F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT March 2, 2006 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1559 7

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C . Do ck et No . 0 2 -0 0 0 3 8 -C R- 0 1 -R WS UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Plaintiff-Appellee, ve rs us W ILLIAM EMM ETT L ECROY, JR ., D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (M ar ch 2, 200 6) Be fo re T JO FL A T , A

N D E RS O N and M A RC U S, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. AN DE RSO N, Circuit Judge:2

The def endant/appellant , W illiam Em m ett Le Croy , Jr . ( “ Le Croy ”) w as co nvi ct ed in the F ed er al D istri ct

Co urt i n th e N orthe rnD istri ct of G eo rg iaof taking a m otor vehicle from a person, Joann L ee T iesler, by force and violence resulting in her death, in viol ation of 18 U.S .C. § 2119 (3) (“ carj acking”). Af ter the penalty

phase, the j ury

returned a death sentence. L eCroy filed a m otion for a ne w tri al , whi ch was d en ie d. L eC ro y appe al s to thi s C ourt onthe f oll ow ing se parate iss ue s, c la im ing the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed : ( 1) by f ai lin g to c onc lud e that R ing v. A ri zo na , 536 U . S. 584 , 122 S. Ct . 242 8 ( 2002 ) re nde re d th e Fe de ra l D eath P en al ty A ct unc onst itu tio na l, (2) by ref using to give a j ury

instruction on "sim

ple" carj acking as a lesser inc lud ed of fe nse , ( 3) by

uph old ing his c onvi ct ionde spi te ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce , ( 4) by a dm itt ing 13 y ear old

e vid en ce a lle ge dly

se iz ed in vio la tio n of

the 4th A m en dm en t, ( 5) by

im pr ope rl y a dm itt ing e vid en ce of

ba d a ct s f

ro m 199 1, in vio la tio n of

F ed er al Ru le of

E vid en ce 404 (b ), ( 6) by a llo w ing af

ed er al a ge nt t o testify as to his op inion about blo od transfer patterns on a piece of the victim 's cl oth ing , ( 7) by

pr ev en tin g th e pr es en ta tio n of m iti ga tin g e vid en ce in vio la tio n of the 8th Am endm ent, ( 8) by adm itting evidence of aggravating circum stances that
w en t be y ond the iss ue s pr es en te d inthe gov er nm en t’ s N oti ce of

I nte nt t o S ee k th e D eath P en al ty , and f

ina lly ( 9) by ins tr uc tin g th e j ur

y ina cc ur at el y

on theL eCroy also filed a c halleng e to the method of se lectingjurors in the Northe rn 1 District of Ge org ia, spec ifically in the Gainesville Division. He c laimed that Hispanics we re under- repr esente d in the master jury whee l from which the pe tit jury and grand jury

is drawn. L eCroy ’s claim fa ils because he fa iled to proffe r any evidenc e of the rele vant population–the perc entag e of the Hispanic population that is elig ible for jury service . Our c ases have held that the re levant compa

rison is the differ ence betwee n the per centa g e of the distinctive gr oup among the population elig ible for jury service and the pe rce ntag e of the distinctive gr oup on the jury whee l. United States v. Grisham, 63 F .3d 1074, 1078 (11 Cir. 1995); United States v. Pepe, 747 th F .2 d 6 32 , 6 49 (1 1 Cir . 1 98 4) . T hu s, we ne e d n ot a dd re ss L e Cr oy ’s se ve ra l argume nts th challeng ing the jury

selec tion. 3 nons ta tut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor of f uture dange ro usne ss. 1 Af ter careful consideration of all of the issues, w e re j ect ea ch of L eCroy 's arg um en ts , andaffi rm

hi s co nv ic ti on an d s en te nc e o f de ath. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Mr. Le Croy

is on death row for the m urder of Joann Tiesler

in October 2 0 0 1 , b u tev en t s th at o cc u rr edwe l l b ef o re h erd ea th ar e r el ev an tt o th i s ca s e. We be ginin 1989 , w he n L eC ro y w as 19 y ears of

a ge . A ft er

le av ing the A rm

y , L eC ro y sp en t t im e atth e h om e o f hi s m ot he r an d s te pf at he r, Don na an d S am

Hou st on . H oust on h ad

tw o da ught er s, one of

w hom , A le ci a, w as 13 y ears old and l ive d w ith he r fathe r. L eC ro y

and A le ci a be gan ase xua l r el at ion shi p th at the pare nts discovered in Janu ary

of 1990. Ale cia's m other–Sam Houston's form er wife –urged the autho rities to prosecute Le Croy for statutory

rape. A ro und the sam e tim e, Co bb C ounty pol ic e w er e inv es tig at ing ase ri es of bur glari es in a re sid en tia l ne ighbor hood oc curr ing in la te 199 0 and e ar ly 199 1, and4

Co bb C ounty

D et ec tiv e K ev in F ly

nn i de nti fi ed

L eC ro y a s asus pe ct . O n M ar ch3, 1991 , L eC ro y

w as arr es te d f

oll ow ing atr af

fi c sto p. I n hi s c ar

pol ic e fo und a holst er and gu n and several hand-wr itten not es. One of the notes described a plan to "rob cars and kill peopl e driving so the car can be used two or thre e day s." Ano th er l is te d s te ps to tak e in cas e o f be in g c ha se d, i nc lu di ng "b ur gl ari ze h ou se ," "fl ee an d s wit ch cars ," "b e ru th le ss an d fa m ou s," an d " rap e ro b a ndpi ll ag e [s ic ]. " Athi rd doc um en t ha d " H -L " wri tte n a t the top and c ont ai ne d ali st o f nam es ; au th or it ie s co nt en de d t hi s was a "h itli st " o f pe op le LeCro y want edto ki ll . T he inv es tig at ionand e vid en ce dis co ve re d inL eC ro y ' s c ar r es ult ed in
m ult ipl e state c harg es , and a uth or iti es de ci de d to sim

ult an eo usl y

pr ose cu te L eC ro y fo r his r el at ion shi p w ithS am H oust on' s da

ught er and f or bur glary . I n Augus t of 1991 , L eC ro y

w as se nt t o pr iso n inG eo rg iaf or a ggr av at ed

a ssa ult , bur glary , c hil d
m ole statio n, and s ta tut or

y r ap e. A s he w as se rv ing his se nte nc e fo r tho se c ri m es , he wa s charged and convicted und er f ederal law of poss ession o f a saw ed-off shotg un, an item

he had obtained du ring one of the burglaries. H e served an ad di ti on al fiv e y ears in pri so n, t hi s t im e in a fed eral faci li ty. L eC ro y w as r el ea se d f

ro m f ed er al c ust ody

in A ugus t 20 01. Upon his relea se, he began serving a three-y ear term of supervised probatio n and m oved int o th e hom e of

his m oth er

and s te pf athe r, Mr . H oust on, on C he rr y L og M ount ai n5

in Gil m er Co un ty, Geo rg ia . A s ac ondi tio n of

his sup er vis ed r el ea se , and b ec au se of

his pr ior convictio ns for statutory

rape and aggravated child m olestation , L eCroy wa s or de re d to und er go a

psy ch ose xua l e va luatio n inS ep te m be r of 200 1. L eC ro y pr em at ur el y le ft the e va luatio n, and o nly

a gr ee d to r et

ur n to sub m it to the te sti ng af te r be ing w ar

ne d by his pr obatio n of

fi ce r that he r isk ed

be ing se nt b ac k to pr iso n if he r ef use d a ga in. T he e va luatio n w as r es ch ed ule d f or O ct obe r 22nd , 200 1. T he gove rn m en t arg ue s th at

de spi te a gr ee ing to be r et es te d, L eC ro y ha d de ci de d to fle e. In the we eks preceding Ms. T iesler's death, L eCroy 's stepfather wa s growing concerned about his s tepson's behavio r. Mr. Houston testified that LeCro y sp en t a g reat de al of t im e o n t he co m pu te r, rare ly leav in g h is be dr oo m . L at er inv es tig at ionof

the c om put er sho w ed that i t ha d be enuse d to se ar chf or sur viv al ge ar , and t o sc anand c opy Mr . H oust on' s pa ssp ort. O n th e ba ck of the le tte r sc he dul ing his or igi na l ps y ch ose xua l e va luatio n, w hic h w as late r fo und by po li ce, LeCr oy wrote ou t a “ ne edto acq ui re” l is t o f it em s h e in te nd edto co ll ect . The se in cl ud edbi no cu la rs , bo ot s, g lo ve s, g un s, amm un it io n, an d fo odan d wat er. O n F ri day , O ct obe r 5th , D onna and S am H oust on l ef

t L eC ro y a lon e at the Ch er ry L og c ab in, inf

or m ing him that the y w oul d be gon e unt il the nig ht o f6

O ct obe r 8th . T his w as the f ir st t im e sin ce his r el ea se f ro m pr iso n th at

Mr . L eC ro y w as le ft a lon e at the hom e. Ase ri es of

r obbe ri es on C he rr

y L og M ount ai n oc curr ed ove r the w ee ke nd o f O ct obe r 5th– 7th, 200 1, inc lud ing the the ft of
m ed ic al supp li es , a sh ot gu n, an d a m m un it io n fr om

ho m es in th e n ei gh bo rh oo d. Se ve ra l w ee ks b ef

or e Ms . T ie sle r w as kil le d, L eC ro y pur ch as ed

c am ouf la ge m ak eu p and p la sti c ca

ble ti es . T he gov er

nm en t c ont en ds tha t the pur ch as es and the r obbe ri es w er e part

of L eC ro y ’ s pl anto co lle ct the it em s f

ro m his ne ed to acq ui re l is t an d fl ee t he co un try. I t i s un dis put ed

that at so m e poi nt o n th e ev en ing of S unday , O ct obe r 7th , L eC ro y br oke int o th e hom e of

Joann T ie sle r, w ho l ive d inthe sam e ne ighbor hood as L eC ro y ’ s st ep fathe r. E nte ri ng thr oughabe dr oom w ind owthat ov er loo ke d a porch, L eCroy

took st eps to return the open bli nds of the window to their original posi tio n so that i t w oul d lo ok undi sturb ed f ro m the out sid e. A t the ti m e of the br eak- in, L eC ro y

w as arm ed

w ithaloa de d sh otg un, akni fe , and p la sti c ca ble ti es . Ms. T iesler had spent the wee kend in Rom e, Ge orgia at the house of her fi an ce e. A ro und 5:4 0pm on O ct obe r 7th , T ie sle r w as se endr ivi ng u p th e m ount ain toward her

cabin. She entere d her hom e and placed her purse on an island in the kitchen. Soon after that Le Croy

attacked her, striking her in the back of the head w ith the sho tgun and discharging it in the hallway outsid e herThe wr iting on the map sa id: “Please plea se plea se for g ive me Joanne [si c]. You 2 wer e an a ng el and I killed y ou. Now I

have to live with that and I can ne ver g o home. I am a va g abond and doome d to hell.” Th e no te sa id: “ Ple a se c a ll the po lic e and re po rt thi s v e hic le a s st ole n. Th ank s, 3 The Thief

.” 7 bedroom . He boun d her hands behin d her back w ith cable ties and strangled her
w ithan e le ctri ca l c or d. S til l a liv e, Ms . T ie sle r w as str ipp ed of he r unde rw ear an d fo rc ed to kne el a t the f

oot of he r be d, w he re she w as r ap ed and the n ana lly so do m iz ed . Sem en fou ndin Ties le r's bo dy was id en ti fie d a s t ha t o f LeCro y . Af ter ra ping her, Le Croy

slashed Tiesler’ s throat with the knife. Doctors determ ined that thi s was likely the fatal w ound , a s the knife severed the external jug ul ar v ei n, ri gh t i nt ern al jug ul ar v ei n, an d ri gh t ca ro ti d a rte ry , pen et rat in g d own to T ie sle r’ s c er

vic al ve rt eb ra e. F ina lly , L eC ro y sta bbe d T ie sle r fi ve ti m es in the back and wiped his knife off on her shirt. She w as left naked and boundon her be d, an d was di sc ov eredth e n ex t d ay by a co-wo rk er an d areal est at e ag en t. Af ter killing Ms. Tie sler, Le Croy took h er key s and her car , a Ford Ex p l o r e r , l o a d e di tup wi th s o me s up p l i e s , an dh e a d e df o r C an a d a . Tw o d ays later, on Tuesday , O ctober 9th, 2001, Le Croy wa s captured at the border betw een Minnesot a and Canada driving Ms. T iesler’ s vehicle. I nside po lice found a knife stained with Tiesler ’ s bloo d; a m ap with w riting on the back; a separate w ritten 2 note; and plastic cable ties like those LeCr oy used to tie up Ms. Tiesler . Police 38

al so d isc ove re d tw o un spe nt s hot gun she lls , boo ts, f ood, w at er , a m

m uni tio n, gl ov es , andot he r it em s fr om LeCro y 's n eedto acq ui re l is t. Le Croy wa s indicted in the United State s District Court f or the Norther

n District of G eorgia on May 15, 2002 for taking a m otor vehicle by force , violence, an d in tim idatio n f

ro m Joann T ie sle r re sul tin g inhe r de ath, in vio la tio n of 18 U . S. C. §21 19 ( 3) . Asup er se din g in dic tm en t a dde d sp ec ia l de ath- el igi bil ity al le gatio ns s ubse que ntl y

f ound by the gr an d j ur

y on Augus t 13 , 200 2. Be fo re tr ia l, L eC ro y

f ile d ase ri es of

m oti ons, a ll of

w hic h w er e de nie d. L eC ro y w as c onvi ct ed

on M ar ch1, 200 4. A t the c onc lus ionof the se nte nc ing phase, the j ury

returned a death sentence, and LeCr oy wa s rem anded to federal custodyat the U nited States Penitentiary in Ter re H aute, Indiana. T his appeal fo llo w ed . II. DISCUS SION

A. T he Constitu tionalit y of the Feder al D eath Penalty Ac t L eC ro y m ak es tw o c onst itu tio na l arg um en ts. W e re vie wc ha lle nge s to the constitu tionalit y

of a statute de novo . U nit ed S ta te s v. S co tt, 263 F . 3d 1 270, 127 1 (11 Cir. 2001 ). Aconcise summ ary of the rele vant provis ions o f the Fe deral th D eath P en al ty

A ct ( “ FD PA ”) w ill a id o ur

dis cu ssi on. T o r en de r L eC ro y e lig ibl e fo r the de ath pe na lty

und er the F D PA , the gov er

nm en t w as r equir ed

to pr oveOther c ircuits have so he ld. See United States v. Allen, 406 F .3d 940 (8 Cir. th 4 2005); United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278 (5 Cir. 2004); United States v. Ba rnett, 390 th 9 be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt any

one of the statut or

y int en t f ac tor s se t ou t i n 18 U. S. C. § 359 1(a)( 2), and in add ition wa s required to prove any one of the statutory ag gr av at ing f

ac tor s se t ou t i n § 3 592( c) . S uc h pr oof w oul d r en de r L eC ro y

e lig ibl e fo r the de ath pe na lty . I f no § 359 2 st at uto ry a ggr av at ing f

ac tor is fo und to e xis t, the n th e de ath pe na lty

is not auth or iz ed . 18 U . S. C. § 35 93( d) . I n a ddi tio n to statutory aggravating circum stances, the governm ent m ay prove nons tatutory ag gr av at in g c irc um st an ces . 18 U.S.C. § 3 59 2( c)(l as t s en te nc e), § 35 93 (a). How ever, the governm ent m ust giv e notice pursuant to § 3593 (a) of both st atutory an d no nst at

uto ry a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s. I d. , § 35 92( c) ( “ T he j ur y , or if the re is no j ury , the c ourt, m ay

consider whether any

other aggravating factor f or which notice has been given exis ts.”) . Fi rs t, L eC ro y

arg ue s th at

the F D PAis fa ci al ly

unc onst itu tio na l un de r the Indictm ent Clause of the Fif th Am endm ent because it does not require prosecutors to c harg e ag gr av at ing f

ac tor s inthe ind ic tm en t. I n th e ins tant c as e, the superseding indictm ent did charge all statutory aggravating factors w hich the jury found. T herefor e, for purposes of this decisio n, w e can a ssum e argu en do , w ith out expressly deciding, that at least one statutory aggravating factor m

ust be includ ed in the ind ic tm ent. T his f orm s th e pr ed ic at e fo r L eC ro y ’ s arg um en t, and this 4F.3d 775, 784- 88; but see United States v. Wills , 346 F.3d 476 ( 4 Cir. 2003). Also, in an th analog ous context, t his circuit has indicated that if the sente nce a ctually imposed was incr ease d on the basis of a

particula r fa ct beyond the statutory maxi mum otherwise per

missibl e abse nt that fac t, then that fac t should be included amongthe fa cts cha rg ed in the indictment. United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1278 a nd n.52 (11 Cir. 2001) (en ba nc). A lthough we need not th decide the issue in this case, a car eful prose cutor will of cour se cha rg e in the indictment the rele vant statutory

ag g ravating c ircumstance s. 10 predicate is based upon Ring v. A rizona, 536 U.S . 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002), Apprendi v. N ewJersey , 530 U. S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), and Jones v. U nited States, 526 U.S . 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999). F rom this predicate L eCroy

derives his arg um en t tha t the F D PAis inc onsi ste nt w ithRi ng i n th at Ri ng i s th e culm ination of Suprem e Court case lawand its progenywhich contem plates that facts which increase the statutory m axim um sentence m

ust be foundby

the j ury be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt and d ef

en dants m

ust be pla ce d onnot ic e the re of by inclusio n of sam e in the indictm ent. I n contrast to that cont em plated procedure, L eC ro y arg ue s th at

the F D PAdoe s no t pr ovi de f or inc lus ionin the ind ic tm en t of the statut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s ( w hic h do inc re as e the statut or y m ax im um se nte nc e to m ak e a de fe ndant e lig ibl e fo r the de ath pe na lty ). R athe r, the statut e spe ci fi es that the gov er

nm en t atto rn ey

sha ll, ar ea sona

ble ti m e be fo re tr ia l, se rv e not ic e uponthe de fe ndant s ettin g f orth the a ggr av at ing f

ac tor or f ac tor s th at

the gove rn m en t pr opos es to pr ove . 18 U . S. C. §35 93( a) . L eC ro y arg ue s th at

thi s al le ge d i nc on si st en cy

ren de rs th e st atut e fac ia ll y un co ns ti tu ti on al . Ever y circuit court of a

ppeals which has addressed this argum ent has11

rej ected it. U nited States v. A llen, 406 F.3d 940, 949 (8 Cir. 2005 ); U nited States th v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775, 788-90 (4 Cir. 2004 ); Robinson , 367 F. 3d 27 8, 290,(5 th th Ci r. 2 0 0 4 ). We ag re e w i th o u r s i s t erci rc u i t s . Th e majo r f l aw i nLe Cr o y’ s ar gum en t i s th at

nothin g inthe A ct

f or bid s, or is inc onsi ste nt w ith , pr ose cu tor s’ takin g th e ad dit ion al ste p of inc lud ing the statut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s inthe ind ic tm en t and s ubm itt ing sam e to the gr an d j ur y . I nde ed , astatut e w ill se ldo m expr es sly pr ovi de f or sub m itt ing e le m en ts o f anof fe nse to the gr an d j ur

y . I t i s sim ply we ll establish ed law–the background against which statutes are en ac te d–whic h in dic at es that e le m en ts o f a cr im e shou ld b e subm itt ed to the gr an d j ur y . Wha t the de fe ndant c la ssi fi es a s an im pr ope r “ cure ” of

apr obl em

is re al ly the governm ent’ s attem

pt to com ply with the com

plex legal backdrop of federal de ath pe na lty

pr ose cu tio ns. A cc or din gly , w e re j ec t L eC ro y ’ s a sse rt ionthat the Fe de ra l D eath P en al ty

A ct is unc onst itu tio na l onit s f ac e in l igh t of

Ri ng and rel at edcas es . Le Croy ’ s second challenge to th e constituti onalityof the FD PAis based uponthe sam e ca se law , i. e. Ri ng and r el at ed c as es . L eC ro y

e xpands his arg um en t be y ond our

a ssum pti on tha t at l ea st o ne statut or y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s m ust be ch ar ge d inthe ind ic tm en t. L eC ro y arg ue s th at all

a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s–bo th statut or y and n onst at

uto ry –th at the gov er

nm en t i nte nds to p re se nt a ga ins t the12

de fe ndant m

ust be inc lud ed

in the ind ic tm en t. A s no te d a bove , the iss ue w ith re gard to statut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s is m oot

in thi s c as e. W ithr es pe ct to nons ta tut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s, w e ar e onc e ag ai n no t the f ir st c ourt t o have face d t hi s i ss ue . In H iggs v . United States, 353 F. 3d 28 1, 298-99 (4 Cir. 2003 ), the 4 th th Ci rc uit he ld tha t i ndi ctm en ts i n de ath- el igi ble m ur de r ca se s ne ed

onl y inc lud e one statutory aggravating factor in order f or the FD PAto be applied in a m anner satisfy ing cons titutio nal requirem ents. T his is so because if at least one statutory ag gr av at ing f

ac tor is inc lud ed

in the ind ic tm en t and f

ound by the j ur y , the n th e defendant is eligibl e for the death penalty . The c ourt conclud ed that nons tatutory aggravating factors need not be added to an ind ictm ent notin g that non statutory ag gr av at or s do not

in any e ve nt, and c annot

by the m se lve s, inc re as e the a va ila ble puni shm en t. T he c ourt c onc lud ed that i f one statut or

y a ggr av at or

w as inc lud ed

in the ind ic tm en t and f

ound by the j ur y , the n “ [a ] ny

a ddi tio na l st at

uto ry or nons ta tut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s m ay

be f ai rl y vie w ed a s se nte nc ing co ns id erat io ns .” Id . at 2 99 . T he 5 Ci rc uit

ha s r ea ch ed

the sam e co nc lus ion . I n U nit ed S ta te s v. th Bo ur ge ois , 423 F . 3d 5 01 ( 5 Ci r. 200 5) , the de fe ndant c la im ed c onst itu tio na l e rr or th because the governm ent had failed to charge the statutory and nons tatutory13

ag gr av at ing f

ac tor s inthe ind ic tm en t. A s inthe c as e at bar, ase co nd, sup er se din g ind ic tm en t w as br ough t a lle gin g th e statut or y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s. B our ge ois ar gue d th at

non statut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s ne ed ed

to be inc lud ed

in the ind ic tm en t a ft er

Ri ng b ec au se the y

e xpos ed the de fe ndant t o ahig he r le ve l of puni shm ent. T he court dism issed the defendant’s argum ent about th e statutory factors beca

use, as in L eCroy ’ s case, the statutory fac tors wer e “ expressly

charged in the second, superseding indictm ent.” Id. at 507. As to the nonstatut ory aggravating factors, the court concluded th at the holdin g from Ring did n ot require the ir inc lus ionin the ind ic tm en t: “ A lon e, non -s ta tut or y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s c annot m ak e a de fe ndant e lig ibl e fo r a de ath se nte nc e. T his is be ca use the j ur

y pr oc ee ds to c onsi de r non- statut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s on ly

a ft er the de fe ndant i s de te rm ine d to be de ath- el igi ble . A cc or din gly , it w as ne ith er

c onst itu tio na l no r statut or y e rr or f or the non -s ta tut or

y a ggr av at ing f

ac tor s to be om itt ed

f ro m the ind ic tm en t. ” Id . a t 50 7- 08. W e ag re e w ithour

sis te r ci rc uit s. W e hol d th at nons tatuto rya ggr av at ing fa ct or s ne ed not

be included in th e indictm ent. N onstatu tory fac tors are c o n s i d e r e do n l y a f

t e r ad e f e n d an th a s b e e nr e n d e r e dd e a th
- e l i g i b l e b y a f i n d i n g
– f r o m b o th th e g r an dan dp e t i tj u r i e s
– o f th e n o rma l e l e me n t s o f

th e c r i me (i nc lud ing me ns rea ) and at lea st one statut ory aggravating factor. N onstatu toryL eCroy also argues that there is no provision in t he F eder al Rules of Criminal 5 Procedur e author izi nga grand jury to make “spe cial finding s,” as the grand jury did in this case . This circuit has r ecognized a g rand jury ’s spec ial finding s in the past. See, United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1108 (11 Cir. 2004). In addition, Fede ral Rule of Criminal Proce dure th 7, which dea ls with the gr and jury , contains nothingto sugg est that g rand jurie s are prohibited from makingsuch spec ial finding s. As noted above , the fa ct-findingresponsibility of g rand a

nd petit juries is so well-embedde d in our leg al sy stem that statutes rar ely , if eve r, expressly provide fo r s uc h a jur y fi nd ing . T hu s w e re

je c t th e de fe nd ant’ s a

rgume nt t hat th e a bs e nc e of an e xpre ss statut or y pr ov isi on

a uth or izin gg ra

nd jur y sp e c ia l f ind ing s ma

ke s th e ind ic tme nt i n th is c a se defe ctive. 14 fa ct or s do not

ope rate to inc re as e the pot en tia l punis hm en t of ade fe ndant, thu s potenti ally

triggering the ind ictm ent requirem ents sug gested in Jo nes. R ather, the y are c onsi de re d by

aj ur y onl y w he n de te rm ini ng h owade ath- el igi ble defendant shou ld be sentenced: to life in prison or death. Failure to include them in the ind ic tm ent do es not vio la te the r equir em en ts o f the r el ev an t c as e law , and do es no t co ns ti tu te co ns ti tu ti on al or s ta tu to ry erro r. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , w e re

j ec t L eC ro y ’ s c onst itu tio na l c ha lle nge s. 5 B. T he Abse nc e of

a“ Si m ple Carj ac kin g” L es se r In cl ude d O ff en se I nstru ct ion . The def endant’ s next groun d of appeal attacks the j ury instruction s given at his tr ia l. L eC ro y

arg ue s th at

the j ur y sho uld have be ena llo w ed

to fi nd h im

gui lty of ale sse r inc lud ed

of fe nse , i. e. c ar

j ac kin g th at

did not r es ult in the de ath of another person. H e contends that th e fa cts of his case could have convin ced a j ury to b el ie ve that he kil le d M s. T ie sle r an d th enin a se parate and unr el at ed inc ide nt af te r the m ur de r, sto le he r ve hic le . T his se t of c ir cum stanc es , he arg ue s, w oul dSection 2119 rea ds in releva nt part: “Whoever , with the intent to cause de ath or 6 se ri ou s b od ily

ha rm take s a mot or ve hic le tha

t ha s b e e n tr ans po rt e d, sh ipp e d, or re c e ive d in interstate or

fore ign c ommerce from the pe rson or pre sence of anothe r by forc e and violenc e or by int imi datio n, or

atte mpt s to do so , s ha ll– (1) be fined unde r this titl e or imprisoned not more than 15 y ear s, or both, (2) if se rious bodily

injury (as de fined in sec tion 1365 of this ti tle). . . re sults, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 year s, or both, and (3 ) i f d e ath r e su lts , b e fi ne d und e r t his tit le or

imp ri so ne d f

or any numbe r o f ye ars up to life, or both, or se ntence d to death. 15 m ak e him gui lty of “ sim ple c ar j ac kin g, ” but

not the c ap ita l of

fe nse of c ar j ac kin g whe re d eat h re su lt s. W e dis ag re e. T he e vid en ce in thi s c as e supp orte d on ly tw o po ssi ble verdicts: (1) the aggravated carj acking resulting in the death verdict which w as fo und by the j ur y and ( 2) an a

bsol ute a cquitta l. T he c ar j ac kin g st at

ute r equir es , fo r any c ar j ac kin g a t a ll, atakin g of am oto r ve hic le , w ithint en t t o c au se se ri ous bodi ly harm or inj ur y , “ fr om the pe rs on o r pr es en ce of anothe r by

f or ce and vio le nc e or

by int im idatio n. ” 18 U . S. C. § 21 19( 3) . I n th is c as e, f or ce , and n ot 6 intim idation , is r elevant. T he only force exerted a gainst, or in the presence of, an o th erp er s o nwa s th e a s s au l t , r ap e, an dm u rd ero f J o an nTi es l er . Le Cr o y’ s atte m pt t o se parate f

or ce a ga ins t a

pe rs on f ro m the de ath si m

ply doe s no t f

it the fa ct s of thi s c as e. I f, a s L eC ro y

c ont en ds, the re w as no c onne ct ionbe tw ee n th e m urder and the theft of the c ar, then he would have been entitled to an acquitt al be ca use T ie sle r’ s F or d E xpl or er w oul d no t have be entake n “ fr om the pe rs on o r pr es en ce of

anothe r by

f or ce and v iol en ce or

int im idatio n. ” Pu t anothe r w ay , both16

sim ple c ar j ac kin g and a ggr av at ed

c ar j ac kin g r equir e the sam e ne xus be tw ee n th e force and the taking of the car ; even sim ple carj acking requires the taking of a
m otor vehicle (with the nece ssary intent) “ from

the person or presence of anoth er by force .” T he j ur y w as pr es en te d w iththe onl y tw o ve rd ic ts tha t f

it the f ac ts and e vid en ce in the c as e, and i t c onc lud ed a ft er r ev ie w ing the e vid en ce that L eC ro y w as gui lty

of the capital offense. T he district court did n ot err by ref using to give the requested le sse r- inc lud ed

j ur y ins tr uc tio n. C. Suffic iency

of the E vidence Le Croy argues that there w as insufficient evidence that the force exerted ag ai nst T ie sle r w as e m

plo y ed in furthe ranc e of

the c ar j ac kin g, and thus that the death did no t result from

the car j acking. In the sam e vein, def endant also argues that there w as insufficient evidence for a j ury to conclude that he had form ed an intent to take the car

before or at the tim e the forc e w as exerted a gainst Tiesler res ul ti ng in he r de at h. W e re vie wthe suf

fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce pr es en te d a t tri al de novo . T he ev ide nc e is v ie w ed

in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the gov er

nm en t, w itha ll inf er en ce s and c re dib ili ty

c hoi ce s dr awn inthe gov er nm en t’ s f av or . T he que sti on to ask is whether a r easonable j ury could have conclud ed that the evidence17

es ta bli she d th e de fe ndant’ s gu ilt be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Diaz , 24 8 F .3d10 65 , 10 85 (11 Cir . 20 01 ). th In suppo rt of his contention , L eCroy cites U nited States v. Applewhaite, 1 9 5 F . 3 d6 7 9 ( 3 C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) . I nAp p l e w h a i t e , th e d e f e n d an t s a s s au l t e dth e v i c t i m, rd thr ewhis body

int o th e vic tim ’ s tr

uc k, and dro ve aw ay . T he y w er e co nvi ct ed

of carj ac kin g bu t the c onvi ct ion s w er e re ve rs ed , w iththe T hir d C ir cu it hol din g: T he r ea son the de fe ndants a ssa ult ed Ro m er o w as not

to tr an spor

t hi s bo dy in h is o w n c ar . Rathe r, the f or ce w as use d so le ly

f or the pur pose of blu dge oni ng R om er o. T ha t w as the obj ec t of the a ssa ult . I t w as not

the m eans of stealing his car. Af ter defe ndants accom

plish ed their obje ctive, th e y dr a g g e dR o mer o ' s u n c o n s c i o u s b o dy t o h i s c ar , an ddr o v e aw ay. How ever. . .unless the threatened or ac tual force is e m ploy ed in furtherance of the takin g of

the c ar , the re is no c ar

j ac kin g w ith in the m eanin g of 18 U. S. C. § 211 9. A ccordingly , the def endants’ c onvi ction for car j acking can no t s ta nd . App le wha it e, 19 6 F .3dat 6 86 . L eC ro y se ek s to appl y

the log ic f

ro m Appl ewha ite to his ow n c as e, c la im ing that the the ft

of T ie sle r’ s ve hic le w as r em ove d inti m e, and thus w as unr el at ed to the force which had previouslybeen exerted a gainst Tiesler, and claim ing th at the re w as ins uf

fi ci en t e vid en ce that L eC ro y ha d f orm ulate d th e int en t t o take Ties le r’s car b efo re o r atth e ti m e th e fo rce was ex ert edag ai ns t h er. W e dis ag re e. W e co nc lud e that the re w as a m ple e vid en ce that L eC ro y fo rm ulate d th e int en t t o st ea l the c ar pr ior to ex er tin g th e fo rc e ag ai nst

T ie sle r, and18

that the f or ce w as e m

plo y ed in furthe ranc e of

takin g th e car. W e not ed above the am ple evidence that Le Croy wa s face d with taking an un wanted psy chosexual ev al ua tio n or

r et ur nin g to pr iso n, and tha t he w as planni ng t o e sc ap e his supe rv is edpro ba ti on an d e sc ap e th e co un try us in g h is fat he r-i n- la w’ s p as sp or t. Upon his arr es t at the Cana dian bo rd er , the pol ic e fo und his “ ne ed to ac qui re ” lis t of item s necessary

for his escape. T here w as also evidence of his need for a c ar, be ca use the onl y

one that m igh t have be en a va ila ble , aJe ep Ch er oke e be lon gin g to his father-in-law , w as not available (the father -in-lawhaving taken th e key s away wi th h i m th at we ek en d ). Fi n al l y, an dcru ci al l y, th e o n l y i t em ta k en fr o m Ti es l er ’s hous e as part of

his assault up on her wa s a set of the key s to Tiesler’ s Ford Explorer. W e conclude that a rea sonable jury could find th at the force wa s exerted against Tiesler in order

to obtain her key s and carj ack the car . A r easonable j ury co uld f ind that L eC ro y

e nte re d th e T ie sle r hom e, lay in w ai t f or he r re tur n, and as sa ul te d a ndki ll edhe r to ge t h er k ey s an d s te al he r car . T he ins tant c as e is v er

y sim ilar to Unit ed

S ta te s v. K im

ble , 178 F . 3d 1 163 (11 Cir. 1999 ). T here the de fe ndants r obbe d ar es taur an t, de m an de d th e th
m an ag er ’ s c ar

ke y s a t gunpoi nt, and the n e xit ed the r es taur an t and f

le d inthe
m anager’ s vehicle. T hey

we re c onvi cted of carj acking and arm ed robbery . They appealed their convictions , c laim ing in sufficient evidence of the re quisi te m en s19

rea , and tha t t ak ing the ke y s f ro m ape rs on who i s no t i n th e im m ed ia te vic ini ty

of the vehicle does not constitu te taking it from the “person or presence” of another as required by

§ 2119 . In Kim

ble, a s in LeCr oy ’ s case, the victim ’ s phy sical loc at ionand the e xe rc ise of f or ce use d to take the c ar

w er e som ewha t r em ove d in tim e and space f

rom the actual entry

into th e vehicle itself. In K im ble, howe ver, this court heldthat the “ degree of nearness” dem onstrated by the evidence in that cas e was su ffi ci en t t o s us ta in a co nv ic ti on . Kim bl e, 17 8 F .3dat 1 16 8. The only differ ence betw een this case and K im ble is that LeCr oy

com m itted
m ur de r, r athe r than arm ed

r obbe ry . T his dis tin ct ionis not r el ev an t t o th is i ssu e on appeal. In both cases, at the m om ent the defendants got in to the vehicles and left the crim e scenes, the force used to take the car w as, to som e extent, in the past. In both c as es , how ev er , the j ur y c oul d f ind that the f or ce w as be ing e xe rt ed

pur suant to an in te nt t o st ea l the ve hic le and i n f urthe ranc e of

the c ar j ac kin g. W e so h old

in thi s c as e. S ee a lso , U nit ed S ta te s v. D ia z, 248 F . 3d 1 065, 109 6 ( 11 Ci r. 200 1) th (“ To uphold th e convictions [for carj acking] , the C ourt m ust conclud e that there
w as suf fi ci en t e vid en ce f

or ar at ion al j ur

y to co nc lud e be y ond a re as ona ble doubt that . . . [ the de fe ndant] int en de d to se ri ousl y harm or kil l the dr ive r if

ne ce ssary

to st eal th e car .”); Uni te d S ta te s v . Lum le y , 13 5 F .3d75 8 (1 1 Cir . 19 98 ). th D. The 1991 Search of L eCroy ’ s Vehicle.We note, initially , that it appear s that the validity of the 1991 sea

rch w as litigated 7 in L e Cr oy ’s 19 95 fe de ra l gun po sse ssi on

tr ia l, a nd if so L e Cr oy

pr ob a bly wo uld no t be e nti tle d to raise the validity

of the sea

rch a g ain in this appeal. In one par agraph of

his reply brief, L eCroy

appea red to ra ise the ar gument that 8 even if the sea rch of his vehicle wa s valid, the police violated his 4 Amendment rights when th they reta ined the docume nts found in his car a fter the completion of his prosec ution for burg lary . Be cause it was not fairly

prese nted in L eCroy ’s brief s, we de cline to addr ess the ar gument. 20 L eC ro y arg ue s onappe al that whe n po lic e sto ppe d hi s ve hic le in 1991 the ir se ar chof his c ar vio la te d hi s 4 A m en dm en t r igh ts, and the use a t hi s c ar j ac kin g th tr ia l of il le ga lly dis co ve re d e vid en ce f

ound dur ing the ve hic le se ar chw ar rants a ne wtr ia l. 7 Rulings on m otion s to sup press evidence constitu te m ixed questi ons of law an d f ac t. U nit ed

S ta te s v. G ar ci a, 890 F . 2d 3 55, 358 ( 11 Ci r. 198 9) . W e w ill th
acce pt th e d is tri ctco ur t’s fa ctua l fi nd in gs un le ss th ey are cl earl y

erro ne ou s, b ut we w ill r ev ie wthe c ourt’ s a

ppl ic at ionof

the lawto the f

ac ts o f the c as e de nov o. I d. Whil e L eC ro y

w as asus pe ct

in a str ing of

r es ide nti al bur glari es , his ve hic le wa s stop ped for having bald ti res, and he wa s eventually arr ested for operating an unsafe vehicle. Police w ere therefore constitu tionallyperm itted to m ake a contem poraneous search incident to th e ar rest, includin g a searc h of the passenger co m partm en t of

the c ar . N ewY ork v. Be lto n, 453 U . S. 454 , 460 , 101 S . Ct . 286 0, 2864 ( 1981 ). T he e vid en ce in que sti on w as dis co ve re d duri ng this pe rm iss ibl e se arch in ci de nt to arre st , andth e d is tri ctco ur t p ro pe rly adm it te d t hi s ev id en ce. A cc or din gly , w e re

j ec t L eC ro y ’ s a

ppe al s ba se d onthe se ar ch . 821

E . E vid en ce f

ro m 199 1 I nve sti ga tio ns U se d D ur ing L eC ro y ’ s T ri al . D ur ing the gui lt pha se of the tr ia l, the gov er

nm en t of fe re d a s e vid en ce the not es f ound dur ing the 199 1 c ar

sto p and d et ai ls f

ro m L eC ro y ’ s 19 91 b ur glari es to prove absence of m istake–that LeCroy did no t intend to m erely

rob Ms. T iesler–as we ll as m odus operandi and identi ty . T he defense obj ected at tr ial but the evidence
w as a dm itt ed . O n a

ppe al , L eC ro y

arg ue s th at

a dm iss ionof

the e vid en ce f

ro m 1991 w as im

pr ope r unde r Fe de ra l R

ule of E vid en ce 404 (b ), c la im ing it w as too re m ote in tim e to b e re le vant, and tha t any pr obativ e va lue w as sub stanti al ly outweighed by

the prej udicial effec t. Adistrict court’ s evidentiary rulings u nder Ru le 404 (b ) ar e re vie w ed usi ng an a

buse of dis cr et ionstandard . U nit ed S ta te s v. Eiri n, 7 78 F.2d72 2, 7 31 (11 Cir . 19 85 ). th Rule 404(b) has been applied in this circuit throug h a three- part test. In order to adm it evidence under Rule 404(b), the district court m ust determ ine that (1 ) t h e e v i d en ce i nqu es t i o ni s re l ev an tt o an i s s u e o th erth an th e d ef en d an t ’s charac ter, (2) the evidence is suffic ient for a j ury to find the defendant comm itted the e xtr ins ic a ct , and ( 3) the e vid en ce m ust m ee t a ll of

the r equir em en ts o f Ru le 403, spe ci fi ca lly

that i ts p ro ba tiv e va lue is not sub stanti al ly

outw ei ghe d by

it s undu e pr ej udi ce . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Mi lle r, 959 F . 2d 1 535, 153 8 ( 11 Ci r. 199 2) th (c itatio ns and f

ootnot e om itt ed ). S ee a lso , U nit ed S ta te s v. T ay lor , 17 F . 3d 3 33,22

338 (1 1 Ci r. 199 4) . R

ule 404 (b ) al low s th e adm iss ionof pa st c ri m es or

a ct s to th pr ove m oti ve , opp ortun ity , int en t, pr ep ar at ion , plan, kno w le dge , ide nti fy , or absence of m istake or accident. U nited States v. Be echum , 582 F. 2d 89 8 (5 Cir. th 19 78 ) (en ba nc ). A t L eC ro y ’ s tr ia l, the gov er nm en t us ed

the not es and the de ta ils of pr ior cr im es to ill ustrate L eC ro y ’ s in te nt o n th e nig ht o f the m ur de r an d to r eb ut the defense contention th at L eCroy only m eant to rob Joann Tiesler. T here w as noth ing particularly

prej udicial about m ost of the evidence, and even if pre j udice co uld be de m onstrate d, it

did not sub stanti al ly

outw ei gh the pr obativ e va lue of the ev ide nc e. T he e vid en ce appe ar s to sa tis fy a ll thr ee pr ongs of

the Ru le 404 (b ) req ui rem en ts , andit s ad m is si on do es no t v io la te Ru le 40 3. N or w as the e vid en ce of

pr ior c ri m es too r em ote to be use d duri ng L eC ro y ’ s c ar

j ac kin g tr ia l. T his c ourt ha s pr ev iou sly uph el d th e adm iss ionof

Ru le 40 4( b) ev id en ce t ha t o ccu rredm or e th an 15 y ears be fo re t he ch arg edoff en se . U nit ed S ta te s v. L am

ple y , 68 F . 3d 1 296, 130 0 ( 11 Ci r. 199 5) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. th Po llo ck , 926 F . 2d 1 044, 104 8 ( 11 Ci r. 199 1) . Mo re ove r, in thi s c as e the th sig nif ic an ce of the te n y ear tim e pe ri od b etw ee n th e pr ev iou s and i nst an t c ri m es is dim ini she d be ca

use L eC ro y

w as inc ar ce rate d f

or m ost of that t im e, and b ec au se the ins tant c ri m e w as c om m itt ed appr oxi m at el y

six w ee ks a ft er

his r el ea se f

ro m23

p ri s o n . Th er ef

o re , we d i s ce rn n o ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o ni nth e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s ad m is si on of t he ev id en ce i n q ue st io n.

F. P oli ce T es tim ony

Re gard ing the K

nif e an d B loo d P atte rn . At tria l, the governm ent called G eorgia Burea u of Investigatio n Agent Jeff Br any on, ac ri m e sc en e spe ci al ist w ho c oll ec te d e vid en ce a t T ie sle r’ s ho m e an d in her car when LeC roy

wa s arre sted near the Canadian border. B rany on testified that a blo od s ta in o n th e ba ck

of T ie sle r’ s sh irt a

ppe ar ed to have be enm ad e by som eo ne w ipi ng a

blo ody kni fe of f on the shi rt . T he de fe nse c la im s th at ( 1) Brany on gave expert testim ony without proper notice und er R ule 16 of the Federal Ru le s of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e (2 ) the gov er nm en t purp ose fu lly

f ai le d to c om

ply with Rule 16 requirem ents and (3) thus th e testim ony about the blo od pattern sh ou ldha ve be en ex cl ud ed . Rule 701 of the Federal R ules of Evidence per

m its opi nion testim ony

by lay
w itn es se s. T o qu al if

y , aw itn es s’ opi nio n is li m ite d “ to those opi nio ns and inf er en ce s whic h are ( a) r at ion al ly ba se d onthe pe rc ep tio n of the w itn es s, ( b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testim ony or the determ ination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized know le dge w ith in the sc ope of Ru le 702 . ” Fe d. R. E vid . 701 . I t i s c le ar that A ge nt Brany on’s te stim ony

qualified und er R

ule 701 anddid no t constitu te expert24

opin ion un der Rule 702. Just because A gent Brany on’s position andexperience
co uld have qua lif

ie d hi m f or e xpe rt w itn es s st at

us d oe s no t m ean th at

any te sti m ony he giv es a t tri al is co nsi de re d “ expe rt te sti m ony . ” I n th is c as e, Br any on m ad e lay pe rs on o bse rv at ion s a

bout the shi rt and knif e, and the re fo re he did

not provide expert testim ony under Rule 702. T hus, no Rule 16 no tice w as required with respect to Br any on’s te stim ony , and LeCr oy has failed to dem onstrate other rev ers ib le erro r wit h re sp ectto th attes ti m on y .

G . T he D istri ct

Co urt’ s E xpe rt

W itn es s R

uli ngs. In preparation for the sentencing phase, the def ense notified the dis trict co urt tha t i t so ught

to intro duc e m iti ga tin g e vid en ce in the f orm of a“ te ac hin g expe rt , ” a psy ch olo gis t sp ec ia liz ing in the stu dy of m enw ho s uf

fe re d se xua l a

buse as c hil dr en . I n or de r to p re pare r eb utt al e vid en ce , the gov er nm en t a ske d to have L eC ro y und er go an inpa tie nt p sy ch ia tr ic e va luatio n. Am ag istrate or de re d th e ev al ua tio n, but

L eC ro y r ef use d, inv oki ng h is F if

th and S ixth A m en dm en t r igh ts. T he dis tr ic t c ourt r es er

ve d m ak ing af

ina l r uli ng o n w he the r the te ac hin g expert could testify , but allowe d the gov ernm ent to have an expert prepare a re port on L eC ro y ’ s m en ta l c ondi tio n th at w as to be se al ed

unt il the c om

ple tio n of the gui lt pha se of

the tr ia l. T his r ep ort w as to be ba se d ondoc um en ta tio n and Le Croy ’ s m edical files, not on a psy chiatric evaluation. T he district court decided25

that i f L eC ro y

w er e fo und gui lty , the de fe nse c oul d in spe ct the r ep ort and d ec ide whether to call its expert, but that the court would then decide whether a gove rn m en t e xpe rt

w oul d be able to te sti fy

in re butta l, and whic h po rt ion s of the se al edrep or t co ul d b e u se d. Le Croy wa s convicted, but rather than calling a teac hing expert at se nte nc ing , the de fe nse c al le d tw o do ct or s who h ad tr eate d L eC ro y

f or psy cholog ical issues while he w as incarce rated in the 1990s . T he doctors wer e pe rm itt ed to te sti fy to ce rt ai n in fo rm at ionr el at ing to the ir m en ta l he al th tre atm en t of L eC ro y . H ow ev er , w he n th e de fe nse sou ght to have the doc tor s pr es en t the ir opin ion di agnosin g LeC roy , the governm ent objecte d. T he district court ruled that if the doc tor

te sti fi ed about pe rs ona lity

te sts and d ia gnos es , a s pr of fe re d, the gove rn m en t m igh t be able to pr es en t r eb utt al e vid en ce , inc lud ing portio ns o f the se al ed r ep ort. A s inthe c as e of the pr ior r uli ng, the dis tr ic t c our

t r es er ve d r uli ng on the scop e of the governm ent’ s rebuttal evidence that the court would allow. In th e en d, t he de fen se de ci de d a ga in stin tro du ci ng th e ch al le ng edev id en ce. Re ly ing upo n L uc e v. U nit ed S ta te s, 469 U . S. 38, 105 S . Ct . 460 ( 1984 ), the governm ent argues that the district court’ s rulings are not reviewa ble. I n that case, the S upr em e Co urt he ld tha t a dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in limine ru lin g, pe rm itt ing pr ior convictio n evidence under Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federa l Rules of E vidence, w as26

not reviewable bec ause the defendant did no t testify and the governm ent never introdu ced the prior convictions at trial. Id. at 41-42, 105 S.Ct. at 463. T he Court concluded th at the alleged harm flowing from

the district court’ s evidentiary ru lin g w as “ w hol ly

spe cu la tiv e” be ca

use it w oul d have be ena“ m atte r of co nj ec tur e” w he the r the dis tr ic t j udge w oul d have pe rm itt ed the pr ior c onvi ct ion te sti m ony . I d. T his c ourt a

ppl ie d L uc e in Unit ed

S ta te s v. S tr

udni ck a, 777 F . 2d 6 52 ( 11 th Ci r. 198 5) . T he re , the de fe ndant w as f ac ing c harg es of

ba il- j um pin g and l y ing to ac qui re f ir earm s. T he tr ia l c ourt r ule d th at if the de fe ndant c hose to take the stand in h is o w n de fe nse , he c oul d f ac e que sti ons ab out

an e ar lie r ch ar ge of

f ai lur e to ap pe ar in co urt. I nst ea d of

be ing sub

j ec te d to thi s qu es tio nin g, the de fe ndant de cl ine d to take the stand. H e w as c onvi ct ed and l at er appe al ed , arg uin g th at

the tri al jud ge erre d i n ru li ng th os e to pi cs were p erm is si bl e dur in g c ro ss ex am in at io n. In that case, citing Luce, we held that Strudnicka’s c laim wa s barred: “ The ta ctical de ci sio n no t t o take the stand, how ev er , pr ec lud es appe llant f ro m c ha lle ngi ng o n ap pe al the tr ia l c ourt' s r

uli ng. Ade fe ndant m

ust te sti fy in or de r to r ai se and pr es erv e th is is su e fo r ap pe ll at e rev ie w.” Id . at 6 60 . By not calling h is expert witnesses, Le Croy fac es the sam e problem dis cu sse d inL uc e. W ith out ar uli ng f ro m the dis tr ic t c ourt onthe sc ope of the27

governm ent’ s rebuttal evidence, L eCroy ’ s argum ent that the gov ernm ent’ s rebuttal
w oul d have be en“ ove rk ill ” is whol ly spe cu la tiv e. T he de fe nse a tte m pts to dis tin gui sh L uc e be ca

use it inv olv ed an in limine m oti on o n pr ior c onvi ct ion s, wh i l e t h e c as e a tb arwa s ab o u tex p er tm i t i g at i o nev i d en ce an dth e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s ru lin g w as not in l im ine . T he se f ac tua l di sti nc tio ns d o no t m ak e the hol din g in Luc e an y les s ap pl ic ab le to th is cas e. T he L uc e ratio na le appl ie s inthi s c as e, j ust a s it did in Stru dni ck a. L eC ro y sim ply did not c re at e the c onf

lic t ne ce ssary

f or the iss ue to be appe al ab le . T he defendant could have called his witnesses, had them testify , and then o bje cted at the proper tim e to governm ent rebuttal testim ony that he felt w as “ overkill.” In suc h c as e, w e w oul d have ha d ac onc re te r uli ng b y the dis tr ic t c ourt a s to the sc ope of the r eb utt al . B y

not c al lin g th e w itn es se s, how ev er , he w oul d f or ce thi s c ourt t o s p e c u l a t e tw i c e : o n c e wi th r e g ar dt o th e c o n t e n to f th e d e f e n s e e x p e rt s ’ t e s t i mo n y, an d ase co nd t im e ab out

w ha t the dis tr ic t c ourt w oul d have pe rm itt ed f ro m the gove rn m en t e xpe rt

in re butta l. I t w oul d be im pr ope r fo r thi s c ourt t o e nga ge in su ch sp ecu la ti on , andth us we de cl in e to reac h t he m eri ts of t hi s i ss ue . H . E vid en ce of

P ri or Cr im es and B ad

A ct s to P ro ve F uture D an ge ro usne ss. Inc om pli an ce w iththe F D PA , the gov er nm en t se rv ed

not ic e on L eC ro y

ofSe c tio n 3 59 3 r e a ds in r e le va nt p art : 9 (a) No ti c e by t he go ve r nm e nt .--I f, in a c ase involvingan off ense de scribed in se ction 3591 the attorne y

for the g overnme nt believes that the c ircumstance s of the off ense a re suc h that a sente nce of

death is justified under this cha pter, the attorney

shall, a re asonable time before the trial or bef

ore a cce ptance by

the cour t of a plea of guilty , sign a

nd file with the cour

t, and serve on the def endant, a notice-- (1) statingthat the g overnme nt believes that the c ircumstance s of the off ense a re suc h that, if the def

endant is convic ted, a se ntence of death is just ified under this chapter a

nd that the g overnme nt will seek the sentenc e of de ath; and (2 ) s e tti ngfo rt

h th e a g g ra

vatin gfa c tor

or fa c tor s th at th e g ov e rnme nt, if the de fe nd ant i s convicted, pr oposes to prove a s justifying a sentenc e of de ath. The statutory

fac tors wer e (1) that the def endant c ommitt ed the c rime in an 10 espec ially heinous or cr

uel manner

involving torture or phy sical abuse of the victim (2) the defe ndant committed the offe nse with the expectation of r ece iving somethingof pec uniary value and (3) the def

endant c ommitt ed the of

fense afte r substantial planningand pre meditation. The g overnme nt eventually

dropped the “pec uniary

value” fac tor prior to trial. 28 its int en t t o se ek

the de ath pe na lty . I n it s se ct ion359 3 no tic e, the gov er nm en t 9 l i s t e ds t a tu t o ry a g g r a v a t i n g f a c t o r s , a s r e qu i r e db y th e F D P A , i no r d e r t o ju s t i f y a s e n t e n c e o f

d e a th up o nc o n v i c t i o n . I ta l s o i n d i c a t e di tw o u l dr e l y o ns o me 10
no ns ta tu to ry

ag gr av at in g fa ct or s, i nc lu di ng th e d efen da nt ’s fut ur e d an ge ro us ne ss . Sp ec if ic al ly , the gov er

nm en t gave not ic e of

tw o a ppl ic ab le statut or

y a ggr av at ing fa ct or s: tha t L eC ro y

c om m itt ed the m ur de r in an e spe ci al ly

“ [h ] ei nous , c ru el , and depraved m anner” involvin g “ torture and serious phy sical abuse” to Ms. T iesler, and that the m

urder involved “ subs tantial planni ng and prem editation.” In additio n, the governm ent gave notice of two nonstatuto ry aggravators upon which it w oul d r el y : f

uture dange ro usne ss and v ic tim im pa ct . L eC ro y ’ s f

oc us i n th is29

appeal is on the future dangerousn ess. I n that regard the notice provided that L eC ro y r ep re se nte d a“ co nti nui ng d an ge r to the li ve s and s af ety ” of oth er s, and that the de fe ndant h as c om m itt ed the ins tant c ri m es and a lso “ ha s c om m itt ed and exhibit ed acts and chara cteristics including , but not lim ited to, the following: (a) specific threats of violence; ( b) risk of escape; ( c) lowrehabilitative potenti al.” T o pr ove the f

uture dange ro usne ss f

ac tor , the gov er

nm en t c al le d f

our w itn es se s a t tri al w ho t es tif ie d a bout L eC ro y ’ s pr ior

c ri m es and b ad

a ct s, inc lud ing burglary , statutory

rape, and the “ hit list ” that he had cre ated. Le Croy now ar gues that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have e xc lud ed thi s e vid en ce be ca

use ( 1) it w as not inc lud ed a s an a ggr av at ing f

ac tor in the not ic e of

int en t t o se ek

the de ath pe na lty and (2) it wa s not relevant to any aggravating circum stance included in th e notice t o s e e kth e d e a th p e n a l ty. W ithr es pe ct

to L eC ro y ’ s f

ir st arg um en t, it

is cl ear in this c as e that the gove rn m en t’ s se ct ion359 3 no tic e suf fi ci en tly appr ise d L eC ro y

of a ll the ag gr av at in g fa ct or s re li edup on by the go ve rn m en t, s ta tu to ry an d n on st atut ory . T he gis t of

L eC ro y ’ s arg um en t i s th at the re is anobl igatio n to pr ovi de not ic e not onl y of the a ggr av at ing f

ac tor , but a lso of the e vid en ce sup portin g sam e. W e have expr es sly r ej ec te d an id en tic al arg um en t i n U nit ed S ta te s v. Battl e, 173 F . 3d 1 343, 1347 ( 11 Ci r. 199 9) . T he re w e he ld tha t “ [t ] he G ove rn m en t i s no t r equir ed to th30

provide sp ecific evidence in its [§ 359 3] notice of intent.” I d. at 1347. More over, the S upr em e Co urt he ld i n G ray v. N ethe rl an d, 518 U . S. 152 , 166 -7 0, 116 S . Ct . 2074 , 208 3, that, a lth oughthe re is a ri ght to advanc e not ic e of

the c harg es , the re is no extant cons titutio nal right to advan ce notice of the evidence to prove such ch ar ge s inac ap ita l se nte nc ing he ar ing . I d. a t 16 7- 68, 116 S . Ct . a t 20 83. T he Co urt i ndi cate d th at

the im port of the c as es w as str ongl y

a ga ins t the va lid ity

of any su ch rig ht . Id. at16 8, 1 16 S.Ct . at 2 08 4. The governm ent in this case satisfied its constituti onal and statu tory oblig ations byinform ing th e defe ndant of what aggravating factors–both st atutory and non statutory

–it inten ded to prov e at tria l. T he governm ent was not obligated to o utl ine w ha t sp ec if

ic pie ce s of

e vid en ce it

planne d to use to supp ort the ag gr av at ing f

ac tor s. W e hol d th at

the gov er

nm en t’ s N oti ce of

I nte nt t o S ee k th e Deat h P en al ty w as su ffi ci en t. L eC ro y a lso c la im s th at

the e vid en ce use d to pr ove f uture dange ro usne ss dur ing the se nte nc ing pha se w as ir re le vant and s houl d have be ene xc lud ed by the tr ia l j udge . L eC ro y ’ s pr ior c ri m es –bur glary

and s ta tut or

y r ap e– w er e cl earl y probative of the questi on of whether he posed a f uture threat. T he “ hit list ” police dis co ve re d in199 1 w as e spe ci al ly r el ev an t t o th is i ssu e; L eC ro y ’ s in te nde d targ et s inc lud ed the m oth er

of his statut or

y r ap e vic tim , lawe nf

or ce m en t pe rs onne l, and31

“ any one w ho [ sto od] be tw ee n [ L eC ro y ] and f re ed om or e sc ap e. ” W e hol d L eC ro y ’ s r el ev an ce arg um en t i s w ith out m er it, and f

ind that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d not abuse it s di sc re tio n w he n it a dm itt ed e vid en ce of

L eC ro y ’ s pr ior

c ri m es and ba d a ct s. I. T he D istri ct

Co urt’ s Jury

I nstru ct ionon F uture D an ge ro usne ss. L eC ro y arg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt c om

m itt ed e rr or w he n it gave instructio ns to th e j ury

that allowed the m em

bers to consid er L eCroy ’ s potenti al dange r to the ge ne ra l pu

bli c in d et er

m ini ng whe the r the a ggr av at ing f ac tor of fu tur e dange ro usne ss h ad be enpr ove n. A t the c harg e co nf er en ce , L eC ro y obj ec te d to the pr opos ed

j ur y ins tr uc tio n, arg uin g th at

the j ur y ’ s c onsi de ratio n of his f uture dange ro usne ss s houl d be li m ite d to the c ont ex t of pr iso n li fe , and s houl d not in clude any

consideration of a threat posed to the pu blic at large. H owever , the gov er nm en t arg ue d th at

L eC ro y a lso pr es en te d age nui ne r isk to the pub lic out sid e of pr iso n, not ing that i t pl anne d to pr es en t e vid en ce of L eC ro y ’ s a tte m

pts to esc ap e whi le he was i nc arce rat edin Mi nn es ot a, an d wh il e h e was awai ti ng tri al . Th e ju d g e i n d i ca t edatth e c h ar g e c o n fe re n ce th at h e w o u l dt ak e t h e d ef en d an t ’s ob jecti on un de r co ns id erat io n. In response to defendant’ s objection, the district j udge revised the propo sed32

instructio n and charged the j ury that it could con sider any threat to the general publ ic only

if the j ury

first found bey ond reasonable do ubt th at defendant w as an es ca pe r isk . T he re w as no f

urthe r obj ec tio n by

the de fe ndant. N ow , on a ppe al , LeCro y arg ue s fo r th e fi rs t t im e th ata di ffer en t s ta nd ardsh ou ldha ve be en us ed . H e nowarg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

in co ndi tio nin g th e j ur

y ’ s c onsi de ratio n of dange ro usne ss t o th e publ ic on a m er e ri sk o f es ca

pe , a s op pose d to ali ke lih ood of esc ap e. Although a challenge to a j ury instruction is ordinarily

a question of law that is r ev ie w ed de novo , United States v. Ric hardson, 233 F.3d 1285 , 1292 (11 Cir. th 2000 ), be ca

use the re w as no o bj ec tio n inthe dis tr ic t c ourt onthi s gr ound , our reviewis pursuant to the plain error analy sis. U nder plan error review , an appellate court m

ust no t correc t an err or the defendant failed to raise in the dist rict court unless th ere is: (1) err or, ( 2) that is plain, and (3) that af fects substantial ri ght s. I f al l thr ee of

tho se c ondi tio ns are m et , the c ourt m ay e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n to n oti ce af

or fe ite d e rr or

but onl y if ( 4) the e rr or

se ri ousl y a ff ec ts the f ai rn es s, integrity , or publ ic reputation of judicial procee ding s. United States v. Rodriguez, 39 8 F .3d12 91 , 12 98 (11 Cir . 20 05 ). th W e re ad ily

c onc lud e that the re is no p la in e rr or . T he e rr or , if any , is not pla in o r obvi ous, the re be ing no r el ev an t c as e law . Mo re ove r, w e re ad ily c onc lud e33

that L eC ro y

c annot sa tis fy the thi rd pr ong; he c annot

de m onstrate that the re is a re as ona ble pr oba bil ity of adif fe re nt o utc om e. I n li ght

of L eC ro y ’ s hi sto ry

of atte m pte d e sc ap es and the j udge ’ s c le ar ins tr uc tio ns t o th e j ur

y r equir ing that i t find a risk of escape “bey ond a reasonable doub t,” we cannot conclude that th ere is a r ea sona ble pr oba bil ity that the dif

fe re nt s tandard

ur ge d by L eC ro y w oul d have re sul te d inadif

fe re nt o utc om e. Mo re ove r, the j ur y f ound e ve ry oth er a ggr av at ing fa ct or a lle ge d by

the gov er

nm en t, and s uc h f

ind ing s are a m

ply sup porte d inthe reco rd . III. CONCLUSI ON H av ing a ddr es se d e ac h of L eC ro y ’ s gr ound s f

or appe al and f

ind ing no re ve rs ibl e er

ro r, w e A FF IRM h is c onvi ct ionand s en te nc e of de ath. AF FIRMED .