; 

the Latino immigrant community; the Police Commission and Inspector General; the 

federal judge monitoring the department; the mayor and city council; and civil liberties 

and other police watchdog groups. It was, Bratton recalled later, like “trying to change a 

flat tire while racing down a highway at 60 miles an hour.” 

A key element in his approach was the recognition that the three challenges were 

closely inter-related, and that addressing them required an integrated strategy. A 

second key element was recognizing that a successful response required, above all, a 

skillful media strategy that acknowledged accountability and promoted transparency—

even at the short-term risk of alienating his own department. His successful strategy 

entailed five key responses. 

On May Day evening, Bratton met with all of his senior staff to map his strategy moving 

forward. With hundreds of hours of footage showing his officers assaulting a defenseless 

crowd, Bratton quickly grasped the reality of the situation, and defused the uproar by 

becoming the most outspoken critic of the department’s actions. Declaring the action 

“the worst incident of this type I have ever encountered in my 37 years” of policing, 

he announced to reporters that “we can’t and won’t tolerate” police officers treating 

community members and journalists in such a manner again. He pointedly refused to 

engage in the “circle-the-wagons” and “admit-no-wrongdoing” approach that had too 

often been the LAPD’s strategy in previous crises.

Bratton asked the head of his Internal Affairs Department and the Inspector General 

to meet him at MacArthur Park in the hours following the incident. He wanted the IG 

to immediately start to monitor the Internal Affairs’ investigation. In Los Angeles the 

Inspector General is the investigative arm of the policy-setting, mayoral-appointed 

civilian police commission. And Bratton wanted commission members to know 

from the start that he had no intention of hiding anything from them. He ordered a 

comprehensive, transparent investigation that included gathering all the video of the 

event, re-staging some of the use-of-force incidents at great expense, and conducting 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 15 —

interviews with participants, victims, and the department’s senior leadership. He also 

asserted leadership by publicly demoting and reassigning the highest ranking officer 

at the scene and reassigning the second ranking officer. He then ordered immediate 

department-wide retraining in crowd control and in understanding the media’s role and 

the department’s responsibility to the media. 

He institutionalized reform by mandating the development of new criteria in crowd 

control in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Justice and the Human Relations 

Commission. The criteria would later become part of the curriculum of LAPD Police 

Training and Education units. He also directed a public information officer to convey 

in Spanish to the Spanish-language media outlets the department’s commitment to 

investigate the entire MacArthur Park incident. 

Emphasizing Transparency

In keeping with his proactive approach to the media, Bratton decided that the 

investigation of the incident should be as transparent and as thorough as possible. As 

he explained, it was necessary to counteract the traditional “old-school belief that you 

need to protect the department, sweep things under the rug, and not talk to the media.” 

He continued:

I’ve never been a part of that school, even though I grew up in an era when it was all 

about that notion. Similarly, the idea that you’re opening the city up to great [financial] 

liability [because of the potential cost of law suits] was the last of my concerns—it 

wasn’t even a concern. I’ve always told my cops, give me a good story, and nobody can 

tell it better. Give me a bad story and I’m going to tell that bad story. 

Transparency was not only the right way to proceed, Bratton believed, but the most 

effective way forward. As Bratton said: 

There are no secrets today—none. Any piece of information can and will get leaked. 

You’re not going to be able to cover things up or hide anything, so why try? Go where the 

truth takes you. Did you consciously engage in an [illegal or out-of-policy] act, or make a 

mistake in judgment? Often it’s not a conscious act; you made a mistake, admit it. 

Over the next several weeks Bratton and/or his surrogates met with a wide variety of 

stakeholders: the media (including the editors of local newspapers); the news directors 

of local television and radio stations (particularly the Spanish-language stations); the 

mayor, police commission, and city council; police-monitoring groups such as the 

ACLU; and numerous community groups (with the press in attendance)—anyone, in 

other words, whom Bratton felt could offer insights and/or help him “calm the waters.” 

Bratton was able to find receptive audiences for his outreach because of the good will 

and trust he’d built with his major constituencies BEFORE the incident. Two examples 

illustrate this:
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 16 —

May Day 2007, Los Angeles

© 2000–2009 Los Angelel Independent Media Center

THE SPANISH-LANGUAGE MEDIA.

Bratton had been very accessible to 

the Spanish-language and other Latino 

media, and was known as a progressive 

on immigrant-rights issues. He’d been 

a steadfast supporter of a city directive 

ordering police not to ask crime victims 

or un-arrested suspects about their 

immigration status; and had advocated 

allowing undocumented immigrants 

to obtain drivers’ licenses. When 

combined with his actions in the days 

following the May Day confrontation, 

there was consequently little animosity 

from the Latino media directed at 

him—and ultimately at the department 

as a whole. Several weeks after the event, Bratton walked into a San Jose, California, 

hotel ballroom packed with hundreds of members of the National Association of 

Hispanic Journalists. “There were by then no questions to be asked because we had 

been so available to them,” recalls Bratton. “They could have been hostile, but they 

weren’t. That’s why stonewalling and circling the wagons is so [counter-productive].” 

THE POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE. Bratton invited leaders of the Police Protective 

League to attend all staff meetings. League officials had used their considerable political 

clout to oust the previous chief. Bratton wanted them on his side. He used the media to 

talk directly to them about how serious he was in fighting violent crime and gang crime. 

Then he made a speech at the police academy and laid out common-sense disciplinary 

standards. “The era of gotcha [in terms of discipline] is over,” he announced. “If you 

make a mistake, I’ll retrain you; if you’re careless, I’ll punish you; but it will be fair 

and proportionate. But if you’re corrupt or brutal, I’ll prosecute you.” The speech 

effectively cleared the air and was widely quoted within the department. Because of his 

relationship with the union, says Bratton, its leaders were relatively restrained in their 

comments, which indicated a “degree of trust they had in me and my leadership team.”

Lessons Learned 

The successful strategy adopted by Chief Bratton can offer useful guidelines for police 

and public safety agencies facing similar crisis situations. The strategy involved both an 

image-rebuilding exercise and substantive changes in department procedures based on 

recommendations produced from a subsequent internal investigation. It provided the 

space and comfort zone to allow the LAPD to fully investigate its own actions. This was 

a key aim of the exercise. 

Bratton’s approach was based on his philosophy of making a “positive out of a 

negative.” Previous controversies involving the LAPD had been subjected to special 

“blue-ribbon” outside investigations. Bratton didn’t want that. Instead, he saw the 

MacArthur Park incident as a perfect opportunity to demonstrate that the department 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 17 —

was making progress in a key requirement of the consent degree: proving it was capable 

and trustworthy of investigating itself under the oversight of the Inspector General and 

Police Commission. By starting early and gaining control of the situation, Bratton was 

able to make his department’s investigation the officially accepted one. 

But these short-term steps would have been unlikely to succeed without the recognition 

that they took place in the context of a long-term community oriented policing strategy. 

Arguably, the department was fortunate in that the foundations for such a strategy had 

already been laid prior to the crisis. 

The opportunity was important for Bratton. He felt that he had begun to change the 

insensitivity that the whole department was accused of. Officers on the street were 

interacting much better with the community, and looked like the community: 45 

percent Latino, 15 percent black, and over 20 percent female. But Metro was still one of 

the last holdovers of the old LAPD. So Bratton “stood down” the entire Metro Division 

until they could be retrained. He met with the division for an intense 90-minute 

meeting. Bratton promised them the investigation would be fair and that “nobody was 

going to be hung out to dry.” But, he added significantly, “MacArthur Park had looked 

very, very bad,” and he intended to do what was necessary to make sure it didn’t 

happen again. 

Bratton enlisted LAPD Deputy Chief Michael Hillmann to co-author a comprehensive 

public report highly critical of Metro’s actions. Hillmann, one of the department’s most 

highly respected officers among the troops, had helped create the Metro Division and 

remained one of its strongest supporters. Following his report, the officer in command 

at the park was demoted and “within two days,” says Bratton, “was gone from the 

department.” The second highest ranking officer was reassigned.

Institutionalizing the elements of that short-term and long-term strategy within a set 

of best practices, and a proactive effort to develop the knowledge and skills needed to 

employ such a strategy, are essential tools to help police and public safety managers 

navigate a crisis. As noted above, the key component of such a strategy involves the 

media.

Here are some of the essential short- and long-term media best practices Bratton drew 

from the episode: 

Senior police management needs to be in constant and open contact with the 

media, particularly during a crisis. 

Bratton made himself and other department spokespeople frequently and readily 

accessible. As he explained:

One of the things you don’t want to do with a big media story is to leave a vacuum,

because if you’re not talking to the media, somebody else is.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 18 —

The principal spokesperson should be the chief. Again, Bratton’s conclusions:

Any time the chief is talking to the media, his comments will lead the story, and be the 

headline. If a chief is available to answer all the press questions, he’ll suck up a lot of 

the oxygen in the room and wear out the press (while having the opportunity to repeat 

his story).

The language used is important. “Preliminary” is a key word to use, Bratton 

emphasizes.

You can go public early if you always start off by saying “this is preliminary information; 

it may change, but based on preliminary information, here is what we think we know at 

this time.” Remember, the story will change, it always does. The first story I got about the 

incident at MacArthur Park was not the right story. It was a much, much bigger story. 

Build a trusting relationship with the media prior to a crisis. 

Early in his tenure Bratton hired a former reporter to head the department’s Media 

Relations Section, which is staffed from 4:00 AM until 12:30 PM. Media relations 

staff are also on call on a 24-hour basis to respond to serious major incidents. It also 

coordinates semi-annual meetings between the media and the chief of police, to help 

built trust. That helped enormously in defusing the crisis.

During a crisis, don’t pull punches. Bratton states:

First and foremost, [it’s imperative that the media] trusts that you’re going to tell them 

what you can, when you can, and you’re going to tell them honestly—that you’re not 

going to purposefully deceive them, or send them in a wrong direction. 

These short-term approaches, in order to be successful, must be wedded to the 

department’s long-term goals.

Use the media during a crisis to advance the department’s long-term community 

policing strategy. 

Once he arrived at MacArthur on May Day evening, Bratton took his first steps toward 

getting his message out. Wanting to insure that the situation wouldn’t escalate further, 

he approached a group of demonstration leaders who were already speaking with the 

media. He promised them a comprehensive investigation, asked for their cooperation, 

and expressed regret for what had happened, while “right off the bat, telling the media 

the same thing.” By engaging with (and not avoiding) reporters, he used the media to 

begin to promulgate his message. 

Aftermath

The official LAPD report on its investigation of the MacArthur Park events was 

published in October 2007. The investigation involved 41 Internal Affairs investigators 

and consumed over 4,700 hours. It identified 26 officers who “may be subject to 

potential discipline.” In keeping with his media strategy, Bratton ordered the highly 

critical report placed on the LAPD’s website. At the same time, Bratton publicly 

accepted responsibility for not having addressed some of the issues that caused the 

event, before it occurred. 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 19 —

The report was widely acclaimed for its transparency and honesty. The department 

used the report, Bratton said,

to break the back of the old LAPD culture. The department had been accused for years 

of insularity and provincialism. By admitting those mistakes, we were able to then correct 

them and retrain the entire department in every area, as a reflection of how seriously we 

took the incident.

In July 2009 a federal judge lifted the LAPD’s decade-long consent decree, effectively 

ending federal oversight. The following September, Bratton resigned as LAPD chief to 

pursue a career as an international law enforcement consultant. 

Last Thoughts: Operating on the New Media Frontier

“Police agencies have to recognize that positive relationships with the press and the 

outside community are important,” says the Police Foundation’s Karen L. Amendola. 

“One of the things that’s needed is transparency. The term ‘internal affairs’ always 

bothered me. When you’re talking about people’s complaints, about the services that 

are provided, or lack thereof, that isn’t an internal affair. And that’s why citizens get 

upset. They want more transparency...to know what’s going on. [Police must be] 

forthright and provide information to the community....If you explain things to them, 

that will go a long way.” 

Nowhere is this more true than in the challenge of dealing professionally with webbased media. Many critics suggest that online platforms have given a license to 

unprofessional, un-sourced, and biased reporting. This is unfortunately true in many 

cases. New media technology represents a new unregulated frontier, and it requires 

cautious and smart public information policies. At the same time, the emergence 

of new dimensions of professional journalism online represents a rich resource that 

can advance a department’s transparency policies, and improve its image and its 

relationship with the community—but only if police executives and officers are trained 

in the appropriate skills that can help them navigate this new frontier. 

It’s also important to remember that the old rules of good police–media relations in 

the era of “traditional journalism” continue to apply in the new era. If public safety 

personnel are honest in their relationship with the press, and never knowingly deceive 

them, when a crisis occurs they’ll tend to take the police account seriously. 

Maintaining an atmosphere of trust and transparency is, therefore, as important to good 

media relations in the new media age as it was in the old. 
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 20 —

Further Reading

Clavette, Larry, David Faggard, Paul F. Bove, and Joseph S. Fordham, n.d. New Media 

and the Air Force. U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Agency, Emerging Technology Division. 

A matrix of guidelines and suggestions for dealing with blogging, produced by the 

U.S. Air Force, the document (with sample blogs) is available in PDF form. 

A more basic matrix designed to respond to all social media is the U.S. Air Force 

“Social media triage.” http://twitpic.com/1fl6vi/full

Standards and Practices Committee. 2009. The Los Angeles Times Social Media 

Guidelines for Editorial Employees. Los Angeles Times. November 19. 

Although designed for reporters, the issues of integrity and avoiding incidents that 

may embarrass you or your agency are remarkably similar.
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 21 —

Appendix A: Police-Media Roundtable List of Participants

Indianapolis, IN

June 8, 2010

Indianapolis Police Department/John Jay College Center on Media, 

Crime and Justice (CMCJ)

Held at: IUPUI (Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis) 

Campus Center

STAFF/SPEAKERS

Stephen Handelman

Director, CMCJ

shandelman@jjay.cuny.edu

Joe Domanick

Facilitator, CMCJ

domanick@usc.edu

Bob Harrison

Facilitator, CMCJ

bobharrison@cox.net

Bill Bratton

Former Chief of LAPD

bill.bratton@altegrityrisk.com

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Paul Ciesielski

Chief of Police

X7130@indy.gov

Brian Sanford

Chief of Fire Department

SB6079@indy.gov

Frank Straub

Director, Public Safety

FSTRAUB@indy.gov

Carolin Requiz-Smith

Chief of Staff/Deputy Director

CREQUIZ@indy.gov

Mark Wood

Planning and Research

Wood.mark@indygov.org

Darryl Pierce

Assistant Chief of Police

P7078@indygov.org

Ronald Hicks

Deputy Chief (Operations Division)

H9915@indy.gov

Teri Kendrick

Animal Control Administrator

TKENDRICK@indy.gov

Amber Myers

Assistant Administrator, Animal Care

almyers@indy.gov

Valerie Cunningham

Deputy Chief 

(Training & Professional Standards 

Division)

C1548@indy.gov

William Benjamin

Deputy Chief (Investigations Division)

B5827@indy.gov

Gary Coons

Homeland Security Administrator

gcoons@indy.gov
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 22 —

Thomas Koppel

Commander (North District)

K9682@indy.gov

Peter Mungovan

Commander (Northwest District)

M6405@indy.gov

Karen Arnett

Commander (Downtown District)

A6504@indy.gov

Clifford C. Myers

Commander (Southeast District)

M9978@indy.gov

Chad E. Knecht

Commander (East District)

X6421@indy.gov

Michael Bates

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police 

Department (IMDP)

B3214@indy.gov

Jeff Duhamell

IMDP Public Information Officer

D7349@indy.gov

Linda Jackson

IMDP Public Information Officer

20092@indy.gov

Fred Pervine

Asst. Director Fire Prevention

P8043@indy.gov

Maura Leon-Barber

Department of Public Safety Public 

Relations Manager

melon@indy.gov

Robert Vane

Mayor’s Office 

MEDIA ATTENDEES

Steve Jefferson

WTHR Channel 13

sjefferson@wthr.com

317.655.5778

Ruthanne Gordon

WISH-TV Channel 8

Ruthanne.gordon@WISHTV.com

317.687.6541

Russ McQuaid

Fox 59

rmcquaid@fox59.com

317.687.6541

Rafael Sanchez

Channel 6

Rafael_sanchez@theindyhannel.com

317.269.1440

John Tuohy

Indianapolis Star

John.tuohy@indystar.com

317.444.2752

Brandon Perry

Indianapolis Recorder

Brandonperry2004@yahoo.com

317.809.1473

Jose Gonzalez

La Voz

Jgonz0724@cs.com

317.423.0957

Cinthya Perez 

Radio Latina

cinthya@wedjfm.com

perezc84@gmail.com

317.924.1071

cell 317.459.4086

Amos Brown

Radio One

abrown@radio-one.com

317.266.9600
Building Productive Relationships with the Media: Dealing with New Media Culture During Crisis Situations

— 23 —

Abdul Hakim-Shabazz

WXNT

attyabdul@gmail.com

317.218.2241

Cory Schouten

Indianapolis Business Journal

CSchouten@IBJ.com

317.634.6200

Jack Rinehart

6 News-WRTV

jack_rinehart@theindychannel.com

317.635.9788

IUPUI 

Bob Dittmer + 3 students

Director of Public Relations, IU School 

of Journalism

rdittmer@iupui.edu

Paul Norris

Chief (Security) IUPUI

317.274.2058

OTHER ATTENDEES

Bill Reardon

Indianapolis Airport

breardon@indianapolisairport.com

317.496.2404

Ben Hunter

Butler University

bdhunter@butler.edu

317.508.0688

Frank Anderson

Sheriff

SH20728@indy.gov

Ryan Vaughn

City Council

rvaughn@indy.gov

R. Weigand

ISP Assistant Superintendant

rweigand@isp.in.gov
Building Productive Relationships with the Media is a report discussing how the web and social networking technology have 

dramatically transformed the way the press interacts with law enforcement and affects community policing. The emergence of a 

24/7, “all-news-all-the-time” media culture has produced strains and missteps on both sides. However, a better understanding 

of how the “new media” environment works can help senior police managers and public information officers improve relations 

with the communities in which they serve, and help rank-and-file officers avoid pitfalls. A case study of how the Los Angeles 

Police Department defused tensions following the 2007 MacArthur Park incident shows that building an atmosphere of trust 

and transparency remains as critical to building productive relations in the new media age as it was in the old.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

145 N Street, N.E.

Washington, DC 20530

To obtain details on COPS Office programs, 

call the COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770.

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov.

February 2012

ISBN: 978-1-935676-53-9 

e121127423