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Planning U.S. 

General Purpose Forces: 

Forces Related to Asia 

June 

1977 

O Congressional Budget Office 

Congress of the United States 

Washington, D.C. 

PLANNING U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES: 

FORCES RELATED TO ASIA 

The Congress of the United States 

Congressional Budget Office 

For sale by tho Superintendent 01 Documents, U.S. Government Prlntlng Office 

WlIShlngton, D.C. 20402 

PREFACE 

This report is one of a series of reports on planning U.S. 

general purpose forces. The other papers have concentrated on 

force elements, such as tactical air forces, that relate to the 

demanding contingency of a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact 

nations. This paper discusses the general purpose forces deployed in East Asia and the Pacific. It identifies alternatives 

to the current posture, including reductions and deletions from 

the overall force structure, realignments involving transfer of 

some force elements to the continental United States and the 

Atlantic for NATO-related missions, and force enhancements concentrated in Northeast Asia. 

The focus of debate on the U.S. defense posture in Asia, 

apart from Vietnam, has in recent years been on the question of 

withdrawing, retaining, or phasing down the U.S. Army Second 

Division deployed in South Korea north of Seoul. That is an 

important issue, and it is addressed in this paper. But there 

is a wider range of force structure issues in East Asia and the 

Pacific that relate to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force 

and to deployments outside of Korea -- in and near Japan, the 

Philippines, and Hawaii, for example. 

The principal purpose of this paper is to illustrate the 

wider range of budget-related choices available in considering 

reductions and restructuring within the region. Another purpose 

is to highlight some dilemmas in which competing U.S. objectives 

make choices more difficult. 

This report was prepared by Charles A. Sorrels of the 

National Security and International Affairs Division of the 

Congressional Budget Office, under the supervision of Robert B. 

Pirie, Jr. and John E. Koehler. The author wishes to acknowledge the useful comments of David M. Shilling of the staff of 

the Senate Budget Committee, as well as those of Patrick L. 

Renehan and Edward A. Swaboda of CBO's Budget Analysis Division, 

who made valuable contributions regarding the cost impacts of 

options and the organization of the alternatives presented. 

iii 
David R. Martin verified the accuracy of the factual material. 

In keeping with CBO's mandate to provide nonpartisan analysis 

of policy options, the report contains no recommendations. 

June 1977 

Alice M. Riv1in 

Director 

iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Preface 

Summary •. 

Chapter I. Introduction •• 

Chapter II. General Context for Policy for U.S. 

Forces Related to Asia: Similarity 

and Contrast to Europe • . • • • • • • 

Chapter III. Recent U.S. Foreign Policy and Force 

Planning Guidance Relating to Asia •• 

Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Asia •••• 

Competing U.S. Policy Objectives in East Asia. 

Planning Guidance for General Purpose Forces 

Related to Asia • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • 

Import of the Sino-Soviet Conflict for U.S. 

Posture in East Asia and the Western Pacific. • 

Chapter IV. Interests and Commitments of the United 

States: The Fundamental Relationship 

with Japan 

Economic Interests. • • • . • • 

Political Interests • • • • • • • • 

Commitments Through Treaty Obligations. 

The Fundamental Relationship with Japan 

Principal Japanese Concerns: Stability in 

Korea and the Soviet Pacific Fleet •• 

. . . . 

. . . . 

iii 

xi 

1 

3 

7 

7 

8 

9 

12 

15 

15 

17 

19 

19 

26 

Chapter V. Regional Threats and Principal Contingencies.. 29 

Regional Threats. . . . • • . • . • • . . • • . • • . 30 

Principal Contingencies Considered in Evaluating U.S. 

Force Deployments in the Pacific and East Asia. . • •• 35 

Chapter VI. The Korean Peninsula: The Military Balance 

and the Role of U.S. Forces. • • • • • 43 

The Political Situation Within and Between North 

and South Korea . • • • • • 44 

v 

The Military Balance Between North and 

South Korea • • • • • • • • • . 

U.S. Forces in Korea: Components and 

Their Roles • • • . • • • • • • • • • 

Roles of Remaining U.S. Force Components •• 

Future Withdrawal of the U.S. Infantry Division 

from South Korea. • • • • • • • . • • • 

Difficult Policy Choices Because of Conflicting 

U.S. Objectives. • • • • • • •• • •.• 

Chapter VII. U.S. General Purpose Forces Currently 

Deployed in East Asia and the Pacific • • 

Force Level and Structure in East Asia and the 

Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Military Personnel Levels in East Asia and the 

Western Pacific • . • • • • • • • . • • • • 

The Problem of Identifying and Costing Forces 

"for Asia". • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • 

Chapter VIII. Alternatives to Current Posture in 

East Asia and the Pacific. • 

Purpose and Approach Adopted. • ••• 

Force Reductions. • • • • • • • 

Force Realignments. . • • ••• 

Force Enhancements in Northeast Asia. 

Appendix A. Soviet Pacific Fleet 

Appendix B. Underway Ship Days of the Pacific 

Fleet (Seventh Fleet and Third Fleet) by 

Geographic Region, for Fiscal Year 1975, 

First Quarter Fiscal Year 1976, and Fourth 

Quarter Fiscal Year 1976/Second Quarter 

Fiscal Year 1977 ••••••.••••••• 

vii 

45 

51 

52 

56 

58 

61 

61 

65 

67 

69 

69 

70 

85 

88 

93 

95 

TABLES 

1. Major U.S. General Purpose Force Structure Elements 

Deployed in East Asia and the Pacific . • . • . . • 62 

2. U.S. Naval Force Levels in the Pacific (November, 1976) 63 

3. U.S. Military Personnel in East Asia and Western Pacific. 66 

APPENDIX TABLES 

A. Soviet Pacific Fleet: Force Level and Composition, 1977 • . 93 

B. Underway Ship Days of the U.S. Pacific Fleet by 

Geographic Region, for Fiscal Year 1975, First 

Quarter FY 1976, and Fourth Quarter FY 1976/Second 

Quarter FY 1977 •...•.•••...•....•...• 95 

FIGURES 

1. World Crude Oil Movements to Major Consuming Areas, 1975. 18 

2. US/USSR Combatant Deployments (1966 and 1976) . • . • 31 

ix 

SUMMARY 

Since World War II, the United States has fought in two 

wars in Asia at an immense cost in lives, domestic consensus, 

and economic impact. Asia has also been an area where major 

U.S. policy objectives have been realized: economic recovery 

and democratic institutions in a Japan closely allied with the 

United States; deterrence of a renewed Korean War; and strong 

economic growth in South Korea and Taiwan. In Asia, the SinoSoviet split has been a political development fundamentally 

altering basic U.S. contingency planning assumptions for sizing 

general purpose forces by substantially reducing the prospect 

of the United States and its allies confronting a combined 

attack by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China 

(PRe) • 

The most demanding contingency against which U.S. general 

purpose forces, along with allied capabilities, are tested is a 

worldwide conventional war with the Soviet Union, centered in, 

but not limited to, the Western European/Atlantic theater. The 

planning for U.S. general purpose forces calls for them to be 

capable of dealing not only with that "major" war contingency, 

but also with a "minor" contingency elsewhere. 

The contingency of a major NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict has 

been treated in the public record in considerable detail by the 

Executive branch. In contrast, no detailed rationale has been 

presented that attempts to derive much of the U.S. forwardforce deployments in East Asia and the Western Pacific from 

threats and contingencies in that area. 

That region could be a "second front" in a worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union. Both the United 

States and the Soviet Union might hesitate to initiate hostilities in East Asia and the Western Pacific, but both might wish 

to "tie down" the other's forces in the region to constrain or 

prevent redeployment to the more demanding European/Atlantic 

conflict. 

Holding a forward defensive position in Northeast Asia is, 

however, justified in part because the European conflict could 

xi 
become worldwide. Because the principal Soviet forces in the 

area confronting the United States are air and naval, and because only Korea is directly threatened by land attack, it is 

assumed that principal battles with Soviet forces in this 

theater of the war would be naval and air. 

There are other contingencies which may justify some U.S. 

forces in the Pacific: 

o A "brush fire" contingency somewhere in the Western 

Pacific or East Asia 

o A Soviet campaign against sea lines of communication 

between the Persian Gulf and Japan or between the 

United States and Japan 

o A war in Korea. 

Many questions remain concerning these contingencies and 

their implications for the level and mix of U.S. forces in East 

Asia and the Pacific. In view of the changed U.S. posture in 

Asia, where and on what scale is some kind of "brush fire" 

likely to erupt? How could the Soviet Union pursue a campaign against the sea lanes -- sinking ships, killing sailors, 

and threatening the economy of Japan -- without forcing a 

test in some other arena? If there were to be an attack in 

Korea, would the North Koreans undertake it alone or would 

they receive help, and of what kind, from China or the Soviet 

Union? 

The Soviet Union maintains significant forces in East Asia 

and the Pacific. About 25 percent of Soviet ground force 

divisions and frontal tactical aviation are in the Soviet Far 

East and along the Sino-Soviet border. About 30 percent of 

the Soviet Navy is in its Pacific fleet. This fleet has grown 

gradually; further qualitative improvements are expected. The 

threat these forces pose to U.S. interests is limited, however, 

by several considerations: 

o The bulk of Soviet ground and air forces in the region 

is directed at the People's Republic of China, not at 

the United States or its allies. Even in a NATO/Warsaw 

Pact war, a substantial part of those assets might well 

remain deployed against a hostile People's Republic of 

China. 

xii 
o The Soviet Pacific Fleet (excluding ballistic missile 

submarines) is much less active than other Soviet fleets 

or the U.S. Pacific Fleet. It is also the last of the 

Soviet fleets to receive new types of vessels. 

o The Soviet Pacific Fleet's two main bases are both less 

than ideal: Vladivostok opens on the Sea of Japan, whose 

narrow exits might be mined or contested; Petropavlovsk 

on the remote Kamchatka peninsula is notably difficult 

to support and resupply. 

The United States appears to have forces deployed in East 

Asia and the Pacific that exceed considerably the needs generated 

by either a North Korean attack, assuming no Soviet or PRC combat 

involvement, or by the threat posed by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. 

The principal rationale for the substantial, although reduced, 

U.S. forces deployed in East Asia and the Pacific is now avowedly 

"political. II The presence of these forces is said to support important U.S. interests. These major interests relate primarily 

to Japan, and include a secure Japan that relies with confidence 

on U.S. commitments to Japan's defense, that does not feel compelled to accommodate with the Soviet Union, to reorient its 

foreign policy away from support for the United States, or to 

undertake a major rearmament. 

In appraising the present forces in East Asia and the Pacific and in considering alternatives, basic questions seem to 

be 

o Given the demanding tasks in the Atlantic for support 

to NATO in a long war, and given that only about 30 

percent of the Soviet Navy is deployed in its relatively 

inactive general purpose Pacific fleet, should the U.S • 

. Navy continue to deploy nearly 50 percent of its fleet 

in peacetime in the Pacific? 

o Are there plausible missions that justify the scale of 

the large U.S. Marine Corps presence in Okinawa? 

o Does the maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula require retaining a U.S. infantry division in 

South Korea? 

o Is there a continuing need to maintain the military personnel at large U.S. bases in the Philippines at a level 

exceeding the 1960 figure by nearly 30 percent? Or, can 

xiii 
some deployment, such as U.S. Air Force tactical air 

squadrons, be reduced or withdrawn? 

o If reductions were made in the presently deployed forces 

in East Asia and the Pacific, should the force elements, 

such as the infantry division in Korea or some naval 

forces, be withdrawn from the force structure or be 

redeployed to the continental United States and the 

Atlantic for priority NATO needs? 

The Range of Force Issues in the Pacific and East Asia 

Recent debate on the U.S. defense posture in Asia has focused on whether to retain, phase down, or entirely withdraw 

the U.S. Second Infantry Division deployed north of Seoul in 

South Korea. President Carter recently declared a commitment 

to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea over a 

period of four to five years -- on a schedule "worked out very 

carefully with the South Korean government. lt The Administration has indicated that a continued U.S. tactical air presence 

will be retained in South Korea over a longer period, and that 

the United States will assist South Korea in provision of needed 

equipment to offset the military capability of ground forces 

withdrawn. 

Decisions regarding Korea should be considered in the context of a wider range of force structure issues in East Asia 

and the Pacific. Such issues relate to the Navy, Marine Corps, 

and Air Force, and to deployments outside of Korea, in and near 

Japan and the Philippines, for example. A wide range of choices 

is available, including reductions and restructuring of U.S. 

forces. For example, it might be reasonable to transfer some 

force elements in the Pacific to the United States or the Atlantic 

for NATO-related contingencies. However, there are important 

dilemmas where competing U.S. objectives make choices difficult. 

Competing U.S. Policy Objectives in East Asia 

The United States pursues competing objectives in its policy 

toward East Asia. One important objective is to discourage nuclear proliferation. Another objective is to induce allies to 

become more self-reliant, particularly in providing ground forces 

to be used in their own defense. Another objective has been to 

xiv 
encourage stability, particularly in Northeast Asia. The presence of U.S. forces makes conflict in Korea less likely, Substantial reduction of these forces may increase the probability 

that either South Korea or Japan, or both, would choose to 

acquire nuclear weapons. Greater military self-reliance for 

these two countries and a reduced U.S. role may conflict with 

the goal of regional stability. 

Current Deployment and Baseline Force Structure 

Since the Korean War of 1950-1953, the United States has 

maintained a significant portion of its military forces deployed 

in Korea, Japan (including Okinawa), and the Philippines. At the 

peak of U.S. combat involvement in the Vietnam war in 1968-1969, 

the United States had 622,000 military personnel in Southeast 

Asia alone. The withdrawals that began in 1969 and continued 

after the end of U.S. direct combat involvement in Vietnam also 

significantly reduced the U.S. personnel in Northeast Asia. 

They cut overall U.S. military personnel deployed in the Western Pacific and East Asia by almost 50 percent below the preVietnam level in fiscal year 1964. 

Despite these major reductions in numbers of military personnel in the Western. Pacific and East Asia, substantial U.S. 

forces remain there. The Navy and Marine Corps have nearly a 

half and at least a third of their combat forces deployed in 

the Pacific, respectively. The Army and Air Force also have 

forces and facilities of major importance in the region, such 

as the U.S. Second Infantry Division in South Korea and the 

large U.S. Air Force base in the Philippines. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED IN WESTERN PACIFIC AND EAST ASIA 

Fiscal Year 1964 Fiscal Year 1968 Fiscal Year 1977 

251,000 874,000 133,000 

xv 
U.S. Contribution to the Security of Japan 

Although the number of U.S, military personnel stationed 

in Japan in fiscal year 1977 is 42 percent less than what it 

was in mid-1970, the level remains substantial and reflects 

both the importance the United States attaches, and the major 

contribution it makes, to Japan's security. In the past, prior 

to and during the Vietnam war, considerable sentiment in Japan 

viewed the U.S. bases there and the Mutual Security Treaty as 

benefiting the United States more than Japan and indeed regarded 

the U.S. bases as a liability. Recently, however, increased 

support for the Mutual Security Treaty relationship has been 

observed in public opinion surveys and the Japanese national 

government has not urged further reduction or consolidation of 

U.S, bases. Japan, by its own assessment, cannot defend itself 

against other than a small-scale conventional attack without 

U.S. assistance. 

Although all components of U.S. forces in East Asia and 

the Western Pacific are obviously not of equal value to Japan's 

security, the overall contributions of these forces are critical. 

For example, a major mission of the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet 

in the Western Pacific is to protect the sea line from Indonesia 

to Japan. That sea line is vital to Japan for delivery of oil 

and raw materials. It is of a much less direct value to the 

United States. The Japanese Government has also stressed the 

importance it attaches to continued peace in Korea and the role 

U.S. forces perform there in deterring attack and promoting stability on the Korean peninsula. 

The cost of Japan's defense effort in 1976 was $5 billion, 

following a long-standing practice of allocating about I percent 

of its GNP to defense. The United States has urged Japan to 

increase its defense effort, particularly in antisubmarine warfare and air defense. However, Japanese defense spending is 

constrained by domestic political considerations, by the anxiety, 

diminishing in recent years, that other Asian nations feel about 

increasing Japanese military strength, and by the fact that the 

Japanese do not feel particularly threatened in a world in which 

the United States guarantees their security and in which progress 

is being made in improving relations between the superpowers. 

Burden sharing and enhanced cooperation by the United States 

and Japan for mutual security are likely to remain important 

agenda topics for the alliance. 
U.S. Forces in Korea: The Level and Role 

There were 41,336 u.s. military personnel in South Korea at 

the end of March 1977. This level has declined only slightly 

since 1971 when the United States withdrew one of the two U.S. 

infantry divisions stationed there. Reasons cited for that reduction were increases in South Korean military capability and 

demonstrated growth of the South Korean economy. 

During 1971, South Korea began a modernization program for 

its military forces with U.S. military assistance support of 

$1.5 billion. During 1975, prompted by the collapse of U.S.-

supported forces in Vietnam, the South Korean Government initiated a further $4-5 billion Force Improvement Plan (FIP). 

By 1980, much of the FIP should be completed, emphasizing 

acquisition of fighter aircraft and more modern tanks, plus 

domestic production of small arms and some artillery. 

In terms of growing capability to deter and defend against 

an attack by North Korea, time seems clearly to be on the side 

of the South, with its much stronger economic base. North Korea, 

however, has not been static since 1971. It has in fact become 

less dependent on support from the People's Republic of China 

and the Soviet Union by building up its own domestic weapons 

production capacity. Since the early 1970s, it has increased 

its armored divisions from one to two. 

In recent years, rationales for the remaining U.S. infantry 

division, located north of Seoul, have not been couched in terms 

of military or "war-fighting" need, given the size of and improvements in South Korean ground forces. Instead, the principal 

rationale has been in terms of the division's role in providing 

high confidence deterrence of a North Korean attack that would 

come with "little warning"; in deterring PRe and Soviet support 

of such an assault; and in promoting stability on the peninsula. 

Principal military requirements for U.S. forces in Korea 

are for tactical air and logistical support for South Korea in 

event of a North Korean attack. Need for logistical support is 

expected to continue at least through 1980, and the need for 

tactical air support for a longer period. 

In weighing further reduction in U.S. ground forces in South 

Korea, the following are some of the considerations involved: 

xvii 

92-200 0 - 77 - 2 
o The United States faces a trade-off between involvement 

and control. Substantially reduced U.S. presence, and 

associated diminished U.S. role in the command and control structure of South Korean and U.S. forces, may 

conflict with the goal of stability on the Korean 

peninsula. 

o Although the political impact of U.S. force reductions. 

is not necessarily direct or predictable, some knowledgeable observers argue that substantial reductions might 

induce a further tightening of repressive measures in 

the South. 

o Because other U.S. force elements, such as tactical air 

and air defense support, which are considered critical 

to South Korea's defense needs, would probably be retained, the withdrawal of the division may not significantly reduce the risk of early U.S. combat involvement 

in a renewed Korean conflict. 

o If the infantry division were withdrawn from Korea in 

fiscal years 1978-1980 and retained in the force structure for NATO-related missions, it would add about $150 

million in program costs between fiscal years 1978 and 

1982, mostly as the result of rebasing in the United 

States. Beginning in fiscal year 1983, after the onetime rebasing and relocation costs were incurred, the 

annual recurring cost of the division based in the 

United States would be about $110 million less than if 

based in Korea. If the division's equipment were left 

in South Korea for South Korean forces -- as was done 

in 1971 -- then the replacement cost for the U.S. infantry division's equipment could approach $1 billion. 

The Problem of Identifying Forces "for Asia" and Their Costs 

It is very hard to say just what parts of U.S. general purpose forces should be assigned exclusively to one or another set 

of regional contingencies. U.S. Army troops stationed in Europe 

or Korea are perhaps the least ambiguous examples of regional 

commitments. But other forces, such as tactical air or naval 

forces, are much more difficult to categorize. Some observers 

have assumed that all U.S. forces located in and around the 

xviii 
Pacific basin are "for Asia." Others point out that much of the 

force now located in the Pacific could be used in Europe if that 

were required. 

Thus, there is no direct and unambiguous answer to the question of what U.S. Asian policy costs in terms of required military forces, and hence there is no specific baseline force for 

Asia. In what follows, then, the costs of various alternative 

force postures in the Pacific are compared with those of the 

forces programmed by the Department of Defense for fiscal years 

1978-1982. 

Alternatives to the Present Posture in East Asia and the Pacific 

Evaluation of alternatives to the present U.S. posture in 

East Asia and the Pacific rests on several basic assumptions 

about the overall U.S. general purpose force structure: 

a Whether U.S. general purpose forces in East Asia and 

the Pacific are judged excessive, adequate, or inadequate when related to military and political requirements in that region 

a Whether forces in Europe and in the United States that 

are designated "for NATO" are adequate or inadequate 

to meet military and political requirements in that 

theater. 

Force reductions. Removing forces from Asia and deleting 

them from the U.S. force structure would imply two assumptions: 

o General purpose forces in East Asia and the Pacific are 

in excess of military and political requirements in that 

region. 

o General purpose forces identified for Europe or NATO are 

sufficient to meet military and political requirements 

for that region. 

Several options would be consistent with these assumptions, 

including some options that are variations more in scope than 

in kind. The options discussed in this paper are as follows: 

A-I. Withdraw the U.S. Army infantry division from South 

Korea and remove it from the force structure. 

xix 
A-2. Reduce the division in South Korea to a brigade; 

delete remainder from the force structure. 

B-1. Delete from the force structure the two-thirds of a 

Marine division and air wing in Japan. 

B-2. Reduce by 50 percent the Marine Corps presence in 

Japan, from two regiments to one on Okinawa, with 

proportional reduction in the air wing component. 

C. Delete the U.S. Army infantry division in Hawaii 

from the force structure. 

D-l. Reduce U.S. Navy aircraft carriers forward deployed 

in the Western Pacific from two to one; delete the 

one forward-deployed carrier and two supporting 

carriers and related ships and aircraft from the 

force structure. 

D-2. Continue forward deployment of two carriers in the 

Western Pacific, but homeport a second carrier in 

either Japan or the Philippines, thereby enabling 

deletion of two carriers from the force. 

E. Delete the two U.S. Air Force tactical air squadrons 

in the Philippines from the force structure. 

Force realignments. Forces removed from Asia might be retained if the second assumption were modified: 

o General purpose forces identified for Europe or NATO 

are insufficient to meet military and political requirements in that theater. 

In that case, the options consistent with the assumptions 

would include 

F. U.S. Army infantry division in South Korea withdrawn, 

but retained in force structure and relocated in the 

continental United States. 

G-l. Three U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, aircraft and related ships transferred to the Atlantic, based upon 

reducing the forward-deployed carriers in the Western 

Pacific from two to one. 

xx 
G-2. Or, two carriers transferred, based upon homeporting 

a second carrier in the Western Pacific. 

Force enhancement in Northeast Asia. Since there is a consensus that U.S. forces in Northeast Asia are the most important 

part of our Asian deployments, we may wish to enhance those 

forces, whether or not we decide to realign or draw down deployments to Asia and the Pacific generally. 

An illustrative force enhancement option could involve the 

following: 

o Increasing the number of tactical aircraft in Korea (by 

transferring the two F-4 squadrons from the Philippines), 

improving the air defense control system, and increasing 

aircraft shelter protection in South Korea; 

o Providing better command and control facilities in the 

theater; 

o Increasing the degree of cooperation between U.S. and 

Japanese forces. 

These would be appropriate if it were desirable to improve the 

capability of the forces deployed. They could be undertaken 

with or without any major force reductions or redeployments. 
COST IMPACTS OF OPTIONS, RELATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1978 

PROGRAM: IN MILLIONS OF FISCAL YEAR 1977 DOLLARS 

ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT POSTURE IN EAST ASIA AND IN THE PACIFIC 

Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal 

Year Year Year Year Year Years 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

1. FORCE REDUCTIONS 

A-I. Delete infantry -100 -300 -500 -600 -600 -2.100 

division in South Korea 

from force structure 

A-2. Reduce division -60 -zoo -330 -400 -400 -1,390 

in South Korea to one 

brigade; delete the 

rest and its support 

B-1. Delete from force -50 -170 -300 -360 -360 -1,240 

structure the two-thirds 

of a Marine division and 

air wing in Japan 

B-Z. Reduce Marine -25 -85 -150 -180 -180 -620 

Corps presence in 

Japan by 50 percent 

C. Delete Army infan- -70 -140 -Z90 -Z90 -290 -1.080 

try division in Hawaii 

from the force structure 

D-l. Reduce aircraft -140 -440 -730 -880 -880 -3,070 

carriers forward deployed in Western 

Pacific from two to 

one; delete three 

carriers from the 

force 

D-2. Homeport a second -85 -400 -540 -540 -540 -2,105 

carrier in Japan or the 

Philippines; delete two 

carriers from force 

E. Delete two USAF -ZO -60 -80 -80 -80 -320 

tactical squadrons 

in Philippines 

(continued) 

xxii 
(Cost of Options, continued) 

Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal 

Year Year Year Year Year Years 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

II. FORCE REALIGNMENTS 

F. Return infantry +100 +60 +10 -10 -10 +150 

division in South Korea 

to continental United 

States for NATO 

G-l. Transfer three +30 +30 +30 0 0 +90 

aircraft carriers 

from the Pacific to 

the Atlantic by re- (costs of rebasing carriers for 

ducing the forward- Atlantic deployment not included) 

deployed carriers in 

the Western Pacific 

from two to one 

G-2. Transfer two air- +30 +30 +30 +20 +20 +130 

craft carriers from Pacific to Atlantic by 

homeporting second carrier in Western Pacific 

III. FORCE ENHANCEMENT IN 

NORTHEAST ASIA 

H. Increase tactical +83 +64 +11 +8 +8 +174 

air presence~ improve 

air defense, enhance 

command, control, and 

communications 

xxiii 

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 

This report provides a general framework for considering 

the current U.S. general purpose forces deployed in East Asia 

and the Pacific. It presents several alternative postures and 

discusses their budgetary impacts over fiscal years 1978-1982. 

Chapter II compares the U.S. defense posture in East Asia 

and the Pacific with that in Western Europe and the Atlantic, 

taking into account the fundamental similarities and differences 

in geography, military situation, and politics that mark the two 

regions. 

Next, in Chapter III, the paper reviews recent post-Vietnam 

foreign policy toward Asia, focusing in particular on the compe~ 

tition among U.S, policy objectives. The chapter recapitulates 

the Guam Doctrine articulated by the Nixon Administration in 

1969-1970, taking note of its emphasis on increased self-reliance 

of allies, particularly in providing ground forces. The bases 

for the changes in the planning guidance for general purpose 

forces, assuming one and one-half llmajor" instead of two and 

one-half "major" conflicts for sizing forces, are described, 

with emphasis on the impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict. 

Chapter IV discusses the general economic and political 

interests of the United States, focusing on Japan as the most 

important U.S. ally in Asia. This section describes the limited 

Japanese self-defense capabilities and the principal concerns 

of Japan with growing Soviet naval capabilities in the Pacific 

and with the possibility of instability and renewed conflict on 

the Korean peninsula. 

The fifth chapter considers those threats and contingencies 

in East Asia and the Pacific that are most relevant to evaluating 

the adequacy of U.S. forces. Topics examined in this section 

include Soviet capabilities in the region, the possibility of 

a North Korean attack on South Korea, a "brush fire" elsewhere 

in East Asia, worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet 

Union, and the possibility of a Soviet interdiction of sea 

lines of communication to Japan. 

1 
Chapter VI looks at the Korean peninsula in terms of the 

military balance between South and North Korea, the roles of 

U.S. forces in South Korea, the future phased removal of the 

remaining U.S. infantry division there, and the possible consequences of that withdrawal. 

The final chapter in the report describes the current 

general purpose posture deployed in East Asia and the Pacific. 

The paper concludes with a discussion of the rationales and 

budgetary impacts of several options, including force reduction, realignment toward NATO tasks, and enhancement of U.S. 

posture in Northeast Asia. 

2 
CHAPTER II. GENERAL CONTEXT FOR POLICY FOR U.S. FORCES RELATED 

TO ASIA: SIMILARITY AND CONTRAST TO EUROPE 

In Europe and East Asia, the Soviet Union poses the threat 

of paramount concern to the United States. Since the outset of 

the containment policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the 

United States has maintained a posture of "forward defense" in 

both regions. This involves overseas U.S. troop deployments 

and mutual defense agreements with allies to deter aggression 

and enable defense of territory on the Eurasian continent, reducing the likelihood of costly efforts to regain seized 

territory. 

In both regions the United States has sought to prevent 

nuclear proliferation by some major allies, especially Japan 

and West Germany, not only by maintaining forward U.S. military 

deployments near or in the territory of these allies but also 

by providing a strategic nuclear tlumbre11a" or "shield" to deter 

nuclear blackmail or attack against key allies. 

A major unstated function of the large U.S. force presence 

in Western Europe and the Western Pacific has been to make the 

growing economic and military strength of West Germany and Japan 

of less concern to other nations in these areas. 

Despite these general similarities, there are important 

differences between the geographic, military, and political context of the U.S. defense posture in East Asia and in Western 

Europe. 

In Western Europe, the presence of Soviet armored divisions 

in Eastern European countries bordering on West Germany makes 

the threat dramatically evident, near, and relevant to Western 

Europe's, particularly West Germany's, security. 

In East Asia today, in contrast to Central Europe, the 

Soviet Union's 40-odd divisions pose a threat, not to the allies 

of the United States, but instead to a former ally and now implacable foe of the Soviets, the People's Republic of China 

(PRC). Only about 30 percent of the Soviet Navy is in its 

3 
Pacific fleet, which, compared to other Soviet fleets and to the 

U.S. Pacific Fleet, is relatively inactive in terms of out-ofarea deployment of surface combatants. 

In contrast to the situation in the Atlantic, the U.S. Navy 

in the Pacific would not face the demanding task of protecting 

large numbers of convoys to sustain a massive allied response to 

a Soviet attack in a conventional land war. In the Pacific, the 

task basically would be to protect economic shipping, primarily 

to Japan. Although important, this task would be less demanding 

than the NATO task, especially if a few critical imports such as 

petroleum have been stockpiled. 

The principal ally of the United States in Asia is Japan, 

an island nation to whom, possibly largely because of U.S. presence and commitment, the military threat seems basically intangible and remote, and to whom the possibility of an attack seems 

highly hypothetical. The Soviet threat, although a matter of 

concern to the United States and Japan, does not have the immediacy it has positioned across the border in Central Europe. 

With the important exception of North Korean capability to 

attack South Korea with little warning, there are now few plausible direct military threats to the United States or its allies 

in Asia. Insurgency, however, remains a matter of serious direct 

concern to some U.S. allies in East Asia, such as the Philippines 

and Thailand. Vietnam's future role and policy in Southeast Asia 

is a matter of some anxiety in the region. 

In Europe, the United States is allied in the multilateral 

NATO organization, with a multilateral command and planning 

structure. There is a general COnsensus on the gravity and 

focus of the Soviet threat to the central front. In East Asia, 

the alliance relationships with the United States are basically 

bilateral. There is not, compared to NATO, a common sense of 

threat. 

In the case of Japan, there has not been such a close coordination of defense efforts. Mutual defense obligations were 

deliberately not made reciprocal, but instead rather one-sided. 

Japan does not have a reciprocal commitment to respond to an 

attack upon the territory of the United States. This unusual 

alliance relationship is derived from the established premise 

of U.S. policy after World War II that substantial rearmament 

by Japan would be destabilizing. Also, there is a lack of 

4 
domestic consensus in Japan to support anything approaching an 

integrated defense relationship such as the United States has 

within NATO. The U.S. forces deployed in Japan and elsewhere 

in the Western Pacific, particularly the Seventh Fleet, contribute importantly to Japanese security. The Japanese Self-Defense 

Forces are not expected to repel other than a small-scale attack 

without direct assistance. The U.S. commitment to defend Japan 

has allowed Japan to concentrate on economic growth and allocate 

annually slightly less than I percent of its GNP to defense 

since the mid-1960s, compared to about 4 percent recently allocated by some other key allies, such as West Germany. 

5 

CHAPTER III. RECENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND FORCE PLANNING 

GUIDANCE RELATING TO ASIA 

RECENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ASIA 

Since the collapse in 1975 of U.S.-supported forces in 

Vietnam, major statements by the executive branch of U.S. policy 

toward East Asia and the Western Pacific have stressed that !! 

o Stability in Asia and equilibrium in Northeast Asia in 

particular are "essential to our peace and safety" and 

cannot "be maintained without our active participation." 

o Japan is the key ally of the United States in Asia, 

"equally vital" as Western Europe. 

o The United States will maintain its treaty commitments 

"throughout Asia and the Pacific" and, while seeking 

"all honorable ways to reduce tensions and confrontation," is specifically resolved to preserve "the peace 

and security on the Korean peninsula," which is of 

"crucial importance to Japan." 

o The United States will continue "efforts to normalize 

diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of 

China," with which the United States has "parallel 

strategic interests in maintaining stability in Asia." 

President Carter recently declared a commitment to withdraw 

American ground troops from South Korea over "a four- or five-year 

1/ Secretary Kissinger's address to Japan Society in New York 

(June 18, 1975), p. 3; speech to Economic Club of Detroit 

(November 24, 1975), pp. 4-6;! and to Rotary Club of Seattle 

(July 22, 1976); President Ford's address "A Pacific Doctrine 

of Peace With All and Hostility Toward None" (December 7, 

1975); see also Joint Communique of President Carter and 

Prime Minister Fukuda: (March 22, 1977), and President 

Carter's address to the General Assembly of the United 

Nations (March 17, 1977). 

7 
time period," with the schedule for withdrawal "to be worked out 

very carefully with the South Korean government" and also "with 

the full understanding and perhaps participation of Japan.1I The 

Carter Administration also has indicated that a continued U.S. 

tactical air presence, logistical support, and intelligence 

elements will remain in South Korea over a longer period of 

time. II Apart from the need to supplement improving South 

Korean capabilities and to protect sea lines of communication 

to Japan, much of the continuing substantial, although diminished, U.S. forward deployments in East Asia and the Western 

Pacific have been justified on the basis of "political presencell 

requirements for stability and credibility of commitments rather 

than military missions. 11 

COMPETING U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES IN EAST ASIA 

The United States has competing policy objectives toward 

East Asia which pose dilemmas in weighing alternative force 

structures. An important general U.S. objective emphasized by 

President Carter is to discourage nuclear proliferation. Another 

objective is to induce allies to become more self-reliant, particularly with respect to ground forces to be used in their own 

defense. Still another principal objective is to encourage 

stability, particularly in Northeast Asia. 

Perhaps the objective of discouraging nuclear proliferation 

(to South Korea, and perhaps thereby indirectly to Japan in 

response) may not be served by withdrawIng the remaining U.S. 

infantry division from South Korea. Greater self-reliance for 

South Korea, and perhaps Japan, may at some point also conflict 

with regional stability in Northeast Asia. The U.S. policy of 

II President Carter's press conference statement, March 9, 1977, 

p. 5 of White House transcript. See also Vice President 

Mondale's arrival statement, Tokyo, Japan (January 30, 1977) 

and press conference on February 1, 1977, in Tokyo. 

11 Secretary Schlesinger's response to questions, House Committee on Armed Services (HCAS), Hearings on Military Posture 

(Part 1) FY 1975 (93:2), p. 51; see also Annual Defense 

Department Report FY 1978 (January 17, 1977), by Secretary 

Rumsfeld (hereafter referred to as Rumsfe1d FY 1978) 

pp. 38-39, 109. 

8 
encouraging Japan to increase her very modest defense effort is 

made more difficult, in part, not only because of continued U.S. 

force deployments near and in Japan, but also because of the 

general U.S. policy of detente, particularly with the Soviet 

Union. 

PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES RELATED TO ASIA 

In 1969, the United States adopted what became known as the 

Guam Doctrine, or Nixon Doctrine, relating to U.S. defense posture in the Pacific and East Asia. The Guam Doctrine was an 

attempt to define a U.S. role in Asia and in the Pacific area 

after the Vietnam war and to avoid "another war like Vietnam. 1I 

In December 1975, President Ford reaffirmed fundamentally 

the Guam Doctrine in his Pacific Doctrine that stressed a continuing U.S. interest and an active role in East Asia and the 

Western Pacific. 4/ The Guam Doctrine was succinctly summarized 

in President Nixo~rs Foreign Policy Report to the Congress in 

February 1970: ~/ 

o The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. 

o We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens 

the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation 

whose survival we consider vital to our security and 

the security of the region as a whole. 

o In cases involving other types of aggression we shall 

furnish military and economic assistance when requested 

and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation 

directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. 

[Emphasis added.] 

i/ President Ford, "A Pacific Doctrine of Peace With All and 

Hostility Toward None" (December 7, 1975). 

~/ President Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New 

Strategy for Peace (Report to the Congress, February 18, 

1970) (hereafter referred to as FPR 1970), pp. 7, 55-56; 

see also Presidential Papers of Richard M. Nixon (July 25, 

1969), pp. 546, 552, 555. 

9 

92-200 0 - 77 - 3 
In 1971, the Administration announced and undertook substantial reductions in U.S. military personnel in East Asia, 

beyond those being withdrawn from Vietnam and Thailand. The 

reductions announced in 1971 were 20,000 from South Korea, 

12,000 from Japan, 5,000 from Okinawa, and 9,000 from the 

Philippines. In the case of the U.S. decision to withdraw 

one of its two infantry divisions from South Korea, the President's Foreign Policy Report to the Congress in early 1971 cited 

as a rationale the substantial increases in the military capability of South Korea and its "remarkable" recent economic 

growth rate. The report emphasized the need for and U.S. commitment to modernization of South Korea's armed forces to enable 

them "to carry a larger share of the Korean burden." §j 

There were, of course, other factors in addition to the 

Guam Doctrine that produced pressure for reduction in general 

purpose forces, particularly ground forces, deployed in East 

Asia. The U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam were explained 

in part by references to the Guam Doctrine's emphasis on selfreliance. But some major reductions in general purpose forces 

probably would have occurred in any event without the doctrine, 

not only because of the growing opposition to U.S. involvement 

in the Vietnam war but also because of Administration efforts 

to restrain the defense budget generally and to absorb the 

impact of great increases in manpower costs associated with an 

all-volunteer force. 

"One and one-half" Instead of "Two and one-half" War Contingency 

Assumption 

About the same time as the adoption of the Guam Doctrine 

in 1969-1970, the Nixon Administration also announced an important change in basic planning assumptions for general purpose 

~I President Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: 

Building for Peace (Report to the Congress, February 25, 

1971), pp. 95-96 (hereafter referred to as FPR 1971); see 

also Secretary Laird's Annual Defense Report for FY 1972, 

p. 109 (hereafter referred to as Laird FY 1972), for estimate that over a five-year period the "total net savings --

that is, U.S. withdrawal and deactivation savings minus 

incremental Korean modernization costs -- could amount to 

abou t $450 million." 

10 
forces. The background of the revised planning assumption was 

summarized as follows II 

The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 

1960' s was the so-called "two and one-half war" 

principle. According to it, U.S. forces would be 

maintained for a three-month conventional forward 

defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast 

Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a 

minor contingency -- all simultaneously. These 

force levels were never reached. 

In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, 

we chose what is best described as the "one and onehalf war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in 

peace-time general purpose forces adequate for 

simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack 

in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against 

non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a 

contingency elsewhere. 

A major basis for the new "one and one-half war" planning 

assumption was recognition of the significance of the SinoSoviet conflict. As the President's Foreign Policy Report of 

1970 noted, §...I 

The prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on 

our allies by Russia and China are low both because 

of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability 

of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do 

not believe that such a coordinated attack should 

be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces. 

[Emphasis added.] 

In February 1970, the posture statement of the Department 

of Defense, in discussing the general implications of the "one 

and one-half war" strategy, stated that V 

21 FPR 1970, pp. 128-29. 

§...I Ibid., pp. 128-29. 

~I Defense Program and Budget, Secretary Laird (February 1970), 

p. 54 (hereafter referred to as Laird FY 1971). 

11 
In Asia, we seek to help our allies develop the capability to defend themselves with the U.S. providing 

materiel and logistic support. However, most of 

these countries lack adequate air and sea power. 

Considerable time and resources will be required 

to solve this problem. 

The Defense Report of February 1975, in discussing the "one 

and one-half war" planning guidance, stressed the significance 

of the assumption of continued Sino-Soviet conflict. The report 

also noted some expected functions of U.S. general purpose forces 

deployed in East Asia and the Pacific if a crisis or conflict in 

Europe occurred: 10/ 

• . • should a crisis erupt in Europe, we would have 

several major objectives in Asia: first, to deter 

adventures by other Asian nations; second, to prevent forces currently deployed in Asia from being 

transferred west of the Urals; and third, to discourage the opening of another front in Northeast 

Asia, whether on land or at sea. Our deployments 

in Korea and Okinawa, together with the "swing" 

forces in Hawaii, California, and Washington, provide us with the basic means to achieve these objectives. Indeed, these deployments are an outstanding 

example of the classical military principle of 

economy of force. 

IMPORT OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT FOR U.S. POSTURE IN EAST ASIA 

AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC 

As noted above, the Sino-Soviet conflict was the primary 

basis for the United States changing its planning guidance for 

general purpose forces for force sizing, from assuming the possibility of two major conflicts plus a smaller contingency to 

assuming one major conflict with the Soviet Union plus a smaller 

contingency. 

10/ Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T, Secretary Schlesinger (February 1975), pp. 111-10,30 (hereafter 

referred to as Schlesinger FY 1976). 

12 
This change would seem to impose a lessened requirement for 

general purpose forces. President Carter has suggested that the 

Sino-Soviet conflict and U.S.-PRC rapprochement are, along with 

increased South Korean military capabilities, an important "strategic" reason for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. infantry 

division in South Korea. 11/ 

On the other hand, the growth in Soviet general purpose 

capability, particularly against NATO, has been a principal 

rationale for increasing U.S. general purpose forces capability, 

such as increasing active Army divisions from 13 to 16 and increasing the mechanized strength of those divisions. 

It has been suggested that continued substantial U.S. deployments in East Asia and the Western Pacific have been recently 

(post 1969-1971) desired by the People's Republic of China (PRC) 

as a counterbalance to Soviet power in the Far East, the growth 

of which has been a matter of grave concern to Peking. 121 

Substantial U.S. reductions in forward deployments in East 

Asia and the Western Pacific might weaken the PRC resolve not 

to move toward major rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Such 

a rapprochement with Moscow would affect U.S. planning assumptions for general purpose forces, which since 1969-1970 have 

taken into account the Sino-Soviet split. Peking's motivations 

in its schism with Moscow are deeply ingrained, however, and are 

,very much the product of nationalistic inclinations and domestic 

political needs for cohesion. Consequently, changes in U.S. 

force posture in the Pacific would probably have a minor impact 

on the likelihood of continued split between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. 

In any event, it seems likely that Peking is more concerned 

about some U.S. reductions (particularly in naval, perhaps also 

in tactical air forces) than others in terms of relevance to 

counterbalancing the Soviet power in the Far East. Moreover, 

given acknowledged PRC concern with a strong NATO as a 

11/ President Carter's news conference, May 26, 1977 (White 

House transcript), p. 3. 

12/ Testimony of Secretary Schlesinger, HCAS, FY 1975 (93:2), 

p. 51; see also an interview with Schlesinger, "Inside China 

Now," U.S. News and World Report (October 18, 1976), p. 42. 

13 
counterweight to the Soviets, it may be that force elements 

reduced in the Pacific, but transferred for use in the Atlantic/ 

NATO area would be less a matter for anxiety in Peking. It may 

also be the case that access to some Western technology, such 

as air defense systems or antitank weapons to counter the 

Soviet armored strength along the Sino-Soviet border, could 

be seen by Peking as more important to its security than the 

impact of reduction in some U.S. forward deployments in East 

Asia and the Western Pacific. 

14 
CHAPTER IV. INTERESTS AND COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 

THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN 

The United States has significant economic interests in 

East Asia, including its relationship with Japan, its largest 

overseas trading partner. However, East Asia is of greater 

direct economic importance to Japan in terms of share of total 

trade, of direct foreign investment, and of sources of raw 

materials. The substantial U.S. forces deployed in the Western 

Pacific make a vital contribution to Japanese security, both in 

a direct military sense and in terms of stability of a region 

of major economic significance to Japan. Japan's own military 

effort is deliberately quite constrained (no more than 1 percent of its GNP since the mid-1960s), reflecting domestic political constraints, foreign concern with Japan's military potential, 

and Japan's reliance upon the defense commitment and major 

forward-deployed military force presence of the United States. 

The United States has a fundamental political interest in 

the continued orientation of Japan toward the West with a posture that is not destabilizing because of other nations' anxiety 

about and reaction to Japanese military capabilities. Nonetheless, important issues for the U.S.-Japanese alliance will 

remain how to share the defense burden and how to enhance effective cooperation in military functions, such as protection of 

sea lanes to Japan. 

ECONOMIC INTERESTS 

Present and previous Administrations have stressed the 

importance of U.S. economic interests in East Asia and the 

Western Pacific. The region, including Japan, is economically 

significant to the United States in terms of U.S. exports (lumber, coal, raw cotton, soybeans, grains) and imports of some 

critical raw materials (bauxite from Australia, oil and natural 

rubber from Indonesia, tin from Malaysia and Thailand). However, 

the relative economic importance of East Asia is considerably 

greater to Japan than to the United States in terms of direct 

foreign investment, share of total trade, and sources of critical 

raw materials. 

15 
The United States does have significant investments in Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere in East 

Asia; but their value is very small compared to U.S. investments 

in Canada and Western Europe. 11 Japan, since the late 1960s, 

has substantially increased its direct foreign investment in 

East Asia (particularly in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and 

Taiwan) to a level that has recently accounted for the largest 

regional share (34 percent in 1975) of such Japanese investment. !I 

With respect to raw materials, the President's Council on 

International Economic Policy (CIEP) on critical imported materials has reported: II 

The major supplying areas of concern to Europe and 

Japan differ from ours. Japan's sources reflect 

significant concentration in Austra1ia~ South and 

Southeast Asia. Europe relies on Africa more than 

the United States or, Japan. The United States relies 

on Canadian and Latin American sources to a significantly greater extent than Europe and Japan. [Emphasis added.] 

In the case of oil, it is worth noting that during 1975, 73 

percent of the crude oil imports of Japan came from the Persian 

Gulf and 11 percent from Indonesia. For the United States, the 

1/ Department of Commerce, Highlights of U.S. Export and Import 

Trade FT 990, December 1975; Council on International Economic Policy (ClEP), Special Report: Critical Imported 

Materials (December 1974), pp. 24, 44; International Economic Report to the President (March 1976), pp. 66-67. 

!I Consulate General of Japan, Japan Report (December 1976); 

M. Y. Yoshino, "Japanese Foreign Direct Investment,1I The 

Japanese Economy in International Perspective, edited by 

Isaiah Frank (Johns Hopkins, 1975), pp. 250-70. 

11 CIEP, pp. 42, 44. 

16 
comparable figures were 27 percent from the Persian Gulf and 8 

percent from Indonesia. 4/ Also, the vast majority (77 percent 

in 1975) of Persian Gulf-exports to the United States travel 

the shorter route around the southern cape of Africa to U.S. 

ports on the Gulf and east coast. ~I One significant implication of these figures is that the sea line of communication 

(SLOC) from the Persian Gulf through straits near Indonesia 

is devoted almost entirely to Japan's petroleum needs, not 

those of the United States. Therefore, the SLOC protection 

mission of the U.S. Navy from the straits in Indonesia to Japan 

is of critical significance to Japan and of much less direct 

importance to the United States. The map of world crude oil 

movements (Figure 1) on the next page makes this quite clear. 

POLITICAL INTERESTS 

The United States has an important interest in the stability 

and security of Asia, particularly Northeast Asia. Japan, with 

a GNP second only to the United States among industrial democracies, has an importance to the United States that goes beyond 

trade, because of the existing economic and potential military 

power of Japan. Perhaps the most important U.S. interest in 

Asia is in the continued orientation of Japan toward the West, 

with a military posture that is not regarded as destabilizing. 

~ Central Intelligence Agency, International Oil Developments, 

Statistical Survey, December 16, 1976, p. 5. (Persian Gulf 

defined as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, United Arab 

Republic, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar.) 

~/ Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, Petroleum Statement (December 1975), pp. 16-17. The crude oil imports to 

the United States that come across the Pacific from Indonesia 

and the Persian Gulf represented 3.5 percent of total U.S. 

domestic consumption in 1975. For Japan, the crude oil imports that are shipped via and up from Indonesia through the 

Western Pacific represented nearly all the domestic consumption of Japan. 

17 
I-' 

<» 

Figure 1. Preliminary World Crude Oil Movements to Major 

Consuming Areas - 1975 

(Thousand Barrels per Day) 

~ ........... :-.. " 

Note: Arrows indicate origin and destination but not necessarily specific routes. 

SOURCE: Adapted from Bureau of Mines, Division of Petroleum and Natural Gas, July 1976. 

tfJ't! 
Considerable difference of opinion can remain, however~ on 

the specific implications of U.S. Asian interests for existing 

baseline and alternative U.S. force deployments in East Asia 

and the Western Pacific. 

COMMITMENTS THROUGH TREATY OBLIGATIONS 

The United States has bilateral mutual defense treaties, 

with generally similar language~ with four nations in East Asia 

(Japan, Korea, Philippines, and Taiwan) and multilateral mutual 

security obligations with three others in the Southwest Pacific 

and Southeast Asia (Australia and New Zealand in the ANZUS Pact 

and Thailand via the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty). 

Most of these formal commitments were undertaken in the context 

of the Korean War and the early containment policy of the Truman 

and Eisenhower Administrations. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN 

Because of its economic size and potential military power, 

Japan is the key ally of the United States in Asia. The relationship of the United States to Japan and Japan's role in 

Asia are critical to a policy of encouraging stability in 

that region. 

The commitment of the United States to the security of 

Japan is embodied in the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 

Security, reaffirmed in 1970. Compared to other mutual defense 

treaties, the U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty is somewhat 

one-sided. Unlike the treaty with NATO, for example, although 

the United States is committed to respond to an attack upon 

Japan, Japan does not have a reciprocal obligation to respond 

to an attack on U.S. territory. ~/ This is consistent with the 

~/ Fred Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations 

(Brookings, 1975), pp. 2, 25. 

19 
fundamental U.S. policy premise that major Japanese rearmament, 

particularly the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability, would not be in the best interest of either Japan or 

the United States. 

This fundamental U.S. policy is reflected in the post-World 

War II Constitution of Japan, Article IX of which renounces war. 

This has been interpreted to permit only forces that are part of 

the inherent right of self-defense. Japanese public opinion and 

opposition party views have not supported a stronger military 

role for Japan. Indeed, the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security 

Treaty itself has not always had strong popular support in 

Japan. U.S. bases have been seen by some Japanese as primarily 

benefiting the United States and indeed a liability to Japan 

because of potential entanglement with U.S. military actions 

elsewhere in Asia. II Recently, however, increased support for 

the Mutual Security Treaty relationship has been observed in 

public opinion surveys and in somewhat more supportive positions 

taken in the last year or two by some opposition political parties in the Diet, the Japanese parliament. ~I 

A further constraint on Japan's military budget has been 

Japan's anticipation of the anxiety and opposition in other 

Asian nations in response to a "major" build-up in Japan's 

military capability. This situation, however, has changed 

significantly in the case of the PRC, which, after the 1972 

Peking-U.S. summit, dropped its opposition to an increase in 

Japan's military effort and to the continuation of the U.S.-

Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty. ~I 

II Ibid., pp. 1, 3, 5, 23, 25-26, 37-38, 49-54. 

~I Defense of Japan, Japanese Defense White Paper, 1976 (hereafter referred to as JDWP) , pp. 23, 36, 44, 52, and 57; and 

discussions with Japanese and U.S. Embassy personnel in 

Tokyo, November 1976. 

~I Greene, Ope cit., p. 9; JDWP, pp. 9, 32-33; New York Times, 

February 28, 1972, p. 14. 

20 
Japan's Defense Budget 

The Mutual Defense Treaty has enabled Japan to concentrate 

on economic growth, and since 1965 Japan has devoted only 1 percent (0.0089 in 1976) of its GNP to its self-defense forces. 

The record since 1955 has been as follows: 10/ 

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 

Percent of Japan's 

GNP devoted to 

defense 1. 78 1.23 1.07 0.79 0.84 0.9 

The cabinet of the Government of Japan has recently reaf~ 

firmed that 1 percent will remain the ceiling for the time 

being. 11/ Of course, with the third largest GNP in the world, 

a considerable expenditure is nevertheless involved, $4.484 billion in fiscal year 1975. Japan's military budget in that year 

placed it 10th in the world, slightly above Italy and Israel, 

but not quite 5 percent of the U.S. effort and lowest in share 

of defense in national government spending (6.2 percent) of 30 

"leadingll nations in defense spending. 12/ 

The "Outline of the National Defense Program," issued by 

the Japanese Government on October 29, 1976, as a guideline for 

fiscal year 1977 (beginning April 1, 1977) stressed the premise 

that the international situation surrounding Japan "will not 

change radically." Instead of any further quantitative growth 

in force levels, the emphasis would be on "qua1itativell improvements and.a "balanced" force including logistics support and an 

ability to repel "small-scale" aggression "in principle" without 

U.S. assistance. 13/ By developing only a one-year projection 

after fiscal year:1976, the Japanese Government was changing from 

its previous policy of having successive five-year "build-up" 

10/ JDWP, p. 158. 

11/ Far Eastern Economic Review, November 19, 1976, p. 15. 

12/ JDWP, p. 160. 

13/ Prime Minister Fukuda, responses on ABC News' "Issues and 

Answers," March 25, 1977. 

21 
plans announced. Fiscal year 1976 will be the end of the fourth 

such plan. The new approach can be regarded as more open-ended, 

broad, and abstract, allowing more flexibility rather than 

being tied to a five-year plan that may prove inadequate or 

develop shortfalls. 

It is uncertain whether restraining defense spending has 

been beneficial to Japan's economic growth. 14/ However, U.S. 

presence in East Asia has made substantial Japanese economic 

investment and involvement in the region less a matter of anxiety and opposition. 

If the general purpose forces in East Asia and the Western 

Pacific can be said to make indirectly quite a significant contribution to Japan's security, then the DoD estimate that in 

fiscal year 1976 $5 billion of the DoD general purpose forces 

budget was for WESTPAC (Western Pacific) would mean the U.S. 

budget costs indirectly related to Japanese (and U.S.) security 

interests -- such as the Seventh Fleet's deployments related to 

the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to Japan -- were about 

equal to the direct expenditures of Japan itself in that year. 

The Japanese Government has officially acknowledged the 

issue of the "free ride" on the United States in defense. In 

recent years, the U.S. Government has urged Japan to do more, 

particularly in antisubmarine warfare and in air defense (including airborne early warning). 15/ Because of rising manpower 

costs and general inflation, however, major shortfalls occurred 

14/ Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, "Japan's Economic Performance: An Overview," Asia's New Giant (Brookings, 1976), 

p. 45. (Estimates that if Japan had spent 6-7 percent of 

GNP on defense, "it would have reduced the growth rate by 

at most only two percentage points, even assuming no beneficial spillover effects of defense expenditures.") 

15/ JDWP, p. 36; Secretary Schlesinger in August 1975 (news 

briefing in Tokyo on 29th), while recognizing the constraints on Japan's efforts, stated that "Japan has been 

too much a passive partner," and emphasized the need for 

better discussion of combined U.S. and Japanese capabilities 

to protect sea lines of communication to Japan. [Emphasis 

added.] See also News Conference, same day, Imperial Hotel, 

Tokyo. 

22 
in the 1972-1976 Japanese defense procurement plan, particularly 

in the planned increase of naval force levels. 16/ The procurement goals for the Air Defense Force, which were more fully 

attained, represented generally qualitative replacement of older 

aircraft rather than an increased force level, as was the case 

with naval forces. 

Within the not quite 1 percent of GNP that Japan devotes to 

defense expenditures, Japan has chosen an allocation that has 

made some programs much more expensive than they need be, leaving 

even less funds available for competing defense needs.!ZJ Such 

substantial additional costs have resulted from licensing coproduction in Japan of such weapons as the F-4 instead of purchasing 

them directly from the United States. 

Japan understandably has not wanted to neglect its own 

industrial base, particularly during the recent recession. If 

Japan should choose the F-15 as successor to the F-l04J, then 

the unit cost has been estimated to be 40-50 percent higher by 

licensed coproduction in Japan instead of direct import. In 

the case of the P-3 as a successor to the P-2J, the unit cost 

through licensed coproduction could be 60-80 percent higher than 

purchasing directly from the United States. If Japan decided 

to develop and produce independently an alternative for the P-3, 

such a "PXL" might have a unit cost 200-300 percent greater than 

the P-3. 18/ 

The issue of burden sharing is likely to remain, and will 

perhaps become an even more contentious, high visibility issue 

in Japanese-U.S. relations. However, without a greater sense 

of threat, which is generally lacking in Japanese public opinion, 

the Japanese Government may remain reluctant to exceed or even 

equal 1 percent of GNP for defense spending. The anticipated 

reduction in the future rate of Japan's economic growth will 

perhaps reinforce this established reluctance. In a way, the 

U.S. specific policy of urging the Japanese to do more is 

frustrated by the general success of the United States' own 

16/ JDWP, pp. 91-93, 133-134, 148-149. 

11/ The same point, of course, could be made about the United 

States and other nations, such as some NATO allies. 

18/ Source: OSD/ISA and Defense Security Assistance Agency. 

23 
policies of providing deterrence of a major attack on Japan and 

of improved relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's 

Republic of China. Both policies have perhaps reinforced the 

general lack of concern with an external threat in Japan. 

U.S. Bases in Japan 

Japan has made military bases available for U.S. forces at 

a cost of about $400 million per year in payments to affected 

communities for leasing of land, etc. These bases are important 

for maintaining a U.S. military presence in the region and 

assisting in the defense of Japan and South Korea. In the main 

islands of Japan, there are several major U.S. installations 

that include logistics support supply depots, airfields, and a 

large-capacity naval base and shipyard facility at Yokosuka. 

Nearly 75 percent of the total land area used by U.S. forces 

in Japan is in Okinawa, particularly training and maneuver 

areas for the U.S. Marine Corps. 19/ 

There have been substantial reduction and consolidation of 

U.S. bases in Japan, particularly in the densely populated Kanto 

plain area around Tokyo. The Japanese Government is estimated 

to be paying over $700 million to construct new facilities, such 

as living quarters, on the remaining bases. There is no longer 

, pressure from the Government of Japan itself, as opposed to some 

local sentiment, for further reduction in U.S. bases in Japan. ~/ 

Even though there has been a substantial reduction of U.S. 

military personnel in Japan in recent years, at the remaining 

bases there are still instances of ~ubstantial overcrowding 

and substandard base living facilities, such as at Iwakuni, 

Japan, where some U.S. Marines are living in "temporary" quarters built in the early 1950s. The operations and maintenance 

costs for U.S. forces in Japan have risen sharply. A major element of these costs is for Japanese employees at U.S. bases. 

Although the number of Japanese employees has dropped substantially (from 34,200 in fiscal year 1973 to 22,700 in fiscal year 

1976), the dollar costs to the United States have significantly 

19/ JDWP, pp. 62-63, 139. 

20/ Discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel, November 1976. 

24 
risen (nearly 70 percent increase in manyear costs from fiscal 

year 1973 to fiscal year 1975). 21/ Some Japanese sharing of 

these labor costs in the "O&M" budget for U.S. bases in Japan 

would obviously be helpful. 

Japan's Limited Self-Defense Capability 

The very modest capability (240,000 military personnel) of 

Japan's Self-Defense Forces does not enable Japan in 1977 to 

defend itself against other than a small-scale conventional 

attack. In the assessment of the Japanese Government, U.S. 

forces are required to deal with more substantial threats. Some 

observers have described even munitions as an area requiring 

U.S. assistance. 22/ 

The Japanese Government has recently reaffirmed the key 

importance of the Mutual Security Treaty as a "pillar" of 

Japanese defense: ~/ 

Naturally, Japan cannot defend herself from largescale aggression or a nuclear threat. Such defense 

would require American military cooperation, making 

the Security Treaty indispensable. American use of 

21/ OSD/ISA. 

22/ Greene, Ope cit., pp. 58, 73, 88. 

23/ JDWP, pp. vii, 50; see also pp. 3, 6, 33-34, 35, 40, 61. A 

more detailed Japanese reference to the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" for Japan deserves note: "Japan depends on the 

American nuclear deterrent to cope with nuclear threats to 

this nation. American government leaders have frequently 

promised protection for Japan from nuclear threats. Confidence in this deterrent is, however, primarily based on close 

Japanese-American relations, and on American recognition of 

Japan as an important partner. As long as Japan remains an 

especially important American ally, the United States may not 

overlook nuclear threats against this nation. Furthermore, 

protecting allies from nuclear threat is a natural position 

for the United States, considering American policy aimed at 

halting nuclear proliferation." [Emphasis added.] 

25 

92-200 0 77 .. 4 
military bases within Japan under this treaty is not 

only an obligation, but is integral to our national 

security. 

PRINCIPAL JAPANESE CONCERNS: STABILITY IN KOREA AND THE SOVIET ----- PACIFIC FLEET 

Japan recognizes how distant regional conflicts, such as 

the October 1973 Middle East War and the oil embargo, can vitally 

affect Japan. The Government of Japan, however, naturally 

focuses on Northeast Asia as the area most important to Japan's 

peace and security. In that regional context, the Japanese have 

stressed the potential for instability and conflict on the Korean 

peninsula and the quality and demonstrated presence of the Soviet 

Pacific Fleet. 24/ 

Stability on the Korean Peninsula 

The Japanese Government recently assessed the situation on 

the peninsula and its significance to Japan: 25/ 

The Korean peninsula continues to be divided, with 

mutual distrust between the North and South deeply 

rooted. Dialogue between them has been stalled, and 

both are actively deploying major forces. These factors make the peninsula one of the world's most 

militarily-strained locations. Judging from the 

~i/ JDWP, p. 2, 11, 13, 26-30, 50. Major qualitative improvements in some U.S. force components ~- such as laser-guided 

munitions and ASW subsystems -- were not noted as much as 

quantitative reductions and did not receive adequate consideration in the 1976 Japanese Defense White Paper. 

2J./ Ibid., p. 12; similar statements were made more recently by 

senior Japanese officials. See address by Fumihiko Togo, 

Ambassador of Japan, to Japan-American Society, Minneapolis, 

Minnesota (November 9. 1976), stating "The United States presence in South Korea is the safeguard against the disruption 

of this Erec~.:rious equilibrium on the Peninsula." [Emphasis 

added. ] SeG' 2rLne Minis ter Fukuda responses on ABC News' 

"Issues and ArL[;\VerS," March 25, 1977. 

26 
current world situation, American pledge to defend 

the Republic of Korea, U.S. military deplo}~nt 

and other factors, it might safely be said that 

there are few signs of any large-scale military 

engagement in Korea at present. Korean peace is 

a prereguisite for the peace and security of all 

East Asian nations, including Japan. It cannot be 

denied that the security of the Korean peninsula is, 

to a large degree, supported by the area's military 

balance, including the presence of U.S. forces in 

the ROK. 

Considering the overall military potential of 

North Korea and the ROK, and taking the 42,000 

U.S. troops present in the ROK into consideration, 

military power on the Korean peninsula is seen as 

roughly in balance. [Emphasis added.] 

The military balance and role of u.S. forces on the Korean 

peninsula is examined further in Chapter VI of this paper. At 

this point, it is important to consider the impact of such a 

renewed Korean conflict on the relationship between the United 

States and Japan. 

The direction and degree of reaction in Japan to a renewed 

Korean conflict would depend very much on how the conflict originated and on the related actions of the United States. 26/ If 

there were clear direct aggression from the North, then~apanese 

political support for South Korea and for U.S. efforts and use 

of the U.S. logistical support bases in Japan would probably be 

forthcoming. But if the outbreak of the conflict were regarded 

in Japan as ambiguous in origin, or apparently a result of 

actions by South Korea, then if the U.S. interpretation differed, 

the issue of support could become quite divisive, not only 

internally in Japan but also in relations with the United States. 

~I Senate Foreign Relations Committee, International Securitj[ 

Assistance (March 1976), pp. 91-93; Nathan White, "Japan I s 

Security Interests in Korea," Asian Survey (April 1976), 

pp. 299-318. 

27 
The Soviet Pacific Fleet 

The Japanese Self-Defense Agency has expressed particular 

concern with the growth in size and quality of the Soviet Pacific 

Fleet, especially the "about 40" nuclear-powered submarines. 

They have also pointedly noted the scale of occasional Soviet 

fleet exercises in "out of area" locations, such as the Philippine Sea, south of Japan, that include "mock convoy attacks." '!:J.../ 

As a consequence of Japanese awareness of their overwhelming 

dependence on ship-borne imports and their special sensitivity 

to the Soviet Pacific Fleet's capabilities, Japanese sensitivity 

to a reduction in the U.S. naval force presence may be greater 

than sensitivity to reductions elsewhere in the U.S. forwarddeployed forces. 28/ 

The presence of the Soviet fleet in the Pacific is examined 

further in the next chapter. 

'!:J...I JDWP, pp. 7, 16-17. 

281 Greene, op. cit., pp. 7. 58, 62-63; interviews in Japan, 

November 1976. 

28 
CHAPTER V. REGIONAL THREATS AND PRINCIPAL CONTINGENCIES 

In contrast to rationales for forces related to NATO, recent 

Administrations have not presented a detailed rationale that attempts to derive much of U.S. deployment in East Asia and the 

Western Pacific from analysis of threats and contingencies in 

that area. Particularly after the collapse of U.S.-supported 

forces in Vietnam, the prinCipal contingency of concern has been 

a North Korean attack upon South Korea. In terms of a threat 

from a major power to U.S. and allied interests and forces in 

the Western Pacific, the naval component of Soviet forces in the 

Far East has received the most attention in Defense Department 

presentations and in Japanese Government commentary. The formidable Soviet ground and air force elements in the Far East are 

regarded as principally directed at the People's Republic of 

China (PRC). 

At first glance, the United States appears to have forces 

in East Asia and the Pacific considerably in excess of the needs 

generated either by the Korean contingency, assuming no Soviet 

or PRC combat involvement, or by the relatively small portion 

(30 percent) of the Soviet Navy represented by its Pacific 

fleet. The rationale for the significantly reduced, but still 

substantial, U.S. forces deployed in East Asia and the Pacific 

is avowedly political. Our presence there is said to s~pport 

important U.S. interests related primarily to Japan. These 

include a secure Japan that relies with confidence on the U.S. 

commitment to Japan's defense and that does not feel compelled 

to accommodate with the Soviet Union, to reorient its foreign 

policy away from the United States, or to rearm in a major way. 

Although the regional threats in East Asia and the Pacific 

do not seem to determine much of the U.S. force structure in the 

region, they are not irrelevant. The first part of this chapter 

reviews these regional threats. The second part of the chapter 

examines the principal contingencies in the region and some of 

their suggested implications for force structure. 

29 
REGIONAL THREATS 

Soviet Union 

Soviet military forces pose the threat of paramount interest 

for U.S. military force planning for Asia and the Pad.fic. However, the threa.t posed by Soviet ground forces deployed along 

the Sino-Soviet border seems principally aimed at the People's 

Republic of China (PRe) not Japan or South Korea. 

In 1968-1969, the Soviets began a build-up of their ground 

forces in the area of their border with the People's Republic 

of China. By 1977, about 40 divisions, nearly 25 percent of the 

Soviet ground forces, were on the Sino-Soviet border, compared 

to perhaps 15 divisions in 1965. Over 900 tactical aircraft, 

25 percent of Soviet tactical aircraft assigned to frontal aviation units, are deployed in this border region. This build-up 

did not reduce the forees Jep10yed in Central Europe. They, in. 

fact, also gr~v somewhat in both quantity and qu.'llity during 

this period. 1::./ 

The Soviet Navy deployed in the Pacific and Indian Oceans 

has been a matter of greater direct concern to the United States 

and Japan than the Soviet ground forces in ·Asia. However, the 

growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been gradual. It now 

contains roughly 30 percent of the Soviet Navy. 2/ The Soviet 

Pacific Fleet (excluding ballistic missile submarines) is much 

less active than other Soviet fleets or the U.S. Pacific Fleet. 

As Figure 2 shows, the Soviet fleet in the Pacific has 

shown a far lower rate of combatant deployment than the U.S. 

Pacific Fleet. There has been no recent dramatic build-up or 

change in activity level or deployment pattern. Nevertheless, 

concern has been expressed, in Japan in particular, over the 

growing (]1la1ity and scale of occasional exercises of the Soviet 

1/ Japanese Defense White Paper (JDWP), pp. 13. 16; Rumsfe1d, 

FY 1977, p. 123; FY 1978, p. 87; Schlesinger, FY 1976, 

p. III-4. 

~/ See Appendix for force level and composition of the Pacific 

Fleet of the Soviet Navy. 

30 
W 

i-' 

Figure 2. 

;I' 

t' 

US/USSR Naval Combatant Deployments Bl 

(Average Calendar Years 1966 and 1976) 

us 

i 

o 

127 

us 

~ 

US 

US "--:::> 

I USSR 

228:1:\::::::::::::: 

\~T2I : ~: ~: ~: ~: ~: ~: ~: ~ 

~ .......... ''! •• ' 

\)0 ,... 

IUSSR

1 

EUSSR 

'I 40~ 

I 

I ? 18~28t:::::::::::::1 US \ USSR 34~ ts~~~:r::::«:: 3 ) rJ USd<::':':-::~::1 '" '" .;.; ...... ;.;. I<S: 4 ;:::: .8.;:::' 

3 2 

u :::;:;:::::::;:;: '.:.:.:.:.:,:.:-: 

1966 1976 

PACIFIC 

~ Includes aircraft carriers, general purpose submarines, major surface combatants, 

minor surface combatants, amphibious ships, and mine warfare ships. 

1966 1976 

MEDITERRANEAN 

SOURCE: Adapted from Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary, January 14, 1977. 

J<6888?I ........... . 

~ 1966 1976 

INDIAN OCEAN 
Pacific Fleet outside of its home waters, such as in the 

Philippine Sea. 

Although qualitative improvements have been introduced in 

recent years, the Soviet Pacific Fleet typically receives new 

classes of vessels after the other fleets. Further qualitative 

improvements can be expected, such as the BACKFIRE bomber assigned 

to naval aviation. The BACKFIRE bomber, armed with air-tosurface antiship missiles, could be a significant, extendedrange airborne threat to the U.S. aircraft carriers even in 

areas south of Hawaii. 

There are significant limitations that constrain the potential sustained operation of the Soviet fleet in the Pacific and 

the Indian Oceans. Vladivostok, located on the Sea of Japan, is 

the principal naval port for the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The Sea 

of Japan would probably not be a feasible operating area for the 

naval forces of either side during a major war, because of the 

Soviet tactical air and submarine forces on the one hand and U.S. 

tactical air forces on the other. The exits from the Sea of 

Japan are vulnerable choke points for passage of Soviet vessels 

in a crisis or wartime situation. It should be noted that nearly 

all merchant shipping to Japan is to ports on the eastern Pacific 

coast of Japan, not on the Sea of Japan. 

Some of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, particularly some submarines, operate out of Petropavlovsk, which, being directly 

on the Pacific, does not have Vladivostok's disadvantages of 

choke point exits and entrances. However, Petropavlovsk is 

on the remote and isolated Kamchatka peninsula off Siberia, and 

is thus significantly handicapped in terms of logistical support. 

Nonetheless, the Soviet Pacific Fleet's ability to interdict shipping, particularly that of oil, by using submarines 

and tactical aviation, is a matter of serious concern in Japan. 

In the Indian Ocean, the present ability of the Soviet Union 

to sustain interdiction of oil shipping from the Persian Gulf 

is quite limited because of the great distances from Soviet 

logistical support. Soviet force elements normally deployed 

in the Indian Ocean during peacetime are not ideal for interdicting shipping. With greater utilization and further development of support basing, for instance on the east coast of Africa, 

Soviet sustaining capability would be improved. But, the basic 

weakness and vulnerability of the Soviet Navy in sustaining 

underway force deployments, particularly where it lacks 

32 
sustained air cover from land based aircraft, would remain. The 

Secretary of Defense's posture statements in recent years have 

especially noted these shortcomings. 3/ 

People's Republic of China (PRC) 

The People's 

tary capability. 

ferior to that of 

large part toward 

Republic of China possesses a significant mil iThis capability is technologically much inthe Soviet Union; moreover it is directed in 

the Soviets. 

In the case of ground forces, the People's Republic of China 

reportedly has an army of about 3.5 million organized into about 

210 divisions, about 90 of which are in regions bordering the 

Soviet Union. To counter the Soviets, the People's Republic of 

China has increased deployment in North China and carried on 

massive civil defense efforts. 

The PRC Navy has been judged "not able to oppose the United 

States or the USSR in open-ocean conflict for the foreseeable 

future." i/ 

In recent years, the United States has taken explicit account of the severe split in USSR-PRC relations. Particularly 

since the U.S.-PRC move toward normalization of relations or 

rapprochement in 1971, the United States has downgraded the PRC 

threat to U.S. interests and allies in Asia in presentation of 

the rationale for U.S. forces in Asia. Indeed, it has even been 

suggested that the People's Republic of China wanted a U.S. presence in Asia to counterbalance the Soviet Union. The People's 

Republic of China has been explicit about supporting NATO as a 

useful counterweight to the Soviet Union. 

The likelihood of the People's Republic of China bringing 

military pressure to bear against Taiwan has been greatly 

1/ Rumsfeld, FY 1977, p. 129. 

i/ Schlesinger, FY 1976, p. 111-4; Rumsfeld FY 1977, p. 129. 

The estimates of PRC military personnel levels appear to be 

of low confidence; House Arm~d Services Committee, Hearings 

on Military Posture, Fiscal Year 1977, Part 3, p. 759. 

33 
discounted in recent years, in light of improved PRC-U.S. relations and PRC preoccupadon with the Soviet Union. '}j 

Vletnam 

Since the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Vietnamese effort 

has been concentrated on national consolidation and economic 

reconstruction. However, there is no indication that their 

combat forces have been demobilized. This is cause for some 

concern elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Laos remains heavily under 

Hanoi's influence. There is concern in Thailand over Vietnamesesupported insurgency; but elsewhere in Southeast Asia the threat 

is not seen to be immediate. 

North Korea 

North Korea is discussed in detail in Chapter VI, which 

focuses on the military balance on the Korean peninsula and the 

role of U.S. forces in South Korea. 

Territorial Conflicts 

In recent 'years, increased interest in the oil ~nd mineral 

resources of the ocean bed has led to instances of jurisdictional conflict over islands and the continental shelf in areas 

such as the South and East China Sea. Overlapping claims of 

Vietnam and the People's Republic of China and of the Philippines 

and Indonesia, for example, have arisen. However, disputes and 

even clashes over these issues seem unlikely to be of much, if 

any, direct concern to the United States, other than for their 

potential interference with freedom of navigation through some 

zones. 

il Schlesinger interview, U.S. News & World Report (October 18, 

1976), p. 42; House Armed Services Committee, FY 1977, 

op. cit., pp. 758-759. 

34 
PRINCIPAL CONTINGENCIES CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING U.S. FORCE 

DEPLOYMENTS IN THE PACIFIC AND EAST ASIA 

The contingencies that are currently most relevant to 

evaluating the need and purported rationale of U.S. general 

purpose forces deployed in the Pacific and relating to Asia 

include the following: 

o War in Korea only, with or without PRC and/or Soviet 

assistance in terms of logistics and/or combat forces. 

o IIBrush fire" or "minor" contingency elsewhere in the 

Western Pacific/East Asia. 

o Worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union 

("two-front" war with the Soviet Union). 

o Soviet efforts to interdict sea lines of communication 

(SLOCs), especially of oil from the Persian Gulf to 

Japan. 

In terms of policy and planning guidance relating to these 

contingencies, U.S. naval and air power is expected to be the 

principal U.S. contribution to its allies, who would have to 

provide nearly all the ground forces to respond to direct aggression against them. 

War in Korea 

In the case of a North Korean attack on South Korea without 

combat support from either the Soviet Union or the People's 

Republic of China, the U.S. assessment has been that the U.S. 

contribution should be primarily in tactical air support and 

logistical support, along with some air defense and intelligence, 

command/control, and communications. i/ 

If North Korea did receive combat assistance from the Soviet 

Union or the People's Republic of China, the need for U.S. support would increase considerably; but this is a contingency 

if See, for example, testimony of Secretary of Defense 

Schlesinger, House Armed Services Committee Hearings, 

Part I, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 51. 

35 
thought to be so unlikely as not to be a major consideration in 

sizing U.S. general purpose forces deployed in East Asia. 

There may be "little warning" of a North Korean attack. Z'/ 

Thus forces in place, or quite rapidly deployable, could be 

critical, given the nearness (30 miles) of Seoul to the dimilitarized zone (DMZ). A major thrust against Seoul with hope of 

fait accompli seizure might be a major objective of North Korea. 

Recently, some emphasis has been reportedly placed by the United 

States on assuming and planning for a short, intense conflict. ~ 

U.S. Tactical Air Assets for Possible Use in Korea 

The present imbalance in combat aircraft favoring North over 

South Korea is approximately as follows: 

Total 

Relatively modern 

jet aircraft 

North Korea 

600 Combat Aircraft 

150 MIG-2l 

50 MIG-19 

200 

South Korea 

204 Combat Aircraft 

72 F-4D/E 

70 F-5A/E 

142 

The U.S. Air Force has two squadrons, totaling about 60 tactical 

fighter aircraft, presently deployed in South Korea. 

The United States has deployed elsewhere in East Asia and 

in the Western Pacific the following tactical air units that 

could be rapidly deployed to South Korea: 

21 House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military 

Posture, FY 1977 (Part 3), p. 765; " ••• at most 12-18 

hours' warning," p. 781. 

~ "U.S. General Envisions 'A Short Violent War' if Korean 

Reds Attack," Wall Street Journal, January 13, 1976, p. 1; 

" ••• much greater emphasis on firepower early in the war, 

to blunt what is presumed to be a surprise attack coming 

down from the North," Secretary Schlesinger, Press Conference, 

September 1, 1975. "The Hollingsworth Line," Far Eastern 

Economic Review, February 27, 1976, pp. 26-29. 

36 
2 (USAF) Squadrons of F-4s in 

the Philippines 

4 (USAF) Squadrons of F-4s in 

Okinawa, Japan 

Two-thirds (USMC) Air Wing in 

Japan 

Fighter Attack Aircraft 

48 

96 

58 

202 

This forward-deployed tactical air capability appears adequate to counterbalance the North Koreans, even without including about four squadrons of tactical fighter aircraft associated 

with the two U.S. carriers forward deployed in the Western Pacific 

or without taking account of superior U.S. technology. This 

suggests that the carriers may not be required in a Korean conflict unless land bases in South Korea become saturated, or are 

overrun, or if land-based tactical air units were unavailable 

for other reasons. 

In the context of East Asia and the Pacific, the Korean 

contingency just discussed is considered to be the most likely 

Ifhalflf war scenario related to force sizing. 

"Brush Fire!! or "Minor" Contingency. 

The two-thirds of a Marine division stationed in Okinawa 

are the U.S. ground forces most likely to be involved in a contingency or "brush fire" in East Asia and the Western Pacific, 

outside of Korea. 

Such a contingency is, by nature, hard to anticipate with 

any realistic detail. Recent examples cited as demonstrating 

the need for the Marine Corps' presence in Okinawa and forwarddeployed continuously afloat presence in the Western Pacific are 

the recapturing of the Mayaguez and its crew and the evacuations 

of Americans from Saigon and the capital of Laos. These examples would be more persuasive if they were not also seen as 

situations stemming from a war's termination and immediate aftermath, rather than as independent incidents. 

Contingencies can be envisioned where the environment surrounding the evacuation or extrication process would be hostile, 

preclude safe commercial evacuation, and require airlifting 

37 
Marine or other elements briefly into a country to suppress 

hostile fire jeopardizing evacuation, or to rescue U.S. personnel from being trapped in civil strife. However, circumstances that would require a force of Ma'dnes as large (21,000) 

as that stationed on Okinawa are very hard even to hypothesize. 

In the Mayaguez incident in May 1975, the }furine Corps 

force elements actually employed were portions of a company-size 

assault team (of somewhat more than 120 men) to recapture the 

ship and two companies of a battalion landing team (BLT) to 

land on the nearby Cambodian island. Those force elements were 

airlifted by the U.S. Air Force in C-14ls from Okinawa and the 

Philippines to Thailand. From there they were flown to the 

area of r-he Mayaguez by helicopters. 2/ 

The contingencies suggested as examples of the utility of 

forward-d~ployed Marines in the Western Pacific seem to call 

for forces considerably smaller than those actually deployed. 

A smaller force, remaining in a less-crowded Okinawa, could be 

highly ready. Marine forces are not needed on Okinawa to support afloat units (one or two battalion landing teams) forward 

deployed in the Western Pacific, since the ships could be rotated 

from the U.S. west coast or Hawaii with Marine personnel rotated 

by airlift. 

Worldwide Conflict with the Soviet Union 

A worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union 

could begin simultaneously in both the NATO/Atlantic and Pacific 

theaters. However, if conflict began in one theater first, it 

is more likely that it would start with a Soviet/Warsaw Pact 

attack in Central Europe, because of the Soviet's strong intu,::;!-

in not giving dramatic strategic warning to NATO by first at, ~k.­

ing U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean arGa; 

because of the economic value of \-Jestern Europe as a greater 

strategic "prize"; and because of the formidable Soviet forces 

9J Captain Walter J. Wood and Major J. B. Hendricks, II 'Mayday , 

for the Mayaguez," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 

1976), pp. 100-108. The size of the Marine Corps elements 

actually used was constrained by the number of appropriate 

Air Force CH-53 helicopters available in Thailand at the 

t:i.me. 

38 
deployed in the heart of Europe, which face minimum land or wateT.:' 

barriers to substantial advance. 

Assuming that a NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional war were 

under way in Europe, either the Soviet Union or the United States 

might be motivated to spread conventional conflict to the Pacific 

area to "tie down" the other's forces deployed in the Far East 

to prevent their transfer to the European theater. In the case 

of the Soviet Union, nearly 25 percent of its divisions and 

tactical frontal aviation are in Soviet Asia. These Soviet 

forces have been assessed by the U.S. Department of Defense 

to exceed requirements for defense against a Chinese attack. 10/ 

However, very conservative Soviet planning assumptions and consideration of a limited offensive against the People's Republic 

of China may be the basis for the apparent surplus capability. 

During a war in Central Europe, Soviet concern with a 

hostile and alarmed PRC~ perhaps redeploying and enhancing 

readiness of some of its forces, would in itself tie do~m a 

substantial proportion of Soviet forces, particularly ground 

forces and perhaps tactical air assets. 11/ Thus Soviet concern with the People's Republic of China-Could reduce the burden 

on the United States and its allies in deploying forces in the 

Pacific to tie down Soviet forces there. 

In addition to concern with the People's Republic of China, 

the Soviets might have other reasons for hesitating to initiate 

a second front in the Far East. TI1e Soviet logistic support 

line across Eastern Russia is vulnerable and not now significantly 

redundant. The Soviets would face considerable constraints 

imposed by the disadvantages of the Sea of Japan and the 

Kamchatka Peninsula in prosecuting naval warfare in the Pacific. 

The Soviets might not even have to "fire a shot" in the 

Pacific to bring effective pressure upon U.S. forces to remain 

there. The United States would be concerned that a substantial 

10/ Schlesinger, FY 1976, p. 111-4. 

11/ Given the alr~ady quite substantial (over 80) divisions the 

Soviets could bring to bear in Central Europe, it may be 

that they would see no requirement to move forces from the 

Far East/Sino-Soviet border in any event, even if free of 

concern about China. 

39 
drawdown to support a NATO effort could tempt North Korea to 

attack even without Soviet encouragement. Such a drawdown 

could cause grave anxiety among U.S. allies in East Asia and 

the Pacific, impelling these allies to accommodate the Soviet 

Union or even to declare neutrality. 

It may be that U.S. force levels and deployment in the 

Pacific should not be considerably higher in peacetime than the 

United States would expect them to remain if a NATO/Warsaw Pact 

conflict broke out. The psychological impact upon Asian allies 

of a peacetime drawdown in U.S. forces deployed there might be 

considerably less severe than a similar scale drawdown during 

war in the Atlantic/NATO area. For example, given Japan's 

special concern as an island nation with the state of the naval 

balance, a reduction and transfer of two carriers to the Atlantic during peacetime, after consultation, might well be less 

traumatic than a similar reduction in a wartime context. 

Soviet Threat to Sea Lines of Communication to Japan 

A contingency of major concern to the Japanese in recent 

years, particularly after the 1973 011 embargo, is the threat 

or act by the Soviets to interdict shipping, particularly of 

oil from the Persian Gulf. through the Indian Ocean to Japan. 

Although such a threat seems remote, in Japan it is regarded 

as more likely than direct aggression. Nevertheless, this 

contingency seems notably unlikely, other than in the context 

of conventional war in the Pacific after a war in the NATO area 

has begun. In such a case, only if the war in Europe went on 

at some length would Soviet interference with Japanese seaborne 

commerce seriously threaten the Japanese economy. U.S. and NATO 

planning discounts the probability of such a lengthy war in 

Europe, but it may be worth considering the effects such a war 

could have. 

In a worldwide conventional war, the desire to deny the 

United States the use of bases in Japan might motivate a Soviet 

threat of SLOC interdiction toward Japan. Japan's ability to 

resist such Soviet "salami" tactics could be substantially 

strengthened by economic actions to reduce the level of imports 

required to sustain domestic consumption. For example, by having 

a stockpile of at least 70 days (peacetime consumption) of 

petroleum, Japan can reduce daily arriving ship requirements 

40 
by perhaps as much as 80 percent for 5-to-6 months. 12/ Such 

economic insulation measures, plus mining of the exits of the 

Sea of Japan through which some Soviet submarines must pass to 

reload munitions and cruise missiles, thereby inflicting serious 

attrition on Soviet submarines and reducing shipping losses, 

could greatly reduce sea lane defense requirements facing U.S. 

and Japanese naval forces. 

Role of Aircraft Carriers in Protection of Sea Lines of Communication in the Pacific 

The sea lines of communication (SLOCs) from southern California to Hawaii and the South or lower Middle Pacific probably 

are so far distant from Soviet homeland support bases that sustained air interdiction of shipping would be very difficult, if 

not impossible, for the Soviets to accomplish. Carrier task 

forces may well not be needed for protecting these SLOCs. As 

the SLOes approach Japan northward from the Philippines, they 

come within range of more Soviet bombers carrying antiship 

missiles. Thus, it could be argued that carriers are needed 

in this region to provide air defense for convoys. However, 

carriers become more vulnerable as they approach the Soviet 

Union. Moreover, this portion of the route is also closer to 

friendly land bases so that shipping could be protected by landbased tactical air units, thus freeing the carriers for other 

missions. 

In any event, it is the attack submarine component of the 

Soviet Navy's Pacific Fleet that is of principal concern to the 

Japanese because of the threat that those submarines pose to 

merchant vessels. For dealing purely with that Soviet submarine 

threat, perhaps the most valuable U.S. Navy assets are not carriers, but P-3 aircraft, U.S. attack submarines, and mines 

placed at choke exit and re-entry points. Some U.S. Navy capabilities, such as nuclear attack submarines (SSN-688), principally relevant to countering the threat of Soviet attack 

submarines, are scheduled to improve in the 1977-1980 period. 11-/ 

12/ David M. Shilling, "A Reassessment of Japan's Naval Defense 

Needs," Asian Survey, March 1976, pp. 223-224. 

13/ Rumsfeld FY 1977, pp. 172-174. 

41 

92-200 0 - 77 - 5 
Role of Aircraft Carriers in Northeast Asia 

A major rationale for U.S. aircraft carriers in the Western 

Pacific has been to provide tactical air support to U.S. and 

South Korean forces in response to a North Korean attack. However, U.S, ability to deploy quickly land-based tactical air 

units frolI1 the continental United States into South Korea was 

demonstrated in August 1976 in the case of an F-lll squadron 

deployed from Idaho. F-4 and other land-based U.S. tactical 

air assets in the Western Pacific, which have been augmented 

since late 1975 with redeployments from Thailand to the Philippines and Japan, could also be deployed rapidly to South Korea. 

Given the increased ability in South Korea to support landbased air unIts, and the reluctance to "tether" a carrier to 

any particular contingency, it may be that one of the principal 

roles of U.S. carriers in the Northwest Pacific is to be able 

to pose a threat to the Soviet Pacific Fleet and some landbased targets in Far Eastern Russia. Soviet initial preoccupation with defending against U.S. carrier task forces may well 

divert some Soviet aviation assets from attacking commerce and 

interdicting U.S. and allied shipping. 

Even if carriers were not used in a power projection mission against Soviet targets in the Far East, other U.S. weapons 

platforms could be employed. For example, attacks against 

Soviet fleet and other coastal targets could be performed by 

other land-based systems, such as B-52s and F-ilis. Carriers 

would probably be very much at risk close to the Soviet Union 

in the Far East. 
CHAPTER VI. THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE MILITARY BALANCE AND 

THE ROLE OF U.S. FORCES 

The United States has had a major military presence and 

responsibility on the Korean peninsula since the end of World 

War II, particularly since June 1950 when President Truman decided to oppose the attack by North Korea by dispatching U.S. 

forces under United Nations' auspices and by providing military 

assistance to South Korea. That fundamental decision in mid1950 was made in a context of broader concerns, beyond the 

immediate situation on the peninsula, with the effect of the 

aggression and U.S. response upon the behavior of the Soviet 

Union, the People's Republic of China, Western Europe, and 

others. 

Today, the issue of appropriate level and role of U.S. 

forces in South Korea remains part of a wider context of concerns that relate to Japan as well as the Soviet Union and 

other nations in Asia. Secretary of Defense Brown recently 

referred to this historical and wider context: !! 

We retain a large stake in the security of South 

Korea as a result of our historic involvement, 

our long-standing political and commercial :interests 

there, and the importance of peace on the peninsula 

to the security of Japan and the balance of power 

in East Asia. 

This chapter discusses the political situation within and 

between North and South Korea~ the military balance between 

North and South Korea, and the role of U.S. forces presently 

there. The chapter then addresses the recent decision to withdraw the remaining U.S. infantry division over a four- or fiveyear time period, the possible consequences of that withdrawal, 

and the difficult policy choices because of competing U.S. 

objectives in Northeast Asia. 

J/ Secretary Brown's statement to National Press Club, May 25, 

1977 • 

43 
THE POLITICAL SITUATION WITHIN AND BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA 

Both North and South Korea are heavily armed states with 

smoldering mutual hostility. In 1971-1973, there was intermittent dialogue between the two governments relating to reunification. This dialogue ended in deadlock and renewed tension. 

North Korea has undertaken a diplomatic campaign to discredit 

and isolate South Korea and bring about the removal of U.S. 

troops from the peninsula. 11 

North Korea is a monolithic, totalitarian political system 

in which lithe citizen is permanently mobilized as part-soldier, 

part-civilian." 3/ It has been described as "the most xenophobic, 

extremist and militarist of all communist states." 4/ Although 

since at least the early 1970s, neither the People's Republic 

of China nor the Soviet Union has been thought likely to encourage North Korea to attack South Korea, thereby challenging the 

United States and alarming Japan, the Sino-Soviet conflict has 

provided North Korea with "more freedom to maneuver" and to "play 

off" Moscow and Peking, which both desire to avoid inducing North 

Korea to move closer to the other. 1/ 

In South Korea, in December 1971, an emergency was declared; 

and in October 1972, martial law was decreed, and the constitution replaced with a more authoritarian one. In 1974 and 1975, 

stringent emergency decrees were issued. As a result of these 

11 Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Habib, April 8, 

1976, International Security Assistance, Hearings, Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations; Subcommittee on Foreign 

Assistance (94:2), p. 101; statement by Assistant Secretary 

of State Hummel, House International Relations Committee, 

September 1, 1976. 

2! Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea 

(Part II), p. 1302; see also pp. 1301-1312, " ••• one of 

the most extensive and oppressive systems of coercion," 

p. 1303. 

~I William E. Griffith, Peking, Moscow, and Beyond (Georgetown, 

1973), p. 52-55. 

1/ Donald S. Zagoria and Young Kun Kin, "North Korea and the 

Major Powers," in The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs, 

(New York University Press), pp. 48-49. 

44 
developments, dissent has been suppressed. Opposition parties, 

although still legal, have been stifled and some of their leaders 

imprisoned. §j 

Some anticipate that the political situation in South Korea 

will deteriorate in terms of legitimacy and political cohesion 

and that, over the longer term, disaffection with the government 

will make the South what previously it had not been: a vulnerable 

target for subversion by the North. 21 

Congressional concern with and opposition to repressive 

trends in South Korea has been reflected in legislative provisions and strongly expressed, for example, in a letter to 

President Ford in April 1976 expressing concern with "continuing 

suppression of Koreans who urge progress toward restoration of 

democracy in their country." '§j 

THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA 

Lack of public information on North and South Korean military forces has handicapped public appraisal and discussion. 

The numbers relating to North Korea are usually outdated, and 

some are not of high confidence in any event. However, in gross 

measures, the military balance between North and South Korea in 

1976 seemed to be as follows: ~I 

§j William J. Barnds, "The United States and the Korean Peninsula" in The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs (New York 

University Press, 1976) edited by William J. Barnds, 

pp. 172-77, 188-98; "Korea North, Korea South," Newsweek 

(June 30, 1975), pp. 32-33, New York Times, May 3, 1977, p. 6. 

11 Edwin O. Reischauer, "The Korean Connection," New York Times 

Magazine (September 22, 1974), pp. 15, 60, 63-64, 68-69; see 

also Crosby S. Noyes, "War Threat Undermines South Korea," 

Washington Evening Star, June 1, 1975, p. E-3. 

~I International Security Assistance, Hearings, Senate Committee 

on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance 

(94:2), pp. 82-123 (hereafter identified as SFRC FY 1977). 

2..1 Military Balance, 1976-1977, pp. 57, 79; International Institute 

of Strategic Studies; 1972-1973, p. 50; Milit~ry Balance, 1975-

1976, p. 56; 1974-1975; pp. 56-57; Rumsfeld, FY 1977, p. 22. 

45 1 
North Korea South Korea 

Population Base 16,280,000 34,610,000 

1976 Force Levels 

Total Armed Forces 495,000 595,000 

Army 430,000 520,000 

Air Force 45,000 30,000 

Navy 20,000 25,000 

Marines 20,000 

Combat Aircraft 

Total Aircraft 600 204 ~ 

Forward Ground 

Attack Fighters 30 (SU-7) 

Light Bombers 70 (IL-28) 

Advanced Design 150 (MIG-21) 72 (F-4 D/E) 

Fighters 50 (MIG-19) 70 (F-5 A/E) 

Other Fighters 300 (MIG-15/17) 50 (F-86) 

Naval Vessels 

Submarines 8 

Destroyers ° ° 7 

Destroyer Escorts ° 9 

Guided Missile-Armed 

Patrol Boats 18 ° Economic Base and 

Defense Budget 

GNP $3.5 B (1972) $18.4 B (1975) 

Estimated Defense N/A (1976) 1.5 (1976) 

Expenditures .878 (1975) .719 (1975) 

.770 (1974) .558 (1974) 

.443 (1972) 

Portion of GNP Devoted 

to Defense 12.7% (1972) 5.1% (1975) 

~ Components below do not account for full total because some 

reconnaissance aircraft are not enumerated here. 

46 
North Korea has been assessed as "probably the most heavily 

militarized state in the world" and estimated to be "in a position to launch a major surprise attack" "with little or no 

warning" (perhaps "at most 12-18 hours"). Its armed forces have 

"undergone a fairly extensive modernization in the last five 

years." Its military industrial base and self-sufficiency have 

grown, making it significantly more independent of PRC or Soviet 

assistance for producing items such as armored personnel carriers, tanks, and even submarines. Although its logistic stockpiles have grown, for "sustained combat," it would be very 

heavily dependent upon the People's Republic of China and the 

Soviets. North Korea has about twice as many tanks as South 

Korea and a "sizeable advantage" in self-propelled artillery 

pieces. However, South Korea has been acquiring TOW antitank 

missiles to offset the North's advantage in tanks. During 1976, 

North Korea retained a substantial numerical advantage in combat 

aircraft, but over 50 percent of its inventory is notably older 

aircraft. In more modern aircraft, the North Korean advantage 

is "relatively small," and with new jet fighter F-4s and F-5s 

entering the South Korean force, the trend "is -favorable" to 

the South. 10/ 

South Korea's advantages include an overall advantage in 

manpower (particularly important in a prolonged war); some good 

10/ SFRC FY 1977, pp. 104, 120; House Armed Services Committee, 

Hearings on Military Posture, FY 1977 (hereafter identified 

as RASC FY 1977), pp. 765, 781, 793-94, 807; Japanese Defense 

White Paper, 1976, p. 27; Far Eastern Economic Review (May 7, 

1976), p. 28; Congressional Record (October 1, 1976), 

pp. S18057-61. 

47 
defense terrain and fortified positions; and, relatively recent 

combat experience of ground force personnel sent to Vietnam. 11/ 

Although South Korea's defense industry is much less well 

developed than North Korea's, the overall economic base of 

South Korea is much stronger than that of North Korea, which 

has had a shortage of foreign exchange and has defaulted on 

some foreign loans, particularly to Japan. Based upon the 

present economic situation and demonstrated high real annual 

GNP growth rates (e.g., 10 percent during 1963-1974, and 15 

percent in 1976) time seems clearly on the side of South Korea, 

although as a heavily export-oriented economy it has some 

vulnerability. ~ 

A major strategic disadvantage of South Korea is the closeness (only 30 miles) of its economic center and political capital, 

Seoul -- with over six million people -- to the demilitarized 

zone (DMZ). In contrast, North Korea's capital of Pyongyang is 

about 100 miles north of the DMZ. Seoul is 'well within the 

range" of North Korean surface-to-surface missiles (FROG 5 and 

FROG 7) provided by the Soviet Union, and perhaps also within 

range of heavy artillery. 13/ Seoul's closeness to the DMZ 

engenders a persistent sense of vulnerability and state-ofseige mentality. But it is probably true that anxiety in the 

11/ Two avenues of approach suitable for a major attack lead 

directly to Seoul. Both of these attack routes were used 

by the North Koreans in their invasion in June 1950. One 

avenue, the Chorwon valley, passes through mountainous terrain. The other, Kaesong-Munsan, is over relatively flat 

terrain, but, except for winter freeze conditions, ~as a 

major water barrier, the Han River and irrigated rice 

fields. Far Eastern Economic Review, February 27, 1976, 

pp. 26-27; RASC FY 1977, p. 810; SFRC, Subcommittee on 

Foreign Assistance, FY 1977, International Security Assistance, p. 104; North Korean pilots reportedly participated 

in the October 1973 war in the Middle East. 

12/ Parvez Hasan, Korea: Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy. (World Bank, Johns Hopkins, 1976), pp. xiii, 

pp. 5, 7-8; "Income distribution in Korea is generally more 

equitable than in comparable developing countries," p. 22. 

13/ Japanese Defense White Paper, 1976, pp. 27-28; Far Eastern 

Economic Review, May 6, 1977, p. 27. 

48 
South is accentuated by the alarmed calls to vigilance and 

national unity by the controlled media in South Korea. 

The military balance between North and South Korea has not 

been and, of course, will not remain static. For example, North 

Korea apparently has increased its armored divisions from one 

to two in the last couple of years. 14/ Although emphasizing 

self-reliance, North Korea would probably like to acquire some 

more advanced weapons from the Soviets, such as the SA-6 surfaceto-air missiles the Soviets made available in the October 1973 

war in the Middle East. South Korea has signed the Nuclear 

Non-proliferation Treaty. However, there have been reports 

that South Korea has an interest in developing nuclear weapons. 15/ 

U.S. Force Drawdowns and South Korean Force Improvements 

In 1971, as noted in Chapter III, the United States, applying the Guam Doctrine, withdrew from Korea and from the force 

structure one of the two infantry divisions there. The remaining 

division (the Second) was drawn back from the DMZ, with a unit 

retained in the Panmunjom area for security and evacuation. This 

decision reflected a U.S. appraisal of growth in South Korean 

capability to defend itself against a North Korean attack. But, 

the United States also recognized a continuing need to augment 

South Korean tactical air assets to balance the North Korean 

tactical air capabilities. Therefore, the United States increased its tactical air presence in South Korea by transferring 

an F-4 wing from Japan. 

To compensate for the U.S. withdrawal, a five-year modernization plan was initiated by the United States and the Republic 

of Korea (ROK), to be financed by $1.5 billion in U.S. military 

assistance. The plan included both ground force and air defense 

improvements, such as artillery and HAWK surface-to-air missiles. 

14/ The Military Balance, 1974-1975, p. 56; The Military Balance 

1975-1976, p. 56; The Military Balance, 1976-1977, p. 57; 

Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1977, p. 27. 

15/ Newsweek, op. cit., p. 32; New York Times, August 25, 1976, 

p. 43; Washington Post, May 27, 1977, p. 1; and Far Eastern 

Economic Review, June 10, 1977, pp. 10-11. 

49 
Inflation and other constraints have delayed the scheduled completion of the program until about the ~nd of fiscal year 1977. 

In mid-1975, perhaps prompted by the collapse of U.S.-

supported forces in Vietnam, South Korea initiated its own ambitious and exp('usive ($4-5 billion) Force Improvement Program 

(FIP), financed primarily by a new income tax surcharge. This 

initiative raised the percentage of South Korea's GNP devoted 

to defense from 5 percent to 7-7.5 p8T"Cent. The FIP includes 

substantial increases in modern fighter aircraft (F-4E and 

F-5E); air defense improvementB; upgraded tank force; acquisition of TOW antitank missiles; domestic production of some 

artillery and small arms (e.g., M-lb riflE-s); and reportedly, 

an enhancement of logistics and war -reserve '·,llnitions. 16/ The 

hope was that within five years (by about 1980), South Korea 

would be on a "rough par" with the North and "develop a force 

structure capable of meeting and defending against a North 

Korean attack with U.S. logistical support only." More than 

50 percent of the FIP financing requires foreign exchange. 

Without substantial Foreign Military Sales credit assistance 

from the United States, the 1980 completion goal may not be 

feasible. 17/ There is also the risk that ambitious South 

Korean force improvements will induce further North Korean 

actions beyond their already considerable force enhancement 

efforts of recent years. 

16/ HASe FY 1977, p. 806. Indigenous production by South Korea 

- of "ground forces equipment, munitions for war reserves" 

was suggested by Secretary Schlesinger as an example of 

"those areas in which the obvious weaknesses of the Korean 

forces occur." Press Conference, Tokyo, August 29, 1975. 

See also ,f.~!!.8ressi~Ilal Record, October 1, 1976, pp. S18058-61. 

17j SFRC FY 1977, April 4, 1976, pp. 105, 114, 115; RAse FY 1977, 

pp. 795··}96, 806; President Park of South Korea sta,ted in 

1975 the goal of independence of U.S. support within five 

years. New YOFk Times, August 21, 1975, p. 1. 

50 
U.S. FORCES IN KOREA: COMPONENTS A}ID THEIR ROLES 

Force components. In 1977, the main U.S. elements remaining in South Korea are the following: 181 

U.S. Army 

o Second Infantry Division 

o Major Logistics Support Element (19th Support 

Brigade) 

o 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade (administers 

and contruls six batteries of NIKE/HERCULES and 

twelve batteries of HAWK surface-to-air missiles) 

o Fourth Missile Command ("Long-range artillery 

support" to the South Korean Army, including one 

battalion of HONEST JOHN and SERGELlliT tacUca1 

surface-to-surface missiles) 

o Command, communications and control, and 

intelligence 

U.S. Air Force 

o Two U.S. Air Force wings, including three tactical 

fighter squadrons 

o Support elements including intelligence and communications, and maintenance of two air bases in 

Ifcaretakerll status for potential deployment of 

additional U.S. tactical aircraft 

181 liASC FY 1977, pp. 765-766, 785, 789, 792-793. In 1977, the 

U.S. Army began deactivating and withdrawing from South 

Korea the SERGEANT missiles. which were the last remaining 

in its force structure. Washi~ton Post, April 15, 1977, 

p. A-25. By the end of fiscal year 1977, the United States 

is scheduled to have completed the process of transferring 

responsibility to South Korea for operating NIKE/HERCUI~ES 

surface-to-air missile batteries. Rumsfe1d FY 1978, p. 169. 

51 
Personnel levels. There were 41,336 u.s. military personnel 

in South Korea in early 1977. By service, the level as of 

March 31, 1977 was Army, 33,507; Air Force, 7,245; Navy, 253 

(headquarters staff); and Marine Corps, 331. 19/ 

Cost aspects. In the fiscal year 1977 budget request, 

about $1.2 billion was requested for supporting the U.S. Army 

and Air Force elements stationed in South Korea. 20/ In addition, some U.S. bases in Japan would probably be important in 

support of U.S. forces in Korea in event of a conflict. 

ROLES OF REMAINING U.S. FORCE COMPONENTS 

Jactica1 air support. The expected important contribution 

of U.S. tactical air force elements in supporting South Korea 

against a North Korean attack was discussed briefly in Chapter 

V, dealing with contingencies considered in force planning related to Asia. The U.S. tactical air presence is relevant, 

not only to air defense of South Korea, but also to firepower 

needed against North Korean armored attack. 

Logistical support. Logistical support has been and evidently will continue to be a critical U.S. contribution to South 

Korean defense, even in the 1980 time frame when the South's 

self-reliance will presumably have been substantially enhanced 

by its Force Improvement Program (FIP). 

Logistical support involves a significant number of U.S. 

military personnel in South Korea. That number might grow 

significantly if a conflict occurs. Testimony by the Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations of the Army has described the 

logistical support role by the United States as follows: 21/ 

We have a logistics system in Korea designed to 

support not only that division, but also the two 

Korean armies that are there, the 1st and 2nd Korean 

19/ OSD (Comptroller), May 18, 1977. 

20/ RASC FY 1977, pp. 766, 808-809. 

21/ RASC FY 1976, pp. 2944-45; see also RASC FY 1977, pp. 766, 

785, 795-796. 801; and SFRC FY 1977, p. 115. 

52 
Army, and that line of communication skeletonized 

now in peacetime runs all the way up from Pusan 

on the southern coast all the way to the DMZ. 

. . • it is a skeleton force that is assumed in 

everyone's eyes to get a lot larger if in fact 

there is a major conflict there involving Soviet 

or Chinese forces. That is why there is a corps 

headquarters rather than just a division headquarters. [Emphasis added.] 

Intelligence support provided by U.S. force components is 

a critical function, not only for U.S. forces, but also for 

South Korean forces in terms of warning, attack assessment, 

and tactical support. 22/ 

Ground-based air defense is a mission to which U.S. Army 

forces make a major contribution, such as operating 12 HAWK 

surface-to-air missile batteries. 

Role of the U.S. infantry division. Executive Branch 

testimony during the Ford Administration did not base the continuing presence of the Second Infantry Division in South Korea 

primarily upon anticipated need in combat. Instead, the justification presented primarily stressed the contribution to 

political stability in Northeast Asia in general and on the 

Korean peninsula in particular. Emphasis has also been upon 

providing high-confidence deterrence of North Korean attack, 

discouraging either Soviet or PRC support for such a move, and 

hedging against the uncertainties of how effective North and 

South Korean forces might actually be in combat. 

Stability. The contribution of remaining U.S. forces, 

particularly of the Army division, to stability on the Korean 

peninsula is related to the U.S. operational control of South 

Korean as well as U.S. forces. That predominant role and 

responsibility of the United States in command and control 

is derived in large part from the presence of the division. 

A U.S. general has operational control over the U.S. and South 

Korean forces, and a U.S. Lt. General commands I Corps north 

of Seoul, which includes 1 U.S. division and 12 ROK divisions. 

Without the U.S. division, it may be quite unlikely that the 

~ Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 1977, p. 26. 

53 
South Korean Government would allow the United States to retain 

as dominant an influence in the force command structure. 

The stabilizing function of U.S. operational control of 

both South Korean and U.S. forces was described by Secretary 

of Defense Schlesinger as follows 23/ 

Today, U.S. operational control over ROK military 

forces, in which the ROK Government concurs, helps 

to assure the maintenance of a cautious and nonproyocative deterrent posture in our mutual efforts 

to maintain peace and stability in the area. It 

insures that an immediate response in a contingency 

would be closely controlled. [Emphasis added.] 

Deterrence. The deterrent function of the remaining U,S. 

infantry division has not been so directly tied to its size 

(full strength or one brigade, for example) as to its physical 

presence, which cannot be removed as quickly as a tactical air 

squadron, and to its location north of Seoul. 

In 1976, the location of the U.S. Second Infantry Division 

was succinctly stated by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army 

for Operations to be Itadmittedly far forward" and "astride the 

main North Korean avenue of approach to Seoul." 24/ 

Other testimony by the Army has described the physical 

location of the division and its "reserve position": 

The bulk of the division is in Uijongbee area which, 

as the Secretary says, is close to the DMZ. The division under alert conditions would move out of its 

ca~ern, out of its cantonment into a reserve position 

and would not be committed initially unless it were attacked by air or something else. [Emphasis added.] 25/ 

23/ House Appropriations Committee, Hearings on Department of 

Defense Appropriations for FY 1975, pp. 581-594; see also 

HASe FY 1975, p. 51; and Schlesinger press conferences of 

August 29 and September 1, 1975. 

~i/ RASC FY 1977, pp. 765, 792, 812. 

25/ House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture, 

FY 1976, p. 2942. 

54 
• •• of course, the North Koreans have poised opposite 

that major avenue of approach the bulk of their forces, 

and it's a capability that must be reckoned with by the 

North Koreans, and therefore, is a very clear deterrent 

signal. 26/ 

Some concern has been expressed that because of the proximity 

of the U.S. ground force elements to the DMZ and to one of the 

avenues of a North Korean attack, the United States might become 

"automatically" involved in a renewed Korean conflict before the 

responsibility for the outbreak became clear and before the 

United States had an opportunity to evaluate events and weigh 

responses. With the possibility of little warning of an attack, 

the situation is one in which the U.S. Government would have 

little time to make a decision about whether and how to involve 

the U.S. division. Other observers believe that even without 

the division, a continued U.S. force presence near the DMZ --

even if only tactical air units -- entails, likely early U.S. 

involvement in hostilities, however they begin. 

Tactical nuclear weapons. The United States has deployed 

in South Korea some delivery systems, such as F-4 aircraft and 

HONEST JOHN and SERGEANT surface-to-surface tactical missiles, 

that are able to deliver tactical nuclear warheads. In mid1975, the United States publicly acknowledged deployment of 

tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Secretary Schlesinger 

emphasized that, although the balance of ground forces in Korea 

was satisfactory and the "purpose and thrust of our military 

policy has been to raise the nuclear threshold," the United 

States maintained its policy of not foreclOSing the option of 

using tactical nuclear weapons. ~/ 

In its 1976 Defense White Paper, the Japanese Government 

referred to the acknowledged presence of U.S. tactical nuclear 

weapons in South Korea and noted the belief that they "have 

considerable deterrent effects." 28/ 

26/ RAse FY 1977, p. 812; see also pp. 777, 780. 

27/ Secretary Schlesinger, response to questions with Godfrey 

Sperling press group, July 1, 1975; Press Conference, 

August 27, 1975. 

28/ JDWP, p. 28. 

55 
FUTURE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION FROM SOUTH KOREA 

Statements by the Carter Administration suggest that the 

basis for the decision announced in early 1977 to withdraw, over 

a four or five year period, the remaining U.S. division in South 

Korea is similar to the rationale of the Nixon Administnation 

to remove the other division during 1971: the demonstrated and 

expected growth in South Korean economic and military capability 

for increased responsibility for its defense, with the United 

States retaining an important but diminished role. The continued presence of the U.S. division is judged by President 

Carter not to be necessary to maintain stability on the Korean 

peninsula. 

President Carter recently stated 29/ 

I think it is accurate to say that the time has come 

for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a 

period of four or five years of ground troops, leaving intact an adequate degree of strength in the 

Republic of Korea to withstand any foreseeable attack and making it clear to the North Koreans, the 

Chinese, the Soviets, that our commitment to South 

Korea is undeviating and is staunch. 

We will leave there adequate intelligence forces, 

observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and 

a firm, open commitment to our defense treaty, so 

there need not be any doubt about potential adversaries concerning our support of South Korea. 

[Emphasis added.] 

Secretary of Defense Brown has expressed confidence that 

over the next several years, South Korea, with U.S. assistance, 

can compensate for the removal of the U.S. infantry division 

and overcome some disadvantages compared to North Korea in 

equipment, by increasing tanks, artillery, antitank weapons, 

29/ President Carter's news conference of May 26, 1977; see also 

his interview with U.S. News & World Report (June 6, 1977), 

p. 19; Secretary of Defense Brown has indicated that ttU.S. 

air and logistics suppore' will be maintained in South Korea. 

Statement to National Press Club, May 25, 1977. [Emphasis 

added. ] 

56 
and training. As the U.S. infantry division is withdrawn, the 

United States may leave behind most of its equipment, such as 

helicopters, artillery, and tanks, for use by the South Koreans. 

A similar action was taken when the United States withdrew 

another division in 1971. Secretary Brown has said 30/ 

Naturally, removing U.S. forces, if you don't do 

anything else, affects that balance and increases 

the risk. But the whole thrust of the U.S. policy 

is to take compensating steps to make that an acceptable situation. 

There will probably be substantial increases in South 

Korean requests for U.S. foreign military sales above recent 

levels, such as the Administration's request for fiscal year 

1978 of $275 million for private credit financing guaranteed 

by the Department of Defense. 31/ 

The Possible Consequences of Withdrawing the U.S. Division in 

Korea 

Withdrawal of the remaining U.S. infantry division from 

South Korea may have adverse consequences: 

o It could increase the likelihood of conflict between 

the two Koreas. 

o It could increase the incentive for South Korea to 

acquire nuclear weapons. 

o It may increase political repression in South Korea. 

o It may stimulate more arms competition between North 

and South Korea. 

Much would depend upon the manner and timing of any reduction, the evident nature of continuing U.S. involvement, and 

the psychological atmosphere. For example, if the United States 

30/ Secretary of Defense Brown, interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face 

the Nation," May 22, 1977. 

31/ New York Times, June 5, 1977, p. 1. 

57 

92-200 0 - 77 .. 6 
made a point of demonstrating the ability to redeploy some 

forces, such as Marines or tactical air, within a few hours or 

days, then such periodic actions might make a considerable 

difference. 

With respect to stability on the Korean peninsula, the 

predominant U.S. role in the command and control structure of 

U.S. and South Korean forces has been a stabilizing element in 

terms of both "nonprovocative deterrence" of the North and 

measured response to incidents. The withdrawal of the U.S. 

division could make it very unlikely that the United States 

could retain as dominant and stabilizing a role in the command 

structure. 

Because other U.S. force elements, such as tactical air and 

air defense support, which are considered critical to South 

Korea's defense needs., would probably be retained, the withdrawal 

of the U.S. infantry division may not significantly reduce the 

risk of early U.S. combat involvement in a renewed Korean 

conflict. 

With respect to nuclear proliferation, the United States 

would presumably retain significant leverage on that matter 

with the South Korean Government and potential suppliers of 

related technology. But there seems little doubt that the 

withdrawal of the division could substantially increase South 

Korean incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. 

DIFFICULT POLICY CHOICES BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING U.S. OBJECTIVES 

In considering the role of remaining U.S. forces in South 

Korea, the choice of alternative postures is difficult because 

of the conflicting U.S. policy objectives described earlier in 

this paper. On the one hand, diminished U.S. ground force presence is consistent with emphasis on increased self-reliance of 

Asian allies, particularly in ground forces. On the other hand, 

diminished U.S. presence and the associated reduction in influence in the command and control structure probably reduces 

stability on the peninsula and thereby in Northeast Asia. Thus, 

it would be contrary to the U.S. objective of maintaining that 

stability. Also, some continuing U.S. force presence and role, 

particularly that relating to command, control, and logistics, 

are related to the continuation of some South Korean deficiencies 

in such key functional areas, which in turn are part of the 

58 
justification of continued U.S. involvement and responsibility. 

In this instance, U.S. force roles related to stability may 

undermine or postpone South Korean self-reliance in critical 

areas of force effectiveness. 

Perhaps the most important and troublesome conflict of U.S. 

policy objectives with respect to U.S. force presence in Korea 

is the conflict between discouraging nuclear proliferation, 

particularly in such tinderbox areas, and encouraging greater 

self-reliance of Asian allies, especially South Korea. 

59 

CHAPTER VII. U.S. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES CURRENTLY DEPLOYED 

IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

The purpose of this chapter is to describe U.S. general purpose forces currently deployed in East Asia and the Pacific. 

This presentation provides a foundation for considering the 

alternatives set forth in Chapter VIII. 

FORCE LEVEL AND STRUCTURE IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 

The general purpose force structure deployed in fiscal year 

1977 in the East Asia and Pacific theaters remains substantial. 

It includes three active divisions, two Army and one Marine Corps; 

six aircraft carriers, including their associated escort vehicles; and nine Air Force tactical fighter squadrons. (See 

Table 1.) Nearly half of the Navy's order of battle and at 

least a third of the Marine Corps' divisional structure is in 

the Pacific. 

As can be seen from Table 2, of the Navy's total general 

purpose force level in the Pacific, as of November 1976, 211 or 

about one-fifth are in the Western Pacific under control of the 

Seventh Fleet. 11 However, in the case of aircraft carriers, 

two out of the five generally operational are forward deployed 

in the Western Pacific. Some of the forward-deployed vessels 

are homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, and return to the United 

States only when major overhaul is required. Other forwarddeployed vessels, such as those used by the Marines for the two 

amphibious ready groups (which support two battalion landing 

teams), rotate from homeports of the Third Fleet, such as San 

Diego, out to the Western Pacific for several months. Upon 

return, they are replaced by other Third Fleet ships. 

11 The Seventh Fleet's operational area is concentrated in the 

Western Pacific, but basically includes the Pacific Ocean 

area west of Hawaii and also the Indian Ocean. Its administrative headquarters is located in Yokosuka, Japan, near 

Tokyo. The Third Fleet's operating area is basically the 

Pacific east of Hawaii, and its administrative headquarters 

is in San Diego, California. 

61 
0'1 

TABLE 1. 

Anny 

MAJOR FORCE STRUCTURE ELEMENTS DEPLOYMENT IN EAST ASIA ~~ THE PACIFIC IN FISCAL 

YEAR 1977 

Total Deployed 

in East Asia and 

Pacific 

2 Divisions 

Total Units in Active 

Force Structure and 

Percentage in East 

Asia and Pacific 

16 (12.5%) 

T~cation of Deployment 

Infantry Division (2d) in South Korea 

Infantry Division (25th) in Hawaii 

Marine Corps 1 Division & 

1 Air Wing 

3 Divisions 

(33 1/3%) 

2/3 of 3rd Marine Division in Okinawa. 

Japan 

2/3 of 1st Marine Air Wing in Iwakuni 

and Okinawa. Japan 

1/3 of 3rd Marine Division and Air 

Wing in Hawaii 

N Navy 6 Aircraft Carriers 13 Carriers (46%) 2 Forward deployed in Wes tern Pacific 

4 in Third Fleet. East of Hawaii 

6 Amphibious Ready 

Groups 

12 (50%) 

12 ASW Patrol Squadrons 24 (50%) 

Air Force 9 Tactical Fighter 

Squadrons 

2 Tactical Airlift 

Squadrons 

SOURCE: Office of Secretary of Defense. 

74 (12.2%) 

16 (12.5%) 

2 Hes t of Hawaii 

4 East of Hawaii 

3 1/3 in Western Pacific 

8 2/3 in Hawaii. West Coast, and 

Alaska 

2 Squadrons in Philippines 

4 Squadrons in Okinawa 

3 Squadrons in Korea 

1 Squadron in Japan 

1 Squadron in Philippines 
0"1 

w 

TABLE 2. U.S. NAVAL FORCE LEVELS IN THE PACIFIC (NOVEMBER 1976) 

Total 3rd Fleet 

Western Pacific 

CV/CVN (Aircraft Carriers) 6 4(1) 2 

CG/CGN (Cruisers) 15 11(3) 4(1) 

DD (Destroyers) 10 8(1) 2 

FF/FFG (Frigates) 33 25(5) 8(1) 

DDG (Guided Missile Destroyer) 18 12(2) 6 

MLSF (Mobile Logistics Support) 23 17 (4) 6 

Auxiliary 38 33(4) 5 

SS/SSN 36 31(9) 5 

Amphibious 32 24(6) 8 

211 165(35) 46 

7th Fleet 

Number Typically Deployed 

to Indian Ocean in a 

Year ':d 

1 

3 

7 

4 

15 

NOTE: Eleven of the 46 vessels in the Western Pacific are homeported at Yokosuka, Japan. One 

of the 9 combatants included within the 11 is a carrier. ~mjor overhauls on a carrier 

such as the Midway, which began homeporting in Yokosuka in 1973, would probably be done 

back in the United States, such as at the Bremerton Naval Shi£yard near Seattle. 

SOURCE: U.S. Navy (Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Hawaii, November 19(6). 

Vessels in overhaul status in parentheses. 

b/ Vessels deployed to Indian Ocean periodically are from the 7th Fleet figures shown under 

Western Pacific. 
In the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, the present 

Soviet threat is remote. The threat of direct aggression against 

an ally of the United States is also remote. However, the United 

States -- particularly the Navy, but also the Air Force to a 

lesser degree -- retains a large presence near and in the 

Philippines. 

The U.S. Navy allocates a substantial portion of the Seventh 

Fleet's peacetime activity pattern to the South China Sea, off 

the coast of the Philippines, where the weather is generally 

better than that nearer the Soviet threat and where excellent 

training and instrumented test ranges are available. (See Appendix for under way ship days of the Pacific Fleet by geographic 

region. ) 

The Navy's presence at Subic Bay in the Philippines and in 

the South China Sea is related in part to the existing requirement to maintain two aircraft carriers forward deployed in the 

Western Pacific and to deploy some naval units to the Indian 

Ocean periodically (for portions of at least three quarters 

within a year). ~/ 

Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines is the largest 

overseas U.S. air base in terms of area and authorized per-

·sonne1. The base includes a major bombing and test range. The 

base's several functions include providing military airlift support for operations in Southeast Asia and toward the Indian 

Ocean/Persian Gulf. 

The force posture of general purpose forces in East Asia 

and the Pacific has not and will not remain static. In 1975, 

the forward-deployed aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific 

were reduced from three to two. In 1975 and 1976, U.S. tactical 

aircraft were withdrawn from Thailand; two of the squadrons of 

F-4s were redeployed to the Philippines and Japan. During 1977, 

the first general purpose helicopter assault ship (LBA) for the 

Marine Corps will enter service with the Pacific Fleet •. It is 

equivalent in size to World War II ESSEX class aircraft carriers 

and capable of a "wide range of crisis response functions." '1../ 

~/ Discussions with U.S. Navy, Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Hawaii. 

~ Schlesinger, FY 1976, pp. 111-79-80; Rumsfe1d, FY 1978, 

pp. 183, 200. 

64 
Major qualitative improvements in tactical air capability, such 

as laser-guided munitions, and in ASW forces, such as 688 (Los 

Angeles) class nuclear attack submarines, have already entered 

the force. New generation weapon systems, such as the F-15, 

may well be deployed to the Pacific theater. 

MILITARY PERSONNEL LEVELS IN EAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC 

At the beginning of fiscal year 1977, the level of U.S. 

military personnel stationed in the Western Pacific and East 

Asia was 132,000, 48 percent fewer than at the end of fiscal 

year 1964, the last year prior to the major build-up in Vietnam. ~/ 

U.S. Military Personnel Stationed in East Asia 

and the Western Pacific 

(end of fiscal year, in thousands) 

1964 1968 1973 1975 1976 

251 874 215 166.6 132.2 

Table 3 presents the military personnel levels in the Western 

Pacific and Southeast Asia during fiscal years 1960, 1964, 1969, 

1975, 1976, and 197T. Examination of that historical trend reveals that the levels during fiscal year 1976 represent a substantial reduction in some countries from both the fiscal year 

1964 -- typically regarded as the !!pre-Vietnam!! baseline year --

and fiscal year 1960 levels. 

Excluding personnel withdrawals from Southeast Asia, and 

considering either fiscal year 1960 or fiscal year 1964 as the 

baseline, the most substantial reduction in terms of manpower 

has been in Japan, particularly in metropolitan Japan rather 

than Okinawa. The reduction in South Korea by fiscal year 1976 

~/ Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), actual 

strengths rather than authorized. Western Pacific and 

East Asia includes Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, 

Vietnam, Thailand, Guam, and afloat personnel in Western 

Pacific and Southeast Asia. 

65 
TABLE 3. U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL: IN THOUSANDS. EN']) FISCAL YEAR 

Japan 

(including South 

Fiscal Year Okinawa) Korea Philippines Taiwan Vietnam Thailand Afloat Total 

1960 75.9 52.3 11.5 6.6 0.8 0.3 NA 147.4 

1964 89 63 15 4 17 4 52 244 

1969 83 61 27 9 539 48 75 842 

1975 48 42 15 3.6 0 20 28 156.5 

1976 45.3 40.4 14.6 2.2 (} 1.2 18.9 122.6 

197Tbl 46.8 39.1 15.5 2.1 0 0.2 19.2 122.9 

Fiscal Year 1976 as a 

Perceiltage of: 

CI' 

CI\ Fiscal Year 1964 51% 64% 97% 5~'7' :J " 0 30% 36% 50% 

Fiscal Year 1960 60% 77% 127% 33% 0 400% 83% 

Personnel Reductions, 

Fiscal Year 1976 from 

Fiscal Year 1964 

"Baseline" -43.7 -22.6 -0.4 -1.8 -17 -2.8 -33.1 -121.4 

SOURCE: Office of Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 

Fiscal Year 1960 figures are for March 1960. 

The transitional quarter (ending September 3D, 1976) between fiscal year 1976 and fiscal 

year 1977. 

NOTE: Guam excluded. 
was about 33 percent from fiscal year 1964 and 25 percent from 

fiscal year 1960. 

Military personnel in Taiwan have been substantially reduced 

compared to fiscal year 1964, particularly since President Nixon's 

trip to China in 1972. The U.S. military presence in Thailand 

was greatly reduced after 1975. The sharp reduction in afloat 

personnel between fiscal years 1975 and 1977 results from the 

reduction of forward-deployed aircraft carriers in the Western 

Pacific from three to two. 

In contrast to these general trends, military personnel 

levels in the Philippines in fiscal year 1976 were at essentially the same level as in fiscal year 1964 and almost 30 percent higher than in fiscal year 1960. 

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING AND COSTING FORCES "FOR ASIA!! 

Some observers have attempted to prepare a discrete baseline of general purpose forces "for Asia.!! The baseline derived 

by some with this approach has included the forces deployed in 

East Asia and the Pacific (discussed above) plus some forces 

located in the continental United States. While this approach 

simplifies analysis of force structure issues, in reality it is 

difficult to identify more than a few major general purpose 

force units -~ such as the Army division in South Korea -- that 

can reasonably be said to exist solely "for Asia." 

Another problem in attempting to identify and cost forces 

lIfor Asia" is that, even assuming no U.S. commitments to allies 

in East Asia and the Western Pacific, the United States would 

very likely deploy some forces in and around Hawaii and in the 

Eastern Pacific for direct defense of the United States. 

Perhaps the most significant difficulty is that some major 

forces deployed in the Western Pacific and East Asia are flexible, particularly the large portion of the U.S. Navy that could 

be redeployed for use in another theater, such as the Atlantic. 

Although this is especially true of naval forces, it is also the 

case with such units as the Army division in Hawaii, which could 

be airlifted to another theater. Moreover, there are some force 

units stationed in the continental United States, such as the 

F-ilis flown from Idaho to South Korea in response to the 

Panmunjom incident in August 1976, which can be deployed to 

67 
other areas as well. For example, later in 1976, the squadron 

of F-l11s was relocated from Idaho to the United Kingdom. There 

are at least three U.S. Army infantry divisions, located in 

Hawaii (25th), Ft. Lewis, Washington (9th), and Ft. Ord, 

California (7th), that, along with the Marine Division and 

Air Wing in Southern California and the Third Fleet in the 

Eastern Pacific, have been counted by some observers as "for" 

or earmarked for Asia. Characterizing and scoping the general 

purpose forces for Asia in such a manner has been the basis for 

an estimate that $20 billion (20.5 percent) of the fiscal year 

1976 Defense Department budget was "for Asia." 2/ 

A contrary view is that much of the Third Fleet would be 

transferred to the Atlantic in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict and 

that, although not as mobile as the F-ll1s mentioned above, even 

the Army and Marine divisions on the west coast and in Hawaii --

with strategic airlift capabilities that have been enhanced 

are not necessarily "for Asia." In fact, the Department of 

Defense has identified those divisions as part of a "swingtl 

force that could be deployed to a major contingency in either 

Europe or Asia. 6/ This view would result in allocating about 

$5 billion, or about 4.5 percent of the fiscal year 1977 defense 

budget, to those forces that would remain deployed in East Asia 

and the Western Pacific in event of a NATO war. 

Thus, there 

question of what 

military forces. 

for Asia. 

is no direct and unambiguous answer to the 

U.S. Asian policy costs in terms of required 

Therefore there is no specific baseline force 

This chapter has described the U.S. forces in the Pacific 

and in East Asia, without attempting to argue the issue of 

whether or not they are "for Asia." In Chapter VIII, the costs 

of various alternative force postures in Asia and the Pacific 

are compared with those of all general purpose forces programmed 

by the Department of Defense for fiscal years 1978 to 1982, 

showing how the alternatives would affect those overall cost 

levels. 

if "Controlling the Defense Budget," by Barry M. Blechman and 

Edward R. Fried, Foreign Affairs (January 1976), Vol. 54, 

pp. 223, 249. 

&./ Schlesinger, FY 1976, p. III-3D. 

68 
CHAPTER VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT POSTURE IN EAST ASIA AND 

THE PACIFIC 

PURPOSE AND APPROACH ADOPTED 

The focus of debate on the U.S. defense posture in Asia, 

apart from Vietnam, has in recent years been on the question of 

withdrawing or retaining the U.S. Army Second Infantry Division 

deployed in South Korea north of Seoul. Withdrawal is an important issue, and it is addressed in this paper. 

There is a wider range of force structure issues in the 

Western Pacific that relate to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air 

Force and to deployments located outside of Korea -- in and near 

Japan, the Philippines, and Hawaii, for example. The principal 

purpose of this paper is to illustrate the wider range of alternatives that involves, not only reduction and restructuring in 

East Asia and the Pacific, but also possible transfer of force 

components for European/NATO missions. Another purpose is to 

highlight some dilemmas where competing U.S. objectives make 

choices more difficult. 

The alternatives considered in this chapter are grouped into 

three major sets: 

o Force reductions 

o Force realignments 

o Force enhancement in Northeast Asia. 

Several different force reduction options are examined in 

this chapter. Three options involving force realignment toward 

NATO-related needs -- without any additions or reductions from 

the overall general purpose force -- are discussed. 

Among the options of either reductions or realignments, one 

option could be chosen or, depending upon appraisal of priority 

requirements and related forces and risks involved, more than one 

could be chosen within reductions or realignments, thereby 

enabling additional budget reductions or larger transfers to 

69 
NATO/European missions. This chapter concludes by examining one 

multi-faceted option of force enhancement in Northeast Asia, 

entailing only relatively modest cost increases. 

Each of the three major sets of alternatives or options rests 

on a different set of assumptions about the adequacy of the 

present U.S. force structure to meet military and political 

requirements in Asia and Western Europe. The purpose of this 

paper is not to make a case for one set of assumptions over 

another, but rather to spell out options that could be considered after one has chosen a particular set of assumptions. 

FORCE REDUCTIONS 

The options below, involving reductions from the present 

force structure, are based upon the assumption that the general 

purpose forces deployed in East Asia and the Pacific are in 

excess of military and political requirements in that theater, 

and, moreover, that forces in Europe or designated "for NATO" 

are sufficient to meet military and political requirements for 

Europe. 

The options identified and discussed below involve removal 

from the overall U.S. general purpose force structure of certain 

force elements currently deployed in East Asia and the Pacific, 

and commensurate reductions in the support establishment in the 

continental United States. 

A. 1. Withdrawal of the Remaining Division in South Korea 

from the Force Structure 

This alternative involves the withdrawal of, ,and removal 

from the force structure of, the U.S. Army infantry division 

deployed in South Korea. The withdrawal would be over three 

years, beginning in fiscal year 1978 and completed by the end 

of fiscal year 1980. Withdrawal would include all nondivisional 

units supporting the division except air defense and surface-tosurface missile units. TIle withdrawal would be based upon consultation with South Korea as well as Japan. 

Withdrawal of the remaining U.S. infantry division in South 

Korea might be based upon the following rationale: Basic U.S. 

policy since at least 1969-1970, when the Guam Doctrine was 

70 
adopted, has been to encourage and expect incre.ased self-reliance 

by Asian allies, particularly in providing manpower for ground 

combat operations in their own defense. Since the last major 

U.S. troop reduction in South Korea during 1971, South Korean 

capabilities have been increased with U.S. military assistance. 

lbis increase will continue with the ambitious Force Improvement Program undertaken by South Korea during 1975 with a 

completion goal around 1980-1981. 

The military balance between South and North Korea does not 

leave South Korea deficient in ground force manpower, given its 

current capabilities and large-population base advantage over 

the North. This option would retain the U.S. tactical air force 

presence in South Korea to offset the decreasing disadvantage of 

South Korea in modern fighter aircraft compared to North Korea. 

Th:ts alternative would minimize, if not eliminate, the possibility of early U.S. ground combat involvement in a renewed 

Korean conflict -- with little time available for the U.S. Government to evaluate events and consider responses -- resulting from 

the presence of the U.S .. division north of Seoul, astride one 

of the potential invasion routes by North Korea. 

This alternative might assume that the large U.S. Marine 

Corps presence in Okinawa would be retained and be available as 

an in-theater, "quick response fl reserve that North Korea would 

presumably take into account. Occasional major exercises demonstrating capability for rapid reinforcement of tactical air and 

perhaps of ground force elements could be conducted, also hopefully having a significant deterrent effect on North Korea. 

Consistent with the Guam Doctrine, this option would not involve 

the abandonment of the U.S. defense commitment to South Korea. 

Japanese reaction to the phased withdrawal would be expected not 

to be one of serious alarm, as long as the United States retained 

significant forces in South Korea and Japan, and the U.S. naval 

force presence was not reduced. 

Withdrawal of the remaining division could be opposed on 

several grounds. As a result of the withdrawal, the anxiety in 

South Korea and disbelief in U.S. assurances of continued commitment could sharply increase the South Korean Government 1 s motiva~· 

tion to acquire nuclear weapons. It might also be argued that 

the logistical support units of U.S. ground forces are critical 

for support of South Korean forces and could not be replaced 

within three years (fiscal years 1978-1980) with adequate Korean 

units. Although obviously less directly affected, the Japanese 

71 
Government would not be indifferent and would be more likely to 

consider substantial rearmament (even including nuclear weapons 

if it appeared that South Korea were developing that capability). 

Critical foreign investment in the South Korean economy might be 

curtailed, reflecting diminished confidence in stability on the 

peninsula. The PRC's reaction might be to question the steadfastness of the United States as a counterweight to the Soviet Union 

in Northeast Asia. Other Asian nations might regard the withdrawal as a precursor of further substantial U.S. force drawdowns 

in East Asia and the Western Pacific. 

The most fundamental concern prompting opposition to the 

withdrawal, however, would be that the chances of a North Korean 

attack would be increased, perhaps dangerously, with grave consequences for peace in an area where major powers may be drawn 

into the conflict. 

It might be argued that, although from a static military 

balance point of view the U.S. division is not clearly needed, 

its deterrence value nevertheless is very high, partly because 

of past U.S. policy declarations about the division's role. The 

division's presence can be seen as a hedge against the uncertainty of the predicted effectiveness of the South Korean ground 

forces in resisting a North Korean attempt to seize Seoul. 

It is unlikely that South Korea would allow the United 

States to retain as dominant an influence in the force command 

structure as it presently has. A reduced U.S. presence and role 

in the command and control structure might hamper substantially 

U.S. ability to restrain the potential of incidents to escalate. 

A variant on this alternative could be to augment the U.S. 

tactical air presence as a partial compensation for withdrawing 

and deactivating the infantry division. One or both of the two 

U.S. Air Force tactical fighter- squadrons of F-4s in the Philippines could be transferred to South Korea, with essentially no 

net additional cost, after the initial one-time costs of moving 

the two squadrons and upgrading an existing base in South Korea 

in "caretaker" status, which might cost as much as $100 million. 

72 
OPTION A-l. WITHDRAWAL AND REMOVAL FROM FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE 

INFANTRY DIVISION IN KOREA 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-100 -300 -500 -600 -600 -2,100 

This estimate assumes that the division and its 

tactical, combat, and logistical support elements 

(except air defense and surface-to-surface missile 

units) plus those dollar and manpower resources 

associated with the support of the division (and 

its direct support elements) in the mission support and central support forces are withdrawn from 

the Army over a three-year period. If the air 

defense (HAWK) units were also withdrawn, then 

the additional cost impact would be at least 

$100 million. Annual redeployment exercises of 

brigade level could cost about $20 million per 

year. 

A. 2. Phased Reduction to Brigade Level of the Remaining 

U.S. Infantry Division in South Korea 

This alternative would involve a phased reduction of the 

remaining division from the present essentially three brigades 

down to one brigade by the end of fiscal year 1980. 

General arguments for a reduction to one brigade are similar 

to those for withdrawing the division entirely. However, retention of one brigade would be based in particular upon a rationale 

that stressed the deterrence value of continuing a U.S. ground 

force presence as a IItrip wire" located north of Seoul, astride 

one of the potential invasion routes. 

Retention of one brigade would facilitate maintenance of 

the stabilizing, predominant U.S. role in the command and control 

73 
of South Korean and U.S. forces. Retention of one brigade might 

also be based upon the need to provide a nucleus for reinforcement (should that later prove necessary, contrary to expectations) 

that was closely familiar with the operational environment in 

South Korea. 

The arguments against the reduction to one brigade are again 

similar to those opposing withdrawal of the division. Retention 

of the brigade for deterrence purposes would leave the United 

States in a position of risking early "automatic" ground force 

involvement in a renewed Korean conflict. Yet the brigade would 

be small enough that it might well be incapable of operating as 

a self-sustaining combat unit, thereby being a "hostage" to events 

and other forces. 

It is worth recalling that the "trip wire" concept for a 

lower level forward deployment as an effective deterrent was 

first popularized in the NATO context after 1949. At the time, 

the United States had overwhelming superiority in strategic 

nuclear weapons and the resolve of the United States to respond 

if the "trip wire" were activated was comparatively unquestioned. 

Moreover, the "trip wire" assumed a highly calculating, "riskaverse" opponent. The Soviet Union has generally been such an 

,opponent, but North Korea has been much less so. 

In the Western European context, the inherent strategic 

value to the United States of the location of a "trip wire" 

force was obvious to a potential aggressor. This is not the case 

with respect to South Korea, considered in isolation. Moreover, 

the U.S. will to respond, particularly since the collapse of 

U.S.-supported forces in Vietnam, is perhaps not as credible, 

especially to South and North Korea, as it might have been prior 

to the outcome in Vietnam. Some of this credibility problem 

could be alleviated by the redeployment exercises mentioned 

above. 

A variant of this alternative could be to deactivate the 

Second Division, but retain one brigade as an organizational 

part of the 25th Division in Hawaii (which is presently one 

brigade short), and mechanize the one remaining brigade in 

Korea. Occasional redeployment exercises to Korea could be 

airlifted from Hawaii. This might be a more effective contribution to deterrence than being the last outpost of an otherwise 

deactivated division. The added cost of mechanizing the remaining brigade would be nominal because the current tank and 

74 
OPTION A-2. WITHDRAWAL OF TWO BRIGADES PLUS APPROPRIATE SHARE 

OF SUPPORT STRUCTURE OF DIVISION 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-60 -200 -330 -400 -400 -1,390 

This estimate assumes that approximately two-thirds 

of the division and its direct support units, plus 

associated resources in the mission and combat support forces, are withdrawn from the Army over a 

three-year period. If the phased reduction to one 

brigade retained a support structure for a divisionlevel effort, the budgetary reduction would be substantially less (nearly $1 billion less over fiscal 

years 1978-1982). 

mechanized battalions in the division could be retained in Korea 

to form a mechanized brigade. 

B. 1. Withdrawal from Japan and from the Force Structure 

of the Two-Thirds of a Marine Division and Air Wing 

The Marine Corps is the largest U.S. force component stationed in Japan, 21,000, or nearly half of the 46,800 U.S. 

military personnel stationed ashore in Japan at the outset of 

fiscal year 1977. This option would concentrate on the substantial Marine Corps presence in Okinawa. The Marines use the 

largest portion of the nearly 15 percent of that crowded island 

reserved for U.S. bases. 

It is important to note that the Marine forces are not 

required to be stationed on Okinawa in order to support afloat 

units in the Western Pacific (such as two battalion landing 

teams (BLTs) deployed on vessels of two amphibious ready groups). 

75 
Marine personnel could be airlifted to Japan or the Philippines 

to meet the ships rotated from the U.S. west coast or Hawaii. 

The most likely major contingency in East Asia and the 

Western Pacific, a Korean conflict, probably does not call for 

the unique amphibious emphasis of the Marine Corps. If the 

Marines in Okinawa were sent to Korea, it would more likely be 

by military airlift aircraft rather than by slower surface 

transport. 

If it is assumed that major manpower reductions are mandated 

in the forward-deployed forces in the Western Pacific, it would 

be a perhaps significantly lower risk to withdraw the two-thirds 

of a Marine division and air wing in Okinawa and the main islands 

of Japan instead of the Army division in South Korea. The Army 

division north of Seoul, while lacking the flexibility of the 

Marine division, at the same time clearly makes more of a direct 

contribution to deterring the outbreak of a Korean conflict. 

Perhaps the strongest argument against this withdrawal and 

deactivation option would be that it would eliminate an intheater, quick-reaction force whose continued presence might 

make total or partial withdrawal of the Army division from South 

Korea less destabilizing. This option would make subsequent 

withdrawal of the Army division a higher risk step. In particular, the deletion of the two-thirds of an air wing would substantially reduce the in-theater tactical air assets for deterrence 

and use in Korea. 

In opposition to this option would be the view that the twothirds of a Marine Corps division and its air wing are viewed by 

North and South Korea, as well as by the Japanese, as a theater 

reserve that would be one of the first to go to Korea should such 

a need be determined by the United States. Japan and other Asian 

nations might regard the reduction as a precursor to further 

withdrawals of greater concern. The "quick reaction" capability 

of the Marine Corps for dealing with "brush fires" in the Western 

Pacific is a force of impressive utility and deterrent value to 

some Japanese defense observers. 

76 
OPTION B-1. WITHDRAWAL AND DEACTIVATION OF THE TWO-THIRDS MARINE 

DIVISION AND AIR WING IN JAPAN 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-50 -170 -300 -360 -360 -1,240 

This estimate assumes that the division and the 

tactical and logistical support elements, including fixed-wing aircraft, plus those dollar and 

manpower resources in the mission and combat 

support forces that are associated with the support of the division and air wing are withdrawn 

from the Marine Corps over a three-year period. 

If the Marine Corps' fixed-wing tactical aircraft were retained in Japan for a Korean 

contingency, the fiscal year 1978-1982 cost 

impact of that would reduce the above estimate 

by about $200 million. 

B. 2. Reduction of Marine Corps Presence in Japan, 

Especially Okinawa, and Deletion from Force 

Structure 

This alternative would substantially reduce the Marine Corps 

presence in Okinawa without removing the basis for use in limited 

contingencies. It would reduce the Marine Corps presence in 

Okinawa by half, going from two regiments to one. The Marine 

air wing stationed at the crowded Iwakuni base in Japan could be 

reduced commensurately with the reduced ground force presence in 

Okinawa. Other Marine Corps forces, such as a battalion landing 

team, could be deployable rapidly by air from California or 

Hawaii to back up forward-deployed, afloat elements. 

The basic rationale for this alternative would be that the 

scale of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa seems considerably 

larger than the contingencies usually mentioned in justification 

77 
of its presence, and that consequently a smaller forward presence 

would be adequate. 

Contingencies usually envisioned for the Marine Corps in 

East Asia are relatively small-scale contingencies. An example 

would be Americans caught in civil strife and becoming hostage 

to hostile fire, preventing low-risk commercial air flight evacuation and thus requiring an armed rescue force to enable safe 

departure. The timing and scale of such situations are, of 

course, impossible to predict with precision. In the Mayaguez 

incident in May 1975, the Marine Corps force elements actually 

employed were portions of a company-size assault team (about 

120 men) to recapture the ship and two companies of a battalion 

landing team (BLT) to land on the nearby Cambodian island. 

The arguments against this reduction of the Marine Corps 

presence in Japan would be similar to those against total withdrawal. Either option for deleting the Marine Corps elements 

from the force structure would require amending the National 

Security Act of 1947, which stipulates a minimum of three Marine 

combat divisions and air wings in the force structure. 

OPTION B-2. REDUCTION OF MARINE CORPS PRESENCE IN JAPAN FROM 

TWO TO ONE REGIMENT 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-25 -85 -150 -180 -180 -620 

Estimate assumes proportionate reductions in air 

support over a three-year period. 

C. Deletion of Army Infantry Division in Hawaii from the 

Force Structure 

This option involves the deactivation of the Army infantry 

division in Hawaii and associated support units. 

78 
Of the major U.S. ground force elements deployed in the 

Pacific, the Army division in Hawaii is the farthest from Korea, 

the area in the region most likely to have substantial conflict 

involving U.S. forces. The division in Hawaii is also one of 

the farthest away from use in a NATO contingency. Given the 

current assessment by the Department of Defense of the Military 

balance in Korea, it is expected that the major U.S. reinforcement in case of a conflict would not be ground force elements, 

but rather augmentation of the tactical air and logistical support. Thus, it could be argued that the likely use of the division in a Korean conflict is remote, even less likely than the 

use of the forward-deployed Marines in Okinawa. If it were 

decided that a division over and above the infantry division 

in Korea and/or the Marines in Japan were needed in an unexpectedly demanding Korean conflict, other divisions in the United 

States, such as those on or near the west coast, would be only 

a few hours farther away from Japan or Korea by military airlift. 

OPTION C. DEACTIVATION OF ARMY INFANTRY DIVISION IN HAWAII 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-70 -140 -290 -290 -290 -1,080 

This estimate assumes that the division and its 

tactical combat and logistic support elements, 

plus those dollar and manpower resources in the 

mission and central support forces that are 

associated with the division and its direct 

support units, are withdrawn from the Army over 

a two-year period. The estimate does not include 

savings associated with deactivating the affiliated National Guard brigade. 

In terms of impact on deterrence of conflict in the Western 

Pacific, deactivation of the division in Hawaii would probably 

79 
have the least impact upon the appraisals and calculations of 

the Koreans, Japanese, the People's Republic of China, and the 

Soviet Union. 

The principal argument against this option would be that 

the 25th Division is considered necessary for NATO, and that 

with strategic airlift its location does not dictate theater of 

usage. 

D. 1. Reduce Aircraft Carriers Forward Deployed in the 

Western Pacific from Two to One 

Reducing the number of aircraft carriers deployed in the 

Western Pacific from two to one could be based on more than one 

rationale. 

Some have argued that the new general purpose helicopter 

assault ship (LHA) is an adequate substitute for a carrier in 

deployment, such as in the Southwest Pacific. Secretary 

Schlesinger in 1975 anticipated that these major new vessels 

could be occasionally deployed "to forward areas in lieu of a 

carrier." With a displacement of nearly 39,000 tons, and a 

capability to carry at least 1,800 Marines with both amphibious 

and airlift capabilities on board, a forward-deployed LHA "could 

perform a wide range of crisis response functions." 1:../ 

A more general argument for the reduction could be that the 

major use of the South China Sea area for forward deployment 

could be curtailed with little risk because the Soviet naval 

threat in that area is presently quite remote. A reduction in 

U.S. deployment there would not require a related cut in presence 

near Japan, where the proximity, capability, and activity of the 

Soviet Navy's Pacific Fleet general purpose forces are concentrated, a matter of particular concern to Japan. 

Perhaps the strongest argument for reducing the forwarddeployed carrier level is that for most of the credible scenarios 

in East Asia, land-based tactical air units, already in the 

theater and available for augmentation, would be adequate for a 

contingency such as a renewed Korean conflict. 

1:../ Schlesinger, FY 1976, pp. III-79, 80. Rumsfe1d, FY 1977, 

p. 160. 

80 
In opposition to the reduction in forward-deployed carriers, 

it could be argued that Japan is particularly sensitive to the 

naval balance in the Western Pacific and its relevance to Japanese 

security as an island overwhelmingly dependent upon uninterrupted 

access to sea lanes. The United States has already reduced its 

naval force levels in the Western Pacific, cutting from three to 

two the carriers forward deployed in 1975. A further reduction 

could induce more anxiety in Japan than any move other than U.S. 

abrogation of the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan or total 

withdrawal from Korea. Japanese reaction might make armed neutrality or major rearmament more likely. The People's Republic 

of China is also reportedly sensitive to the naval balance in 

the Western Pacific and has expressed concern about Soviet 

encirclement, including use of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. 

OPTION D-l. TOTAL CARRIER FORCE LEVELS REDUCED BY THREE CARRIERS 

AND THEIR ASSOCIATED SUPPORT SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-140 -440 -730 -880 -880 -3,070 

This estimate assumes decommissioning one conventional carrier per year from fiscal year 1978 

through fiscal year 1980, as well as the reduction from the Navy and Marine Corps of the manpower and dollar resources associated with these 

carriers and with their support in the mission 

and central support forces. If the aircraft 

and supporting ships associated with the carriers were retained in the force structure for 

convoy protection and tactical air missions, 

the cost impact of this carrier reduction 

option would be about $1 billion over five years 

instead of the $3 billion estimate above. Retaining carrier tactical air assets would require 

some base construction and operating costs, again 

not estimated here. 

81 
In countering the view that the LHA could substitute for a 

carrier in the Southwest Pacific, the tactical air power projection capability of the carrier would be stressed, not only for 

potential use in a Korean conflict, but also for protecting the 

LHA itself in a hostile environment. The possibility of saturation of land-based tactical air support facilities should also 

be noted. 

D. 2. Homeport a Second Carrier in Either Japan or the 

Philippines, Thereby Enabling Continued Forward 

Deployment in the Western Pacific of Two Carriers, 

but Also Enabling Deletion of Two Carriers from 

the Force Structure 

In 1973, the Japanese Government approved the "homeporting" 

of a U.S. conventionally powered aircraft carrier, U.S.S. Midway, 

at the Yokosuka Naval Shipyard and Repair Base near Tokyo. Presently 10 other U.S. naval vessels are also homeported there. 

Reportedly, the initial reception by much of the Japanese media 

to the homeporting of the Midway was generally favorable. ~ 

Cost and operational availability advantages of such a 

homeporting arrangement are quite substantial. The logistics 

tail supporting the ship's forward deployment is much shorter, 

reducing the number of support ships needed. The number of 

carriers required in the fleet to support one forward-deployed 

carrier is substantially reduced by homeporting at a forward 

base. 21 Thus, if a second U.S. carrier were homeported in the 

~! Fred Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations 

(Brookings, 1975), p. 63. 

21 Rumsfeld, FY 1977, p. 160. Homeporting a carrier in Japan, 

given the requirement of two carriers forward deployed in the 

Western Pacific, reduces the needed carriers in the Pacific 

by three (five rather than eight carriers). This is based 

upon the relationship that for every forward-deployed carrier 

not homeported, the Navy plans for a deployment schedule such 

that the crew spends two months in or near the continental 

United States for every month forward deployed. This planning 

factor in turn means that four carriers are required, considering transit time and major overhaul periods, to support one 

carrier forward deployed. 

82 
Western Pacific (in Japan or Subic Bay, Philippines), then two 

carriers could be deactivated. 

Even if occasional deployments into the Indian Ocean were 

retained as a responsibility of the Pacific fleet rather than 

the Atlantic fleet, it would be possible under this option to 

increase the amount of Seventh Fleet activity actually concentrated near Japan and the general location of the Soviet Pacific 

Fleet. 

The argument for this alternative would primarily be the 

quite significant long-term cost savings if the total carrier 

levels were reduced by two. 

Arguments against this option might concentrate on feasibility and related Japanese reactions. In Japan, Yokosuka 

appears presently to be fully utilized with occasional demanding workload peaks, such as when the Midway comes in for several 

weeks for upkeep. Thus, homeporting a second carrier in Japan 

could require a major expansion of facilities which would be 

available to the United States in Japan. However, if the second 

carrier were homeported at Subic Bay, then the ship repair 

facilities there would perhaps be adequate. 

Perhaps there are other alternatives, such as Sasebo. Japan, 

or Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Because of sensitive political reaction, a nuclear-powered carrier probably could not be homeported 

in Japan. 

Although this option would not involve reduction of U.S. 

naval presence in the Western Pacific, the Japanese Government 

would look at the overall U.S. naval inventory in the Pacific 

and be disturbed by the reduction in the Pacific generally. 

The Japanese concern should be allayed somewhat by the U.S. 

emphasis on the limited contribution that U.S. carriers make 

to antisubmarine warfare when compared to other U.S. naval assets, 

such as P-3 patrol aircraft and attack submarines. This is important since the principal Soviet naval threat to Japan is the 

submarine threat to sea lanes of communication, particularly as 

those lanes approach the main islands of Japan. There may be 

83 
physical capacity or feasibility problems and high one-time costs 

of construction or expansion associated with this option. Additionally, tolerable living conditions for the homeported families 

would have to be assured. This study has not had an opportunity 

to explore these potential problems. However, the possibilities 

seem worth exploring because of the potential for substantial 

cost savings or for facilitating transfer of some Pacific fleet 

assets to the Atlantic, should that be deemed appropriate. 

OPTION D-2. HOMEPORTING A SECOND AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN THE WESTERN 

PACIFIC, AND DELETING TWO CARRIERS, WITH THEIR ASSOCIATED SUPPORT SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT, FROM THE FORCE 

STRUCTURE 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-85 -400 -540 -540 -540 -2,105 

Estimate assumes that the carrier deactivations 

take place over a two-year period and excludes 

costs of additional basing facilities in the 

Western Pacific. 

E. Delete the TWo Air Force Tactical Air Squadrons from 

the Force Structure 

There are presently two tactical fighter squadrons of F-4s 

stationed at Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. 

The argument in favor of withdrawing them from the force 

structure in the Pacific is that the threat to the Philippines, 

to which they are relevant, seems quite remote. The primary 

threat to Philippine security is insurgency and clearly not air 

attack. Tactical air assets elsewhere in the Pacific, including 

those in Okinawa and aboard carriers, are arguably adequate for 

augmentation during a Korean conflict. 

84 
As opposed to total withdrawal, it has been suggested that 

the Philippine Government might require at least one squadron to 

remain as a contribution to air defense of the Philippines as 

the most direct U.S. contribution to their defense under the 

Mutual Security Treaty and consistent with the emphasized supplementary role of U.S. forces under the Guam Doctrine. In 

addition, the aircraft, although stationed at Clark, are only a 

few hours flight from Korea. 

OPTION E. DELETE THE TWO AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR SQUADRONS IN 

THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE FORCE STRUCTURE 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

-20 -60 -80 -80 -80 -320 

Deleted over a two-year period (fiscal years 

1978-1979). 

FORCE REALIGNMENTS 

Assumptions underlying the options discussed in this section 

are that force requirements for NATO/Europe are not fully met, 

and that some force elements drawn from excess forces "for Asia" 

would be needed to help meet European requirements. 

F. Return of the Infantry Division in South Korea to 

Continental United States for NATO-Related 

Requirements 

Arguments for withdrawing the Second Infantry Division from 

South Korea would be the same as under the alternative presented 

above under force reductions, with the additional argument that 

the need for increasing active divisions deployable to Europe in 

a NATO contingency justifies keeping the division in the force 

85 
structure. This alternative would incur substantial one-time 

relocation and rebasing costs, but would eventually encounter 

lower operating costs in the United States. 

Apart from near-term, one-time cost concerns, another basis 

for opposing this option could be that alternative uses of resources absorbed in retaining this division in the force structure 

might be more effective contributions to enhanced NATO capability, 

particularly for a "short" war. 

OPTION F. RETURNING SECOND INFANTRY DIVISION TO CONTINENTAL 

UNITED STATES 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

+100 +60 +10 -10 -10 +150 

This estimate assumes that the division and its 

tactical combat and logistical support units 

(except air defense and surface-to-surface missile units) are temporarily relocated over a 

three-year period to an existing inactive post 

within the continental United States with facilities of lower standards than those normally associated with the volunteer army. For construction 

of permanent facilities, $500 million has been 

spread evenly over fiscal years 1978-1982. If, 

as was done in 1971 when the other U.S. infantry 

division was withdrawn from Korea and then deactivated, the division's equipment were left in 

South Korea for South Korean forces, then the 

replacement cost to the United States could 

approach $1 billion. Beginning in fiscal year 

1983, after the one-time rebasing and relocation 

costs were incurred, the annual recurring cost 

of locating the division in the United States 

could be about $110 million per year less than 

it would be in South Korea. 

86 
G. 1. Transfer Three Aircraft Carriers from the Pacific 

to the Atlantic by Reducing the Forward-Deployed 

Carriers in the Western Pacific from Two to One 

In the context of East Asia and the Western Pacific, the 

arguments for and against reducing the forward deployment of 

aircraft carriers from two to one would be the same as discussed 

under option D. 1. among the force reduction possibilities. 

Another rationale for reducing the carrier presence in the 

Pacific could be that the Atlantic fleet would require additional 

carriers in a NATO long-war contingency. Transferring three 

carriers to the Atlantic fleet from the six now in the Pacific 

fleet would make peacetime deployments closer to what may be 

wartime requirements, thereby reducing the delay of two weeks 

or longer in redeploying from the Pacific to the Atlantic. The 

responsibility for occasional deployments into the Indian Ocean 

could be transferred to the Atlantic fleet. 

Japanese opposition to transferring three carriers from the 

Pacific would be an important consideration. Moreover~ it might 

be argued that in a "long" NATO war context, two weeks or so 

delay in transferring some carriers to the Atlantic would be a 

tolerable risk. The transfer also might prove difficult in 

terms of available basing on the U.S. east coast and expensive 

in terms of one-time, near-term costs to expand or reopen base 

facilities. 

The cost impact of this option is presented below with the 

estimate for transferring two instead of three carriers. 

G. 2. Transfer Two Carriers to the Atlantic, Based upon 

Homeporting a Second Carrier in Either Japan or 

the Philippines 

As discussed in option D-2, considerations for and against 

homeporting a second carrier in the Western Pacific would be the 

same under this option of transfer rather than deactivation of 

the "freed" assets. 

Arguments for and against a transfer to the Atlantic could 

be the same as those expressed above under G. 1. 

87 
OPTIONS G-l AND G-2. 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Year 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

G. 1. Transfer 

Three Aircraft 

Carriers to 

the Atlantic 

G. 2. Transfer 

Two Aircraft 

Carriers to the 

Atlantic, Homeport Second 

Carrier in 

Western Pacific 

+30 

+30 

+30 

+30 

+30 o o 

+30 +20 +20 

These estimates assume the transfers would occur 

over a three-year time period and exclude onetime rebasing costs, both in the Atlantic and 

Western Pacific. The fiscal year 1981-1982 estimates for option G-2 reflect primarily the higher 

personnel costs associated with basing personnel 

overseas rather than in the United States. 

FORCE ENHANCEMENTS IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

+90 

+130 

A package of options involving force enhancement in Northeast Asia could be based upon the following basic assumptions: 

o Northeast Asia is the region within East Asia and the 

Pacific, (1) where the political requirements for 

force presence are strongest, (2) where the threats 

and contingencies are most significant and demanding, 

(3) where U.S. forces are most relevant to the contingencies, and (4) where U.S. forces make the most 

needed contribution to allies' forces. 

88 
o General purpose forces in East Asia and the Pacific 

can be restructured in a way that enhances some aspects 

of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia without increasing 

total forces in the Pacific and even allowing for a 

reduction in those forces. 

a General purpose forces identified for Europe are either 

sufficient or require additions that do not preclude 

some strengthening of posture in Northeast Asia by 

restructuring within the Pacific. 

The specific example chosen to illustrate costing a force 

enhancement option is at the lower end of the cost range of 

alternatives that might be considered. 

An exemplary force enhancement option could involve the 

following: 

U.S. Force Tactical Air Presence in Northeast Asia 

o Transfer the two F-4 squadrons in the Philippines to 

Korea 

o Substantially upgrade facilities and technology for air 

defense control in South Korea 

o Increase shelter construction for U.S. tactical aircraft that might be sent to South Korea in a contingency 

In-Theater Command, Control, and Communications 

a Augment and improve by deploying to Northeast Asia 

(perhaps Okinawa) three specially configured C-130 aircraft for immediately available airborne communications, 

command, and control equipment for crisis management 

Increase Cooperation and Effectiveness of U.S.-Japanese Defense 

Relationship 

o Increase joint training exercises with Japan in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 

89 
o Add to U.S. antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the 

Western Pacific by procuring more mines to close the 

exits from the Sea of Japan 

o Increase the number of Japanese military officers attending training and professional military schools in the 

United States 

o Make training areas in the United States available for 

some elements of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces that 

lack suitable areas in Japan for proficiency training 

and exercises. 

These force enhancement options for Northeast Asia would not 

necessarily preclude some of the force reductions or realignment 

options noted above, such as the homeporting of a second carrier (perhaps in Japan), allowing two carriers to be either 

deleted from the force structure or transferred to the Atlantic 

for NATO needs. Some of the force enhancement options might well 

be funded largely by either the Japanese or South Korean 

Governments. 

Deploying advanced weapons systems and enhancing command 

and control capacity, although clearly important and more costly, 

would perhaps be secondary compared to the intended psychological 

benefit of reassuring South Korea and Japan with physical evidence of durability of U.S. resolve to retain a substantial force 

in South Korea. Such reassurance would hopefully reduce the 

motivation of South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. 

Deploying two more squadrons of F-4s to South Korea would 

improve deterrence and be directly relevant to the expected principal U.S. contribution needed for South Korean defense against 

a North Korean attack. Increased shelter protection and enhancement of air defense control capabilities in South Korea would 

improve both the survivability and effectiveness of U.S. tactical 

air assets deployed in South Korea. If enhancement of tactical 

air capability in Northeast Asia were undertaken, it might make 

subsequent or related reductions in ground force presence in the 

region less destabilizing. 

Antisubmarine warfare improvements could be seen as emphasizing a capability that responds to the primary naval threat to 

Japan. There has been, compared to 1973, a recent significant 

90 
decline in joint antisubmarine warfare exercises between the U.S. 

Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces. il 

Japanese Self-Defense Force elements lack land and air 

training space in Japan, partly due to Japanese restrictions 

on disturbance to surrounding communities. As in the case of 

some military personnel from the Federal Republic of Germany 

who use training areas in Texas, it might be feasible and desirable to encourage some Japanese Self-Defense Force elements, 

such as those responsible for air defense, to use some base in 

the United States. 

There has been a substantial decline in the percentage of 

Japanese military officers attending professional military 

schools and specialized training programs in the United States. 

This apparently is due in part to the sharp increases in charges, 

sometimes on short notice, related to sharing of overhead and 

other support costs. il Given the critical importance of the 

U.S. mutual security alliance relationship with Japan and the 

communication problems encountered between such different cultures, the argument would be that the United States should not 

only reverse the sharp decline in Japanese attendance at U.S. 

schools, but should also increase some U.S. military professional schooling in Japanese institutions, such as their National 

Defense College. 

This force enhancement option might be opposed on several 

grounds. It could be seen as an endorsement of undemocratic 

conditions in South Korea and as a departure from the emphasis 

of the Guam Doctrine upon increased self-reliance of Asian allies. 

It might be argued that relocating C-130 command, control, and 

communications aircraft from the continental United States would 

be unnecessarily expensive, because they could be deployed from 

a central U.S. location, with lower operating costs, in a few 

days in any event. In the case of antisubmarine warfare improvements, it might be argued that these are prime examples of 

appropriate increases that Japan itself should undertake in 

its defense efforts. 

il Japanese Defense White Paper (1976), p. 154. 

il Discussions with U.S. Embassy personnel, Tokyo, November 

1976. 

91 
OPTION H. STRENGTHENING U.S. POSTURE IN NORTHEAST ASIA 

Cost Impact Relative to President's Fiscal Year 1978 Program, 

in Millions of Fiscal Year 1977 Dollars, by Fiscal Years 

1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1978-1982 

+83 +64 +11 +8 +8 +174 

This estimate includes the relocation of the 

two F-4 squadrons from the Philippines to South 

Korea. 

92 
APPENDIX A 

SOVIET PACIFIC FLEET 

Force Level and Composition* 

Submarines 

Total 

Ballistic Missile 

Cruise Missile 

Attack 

Principal Surface Combatants 

Total 

Cruisers 

Destroyers 

Frigates 

Minor Surface Comb a tan ts 

Amphibious Warfare Ships 

Total 

Coastal Patrol 

River Patrol 

Mine Warfare 

Amphibious Warfare 

Amphibious Warfare 

and 

Ships 

Craft 

100 

58 

278 

25 

19 

56 

6 

27 

25 

100 

40 

100 

18 

20 

* F. J. West, Jr., et al., "Toward the Year 1985: Relationship 

Between U.S. Policy and Naval Forces in the Pacific," (April 8, 

1977), Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College. 

93 

APPENDIX B 

UNDERWAY SHIP DAYS OF THE PACIFIC FLEET 

(SEVENTH FLEET AND THIRD FLEET) BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION, 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975, FIRST QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1976, 

AND FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 1976/SECOND QUARTER 

FISCAL YEAR 1977 

1. The following figures reflect the number of underway days 

for Pacific fleet ships by general geographic region. This 

data was extracted from historical files by running a computer query for all major employment underway terms and 

sorted by geographic location. This procedure necessarily 

results in the totals being approximations rather than 

precise figures due to the arbitrary rules that must be 

established in defining areas to keep the data extraction 

process within manageable proportions. 

2. The data provided cover fiscal year 1975 through 1st 

Quarter fiscal year 1976 and 4th Quarter fiscal year 1976 

through 2nd Quarter fiscal year 1977. 

FY 76 FY 76 (4th Qtr) 

Area FY 75 (1st Qtr) FY 77 (2nd Qtr) 

South China Sea 5,835 (23.3%)* 850 (15~5%) 3,011 (14.6%) 

Philippine Sea 1,586 ( 6.3%) 500 ( 9.1%) 2,032 ( 9.8%) 

Northern Japan 593 ( 2.4%) 208 ( 3.8%) 974-( 4.7%) 

Sea of Japan 1,235 ( 4.9%) 233 ( 4.2%) 1,052 ( 5.1%) 

Okinawa 612 ( 2.4%) 91 ( 1. 7%) 405 ( 2.0%) 

Indian Ocean 624 ( 2.5%) 145 ( 2.7%) 381 ( 1.8%) 

South Pacific 137 ( 0.5%) 12 ( 0.2%) 481 ( 2.3%) 

Mid-Pacific 4,462 (17.9%) 1,067 (19.4%) 3,850 (18.6%) 

West Coast 9,910 (39.7%) 2,387 (43.5%) 8,503 (41.1%) 

TOTAL 24,994 5,493 20,689 

* Totals of percentages may not equal 100 because of rounding. 

95