" ! SENATE 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

111–347 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE 

ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST 

JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR. 

NOVEMBER 16, 2010.—Ordered to be printed 

Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 15, 2010 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARINGE:\Seals\Congress.#13

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

62–202 

" ! SENATE 

111TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2010

111–347 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE 

ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST 

JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR. 

NOVEMBER 16, 2010.—Ordered to be printed 

Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 15, 2010 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARINGE:\Seals\Congress.#13
(II) 

IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE 

ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR. 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, MISSOURI, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH, Vice Chairman 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JIM DeMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

COMMITTEE STAFF 

DERRON R. PARKS, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

THOMAS L. JIPPING, Deputy Staff Director and Deputy Chief Counsel 

JUSTIN S. KIM, Counsel 

REBECCA S. SEIDEL, Counsel 

ERIN P. JOHNSON, Deputy Counsel and Chief Clerk 

LAKE DISHMAN, Professional Staff Member 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE STAFF

SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, Analyst on the Federal Judiciary 

SENATE LEGAL COUNSEL STAFF

MORGAN J. FRANKEL, Senate Legal Counsel 

PATRICIA MACK BRYAN, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel 

GRANT R. VINIK, Assistant Senate Legal Counsel 

THOMAS E. CABALLERO, Assistant Senate Legal Counsel 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
(III)

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The Committee gratefully acknowledges the high standard of 

professionalism and long hours of dedicated service of its staff. The 

Committee also expresses its appreciation to Lynden C. Armstrong, 

Chief Clerk of the Committee on Rules and Administration, and to 

the following staff of Committee members: 

STAFF OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Senator MCCASKILL, Chairman, Derron R. Parks 

Senator HATCH, Vice Chairman, Thomas L. Jipping 

Senator KLOBUCHAR, Paige Herwig 

Senator WHITEHOUSE, Stephen C.N. Lilley and Justin G. Florence 

Senator UDALL, Matthew T. Nelson 

Senator SHAHEEN, Thomas J. Maloney 

Senator KAUFMAN, Nhan Nguyen 

Senator DEMINT, Erica Suares 

Senator BARRASSO, Bryn Stewart 

Senator WICKER, Emily Ferris 

Senator JOHANNS, Sarah Novascone 

Senator RISCH, Jason Bohrer 

INTERNS

Christian Dibblee 

Timothy Holman 

Hannah Lockhart 

Annie Moulton 

Michael Naclerio 

Patrick Sadler 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

PART ONE 

Certification to the Senate of the Committee’s Proceedings ................................ 3 

PART TWO 

Summary of the Evidence ....................................................................................... 4 

Procedural History ................................................................................................... 5 

I. Article I ............................................................................................................. 6 

A. Text of the Article ........................................................................................ 6 

B. Introduction to the Evidence ...................................................................... 7 

C. Statement of Facts ....................................................................................... 7 

1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Curatorships ..................... 7 

a. The House’s perspective ................................................................ 10 

b. Judge Porteous’s perspective ........................................................ 10 

2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Lifemark Hospitals 

v. Liljeberg Enterprises .......................................................................... 10 

a. The House’s perspective ................................................................ 14 

b. Judge Porteous’s perspective ........................................................ 14 

D. Expert Testimony ........................................................................................ 15 

1. Professor Charles G. Geyh ................................................................... 15 

2. Professor Dane Ciolino ......................................................................... 15 

II. Article II ............................................................................................................ 16 

A. Text of the Article ........................................................................................ 16 

B. Introduction to the Evidence ...................................................................... 17 

C. Statement of Facts ....................................................................................... 17 

1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Relationship with the 

Marcottes ................................................................................................ 17 

a. Bail bonds process and alleged favors .......................................... 17 

i. The House’s perspective .............................................................. 21 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective ..................................................... 22 

b. Set aside and expungement of criminal convictions ................... 24 

i. The House’s perspective .............................................................. 26 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective ..................................................... 27 

c. Louis Marcotte’s interview with the FBI ..................................... 28 

i. The House’s perspective .............................................................. 29 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective ..................................................... 29 

2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Relationships with 

the Marcottes ......................................................................................... 29 

a. The House’s perspective ................................................................ 31 

b. Judge Porteous’s perspective ........................................................ 31 

D. Expert Testimony ........................................................................................ 32 

1. Professor Charles G. Geyh ................................................................... 32 

2. Professor Dane Ciolino ......................................................................... 32 

III. Article III .......................................................................................................... 33 

A. Text of the Article ........................................................................................ 33 

B. Introduction to the Evidence ...................................................................... 33 

C. Statement of Facts ....................................................................................... 33 

1. Background ............................................................................................ 33 

2. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Overview ....................................................... 34 

3. Judge Porteous’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings .............................. 35 

4. May 9 Creditors Meeting and June 28 Confirmation of the Chapter 

13 Plan .................................................................................................... 38 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
Page

VI 

Procedural History—Continued 

C. Statement of Facts—Continued 

5. Gambling-Related Activity and Extensions of Credit ........................ 39 

6. FBI Investigation into Judge Porteous’s Bankruptcy Filings ........... 41 

D. Contested Issues .......................................................................................... 42 

1. Using a False Name and Post Office Box on the Original Bankruptcy Petition ....................................................................................... 42 

2. Concealing Assets and Income ............................................................. 43 

3. Incurring Debt Through the Use of Casino Markers ......................... 46 

4. Preferential Payments to Creditors ..................................................... 47 

5. Concealing Gambling Losses ................................................................ 49 

6. Incurring More Debt in Violation of Judge Greendyke’s Order ........ 50 

7. The Materiality of Judge Porteous’s Conduct ..................................... 50 

E. Expert Testimony ........................................................................................ 51 

1. Advice of Counsel .................................................................................. 51 

2. Judge Greendyke’s Admonishment Against Incurring More Debt ... 52 

IV. Article IV ........................................................................................................... 52 

A. Text of the Article ........................................................................................ 52 

B. Introduction to the Evidence ...................................................................... 53 

C. Statement of Facts ....................................................................................... 53 

1. FBI Interviews ....................................................................................... 54 

a. Initial interviews ............................................................................ 54 

b. Follow-up interviews ...................................................................... 56 

2. Nomination and Senate Confirmation ................................................. 57 

D. Contested Issues .......................................................................................... 58 

1. The House’s Perspective ....................................................................... 58 

2. Judge Porteous’s Perspective ............................................................... 58 

E. Expert Testimony ........................................................................................ 59 

1. Professor Charles G. Geyh ................................................................... 59 

2. Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie ............................................................ 59 

Committee Rollcall Vote .......................................................................................... 61 

ADDENDA 

A. Rule XI of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting 

on Impeachment Trials ........................................................................................ 61 

B. Senate Resolution 458 ........................................................................................ 62 

C. Description of Committee Proceedings .............................................................. 63 

D. Glossary of Names Appearing in the Committee Report ................................ 65 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
1 U.S. Const., art. II, § 1A4. While the Constitution does not define ‘‘civil Officers of the United 

States,’’ the House and Senate have consistently found federal judges to be in this category. Not 

including Judge Porteous, the House has impeached eighteen federal officials, fourteen of whom 

have been judges. Of these fourteen, the Senate has convicted seven and acquitted four. The 

remaining three judges resigned before their trials could be completed. 2 Id., art. I, 2. 3 Id., art. I, 3. 4The text of Rule XI appears as Addendum A to this report. 

5The text of Senate Resolution 458 appears as Addendum B to this report. 

ON THE IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE G. THOMAS 

PORTEOUS, JR. 

NOVEMBER 16, 2010.—Ordered to be printed 

Filed, under authority of the order of the Senate of November 15, 2010 

Mrs. MCCASKILL, from the Impeachment Trial Committee on the 

Articles Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., submitted the 

following 

R E P O R T 

INTRODUCTION 

The United States Constitution provides: ‘‘The President, Vice 

President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 

Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.’’ 1 The Constitution gives the ‘‘sole Power of Impeachment’’ 2 to the House of Representatives and the ‘‘sole Power to try all Impeachments’’ 3 to the 

Senate. 

On March 17, 2010, pursuant to Rule XI of the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment 

Trials, 4 the Senate created this Impeachment Trial Committee 

with its adoption of Senate Resolution 458. This resolution authorized the Committee ‘‘to receive and to report evidence’’ with respect 

to the articles of impeachment presented by the House against U.S. 

District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., of the Eastern District of Louisiana. 5 Pursuant to its mandate, the Committee received evidence on the following articles: 

Article I alleges that, while a federal judge, Judge Porteous improperly denied a motion to recuse himself from presiding over a 

case, despite having a ‘‘corrupt financial relationship’’ with a law 

firm representing one of the parties to the case. He also allegedly 

misrepresented this relationship during the recusal hearing. Additionally, while the case was under advisement, Judge Porteous solicited and accepted things of value, including thousands of dollars 

in cash, from attorneys appearing before him. 

Article II alleges ‘‘a longstanding pattern of corrupt conduct’’ 

with former bail bondsmen. While on the state court bench, Judge 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
2 

6Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Procedure for the Impeachment Trial of U.S. 

District Judge Alcee L. Hastings in the United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Rpt. 101– 

1, at 74 (February 2, 1989). 7See also Report of the Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles Against Judge Walter 

L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Rpt. 101–164, at 3 (October 16, 1989) (stating that the 

Committee ‘‘has no authority to recommend to the Senate whether the Senate should vote to 

convict or to acquit Judge Nixon on the Articles of Impeachment’’); Report of the Impeachment 

Trial Committee on the Articles Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Rpt. 

101–156, at 3 (October 2, 1989) (Hastings Committee Report) (stating that the Committee ‘‘has 

no authority to recommend whether the Senate should vote to convict or to acquit on the articles 

of impeachment’’); id. at 10 (‘‘The Committee’s report is meant to be a neutral statement that 

neither explicitly nor implicitly urges a particular result in the case, or on any aspect of it.’’); 

id. at 11 (‘‘In accordance with its limited mandate, the Committee as a whole takes no view 

of the evidence.’’); On the Impeachment of Harry E. Claiborne, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., S. Rpt. 

99–511, at 1 (October 1, 1986) (‘‘Senate Impeachment Rule XI does not authorize the Committee 

to make recommendations to the Senate.’’). 

Porteous favorably set and structured bonds and performed other 

official acts for bail bondsmen while soliciting and accepting things 

of value from them. As a federal judge, he continued to receive 

things of value in exchange for ‘‘us[ing] the power and prestige of 

his office’’ to help these bondsmen form corrupt relationships with 

state court judges. Finally, Judge Porteous is alleged to have 

known that one bondsman made false statements to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in an effort to assist Judge 

Porteous’s appointment to the federal bench. 

Article III alleges that, in relation to his personal bankruptcy in 

2001, Judge Porteous knowingly and intentionally made material 

false statements and representations in his bankruptcy filings 

under penalty of perjury and violated the bankruptcy court’s order. 

These alleged actions include using a false name in his bankruptcy 

filing, concealing assets and debts, concealing preferential payments to creditors, concealing gambling losses, and incurring new 

debt while the case was pending. 

Finally, Article IV alleges that Judge Porteous knowingly and intentionally made material false statements to the Senate and to 

the FBI ‘‘in order to obtain the office of United States District 

Court Judge.’’ These statements include denying that there was 

anything in his background that could be used to influence, coerce, 

blackmail, or compromise him; embarrass him or the President if 

publicly known; or affect his nomination. 

Having received the evidence, the Committee has two responsibilities that it fulfills in this report. First, Rule XI directs the 

Committee to ‘‘report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of 

the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before such committee.’’ The Committee satisfies this responsibility in 

Part I of this report. Second, Senate Resolution 458 directs the 

Committee to ‘‘report to the Senate a statement of facts that are 

uncontested and a summary, with appropriate references to the 

record, of evidence that the parties have introduced on contested 

issues of fact.’’ This is a ‘‘neutral summary’’ 6 because the Committee has no authority to make recommendations regarding matters as to the weight of the evidence or whether the Senate should 

vote to convict or acquit on the articles of impeachment. 7 The Committee achieves this in Part II of this report. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
3 

8To further assist Senators, Addendum C to this report provides a brief narrative description 

of the Committee’s proceedings. 9Twenty-six witnesses testified before the Committee’s evidentiary hearings. Each was subject 

to examination and cross-examination by the parties and to questions from Committee members. 

PART ONE—CERTIFICATION TO THE SENATE OF THE 

COMMITTEE’S PROCEEDINGS 

The record of the Committee’s proceedings is printed in the Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles 

Against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr.: Hearings Before the Senate 

Impeachment Trial Committee, S. Hrg. 111–691, 111th Cong., 2nd 

Sess. (2010). The Committee met on November 16, 2010, and, as 

Rule XI directs, certified the hearing report to be a copy of the 

transcript of proceedings had and testimony given before it.8 The 

roll call vote appears after the summary of the evidence. 

Part 1 of this hearing report contains the Committee’s pre-trial 

proceedings, from its creation on March 17, 2010, to the start of its 

evidentiary hearings on September 13, 2010. Part 2 consists of the 

transcript of the Committee’s evidentiary hearings.9 Part 3 contains the exhibits admitted during and after the Committee’s evidentiary hearings, demonstrative exhibits used during the hearing, 

the parties’ proposed findings of fact, and other post-trial filings. 

Prior to the consideration of the articles of impeachment before 

the full Senate, each Senator will receive copies of post-trial briefs 

from the parties. These post-trial briefs present the House’s and 

Judge Porteous’s positions on matters of fact and law. Each side 

will also have the opportunity to present a summation to the full 

Senate. The Senate will then meet in closed session to deliberate 

on the merits of the articles. Each article is to be voted on separately, and the question presented will be whether the respondent, 

Judge Porteous, is ‘‘guilty’’ or ‘‘not guilty’’ of the article at issue. 

The Committee highlights one unresolved matter from its pretrial proceedings. Prior to the evidentiary hearings, both parties 

filed a number of pre-trial motions. These included motions to dismiss the articles of impeachment, individually and collectively. The 

Committee declined to act on Judge Porteous’s motions to dismiss 

separately each article because it is not authorized to dismiss articles of impeachment. If Judge Porteous seeks to renew these motions before the full Senate, in which case the Senate may decide 

whether to hear argument on these issues and vote separately on 

the motions or whether to consider the issues raised by the motions 

in the context of its disposition of the articles of impeachment. 

Upon the Senate’s receipt of this report, Rule XI provides that 

‘‘the evidence so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having 

been received and taken before the Senate.’’ Thus, the Senate remains the master of the record before it and may review the admissibility of the evidence received by the Committee and summon 

witnesses to testify before the full Senate. 

There remains a question of the appropriate standard of proof for 

impeachment trials. The Committee notes that during his 1986 impeachment trial, U.S. District Judge Harry E. Claiborne moved ‘‘to 

designate ‘Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ as the standard of proof in 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
4 

10 132 Cong. Rec. 29152 (Oct. 7, 1986). 11 Id. 12 Id. at 29153; see also Hastings Committee Report, supra note 7, at 5. 13The full text of the articles were also published within S. Doc. 111–13. 

[his] impeachment trial.’’ 10 The Senate’s Presiding Officer ruled 

that ‘‘the question of standard of evidence is for each Senator to decide individually when voting on Articles of Impeachment.’’ 11 Upon 

a Senator’s request, Judge Claiborne’s motion was submitted to the 

full Senate, which voted 17–75 against it, thereby declining to establish an obligatory standard.12 Each Senator may, therefore, use 

the standard of proof that he or she feels is appropriate. 

PART TWO—SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 

Introduction 

The Committee’s basic responsibility to receive and report evidence is the same as in the three previous impeachments for which 

an impeachment trial committee was used. Carrying out that responsibility, however, is unique to each impeachment trial. As a result, this report’s format and content are guided by the responsibilities assigned to the Committee by Rule XI and Senate Resolution 

458, the nature of these particular articles of impeachment, and 

the evidence in this case. The Committee has not sought to present 

every fact to which the parties might attribute some meaning and 

has undoubtedly included facts that one party might consider irrelevant. The evidentiary summary does, however, attempt to describe 

those matters that the Committee understands to be the chief factual issues and to explain the significance of factual controversies. 

This report is not a substitute for the parties’ own marshaling of 

facts and arguments in support of their positions and is but one resource that the Senate may use in this case. The principal discussion of each party’s view of the evidence and the overall case will 

be found not in this report but in the parties’ written briefs and 

oral summation before the Senate. The Committee’s description of 

the parties’ arguments or perspectives in this report is intended 

only to aid in providing a coherent and meaningful summary. 

The summary of the evidence begins with a procedural history, 

which provides an overview of various proceedings in this matter 

that occurred prior to the Senate trial. This procedural history is 

followed by a discussion of the evidence pertaining to each article 

of impeachment against Judge Porteous. As the articles allege relatively distinct patterns or sets of conduct, this report will present 

this discussion in four separate sections, one for each article. In 

each section, the text of each article, as drafted by the House, will 

be presented, followed by a presentation of the uncontested and 

contested facts relevant to that article.13

The Committee has sought to indicate when there is conflicting 

evidence on any factual matter, while also presenting a report that 

is coherent and readable. To that end, the discussions of Articles 

I and II, which rely heavily on witness testimony, integrate 

uncontested and contested facts to a greater degree than the discussions of Articles III and IV, which rely more heavily on docuVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
5 

14 Addendum D contains a glossary of persons who are frequently mentioned in this report. 15 Citations in this report, whether witness testimony (identified by last name), stipulations, 

or exhibits, will include the part and page number of the hearing report. The parties’ stipulations are found in Part 1C; a transcript of the evidentiary hearings are found in Parts 2A and 

2B; and exhibits appear in Parts 3B through 3E of the certified record. Generally, exhibits initially identified by the House are numbered between 1–530; those identified by Judge Porteous 

are numbered between 1001–2007. 16 In the letter submitting a judicial misconduct complaint to the Fifth Circuit, the Department of Justice cited factors contributing to its decision not to prosecute Judge Porteous. These 

include ‘‘the relevant statute of limitations’’ regarding some incidents; whether the government 

could prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt to a unanimous jury; whether the government 

could prove elements such as materiality and an intent to deceive; the need for ‘‘consistency in 

charging decisions concerning bankruptcy and criminal contempt matters’’; and ‘‘the availability 

of alternative remedies for Judge Porteous’s history of misconduct while on the bench, including 

impeachment and judicial sanctions.’’ Ex. 4, 3B at 378–388. In 2006, while a target of a federal 

grand jury investigation, Judge Porteous signed three agreements extending for a total of five 

months the five-year statute of limitations regarding certain federal crimes. These agreements 

did not affect the statute of limitations that had expired prior to April 2006. Exs. 1003–1005, 

3E at 5538–5546. 17The Fifth Circuit Judicial Council is comprised of the Chief Judge, nine Fifth Circuit judges, 

and nine U.S. District Court judges. 18Four dissenting judges agreed that Judge Porteous must be publicly reprimanded ‘‘for legal 

and ethical misconduct during his tenure as a federal judge’’ but disagreed ‘‘that the evidence 

demonstrates a possible ground for his impeachment and removal from office.’’ Ex. 6(b), 3B at 

472. 19Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 354(b)(2)(A), a judicial council ‘‘shall promptly certify . . . to the 

Judicial Conference of the United States’’ a determination ‘‘that a judge appointed to hold office 

during good behavior may have engaged in conduct which might constitute one or more grounds 

for impeachment under article II of the Constitution.’’ 

mentary evidence.14 Citation to exhibits and testimony will reference the record as contained in the hearing report.15

Procedural History 

Judge Porteous served as a judge on Louisiana’s 24th Judicial 

District Court (JDC) from 1984 until 1994, when President William 

J. Clinton appointed him to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 

District of Louisiana. In 1999, an FBI probe into corruption involving judges on the 24th JDC, known as ‘‘Operation Wrinkled Robe,’’ 

uncovered allegations of corruption involving Judge Porteous. 

While declining to seek criminal charges against Judge Porteous, 

the Department of Justice submitted a complaint of judicial misconduct to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in May 

2007.16 The conduct alleged in the complaint corresponds to the allegations in the first and third articles of impeachment now before 

the Senate. 

The Judicial Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit appointed a Special Investigatory Committee to investigate 

the allegations concluded that Judge Porteous committed judicial 

misconduct that ‘‘might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment.’’ 17 On December 20, 2007, the Fifth Circuit Judicial 

Council voted 15–4 to conclude that Judge Porteous ‘‘has engaged 

in conduct which might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment under Article II of the Constitution.’’ 18 Ex. 5, 3B at 464. 

The Council also voted to certify the Justice Department’s complaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States.19

On June 17, 2008, the Judicial Conference voted unanimously to 

certify to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives that 

‘‘consideration of impeachment of United States District Judge G. 

Thomas Porteous (E.D. La.) may be warranted.’’ Ex. 7(b), 3B at 

536. On September 10, 2008, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council 

issued a public reprimand of Judge Porteous for ‘‘conduct that is 

prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
6 

20On September 8, 2010, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council extended this effective suspension 

until December 31, 2010. 21 156 Cong. Rec. H1335–37 (daily ed. March 11, 2010). 

business of the courts’’ and that ‘‘brought disrepute to the federal 

judiciary.’’ The Council ordered that no new cases be assigned to 

Judge Porteous and suspended his authority to employ staff for two 

years or ‘‘until Congress takes final action on the impeachment 

proceedings, whichever occurs earlier.’’ 20 Ex. 8, 3B at 594–601. 

On September 17, 2008, the House of Representatives adopted 

House Resolution 1448, authorizing the Judiciary Committee to inquire whether the House should impeach Judge Porteous. A Judicial Impeachment Task Force comprised of 12 House members held 

four hearings in November and December 2009. On January 21, 

2010, the Task Force voted unanimously to recommend four articles of impeachment, followed by a unanimous vote of the House 

Judiciary Committee on January 27, 2010. The House, in turn, 

voted unanimously to approve each of the four articles of impeachment on March 11, 2010.21

I. ARTICLE I

A. Text of the Article 

G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., while a Federal judge of the United 

States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, engaged 

in a pattern of conduct that is incompatible with the trust and confidence placed in him as a Federal judge, as follows: 

Judge Porteous, while presiding as a United States district judge 

in Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, 

denied a motion to recuse himself from the case, despite the fact that 

he had a corrupt financial relationship with the law firm of Amato 

& Creely, P.C. which had entered the case to represent Liljeberg. In 

denying the motion to recuse, and in contravention of clear canons 

of judicial ethics, Judge Porteous failed to disclose that beginning 

in or about the late 1980s while he was a State court judge in the 

24th JDC in the State of Louisiana, he engaged in a corrupt scheme 

with attorneys, Jacob Amato, Jr., and Robert Creely, whereby Judge 

Porteous appointed Amato’s law partner as a ‘‘curator’’ in hundreds 

of cases and thereafter requested and accepted from Amato & Creely 

a portion of the curatorship fees which had been paid to the firm. 

During the period of this scheme, the fees received by Amato & 

Creely amounted to approximately $40,000, and the amounts paid 

by Amato & Creely to Judge Porteous amounted to approximately 

$20,000. 

Judge Porteous also made intentionally misleading statements at 

the recusal hearing intended to minimize the extent of his personal 

relationship with the two attorneys. In so doing, and in failing to 

disclose to Lifemark and its counsel the true circumstances of his 

relationship with the Amato & Creely law firm, Judge Porteous deprived the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of critical information for 

its review of a petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to 

overrule Judge Porteous’s denial of the recusal motion. His conduct 

deprived the parties and the public of the right to the honest services of his office. 

Judge Porteous also engaged in corrupt conduct after the 

Lifemark v. Liljeberg bench trial, and while he had the case under 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
7 

22Over Judge Porteous’s objection, the Committee admitted into evidence his testimony before 

the Special Investigatory Committee of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which 

was compelled pursuant to an immunity order. The Committee declined the House’s request to 

issue a subpoena to Judge Porteous to testify in the Committee’s evidentiary hearings, and 

Judge Porteous chose not to testify before the Committee. See Addendum C. Therefore, the only 

sworn testimony of Judge Porteous relating to any facts underlying the articles of impeachment 

was before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee. 23 Amato and Creely practiced law together from approximately 1973 until 2005 as partners 

in the law firm of Creely & Amato. Stip. 54, 1C at 2530. 

advisement, in that he solicited and accepted things of value from 

both Amato and his law partner Creely, including a payment of 

thousands of dollars in cash. Thereafter, and without disclosing his 

corrupt relationship with the attorneys of Amato & Creely PLC or 

his receipt from them of cash and other things of value, Judge 

Porteous ruled in favor of their client, Liljeberg. 

By virtue of this corrupt relationship and his conduct as a Federal judge, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal and disrepute, prejudiced public respect for, and confidence in, the Federal 

judiciary, and demonstrated that he is unfit for the office of Federal 

judge. 

Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 

crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office. 

B. Introduction to the Evidence 

Article I addresses Judge Porteous’s handling of the Lifemark v. 

Liljeberg case in light of his prior relationships with Jacob Amato 

and Robert Creely. The statement of facts below outlines those relationships while Judge Porteous served as a state court judge, as 

well as his handling of Lifemark v. Liljeberg as a federal judge. The 

evidence relevant to Article I is drawn primarily from Judge 

Porteous’s testimony before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory 

Committee,22 the parties’ stipulated facts, and the testimony of 

Amato and Creely before this Committee. Due to the nature of the 

evidence, creating a cohesive narrative required integrating some 

contested facts with uncontested facts. Because Article I relies 

heavily on testimonial evidence, the credibility of witnesses and, as 

a result, the meaning of their testimony are accordingly important. 

C. Statement of Facts 

1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Curatorships 

Judge Porteous graduated from Louisiana State University in 

1968 and the Louisiana State University Law School in 1971. Stip. 

5, 1C at 2526. Starting in 1973 and continuing until 1984, he 

worked with Jacob Amato as an Assistant District Attorney in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana; for part of this time, Judge Porteous and 

Robert Creely also worked in the law firm of Edwards, Porteous & 

Amato. Stips. 8–10, 1C at 2526.23

After his election to the state court bench in 1984, Judge 

Porteous remained close friends with his colleagues and would 

often have lunch with Amato and with Creely. Stips. 60, 69–70, 1C 

at 2531. Between 1984 and 1994, many state court judges in the 

24th JDC went to lunch with attorneys practicing in the area. Stip. 

62, 1C at 2531. Both Creely and Amato generally paid for lunches 

they had with state judges, including Judge Porteous. Stips. 62–65, 

71–76, 1C at 2531–2532. In testimony before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee, Judge Porteous admitted that it was 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
8 

24 In addition to receiving curatorship appointments from Judge Porteous, Creely received curatorship appointments from several other judges in the 24th JDC. Stip. 99, 1C at 2533. 

not uncommon for Creely and Amato to treat him to lunch and, on 

occasion, dinner, noting that, when he went out with Creely and 

Amato, he never paid. Ex. 10, 3B at 794. 

In addition to dining together, judges and attorneys in Gretna, 

Louisiana, also socialized in other ways, such as hunting and fishing together. Stip. 81, 1C at 2532. From their time together in private practice through Judge Porteous’s appointment as a federal 

judge, Creely and Judge Porteous regularly hunted and fished together, and they were often joined by Amato. When Robert Creely 

hosted judges and other attorneys on these trips, he usually paid 

for all of the expenses. Amato, 2A at 125–126; Creely, 2A at 257– 

259; see Stips. 79–80, 1C at 2532; Ex. 10, 3B at 800–801. To Judge 

Porteous’s children, who often went along on the fishing trips, 

Amato and Creely were ‘‘Uncle Jake’’ and ‘‘Uncle Bob.’’ Timothy 

Porteous, 2B at 1155, 1157, 1164; Stip. 55, 1C at 2530. 

While serving on the state court bench, Judge Porteous occasionally asked Creely for money when they were having lunch or hunting and fishing. Creely indicated that Judge Porteous would ask for 

this money to cover ‘‘daily living expenses’’ or tuition for his children. Creely, 2A at 282. At first, Creely gave Judge Porteous whatever cash he had on hand, but over time, these amounts increased 

from under $100 to possibly as much as $1,000. Eventually, the 

amounts increased to the point that Creely confronted Judge 

Porteous, telling him, ‘‘I’m tired of giving you money, I’m tired of 

you asking for money. This isn’t what friends are supposed to do 

to one another.’’ Id. at 260–262. Creely refused to give Judge 

Porteous any more money and told him that he needed to get his 

finances under control. Judge Porteous acknowledged in testimony 

before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee that he received money from Creely over a period of years but does not recall 

the total amount. There, Judge Porteous testified that he considered these payments to be gifts or loans but acknowledged that he 

never repaid Creely for these amounts. Ex. 10, 3B at 785–786. 

Shortly after Creely refused to continue giving him money, Judge 

Porteous started to assign ‘‘curatorships’’ to the law firm of Amato 

& Creely.24 During this time period, judges on the 24th JDC frequently assigned attorneys as ‘‘curators’’ to represent the interests 

of absent parties in litigation. These curatorship cases were largely 

administrative, lasted approximately three to six months, and generated fees of approximately $150 to $200 per case. Amato, 2A at 

132, 244–245; Creely, 2A at 262–263; Stips. 90, 98, 1C at 2533. 

From 1988 through 1994, available court records show that 

Judge Porteous assigned 192 curatorships to Creely. Stips. 91–97, 

1C at 2533. According to Creely, he neither asked for nor wanted 

the curatorship appointments; he testified that ‘‘[a] curator was 

like a pain in the neck to me.’’ Creely, 2A at 263. However, Creely 

accepted the appointments, completed the work, and collected the 

fees for his law partnership. Amato, 2A at 131–132. These curatorships are estimated to have generated approximately $40,000 in 

fees for the law firm of Creely & Amato. Amato, 2A at 134–135. 

During the time he was assigning curatorships to Creely, Judge 

Porteous again started asking Creely for money, and Creely 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
9 

25 Amato testified that he told Creely that he ‘‘thought it was going to turn out bad.’’ Amato, 

2A at 128. 26 Creely further testified that this $10,000 estimate of the amount he himself provided also 

generally included the money given before and after the curatorships. Creely, 2A at 301–302. 

obliged. Creely, 2A at 263–264. According to Creely and Amato, 

when Judge Porteous asked for money during this period, they 

would each take an equal draw from the law firm’s general operating account and arrange for cash to be put in an envelope for 

Judge Porteous. Amato, 2A at 129–130; Creely, 2A at 275–278; see 

also Ex. 10, 3B at 796. It was Creely’s understanding that Judge 

Porteous ‘‘didn’t want checks. He wanted cash.’’ Creely, 2A at 367. 

According to Amato, cash was given to ‘‘avoid any kind of paper 

trail.’’ Amato, 2A at 131. 

Creely eventually began avoiding Judge Porteous because, as 

Creely testified, ‘‘most of the time that I was around him, he would 

begin to ask me for cash.’’ Creely, 2A at 266. After Creely started 

avoiding him, Judge Porteous called Creely’s secretary asking for 

a portion of the fees resulting from the curatorship appointments. 

Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth Circuit that he does not 

recall this conversation. Id. at 265; see also Ex. 10, 3B at 800. 

Amato confirmed that Judge Porteous had ‘‘called [Creely] and 

hounded him and, you know, [asked him] where’s, you know, my 

curator money.’’ Amato, 2A at 129. Creely testified that he was 

troubled by this telephone call because he had not drawn a connection between the money he gave to Judge Porteous and the fees 

generated by the curatorships Judge Porteous assigned to him. 

Nonetheless, Creely testified that it was clear to him that Judge 

Porteous made such a connection even though there was no explicit 

arrangement to that effect. Creely, 2A at 265–266, 299. 

After this telephone call, Creely testified that he told Amato, 

‘‘[T]his is getting out of control with a friend. I don’t know how to 

handle this anymore. I don’t know how to end this. I don’t know 

how to control this, but it’s got to stop.’’ Id. at 266–267. Creely and 

Amato eventually agreed that they would continue to give Judge 

Porteous money because, given the firm’s revenue from the curatorship fees, the payments ‘‘weren’t costing [them] anything.’’ Id. at 

267, 274. While he never discussed the matter with Judge 

Porteous, Amato testified that he understood that Judge Porteous 

was assigning curatorships and, in turn, Creely was giving money 

to the judge from their respective draws. Amato, 2A at 127–129; 

Creely, 2A at 275. Amato characterized this activity as ‘‘probably 

unethical more than being . . . some type of criminal offense’’ but 

judged it to be a form of a kickback.25 Amato, 2A at 129. 

The House proffered evidence that, ultimately, Judge Porteous 

received approximately half of the fees generated by the assignment of curatorships to Amato & Creely. The FBI calculated that, 

in total, Amato & Creely generated $40,000 in fees from the 192 

curatorships that Judge Porteous assigned to Creely. Creely and 

Amato testified that, over a period of six years, they gave Judge 

Porteous $20,000, or approximately one-half, of the total fees collected from the curatorships.26 Amato, 2A at 132, 134–135, 218– 

220; Creely, 2A at 268, 274–275. In October 1994, Judge Porteous 

was confirmed as a U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana and, in this position, was no longer able to assign 

state court curatorships. Creely and Amato both testified that after 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
10 

27 Before being assigned to Judge Porteous, at least seven district court judges and three magistrates presided over various portions of the case. Stip. 105, 1C at 2534. 

Judge Porteous’s appointment to the federal bench, their monetary 

gifts to him all but ceased. Amato, 2A at 133; Creely, 2A at 278. 

a. The House’s perspective 

The House argues that Judge Porteous assigned curatorships to 

Robert Creely as part of a kickback scheme to collect a portion of 

the generated fees. The House asserts that, given the amount of 

money involved and curatorships assigned, an implicit understanding existed regarding the curatorship appointments and the 

money given to Judge Porteous by Amato and Creely. The House 

insists that admissions from Judge Porteous during his Fifth Circuit testimony, taken as a whole, paint a picture of a classic kickback relationship in which Judge Porteous received money from 

Creely and Amato after assigning them curatorships. Ex. 10, 3B at 

785. Additionally, the House argues that Creely’s testimony that 

Judge Porteous called Creely’s secretary to inquire about the 

money from the curatorships demonstrates that Judge Porteous understood a linkage between the curatorships and the money Creely 

and Amato gave to him. The House asserts that this view is also 

supported by evidence that Judge Porteous stopped receiving 

money from them after he became a federal judge when he could 

no longer assign curatorships to Creely and, therefore, could no 

longer ask for money generated from the assignment of those curatorships. Amato, 2A at 133; Creely, 2A at 278. 

b. Judge Porteous’s perspective 

Judge Porteous contends that the House misrepresents his longstanding and close friendships with Amato and Creely, and that 

the evidence shows merely that his good friends provided occasional assistance. Before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory 

Committee, Judge Porteous testified that the money he received 

from Creely and Amato was a loan or a gift from friends, not a 

kickback from the curatorship assignments. Ex. 10, 3B at 785–786. 

Creely also denied that there was any explicit agreement linking 

the curatorships to the money given to Judge Porteous. As a result, 

Creely did not consider his cash gifts to Judge Porteous to constitute a kickback or a quid pro quo. Moreover, any money that he 

gave to Judge Porteous could not have been intended as a bribe to 

influence him because Creely did not have any pending cases before the Judge. Creely, 2A at 302–303, 347–348. 

2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Lifemark Hospitals v. Liljeberg Enterprises 

On January 16, 1996, Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. v. Liljeberg 

Enterprises, Inc. was transferred to Judge Porteous. This was a 

complicated, non-jury civil case, filed in 1993, involving Louisiana 

law.27 Stip. 104, 1C at 2533. Lifemark financed construction of the 

Kenner Regional Medical Center by the Liljeberg family. Once 

built, Lifemark operated the medical center, and the Liljebergs operated the affiliated pharmacy. The Liljebergs lost the hospital 

through foreclosure with another lender. Believing that Lifemark 

bore at least some of the responsibility, the Liljebergs sought damVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
11 

28Prior to entering the case, Amato took two to three months to evaluate the merits of the 

case in order to decide whether to enter the case. Stip. 113, 1C at 2534. Amato was brought 

in before Levenson. Amato, 2A at 196. 29 In Lifemark’s motion to recuse, Lifemark attorney Joseph Mole describes Leonard 

Levenson’s specialty as personal injury law. This differs from Judge Porteous’s description of 

Levenson’s specialty in the Fifth Circuit proceedings, in which he indicated that Levenson dealt 

with complex civil litigation in state courts. Ex. 10, 3B at 816–817; Ex. 52, 3B at 1139. 

ages from Lifemark. Lifemark then sued the Liljebergs to end its 

contract with them, and the Liljebergs sued Lifemark to recover 

under the pharmacy contract. Mole, 2A at 383–384. 

Approximately six weeks before the scheduled start of the bench 

trial, the Liljebergs filed a motion to enter the appearances of 

Jacob Amato and Leonard Levenson as counsel, which Judge 

Porteous granted four days later.28 Levenson, like Amato, was a 

close friend of Judge Porteous’s. Stips. 108, 110, 137, 1C at 2534. 

Judge Porteous testified that, unlike Levenson, who often handled 

complex civil litigation in state courts, Amato would not ordinarily 

have been involved in this kind of case because his background and 

practice were almost exclusively in personal injury.29 Ex. 10, 3B at 

815. Liljeberg Enterprises hired both on a contingent fee basis. 

Stip. 109, 1C at 2534. The Liljebergs valued the case at between 

$15 million and $30 million, and if successful, Amato stood to earn 

between $500,000 and $1 million. Amato, 2A at 136. 

Joseph Mole, Lifemark’s lead attorney, was concerned by the timing of Amato’s and Levenson’s appearances in the case. After asking around, Mole testified that he ‘‘developed some serious concerns 

that Mr. Amato’s and Mr. Levenson’s presence in the case would 

be a problem that would keep the case from having a fair result.’’ 

Mole, 2A at 386–387. On October 1, 1996, Lifemark filed a motion 

to recuse Judge Porteous, which was accompanied by the affidavit 

of Mole, noting Judge Porteous’s close relationships with Amato 

and Levenson. The Liljebergs opposed the motion. Id. at 388–389; 

Stip. 114, 1C at 2534. 

On October 16, 1996, Judge Porteous held a hearing on the motion to recuse, at which Amato and Levenson were present. Stips. 

118–119, 1C at 2534–2535. According to the transcript of the hearing, Mole argued that an appearance of impropriety was created by 

the appearance of Amato and Levenson because, as Mole asserted 

at the recusal hearing, ‘‘All they have in common is that they are 

your close friends. The public perception is that they dine with you, 

travel with you, that they have contributed to your campaigns.’’ 

Judge Porteous, however, refuted Mole’s assertion that he received 

campaign contributions from Amato and Levenson, stating, ‘‘Well, 

luckily, I didn’t have any campaigns, so I am interested to find out 

how you know that.’’ Ex. 56, 3B at 1181. Judge Porteous noted that 

the one instance in which Amato and Levenson did contribute to 

his re-election campaign was through a ‘‘Justice for All’’ event organized by Jefferson Parish, from which each judge received a portion 

of the contributions. Judge Porteous stated: 

You haven’t offended me. But don’t misstate, don’t come 

up with a document that clearly shows well in excess of 

$6700 with some innuendo that means that they gave 

money to me. If you would have checked your homework, 

you would have found that that was a Justice for All Program for all judges in Jefferson Parish. But go ahead. I 

don’t dispute that I received funding from lawyers. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
12 

30 Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee that Gardner was another friend who occasionally gave him cash. Ex. 10, 3B at 795. 

Id. at 1183. Judge Porteous also stated during this hearing, ‘‘Yes, 

Mr. Amato and Mr. Levenson are friends of mine. Have I ever been 

to either one of them’s house? The answer is a definitive no. Have 

I gone along to lunch with them? The answer is a definitive yes. 

Have I been going to lunch with all members of the bar? The answer is yes.’’ Id. at 1180. Judge Porteous assured Mole that ‘‘I have 

always taken the position that if there was ever any question in 

my mind that this Court should recuse itself that I would notify 

counsel and give them opportunity if they wanted to ask me to get 

off.’’ Id. at 1291. 

Judge Porteous, however, did not disclose that, as a state court 

judge, he had never or rarely paid for lunch when he dined hundreds of times with Amato and Creely; nor did Judge Porteous disclose that they had given him approximately $20,000 after he 

began to assign curatorships to Creely. Mole, 2A at 389–390; Stip. 

114, 1C at 2534; Ex. 10, 3B at 818; Ex. 56, 3B at 1174–1198. Judge 

Porteous also failed to disclose that, several months before his appointment to the federal bench, in the summer of 1994, he told 

Rhonda Danos, his secretary, to solicit money from Amato, Creely, 

and Levenson to sponsor his son’s externship in Washington, D.C. 

Danos, 2A at 784–785; Timothy Porteous, 2B at 1165–1166. 

Judge Porteous denied the motion to recuse but granted a stay 

of the trial pending Lifemark’s appeal of his order to the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 28, 1996, the 

Fifth Circuit denied Lifemark’s request for a writ of mandamus on 

the motion to recuse. Stips. 12, 114, 120, 1C at 2526, 2534, 2535; 

Ex. 59, 3B at 1329–1330. Mole testified that, following Lifemark’s 

attempt ‘‘to level the playing field’’ before the Fifth Circuit failed, 

he was told to ‘‘hire someone who [knew] the judge.’’ In consultation with Tom Wilkinson, the Jefferson Parish Attorney who had 

appeared before Judge Porteous on the state court bench, Mole 

hired Donald Gardner, another close friend of Judge Porteous.30

Stip. 100, 1C at 2533. Mole hoped that Gardner’s addition to 

Lifemark’s legal team would induce Judge Porteous to recuse himself since close friends represented both parties. Mole, 2A at 393– 

395, 425. 

As part of the retainer agreement, Lifemark agreed to pay Gardner $100,000 upon enrollment as counsel. The retainer agreement 

also provided that if Judge Porteous withdrew from the case, 

Lifemark would pay Gardner an additional $100,000, at which time 

Gardner would withdraw as a counsel. Id. at 395–396; Stips. 124– 

126, 1C at 2535; Ex. 35(b), 3B at 1041–1042. On March 11, 1997, 

Lifemark filed a motion to enroll Gardner as an additional counsel. 

Stip. 123, 1C at 2535. Judge Porteous acknowledged before the 

Fifth Circuit Judicial Council that Gardner’s appearance in the 

case was ‘‘unusual’’ given that Gardner dealt mostly with divorces 

and family law and had little expertise in the complex civil issues 

involved. Ex. 10, 3B at 817–818. 

The bench trial began on June 16, 1997, and concluded on July 

23, 1997, at which time Judge Porteous took the case under advisement. Stip. 128–129, 1C at 2535. During this time, Judge Porteous 

continued to socialize with and accept things of value from Amato, 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
13 

31 Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee that he 

could not recall this conversation but did not deny it. Ex. 10, 3B at 787. 

Creely, Gardner, and Levenson. While the case was under advisement, Creely and Amato continued to take Judge Porteous out to 

lunch. Ex. 21(b) and 21(c), 3B at 907–1014. In May 1999, Creely 

and Gardner attended a bachelor party in Las Vegas for Judge 

Porteous’s son, Timothy. On this trip, Creely paid for Judge 

Porteous’s hotel room for three or four days, totaling more than 

$250, as well as meals and entertainment-related expenses. Creely, 

2A at 292–294; Stips. 134–136, 1C at 2536; Ex. 10, 3B at 806–809. 

Additionally, Amato and Creely’s law firm contributed to a party 

celebrating Judge Porteous’s five-year anniversary of his appointment to the federal bench. Amato, 2A at 148; Danos, 2A at 783– 

784. 

Around the same time, Amato went on a fishing trip with Judge 

Porteous. Amato testified that, during this trip, Judge Porteous became emotionally distraught about his financial problems and worried that he would be unable to pay for his son’s upcoming wedding.31 Amato, 2A at 181–182. Upon returning from the fishing 

trip, Amato shared his conversation with Creely and proposed to 

share the cost with him. Creely and Amato took equal draws totaling $2,000, from their firm’s account and placed the money in an 

envelope, which was picked up by Judge Porteous’s secretary, 

Rhonda Danos. Id. at 143–145; Creely, 2A at 295–297. When Danos 

asked what was in the envelope, Creely’s secretary rolled her eyes. 

In response, Danos said, ‘‘[N]ever mind, I don’t want to know.’’ 

Danos, 2A at 782–783. 

Judge Porteous also continued to occasionally socialize with 

Levenson during the pendency of the case. Sometime between 1996 

and 1998, Judge Porteous went on a hunting trip with Levenson, 

although no testimony was offered as to whether Levenson paid for 

this trip. In April 1999, Levenson attended a Fifth Circuit Judicial 

Conference at Judge Porteous’s invitation. At this conference, 

Levenson paid for Judge Porteous’s meals and drinks. Ex. 10, 3B 

at 794–795; Stip. 138–140, 1C at 2536. 

On April 26, 2000, three years after the end of the trial, Judge 

Porteous issued his ruling in Lifemark Hospitals of La., Inc. v. 

Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc. Stip. 130, 1C at 2535. Judge Porteous 

ruled largely in favor of Liljeberg Enterprises, returning to the 

Liljebergs the hospital lost earlier in foreclosure, sustaining the 

pharmacy contract, and ordering Lifemark to pay the Liljebergs an 

award of $10 million, a portion of the damages sought. Mole regarded this as a ‘‘resounding loss’’ for his client. Mole, 2A at 403– 

404. 

Lifemark appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which unanimously affirmed Judge Porteous’s decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. The Fifth Circuit sided predominately with 

Lifemark and was strongly critical of significant parts of Judge 

Porteous’s reasoning, opining that Judge Porteous’s ruling was ‘‘inexplicable,’’ ‘‘a chimera,’’ ‘‘constructed entirely out of whole cloth,’’ 

‘‘absurd,’’ ‘‘close to being nonsensical,’’ and ‘‘not supported by law.’’ 

See Stip. 131, 1C at 2535; Exs. 62–63, 3B at 1474–1477. Lifemark 

and Liljeberg settled within a month of the Fifth Circuit’s decision 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
14 

because, Mole testified, ‘‘[m]y client did not want to go back to 

Judge Porteous on the remand.’’ Mole, 2A at 408. 

a. The House’s perspective 

The House argues that, during Lifemark, Judge Porteous intentionally misled the parties and actively concealed the extent of his 

relationships with Amato and Levenson. See Amato, 2A at 146– 

151. By denying the motion seeking his recusal without disclosing 

the true nature of these financial relationships, Judge Porteous deprived Lifemark of a fair trial and the Fifth Circuit of information 

necessary to properly decide the subsequently filed mandamus petition seeking to remove Porteous from the case. The House suggests 

that the Fifth Circuit’s decision on this matter would have been different had it known the extent of Judge Porteous’s prior financial 

relationship with Amato. See Mole, 2A at 393. 

The House additionally maintains that Judge Porteous continued 

to abuse his office and position as a federal judge by accepting and 

soliciting gifts from the parties’ counsels during the three years 

that he had the Lifemark case under advisement. In particular, the 

House points to Amato’s testimony that Judge Porteous solicited 

$2,000 for his son’s wedding during a fishing trip in May or June 

1999. Amato recalled Judge Porteous asking for financial assistance, which was the only time he remembered Judge Porteous directly asking him for money. Amato, 2A at 143–44, 181–182. The 

House argues that, during the pendency of the Lifemark case, 

Judge Porteous exercised tremendous leverage over Amato, who 

worked on little else but the Lifemark case for two years and stood 

to recover nothing if he lost the case. See id. at 136–137. Amato 

himself acknowledged that the pending case somewhat affected his 

decision to help Judge Porteous. Id. at 235–236. 

b. Judge Porteous’s perspective 

Judge Porteous maintains that he fully acknowledged his relationship with Amato and Levenson at the recusal hearing. Judge 

Porteous asserts that, because there was no kickback agreement 

with Amato and Creely, any money given to him by Amato was 

given out of friendship. Thus, there was no financial relationship 

to disclose. Judge Porteous, moreover, contends that there was 

nothing wrong with dining with friends and close associates. Attorneys in Gretna, Louisiana, often paid for meals, drinks, gifts, and 

even trips for judges; it was local practice and custom. See Creely, 

2A at 307–308; Ciolino, 2B at 1506. 

Judge Porteous asserts that he was impartial in the Lifemark 

case despite the fact that several friends representing both sides 

appeared before him. Both Amato and Gardner testified that they 

never thought that their friendships with Judge Porteous would affect his ability to preside impartially. From the beginning, Gardner 

told Mole that his involvement alone would not ‘‘steer the result of 

the case’’ or ‘‘influence the judge.’’ According to Gardner, he only 

believed that he would be able to help Lifemark and its attorneys 

both to better understand Judge Porteous and to better present the 

evidence to him. Mole, 2A at 397, 422–423. Judge Porteous also 

dismisses as mistaken the criticisms found in the Fifth Circuit’s 

opinion, which was written by a panel of Texas judges on an arcane 

point of Louisiana law. In Amato’s opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s deciVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
15 

32Geyh based his opinions on the House report and the allegations set forth within. He admitted that he was not an expert in Louisiana legal ethics, and that he did not review rulings by 

Louisiana judges on issues of judicial misconduct. He did, however, review some materials from 

the Louisiana code of judicial conduct dating back to 1984. Geyh, 2A at 744–748. 

sion overturning Judge Porteous’s ruling was ‘‘wrong, wrong, 

wrong.’’ Stip. 132, 1C at 2535–2536. Additionally, Judge Porteous argues that the gift of $2,000, given 

to him by Amato and Creely, was never meant as a bribe to affect 

the outcome of the Lifemark case; Amato himself testified that he 

neither viewed the money as a bribe, nor did he believe that it 

would have an impact on Judge Porteous’s decision ‘‘one way or the 

other.’’ Moreover, the pending Lifemark case was not the primary 

reason Amato gave Judge Porteous money. Amato testified, ‘‘[I gave 

him money] because of my friendship, and I really felt sad for him.’’ 

Amato, 2A at 182–183. 

D. Expert Testimony 

The House and Judge Porteous each offered one expert witness 

whose testimony related to the allegations in Article I. The House 

called Professor Charles G. Geyh of the Indiana University— 

Bloomington Maurer School of Law as an expert in judicial ethics. 

Judge Porteous called Professor Dane Ciolino of Loyola University 

Law School as an expert in legal and judicial ethics. Both witnesses 

were accepted as experts in their designated fields. Geyh, 2A at 

714–716; Ciolino, 2B at 1480–1485. 

1. Professor Charles G. Geyh 

Professor Geyh fielded numerous questions about the ethical behavior of Judge Porteous concerning the allegations in Article I.32

With respect to lunches and trips paid for by attorneys, Geyh testified, ‘‘[T]here is nothing wrong with lawyers and judges socializing, 

. . . [b]ut there is a point where, you know, a line can be crossed, 

where what the judge is, in effect, doing is exceeding the bounds 

of normal hospitality and is trading on his position as a judge for 

private gain.’’ In his opinion, Judge Porteous crossed that line. 

Geyh, 2A at 717–718. Geyh said Judge Porteous’s conduct in assigning curatorships to Creely was ‘‘very, very troubling’’ and testified that the behavior was a violation of the ABA model code of judicial conduct. Id. at 718–721. 

Regarding Judge Porteous’s failure to recuse himself from 

Lifemark, Geyh stated that, while a judge is not required to recuse 

himself simply because a friend is a counsel in the case before him, 

‘‘the judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding where his impartiality might be reasonably questioned.’’ Id. at 722. Geyh also 

opined that Judge Porteous’s solicitation of cash from Amato for his 

son’s wedding violated ethics rules governing gifts. Geyh testified 

that based on the evidence of the lunches, curatorship assignments, 

and monetary gifts involving Amato and Creely, Judge Porteous 

should have disqualified himself. Id. at 724–727. 

2. Professor Dane Ciolino 

Professor Ciolino testified about Louisiana’s Code of Judicial 

Conduct and the ethical standards for governing Louisiana state 

court judges. He explained that, during the time Judge Porteous 

was on the state bench, the applicable ethical rules were not 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
16 

bright-line or per se rules, but instead incorporated the general ‘‘appearance of impropriety’’ standard. He considered this to be a 

vague standard that offered little guidance to attorneys and judges 

as to what exact behavior was deemed unethical. As a result, 

Ciolino stated that it was common in Louisiana for firms to offer 

judges gifts and lunches, as well as golf, hunting, and fishing outings. Ciolino, 2B at 1493–1495, 1505–1508. 

Ciolino also testified that in Louisiana ‘‘most of the curatorships 

are given to friends of the judges, the campaign contributors for the 

judges. Sometimes some judges give them to younger lawyers who 

are just starting out to help them out [or] former law clerks.’’ Id. 

at 1511–1512. Curatorships awarded in conjunction with a bribe or 

kickback scheme, however, were both unethical and unlawful, even 

under the nebulous ‘‘appearance of impropriety’’ standard. Id. at 

1512. 

While Ciolino testified that the applicable ethical standards at 

the time were vague and subject to different interpretations, 

Ciolino found the relationship between attorneys and judges in 

Louisiana troubling and testified that he considered most of the alleged conduct to be unethical. Ciolino additionally testified that 

any ethical judgment of Judge Porteous’s conduct depends on 

where one draws the line along a continuum. Ciolino testified that, 

in his opinion, if Judge Porteous did ask for $2,000 from Amato 

during the pendency of the Lifemark case, such behavior would be 

located on the ‘‘malignant end of the spectrum.’’ Id. at 1537–1540. 

II. ARTICLE II

A. Text of the Article 

G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., engaged in a longstanding pattern of 

corrupt conduct that demonstrates his unfitness to serve as a United 

States District Court Judge. That conduct included the following: 

Beginning in or about the late 1980s while he was a State court 

judge in the 24th JDC in the State of Louisiana, and continuing 

while he was a Federal judge in the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Judge Porteous engaged in a 

corrupt relationship with bail bondsman Louis M. Marcotte, III, 

and his sister Lori Marcotte. As part of this corrupt relationship, 

Judge Porteous solicited and accepted numerous things of value, including meals, trips, home repairs, and car repairs, for his personal 

use and benefit, while at the same time taking official actions that 

benefitted the Marcottes. These official actions by Judge Porteous 

included, while on the State bench, setting, reducing, and splitting 

bonds as requested by the Marcottes, and improperly setting aside 

or expunging felony convictions for two Marcotte employees (in one 

case after Judge Porteous had been confirmed by the Senate but before being sworn in as a Federal judge). In addition, both while on 

the State bench and on the Federal bench, Judge Porteous used the 

power and prestige of his office to assist the Marcottes in forming 

relationships with State judicial officers and individuals important 

to the Marcottes’ business. As Judge Porteous well knew and understood, Louis Marcotte also made false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to assist Judge Porteous in being 

appointed to the Federal bench. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
17 

Accordingly, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., has engaged in conduct so utterly lacking in honesty and integrity that he is guilty of 

high crimes and misdemeanors, is unfit to hold the office of Federal 

judge, and should be removed from office. 

B. Introduction to the Evidence 

Article II focuses on Judge Porteous’s relationship with Louis 

and Lori Marcotte, the owners of a bail bonds company in Gretna, 

Louisiana. This section first examines Judge Porteous’s relationship with the Marcottes first as a state court judge and then as a 

federal judge. The evidence presented here is primarily testimonial, 

and the parties challenge the credibility of several witnesses, including the Marcottes (who pled guilty to federal corruption 

charges). As with Article I, the description of the evidence integrates uncontested and contested facts. 

C. Statement of Facts 

1. Conduct While a State Court Judge and Relationship With 

the Marcottes 

a. Bail bonds process and alleged favors 

During the 1990s, as a judge on the 24th JDC, Judge Porteous 

was part of a rotational system in which one judge would serve as 

the ‘‘magistrate’’ or ‘‘duty’’ judge for a given week. The magistrate 

judge was primarily responsible for reviewing and setting bail and 

bail bonds, although all judges in the 24th JDC retained this authority. Griffin, 2B at 1637; Lori Marcotte, 2A at 576; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 456–457, 506; Ex. 1113, 3E at 5970. 

When a judge sets bail, he determines the amount of money that 

a criminal defendant must post with the court as a condition of 

temporary release from imprisonment. If a defendant released on 

bail appears for his court dates and complies with other conditions 

set by the magistrate judge, the amount posted with the court is 

eventually returned to the defendant. If the defendant violates the 

terms of his release, the posted bail is forfeited. 

A defendant who cannot afford to post the full amount of the set 

bail can contract with a commercial bail bondsman, who posts the 

bail on the defendant’s behalf in exchange for a premium. The bond 

premium is typically ten to fifteen percent of the bail set by the 

court. A bail bondsman profits from the premium paid so long as 

the defendant appears in court; otherwise, the bail bondsman forfeits the entire bail amount to the court. When a defendant purchases a bail bond, he does not recover the premium paid to the 

bondsman. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 456–458; see also Ex. 442, 3D at 

4650–4651. 

In the 1980s, Louis Marcotte and his sister Lori started Bail 

Bonds Unlimited (BBU) in Gretna, Louisiana. Louis Marcotte, 2A 

at 454; Stip. 11, 1C at 2526. By 1993, the Marcottes controlled approximately 90 percent of the bail bonds business in the area. In 

the late 1990s, BBU received approximately $6 to $7 million in premiums. In the following years, BBU grew considerably, and in 

2003, BBU made approximately $30 million in premiums and operated in thirty-four states, with approximately 300 employees and 

1,000 licensed bail agents. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 454–455, 501. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
18 

Louis Marcotte aggressively pursued a strategy to maximize 

BBU’s profits. Id. at 456–460. Generally, he sought to have bail set 

at the highest amount for which each defendant could afford to pay 

the percentage-based premium. In many cases, the highest bond a 

defendant can afford may also be the socially optimal bond level, 

so as to eliminate unnecessary detention while providing the maximal incentive for the defendant to appear. See id. at 504–06. A particular challenge for BBU occurred when a bond was set at an 

amount higher than what the defendant could pay; in such a case, 

unless the bond was reduced, the bail bondsman would lose potential business from that defendant. Id. at 457. BBU would also lose 

business when a defendant was released on his own recognizance, 

so Marcotte sought to have bail bonds set by a friendly judge before 

this occurred. Id. at 457–458. 

To achieve this end, a BBU employee or agent would seek to 

interview a defendant soon after arrest to gather basic identifying 

information, the basis for the arrest, and any prior criminal history. BBU would also locate, interview, and run credit reports on 

family or friends of the defendant willing to post the bond to determine how much of a bond premium they could afford to pay. BBU 

would use this information to make a bail bond recommendation to 

a judge. Id at 455–456, 473–476. 

After a bail amount had been set, a judge could also choose to 

reduce a bond or approve a ‘‘split’’ bond. A split bond is comprised 

of two components: a standard commercial bond and a surety, such 

as property bond or a promissory note signed by an individual. For 

example, if the original bond was set at $200,000, it could be divided into a $100,000 standard commercial bond underwritten by 

the bondsman and a $100,000 property bond or promissory note. 

Bail bondsmen, including Louis Marcotte, often favored split bonds 

because they reduced the amount of cash premium that a defendant needed to pay the bondsman and therefore had the same practical effect as a bond reduction. Id. at 477. 

Louis Marcotte testified that the bond-setting practices of the 

state judges had an enormous financial impact on his business because how bonds were set, reduced, or split affected whether defendants needed the services of a bondsman. Therefore, a favorable 

judge willing to exercise discretion in setting, reducing, and splitting bonds upon the recommendation of BBU was important to 

maximizing profits. Id. at 457–460, 472, 474–475; Ex. 447, 3E at 

4999. 

As a judge on the 24th JDC, Judge Porteous set bail for criminal 

defendants and approved bail bonds, including cases where BBU 

acted as the bail bondsman. Louis Marcotte met Judge Porteous 

through another bail bondsman, Adam Barnett. Louis Marcotte, 2A 

at 460; Stip. 145, 1C at 2536. Around September 1993, Judge 

Porteous began working directly with Marcotte, and the two became closer. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 511–512. 

Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous was ‘‘available to do bonds 

at [Marcotte’s] request.’’ Id. at 472. Then-BBU employee Jeffrey 

Duhon indicated that Marcotte enjoyed an ‘‘open door’’ policy with 

Judge Porteous and testified, ‘‘[S]ometimes me and Louis walked in 

there, they might have had 10, 12 lawyers sitting there, and we 

just went right by them, right straight into [Judge Porteous’s 

chambers].’’ Duhon, 2A at 613. If a magistrate had not set a bond 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
19 

33Louis and Lori Marcotte offered somewhat conflicting testimony about when the regular 

lunches with Judge Porteous began. Lori Marcotte believed that the lunches started around 

1992. Ex. 448, 3E at 5085–5086, 5130. Louis Marcotte testified that he recalled that the lunches 

began in 1994 or 1995 but said that it could have been earlier; he also recalled that he began 

dealing directly with Judge Porteous and taking him out to lunch following some unfavorable 

press coverage of Judge Porteous’s dealings with the bondsman Adam Barnett in September 

1993. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 511–513; Ex. 119z, 3C at 2459. 34For example, Lori Marcotte testified that Judge Porteous helped the Marcottes form a relationship with another judge on the 24th JDC, who was ultimately charged and convicted on federal corruption charges. According to Lori Marcotte, it was during a lunch with this other judge 

that Judge Porteous explained the concept of splitting bonds and ‘‘[t]hat was kind of like the 

stage of everything else that would happen.’’ Ex. 442, 3D at 4665; see also Ex. 73(a)–(d), 3C at 

1917–1936. 

at all or the bond set was too high, Marcotte would go to Judge 

Porteous to have the bond set or reduced. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 

472. On these occasions, Marcotte testified that he would drop off 

his worksheets, which identified how much the defendant could 

pay, and Judge Porteous would often approve the amount. Sometimes he would give Judge Porteous these worksheets himself; 

other times he would drop them off with Rhonda Danos, the judge’s 

secretary. When Marcotte needed a bond set at night or when the 

court was not in session, he was able to reach Judge Porteous on 

his home phone. Id. at 472–473. 

During this time, Judge Porteous developed a social relationship 

with Louis Marcotte. Sometime around 1992 to 1994—the precise 

year is disputed,33 Judge Porteous began to have regular lunches 

with Louis and Lori Marcotte. These lunches, for which the 

Marcottes paid, often included Judge Porteous, other judges, and 

local attorneys. Judge Porteous and the Marcottes would discuss a 

variety of business and personal topics at these lunches, including 

bonds, their families, sports, and politics. Stip. 144, 1C at 2536. 

Louis Marcotte testified that the lunches, which were occasionally initiated by Judge Porteous, occurred once or twice a week, 

and that BBU always treated the attendees; Judge Porteous never 

paid. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 460–465, 513–514; see Danos, 2A at 

804–805; Ex. 442, 3D at 4652–4653; Ex. 448, 3E at 5085–5186, 

5130, 5136–5137. Judge Porteous was allowed to invite whomever 

he wished because he was perceived as a leader at the courthouse, 

and the Marcottes wanted him to have a good time. Thus, according to Marcotte, it was common to dine in groups of up to ten or 

more people. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 461–462; Duhon, 2A at 614– 

615. In these groups, the Marcottes stated that Judge Porteous 

would use his influence to persuade other state court judges and 

business executives to put trust in and to develop professional relationships with Louis Marcotte. Louis Marcotte testified that Judge 

Porteous ‘‘brought strength to the table.’’ Ex. 447, 3E at 5062. Having lunch with Judge Porteous demonstrated to other judges in attendance that Louis Marcotte was ‘‘a businessman instead of a 

bondsman’’ and that the Marcottes were ‘‘trusted people.’’ Louis 

Marcotte, 2A at 462, 489; see Lori Marcotte, 2A at 563. According 

to the Marcottes, Judge Porteous helped ‘‘train’’ new state court 

judges in the practice of setting and splitting bonds, and even gave 

a ‘‘sales pitch’’ emphasizing the importance of setting commercial 

bonds.34 Ex. 448, 3E at 5128–5130. Louis Marcotte believed that 

these lunches were an investment in his business. Louis Marcotte, 

2A at 465; see also Ex. 442, 3D at 4660; Ex. 448, 3E at 5131–5132. 

Although Judge Porteous contests the testimony proffered at the 

hearings, several witnesses also stated that Marcotte arranged and 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
20 

35Danos also accompanied the Marcottes to Las Vegas on several occasions, and the Marcottes 

paid for these trips ‘‘because she was Judge Porteous’s secretary and we wanted to get some 

help from that office.’’ Lori Marcotte, 2A at 561–562. Danos testified that she believed that 

Judge Porteous was aware that the Marcottes were paying her way. Judge Porteous disagrees 

that he had any knowledge of this. Danos, 2A at 788, 803, 807–808; Ex. 448, 3E at 5092, 5096, 

5180–5182. 36The House also points to Judge Porteous’s failure to disclose his attendance at conventions 

of the Professional Bail Agents of the United States in 1996 and 1999 on his annual disclosure 

forms as additional evidence that Judge Porteous was attempting to hide his relationship with 

the Marcottes. Ex. 102a, 3C at 2141–2144; Ex. 105a, 3C at 2384–2387. 

paid for Judge Porteous’s car to be repaired and maintained on 

multiple occasions. This service included picking up Judge 

Porteous’s car to have it washed, detailed, and filled with gas, as 

well as fixing tires and radios, repairing the transmission, and performing bodywork. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 466–469. When Judge 

Porteous needed to have one of his cars repaired, he or his secretary would let Marcotte know. His cars would be picked up and 

taken for maintenance or repairs by Jeffrey Duhon or Aubrey Wallace, both BBU employees during this period. Duhon, 2A at 608– 

610; Wallace, 2A at 634–636. Marcotte testified that Judge 

Porteous owned three or four old cars that ‘‘were broken a lot,’’ and 

Marcotte, through BBU, would pay for repairs ‘‘once a month or 

once every three months.’’ These repairs, however, occurred over a 

period of only six or eight months. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 467–469; 

Stip. 158, 1C at 2537; Ex. 442, 3D at 4653–4654; Ex. 448, 3E at 

5155. 

Several witnesses testified that on one occasion, Marcotte sent 

Duhon and Wallace to repair a wooden fence on Judge Porteous’s 

property after it was damaged in a storm. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 

469, 520–521, 591. Duhon and Wallace testified that this project 

was completed in approximately three days and that Louis Marcotte paid for the necessary materials. Duhon, 2A at 610–612; Wallace, 2A at 637–638; Ex. 442, 3D at 4654. 

Louis Marcotte also provided local judges, including Judge 

Porteous, with occasional gifts, including bottles of liquor or coolers 

filled with shrimp. Marcotte testified that, with these gifts, he 

wanted to ‘‘make a statement’’ and would give judges between $300 

and $500 worth of shrimp at a time. According to Louis Marcotte, 

Judge Porteous, unlike some state judges, never refused Marcotte’s 

gifts. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 553, 637; see Wallace, 2A at 637, 657. 

Finally, Louis Marcotte testified that he took at least one trip 

with Judge Porteous to Las Vegas in 1993 or 1994. On this trip, 

Marcotte and Judge Porteous were joined by two local attorneys 

who were friends of Marcotte, several friends of Judge Porteous, 

and another state court judge. Marcotte testified that, ‘‘given the 

stain that the bail bonds business has at the national level,’’ he felt 

that it was important for Judge Porteous to invite some attorneys 

on the trip so ‘‘it wouldn’t look so bad with him going to Las Vegas 

with me.’’ Louis Marcotte, 2A at 469–471. According to Marcotte, 

Judge Porteous’s expenses were split between him and the two 

local attorneys, who paid Danos in cash. Danos then deposited the 

money into her account and ‘‘cut the checks for [Judge Porteous’s] 

tickets.’’ 35 Louis Marcotte explained that they reimbursed Judge 

Porteous for his trip in this manner to ‘‘hide it from the world.’’ Id. 

at 471; see also Lori Marcotte, 2A at 561–562; Ex. 442, 3D at 4654, 

4664; Ex. 447, 3E at 5026–5027.36


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
21 

i. The House’s perspective 

The key factual disagreement regarding this article is whether, 

as the House alleges, Judge Porteous engaged in a corrupt scheme 

with the Marcottes to set bail and reduce or split bonds in criminal 

cases to maximize their profits at the expense of defendants, their 

families, and the public in exchange for things of value. In particular, the House alleges that Judge Porteous’s enjoyment of free 

meals, repairs, and gifts from the Marcottes was linked to his favorable bail bonds decisions and other official actions he undertook 

on their behalf. While an occasional meal gifted by a professional 

associate may not be worrisome, the House argues that the evidence proves that Judge Porteous and the Marcottes had a far 

more extensive arrangement of regular, expensive meals that often 

included heavy drinking. The House contends that a number of witnesses corroborate key elements of the Marcottes’ testimony about 

these meals, including Judge Porteous’s secretary, Rhonda Danos, 

and other employees of BBU. Danos, 2A at 804–805; Duhon, 2A at 

614–615; Griffin, 2B at 1650–1651. 

According to the House, the lunches, home and car repairs, and 

other favors Louis Marcotte gave to Judge Porteous were in return 

for greater access to the judge and to strengthen the Marcottes’ 

bail bonds business. While giving Judge Porteous things of value, 

the Marcottes testified that they frequently circumvented the magistrate or duty judge assigned to handle bonds for the 24th JDC to 

have Judge Porteous set bonds at their preferred amounts. According to Louis Marcotte, his close relationship allowed him direct access to Judge Porteous whenever he thought Judge Porteous would 

set a more favorable bond than the assigned magistrate. Louis 

Marcotte, 2A at 458–460, 471–479; Ex. 447, 3E at 5064–5065. 

The House contends that the Marcottes enjoyed special access to 

Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte testified that they would go by 

Judge Porteous’s chambers, drop off paperwork with Rhonda 

Danos, or call at Judge Porteous at night or on the weekend when 

the courthouse was not open. See Louis Marcotte, 2A at 473; see 

also Duhon, 2A at 612–613; Wallace, 2A at 633. Marcotte testified 

that after he took Judge Porteous to lunch or cared for his car, 

Judge Porteous would be ‘‘more apt to do things’’ for them. Louis 

Marcotte described the reasons he gave Judge Porteous things of 

value: ‘‘I wanted service, I wanted access, and I wanted to make 

money’’ and ‘‘[Judge Porteous] would do more when we would do 

more for him.’’ Louis Marcotte believed that Judge Porteous knew 

he was helping BBU make money by setting favorable bonds. Louis 

Marcotte, 2A at 471–479, 553–554; Ex. 442, 3D at 4655; Ex. 447, 

3E at 4987, 5048; see also Ex. 448, 3E at 5193. 

Marcotte testified that his special access to Judge Porteous for 

bond decisions continued until the very end of his state court tenure in October 1994. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 517–519. The House 

points to documentary evidence that Judge Porteous signed twentynine bonds for BBU in October 1994; twenty-seven of these bonds 

were signed after his Senate confirmation on October 7, 1994. 

Stips. 152–153, 1C at 2537. The House characterizes these bonds 

as a late rush by the Marcottes and Judge Porteous to capitalize 

on their corrupt relationship before Judge Porteous took the federal 

bench. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
22 

37Testimony regarding ethics rules is discussed in section D. 

Furthermore, the House alleges that there was a connection between Louis Marcotte’s favors and Judge Porteous’s official actions. 

Louis Marcotte made no pretense that the expensive meals and 

other favors he gave Judge Porteous were anything but shrewd investments in his bail bonds business. See, e.g., Louis Marcotte, 2A 

at 471–479, 553–554. Judge Porteous in turn provided BBU direct 

access to his chambers to deal with bond issues. The House notes 

that not all judges worked directly with bondsmen and that at least 

three judges in the 24th JDC would work only with lawyers rather 

than with the bondsmen. See Griffin, 2B at 1652–1653. 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective 

Judge Porteous denies that he set, reduced, or split bonds to 

favor the Marcottes in exchange for meals and other things of 

value and argues that the House’s evidence consists only of general, misleading testimony about the bond setting process and 

Judge Porteous’s relationship with the Marcottes. Judge Porteous 

argues that the House exaggerated both the frequency and cost of 

the meals for which the Marcottes allegedly paid. To support this 

claim, Judge Porteous points to the House’s lack of documentary 

evidence of any meal purchased by the Marcottes for Judge 

Porteous while he was on the state bench. Moreover, Judge 

Porteous argues that when these meals occurred, they were in the 

open and in public restaurants; he asserts that no one tried to hide 

the fact that they were dining together because the acceptance of 

the lunches was common and customary in Gretna and did not violate any applicable rules or ethical obligations.37 See Louis Marcotte, 2A at 514, 539. Judge Porteous contends the purpose of these 

lunches was more social in nature than business-oriented and that 

the conversation tended to focus on matters unrelated to work. See 

Lori Marcotte, 2A at 587; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 513–514. Furthermore, Judge Porteous argues that there was nothing improper 

about accepting occasional meals as gifts, and no connection between the occasional lunches he had with the Marcottes and the 

bail bonds he set. Id. at 514–515; Griffin, 2B at 1641–1642, 1650– 

1651. 

Although Judge Porteous acknowledges that he occasionally accepted meals from the Marcottes, he asserts that the testimony 

that Louis Marcotte paid for car and home repairs or trips to Las 

Vegas is grossly overstated. Judge Porteous disputes that Marcotte 

routinely paid for car repairs and maintenance and, while offering 

no contradictory testimony, notes that no documentary evidence 

corroborates any of the testimony offered by the House, all of which 

is from witnesses who are convicted felons. See Louis Marcotte, 2A 

at 521–522. Moreover, Judge Porteous similarly disputes testimony 

that Louis Marcotte ever had his fence repaired and emphasizes 

that the House has no records or documentation to corroborate this 

claim. On cross-examination, Marcotte admitted that he never saw 

the repaired fence. Judge Porteous also challenges the credibility of 

Aubrey Wallace and Jeffrey Duhon, the two BBU employees allegedly sent to repair the fence, by noting Louis Marcotte’s testimony 

that they were known to use illegal narcotics while on the job. See 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
23 

38 According to studies cited by Judge Porteous, defendants are 28 percent more likely to appear when released on bonds rather than on their own recognizance. See Ex. 1134, 3E at 6071. 

id. at 519–521; Wallace, 2A at 656–657; Stips. 156, 157, 1C at 

2537. 

Judge Porteous does not deny that he received occasional gifts of 

shrimp and liquor from Louis Marcotte, but he points to Marcotte’s 

testimony that such gifts were provided to all of the local judges 

and many court personnel, at least during the holiday season. See 

Louis Marcotte, 2A at 538–539; Wallace, 2A at 637, 657; Ex. 448, 

3E at 5139–5143. 

Judge Porteous also denies that Louis Marcotte paid for any trip 

to Las Vegas, noting that no documentary evidence of the details 

of those expenses has been introduced. To support this position, 

Judge Porteous points to Marcotte’s uncertainty over whether he 

was accompanied by Judge Porteous on one or two trips while on 

the state court, as well as Marcotte’s admission that Judge 

Porteous may have been traveling to Las Vegas in a professional 

capacity to speak at a Professional Bail Agents of the United States 

(PBUS) convention, in which case the PBUS would have compensated Judge Porteous for his travel costs and hotel room. See 

Louis Marcotte, 2A at 522–525; Ex. 447, 3E at 5026–5027. 

Judge Porteous argues that he never set, reduced, or split bonds 

in order to benefit the Marcottes’ bail bonds business. He defends 

his practice of managing bonds in the context of an imperfect criminal justice system. Judge Porteous maintains that he was a proponent of using commercial and split bonds to address chronic 

problems such as jail overcrowding and that aggressive use of commercial bonds, in this context, was in the public interest.38 Louis 

Marcotte, 2A at 504–506; Lori Marcotte, 2A at 579–582. During the 

relevant period, the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center was 

under a federal court consent decree that limited its capacity to 700 

inmates. Under the circumstances, many defendants who were not 

released on bond might be released instead on personal recognizance under the terms of the consent decree. Bodenheimer, 2B at 

1180–1183, 1193–1194; Mamoulides, 2B at 1562–1566; Stip. 162, 

1C at 2538. John Mamoulides, the District Attorney in Jefferson 

Parish from 1972 until 1996, agreed that defendants released on 

commercial bonds were more likely to appear for required court 

dates because there was another interested party, the bondsman, 

who would be actively looking for those who ‘‘jumped bond.’’ 

Mamoulides, 2B at 1574–1575. Former Judge Ronald Bodenheimer 

testified that Judge Porteous was viewed as an experienced judge 

on criminal matters, a public advocate for commercial bonds, and 

a local leader in finding a solution to the jail overcrowding problem. 

Bodenheimer, 2B at 1171, 1179–1180, 1187–1188, 1193–1194. 

Judge Porteous notes that the House has not identified a single 

particular bond that he improperly set, split, or reduced. Furthermore, given that the Marcottes held a near-monopoly of the bail 

bonds business around the 24th JDC, he argues that he essentially 

had to deal with the Marcottes when setting bail or deciding bonds. 

This problem was exacerbated, according to Judge Porteous, because other judges on the 24th JDC disliked magistrate duty, were 

hard to reach, and did not like setting bonds. Thus, it was common 

for bail bondsmen and attorneys to bypass the assigned magistrate 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
24 

and seek out another judge to secure a bond. Bodenheimer, 2B at 

1188–1191; Griffin, 2B at 1638–1639; Lori Marcotte, 2A at 576– 

577; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 506–507; Ex. 448, 3E at 5118–5122. 

According to Judge Porteous, he neither ‘‘invented’’ split bonds 

nor was the only judge who used them; split bonds were very common in the early to mid 1990s. Bodenheimer stated that, of the 16 

judges in the 24th JDC, ‘‘[all] of them used the split bond concept.’’ 

Bodenheimer, 2B at 1181, 1185. The Marcottes also went to many 

other judges to set, reduce or split bonds. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 582; 

Louis Marcotte, 2A at 508–510; Mamoulides, 2B at 1576; Ex. 447, 

3E at 4989. 

Judge Porteous insists that he gave no ‘‘special access’’ to the 

Marcottes but maintained an open-door policy to his chambers for 

everyone. Danos, 2A at 800; Griffin, 2B at 1639. Rhonda Danos, 

Judge Porteous’s former secretary, testified that the Marcottes did 

not receive special access or treatment from chambers. Danos, 2A 

at 786–787, 800–801. Moreover, Danos and Darcy Griffin, Judge 

Porteous’s criminal clerk, testified that Judge Porteous did not 

merely take Marcotte’s assertion that a certain bond level was appropriate at face value. Before setting, reducing, or splitting a 

bond, it was his standard operating procedure to have a member 

of his staff call the jail and obtain information related to the criminal background of the arrestee. Id. at 799–800; Griffin, 2B at 1640– 

1641. Lori Marcotte indicated that, at times, Judge Porteous would 

personally call the jail, rather than have his staff perform this duty 

and, on occasion, rejected bond requests. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 577– 

578; Ex. 448, 3E at 5115–5116; see also Danos, 2A at 799–800; 

Griffin, 2B at 1641; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 510–511; Wallace, 2A at 

654. 

Judge Porteous refutes the House’s theory that he approved an 

unusually large number of bonds in October 1994 before he was 

sworn in as a federal judge. He notes that the House failed to offer 

evidence of the average number of bonds handled by a judge on the 

24th JDC and cites evidence that, as a state judge, he signed just 

as many, if not more, bonds in other months. Exs. 2002–2004, 3E 

at 6077–6197. Thus, twenty-nine bonds in a month for BBU, which 

held a near monopoly of the bail bonds business in that courthouse, 

was not an unusually high number. Griffin testified that twentynine bonds processed in a month was a low number. Griffin, 2B at 

1646. 

b. Set aside and expungement of criminal convictions 

Judge Porteous’s actions involving the process to expunge the 

criminal convictions of BBU employees Jeffrey Duhon and Aubrey 

Wallace in the early 1990s are also at issue. Louis Marcotte wanted 

Duhon and Wallace to obtain bail bondsman licenses to expand his 

business, but their prior criminal convictions precluded them from 

doing so. Duhon, 2A at 616; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 479–480. Both 

Duhon and Wallace testified that Marcotte had spoken with Judge 

Porteous about the expungement of their prior criminal convictions. 

According to Duhon, he was told that Marcotte would ‘‘take care’’ 

of Duhon’s criminal conviction so that he could get a bail bondsman 

license; one of Duhon’s two felony convictions was eventually expunged by Judge Porteous. Duhon, 2A at 616–618. Wallace also 

testified that he believed that the set-aside of his burglary convicVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
25 

39 Article 893(E) of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure states, in relevant part, 

When the imposition of sentence has been suspended by the court for the first conviction only, as authorized by this Article, and the court finds at the conclusion of the probationary period that the probation of the defendant has been satisfactory, the court 

may set aside and dismiss the prosecution and the dismissal of the prosecution shall 

have the same effect as acquittal, except that said conviction may be considered as a 

first offense and provide the basis for subsequent prosecution of the party as a multiple 

offender, and further shall be considered as a first offense for purposes of an other law 

or laws relating to cumulation of offenses. Dismissal under this Paragraph shall occur 

only once with respect to any person. 

tion was done by Judge Porteous at Marcotte’s request, an accusation that Judge Porteous has denied. Wallace, 2A at 641; 

Goyeneche, 2A at 681–682. 

In Louisiana, there are multiple steps for expunging a criminal 

conviction. If a judge did not originally sentence a defendant under 

‘‘Article 893,’’ a motion must first be made to amend the sentence 

to an Article 893 sentence. Article 893 of the Louisiana Code of 

Criminal Procedure permits a sentence to be set aside if probation 

is successfully completed.39 An individual must then petition for 

the enforcement of Article 893 upon satisfactory completion of probation. After petitioning for the enforcement of Article 893, a motion must be made to set aside the conviction, and finally, a separate motion must be made to expunge the conviction. These last 

two steps are primarily administrative and routine steps if the motion to amend sentence and the petition to enforce Article 893 are 

granted without objection. Rees, 2B at 1769, 1793–1794. 

Duhon had two convictions from 1976 on his record. One conviction was set aside and expunged by Judge E.V. Richards on July 

22, 1992. Ex. 2006, 3E 6203–6214. A second conviction was set 

aside by Judge Richards on or about June 17, 1993, but Judge 

Porteous signed the expungement order on July 29, 1993. After his 

record was cleared of his convictions, Duhon eventually obtained a 

bail license. Duhon, 2A at 607; Stip. 148, 1C at 2537; Exs. 77(a)– 

(c), 3C at 1937–1943. 

Wallace had a drug conviction arising from a December 1988 arrest and a burglary conviction from a May 1989 arrest. Wallace 

pled guilty to and was first sentenced on the burglary charge, 

which arose from the second arrest. Judge Porteous sentenced Wallace on June 26, 1990, to a three-year suspended sentence and two 

years of probation. On October 15, 1990, while on probation, Wallace pled guilty and was sentenced to five years imprisonment for 

the earlier drug charge. Wallace’s guilty plea on the drug charge 

and prison sentence triggered a violation of his terms of probation 

on his burglary conviction and caused the unsatisfactory termination of his probation. Wallace completed his drug sentence and 

was released from prison in August 1993. Wallace, 2A at 656; Ex. 

81, 3C at 1944–2004. 

On September 20, 1994, attorney Robert Rees filed a motion to 

amend Wallace’s burglary sentence to an Article 893 sentence to 

begin clearing Wallace’s criminal record. On September 21, 1994, 

Judge Porteous held a hearing and ordered that Wallace’s record 

in the burglary case be amended to remove the unsatisfactory completion of probation and to amend the sentence to one under Article 

893. Stip. 149, 1C at 2537. On September 22, 1994, Judge Porteous 

amended Wallace’s burglary sentence to reflect that he had pled 

under Article 893. Stip. 150, 1C at 2537. On October 14, 1994, 

Judge Porteous entered an order setting aside Aubrey Wallace’s 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
26 

40 In addition to Article 893, Articles 881 and 882 were also discussed. Article 881 provides 

that ‘‘the Court may amend or change the sentence, within the legal limits of its discretion, prior 

to the beginning of the sentence.’’ Ex. 69(d), 3B at 1823. Article 882 permits the court to correct 

or review an ‘‘illegal’’ sentence. Id. at 1824–1828. 41 John Mamoulides, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney during the relevant period, could 

not explain why Reynolds—if he had reservations about the set aside—did not object at the 

hearing or raise the issue with his supervisors before going to the MCC. Mamoulides, 2B at 

1596–1598. 

1989 burglary conviction. Stip. 151, 1C at 2537; Ex. 81, 3C at 

1944–2004; Ex. 82, 3C at 2005–2111. Judge Porteous, however, 

never entered an expungement order on Wallace’s burglary conviction. 

The parties offered conflicting evidence on whether Judge 

Porteous erred as a matter of law in setting aside Wallace’s conviction. Several sections of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 

were referenced in testimony regarding the judicial authority to set 

aside a sentence that had already been served.40

Although Mike Reynolds, the Assistant District Attorney who 

was present for the hearing on the motion to amend Wallace’s sentence, did not object in court, Reynolds later reported that Judge 

Porteous had unlawfully set aside Wallace’s conviction to the Metropolitan Crime Commission (MCC), a local nonprofit organization 

that investigates crime and corruption.41 Rafael Goyeneche, the 

President of the MCC, investigated the facts and agreed with Reynolds that Article 881, which allows for correction of a sentence 

‘‘prior to the beginning of the sentence,’’ precluded Judge Porteous 

from invoking Article 893 after the commencement of Wallace’s 

sentence and ultimately ordering an expungement of his record. 

Goyeneche, 2A at 670, 672–674, 681–687. 

Rees, Wallace’s attorney, disagreed and explained that regardless 

of whether Article 893 was explicitly referenced in Wallace’s original suspended sentence on the burglary conviction, it was necessarily invoked because that section provided the sole authority 

for a judge in a felony case to order a suspended sentence and probation. Rees, 2B at 1784–1786, 1799–1800. In other words, Rees 

believed that the motion to amend was a mere formality because 

the underlying sentence was already an Article 893 sentence. According to Rees, the motion to amend Wallace’s sentence was therefore lawful and proper. Id. at 1773, 1779–1780; Ex. 69(d), 3B at 

1803–1822. In addition, Rees stated that in the first place, it had 

been ‘‘incorrect to terminate [Wallace’s] probation based on that, 

the fact that he got jail time as a result of a prior arrest.’’ The 

wrongful termination of Wallace’s probation, in his view, permitted 

Judge Porteous to go back, review, and amend the sentence under 

Section 882. Rees, 2B at 1765–1768. 

i. The House’s perspective 

The House argues that Judge Porteous intervened in a highly 

questionable manner to expunge the conviction of Jeffrey Duhon in 

a case assigned to another judge and violated Louisiana law in setting aside Aubrey Wallace’s sentence. In the House’s view, Judge 

Porteous’s actions constituted improper favors provided to Louis 

Marcotte. 

The House contends that Judge Porteous completed the 

expungement of Duhon’s burglary conviction at the request of Louis 

Marcotte, a point supported by both Marcotte’s and Duhon’s testiVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
27 

mony. The House asserts that Judge Porteous’s action in expunging 

Duhon’s conviction was noteworthy because a judge in another section of the court originally had sentenced Duhon and completed all 

but the final step in the expungement process. Duhon, 2A at 616– 

618; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 480–481; Ex. 442, 3D at 4656. 

The House also considers the set aside of Wallace’s burglary conviction as an egregious example of misconduct. The House maintains that Louis Marcotte repeatedly asked Judge Porteous to set 

aside Wallace’s felony burglary conviction in the summer of 1994, 

around the time that Judge Porteous was nominated to the federal 

bench. Notwithstanding Rees’s interpretation of the applicable provisions, the House insists that Article 881 precludes the amendment of a sentence after its commencement. Judge Porteous nonetheless amended Wallace’s sentence, which he had already served, 

to permit relief under Article 893 and to set aside the conviction. 

Goyeneche, 2A at 683–687; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 487–488; Wallace, 2A at 643–644; see also Rees, 2B at 1783. 

The House alleges that the timing of Judge Porteous’s actions to 

set aside Wallace’s conviction was motivated by his Senate confirmation to the federal bench. According to Marcotte, ‘‘[Judge 

Porteous] said look, Louis, I’m not going to let anything stand in 

the way of me being confirmed and my lifetime appointment, so 

after that’s done, I will do it.’’ Louis Marcotte, 2A at 487. The 

House argues that the confirmation timeline corroborates 

Marcotte’s testimony by showing that Judge Porteous set aside 

Wallace’s conviction on October 14, 1994, one week after the Senate 

confirmed him on October 7, 1994, and two weeks before he was 

sworn in on October 28, 1994. Id. at 488; Stips. 14, 16, 1C at 2527; 

Ex. 442, 3D at 4659; see Rees, 2B at 1793–1795. 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective 

Judge Porteous contends that the House misconstrues what happened and wrongly interprets the applicable Louisiana law. He 

maintains that what he did in these cases was to act on a routine, 

administrative request for Duhon and to correct a legal error from 

his prior order terminating Wallace’s probation. 

Judge Porteous counters that the witness testimony proffered by 

the House regarding his role in the Duhon expungement is wrong 

and that Marcotte and Duhon were both discredited on this point 

at the evidentiary hearings. While Marcotte and Duhon both testified that Judge Porteous cleared the burglary conviction from 

Duhon’s record, the documentary evidence shows that another 

judge had granted the motion to amend the sentence, the petition 

to enforce Article 893, and the motion to set aside the conviction. 

About a month after the motion to set aside was granted by Judge 

Richards following a hearing, Judge Porteous granted the motion 

for expungement—the final, administrative step in the process. 

This fact, in Judge Porteous’s view, undermines the credibility of 

Marcotte and Duhon. See Duhon, 2A at 620–624; Louis Marcotte, 

2A at 527–529; Ex. 77(a)–(c), 3C at 1937–1943. 

Judge Porteous also maintains there was nothing improper in his 

handling of the set aside of Aubrey Wallace’s burglary conviction. 

In fact, Judge Porteous went beyond the minimum required by 

statute and scheduled a ‘‘show cause’’ hearing on the motion to 

amend Wallace’s conviction, providing the District Attorney with 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
28 

42 Judge Porteous also relies on the testimony of Wallace, who stated that it was he who wanted to pursue a bail bondsman license. When Wallace—now a reverend—was asked whether he 

deserved the amended sentence and the set aside, he replied, ‘‘I just think I was shown some 

compassion.’’ Wallace stated that, since his conviction was amended and set aside, he has seen 

Judge Porteous on occasion, and that he could tell Judge Porteous viewed Wallace with ‘‘a sense 

of pride.’’ Wallace, 2A at 639–640, 644, 659–660. 43The Committee admitted Exhibit 69(b), the FBI background investigation file for Judge 

Porteous’s federal nomination, with certain limitations. Parts of Exhibit 69(b) are part of the 

public, certified record; however, the full exhibit is available only to Senators upon their request. 

Citations to portions of the exhibit that were not included into the public record will reflect a 

general citation to the full exhibit and the appropriate Bates number. 

an opportunity to object. See Rees, 2B at 1752, 1761–1762. Judge 

Porteous insists that the motion to amend had merit because Wallace’s probation on the burglary charge was wrongly terminated; 

his plea and sentence on the drug charge did not violate the terms 

of his probation on the burglary conviction because the drug arrest 

pre-dated the burglary arrest. Rees, who represented Wallace and 

filed the motion to set aside the conviction, testified that Judge 

Porteous’s actions were not wrong as a matter of law. Id. at 1750, 

1773, 1799–1800. 

Judge Porteous argues that there is no evidence that the set 

aside of Wallace’s conviction was either a pre-arranged deal with 

Louis Marcotte or timed to avoid scrutiny during Judge Porteous’s 

Senate confirmation. Judge Porteous insists that he acted on a routine motion to set aside a conviction that was properly noticed and 

filed on behalf of Wallace to which the District Attorney’s office did 

not object. Rees, 2B at 1749–1750, 1756–1761, 1764–1774, 1783, 

1800; Ex. 69(d), 3B at 1818–22; see also Ex. 82, 3C at 2005–2111. 

Judge Porteous also argues that the House’s asserted motive is 

doubtful because even if Wallace’s burglary conviction had been expunged, he still would have been ineligible to serve as a bail bondsmen because of his separate drug conviction. To address the drug 

conviction, Wallace would have needed a pardon from the governor. 

See Rees, 2B at 1765–1766; Wallace, 2A at 643, 658–659.42

c. Louis Marcotte’s interview with the FBI 

In 1994, the FBI interviewed Louis Marcotte as part of its background investigation of Judge Porteous, who was being considered 

for an appointment to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The FBI interviewed Louis Marcotte on or about 

August 1, 1994. Stips. 171, 178, 1C at 2539. Marcotte testified that 

Judge Porteous told him that the FBI was going to be coming to 

interview him. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 482. 

According to the written summary of the interview prepared by 

the FBI, Marcotte explained that he was a professional and social 

acquaintance of Judge Porteous who ‘‘sometimes [went] out to 

lunch with the candidate and attorneys in the area.’’ Stip. 179, 1C 

at 2539. Marcotte also told the FBI that Judge Porteous was ‘‘really helpful and available for everybody’’ and was ‘‘open-minded and 

fair, but [was] not a push-over.’’ In his interview, Marcotte generally discussed bond setting practices in the Jefferson Parish 

courthouse and his bail bonds business. Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 

471).43

Also in this interview, Marcotte denied knowledge of any abuse 

of alcohol or prescription drugs by Judge Porteous; Marcotte stated 

that Judge Porteous would have a beer or two at lunch but Marcotte had never seen him drunk. Marcotte also told the FBI that 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
29 

he had ‘‘no knowledge of the candidate’s financial situation’’ and assured the FBI that ‘‘he [was] not aware of anything in the candidate’s background that might be the basis of attempted influence, 

pressure, coercion, or compromise or that would impact negatively 

on the candidate’s character, reputation, judgment, or discretion.’’ 

Id. After the interview, Marcotte told Judge Porteous, ‘‘Thumbs 

up.’’ Louis Marcotte, 2A at 486. 

At the evidentiary hearings, however, Marcotte testified that his 

statements to the FBI in 1994 about Judge Porteous’s financial circumstances, his alcohol usage, and general ‘‘integrity’’ were false. 

According to Marcotte, he lied to protect Judge Porteous because 

the Judge was someone who had been good to him, and Marcotte 

wanted to aid Judge Porteous’s appointment to the federal bench. 

Louis Marcotte, 2A at 483–485. 

i. The House’s perspective 

The House argues that Louis Marcotte lied to the FBI during its 

background investigation of Judge Porteous to help him attain his 

judicial appointment and to protect against the exposure of their 

corrupt relationship. Marcotte was a close and trusted associate 

who could be counted on by Judge Porteous to say positive things, 

even if that meant lying, given all that Judge Porteous had done 

for Marcotte over the years. In other words, Marcotte’s lies on 

Judge Porteous’s behalf were an element of their corrupt relationship. 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective 

Judge Porteous argues that Marcotte did not say anything demonstrably false in his FBI interview. Statements to the effect that 

Judge Porteous may have appeared drunk are uncorroborated; the 

available documentary evidence only shows that Judge Porteous 

had one or two drinks at lunches. Exs. 372(a)–(d), 3D at 4394– 

4401; Ex. 373(d), 3D at 4408–4410. Furthermore, Judge Porteous 

contends that Marcotte could not have lied about Judge Porteous’s 

financial condition because Marcotte had no direct knowledge of his 

financial affairs. He argues Marcotte’s contrary impeachment trial 

testimony is based solely on his observations about the decrepit 

state of Judge Porteous’s cars, ‘‘lifestyle,’’ and gambling habits. 

Louis Marcotte, 2A at 535. 

Finally, with regard to Marcotte’s response to the compromise-orcoercion question, Judge Porteous points to Marcotte’s own admission that he would have never extorted or blackmailed Judge 

Porteous. See id.; Ex. 447, 3E at 5052–5053. Even when asked if 

Marcotte had information that could potentially embarrass Judge 

Porteous and be used as leverage against him, Marcotte responded, 

‘‘But I would have never leaned on him that kind of way. I would 

do without before I would have leaned on him in that kind of way.’’ 

Id. at 4971, 5053. From this testimony, Judge Porteous maintains 

that Marcotte himself refutes the House’s allegations. 

2. Conduct While a Federal Court Judge and Relationship 

With the Marcottes 

It is uncontested that after Judge Porteous became a federal 

judge, his relationship with Louis Marcotte changed, and their 

lunches became less frequent. Nonetheless, records submitted as 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
30 

44For example, in 1997, the Marcottes set up two lunches with Judge Porteous and two justices of the peace, who also had the ability to set bonds. At this lunch, Judge Porteous vouched 

for the Marcottes, but in both cases, the justices of the peace were uncomfortable with forming 

a professional relationship with them. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 563–564; Ex. 447, 3E at 5035–5038; 

Ex. 448, 3E at 5187–5188. Judge Porteous also met with an official from the insurance company 

that set the Marcottes’ bond writing authority. At this lunch, Judge Porteous’s presence helped 

the Marcottes ‘‘to develop trust, [a good] reputation, [and] stability . . . on our part,’’ which were 

important in securing the ability to write larger bonds from the insurance company. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 564–565. 

evidence show that the Marcottes paid for lunches with Judge 

Porteous on at least six occasions.44 Stip. 164, 1C at 2538; Exs. 

372(a)–(d), 3D at 4394–4401; Ex. 373(a), 3D at 4402–4404; Ex. 

373(c), 3D at 4405–4407; Ex. 373(d), 3D at 4408–4410; Ex. 375, 3D 

at 4411. Moreover, Louis Marcotte testified that he tried to maintain his relationship with Judge Porteous. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 

489–490. 

In March 2002, Marcotte arranged a lunch at Emeril’s Restaurant with Judge Porteous and Judge Ronald Bodenheimer of the 

24th JDC, a relatively new state court judge; Marcotte wanted 

Bodenheimer to ‘‘step into [Judge Porteous’s] shoes.’’ Id. at 490. 

Prior to that lunch, Judge Bodenheimer ‘‘kind of stayed away from 

Louis Marcotte intentionally,’’ because, at that time, ‘‘the rumor 

was that [Marcotte] was doing drugs.’’ Bodenheimer, 2B at 1174– 

1175. Judge Porteous, however, spoke highly of Louis Marcotte’s 

honesty in the bond business, and Bodenheimer took Judge 

Porteous’s statements seriously. Id. at 1171–1175, 1177; Louis 

Marcotte, 2A at 462, 490; see Stip. 166, 1C at 2538; Ex. 447, 3E 

at 5036–5037. Bodenheimer also testified that, at some other time, 

Judge Porteous told him that now that Bodenheimer was a judge 

‘‘he would never have to buy lunch again.’’ Bodenheimer clarified 

that he thought the statement to be made in jest. Bodenheimer, 2B 

at 1175–1177. 

According to Louis Marcotte, after this lunch he provided meals, 

house repairs, and a trip to the Beau Rivage casino to 

Bodenheimer, and in return, Bodenheimer ‘‘became helpful to the 

Marcottes in setting bonds.’’ Louis Marcotte, 2A at 490–491; see Ex. 

375, 3D at 4411; Ex. 442, 3D at 4661; Ex. 447, 3E at 5040–5041; 

Ex. 448, 3E at 5144. In his testimony, however, Bodenheimer maintained that Judge Porteous never told him what to do in relation 

to the Marcottes, nor did Bodenheimer feel that Judge Porteous 

ever used his position as a federal judge to pressure Bodenheimer 

to work with the Marcottes or to issue any bonds. Judge Porteous 

simply told Bodenheimer that he could trust the Marcottes when 

it came to providing information related to a particular offender. 

Bodenheimer always verified the information provided by Marcotte 

and ‘‘never, ever caught him in a lie.’’ Bodenheimer, 2B at 1197. 

Moreover, Bodenheimer stated that the pressure to set bonds, in 

general, came from the fact that many defendants would be subject 

to release on personal recognizance due to a federal court decree. 

Given this situation and BBU’s dominance in the area, 

Bodenheimer testified that he believed that working with the 

Marcottes was unavoidable. Id. at 1172–1173, 1178–1183, 1196– 

1197. 

Louis Marcotte pled guilty in 2004 to criminal racketeering 

charges arising from his bail bonds business. Lori Marcotte pled 

guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud in 2004. Bodenheimer 

pled guilty in 2003 to three counts, including one count of honest 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
31 

services fraud. Ex. 71(a), 3B at 1848, 1858–1859; Ex. 71(e), 3C at 

1891–1896; Ex. 88(d), 3C at 2112–2115; Ex. 88(f), 3C at 2122–2133; 

Ex. 88(h), 3C at 2136. 

i. The House’s perspective 

The House argues that, when Judge Porteous became a federal 

judge, he could do less for the Marcottes, and, accordingly, the 

Marcottes did less for him. After his appointment to the federal 

bench, the Marcottes no longer repaired Judge Porteous’s cars or 

home. See Lori Marcotte, 2A at 591; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 522; 

Wallace, 2A at 657. Nevertheless, the House maintains that the 

Marcottes continued to pay for some lunches and drinks, and that 

Judge Porteous assisted them by using the power and prestige of 

his office to recruit state judges to fill his former position as the 

‘‘go-to’’ judge for the Marcottes in setting bonds. 

The Marcottes and BBU also paid for meals and drinks for Judge 

Porteous when he was invited to speak at the annual convention 

of the Professional Bail Agents of the United States (PBUS) in 

1996 and 1999. In 1996, the convention was held in New Orleans 

and hosted by the Marcottes. In 1999, the convention was held in 

Biloxi, Mississippi, and although PBUS paid for Judge Porteous’s 

room and some expenses, the Marcottes subsidized other meals and 

drinks. Lori Marcotte, 2A at 565–566; Ex. 90(a), 3C at 2137–2138; 

Ex. 90(b), 3C at 2139–2140. 

The House asserts that the charges against Bodenheimer mirror 

the current allegations against Judge Porteous, in that 

Bodenheimer was charged with ‘‘enrich[ing] himself by setting, reducing, and splitting bonds in various criminal matters pending before him as well as other judges on terms most advantageous to the 

bail bonding company in exchange for things of value, including 

meals, trips to resorts, campaign contributions, home improvements, and other things of value.’’ According to the House, Louis 

Marcotte, Lori Marcotte, and Bodenheimer all pled guilty to 

charges arising out of their corrupt relationship, while Judge 

Porteous avoided criminal sanction for his similarly corrupt conduct with the Marcottes. See Ex. 71(a), 3B at 1845–1863; Ex. 71(e), 

3C at 1891–1896; Ex. 88(d), 3C at 2112–2115; Ex. 88(f), 3C at 

2122–2133; Ex. 88(h), 3C at 2136. 

ii. Judge Porteous’s perspective 

Judge Porteous maintains that his contact with the Marcottes 

was minimal after he became a federal judge, which by Louis 

Marcotte’s own admission amounted to only five to eight lunches. 

Accepting those lunches was not barred under the canons of judicial ethics because he did not use his office as a federal judge to 

influence others inappropriately on behalf of the Marcottes. While 

Marcotte may have wanted Judge Porteous to lobby and pressure 

state court judges to deal with BBU, there is no evidence that he 

did anything other than provide a professional reference for Marcotte, as Judge Porteous did with Bodenheimer. See Danos, 2A at 

805–806; Louis Marcotte, 2A at 490; Ex. 447, 3E at 5029–5030. 

Judge Porteous argues that the alleged corrupt conduct in Article 

II, then, amounts to a handful of lunches and contradictory testimony as to whether he abused the power and prestige of his federal judgeship to lobby other state judges on behalf of the 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
32 

45Louis and Lori Marcotte gave sworn pretrial deposition testimony on August 2, 2010. See 

Ex. 447, 3E at 4926–5070; Ex. 448, 3E at 5071–5206. 46Geyh acknowledged that he did not reject any House assertion as being untrue. Geyh, 2A 

at 745. 

Marcottes. Rather than providing concrete evidence of misconduct, 

Judge Porteous argues that the House merely attempts to link him 

with the criminal convictions of the Marcottes and Bodenheimer, 

despite the fact that he was never charged with a crime. In particular, unlike other judges investigated by the FBI and accused of 

wrongdoing, Judge Porteous never asked that the Marcottes provide him with a percentage of the premium earned from the bonds 

he signed for them, nor did he receive improper cash payments 

from the Marcottes. See Lori Marcotte, 2A at 568–569; Stip. 163, 

1C at 2538. 

D. Expert Testimony 

1. Professor Charles G. Geyh 

In preparing his testimony as an expert witness for the House, 

Professor Geyh used the House Report and sworn pretrial testimony before the Senate 45 as the basis to form his opinions.46 Geyh, 

2A at 716. Geyh stated the applicable ethical standard at the time 

was that no judge should accept any gifts or favors that might reasonably appear designed to affect his judgment or influence his 

conduct. He testified Judge Porteous’s alleged relationship with the 

Marcottes was a ‘‘traditional’’ form of corruption tantamount to a 

quid pro quo arrangement. Id. at 728. Professor Geyh viewed these 

allegations to be an ‘‘abuse [of] the prestige of his office, this time 

to favor the Marcottes’ interests. . . . And in this case, Mr. Marcotte . . . thought of Judge Porteous as being on commission. I 

mean, these gifts are designed to affect the judge’s conduct.’’ Id. 

Similarly, Professor Geyh viewed the account of the lunch meeting 

with new state judges where Judge Porteous was described as 

‘‘bringing strength to the table’’ as a continuing quid pro quo where 

Judge Porteous traded on the prestige of his federal office. Id. at 

731. 

2. Professor Dane Ciolino 

As discussed in Article I, Judge Porteous’s expert, Professor 

Ciolino, testified that a judge could not accept a gift if it might reasonably appear to affect the judge’s official conduct. For a more 

complete discussion on this standard, please refer to Professor 

Ciolino’s testimony in Article I. 

With respect to the allegations of Judge Porteous doing favors for 

the Marcottes in return for receiving things of value, Ciolino also 

testified that if the allegations regarding the Judge’s actions were 

true and a quid pro quo relationship existed, then the behavior 

would be criminal and unethical. Ciolino, 2B at 1524. According to 

Ciolino, an express agreement is not necessary to establish a quid 

pro quo relationship. Id. at 1536. Since the applicable standard 

weighs the totality of the circumstances, any change in a fact, such 

as whether or not bonds were set too high or too low for the defendant, may result in a different conclusion. Id. at 1529–1530. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
33 

III. ARTICLE III

A. Text of the Article 

Beginning in or about March 2001 and continuing through about 

July 2004, while a Federal judge in the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana, G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., engaged in a pattern of conduct inconsistent with the trust and confidence placed in him as a Federal judge by knowingly and intentionally making material false statements and representations 

under penalty of perjury related to his personal bankruptcy filing 

and by repeatedly violating a court order in his bankruptcy case. 

Judge Porteous did so by— 

(1) using a false name and a post office box address to conceal his identity as the debtor in the case; 

(2) concealing assets; 

(3) concealing preferential payments to certain creditors; 

(4) concealing gambling losses and other gambling debts; 

and 

(5) incurring new debts while the case was pending, in violation of the bankruptcy court’s order. 

In doing so, Judge Porteous brought his court into scandal and 

disrepute, prejudiced public respect for and confidence in the Federal judiciary, and demonstrated that he is unfit for the office of 

Federal judge. 

Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of high 

crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office. 

B. Introduction to the Evidence 

Article III addresses Judge Porteous’s actions regarding his 

Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy and relies heavily on documentary 

evidence that is largely uncontested. While there was also broad 

agreement among fact and expert witnesses regarding the process 

of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy generally and Judge Porteous’s case 

specifically, a few distinct areas of sharp disagreement remain. For 

this reason, the discussion of Article III is organized differently 

than the discussions of Articles I and II, and the House’s and 

Judge Porteous’s perspectives on contested issues are integrated in 

one separate section following the statement of facts. 

C. Statement of Facts 

1. Background 

Between 1996 and 2000, Judge Porteous accrued increasing levels of credit card debt and, by the summer of 2000, was in a ‘‘downward financial spiral.’’ Ex. 5, 3B at 434. Judge Porteous hired 

Claude Lightfoot, a New Orleans bankruptcy attorney with 10 

years of experience, in an attempt to ‘‘workout’’ debts accrued on 

various unsecured credit cards informally through a payment financed by an additional mortgage against Judge Porteous’s home. 

Judge Porteous first pursued this option, as opposed to filing for 

bankruptcy, in order to avoid the embarrassment of seeking bankruptcy protection, about which Judge Porteous’s wife, Carmella, 

was particularly distraught. Lightfoot, 2A at 983–984, 1013–1014. 

In order to formulate the workout plan, Lightfoot acquired information about Judge Porteous’s assets and liabilities soon after he 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
34 

47The Committee accepted the following individuals as expert witnesses: Bankruptcy Judge 

Duncan W. Keir of the District of Maryland, in the area of bankruptcy; Henry Hildebrand, 

Standing Chapter 13 Trustee for the Middle District of Tennessee, in matters relating to Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases; Professor Rafael Pardo, Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law, in matters pertaining to bankruptcy law; and former Bankruptcy Judge 

Ronald Barliant of the Northern District of Illinois, in matters pertaining to bankruptcy law. 

See Barliant, 2B at 1701–1702; Hildebrand, 2B at 1655; Keir, 2A at 1095; Pardo, 2B at 1261– 

1262. 48 Unlike a Chapter 7 estate that, with some exceptions, is composed only of what the debtor 

owned when the petition was filed, a Chapter 13 estate also encompasses the debtor’s future 

income and other post-petition assets. Some assets, such as individual retirement accounts, are 

generally exempt. Pardo, 2B at 1288–1290. 

was hired. Judge Porteous provided Lightfoot with his May 2000 

pay stub, which listed a net monthly income of $7,531.52, and a 

handwritten list of his creditors. In August 2000, Lightfoot asked 

Judge Porteous to fill out bankruptcy worksheets, which provided 

a fuller picture of Judge Porteous’s financial health and listed his 

assets and creditors. Additionally, Judge Porteous periodically sent 

Lightfoot credit card statements in order to keep these worksheets 

current. Id. at 985–988, 1000, 1017–1018; Ex. 138(b), 3C at 2553– 

2581. 

In pursuit of an informal workout, on December 21, 2000, Lightfoot wrote a letter to each of Judge Porteous’s unsecured credit 

card creditors, asking them to accept a pro rata share of money to 

be borrowed against Judge Porteous’s home. Judge Porteous’s total 

unsecured credit card debt was listed as $182,330.23 across 13 

credit cards, with balances ranging from $1,724.23 to $28,708.98. 

This letter twice indicated that Judge Porteous might be forced to 

file for bankruptcy. Lightfoot, 2A at 987; Ex. 5, 3B at 431–432; Ex. 

146, 3C at 2752. 

Lightfoot attempted to follow up with these creditors for months 

but failed to receive a response. At that point, Lightfoot advised 

Judge Porteous to stop making payments to his unsecured creditors 

in an effort to get their attention, a tactic that ultimately increased 

Judge Porteous’s level of indebtedness. In March 2001, when it became clear to Lightfoot that the workout plan would be unsuccessful, Judge Porteous decided to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. Lightfoot, 2A at 987, 995, 1023–1025. 

2. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Overview 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy is often called a wage earner’s bankruptcy. Unlike Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in which the debtor’s current 

assets are liquidated to pay creditors, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is a 

voluntary process through which a debtor commits future disposable income to repay creditors at least the value they would have 

received if the debtor had filed for Chapter 7 protection. Chapter 

13 bankruptcy plans cannot move forward if this equivalency requirement is not met, which is determined by the ‘‘best-interest-ofcreditors’’ test. If this test reveals that the debtor’s projected disposable income over the course of the plan is insufficient to satisfy 

this standard, the debtor’s current assets may be used in the plan. 

Keir, 2A at 1096, 1120; Horner, 2A at 932–933; Hildebrand, 2B at 

1656, 1662; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).47

When a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition is filed, a bankruptcy estate is automatically created by statute.48 Although a debtor continues to own his estate throughout the Chapter 13 bankruptcy 

process, a trustee is appointed to administer it. All property not accounted for in the debtor’s plan when the confirmation order is 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
35 

49 Creditors meetings are also referred to as ‘‘341 meetings’’ throughout the testimony. This 

refers to the section of the United States Code (11 U.S.C. § 341) requiring this meeting of the 

creditors. 50 If confirmed, appeals of this order are heard by U.S. District Court judges or, in a few circuits, U.S. Bankruptcy Court judges sitting on a bankruptcy appellate panel. In the Eastern District of Louisiana, appeals are heard by one of the twelve U.S. District Court judges. Pardo, 2B 

at 1301–1303. 51 Nevertheless, neither debt omitted from the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules nor debt accrued 

post-bankruptcy will be discharged when the plan is completed. See Pardo, 2B at 1266–1272. 

issued vests back to the debtor. Keir, 2A at 1117–1118; Pardo, 2B 

at 1293. 

Creditors are sent a notice of the commencement of the case after 

the filing of the petition. This notice contains identifying information about the debtor, the deadline by which creditors must file 

claims against the estate, and the date of the creditors meeting.49

This meeting allows creditors to ask questions and object to the 

plan. During this meeting, the trustee reviews the debtor’s bankruptcy filings, which include a petition, bankruptcy schedules containing information on the debtor’s assets and liabilities, and a 

statement of financial affairs. Trustees use this opportunity to 

evaluate the sincerity of the debtor through an examination of the 

debtor under oath. Hildebrand, 2B at 1674–1675; Lightfoot, 2A at 

1004–1005; Pardo, 2B at 1270–1271. 

All Chapter 13 plans must be confirmed by a bankruptcy judge. 

After the meeting, the trustee makes a recommendation to the assigned bankruptcy judge as to whether the plan should be confirmed. If the trustee objects, which is a common occurrence, the 

plan is subject to litigation before a bankruptcy judge at a confirmation hearing. After the confirmation hearing, the judge rules 

on the trustee’s objection and decides whether to confirm the debtor’s plan.50 Beaulieu, 2B at 1400. 

Chapter 13 plans can last between three and five years and, if 

the plan is completed, the debtor’s debts may be discharged.51 The 

statutory basis for the denial of a discharge in a Chapter 13 case 

is failure to complete the plan, which occurs in more than twothirds of cases. A plan may also be converted to a Chapter 7 plan 

or dismissed if the plan was not proposed in good faith. If a discharge has been granted, it may be revoked if the debtor obtained 

the discharge through fraud. Lightfoot, 2A at 1065; Pardo, 2B at 

1265–1268, 1272, 1313; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1307. 

3. Judge Porteous’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Filings 

On March 28, 2001, Judge Porteous filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection. His petition was filed under the fictitious name 

of ‘‘G. T. Ortous’’ and used a newly acquired post office box as his 

residential address. His filing accurately listed his Social Security 

number. Lightfoot suggested the idea of using the name ‘‘G. T. 

Ortous’’ and a post office box to avoid any embarrassment that 

would result from inclusion of Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy filing 

in the New Orleans Times-Picayune’s weekly listing of local bankruptcies. Both Lightfoot and Judge Porteous signed the petition 

under the following declaration: ‘‘I declare under penalty of perjury 

that the information provided in this petition is true and correct.’’ 

Lightfoot 2A at 991–994, 1027; Stips. 202, 208, 1C at 2541, 2542; 

Ex. 125, 3C at 2492–2493; Ex. 138(a), 3C at 2551; Ex. 145, 3C at 

2749. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
36 

On April 8, 2001, the Times-Picayune printed a list of local bankruptcies, including Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy, which was filed 

under the name ‘‘G. T. Ortous.’’ Lightfoot filed an amended petition 

on the following day using Judge Porteous’s correct name, accompanied by bankruptcy schedules, a Chapter 13 plan, and a statement of financial affairs to accompany the amended petition. These 

documents were prepared by Lightfoot, based on the information he 

had previously received from Judge Porteous. The notice to creditors was not sent until after Judge Porteous’s schedules were filed, 

and as a result, no creditor received a notice with the name ‘‘G. T. 

Ortous.’’ Beaulieu, 2B at 1382; Lightfoot, 2A at 991–995, 1032– 

1037; Stips. 189–190, 1C at 2540; Exs. 126–127, 3C at 2497–2498; 

Ex. 1064, 3E at 5566–5568. 

The bankruptcy schedules filed by Judge Porteous, labeled ‘‘A’’ 

through ‘‘J,’’ require that the debtor list real property; personal 

property, including assets held in bank accounts or retirement 

plans; all creditors holding various types of secured and unsecured 

claims; any contracts or leases; current income; and current expenditures. Judge Porteous signed this form under the following 

declaration: ‘‘I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read 

the forgoing summary and schedules, consisting of 18 sheets plus 

the summary page, and that they are true and correct to the best 

of my knowledge, information, and belief.’’ Ex. 127, 3C at 2499– 

2524. 

The statement of financial affairs, filed with a debtor’s bankruptcy schedules, requires the debtor to answer a series of 21 questions to further assess the financial health of the debtor. Among 

other things, the statement of financial affairs asks whether the 

debtor has made any payments to creditors over $600 in the 90 

days preceding the debtor’s bankruptcy filing (question 3). The 

statement also requires the debtor to list any gambling losses incurred in the year immediately preceding the commencement of the 

bankruptcy case or since (question 8). Judge Porteous signed this 

form under the following declaration: ‘‘I declare under penalty of 

perjury that I have read the answers contained in the foregoing 

statement of financial affairs and any attachments hereto and that 

they are true and correct.’’ Id. at 2499–2524. 

Although unknown to the bankruptcy trustee at the time, 

Porteous’s bankruptcy schedules failed to disclose certain assets 

and undervalued others. Judge Porteous’s Schedule B, on which he 

was required to list any ‘‘checking, savings, or other financial accounts,’’ as well as the value of those assets (question 2), undervalued his listed Bank One checking account. Judge Porteous listed 

this account as having a balance of $100, despite having deposited 

$2,000 into this account on March 27, 2001, the day prior to the 

filing of his original petition. Moreover, from March 23 through 

April 23, the account had an opening balance of $559.07 and a closing balance of $5,493.91. At no time during this period did Judge 

Porteous’s balance drop as low as $100. Horner, 2A at 906–907; 

Stips. 223–224, 226, 1C at 2543; Ex. 127, 3C at 2499–2524, Ex. 

144, 3C at 2732–2748. 

Additionally, Judge Porteous failed to list his Fidelity money 

market account on this schedule. Judge Porteous used this account 

frequently, and in the days shortly prior to filing for bankruptcy, 

Judge Porteous wrote numerous checks drawn on the Fidelity acVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
37 

52For example, in May 2002, the account balance in the Fidelity money market account was $8,760.37, and the account balance in the Bank One account was $1,120.91. In June 2002, the 

account balance in the Fidelity account was over $7,800, and the balance in the Bank One account was $857. 53On the day that his original petition was filed, Judge Porteous’s net monthly income was $7,705.51, about $174 more than the net monthly income listed on the schedule. 54 In July 2001 through the end of the year, Judge Porteous’s monthly net salary increased 

to roughly $8,500, about $1,000 more than was listed as his net income on his bankruptcy 

schedules. 

count, including a check for $40 on March 27, 2001. The value of 

this account on March 28, 2001, the date on which Judge Porteous 

filed his original petition, was $283.42. However, for several 

months during Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy, the undisclosed Fidelity money market account carried a balance significantly higher 

than in the disclosed Bank One account.52 Horner, 2A at 907, 927– 

928; Stips. 228, 230, 1C at 2543; Ex. 143, 3C at 2725–2731. 

Schedule B also requires the debtor to list ‘‘[o]ther liquidated 

debts owing debtor[,] including tax refunds.’’ In response to this 

question, Porteous marked ‘‘none.’’ However, on March 23, 2001, 

Judge Porteous had filed for a tax refund of $4,143. This refund 

was deposited into Judge Porteous’s Bank One checking account on 

April 13, 2001, four days after the filing of Judge Porteous’s 

amended petition and bankruptcy schedules. Horner, 2A at 902; 

Lightfoot, 2A at 998; Stips. 221–222, 240, 1C at 2543, 2544; Ex. 

127, 3C at 2504; Ex. 141, 3C at 2723–2724; Ex. 144, 3C at 2732– 

2748. 

In addition to the issues described above, Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy schedules did not accurately reflect his net monthly income. 

Schedule I requires the debtor to list gross monthly wages, less 

payroll deductions, and any other income the debtor derives from 

other sources, which provides the trustee with an accounting of the 

debtor’s total net monthly income. On this schedule, Judge 

Porteous listed both his gross wages and net monthly income as 

$7,531.52, and his May 2000 pay stub—the same pay stub used by 

Lightfoot to calculate the ‘‘workout’’ plan in the summer and autumn of 2000—was attached. Ex. 127, 3C at 2516–2517. 

Judge Porteous’s Schedule I misrepresented his monthly income 

in two ways. First, Judge Porteous had received a pay increase between May 2000 and March 2001.53 Second, Judge Porteous’s 

Schedule I did not account for the fact that Social Security taxes 

were withheld from Judge Porteous’s salary only until his income 

reached a statutorily defined annual gross salary referred to as the 

Social Security ‘‘wage base.’’ His income typically reached this level 

in July of a calendar year. At that point, certain federal taxes are 

no longer withheld, and his net monthly salary increased by several hundred dollars.54 Horner, 2A at 925–926; Stip. 238, 1C at 

2544. 

Finally, Question 8 on the statement of financial affairs requires 

the debtor to ‘‘list all losses from fire, theft, casualty, or other gambling within one year immediately preceding the commencement of 

this case or since the commencement of the case.’’ Judge Porteous’s 

listed response was ‘‘none.’’ Although the parties dispute the 

amount of Judge Porteous’s offsetting gambling winnings, Judge 

Porteous incurred at least $12,700 in gambling losses over the previous year. Horner, 2A at 910, 913; Ex. 127, 3C at 2521. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
38 

55 In particular, Beaulieu objected to an expense relating to the Porteouses’ daughter, who was receiving $300 to $400 a month for her college food plan and rent. Beaulieu, 2B at 1378, 1530; 

Lightfoot, 2A at 1057. 56The Fifth Circuit had ordered that the three bankruptcy court judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana recuse themselves from Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy case; Judge Greendyke 

was assigned by Judge Carolyn Dineen King. Ex. 10, 3B at 723. 

4. May 9 Creditors Meeting and June 28 Confirmation of the 

Chapter 13 Plan 

Judge Porteous’s Chapter 13 trustee, S.J. Beaulieu, Jr., conducted the creditors meeting on May 9, 2001. At this meeting, 

Judge Porteous testified under oath that he had listed all of his assets. During this meeting, neither the trustee nor any creditor objected to the amount of income listed in Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy schedules. Additionally, a large number of creditors failed to 

file claims to collect the money available through the Chapter 13 

plan. Beaulieu, 2B at 1381; Lightfoot, 2A at 1134. 

At the end of the meeting, Beaulieu told Judge Porteous that he 

was prohibited from borrowing money or buying anything on credit 

while his case was pending. Specifically, Judge Porteous was informed, ‘‘Any charge cards that you may have . . . you cannot use 

any longer. So basically you [sic] on a cash basis now.’’ Any loan 

or purchase on credit would have to be approved by Beaulieu. 

Beaulieu, 2B at 1398; Ex. 130, 3C at 2537; Ex. 135, 3C at 2548. 

Beaulieu had mailed Judge Porteous a pamphlet entitled ‘‘Your 

Rights and Responsibilities in Chapter 13’’ prior to the meeting. 

This pamphlet explained that while the Chapter 13 process was ongoing, the debtor was prohibited from borrowing money or buying 

anything on credit without permission from the bankruptcy court, 

including using credit cards or charge accounts of any kind. The 

pamphlet additionally stated that ‘‘[t]he Trustee also has the right 

to use [tax] refunds to fund your plan.’’ While testifying before the 

Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee, Judge Porteous indicated that he had understood that he could not incur more credit 

in bankruptcy. Lightfoot, 2A at 1006; Ex. 10, 3B at 728; Ex. 148, 

3C at 2754–2758. 

Prior to the creditors meeting, Beaulieu had objected to Judge 

Porteous’s original plan, indicating that he was not making use of 

all available disposable income and had not met the Chapter 7 

equivalency value.55 In his objection and motion to amend the 

bankruptcy plan, Beaulieu requested that the bankruptcy court increase the percentage payable to unsecured creditors. To resolve 

these issues, a telephone confirmation hearing was arranged with 

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge William R. Greendyke, who was sitting by 

designation from the Southern District of Texas.56 Beaulieu, 2B at 

1378–1379, 1398–1399; Ex. 129, 3C at 2533; Ex. 135, 3C at 2547; 

see also Lightfoot, 2A at 1007–1008. 

On June 28, 2001, Judge Greendyke confirmed the amended 

bankruptcy plan, allowing an increase in Judge Porteous’s monthly 

payments from $875 per month to $1,600 per month, per Beaulieu’s 

request, payable to the Chapter 13 trustee for a period of 36 

months. The failure of many creditors to file claims resulted in 

each creditor receiving a higher repayment percentage than proposed by the original plan—in total, 34.5%. Beaulieu, 2B at 1379, 

1398; Lightfoot, 2A at 1058; Ex. 133, 3C at 2543–2545. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
39 

57Four judges on the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council noted in the dissent to the certification 

of misconduct, ‘‘Under Louisiana commercial law, markers are considered ‘checks’ as defined by 

Louisiana statute.’’ This statement does not necessarily imply that markers should be treated 

as checks rather than loans in the bankruptcy context, although the definition of markers under 

Louisiana commercial law provides ‘‘some support for a good faith understanding that ‘markers’ 

would be treated as checks and not credit in the bankruptcy context within Louisiana and the 

Fifth Circuit.’’ Ex. 6(b), 3B at 510. 58 Article III, § 3–104(f), of the Uniform Commercial Code defines a check to be ‘‘(i) a draft, 

other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier’s 

check or teller’s check.’’ An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face 

by another term, such as ‘‘money order.’’ 59The parties disagree as to whether executing and redeeming markers constituted preferential payments to creditors that should have been listed on his statement of financial affairs. 

This issue is discussed in the ‘‘Contested Issues’’ section. 

Echoing Beaulieu’s admonishment during the May 9 creditors 

meeting, paragraph 4 of Judge Greendyke’s order expressly stated: 

‘‘The debtor(s) shall not incur additional debt during the term of 

this plan without written approval of the Trustee. Failure to obtain 

such approval may cause the claim for such debt to be unallowable 

and non-dischargeable,’’ meaning that any debt that Judge 

Porteous incurred after the confirmation hearing would not discharge upon the completion of the plan. Judge Porteous received a 

copy of this order. Lightfoot, 2A at 1008–1009, 1060; Ex. 10, 3B at 

728; Ex. 133, 3C at 2443–2445. 

Prior to the end of the 36-month period, Judge Porteous completed the repayment plan but, on the advice of his attorney, continued to make his monthly payments and distribute money to his 

creditors. Upon the completion of the plan, the bankruptcy court 

discharged the remainder of Judge Porteous’s scheduled debts in 

July 2004. In total, Judge Porteous paid $57,600 to the trustee to 

fulfill the Chapter 13 plan, $52,567.01 of which was distributed to 

Judge Porteous’s unsecured creditors. Compared with most Chapter 13 plans, Judge Porteous was considered to have completed a 

large plan. If he had entered into Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and all 

of his assets been accurately listed, the net amount available to 

creditors would have been about $33,677, or $18,890 less than 

Judge Porteous actually paid out to creditors. See Beaulieu, 2B at 

1378; Hildebrand, 2B at 1683; Lightfoot, 2A at 1061, 1063; Pardo 

2B at 1275–1284; Stip. 330, 1C at 2551; Ex. 4, 3B at 379; Ex. 

1100(z), 3E at 5823. 

5. Gambling-Related Activity and Extensions of Credit 

Throughout this process, Judge Porteous gambled at casinos in 

and around New Orleans using markers. Under Louisiana law, a 

marker is a check from an individual’s bank account, which is 

drawn in exchange for casino chips.57 Article III of the Uniform 

Commercial Code, which has been adopted by the state of Louisiana, defines a check to be a negotiable instrument in the form 

of a ‘‘draft,’’ which is payable on demand and drawn on a bank.58

If a marker is not repaid, the casino will negotiate, or deposit, the 

marker at the individual’s bank for payment like a normal check. 

Horner, 2A at 946; Pardo, 2B at 1297. 

In the 90 days prior to filing for bankruptcy, Porteous executed, 

or took out, nine markers worth $5,500.59 These nine markers were 

executed on two separate occasions. The first two, totaling $2,000, 

were executed in February 2001 at the Grand Casino Gulfport in 

Gulfport, Mississippi. Judge Porteous left the casino without first 

redeeming, or repaying, the markers. On March 16, the Grand CaVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
40 

60To cover the markers, Judge Porteous deposited $2,000 into his Fidelity money market ac- count, $1,960 of which was drawn from his Fidelity Individual Retirement Account (IRA). 

Horner, 2A at 896; Stips. 197, 225, 1C at 2541, 2543; Ex. 143, 3C at 2725–2732; Ex. 144, 3C 

at 2732–2748; Ex. 301(a), 3D at 3732. 61Stip. 199, 1C at 2541. These markers, however, were returned as uncollected on April 3, 

2001, due to an invalid account number on the markers. This occurred because Porteous’s bank 

merged with another bank, and the routing number and account number were incorrect as a 

result. After the markers were returned to the casino on April 3, the casino contacted Porteous 

and the error was corrected. On April 4, 2001, Porteous’s markers were deposited into the correct account. Finally, on April 12, the two $1,000 markers cleared Porteous’s bank account. See 

Horner, 2A at 916; Stips. 198–199, 1C at 2541; Ex. 301(a), 3D at 3732. 62 Between April 7 and 8, Porteous executed four markers, totaling $2,000, at the Beau Rivage 

Casino in Biloxi, Mississippi. Before leaving the casino on April 8, Porteous redeemed $1,000 

worth of markers in chips, but left the casino with $1,000 in markers outstanding. Stips. 247– 

248, 1C at 2545; Ex. 303, 3D at 3741. On May 7, 2001, Judge Porteous executed four markers 

at the Treasure Chest Casino in Kenner, Louisiana. At this casino, Porteous took out four 

$1,000 markers, which were repaid with cash on the same day. Stips. 258–259, 1C at 2546; Ex. 

307, 3D at 3747–3748. 63 Judge Porteous redeemed six of these eight markers, totaling $5,000, on the same days they 

were executed. 64On May 4, 2001, Danos’s $1,000 check to the Beau Rivage Casino, written on Judge 

Porteous’s behalf, was paid at the cage and was credited against Judge Porteous’s Beau Rivage 

account. The Beau Rivage Casino deposited Danos’s $1,000 check on May 5, 2001. Stip. 253, 

1C at 2545; Ex. 304, 3D at 3742–3743. 65On two separate trips, Judge Porteous executed two markers, worth $1,000 total, at the 

Treasure Chest Casino. He redeemed each of these markers on the same day they were executed. The remaining two markers, worth $1,000 total, were executed at the Grand Casino Gulfport on the same trip. Judge Porteous made a $900 payment on these markers, repaying one 

marker in full the day it was executed and another in part; the remaining $100 was repaid on 

the following day. 66During this time, Judge Porteous gambled at the Treasure Chest Casino in Kenner, Louisiana, on eight occasions (Stips. 282–302, 1C at 2547–2549; Ex. 312, 3D at 3755; Ex. 313(a), 

3D at 3756–3757; Ex. 315–316, 3D at 3760–3762; Ex. 318–319, 3D at 3764–3766; Ex. 322, 3D 

at 3769; Ex. 530, 3E at 5247–5250), Harrah’s Casino in New Orleans on two occasions (Stips. 

304–306, 1C at 2549; Ex. 314, 3D at 3759; Ex. 320, 3D at 3767), the Beau Rivage Casino in 

Biloxi, Mississippi, on one occasion (Stip. 307, 1C at 2549, Ex. 317, 3D at 3763), and the Grand 

Casino Gulfport in Gulfport, Mississippi, on three occasions (Stips. 308–312, 1C at 2549–2550; 

sino Gulfport deposited these markers,60 which cleared Judge 

Porteous’s account on March 24, 2000. On the day his original 

bankruptcy petition was filed, Judge Porteous’s balance at the 

Grand Casino Gulfport was zero.61 The remaining seven markers, totaling $3,500, were executed at the Treasure Chest Casino. Four 

of these markers were redeemed on the same day with chips. Judge 

Porteous redeemed the remaining three markers on March 27, 

2001, the day before he filed for bankruptcy. Horner, 2A at 890, 

896–897; Stip. 193, 1C at 2540. 

Judge Porteous also gambled using markers between the date of 

his original bankruptcy filing on March 28, 2001 and the creditors 

meeting on May 9, 2001. During this time, Judge Porteous gambled 

using markers on two separate occasions.62 On these two trips, 

Judge Porteous executed eight markers, totaling $6,000.63 Two 

markers, totaling $1,000, were later repaid by a personal check 

written by Judge Porteous’s secretary, Rhonda Danos. Judge 

Porteous reimbursed her by signing over a $1,000 check, drawn 

from his individual retirement account.64 Danos, 2A at 796; 

Horner, 2A at 918. Between the creditors meeting on May 9, 2001 

and Judge Greendyke’s confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan on 

June 28, 2001, Judge Porteous continued to gamble using markers. 

During this time, he executed four markers, totaling $2,000.65

Finally, Judge Porteous’s gambling activities continued in the 

year following Judge Greendyke’s confirmation of his Chapter 13 

bankruptcy plan. In total, between July 19, 2001, and July 5, 2002, 

Judge Porteous gambled with markers on 14 different occasions 

and executed 42 markers, totaling $33,400, at 4 different casinos.66

Horner, 2A at 922. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
41 

Ex. 321, 3D at 3768; Ex. 323, 3D at 3770; Ex. 325, 3D at 3772–3774). Of the 42 total markers, 

Judge Porteous repaid 26 of the 42 markers on the day the marker was originally executed— 

a total of $21,500. Many of these payments were made with chips. An additional six markers, 

totaling $3,500, were repaid within one day of their execution. Horner, 2A at 952–954. 67 In his testimony, Horner incorrectly identified the first purchase made on this credit card 

as a purchase at Lucy’s Restaurant on September 17, 2001. See Stip. 316, 1C at 2550; Ex. 

341(b), 3D at 3921. 

In order to execute markers at a casino, an individual must first 

apply for a line of credit and undergo a credit check. Throughout 

the bankruptcy process, Judge Porteous sought to obtain additional 

credit at three different casinos. In particular, Judge Porteous submitted two applications for increases in existing credit or new credit lines prior to the May 9, 2001, creditors meeting. On April 6, 

2001, less than two weeks after the original filing of his bankruptcy petition, Judge Porteous requested a temporary credit limit 

increase of $1,500 at the Beau Rivage Casino, bringing his total 

credit limit to $4,000 for that particular visit to the casino. On 

April 30, Judge Porteous submitted a different credit application, 

this time for a new $4,000 credit limit at Harrah’s Casino. Judge 

Porteous’s last application for an increase in credit occurred on 

July 4, 2002. On this occasion, Judge Porteous requested an increase in his credit line at the Grand Casino Gulfport, from $2,000 

to $2,500. See Horner, 2A at 917–919; Pardo, 2B at 1315–1316, 

1354–1355; Stips. 230, 245, 1C at 2543, 2545; Ex. 10, 3B at 791– 

793; Ex. 149, 3C at 2759; Ex. 303, 3D at 3741; Ex. 324–325, 3D 

at 3771–3774. 

Following the confirmation of his plan, in addition to applying for 

extensions of credit at casinos, Judge Porteous applied for and used 

a Capital One Visa credit card without the written approval of the 

trustee. On August 13, Judge Porteous’s credit card application was 

approved with a $200 limit. The first charge on this card, which 

occurred on August 23, 2001, was a $49.00 charge toward a security deposit.67 In May 2002, the credit limit on this card was increased to $400 and, six months later, increased again to $600. 

Horner, 2A at 920–921; Stips. 314, 318–319, 323, 1C at 2550, 2551. 

6. FBI Investigation into Judge Porteous’s Bankruptcy Filings 

In late 2001 or early 2002, Special Agent DeWayne Horner was 

assigned as the case agent in the FBI’s investigation of Judge 

Porteous after he was identified as a target in ‘‘Operation Wrinkled 

Robe.’’ Agent Horner, with other FBI and DOJ personnel, met with 

Beaulieu on two occasions prior to completion of Judge Porteous’s 

Chapter 13 repayment plan. In these meetings, FBI and DOJ personnel discussed Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy filings with 

Beaulieu, including problems with Judge Porteous’s initial filing, 

his listed assets, his use of a new credit card after the confirmation 

hearing, and his execution of markers at casinos. Beaulieu, 2B at 

1379–1380; Horner, 2A at 956–959; Stips. 326–327, 1C at 2551. 

After his second meeting with Beaulieu, Agent Horner received 

a letter from a staff attorney in Beaulieu’s office. The letter, responding to advice from FBI and DOJ personnel that Beaulieu conduct an investigation into Judge Porteous’s conduct, indicated that 

because the FBI was unwilling to provide the trustee with ‘‘any evidence of improprieties by [Judge Porteous],’’ Beaulieu had decided 

against taking any action. Beaulieu presented the FBI with the opVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
42 

68 Horner testified that the FBI did not provide Beaulieu with more information because ‘‘the 

position of the Department of Justice was that, you know, if you learned something through the 

questions that we ask you, you know, you have to take your own steps, that we can’t provide 

you with evidence and documents and things like that, you have to ask your own questions, 

get your own records, and take your own course of action.’’ Horner, 2A at 954–955. 

portunity to provide him with more information or object to Judge 

Porteous’s plan before its completion. The FBI did neither.68

Beaulieu, 2B at 1381; Horner, 2A at 962–965; Exs. 298–299, 3D at 

3728–3731. 

D. Contested Issues 

1. Using a False Name and Post Office Box on the Original 

Bankruptcy Petition 

The first charge in Article III accuses Judge Porteous of attempting to defraud the court and his creditors by filing his original 

bankruptcy petition using a false name and a recently acquired 

post office box. However, Judge Porteous has argued that he was 

merely following the advice of counsel and that, while done knowingly, filing his original petition under a false name was not done 

with the intent to defraud creditors. Rather, the intent was to 

avoid unwanted publicity. By filing under a false name, Lightfoot 

hoped that Judge Porteous would avoid the publicity that would 

eventually come from not only the initial notice in the Times-Picayune, but any investigation into Judge Porteous’s private life that 

may follow. Lightfoot, 2A at 991–992, 1028–1031, 1036–1037; Stip. 

202, 1C at 2541. 

Judge Porteous’s contention that he did not intend to defraud the 

creditors is supported by the fact that, as discussed above, no creditor received a notice regarding Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy under 

the false name ‘‘G. T. Ortous.’’ Judge Porteous and Lightfoot’s plan 

was always to file an amended petition immediately after the 

Times-Picayune listed Porteous’s bankruptcy under the false name. 

Upon filing an amended petition, they would also file the bankruptcy schedules and Chapter 13 plan. Only after these documents 

were filed would a notice be sent to creditors. As a result, Lightfoot 

knew that no creditor would receive a petition listing a false name. 

This differed from most other petitions filed with inadvertently incorrect names in the Eastern District of Louisiana, in which the incorrect name is not usually caught until after the notice is sent to 

the creditors. See Beaulieu, 2B at 1383–1384; Lightfoot, 2A at 

1034. 

Furthermore, although Lightfoot ‘‘rue[s] the day’’ that he thought 

of the idea to file the original petition under a false name, he asserted that there is nothing inherently wrong with using a post office box as the address on the bankruptcy petition. Debtors frequently list post office boxes as their address for a variety of reasons. Unlike filing under a false name, Lightfoot had no reservations in advising the Porteouses to use a post office box in the initial filing. Id. at 1029, 1032–1033. 

Finally, Judge Porteous argued that, as a debtor faced with navigating a complex and highly technical bankruptcy code, he was entitled to rely on the advice and guidance of his bankruptcy attorney. Four judges on the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council issued a dissent from the Fifth Circuit’s decision to certify findings of misconduct to the Judicial Conference of the United States, in which 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
43 

69To support this position, the dissenting opinion cited the following cases: Hibernia Nat’l 

Bank v. Perez, 124 B.R. 704, 710–11 (E.D. La. 1991), aff’d 954 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1992); First 

Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that reasonable and 

good faith reliance on advice of counsel sufficient to show debtor lacked requisite fraudulent intent to revoke or deny discharge); Beckanstein v. United States, 232 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1956) 

(‘‘The advice of counsel is also important in determining whether appellant made the statement 

with a corrupt motive.’’). Additionally, the dissent also noted that, ‘‘according to the Commentary to Canon 5C of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, [a] judge has the rights 

of an ordinary citizen with respect to financial affairs.’’ Ex. 6(b), 3B at 508–509. 70The House’s argument on this issue additionally relies on expert testimony, which is discussed in section D. 

they stated that ‘‘[g]enerally, a debtor is entitled to rely on the advice of his bankruptcy counsel where reliance is reasonable and in 

good faith.69 Id. at 1028; Ex. 6(b), 3B at 508–509.70

The House argues, in contrast, that even though no creditor received notice of the bankruptcy petition under the false name of ‘‘G. 

T. Ortous,’’ Judge Porteous committed perjury and the defense of 

‘‘no harm, no foul’’ is unacceptable. Furthermore, creditors may still 

have been deceived by the bankruptcy listing in the newspaper and 

been deprived of the opportunity to make a claim or take another 

action with respect to the bankruptcy. Judge Porteous’s original filing created a false record with the bankruptcy court in the Eastern 

District of Louisiana. If a business wanted to check whether Judge 

Porteous had filed for bankruptcy protection between March 28, 

2001, and April 9, 2001, and had contacted the bankruptcy court, 

it would have been misled by the false name on the record. Keir, 

2A at 1098–1101. 

2. Concealing Assets and Income 

The second charge in Article III alleges that Judge Porteous concealed various assets on his bankruptcy schedules and statement 

of financial affairs. Both parties agree that Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy filings did not accurately list assets held by Judge Porteous 

at the time of his original bankruptcy filing. The House contends 

that Judge Porteous intentionally hid his assets from the bankruptcy trustee and his own bankruptcy attorney. By failing to list 

certain accounts in his bankruptcy schedule and undervaluing others, Judge Porteous withheld funds that potentially could have 

been made available to creditors. Ex. 4, 3B at 382–383. To support 

this position, the House presented evidence that Judge Porteous 

hid his undisclosed Fidelity money market account from his own 

bankruptcy attorney while, at the same time, using the account to 

accumulate cash for gambling and other purposes. 

Judge Porteous argues that the omission of his Fidelity money 

market account was accidental and, despite its absence on his 

bankruptcy filings, he ‘‘honestly believe[s]’’ that he told Lightfoot 

about the Fidelity money market account. Ex. 10, 3B at 753. From 

Judge Porteous’s perspective, there was no reason not to tell Lightfoot about this account. Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth 

Circuit that, at any given time, the disclosed Bank One account, 

into which Judge Porteous’s paychecks were deposited, would have 

had a higher balance than the Fidelity account. Furthermore, 

Judge Porteous presented evidence that keeping money in his Fidelity accounts after the plan was confirmed was not improper. 

After a debtor’s petition is filed, he is not prohibited from keeping 

money in accounts not listed on his Schedule B filings. Horner, 2A 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
44 

71This was a practice of Judge Porteous before he filed for bankruptcy in 2001. From 1997 

through his bankruptcy, when Judge Porteous drew down on his IRA, he would receive funds 

by check. On these occasions, he would deposit the funds into a Fidelity money market account. 

On many occasions, he used this account to write checks to casinos to pay gambling debts. See 

Horner, 2A at 968; Ex. 383, 3D at 442; Ex. 529, 3E at 5241. 72 Judge Keir clarified that ‘‘[l]iquidated does not mean collected; it means quantified.’’ Keir, 

2A at 1103. 

at 928; Pardo, 2B at 1292; Stip. 230, 1C at 2543; Ex. 10, 3B at 

753.71

The House claims that, in addition to concealing his Fidelity 

money market account, Judge Porteous also intentionally undervalued his Bank One checking account. For example, the House 

points to a $2,000 deposit to the Bank One account made by Judge 

Porteous on March 27, 2001, the day before he filed his original 

bankruptcy petition. This suggests that Judge Porteous must have 

been aware that his stated account balance of $100 was incorrect. 

Horner, 2A at 906–907. 

Similar to the omission of the Fidelity money market account, 

Judge Porteous argues that the undervaluation of his Bank One account was unintentional. A few days before the filing of the bankruptcy schedules, Lightfoot asked Judge Porteous to approximate 

the amount of money in his Bank One checking account. He asked 

only for an approximation, because the actual amount in a debtor’s 

checking account at the time of filing is not as important in a 

Chapter 13 plan, which commits future income, as it is in a Chapter 7 plan, in which all assets are liquidated to pay creditors. 

Lightfoot did not ask Judge Porteous this question until immediately before filing the schedules ‘‘because checks are coming and 

going all the time.’’ Lightfoot 1138:4–1140:19. Additionally, Judge 

Porteous’s bankruptcy filings were not signed by him on the date 

they were filed. Rather, Lightfoot gave the forms to Judge Porteous 

in his chambers, and the Judge then took them home for his wife 

to sign. The date on Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy documents reflects the date they were filed, not the date on which they were 

signed. Id. at 1050–1052, 1075–1077. 

The House also asserts that, beyond his undisclosed Fidelity 

money market account and his undervalued Bank One account, 

Judge Porteous attempted to conceal his year 2000 tax refund from 

the bankruptcy trustee and his creditors. The presence of a tax refund indicates that there is monthly income that should possibly be 

distributed to creditors, and the debtor’s plan may be too low. Although it may or may not be included in the debtor’s Chapter 13 

plan, if the trustee does not know that the debtor is receiving a tax 

refund, then he cannot ask the debtor to surrender it. Beaulieu believed that this tax refund should have been included in Judge 

Porteous’s bankruptcy schedules. Its inclusion would have enabled 

Beaulieu to raise questions as to the amount of disposable income 

available to Judge Porteous, especially since it was a large refund, 

and would have prompted Beaulieu to perform a closer examination of Judge Porteous’s taxes. Furthermore, the House presented 

evidence that the right to receive a refund is an asset. Judge 

Porteous’s refund, for which he had filed prior to his original bankruptcy filing, should properly be considered to be a liquidated 

sum. 72 When Judge Porteous failed to list his expected tax refund, 

he falsified his schedule. Judge Porteous discussed his expected 

year 2000 tax refund with neither his bankruptcy attorney nor the 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
45 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee. See Beaulieu, 2B at 1383; Keir, 2A 

at 1103–1104; Lightfoot, 2A at 998, 1053. 

Judge Porteous disputes that he was attempting to conceal his 

tax refund. Judge Porteous testified before the Fifth Circuit Special 

Investigatory Committee that he discussed his year 2000 return 

with Lightfoot, who advised him that ‘‘[i]f the trustee didn’t put a 

lien on it, put it in your account; but they may . . . ask for it 

back.’’ Ex. 10, 3B at 749–750. However, Judge Porteous argued 

that, regardless of whether he informed others of his pending refund, the trustee was not in the habit of asking for the debtor’s current or future tax refunds to distribute to creditors. Lightfoot, 2A 

at 1053; Ex. 6(c), 3B at 526; Ex. 124, 3C at 2469–2470. 

Judge Porteous also presented evidence that debtors often submitted their bankruptcy schedules without listing their tax refund, 

and that these debtors are almost always represented by counsel. 

If a debtor tells an attorney that he had received a tax refund, the 

burden is on the attorney to make sure that the tax refund was included on the debtor’s bankruptcy schedules. Two witnesses also 

testified that whether or not the tax refund was accidentally omitted from Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy schedules, a tax refund from 

a previous year should not be included in a debtor’s Chapter 13 estate. While a Chapter 13 debtor may liquidate property, ‘‘there can 

be no requirement for him to do so.’’ Hildebrand, 2B at 1667, 1671; 

Pardo, 2B at 1288–1290. 

In addition to the previously discussed assets, the House also 

points to the fact that Judge Porteous’s net monthly income, as listed on his bankruptcy schedules, was inaccurate. As discussed in 

the previous section, Judge Porteous’s actual net monthly income 

was roughly $174 greater than the listed amount. This income information, which was derived from an outdated May 2000 pay stub, 

also failed to disclose that Judge Porteous reached the Social Security ‘‘wage base’’ on or around July of each calendar year. 

Judge Porteous argues, however, that Lightfoot was not aware 

that he received a pay increase prior to his bankruptcy filing, nor 

was Lightfoot aware of federal tax limits associated with the Social 

Security wage base, as Lightfoot’s regular clients never approached 

this limit. Moreover, Beaulieu never requested that Judge Porteous 

update his schedules in any way, and Judge Porteous was under 

no obligation to make additions to the schedules. Generally, debtors are only ordered to update their schedules to reflect changes in 

income when the debtor experienced large fluctuations in his 

monthly income due to the nature of his employment. Barliant, 2B 

at 1715–1716; Lightfoot, 2A at 1047–1048. 

Finally, Judge Porteous presented evidence to demonstrate that 

errors and omissions, such as those found in his own bankruptcy 

filings, are not uncommon among debtors. To illustrate this, Judge 

Porteous presented the findings of an empirical study of 1,700 

Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases filed in 2006. This study found that 

in 95% of cases examined, the debtor, a creditor, or both made inaccurate statements in bankruptcy filings. In a separate study of 

200 randomly selected bankruptcy filings, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 

Steven W. Rhodes of the Eastern District of Michigan, found that 

198 (99%) contained at least one error, with an average number of 

3.4 errors per case. Thus, an all-or-nothing approach to the bankruptcy system, where perfect bankruptcy filings are a prerequisite 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
46 

73 Hildebrand testified that perfection is not the standard by which bankruptcy filings are or 

ought to be judged. Hildebrand, 2B at 1698. 74The study also found that circuit courts cited the opinions of district court judges less frequently than they cited the opinions rendered by a bankruptcy appellate panel. Both of these 

findings were statistically significant. Ex. 1067, 3E at 5571–5572. 

to any relief, is unworkable, unrealistic, and would cause the entire 

bankruptcy system to grind to a halt.73 Pardo, 2B at 1305–1311; 

Ex. 1068, 3E at 5650; Ex. 1070, 3E at 3737. 

Moreover, Judge Porteous argues that, although he served as a 

U.S. District Court judge, he was relatively inexperienced in the 

area of bankruptcy law. District court judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana hear few bankruptcy appeals. Judge Porteous 

had written only seven bankruptcy opinions in his career as a federal judge, of which only three dealt with consumer bankruptcies. 

Pardo, 2B at 1302. Judge Porteous also presented evidence that 

opinions of federal district court judges in bankruptcy cases were 

reversed at a much higher rate than decisions rendered by bankruptcy judges sitting on bankruptcy appellate panels. Pardo, 2B at 

1301–1304.74

Finally, Judge Porteous submitted testimony and exhibits suggesting that he did not fully understand his own finances. In particular, Judge Porteous indicated that ‘‘he did not fully understand 

his financial status and, therefore, never knowingly misrepresented 

his bank accounts.’’ Judge Porteous also presented evidence that 

his wife and secretary normally handled his personal finances. For 

example, in a practice that developed over time, Danos began paying Judge Porteous’s bills as they came in, and she would tell him 

the amount for which he needed to reimburse her. Ex. 6(b), 3B at 

511; see Danos, 2A at 794–796. 

3. Incurring Debt Through the Use of Casino Markers 

The third, fourth, and fifth charges in Article III allege that 

Judge Porteous concealed preferential payments to creditors, concealed gambling losses and other gambling debts, and incurred new 

debts while his case was pending, in violation of the bankruptcy 

court’s order. The House argues that Judge Porteous’s habit of 

gambling at casinos using markers is a component of each of these 

offenses. 

As discussed in the previous section, Judge Porteous gambled 

using markers both before and after his plan was confirmed. The 

House recognized that a casino marker is a three-party instrument 

called a ‘‘draft,’’ which is an order to pay by the signer or drawer 

(Judge Porteous) on a drawee (the bank) to pay the payee or holder 

(the casino). To support its position that this activity created debt, 

however, the House presented evidence that the marker itself is 

‘‘separate and apart’’ from the underlying debt that arises when 

Judge Porteous uses the chips procured by executing a marker. As 

soon as Judge Porteous made a wager on credit, he had an obligation to repay the casino for that amount. In other words, ‘‘[w]hen 

the casino pushes the markers across the counter to the gambler, 

who doesn’t immediately pay for them, but will pay for them, the 

gambler is now obligated to pay the casino for the value of the 

markers. That’s when the debt arises.’’ Horner, 2A at 946; Keir, 2A 

at 1106–1107. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
47 

From this perspective, markers, like any other personal check, do 

not suspend the individual’s underlying obligation to pay. Rather, 

the obligation to pay is ‘‘just not extinguished.’’ For example, an individual who pays for groceries with a check ‘‘technically incurs a 

debt until the check is honored by his or her bank.’’ Once the check 

is honored, however, the drawer’s obligation to pay is extinguished. 

If the check is not honored, then the holder of the check may pursue a contract action or a suit on the instrument. Keir, 2A at 1126– 

1127. 

Judge Porteous, however, introduced evidence that the use of 

markers did not generate debt for the purposes of bankruptcy. In 

particular, Judge Porteous disagreed with the House’s interpretation that the execution of a draft, such as a marker or personal 

check, did not suspend the drawer’s underlying obligation to pay. 

Judge Porteous presented evidence that when a payment is made 

using a check, the drawer is liable and able to be sued by the 

check’s holder if and only if the drawee does not honor the check. 

In other words, contrary to the evidence presented by the House, 

the underlying obligation is suspended until the bank dishonors 

the check. As a result, a marker, which is a check and, therefore, 

an order to pay, is not a debt instrument. Pardo, 2B at 1263–1264, 

1296–1297, 1316–1317. 

Judge Porteous presented additional evidence that the suspension of the liability is not affected by the amount of time the casino 

holds the marker before depositing it. However, what does result 

is a contingent liability or contingent debt, in the sense that the 

liability is not an actual liability until the marker is presented at 

a bank and dishonored. From this perspective, although any markers outstanding at the time Judge Porteous’s bankruptcy petition 

was filed should have been listed on his bankruptcy schedules as 

contingent debt, redeeming a marker is not equivalent to using a 

credit card or borrowing money. Pardo, 2B at 1281–1283, 1297– 

1298, 1371–1375. 

4. Preferential Payments to Creditors 

As mentioned above, the third charge in Article III alleges that 

Judge Porteous concealed preferential payments to creditors in his 

statement of financial affairs filed with his amended petition on 

April 9. The House points in particular to Judge Porteous’s response to question 3 on his statement of financial affairs, which requires the debtor to list any payments to creditors exceeding $600 

in the 90 days preceding his bankruptcy filing. Judge Porteous’s response was ‘‘normal installments.’’ The phrase ‘‘normal installments’’ was meant to capture regular contractual payments associated with Judge Porteous’s two car leases and two home loans, as 

Judge Porteous had stopped paying his unsecured credit card creditors during the ‘‘workout’’ period under advice of counsel. Horner, 

2A at 899–900; Lightfoot, 2A at 1001; Ex. 127, 3C at 2499. 

As discussed in the previous section, Judge Porteous made payments over $600 at two casinos in the 90 days prior to his original 

bankruptcy filing. Judge Porteous also paid his wife’s Fleet credit 

card bill in full. To make this payment, Judge Porteous asked his 

secretary, Rhonda Danos, to write a personal check to cover the 

balance on the Fleet credit card, totaling $1,088.41. This payment 

cleared Danos’s account on March 29, 2001, and Judge Porteous 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
48 

75 Additionally, Judge Porteous presented evidence that the federal circuits are split as to 

when, for the purposes of determining preferential payments to creditors, a debt is deemed to 

arise. Some circuits take the view that a debt does not arise ‘‘until . . . the debtor first becomes 

legally bound to pay.’’ While the casino is still in possession of the marker, the debtor has no 

obligation to pay. From this perspective, the payment would only need to be listed on Judge 

Porteous’s statement of financial affairs if the casino had attempted to deposit the marker and 

the bank refused to honor it. Pardo, 2B at 1280–1283. 

later reimbursed her for the amount. Danos, 2A at 789–790, 796; 

Ex. 329, 3D at 3777. 

Based on the House’s understanding of markers, the House argues that Judge Porteous should have reported his payments to 

two casinos in the 90 days prior to his original bankruptcy filing 

as ‘‘payments to preferential creditors’’ on his statement of financial affairs. However, these payments were not listed, either as 

debts outstanding to unsecured creditors or payments to preferred 

creditors, on his bankruptcy schedule. See Beaulieu, 2B at 1393– 

1394; Hildebrand, 2B at 1693; Horner, 2A at 899–900; Ex. 127, 3C 

at 2510. 

Under Judge Porteous’s understanding of markers, however, his 

payments to casinos made immediately prior to filing for bankruptcy do not qualify as ‘‘preferential payments to creditors’’ and, 

as such, were correctly excluded on his statement of financial affairs. In order for a payment to be voidable, or preferential and recoverable by the court, it must be a payment to the creditor by the 

debtor for an antecedent, or existing, debt. However, if markers are 

not debt instruments, any obligation Judge Porteous incurred upon 

executing a marker was suspended until the casino deposited the 

marker against his account.75 From this perspective, there was no 

antecedent debt. Alternatively, providing payment to a casino for 

a marker could be viewed as a way of purchasing back a marker, 

which is a negotiable instrument, making it Judge Porteous’s property—not a debt. Pardo, 2B at 1281–1282. 

Moreover, Judge Porteous argues that there is nothing technically wrong with paying a creditor within 90 days of filing for 

bankruptcy; these are legal debts owed to the creditor that require 

payment. Before an individual files for bankruptcy, the principle of 

equitable distribution does not apply. Once a debtor files for bankruptcy protection, however, creditors are entitled to an equitable 

distribution of the debtor’s assets under his plan. Any recent payments to creditors are perceived as having a negative effect on the 

debtor’s ability to equitably repay each creditor. Thus, to ensure a 

fair distribution to all creditors, pre-bankruptcy payments may be 

recovered. Id. at 1280. 

Additionally, Judge Porteous argues that Danos’s payment on the 

Fleet credit card may not properly be considered a voidable payment because Danos, who was a third-party, and not Judge 

Porteous, made the payment. If Danos paid with her own funds 

and was reimbursed by Judge Porteous, he should have listed his 

payment to Danos as a preferential payment. However, if Danos’s 

bank account was merely a conduit, and the bill was paid with 

Judge Porteous’s money, then the credit card company should have 

been listed as a preferential payment to a creditor. Id. at 1363– 

1367. 

Judge Porteous maintains that, regardless of whether these payments are voidable, his failure to list these payments on his statement of financial affairs was immaterial because the Chapter 13 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
49 

76 Horner noted that rated players must fill out a credit application with the casino in order 

to open up a line of credit. Rated players then draw on their line of credit to gamble at the 

casino. Horner, 2A at 910–911. 

trustee in the Eastern District of Louisiana generally did not try 

to recover preferential payments to creditors. Beaulieu testified 

that he would not automatically attempt to recover preferential 

payments but, because recovering voidable payments costs money, 

he would weigh the cost of going after the payments to preferred 

creditors. In this case, Beaulieu testified that had he known payments to preferred creditors had been made in Judge Porteous’s 

case, he would not have attempted to recover the payments because, in his opinion, the payments were ‘‘inconsequential,’’ and 

were not payments to an insider. Beaulieu, 2B at 1385, 1402–1403; 

Lightfoot, 2A at 1055–1056. 

5. Concealing Gambling Losses 

The fourth charge in Article III alleges that Judge Porteous concealed gambling losses and other gambling debts. The House asserts that, as with his concealment of bank accounts, Judge 

Porteous also concealed gambling losses accrued in the previous 

year. When asked on his statement of financial affairs if he had experienced any gambling losses in the previous year, Judge Porteous 

indicated ‘‘none.’’ However, an FBI analysis proffered by the House 

indicated that Judge Porteous experienced total gross gambling 

losses of $12,895.35 and gross winnings of $5,312.15, with net gambling losses of $7,583.20. Although gambling losses are not evaluated as part of the ‘‘best-interest-of-creditors’’ test, the statement of 

financial affairs requires the debtor to answer this question because the answer may prompt the Chapter 13 trustee to ask particular types of questions in an examination of the debtor. Horner, 

2A at 913–914; Lightfoot, 2A at 1003–1004; Ex. 337, 3D at 3832– 

3853; see also Ex. 5, 3B at 428. 

Judge Porteous, however, argues that Agent Horner’s analysis of 

Judge Porteous’s gambling losses is not necessarily accurate. His 

table was calculated using only Judge Porteous’s winnings and 

losses when gambling as a ‘‘rated player.’’ When an individual gambles as a rated player, casinos track ‘‘how much [the gambler] bets, 

how much he wins, [and] how much he loses.’’ Rated players may 

earn ‘‘comps’’ from the casinos based on how much they play, in the 

form of complimentary or reduced rates on hotel rooms or free 

meals and drinks. Being a rated player is also useful for tax purposes. Horner, 2A at 910–911; Ex. 337, 3D at 3832–3853.76

Judge Porteous indicated, however, that he did not always gamble as a ‘‘rated player.’’ While Porteous was fairly well known at 

the Treasure Chest, he was less well known at casinos like the 

Beau Rivage or others on the Gulf Coast. In these casinos, Judge 

Porteous may have gambled without being rated, meaning that 

Judge Porteous’s winnings and losses were not tracked at these casinos. Thus, Judge Porteous’s net gambling losses may have differed from those indicated by Agent Horner’s analysis. Horner, 2A 

at 950–952; Ex. 337, 3D at 3832–3853. 

Finally, the House argues that Judge Porteous’s effort to intentionally hide his gambling losses is reflected in his failure to inform 

his own bankruptcy attorney of his gambling activities. Lightfoot 

indicated that Judge Porteous never told him about his gambling 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
50 

losses, and he did not know that Porteous gambled at all. Judge 

Porteous contends that Lightfoot should have noticed gambling-related charges reflected in two credit card statements sent to Lightfoot in the summer of 2000. When questioned about this, however, 

Lightfoot testified that he did not realize that the Beau Rivage and 

the Treasure Chest, the gambling establishments at which Judge 

Porteous used his credit cards, were casinos. Lightfoot, 2A at 1071– 

1072; Ex. 343, 3D at 3997, 4003. 

6. Incurring More Debt in Violation of Judge Greendyke’s 

Order 

The fifth and last charge contained in Article III alleges that 

Judge Porteous incurred new debt in violation of Judge 

Greendyke’s June 28 confirmation order. The House argues that 

Judge Porteous violated the order in several ways, including: gambling using markers; applying for credit at casinos; and applying 

for and using a new credit card after the confirmation of the order. 

Since gambling with markers necessarily creates debt, under this 

view, Judge Porteous’s execution of 42 markers after confirmation 

of his plan violated Judge Greendyke’s order. Furthermore, the 

House presented testimony that, the instant the credit card was 

used, Judge Porteous had incurred an obligation to repay. Keir, 2A 

at 1106–1108. 

Judge Porteous argues, however, that executing markers does 

not create debt for the purposes of bankruptcy and, therefore, as 

a result, gambling with markers did not violate Judge Greendyke’s 

bankruptcy order. Furthermore, Judge Porteous presented evidence 

that, contrary to Judge Greendyke’s confirmation order, there is 

nothing in the bankruptcy code to preclude the debtor from borrowing money or making purchases on credit without the trustee’s 

approval. The bankruptcy code expressly recognizes that a debtor 

will incur more debt by indicating that such debt may not be allowable, meaning not part of the Chapter 13 case, or dischargeable 

upon completion of the plan, with certain exceptions. Barliant, 2B 

at 1716–1717; Pardo, 2B at 1294–1295. 

Finally, Judge Porteous contends that a literal interpretation of 

Judge Greendyke’s order would lead to ‘‘an absurd result,’’ because 

a debtor incurs debt when doing ordinary tasks, such as going out 

to eat, getting the oil changed in his car, and even turning on the 

lights in his home. However, the House presented evidence that 

prohibitions on incurring debt were common and, while the debtor 

may choose to appeal an order, no one has the right to disregard 

a lawful order. Barliant, 2B at 1719; Hildebrand, 2B at 1692–1693; 

Keir, 2A at 1104–1105; Pardo, 2B at 1295–1296. 

7. The Materiality of Judge Porteous’s Conduct 

In all of these charges, the House alleges that Judge Porteous’s 

conduct harmed the resolution of his bankruptcy estate. This position is supported by Beaulieu’s testimony, in which he indicated 

that, given the importance of a debtor acting in good faith, if he 

had known about Judge Porteous’s intentional use of a false name, 

he would have petitioned the court to dismiss and ‘‘[left] it to the 

discretion of the judge and the U.S. trustee to follow up on it if 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
51 

77 Beaulieu did not know at the time that the misspelling of Porteous’s name was intentional. 

Beaulieu testified that Lightfoot called him and told him that a ‘‘typographical error’’ had been 

made on the original petition. Beaulieu, 2B at 1377. 

they saw fit.’’ 77 Furthermore, if Judge Greendyke had known about 

the ‘‘preferred payments, the omitted tax refund, the understated 

bank account balances, and the false names on the petition, he 

would not have signed the confirmation order and would have sua 

sponte objected to confirming a plan on the basis of good faith.’’ 

Beaulieu, 2B at 1383; Ex. 335, 3D at 3823. 

Judge Porteous argues, however, that even if the Chapter 13 

trustee was aware of Judge Porteous’s knowing use of a false name 

and the errors on his bankruptcy filings, the trustee still should 

have granted a discharge of his debts. Lightfoot testified that, in 

his experience in the Eastern District of Louisiana, he had never 

seen a debtor be held in contempt of court for incurring post-confirmation debt without court authority. Lightfoot, 2A at 1060. 

Beyond the individual consequences of Judge Porteous’s actions, 

the House also argues that Judge Porteous’s conduct is detrimental 

to the viability of the bankruptcy system. Specifically, the House 

contends that, in order for the bankruptcy system to function, a 

debtor must act in good faith when filing for bankruptcy. The 

House argues through his concealment of assets, preferential payments to creditors, undisclosed gambling losses and debts, and accrual of new debt following the confirmation of his plan, Judge 

Porteous failed to act in good faith and materially damaged the 

bankruptcy system. Given the number of bankruptcy cases active 

in the Eastern District of Louisiana at any given time, there is no 

opportunity for the trustee to double-check the debtor’s petition, 

schedules, and statement of financial affairs. Because of this, the 

candor and honesty of the debtor is important; otherwise ‘‘Chapter 

13 or Chapter 7 does not work.’’ Beaulieu, 2B at 1388. 

D. Expert Testimony 

1. Advice of Counsel 

As discussed above, Judge Porteous argues that he was entitled 

to rely on advice of counsel with respect to the use of a false name 

on his original bankruptcy petition. Expert witnesses presented by 

the House, however, were critical of the position that Lightfoot’s 

recommendation constituted legal advice. The Honorable Duncan 

W. Keir, Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Maryland, 

testified that he knew of no legal defense of or cure for perjury, 

which Judge Porteous committed when he signed his bankruptcy 

filings under a false name. Moreover, Judge Keir indicated that advising someone to knowingly commit a wrongful legal act does not 

constitute legal advice and that it may actually be collusion. Keir, 

2A at 1099–1100, 1102. 

Professor Charles Gardner Geyh, who was designated as an expert in judicial ethics, echoed this sentiment. Professor Geyh testified that Lightfoot’s suggestion to commit perjury cannot be considered advice of counsel in a ‘‘traditional context,’’ let alone in Judge 

Porteous’s bankruptcy case. Professor Geyh opined that, unlike an 

undereducated layperson, Judge Porteous should fully understand 

what signing his bankruptcy documents under penalty of perjury 

means. The advice of defense counsel, in his opinion, does not obviVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
52 

ate the ethical implications of Judge Porteous, who ‘‘being a lawyer 

and a judge, was able to exercise independent legal judgment [and 

yet] did not.’’ Geyh, 2A at 758–759, 769. 

2. Judge Greendyke’s Admonishment Against Accruing More 

Debt 

The parties also disagreed as to the validity of paragraph 4 of 

Judge Greendyke’s order prohibiting Judge Porteous from accruing 

additional debt. Ronald Barliant, a former U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 

in the Northern District of Illinois, testified that he considered 

Judge Greendyke’s order to constitute judicial error. Barliant testified that had he issued such an order, he would have ‘‘kicked himself for having entered’’ it and vacated the first sentence in paragraph 4 prohibiting the accrual of additional debt. Barring that, 

Barliant testified, he would attempt to ‘‘construe the order in a way 

that was consistent with the Bankruptcy Code.’’ Moreover, Barliant 

testified that he would be very reluctant to dismiss a Chapter 13 

case as long as the debtor made timely payments, even if that debtor had incurred post-petition debt, since doing so would end plan 

repayments and not help any of the interested parties. Barliant, 2B 

at 1719–1723. 

IV. ARTICLE IV

A. Text of the Article 

In 1994, in connection with his nomination to be a judge of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 

G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., knowingly made material false statements 

about his past to both the United States Senate and to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation in order to obtain the office of United States 

District Court Judge. These false statements included the following: 

(1) On his Supplemental SF–86, Judge Porteous was asked if 

there was anything in his personal life that could be used by someone to coerce or blackmail him, or if there was anything in his life 

that could cause an embarrassment to Judge Porteous or the President if publicly known. Judge Porteous answered ‘‘no’’ to this question and signed the form under the warning that a false statement 

was punishable by law. 

(2) During his background check, Judge Porteous falsely told the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation on two separate occasions that he 

was not concealing any activity or conduct that could be used to influence, pressure, coerce, or compromise him in any way or that 

would impact negatively on his character, reputation, judgment, or 

discretion. 

(3) On the Senate Judiciary Committee’s ‘‘Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees’’, Judge Porteous was asked whether any unfavorable 

information existed that could affect his nomination. Judge 

Porteous answered that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not 

know of any unfavorable information that may affect [his] nomination’’. Judge Porteous signed that questionnaire by swearing that 

‘‘the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my 

knowledge, true and accurate’’. 

However, in truth and in fact, as Judge Porteous then well knew, 

each of these answers was materially false because Judge Porteous 

had engaged in a corrupt relationship with the law firm Amato & 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
53 

Creely, whereby Judge Porteous appointed Creely as a ‘‘curator’’ in 

hundreds of cases and thereafter requested and accepted from 

Amato & Creely a portion of the curatorship fees which had been 

paid to the firm and also had engaged in a corrupt relationship 

with Louis and Lori Marcotte, whereby Judge Porteous solicited 

and accepted numerous things of value, including meals, trips, 

home repairs, and car repairs, for his personal use and benefit, 

while at the same time taking official actions that benefitted the 

Marcottes. As Judge Porteous well knew and understood, Louis 

Marcotte also made false statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in an effort to assist Judge Porteous in being appointed to 

the Federal bench. Judge Porteous’s failure to disclose these corrupt 

relationships deprived the United States Senate and the public of 

information that would have had a material impact on his confirmation. Wherefore, Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., is guilty of 

high crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed from office. 

B. Introduction to the Evidence 

Article IV focuses on the completeness and accuracy of Judge 

Porteous’s statements to the FBI and the Senate in connection with 

his nomination to the U.S. District Court. These include his responses to questions in the background investigation forms, questionnaires, and interviews. As with Article III, the evidence comprises mostly documents and is largely uncontested. This discussion begins by providing a narrative statement of facts, followed by 

contested issues identified by the parties. 

C. Statement of Facts 

In 1994, President William J. Clinton began considering Judge 

Porteous for an appointment to the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Louisiana. Judge Porteous was required to 

complete and submit various forms and questionnaires, including 

‘‘Standard Form 86’’ (SF–86), which he completed and signed on or 

about April 27, 1994. The SF–86 includes numerous background 

questions and requests personal and professional references. The 

form also asks the candidate about any prior criminal history, use 

of illegal drugs, or abuse of alcohol. See Stips. 167–169, 1C at 

2538–2539; Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 232–243). 

Judge Porteous also filled out and signed a document entitled 

‘‘Supplement to Standard Form 86 (SF–86), Questionnaire for Sensitive Positions (For National Security)’’ (Supplemental SF–86). 

Stip. 170, 1C at 2539. Among other topics, the Supplemental SF– 

86 form inquires into the candidate’s personal finances and interests in business entities. Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1790–1791. The final 

question on the Supplemental SF–86 form asks whether ‘‘there [is] 

anything in your personal life that could be used by someone to coerce or blackmail you? Is there anything in your life that could 

cause an embarrassment to you or to the President if publicly 

known? If so, please provide full details?’’ Judge Porteous answered, ‘‘No.’’ He also signed the document and adopted the following declaration: ‘‘I understand that the information being provided on this supplement to the SF–86 is to be considered part of 

the original SF–86 dated April 27, 1994 and a false statement on 

this form is punishable by law.’’ Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1791. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
54 

78 Early in the investigation, the FBI interviewed staff assistants of Senator J. Bennett Johnston, Jr., and Senator John Breaux of the State of Louisiana. Both Senators’ aides told the FBI 

that the Senators had known Judge Porteous for several years, thought he was well-qualified 

to be a federal judge, and had not heard any derogatory comments about him. Ex. 69(b) (full 

exhibit, at 278–279). 79 Hamil conservatively estimated that he had performed 100 interviews relating to FBI background checks over the course of his career. Hamil, 2A at 843. 80The FBI uses a standard form (FD–302) to prepare interview summaries; these summaries 

are routinely referred to in the impeachment proceedings as ‘‘302s.’’ See, e.g., Hamil, 2A at 844– 

845. 

Finally, Judge Porteous signed a ‘‘Memorandum for Prospective 

Appointees’’ issued by the White House, allowing the FBI to ‘‘investigate [his] background or conduct appropriate file reviews in connection with the consideration of [his] application for employment.’’ 

On June 23, 1994, the FBI received instructions to ‘‘initiate a background investigation of [Judge Porteous].’’ Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 

224–225). 

1. FBI Interviews 

Starting on or about June 24, 1994, a number of FBI agents conducted approximately 120 interviews of Judge Porteous’s personal 

and professional associates as part of his background investigation. 

Hamil, 2A at 843; Stip. 176, 1C at 2539; see generally Ex. 69(b) 

(full exhibit).78 Bobby Hamil, an FBI agent from 1983 to 2008,79

participated in several key interviews, including two of Judge 

Porteous. See Hamil, 2A at 814–815. Although he had no independent recollection of his responsibilities during Judge Porteous’s 

background investigation, Hamil offered testimony about the general background investigation interview process and Judge 

Porteous’s investigation based on contemporaneous notes and summaries he had prepared in 1994. Id. at 819–821, 844. 

Prior to a witness interview, an agent would review the candidate’s SF–86, as well as instructions from FBI headquarters. Id. 

at 818. When candidates, like other witnesses, are interviewed, 

they are not placed under oath nor are they given the opportunity 

to review or comment on the FBI agent’s summary write-up of the 

interview.80 Id. at 845–846. 

FBI agents follow a standard interview format that focuses on 

the candidate’s character, associates, responsibility, loyalty to the 

United States, ability, bias or prejudice, financial responsibility, alcohol abuse, and use of illegal drugs or abuse of prescription drugs. 

The last question in a background interview is the so-called ‘‘compromise or coercion’’ question. This question asks whether there is 

anything in the candidate’s background that could be used to coerce or compromise the candidate or might subject the candidate to 

undue influence or would impact negatively on his or her reputation or character. Id. at 816–818, 849–850. 

a. Initial interviews 

In early July 1994, FBI Agents Charlene Tackett and Bobby 

Hamil interviewed Judge Porteous and prepared a summary. Stip. 

180, 1C at 2539. They asked Judge Porteous a series of questions 

designed to elicit information that might bear upon his fitness to 

serve as a federal judge. The agents’ summary states, ‘‘PORTEOUS 

said he is not concealing any activity or conduct that could be used 

to influence, pressure, coerce, or compromise him in any way or 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
55 

81The FBI interview summary also indicates that ‘‘PORTEOUS said that he has not abused 

alcohol or prescription drugs or used illegal drugs, to include marijuana, during his entire adult 

life. He has had no participation in drug or alcohol counseling/rehabilitation programs since age 

18.’’ Ex. 69(i), 3B at 1829–1833. 82 Interviewees occasionally reveal adverse information about a candidate, but not in response 

to the question about any activity or conduct that could be used to influence, pressure, coerce, 

or compromise him in any way or that would impact negatively on the candidate’s character, 

reputation, judgment or discretion. Hamil, 2A at 868–869. 

that would impact negatively on the candidate’s character, reputation, judgement [sic], or discretion.’’ 81 Ex. 69(i), 3B at 1831. 

Hamil was not surprised that neither Judge Porteous nor any of 

the other persons interviewed in the background investigation answered the compromise-or-coercion question in the affirmative. 

Hamil could not recall a single candidate answering ‘‘Yes’’ to that 

specific question in all of the background investigation interviews 

he conducted over the course of his career; and even in non-candidate interviews, the answer is ‘‘just about always no.’’ See Hamil, 

2A at 851, 867–868; see also Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit).82

The FBI interviewed Louis Marcotte on two occasions during its 

background investigation of Judge Porteous. The first interview occurred on or about August 1, 1994. Stips. 171, 178, 1C at 2539. According to the FBI interview summary, Marcotte stated that he 

was a professional and social acquaintance of Judge Porteous who 

‘‘sometimes [went] out to lunch with the candidate and attorneys 

in the area.’’ Stip. 179, 1C at 2539. Marcotte also told the FBI that 

Judge Porteous was ‘‘really helpful and available for everybody’’ 

and was ‘‘open-minded and fair, but [was] not a push-over.’’ Marcotte generally discussed bond setting practices in the Jefferson 

Parish courthouse and his bail bonds business. Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 471). 

In his interview, Marcotte denied knowledge of any use of illegal 

drugs or abuse of alcohol or prescription drugs by Judge Porteous; 

Marcotte stated that Judge Porteous would have a beer or two at 

lunch but Marcotte had never seen him drunk. Marcotte also told 

the FBI that he had ‘‘no knowledge of the candidate’s financial situation’’ and assured the FBI that ‘‘he [was] not aware of anything 

in the candidate’s background that might be the basis of attempted 

influence, pressure, coercion, or compromise or that would impact 

negatively on the candidate’s character, reputation, judgment, or 

discretion.’’ Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 471). As discussed above in 

the context of Article II, Marcotte testified in the evidentiary hearings that he lied to the FBI during this interview about Judge 

Porteous’s financial circumstances, his alcohol usage, and in response to the general ‘‘integrity’’ questions. Marcotte stated that he 

understood at the time he was interviewed that his relationship 

with Judge Porteous was improper and that he lied to protect the 

lifetime federal appointment of Judge Porteous, who had been good 

to him, and himself. Louis Marcotte, 2A at 481–486. 

The FBI also interviewed Robert Creely on or about August 1, 

1994. The FBI summary of Creely’s interview states that Creely 

told the FBI that he had ‘‘never known the candidate to use illegal 

drugs or abuse alcohol or prescription drugs’’ and that he ‘‘was not 

aware of anything in the candidate’s background that might be the 

basis of attempted influence, pressure, coercion, or compromise or 

that would impact negatively on the candidate’s character, reputation, judgment, or discretion.’’ Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, 476–477). At 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
56 

83The Committee requested that the Department of Justice and the FBI provide unredacted 

versions of this and other FBI interview summaries. The Department declined to disclose information about the identity of a number of its confidential sources. 84 According to Hamil, after receiving instructions from FBI Headquarters to re-interview 

Judge Porteous but before he had contacted Judge Porteous to set up a second interview, Judge 

Porteous called him to discuss allegations of improper bond setting. Apparently, the FBI had 

raised these allegations in its interview of Jolene Acy, Judge Porteous’s civil court clerk, and 

she had apprised Judge Porteous. Hamil stated that he considered Judge Porteous’s unsolicited 

call to discuss such allegations to be ‘‘out of the ordinary’’ for a candidate. Hamil, 2A at 833– 

835; see Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1795. 

the evidentiary hearing, Creely testified that he misled the FBI in 

this interview about Judge Porteous’s finances because he ‘‘didn’t 

want to hurt the man and hurt his appointment.’’ Creely, 2A at 

282–283. 

On August 8, 1994, the FBI interviewed an individual who asked 

that his/her identity remain anonymous.83 This confidential source 

(referred to in the interview summary as T–6) made a number of 

allegations regarding Judge Porteous. This source alleged that 

Judge Porteous received things of value from Louis Marcotte in return for signing bonds ahead of time and reduced bonds in exchange for money. Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 524, 526). 

b. Follow-up interviews 

After the FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., received the results of the initial background investigation, it instructed the FBI 

field office in New Orleans to conduct an additional investigation. 

On August 12, 1994, FBI Headquarters sent a teletype to the New 

Orleans field office directing additional interviews ‘‘to verify and 

corroborate’’ information provided by a confidential source. Ex. 

69(b) (full exhibit, at 478–479); Hamil, 2A at 831–832. In particular, FBI Headquarters ordered the field agents to seek additional information concerning Judge Porteous’s bond-setting practices. FBI agents were also instructed to ask Louis Marcotte whether he was aware of any ‘‘exchange of money with Judge Porteous 

and others to get a bond reduction’’ for a specific individual. The 

agents were further instructed to re-interview Judge Porteous and 

to give him an opportunity to address these allegations. See Ex. 

69(b) (full exhibit, at 462–463, 478–480). 

Pursuant to the teletype, FBI agents interviewed Adam Barnett, 

another bail bondsman in Gretna, Louisiana, on August 17, 1994. 

Barnett stated that he did not know of any questionable conduct 

or acts by Judge Porteous, financial problems experienced by Judge 

Porteous, or personal problems or habits that would bar Judge 

Porteous from service as a federal judge; he went on to recommend 

Judge Porteous for the federal bench. Stip. 175, 1C at 2539. 

On or about August 17, 1994, Louis Marcotte was re-interviewed 

by the FBI. According to the FBI summary, Marcotte was ‘‘confronted with questions and information about his knowledge and 

relationship’’ of specific bond matters. Hamil, 2A at 833; Stip. 172, 

1C at 2539. Marcotte ‘‘totally den[ied] . . . arranging for a portion 

of the bond reduction fee to go directly to Judge Porteous as a 

‘kickback.’ ’’ Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 513–514). 

On or about August 18, 1994, Judge Porteous was interviewed by 

the FBI for the second time. Hamil, 2A at 836; Stip. 173, 1C at 

2539. Agent Hamil interviewed Judge Porteous regarding the allegations of misconduct regarding bond-setting practices.84 Judge 

Porteous was asked about allegations that he had received monies 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
57 

85 Hamil did not ask Judge Porteous about lunches with Louis Marcotte, curatorships, or gifts 

received from Robert Creely or Jacob Amato. See Hamil, 2A at 846; Exs. 69(i), 3B at 1829–1833; 

69(k), 3B at 1835. 86Like Exhibit 69(b), the Exhibit 439 series is also omitted from the public record, but available to Senators upon request. 

from an attorney and a bail bondsman to reduce bonds; he was also 

questioned about his reduction of an unrelated bond, for which 

Adam Barnett was the bondsman. Judge Porteous denied these allegations and the allegations raised by FBI confidential source T– 

6. According to the FBI interview summary, Judge Porteous ‘‘denied that he had ever signed any bail bonds ‘in blank’ and reiterated that he was unaware of anything in his background that 

might be the basis of attempted influence, pressure, coercion, or 

compromise and/or would impact negatively on his character, reputation, judgment, or discretion.’’ See Hamil, 2A at 837–839; Ex. 

69(b), 3B at 1797–1798; Ex. 69(k), 3B at 1835.85

Once the FBI field agents completed the background investigation, the results were sent to FBI Headquarters for transmittal to 

the Department of Justice. On August 19, 1994, the FBI sent a 

background note to the Department of Justice, summarizing the 

FBI’s findings (including the allegations made by the confidential 

source identified as T–6) and stating it had completed the investigation. Hamil, 2A at 862–863; Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 530). 

2. Nomination and Senate Confirmation 

On August 25, 1994, President Clinton nominated Judge 

Porteous to be a United States District Court Judge for the Eastern 

District of Louisiana. During the Senate confirmation process, 

Judge Porteous completed a United States Senate Judiciary Committee ‘‘Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees’’ (Senate Judiciary 

Questionnaire). Ex. 9(a), 3B at 602–604; Stips. 12, 182, 1C at 2526, 

2539. 

When asked on the Senate Judiciary Questionnaire whether 

there was ‘‘any unfavorable information that may affect your nomination,’’ Judge Porteous answered, ‘‘To the best of my knowledge, 

I do not know of any unfavorable information that may affect my 

nomination.’’ Judge Porteous adopted the affidavit at the end of the 

Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, which stated: ‘‘I, Gabriel Thomas 

Porteous, Jr., do swear that the information provided in this statement is, to the best of my knowledge, true and accurate.’’ The Senate Judiciary Questionnaire was signed by Judge Porteous and notarized. Stip. 174, 1C at 2539; Ex. 9(f), 3B at 696–697. 

Upon receiving Judge Porteous’s nomination, Senate Judiciary 

Committee staff was given access to his FBI background investigation file. One staff member took notes on this file, which included 

the following allegations: that Judge Porteous ‘‘took kick-backs’’ in 

relation to Louis Marcotte, that he was living beyond his means 

and questioned whether he might be involved in some type of 

criminal activity, that he had a drinking problem, and that he gambled on occasion. The Judiciary Committee staff also placed additional telephone calls to Robert Creely, Donald Gardner, and Louis 

Marcotte, among others. Ex. 439(q) (full exhibit) 86; see also Stip. 

184, 1C at 2540. 

Judge Porteous’s confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee was held on October 6, 1994; he was confirmed by 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
58 

the Senate on the following day. Judge Porteous received his judicial commission on October 11, 1994, and was sworn in on October 

28, 1994. Stips. 13–16, 1C at 2527; Ex. 9(c), 3B at 655–656. 

D. Contested Issues 

The parties offer sharply different views about whether Judge 

Porteous misled or withheld information from the FBI or the Senate during his background investigation. The core factual disagreement is whether, as the House argues, Judge Porteous lied to and 

withheld relevant information from the FBI in response to certain 

questions about his background or whether, as Judge Porteous contends, his answers were realistic responses to flawed and ambiguous ‘‘catchall’’ questions. 

1. The House’s Perspective 

The House maintains that several of Judge Porteous’s answers in 

response to the background investigation and Senate confirmation 

questions were false and made with the intent to deceive in order 

to obtain a judicial appointment without disclosing material information that would have adversely affected his nomination. The 

House identifies four separate occasions in which Judge Porteous 

allegedly lied prior to his confirmation: once on the White House 

Supplemental SF–86, twice during FBI interviews, and once to the 

Senate on the Judiciary Committee Questionnaire. According to the 

House, Judge Porteous withheld information during the background investigation and confirmation process about his ongoing 

corrupt relationships, namely, the ‘‘curatorship scheme’’ with 

Creely and the firm of Amato & Creely, and his corrupt relationship with Louis and Lori Marcotte. See Ex. 69(b), 3B at 1791, 

1796–1798; Ex. 69(i), 3B at 1829–1833; Ex. 9(f), 3B 662–697. 

2. Judge Porteous’s Perspective 

Judge Porteous denies that he withheld information from, or otherwise lied to, the FBI or the Senate during his confirmation. 

Judge Porteous faults the broad ‘‘catchall’’ questions on the Supplemental SF–86, the FBI interviews, and the Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire as overly vague and ambiguous. To the extent 

that he admits receiving lunches and gifts from friends who were 

attorneys and bail bondsmen, he argues that there is no evidence 

that he believed such conduct to be a basis for coercion, blackmail, 

public embarrassment, or unfavorable to his nomination. In fact, he 

notes that the lunches with Creely, Amato, and the Marcottes all 

occurred in public places because he had nothing to hide. He insists 

that the House has presented no evidence that he concealed unfavorable or embarrassing information from the White House, the 

FBI, or the Senate. 

Judge Porteous also dismisses the notion that he misled the FBI 

in light of the information of alleged misconduct gathered by the 

FBI and made available to the Senate. He cites as evidence the 

FBI summaries of Louis Marcotte’s interview about his occasional 

lunches and professional relationship with Judge Porteous. Hamil, 

2A at 847–848, 856–857. These summaries were made available to 

the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Ex. 69(b) (full exhibit, at 471, 

526); Ex. 439(q). Judge Porteous also cites Marcotte’s testimony 

that Marcotte never thought he would extort or embarrass Judge 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
59 

Porteous as leverage. Ex. 447, 3E at 5052–5053. In Judge 

Porteous’s view, this admission only confirms that he responded 

truthfully to the compromise-or-coercion, public embarrassment, 

and unfavorable information questions in the Supplemental SF–86, 

the FBI interviews, and the Senate Judiciary Committee Questionnaire. 

D. Expert Testimony 

The parties offered two experts who addressed the allegations in 

Article IV. The House called Professor Charles Geyh of the Indiana 

University—Bloomington Maurer School of Law as an expert in judicial ethics. Judge Porteous offered Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie 

of Colby College as an expert in presidential appointments, the appointments process, and governmental ethics. The Committee accepted both professors as experts in their designated areas. See 

Geyh, 2A at 714–716; Mackenzie, 2B at 1807. 

1. Professor Charles G. Geyh 

Professor Geyh was asked a number of questions regarding the 

discipline of a judicial officer for misleading or providing false information to the Senate Judiciary Committee. When asked about 

his expert opinion on Judge Porteous’s alleged conduct during the 

federal nomination and Senate confirmation process, he opined that 

if Judge Porteous had made false statements under oath it would 

reflect adversely on his integrity. Although he acknowledged that 

the statements in the confirmation process are ‘‘a trickier question’’ 

because the standard compromise-or-coercion question has ‘‘weasel 

room,’’ the serious allegations regarding the curatorships, the bail 

bonds, and other quid pro quo schemes, if true, are subjects that 

would affect any nominee in Judge Porteous’s position and possibly 

make him vulnerable to blackmail. Therefore, in this circumstance, 

answering ‘‘no’’ to the compromise-or-coercion question in his background investigation would ‘‘qualify as perjury.’’ See Geyh, 2A at 

734–736. 

On cross-examination, Professor Geyh was asked about several 

instances in which a candidate for presidential appointment was 

alleged to have made false statements to the Senate Judiciary 

Committee. When asked about one case in which a judge provided 

allegedly inconsistent testimony and submissions to the Senate, 

Professor Geyh agreed that the intent of the judge is a relevant factor when considering discipline of a judge who provided inconsistent or false information to the Senate Judiciary Committee. 

Professor Geyh also emphasized that there is important ‘‘context to 

all cases.’’ See id. at 757–758,760–761. 

2. Professor G. Calvin Mackenzie 

Professor Mackenzie testified that the process of FBI background 

checks began in the Eisenhower administration and was directed 

at uncovering national security risks. Mackenzie explained that the 

decision to nominate an individual for a presidential appointment 

requiring Senate approval begins an elaborate process involving 

numerous forms and document productions. Mackenzie, 2B at 

1807–1809. Professor Mackenzie stated that the average nominee 

has to answer approximately 200 written questions during the 

nomination process and that many of these questions are redunVerDate Mar 15 2010 08:00 Nov 17, 2010 Jkt 062202 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR347.XXX SR347

rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
60 

87On cross-examination, Professor Mackenzie agreed that the forms and questionnaires include many valid questions (such as the compromise-or-coercion question) that are important 

safeguards for high-level federal appointments; he only advocated eliminating some of the redundancy in the forms and questionnaires. Id. at 1855–1857. 

dant. Id. at 1826–1827. He also stated that there is evidence that 

‘‘these background checks are not very useful to most people in the 

process’’ because of the accumulation of unverified information in 

background files.’’ 87 Id. at 1810. 

Professor Mackenzie opined that many candidates find answering numerous specific and intrusive questions about their professional and personal lives to be quite burdensome and that when 

asked a broad ‘‘catchall’’ question (such as the compromise-or-coercion question) at the end of the form or interview, most candidates 

consider the question to be redundant and answer ‘‘No.’’ When 

asked if he personally knew of any candidate who had answered 

the compromise-or-coercion question affirmatively, he responded, 

‘‘No, I don’t, but I suspect [any such candidates] wouldn’t have 

completed the process if they added something different to that 

question.’’ See id. at 1811–1814. 

Regarding the question on Supplemental SF–86 that seeks information that was potentially embarrassing or could be used for coercion or blackmail, Professor Mackenzie testified that the question 

is ‘‘ambiguous’’ and ‘‘very difficult to apply.’’ He further noted that 

‘‘history is replete with examples of people who have answered no 

to this question, gone into the confirmation process or sometimes 

even gone through successfully the confirmation process, only to 

have information come out later which was embarrassing to them, 

sometimes embarrassing to the President.’’ Professor Mackenzie 

also testified that while the compromise-or-coercion question is 

asked ‘‘routinely’’ of ‘‘virtually everybody who is interviewed,’’ he 

could not recall any candidate who had ever responded affirmatively to this question. Id. at 1811–1814. Nor was he aware of any 

individual who has ever responded affirmatively to a question that 

asks the candidate to ‘‘advise the Committee of any unfavorable information that may affect your nomination’’ or any nominee who 

had ever been prosecuted or removed from office for falsely answering such a question. See id. at 1835. 

Professor Mackenzie clarified that candidates have no right to lie 

in response to ‘‘catchall questions’’ on the Supplemental SF–86 or 

the Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, and if the nominee were to 

give false answers, that would be a problem. Id. at 1890. He agreed 

that the disclosure that a candidate had taken kickbacks from attorneys as a state court judge, as well as receiving gifts from and 

performing favors for bail bondsmen, would unfavorably affect, and 

likely kill, any federal appointment. See id. at 1863–1867. He also 

acknowledged that the catchall question serves the purpose of preventing a candidate from hiding and rationalizing unfavorable facts 

during the background investigation as long as no question specifically asked about that fact. Id. at 1885–1886. For these reasons, he 

was ‘‘not opposed to the catchall questions.’’ See id. at 1860–1862, 

1887. 

* * * * * 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
61 

88Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate, 99th Cong., 

2nd Sess., Doc. 99–33, at 4 (August 15, 1986). 

COMMITTEE ROLLCALL VOTE 

In compliance with paragraph 7(b) and (c) of rule XXVI of the 

Standing Rules of the Senate, the record of the rollcall vote of the 

Impeachment Trial Committee on the Articles Against Judge G. 

Thomas Porteous, Jr., to issue this report to the Senate was as follows: 

YEAS NAYS 

Mrs. MCCASKILL

Mr. HATCH

Ms. KLOBUCHAR

Mr. WHITEHOUSE

Mr. UDALL

Ms. SHAHEEN

Mr. DEMINT

Mr. BARRASSO

Mr. WICKER

Mr. JOHANNS

Mr. RISCH (by proxy) 

ADDENDUM A 

RULE XI OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE

SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 88

That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the 

Senate, if the Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take testimony at such times and 

places as the committee may determine, and for such purpose the 

committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by 

the committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and 

the Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively, under the rules of 

procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment 

trials. 

Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure 

and practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials 

shall govern the procedure and practice of the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in 

writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before such committee, and such report shall 

be received by the Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes, 

subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality, as having been received and taken before 

the Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open Senate, or 

by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
62 

ADDENDUM B 

111th Congress, 2d Session 

S. RES. 458

To provide for the appointment of a committee to receive and to 

report evidence with respect to articles of impeachment against 

Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 17, 2010

Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. MCCONNELL) submitted the following resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION

To provide for the appointment of a committee to receive and to 

report evidence with respect to articles of impeachment against 

Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. 

Resolved, That pursuant to Rule XI of the Rules of Procedure and 

Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, the 

Presiding Officer shall appoint a committee of twelve senators to 

perform the duties and to exercise the powers provided for in the 

rule. 

SEC. 2. The majority and minority leader shall each recommend 

six members, including a chairman and vice chairman, respectively, to the Presiding Officer for appointment to the committee. 

SEC. 3. The committee shall be deemed to be a standing committee of the Senate for the purpose of reporting to the Senate resolutions for the criminal or civil enforcement of the committee’s 

subpoenas or orders, and for the purpose of printing reports, hearings, and other documents for submission to the Senate under Rule 

XI. 

SEC. 4. During proceedings conducted under Rule XI the chairman of the committee is authorized to waive the requirement 

under the Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials that questions by a Senator to a witness, a manager, or counsel shall be reduced to writing and put by 

the Presiding Officer. 

SEC. 5. In addition to a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before it, the committee is 

authorized to report to the Senate a statement of facts that are 

uncontested and a summary, with appropriate references to the 

record, of evidence that the parties have introduced on contested 

issues of fact. 

SEC. 6. (a) The actual and necessary expenses of the committee, 

including the employment of staff at an annual rate of pay, and the 

employment of consultants with prior approval of the Committee 

on Rules and Administration at a rate not to exceed the maximum 

daily rate for a standing committee of the Senate, shall be paid 

from the contingent fund of the Senate from the appropriation account ‘‘Miscellaneous Items’’ upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the committee, except that no voucher shall be required to 

pay the salary of any employee who is compensated at an annual 

rate of pay. 

(b) In carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under this 

resolution, the committee is authorized, in its discretion and with 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
63 

89 Judge Porteous requested a total of ten depositions. 

the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on 

a reimbursable, or nonreimbursable, basis the services of personnel 

of any such department or agency. 

SEC. 7. The committee appointed pursuant to section one of this 

resolution shall terminate no later than 60 days after the pronouncement of judgment by the Senate on the articles of impeachment. 

SEC. 8. The Secretary shall notify the House of Representatives 

and counsel for Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr. of this resolution. 

ADDENDUM C 

DESCRIPTION OF COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS

This Addendum offers a brief overview of the Committee’s proceedings, which are documented by the certified record. The Committee’s proceedings are best understood in two phases: the pretrial matters and the evidentiary hearings. 

PRE-TRIAL MATTERS

The pre-trial phase of the Committee’s work occurred from 

March 17 to September 13, 2010, during which the Committee addressed discovery issues, pre-trial evidentiary disputes, witness 

subpoena and immunity requests, stipulations, and other procedural matters. In addition to document discovery, the Committee 

authorized the pre-trial deposition of four principal witnesses upon 

Judge Porteous’s request: Jacob Amato, Robert Creely, Louis Marcotte, and Lori Marcotte.89 1A at 296–298. The correspondence, filings and motions, and Committee orders on these pre-trial matters 

are found in Part 1 of the certified record. Three pre-trial matters 

deserve to be highlighted. 

First, in June 2010, the Committee disqualified one of Judge 

Porteous’s counsel because of a serious conflict of interest based on 

his concurrent representation of two of the most important witnesses, Louis and Lori Marcotte, in a pending, related civil proceeding. 1A at 625–632. The Committee continued its scheduled 

hearings by six weeks to account for the substitution of additional 

counsel. The filings and the Committee’s order addressing this conflict of interest are found in Part 1A. 

Second, on August 4, 2010, the Committee held a hearing on 

three issues raised in the parties’ pre-trial motions: Judge 

Porteous’s motion to dismiss based on the asserted unconstitutional 

aggregation of conduct in the articles of impeachment, the parties’ 

cross-motions on the use of Judge Porteous’s prior immunized testimony before the Fifth Circuit Special Investigatory Committee, and 

the parties’ cross-motions on the admissibility of other prior witness testimony from the Fifth Circuit judicial disciplinary hearings 

and the House impeachment proceedings. The Committee declined 

to hear pre-trial arguments on Judge Porteous’s four motions to 

dismiss the individual articles of impeachment because the motions 

relied on and cited to evidence that had not yet been received by 

the Committee. After deliberations and votes on the remaining motions, the Committee issued an order on August 25, 2010, denying 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
64 

Judge Porteous’s motion to dismiss based on the aggregation of 

conduct, permitting use of Judge Porteous’s immunized testimony 

from the Fifth Circuit, and deeming admissible some other witness 

testimony from the Fifth Circuit and the House impeachment proceedings, namely, the prior testimony of fact witnesses who had 

been the subject of cross-examination. 1B at 1967–1973. The Committee denied the House’s motion to compel Judge Porteous to testify. The order, related filings, and transcript from the pre-trial motions hearing are found in Part 1B. 

Third, the Committee engaged in prolonged discussions, on behalf of Judge Porteous, with the Department of Justice regarding 

discovery requests for documents within the possession of the Department. 1C at 1999–2000. As a result, the Department made a 

number of productions from its investigation of Judge Porteous in 

late August and September 2010. The filings and correspondence 

regarding the discovery to the Department are found in Part 1C. 

THE EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS

The evidentiary hearings of the Committee took place over five 

days, on September 13, 14, 15, 16, and 21, 2010. 

The Committee subpoenaed all fact witnesses requested by the 

parties with two exceptions. Judge Porteous requested subpoenas 

for two attorneys with the Department of Justice, Criminal Division, who were involved in the investigation of Judge Porteous. The 

House requested a subpoena to compel Judge Porteous’s testimony. 

For both of these matters, the subpoena requests were considered 

and denied by the full Committee. The Committee declined to subpoena the parties’ proffered expert witnesses, but permitted selected expert testimony to be introduced. The Committee paid for 

the travel expenses of all subpoenaed witnesses. 1A at 553. 

Each party was allotted twenty hours to present its case. The 

House called 14 witnesses; Judge Porteous called 12 witnesses. 

Each witness was subject to examination by counsel for the parties 

and, in some cases, by the members of the Committee. Neither side 

was denied the opportunity to call a witness based on insufficient 

time. 1C at 2581–2582. 

The Committee also admitted exhibits during the evidentiary 

hearings and additional exhibits in consultation with the parties 

following the hearings to complete the record. 3A at 342–363. The 

Committee declined to include in the certified record two admitted 

exhibits in their entirety: Exhibit 69(b), which is the FBI’s background investigation file for Judge Porteous’s federal appointment, 

and Exhibit 439, which is the Senate Judiciary Committee’s nomination file of Judge Porteous. These exhibits, however, will be 

available to Senators only upon request for review. The transcripts 

of the evidentiary hearings are found in Parts 2A and 2B, and the 

admitted exhibits are contained in Parts 3B, 3C, 3D, and 3E. 

After the evidentiary hearings, the Committee requested from 

the parties proposed findings of fact and post-trial briefs on the factual and legal issues. The proposed findings of fact are found in 

Part 3A. The post-trial briefs will be provided separately to each 

Senator along with this report and the certified record. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
65 

ADDENDUM D 

GLOSSARY OF NAMES APPEARING IN THE COMMITTEE REPORT

1. Amato, Jacob J., Jr.—Attorney with longstanding friendship 

with Judge Porteous, who was retained as counsel for Liljeberg in 

the Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article I. 

Former law partner of Judge Porteous and of Robert Creely. 

2. Barliant, Ronald—Former U.S. Bankruptcy Judge for the 

Northern District of Illinois, called by Judge Porteous as an expert 

witness on bankruptcy law. 

3. Barnett, Adam—Bail bondsman in Gretna, Louisiana, who 

worked with the Marcottes and Judge Porteous. 

4. Beaulieu, S.J., Jr.—Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee for the 

Eastern District of Louisiana who oversaw Judge Porteous’s personal bankruptcy. 

5. Bodenheimer, Ronald—Former state court judge of the 24th 

Judicial District Court, first elected in 1999, who pled guilty to corruption in ‘‘Operation Wrinkled Robe.’’ 

6. Ciolino, Dane—Professor at Loyola University School of Law 

called by Judge Porteous as an expert witness on judicial ethics 

and standards, as well as practices in the 24th Judicial District 

Court. 

7. Creely, Robert—Attorney with longstanding friendship with 

Judge Porteous and partner of Jacob Amato. 

8. Danos, Rhonda—Judge Porteous’s secretary during his time as 

both a state court judge and a federal district court judge. 

9. Duhon, Jeffrey—Former Employee of Bail Bonds Unlimited. 

10. Gardner, Donald—Attorney with longstanding friendship 

with Judge Porteous, who was retained by Lifemark in the 

Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article I. 

11. Geyh, Charles G.—Professor at Indiana University School of 

Law who was called as an expert witness by the House on judicial 

ethics. 

12. Goyeneche, Raphael—President of the Metropolitan Crime 

Commission, a non-profit community organization to report crime 

and corruption in New Orleans, LA. 

13. Greendyke, William R.—Former judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas who presided over 

Judge Porteous’s personal bankruptcy from 2001 through 2004. 

14. Griffin, Darcy—Criminal minute clerk for Judge Porteous between 1992 and 1994 on the 24th JDC. 

15. Hamil, Bobby P., Jr.—Former FBI Agent who was involved 

in the background investigation of Judge Porteous for his federal 

judicial nomination. 

16. Hildebrand, Henry—Standing Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustee for the Middle District of Tennessee who was called as an expert 

witness by Judge Porteous on bankruptcy law. 

17. Horner, DeWayne—FBI agent who was part of ‘‘Operation 

Wrinkled Robe’’ and who led the related investigation of Judge 

Porteous. 

18. Keir, Duncan W.—Chief Judge of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court 

for the District of Maryland who testified as an expert witness for 

the House on the area of bankruptcy law. 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING
66 

19. Levenson, Leonard—Attorney with longstanding relationship 

with Judge Porteous who represented Liljeberg in the Lifemark v. 

Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article I. 

20. Lightfoot, Claude—Bankruptcy attorney retained by Judge 

Porteous in the summer of 2000. 

21. Mackenzie, G. Calvin—Professor of Government at Colby College who was called as an expert witness by Judge Porteous on the 

federal appointments process and Senate confirmation. 

22. Mamoulides, John—Former Jefferson Parish District Attorney from 1972 to 1996, during which time Judge Porteous was an 

Assistant District Attorney and, later, a state court judge. 

23. Marcotte, Lori—Former employee of Bail Bonds Unlimited 

and sister of bail bondsman Louis Marcotte. 

24. Marcotte, Louis—Bail bondsman who founded Bail Bonds 

Unlimited. 

25. Mole, Joseph—Attorney who represented Lifemark in the 

Lifemark v. Liljeberg case that is the subject of Article I. 

26. Netterville, Bruce—Attorney with longstanding relationship 

with the Marcottes and Judge Porteous. 

27. Pardo, Rafael—Professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law who was called as an expert witness by Judge 

Porteous on bankruptcy law. 

28. Porteous, Timothy—Judge Porteous’s son. 

29. Rees, Robert B.—Criminal defense attorney who represented 

Aubrey Wallace on the set aside of his burglary conviction. 

30. Reynolds, Mike—Former Assistant District Attorney who represented the state in the hearing on the motion to set aside Aubrey 

Wallace’s burglary conviction. 

31. Tackett, Cheyenne—Former FBI Agent who was involved in 

the background investigation of Judge Porteous for his federal judicial nomination. 

32. Wallace, Aubrey—Former employee of Bail Bonds Unlimited. 

Æ 


rmajette on DSK29S0YB1PROD with HEARING