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NORTH KOREA: HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN

RIGHTS CONCERNS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA 

AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 2, 2002

Serial No. 107–95

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

ERIC CANTOR, Virginia 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

ENERE LEVI, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN MILLER, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Jasper Becker, former Beijing Bureau Chief, South China Morning Post ......... 9

Sophie Delaunay, North Korean Project Representative, Me ́decins Sans 

Frontie`res .............................................................................................................. 12

John Powell, Regional Director, World Food Program ......................................... 20

Timothy A. Peters, Founder and Director, Helping Hands/Korea and Tona-Month Club ........................................................................................................ 26

Norbert Vollertsen, former Medical Doctor inside North Korea .......................... 45

Kim Sung Min, Defector and Director of North Korean Defectors’ Volunteer 

Group, Committee to Help North Korean Refugees .......................................... 49

Sun-ok Lee, former prison and camp survivor ...................................................... 54

Lee Young-Kook, former bodyguard of Kim Jong-II and prison camp survivor . 81

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific: Prepared statement ................................................................................................... 3

The Honorable Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 5

Sophie Delaunay: Prepared statement .................................................................. 14

John Powell: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 23

Timothy A. Peters: Prepared statement ................................................................ 28

Norbert Vollertsen: Prepared statement ................................................................ 47

Kim Sung Min: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 51

Sun-ok Lee: Prepared statement ............................................................................ 57

Lee Young-Kook: Prepared statement ................................................................... 84

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 93

The Honorable Earl Blumenauer, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Oregon: Prepared statement ................................................................. 94

Article entitled ‘‘Don’t let North Korean softening obscure persistent hunger,’’ 

The Christian Science Monitor, by Roberta Cohen ........................................... 95

Excerpts from ‘‘Minimum conditions for humanitarian action in the DPRK: 

a survey of humanitarian agency involvement and perspectives,’’ by Dr. 

Hazel Smith, Senior Fellow, Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program, 

United States Institute of Peace ......................................................................... 96

Article entitled ‘‘DPR Korea: North Korean Refugees—An Escalating Crisis?’’ 

by Aidan Foster-Carter, Hon. Senior Research Fellow in Sociology & Modern Korea, Leeds University, dated September 2001 ........................................ 110

(1)

NORTH KOREA: HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN 

RIGHTS CONCERNS 

THURSDAY, MAY 2, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Committee will come to order. On behalf of the 

Subcommittee, I would like to warmly welcome our distinguished 

witnesses, many of whom have traveled from as far as Beijing and 

Seoul to be with us here today. We’re honored by your presence. 

In this regard I would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, and the 

U.S. Committee for Human Rights North Korea in helping to make 

this hearing possible. 

The leadership of two Members who have been instrumental in 

developing this hearing should also be singled out. Representative 

Ed Royce who chairs the U.S. South Korean Inter-Parliamentary 

Exchange and Representative Mark Kirk, who traveled to North 

Korea as a former staff member for this Committee and recently 

chaired a Congressional Human Rights Caucus briefing on North 

Korea. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine a trio of increasingly significant humanitarian and foreign policy issues that have 

arisen as a direct consequence of North Korea’s inhumane and 

failed system of governance. All of which have important implications for the United States and the international community—refugees, acute food shortages, and human rights. 

This hearing is particularly timely given the recent increase of 

North Korean asylum bids through western embassies in Beijing. 

It also takes place against the sensitive diplomatic backdrop of renewed North-South dialogue, tentative steps toward re-engagement 

between Tokyo and Pyongyang, and the planned resumption of 

high-level dialogue between the United States and the DPRK. 

Congress hopes and expects that North Korea will seize this opportunity to demonstrate its sincerity through negotiations and 

begin to alleviate the concerns of the world community. As we’ve 

all come to understand, awareness of the plight of North Korean 

refugees is rising dramatically. A series of high-profile instances in 

China, including in the last week two North Korean refugees gaining entry into the United States Embassy and the arrest of three 

2

asylum seekers outside the South Korean Embassy, has brought 

unprecedented exposure to a searing human rights tragedy largely 

heretofore hidden from the West. 

The basic facts are as follows—the refugee issue first surfaced in 

connection with the appalling condition of DPRK contract laborers 

in Siberia. By the mid-1990s, with economic collapse and natural 

disasters combining to create famine conditions in the North that 

may have claimed as many as 2 million lives, the focus shifted to 

China. Over the last several years, somewhere between 100,000 

and 300,000 North Koreans have crossed into northeastern China, 

a region with a large and welcoming community of ethnic Koreans. 

Most of the North Koreans are in search of either food or work. 

Many have evidently criss-crossed the border several times. In recent years some refugees who have been repatriated to North 

Korea actually managed to escape and return to China. Of this 

group an unknown number have suffered harsh punishment at the 

hands of the secret police, causing them to turn against the DPRK 

regime and therefore giving rise to well-founded fear of persecution 

should they be forcibly returned by the PRC to North Korea. 

The PRC’s reaction to the influx of North Koreans appears to 

fluctuate between placid tolerance and violent bouts of repression. 

As a matter of principle, Beijing maintains that the North Koreans 

are economic migrants. In practice, however, local authorities have 

allowed NGOs to assist refugees in China and even turned a blind 

eye to NGO efforts to facilitate their asylum to South Korea 

through third countries, provided such activities remain low-profile. 

But Beijing also orders periodic crackdowns against the refugees 

and those who assist them, and by some reports may even allow 

DPRK agents to conduct operations in northeastern China. 

While the flow of refugees in north China may be more stable 

than in years past, the number of defectors arriving in Seoul, while 

small in absolute numbers, is growing at an impressive rate. The 

flow of North Korean asylum-seekers has surged from 149 in 1999, 

to 312 in 2000, to 583 last year, and this year defections are occurring in an accelerated rate. Because North Korea cannot feed itself, 

U.N. agencies have become responsible for feeding almost a third 

of the country’s 23 million people. 

A compassionate and global response to U.N. appeals for food 

and medical donations will almost certainly be needed to help protect women, children, and others at risk. 

Finally, as to human rights, it should be clear that the North Korean regime is an abomination. Its policy stands as an affront to 

the most basic standards of human decency. President Bush is precisely correct to note that North Korea is starving its people while 

developing weapons of mass destruction. Yet, he has been careful 

to observe that America has ‘‘great sympathy and empathy for the 

North Korean people. We want them to have food.’’ The President 

has noted strongly, ‘‘We want them to have freedom.’’

How the U.S. and the world community can most effectively express its sympathy and concern for the North Korean people, including refugees in China, is the single issue before us today. In 

this context we look forward to the testimony of our panelists, several of whom are outside experts, others survivors of some of the 

3

most challenging rigors of the human condition. Mr. Faleomavaega? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to warmly welcome our distinguished 

witnesses, many of whom have traveled from as far as Beijing and Seoul to be with 

us here today. We are honored by your presence. In this regard, I would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of the Republic of Korea, the U.S. Embassy in 

Seoul, and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea in helping to make 

this hearing possible. The leadership of two Members who have been instrumental 

in developing this hearing should also be singled out: Representative Ed Royce, who 

chairs the US-South Korean Inter-parliamentary Exchange, and Representative 

Mark Kirk, who traveled to North Korea as a former staff member for this Committee and recently chaired a Congressional Human Rights Caucus briefing on 

North Korea. 

The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine a trio of increasingly significant humanitarian and foreign policy issues that have arisen as a direct consequence of 

North Korea’s inhumane and failed system of governance, all of which have important implications for the U.S. and the international community: refugees, acute food 

shortages, and human rights. 

This hearing is particularly timely given the recent increase of North Korean asylum bids through western embassies in Beijing. It also takes place against the sensitive diplomatic backdrop of renewed North-South dialogue, tentative steps toward 

re-engagement between Tokyo and Pyongyang, and the planned resumption of highlevel dialogue between the U.S. and the DPRK. Congress hopes and expects that 

North Korea will seize this opportunity to demonstrate its sincerity through negotiations and begin to alleviate the concerns of the world community. 

As we have all come to understand, awareness of the plight of North Korean refugees is rising dramatically. A series of high-profile incidents in China, including in 

the last week two North Korean refugees gaining entry to the U.S. Embassy and 

the arrest of three asylum seekers outside the South Korean Embassy, has brought 

unprecedented exposure to a searing human rights tragedy largely heretofore hidden from the West. 

The basic facts are as follows. The refugee issue first surfaced in connection with 

the appalling condition of DPRK contract laborers in Siberia. By the mid-1990s, 

with economic collapse and natural disasters combining to create famine conditions 

in the North that may have claimed as many as two million lives, the focus shifted 

to China. Over the last several years, somewhere between 100,000 and 300,000 

North Koreans have crossed into northeastern China, a region with a large and welcoming community of ethnic Koreans. Most of the North Koreans are in search of 

either food or work. Many have evidently criss-crossed the border several times. In 

recent years some refugees who have been repatriated to North Korea actually managed to escape and return to China. Of this group, an unknown number have suffered harsh punishment at the hands of the secret police, causing them to turn 

against the DPRK regime and therefore giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecution should they be forcibly returned by the PRC to North Korea. 

The PRC’s reaction to the influx of North Koreans appears to fluctuate between 

placid tolerance and violent bouts of repression. As a matter of principle, Beijing 

maintains that the North Koreans are economic migrants. In practice, however, 

local authorities have allowed NGOs to assist refugees in China and even turned 

a blind eye to NGO efforts to facilitate their asylum to South Korea through third 

countries, provided such activities remain low-profile. But Beijing also orders periodic crackdowns against refugees and those who assist them, and by some reports 

may even allow DPRK agents to conduct operations in northeastern China. 

While the flow of refugees into northern China may be more stable than in years 

past, the number of defectors arriving in Seoul—while small in absolute numbers—

is growing at an impressive rate. The flow of North Korean asylum seekers has 

surged from148 in 1999, to 312 in 2000, to 583 last year. This year, defections are 

occurring at an accelerated rate. 

Because North Korea cannot feed itself, UN agencies have become responsible for 

feeding almost one-third of the country’s 23 million people. A compassionate global 

response to UN appeals for food and medical donations will almost certainly be 

needed to help protect women, children and others at risk. 

4

Finally, as to human rights, it should be clear that the North Korean regime is 

an abomination. Its policies stand as an affront to the most basic standards of 

human decency. President Bush is precisely correct to note that North Korea is 

starving its people while developing weapons of mass destruction. Yet he has also 

been careful to observe that America has ‘‘great sympathy and empathy for the 

North Korean people. We want them to have food . . . We want them to have freedom.’’

How the U.S. and the world community can most effectively express its sympathy 

and concern for the North Korean people, including refugees in China, is the signal 

issue before us today. In this context, we look forward to the testimony of our panelists, several of whom are outside experts, others survivors of some the most challenging rigors of the human condition.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for calling this hearing today to shed light on the tragic 

humanitarian plight of the North Korean people who labor under 

one of the repressive, totalitarian regimes in the world, the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea. 

I’d also like to extend a warm welcome to our distinguished panel 

of witnesses; especially, those who have traveled from overseas to 

share their personal experiences with the Members of our Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, many have advocated that the people of North 

Korea are the least free people on earth. As over the past 4 decades, they have been denied the most basic of human rights. They 

have been isolated from one another and they have been cut off 

from the world by their government. Moreover, due to their government’s disastrous agricultural and economic policies, which have 

been compounded by natural disaster, the North Korean people 

have suffered through a brutal famine that has killed well over a 

million, perhaps, up to 3 million of their own fellow citizens and 

left a generation of children physically and mentally stunted. 

Mr. Chairman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy 

and Human Rights and Labor, Lorne Craner, has recently testified 

that the North Korean government is among the most repressive 

regimes in the world. The closed nature of the North Korean regime makes it difficult to obtain information on the conditions inside that country. But the reports that make it out paint a shocking, often horrifying picture of brutality, opposition, injustice and 

depravation. 

In North Korea individual rights are considered subversive to the 

goals of the state and the party. There is no tolerance for criticism 

of the state or its leaders. And accordingly, no freedom of expression, assembly or belief. The regime uses extreme repression and 

a pervasive surveillance network to intimidate and instill fear in 

the population. It maintains control through terror, threat of severe 

punishment and the manipulation of privileges, including the privilege of food allotments. 

Given these terrible conditions in North Korea, Mr. Chairman, 

it’s not surprising that tens of thousands of refugees, many of them 

malnourished women and children, have fled their homeland for 

northeast China. It is estimated that well over 150,000 North Korean refugees currently live in China dreading forceful repatriation 

that would result in imprisonment, torture or execution. 

On the issue of food aid, I’m proud of the World Food Program 

and resident NGOs that are continuing to provide humanitarian 

assistance on the ground in North Korea. Due in part to their efVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
5

forts, the North Korean people are continuing a fragile recovery 

from the famine crisis of 1997. While better monitoring of food and 

aid distribution to prevent diversion still remains an important objective. Much of the aid provided over the years has no doubt been 

effective in significantly reducing the numbers of North Koreans 

starving to death; especially within the targeted populations of children and women. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m proud that our nation has continued to play 

a major donor role in coming to the assistance of the long-suffering 

people of North Korea. This year alone the United States has contributed 155,000 metric tons of food to North Korea. On that point, 

the Administration should be commended for continuing to separate issues of humanitarian assistance from the conflicts with the 

government of North Korea over weapons of mass destruction, conventional military forces and other matters. 

Clearly, the innocent and powerless people of North Korea should 

not be condemned to starvation and made victims because of an 

unstable leadership they had no choice in choosing. 

Concluding, Mr. Chairman, I’m heartened by the offer yesterday 

from Kim Jong-Il to re-engage with negotiations with Washington. 

And I’m hopeful that Ambassador Jack Pritchard will be able to 

travel soon to North Korea to start addressing the full range of 

complex issues our nation has with North Korea. 

And with that Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the opportunity 

of hearing from our witnesses this morning. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

Mr. Chairman: 

I commend you for calling this hearing today to shed light on the tragic humanitarian plight of the North Korean people, who labor under one of the most oppressive totalitarian regimes in the world, the Government of the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea (DPRK). 

I would also extend a warm welcome to our distinguished panel of witnesses, especially to those who have traveled from overseas to share their personal experiences with our Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, many have advocated that the people of North Korea are the least 

free people on earth, as over the past four decades they have been denied the most 

basic of human rights, they have been isolated from one another, and they have 

been cutoff from the world by their government. Moreover, due to their government’s disastrous agricultural and economic policies, which have been compounded 

by natural disasters, the North Korean people have suffered through a brutal famine that has killed well over a million, perhaps up to three million, of their fellow 

citizens and left a generation of children physically and mentally stunted. 

According to the 2001 State Department Human Rights Report on North Korea, 

‘‘The Government’s human rights record remained poor, and it continued to commit 

numerous serious abuses. Citizens do not have the right to peacefully change their 

government. There continued to be reports of extrajudicial killings and disappearances. Citizens are detained arbitrarily, and many are held as political prisoners; 

prison conditions are harsh . . . The regime subjects its citizens to rigid controls. 

The leadership perceives most international norms of human rights, especially individual rights, as illegitimate, alien, and subversive . . . The Government prohibits 

freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association . . . The Government restricts freedom of religion, citizen’s movements, and worker rights.’’

To this effect, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor, Lorne Craner, has recently testified, ‘‘The DPRK is among the most repressive regimes in the world. The closed nature of the North Korean regime makes it 

difficult to obtain information on the conditions inside the country. But the reports 

that make it out paint a shocking, often horrifying, picture of brutality, oppression, 

injustice and deprivation . . . In North Korea, individual rights are considered subVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

versive to the goals of the State and Party . . . There is no tolerance for criticism 

of the State or its leader and accordingly no freedom of expression, assembly or belief . . . The regime uses extreme repression and a pervasive surveillance network 

to intimidate and instill fear in the population. It maintains control through terror, 

threat of severe punishment and the manipulation of privileges, including the ’privilege’ of food allotments.’’

Given these terrible conditions in North Korea, Mr. Chairman, it is not surprising 

that tens of thousands of refugees—many of them malnourished women and children—have fled their homeland for northeast China. It is estimated that over 

150,000 North Korean refugees currently live in China, dreading forcible repatriation that would result in imprisonment, torture or execution. It is reprehensible 

that China, a party to the U.N. Refugee Convention of 1951, continues to deny 

UNHCR access to the border areas and assists DPRK security agents in pursuing 

and forcibly returning North Korean refugees. I am particularly troubled by horror 

stories that some of the refugees returned have been led away like cattle, with wires 

forced through their noses and tied together. 

On the issue of food aid, I applaud the World Food Program (WFP) and resident 

NGO’s that are continuing to provide humanitarian assistance on the ground in 

North Korea. Due in part to their efforts, the North Korean people are continuing 

a fragile recovery from the famine crisis of 1997. While better monitoring of food 

aid distribution to prevent diversion still remains an important objective, much of 

the aid provided over the years has no doubt been effective in significantly reducing 

the numbers of North Koreans starving to death, especially with the targeted populations of children and women. 

Mr. Chairman, I am proud that our Nation has continued to play a major donor 

role in coming to the assistance of the long-suffering people of North Korea. This 

year alone, the United States has contributed 155,000 metric tons of food to North 

Korea. On that point, the Administration should be commended for continuing to 

separate issues of humanitarian assistance from conflicts with the DPRK Government over weapons of mass destruction, conventional military forces and other matters. Clearly, the innocent and powerless people of North Korea should not be condemned to starvation and made victims because of an unstable leadership they had 

no voice in choosing. 

In concluding, I am heartened by the offer yesterday from Pyongyang to reengage 

in negotiations with Washington, and I am hopeful that Ambassador Jack Pritchard 

will be able to travel soon to the DPRK to start addressing the full range of complex 

issues our Nation has with North Korea. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to briefly comment and I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to 

commend you for holding this hearing. I guess it was several 

months ago——

Mr. LEACH. If you will yield, this was at your request and I’m 

delighted that you made that request. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate very much the leadership you’ve shown. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, I thank you. I appreciated the meeting we had 

with Congressman Kirk where we discussed the plight of the North 

Korean refugees, and so you’ve made this hearing a reality. I think, 

as we’ll hear today, the so-called Hermit Kingdom is one of the 

most brutal regimes that exists on this planet. 

As we have found out and as Congressman Kirk has found out, 

the elite there live in luxury while the people are starving. North 

Korea is, thus, one of the greatest humanitarian disasters that we 

face. And I want to thank all of the witnesses that are going to 

come here before us today on both panels because some of those 

witnesses endured great pain, great suffering, and they also demonstrated the greatest bravery. 

This Subcommittee, I believe, is doing a great service by bringing 

attention to the nightmare that is North Korea for many, many 

people that are in that country that are starving as we speak. 

7

Last year, along with Congressman Becerra, who co-Chairs the 

U.S.-Republic of Korea Inter-Parliamentary Exchange with me, and 

I introduced a resolution—House Concurrent Resolution 213, which 

addresses the plight of North Koreans, and especially, of the refugees of North Korea. This resolution came out of Exchange discussions that we had last summer with our South Korean colleagues. 

We each discussed the question of who is going to respond to this 

refugee crisis. What is the world going to do about this humanitarian obligation? 

The resolution we developed calls on the Chinese government to 

honor its international obligations to honor the U.N. convention relating to the status of refugees of 1951 by providing asylum to 

North Korean refugees. It also calls on Beijing to cooperate with 

the UNHCR to resettle these refugees in third countries. 

Unfortunately, as we’ll surely hear today, China is cooperating at 

this moment instead with North Korean authorities as they hunt 

down these refugees and subject them to the most brutal treatment 

imaginable, and we’d like to bring some international pressure to 

bear to change that. 

While the Chinese government’s actions I think come as no surprise, we should continue to bring all the attention that we can to 

the issue of these refugees, and we should continue to urge Chinese 

cooperation to bring these refugees to safe ground. 

China is not immune to international pressure. So I would hope 

that this Committee would consider building on this hearing by 

moving this resolution, which is co-sponsored by several Members 

of the Committee, including Congressman Faleomavaega from 

American Samoa and Congressman Kirk of Chicago and myself. 

So again, I thank you for this hearing in the interest of a very 

just humanitarian cause, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Mr. Chabot, did you want to make any 

opening statement? 

Mr. CHABOT. I’ll be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank 

you also for calling this hearing. And I just coincidently happened 

over the last week just finish a book called the Aquariums of 

Pyongyang written by Kang Chol-Hwan, who spent 10 years, from 

the age of 9 until the age of 19 in one of the camps—Camp Yodok. 

I’m not sure if I’m pronouncing that correctly. It’s Y–O–D–O–K, 

and it’s called 10 Years in the North Korean Gulag. 

The story he tells is shocking. The brutality is really unbelievable—the inhumanity, the absence of basic human rights. After 

being released from the camp, he subsequently escaped to the 

South and talks about it, but still has friends and family members 

and others and it’s a shocking story that in the 21st Century that 

this sort of brutality is ongoing. 

Again, I just want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing and look forward to doing whatever we can to one day hopefully 

make those lives, which far to often they just live in the most unspeakable brutality imaginable. But it’s just totally inappropriate 

for human beings to be treated as those human beings were. I appreciate the Chairman holding this hearing and I look forward to 

hearing the testimony this morning. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chabot. Mr. Kirk? 

8

Mr. KIRK. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the invitation for a non-Committee Member. I also want to thank Mr. 

Faleomavaega and Mr. Royce and my other colleagues. 

As a staff member of this Committee, I spent quite a lot of time 

in North Korea, both in 1997 and ’98. I visited six major regions 

of North Korea, about 50 counties, all the way from Hui Jong on 

the Chinese border to Songgwan, near the DMZ. 

I also want to commend Doug Anderson of this Committee staff 

who just spent, 4 weeks ago, a trip along the Chinese border looking at these issues. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we have seen over 

the last 5 years a silent massacre in North Korea. I estimate that 

approximately 2 million people have starved to death in North 

Korea since U.S. food assistance was started to alleviate the suffering there. 

The suffering there is confirmed, not just by my visits and those 

of others to North Korea, but also of refugees who come over the 

border to China. The faces of this famine are clear. I met a young 

girl, Koch Kim Chin, in Hui Jong City Hospital. She was 1 year 

old and weighed just 11 pounds. In the Hui Jong Hospital Number 

1, the following year, I met Kim Hui Bong, age 11, and she 

weighed just 35 pounds. 

When we think of North Korea, we think of missiles and other 

military maneuvers, but the Korea that I saw was a Korea without 

any windshield glass for trucks. It was easy to see a North Korean 

truck driver because he would have bugs in his teeth. The DPRK 

government has blamed this famine on wind, on floods, on rain, but 

really it’s the government policy there. Korea has never fed itself. 

It has always survived off of food traded for goods from other countries and in the autocratic policy of today, Korea cannot feed itself. 

Despite President Bush’s characterization of North Korea as one 

of the axis of evil, the United States remains the number one donor 

of food to North Korea. The U.S. is the number one donor of food 

to North Korea. We feed every child in North Korea under the age 

of 15, 21 million meals a day, and I think we need to enhance that 

program. We need to bring U.S. NGOs and U.S. NGO consortium 

back to Pyongyang to be partners with the world’s food program. 

We do all this under Ronald Reagan’s theme articulated during 

the Ethiopian famine that a hungry child knows no politics. But I 

think we should do more. We should help out the refugees in 

China. They are sometimes called Ggotjaebi, black swallows. I met 

many of them. The refugee children in Yanji in the province which 

contains 2 million ethnic Koreans. It’s there that those kids survive 

on scraps dropped from the marketplace stalls. 

There are over 200,000 North Koreans in China. I’ve started my 

own effort with my neighbors in Chicagoland. We have formed the 

Korean-American Coalition of the Midwest. Recently, Kraft has 

agreed to join our effort in our own privately-funded assistance 

plan for North Korea. We will aid Korea in our own way, but we’re 

also looking for something from the DPRK on non-proliferation, 

yes, but especially, on reunification. 

South Koreans are able to see their North Korean relatives in 

very limited numbers. But Korean Americans have been totally unable to see their North Korean relatives. We estimate that there 

are 500,000 American citizens who have relatives in North Korea. 

9

I was very happy when Secretary Powell accepted their petition, 

now totalling 50,000 signatures to make sure that the reunification 

of Korean-Americans with their relatives in North Korea is accepted. 

Mr. Chairman, I also think we need a new assistance project, 

and this is based on the suggestions of the Czech President, Vaclav 

Havel, who saw the powerful evidence by video cameras given to 

dissents within his country that recorded what happened. I think 

the United States and private sector parties should fund video 

cameras give to refugees in China to then take back into North 

Korea to document what is happening there. This will boost our assistance efforts and it will also boost our efforts to promote human 

rights in North Korea. 

To everyone in the room, I say (Alionsayhow) and thank you for 

holding this hearing. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mark. Mr. Green, did you want to make 

an opening statement? 

Well, at this point, let me turn to our panelists. Let me introduce 

Mr. Jasper Becker, was until this Monday, the Beijing Bureau 

Chief for the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post newspaper. He is a journalist and the author of acclaimed books on 

China, including The Chinese and Hungry Ghosts, an account of 

the great Chinese famine of the last century. 

Ms. Sophie Delaunay is a regional coordinator for North Korea 

for Doctors without Borders, a respected humanitarian NGO. 

Mr. John Powell is the regional director for the Asia region for 

the World Food Program. Mr. Powell recently returned from a 2-

week mission inside North Korea. 

Mr. Timothy Peters is the founder and director of both Helping 

Hands Korea and a Ton-a-Month Club, two Seoul-based humanitarian organizations that attempt to provide assistance to North 

Koreans living both outside and inside North Korea, respectively. 

We’ll begin with the order of introduction with Mr. Becker. And 

let me also ask if Mr. Young Lim, who is the translator for the witnesses that are here, if he could meet in the back of the room with 

staff. That would be appreciated. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Becker, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF JASPER BECKER, FORMER BEIJING BUREAU 

CHIEF, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST 

Mr. BECKER. Thank you very much for inviting me. I started 

writing about the North Korean famine just after I’d finished a 

book which looks at what happened in China during the great famine in the early ’60s, and it became apparent from interviewing refugees inside China that this was an enormous famine because you 

had all the same signs that demonstrated the enormous scale of 

the famine China. 

The North Koreans invited the international community to help 

with the famine in 1995. But actually, it seemed that the famine 

started much earlier than that, and from the people that I’d spoken 

to, it seemed that famine began actually in the mid-1980s after collapse of some very big agricultural projects that the North Koreans 

had attempted after 1980. And food rations began to get shorter 

and short. 

10

And already in the early ’90s, I think they asked for a World 

Food Program team to come in because they were already then 

thinking of calling for international aid. This means that many of 

the people in North Korea have been on starvation rations really 

for over 12 years. And they’ve been living on food substitutes, much 

as people did in China during the early 1960s. 

Even after 7 years of food aid, the World Food Program said that 

in March people were just being distributed 300 grams of food a 

day when people should be getting at least 500 grams. And you can 

see the evidence of the famine in the malnourished children who 

would come over the border and beg on the streets in Yanji and 

other parts of Chongjin province. 

They look incredibly stunted. People who say they are age 19 or 

20 look like they are 12. All the evidence suggests that these children who cross over are quite representative of the majority of children in North Korea who have grown up with long famine food 

shortages. 

The big question as always in a famine is how many people have 

died, and there are very few statistics which are made available 

from the North Koreans, but it could be as high as 4 million people; 

perhaps, as much as a quarter of a population according to some 

sources. 

Not only is, therefore, the North Korean famine unique in terms 

of the impact on this population, but it’s also unique in its duration. Most severe famines just last a couple of years, but this has 

now been going on now for, I would say, a decade. 

The other question is which people have been most affected? 

Which are the people who have died in North Korea? According to 

the refugees, there are sort of different ways of looking at this, but 

one way is that most of the people who died first are those who 

belong to the classes which were considered less reliable, less politically loyal to the regime. 

As you probably know, the North Korean population is divided 

up into classes according to their political loyalty. This determination—this labeling also meant that those who are labeled disloyal 

would be the last in line for food. So these people have been the 

most vulnerable. 

Secondly, many of the refugees also say that the hardest hit 

areas have been those on the east coat, which have traditionally relied on surplus food being delivered from the area around 

Pyongyang on the west coast. There are also stories that the food 

is being deliberately withheld from some areas in order to punish 

these areas for staging anti-government protest or rebellions or 

even military uprisings. Again, this is very hard to verify. 

The third peculiarity of the North Korean famine is that it’s not 

been the rural areas, the poorer areas which have been hardest hit, 

but it’s often been the urban residents who have been hardest hit 

because they haven’t been getting food through the distribution 

system and because they haven’t been able to function normally because of the economic collapse. So most of the factories were closed. 

This, in turn, has lead to another common phenomenon in a big 

famine, a big movement of population when people leave their 

homes in search of food. Many people have left the cities to go to 

the countryside to try and grow their own food. But also, a lot of 

11

people have been going to China during the last 7 or 8 years to beg 

for food or to borrow money from their relatives there. 

The border, which I’ve been along many times, is quite open and 

is quite easy to cross. The fact that for the first time since the 

founding of North Korea, many people have been able to leave 

North Korea and to speak freely means that the refugees have provided a very unusual fund of knowledge and testimony about what 

actually goes on in North Korea. They have been able to explain 

the causes of the famine to demonstrate that the famine is not 

caused by natural processes. That the food distribution is somewhat different from that described by the World Food Program and 

many of the aid workers operating in North Korea. 

They’ve also borne witness to the brutality of the regime. The 

violent punishments which have been introduced in order to keep 

the population under control—a desperate population under control. Although the Chinese government, the central government, 

has been launching these quite tough campaigns to round up people who have been living amongst the North Korean population in 

China, the local population—the ethnic Koreans have done a great 

deal to help their relatives and to help them escape and to keep, 

really, large numbers of people alive, even though, they, themselves, are extremely poor. 

But the real sort of question mark that I think the refugees have 

raised is really what has gone with the aid relief effort. It’s been 

one of the largest and longest ever undertaken by the international 

aid community. Their testimony has contradicted many of the 

statements by the World Food Program and its officials. They’ve 

often denied that they’ve seen this food aid distributed. They’ve 

said that it hasn’t been going to the most vulnerable parts of the 

population and they continue to assert that the favorite members 

of the regime and the party—the army and the police and so on—

have been the ones who are benefitting from this aid. 

This brings me to another point which I think is very relevant. 

The food aid has partly been a failure because it’s being used as 

a bargaining chip to negotiate security issues with North Korea. It 

hasn’t been used successfully to allow the humanitarian organizations—the NGOs, the WFP to do their job properly to go out and 

monitor that the food is going to the right people. 

Secondly, the food aid has been a failure because its failed to be 

used to pushed the North Korean government into carrying out the 

essential economic reforms which would make the population selfsufficient in food and to revive the economy. 

That leads one to the final conclusion that the international community is actually been failing the North Korea people. Although, 

many countries have been extremely generous, it hasn’t actually 

led to an end to the famine, which I believe is still going on. And 

although the weakest part of the population has already died, I 

think a large number of people in North Korea are still extremely 

vulnerable and very short of food. 

The final point I wanted to make is the relief effort and the 

international negotiations with the Korean government have failed 

and that leads one to a conclusion to ask whether the real solution 

to this problem is that the regime itself has to be replaced. And 

12

until that has happened, it is difficult to see how this famine is 

ever going to be resolved. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Becker. And let me say, without objection, all of our statements will be fully placed in the record. So 

if you want to summarize, you are welcome to do that. Ms. 

Delaunay? 

STATEMENT OF SOPHIE DELAUNAY, NORTH KOREAN 

PROJECT REPRESENTATIVE, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES 

Ms. DELAUNAY. Thank you Mr. Chairman for giving me the opportunity to testify before you in the name of Medecins Sans 

Frontieres or what you know as Doctors Without Borders or MSF 

and share with you our experience and understanding of the crisis 

affecting the North Korean people. 

As you know, MFS ran medical and nutrition programs inside 

North Korea from 1995 to 1998. Convinced that our aid was not 

reaching those most in need, MFS made the painful decision to 

withdraw from North Korea in September ’98. 

Since then, our organization has remained deeply concerned 

about the situation inside the country, and explored alternative 

ways to reach the most needy. So today, I would like to say that 

we share most of the opinions which have been expressed by Jasper Becker today regarding the humanitarian situation in North 

Korea. 

I would like to address two fundamental concerns regarding this 

situation of the North Korean people. The first one is the lack of 

access of the most vulnerable population in North Korea to international aid. The second concern is the lack of protection and assistance for North Korean refugees. 

Regarding the first point on the lack of access of the most vulnerable, to this date, the vast majority of refugees who MFS has interviewed say they have never received food aid. Anyone who has sat 

and talked with these refugees would find it really difficult to believe the assurance of the WFP, which is reporting that aid is saving millions of lives. That the have access to the people and that 

they know where the aid is going. 

According to the refugees, as Jasper mentioned, after a decadelong food shortage in the country, those who remain are the survivors and only the strongest have learned to cope. Even population 

groups, such as children, pregnant women and the elderly who are 

specifically targeted by the WFP for assistance are being denied 

food distribution. 

In February 2002, an MSF team met with 12 North Korean children between the age of 6 and 15. These children had recently arrived in China. None of them had ever received food at primary 

school. According to them, pupils have to bring their own lunch 

from home. The same month a woman from Hyesan told us that, 

as a pregnant woman she was not entitled to any aid from the government. She was 1 month from delivery and was forced to cross 

the border at night in sub-zero temperatures to get some help. And 

in the same line several elderly people, who MFS interviewed, who 

belonged to the WFP target population, said they also did not benefit from any assistance. 

13

For MSF, the testimonies of North Korean refugees raise serious 

questions about the way humanitarian assistance is delivered in 

North Korea. From our point of view, two major weaknesses in the 

relief programs favor the exclusion of vulnerable populations from 

the aid system. Those weaknesses are, first, the use of Public Distribution System or PDS to channel food aid; and the second is the 

quality of monitoring food aid. 

As to the Public Distribution System, Jasper explained to you in 

North Korean society the three class labels, which are ‘‘core,’’ ‘‘wavering,’’ and ‘‘hostile’’ continue to be used to prioritize entitlement 

to items distributed to the PDS. Everyone in North Korea, with the 

exception of cooperative farmers, depends on the PDS for the basic 

food rations. Therefore, vulnerability and need have more to do 

with political and social standing than age and gender. Age and 

gender is the criteria which is used by aid organizations to define 

target beneficiaries. 

Since ’98, MSF has denounced the fact that any assistance which 

was channeled through the PDS was discriminatory by nature. We 

still believe that by using the PDS as the distribution channel for 

assistance, organizations are collaborating in organized government 

discrimination against its own citizens. 

As with regard to the PDS and its function, according to individuals we have interviewed ordinary urban residents cannot rely on 

the PDS for their survival, and they are forced to find alternative 

ways to obtain food. Erratic for years, the PDS came to a virtual 

standstill in the late ’90s with meager distribution on major national holidays. 

The second weakness that we would like to question is the quality of monitoring food aid. MFS believes that after 7 years of massive international assistance to North Korea, monitoring conditions 

remain unacceptable. North Korea still does not provide the complete list of beneficiary institutions and WFP teams are still barred 

from making spot checks. The transparency of field inspections can 

also be questioned. You can see in the testimonies at the end of 

these document that some refugees have witnessed U.N. visits and 

their testimonies raise questions over the way field inspections are 

organized, if not staged, by the North Korean partners. 

From its experience and understanding of the North Korean system, MSF would like to reiterate that access by the population to 

the aid it needs can only be improved if there are independent 

needs assessments, independent distribution mechanisms, and 

independent monitoring by operating agencies. 

As with regard to the second concern we would like to address 

today, it’s the lack of protection and assistance for North Korean 

refugees. 

Once outside North Korea, challenges remaining for North Koreans seeking refuge outside. Most North Korean refugees don’t even 

contemplate reaching the South. Instead, they cross the border into 

China in search of food for their families or for themselves or in 

search of a temporary job that will allow them to buy medicine or 

essential goods. These refugees live in a very precarious situation 

in China and they are in urgent need of assistance. Considered illegal migrants, they live in hiding and face the risk of being arrested 

14

at any time, then forcefully repatriated, and then subject to severe 

punishment in North Korea. 

Fines and rewards discouraging Chinese citizens from assisting 

them and recent arrests of NGO workers illustrate how impossible 

it is to adequately provide effective humanitarian assistance there. 

Numerous discussions between the MSF and the UNHCR about 

the need for protection have not proved fruitful. July 2001 calls by 

MSF on the Chinese authorities to cease forced repatriations and 

allow humanitarian assistance for the refugees have not been answered. The ongoing repression of North Korean refugees and of 

those who assist them limits the scope of our humanitarian operation on the Sino-Korean border. You have to know that there may 

soon be no more refugees to tell you about North Korea. 

As a conclusion, we would like to say the need for assistance to 

the North Korean people is acknowledged. However, the testimonies of North Korean refugees confirm that despite this international relief assistance going into the country, a significant segment of the population remains in a precarious food situation. 

These testimonies also suggest that humanitarian assistance is 

not primarily directed at, nor reaching the most vulnerable. 

Medecins Sans Frontieres expresses it grave concern over the 

endless suffering of the North Korean people and urges aid agencies operating inside North Korean to improve their monitoring and 

be responsible for the population they are entrusted to assist. 

A second concern addresses the dire plight of North Koreans 

seeking refuge in China. Medecins Sans Frontieres urges UNHCR 

and the Chinese government to open a dialogue leading to ensuring 

protection of North Korean refugees in China and to authorizing 

the provision of emergency assistance to the refugee population. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Delaunay follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SOPHIE DELAUNAY, NORTH KOREAN PROJECT

REPRESENTATIVE, ME ́ DECINS SANS FRONTIE` RES

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify before you in the name of Me ́decins Sans Frontie`res/Doctors Without Borders (MSF), 

and share with you our experience and understanding of the crisis affecting North 

Koreans in need of food assistance inside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

(DPRK) as well as of the plight of North Korean refugees in China. 

MSF operated inside North Korea from 1995 to 1998. During this time, MSF attempted to supply drugs and provide medical training for approximately 1100 health 

centers, and to run 60 therapeutic feeding centers for malnourished children in 

three provinces of the country. Convinced that, despite the best efforts of our field 

teams, our aid was not reaching those most in need of aid as intended, MSF made 

the painful decision to withdraw from North Korea in September 1998. Since then, 

MSF has remained deeply concerned about the situation inside North Korea and explored alternative ways to reach the most needy. 

MSF derives its current understanding of the humanitarian situation in North 

Korea from the following sources:

• North Korean refugees in China

• North Korean refugees in third countries

• Aid workers providing cross-border assistance

Today, I would like to address two fundamental concerns regarding the disastrous 

humanitarian situation of the North Korean people.

• The lack of access of the most vulnerable populations in North Korea to international aid

• The lack of protection and assistance for North Korean refugees 

15

LACK OF ACCESS OF THE MOST VULNERABLE POPULATIONS INSIDE NORTH KOREA TO

INTERNATIONAL AID

In October 2001, I described to a 40 year-old North Korean refugee how MSF used 

to provide aid in North Korea. After listening to my explanation, he smiled at me 

and said, ‘‘You cannot reach people like this . . . You can’t reach the common people.’’

His comment illustrates the striking discrepancy in information between aid agencies present in North Korea and aid workers assisting North Korean refugees about 

whether aid is reaching its intended targets. This has been a characteristic of the 

North Korean crisis for the past 7 years. MSF itself experienced such a divergence 

when in 1998, the extent of the famine described by the refugees that MSF met on 

the Chinese border could not be observed by its teams operating in the DPRK. This 

was due to the restrictions imposed by the North Korean government on the ability 

of aid organizations to independently assess humanitarian needs. 

To this day, the vast majority of refugees who MSF has interviewed say they have 

never received food aid. This includes those belonging to the target beneficiaries of 

the United Nations program. Anyone who has sat and talked with these refugees 

would find it difficult to believe the assurances of the World Food Program (WFP), 

which is reporting that aid is saving millions of lives, and that they have access to 

monitor and know where the aid is going. 

North Korea has been one of the largest recipients of food aid in the world for 

a number of years, yet it is still a great challenge for vulnerable populations to access food. Despite increased border controls, some North Koreans, mostly from the 

northern provinces, continue to cross into China in search of the means to survive. 

According to the refugees MSF has interviewed, the food situation remains critical 

for most of the ordinary people in North Korea. In their own words, after a decadelong food shortage in the country, those who remain are survivors and only the 

strongest have learned to cope. 

Even population groups such as children, pregnant women, and the elderly, who 

are specifically targeted by the WFP for assistance, are being denied food distribution. In February 2002, an MSF team met with 12 North Korean children between 

the ages of 6 and 15 who had recently arrived in China. None of them had ever 

received food at primary school. According to them, pupils have to bring their own 

lunch from home. Children are often unable to attend school because they are simply too weak or too busy providing for their own sustenance. The same month, a 

woman from Hyesan told us that, as a pregnant woman she was not entitled to any 

aid from the government. She was one month from delivery and was forced to cross 

the border at night in sub-zero temperatures to get some help. Several elderly people who MSF interviewed, who belonged to the WFP target population, said they 

also did not benefit from any assistance. 

Testimonies from refugees and aid workers who are carrying out cross-border assistance largely deny that farmers are better off and can benefit from the crops they 

grow. A bad harvest combined with a required quota deducted by the government 

does not leave much for the rural populations to rely on. Despite the irregular functioning of the Public Distribution System in urban areas, it seems that cities offer 

survival alternatives that cannot be found in rural areas, including widespread 

black markets. 

For MSF, the testimonies of North Korean refugees raise serious questions about 

the way humanitarian assistance is delivered in North Korea. From our point of 

view, two major weaknesses in the relief programs favor exclusion of vulnerable 

populations from the aid system. Those weaknesses are:

— The use of the Public Distribution System (PDS) to channel food aid; and,

— The quality of monitoring food aid. 

THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

In North Korean society, the three class labels—‘‘core,’’ ‘‘wavering,’’ and ‘‘hostile’’—continue to be used to prioritize access to jobs, region of residence, and entitlement to items distributed through the Public Distribution System (PDS). Everyone in North Korea, with the exception of cooperative farmers, depends on the PDS 

for the basic food rations they require for survival. Therefore, vulnerability and need 

have more to do with political and social standing than age and gender, the criteria 

used by aid organizations to define target beneficiaries. 

As early as 1998, MSF denounced the fact that any assistance channeled through 

the PDS was discriminatory by nature. By using the PDS as the distribution channel for assistance, organizations are collaborating in organized government discrimination of its own citizens based on politics instead of needs. 

16

1Statement of John Powell, Director of the WFP Regional Bureau for Asia. Joongang Ilbo, 

April 12, 2002 2Fines: 

5000 to 10000 Rmb for helping NK refugees. 

Rewards : 

30 RMB for denouncing shelter 

50 Rmb for denouncing a refugee 

100 Rmb for taking a refugee to the Chinese police station 

*Information collected by an aid worker at the border in July 2001. (8Rmb = $1 USD) 

3 1) On April 20, 2001, the Chinese government arrested, detained and harshly treated four 

members of the NGO Good Friends and their translator 2) Chun Ki-won, 46, a South Korean 

missionary helping North Korean defectors in China has been under custody by Chinese security 

authorities since he was caught at the end of 2001 3) Rev. Choi Bong Il, 46, was arrested on 

April 15, 2002 by Yanji Police for his relations with a group of defectors.

‘‘Last time I received food from the PDS was in 1997, only once that year. I received according to my ration ticket. Everyone has different amounts,’’ testified a 20 

year-old man from Hoeryong city last October. 

According to individuals we interviewed, ordinary urban residents cannot rely on 

the PDS for their survival and are forced to find alternative ways to obtain food. 

Erratic for years, the PDS came to a virtual standstill in the late 90’s with meager 

distribution on major national holidays. 

THE QUALITY OF MONITORING FOOD AID

After 7 years of massive international assistance to North Korea, monitoring conditions remain unacceptable. North Korea still does not provide the complete list of 

beneficiary institutions and WFP teams are still barred from making spot checks.1

Random access for assessment purposes appears to be impossible, calling into question the transparency of field inspections. Some refugees have witnessed UN visits 

and their testimonies raise questions over the way field inspections are organized, 

if not staged, by the North Korean partners. 

From its experience and understanding of the North Korean system, MSF would 

like to reiterate that access by the population to the aid it needs can only be improved if there are independent needs assessments, independent distribution mechanisms, and independent monitoring by operating agencies. 

THE LACK OF PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE FOR NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

Once outside North Korea, challenges remain for North Koreans seeking refuge 

outside their country. Most North Korean refugees do not even contemplate reaching South Korea. Instead, they cross the border into China in search of food for their 

families, or a temporary job that will allow them to buy medicines or other essential 

goods needed at home. These refugees live in a precarious situation in China and 

are in urgent need of assistance. Considered illegal migrants by the Chinese authorities, they live in hiding and face the risk of being arrested at any time, forcefully repatriated, and subject to severe repercussions in North Korea. Border rules 

posted along the Tumen River in Chinese and Korean stipulate that, ‘‘It is forbidden 

to financially help, allow to stay, harbor, or aid in the settlement of people from the 

neighboring country who have crossed the border illegally.’’

Fines and rewards 2 discouraging Chinese citizens from assisting North Korean 

refugees and recent arrests of foreign NGO workers illustrate how impossible it is 

to adequately provide effective humanitarian assistance.3 Only a handful of refugees 

manage to reach a third country, where they continue to face the risk of being arrested anytime as illegal migrants during their 3-to-4-month screening process. Up 

to now, none of the 1988 North Korean defectors who have been resettled in South 

Korea have been granted refugee status.

Numerous discussions between MSF and the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR) about the need for protection have not proved fruitful. July 

2001 calls by MSF on the Chinese authorities to cease forced repatriations and 

allow humanitarian assistance for the refugees have not been answered. The ongoing repression of North Korean refugees and of those who assist them limits the 

scope of any humanitarian operation on the Sino-Korean border. There may soon 

be no more refugees to tell you about North Korea. 

CONCLUSION

The need for assistance to the North Korean people is widely acknowledged. Testimonies of North Korean refugees confirm that despite massive international relief 

going into the country, a significant segment of the population remains in a precarVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
17

ious food situation. These testimonies also suggest that humanitarian assistance is 

not primarily directed at, nor reaching, the most vulnerable populations. 

Me ́decins Sans Frontie`res expresses its grave concern over the endless suffering 

of the North Korean people and urges aid agencies operating inside North Korea 

to improve their monitoring and be responsible for the populations they are entrusted to assist. A second concern addresses the dire plight of North Koreans seeking refuge in China. Me ́decins Sans Frontie`res urges UNHCR and the Chinese government to open a dialogue leading to ensuring protection of North Korean refugees 

in China, and the provision of emergency assistance to the refugee population. 

Thank you for your attention 

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL TESTIMONIES OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

1. Statements regarding reasons for crossing the border 

Man, 35, from Hoeryong city, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

October 2001: 

‘‘There are rich people in North Korea too. People who are poor, who just eat 

corn, come here [to China]. The rich, who have the rice, they don’t need to come 

here. For them, we are bad, traitors.’’

Boy, 18, from Sampong city, Musan county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview 

conducted in July 2001: 

‘‘I came to China in June 2001 because I had nothing to eat, my mother died 

and my father is sick.’’

Peasant, 40, from Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted 

in April 2001: 

‘‘Me and my wife came to China because we were starving.’’

Women, 43, from Aoji coal mine, Eundok county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in April 2001: 

‘‘We have the choice between dying from starvation or dying in the hands of 

the police after being arrested. Anyhow we may die so we come to China, at least 

we can please our stomach there.’’

‘‘If somebody has a high position in North Korea, he does not have any problem. If I was in a high position, I would not need to come to China.’’

2. Statements regarding pregnant women’s access to aid 

Pregnant women, 31, from Hyesan county, Ryanggang Province. Interview conducted in February 2002: 

‘‘I am pregnant and I will deliver next month. As a pregnant woman I am not 

entitled to any aid from the government. No pregnant women ever receive any. 

Until the end of the 80s, pregnant women would receive food during their hospitalization.’’

Women suffering from tuberculosis, 33, from Chongjin city, North Hamkyong 

Province. Interview conducted in February 2002: 

‘‘Pregnant women do not benefit from government care. Well so they say but 

. . . when the third child is born, a 300 g ration of food is distributed in his 

name. After that there is nothing for the child nor for the mother.’’

3. Statements regarding elderly access to aid 

Man, retired from the Workers Party, 50, from Aoji coal mine, Eundok county, 

North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in April 2001: 

‘‘After I retired, me and my wife have not got any income. We don’t ask too 

much, not even rice. But even corn soup we cannot always have.’’

Retired couple from the Workers Party, 60 & 61, from Obong city, Eundok county, 

North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in February 2001: 

‘‘When you’re over 61 years old you’re unable to work because of the age limit. 

But right now in North Korea, they write the [retirement] annuity on a piece of 

paper. With that you can get 600 g of rice for one day but it is only a piece of 

paper, and I never receive anything, and I cannot eat the paper, we are not 

goats. I never get any distribution nor any grant and I never receive a wage. If 

people in the coal mines don’t receive any food, how can old people like us receive 

any?′′

4. Statements regarding food availability for farmers 

Couple of farmers, 49 and 45, from Eundok county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in October 2001: 

18

‘‘We came to China because we were in difficulties so we came here to get some 

help. We had a bad harvest, no PDS, it’s hard to get food, so we came here 

along.’’

Peasant, 40, from Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted 

in April 2001: 

‘‘Before we used to receive some distribution of crops, but nowadays there are 

not enough crops. Although we plant crops for the year it is not even enough for 

peasants. On the top of that we have to provide crops to the workers office. There 

are only 3 to 4 months a year when we have enough crops to eat. Most of the 

crops are provided to the army base.’’

Farmer, 40, from Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted 

in February 2001: 

‘‘Once they tax everything there is not much left for us to eat.’’

Retired couple from the Worker’s Party, 60 & 61, from Obong city, Eundok county, 

North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in February 2001: 

‘‘Right now farmers cannot even produce enough food for themselves. There are 

several reasons why; there isn’t any fertilizer and farmers don’t have energy to 

work because they don’t have anything to eat.’’

Pregnant women, 31, from Hyesan county, Ryanggang Province. Interview conducted in February 2002: 

‘‘People living in the cities are always better off than those from the countryside. In the city, they can always manage to beg. In the countryside, there is 

nothing but the grass for the rabbits.’’

5. Statements regarding the functioning of the PDS 

Couple of farmers, 49 and 45, from Eundok county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in October 2001: 

‘‘The PDS stopped in 95–96 but we still have to keep working′′

Man, 23, from Musan county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

July 2001: 

‘‘In North Korea the only source of food is PDS, if there is no food ration, there 

is no other source of food. But you know, since I began to have hair on my head, 

I have never seen food ration on a regular basis, so it was erratic already after 

my birth and PDS has always been a major problem for the people.’’

Woman, 50, from Sampong district, Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in April 2001: 

‘‘The government does not supply any food to the population nowadays, and 

says to them that ’although we only have water and fresh air, we have to keep 

our ideology.’ They just leave on corn soup in my hometown. They get the corn 

from merchants from Chongjin who make profit out of it.’’

Woman, 50, from Sampong district, Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in April 2001: 

‘‘In 1997, on April 15, Kim Il Sung’s birthday, I received 3 kg of corn from 

the US. Every family also got 10 kg of potatoes from China on October 10th, 

1998 for the Worker’s Party foundation day. Besides those two cases, we did not 

get anymore from the PDS. And the government announced to citizens that no 

more food would be provided so they should not expect anything from the government and that everybody had to manage their life by themselves.’’

Woman, 30, from Aoji, Eudok county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in April 2001: 

‘‘Since 1995 I have only received food from PDS once or twice a year for Kim 

Il Sung’s and Kim Jung Il’s birthdays.’’

Retired couple from the Worker’s Party, 60 & 61, from Obong city, Eundok county, 

North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in February 2001: 

‘‘We just receive food from PDS for anniversaries in January1, February 16, 

April 15, a ration for 3 days.’’

Man, 35, from Aoji, Eundok county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in February 2001: 

‘‘I gave up my job in the 7.7 fertilizer factory because there wasn’t any food 

distribution.’’

Pregnant woman, 31, from Hyesan, Ryanggang Province. Interview conducted in 

February 2002: 

19

‘‘In theory the PDS should distribute 800g/day/person. But since the 80’s, the 

rations have officially been reduced to 4–5 months. Even though it is fixed like 

that, the PDS is corrupted and this quantity has not been provided. We receive 

much less than that. The decrease in rations is always justified by the need to 

help the army or because the agricultural program did not succeed.’’

6. Statements regarding visits of UN inspectors 

Man, 23, from Musan county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

July 2001: 

‘‘I have seen some foreign guys from the UN traveling around. I don’t know 

what they are doing but when they are traveling, just around this time, government suddenly becomes very busy, you know, try to find those undernourished 

boys and children . . . They keep them away, you know, those undernourished 

children, at some place . . . Perhaps they were expecting that these UN guys 

visit welfare facilities inspection, so they want to be prepared for it.’’

Man, 19, from Hamheung city, South Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

February 2001: 

‘‘Last year I saw UN guys coming to Musan to assess flood damage. The government dug up the river and the streets to make it look more damaged, in order 

to get more rice. The UN investigators came back to Musan a number of times.’’

7. Statements regarding forced repatriation and related punishment in North Korea 

Boy, 16, from North Pyongan Province. Interview conducted in July 2001: 

‘‘I was arrested a few month ago in China, put in jail, then sent to North 

Korea where I was kept in a childrens camp in Heoryong. I escaped again to 

come back to China.’’

Man, 23, from Musan county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

July 2001: 

‘‘I was detained in a Chinese detention center in Hunchun in January 2000 

then sent back to North Korea with another group of North Koreans. We were 

handcuffed until we reached Saepiol and then we were blindfolded and taken 

to a camp. I learned from my cellmates later on that we were in Chongjin. In 

the camp it was very hard and I have been tortured, but after I mentioned my 

aunt was working in the North Korean anti South Korean intelligence, I was released.’’

Woman, 50, from Sampong district, Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in April 2001: ‘‘My son was already arrested and repatriated 

3 times from China, therefore he will stay in jail for 5 years. Citizens know that 

if they are caught leaving the country, the first time they have to stay in jail one 

year, the second time 3 years. I myself was arrested for leaving the country without 

permission last year in July. I was taken to Chongjin city jail where I only stayed 

one month because it was too crowded and there was not enough space in the jail. 

There were 120 males and 178 females there, all of them had been arrested for escaping the country.’’

8. Statements regarding the manipulation of foreign aid 

Man, 23, from Musan county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

July 2001: 

‘‘The rice and corn in the market are in foreign packages, it is the food that 

arrives in Korea from good people like you. Then those bastards of senior party 

members are taking them into their home and their big bellies, but since they 

cannot sell the things themselves at the market, then they send their wife to do 

the job. I can precisely tell you that the things are from foreign countries because 

I often go to the port in Chongjin. A lot of cereals are being unloaded there. We 

saw all kinds of grains and foreign ships. And sometimes we see the American 

flag and the package label. So I can precisely say where the cereals we find in 

the market come from.’’

Woman, 50, from Sampong district, Onsong county, North Hamkyong Province. 

Interview conducted in April 2001: 

‘‘Citizens know that a lot of relief supply is coming to North Korea from other 

countries. We have heard about it. But most of the time we never got any of those 

supplies, so we think that the government keeps for themselves.’’

Man, 20, from Chongjin city, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in 

April 2001: 

‘‘I have been to the black market recently, I have seen bags of corn there. It 

had a US flag on the top and it was written that it was a gift from the US.’’

20

Mine worker, 46, from Saepiol county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in February 2001: 

‘‘We heard that soldiers in the army still eat 3 meals a day, 2 meals of rice 

and one meal of porridge. To the army, the food goes to the army. The rice is 

used to make oil and turned into gunpowder. From what I heard, the army base 

has about 80–90% go to the army and the rest is sent to the people. At the army 

factory they use glutinous rice powder to make gunpowder. Or the glutinous rice 

or corn or peas can be used to produce oil. Or candy powder can be used as 

well.’’

Man, 36, from Rason, Eundok county, North Hamkyong Province. Interview conducted in February 2001: 

‘‘If you listen to the [South Korean] radio it says how much rice is brought 

into the country from South Korea, Japan and America. 500,000 tons came into 

Nampo harbor and other places. But in reality the amount of our ration is one 

or two days worth, sometimes a week worth. After that there is no more. So I 

start to wonder if we really got that rice and if the South Korean radio is lying. 

I think about that sometimes: if the rice came in, why is no one giving it to the 

people?′′

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Delaunay. Mr. Powell? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN POWELL, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, WORLD 

FOOD PROGRAM 

Mr. POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like 

to thank this congressional panel for invitation to speak with you 

about the food situation in North Korea. The timing of the hearing 

is opportune because I’ve recently returned from a 13-day mission 

to that country. 

The purpose of that mission was to take stock of our emergency 

operation in North Korea. During the mission, I visited WFP suboffices in Sinuiju, Hamhung, Chonqjin, Hyesan and Wonsan as well 

as Pyongyang. I saw WFP activities in each of these areas, visiting 

orphanages, nurseries, kindergartens, primary schools, pediatric 

hospitals and food for work activities. I spoke with pregnant 

women, nursing mothers and the elderly. I also met with government officials at national, provincial and county levels. 

Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, share with you a few snapshots 

of what we saw. Power—the lack of power is evident everywhere, 

especially in the industrial sector where factories lie idle, causing 

considerable unemployment and underemployment, particularly in 

the northeast of the country. Lack of power and other inputs means 

less fertilizer, less fertilizer means less food production. 

Hillside and urban agriculture—we saw farmers preparing land 

for planting on slopes where it was quite impossible to stand erect. 

This land should be under forest cover, not under cultivation. In 

urban areas we saw land cultivated from the roadside to the very 

edge of apartment buildings. In rural areas, the few meters of land 

around the house are intensely cultivated, including on the roofs. 

Children’s nutrition—there was a visible improvement in the 

health status of children. We no longer saw evidence of the widespread, acute malnutrition seen in previous years. Children in kindergartens and primary schools were active and alert. A far cry 

form the reports of just a few years go when children were visibly 

lethargic and with the usual signs associated with the existence of 

famine—orange hair, skin discoloration and so on. 

Primary schools—we spoke with a 70-year old principal of a primary school who said that school attendance had increased from 75 

21

to 95 percent since the introduction of WFP biscuits. Primary 

school children, some 1.4 million of them make up the largest number people who receive WFP assistance. 

So while great strides have been made in reducing levels of acute 

malnutrition, the kind most associated with famine, chronic malnutrition remains at unacceptably high levels. It is estimated that 

more than 40 percent of children under 5 are malnourished because even with full WFP rations the children may not be getting 

enough food. 

On the issue of the alleged diversion of WFP food assistance to 

the military, let me be direct. The army takes what it wants from 

the national harvest up front, in full. It takes it in the form of food 

Koreans prefer—Korean rice. The food that WFP provides is overwhelmingly maize or wheat, or in 2001, Japanese brown rice—commodities not preferred by those in power. They do not need to take 

WFP food, nor have we seen any evidence that they do. 

As to monitoring, WFP has its’ main office in Pyongyang and five 

sub-offices located throughout the country. We have some 50 international staff who together make between 300 to 400 monitoring 

visits every month of the year. They visit all types of institutions 

through which WFP food is distributed. Often it is nurseries, kindergartens, pediatric hospitals, schools—primary and secondary. 

They do all the things that I did, and they always speak with those 

who are receiving the food. 

As a result, we have amassed a considerable amount of observable data during our 7 years in the country. And when we have 

concerns about food distribution, we do something about it. In 

2000, for example, we cut out the general hospital feeding program 

because we were not sufficiently confident that the food was reaching those for whom it was intended. And, in 2001, we did not proceed with a 92,000 ton relief and recovery operation because we 

could not reach agreement with the authorities on the number of 

additional staff that WFP would need to properly monitor the operation. 

So like in WFP operation anywhere in the world, we do not know 

where each and every bag of food is going, but we do have a reasonable degree of assurance that the food provided through WFP 

gets to those who need it. 

Yes, we still have a long way to go to lift our monitoring standards in North Korea to the same level as they are in most other 

countries. Let me explain the main reasons why we are not satisfied. We are not satisfied because we do not yet have access to all 

of the counties to assess needs and to provide food to those who 

need it. Our ‘‘no access no food’’ policy means, we think, that many 

people in genuine need of food assistance are not reached. 

We are not satisfied because we are unable to make random spot 

checks. We are not satisfied because we are not permitted to bring 

Korean speakers into North Korea as WFP staff members. And we 

want to have access to farmers markets to have a better understanding of the relative price of food commodities bought, sold or 

barter. These are matters that we are taking up consistently and 

persistently with the authorities. 

This being said, we have come a long way with the DPRK authorities over the past 4 years as some degree of trust and conVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
22

fidence has been built. Some of these milestones include the establishment of five WFP sub-offices throughout the country and 50 

international staff, many of whom are located in those sub-offices. 

WFP is the only agency to have access to so many counties—

some 163 of 206. And to have staff permanently assigned outside 

of Pyongyang. The number of counties to which we have access has 

increased from 145 in 1998 to 163 in 2002. This means that we can 

now reach more people who need help, about 85 percent of the population. 

Since 2000, WFP international staff have been able to take Korean language training lessons in Pyongyang. A few have a pretty 

fair grasp of the language and can at least detect when interpretation is not accurate. 

The government has agreed to a new nutrition survey to follow 

up the 1998 nutrition survey. This has been a longstanding issue 

on our agency and the government’s agreement is a big step forward. A technical proposal for the conduct of the survey is now 

with the authorities. The government has reaffirmed its commitment given last year to provide WFP with the full list of institutions through which WFP food assistance is provided. 

This arrangement will enable us to increase the randomness of 

our monitoring. It is, of course, not the same thing as random access, but it is progress. The authorities have informed us that this 

list is to be made available shortly. 

The 1998 nutrition survey found that 62 percent of children 

under the age of 7 years were suffering from chronic malnutrition. 

The kind that arises from eating insufficient nutritious food day in, 

day out over a protracted period. That same survey showed that 

about 16 percent of children were acutely malnourished. The kind 

that is usually associated with the existence of famine. 

WFP does not have the luxury of saying that it will leave because our minimum operational conditions are not met. We need to 

remain engaged and persevere and to work toward achieving those 

conditions. They will not be met if we all simply pull out. And the 

resultant suffering for the country’s most vulnerable would verge 

toward the unimaginable. 

We remain optimistic that with persistent principled negotiation, 

and the support of the international community, much more 

progress can be made. And no gain achieved has been later taken 

back. 

As to resources, WFP will run out of food in July or August this 

year unless new pledges are made urgently. The urgency aries because it takes 2 to 4 months to translate a pledge from a donor to 

food into the stomach of child in North Korea. Beginning this 

month, we’re having to eliminate the distribution of food to some 

675,000 secondary school children. Some 350,000 of the elderly will 

not receive food rations through WFP. Care givers in institutions, 

144,000 of them, mainly women, will not receive WFP rations. And 

food-for-work will be sharply cut back, therefore, reaching far fewer 

urban underemployed in the northeast; perhaps, affecting a half a 

million people. Some 1.5 million people will not get the food because of the shortfall. 

Doing this will stretch the reach of our support to pregnant 

women, nursing mothers and young children for a few more 

23

months. It will not be enough to meet their requirements for the 

year. And those recipients of WFP food assistance will therefore 

have to rely on a public distribution system that cannot cope. 

That system will provide her with perhaps 200 to 250 grams of 

cereal a day or about half the ration of a refugee in a camp in any 

country in the world. Without that food, the prospects are chilling. 

Those who rely on WFP assistance are looking down the barrel of 

the food crisis. 

Before closing, on behalf of WFP I would like to thank the people 

of the United States for their unstinting generosity for the most 

vulnerable people in North Korea—their women and children. The 

United States has already contributed some 155,000 metric tons of 

food to our emergency operation for 2002. Without this food, the 

situation would be much more serious; and it would have become 

so much earlier. It has been a major contributor to our emergency 

operations over all the years of our work in North Korea. 

The United States has also been a strong and clear voice in support of the kinds of measures that we would like to see to further 

improve the operational performance of our work; and in improving 

the working conditions of our staff. And perhaps, most importantly, 

the United States has consistently shown the commitment to separate its political agenda from humanitarian concerns, holding true 

to the principle spelled out by former President Reagan, ‘‘A hungry 

child knows no politics.’’ This is not always an easy principle to follow; and we admire you for being able to do so. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN POWELL, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, WORLD FOOD

PROGRAM

CONGRESSIONAL PANEL PRESENTATION

On behalf of the World Food Programme I would like to thank this Congressional 

Panel for the invitation to speak with you about the food situation in DPR (North) 

Korea. The timing of the hearing is opportune because I have recently returned 

from a 13 day Mission to North Korea. The purpose of the Mission was to take stock 

of our emergency operation in the country. During that Mission I visited WFP SubOffices in Sinuiju, Hamhung, Chonqjin, Hyesan and Wonsan; as well as Pyongyang. 

I saw WFP activities in each of these areas, visiting orphanages, nurseries, kindergartens, primary schools, pediatric hospitals and food for work activities. I spoke 

with pregnant women, nursing mothers and the elderly. I also met with Government Officials at National, Provincial and County level. 

Let me share with you a few snapshots of what we saw:

• Power—the lack of power is evident everywhere, especially in the industrial 

sector where factories sit idle, causing considerable unemployment and underemployment, particularly in the Northeast of the country. Lack of power and 

other inputs also means less fertilizer, which means less food production. 

Lack of power means very little light, especially in the winter; and the handcarrying of water, whether in rural settings or in apartment buildings in the 

urban areas. It is a huge problem for hospitals; and not much less for the citizens of the country. It also causes problems for our local food production 

where limited and erratic power supply means that often the factory equipment cannot function.

• Hillside and urban agriculture—we saw farmers preparing land for planting 

on slopes where it was quite impossible to stand erect. This is land that 

should be under forest cover, not under cultivation. Yet a clear sign that any 

land on which food could be produced—however tenuously—would be used, 

despite the negative impact on the environment that this practice causes—

including increased vulnerability to flooding. In urban areas we saw land cultivated from the roadside to the very edge of the apartment buildings. In 

24

rural areas, the few metres of land around the houses are intensely cultivated—including on the roofs.

• Children’s nutrition—there was a visible improvement in the health status of 

the children. We no longer saw evidence of the widespread acute malnutrition 

seen in the previous years. Children in kindergartens and primary schools 

were active and alert. A far cry from the reports of just a few years ago, when 

children were visibly lethargic and with the usual signs associated with the 

onset of famine—orange hair and skin discolorations.

• Primary schools—we spoke with a 70 year old Principal of a primary school 

who said that student attendance had increased from 75% to 95% since the 

introduction of WFP biscuits. And the schoolteachers, who also received the 

biscuits, were more regular in their attendance and more active with the children. Primary school children—some 1.4 million of them—make up the largest number of people who receive WFP food assistance.

So, while great strides have been made in reducing the levels of acute malnutrition, the kind most associated with famine, chronic malnutrition remains at unacceptably high levels. It is estimated that more than 40% of children under 5 remain 

malnourished because even with the full WFP rations the children may not be getting enough food. 

On the issue of the alleged diversion of WFP food assistance to the military, let 

me be direct. The army takes what it wants from the national harvest up front, in 

full. And it takes it in the form of food Koreans prefer: Korean rice. The food that 

WFP provides is overwhelmingly maize or wheat (or, in 2001, Japanese ‘‘brown 

rice’’), commodities not preferred by those in power. They do no need to take WFP 

food. Nor have we any evidence that they do. 

As to monitoring, WFP has its’ main Office in Pyongyang and five Sub-Offices located throughout the country. We have some 50 international staff who together 

make between 300–400 monitoring visits every month of the year. They visit all of 

the types of institutions through which WFP food is distributed-orphanages, nurseries, kindergartens, pediatric hospitals and schools, both primary and secondary. 

They visit pregnant women and nursing mothers at home, as they do the elderly. 

They visit Food-for Work sites. And always they speak with those who are receiving 

the food. 

As a result we have amassed a considerable amount of observational data during 

our seven years in the country. And when we have concerns about the food distribution we do something about it. In 2000, for example, we cut out the general hospital 

feeding progamme because we were not sufficiently confident that the food was 

reaching those for whom it was intended. And, in 2001, we did not proceed with 

a 92,000 tonnes Relief and Recovery Operation because we could not reach agreement with the Authorities on the number of additional staff that WFP would need 

to properly monitor that Operation. So, like in any WFP operation anywhere in the 

world, we do not know where each and every bag of food is going but we do have 

a reasonable degree of assurance that the food provided through WFP gets to those 

who need it. 

Yet we still have a long way to go to lift our monitoring standards in North Korea 

to the same level as they are in most other countries. Let me explain the main reasons why we are not satisfied. We are not satisfied because we do not yet have access to all of the counties to assess needs and to provide food to those who need 

it. Our ‘‘no access no food’’ policy means, we think, that many people in genuine 

need of food assistance are not reached. We are not satisfied because we are not 

able to make random spot checks. This diminishes the effectiveness of any set of 

monitoring arrangements. We are not satisfied because we are not permitted to 

bring Korean speakers into North Korea as WFP staff members, which means that 

we do not have the opportunity to interact directly with those who receive WFP food 

assistance. And we want to have access to farmers markets to have a better understanding of the relative price of the food commodities bought, sold or bartered. 

These are matters that are taken up consistently—and persistently—with the Authorities. 

Other matters of special concern to us relate to the working conditions of WFP 

staff in the country, especially in the Sub-Offices. We do not yet have a medical 

evacuation procedure agreed with the Authorities, placing staff members—and their 

supervisors—in a very uncomfortable position. After the completion of the daily 

monitoring visits, our staff working in the Sub-Offices used to not have much freedom of movement outside of the grounds of the hotels in which they were accommodated without prior permission; and even then they were to be accompanied. This 

restriction has been somewhat relaxed over the last few months. Most recently in 

Hyesan, for example, our staff can walk now to a monument and back unaccomVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
25

panied. Our staff are not allowed to have satellite phones or vehicle-to-vehicle communications or secure international communications arrangements. We are not allowed to have nationals of Japan or the Republic of (South) Korea on staff; and we 

have only one United States national in the country. (He is the Country Director.) 

Again, these are matters that we constantly raise with the Authorities. 

This being said, we have come a very long way with the DPRK Authorities over 

the past four years, as trust and confidence has been built. Some of these milestones 

include:

• The establishment of five WFP Sub-Offices throughout the country; and 50 

international staff, many of who are located in the Sub-Offices. A remarkable 

advance on the three staff members, all of who were located in Pyongyang, 

which was the situation in 1995.

• WFP is the only agency to have access to so many counties, some 163 of 206; 

and have staff permanently assigned outside of Pyongyang. The number of 

counties to which we have access has increased from 145 in 1998 to 163 in 

2002. This means that we can now reach more people who need help—about 

85% of the population.

• Since 2000, WFP international staff have been able to take Korean language 

training lessons in Pyongyang. A few have a pretty fair grasp of the language 

and can at least detect when interpretation is not accurate.

• The Government has agreed to a new Nutrition Survey to follow up the 1998 

Nutrition Survey. This has been a longstanding issue on our agenda; and the 

Government’s agreement is a big step forward. A technical proposal for the 

conduct of the Survey is now with the authorities. The Survey is scheduled 

for the third quarter of this year, with the results being available before the 

end of the year. The Survey will be a joint UNICEF/WFP/DPRK undertaking, 

with technical support being provided through an international academic consortium. The results of the Survey will enable us to compare the situation in 

2002 with that of 1998; to measure the progress of the nutritional status of 

children; and to improve the planning and targeting of interventions for their 

benefit.

• The Government has re-affirmed its commitment to give WFP a full list of 

the institutions though which WFP food assistance is provided. This arrangement will enable WFP to increase the randomness of its monitoring. It is, of 

course, not the same as random access. But it is progress. The Authorities 

informed us that this list is to be made available ‘‘shortly.’’

The 1998 Nutrition Survey found that about 62% of children under seven years 

of age were suffering chronic malnutrition; the kind that arises from eating insufficient nutritious food day in and day out over a protracted period. That same Survey 

showed that about 16% of children were acutely malnourished, the kind that is generally associated with the existence of famine. WFP does not have the luxury of saying that it will leave because our minimum operational conditions are not met. We 

need to remain engaged and persevere, and work towards achieving those conditions. They will not be met if we all simply pull out. And the resultant suffering 

for the country’s most vulnerable would verge towards the unimaginable. 

We remain optimistic that with persistent principled negotiation—and the support 

of the international community—much more progress can be made. 

As to resources, WFP will run out of food in July or August this year unless new 

pledges are made urgently. The urgency arises because it takes from 2–4 months 

to translate a pledge from a donor to food into the stomach of a child in North 

Korea. Beginning this month we are having to eliminate the distribution of food to 

some 675,000 secondary school children; and some 350,000 of the elderly will not 

receive any food rations through WFP. Caregivers in institutions—some 144,000 of 

them, mainly women—will not receive WFP rations. And food-for Work must be 

sharply cut back, thereby reaching far fewer urban underemployed in the Northeast, 

affecting perhaps 500,000 people. Some 1.5 million people will not get food because 

of the shortfall. 

DPRK is a mountainous country with limited arable land and a short growing 

season. It cannot produce enough food to meet the basic requirements of its people. 

And it does not have the foreign exchange to import that food. For 2002, a ‘‘normal 

bad year’’, the gap between the quantity of food that is available (food production 

plus imports) and the needs of the North Korean people is about 1.5 million metric 

tons of cereals. 

WFP does not seek to fill the national gap. We calculate the food needs of the 

most vulnerable groups—pregnant women, nursing mothers, children and a small 

percentage of the elderly and those most dependent on the Public Distribution SysVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
26

tem. Women and children comprise about 90% of those who receive WFP food. For 

some categories of beneficiary the food is provided year-round, for example pregnant 

women, nursing mothers and children in primary schools. For other categories of 

beneficiary such as secondary school children, the food is targeted geographically to 

those living in the urban areas of the most food insecure Provinces, mainly in the 

Northeast. For other categories, such as Food-for Work beneficiaries, the food assistance is provided only during certain times of the year, typically over the period 

April through August when these people must depend on a Public Distribution System that cannot cope. 

WFP needs 611,000 metric tons of food for calendar year 2002 to meet the needs 

of the 6.4 million beneficiaries, most of who are women and children who live in 

the counties to which we have access. We have available about half of that amount. 

The United States, the Republic of Korea and Finland have given to this year’s operation; and we are hopeful that other donors will step forward. 

As I indicated earlier, we are having to cut back on our planned distributions. 

Doing this will stretch the reach of our support to pregnant women, nursing mothers and children aged from six months to 10 years for a few more months. It will 

not be enough to meet their requirements for the year. An erstwhile recipient of 

WFP food assistance will therefore have to rely on a Public Distribution System that 

will provide her with perhaps 200–250 grammes of cereal per day. Or about half 

of the ration of a refugee in a camp. There is no doubt that the people are hungry 

and need the food. Without that food, the prospects are chilling. Those who rely on 

WFP assistance are looking down the barrel of a food crisis. 

Before closing, on behalf of WFP I would like to thank the people of the United 

States for their unstinting generosity to the most vulnerable people in North 

Korea—their women and children. The United States has already contributed some 

155,000 metric tones of food to the Emergency Operation for 2002. Without this 

food, the situation would be much more serious; and it would have become so much 

earlier. And it has been the major contributor to our Emergency Operations over 

the years of our work in that country. The United States has also been a strong 

and clear voice in support of the kind of measures that would further improve the 

operational performance of our work; and in improving the working conditions of 

our staff. And, perhaps most importantly, the United States has consistently shown 

the commitment to separate its political agenda from humanitarian concern, holding 

true to the principle spelled out by former president Reagan ‘‘A hungry child knows 

no politics’’. This is not always an easy principle to follow; and we admire you being 

able to do so. 

We thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Powell. Mr. Peters? 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY A. PETERS, FOUNDER AND 

DIRECTOR, HELPING HANDS/KOREA AND TON-A-MONTH CLUB 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this privilege and 

honor to appear before the Subcommittee today. I am a spokesman 

and founder for two small, what I call grassroots initiatives. One, 

Helping Hands Korea, which is principally to aid North Korean refugees and was founded approximately 4 years ago. And, in fact, 

this was an outgrowth of our first initiative, which was Ton-aMonth Club, a tiny, as the name implies, a small initiative started 

in 1996 as more news reports surfaced about the famine in North 

Korea. 

I hope that in some ways that my testimony might represent the 

efforts of small, individual citizens who are concerned and do not 

have large resources, but nevertheless feel that action is imperative, even on an individual basis. I’m happy to say that despite the 

IMF crisis in Korea that began in December 1997, a recent checking of our records revealed that, quite amazingly, despite the fact 

that we are not a registered charity in South Korea, we were 10 

years ahead of schedule of our Ton-a-Month Club—one ton per 

month donation. So it’s a testimony, I believe, to the fact that it 

is possible for individuals to make a difference. 

27

Naturally, using our own resources and small fundraisers, we 

wanted to be sure that our efforts and our donations were going 

where they were intended that the ‘‘widows’ mites’’ that we were 

collecting, in fact, were going where they were intended. Factfinding missions to Northeast China showed us after perhaps 2 or 

3 years, that there were troubling developments about transparency. 

At the same time we came to learn of the refugee crisis during 

these factfinding missions. That was when Helping Hands Korea 

was born and we began to shift, although limited, a larger percentage of our collected donations to helping refugees. 

In my opinion, and in my experience, this has a very distinct advantage in that you are continuing to help the North Koreans. 

However, you have eliminated the middle man. You have eliminated handing over the donation to the bureaucracy that is controlling the North Koreans within their own borders. Instead, you are 

entrusting your donations to tried and proven, very sacrificial aid 

workers in third countries—China, but other countries as well. 

As to the effects of the long-term famine, as Mr. Becker referred 

to, I wonder if, for a moment, we could put a face on this. If I could 

ask that one picture of a young boy be put on the monitor. The 

name of this boy is Yoo Chul Min. In fact, I first came in contact 

with this 10-year old boy last April in a combined aid trip to Northeast China. As well, I invited Dr. Vollertsen to join us, since he had 

been sent out of North Korea itself; I encouraged Dr. Vollertsen to 

come and help the refugees in Northeast China. 

He very kindly came. As well we also brought some international 

journalists with us to see the refugee situation. During that visit, 

I had the pleasure of meeting this small North Korean boy who 

was taking refuge in a missionary’s home. He, as you can see, this 

was actually the picture to be given to the South Korean Embassy 

in Ulan Bator when Mr. Yoo Chul Min would have crossed the border from China into Mongolia and then taken—escorted by activists to the capital of Mongolia for processing for a final—being 

brought to South Korea. 

I’m using Chul Min because, despite the fact that 1 or 2 years 

of relatively good diet in China and his appearance to be a relatively healthy, pre-teen boy, the events that I will describe shows 

how mistaken these appearances are and the ravages of the longterm famine. 

Chul Min was one of five members of a team that were gathered 

to make an attempt to cross under the nine high voltage fences 

that exist at the China-Mongolian frontier. Unfortunately, the leader who had been briefed—the leader of their small team who had 

been briefed the night before, several hours prior to the departure 

time, the leader was picked up by Chinese security officials and the 

remaining small team was leaderless. 

Given the crackdown as of roughly February of last year in 

Northeast China against the North Korean refugees, the team 

made a very sobering decision that they would go forward feeling 

that they could not go back to the area of Yenji and other Chinese 

towns near the Chinese-North Korean border with which they had 

some familiarity. 

28

They went forward and perhaps, predictably, became lost. They 

were 26 hours without food and water. This does not seem lifethreatening, even to a normal and healthy pre-teen boy. I’m very 

sad to say that this cannot be said for Chul Min. He perished in 

the frontier within those 26 hours, which I believe reveals simply 

that his young body, which had been ravaged by the long-term effects of malnutrition in his home town or his own particular situation in North Korea had weakened him to this point. 

Because my time is quickly running out, I am going to ask that 

another picture be shown, if it is all right. This is my dear friend 

Chun Ki Won, and perhaps, one of the bravest men I have ever had 

the privilege of knowing. He is a Robin Hood in every sense of the 

word of helping the poor and helpless. In fact, this gentleman is 

now languishing in an Inner-Mongolian prison because he has 

helped in the underground railroad of assisting North Korean refugees to Mongolia and other areas. 

He was caught on December 30th of 2001 attempting to take 

over a number of refugees after many successful attempts before. 

Unfortunately, this time it’s very possible that among the handful 

of refugees was a possible informer who had informed the Chinese 

security in advance that they were coming and he was picked up. 

He remains in prison in Inner-Mongolia. He has been there for a 

few days beyond 4 months. He has been visited only once by a consular officer of his nationality in South Korea as far as we know, 

as of a week ago. 

And I can only act as a spokesman, a voice for, not only Mr. 

Chun, but many others whom I consider unsung heroes who have 

taken it upon themselves, not only their personal safety, but their 

personal resources. Some of whom have gone into debt for considerable amounts, which have strained their marriages and their own 

personal finances to bring North Koreans to safety. 

I would like to suggest, therefore, that due consideration be given 

to allocating funds to help those who are literally risking their lives 

to help North Korean refugees in third countries. I would also like 

to suggest on the humanitarian aid side the possibility of a shotgun 

effect. 

Instead of giving enormous amounts at one given time, and in 

state-to-state transfers, I would like to strongly suggest that smaller allocations of grants, et cetera, could be given so that the likelihood that more of the aid could get across the border in accepted 

channels. In channels that—I’m sorry, not DPRK accepted channels, but channels that have been already established as tried and 

proven through a strong relationship that has been formed with 

the ethnic Chinese-Korean community on the border and taken 

across. 

I feel that due consideration should be given to portioning out 

smaller amounts of large grants, and giving that to aid organizations that, perhaps, could have an improved level of effectiveness. 

I thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peters follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY A. PETERS, FOUNDER AND DIRECTOR, HELPING

HANDS/KOREA AND TON-A-MONTH CLUB

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to testify and this opportunity to 

address the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on East 

29

Asia and the Pacific, on humanitarian and human rights concerns related to North 

Koreans. In this written statement I will briefly address the humanitarian aid aspect of our work, then give special emphasis to our efforts to ease the plight of 

North Korean refugees in China. 

BACKGROUND OF OUR RELIEF EFFORTS

Helping Hands Korea is a Christian charitable initiative based in Seoul that was 

founded in 1990. In October of 1996, our organization significantly shifted its primary focus from activities within South Korea to the desperate needs of North Koreans. Our first project to help needy North Koreans was a grassroots initiative we 

named Ton-a-Month Club. Its genesis was a small prayer meeting around our kitchen table in the summer of 1996 and took as its goal providing humanitarian food 

aid to the most vulnerable victims of famine in the North. With a staff limited to 

my own family and a handful of volunteers with limited resources, our project has 

not gained official charitable status with the Republic of Korea government, so our 

fundraising has relied principally on rallying sacrificial donations from concerned 

South Koreans, expatriate residents in South Korea and several longstanding and 

faithful supporters in the U.S. to purchase one ton per month (or its equivalent 

value) of desperately needed foodstuffs to send as famine-relief to the North Korean 

civilian population. In the six years since its inception, Ton-a-Month Club has dispatched food aid to North Koreans through a number of channels: Korean National 

Red Cross, The Internet Campaign to Help North Korean Flood Victims, Good 

Friends, as well as a wide range of independent deliveries that have been arranged 

with the assistance of aid workers on the border of China and North Korea to bring 

rice, corn, wheat flour, and a mixture of goat and soy milk to individual villages 

and towns in the neediest areas of Hamkyoungpuk-to Province of North Korea. 

Like many other humanitarian aid initiatives large and small, we at Helping 

Hands Korea continue to have serious concerns regarding North Korean government 

interference in the delivery of food aid to the most vulnerable sectors of its population: children under age six, orphaned children, pregnant mothers, the handicapped and the elderly. It is our understanding that North Korean society is divided 

into 52 strata, and the basis for these divisions is essentially the degree of loyalty 

to the Kim Jong-il regime. Humanitarian aid given in government-to-government 

transfers to North Korea becomes a reward to the loyal and its deprivation constitutes a punishment for the disloyal. 

It is apparent to us that the priorities of the North Korean government in awarding food aid to its citizens is fundamentally at cross purposes with our own desire 

to see the neediest taken care of. For that reason, we have periodically conducted 

in the past four years combined fact-finding trips to Northeastern China (as well 

as an actual monitoring trip to the Rajin-Songbong area of North Korea itself) to 

regularly seek out more effective and transparent methods to ensure that our donors’ wishes to feed the most vulnerable were being honored. 

REFUGEE ASSISTANCE: AN OUTGROWTH OF FAMINE RELIEF

In the course of the abovementioned fact-finding trips to northeastern China in 

a quest to continually improve our Ton-a-Month effectiveness, we grew increasingly 

aware and deeply concerned by the discovery of a considerable number of North Koreans who had fled their nation due to hunger, privation, and fear of political and 

religious persecution. In China we began to visit secret orphanages for North Korean children and temporary urban shelters for adults. On two occasions we have 

also invited a physician to join us for the purpose of bringing medical attention to 

North Koreans in a mountain hideaway as well as urban shelters in northeastern 

China. 

The more we personally investigated and interviewed individuals in this largescale exodus, the more shocked we became at a growing body of reliable reports that 

the number of North Korean refugees had swollen to a quarter million or more in 

China, not to mention those who had fled to other surrounding countries such as 

Russia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand. 

Accordingly, we at Helping Hands Korea decided that, in addition to helping malnourished North Koreans in their hometowns, we would actively address the needs 

of North Korean refugees in China by devoting a significant proportion of collected 

donations to this second crisis. To make it easier for donors to distinguish between 

the two projects in designating their donations, we have maintained the name Tona-Month Club to denote famine relief within North Korea and now use Helping 

Hands Korea to specify refugee assistance. Donors are invited to clarify how they 

would like their donations used. 

30

TWO CRITICAL ADVANTAGES IN HELPING NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

The more we analyzed this second initiative, the clearer it became that support 

for refugee ‘‘safehouses’’ and ‘‘secret orphanages’’ for North Korean children in 

China, carried with it a double advantage. On one hand, the quality of monitoring 

our donors’ aid, a chronic difficulty in direct or indirect dealing with North Korean 

bureaucrats, was immediately enhanced through our newfound direct access to refugees. By assisting refugees, we were personally able to deliver donations to likeminded humanitarian workers and receive feedback from the refugees themselves. 

Hence, we received the implicit and enormous strategic advantage of eliminating 

from our aid delivery chain the ‘‘middleman’’ of the North Korean bureaucracy and 

its well-documented and dubious agenda in food distribution. [See reports on this 

issue from Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), Oxfam, etc.] A second advantage, in our view, when helping refugees is the ability we have of directly 

rewarding those individuals who exhibit personal bravery and the sovereignty of 

free choice by leaving destitution and oppression so rampant in their own country 

and forging into the unknown in the quest of a better life, despite the inherent dangers of an unprotected existence in China or Russia. 

Although refugee children naturally rank first in our list of priorities for assistance, it must be emphasized that tragedy can be witnessed at virtually every age 

group of North Koreans hiding in China. For example, we have brought medical assistance to a refugee who had fallen victim to a loan shark in northeastern China. 

An aid worker had attempted to place the threatened man in safety, but was short 

of resources at the time of the first visit. When I accompanied the aid worker to 

China on the following visit, the loan shark had already extracted his ‘‘pound of 

flesh’’ from the refugee, by hiring someone to stab the male refugee in the face and 

putting out one eye. The aid worker was almost beside himself with grief, feeling 

responsible for the loss of the refugee’s eye. 

The extreme urgency of the dual crisis of long-term famine within North Korea 

and the North Korean refugee crisis in China and other surrounding countries, including Russia, can be encapsulated in the story I recently wrote of 10 year-old 

North Korean boy, Yoo Chul Min, whom I met in April and June of 2001 in China. 

WHO WAS YOO CHUL MIN? AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?

A 10 year-old North Korean refugee boy hiding in China, made a sobering decision 

that was light years away from what most other elementary 4th graders are preoccupied with—a life-and-death gamble to cross the China-Mongolian border under 

the cover of darkness. 

His name was Yoo Chul Min and his decision resulted in a heart-rending tragedy. 

Joining five other North Koreans, also desperate for even a fleeting glimpse of freedom, Chul Min and his companions became disoriented for 26 hours in the arid, 

desert-like conditions of the Mongolian frontier. Years of gradual malnutrition in 

North Korea had weakened Yoo Chul Min’s body and the normal reserve of endurance and resistance to the elements one would expect of a healthy preteen boy were 

sadly lacking. Yoo Chul Min died from exhaustion and exposure on July 7th, 2001. 

His body was carried across the Mongolian border by the remaining refugee team 

when they finally gained their bearings. 

Perhaps I’ve taken a particular interest in this story because it so happened that 

Chul Min and my paths crossed in the course of my work in Helping Hands Korea. 

I had met and just begun getting to know this 10 year-old on two occasions, shortly 

before his death, this year. At the time, he was under the protection of courageous 

Korean missionaries in the Yenbian (ethnic Chinese-Korean region) district of northeast China. 

I remember noticing how withdrawn this boy was. Because he had lived in China 

for over a year, he did not immediately strike me as malnourished and his clothes 

were clean. I noticed with some amusement that he would never take off his baseball cap, even inside the house of my friend. My curiosity grew into a little personal 

challenge to spend some time with him and see if I could find a way to break 

through that shell of suspicion of foreigners and get a friendship started. 

I was told by those caring for him that Chul Min was very studious and doing 

well in a Chinese elementary school. One day in June of this year, I happened to 

spot on the missionary’s bookshelf the Korean version of a book that I had read 

countless times with my own five children, in English, as they were growing up, The 

Picture Bible. Despite his initial reluctance to sit down next to a dreaded American, 

Chul Min’s curiosity about the book seemed to get the upper hand, and soon we 

were leafing through the wonderfully illustrated volume together and he was eagerly reading the Korean text aloud. It became the bridge for what I hoped would 

31

be a real friendship. Little did I realize at that time, that death was only a month 

away for my little newfound friend. 

In the days that followed the jarring news of Chul Min’s sudden death, despite 

our urgent entreaties, the security officials in Mongolia did not agree to wait for 

Chul Min’s father to arrive in Ulan Bator to identify his son’s body and to be 

present at his burial. Mr. Yoo, Chul Min’s father, himself was a recent arrival to 

South Korea as a North Korean refugee from China, and an extra amount of time 

was needed for him to obtain South Korean travel documents. (The adjoining photo 

shows Chul Min’s father, a new Christian, mourning his son’s death shortly after 

seeing his son’s grave for the first time on the barren Mongolian desert near the 

China/Mongolian border) 

THE DANGERS FACED BY REFUGEE AID WORKERS IN CHINA

Tragedy befalls aid workers in China also with unnerving frequency in the course 

of their humanitarian labors. One courageous aid worker in China personally takes 

care of six separate refugee shelters in China. Approached from behind in the dark 

over one year ago, he was stabbed in the stomach by an unseen assailant. The 

likeliest suspect of this hideous crime is one of thousands of undercover North Korean agents who operate in China to track down, capture and forcefully repatriate 

refugees back to North Korea against their will. 

Due to complicated security circumstances and a very narrow timeframe, it was 

necessary to bring a physician to a quiet corner of a transportation terminal restaurant to administer necessary antibiotics to the aid worker as this maneuver was 

shielded from the view of authorities by other members of the aid community at the 

table. 

Many Christian and other humanitarian activists are fully aware that they face 

arrest and imprisonment as a result of providing food, shelter and guidance to safety to the North Korean refugees. One such heroic activist is South Korean evangelist Chun Ki Won. On the night of December 30th, 2001 Evangelist Chun was arrested near the tiny border town of Dungqi (150 km southwest of Hilar) in the 

northeastern area of Inner Mongolia, PRC, while attempting to help twelve North 

Korean refugees cross the border from China to Mongolia. To the best of our knowledge, two of the 12 North Korean refugees have been repatriated to North Korea 

in violation of the 1951 International Convention on Refugees of which the People’s 

Republic of China is a signatory. Ten still remain incarcerated at a military facility 

near Manzhouli, Inner Mongolia. I had the privilege of making four separate mission trips with Evangelist Chun to Northeast China as well as the China/North Korean border area in the year 2001 (January, April, June and December). During 

these four journeys, I had many opportunities to observe Mr. Chun’s personal courage and sacrificial spirit as exhibited in lending vital assistance to North Korean 

refugees who were being hunted down by both Chinese security officials and North 

Korean secret police operating clandestinely within China. We opened and outfitted 

refugee shelters together, helped to transfer refugees to new locations within China, 

and provided briefings to refugees who insisted on making the hazardous bid to 

freedom by crossing the Chinese border with Mongolia. In certain cases, the North 

Korean refugees were in such a state of desperation due to North Korean secret police being in hot pursuit of their whereabouts that they declared their willingness 

to try to cross the ‘‘no man’s land’’ between China and Mongolia with or without 

assistance from activists. 

During many months of imprisonment with only the bare minimum of diplomatic 

attention from his embassy in Beijing, Evangelist Chun has been subjected to degrading treatment including cleaning prison toilets and carrying human excrement 

to a waste area on the prison grounds. It is likely that he will be charged with the 

crimes of either smuggling or human trafficking, whereas in reality he has been carrying out the Biblical injunction: ‘‘Hereby perceive we the love of God, because He 

laid down our lives for us and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.’’ 

(I John 3:16) In fact, he has been giving aid and encouragement to true refugees, 

although China fails to recognize their status. I respectfully and strongly request 

that the Committee on International Relations exert its considerable influence on 

the government of the People’s Republic of China to petition the release of Evangelist Chun Ki Won from prison. 

In closing, I wish to make the point that the heartbreaking realities of Yoo Chul 

Min’s death and Mr. Chun’s humiliating imprisonment for helping North Korean 

refugees are all the more tragic because they were by no means inevitable. Had the 

relevant nation-signatories of the UN Charter for Refugees of 1951 in the northeastern Asian region acted upon principle and carried out their commitments to relevant charters, neither of these grievous events need have occurred. 

32

My appearance before your Committee is largely as a representative voice for 

many of my colleagues in the activist community who daily lay down their lives in 

sacrificial service for North Korean refugees. Due to security concerns and in some 

cases imprisonment, these unsung heroes are unable to appear before you. But I 

submit to you that this small ‘ragtag’ group of volunteers has undertaken an enormous humanitarian challenge single-handedly that international organizations such 

as the UNHCR, with all their influence and expertise, should be addressing. However, in actual practice, the UNHCR office in China and many governments in the 

region have retreated from the actual fray to occupying passive seats in the grandstands as this human drama plays out, essentially taken hostage by political and 

economic compromises with the major violators of international treaties that should 

protect the rights of North Korean refugees. By doing so, they have abdicated an 

active role on the playing field upon which hundreds of thousands of lives are at 

stake. 

I am confident, however, that this august body, the House of Representatives, rich 

in tradition of heeding the cries of the oppressed, will not follow suit. I believe it 

will issue forth with the clear sound of a trumpet, speaking in an uncompromising 

voice in defense of the starving, intimidated populace of North Korea and the hundreds of thousands of refugees the North’s failed economy and style of governance 

have spawned. 

On behalf of the North Korean refugees and the activist community that serves 

them, I thank you.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much, Mr. Peters. And I want to 

thank the panel. Let me just begin with a couple of questions here. 

There is an ongoing debate on whether public diplomacy, very 

high pitched, would be helpful or harmful to the refugee situation. 

And then a second debate that underscores it that is even more important, whether the world community should be encouraging programs that would create far greater numbers of refugees or whether its better off to try assist the North Korea population at home. 

Do you have any views on this particular subject? Mr. Becker? 

Mr. BECKER. Yes, I do. I think that there hasn’t been enough 

public attention given to the plight of the refugees and to their testimony. It’s very hard to get this issue on television to get it to 

reaching a major, international audience because of the way that 

China controls access to the border areas and to the refugees because they’re constantly in hiding and the people who help them 

are afraid. And therefore, you have very, very difficult conditions 

in reporting what they have to say. 

I think the more attention that is given to this, the easier it 

would become. 

Mr. LEACH. Does anyone else wish to comment on this? 

Ms. DELAUNAY. From the field workers’ point of view, we have 

sort of a real dilemma between the willingness to testify about 

what’s going on and the fear that operations would be stopped. It 

is also difficult for the refugees themselves who would like to say 

to the world what’s going on in that country, and what kind of suffering they are enduring. But at the same time, they know that it 

would be their relatives and their friends in danger. So it’s a constant dilemma in testifying on this issue. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Powell? 

Mr. POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The point, I 

guess, that the World Food Program would like to make is that we 

have a massive number of people within the borders of DPRK who 

simply don’t get enough to eat each day every day of the year. I 

think that the situation of those who leave the country and cross 

the border into China is alarming and needs all the attention that 

this Committee and other Committees that might address it. 

33

Far more profound to us is what happens to those who stay? We 

have 6.4 million of them today who are WFP beneficiaries. The 

numbers are clearly greater than those that we provide assistance 

to. So in looking at the needs of the 153,000, please do not let us 

forget the 6.5 million, 90 percent of whom are women and children 

who will not get across the border. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, the international community has yet to come 

to grips with the second sanctuary issue. I mean, we understand 

the dilemma of China. They may get more than they would like, 

but where would they go after China? And it’s impressive to me 

how few have gone to South Korea to date, not how many. And the 

rest of the world community isn’t offering second sanctuary either. 

Do you think that is a subject that ought to be raised as a matter 

of international diplomacy? Mr. Peters? 

Mr. PETERS. I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman, I’m not sure I fully understood. Are you saying that the number of refugees are relatively 

limited that have come into South Korea, so where could the rest 

go? 

Mr. LEACH. Well, should not more go to South Korea or are there 

other alternatives? 

Mr. PETERS. Certainly, in my opinion, many more could go to 

South Korea. At the moment, the facility that is preparing North 

Korean defectors for life in South Korea is being expanded. I believe in the coming month they will be able to handle 300 at a 

time, and that would only translate into 1200 per year. Frankly, 

I think it’s too little. It’s too late. It would certainly need to be improved, and the flood of refugees seems to be building. 

But it would strike me also as a distinct possibility that other nations could begin considering absorbing the overflow of refugees. 

Frankly speaking, I’m not at all convinced that taking North Koreans who basically have lived in a failed economy for decades and 

tossing most of them into the high speed dynamic, almost overwhelming environment of Seoul or other large South Korean cities—it’s difficult for me to accept that as an acceptable solution for 

many of them. 

It would seem like a ‘‘decompression area’’ would be preferable. 

Perhaps, farms in central Asia. If certain central Asian nations 

would possibly consider taking some refugees, and in some cases, 

we have indications that Mongolia is not against North Koreans 

living and staying there on a temporary basis as long as they do 

not become a burden upon their own social safety net, which is extremely fragile as it is. But it would seem to me that with sufficient support from the outside, that in many cases North Korean 

farmers, for example, could be introduced gradually to a market 

economy instead of suddenly being fast-forwarded 3 or 4 decades 

economically into a very fast paced South Korean society in which 

many times—all too many times—they fail and other social problems result. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Mr. Becker and then I’ll conclude. 

Mr. BECKER. I know that the UNHCR in Beijing has often tried 

to negotiate some kind of deal with the Chinese government which 

would allow them to set up some kind of centers where they could 

assist the refugees, you know, if they were needing food or aid, give 

them temporary shelter, give them basic requirements and then, 

34

encourage them to go back, or if they wanted to claim political asylum, to do so and go through the customary procedures. This has 

constantly been refused by the Chinese government. They’ve 

turned this option down. 

I know many NGOs have also approached the Chinese government, offering to do something of this nature. I think if there was 

a bit more pressure on the Chinese government, they might agree 

to this. And secondly, I think the people—the North Koreans who 

have come over—are very much feared by the North Korean government when they return because when they come back they tell 

everyone that they’ve seen something of the outside world and it’s 

quite different from the picture painted by North Korean propaganda. That’s a huge shock and that could potentially make a huge 

impact on North Korean society and sort of push forward some 

change. Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, sir. Mr. Faleomavaega? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate the testimonies that have been provided. I don’t know 

whether I feel more depressed or encouraged in terms of trying to 

provide a solution to the problem that I don’t think any government or even the world community has the capability of resolving 

simply because we’re talking about a totalitarian and a complete 

dictatorship. 

And I get the very strong impression, after listening to Mr. Becker and Ms. Delaunay kind of the barriers went down. We’re not 

doing enough. And then, after hearing Mr. Powell saying, well, 

we’re doing a lot of things. But I get the strong impression, after 

listening to the witnesses this morning, that it comes to the bottom 

line that the North Korean government actually controls when, 

where, and how the food the aid system is providing is distributed. 

I get the strong impression, also, that in a very cold, calculated 

way, the dictatorship or the regime makes sure that the Army is 

properly fed, but as far as women and children, they’re expendable. 

And with a country of 23 million people, it just makes it more complex to me in trying to figure out how we’re going to feed a starving 

population when you know that the government that controls the 

system controls us. So Mr. Powell commented earlier that we are 

making strides, but to what extent are we really serious about 

this? 

Mr. Becker suggested that our food aid program is somewhat of 

a failed policy. At the same time, if we don’t provide some kind of 

food aid, you’re going to have people starving to death. 

I’m asking for solutions and I wanted to ask you, Mr. Powell, 

you’ve been there personally. Do you think that we are making 

strides in providing this kind of aid given the fact that we’re dealing with a governmental system that is totally repressive? Are they 

really serious about wanting the world community to give them assistance or it is because they have a policy or a system of priorities 

that is quite different from the rest of the world community? 

I’d like to ask Mr. Powell what his impressions are because it 

seems to me that the leadership of the North Korean government 

really has no basis of really considering whether or not women and 

children starve to death. It’s irrelevant. And to what extent has the 

food aid been given to make sure that the Army is fully fed? 

35

I’d like to ask Mr. Powell is a portion of the food aid given really 

going to provide for the needs of the Army more so than the general population? 

Mr. POWELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I can deal 

with the last part of the question first. The answer is yes. What 

the North Korean military does, and the power does, is the take 

first cut at the national harvest. And they take what they want in 

the amount they want it at the time they want it. I think that is 

common ground between the North Korean and ourselves and almost anyone else that deals with that issue seriously. 

There are at least two donors who provide food bilaterally. That 

is, they give it to the government of DPRK and say, please, do good 

things with this food. One of those countries is in China. The other 

one is the Republic of Korea. I would guess, that through you, Mr. 

Chairman, those countries would not only want to see the bulk of 

the population DPRK feed. I should imagine that would not want 

to have a hungry Army on their borders. So I can understand why 

some people might want to give undirected food assistance. 

For our part, what we are concerned about is to provide food to 

the most vulnerable in that country. The most vulnerable in that 

country are pregnant women, nursing mothers and small children 

up to the age of 16—secondary school kids. The other extraordinarily vulnerable group are the elderly. Dealing first with those 

who are most young, what we do is there is a map that is provided 

in our package which shows where we have set up, 1816, what we 

call ‘‘local production facilities.’’

What these facilities seek to do is to produce food particularly designed to meet the food, nutrition, and micronutrient needs of 

women and small children, children in pediatric hospitals. So the 

food tracks from the port of arrival at a distribution plan decided 

by the World Food Program in collaboration with DPRK, but it is 

decided by us. 

We have a port captain who ensures that the quantity of foods 

that arrives is the quantity of food that is delivered. When that 

food is not in 50 kg bags as we ask, that food is bagged at the port 

before it leaves the port. All of those bags have the markings of the 

donor. That food is then taken to the sites which are marked as 

these ‘‘local food production facilities.’’

It is there, combined with other food inputs, micronutrient inputs 

provided by UNICEF where it is converted into rice soy milk for 

CSM and so on. That is provided then, from the institution from 

that production plant, to the various institutions, whether they be 

hospitals, pediatric hospitals; whether they be orphanages; whether 

they be the institutions which children of ages between 6 months 

and 4 years are placed from date of birth—from that age. 

What we are, therefore, able to do is to track the food through 

that system to where it is consumed by the beneficiaries at that 

site. When I talk about monitoring and the number of monitoring 

visit is, I’m talking about that whole chain. The chain which starts 

from saying which port should this food be delivered to, to how 

much goes to which food production plant to how much biscuit for 

CSM is produced to which institution it is delivered and in what 

quantities. That is what our monitors look at. We know what the 

numbers are. 

36

I agree with you, however, implicitly, that it’s not impossible to 

fiddle the numbers. That’s why it’s so important to be able to look 

at the children. Look at them. Do they have the visible characteristics of those who are acutely malnourished or do they not. When 

you see where the place they ate and the time they ate. When they 

come into a room, does it look as if it’s the first time in the room. 

Do they know where to sit? Does it look as if it’s the first time 

they’ve had this kind of food? 

All the practical things that you and I would do where we to 

want to know is this the first time this child has done this. What 

we find is the answer is no. It is a consistent pattern, and that we 

find the visible observation; namely, that there is a sharp decline 

in acute malnutrition and the children seem used to eating this 

food at this time. And when we track back the numbers, they 

match. 

The bottom line, through you, Mr. Chairman, through that arrangements for those kinds of food stuffs, we don’t go near the public distribution system—direct distribution, through the chain. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. My time, I know, is nearly up, Mr. Chairman, but I just want to say that the predicament that I and Members of the Committee find ourselves in, is that we feel so helpless. 

We feel like we know what the problems are. The international 

community doesn’t seem to be outraged. I don’t hear the United 

Nations coming out and putting pressure on the North Korean 

Army to do something about this serious problem. And as Mr. 

Becker suggested earlier, we have a failed policy of the food aid, 

but what do you suggest, Mr. Becker? How do you suggest resolving the issue? And I’ll end with that, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BECKER. I don’t have a pat solution either. I think of the 

problems is there isn’t enough media attention to it because you 

can’t get pictures of what really goes on in North Korea, and you 

can’t get reliable witnesses—witnesses that are acceptable to everyone. I think the international community has looked to South Korea’s Sunshine Policy to find a way out of this impasse, and unfortunately, it now seems to have run it course without being successful. 

Therefore, I think another possible initiative would be for the 

United States to organize more of an internationally coordinated 

policy on North Korea, which would bring together the food issues, 

the security issues, and the economic issues together in order to 

sort of bring this to some sort of resolution. 

I mean, it’s impossible—not impossible, but it’s extraordinary 

that a famine aid program should have gone on for so long and 

without apparently an end in sight, and having reached that stage 

and having failed with the Sunshine Policy, I mean, it must be 

time for a fresh initiative which would bring more of the actors together to agree on a plan of action. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The panel mentioned basically that the Army gets the food and the people starve. Is this 

a situation of indifference to the people by the ruling elite or is 

there, perhaps, a consensus policy to keep people hungry? Does the 

regime want the North Korean people, or at least many of them 

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cause there seems to be a policy of starvation. And this would not 

be the first time in history where there is a state policy to keep 

the serfs weak. 

Certainly in Sparta, Lycurgus, developed a system where the 

spartans were kept healthy and strong. And the concept was to 

keep the serfs as weak as possible, and periodically, when they became too numerous to actually eliminate a large percentage of the 

serf population in Sparta. 

My father took photographs at Dachau, at the liberation of that 

camp. Again, there was a state policy to take those who did not 

support the Reich—to take those who were the Jews or the social 

democratic, the monarchist and the leftist, and if they didn’t support the Reich, to literally put them in camps and work them to 

death and to starve them to death. 

So there are only some 43 counties that you do not have access 

to in the country out of some 203; and those are the areas where 

we hear about these work camps. These concentration camps where 

people are being worked and starved to death. My question is, is 

that state policy in North Korea? I’d ask any of the members of the 

panel who might want to respond to answer. 

Mr. PETERS. Congressman Royce, I don’t pretend to be an expert 

on the ongoings on inside North Korea, but I think it is—I believe 

Mr. Becker referred to the fact that North Korean society is stratified, basically, according loyalty to the regime. In effect, there is 

even up to, I understand, 52 distinct levels within society. But the 

primary litmus test as how high up the scale you go, of course, is 

your loyalty to the Kim Jong-Il regime. It seems that it’s absolutely 

correct that food is used as a reward or as a weapon regarding loyalty. I, frankly, believe that and see evidence of it in testimonies 

from defectors that I think it’s without question. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let’s talk about the 43 areas, Mr. Powell, where you 

cannot go. What’s your anecdotal information about what goes on 

there. I’ve read a book about what purports to go on there. It’s hard 

for me to believe that, that type of horror could exist at this time. 

That there could be that level of abrogation of rights and starvation. But what do you hear is going on in that sector? 

Mr. POWELL. Thank you very much, Chairman. I do apologize on 

this particular element. I am not able to enlighten the Committee 

simply because we do not know. We are absolutely refused access. 

We cannot pass through those areas in transit to somewhere else. 

So we simply don’t go there at all. 

If I might just spend a moment on your previous question. There 

are two parts to it. The first is that the country simply doesn’t 

produce enough food to feed itself. It doesn’t have the foreign exchange to buy what is needed and it doesn’t have the creditworthiness to borrow on terms to get it. So all we’re talking about each 

year is whether the deficit in food terms is 1.2 to 3 million tons of 

cereals or it’s 2.2 million tons of food. So it’s massive deficit. 

So I don’t think there should be, in a sense, a misunderstanding 

of a policy of starvation. It is simply they do not produce enough 

to feed themselves and they cannot find a way to buy it. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, let me ask you this. I mean, money is fungible. 

For those of us that have spent some time in Korea and seen an 

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38

power. One of the largest armies in the world. It is certainly odd 

to see a military build up that is far in excess of anything they 

could possibly use while people are starving to death. And so it 

does beg the question, since those resources could go to keep the 

rural population alive, why would you put 80 percent of the national budget, in terms of military buildup? I guess that’s a rhetorical question. 

Sophie, would you have any observations? 

Ms. DELAUNAY. I’d be happy to add a few comments to these discussions. I think we all agree that there is a food shortage in North 

Korea. The point is not to even try to estimate them because at the 

moment it’s not transparent enough to do so. But I think that it’s 

time to question why we have not been able to solve the problem. 

And where all this food has gone. 

We have some information that it goes to the Army and that the 

Army is well-fed. But we also have information that there is food 

on the black market. That is not just the South Korean rice or the 

Chinese rice. There is also what they call the U.N. drugs. The 

North Koreans, they know how to recognize maize coming from 

China or from the Western world or from their own country. They 

know all this, and they are able to give you the price of each item. 

And when you meet them regularly, you realize that there is a 

real economy. And that they are all commodities available in the 

black market at the moment in North Korea. And that the prices 

are fluctuating and the fluctuating of prices are quite similar with 

the amount of humanitarian assistance which arrives in the country. And it’s normal because the only availability comes from the 

aid. So I think there are some resources now in North Korea. And 

according to the refugees, you can find everything you need. The 

problem they have at the moment is that they have no money to 

buy it. 

Mr. ROYCE. So you’re saying, what you testified to, was that as 

you interview these refugees they have not received food through 

these programs. Many of them have never had a meal, and yet, at 

the same time you find that on the black market. That food is 

available, presumably, it’s either through corruption or the government has a policy of earning the exchange—their hard currency by 

taking that money, and instead of feeding the people with it, the 

North Korean government is basically selling it. 

Ms. DELAUNAY. I don’t know exactly what are the mechanism. 

What I’ve heard was that there are some commodities, a lot of commodities, more than before—they say that’s much more than before 

’95. And that if they had the money, the would be able to have a 

decent life there. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. First, I’d like to ask 

Mr. Becker about, and this may be off the set of focus of the hearing, but could you tell us why you were fired from your job as at 

the newspaper. 

Mr. BECKER. Well, I went to see the editor about 3 weeks ago to 

express my concerns about the way the coverage of China and, indeed, the North Korean issue was being changed. And that there 

had been an effort by the Hong Kong authority after October to 

39

sort of bring the South China Morning Post under control. And 

they’d begun sort of issuing demands that all the foreign journalists should be replaced by ethnic Chinese journalists. 

And there was sort of a compromise negotiated. And from that 

moment on, I began to notice that they were changing the way we 

were reporting on China. We couldn’t get access to funds to fund 

our bureau. We’ve been restricted on the trips we go. The stories 

were being changed. And for instance, stories on North Korea were 

being changed so that stuff was being added to my copy saying that 

the North Korean famine was due to harsh winters and so on. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you’re seeing here an example of creeping 

totalitarianism and the control that the very evil that we’re talking 

about in North Korea is just actually creeping along and even expanding even outside of Korea 

Mr. BECKER. Yes, I thought that the Chinese authorities in Hong 

Kong were trying to bring the very lively Hong Kong media under 

control. I wanted to express my concerns privately and to sort of 

try to change things by arguing this wasn’t really necessary—this 

self-censorship. But my criticisms were not acceptable. So I was 

fired. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Being a former journalist myself, I totally 

sympathize with what you’re saying and for those who think 

they’re going to feed the crocodile with self-censorship, let us note 

that they will be eaten by the crocodile in very short order. And 

that self-censorship and the type of bending over backwards and 

trying to placate these terrorist regimes, gangster regimes, will always lead to a North Korea situation in the end where you have 

a—well, however we would like to characterize the mental state of 

their leader and the leaders of the regime. But we do know they 

are willing to see large numbers of their own people starve to death 

while they pump money into their military establishment; perhaps, 

out of some physiological paranoia. 

What a tragedy that is. And this is not something that has just 

happened in Korea. As my friend, Mr. Royce, has indicated. Historically, we can see these things have happened in the past. I’m 

sorry that you, personally, have had to face this; but I think that 

the world needs to know that when a journalist is censored, it’s 

just a another step into the abyss and into the blackness and darkness of totalitarianism and toward the direction of this type of depravation of freedom and just even the basics of life for normal people. 

In terms of what’s been going on in Korea, I understand that 

there is about 350,000 tons of wheat are shipped per year from the 

United States to North Korea, is that right? 

Mr. BECKER. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We also provide, and others provide hundreds of millions of dollars of fuel oil to North Korea? 

Mr. POWELL. In technical terms, Mr. Chairman, the international 

community pays a subsidy on the amount of fuel—the cost of transporting the food from port to the county warehouses. That works 

about 25 percent of actual costs. It’s actually $8. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, I respect each and every one of 

you for your good hearts and your humanitarian instincts. And who 

wants to see a little boy die like that. I mean, obviously, I want 

40

to commend you for using that as an example to us of just how dramatic this is. Even though, it’s like the firing of a newspaper editor. It sort of creeps up on you and sometimes it’s hard to identify 

how evil a situation really is until you put it in the life of a boy 

who didn’t need to die and was actually murdered by the system 

when you get down to it. 

I don’t think the United States of America should be involved in 

subsidizing a regime like this. But at the same time, we have total 

sympathy for the people of that country. I would hope that our desire for stability in the short run and helping those people in the 

short run does not prevent a change in the regime in the long run. 

And I would just like your thoughts on that. Are we, by using our 

hearts, preventing the total break down of the regime, which in the 

long run would be what would be best for everyone? Whoever 

wants to comment is fine with me. 

Mr. PETERS. I personally feel that the very beginning of our little 

Ton-of-Month effort, and in fact, it began with a small prayer 

around our kitchen table. And the scripture that we received was 

simply ‘‘If thy enemy hungers, feed him.’’ But after 6 years of doing 

this, I feel that we should do it as intelligently, judiciously, wisely 

and in the most informed way possible. And I’m not convinced that 

enormous state-to-state transfers is that way, frankly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go ahead. 

Mr. PETERS. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, the operation in North 

Korea does raise the most acute moral and ethnical dilemmas. The 

first part of the dilemma is exactly as you have spelled it out. Is 

this the kind of arrangement which will keep the regime, the kind 

that is so distasteful to so many, in power for a longer period of 

time? If you strongly believe that to be the case, you would take 

a particular course of action. 

The other view focuses on who are the victims. The victims are 

the women and they’re the children. And as President Reagan said 

a hungry child knows no politics. So the humanitarian community 

takes the view that it is the ethnical consideration that needs to 

take primacy. But we would certainly subscribe to the point of view 

that it needs to be done thoughtfully, intelligently and in a way 

which builds toward a better future than the present. Thank you. 

Mr. POWELL. Well, I go back to my earlier point. When you deliver aid, you enter into a kind of negotiation, and the negotiations 

so far are always over security issues. So that, for instance, the 

Japanese are now negotiating over delivering food because they 

want to know what happened to these Japanese who have been 

kidnapped or allegedly kidnapped. There are the South Koreans 

who are offering food only if they get a summit or some kind of diplomatic concessions. So all these food deals or the fuel that the 

United States is delivering to North Korea, it’s all related to some 

security issue. And I think the food aid negotiations should be concentrated on extracting concessions on the monitoring of food and 

the monitoring of the health of the population so that, at least, the 

food is given; but at least we really know who is getting that aid. 

And the public is really assured that the most vulnerable members 

are getting the medical aid they need. I think the failure of the 

past 7 years has been to allow the WFP to negotiate on its own 

41

really and it has to be the full backing of the international community to push the North Koreans on this. 

I think, in addition, there should be a sort of step-by-step program to bring the North Koreans to the point where they would do 

the kind of economic reforms that we’ve seen in China. I think 

there hasn’t been a coordinated effort to do this. And I know the 

UNDP tried to do that a few years ago, but there were such splits 

within the major actors that it was ineffective and the North Koreans just walked away from it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One last note and then—thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for indulging me just to say let none of us leave any 

doubt that we’re talking about a regime that is a disgrace to all 

human values, and it’s pathetic to see the way they are treating 

their people. And just the ignorance and vile of that regime is beyond description. So I want to make sure that our friends in the 

press who may or may not have the freedom to say these things 

that need to be said, need to understand while the American people 

can be very proud that we are helping people who are hungry; especially, women and children who are hungry, we hold the regime 

of North Korea in total disdain and we are siding with the people 

of North Korea and the Korean people and not their pathetic and 

disgusting government. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. Mr. Kirk. 

Mr. KIRK. Dana, what do you really think? I want to give you 

a face of North Korea that I saw. I don’t know if you can see this. 

This is Kim Yo Balk. Someday I hope to go back to Ho Jang to find 

her if she’s surviving. We think of North Korea as a weapons factory, but this is the North Korea that I know and have seen on so 

many faces. 

We have a situation in which North Korea has produced a lot of 

things. Jasper, you’re not a free voting journalist. Any idea how 

much—North Korea has shot missiles over Japan—No Dong missile, Taepo Dong missiles. Any idea how much they’ve spent building missiles? 

Mr. BECKER. I think it’s clear evidence they’ve devoted an enormous amount of resources for a poor country to this program that 

should have gone into feeding the population. And I think they see 

this military hardware as a way of extracting money from the 

international community as a kind of blackmail. And that they actually hold the vulnerable population hostage, saying, if you don’t 

give us the aid without conditions, these people will die And I 

think their sort of negotiating strategy is now pretty clear. There 

must come a point when the international community finds it unacceptable and reacts to it. 

Mr. KIRK. Yes. At a meeting I had in Pyongyang with Kim Ka 

Ywang they said we’re stop selling missiles to Iran for a billion 

bucks. It’s unfortunate. Now the Government of Israel now is responding to the North Korean threat because the Shihab III missile, which you see running down the streets of Tehran is just a 

No Dong that’s been repainted with an Iranian flag put on it. 

And we know that North Korea missile is pointed at Jerusalem. 

So it’s a difficult problem to take on. We also have the KEDO reactor being built by the international community, but it’s sort of a 

deal that doesn’t seem to make sense. Two white elephant nuclear 

42

reactions in the middle of North Korea. But my view of North 

Korea there is no power grid to connect these reactors to. There is 

no way to get the electrical—is that your understanding of what 

we’re building here? 

Mr. BECKER. The point is, and the country’s already littered with 

all kinds of white elephants which have failed to put North Korea 

of path of self-sufficiency. The huge barrages, which they built on 

the east coast were designed, actually, to solve the food problem 

and never worked. They had the—I think the UNDP started to 

help them with economic development aid, and the only investors 

there were some Hong Kong casinos. I mean, it’s absolutely ridiculous what’s been going on in North Korea and what many countries 

have encouraged to happen. 

All of these things are complete irrelevant to solving North Korea’s problems. 

Mr. KIRK. North Korea is a country of many white elephants 

while children starve. My favorite is the pyramid which is in the 

center of Pyongyang—a 105-story building. But it was so sloppily 

built that the elevator corridors going up the building are like this. 

So the building is useless. No one is going to walk up 105 floors 

by the stairway. And so it’s a monument to the incompetence of the 

regime in the middle of the capital city. 

But North Korea stands out for other reasons, and to new lows 

in human rights. We heard all of these reports of 9–27 prisons. 

September 27, 1995, I believe, Kim Jong-Il issued this order to arrest all hungry children outside of their home county. The security 

of these facilities doesn’t seem to be too heavy. I ran into dozens 

of children in China who had escaped from 9–27 prisons. 

Now we’ve heard updated reports that maybe these hungry child 

prisons don’t exist anymore. Any news on whether 9–27 prisons are 

still operating or not? 

Mr. BECKER. I’ve heard that many of them have been closed 

down. That the order has been to send these children back to their 

home villages. But as in the Chinese famine, I mean, the number 

of homeless or orphans or children who have lost their parents in 

some way—can’t find out where they are is still quite enormous. 

I’ve spoken to children who even been arrested when they going 

begging around Pyongyang. 

But the problem with North Korea’s response to the plight of the 

homeless children is that they, themselves, don’t really recognize 

the famine for what it actually is. They don’t themselves really live 

in the sort of realty of what the problems of the country are. So 

they continue to live a kind of fantasy, propaganda world, which 

prevents them from actually responding rationally to what is happening in the country. 

Mr. KIRK. When you turn on the TV in Pyongyang, you’ll get videos on how to make Pomjay, alternative food where they’re stripping barks off trees and teaching people how to boil this stuff up. 

The reason why though we see so many kids without their parents 

is the structure of Korean culture. That when the food runs out, 

the first people who agree to starve to death, or any many cases 

commit suicide are the grandparents and the parents and then that 

leaves the homeless kids. 

43

I interviewed some refugees in Yanji who talked about how their 

grandparents had committed suicide, and that leaves these black 

swallow children then moving to the North, but the refugee situation is bleak. These people have no idea what China looks like. 

They have no map. So by the time they crawl across the Tumen 

River, they’re in Jang By Mountain being hunted down by these 

gangs that sell the girls into sex slavery and almost as horrible 

conditions in China for the refugees. 

So here my other question is we started a huge cross border program in other countries I remember. I remember a big one, for example, in Afghanistan that we ran out of Pakistan. Is it time to 

launch a cross border assistance program for North Korea? 

Ms. DELAUNAY. Well, I think first of all, we should recognize 

these people as refugees. As people who are starving and have 

come for help. This is the first step. If they are not recognized, 

there is nothing we can do. 

Secondly, you have to be aware that also on the other side of the 

border control is increasing. And maybe Tim, I think he knows better than me, but from our experience most of the refugees come 

from bordering provinces. And still now a lot of North Korean people do not have access to China, either because it’s too far away 

and they cannot go there or because they have no idea. They don’t 

know that they might be able to get some food from there. 

Mr. KIRK. I think there is a real moral dilemma that we’ve seen 

here that assistance groups that need access to the DPRK cannot 

condemn the government because then they will be denied access 

and cannot carry out their basic humanitarian function. So we’ve 

got to develop here in the Congress a two track operation. 

Human rights groups, which speak out and deliver the clear message of what’s happening and better access to radio-free Asia and 

hopefully getting cameras inside. And meanwhile boosting up the 

humanitarian organizations and their presence and U.S. NGOs in 

North Korea, but not asking them to do the heavy lifting on human 

rights because they will be shut down the moment they condemn 

the regime. 

It’s that human rights operation that we haven’t really launched 

yet where we’re broadcasting the true story of what’s going on into 

North Korea. And we’re assisting North Korean groups in China, 

in South Korea and elsewhere to get the message out. And I think 

that’s the essential thing. Jasper, am I not right? We see this 

moral dilemma and we can’t force the humanitarian groups to 

speak out on human rights because then they’ll be shut down. But 

we do have to develop the outside groups that will tell us what’s 

really going on in North Korea. 

Mr. BECKER. Yes, I mean, the key is some free-flow of information, and that’s why the refugees are so important. That’s why it’s 

so important to prevent the Chinese government from hunting 

these people down and expelling them. Because if we don’t have 

the refugees we won’t have any idea what is really going on in the 

country because in a totalitarian regime like that, I personally believe, with all due respect to Mr. Powell, that it’s quite easy to 

hoodwink visitors and to spend them a line. And therefore, you 

need these alternative sources of information. And you need much 

more information going into the country. That should also be a conVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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dition of aid, I think. That they should be—people should be allowed to realize the extent to which they’re being artificially deprived of the means to make themselves self-sufficient and to feed 

themselves. 

Mr. KIRK. And the last point, the food availability situation. We 

really should pressure WFP, et cetera, to get a better idea of the 

food availability situation there. We’re not condemning the regime. 

But to my knowledge, the international community has zero access 

to any farmers markets in North Korea. Is that correct? 

Mr. POWELL. That is correct. 

Mr. KIRK. So we have no idea how much a kilogram of rice costs 

in North Korea. And yet, it is sold—I’ve seen the satellite images. 

I forgot the name of the street, Qwan Bach Street in Pyongyang—

an enormous 5-mile long market where bulk commodities are sold 

and the international community assisting North Korea has no 

idea what the prices are for food in that market. Have you been 

to Qwan Bach Street? 

Mr. POWELL. You are perfectly correct, which is why I mentioned 

in my introductory statement that access to farmers markets is one 

of the key issues which looms very high on our agenda for exactly 

that purpose. I think the point that I would especially like to make 

on farmers markets is that I actually think there is something to 

be encouraged and facilitated, not something to be afraid of or call 

them black markets in order to close them down. 

Mr. KIRK. Right. I think the legitimatization of farmers markets 

is key to increasing food availability. And while we can’t force WFP 

to get into the reactor and find out what’s going on there. We 

should have some pretty hard line on getting WFP to get into the 

farmers markets to improve food availability distributions, even 

through micro-loans, which I think would be an enormous help for 

them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. Let me thank this panel and 

also express great admiration on behalf of the Congress for the 

work you do. And several of the observations that have been made 

are things I’m confident this government is going to have to take 

seriously in terms of foreign policy initiatives. So we thank you all. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LEACH. If the Subcommittee can come back to order. Our second panel is composed of Dr. Norbert Vollertsen, who is a German 

physician who spent 18 months inside North Korea providing humanitarian medical assistance with access to regions outside 

Pyongyang. After his expulsion from North Korea in December of 

2000, he has traveled the world campaigning for human rights in 

North Korea. 

Mr. Kim Sung Min was a captain in the North Korean Army at 

the time of his defection in 1996. He appears today as the director 

of the North Korean Defectors Volunteer Group of the Committee 

to Help North Korean Refugees, a Seoul-based NGO that collected 

nearly 12 million signatures inside South Korea supporting refugee 

status for North Koreans inside China, which it delivered to the 

United Nations. 

Ms. Sun-ok Lee is a former party official inside North Korea and 

a survivor of several years inside a North Korean political prisoner 

camp. She’s the author of the book Eyes of the Tailless Animals, an 

45

account of her imprisonment. And finally, Mr. Lee Young-Kook 

served as a personal bodyguard for a North Korean leader, Kim 

Jong-Il, for a decade, and later survived years in a North Korea 

prison camp before escaping into China and eventually South 

Korea. And I understand has also written a book about his experience. 

We will begin in the order of the introductions with Dr. 

Vollertsen. Dr. Vollertsen? 

STATEMENT OF NORBERT VOLLERTSEN, FORMER MEDICAL 

DOCTOR INSIDE NORTH KOREA 

Dr. VOLLERTSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, unfortunately, most of the people are gone to lunch. Maybe 

that’s one of the most problems of North Korea. Here are now the 

eye witness of human rights violations in North Korea, but there 

is nearly nobody who can listen. There is nearly no more attention. 

Unfortunately, even some of the congressmen are gone. I think bad 

timing. 

Sorry for that comment. I was a German emergency doctor. I 

lived in North Korea for 11⁄2 years. I took care for 10 different hospitals, several orphanages and several kindergartens all over North 

Korea. I got a lot of access. I lived there for 11⁄2 years. And I came 

closer to those people who are in need. 

I learned about food distribution. I learned about the medical situation. The medical situation in North Korea, to make it very brief, 

there is no power. There is no electricity. There is no medicine. 

There is no bandage material. There is nothing. After 2 weeks, I 

got the opportunity to get closer to the North Korean people because there was one burnt patient of mine who suffered from his 

burns, and there was a skin donation from the North Korean people because they do not have any medical supplies, they gave their 

own skin to their citizen. 

My colleague and I, we joined this operation and afterwards we 

were awarded this friendship medal. The first two Westerners ever 

who got such a high honor, and I got closer access to the elite. I 

was invited to many, many festivities of all those generals and all 

those who are in charge of power in the foreign ministry. 

I learned about this life style in North Korea. Nice buffets and 

casinos, nightclubs—Chinese nightclubs. I was invited to all those 

facilities. I learned about internet access. I learned about satellite 

television. I learned about people who are not in need. 

And in the countryside I took care for my patients. These are the 

people in North Korea. These are the starving children. I wondered 

about the difference. I do not know where the international food 

aid is going to. I simply ask this question about the difference of 

those two pictures. I stayed in North Korea 11⁄2 years. And in the 

beginning I tried to be a Sunshine politician. I even gave my own 

skin for one of them. 

Then I changed my attitude. I saw there was some more power 

needed. There is the power of the international media needed in 

order to show what’s going on in North Korea. So I invited many, 

many of those journalists to a private tour. Together with my 

friendship medal, I got a so-called VIP passport and a private driving license. I was allowed to travel around on my own without any 

46

minor, without any guide, without any translator, without any 

driver. So I got a lot of access in North Korea. I made secretly 2500 

photos, mainly of my patients in the hospitals. But also, I made secretly a video tape of the situation in these hospitals. And I wanted 

to show it to the international journalists. 

Because this offended the North Korean authorities, I was expelled the first time. The most worst thing happened to my translator. He disappeared. I never saw him again and I never saw his 

family again. One week later, I found an obviously tortured solider 

on the middle of the road. He had cigarette burns on his back and 

marks where he was beaten—where he was whipped. I tried to get 

the evidence to show it to you. I was not allowed to do so. I was 

nearly arrested. My camera was taken away. I was disciplined 

again. I was threatened to be expelled again. So there is no possibility to get any evidence outside of North Korea. There is no possibility to get any pictures outside of so-called reform institutions. 

I learned about this reform institutions by a very simple method. 

I buy the original criminal law of North Korea in Pyongyang, and 

there it’s written in Article 46,

‘‘A person who encourage others to attempt the overthrow, the 

disruption or the undermining of the republic or to commit 

other anti-state criminal acts shall be committed to a reform 

institution for up to 7 years and there he will be reformed 

through labor.’’

I just wondered about the image of these reform institutions. I 

thought when this is the normal situation in the children’s hospital 

in North Korea, how it might have looked in those so-called reform 

institutions. These are labor camps. And you can prove it simply 

with this criminal law. So I thought the outside world has to know. 

I wanted to inform the journalists. So after I was expelled in the 

end of 2000, I went to Seoul. I published books. I spoke to the 

international journalists, but there was not nearly enough attention. 

So we tried to get more attention, more media attention. I think 

only with the power of the media we can change the situation of 

those children. I tried to contact those groups who are in charge 

to take the refugees out of North Korea. And we succeed to stage 

those incidents in Beijing at those Western embassies. And we will 

try to do more. I’m from Germany. I think I have to speak out 

about this. Even when there are only rumors about concentration 

camps in North Korea, I speak out because you know about German history. We were accused that nobody was outspoken. That 

nobody acted. We failed to act. So I think that should not happen 

again. 

I have to speak and I have to believe in the power of refugees. 

That means a land of refugees can lead to the final collapse of a 

terror regime. And North Korea is a terror regime. They are committing genocide there. They are responsible for those people. They 

are using food as a weapon against their own people. They are committing genocide, and I think we have to care. As an international 

community, we have to intervene. And when are talking here about 

food aid, we have to talk about how to get the collapse of North 

Korea—of this regime. Otherwise, we’re all responsible that we 

47

kept silent because this in North Korea are the real killing fields 

of the 21st Century. And it’s a shame that this is still existing and 

nobody knows. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Vollertsen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORBERT VOLLERTSEN, FORMER MEDICAL DOCTOR INSIDE

NORTH KOREA

I was a member of a German medical group, Cap Anamur, and entered North 

Korea in July 1999 to carry out humanitarian medical assistance. I remained in 

North Korea for 18 month until I was expelled on Dec. 30, 2000 for publicly denouncing the regime for abusing basic human rights and for its failure to distribute 

the massive foreign food aid to the people who needed it most. 

Early on during my stay I was summoned to treat a workman who had been badly 

burned by molten iron. My colleague at that time and I volunteered our own skin 

to be grafted onto this patient in order to show our friendship with the ordinary 

North Korean citizens. For this action we were nationally acclaimed by the media 

and awarded with the Friendship medal, the only two western foreigners ever to 

receive this high honor. 

Together with this medal I was issued a somewhat VIP-passport and a driver‘s 

license, which allowed me to travel to many areas inaccessible to foreigners and to 

ordinary North Koreans citizens. I even secretly photographed my patients and their 

decrepit surroundings. 

While acting as an Emergency doctor and looking for the victims of many accidents I also visited a number of other hospitals in other provinces beside the official 

ten hospitals and three orphanages I was assigned to. In order to deliver clothes 

to the North Korean children I also visited several dozens kindergartens all over 

the country side. 

In every hospital I visited I found unbelievable deprivation and I was shocked to 

see patients and orphans in these places. There were no bandages, no scalpels, no 

antibiotics, no operation facilities—only broken wooden beds supporting starving 

children waiting to die. In the hospitals the doctors were constantly using empty 

beer bottles as vessels for dripping, and safety razors as scalpels—there was even 

an appendectomy without any anaesthesia. They insisted on the serious shortage of 

medical products and equipment while I found throughout my ‘‘investigations’’ that 

there was a large stock of bandages and other medical goods in governmental storehouses and in diplomatic shops. 

There are two worlds in North Korea. The world for the senior military, the members of the workers party and the country‘s elite where they are enjoying a nice lifestyle with fancy restaurants, diplomatic shops with European food, nightclubs and 

even an casino and the world for the ordinary people. 

In the world for these ordinary people in a hospital one can see young children, 

all of them too small for their age, with hollow eyes and skin stretched tight across 

their faces, wearing blue-and-white-striped pajamas like the children in Auschwitz 

and Dachau in Hitler‘s Nazi Germany. 

Most of the patients in the hospitals suffer from psychosomatic illnesses, worn out 

by compulsory drills, the innumerable parades, the assemblies from 6:00 in the 

morning and the droning propaganda. They are tired and at the end of their tether. 

Clinical depression is rampant. Alcoholism is common because of mind numbing 

rigidities and hopelessness of life. 

The patients in the North Korean hospitals are looking exhausted and fed up. The 

condition of the children was deplorable, emaciated, stunted, mute, emotionally depleted. Young adults have no hope, no future and anxiety is everywhere. One can 

only wonder why there are so many orphans. 

Constraints and difficulties of operating in North Korea effect any accountable humanitarian aid assistance. There is no effective monitoring because there is no freedom of movement for the international humanitarian aid agencies. Nobody really 

knows where the food is going to. 

Before Cap Anamur came to North Korea other humanitarian agencies like MSF, 

OXFAM, ACF and CARE pulled out of North Korea, because they were not allowed 

to distribute the aid directly to the people. They had to turn it over to the government for the authorities to carry out the distribution and it is not possible to proof 

if a substantial portion of the foreign aid is going to the army or to those with status 

or sold to other countries. I myself did not witness any improvement in the availability of food and medicine or in the general living conditions during my whole 

staying. 

48

Knowledge about the overall humanitarian situation in North Korea is also not 

available for the normal foreign visitor, aid worker or diplomat. Protection of the 

humanitarian interests of the population is not possible. General social and political 

rights, as basic rights grants to human beings in freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration, ideology, religion and association are restricted in North 

Korea. 

There is no activity in any of the churches in Pyongyang. It is a showcase for all 

the foreign visitors. When we were shown around the ‘‘priest’’ was only talking 

about the money-investment for the church, Kim Jong-IL and his goodwill towards 

the Christian community but there was no word about religion. And—what surprised us the most—when the priest talked about the open service in the church 

every sunday morning we found all the seats in the church full of dust—never used 

in the last months, maybe years. . . . Also whenever I passed the church on a sunday morning there was actually no activity—not even one of the 300 or 400 Christians the priest was talking about. 

In North Korea the life of the workers has reached its limit, the life of the peasants is in a desperate condition too. The deprivation of the basic right to exist is 

obvious. The ordinary people are starving and dying. Violation of the freedom of personal inviolability and conscience by unwarranted arrest and detention is common 

and one can only imagine what the conditions are like in the so-called ‘‘reform institutions’’, where entire families are imprisoned when any member does or says something that offends the regime. These camps are closed to all foreigners, even the 

International Federation of the Red Cross has been denied access. 

In the last Stalinist country on earth sexual violence against women, used like 

modern ‘‘comfort women’’, forced labor and torture is an important mean for maintaining the suppression of any opposition. A repressive apparatus is acting whenever there is any criticism and the constriction of human rights by intelligence surveillance, shadowing, wiretapping and mail interception is enormous. The oppressive nature of the police forces is evident and obvious at every street corner. 

If the main medical diagnosis in North Korea is fear and depression because of 

man-made policy and not because of ‘‘natural disasters’’ one has to think about the 

right therapy and to speak out publicly about repression and human right abuses. 

I realized that the only way to rescue people in North Korea in poverty and difficulty is to let the world know the real state of this country. So according to my 

extended possibilities with the friendship medal I guided around Pyongyang a group 

of journalists accompanying Mrs Albright, the then U.S. Secretary of State who visited North Korea in the autumn of 2000. Additionally, I spoke to every diplomat and 

after I found an obviously tortured soldier I handed over a statement of humanitarian principles to the North Korean government. My so-called coordinator and 

minder at that time who was made responsible for not preventing my activities was 

exchanged. I never saw him and his family again. 

My behavior offended the leaders of the workers party and I was forbidden to go 

to the hospitals anymore, my car was sabotaged and finally I was forced to leave 

the country. As promised to the North Korean authorities I went directly to Seoul 

instead of going home to Germany and spoke to the international journalists there. 

In the following months I also interviewed several hundreds North Korean defectors 

in Seoul, at the Chinese-North Korean border and in several other places where 

they are hiding themselves in order to learn more about the cruel reality in their 

home country. 

All the former prisoners of the concentration-camps were talking about mass-execution, torture, rape, murder, baby-killing and other crimes against humanity because they were punished for any ‘‘antistate criminal acts’’. 

Working closely with the media the international community has to put pressure 

on the North Korean regime to open up toward the outside world and save the ordinary citizens lives. To improve human rights in North Korea the world has to speak 

out against the current regime. 

The regime of Kim Jong-IL is committing crimes against humanity, they are using 

food as a weapon against their own people. Kim Jong-IL is responsible for genocide, 

North Korea is a real terror state with terror against his own people and therefore 

the leadership of this country has to face the International Criminal Court in The 

Hague. 

As a German born after the war I know too well the guilt of my grandparents‘ 

generation for remaining silent while the Nazis where committing indescribable 

crimes. I felt it my duty as a human being, particularly as a German to expose the 

crimes and tyranny of the North Korean regime. 

And as a German I know about the impact of refugees who are fleeing the country. Like in former East Germany where it started with several dozen refugees in 

the West German Embassy in Prague it will lead to the final collapse of the system. 

49

After visiting the United States, Japan and Europe I will subsequently continue 

all over the world for the express purpose of exposing the tyranny and criminality 

of this secret state, with the hope that international pressure will be applied by the 

world community to bring about a reformation of this depraved ‘‘mad place’’.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Vollertsen. Before 

turning to the next witness, let me indicate a matter of congressional procedure. There will be votes on the Floor in the not too 

distant future. At which point we will have to interrupt proceedings. And so it’s possible that when one of you is talking, we 

will have to interrupt the proceeding and then reconvene at a time 

somewhat later. I apologize for the circumstance, but several very 

important issues are before the Floor this afternoon. 

Our next witness is Mr. Kim Sung-min, who is a former captain 

in the North Korean Army. We have an interpreter, Mr. Young 

Lim, who will assist him, if needed, and the other witnesses if 

needed. Mr. Kim, please proceed as you see fit. 

STATEMENT OF KIM SUNG MIN, DEFECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF 

NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS’ VOLUNTEER GROUP, COMMITTEE TO HELP NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES 

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Chairman. I wish to thank you first and I 

understand I am here to talk about the human rights issues in 

North Korea. And although I deeply thank you for your invitation, 

I am saddened that I am not at the Congress or National Assembly 

of my own country, the Republic of Korea, but rather in the United 

States Congress. 

I wish to talk you and your Committee based on my own experience on the problems of human rights and the problems of North 

Korean refugees in China. I came to South Korea in 1999. And in 

the beginning of my life in South Korea, I used to call the dear 

leader’s name only ‘‘Kim Jong-Il’’ said such and such. Then the people around me, including the South Koreans, were correcting me, 

reprimanding me that I was not using the honors such as ‘‘Dear 

Leader Kim Jong-Il.’’

Since then, a year and a half has past, and at present I still am 

to say Kim Jong-Il says so. Kim Jong-Il did such and such. Now 

I’m corrected not having called him Defense Commissioner Kim 

Jong-Il. 

The one I know, Kim Jong-Il, is the person responsible who murdered more than 1 million people of my home—my country. I also 

served in the North Korean Army. He is also responsible for having 

soldiers die of starvation and malnourishment. And he should be 

the person responsible. 

The one I know, Kim Jong-Il, is the one who orders 23 million 

North Koreans to do what he wants them to do and what his regime wants them to do. Again, considering South Korea, the one 

I know, Kim Jong-Il, is the one who caused 70 million—the entire 

Korean people—to be used for his own personal benefit. 

Sometimes it’s said that Kim Jong-Il is ignorant of the outside 

world. He does not pay attention to what’s happening other than 

in his own country, but that is not true. He is listening and watching everything that’s taking place. I’m sure he is watching and listening right now to what’s going on right here. 

50

Having said that, I wish to report to you the misery, the tragedy 

the Korean people are suffering with in North Korea today. Outside North Korea, they say North Korean soldiers are well off, living well, well fed; but that is not so. I served in the North Korean 

Army for 16 years. In 1992 and 1993 I saw 12 fellow soldiers dying 

of malnourishment. 

North Korean soldiers get rations with salt and rice, and due to 

eating only salt and rice, they would naturally be malnourished. In 

1991, North Koreans were given daily rations of rice and some 

other mixed grains and the rest was ordered to be provided by selfsufficiency. Authorities of the Army will feed the soldiers other 

than the ration of salt and rice and some other mixed grains. 

On April 15th and February 15th, two national celebration days, 

for example, Kim Il-Sung’s birthday and Kim Jong-Il’s birthday, 

soldiers were given one kilogram of pork, but it acted as if it 

poisoned the malnourished person’s empty stomach. The oil went 

inside and the soldiers would have diarrhea, and diarrhea would 

not stop. So they would die. In one year I saw 12 soldiers dying 

with my own eyes, and felt so sad and miserable. 

Mr. LEACH. If I could interrupt. I apologize to you, Mr. Kim. But 

the buzzers and the lights you see in the clock indicate that there 

is a vote on the Floor. And what I would like to do is to interrupt 

your testimony. It is extremely moving and extremely important. 

But what we will do is interrupt it for this time and then return 

and then we’ll come back to you, Mr. Kim, to finish your testimony 

before turning to the other witnesses. 

So I would like to adjourn this meeting, pending the vote, and 

indicate that we probably won’t reconvene until about 20 minutes 

after 1 o’clock. So you’re free to visit in the halls or whatever you 

may need to do during that time period. The Committee is in recess 

until 1:20 p.m. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LEACH. The Subcommittee will reconvene. And when we 

broke, Mr. Kim was in the middle of very compelling testimony. 

And I apologize to him for this interruption. But please, if you 

would proceed as he sees fit. 

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Chairman, for being kind to me and to us. 

While I was in the Army, I’ve seen people dying of starvation inside the Army and outside the Army in the neighborhoods. And according to the labor party secretary, Hwang Jang Yop, he estimated those died of starvation to be 1.5 million and 2 million. 

In order to escape death by starvation, one would flee North 

Korea. We call them escapees or refugees into China. The number 

of those refugees, according to the South Korean government, is 40 

to 45,000. But Kim Song Chul, who leads a national movement for 

the refugees, his estimate is 200,000. 

Chairman, with respect, I will not talk anymore on the inhuman 

realities of North Korea or the tragedies experienced by the North 

Korean refugees in China. 

Though I wish to report to you that, not the South Korean government, but the people in South Korea and the Korean-Americans, mainly Christians in New York and Washington, DC, are trying to hard to help North Korean refugees in China. As of April 

2002, these Korean-American christians are collecting signatures to 

51

have those North Korean refugees in China acquire status as international refugees. And I’m told that the number of signatures has 

reached 11,700,000. We also have the problem of China. They are 

challenging human conscience and the dignity of human beings, 

their humanity. But as long as we all are trying hard together such 

a barrier will be disassembled and the problem of human rights 

will be solved. I thank you so very much, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kim follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KIM SUNG MIN, DEFECTOR AND DIRECTOR OF NORTH KO- REAN DEFECTORS’ VOLUNTEER GROUP, COMMITTEE TO HELP NORTH KOREAN REFU- GEES

On October 1st, 1995, I left my hometown, where I was born and had spent more 

than 30 years, with happy and sorrowful memories. Yes, it was and still is my 

hometown. But when I was leaving, there was no one shedding tears or saying a 

prayer or two for the uncertain future ahead of me. There was not even a hint of 

sadness in that moment of separation. Having lost both parents in my early teens, 

my hometown meant nothing to me but hunger, loneliness and despair. 

Since I was fourteen, I drifted from one ’home’ to another learning how to cope 

with hunger and to read others’ faces trying to become a good boy. In 1978, as a 

seventeen-year-old boy, I was conscripted into the North Korean People’s Army, Kim 

Jong Il’s most favored organization, for 10 years and one month. During all those 

years, I was a well-trained war machine who was ready to do whatever was needed 

under the banner of ‘‘Reunify the country with the red force.’’

Upon completion of military service in 1988, I was admitted to the Kim Hyung 

Jik College of Education. When I graduated from the college four years later, I got 

a letter of appointment from the authorities, which made me an officer of the People’s Army. For a man who had spent a total of 15 years in a military uniform, the 

military spirit naturally became the supreme value of life. Nothing else could match 

that. 

Then, a thunderous news hit me one day. It was the death of ’our great leader’ 

Kim Il Sung, who had been to me, like to everyone else in North Korea, the Immortal Sun. His death was followed by bizarre and appalling rumors, such as hungry 

people killing each other to eat their flesh. As if to confirm those rumors, people 

often saw corpses of elderly people and children in dark corners of city streets or 

remote mountain trails. Every station and every street market began to be crowded 

with elderly people and children who were either abandoned or ran away for lack 

of food. 

Listening to their horror stories, I could not help but ask myself what I was doing 

as a member of the People’s Army whose duty should be to protect the people from 

all evil forces. I concluded from the terrible experiences that the politics of the Republic had nothing to do with the welfare and happiness of its people and that the 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was born only to kill democracy on this land. 

This absurd society, where one segment was busy with talks about Kim Jong Il’s 

succession as if preparing a coronation while people in other segments were starving, made me really sick. The moment of choice came for me, and I chose freedom 

and a better life. 

One day I crossed the Tumen River, the border waterway between China and 

North Korea. As I was a runaway military officer on the active list, getting caught 

meant instant execution, and every step I took on that foreign soil was crucial to 

saving my life. My only hope was to go to South Korea somehow, but I didn’t know 

how. For a North Korean refugee, finding things to eat is a major daily concern; 

no passage was open to that land of hope and safety. 

Finally, I arrived at the destination of my long journey, the Korean embassy in 

China. However, nothing was further away from my expectation than their reception. ‘‘Go away quickly and go back! What if the Chinese police catch you? We have 

no way to handle cases like yours.’’ Without knowing it, I was clenching my fists 

and my teeth, and a streak of blood was running from my mouth. They didn’t seem 

to have the slightest idea about what North Korean refugees in China like me were 

going through. 

By mentioning the Chinese police and this and that excuse, they succeeded in 

driving me away. I spat and spat at them, at their inhumanity even to their brothers. Frustrating though it was, I had no choice but to continue my personal exodus 

to the land of freedom and safety. I somehow managed to sneak to the port city of 

Dalian and was lucky to find a Korean merchant ship. As night fell, I proceeded 

52

to the ship. But then, a group of Chinese armed police rushed out of the darkness 

and handcuffed me without asking questions. 

I was escorted to the police station in Dalian’s port, and put in jail. Two days 

later, on February 24th, I was transferred to the City of Dalian’s prison, where on 

the way I was escorted by three Chinese officials, including the chief of the External 

Affairs Department of the city’s Public Security Bureau. I had to stay in that cell 

with Chinese petty criminals for about forty days, while they conducted an investigation and waited for the decision from higher authorities. Anyway, that is what 

I was told. I pleaded with them whenever I found the opportunity, often with tears, 

not to send me back to North Korea, saying, ‘‘I would rather stay here in prison 

all my life than go back and be executed.’’ It was useless. Soon I was transferred 

to Tumen, under the escort of five armed guards. 

The fact that Tumen is a border town near North Korea was good enough to drive 

me into a state of terror. Looking at those who took me in, I realized instantly that 

they were specialists in dealing with refugees from North Korea, like me. The first 

thing they told me to do was to take off all my clothes to search for something only 

they knew. I had to give them all I had, my body and clothes, so they could do their 

‘‘search,’’ trembling with shame and fear. Then, they roughly pushed me to a wall, 

and began taking pictures of my front, my back, my sides and every part of me. 

Abysmal shame and terror overpowered me, and I became an animal that was half 

dead. 

After the search, they dragged me further inside through 2 sets of iron doors, and 

put me into a tiny prison cell, which I shared with seven of my countrymen who 

had also escaped from North Korea for a variety of reasons. The room had neither 

windows nor a ventilation system. The heavy iron door I had just passed through 

was the only path to the outside world. I wondered if I would die from lack of oxygen, even though my cellmates assured me that no one had died because of that, 

at least until then. In the room there was a spy camera at one corner of the ceiling, 

a toilet pot like a toy, and several pieces of dirty, ragged blankets and pillows. 

This is one of the detention camps located at the border between China and North 

Korea, which China built to put away the North Korean refugees they catch. The 

detention camp at Tumen, which is managed by special agents of the Chinese Security Bureau (similar to the U.S. CIA), Jilin Province, is completely segregated from 

the outside world by high walls and barbed wire. Even within the camp building, 

every movement by inmates is closely monitored and controlled by the three iron 

doors and one prison gate as well as the well-trained guards. 

What is waiting for these refugees is forced repatriation to North Korea, a situation they want to avoid at any cost. To prevent refugees from taking any drastic 

action, camp officials often cajole them by saying that they might send them to the 

so-called ‘‘Farm for Brainwashing through Labor’’ in China rather than send them 

back to North Korea if the refugees cooperate with them by adhering to the camp 

regulations. That is why inmates try to survive in the camp. 

One should have been smart enough to realize that what they were saying were 

complete lies, and taken certain resolute measures. But in such an unusual situation, people often make the wrong decision, and so did I. I decided to stay calm and 

cooperate with them, hoping to be transferred some day to the farm they talked 

about. I gave honest answers to their questions about when and where I had been 

in China, and whom I met and for what reason, etc., etc. Their interrogation lasted 

for days, often interrupted because they wanted to check if I was giving correct answers. 

Then, one day I was told to come out to the prison yard, where two soldiers were 

waiting for my arrival. They dashed over to me, handcuffed me, and pushed me into 

a van. The van was already on the Tumen Bridge even before I knew what was 

going on. It takes only five minutes to the Tumen Bridge by van from the camp. 

By the time I realized what was happening to me, I was right there in North Korea, 

the last place I wanted to be on earth. 

I was handed over to a group of North Korean soldiers that took part in the ritual 

of changing handcuffs, from Chinese to North Korean state property. As if well prepared for my arrival, the North Korean soldiers dragged me to Kim Il Sung’s Tower 

of Immortality, a monument erected at a place directly opposite the Domun (Tumen) 

Customs House. There, a man who said he was the director of Onseong-gun Office 

of the National Defense Agency, the powerful military organization that could be 

compared to the CIA of the U.S., introduced me to a crowd of civilians who were 

gathered around the tower for my arrival, using the term ‘‘bandong-bunja (reactionary),’’ a title that I had become so familiar with. 

He told the crowd to look at me closely to see what a traitor looked like, and had 

me walk among them. Angry shouts of ‘‘you, dirty rat,’’ ‘‘you, betrayer,’’ and ‘‘die, 

you turncoat’’ were shouted at me. Some spat in my face, and some threw their 

53

shoes at me. Then, I was hit by a stone on my forehead, and heard loud cheers coming from the crowd. The cheering made these people even more excited, and soon 

my face and head became covered with blood from the stones hitting me. I kept 

walking, and cursed not them, my poor countrymen, but myself, for the stupidity 

of having not killed myself in front of the Korean Embassy or while in the detention 

camp in Tumen. After the ritual, I was escorted to the Onseong-gun Office of the 

National Defense Agency. 

I have heard that there are talks about North Korean refugees going on at the 

United Nations, whether the refugees should be treated as political refugees or illegal immigrants who left their country just for economic reasons. One thing I can 

say to those who are involved in the debate is that in North Korea all North Koreans who escaped their country with reasons similar to mine are treated as political 

offenders. My case clearly shows this. As soon as I was taken into the building of 

the Onseong-gun’s NDA, they started to ’interrogate’ me under the charge of high 

treason. It was an interrogation session conducted more by physical abuse than by 

words. 

They didn’t ask me who I was, where I lived, what I did at home and abroad and 

why I committed such a horrible crime of betraying my own country. It wasn’t important to them, or perhaps they already knew all about me and others who were 

in the same situation. They broke my fingers, ballooned my face, and pickled my 

whole body in dark blood. After going through the hell of the ‘‘preliminary interrogation’’ that seemed to last forever, I was then put in a prison cell where lice and fleas 

were waiting for me. Every minute I prayed to God to put an end to my suffering, 

to take my life. 

After eight days of imprisonment in the Onseong-gun Office of the NDA, I was 

put on a train to Pyongyang, escorted by armed guards from the Headquarters of 

the NDA. ‘‘You too are a poor little thing,’’ said the military officer leading the 

guards, in response to my question of where we were going. ‘‘Don’t you know? What 

do you think a thing like you deserves but execution by a firing squad? Your colleagues are waiting for you, and there will be a public trial for you five days from 

now,’’ he added. 

Now was the time to get myself killed, I thought. I couldn’t bear the thought of 

being shot dead as a traitor to the Republic in front of the soldiers I had once led 

as their captain. I made the decision to jump off the train, even if to be killed by 

the train wheels. Passing by Sinseongchon Station near Pyongyang, I jumped off the 

running train, and found that I once again had become a free man instead of a dead 

man. I ran and ran and ran toward the north. On April 3rd, I crossed the Tumen 

River again to re-start life as an illegal immigrant, which would last for nearly four 

years. Thanks to God, my horror story suddenly took a turn for the best on February 9th, 1999, when I was admitted to the country where I always wanted to be, 

the Republic of Korea, which was, and still is, a true Republic to me. 

Now, as a man who survived all kinds of inhuman conditions through the valley 

of the shadow of death and now living in a free society, I have something to tell 

the conscience of mankind. What I have to say is, of course, about the North Korean 

refugees in China, a group of people, including children and women, who are leading 

among the most tragic of lives in the world today. No one exactly knows how many 

there are. The suggested figures among humanitarian groups or concerned government officials vary widely from none to thousands or even to millions. 

The truth is that a great number of these refugees are being caught, treated 

inhumanely and repatriated by force back to ‘‘their own country’’ to be drowned, tortured, maimed, hanged, or shot to death. Pretending not to have seen anything, we 

have encouraged those who inflict indescribable pain, both mental and physical, on 

these helpless human beings. It is a great shame for both Korea and the world. I 

plead particulary with people in the South to pay closer attention to the horrific situation which their brothers and sisters are subjected to. It cannot be a matter just 

for the Chinese and North Korean governments. It is a matter to be dealt with by 

the South Korean government from a historical perspective as well as a matter over 

which the future generations of reunified Korea will ponder again and again. 

It is too cruel, or too foolish, for parents to haggle with doctors over hospital fees 

when there is a loving baby dying in an emergency room. There certainly are laws 

and procedures to be followed in international affairs, but I believe that the universal law of human rights should come first. We should do everything to make this 

clear for the reactionary governments of China and North Korea until they give up 

their policies of killing innocent people. The tragedy of North Korean refugees 

should end right now.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Kim. Ms. Lee? 

54

STATEMENT OF SUN-OK LEE, FORMER PRISON AND CAMP 

SURVIVOR 

Ms. LEE. Chairman Leach, my name is Lee Sun-Ok, who escaped 

North Korea in search of freedom into South Korea with my son, 

Choi Dong Chul. Today, I have an opportunity to provide testimony 

to your Committee, and I thank you very much for such an opportunity. 

Before I report to you of my own personal experiences, I wish to 

cover in summary to help your understanding of the current status 

of human rights violations in North Korea. 

If I describe in one word the status of North Korean human 

rights, the best concept for Westerners would be that such thing 

does not exist. The people of North Korea do not even have the 

term ‘‘human rights.’’ And even if they did, they wouldn’t know the 

basis of human rights. They do not understand human rights. 

Kim Jong-Il’s regime is neither socialism nor communism. Its political system is Kim Jong-Il’s own one person, one party political 

system. In order to maintain his dictatorial regime, he has established numerous political prisons and camps. When the international organizations demand those political prisoners to be freed 

from those camps and prisons, North Korea’s answer is provided in 

a lie that there are no political prisons or camps. 

There are political prison camps in 12 different regions in North 

Korea. They euphemistically call these political prisons or camps to 

be reform institutes or reform facilities. And in one facility, one institute, there could be from 6,000 prisoners up to 10,000 prisoners. 

The biggest one would even have 30,000. The dictatorial regime of 

Kim Jong-Il unconditionally imprisons those who are critical of his 

dictatorship. Those who are in the political prisons or the reform 

institutes number nearly 200,000. 

Those who are held at the reform institute or facility are deprived of even the very basic rights as a human being. And they 

are excluded from demographic statistics in North Korea. So they 

could be called inhuman human beings. Those who are held in the 

reform institute or the facility are not free to even talk to each 

other. And in the case of women, they are prohibited to give birth 

to babies. 

In North Korea, even today, guilt by association is applied and 

it’s a crime. If one member of the family is determined to be put 

into reform institute, the entire family has to follow him or her to 

the reform institute. That applied to myself also. Once I was taken 

to the reform institute, my family, including my husband and son, 

were expelled from the positions they were holding and put into 

the camp for forced labor. 

Right now, currently, horrible things are taking place in North 

Korean reform institutes or political prisons and camps unimaginable by the people in the West. In North Korea there is an annual 

pre-plan for how many people have to be taken into those political 

prisons and camps. In order to achieve such a quota, innocent people are tortured to make false confessions. 

In my case, also, I suffered. I was an innocent person, but I had 

to suffer 14 months in a secret underground torture room. At that 

time, I was working as a head of a local material supply center. 

And my crime was that as the person in charge I was neglectful 

55

of properly dispensing the material under my charge. But Kim 

Jong-Il was responsible and he was unable to give me the material 

for my distribution for the local residents. 

Suffering these various types of tortures, I lost left side teeth, 

eight of them. And also on the left side of my face, I still have the 

facial paralysis as the after effect of the torture. 

In the reform institute in Kaechon where I was held, there were 

200 women housewives as prisoners. In the case of these women, 

if any is pregnant, the baby would be killed. If a baby’s mom was 

a political criminal, inside her the baby is the same political criminal. So the seed of a political criminal should not be allowed to be 

born. That’s why the baby was killed inside of her. 

I have seen the true scenes of killing babies inside and those babies could be 7-, 8-, 9-months-old. Despite all this, if a baby was 

strong enough to live on, I saw a medical officer stepping on the 

baby’s neck with his boots once he or she was born. If the mom 

would cry for help to save her child, it was an expression of dissatisfaction against the party. So such a woman would be dragged 

out of the building and put to public execution by firing squad. 

The North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Il, is not interested in acquiring any foodstuffs for the people. But he is busy producing ammunition on a huge scale, too much ammunition, that will be used 

to kill his own people. 

At this public execution by firing squad of a weak woman, she 

was tied to a iron post. There were six in the firing squad and each 

had three rounds of ammunition, firing at the weak woman’s chest. 

So she was shot by 18 rounds in her chest. While the mom was 

watching, the baby was killed, taken out, put in a bucket, and 

taken to the laboratory for experimentation. 

I have seen so many people put to death at Kaechon during my 

7 years in the reform institute. Things that should not be done by 

a human being are being done. 

Not a laboratory rat, but a live human body is being used for experimentation. 

The worst kind of political criminal in North Korea is considered 

to be one who believes in God or Heaven rather than the great 

leader god of North Korea. I have seen hundreds who suffered pain 

all their lives and were finally killed at the Kaechon reform institute only because they said they believed in God. 

The family members of those were imprisoned, even a 3-year old 

granddaughter or grandson, only because their grandfather was a 

Christian. They were all put in together in the family camp. In 

1990 I had an opportunity to go and see Kaechon political camp, 

which was next to where I was at, the Kaechon reform institute. 

That’s where I saw the children isolated in their own children’s 

camp and mothers are isolated away from their children in mothers’ camp. 

Those children who stayed there for more than 10 years, for example, would not be able to recognize their mother’s face. I have 

spent 7 years in a political reform institute and I have seen horrors 

and tragedies of the worst kind. And I wish to ask the international community if such a regime in North Korea could ever be 

forgivable? 

56

In my case, my loving husband and son, only because they were 

members of my family, had to live so long in such a painful place. 

I believe the international community, including the Republic of 

Korea, is being cheated by the Kim Jong-Il regime. As I sit in front 

of you to provide testimony, I’m full of honor and a sense of duty 

that I should continue on sitting here and work until the day the 

North Korean political system crumbles down and, thanks to the 

international community’s public opinion, those horrible political 

prisons and camps are disestablished. 

I only wish for all of us who are sitting here to imagine that each 

and every member of our family is suffering in that political prison. 

And with such a consistent and long-lasting interest I hope the 

North Korean people will be helped. The population of 23 million 

people in North Korea is only a pawn held by Kim Jong-Il. 

In the 1980s North Korea was not open to the rest of the world 

or to the international community, but it is open because Kim 

Jong-Il is asking for economic and food aid. He is asking for help. 

North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il comments on South Korea’s Sunshine 

policy are:

‘‘South Korea’s Sunshine policy was successful to make South 

Koreans take off their jacket, but not the coat I’m wearing.’’

I have lived through almost 50 years in North Korea with all 

these pains under such a harsh dictatorship. And I know the system so well, therefore, my disappointment is greater. In talking to 

North Korea the priority the international community should be 

set on, to include South Korea, is not dialogue with North Korea. 

It should be the international community’s demand by public opinion that improvement in human rights in North Korea should proceed in order to have any dialogue. 

All the support and aid given to North Korea from the international community, including South Korea, was successful in only 

in the aspect that it prolonged Kim Jong-Il’s regime. Since the 

North Korean regime is having its own people in their own country 

starved, naturally, there will be many who escape away from home 

to China, to South Korea, since they couldn’t make a living in their 

own country. And now they are homeless wanderers and starving, 

asking for food. 

A person like me, guilty of having been born in North Korea was 

forced to leave home, North Korea. Those who left North Korea and 

escaped to other countries are not taken care of by the international community. I escaped North Korea, went to Beijing and 

found the South Korean Embassy in Beijing. Holding my son’s 

hand, I entered the South Korean Embassy in Beijing and asked 

for political asylum. 

The South Korean Embassy in Beijing coldly rejected and expelled us out of the facility, myself and my son. This has happened 

not only to me, but also to many, many people who run away from 

North Korea. Currently, today, there are these people who do not 

have their own nation, who are not attended to by the international community, and they are living a beggar’s life. 

It is high time for the international community, including South 

Korea, to hold Kim Jong-Il responsible. I do not believe there could 

be such a ruler who could rule his or her people while unable to 

57

feed them. I believe the one leader who could not be held responsible for his own people should be expelled out of the international 

community. 

Eighty percent of the annual budget of North Korea is used for 

manufacturing and in the sales of weapons systems for war. 

Out of a sense of duty, I wrote a book about the cruel realities 

taking place in North Korean political prisons and reform institutes. I am with you, Chairman, at the U.S. Congress as a witness 

to provide testimony for the third time today. I am a Korean but 

I cannot work for the Korean people—for the human rights of the 

North Korean people in Korea. Every time I appear before you I 

am full of a sense of shame. 

South Korea is looking the other way as if the problem of human 

rights in North Korea is a thing happening in a far, far away land. 

I do recognize and believe in the importance of economic exchange 

and mutual dialogue. But without any progress in the human 

rights area, everything else will not succeed, will not prevail. 

I wish to ask you in greatest sincerity once again to all who are 

present here today, I wish to ask you. Perhaps it is out of place 

to make such a request because it’s such a difficult and big request. 

In order to see any progress in the North Korean human rights violations and North Korean repression of human rights, our efforts 

should not be a one-time political issue. But I would ask you now 

to continue on until the day the problem of human rights in North 

Korea would end. 

Chairman, thank you so much for allowing me to talk for a quite 

lengthy time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUN-OK LEE, FORMER PRISON AND CAMP SURVIVOR

I was a normal gullible North Korean citizen, loyal to Leader and Party, and believed that North Korea was a people’s paradise. I was the Director of the Government Supply Office for party cadres for 14 years when I was arrested in 1984 under 

the false charge of embezzlement of state property. I was subjected to severe torture 

during a 14-month preliminary investigation until I was forced to admit to the false 

charges against her. Eventually, I received a term of 13 years in prison at a kangaroo court. I had served 5 years and two months in prison when I was released 

in 1992 under a surprise amnesty. 

During the first six months in the prison, I had worked briefly at all of the factories in the prison before I was finally assigned accounting work due to my background as an accountant. My routine responsibilities included updating prisoners’ 

list by deleting the dead from it and adding new arrivals to it, allocation of meals 

and work quotas, updating work accomplished, collecting daily work reports, carrying new work instructions to all work sites, and so on. 

Thus, I had access to records of numbers of inmates and production plans, etc., 

and was privileged to daily visit all factories in the prison in both men’s and women’s sectors. I survived her over five years of ordeal because of the opportunity to 

walk to all the work sites every day which other prisoners could not and because 

I had relatively easy work in an office as an accountant with the prison officials. 

I surrendered to South Korea in December 1995 with my son Dong-chul Choi. I 

published a book, The Bright Eyes of the Tailless Beasts in Seoul in December 1996 

to inform the world of these crimes against humanity by the North Korean government. With the help of a volunteer art student, I has produced the following illustrations to show the world the reality of the North Korean crimes against humanity. 

In addition to the detention settlements for political prisoners, there are two or 

three secret political prisons. Prisoners accused of violating policies of the party are 

imprisoned here through kangaroo court. I was a prisoner at one of these political 

prisons. 

I recollects life in the North Korean prison:

58

‘‘A prisoner has no right to talk, laugh, sing or look in a mirror. Prisoners 

must kneel down on the ground and keep their heads down deeply whenever 

called by a guard, they can say nothing except to answer questions asked. 

Women prisoners’ babies are killed on delivery. Prisoners have to work as 

slaves for 18 hours daily. Repeated failure to meet the work quotas means a 

week’s time in a punishment cell. A prisoner must give up her human worth. 

When I was released, some 6,000 prisoners, both men and women, were crying 

and pleading with me in their hearts to let the outside world know of their suffering. How can I ever forget their eyes, the eyes of the tailless beasts?’’

After release, I could have lived peacefully in North Korea and enjoyed my previous status as a senior party member because people all knew that I was innocent. 

However, I decided to risk my own life to inform the world of the Kim Jung II’s 

crimes against humanity. I testifies that most of the 6,000 prisoners who were there 

when I arrived in 1987 had quietly perished under the harsh prison conditions by 

the time I was released in 1992. This shows that about 1,000 prisoners died each 

year and a fresh supply of new prisoners was obtained each year in order to meet 

the production quotas! I recalls that I was the only prisoner released during the 

term of my imprisonment. The only exception I can recall is a group of some 250 

prisoners, Koreans from Japan. They had arrived there from Yodok detention settlement, I was told, several months before my arrival. On the day of the 30th anniversary of the signing of agreement between North Korea and Japan for returning Korean residents from Japan to North Korea (shortly after her arrival at the prison), 

they were sent to an unknown location. 

North Korean Kangaroo Court

EXPERIENCED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The preliminary trial was for 10:00 am at my former office, where I worked for 

17 years as a loyal party member. I asked for my husband before entering the court. 

‘‘Your husband is not here. Don’t ever try to meet anybody else, understand?’’ was 

the reply. Don’t I even get to see my husband on the day of my trial? 

I met my lawyer for the first time in the courtroom. The court consisted of a 

judge, prosecutor, lawyer and a two-member ‘‘jury.’’ My interrogator was there also. 

The judge made a few remarks about the charges against me and asked me if I accepted the charge. 

I had promised the interrogators earlier that I would accept the charge, but I simply could not control myself at that moment. ‘‘Your Honor, I have neither embezzled 

government property nor violated any of the party policy. Never, never! I am innocent. Please allow me a fair investigation.’’ The two guards at my sides shouted, 

‘‘You must be crazy!’’ and started to kick me in the knees. At that moment, the 

judge declared the preliminary trial closed. The trial lasted less than 15 minutes! 

It was very cold on November 9, 1987, my trial day. In the morning, the interrogators repeated their warning, ‘‘You better be careful what you say in court or your 

husband and son will be in serious trouble. Remember that!’’ (I did not know that 

my husband, in fact, had already been exiled internally!) However, I was firmly determined to do what I could to prove my innocence to the party officials and my 

husband. I was still so naive and excited by the idea of meeting my husband and 

telling him loudly, in the court room, all about my sufferings. 

After the preliminary trial which lasted less than 15 minutes, I was detained at 

the police cell for the formal trial until five o’clock in the afternoon. I was given no 

water and food. The interrogators persistently harassed me with the same threat, 


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‘‘What about your husband and son? If you accept the charge in court, they will be 

safe. Otherwise, you know what’s going to happen to them.’’

At court in the afternoon, I had to say yes when the judge asked me, ‘‘Do you 

accept the charges against you?’’ There was no evidence produced nor any witnesses 

against me. The judge made no reference to the absence of evidence and witnesses 

and committed me to a 13-year imprisonment in violation of the government commercial policy and state property embezzlement. The lawyer remained silent 

throughout the entire court proceeding. The mere formality to send me to prison 

was thus over under the pretext of a trial. 

Underground Emergency Execution Chamber

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, A FORMER FEMALE PRISONER

Near the prison gate, there is a huge iron gate that leads to the underground tunnels. Guards often remind the prisoners that their lives are considered disposable 

and that they can be collectively annihilated at any time in the underground tunnels. The tunnels, of course, can be blasted at any time, leaving no traces of massacre. It is said that the underground space is so large that it can accommodate several thousand prisoners at one time. The male prisoners’ sector has a huge underground factory for the production of ammunition and weapons. I have never been 

to the underground weapon factory myself but I have frequently heard prison officials talking about it. I do not know whether the underground tunnels in the women’s sector are connected to the men’s underground factory. 

I often saw fumes coming from a distant chimney atop a nearby hill. I was told 

that the chimney is one of the ventilators of the underground tunnels. 

Meals for Prisoners

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

Salt soup

100 grams of broken corn, full meal

80 grams of broken corn, reduced for punishment

60 grams of broken corn, reduced for punishment 

Prisoners’ Sleeping Conditions

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON


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Some eighty to ninety prisoners sleep in a flea-infested chamber about six meters 

long by five meters wide (about 19 feet by 16 feet). Some eighty percent of the prisoners are housewives. The prison chamber is so congested that sleeping there is 

itself a torture. Prisoners sleep on the floor, squeezed together, head and feet alternating. So, prisoners sleep with the stinking feet of other prisoners right under their 

nose. They roll up their clothes for pillows. 

During the winter, prisoners share body heat against the cold wind coming under 

the floor. However, during the summer, it is so stuffy with the sweat and stink of 

the prisoners that they prefer sleeping at the work site even though it means more 

work. 

Two prisoners must stand on night duty for one-hour shifts. The following morning, prisoners on night duty must report to the prison authorities all the details of 

their duty including the sleep talking of other prisoners. They get their duty hour 

extended if caught sleeping. 

Evening Roll Call

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The prisoners are divided into units and teams and must always act collectively 

by group under the slogan, ‘‘All Actions by Unit and Team!’’ Prisoners get up, line 

up for roll call, proceed to work, take meals, go to the toilet, finish work and go 

to bed collectively and at the mercy of the prison authorities. 

At the end of the day’s grueling work, the prisoners are so tired and exhausted 

that many of them experience physical problems returning to the prison chamber 

promptly. This means that the other prisoners in the same unit have to wait and 

sleep less. Every night, it is a hellish experience that lasts for an hour or even 

longer: the calling of prisoners for others, or repeated roll calls, and prisoners desperate to go to sleep as soon as possible. 

The Kaechon Women’s Prison comprises the following eleven work units: miscellaneous factory, export factory, shoe-making factory, leather/rubber factory, clothing 

factory, fabric-cutting factory, work preparation unit, maintenance unit, drop-out 

punishment unit, farm unit and kitchen unit. 

The prisoners must always keep their heads down at work and avoid other movement unnecessary for work. More than half of the female prisoners have lumps on 

their head or shoulders and are hunchbacks or crippled. Most female prisoners 

working in the shoe factory are baldheaded. 

The entire unit is responsible for the mistakes of any one prisoner in the team. 

As a result, newcomers are not welcome because the entire unit will have to work 

more and go to bed later because of the newcomer’s failure to move and work fast 

enough. 


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Prisoners and Prison Guards

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

At all the factories, there are glass boxes for prison guards to sit in while supervising prisoners at work. The glass walls enable them to watch the prisoners at 

work while avoiding their terrible stench. In addition, the prison guards always 

wear masks and keep some distance from the prisoners because of the bad smell. 

As standard practice, a prisoner must run to the official and sit down on her 

knees with her head down whenever she is called. The prisoner can only answer 

the questions asked and cannot say anything else. Prisoners are very often kicked 

in the face or breast for slow answers or movement. The prisoners are severely punished for raising their heads or stretching their bodies. 

Punishment Cells, Chambers of Death

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The punishment cell is one of the most dreaded punishments for all prisoners. 

The cells are usually 60 cm wide and 110 cm high. Therefore, the prisoners have 

no room to stand up, stretch their legs or lie down. They cannot even lean against 

the walls because they are too jagged. There are twenty such cells for female prisoners and 58 cells for male prisoners. They are usually detained for seven to ten 

days as punishment for certain offenses, such as leaving an oily mark on clothes, 

failing to memorize the president’s New Year message or repeated failure to meet 

work quotas. 

When the prisoners are released from the cells, their legs are badly bent, with 

frostbite in the winter, and so they can hardly walk. Many victims are permanently 

crippled from the lack of adequate exercise and eventually died as a result of the 

work resumed immediately after the release. The prisoners call the punishment cell 

‘‘Chilsong Chamber,’’ meaning a black angel’s chamber of death. 

In November 1989, I was detained in the punishment cell for a week for attempting to cover-up a faulty piece of shirt made by a 20 yearold girl. The young girl was 

sent to the torture chamber and never seen again. Among other things, the freezing 

cold wind from the toilet hole made the experience extremely painful. During the 

summer, the prisoners struggle to brush thousands of maggots back into the toilet 

hole. 

After being released, I had problems walking for 15 days but I was able to recover 

because my job gave me the needed opportunity to walk to all corners of the prison 

with work instructions. 

They say it is a day of great fortune if a prisoner finds a rat creeping up from 

the bottom of the toilet hole. The prisoners catch it with their bare hands and deVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

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vour it raw, as rats are the only source of meat in the prison. They say the wonderful taste of a raw rat is unforgettable. If they are caught eating a rat, however, the 

punishment is extended. So they have to be very careful when catching and eating 

a rat. 

Prisoners Can Use Communal Toilets Only Twice a Day

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

There is one collective toilet, one meter wide and two meters long, for every 300 

prisoners. Five or six prisoners use the toilet together at the same time. The first 

group leaves work for the toilet with a wooden pass. Then, they return to work with 

the pass. The next group is then allowed to visit the toilet collectively with the pass. 

In this way, the prisoners use the toilet only twice a day in group shifts, not when 

they need to. The prisoners squat on a slope and evacuate onto a sloped floor. There 

is only one hole at the end of the toilet. 

Please note the toilet duty prisoner holding a wooden pass in the above drawing. 

The prisoner on toilet duty must stay inside the toilet for 17–18 hours a day. They 

are normally old and crippled women who are not fit to work. They look horrible 

with faces swollen and yellow from the stench. Some prisoners prefer the job because of the guarantee of a full ration meal, but they normally die within a year. 

Prisoners Die After Spending Time in Punishment Cell

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

Hun-sik Kim was the principal of Pyongyang Light Engineering College. She was 

sentenced to a 5-year imprisonment for suggesting to the City Education Board that 

her students’ labor responsibility be reduced so that they could spend more time 

studying. 

In prison, she was assigned the work of measuring fabric to produce jackets, 

which were to be given as gifts to workers outside by the President on his birthday. 

One time, she miscalculated the imported nylon fabric but immediately corrected 

the error and no fabric was wasted. However, she was detained in the punishment 

cell for ten days for ‘‘attempting sabotage.’’ She was crippled and partly paralyzed 

when she was released from the punishment cell. On a very hot summer day in August, the camp doctors burned her bottom with heated stones to see if she could feel 

pain. Just before she died a few weeks later, she whispered to me, with a twittered 

tongue and tears in her eyes, ‘‘I want to see the blue sky. You know my children 

are waiting for me.’’

When she was released from the punishment cell, she needed two prisoners to 

help her walk to the work site and back. The camp officials claimed that she was 

feigning injury, and yelled, 

‘‘You bitch! Who do you think you are fooling?’’

She was kicked around like a soccer ball by the guards but withstood the insults 

and beatings for about a month. She suffered injuries all over her body while pulling 

herself up. The sores began to badly suppurate from the infections. She often fainted. She was sent to the sick room but she had to continue her work in the sick 

room. I was in the same room because I was a paratyphoid patient. One day in August, the camp doctors burned her with heated stones to see if she could feel pain. 


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I could smell flesh burning, and felt like vomiting and fainting. I remembered what 

the camp official told me when I first arrived at the camp, ‘‘You must give up all 

your rights as a human!’’ She never felt any pain when her flesh was burning. 

From that day on, she could not control urination and evacuation. I was suffering 

from a high fever myself but tried my best to caress her burnt wounds with the 

dirty cloth the doctors gave me. She said to me, with a twittered tongue and tears 

in her eyes, 

‘‘I want to see the blue sky. You know my children are waiting for me.’’

The next few days, I felt very sick and was unconscious myself, so nobody looked 

after her as she kept moaning. 

A few days later, I came to myself, crawled to her and removed the cloth from 

her wound. I was shocked to see the wound full of maggots! She died that night. 

I shouted to a guard through the small door hole, 

‘‘Sir, somebody died here.’’

The reply was, 

‘‘So what? You bitch! Don’t panic. Wait until morning!’’

I found the floor full of maggots the following morning. I had to brush the floor 

with my bare hands and pick up the maggots into a vinyl bag. I told myself, ‘‘You 

must not die like this. You must survive and tell the whole world about it.’’

Patients Left to Die under Quarantine

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

I was sequestered in a patient room and left there to die twice, in 1989 and 1992. 

Paratyphoid spread among the prisoners in May 1989. Many prisoners complained 

of pain in the abdomen and high fever before fainting. The prison doctor ordered 

them quarantined in a small room. Some fifty patients were put into a tiny room, 

so small that patients were placed on top of one another. Those who were conscious 

reached out their hands for help; those who were unconscious simply remained underneath and died. 

Yong-hi, a 19 year-old girl, was brought to the prison with her mother. She called 

her mom in a feeble voice for an apple and a little water before she died under the 

other patients. Her mother was working at the miscellaneous factory and did not 

know that her daughter perished there. 

One day, I woke up to hear the voice of Shin-ok Kim, the prisoner/nurse. ‘‘How 

is it that you are still alive? Everybody else died. Get out from there.’’ I was among 

the few lucky patients who survived the ordeal. When I somehow recovered from 

the disease, I was sent to report to the medical room. On this occasion, I witnessed 

the killing of babies in the medical room. 

So Much Punishment and Loss of Life to Meet Export Deadline

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

To meet the deadlines for export, the prisoners often worked until one o’clock in 

the morning or, for many months, the prisoners slept two to four hours at the work 

site. They ate, worked and slept in the same place. The standard export items all 

year around were clothing and different kinds of brushes. They were for markets 

in Europe, Japan and Hong Kong. 

On an ad hoc basis, prisoners produced rose decorations of various colors, each 

prisoner producing 60 pieces an hour or 1,000 pieces a day, for export to France 

(September 1990 to February, 1991). They produced some 900,000 pieces of brasVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

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sieres for export to Russia for $2 a piece (May to November 1988), and countless 

pieces of sweaters to Japan (February to August, 1991). 

There were big water pans for the prisoners to wash their hands clean frequently. 

Each prisoner was given a piece of white cloth to cover their dirty laps and keep 

the products clean. The finished products were beautifully packed and shipped for 

export. 

The prisoners often fall asleep while working and wake up when their fingers are 

injured by the sewing machine. They apply sewing machine oil on the wound and 

continue to work. They have to hide their bleeding fingers for fear of punishment 

for sleeping. So much punishment and loss of life for the sake of meeting the export 

deadline! I was informed that the foreign exchange earned was spent to supply imported television sets and refrigerators for the security and police officers. 

Dead Prisoners Buried under Fruit trees

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

Many prisoners died from hard work, poor treatment, and beatings. The dead bodies were often buried under the fruit trees in the prison orchard. The fruits (apples, 

pears, peaches, and plums) from the Kaechon orchard have earned a reputation for 

their large size and sweet taste. They are reserved for senior party and police officials. 

On one occasion, 150 corpses were rolled up in straw mats and buried under the 

fruit trees. The families were never informed and the bodies can no longer be identified. 

I remember some of the victims who disappeared under the trees. Kwang-ok Cho, 

a 62-year old housewife from Shinuiju city, who was arrested for trying to obtain 

a blanket in the black market for her daughter’s wedding gift; In-suk Kim, a middleaged housewife whose husband died in a mine accident and who often cried out in 

her dreams the names of her three children left behind at home; Dok-sun Kim, a 

middle-aged housewife from Chongjin city who was terribly worried about her old 

parents; Sa-won Kim, a housewife from Kosong-kun, whose handicapped husband 

badly needed her; Jong-shim Lee, a 19 year-old girl. Once, a group of dead prisoners 

were buried collectively at a location near the chestnut forest outside the prison. 

Freezing Torture

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

One winter night in 1987 when I was under investigation at the Chongjin Police 

Station, the interrogator yelled, ‘‘Bitch! You’ve been spoiled by the warmth in the 

interrogation room. I’m gonna teach you a lesson!’’ He made me sit outside wearing 

my underclothes only. It was freezing cold outside. I was showered with a bucket 

of cold water and left on my knees for an hour. It was here where I saw other prisoners for the first time. There were some ten prisoners on their knees before me 

on the ground looking like grotesque boulders. The freezing torture was repeated 

every night throughout the winter. Six prisoners died from this torture. 

There were some ten prisoners on their knees before me on the ground. I was told 

to sit in the front. I walked through the other prisoners to the front. It was so cold 

that the guard went right back into the office. I heard a low voice, ‘‘Hey, Comrade 

Soon-ok, it’s me here!’’ It was Younghwan Choi, the Supply Manager of Hweryung 


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District! Soon, I was able to recognize the familiar faces of five former colleagues. 

They had all been arrested under the same false charges that I was. They all realized that if they died from the torture, they would be perishing under false charges. 

So they all displayed strong will power to overcome the torture and survive. 

However, I witnessed a total of 6 prisoners die from this freezing torture during 

the winter. The cold was very painful on my hands, legs and ears for the first 20 

to 30 minutes. But after that, I felt nothing at all. When we were told after one 

hour to get up, we were literally frozen and could not stand up. We all fell several 

times before we somehow managed to rise and stumble back into our cold cells. 

Soon, I had large swollen ears. My feet were so swollen that I could not put on 

my shoes. Water was running from the sores in my swollen legs. When I finally left 

the interrogation center and arrived at the prison, a prison official told me to apply 

pine resin from the shoe-making factory. The resin melted all my flesh and I could 

see some of the bones in my feet. However, because of the resin, fresh flesh began 

to cover the bones and, after six months, I had normal feet again. I cannot remember when my swollen ears recovered. 

Water Torture

EXPERIENCED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

One day in early March 1997, I was taken into a torture chamber that I had 

never been in before. I saw a big kettle on a small table and a low wooden table 

with straps, about 20 centimeters high. By surprise, one of the two interrogators 

tripped me with his leg. They strapped me on to the table and forced the kettle 

spout into my mouth. The spout was made so that it forced my throat wide open 

and I could not control the water running into my body. Close to suffocation, I had 

to breathe through my nose. My mouth was full of water and it overflowed from 

my nose. As I began to faint from the pain and suffocation, I could not see anything 

but felt sort of afloat in the air. I had been through all kinds of torture, such as 

whippings, beatings with rubber bands or hard sticks, or hand twisting with wooden 

sticks between my ten fingers, but this was worse. 

I do not remember how long it lasted but when I woke up I felt two interrogators 

jumping on a board which was laid on my swollen stomach to force water back out 

of my body. I suddenly vomited and kept vomiting with terrible pain. 

I had no idea how much water ran into my body but I felt like the cells in my 

body were full of water and water was running out of my body through my mouth, 

nose, anus and vagina. 

I faintly heard somebody saying, ‘‘Why doesn’t this bitch wake up. Did she die?’’ 

I could not get up so I was dragged to my cell that day. From that day on, I suffered 

from high fever and often fainted. My whole body was so swollen that I could not 

open my eyes. I could only urinate a few drops of milk-like liquid with blood and 

felt a severe pain in my bladder. I was able to get up and walk again in about two 

week’s time. 

I can not explain how I could have survived such an ordeal. I would have died 

if that had happened to me in my ordinary life. I must have developed a mysterious 

super power to sustain myself under an emergency situation. 


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School Principal, a Torture Victim

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

In 1987, a school principal in Chongjin city found two female teachers murdered 

the previous night in the night duty chamber of the school. He immediately reported 

the murders to the police. When the police made little progress in the investigation, 

they arrested him for murder. He was subject to all kinds of severe torture for two 

years and forced into confessing the murder. 

When I saw him in the police jail, both his ears were gone with only ear holes 

in their place. I have no idea how it happened but his fingers were cut short and 

clustered together. He was badly crippled, one leg shorter than the other, and unable to walk. His mouth was slanted and he could not control his lips, which made 

it very difficult to understand what he said. He was a tall and handsome person 

before he was arrested but became as short as a ten year-old boy in the two years 

in the police jail. 

He was the principal of Subok Girls’ high school in Chongjin City, North 

Hamkyong Province. He devoted his entire life to education as a career teacher. 

He pleaded innocent throughout the severe tortures. Two years later, two criminals were arrested for robbery and confessed that they had snuck into the school 

to steal an organ, found two women teachers, and murdered them after an unsuccessful attempt at rape. 

Nobody was punished or held responsible for arresting the wrong person. There 

was no apology. Rather, the provincial police forced him to sign a statement that 

he would never disclose that he had been tortured. He was completely disabled and 

received no compensation. He died shortly after his release. 

This incident shows how incompetent the normal North Korean police investigators are and, as a result, how they commonly torture innocent victims to extract 

false confessions. 

Prisoners Beaten Cruelly

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

One common form of torture was to tie a prisoner against iron bars, spread-eagle 

by hands and legs and beat him all over the body with a rubber or cow skin whip. 

Just the pain from hanging by your body weight makes the ordeal unbearable. From 

the beatings, the skin becomes torn all over, blood splashes and the prisoners begin 

to feel that their skin isn’t human any more. When a prisoner is released from the 

iron bar, his whole body is so swollen that he cannot bend his back or knees. The 

prisoner must evacuate and urinate standing. 


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In the Nongpo Police Detention Center, there were three torture chambers and 

all kinds of torture were routinely practiced on inmates. I was 39 years old at that 

time. They subjected me to all kinds of torture there. 

Once I resisted when they tried to undress me. One of the torturers punched me 

in my face so hard that I fainted to the floor. Sometime later, I woke up to find 

my mouth full of something. They were my broken teeth. Obviously, I bled terribly 

because the floor was full of my blood. My face was so badly swollen that I could 

hardly open my eyes. I spit out the broken teeth only after holding up my lips with 

my fingers. Four teeth from the upper jaw were gone. I began to feel terrible pain 

in my other teeth. Usually, I was taken to the torture chamber at five o’clock in 

the morning and remained there until midnight. 

Tearing Off the Ears of a Prisoner

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The Comptroller of the Seamen’s Club of Chongjin City was an old man, 60 years 

old. He could no longer withstand the tortures that continued daily. When the investigators tore off one of his ears and began tearing off the other, he decided to please 

the investigators by claiming to be a big thief—the bigger the better. So, he told 

them that he stole a locomotive from the city railway station. He acquired the nickname, ‘‘locomotive head’’ from the police investigators and officers. 

Prisoners Used for Martial Art Practice

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF POLITICAL PRISON

A prisoner in the police jails becomes a different person, skin and bone, from starvation and torture. Male prisoners appear to become undernourished and confused 

sooner than female prisoners. The jail guards commonly use inmates as martial arts 

target. They punch and kick prisoners during martial arts practice. The prisoners 

fall bleeding at the first blow and remain motionless for a while on the cement floor 

until they are kicked back into the cells. 

The guards often bring fish and grill it on their stove, sending a wonderful aroma 

to the prisoners. This is as painful as any form of torture could be for the starving 

inmates. 


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Christians Killed for Refusing to Convert

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The cast-iron factory was considered the most difficult place to work in the entire 

prison. Christians were usually sent there to work. One Christian working at the 

cast-iron factory was killed by hanging in a public execution in December 1988 for 

hiding a friend at his house before he was arrested. 

In the spring of 1990, I was carrying a work order to the cast-iron factory in the 

male prison. Five or six elderly Christians were lined up and forced to deny their 

Christianity and accept the Juche Ideology of the State. The selected prisoners all 

remained silent at the repeated command for conversion. The security officers became furious by this and killed them by pouring molten iron on them one by one. 

A North Korean Miner’s Wife

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

Jong-ok Kim, about 45, wife of a minor, Hweryong district, was arrested for stealing some 20 liters of corn from a nearby cooperative farm when her children were 

starving at home in the spring of 1987. During the trial, the judge scolded her for 

stealing. There was a microphone in front of her but she did not know what it was. 

She murmured in a very low voice, ‘‘Of course, I know stealing is bad. Why would 

I steal if food ration had continued? How awful this country is.’’ Her complaint 

reached the judge through the microphone. He was furious and committed her to 

15year hard labor in prison for ‘‘criticizing the party policy.’’ She died in the autumn 

of 1992 of undernourishment and diarrhea, after five years in prison. 

She was detained at the cell next to me during the police investigation but we 

did not see each other at that time because the movement of prisoners was always 

so strictly controlled that prisoners do not meet each other. The guards in the jails, 

however, always felt bored when on duty for hours and they would normally ask 

inmates for all kinds of questions, ‘‘Hey you! What’s your name? Where are you 

from? What’s the Charge? etc.’’ I overheard their conversations with other inmates 

and knew about them and, in the same way, the other inmates knew about me even 

though we did not meet. 


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One day in prison in 1988, I was carrying work instructions as usual when a prisoner suddenly stopped me by pulling my clothes and whispered to me, ‘‘Aren’t you 

the Supply Manager from Onsong District?’’ Speaking each other was against the 

prison regulation. I was scared and I moved off without a word. The next day, when 

there was no prison guard around, I asked her, ‘‘How did you know about me?’’ This 

is how we met in the prison. 

She worked at the leather factory in prison. She had been in prison for about 5 

years when, one day in the autumn of 1992, she became too weak to meet her work 

quota. She received reduced meal for punishment and began to be weaker with less 

food. She also had serious loose bowels and felt so thirsty but there was no water 

for prisoners. She was so desperate that she drank the dirty water from the bucket 

where floor mops had been washed several times. The next day, she dropped to the 

floor while trying to make a leather bag. She did not move when prison guards 

kicked her hard. She was dead. They had her dead body wrapped in a straw mat 

and carried away. 

One day in 1994, while I was hiding in China waiting for an opportunity to come 

to Seoul, I was listening to a mid-night radio broadcast from Seoul which announced 

arrival in Seoul of two young brothers from North Korea. Their names rang my 

ears. When I was undergoing intelligence clearance in South Korea, I was able to 

confirm that the two brothers were indeed the sons of Sung-Ok Choi. 

When I was expecting to see her sons in Seoul, the intelligence officers advised

me not to tell them about their mother’s death because the boys are in a very fragile 

condition emotionally. So, I did not tell them about their mother’s death when I first 

met them. One day in April, 1998, they visited me and told me that they had heard 

from their relatives in China that their mother had died. Then, I had to confirm 

the information. They are in South Korea now and visit me regularly. 

Typical Scene of Prisoners at Work

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

Officially, the purpose of the prison is to reform the ideology of the prisoners. In 

reality, however, the purpose of the prison is to exploit slave labor. The prisoners 

work 1618 hours every day without wages. Cow leather whips are always ready on 

the walls and women are whipped, kicked, or punched daily for no reason. The prisoners are not allowed to talk, laugh or take a rest. In addition, the prisoners must 

always keep their heads down and only repeat the same motion for work. As a result, more than half of the women have lumps on their heads or shoulders, are 

hunchbacks, or are crippled. The camp officers and guards always wear masks because they cannot tolerate the prisoners’ stench! The prisoners often urinate or defecate while working because they cannot wait. 

The prisoners are allowed to take showers only twice a year. Therefore, all the 

prisoners naturally stink. The entire prison is full of the awful smell of sweat and 

the stench of the prisoners enters your lungs the moment you are inside the prison. 

The prison officials and guards are there by life appointment. North Korean authorities never transfer them to other posts for fear that their crimes may leak to 

the outside world. 


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Have You Heard About the Human Motor?

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The power supply in North Korea was erratic and almost every other day prisoners worked without electricity during the daytime. However, the prison rule was 

that the daily quota had to be met whether there was electric power or not. So, female prisoners were whipped to keep the motor running manually for the power 

sewing machines. 

There were about 100 sewing machines in the sewing factory, operated by one 

electric motor. The women were forced, ten in each team, to pull the belt on their 

shoulders and operate 100 sewing machines, for one hour each. The hardship of the 

prisoners was beyond description. The production officers mercilessly whipped the 

prisoners to maintain their productivity. 

The female prisoners must meet their work quota to get the standard meal of 100 

grams. Each shoe manufactured requires a countless number of small nails to be 

hammered and so each prisoner has to hammer so many nails every day. 

Their fingers are all bent and deformed with hard skin. Three hundred prisoners 

produce 1,000 pairs of boots daily, working 1618 hours daily to meet the work quota. 

Often they are forced to work until morning to meet the quota, under collective punishment for the failure of other prisoners to meet the quota. 

Myong-suk Kim was a very competent and skillful worker and produced the best 

quality boots for senior officers. The machines were German, but they were imported in the sixties and started to give problems as they aged. One day, she could 

not meet the quota due to equipment failure. The guards kicked her and shouted, 

‘‘You swine, you better fix your machine quickly.’’

When it became clear one day that she could not meet the quota, she drank hydrochloric acid that was kept there for repairing the machine and killed herself. 

That was in January, 1992. 

The prison authorities conducted ideology classes for all prisoners, everyday, to 

prevent this ‘‘ideological corruption’’ from recurring. It was very tiring to stop work 

for one hour everyday and stand listening to a nonsense speech before going to bed 

an hour late. 


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Women Prisoners Carrying Dung

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The prisoners who are old, slow at work or caught looking at their reflections in 

a window glass are sent to the ‘‘drop-out team’’ for 3 months, 6 months or one year 

for punishment. Their main job is to collect dung from the prison toilet tanks and 

dump it into a large dung pool everyday for supply to the farming teams working 

at the prison farm outside the wall. Teams of five prisoners must pull a metal tank 

weighing 800 kilograms. 

Two women wade knee-deep at the bottom of the toilet arid fill a 20-liter rubber 

bucket with dung using their bare hands. Three other women pull up the rubber 

bucket from above and then pour the contents into a transport tank. 

Sometimes, the prisoners pulling up the bucket are so weak, they fall into the toilet tank because of the weight of the bucket. When the heavy tank is full, they haul 

it up to a very large and deep dung pool on the hill. 

One rainy day in 1991, a housewife from Pyongyang name Ok-tan Lee had been 

carrying dung all day long and was ready to transfer the dung to the huge pool. 

However, the lid of the tank on the wheel somehow got stuck and would not open. 

When she climbed on the tank to push the door open, she slipped from the rainwet surface and plunged into the ground dung pool. It was so deep that she disappeared into the dung. A guard some distance away (they always keep their distance because of the stink from the prisoners) shouted, ‘‘Stop it! Let her die there 

unless you want to die the same way yourself!’’ She was left to drown there in the 

dung. 

Female Prisoners at a Rubber Factory

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

The prison rubber factory was one of the most dangerous and difficult places for 

women to work. They had to mix used rubber scraps with granular rubber, carry 

the resulting rubber substance, mix it with rubber glue that came from a big tank 


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which produced poisonous fumes, and knead it in a big round tank. I remember one 

female prisoner whose head got covered by the rubber glue while she was cleaning 

the tall rubber glue tank. She suffocated. 

Because air creates foam in the rubber, the whole factory is tightly sealed all year 

round. In addition, the factory is always full of hot steam for molding shoe soles. 

Therefore, it’s always stuffy and suffocating! The sticky mixture in the tank often 

overflows and women must push it back into the tank. This was very difficult work 

for hungry and weak women, and so the sticky mixtures often dragged women into 

the tank and killed them. So many female prisoners were killed and injured that 

the prison authorities finally ordered the factory to be operated only by male prisoners in 1989, two years after my arrival at the prison. 

Babies Born and Killed

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

When I miraculously survived paratyphoid in 1989, I was sent to the medical 

room to report. When I arrived at the medical room, I noticed six pregnant women 

awaiting delivery. I was told to wait for my supervisor to come and take me over. 

While I was there, three women delivered babies on the cement floor without any 

blankets. It was horrible to watch the prison doctor kicking the pregnant women 

with his boots. When a baby was born, the doctor shouted, ‘‘Kill it quickly. How can 

a criminal in the prison expect to have a baby? Kill it.’’ The women covered their 

faces with their hands and wept. Even though the deliveries were forced by injection, the babies were still alive when born. The prisoner/nurses, with trembling 

hands, squeezed the babies’ necks to kill them. The babies, when killed, were 

wrapped in a dirty cloth, put into a bucket and taken outside through a backdoor. 

I was so shocked with that scene that I still see the mothers weeping for their babies in my nightmares. I saw the baby-killing twice while I was in the prison. 

When I went back to the medical room for routine duty a few days later, ShinOk Kim and Mi-Ok Cho, the prisoner/nurses working in the medical room, were sobbing and one of them told me, ‘‘Accountant, we are devils worse than beasts. They 

say that the dead babies are used to make new medicine for experiments.’’ I was 

so afraid that I closed her mouth with my finger and said, ‘‘I never heard you say 

this.’’ I hurried to leave from their presence. 

I was sent to the same medical room once again when I recovered from pleurisy 

in 1992. This time, there were some ten pregnant women in the small medical room. 

They were all injected to induce forced delivery and suffering from pain for many 

hours. A woman, so undernourished and weak, could not endure the delivery and 

died during labor. The prisoner/nurse there whispered to me that it is more difficult 

to deliver a dead baby than a living baby. 

The other pregnant women looked so pale from the pain, and they had sweat on 

their faces. If they groanned from the pain, the doctor mercilessly kicked their belly 

hard and shouted, ‘‘Shut up! Don’t feign pain!’’ I was waiting for my supervisor to 

take charge of me from the doctor at the corridor outside. I heard the crying voice 

of Byung-Ok Kim, 32 years old, and peeped into the room through the half-open 

door. She had just delivered a baby and cried, ‘‘Sir, please save the baby. My parents-in-law are anxiously waiting for the baby. Please, please save the baby.’’ She 

was out of her mind with sorrow. All the other women remained quiet and she was 

the only woman crying and begging loudly. The doctor was taken momentarily by 


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surprise. But soon, he regained himself and shouted, ‘‘You want to die, eh? Kill the 

baby!’’ He kicked her hard. 

Then, the Chief Medical Officer came in and said, ‘‘Who was it yelling like that? 

Put her in the punishment cell!’’ The Chief Medical Officer kicked her hard several 

times and had her dragged to the punishment cell because she could not hold herself up. This is one of the scenes that I will never forget. She died shortly after she 

was released from the cell. 

Public Execution in Prison

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

Public executions are standard practice in and outside prisons in North Korea. In 

1988, seven men and one woman were publicly executed in the Kaechon prison 

without trial. At each public execution, all the prisoners, some six thousand 

(1,8002,000 women and 4,000 men), are crammed into the prison square to watch. 

The victims are always gagged so they cannot protest. They are tied to a pole in 

three parts; chest, sides and knees. Six guards fire three bullets each into the chest 

for a total of 18 bullets. With the top ropes having been cut by the bullets, the upper 

part of the body hangs down bleeding, like a rotten log broken in half, still tied to 

the pole by the lower ropes. Then, all the prisoners are forced to march around the 

dead body and watch. 

Prisoners Go Insane from Watching Public Executions

The execution victims include those who pleaded for death during torture, stole 

food, or simply wept over the fate of two small children left home alone. The charge 

was lack of confidence in the mother party. Also included are those who are branded 

as ‘‘anti-party elements’’ or ‘‘reactionaries.’’

The public execution ground is so crammed with prisoners that the women in the 

front watch the killing from a distance of only a meter or so and often get blood 

splashed on them. Some women prisoners are so shocked that they vomit, faint, or 

develop mental illness (e.g., sudden singing or laughing hysterically). They are sent 

to punishment cells for being ‘‘weak in ideology’’ and ‘‘showing sympathy to the peoVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

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ple’s enemy.’’ Those who become completely insane simply disappear and nobody 

knows what happens to them. 

Hi-suk Choi and Young-ok Choi, housewives from Kimchaek City, were punished 

for singing at the site and later died of shock during electric torture. The Kaechon 

Prison has twenty punishment cells that are always full of ‘‘ideologically weak’’ prisoners on the days of public executions. 

Prisoners Killed in Temperature-regulated Compression Chamber

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

There are executioners in the Interrogation Department of the Provincial Security 

Headquarters. Here, they execute the prisoners that they are embarrassed to execute publicly. They always execute prisoners at midnight without trial and bury the 

corpses in a nearby valley. 

There is also a temperature-regulated compression chamber used for torturing or 

killing. The chamber is 60 square centimeters and the height is adjustable according 

to the prisoner’s height. A prisoner is pushed into a rice straw bag first, and then 

into the chamber with his head pushed down between his knees. These acts usually 

occur between one and two o’clock in the morning. Freezing temperatures are used 

in the winter and hot temperatures in the summer. 

A 17 year-old boy, the son of a welder in Kimchaek Steel Factory, was brought 

here sometime in October 1987. He was arrested for organizing gang fighting in 

school. Gang fighting is considered a very serious crime leading to subversion in 

North Korea. He was killed in the chamber by freezing in the midnight. I heard 

this from Yong-ho, a guard, who proudly told us, ‘‘You bitches better obey unless 

you want to be killed like the boy, frozen and compressed.’’ In fact, other guards 

repeated similar threats. 

A young man became lunatic as a result of continuing torture. He complained one 

day, ‘‘Great Leader? What has he done for me?’’ He was frozen to death in the chamber that night. 

The chamber was next to my cell at the end of the corridor. The cries of a prisoner 

resisting and angry voices of guards trying to push him into a rice straw bag and 

into the chamber always woke me up. I always found executioners in uniform and 

with a star on their shoulders on such occasions. During the 14 months I was there, 

I remember five or six killings in the chamber. 


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Male Prisoners Shot to Death for Attempting to Get ‘‘Edible Clay’’ from 

Women Prisoners

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

At the end of February 1990, we were carrying edible clay in bags. Some male 

prisoners on the other side of the river must have seen us eating the clay. They 

looked like skeletons with skulls and bright eyes. They gestured to us begging for 

some clay. None of us responded for fear of punishment. Desperately, three of them 

came to our side of the river to get some clay. 

Suddenly, we heard shooting. It was a horrible scene when the shooting ended. 

We were all so scared. The intestines of one of the male prisoners were protruding. 

But he was still alive because we heard his feeble voice whispering, ‘‘Help!’’ The second prisoner had his leg broken and bleeding. The third prisoner was dead instantly. Soon a truck arrived and an officer said, ‘‘Put them all onto the truck, dead 

or alive.’’ We were told to resume our work. That night, some twenty women complained of pain and died as a result of having eaten too much clay. 

At the end of February 1990, we were bringing fresh soil from a nearby mountain 

to the prison farm. It was very tiring to climb up the mountain to bring fresh soil 

all the way down to the farm. Because it was February and still cold, we could not 

find any plants to eat in the mountain, no matter how desperately we looked. It was 

too early in the season. 

One day, I saw some prisoners eating clay. As always, we were exhausted, hungry 

and thirsty. One of them said to me, ‘‘Accountant, you want some? This is good and 

tasty. Try it.’’ I wasted no time and ate it. It was clay and, indeed, starchy and tasted good. I ate half the size of my fist that day and I felt somewhat full and even 

felt some strength, too. Our unit moved our burrow to a riverside location when the 

killing of three male prisoners took place. 


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Prisoners Shot to Death for Falling on a Steep Slope

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

In February, 1988, while carrying a 20 kilogram bag of top soil from a mountain 

to the prison farm, an exhausted female prisoner slipped and fell on the slope, causing two other prisoners also to fall from the path. Although they could have been 

helped up to rejoin the line, they were immediately shot and killed. The prison 

guards shouted at the rest of the women, ‘‘Did you see what happened? This will 

happen to you if you fall!′′

Every February, all the prisoners are mobilized to carry top-soil from Kaechon 

Mountain to the prison farm. The mountain is outside the prison, 600 meters high, 

very rugged and slippery when climbing up and down the steep slope. 

Each female prisoner must carry a 20-kg bag of topsoil on her back all the way 

down to the farmland. Prisoners are kicked and beaten for any bag that weighs less 

than 20 kilograms. 300 prison guards and 350 policemen line up on the path with 

rifles pointing at the prisoners. The prisoners are ordered to make three trips in 

the morning and three more trips in the afternoon. Climbing up and down a 600-

meter mountain six times a day is like torture. The prisoners were warned that if 

they strayed from the path by even a step they would be shot to death instantly. 

Prisoners Killed for Eating Pig Slops

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

There is no wasted food in the prison kitchen. The kitchen prisoners always give 

the leftover food from outside to the pigs. So, the pigs are always well-fed and fat 

for the security officers. The prisoners envy the pigs for the good food and leisure. 

The dung carrying team is also responsible for cleaning the pigsty. The prisoners 


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77

carrying dung are always so hungry that many of them risk their lives to steal the 

pig slops as they pass by. When caught eating the pigs’ feed, they are shot and 

killed. 

The prisoners on the dung-carrying team look forward to cleaning the pigsty because they can eat the leftovers from the slops with their hands still filthy with 

dung. The prisoners on the pig-raising team supply pig slops when the prisoners 

come to clean the pigsties so that the cleaning prisoners can enjoy the chance to 

have a ‘‘good meal’’ with the pigs. 

Kum-bok Kim was from Kanggye town, Jagang Province. She was pretty and a 

very kind-hearted woman. Once, she was caught giving the pigs their feed when 

other prisoners were around cleaning. She was badly beaten by a prison official and 

kicked until she fainted. She was forced to confess her crime in writing and was 

sent for further investigation. She died under torture during the investigation. 

Prisoners Shot for Stealing Corn

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

All prisoners are mobilized once a year for harvest work in the prison farm. Some 

400 guards watch while the prisoners work outside the prison. In September 1990, 

five male prisoners could not resist the temptation of eating raw corn during work 

and so they stole some ears and hurried to eat them. I was delivering a work order 

to a unit nearby at that time. The five prisoners were shot instantly by the guards 

without warning. In the prison, few trials or investigations were ever held for punishing or killing prisoners. Punishing and killing prisoners without trial or investigation were within the power of the prison superintendent. 

Guards Killing Prisoners for Fun

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON


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A couple of times, I saw guards stop a group of male prisoners for fun. ‘‘Hey, you 

and you, come here. If you cross the barbed wire, I will let you go home.’’ With these 

words, the prison guards tempted prisoners to cross the electrified barbed wire. The 

prisoners were so desperate and confused that, without hesitation, they jumped to 

their death with the faint hope of going home. This shows how prisoners are considered disposable and easily replaced. This is not an isolated incident. I have heard 

about it several times and have myself seen it happen twice during the five years 

I was in prison. 

Prisoners Killed During the Testing of a New Chemical Poison

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

One day in February, 1990, I was doing routine paper work at the staff operation 

office at around 10:00 0’ clock in the morning when, to my surprise, the prison superintendent, vice-superintendent, intelligence chief and three other unidentified officials walked into the room. One of them pointed to something outside my window. 

I was very terrified at their unusual appearance. Then, I overheard them saying, 

‘‘Look! How powerful. What a great scientist Dr. Sung-ki Lee is, indeed! Well, from 

now on, its chemical warfare.’’ Shortly afterwards, as I was walking to the other 

side of the room to deliver some papers to my guard, I saw them seriously watching 

something outside the window. On my way back to my desk, I took a quick glance 

outside. I saw many prisoners lying on the slope of a hill, bleeding from their 

mouths and motionless, enveloped by strange fumes and surrounded by scores of 

guards in the gas masks I delivered to the Chief Guard earlier in the morning. 

In February, 1990, I was asked by the Chief Guard to follow him to an administration warehouse at 05:30 in the morning. He ordered me to check out six bundles 

(five pairs in each bundle) of gas masks with rubber gowns, which looked like a sea 

diver’s kit. When I returned to my prison chamber, a total of 150 prisoners, several 

from each unit, were selected and separated from the other prisoners. The selected 

prisoners were mostly crippled and weak women who had less labor value. 

I had to issue instructions for lunch with the same usual number for the male 

prisoners but 150 meals less for women. The prisoners started to exchange nervous 

looks with each other when the 150 prisoners did not return to work. An air of unusual tension and fear spread among the prisoners. 

Normally, when a prisoner is sent to a punishment cell, an announcement is always made about why the prisoner is being punished to warn others. But that 

night, so many prisoners were sent to punishment cells for whispering, looking 

around nervously and exchanging signs of tension without the usual announcement. 

That night, the punishment cells were all full with a long list of prisoners awaiting 

the punishment. Obviously, the prison authorities attempted to cover up the 

killings. 

Around October, 1990, an engineer supervisor was sent here from the defense 

chemistry factory in Hamhung. He was responsible for an explosion in the factory 

there and was secretly executed at an underground cell in about a month. At that 

time, I was told to reduce the number of meals by one in the kitchen. Later, I was 

confidentially informed about the killing by a prisoner/nurse who was involved in 

getting rid of the corpse. 

At that time, 500 female prisoners were sent from here to the Hwachon area for 

some kind of expansion work of a chemical factory. The prisoners returned in about 

a month’s time. One of the prisoners told me that there was a special chemical research institute in Hwsachon. 


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Prisoners Killed During a Biological Test

WITNESSED BY SO LEE, FORMER FEMALE PRISONER OF A POLITICAL PRISON

One day in May 1988, I had been in the prison for only six months and I was 

still trying to get accustomed to the prison conditions. I was working on the second 

floor of the export factory moving half-finished products from one table to another 

for assembly. Dung lunch time, I saw a pile of fresh cabbages at the kitchen entrance through the windows. This was the only time I saw cabbages in such good 

shape at the prison. I was so hungry that I began to wonder who would be the lucky 

people to eat them. 

A little later when I came back to the same spot, I saw some fifty women prisoners eating the cabbage from a bowl with their fingers. The cabbages appeared 

somehow steamed. Soon, I saw the prisoners vomiting, bleeding from their mouths 

and moaning on the ground. I could not stay to watch more. 

However, when I came back to the same spot again after a little while, I saw 

camp guards loading the dead prisoners onto a truck. 

There were several strangers in white gowns around the dying prisoners. This 

was very strange because the political prison was under such strict control that no 

strangers were allowed inside. Then, I remembered that some fifty women had been 

told to come outside earlier, a few from each work unit. 

Later, it was announced that they died from food poisoning. The prisoners knew 

what happened and they started to inform each other through their eyes. The prison 

officials were very nervous trying to keep the prisoners quiet. Why were the prison 

officials so nervous over the food poisoning when its mention was not a subject for 

punishment on other occasions? Unusually, many prisoners were sent to punishment cells that night for whispering or looking nervous. 

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT

From Harbin to Hong Kong: The Final Chapter of My Escape from North Korea 

Those of you who read my book Eyes of the Tailless Animals know the account 

of my son’s and my escape from North Korea in the winter of 1994 and subsequent 

wandering around Northeast China in 1994 and 1995. It records how we made our 

way to Heilongjiang Province where a number of different people gave us refuge. 

As I noted we were being pursued by North Korean plainclothes police inside China. 

They were determined to find us as they did not want a former inmate of the North 

Korean camps organized to hold political prisoners to reach the outside world and 

bear witness to the human rights abuses taking place inside the camps. My book 

finishes with us making our way to South Korea via Hong Kong but does not contain the particulars of our route from Harbin to Hong Kong. The following are the 

details of that round-about refugee trail: 

After moving from place to place with a price on our heads, we finally came to 

the city of Harbin, where a Korean-Chinese family helped us out of kindness, for 

a period of a few weeks. We heard there that the North Korean security services 

had undergone great anxiety when they learned that a former prison camp inmate 

had escaped to China. As I noted in my book, I was the only one I knew of to be 

released during my years in the camp; I was only released due to a desire to show 

official leniency and to gain good publicity on the occasion of Kim Il Sung’s 80th 

birthday celebration. I also believe it was seen by prison authorities a means of 

showing those in the camp that, if they studied Kim Il Sung’s philosophy with diligence, worked hard, and truly reformed, they could anticipate being released some 

day. Still, I was the only one released and I still consider it a miracle. 


lee35.eps
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After being released, the security authorities naturally kept me under close surveillance so they knew immediately when my son and I illegally left for China in 

February, 1994. Thus, there was a widespread manhunt on for us even in Harbin, 

far from the North Korean border. This last family wanted to assist us, but they 

had to think of their own and our safety. They advised us to go to Beijing to seek 

help getting to South Korea. Surely, I thought, my compatriots at the South Korean 

Embassy will help me? We are the same race, the same people, the same blood. The 

family bought train tickets for my son and me and we took the train to Beijing planning to make our way to the South Korean Embassy. 

Beijing in the summer of 1995 was hosting the UN’s International Conference on 

Women to discuss human rights. I, as a Korean woman and mother, made my way 

to the South Korean Embassy for help. Instead of the warm reception from my own 

people which I expected, I was received in a cold-hearted and rough manner. For 

two hours I begged for help; pleaded that my son and I were on the run and were 

being pursued by North Korean agents. ‘‘Go away,’’ they said. With nothing, my son 

and I left after two hours. 

My son, 26, who had a knack for languages and had learned some Chinese during 

our journey across northern China, came up with an idea. He said we should go to 

a port city where there was cargo traffic between China and South Korea and try 

to stowaway on a ship. 

My son found a Chinese truck driver at a warehouse in Beijing who drove cargo 

between Beijing and Qingdao, the Chinese main port city on the Shandong peninsula where there is a lot of trade with South Korea. The Chinese driver took pity 

on us and agreed to drive us for free to 

Qingdao. When we arrived at the factory near the Qingdao docks which was the 

driver’s final destination, he told us that he would be back in a week to pick up 

more cargo. He said that if we had no luck in getting out of Qingdao to go to South 

Korea he would meet us in the same place exactly one week later and take us back 

to Beijing. 

We hid among sacks of corn piled on the dock for one week. Cargo ships going 

to South Korea were there. There were also many Chinese customs and other officials so we had to hide ourselves. My son wanted me to climb the ropes that moored 

the cargo ships to the docks and get on board a South Korean-bound vessel. However, my legs were still crippled from the torture I received in the concentration 

camp and my shoulder and back were also in pain. The decks of the ships were too 

high. I just could not make it up the ropes to the waiting deck. We also failed to 

find any South Korean merchant sailor in an isolated situation where we could seek 

help. After a week we gave up. We decided to meet the kind Chinese truck driver 

at the agreed rendezvous point and to return to Beijing. There we would try our 

luck one last time at the South Korean Embassy. 

When we arrived in Beijing, before going to the South Korean Embassy again, I 

went to a pharmacy and purchased rat poison. I placed the poison in two plastic 

bags, one for my son’s pocket and one for my own. I told my son that if we failed 

to get help this time, we would die on the streets of Beijing rather than be returned 

by force to North Korea. 

We came to the South Korean Embassy at nine o’clock in the morning and stayed 

until approximately six p.m. in the evening. We were interviewed by two South Korean officials, ‘‘Minister Counselor’’ Choi, as everyone called him, and ‘‘Consul’’ 

Hong. I begged and pleaded for help. ‘‘Please save the lives of my son and myself!’’ 

I cried. ‘‘You are our fellow countrymen. North Korean agents are looking for me 

as the one who has knowledge of their concentration camps. They will not let me 

live. If you do not help my son and me, I will be sent back and will die in North 

Korea.’’ Choi and Hong said there was no way they would or could help. They said 

that my son and I should go away. I asked what would happen if I went to the 

American Embassy. They told me that I did not understand international relations. 

‘‘If you go to the American Embassy they will just call us and we still won’t help 

you,’’ they said cold-heartedly. 

I became hysterical. I cried bitter tears. I begged them to help me, to save our 

lives. As the day wore on, they lost patience. They said that if my son and I did 

not leave at once they would call the Chinese police and have us arrested. I told 

them that this meant death, that the Chinese police would give us to the North Koreans and that I at least would surely die. They just didn’t care. My own people 

turned their backs on me. Even now when I remember this experience I am moved 

to tears. At six p.m. they said ‘‘We close the doors now. You must leave.’’ Six Embassy officials pushed me and my son out of the diplomatic compound and into the 

street, closing the door on us. We were all alone. 

I told my son there was no hope. We were all alone in the world. I said that ‘‘No 

one will help us, so we must die.’’ We went to a city park in Beijing near the South 

81

Korean diplomatic compound. We sat on the ground dejected, waiting for the courage to take the poison. An old Chinese gentleman, out for his evening exercise, came 

by. He noticed that we looked alone and depressed. ‘‘What is wrong?’’ He asked. 

‘‘Can I help you?’’

My son explained our circumstances. The old man was intelligent; he looked like 

he had once been a high Chinese government official. He said that he could take 

us to the Embassy of a third country where he was certain they would help us. It 

was a long way. He took us to the gates of that country’s Embassy and said ‘‘please 

go in.’’ We entered, not really knowing what to expect. 

Two diplomats, a man and a woman, listened to our story. We told them that we 

had been twice to the South Korean Embassy and that all help there had been refused. They agreed to help us. They made arrangements for us to go to Hong Kong. 

I was in Hong Kong for forty days because this third country Embassy arranged 

for me to be hospitalized to recover from some of the injuries brought about by torture in the prison camp. Then the British allowed us to leave Hong Kong and to 

travel to South Korea. (This was before reversion of control of Hong Kong to China.) 

This is my story. 

Signed: Lee Soon Ok, May 2, 2002

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Ms. Lee. There have been extraordinary testimonies brought before the Congress, through it’s long 

history, but yours is one of the most stunning in its details of 

human hardship. Mr. Lee? 

Before you commence, Mr. Lee, I want to apologize. There are 

more votes coming on the House Floor and I wanted to let Ms. Lee 

continue because of the depth of her experience and convictions, 

but we do have some timing problems. And I hope that will be understood. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Lee? 

STATEMENT OF LEE YOUNG-KOOK, FORMER BODYGUARD OF 

KIM JONG-IL AND PRISON CAMP SURVIVOR 

Mr. LEE. First of all, I wish to thank you for this testimony for 

the human rights in North Korea. Special thanks to the Chairman 

and the Committee Members and to all present. 

I was a member in the protective service of Kim Jong-Il for 11 

years. Then I moved to the North Korean Labor Party position and 

worked there. Then I attempted my escape in 1994, got caught, 

was abducted by to North Korea and spent 4 years as a political 

prisoner in Yodok. 

I left the Labor Party management position in January 5th of 

1999. And by April, I came to China. I came into the bosom of the 

Republic of Korea in May of 2000. As you can see, I have recovered 

my good health and I can provide testimony before you. My first 

thanks to the Republic of Korea. 

For 11 years in protecting Kim Jong-Il, I have spoken to Kim 

Jong-Il. He, at times, could be considerate and I performed policy 

missions, also. But then I had to go to the Yodok prison camp, and 

became a handicapped, crippled man. Nonetheless, I am able to 

provide testimony in front of you here today. I could really feel how 

serious and important a subject it is, the human rights problem in 

North Korea. 

I could go on and on describing the painful experience I had at 

the Yodok political prisoners camp, but I will choose just a couple. 

I was caught in Beijing, as I reported earlier. I was kidnapped, abducted. Morphine injections were put into me. Sleeping pills were 

given to me and my body was covered with plastic and taken back 

82

to North Korea and I suffered tortures while held in a dungeon—

an underground prison. 

But I was able to leave because my brother was the driver for 

Kim Jong-Il. And my brother is driver for Kim Jong-Il and in the 

protective service, I was Kim Jong-Il’s bodyguard as an officer. The 

prison camp I was held at is divided into sections or departments. 

The criminals and those responsible for crime, allegedly, and their 

members were put together in the same place. 

In 1997 there was a rumor that we would be visited by an international organization. So in Yodok new buildings went up. Renovation was made. 

In Yodok camp I saw one prisoner who had been there for 25 

years. His crime none other than that he said Kim Jong-Il’s system 

was a bad one and that he was opposed to it. 

People there are put to an unnatural death, like a live man 

dying. And I saw 200 of them die like that in a year. One problem 

there is food—eating and surviving. We were given a meal of 130 

grams a day, but put to work for 16 hours a day. Those who are 

held in Yodok camp wouldn’t know God or Heaven to pray to. And 

they die like that. In the end, their bodies are swollen so much in 

the chest and in the legs, and strange liquids are seeping out like 

water. Then they have their last breath and become a corpse. Then 

they are taken out into the mountain and buried without any grave 

markings. Around Yodok camp there were 2,000 such graves. 

I am reporting to you about the dying people. So people die in 

such a way. People die because they say something wrong or something that should have not been not said. Some are killed by gunfire while trying to escape. Some die in public executions. And 

when one dies and bleeds, those around him or her are told to 

move up to the body and to pick up the blood and make a hand 

print, so that the prisoner would never think about escaping himself or herself. 

I apologize, Chairman, I’ll do the first portion and the second 

portion I missed. I’ll be brief. Let’s talk about one who escaped the 

camp because he was so hungry. He was 22 years old and he went 

next door to Tas Son Lee and he was successful at hiding for 3 

days. But by the third day he was finally caught—he was hit by 

a gunshot in the leg and taken back to the camp in a Russian jeep. 

He was taken out by the Russian jeep to the execution site and we 

were all watching and were all told to make a hand print in his 

blood. 

Mr. LEACH. Excuse me. I apologize. This is extremely moving testimony, but we are obligated to recess briefly for the vote. So when 

we return, we will return to this testimony. So the Committee is 

in recess, pending the vote on the House Floor. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. LEACH. The Subcommittee will reconvene. Let me apologize 

and explain. We have a difficulty that on the Floor is a bill from 

the Full Committee, and it’s a very important bill. So Members are 

generally obligated to be on the Floor when a Committee bill is up. 

But I want to be able to finish the testimony of Mr. Lee. And at 

the risk of presumption, would hope that it would not be extremely 

long. 

Please proceed. 

83

Mr. LEE. Chairman Leach, with your permission, I wish to finish 

the last portion of the testimony. 

Mr. LEACH. Of course. 

Mr. LEE. The way this 22-year old man was caught and put to 

death, the making of handprints in his blood, and the way his body 

was disposed of were all a shock to me. And it lingers inside me 

as a nightmare even until today. I was taken back to the prison 

and beaten up so badly that my eyes went bad. My eardrums were 

all burst out. The two teeth I have, if they still have nerves, are 

not good enough to chew food. 

In other parts of my experience in the Yodok management station, I was beaten up. And I always would hear people crying, asking for help, asking for their lives to be spared. Such a sad petition 

and all of them are still bothering me very much. Inside the station 

or in the prison, people are fed with salt soup only, while the work 

they have to do—the forced labor—is such a hard task that they 

are dying right now today. 

If prisoners could, they would catch rats, snakes, and even eat 

grasses. I hear them asking for help and to save their lives and 

that is what is going on right now. Remembering back, I’m doing 

my best to forget those things that happened, but somehow all 

these memories are all imprinted so hard into my brain, I can 

hardly get rid of them. 

If I could sleep, I would do so during the night. I cannot sleep. 

At best, in the night I fall asleep 2 o’clock in the morning and wake 

up at 5 o’clock. Mostly, I stay up all night with my eyes open. I 

try to forget, but I cannot. My teeth are bad and I cannot chew food 

very well. So I am experiencing lots of difficulties. 

What crime did I commit? I wanted to come to the bosom of 

South Korea for freedom. For such a wish and hope, I became a 

political prisoner. I was put into the criminals’ camp. While I was 

in North Korea inside the prison of Kim Jong-Il, I did not know. 

But once I got out of it, I could easily see what a bad regime Kim 

Jong-Il is in charge of. 

I came to South Korea for freedom, and I had suffered great 

pains; but that’s just me. At this very moment, hundreds of thousands of North Koreans are suffering the same fate in North 

Korea, and they are falling down and dying. With such a thought, 

I am a firm believer that the human rights in North Korea should 

be as soon as possible recovered and respected. 

President Bush remarked that North Korea is a part of the axis 

of evil, but he kindly separated the evil North Korean regime from 

the innocent North Korean people, which I appreciated so much. 

When we talk about North Korea, the land of North Korea, that’s 

Kim Jong-Il. When we talk about North Korean people, we are 

talking about the slaves of Kim Jong-Il. 

Kim Jong-Il’s aim is to live well for himself and for his system 

and for his regime. He is binding the entire population and then 

puts them into political prisons if they are critical of him or his system. That’s why North Korea was not able to make any progress 

into modern times. It belongs to the 19th Century. 

The World Food Program, the Republic of Korea, and the United 

States societies are all together helping the people of North Korea 

to solve their problem of starvation and famine. That is admirable. 

84

In the same context, if we would all work together, the entire 

world, one by one, to solve the human rights problems in North 

Korea, I am confident that the North Korean problem could be 

solved. 

I believe it is a way to solve the problems of human rights in 

North Korea. That’s why they always come up with some type of 

condition. We’ll accept your rice if you do this or that. So such conditions will all go away. The North Korean regime cannot survive 

if the problem of human rights is solved first. 

Finally, I wish to make two proposals. The first, we need to have 

refugees from North Korea into China have status as legitimate 

international refugees. Along with that, we need to establish refugee centers, each in the capacity of 10,000 refugees to take care 

of. If we see this status recognized and refugee centers established, 

North Korea will crumble overnight. And those refugee centers 

could be established in Russia and in Mongolia. 

The second proposal I wish to make is that the North Korean refugees in China should not be forced back to North Korea. China 

is going to be the host nation for the 2008 World Olympics, so we 

should raise the problems of human rights, along with prevention 

of repatriation of the North Korean refugees in China back to 

North Korea. I sincerely hope that they will not repeat the life I 

have lived. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEE YOUNG-KOOK, FORMER BODYGUARD OF KIM JONG-II 

AND PRISON CAMP SURVIVOR

I WAS A FORMER BODYGUARD OF DEAR LEADER, KIM JONG-IL

I was born in the Musan District, North Hamkyong province, North Korea, on 

May 16, 1962. My father was a locomotive operator and my mother was a farmer 

at a local collective farm. I have four sisters in North Korea. I joined the North Korean army in May, 1978 after finishing my high school education in my hometown 

and did the customary 10 years of military service. Until my discharge in May 1988, 

I served as one of the 200 closest bodyguards of the ‘‘dear leader’’ Kim Jong-il and 

often talked with Kim face to face. 

After discharge from the military service, I became a senior party member at my 

hometown for almost 3 years—between June of 1988 and April of 1991. During this 

time, I slowly began to be aware of the various injustices and oppressive nature of 

the North Korean system. Atrocities committed against the people was standard 

practice. I secretly listened to the South Korean radio programs for information 

about the outside world. 

In April 1991, I was sent to the Central Party Military College in Pyongyang. I 

graduated from the 3-year course in April 1994. Indeed, I was in a privileged position with a promising future in North Korean society. I was sent back to my senior 

position in the workers’ party in April, 1994 for additional on-the-spot training in 

my hometown. However, my conscience was always tormented by the North Korean 

reality, and my interest in the outside world and my yearning for freedom grew 

even stronger. 

On October 1, 1994, I defected to China. Unfortunately, after about two months 

in China, I was kidnapped in Beijing by North Korean agents on December 4, 1994. 

Two days later, on December 6, I was shipped to Pyongyang via North Korea’s airline. Before being put on the plane, I was given injections that made me unconscious. My arms and legs were strapped to long pieces of metal rods with bandages, 

then my body was tied to a stretcher. I was brutally beaten at the North Korean 

embassy and during a 6-month interrogation by the State Security Agency in 

Pyongyang, I lost 6 teeth, my left eye was badly injured, and one of my eardrums 

was broken. 

They spared my life because of the influence of my relatives. I was sent to the 

Yodok concentration camp on May 26, 1995 and was released on January 5, 1999. 

Shortly after my release, I was again arrested on 28 April 1999 for remarks I made 

85

to my relatives and friends about the outside world. I was handcuffed and escorted 

at night by the state security officers. I broke away from them on the way. They 

were shooting at me from behind and they eventually lost me. I ran up a nearby 

mountain and arrived in China the next day. I arrived in South Korea on May 22, 

2000 after hiding in China for about a year. 

A record of my nightmare at the concentration camp would take up more than 

200 pages. To say only a few quick words about the prisoners’ life in the camp, for 

example, prisoners were forced to carry their own feces in their hands to manure 

the cornfield nearby after every bowel movement. I still have a skin problem with 

my hands as a result of this practice. The prisoners are so used to deaths that nobody is surprised when anyone dies. Actually, I carried over 200 bodies on my back 

and buried them at a hillside in the camp. 

One of the many unforgettable tragedies I witnessed happened to a 22-year-old 

man who had been repatriated from China. Sometime in July, 1997, this young man 

named ‘‘Yong-chol’’ unsuccessfully attempted to escape from the camp. When he was 

arrested, one of his legs already had been seriously wounded from a gunshot. Some 

1,000 men and women prisoners were ordered to stand in line on both sides of the 

road near the hill where he was caught. Guards gagged the young man and tied 

his legs up to the trailer hitch of a Russian truck, then dragged him for about 4 

kilometers in front of the prisoners, who were forced to watch. He was bleeding, and 

the scalp on the back of his head and the skin from his back were all gone by the 

time the truck stopped and he was finally executed publicly. 

The camp officer warned the prisoners that this would be exactly what would happen to them if anybody else tried to escape. All the prisoners were forced to pass 

by the dead body and dip their hands in his blood. But suddenly a young man 

dashed out of the line, grabbed a microphone and shouted, ‘‘We are not beasts, are 

we? We are human beings, are we not? How can a human being treat another 

human being . . .!’’ Before he finished his last words, he was machine gunned from 

a nearby guard position temporarily set up for the public execution. 

I weighed 94 kilograms when kidnapped in China and 53 kilograms when released from the concentration camp. During the ordeal, the sight of my right eye 

seriously deteriorated and my left eardrum was broken from severe beating. I lost 

many teeth and my legs still show marks of severe beating. All prisoners were treated with utmost atrocity and brutality. I saw so many deaths and mysterious disappearances of young prisoners (prisoners believed to have been sacrificed for 

human biological tests). I am prepared to testify to the crimes against humanity occurring in North Korea in detail to the best of my knowledge and do what I can 

to save the many innocent victims there.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much for your testimony. Thank you 

all. I want to return here to Ms. Lee’s testimony that she submitted for the record and I would urge all of you to get a number 

of extra copies of her full testimony because she abbreviated that 

testimony. But I want to briefly talk about chemical and biological 

warfare and some of the experiments done, as reported by Ms. Lee, 

at the prison compound. 

And she reports that in February 1990 an engineering supervisor 

was sent from the defense chemical factory in Homburg. And in her 

testimony, and I wanted to ask you about this, Ms. Lee. You say 

that:

‘‘The chief guard ordered me to check out of the warehouse six 

bundles—five pairs in each bundle of gas masks with rubber 

gowns, which looked like a sea divers kit. When I returned to 

my prison chamber, a total of 150 prisoners—these were 

women—selected out of the women’s unit were taken outside. 

‘‘I was issued instructions that there be 150 less women for 

lunch for that day, to prepare less meals. On my way back to 

my desk, I took quite a glance outside, Ms. Lee says, and I saw 

many prisons lying on the slope of a hill, bleeding from their 

mouths and motionless, enveloped by strange fumes and surrounded by scores of guards in the very gas masks I’d delivered 

to the chief guard earlier in the morning. 

86

‘‘In addition to these chemical experiments and the 150 victims were buried shortly thereafter, we also had the biological 

tests reported at the site. Fifty women prisoners who ended up 

vomiting, bleeding from their mouths and moaning on the 

ground, all shortly thereafter were dead, loaded onto a truck 

after the biological test.’’

Were there any other examples of chemical or biological testing 

done at the prison besides these two incidents you recounted in 

your testimony? 

Ms. LEE. I was held at the Kaechon Reform Institute beginning 

in November 1987. And later on in May 1988, I heard that the experimentation with those materials was conducted extensively in 

the ’80s, I heard that there were several experiments of such magnitude conducted. 

I would not know anything that happened before I went to 

Kaechon Reform Institute, which was November of ’87. But regarding those experiments conducted while I was there, I’m an 

eyewitnesse and I also happened to be nearby the experimentation 

sites. 

Mr. ROYCE. Did you want to add something? 

Ms. LEE. I was in charge of the financial tasks. I saw with my 

very own eyes in detail; particularly the gas experimentation you 

noted. I am the one who issued the gas masks to the research fellows and the security guards at the reform institute. 

Whenever the gas experimentation was to take place in the reform institute, or the live body experimentation, at the time, the 

general prisoners would be sent back to their prison cells from 

their work sites. And the experimentation would take place in secret isolation. When Kim Il-Sung was alive, there was an internal 

direction or instruction that effectiveness of such experimentation 

would be greater if tested upon live bodies rather than animals. 

Their experimentation on the germs for disease were also conducted. That’s all I have to say. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. How fervently do the average North Koreans believe in the personality cult of Kim Jong-Il and Kim IlSung? Has the faith in Dear Leader been shaken by the famine 

and the food shortages in the past decade or, alternatively, do most 

people still revere the Dear Leader because of the propaganda? I 

would just ask the witnesses for their feeling about that. 

I think it was Mr. Lee who said it wasn’t until after he purchased a radio on the black market and began to listen to radio 

broadcasts that he began to suspect the truth about South Korea, 

that the people weren’t, in your words, I think, falling worse and 

worse into starvation in South Korea. You began to believe that 

South Korea must be prosperous because of the radio broadcasts 

and began to question what you’d been told. And I just wondered 

how widespread that questioning was. 

Mr. LEE. Since 1995, maybe about 50 percent of the population 

have changed their understanding, attitude, and consciousness 

about their regime. Since they don’t have anything to eat, how 

could they say we have a good government? How could they say 

thank you great leader Kim Jong-Il, who is our father chief anymore. 

87

The problem of filling one’s stomach is so great that one has to 

go out and pick wild grass and eat it. So I should conclude that 

there is no family that hasn’t had at least one of the family members victimized by the famine and starvation. 

Currently, the North Korean residents seem to uphold Kim JongIl. And they say they are full of loyalty, but that’s only propaganda. 

In actuality people do not like Kim Jong-Il, but since he has the 

reform institutes, management stations, and restricted areas, they 

are forced to pledge loyalty to Dear Leader Kim Jong-Il. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you this. You’re his former bodyguard or 

one of his bodyguards. Can you give us some personal observations 

about aspects of his life style or specific events that could describe 

to us a sense of his genuine character? It would be, I think, interesting to us to hear from someone who has been around Kim JongIl. Some aspects of his character—tell us about this individual. 

Thank you, Mr. Lee. 

TRANSLATOR. Chairman, with your permission, I wish to finish 

the last portion of what he said. I wasn’t quite done. 

Mr. ROYCE. I’m sorry, sir. Go ahead. 

Mr. LEE. The North Korean mass media, they have to get personal approval—Kim Jong-Il’s signature every day to put their 

newspaper or news out—broadcast out. Therefore, there is no freedom of speech and printing. 

I wish to be brief, Chairman. Kim Jong-Il’s daily schedule is not 

published as it is with the President of the United States. Therefore, we would have difficulty knowing that he’s doing; especially, 

in his private life. But what I do know is that Kim Jong-Il is a very 

clever man. His brain is excellent. He is very ambitious and he’s 

a great schemer. From behind the scenes, he plans and organizes 

things he wants done. If he doesn’t feel very good, or is upset or 

mad, even one who has been loyal to him for a long time could be 

ordered arrested in a split second. 

Mostly, he makes decisions. He drinks a lot. He continues with 

his work while having drinks. Politics in North Korea is carried out 

by Kim Jong-Il and his younger sister, Kim Kyong Hee. Those two 

are the highest political operators. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. LEE. Kim Jong-Il is in fear of the United States most. Inside 

of him, he is always being very watchful. But on the outside, he 

raises his voice. I believe such a diplomatic technique has worked 

for him up to today. North Korea has been successful. U.S. efforts 

to approach him have not been successful. He, as I said to you, is 

a very clever man. If one could do one, he could 5 or 10. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, thank you. I want to thank you all for your 

level of commitment and your bravery. And I want to thank Mr. 

Vollertsen for his compassion of spending 18 months in North 

Korea, and end with one question of Dr. Vollertsen. And that is, 

the concept of putting up maybe refugee centers in Mongolia or in 

Russia, additionally, do you think that would have promise? Is that 

something we should be looking at in Congress and encouraging 

that kind of a development for North Korean refugees? Thank you. 

Dr. VOLLERTSEN. I’m absolutely sure about that. That it will 

work. I know there are some negotiations with the Mongolian government on the way. And also, some other negotiation—the only 

88

need is a lot of money for those refugee camps. There are old Russian facilities near the Mongolian-Chinese border. These facilities 

are very recently examined and they are quite in good condition. 

We actually checked that there are some possibilities for medical 

facilities. And I will be very eager to go to this area in the summertime in order to create such refugee camps, but we need the help 

of the international community. 

The Mongolian authority, they, declare very open mind that they 

want to do so, even when there is some maybe disagreement from 

the Chinese or North Korean government, but they are in urgent 

need for money. The Mongolian government actually suffers from 

drought and bad winter seasons 2—those last 2 years ago. So they 

are in urgent need for money and simply put it like this, for money 

they will do everything. Even get in some trouble with China. So 

I think there is an urgent need to do so. I know there are many, 

many North Koreans who are very eager to go to Mongolia. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, we’re going to follow up on that and Chris 

Smith is a leader in the Human Rights Caucus here on the Hill, 

and I’m going to go to Mr. Smith. But we’ll be working with Chris 

also on this issue. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Like you and 

our very distinguished Chairman who convened this hearing, I 

want to thank our very distinguished panel of heroes—of courageous people. I frankly think words are inadequate to express, from 

here, just how numbing and how heartbreaking it is to hear the 

cruelty that you’ve suffered. 

I just wanted to make it very clear that very often human rights 

take a back seat in geo-political considerations. The big talk for the 

last 10 years has been light-water reactors as well as providing 

food aid. And human rights, whether it be religious persecution or 

this pervasive use of torture. Whenever any of us brought it out, 

it got no hearing. 

Ms. Lee, your book was published in 1999. A few Members and 

a few people in the international community have read it. I think 

this is a must read for anyone who is concerned about torture in 

Northern Korea. 

You made an appeal that the international community sit up and 

take note. I have every reason to believe that the Bush Administration, at the next U.N. Convention on Human Rights, will push for 

a resolution condemning the use of torture and the human rights 

atrocities committed by the Dear Leader, who really ought to be 

called the Dear Torturer when that body convenes. 

It is worth noting that U.S. government officials asked the European Union, its representatives on that body to table or to introduce a resolution on North Korea, and they rejected our request. 

I’m looking, again, Ms. Lee, at your book, the discussion in here 

about the killing of babies, which you described as ‘‘the most cruel 

human behavior I have ever seen in my life.’’ Just for the Members 

of the Committee and for the record:

‘‘The mothers of these newborn babies just laid on the floor 

and sobbed so helplessly while a medical prisoner’s shaking 

hands twisted the baby’s neck. Some of the women screamed 

and were beaten. The baby struggled for a short second, but 

89

they died so easily. Male prisoners wrapped the babies in rags 

and dumped them in a basket.’’

You also talked about forced abortion. You talked about the use 

of mental hospitals or mental asylums and the use of electric torture. And then, the one case of the women in the feces tank was 

just outrageous. Five women died. One fell into a feces tank. One 

by one, other women went in to help her, and then the officer said 

close the door and they died a very cruel death. 

Elsewhere you talk about the killing of Christians who refuse to 

convert, the pouring of molten iron on them, one by one. The use 

of prisoners for martial art practice. The water torture that you 

suffered yourself. All of that, I think, points out the unspeakable 

cruelty of Kim Jong-Il and his dictatorship. All the more reason 

why this Committee, this Congress, our President, and everyone 

who believes in human rights needs to shout from the rooftops that 

these atrocities must end. 

I do have just a few very brief questions as you’ve been very patient, all of you, with your time. 

One on religious freedom. We know that for international audiences very often the government will showcase a few governmentrun churches to try to give the air of religious freedom. Has that 

been your case? Does the government run that kind of operation 

where they have a few churches with government-controlled people 

trying to give the air of religious tolerance? 

Ms. LEE. North Korea, into the late ’80s—1988 and 1989—allowed Christians to come visit North Korea from overseas. And 

these foreign visitors, when they were Christians, they would naturally want to go to church on Sundays. But they did not have any 

churches in North Korea then. So for propaganda use purposes, to 

be recognized by the foreign visitors, they built two Presbyterian 

churches, Bongsu Church and Chilgol Church—probably two locations. 

And then, for the Catholics, they built Jangchung Church, a 

Catholic church. They are all for propaganda only. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Lee, do you agree with that, and Mr. Kim, is that 

your understanding as well? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes? 

Mr. LEE. I agree with Ms. Lee. I not only agree, but say that 

Christianity is impossible in North Korea. It is not allowed because 

they have self-reliance principle and philosophy. If Christianity 

comes in, Juche will have to go out, which is not logical and impossible. It’s only an excuse that they have church or religious freedom. 

The Labor Party is governed by the 10 major principles. And the 

very first principle insists that other than self-reliance, no other 

principles or philosophies are acceptable. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Kim, did you want to comment on that? 

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Chairman. I came a long way and so far 

am mainly talking about what happened in the past. I believe more 

in what we are going to do into the future or even right now, for 

this moment. I have heard that there are three refugees from 

North Korea in China who got caught and whose lives are in danger. So I wish we could help them and save them first. 

90

We were talking about religious problems, so I will go back to the 

point. The religious freedom and the existence of churches in North 

Korea, that’s a false, fictitious image. Falsely made by North Korea 

in order to maintain its regime and for international relations sake. 

Having said that, I also, again, reiterate that those who are 

about to die should be helped first. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you just a few final questions and I’ll ask 

them all and yield to all of you if you would respond. Dr. 

Vollertsen, as far as you know, were international bureaucrats deceived by this religious front, this deception that was put on. And 

generally speaking, were the unaware of the extensive and pervasive use of torture, either wittingly or unwitting? 

I mean, you, yourself, after doing so much good humanitarian 

work got glimpse after glimpse. And a matter of fact, I appreciate, 

personally, you spending several hours with me delineating the 

horrific abuses several months ago. It was certainly an additional 

wake up call for me and my staff as just how terrible it is. 

I would like to ask about trafficking; especially, Mr. Lee, if you 

were aware of women, especially, for forced prostitution? Whether 

that is an issue that you are aware of in North Korea. 

You mention, Ms. Lee, in your book about the Korean POWs, 

that after 30 years later they were still being used as slaves. Well, 

the United States had approximately 8,000 missing in action/

POWs. Many were presumed to be dead, but some not. Did you 

ever hear—Mr. Lee, you might have some information on this—

about any Americans who are still held captive in North Korea? I 

will have some additional questions I would like to submit, but if 

you could answer those. 

Mr. LEE. Thank you, Chairman. First, the Americans missing in 

action since the Korean War. I even did not know about that. I 

have not seen any, so I am ignorant. The young ladies sold and 

bought in trafficking for prostitution, I have not seen it with my 

own eyes. I’ve heard lots of stories, but none I have actually seen. 

About the religious issue, yes, international community was lied 

to and cheated by the North Koreans. The principle of self-reliance 

is the one leader, there cannot be two, or more. So in principle, 

when North Korea was successful in maintaining its one-man regime, Kim Il-Sung and then Kim Jong-Il are equal to God. So as 

long as one of them is there, there is no way a second God could 

come in. Christianity is impossible because of self-reliance. For it 

to become possible, then we’d have to have Kim Jong-Il taken out 

of the picture. 

Mr. KIM. Chairman, I’m the Chairman of Paektu-Halla Association. Paektu-san being the northernmost, highest mountain. Hallasan being the southernmost mountain in Cheju Island off the peninsula. That’s the name of our association, made up of my friends 

who are all escapees from North Korea. Since they are not there, 

for their sake, I must tell you on their behalf about the church in 

North Korea. 

Two churches mentioned are there for the Kim Jong-Il regime to 

prove to the people that North Korea is, indeed, a member of the 

international community. Also, as a means of attracting external 

assistance and aid, meaning from foreign nations and from the 

international community. Therefore, the churches in Korea have no 

91

real meaning, no truthfulness and I have said this to you for my 

friends. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Vollertsen, did you want to respond in terms of 

the deception of international bureaucrats? Have they been deceived or are they just not knowledgeable about the torture, the 

fronting of a church in order to make it look as if there is some 

semblance of religious freedom? When will actually wake up and 

just—I mean, this hearing certainly is a wake up call. 

Dr. VOLLERTSEN. Okay, about religious freedom, when I lived in 

North Korea for 11⁄2 years, I met many, many German politicians 

who were shown around in capital city and we managed to visit 

two churches there. It was a real showcase because this pastor, he 

was not a real pastor. He was talking about Kim Jong-Il and his 

gratitude to finance these churches. He was talking a lot about 

Kim Jong-Il and he showed up around in this showcase. And I wondered, because you can simply prove that—I wondered, when I was 

going around, what’s going on in these churches. He talked about 

service on Christmas Eve. He talked about the service on Easter 

and several hundreds of Christians were attending. And as simple 

proof, I went around those chairs and I simply touch the dust, the 

dust of the last 2 years, never used those chairs. 

When I traveled around in Pyongyang nearly every Sunday and 

I had my own jeep, and with my driving license, I was allowed to 

go without any translator and driver. So I visited those churches 

on Sunday morning at 10 o’clock on Christmas Eve, on Easter, and 

there was never any Christians. It was closed. And in winter times 

it was snow in front of those churches, two meters of snow never 

carried away. So it was a real showcase to what’s going on about 

Christianity. 

All those other things, as a foreign in North Korea, you will 

never get the real image. That’s the common known Sunshine policy in South Korea maybe. I’m arguing for some rain showers in 

this Sunshine policy. I think we have to care for those children. 

We have to create some pressure in the international community, 

and I think we can’t do it with this inside information. We can only 

do it with those refugees who are coming out and they’re very 

eager now to testify because they can feel that there is some pressure from the international community. That there is some potential from the media. 

So with this attention, I think we can spread the knowledge. And 

I’m absolutely sure that when people in the United States and the 

christian community there will know what happens, then they will 

care and then they will change the desperate situation of those 

children. I’m very sure about that. We can help and you must help 

to spread the message and get them involved. 

Mr. SMITH. We’ll certainly work very hard on that. As a matter 

of fact, we’re looking at introducing a resolution that would at least 

lay out the facts concerning the humanitarian and human rights 

crisis in North Korea. And also, to call on our own government as 

well as getting the attention of the community, and as we get to 

it, the U.N. Convention on Human Rights to take very decisive action. This period of time of looking the other way is over. Even 

when the International Religious Freedom Commission and our 

own State Department looked at countries of particular concern, 

92

somehow North Korea didn’t make the initial list of egregiously 

violating countries, which was absurd. 

Part of the explanation was, we don’t have information. Well, we 

could make a presumption based on what the refugees and others 

were telling us. But now there is a body of information that grows 

by the day. 

I just want to conclude, Ms. Lee, when you were in Beijing, seeking your freedom—I led a delegation to the U.N. Women’s Conference, the Beijing Women’s Conference. So I was in town when 

you were in town, but I was struck by your written statement 

about the gentleman that came by in the park when you were in 

the park with your son. He sounded an awful lot like an angel to 

me, after having encountered such atrocities and cruelty in your 

life, to finally find someone who had heart and some compassion. 

And all of you, thank you for your courage. We’ve got to do our 

part, but you have done it in spades and I admire you and we all 

admire you very much. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. I want to thank you again for making the trip here 

to testify. I will attempt to obtain an abbreviated version of your 

testimony so that I can send that and maybe Congressman Smith, 

as former Chairman of the Human Rights Subcommittee, will want 

to join me in this to send this to our colleagues so that they can 

read the verbatims of some things that you’ve said here and that 

you’ve shared with us here today. So thank you all so much. 

We’ll adjourn this hearing at this time. 

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(93)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTER- NATIONAL RELATIONS

I want to thank Chairman Leach for convening today’s hearing, which will provide us with a rare glimpse into the ‘‘hermit kingdom’’ of North Korea. The excellent 

witnesses you have assembled will help us peer behind one of the last vestiges of 

the Iron Curtain that Josef Stalin and his collaborators drew across the world after 

World War II. The North Korean regime is brutal, totalitarian, and veiled in secrecy. It is time to lift the veil. 

I want to welcome the distinguished journalist and Asian expert, Jasper Becker, 

who, until very recently, was the Beijing bureau chief of the South China Morning 

Post. In light of the career change forced upon him on Monday, I look forward to 

any additional comments he would like to make regarding the problem of ‘‘self-imposed censorship’’ by journalists working in Beijing. 

We also have a distinguished panel of representatives from international aid 

agencies and NGOs. They will help to clarify issues with regard to humanitarian 

relief efforts and the monitoring of the distribution of food aid. This is a key concern 

for the Congress since North Korea has been the number one recipient of U.S. food 

assistance in Asia for some years. I agree with President Reagan that ‘‘a hungry 

child knows no politics,’’ and am proud that our food assistance has saved the lives 

of millions of vulnerable Koreans. On the other hand, the admonition to ‘‘love your 

enemies’’ does not, in my view, include putting rice in the bellies of a hostile North 

Korean army which threatens our friends in South Korea and the thirty-seven thousand American troops who stand with them. 

The second panel, made up of defectors and those who survived the North Korean 

gulag, will, I fear, provide chilling testimony. They will speak from personal experience of the human rights abuses that the Pyongyang regime commits against its 

own people. Two of them will recount their experiences inside North Korea’s horrific 

concentration camps for political prisoners. These are places where unjustly imprisoned Koreans face daily abuse, torture, and summary execution at the whim of their 

tormentors; where mothers and fathers are starved because they stole a few kernels 

of corn to feed their own starving children; where Christians are martyred because 

of the strength of their religious faith; where pregnant women are classified as enemies of the state and forced to watch in horror as their newborns are murdered 

before their eyes. 

North Korea is a place so feared by the thousands of refugees on the run that 

they have chosen a homeless existence where they are subject to exploitation, trafficking, and sexual abuse. Most of all, these refugees fear the threat of forced repatriation to the dark, murky gulag from which they escaped at great personal risk. 

Some are so desperate that they threaten suicide rather than return to what they 

call a ‘‘hell on earth.’’

One might think these accounts are exaggerated. Too horrifying to be true, others 

may say. But I am old enough to remember the Second World War. As a veteran 

of that noble conflict, I remember a lot of things that weren’t supposed to happen. 

I also recall those who said we couldn’t know what was taking place within foreign 

borders half a world away. 

I, however, know full well what unscrupulous regimes with a lust for power are 

capable of: Pearl Harbor. The rape of Nanking. Concentration camps. The Holocaust. 

And so we promised ‘‘never again.’’ Yet how many times have those words rung 

hollow since the end of World War II? I fear that we may one day be indicted by 

our silence about the enormous human rights abuses going on today in North Korea, 

94

even as we speak. And the refugee issue, long wrapped in silence, has now reached 

inside the very gates of the American embassy in Beijing. It is time to hear the testimony of these witnesses. 

Our President took a lot of public criticism from the so-called ‘‘experts’’ when he 

identified North Korea as part of an ‘‘axis of evil.’’ But the experts who claim they 

know history should remember that George W. Bush was not the first American 

president who saw evil in the North Korean regime. 

No. Harry Truman was the first. President Truman faced an excruciating decision 

when Pyongyang launched a sudden, unprovoked attack on a Sunday morning in 

June, 1950. He either had to acquiesce in the extension of the Iron Curtain over 

the entire Korean peninsula or come to the immediate rescue of those in the south. 

Truman knew the cost involved. It was a cost paid with the blood of almost fiftyfive thousand heroic young American military personnel, not to mention the soldiers 

of allied nations under the U.N. command, and the millions of Korean casualties. 

Was President Truman right to perceive evil in the North Korean regime? I think 

today’s testimony will make clear that he was. We can all be thankful that our 

friends and allies in South Korea were not subjected to a half-century of the ghastly 

repression of which we are about to hear. 

I look forward to receiving the testimony of our witnesses. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL BLUMENAUER, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OREGON

I want to congratulate Chairman Leach and Ranking Member Faleomavaega for 

holding a hearing on these important issues today. We are all heartened at the recently announced news that dialogue will resume between North Korea and the US. 

Since the beginning of the Bush administration, there has been a long silence regarding US policy toward the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and a 

resulting lack of engagement, furthering the isolation of North Korea. As is now 

well agreed, North Korea experienced a devastating famine which peaked in 1996–

97 and resulted in the deaths of nearly two million according to some estimates. 

And the suffering for the people of North Korea continues in a country that still 

cannot feed its people and by all accounts, a country that routinely abuses the 

human rights of its citizens. As a nation, the US is faced with some troubling real 

world choices about how best to address these issues. 

The DPRK has long been isolated from the rest of world, operating in its hermit 

kingdom. I strongly believe that engagement is a critical approach for bringing 

North Korea into the world community and help end the severe isolation of its citizens. As most experts both here in the US and throughout Asia agree, we want to 

avoid if possible a sudden collapse of the regime that could plunge its citizens into 

further chaos, suffering and destruction. 

In his book, The Great North Korean Famine, Andrew Natsios, now the USAID 

Administrator, notes that the greatest benefits of the international food donations 

during the late nineties included a flooding of food into the burgeoning private farmer markets. This influx of food kept the food prices low and therefore fed far more 

average North Koreans citizens that otherwise would have occurred. At the same 

time people knew the food was coming from outside the country, so it further undermined the system as citizens realized the state was no longer able to provide for 

their needs. 

Natsios also notes the significant impact of more than 100 NGO and UN aid 

workers as they fanned out across the country for the first time in fifty years, chiseling away at the extreme isolation of the people in North Korea and chipping away 

at the illusions of the juche ideology. 

Another important issue for our consideration is that there continues to be an urgent need for additional food aid in North Korea to avert a severe food crisis. In 

an April 12, 2002 news release, the UN World Food Programme (WFP) urged the 

international community to give desperately needed food aid to the vulnerable people in the DPRK. Some 6.4 million beneficiaries will be affected unless new contributions to the emergency operation are made now. The WFP Regional Director 

for Asia has just completed a two-week countrywide assessment and concludes that 

a break in the food aid pipeline would disrupt WFP’s efforts to alleviate hunger and 

reduce malnutrition among the at-risk population groups (children, pregnant 

women, nursing mothers and the elderly). The most vulnerable will have dramatically reduced rations by August under current funding levels. An additional 368,000 

tons of cereals and other commodities are urgently needed to help stave off a major 

food crisis. 

95

1 Roberta Cohen is codirector of the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement. 

I would hope we can continue fulfilling our moral imperative of providing food to 

the North Koreans. I applaud the Bush Administration’s pledge to uphold the dictum of Ronald Reagan that a hungry child knows no politics, and hope that translates into additional food for North Korea with US food monitors who can continue 

the process of ending the isolation of North Korea. 

Copyright 2000 The Christian Science Publishing Society 

The Christian Science Monitor 

September 6, 2000, Wednesday 

DON’T LET NORTH KOREAN SOFTENING OBSCURE PERSISTENT HUNGER

BY ROBERTA COHEN 1

There’s been encouraging news of late from the Korean Peninsula. Leaders of the 

North and South held a first summit in June, and family reunions and cultural programs are under way. North Korea is establishing diplomatic relations with other 

Asian and Western countries and is negotiating with the US about freezing its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. 

Despite the fact that the US has provided North Korea with more than $ 400 million in food and other commodities since 1995, there are still no firm assurances the 

food is reaching those who need it most. Congressional and nongovernmental-organization (NGO) estimates suggest upward of 2 million North Koreans died from 

starvation and related diseases between 1994 and 1998. A major reason is that the 

food aid goes directly to North Korean authorities, with no controls to prevent their 

handing it out to party officials and their families, the military, people considered 

loyal, and workers deemed essential, to the detriment of others. 

To survive, tens of thousands have illegally crossed into China in search of food 

and shelter from China’s Korean communities. But the majority don’t make it across 

the border. New, unpublished reports from aid organizations and researchers working on the border suggest many become internally displaced within North Korea, 

moving from village to village, or from urban to rural areas, foraging for food. Growing numbers of malnourished children separated from their families roam city marketplaces and train stations, scavenging. Since the North Koreans restrict internal 

travel, those caught outside home areas without permits are subject to beatings, arrest, and confinement in centers specifically created for people who ‘‘wander’’ in 

search of food. Border groups describe conditions in these centers as ‘‘grim at best, 

with limited food, heating, and medical care.’’ Although the government claims to 

feed people in these camps, disease and death rates are reportedly high, and international monitors aren’t allowed inside. 

The worst period of the famine appears to have peaked, but large pockets of hunger and starvation remain. Some international aid officials insist the bulk of the 

food they provide is reaching those in need. 

But the US General Accounting Office reports that the North Korean government 

doesn’t allow the World Food Program (the main conduit for US aid) sufficient access to ensure food is ‘‘shipped, stored or used as planned.’’ Leading NGOs, including Action Against Hunger, Oxfam, and Nobel-prize-winning Mdecins Sans 

Frontires (Doctors Without Borders), have left North Korea in protest of government 

restrictions. 

North Korea is not able to produce the 4.7 million tons of food it needs each year 

to feed its people. Only 20 percent of its land is arable, it lacks the machinery, fertilizer, and infrastructure to improve its agricultural output, and it is shackled with 

a Stalinist agricultural system. This means that the US and others will very likely 

have to continue providing food aid for some years to come. If that’s the case, it’s 

time to make sure US aid actually reaches the people who need it most. 

Right now the World Food Program is negotiating its latest food-aid agreement 

with North Korea. The US should insist upon:

• an accurate survey of food needs throughout North Korea.

• an independent monitoring system for food distribution with uncontrolled, 

random access to all vulnerable groups - internally displaced persons, those 

in camps, and children suffering malnutrition and related diseases in hospitals and orphanages.

• the provision by North Korea of lists of the actual institutions to which food 

and medical aid is going;

96

• permission for NGOs to set up feeding stations accessible to hungry North 

Koreans.

• an expanded presence for relief workers in the country.

• and agricultural reforms to address the famine - such as increasing the number of individual plots of land on which people can grow their own food.

Persuading the North Koreans to allow these steps won’t be easy. 

Chances of success will be far better if the US mobilizes other donors, and other 

democratically based countries with which North Korea now has ties, to join in insisting that food go to the truly needy. 

Excerpts from: 

MINIMUM CONDITIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN THE DPRK: A SURVEY OF

HUMANITARIAN AGENCY INVOLVEMENT AND PERSPECTIVES

Dr. Hazel Smith 

Senior Fellow 

Jennings Randolph Fellowship Program 

United States Institute of Peace 

1200 17th Street, NW 

Washington, D.C. 20036

hsmith@usip.org

December 2001

Executive summary 

This report provides an overview of the humanitarian situation in the DPRK—

by assessing humanitarian needs and the response to date from the international 

humanitarian community. Secondly, it presents a summary and evaluation of the 

various views within the humanitarian community in respect of the operating conditions for humanitarian activity within the country. 

The major UN agencies—UNDP, UNICEF and WFP—started their relationship 

with the DPRK in the 1980s and some minor activities were undertaken in the 

country. These agencies became fully operational in the DPRK after 1995, when the 

DPRK government appealed to the international community for assistance to cope 

with gross food shortages, which threatened starvation for its people. The DPRK 

also appealed for assistance to NGOs, which started to take up residence in the 

DPRK in 1997, just four years ago. Prior to the mid-1990s, the DPRK had no experience of working with NGOs except for periodic links with the Red Cross and 

through its hosting of small delegations to the country of organisations such as the 

American Friends Service Committee. 

The UN agencies and the NGOs had little knowledge of the DPRK and the DPRK 

government had no experience of dealing with the international humanitarian community. The norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures of the DPRK 

were thus virtually unknown to the international humanitarian community. The 

DPRK government had a parallel lack of knowledge and understanding of the conventional requirements for international humanitarian assistance transfers. 

Agency responses to working in the DPRK varied considerably. Responses varied 

according to a multiplicity of factors, including but not only related to type of agency 

and country of origin, type and nature of donor, and agency preferred method of 

working 

There is a large area of agreement between the agencies as to the need for improved monitoring and assessment conditions. A small number of agencies have the 

view, expressed by MSF, that there is ‘no humanitarian space whatsoever in the 

DPRK’. Another view expressed by some agencies is that the conditions demanded 

of the DPRK government are more stringent than in any other international humanitarian operation. The majority perspective, however, is that conditions need improving but that it is necessary to continue to engage with the DPRK. From this 

perspective, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DPRK reports, in 2001, that 

‘Essentially, the minimum conditions are not yet achieved here, but we know that 

there is a very serious crisis that affects millions of people. We have no doubt that 

our aid has saved many, many lives. We do not have the luxury of choice that allows 

us to say ‘‘ we will not operate because minimum conditions are not reached’’—we 

have to remain engaged and persevere, and work towards achieving those conditions. The minimum conditions will certainly not be achieved if we all simply pull 

out.’ (Morton, 2001) 

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1. Purpose of report 

The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD)—that brings together Heads of Humanitarian agencies including UN and NGOs—is organising a series of consultations on humanitarian dilemmas. One of these consultations was held on December 

6, 2001 in Geneva and the topic was—‘Minimum conditions for humanitarian action’. 

The CHD workshop looked in detail at the case of DPRK. The purpose of this report is twofold. Firstly, it provides a brief overview of the humanitarian situation 

in the DPRK—by assessing humanitarian needs and the response to date from the 

international humanitarian community. Secondly, it presents a summary and evaluation of the various views within the humanitarian community in respect of the 

operating conditions for humanitarian activity within the country. 

2. Methodology 

The bulk of the report was based upon documentation from the consultant’s own 

papers, electronic resources such as the Reliefweb archives and responses from to 

an email communication sent to a number of organisations and individuals located 

through the net, personal sources and available relevant email lists. This method 

involved somewhat of a scattershot approach but—in the absence of an available 

master-list of humanitarian organisations operating or having operated in the 

DPRK—the aim was to try to ensure that as many interested parties as possible 

would have the opportunity to contribute their views. 

A wide range of persons and agencies responded to the email communication. I 

have not listed them all here but they included government departments, NGOs, 

UN agencies, persons that had worked in the DPRK or that were still working in 

the DPRK, and media representatives. Many apologies are offered to those that 

were inadvertently missed out. 

Few external observers are aware of the sheer immensity and diversity of the humanitarian effort and so some attempt has been made to map the humanitarian 

presence in the DPRK. The wide variety of organisations also helps to explain the 

wide variety of perspectives on humanitarian involvement in the DPRK. This is why 

it is difficult to present an ‘aggregate’ view of the humanitarian community’s views 

on this subject. Some common positions can, however, be observed and, where they 

do exist, are outlined in this paper. 

3. Constraints 

The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), formerly known 

as the UN Department of Humanitarian assistance, maintains useful records on assistance to the DPRK but it is wholly reliant on what figures are reported to it. 

Some agencies have preferred to enter into bilateral arrangements with the DPRK 

and it is likely that these donations are not well-recorded. There have, however, 

been some improvements in transparency. Since the North-South Korean Summit 

of 2000, for instance, assistance provided by south Korean and Japanese NGOs is 

less of a sensitive issue for those NGOs and so this assistance is becoming increasingly more visible. It is not possible, therefore, to provide a comprehensive historical 

account of what assistance has been channelled to he DPRK since 1995. It is also 

doubtful whether even today it is possible to identify with much precision how much 

assistance is going to which beneficiaries, unless that assistance is channelled 

through the mechanisms of the UN Common Humanitarian Appeal Plan. 

Other constraints were that for those organisations operating in the DPRK, or 

contemplating operating in the DPRK in the future, the subject of ‘minimum conditions for humanitarian involvement’ remains extremely sensitive. Agencies may 

judge that it is not necessarily helpful to engage in discussions of this issue outside 

of their own bilateral negotiations with the DPRK government. This also means that 

there is a potentially disproportionate voice for those organisations that have chosen 

no longer to work in the DPRK. 

4. A summary of humanitarian involvement in the DPRK 

The major UN agencies—UNDP, UNICEF and WFP—started their relationship 

with the DPRK in the 1980s and some minor activities were undertaken in the 

country. These agencies became fully operational in the DPRK after 1995, when the 

DPRK government appealed to the international community for assistance to cope 

with gross food shortages, which threatened starvation for its people. The DPRK 

also appealed for assistance to NGOs, which started to take up residence in the 

DPRK in 1997, just four years ago. Prior to 1997, the DPRK had no experience of 

working with NGOs except for periodic links with the Red Cross and through its 

hosting of small delegations to the country of organisations such as the American 

Friends Service Committee. 

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The UN agencies and the NGOs had little knowledge of the DPRK and the DPRK 

government had no experience of dealing with the international humanitarian community. The norms, principles, rules and decision-making procedures of the DPRK 

were thus virtually unknown to the international humanitarian community. The 

DPRK government had a parallel lack of knowledge and understanding of the conventional requirements for international humanitarian assistance transfers. 

In 1998, in an attempt to clarify with the government what the humanitarian 

agencies viewed as appropriate and essential principles for humanitarian operations 

in the DPRK, humanitarian agencies issued a collective set of ‘Humanitarian principles.’ These were initially worked out with DPRK officials and were first issued 

in November 1998 and amended April 1999 and March 2001. Humanitarian agencies have also issued three consensus statements on humanitarian operations in the 

country. The Humanitarian Principles with a list of the signatories are reproduced 

in appendix one. The Consensus Statements, also with lists of signatories, are reproduced in Appendix two. 

The Humanitarian principles are monitored through a series of ‘benchmarks’ developed by the in-country humanitarian/development working group comprised of all 

the resident humanitarian agencies. Progress on the benchmarks is regularly recorded in reports on the implementation of the Common Humanitarian Assistance 

Plan, which is coordinated by the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) which also has in-country representation. The most recent, October 

2001, OCHA summary of progress on the Humanitarian principles is enclosed as appendix three. 

5. The Humanitarian situation 

Background 

In the mid 1990s the DPRK suffered from a series of natural disasters that both 

destroyed food crops and exacerbated the structural economic decline, which had 

been taking place since at least the late 1980s, and which was a result of a loss 

of preferential trading arrangements with China and the former Soviet Union and 

Communist eastern Europe. Subsequent to the end of the Cold war, and the shift 

in the Chinese economy towards ‘market socialism’, former partners demanded hard 

currency payments for key Korean imports, most importantly oil. Lack of oil and 

other imported inputs contributed to massive shutdowns of industrial production. 

The DPRK also relied on industrial inputs (fertiliser, chemicals, electricity fed irrigation systems) to maintain agricultural output and a lack of these inputs contributed to dramatic falls in food production, such that by the early to mid-1990s the 

DPRK could not feed its population by its own production, and did not have the resources to purchase food from abroad. In addition, lack of locally produced inputs 

and the wherewithal to purchase them contributed to nation wide deterioration in 

the socio-economic infrastructure—including (although not confined to) the transport, energy, health, education and welfare sectors. 

The DPRK government had initially responded to the growing crisis with various 

self-help initiatives that included encouraging innovation in the workplace, recycling 

of all used material, the cultivation of very marginal agricultural land, the 

organisation and support of population movement towards land where food could be 

obtained, and the ever more extensive use of human labour in place of equipment 

and machinery that was no longer available in the country. In 1995, the government 

was forced to appeal to the United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organisations for assistance because the scale of the crisis was such that it 

could not be resolved by self-help methods. 

According to figures produced jointly by the government and the UNDP, GDP declined by about 50 per cent between 1993 and 1996—representing a drop in per capita income to $481. Acute food shortages threatened the lives of millions, particularly the most vulnerable—children, women, the elderly, the sick. There were unsubstantiated rumours of starvation—unsubstantiated because it was impossible for 

independent observers to have access to the DPRK population. What was incontestable was that there were many ‘excess deaths’ due to malnutrition/disease related 

causes. The figures are still in contention with numbers cited at the lower and higher end closely allied to political agendas of the sources—from 200,000—the government’s figure—to the three million cited by United States Republican Andrew 

Natsios—now director of USAID. Independent observers argue for a more variegated 

picture—with the industrial north-eastern province of North Hamgyong much more 

adversely affected by food shortages, for instance, compared to the breadbasket 

areas of North and South Hwanghae. 

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Current aggregate food needs 

Since 1995, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has carried out, in conjunction with the government and the UN World Food Programme (WFP), bi-annual 

food and crop assessments to try to gauge the requirements for international assistance. The FAO/WFP surveys, complied with the help of satellite data, government 

information, discussions with the humanitarian agencies and field visits have shown 

that annual food production is insufficient to meet needs. Annual cereal production 

has remained at a low level with a perceptible decline since the start of the FAO/

WFP surveys in 1995. On the more positive side, the most recent crop assessment, 

of October 2001, indicates quite a sharp recovery of cereal production compared to 

the very difficult previous year, with some indication of structural improvements, 

although the report also indicates a continuing large aggregate food deficit (see Appendix four, table one). 

Using a minimal food requirement (167 kg per person per year to provide 75 percent of a minimum calorie requirement of 2100 kcal.), FAO/WFP calculates that 

even with the efforts made by the government, supported by the international community, to rejuvenate agricultural production, there will be insufficient food to meet 

basic needs in the year 2000/2001 (see appendix four, table two). The FAO/WFP October 2001 assessment mission found that aggregate food deficits would continue 

into 2001/2002 and a grave food crisis can only be averted through continuing international assistance. 

While no-one is sure about the accuracy of the numbers, humanitarian agencies, 

donors and government share the broad conclusions of the FAO/WFP surveys that 

indicate an aggregate need for food and other basic needs support, as well as for 

assistance to revive the economy so the country can both produce food and afford 

to buy food on international markets. 

6. The humanitarian response 

Since 1995 and the first international humanitarian responses to the crisis, the 

composition of the international humanitarian community in terms of the types of 

agencies (multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental) and their geographical provenance has been diverse. Methods of operation have been varied. Sectors of assistance have remained more or less the same. 

There have been two main changes in the composition of the international humanitarian between 1995 and 2001. The first is the move from a negligible in-country humanitarian agency presence to a, relatively speaking, substantial residential 

presence, including governmental, multilateral and non-governmental agencies. 

The second and related change is the start of work by non-governmental 

organisations in the DPRK. This NGOs differ according to geographical origin in 

terms of their method of operation. South Korean and Japanese NGOs are non-residential, United States NGOs have been mainly non-residential (with the partial exception of the presence of health and food aid monitors in-country in parts of 1998, 

1999 and 2000). European NGOs have been mainly residential. (It is a condition of 

funding of the European Community’s Humanitarian Office that there is a resident 

presence). So far the Canadian NGOs have operated as non-residents. 

Initial response to the emergency came in the form of food aid and, although the 

types of assistance now cover more sectors, primarily agriculture and health, the 

most substantial sector of foreign assistance remains that of direct food aid. 

The initial humanitarian response 1995–1997

The first international agencies to respond to DPRK appeals for assistance were 

those with an already established relationship with the DPRK—UN WFP, UNICEF, 

UNDP and FAO—along with the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) 

and the Catholic-based NGO, CARITAS-Hong Kong. Less visible and less recorded, 

because of the political constraints, was the delivery of aid from Japanese and south 

Korean NGOs, which also began in 1994/1995. Korea Food for the Hungry International, for instance, sent medical equipment and clothes in 1994 and 1995. South 

Korean NGOS channelled their early assistance via their international links or US 

affiliates. In 1996, for example, World Vision Korea, channelled food through World 

Vision International and the Association of Evangelism in Korea donated rice 

through the Eugene Bell Foundation US. 

WFP delivered just over 18 thousand MT of rice to a value of about $4.5 million, 

excluding freight and monitoring costs between November 1995 and May 1996. 

UNICEF’s initial response in 1995–1996 was the provision of around $2 million 

worth of supplementary food for young children, measles immunisation, oral rehydration salts and multivitamin tablets. The IFRC appealed for 26 million Swiss 

francs in three appeals dated September 1995, March 1996 and November 1996. It 

is unclear from the records available how much funding was actually raised for the 

100

IFRC appeal, although a variety of food aid was donated including 22MT of cereals 

along with non-food items such as winter clothing. CARITAS mobilised five and a 

half million dollars in its first year of assistance, 1995/1996, allocating four and a 

half million dollars to food aid, about half a million dollars to support of agriculture 

and the rest to support in various social sectors including education. 

International agency activity increased in 1996/1997. Further support to the 

DPRK came from Swiss government bilateral assistance in agriculture, agricultural 

missions by MSF, and, also in the agricultural sector, from Canadian Foodgrains 

Bank (CFGB),World Vision International, Mercy Corps, Action for Churches Together (ACT) and Food for the Hungry. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 

sent assessment missions. 

Resident humanitarian agencies 

From 1995, UN resident missions were consolidated and expanded and shifted in 

focus from non-residential to residential operations. Key agencies were UNDP, the 

‘oldest’ of the resident agencies, having established an office in 1980, WFP which 

established an office in November 1995, UNICEF in January 1996 and World 

Health Organisation (WHO) in late 1997. 

In 1997 the NGO presence was firmly established when the IFRC set up an office 

in Pyongyang in 1997 and six non-governmental agencies began operating as residents in the DPRK. These were Children’s Aid Direct (CAD), Concern Worldwide, 

Cooperazione e Sviluppo (CESVI), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe—known in English as 

German Agro Action (GAA), Medecins du Monde (MDM) and Medecins sans 

Frontieres (MSF). These NGOs were followed in 1998 by Action Against Hunger 

that took up residence in the DPRK, as did Help Age International, Oxfam and Cap 

Anamur. 

In July 1997, the Swiss Disaster Relief Unit (SDR) opened an office in Pyongyang, 

followed in August by the European Commission, which established an office with 

six international staff members (four from the Commission’s Food Security Unit and 

two from ECHO. 

UN agencies in DPRK have expanded their presence since 1995 with, by 2001, 

in-country international representation from the UN Family Planning Association, 

a national officer employed by FAO in country, and regular visiting missions from 

smaller UN agencies, for example, the World Tourism Organisation. 

The resident NGO community 

The NGO community has fluctuated in number. Five have left and six have arrived. Since 1997, additions to the resident NGO community have been Adventist 

Development Relief Agency (ADRA)—Switzerland, PMU Interlife (Sweden), Campus 

fur Christus (Switzerland) and in 2000, two new French NGOs—Handicap International and Triangle. In 2001 Hungarian Baptist Aid took up residence. 

Of the five resident agencies that decided to leave DPRK, two voiced concerns that 

they were not reaching the most vulnerable children and that the difficulties and 

constraints they faced prevented adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation 

activities. One agency, Oxfam, was particularly concerned with constraints on adequate monitoring and assessment, not of beneficiaries, but of the water facilities it 

was testing. 

The non-resident NGOs 

At least four groups of non-resident NGOs have also assisted DPRK—none of 

these groups being mutually exclusive. Two groups (with overlapping membership) 

operate through a semi-resident presence in the DPRK. The first are those who coordinate their activities through the NGO funded Food Aid Liaison Unit (FALU) of 

the WFP. The second are those NGOs from the United States that have coordinated 

their activities through the Private Voluntary Organisation Consortium (PVOC). A 

third group operates through sister NGOs—some of which are resident in the DPRK 

and some of which are not. A fourth group operates bilaterally, directly with the 

DPRK government, and includes south Korean, Japanese and United States based 

NGOs. 

FALU was set up in 1997 by CARITAS, CFGB, ACT/Church World Service, World 

Vision International (WVI), ADRA, Food for the Hungry and Mercy Corps. In 2001, 

current members are CARITAS, CFGB, ACT and WVI. FALU employs one DPRK 

based international officer and two national officers who undertake monitoring, 

evaluation and reporting activities on behalf of its constituent NGOs. 

The PVOC was established in 1997 and was comprised of ADRA, Amigos 

Internacionales, CARE, Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, KoreanAmerican Sharing Movement, Latter Day Saints Charities, Mercy Corps International and World Vision. PVOC monitors were based in DPRK in 1998, with 

101

UNICEF, and in 1999–2000 with WFP. Three Korean speakers were employed in 

a team whose numbers changed but comprised around eight people. The PVOC team 

exited the country when the potato seed project and the Food For Work activities, 

which its member NGOs had supported, came to an end in 2000. 

The third group of NGOS—mainly of US origin—work with international counterparts. These include the American Red Cross who work through the IFRC and 

Catholic Relief Services who work closely with CARITAS-Hong Kong. US agencies 

like the Eugene Bell Foundation and the Institute on Strategic Reconciliation work 

closely with south Korean counterparts as well as the DPRK authorities. 

Some non-resident NGOs choose to work bilaterally. These include Americares, 

the American Friends Service Committee and Mercy Corps (in addition to its work 

within the PVOC). 

Japanese NGOS, which have been assisting the DPRK since 1995 have tended to 

work closely with the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, a long-established organisation with extremely close ties to the DPRK government. These include the Association to send eggs and bananas to he children of the DPRK, 

CARITAS-Japan, the Relief Campaign Committee for Children and the National 

Christian Council in Japan. 

South Korean NGOs have also assisted the DPRK and their numbers and activities have grown since they first started work in late 1995. Agencies include the Korean Sharing Movement, Iussaran Association, World Vision, Join Together Society, 

the Korean People’s Welfare Foundation. In June 2001, 26 south Korean NGOs were 

donating humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. 

Of the non-resident NGOs, two US based NGOS have decided that they will no 

longer operate in the DPRK, citing operational constraints including the inability 

to conduct adequate assessment, monitoring and evaluation activities. These are 

CARE and Catholic Relief Service (CRS). In contrast, south Korean NGOs have 

tried to encourage a greater participation from international non-governmental 

agencies in the DPRK. 

Changing volumes and types of assistance 

The first UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal ran from 1 July 1996 to 30 March 

97 and by February 1997. The appeal was for $43.6 million and was just under 60 

per cent funded (no final year figures available). Only UN agencies participated in 

this first appeal. Funding, even at this early stage came from a wide variety or 

agencies. Appendix five indicates the food aid recorded by the UN system for DPRK 

for 1995/1996 and shows large bilateral donations from Japan (over $60 million), 

Syria (over $8 million) and Switzerland ($2.5 million) through Swiss Disaster Relief. 

It also show large NGO donations from CARITAS (around two and a half million 

dollars) and the IFRC (about two million dollars). 

The second consolidated appeal, involving again only UN agencies was for US$ 

126,226,177 for the period from 1 April 1997 to 31 March 1998. In July 1997, the 

total requirement was increased to US$184 million. Some US$158 million was 

raised—an over 80 percent response rate. The third appeal, which ran from 1 January 1998 through 31 December 1998 was for US$415,648,979—of which US$ 

345,801,900 (or 90 percent) was for food assistance. Although only about 57% of the 

appeal was funded—the entire cereal component of the appeal was received. The 

fourth appeal was for 1999 and the amount requested was US$ 376,112,894—of 

which about 89 percent, or approximately US$ 243 million, was for food assistance 

and the promotion of food security. Again just over 50 per cent was funded—but 

WFP received over 100 per cent of its appeal. The fifth appeal, for the year 2000, 

was for US$ 331,706,092 with about 92 percent, or approximately US$ 303.6 million, for food assistance and the promotion of food security. Again, overall the appeal 

in overall terms was funded to just over 50 per cent of requirements, but food aid 

through WFP reached almost full funding. 

The most recent appeal, for 2001, was for $383, 984,914—with all bar about $60 

million designed for WFP food aid. 

Key donors in the most recent appeals have been Japan, the Republic of Korea, 

and the United States. Table one indicates the key donors to the UN Common Appeal. Table two indicates the key donors from all sources (given the reported information).

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Table one: Humanitarian Assistance in Response 

to the 2000 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency 

Appeal for Democratic People’s Republic of 

Korea 

January–December 2000

Donor Value US$ % of Funding 

1. Japan .............. 95,657,289 62.48%

2. USA ................. 29,228,497 19.09%

3. Australia ......... 6,662,379 4.35%

4. EU ................... 4,784,131 3.12%

5. Italy ................. 3,224,355 2.11%

6. Sweden ........... 2,799,278 1.83%

7. Norway ............ 2,293,562 1.50%

8. Canada ........... 1,710,526 1.12%

9. Denmark ......... 1,511,486 0.99%

10. Finland ............ 1,132,934 0.74%

Others* .................. 4,099,456 2.68%

TOTAL ..................... 153,103,893 100.00%

Table two: Humanitarian Assistance in Response to 

the 2000 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 

for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

January–December 2000

Donor Value US$ % of Funding 

1. Japan .............. 95,657,289 42.76%

2. ROK ................. 53,809,287 24.05%

3. USA ................. 29,228,497 13.06%

4. Australia ......... 6,992,132 3.13%

5. EU ................... 5,003,391 2.24%

6. Canada ........... 3,830,733 1.71%

7. Sweden ........... 3,428,506 1.53%

8. Italy ................. 3,224,355 1.44%

9. Norway ............ 2,314,867 1.03%

10. Denmark ......... 2,093,259 0.94%

Others* .................. 18,144,097 8.11%

TOTAL** ................. 223,726,413 100.00%

*Others includes Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 

Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, UN Agency, 

UNICEF National Committee, Multilateral, IFRC and NGOs 

**Total Humanitarian Assistance calculated as follows—Contributions in direct response to the 2000 Appeal 

plus additional contributions outside of the Consolidated 

Inter-Agency Appeal framework (i.e. IFRC, ICRC, NGOs, Bilateral, etc.) 

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 

Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency 

Appeal for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2001

The first appeal focused on food aid, recovery of arable land and health. Food aid, 

food security and health were the key components of the second UN appeal with 

water and sanitation added to the list in the third appeal. These sectors remained 

key throughout the appeals with some emphasis shifting towards capacity-building 

and to dove-tailing humanitarian assistance with the UNDP/DPRK government Agricultural recovery and Environmental protection (AREP) plan, which was formulated and agreed with donors in 1998 and reviewed in 2000. 

Food aid has remained overwhelmingly dominant in both volume and type of assistance donated to the DPRK since 1995. In addition, the UN World Food Programme has remained by far the most important channel of international humanitarian assistance to the country. The numbers of international staff resident in 

country illustrates this. In 2001 UN WFP has authorisation for 56 international 

staff. The nearest in number is UNICEF with 10. The relative volume of assistance 

being handled by the international agencies is also illustrated by the appeal summaries for 2001 in the table below.

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Table three: Appeal for assistance for DPRK for 1 January 2001 

to 31 December 2001

Appealing Agency, Requirements (US$) 

Food and Agriculture Organization/

United Nations Development Programme 40,049,304

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ............ 1,301,275

United Nations Children’s Fund ............................................ 10,502,940

United Nations Population Fund ........................................... 750,000

World Food Programme ......................................................... 315,920,424

World Health Organization .................................................... 8,350,280

Non-Governmental Organisations .......................................... 7,110,691

Grand Total ............................................................................ 383,984,914

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 

United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea, 2001, undated 

Non CAP assistance is, by definition harder to account for as not all is reported 

to the UN coordination office. For the year 2000, however, OCHA estimated that 

about $70 million worth of assistance had arrived in DPRK—mainly from the Republic of Korea. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification reports that between 1995 

and 2001, US$523 of relief good including food, fertiliser and medical supplies, had 

been provided from the Republic of Korea (south Korea). 

Coordination 

The need for agency coordination and cooperation was recognised by the humanitarian agencies from the beginning of the emergency operations. In-country coordination has evolved to incorporate resident agencies and visiting delegations from 

non-resident humanitarian agencies. Out of country mechanisms have been more diverse, reflecting differing interests and operating procedures of the very disparate 

types of agencies that have become involved with the DPRK between 1995 and 

2001. 

UNDP provided initial in-country coordination and, in February 1997, appointed 

an emergency rehabilitation officer for his purpose. WFP took more of a lead role 

in 1998 when the WFP Representative was appointed as Humanitarian Coordinator. 

In 1999 the WFP Representative also became UNDP Representative and UN Resident Representative. A weekly inter-agency meting takes place in Pyongyang and 

regular inter-sectoral meetings in agriculture, health and nutrition, food aid coordination and water and sanitation are also convened. A humanitarian working group, 

comprising representatives form all the agencies meets regularly to monitor the appeal. The UN country team meets regularly as do the NGOs. 

Out of country organisation has taken place through country wide coordination as 

in the US and Japan, through Church based mechanisms as with the CARITAS network, and through various innovative mechanisms such as the three annual conferences on humanitarian assistance to the DPRK which have taken place in Beijing 

(1999), Tokyo (2000) and Seoul (2001). 

Complexity and change 

The humanitarian community is a very diverse, particularly in the NGO community. The UN agencies provide the vast majority of humanitarian assistance and the 

delivery of UN assistance is in turn dominated by WFP. There has been a shifting 

emphasis towards food security and health and an increasing willingness to attempt 

to support rehabilitation and recovery. In humanitarian assistance volume terms, 

however, food aid remains by far the dominant sector. All programmes, including 

food aid are cross cut by capacity building programmes—for example including 

study tours abroad—and all UN programmes and some of the NGO programmes 

promote conscious gender sensitivity in their programmes. CARITAS and IFRC remain large providers of NGO assistance although, collectively, south Korean NGOs 

have an increasing presence (though not residence) in the country. 

7. The conditions for humanitarian assistance 

A background of mutual incomprehension 

The DPRK is probably the most closed society in the world and prior to the food 

emergency of the 1990s very little reliable information was available about the country. The government viewed all data through a national security prism which considered that even basic micro socio-economic statistics could be useful to its adversaries. The agencies thus had a double handicap. The first was that they had no 

104

basic information other than that provided by government or that could be gleaned 

from the rare publication that had attempted to offer some objective analysis of the 

country from the little data available. The second was that requests for what was 

seen by the agencies as standard baseline data were often seen by the government 

as unnecessarily intrusive, and as seeming to ask for information which could the 

be made available to enemy states. Principles of transparency and accountability demanded by agencies were therefore antithetical to the operating of the state. 

The DPRK had never worked extensively with humanitarian or development 

organisations and not at all with NGOs and had no knowledge of standard operating procedures of humanitarian agencies. Conversely, humanitarian agencies had 

little or no knowledge of the DPRK and humanitarian workers had to train themselves in the culture, politics and society of the DPRK as best they could. 

Humanitarian agency concerns 

From early 1997, NGOs in particular, but also the key UN agencies of WFP and 

UNICEF, began to express concerns that they were not permitted unimpeded access 

to beneficiaries to assess need and impact of assistance, and to monitor the distribution of aid. Agencies were also concerned with the reliability and quality of information they received from government. 

The substantive concerns of many humanitarian agencies focused on two related 

areas—whether aid was reaching the most vulnerable of the population—and the 

restrictions on direct access to beneficiary or potential beneficiary groups. Not all 

the agencies voiced these concerns and the agencies that have voiced these concerns 

have not shared them to the same degree. There has, however, been a shifting consensus on these issues by many agencies, made public in the three consensus statements outlined in Appendix two. The most recent consensus statement of March 

2001 concentrates on the progress that has been made but also comments that more 

need to be done. 

Humanitarian principles 

In response to the concerns expressed, humanitarian agencies developed a set of 

humanitarian principles in November 1998, which have since been amended, in 

April 1999 and March 2001 (see Appendix one). 

The nine humanitarian principles express broad areas in which the agencies wish 

to see progress and serve as a baseline for individual and collective agency negotiations with government. A set of indicators has been developed by OCHA in order 

to record, in detail, achievements and constraints in respect to the progressive implementation of the humanitarian principles. These are regularly updated (see Appendix three for most recent report of October 2001). The most recent report shows 

gradual improvements in some areas, continuing constraints in others and some deterioration in one area. 

8. Agency responses to conditions for humanitarian operations in the DPRK 

Agency responses to working in the DPRK varied considerably. Responses varied 

according to a multiplicity of factors, including but not only related to type of agency 

and country of origin, type and nature of donor, and agency preferred method of 

working. In so far as generalisations can be made about such a range of agencies, 

some attempt is made to group responses below. Individual agency responses are 

also outlined to illustrate the range of views. Some emphasis has been placed on 

the European NGO response because of the publicity some of these organisations 

have generated, not because they are the most substantial providers of assistance 

to the DPRK. 

South Korean and Japanese NGOs 

South Korean and Japanese agencies consider that they are responding to humanitarian need and at the same time are contributing to the peace process on the Korean peninsula. South Korean and Japanese agencies state that they are responding 

to a demonstrated overwhelming need for emergency assistance—and there is less 

emphasis upon detailed in-country monitoring of distribution and the necessity for 

rigorous assessment of impact on individuals and beneficiary groups. Some South 

Korean NGOs working in the agricultural sector, however, have had access to continued follow-up on projects and dialogue with counterparts in the Ministry of Agriculture, the Academy of Agricultural Sciences, county officials and farm management committees such as to permit assessment and evaluation of assistance. 

Of the 8000 south Koreans who visited the DPRK in 2000/2001, many were involved in humanitarian support to the DPRK. Obvious advantages arise to south 

Korean counterparts because of language facility, although one negative aspect is 

that it is difficult for south Koreans to travel outside Pyongyang. South Korean and 

Japanese agencies have more or less accepted that it is impossible to have a resiVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00108 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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dent presence until political agreements are found between their governments and 

the DPRK government. Some of these work bilaterally and some coordinate with the 

multilateral agencies. 

US NGOs 

United States NGOs have stated that they are responding to humanitarian need 

although there has been widespread discussion in and out of humanitarian circles 

in the United States of the idea that US provided humanitarian assistance can also 

contribute to improving the general atmosphere of relations between the DPRK and 

the US. US NGOS, through the PVOC, had resident monitors for lengthy periods 

of time in 1998, 1999 and 2000. In 1998 and 1999 these monitors stayed in hotels 

where other international visitors stayed but in 2000 US monitors had to stay in 

a government guest house separate from the rest of the international community. 

The US NGOS were permitted to employ Korean speakers. Travel plans for monitoring were approved a week in advance but once on site, according to a US government paper researched and published by the US General Accounting Office (June 

2000), on the spot visits to projects, distribution centres, project participants and 

homes were normally permitted. 

The PVOC responded to the concern of having to give one week’s notice of visits 

by increasing the number of monitoring activities, reporting to the GAO that their 

monitoring activities exceeded those in other countries. (GAO, June 2000) While the 

PVOC was in-country it continued to negotiate with the DPRK government on ways 

of improving access, having more security over visas, and to try to improve the ability of the PVOC to conduct needs assessments. 

In 2000 at the close of the PVOC programme, one PVOC agency, CARE, decided 

to withdraw from the Consortium. It stated the food crisis was not as severe as previously and would have chosen to work in rehabilitation efforts except that,‘Despite 

a nearly four-year dialogue with the North Korean government regarding the importance of access, transparency and accountability . . . the operational environment 

in North Korea has not progressed to a point where CARE feels it is possible to implement effective rehabilitation programs For that reason, CARE will withdraw 

from the consortium by June 30, 2000’. 

Other agencies continue to work bilaterally with the DPRK—for instance Mercy 

Corps and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)—which are both involved in the agricultural sector. 

AFSC monitors its assistance by making visits to farms two or three times a year 

with the intention of building trust through direct contact with farm managers. 

AFSC notes that relationships with Korean counterparts have developed and grown 

over time in a positive manner. AFSC also records this as the experience of other 

NGOs working in DPRK over a long period of time. 

ACT remarks that ‘the minimum conditions for humanitarian aid should always 

be based in the Code of Conduct’ [for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 

movement and NGOs] (email to author). 

Other NGOs work through international affiliates, which take the lead in monitoring and evaluation activities. These include the American Red Cross and the 

United Methodist Committee for Relief Work UMCOR). UMCOR remarks that: ‘we 

do not have a policy, or a standard that we’ve established to measure situations 

against. Our giving to the DPRK is pushed mainly by donors (as is most of our giving).’ (email to author) 

US NGOs have also received some criticism for poor management of programmes 

and failure to respond to DPRK willingness to actively engage in monitoring and 

evaluation of seed potato production at eight farms. (See GAO, 2000) The DPRK 

government also had some difficulty in discerning why the donated food for Food 

for Work programmes from the US government was channelled through the PVOC 

when the vast majority of US assistance was channelled through the UN WFP. In 

this respect. DPRK representatives were reported as saying that they accepted monitoring for the sake of food assistance but were less happy with food assistance for 

the sake of monitoring. 

European, Canadian and Australian agencies 

There have been a wide variety of responses from European, Canadian and Australian agencies to concerns that humanitarian agencies are limited in their activities in the DPRK. Some agencies choose to continue to negotiate with the DPRK 

government and to try to build long-term relationships in order to facilitate cooperation. These include GAA, Children’s Aid Direct, CESVI, Campus fur Christus, Concern Worldwide, PMU Interlife. Cap Anamur was involved in a major conflict with 

the government when its Director accused the government of human rights violations in December 2000—although the agency itself decided to stay in the DPRK 

106

and disavowed its outgoing country representative. ADRA Switzerland has sometimes had confrontational relations with the government but remains in the DPRK 

despite funding shortages for its DPRK programme. 

Others including MSF, ACF and Oxfam have withdrawn from operating in the 

DPRK, citing restrictions on activities. MDM and Help Age International also withdrew. Funding difficulties were reported as contributing to the decisions of these latter two agencies to withdraw from the DPRK. Save the Children had also had a 

presence in the DPRK via seconded nutritionists to UNICEF but withdrew because 

they were concerned about the manner in which UNICEF distribution of high energy milk was taking place. 

Canadian and Australian activity has been non-resident and these agencies have 

reported relatively good means of cooperation with the DPRK government. 

Individual agency responses 

Children’s Aid Direct report that they support the Code of Conduct as a basis for 

working in the DPRK. They report an improvement in the conditions of humanitarian involvement in the DPRK. CAD reports that

‘the minimum conditions for Humanitarian involvement in the DPRK as an 

evolving situation. We accept that to date these conditions have not fully been 

met, but we see a slow but continuing move towards meeting these conditions. 

Our levels of access, a fundamental issue, have increased during the time that 

we have worked in the DPRK, as has the level of co-operation we have received 

from the FDRC.’

German Agro Action, in a paper reviewing European NGO activity in the DPRK 

between 1995 and 2000, also noted, that while conditions were difficult, in terms 

of access to reliable information and having access to target groups for monitoring 

and evaluation, there had been noticeable improvements over the period. Freedom 

of movement had increased and, compared to 1997 [the first year of GAA residence] 

‘a definite positive difference for our work can be noted’. The GAA paper went on 

to say that

‘confidence that has been carefully built up by all sides involved through the 

years is an asset too valuable to be given up even in times of difficulties of finding funds for innovative approaches’ (Von Ramdohr, 2000).

Speaking on behalf of Concern Worldwide, CAD and GAA to an international conference of NGOs working in the DPRK in 20000, CAD emphasised that ‘it is easier 

to leave than to stay on’—stating that: ‘we have a presence on the ground and are 

learning and understanding ourselves the system and culture that people we work 

with live in. We accept the constraints but we are also looking for ways to overcome 

them. difficulties can be worked through and we need to continue to work along the 

path of mutual understanding and co-operation’ (Sirrell, 2000). 

MSF operated in the DPRK from 1995, becoming resident from July 1997 and 

leaving in September 1998. MSF was concerned that it was not reaching the most 

vulnerable children and was not able to conduct a nutritional survey in the counties 

in which it worked (Pecchio, 1998). The current MSF position is that there is ‘no 

humanitarian space whatsoever’ for work in the DPRK. MSF currently is doing 

some work with Korean refugees inside China along the China/DPRK border and 

also looking at the work of the humanitarian agencies which continue to work in 

the DPRK. (Terry, November 2001) From their interviews with DPRK citizens in 

China, MSF is concerned that international food assistance is not reaching any of 

the vulnerable in the northern province of North Hamgyong. (Terry, November 

2001) MSF commented that it is difficult for them to assess change in the conditions 

of working within the DPRK because they have not worked in the country for over 

three years. In September 1998, when MSF left the DPRK, they called for: ‘all donor 

governments to review their aid policies towards DPRK to demand that it is more 

accountable and that the North Korean government ensures that humanitarian 

agencies can freely and impartially assess needs, deliver aid, have direct access to 

the population and assess the effectiveness of their programs’. (MSF, September 

1998) 

Action Against Hunger (ACF) worked in the DPRK for just over two years, from 

January 1998 to March 2000. They carried out nutritional support programmes and 

a water rehabilitation programme in North Hamgyong, a remote mountainous province with very little arable land and generally considered the worst off province in 

the country in terms of food and other shortages and in terms of the lack of coping 

strategies for most of the population. ACF also carried out support for cereal production in farms in Pyongan and South Hamgyong. During the period in residence ACF 

carried out detailed agricultural surveys on the farms in South Pyongyan, detailed 

107

nutritional and attendance surveys in nurseries in North Hamgyong and a survey 

of water quality in North Hamgyong. Four personnel were based in a sub office in 

North Hamgyong. The nutritional support programme involved training Korean 

medical staff in 17 one-day courses in each county and district and North 

Hamgyong. (ACF, November 1999; ACF, February 2000 a ) 

ACF results showed that the incidence of malnutrition was not high in the nurseries and attendance was low compared to registered children. On the other hand 

malnutrition was high in the provincial residential children’s institutions (babyhome 

and orphanages). This led ACF to be concerned about the existence of a group of 

children who were not attending children’s institutions and were not therefore receiving international food. In order to reach these children ACF proposed the setting 

up soup kitchens in Chongjin, the provincial capital. The government agreed to this 

but did not agree to the monitoring protocol proposed by ACF. The ACF view of February 2000 is that information, particularly related to numbers of beneficiaries, 

could not be verified and food aid was/is not reaching the most vulnerable. They 

called for another international nutritional survey to be carried out, similar to that 

conducted in 1998. (ACF, February 2000, a, b, c) 

Oxfam left the DPRK in December 1999, after a series of negotiations with the 

government on access to monitoring water quality. The Country Director of the 

Oxfam programme felt that the government finally had agreed to almost all that 

Oxfam had requested by the time Oxfam left the DPRK but their decision to allow 

access were too late to make a difference to the decision taken (author’s interview 

with Oxfam country director, Pyongyang, December 1999). 

The major Canadian humanitarian agency involved in the DPRK, the Canadian 

Foodgrains Bank, which has supplied assistance since 1996, argues that monitoring 

works relatively well in the DPRK and, finds that the quality of monitoring ‘would 

exceed the average monitoring of CFGB program[s].’ The lack of information to 

evaluate impact is more of a concern for CFGB in terms of not having available another nutrition survey similar to the one carried out in 1998. Although noting the 

inherent danger in comparisons to other operations, CFGB notes that ‘the provision 

of humanitarian assistance is [a] messy business which requires the weighing of options between ‘‘less than ideal’’ approaches. in comparison with some other contexts, 

the concerns in the DPRK do not come close to the diversions and human rights 

violations of other contexts’ (Frey, 2001). 

Australia’s NGO involvement with the DPRK is via the Australian Centre for 

International Agricultural Research. This agency funds training for DPRK scientists 

and administrators in Australia and programmes do not involve ‘cash injections’ into 

the DPRK. The agency reports that ‘so far we are optimistic that the minimum conditions for assistance obtain’. (quotes from Brown, November 2001). The agency reports that: ‘The most critical ‘minimum condition’ for us is a preparedness on the 

part of the DPRK to exchange agricultural research knowledge freely and to have 

unfettered access to all agreed sites, facilities, information, equipment and records 

pertaining to agreed agricultural R and D projects. So far we have plenty of positive 

indications that this will be achieved, and only one or two minor negative indications’. (Brown, 2001). 

CARITAS and IFRC 

CARITAS is a confederation of 154 Catholic based agencies and IFRC is a federation of national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Both fundraise through their 

constituent organisations and therefore represent international constituencies in 

their work in the DPRK. CARITAS considers that while operating conditions can 

be difficult in the DPRK, they are much improved since the start of their operations 

in 1995, and part of that improvement is due to the process of building up trust 

through continuous dialogue from both dialogue partners. CARITAS has experienced 

a good deal of flexibility on monitoring visits such as to be able to request and be 

granted variations from schedules in the field. 

CARITAS-Germany would like to see more beneficiary input (Scholz, 2001). 

CARITAS-Hong Kong, the liaison agency for the CARITAS network, after six years 

of involvement with the DPRK argued strongly for continued engagement. 

‘Withholding aid would not only be morally wrong, it would also not solve any 

problems. Closing the door now means much greater difficulty in reopening it in the 

future—and with it the possibility of the same level of communication, or of gradually developing an even better [level of communication]. (Zellweger, 2000) 

IFRC must also give one week’s notice of visits. IFRC has not found any evidence 

of diversion of its supplies and has found evidence of efficient and effective distribution of drugs and equipment. The agency has recently completed a review of its activities within the DPRK which has not yet been made public but which includes 

an assessment of monitoring and assessment capabilities. IFRC appears to be of the 

108

view that while the quality of information on different aspects of the programme 

varies, much of the information provided is usable, although some areas could be 

improved in both data collection and organisation, and monitoring. 

Governmental agencies: bilateral and multilateral 

The major bilateral agency operating in the DPRK is SDC—Swiss Development 

and cooperation agency and the main multilateral UN agencies operating in DPRK 

are WFP, UNICEF and UNDP. 

SDC operates in specified farms and counties and engages in support for agricultural recovery including in the provision of training in and out of the country. Its 

full time international staff work with farmers, the Academy of Agricultural 

Sciences and the Ministry of Agriculture and the FDRC. It has engaged in food distribution, most recently of frozen beef, and its monitors claim to have had exceptional access to institutions and beneficiaries. 

WFP has developed an elaborate monitoring and assessment system based on the 

county as the unit of analysis. The new WFP county data base allows for systematic 

collection, organisation and comparison of population, agricultural, nutritional and 

gender based data—using qualitative as well as quantitative inputs from government, observations and interviews. The continuing problem here remains the accuracy of the data supplied. 

WFP has five sub-offices which are more or less permanently staffed throughout 

the year and although monitoring visits still require a week’s notice and are still 

sometimes cancelled without adequate explanation, some flexibility has been 

achieved in the ability of emergency officers in the field to vary schedules. Geographical access has increased to 168 counties out of 212, with the most recent becoming open in October 2001. 

About 400 visits take place a month to county officials, children’s institutions, hospitals, Food for Work sites and beneficiaries’ homes. The quality of information from 

visits is variable. Many county officials and institution directors are keen to share 

information with international staff but there are also those who either offer minimal information or information which does not appear accurate. Very often the quality of the information correlates directly to the quality of relationship the international officer has developed over the months or years with the Korean counterparts with whom they are working. Generally conversations with beneficiaries appear less open than conversation with officials. This could be because family visits 

tend to involve up to seven or eight people being present with the beneficiary, the 

beneficiary is unlikely to have had any previous contact with foreigners and the gender dimensions are such (many adult beneficiaries are women) that it is inhibiting 

to talk to strangers about personal issues such as breast-feeding or nutrition habits. 

It could also be because they are prevented from responding freely by officials. WFP 

has also held a number of provincial workshops on nutrition and food for work procedures. These capacity building exercises are commended by Korean and international participants. 

Conditions for staff in the field are still difficult, as they are for all agency staff. 

Outside Pyongyang. staff may not leave their accommodation unaccompanied. Visa 

restrictions and delays in visa processing also remains a problem for WFP. 

WFP is involved in continuous negotiations with the government, almost on a 

daily basis, to try to reduce constraints to the humanitarian programme. The view 

of the WFP representative who is also Humanitarian Coordinator in DPRK is that: 

‘At the beginning, knowledge about the DPRK in general and of the humanitarian 

situation in particular, was extremely limited. Also, knowledge by the DPRK of 

international agencies and NGOs, and how they worked and raised resources, was 

also extremely limited. I believe that the dramatically increased knowledge that we 

have gained about the country, its situation, and our understanding of the reasons 

underlying the crisis are very valuable in itself, together with the increased understanding from the DPRK side, and the lessening of mutual suspicions. Our knowledge of the coping mechanisms and of the relative vulnerabilities of people in both 

geographic terms as well as urban/rural, has increased the effectiveness of our programmes.’ (Morton, 2001) 

UNICEF has noted ‘significant improvements . . . in the partnership with the 

government’ but still notes constraints including restricted movement and limited 

access to target population indirect access to counterparts, limited feedback on enduse of supplies, inadequate focus on skills development and lack of disaggregated 

data on children and women. (UNICEF, 2001) 

Coordination 

The agencies have attempted to share their experiences and, where possible coordinate their positions on the issue of the conditions for humanitarian work, since 

109

the start of activity in the DPRK. This has taken place out of country and in country. 

Out of country, in 1997 a widely attended meeting, organised by UNICEF with 

a position paper written by Save the Children was held in Geneva. The three international conferences organised by the NGOs working in DPRK, were widely attended, by UN agency representatives as well as by other interested parties. 

In country, the mechanisms referred to above operate in relation to the inter-sectoral meetings and the inter-agency meetings take place weekly. Joint assessments 

of need and impact take place more regularly than previously, with agencies now 

also permitted to visit other agencies’ projects. 

Change 

There is a large area of agreement between the agencies as to the need for improved monitoring and assessment conditions. The majority of those who continue 

to work in the DPRK and have worked there for some time note change in a positive 

direction. MSF, after having left the country in 1998, sees no room for improvement 

short of policy change which in practice would probably amount to a change of government. A number of agencies consider that the DPRK is expected to operate to 

a higher standard in terms of aid distribution, assessment and evaluation practices 

than most other governments were large scale assistance takes place. 

Some features of monitoring and assessment conditions remain the same particularly in that travel is still organised one week in advance. One change is in terms 

of more access to more institutions. In 1998 for instance MSF was not permitted 

to see children in the orphanages in Pyongsong (Pecchio, 1998). In 2000/2001 the 

humanitarian agencies organised a working group that covered all the provincial institutions, including babyhomes, orphanages and boarding schools, collating and recording information from all the agencies. 

Another change is in terms of the ability to collect, collate and disseminate information. In 1997/1998 MSF had signed a protocol with the government where they 

agreed not to share information collected with other agencies. Agencies in 2000/2001 

regularly share information formally through the inter-sectoral working groups and 

informally through regular interaction. 

The quality of information has also improved although it still needs to improve 

further. An international/national nutrition survey took place in 1998 and the government has recently agreed that another will take place in 2002. The newly established WFP information base provides a potentially invaluable tool for the whole 

international humanitarian community. 

The major concern that is not yet addressed however is the inability to assess 

whether the most vulnerable groups in the country are receiving adequate assistance. 44 of the counties, which cover about 18% of the population are not accessible 

to the humanitarian community. In addition, children not attending nurseries or 

schools would not necessarily receive international assistance as food aid is channelled through children’s institutions. There is still a concern shared by many agencies that unhealthy children observed in the country may not be receiving food 

through the international community aid distribution. 

Most of the agencies would agree with ACF that malnutrition is not high in the 

children’s institutions compared to 1997 when the agencies first entered the country. They would also agree that the worst cases of malnutrition are seen in the provincial residential children’s institutions and these are being used as nutritional rehabilitation centres for children. This is why many of the agencies—governmental 

and NGOs—are concentrating activities in these institutions. The change in this respect is that resident agencies have continued to call for another nutritional survey, 

which the government has now agreed to. 

In terms of the conditions for international staff, David Morton points out that 

there have been some improvements. 

‘Although there is a long way to go, we should recall that in 1995, the very few 

international staff were confined to the Koryo Hotel and field travel was undertaken 

by train. Nowadays we have over 100 UN and NGO staff, and WFP has five suboffices outside Pyongyang, and staff are travelling by vehicle every day. (Morton, 

2001) 

9. Minimum conditions for humanitarian involvement 

The minority view on whether conditions permit humanitarian operations in the 

DPRK is that expressed by MSF, that there is ‘no humanitarian space whatsoever 

in the DPRK’. This view is explicitly critical of the majority view which is that conditions need improving but that they are gradually moving in the right direction. 

The majority view, implicitly critical of the minority view, is expressed by the HuVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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1Likewise, the terms South Korea and ROK (Republic of Korea) are used interchangeably 

here 2Lohman, D., North Korea: A Potential Refugee Crisis?, WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, October 1996 (UNHCR REFWORLD Databases) 3Foster-Carter, A., North Korea: Prospects, Scenarios, and Implications, WRITENET for 

UNHCR/CDR, March 1999 (UNHCR REFWORLD Databases) 4Foster-Carter, A., The Prospects for North Korea: Implications for Refugee Flows, WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, September 2000 (UNHCR REFWORLD Databases) 5Kirk, D., North Offers to Resume Talks with South Korea, International Herald Tribune, 3 

September 2001 6Kirk, D., Refugee Aid Groups Say Seoul Is Playing Politics, International Herald Tribune, 28 June 2001 7Kirk, D., Fleeing North Koreans Find No Refuge in China, International Herald Tribune, 26 

July 2001 8Larkin, J., Refugees in Purgatory, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 September 2001; Rennie, 

D., Terror Faces Starving Who Flee to China, Daily Telegraph [London], 1 September 2001 9Whittell, G., Kim Sells Workers to Gulags in Debt Deal, The Times [London], 6 August 2001; 

Startseva, A. and Korchagina, V., Pyongyang Pays Russia with Free Labor, Moscow Times, 6 

August 2001; Korchagina, V., Serfdom Alive and Well in Russia, Moscow Times, 10 August 2001

manitarian Coordinator when he argues that the process of continuing to try to engage with the DPRK is necessary. 

‘Essentially, the minimum conditions are not yet achieved here, but we know that 

there is a very serious crisis that affects millions of people. We have no doubt that 

our aid has saved many, many lives. We do not have the luxury of choice that allows 

us to say ‘‘ we will not operate because minimum conditions are not reached’’—we 

have to remain engaged and persevere, and work towards achieving those conditions. The minimum conditions will certainly not be achieved if we all simply pull 

out.’ (Morton, 2001) 

. . . 

DPR KOREA: NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES—AN ESCALATING CRISIS? 

By Aidan Foster-Carter, Hon. Senior Research Fellow in Sociology & 

Modern Korea, Leeds University

SEPTEMBER 2001

1. INTRODUCTION

This is WRITENET’s fourth report for UNHCR on refugee issues emanating from 

the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK or North Korea).1 Each 

is somewhat different in focus. The first, in 1996, was mainly a factual account of 

North Korean asylum seekers in neighbouring countries: mostly Russia, the People’s 

Republic of China (here referred to China or PRC), and South Korea.2 The second, 

by the present writer, offered a broad overview of North Korea’s current condition 

and prospects as of March 1999, with particular reference to implications for refugee 

flows—both actual and potential.3 The third, also by the present writer, was a shorter update as of September 2000; with particular emphasis on the improved international environment and peace process following the first ever inter-Korean summit meeting in June 2000.4 All these remain relevant, and are recommended for a 

fuller picture of the overall position than is possible here. 

The present report is again mainly an update, prompted by two developments. 

Over the past six months the international climate has worsened, with North Korea 

using its mutual mistrust with the new Bush administration in the US as a pretext 

to break off official contacts with Seoul as well. A dark cloud has fallen on Kim Daejung’s ‘‘sunshine’’ policy, leaving the South Korean President politically beleaguered. 

The North’s new offer to resume talks may come too late to resurrect last year’s euphoria.5

In addition, awareness of North Korean refugee issues is rising. The incident of 

‘‘Gilsu’s family’’, who in June took refuge in UNHCR’s Beijing office in a successful 

bid to win onward passage to South Korea, focussed unprecedented publicity on an 

issue which hitherto had not had great exposure.6 All too predictably, it also 

prompted a crackdown by the Chinese authorities, lest this success should inspire 

imitators.7 But this in turn may provoke a backlash, at least in terms of heightened 

media attention.8 A revival of DPRK contract labour in Russia, of a kind that raised 

concerns in the past, has also been noted and criticized as akin to slavery, even in 

the Moscow press.9

111

10 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, Peace and Cooperation: White Paper on Korean 

Unification 2001, Seoul, 2001, p. 165 11Gordon, M.R., How Politics Sank Accord on Missiles with North Korea, New York Times, 6 March 2001; Sigal, L.V., Bush’s Tough Line on North Korea Is Dangerous, International Herald Tribune, 8 May 2001 12 United States, Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2000: 

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Washington, February 2001 13 United States, Congress, North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, U.S. House 

of Representatives, Washington, November 1999, http://www.house.gov/international—relations/

nkag.report.htm [accessed 5 September 2001] 14Du Mars, R.D., The Deep Freeze, Asiaweek, 25 August 2001 15 Reuters, T. Vidaillet, N. Korea Seen Relying on Food Aid for Years, 21 August 2001 16See the—overlapping—‘‘Testimonies’’ in The Chosun Journal, http://www.chosunjournal.com 

[accessed 5 September 2001] and ‘‘Witness Accounts’’ at the website of Citizens’ Alliance for 

North Korean Human Rights [NKHR], http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/index—eng1.html 

[accessed 5 September 2001] 

These two trends may also interact. As noted in our last report, a painful paradox 

of the sunshine policy was that refugee and other DPRK human rights issues received short shrift. For South Korea, both the tactics and pieties of dialogue (respect 

for each other’s systems, and so forth) prompted a desire to seek common ground 

and begin with easier rather than thorny issues. Seoul is also at pains not to antagonize China. Hence even Kim Dae-jung, awarded the Nobel Peace Prize as a lifelong democrat, says that ‘‘the time is not ripe to raise the issue of [DPRK] human 

rights yet’’.10

For the US, meanwhile, which under Clinton was North Korea’s other main interlocutor, security issues were paramount. Washington’s agenda was headed first by 

nuclear concerns, and more recently missiles; a deal was done on the former, and 

almost on the latter.11 So although the US officially noted human rights violations, 

including refugee issues, it has hardly raised them in its dialogue with Pyongyang.12

But the reverse also applies. If the effort to engage North Korea remains in abeyance or definitively breaks down, there is less reason to tread delicately. US Republicans are basically hostile to the DPRK, and in opposition were critical of Clinton’s 

alleged appeasement of Pyongyang.13 Now South Korea in turn faces a presidential 

election in a little over a year. This may well be won by the conservative opposition 

Grand National Party (GNP), which likewise accuses Kim Dae-jung of appeasement. 

So by early 2003 the political climate around the peninsula could well revert to the 

hostility of the Cold War era. The sunshine era, rather than a new turn, may turn 

out to have been an interlude: a brief window of opportunity, which is now closing.14

A harsher atmosphere has its own dangers, but may make interlocutors less inhibited in raising the plight of refugees, even if this antagonizes Pyongyang. Even 

so, raison d’e ́tat will still set limits. Not only China, but also Russia, will continue 

to sustain the DPRK so as to avert the risks that would arise were it to collapse—

including refugee flows dwarfing any seen so far, a prospect equally unpalatable to 

South Korea. 

Meanwhile, there is little sign that the factors which have driven North Koreans 

to cross into China in recent years will cease to apply. The DPRK’s food shortage 

looks increasingly endemic.15 Tighter controls and harsher punishment may check 

the flows; but they might also backfire. The increasing body of case material suggests that while first time border crossers are economic migrants who simply want 

to eat, subsequent brutalization of those repatriated by China turns many against 

their country’s regime.16 While the DPRK remains largely impervious to human 

rights arguments as such, Kim Jong-il would do well to ponder if he is not thereby 

sowing dragon’s teeth and putting at risk the DPRK’s hitherto remarkable political 

solidity and stability. 

The rest of this paper elaborates on these issues. After brief updates on political 

developments in the past year and the position of refugees, we look at the perspectives and policy choices facing each of the main states involved—North and South 

Korea, China and Russia, and also the US, Japan, and the EU—and try to predict 

their likely responses over the next two to three years. As before, this entails thinking through a complex set of relationships—between short and long term effects, 

politics and economics, domestic and external trends, individual rights and raison 

d’e ́tat, and more—in a context where unknowns abound, and the practical and 

moral dilemmas facing concerned participants, not least UNHCR, are acute. There 

are no easy answers, but it is hoped that this paper may be of some small help in 

illuminating, if not unravelling, the political knots that tightly bind the human tragedy of North Korean refugees. 

112

17For fuller details, see the present author’s quarterly updates of inter-Korean ties and annual surveys of North Korea’s wider diplomacy in Comparative Connections: an E-journal on 

East Asian Bilateral Rrelations, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejournal.html. Specifically: FosterCarter, A., States Stalled: Business As Usual?, Second Quarter, 2001; Will All Things Go Well? 

Ups and Downs in the New Inter-Korean Normality, First Quarter, 2001; New Millennium, New 

North Korea?, Fourth Quarter, 2000 18See a typical editorial in Seoul’s leading conservative daily. This Kind of Military, Chosun 

Ilbo, 15 June 2001 19 A Delegation of Loose Cannon, Chosun Ilbo, 19 August 2001 20 Assembly Passes No-Confidence Resolution on Lim, Chosun Ilbo, 3 September 2001 21 Associated Press, N. Korea Hails China President’s Visit, 3 September 2001 22Punishment of North Korean Refugees Eased, Chosun Ilbo, 13 November 2000

2. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

2.1. Political Developments 

The past year has seen contrary trends. From mid-2000 until early 2001, engagement prevailed. Following the June 2000 Pyongyang summit, the two Koreas embarked on a wide-ranging dialogue: ministerial meetings, family reunions, economic 

talks, and the restoring of road and rail links across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). 

In October Madeleine Albright became the first US Secretary of State ever to visit 

the DPRK. Bill Clinton was ready to follow, but an agreement to curb North Korean 

missiles foundered on verification problems. The EU and most of its member states 

recognized the DPRK, leaving only France and Ireland without full diplomatic 

ties.17 In May a top-level EU delegation visited Pyongyang and met Kim Jong-il. 

The ever less reclusive ‘‘dear leader’’ in January paid his second visit to China in 

eight months: a business-oriented tour of Shanghai which raised hopes that he 

might at last embrace market reforms. This summer he visited Moscow—by train, 

taking over three weeks. 

But reforms have not been forthcoming; and since March, Pyongyang has used the 

Bush administration’s initial hostility as a pretext to suspend all official contacts 

with Seoul. Some were already in trouble: the North had hardly begun work on its 

side of the new road-rail link. However, unlike in past ups and downs, business and 

civilian exchanges continue. The South donated fertilizer as a goodwill gesture; the 

North responded by sending merchant ships into Southern waters, angering Southern hawks.18 Kim Dae-jung was further weakened in August, when a few of a group 

of unification activists allowed to visit Pyongyang expressed embarrassingly proNorth views.19 This prompted a political crisis, and Kim’s coalition partners joined 

the opposition to pass a vote dismissing the unification minister Lim Dong-won, architect of the sunshine policy.20 Though this had no binding force, Lim resigned, as 

did the entire cabinet. As of early September, the political scene in Seoul was one 

of discord and turmoil. 

North Korea’s sudden offer on 2 September to resume talks did not save Lim, and 

it is uncertain if it can revive a peace process which had begun to look doomed. The 

test will be if the North not only re-opens all the various channels currently frozen, 

but is ready to make substantive progress: completing the rail link, increasing the 

scope of family reunions, resuming military talks, and above all proceeds with Kim 

Jong-il’s long-delayed return visit to Seoul. Also, it is not clear if Pyongyang is also 

prepared to sit down with the US, which since June has said it is now ready for 

unconditional talks. Jiang Zemin, who on 3 September became the first Chinese 

leader to visit the DPRK in a decade, will press Kim Jong-il to return to serious 

dialogue abroad and get on with economic reforms at home.21 But there is no guarantee that future progress will be more sustained than in the past. (The positions 

of these various interlocutors are analyzed more fully in Section 3, below.) 

2.2. Refugees: A Higher Profile 

As to refugee issues, the underlying situation has not changed greatly in the past 

year. North Korea remains unable or unwilling to feed all its people, prompting 

thousands—as ever, exact numbers are in dispute: estimates range from 10,000 to 

500,000, with a figure of at least 100,000 plausible—to cross into China in search 

of food or work, especially from the north-eastern province of Hamgyong-pukto 

(North Hamgyong). Most are thus initially economic migrants intending to return; 

some go back and forth several times. Their ability to do this varies, as neither government is consistent in how it treats them (except in regarding them as illegal). 

As throughout the period since 1995 when large-scale movement began, the past 

year has brought contradictory reports of crackdowns and loosening up, on both 

sides of the border.22 Since this summer it seems clear that China at least is now 

adopting a much tougher policy, both towards North Korean migrants and those in 

the local ethnic Korean communities in north-east China who help and harbour 

113

23 Crackdown Intensified on North Korean Escapees in China, Chosun Ilbo, 29 July 2001. See 

also fn 8. 24For a harrowing first-hand account, see Kim Min-Hee, North Korean Women on the Market, 

on the NKHR website, http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/index—eng1.html [accessed 5 September 

2001]. Also Amnesty International, Persecuting the Starving:The Plight of North Koreans Fleeing 

to China, London, December 2000 25See footnote 16 26Wehrfritz, G. and Takayama, H., Riding the Seoul Train, Newsweek, 5 March 2001 27 Ibid. Such groups include, in South Korea, NKHR (Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean 

Human Rights), http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/index—eng1.html; in Japan, RENK (Rescue 

the North Korean People!), http://www.bekkoame.ne.jp/ro/renk/englishhome.htm; and in the US, 

Exodus 21, on which see Kang, C., L.A. Group Helps North Koreans Hiding in Asia, Los Angeles 

Times, 21 March 2001, and, Interview with Douglas Shin [of Exodus 21], Chosun Journal, 5 

May 2001 28The total so far this year is over 300, as against 312 for the whole of last year, itself double 

the 1999 figure, which in turn was double the figure for 1998. The cumulative total from 1953 

to 1999 was barely 1,000. See data in Republic of Korea, Ministry of Unification, pp.154 ff 29See NKHR and RENK websites (details above in fn 27) 30See below, Appendix 31Leaving Collapsing Communities Heading for Money in Korea, Hankyore Shinmun [Seoul], 

5 January 2001 32 108 Illegal Entrants Including NK Defectors Disappeared, Donga Ilbo, 2 July 2000

them.23 This can only worsen an already precarious existence, with exploitation and 

abuse (e.g. of young women) endemic.24

Amid these fluctuations, five trends are discernible. First, harsh punishment inflicted on some returnees turns them from merely hungry into angry enemies of the 

regime, who escape again and denounce Kim Jong-il.25 If they were not political refugees first time around, they thus become—or are made—so. Second, there is a 

greater variety and systematization of lengthy and arduous secondary escape routes 

out of China into fourth countries like Mongolia and Thailand, where ROK embassies may assist as they dare not in China.26 Third, such underground railroads are 

facilitated by a growing network of South Korean and other NGOs, often religious 

in inspiration.27 Fourth, despite all obstacles the number who make it to South 

Korea is growing fast—albeit still tiny by former German or most other global comparative standards.28

Fifth, all this is gaining wider publicity. The incident of ‘‘Gilsu’s family’’, for whose 

successful escape more than one NGO has claimed credit, may well inspire others 

to attempt similarly dramatic and attention-grabbing gestures.29 Press and TV coverage of North Korean refugees has increased during the past year, as has the number and quality of Internet websites devoted to this and other DPRK human rights 

issues.30 While as ever media interest may wax and wane, it is unlikely to go away; 

especially since the readiness of governments too to take up this cause will grow, 

as a fading peace process makes them less inclined to give Kim Jong-il the benefit 

of the doubt. 

2.3. Chinese Koreans: Not So Stable? 

While this report’s focus is on North Korean refugees, one must add that their 

hosts—themselves descended from migrants who crossed the same border from the 

1860s onwards, to escape feudal and Japanese colonial oppression and poverty—are 

also on the move. The two million ethnic Koreans in north-east China, the largest 

of the many Korean diaspora groups, are no longer the stable community and model 

minority they once were. Since China and the ROK opened relations in 1992, many 

have gone to work in South Korea, mostly illegally. As often, individual gain (itself 

uncertain, due to greedy or cheating brokers and low wages) is communal loss: villages depopulated, farms abandoned, falling school rolls.31 This, as well as Chinese 

state repression, must affect the ability of Chinese-Koreans to aid North Korean refugees. Their fates are entwined in another way: one recent boatload of illegal entrants to South Korea reportedly included both Chinese-Koreans and North Koreans.32

3. ACTION AND REACTION: FUTURE PROSPECTS

The rest of this paper attempts to look forward, predicting probable political 

trends in and actions by the countries most concerned. The three main ones are of 

course North Korea, the source of the problem; China, as the chief primary destination; and South Korea, the main secondary destination. Besides these, Russia may 

loom larger if renewed DPRK contract labour once again generates both human 

114

33 Amnesty International, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea / Russian Federation: Pursuit, Intimidation and Abuse of North Korean Refugees and Workers, London, September 1996. 

See also fn 9 34 Catherine Bertini, WFP’s executive director, recently acknowledged the structural aspect. 

See fn 15 35 Noland, M., Avoiding the Apocalypse: Economic Turmoil on the Korean Peninsula, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 2000 36Kim Jong-il’s visit to Shanghai in January, and some pragmatic new year maxims attributed to him, hinted at reform. See Kim Jong Il Pays Unofficial Visit to China, and, Kim Jong 

Il Stresses Economic Renovation with New Thinking, People’s Korea, 25 January 2001, translating remarks published in Rodong Sinmun, daily paper of the DPRK’s ruling Korean Workers’ 

Party (KWP), 4 January 2001 37For a recent ROK instance, see S. Korea Mulls Provision of Excess Rice to NK, Korea Times, 26 August 2001 38Terry, F., Feeding the Dictator, The Guardian [London], 6 August 2001 39 Agence France Presse, Flood, Drought Will Again Hamper North Korean Harvest, 6 August 

2001, quoting WFP. Contrast Crop Yield in North Korea to Hit Record High, Korea Times, 25 

August 2001, citing Dr Kim Soon-kwon of the International Corn Foundation. Dr Kim seems 

to be in the minority, but after 20 visits to the DPRK, where he runs an active programme, 

he is no amateur. 

rights worries and refugees, as it did in the past.33 Japan too must be considered, 

as a neighbour with its own fears and interests. Finally, two more distant powers 

are involved. US policy is crucial for the peninsula’s overall evolution; while the EU 

aspires to acquire a Korean role, and is the only one of these to attach much explicit 

weight to human rights. 

While most of the focus is on states, it is not intended to reify these, let alone 

imply that they are or should be the sole actors. To the contrary, at least in democracies the interplay between government and public opinion, often mediated by 

NGOs, is a crucial factor. Nor can a report addressed to UNHCR overlook multilateral bodies. 

3.1. North Korea 

Predicting change in North Korea gets no easier, but at least we can specify the 

variables in play. So far, refugee flows are generated mainly by food shortages. Two 

things might ease these: better harvests, or failing that increased aid (and more 

equal distribution thereof). The former requires not only more clement weather than 

the run of flood and drought in recent years, but also structural reforms in farming 

without which output will remain low and vulnerability to natural disasters high.34

Despite a de facto growing marketization of the rural economy, continuing refusal 

to officially embrace reform, as happened in China, means that its transformative 

potential is limited. Many analysts doubt if North Korea—the hillier and colder half 

of a divided land—can ever be self-sufficient in food, or should even try.35 But the 

rational option, to export manufactured goods and import food, again means a commitment to economic reform which Kim Jong-il, despite hints, appears reluctant to 

make.36

If the DPRK cannot feed itself, will others continue to feed it? Remarkably, the 

World Food Program’s operation in North Korea is its largest anywhere. Remarkably too, so far its appeals have largely been met. Yet donor fatigue, seen in failure 

to fund UNDP’s AREP programme for rehabilitation, may well grow if major donors 

like South Korea and the US feel the political objectives of their aid, to promote 

de ́tente, are not being met. Then again, the grain purchases required by aid help 

farmers in both countries; which is one reason why US donations via WFP have continued under Bush.37 On the other hand, the argument made forcefully by Me ́decins 

Sans Frontie`res, that aid merely props up a vile regime which is itself the problem, 

could in future come to appeal to disillusioned governments as well as NGOs.38 But 

even in that event China will go on sending grain and other aid, albeit not generously. All in all, the DPRK’s food supply in the next few years seems unlikely to 

differ much from the recent past. Immediate prospects are generally seen as bad, 

after both drought and floods this year; although a leading South Korean maize expert and regular visitor to the North is optimistic.39

But refugee flows depend on political as well as economic factors: specifically, on 

the attitude and capacity of the DPRK state. Policing the Tumen river border is not 

easy, and guards can often be bribed. Then Pyongyang, like Beijing, must make a 

political decision on how hard it tries to stop or catch migrants, and how it then 

treats them. Those who have contacted South Koreans or missionaries tend to suffer 

worst, while teenage children may get off with a caution. There is also periodic easing and tightening of the whole system, presumably in response to political orders 

115

40Political Security Bureau Acts as Secret Inspector-General, Chosun Ilbo, 27 May 2001. See 

also the section, The Authority of the Military and Security Greatly Weakened, in Kim Young 

Jun (pseudonym), March 2001: Lives of the People in Chongjin, Keys Quarterly [Seoul], Vol. 5, 

Summer 2001, pp. 54 ff. But Ahn Chol, a young refugee who with help from RENK has twice 

returned to film secretly inside North Korea, has a contrasting view: ‘‘the complete revival of 

the secret police’’, Lee Young-hwa, Ahn Chol’s Most Recent Video Coverage of North Korea, 

http://www.bekkoame.ne.jp/ro/renk/ahnchol/ahnchol—e.htm [accessed 10 September 2001] 41This may explain a rare reference in the Pyongyang press to refugee issues: global, not 

local. Serious Problems of World Refugees, Rodong Sinmun, 16 July 2001, reported in JoongAng 

Ilbo, 30 July 2001 42Waddington, R., N. Korea Defends Rights Record at U.N., Japan Today, 20 July 2001; Kim 

Mee-Young, Material Evidence Critical for North Korean Human Rights, Chosun Ilbo, 5 August 

200143 Ideology Education Intensified in N.K. in Fear of Outside World, JoongAng Ilbo, 29 August 

200144 N.K. Workers May’ve Gone for Strike, JoongAng Ilbo, 28 August 2001 45On collapse and other scenarios, see the present author’s 1999 WRITENET report, Ch. 4, 

and references therein 46For a dramatic report alleging that party secretary Kim Yong-sun, who is associated with 

dialogue with South Korea, was briefly arrested in March this year, see B. Choi (Choi Won-ki), 

Special: Dissension On [sic] NK Ranks, JoongAng Ilbo, 20 August 2001, translated from Wolgan 

JoongAng, August 2001

from the centre—or power struggles between different agencies. Importantly, the 

latter is one way in which the North Korean system is not entirely monolithic.40

Nor is it wholly impermeable to pressure.41 This year the DPRK submitted its 

first human rights report for 16 years to a UN committee, which was 

unimpressed.42 Sharp questions may discourage any repetition. Some EU states 

have begun a human rights dialogue with Pyongyang. Yet it shows no sign of liberalizing politically, even to the degree that China has. On the contrary, it may be 

tightening ideological control.43 Not that such efforts will inevitably succeed. Despite 

North Korea’s enduring against expectations when other communist regimes crumbled, its stability or even survival are not foreordained. Recent reports of a miners’ 

strike in North Hamgyong suggest that unrest cannot be ruled out.44 In that context, Kim Jong-il should ponder whether it is wise to sow dragon’s teeth by brutalizing refugees, which risks turning hungry but loyal or quietist subjects into fierce 

enemies of his rule. In the long run a collapse scenario, as in Germany, cannot be 

ruled out; though the spectre of far larger refugee flows, among other risks, is why 

both South Korea and China will seek to avoid this.45

There is also intra-elite dissent. In Pyongyang as in Seoul, hawks and doves argue 

it out (albeit not in public), with Kim Jong-il not firmly committed to either camp.46

For now, Kim’s rule as such seems secure. Next February he turns 60. The hope 

is that this will be the occasion for a long overdue Party congress, which will proclaim a definitive turn to opening and reform. But the fear is that it will just be 

yet another extravaganza by a regime which will remain a menace at home and 

abroad. 

3.2. China 

In happier days, Sino-North Korean comradeship was described as being ‘‘like lips 

and teeth’’. Despite the formal warmth of Jiang Zemin’s visit, and Kim Jong-il’s two 

trips to China in under a year, the teeth are now gritted. The DPRK causes China 

many headaches, yet it is also indispensable. Problems include Kim Jong-il’s missile 

ambitions, such as a 1998 rocket launch over Japan which was a major reason for 

the US push for a national missile defence (NMD); its dire economy as a result of 

refusing reform, requiring endless aid; and of course the refugee situation, which 

destabilizes a sensitive frontier area while earning brickbats for Beijing when it 

cracks down. 

On the other hand, North Korea is also a buffer state without which the US 

troops in South Korea could be on China’s very borders. Having finally won the long 

rivalry with Moscow for primacy in Pyongyang when the USSR collapsed, Beijing 

will not throw that card away; especially as it manages skilfully to combine this 

with a new but much more thriving relationship with Seoul. So China will keep 

North Korea on life-support, whether or not Kim Jong-il heeds its urgent advice to 

change. 

In this context, what are the prospects for pressing China on North Korean refugees? It should be tried anyway, on legal and humanitarian grounds. The PRC 

should allow UNHCR into border areas, and accept (as it has never yet done) the 

designation of at least some DPRK fugitives as bona fide refugees. China’s desire 

for global status, as in joining the WTO and hosting the 2008 Olympics, should be 

leveraged if possible. Yet it is hard to expect much success. The Falun Gong crackVerDate May 01 2002 14:32 Sep 05, 2002 Jkt 080061 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EAP\050202\79392 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
116

47 Article 3 of the ROK Constitution reads: ‘‘The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands’’. Full text in Sung Chul Yang, p. 934 ff 48Larkin, fn 1; NKHR, Activity News April–June 2001, http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/

index—eng1.html [accessed 5 September 2001] 49See United States Committee for Refugees, Current Report on South Korea, http://

www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/easia—pacific/south—korea.htm [accessed 12 September 

2001] 50See reports and comment in Korea Now [Seoul], Vol. 29, No, 2, 29 January 2000, pp. 4, 5, 

28–29, 50 51 Baker, M., N. Korean Refugees Gain a Crusader, but So Far No help’’, Christian Science 

Monitor, 16 May 2001 52See fn 10, and also a very interesting article (no author named), Why Are South Korean 

Progressives So Indifferent to North Korean Human Rights?, Keys Quarterly, Vol. 5, Summer 

2001, pp. 20–34 53For thoughtful South Korean discussions of different aspects of refugee and defector issues, 

see Son, Chu Whan, North Korean Refugees: Problems and Policy Considerations, Korea Focus, 

Vol. 7, No. 3, May–Jun 1999; Lee, Sang Man, Resettlement Training for North Korean Refugees, 

Korea Focus, Vol. 9, No. 1, Jan–Feb 2001

down shows a disregard for international concern and humanitarian norms alike. 

Border areas are especially sensitive; witness Tibet and Xinjiang. Above all, China 

fears that any encouragement of refugees will destabilize the DPRK and open the 

floodgates. Still, the point should be put that brutalization may prove just as destabilizing, as well as being inhumane. 

3.3. South Korea 

South Korea’s position is complex. The ROK constitution proclaims jurisdiction 

over the whole peninsula, and the Constitutional Court has interpreted this to mean 

that North Koreans are ROK citizens as of right.47 Until recently the DPRK’s tight 

controls kept numbers small, and the impermeability of the DMZ—the world’s most 

heavily armed frontier, despite its name—means that only a handful ever come by 

that route. 

The larger numbers entering China from the mid-1990s posed a new challenge. 

Most do not seek to go to South Korea, at least initially; but those who try get scant 

official help, for three reasons. The ROK and PRC only established diplomatic ties 

in 1992, and Seoul is keen to keep Beijing onside as regards North Korea; so it 

treads carefully on sensitive issues. Refugees must often make arduous journeys to 

fourth countries like Mongolia and Thailand before ROK embassies will help them 

(and some refuse even then).48 A second reason is a fear shared with China: that 

too soft a stance might turn the trickle into a deluge, destabilizing the region and 

overwhelming Seoul’s meagre resettlement facilities. Thirdly, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy entails a reluctance to antagonize the DPRK; so human rights issues 

are not on the agenda, for now. 

That may change. In December 2002 South Korea will elect a new president, to 

take office in February 2003. Kim Dae-jung cannot run again. A backlash against 

North Korea, and on other issues like economic restructuring, means that the conservative opposition Grand National Party (GNP) may well return to power. In opposition, the GNP leader Lee Hoi-chang attacks sunshine as appeasement, inter alia

for neglecting human rights. What he would do in power is less clear, as two of the 

above three reasons—fear of a deluge, and of offending China—will still apply. 

Hence a change of government in Seoul may not necessarily alter the approach to 

refugees. (Our topic here is North Korean refugees, but the ROK is even less kind 

to non-Koreans, and is among the countries in the world with the lowest proportion 

of refugees in relation to its population.49

Such caution also reflects public opinion. As in other literate democracies in an 

age of mass communication, South Koreans can be roused to temporary euphoria—

as with last year’s inter-Korean summit—or indignation, as in January 2000 when 

seven young North Koreans were deported by both Russia and China.50 A campaign 

for international recognition of the plight of refugees attracted 11.8 million signatures, over a quarter of the ROK population.51 In a culture where civic groups 

abound, NGOs focussing on this issue are growing more active and visible. Yet sentimental concern for suffering fellow-Koreans has its limits. After half a century of 

division in which living standards in north and south have diverged vastly, the idea 

of 22 million impoverished northerners swarming south and swamping their hardwon prosperity is a nightmare for most South Koreans. Even the few who are serious about unification tend to endorse the sunshine approach, and so are loath to 

raise human rights issues.52

In sum, the ROK’s approach to North Korean refugees may not change much in 

the next few years.53 A more conservative government might be less silent on 

117

54Sisci, F., Festering Pyongyang Threatens All of Asia, Asia Times Online, 10 March 2001, 

http://atimes.com/china/CC10Ad02.html 55See the first-hand account by Lee, Yong-il, The ‘Third Area’ in Russian Territory, 5 July 

2001, on NHKR website, under Witness Accounts, http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/index—

eng1.html. A good overview is Yoon, Yeo-sang, Situation and Protection of North Korean Refugees in Russia, paper presented at the First International Conference on North Korean Human 

Rights and Refugees, Seoul, 1999 (organized by NKHR). Available at: http://

www.chosunjournal.com/yeosangyoon.html. See also fn 9 above 56Dalziel, S., Kim Jong-il’s Russian Odyssey, 6 August 2001, BBC News Online, http://

news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid—1476000/1476466.stm [accessed 12 September 

2001] 57On Koreans in Japan, see Weiner, M., The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 

1910–1923, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989; and for an insider’s account, Ryang, 

S., North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology and Identity, Boulder CO: Westview, 1997

Northern human rights issues, but it will not rock the boat with China or encourage 

a deluge.54

3.4. Russia 

When North Korean refugees first became a concern in the 1990s, Russia was a 

prime focus. Unlike the larger numbers entering China after 1995, this mainly involved workers brought to Siberia under contracts going back to the Soviet period, 

especially as loggers in the Khabarovsk area. Some escaped, and a few attained refugee status and reached Seoul. They told tales of harsh conditions and virtual extraterritoriality, with DPRK agents operating prisons in the camps and repatriating 

some offenders.55

While adverse publicity helped ensure that the forestry treaty was not renewed 

at state level, in practice local arrangements continued. Now this issue is once again 

in the spotlight, with reports during Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia this summer that 

North Korea is repaying its large debts to the ex-USSR by sending labour. This 

news prompted hostile comment in a Moscow press already critical of the solicitude 

shown to the DPRK leader (all stations where he passed were closed, causing much 

inconvenience), who to many Russians was an eerie reminder of their own past.56

Yet even in the Yeltsin era, a few liberals in Moscow were no match for the economic interests of Khabarovsk and other under-populated regions, to whom DPRK 

labour is a boon. A fortiori the balance of forces will be even less favourable under 

Putin, who is less liberal generally and seeks to rebuild ties with the DPRK as with 

other Soviet-era allies. So the likelihood is that labour contracts will increase, with 

little concern for the rights of DPRK workers. On past form, this will generate 

escapees who will become refugees. UNHCR should therefore prepare for a higher 

caseload of DPRK fugitives in Russia in the coming years. As with China protests 

should of course be registered, with perhaps more hope on two grounds: Russia is 

partly democratic, and is accused not of direct state oppression itself, but of tolerating it by the DPRK on Russian territory. Even so, the chances of effecting improvements may not be high. 

3.5. Japan 

So far the role of Japan has yet to be considered. Japan has a complex relationship to the DPRK. There are no formal diplomatic ties, but geographical proximity 

and historical links mean substantial de facto contacts. These include migration: in 

the 1950s and 1960s almost 100,000 Koreans left Japan to settle in North Korea. 

Tokyo was glad to see them go, and tends to regard the 200,000 or so pro-North 

Koreans who remain in Japan (a further 500,000 are pro-South) as a fifth column 

for Pyongyang.57

As this suggests, anxiety is a keynote of Japanese attitudes to North Korea. Its 

main focus is the military threat from missiles, suspected nuclear weapons, and incursions. The latter include alleged abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s: an 

issue that tops Tokyo’s agenda in intermittent talks with Pyongyang, which naturally denies all knowledge. There is also some concern for the 6,000 Japanese wives 

who settled in the DPRK with their Korean husbands, of whom a very few have 

for the first time in four decades been let out for brief home visits in recent years. 

In both instances it is its own nationals that concern Japan, not human rights in 

the abstract. As to refugees, some Japanese profess to fear a potential armada of 

boat people from North Korea. (There has only ever been one boat, in the 1980s; 

the family went on to South Korea). 

On wider policy towards Pyongyang, Tokyo tends to follow its US and South Korean allies. Thus since 1998 it has gone along with engagement, if reluctantly: it 

was slow to offer fresh food aid, having had scant thanks for generous gifts in the 

past. But this is now more complex, given the gulf that has opened between an ROK 

still committed to sunshine (for now) and a more sceptical US. Moreover, Japan 

118

58For the view from South Korea, see Seoul Stands Firm, Korea Now [Seoul], 25 August 2001 59Deportation Move Decried, Japan Times, 5 May 2001; North Korean Leader’s Son Travelled 

Illegally, but in Style’’, Japan Times, 5 May 2001 60 United States Committee on Refugees 61 Cumings, B., Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History, New York: W.W.Norton, 1997, 

pp. 186–7 62 Associated Press, J. Christensen, Korea War Soldiers Remains Returned, 24 August 2001 63 IAEA to Adopt Resolution on N.K. Next Month, Chosun Ilbo, 31 August 2001; Hart, T., The 

Impending Agreed Framework Crisis, in G. Jonsson and K. Soffronow (eds.), Korea: A 

Stocktaking Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University, 2000 64 United States, Congress, North Korea Advisory Group 

itself has a new leader who is already enmired in controversy, having antagonized 

both Koreas by visiting the Yasukuni shrine—which honours war criminals, among 

others—and allowing a school history textbook which defends Japan’s pre-1945 imperialism.58

This reinforces Korean and Chinese suspicions that premier Koizumi, portrayed 

in the west as a liberal reformer, is a right-wing nationalist. That may be unfair; 

but if by 2003 both the US and ROK have turned more sceptical on the DPRK, 

Japan is likely to go along. Japanese public opinion is hostile to North Korea, 

thanks to its August 1998 rocket launch across Japan and the abduction issue. 

(When in a bizarre incident in May Kim Jong-il’s son and his family were caught 

trying to enter Japan on false passports—ostensibly to see Disneyland—and promptly deported, critics said they should have been kept as bargaining chips for the release of Japanese abductees.) 59

In sum, even if underlying Japanese hostility to the DPRK becomes more overt 

in policy in future, this implies no encouragement of North Korean refugees. Japan 

is unwelcoming to non-ethnic fugitives in general (as is the ROK), and has a legacy 

of racism towards Koreans in particular.60 Insofar as the boat people fantasy lingers—ludicrously: they would head for South Korea—Japan may regard a potential 

collapse of the DPRK as an even greater threat than the risks posed by North Korea 

‘‘as is’’. 

3.6. The US 

Though too geographically remote from Korea to be directly affected by refugees, 

the United States has been centrally involved ever since it partitioned the peninsula 

(‘‘temporarily’’) in 1945.61 With a continuing security alliance and 37,000 troops in 

the ROK, the US had no diplomatic contacts with the DPRK until the 1990s, when 

nuclear concerns led to talks that produced the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF). This 

in turn ushered in a wider dialogue, including on missiles. That was under Clinton. 

Since George W. Bush succeeded him and professed initial mistrust, North Korea 

has eschewed contacts, evn though President Bush has now changed his mind. The 

US continues to provide food aid via WFP, and the Pentagon and the Korean People’s Army still cooperate in searching for the remains of US soldiers missing in action from the Korean War.62

Bush has also endorsed the AF, criticized by Republicans when in opposition for 

rewarding North Korea for misbehaviour. But the AF is now approaching a crisis, 

as new light water reactors (LWRs) cannot be supplied until the DPRK comes back 

into compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT). It continues to thwart inspectors from the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA), amid suspicion that plutonium unaccounted for has gone for military use.63

All this is both technical and seemingly remote from refugees. But the nuclear 

issue almost started a second Korean war in 1994, and retains the capacity to dominate the wider agenda between the DPRK and its various interlocutors. Even if a 

new nuclear crisis can somehow be avoided, missiles too are high on the US list of 

concerns; although cynics suggest that Bush is less keen than Clinton to actually 

resolve this, as North Korea is useful as the potential enemy justifying his missile 

defence plans. In proposing to resume talks, Bush also annoyed Pyongyang by added 

conventional force levels as an agendum alongside the familiar pair of nuclear and 

missile issues. 

As this suggests, the US agenda with North Korea is overwhelmingly military, 

and in particular focussed on weapons of mass destruction. Hence Washington, like 

other interlocutors, will not needlessly antagonize Pyongyang by raising what it regards as secondary issues, like refugees and human rights in general. In opposition, 

by contrast, Republicans were happy to denouncet the DPRK as a Stalinist tyranny 

par excellence.64 Some on the right of the party would still like to do that, and seek 

to undermine Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy: for instance by inviting the senior 

northern defector Hwang Jang-yop, whose attacks on Kim Jong-il are ironically now 

119

65The prime mover here is the Defense Forum Foundation, see, http://defenseforum.org/

page9.html 66 A key moderate Republican is Donald Gregg, a former US ambassador in Seoul and Asia 

adviser to George Bush Sr, who is credited with pushing his son to a less hardline stance towards the DPRK. See Reuters, Hepinstall, S. Experts: US Has Rare Opportunity to Engage N. 

Korea, 28 August 2001 67For an interesting discussion, see Human Rights Without Frontiers, The Controversial Trip 

of Belgian Parliamentarians to the Country of Kim Il Song, http://www.hrwf.net/newhrwf/html/

north—korea———interviews.html [accessed 12 September 2001] 68See KEDO’s official website, http://www.kedo.org [accessed 12 September 2001] 69The above discussion, and this paper generally, reflect the author’s participation over the 

past year in policy-related seminars in Berlin, Brussels, London, and Paris, which cannot be 

minuted in more detail. 

muzzled in Seoul, to speak in Washington.65 On this view, North Korea should be 

shunned like Cuba or Iraq: meaning refugees are encouraged, at least in theory. But 

as this has failed to bring down either regime, pragmatic Republicans see no gain 

in treating the DPRK the same way; especially against the (current) wishes of their 

allies in Seoul.66 Hence Bush’s shift from a hawkish to a more moderate stance. 

Still, if Pyongyang refuses overtures or reverts to provocation, the hawks may gain 

ground. 

The same divide animates Republican views of China, which in turn affects policy 

on Korea. To the extent that again, after initial hard words, the administration now 

seeks to improve relations with Beijing, Washington is unlikely to criticize loudly 

how China treats North Korean refugees: an issue anyway of lower political salience 

in the US than others with more powerful lobbies, like Tibet. All in all, the US cannot be expected to prioritize refugee issues in its dealings with the DPRK in the 

years ahead. 

3.7. The EU 

Finally, mention should be made of the European Union (EU). As noted above, 

in the past year most EU members and the EU itself have opened formal relations 

with the DPRK. Moreover, many of these new interlocutors specify human rights 

as among the issues they plan to raise with Pyongyang.67 Conversely, human rights 

concerns are said to be one reason why France so far chooses not to go along with 

the trend. The EU is also a board member of KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization), the consortium set up under the AF to supply LWRs to 

North Korea.68

The decision to recognize the DPRK was partly made in deference to Kim Daejung, as its timing—around the third Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Seoul in October 2000—suggests. Similarly, sending a high-level EU mission to Pyongyang in 

May was also meant to support the sunshine policy, and to signal to Washington 

to do likewise. Beyond this, Korea is an opportunity for those who favour a more 

activist EU foreign policy; and in some ways less difficult than places closer to 

home, like the Balkans or Middle East. Despite strong economic links with South 

Korea, Europe cannot really be said to be as closely involved in the region as any 

of the countries mentioned above. Still, it is commendable that at least somebody 

at state level is prioritizing human rights with the DPRK. One can only await results, perhaps without undue optimism.69

4. CONCLUSION

A short paper can only scratch the surface of complex issues. For a fuller discussion, reference is again made to WRITENET’s earlier reports, as well as other works 

cited. In general, the sunshine or engagement phase of reaching out to North Korea 

is in difficulties and may be over, with darker clouds ahead. In particular, refugee 

issues are likely to gain a higher profile, for the reasons given in 2.2 above. However, raison d’e ́tat means that even if South Korea and Japan follow the US in reverting to a more hostile or sceptical approach to the DPRK, they are unlikely to 

take the confrontation too far. Since none of North Korea’s neighbours wants to risk 

precipitating a mass exodus of refugees—in itself a defensible view, as this would 

be profoundly destabilizing in every way: politically, socially, economically, and militarily—the much less defensible corollary is that treatment of existing North Korean 

refugees will continue to range from unhelpful to brutal so as not to encourage 

greater numbers. 

A final analytical point. Methodologically, as already noted, an exercise like this 

involves thinking through at least four sets of linkages: between short and long 

term effects, politics and economics, domestic and external trends, and individual 

rights and raison d’e ́tat. Besides that quartet, there is also a more substantive triad. 

As the above discussion has shown, the North Korean refugee issue is closely linked 

120

to two other major DPRK concerns: famine, and human rights. All three raise questions about the culpability of Kim Jong-il’s regime, and the reaction of the international community. The former is not in doubt, but what is to be done is less 

clearcut. Those like MSF, who call for all aid to North Korea to stop, risk not only 

worsening short-run suffering inside the country, but also thereby increasing refugee flows. If the implicit aim is to bring down the regime, that is grossly irresponsible without very careful thought as to the consequences. Evolution is better than 

revolution. Most analysts, and above all most Koreans, see a soft-landing scenario, 

if it can be brought off (a big if), as far preferable to German-style collapse with 

all its risks and costs. 

But one can also tread too softly. Though striving to maintain academic detachment in this paper, on a personal note the suffering of North Korean refugees is 

a source of considerable emotion. It is intolerable that they are treated as pawns 

in the Realpolitik of inter-state relations, even for laudable ends like the sunshine 

policy. If no government will stand up for these innocents and their rights, then not 

just NGOs but also international bodies must do so. UNHCR, as is well known, 

faces many larger refugee crises elsewhere in the world, as well as budgetary constraints; and is itself not immune from pressures to tread delicately on political 

matters. It must nonetheless be hoped that ways can be found for more robust and 

effective aid and advocacy for North Korean refugees than hitherto. 

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Baker, M., N. Korean Refugees Gain a Crusader, but So Far No help’’, Christian 

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August 2001

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(eds.), Korea: A Stocktaking Stockholm: Center for Pacific Asia Studies, Stockholm University, 2000

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yeosangyoon.html 

6. APPENDIX: INTERNET AND OTHER RESOURCES

Since the last WRITENET report on this subject, written a year ago, in September 2000, both the quantity and quality of Internet resources on North Korean 

refugees and related topics have greatly improved. So as well as the specific references given in footnotes, it may be helpful to list the sites which have been most 

valuable in writing this report, and thus may be of continuing use to UNHCR in 

monitoring future developments. Where (as often) a main site is in Korean, the URL 

given here is to the English-language section. Sites obviously already known to 

UNHCR, such as the US Committee for Refugees (http://www.refugees.org), have 

been omitted, invaluable though they are. All sites and footnote references were 

checked during the period 1–12 September 2001. 

A. NGO and Academic Sources 

Association of North Korean Defectors (in Korean only) 

http://www.nkd.or.kr

The Chosun Journal 

http://www.chosunjournal.com/

Despite its name, this site does not seem to be related to the Chosun Ilbo journal 

and sites in South Korea. (Chosun is one Korean word for Korea, used by the DPRK 

and by the last pre-modern dynasty, but not by the ROK which calls itself 

Hankuk.). Described as an independent site devoted to human rights in North 

Korea, it is very comprehensive and well-organized, consisting mainly of links to a 

wide range of news, analysis, NGOs, and testimonies. Though avowedly partisan, 

it includes a range of perspectives, and a Forum in which Koreans and others argue 

issues and strategies back and forth. Highly recommended.

Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights [NKHR] 

http://www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/index—eng1.html 

The leading South Korean NGO in this field. Another very useful site, again raising refugee issues within wider human rights concerns. Publishes a weekly email, 

Friends Network Newsletter, and a quarterly journal, Life and Human Rights in 

North Korea.

Good Friends (Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement) 

ROK Buddhist organization, very involved with refugees. English website under 

reconstruction. The old URL (http://blue.nownuri.net/?kbsm) currently redirects you 

to http://www.jungto.org/gf, in Korean only. The parent JungTo Society has an 

English site (http://www.jungto.org/english/english.html), but nothing on refugees as 

such.

Human Rights Without Frontiers (HRWF) 

http://www.hrwf.net/newhrwf/html/north—korea—project.html 

Partners NKHR overseas. A succinct Belgian site, offering a European perspective

The Nautilus Institute 

http://www.nautilus.org 

123

Nautilus is a Berkeley, CA-based NGO specializing in Asian energy, security and 

environmental issues; and hence with a considerable interest in North Korea, as 

well as China and elsewhere. Its website is a valuable archive, while its free daily 

email NAPSNet report and associated special papers are a painless way to keep 

abreast of the DPRK and other regional issues. The current daily report, with links 

to a signup page and archives, may be viewed at http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/

dr/index.html

Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights [NKNET] 

http://www.nknet.org/enknet/eindex.htm 

Covers similar territory to NKHR. Publishes a quarterly journal, KEYS. Of interest as a rare instance of South Korean ‘‘progressives’’—veterans of the struggle 

against dictatorship, some formerly pro-Pyongyang—breaking ranks with the rest of 

the ROK left by insisting on raising North Korean human rights issues, including 

refugees. A new English website is said to be due for launch by the end of September 2001.

North Korean Studies 

http://north-korea.narod.ru 

An academic site maintained by Leonid Petrov, a Russian scholar currently at the 

Australian National University. Extremely useful, especially its section on defectors: 

(http://north-korea.narod.ru/defectors—new.htm), including a link to NKHR (http://

north-korea.narod.ru/alliance.htm) which may be the most convenient way to read 

NKHR’s own news archive. Also good on DPRK-Russia relations.

Rescue the North Korean People! (RENK) 

http://www.bekkoame.ne.jp/ro/renk/englishhome.htm 

An activist group based in Japan. Site is patchy but interesting, including film 

shot secretly inside North Korea. 

B. Media Sources 

Chosun Ilbo 

http://nk.chosun.com/english/index.html 

Seoul’s leading conservative daily has several sites that cover the DPRK, mostly 

critically. The above is a site dedicated to North Korean issues. See also its weekly 

North Korea Report (http://www.chosun.com/english/special/nkreport1031.html), 

which each week covers three or four aspects of the DPRK in telling detail, based 

presumably on defector and/or intelligence sources. Also the Chosun’s associated 

monthly magazine homepage (http://monthly.chosun.com), though mainly in Korean, 

includes a number of pertinent items in English e.g:

The Tragic Stories of North Korean Refugees 

http://monthly.chosun.com/html/200003/200003020002—1.html

The Account of a Korean-Chinese Couple’s Recent Visit to North Korea (16 parts) 

http://monthly.chosun.com/html/200003/200003160002—1.html

A Letter from North Korea 

http://monthly.chosun.com/html/200007/200007030001—1.html

‘North Korea’s Auschwitz’—the Inside Story on the No. 14 Detention Center (12 

parts) 

http://monthly.chosun.com/html/200006/200006130003—1.html

JoongAng Ilbo 

http://english.joins.com 

South Korea’s other leading daily also has good North Korean coverage, if less 

well laid out than its rival the Chosun Ilbo. Sidebars on the left of the homepage 

offer a three-way choice: news (http://english.joins.com/NK/index.asp); analysis 

(http://english.joins.com/NK/ana/index.asp); and op-ed, i.e. opinion pieces (http://

english.joins.com/NK/col/index.asp). All are valuable.

Korea Focus 

http://www.kf.or.kr/KoreaFocus 

A bimonthly digest of policy debate and discussion from the ROK press, compiled 

by the Korea Foundation in Seoul. Available both as print and online. Excellent 

source, conveying the full range of South Korean debate. Thoughtful coverage of the 

DPRK, including refugee and human rights issues. A good search facility.

Korea Herald 

http://www.koreaherald.co.kr 

One of Seoul’s two English-language dailies

Korea Now 

http://kn.koreaherald.co.kr/

124

Fortnightly magazine (print and online) produced by the Korea Herald. Korea 

Now has regular North Korea coverage, usually reflecting government views.

Korea Times 

http://www.koreatimes.co.kr 

English-language daily, Seoul

Yonhap News 

http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/services/2000000000.html 

Oddly, the ROK’s quasi-official newsagency, whose English site gives only headlines (not stories) for South Korea, has fuller coverage of the North! Click on left 

sidebars for weekly news on the DPRK, or for (not very up to date) contents list 

of the monthly journal Vantage Point, itself available only by mail. VP is good, 

though its tone has changed from hard-line to sunshine since Yonhap took it over 

from Naewoe Press 

C. Governmental Sources 

C1. ROK 

Korea Institute for National Unification [KINU] 

http://www.kinu.or.kr/english/index.html 

The ROK’s main official research body on North Korea and unification issues. Its 

website could be more helpful. KINU includes a Center for North Korean Society 

and Human Rights, which publishes a very useful annual White Paper on Human 

Rights in North Korea (seemingly not available online)

Koreascope 

http://www.koreascope.org/english 

Includes a section on North Korea Today, with a sub-section on human rights: 

http://www.koreascope.org/english/sub/2/ks2.htm. It is not clear how recently this 

has been updated. Also, while there is a list of video materials, most with trenchant 

titles, the video clips are no longer available (http://www.koreascope.org/english/sub/

vdo/kvc.htm)

Ministry of Unification 

http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng/index.php

National Intelligence Service 

http://www.nis.go.kr/english 

The NIS has several substantial sections on North Korea, including testimonies 

by defectors (http://www.nis.go.kr/english/democratic/defector—index.html); but none 

seemingly more recent than May 2000. 

C2. DPRK 

Although no websites yet exist with the DPRK’s allocated suffix (.kp) actually inside North Korea, the following have quasi-official status in varying degrees:

DPRK Infobank 

http://www.english.dprkorea.com 

This site, produced by the Pan-Pacific Economic Development Association of Korean Nationals, is newer and far more professional than the others listed here, if 

no more informative on refugees. However, to get very far entails paying a US$300 

membership fee.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) 

http://www.kcna.co.jp

The People’s Korea 

http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk 

This site is maintained by pro-North Koreans in Japan

Æ