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62–401 PDF 2010

U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION: NEXT 

STEPS FOR THE ME ́RIDA INITIATIVE 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, 

AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Serial No. 111–68 

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Serial No. 111–123 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 27, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security and the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

LAURA RICHARDSON, California 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

AL GREEN, Texas 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

MARY JO KILROY, Ohio 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

VACANCY

VACANCY

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana 

STEVE AUSTRIA, Ohio 

I. LANIER AVANT, Staff Director 

ROSALINE COHEN, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

AL GREEN, Texas 

VACANCY

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

ALISON NORTHOP, Staff Director 

NIKKI HADDER, Clerk 

MANDY BOWERS, Minority Subcommittee Lead 
(III) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MICHAEL E. MCMAHON, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

LYNN WOOLSEY, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM COSTA, California 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

YLEEM POBLETE, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

RON KLEIN, Florida 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 

Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security ...................................... 1 

The Honorable Eliot L. Engel, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7 

The Honorable Connie Mack, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs ............................................................... 8 

The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, Committee on Homeland Security ......... 2 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .. 10 

WITNESSES

PANEL I 

Ms. Roberta Jacobson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 12 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 14 

Ms. Mariko Silver, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Office of International Affairs, Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 21 

Mr. Alonzo Pen ̃ a, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27 

Mr. Allen Gina, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Intelligence and 

Operations Coordination, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department 

of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38 

PANEL II 

Mr. John D. Negroponte, Vice Chairman, McLarty Associates: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 77 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 79 

Ms. Shannon K. O’Neil, Douglas Dillon Fellow For Latin America Studies, 

Council On Foreign Relations: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 81 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 83 

Bill McDonald, Rancher, Douglas, Arizona: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 89 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 91 
Page

VI 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Eliot L. Engel of New York for Roberta Jacobson .. 109 

Questions From Chairman Henry Cuellar of Texas for Allen Gina .................... 112 

Questions From Chairman Henry Cuellar of Texas for Alonzo R. Pen ̃ a ............ 117 

Question From Chairman Eliot L. Engel for Alonzo R. Pen ̃ a .............................. 117 

Questions From Chairman Henry Cuellar of Texas for Mariko Silver ............... 118 

Question From Chairman Eliot L. Engel for Mariko Silver ................................. 119 

Questions From Chairman Henry Cuellar of Texas for Shannon K. O’Neil ....... 120 
(1) 

U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION: NEXT 

STEPS FOR THE ME ́ RIDA INITIATIVE 

Thursday, May 27, 2010 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL

TERRORISM, AND

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar [Chairman 

of the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism] presiding. 

Present from Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism 

subcommittee: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Sanchez, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Kirkpatrick, Green, McCaul, Smith, Bilirakis, 

and Miller. 

Present from Western Hemisphere subcommittee: Representatives Engel, Green, Giffords, Lee, Mack, and Bilirakis. 

Mr. CUELLAR [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to order. 

The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, 

Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, are meeting today to receive testimony on the ‘‘U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: Next Steps for the Me ́rida Initiative.’’ 

I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Chairman Eliot 

Engel, who will be here in a few minutes, and the Members of the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, for agreeing to hold this joint hearing today. 

The issues before us are of great concern to both subcommittees, 

and I anticipate a thoughtful and productive discussion. 

I would also like to welcome the new Ranking Member of the 

Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, 

my friend, Candice Miller of Michigan. 

We now have the southern and northern border represented. 

Both of us represent districts along the Nation’s board, and I 

know we have several issues of mutual interest. I would also look 

forward to working with her in the next weeks and months ahead 

on some of the issues facing both the north and the southern border. 

Also, the Chairman of the full committee is here. Mr. Thompson, 

thank you for all the leadership that you have provided to us. 
2 

This brings us, today, to today’s hearing on the Me ́rida Initiative 

and the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. This hearing could not be 

more timely. 

It comes on the heels of the Mexican president, Felipe Caldero ́n’s 

state visit and address to Congress last week. It also follows this 

week’s announcement by the Obama administration regarding border security, about a half a billion dollars going down to the southern border, requesting the $500 million in supplemental border security funding along with the 1,200 National Guard going down to 

the border. 

Since the introduction of my bill in the 110th Congress, A Prosperous and Secure Neighbor Alliance Act of 2007, which I believe 

laid the groundwork for the aid to Mexico, I have been a strong 

supporter of the Me ́rida Initiative along with some of the other 

Members that we have here today. Again, I was greatly encouraged 

by the dialogue that we had with President Caldero ́n last week. 

As the witnesses are well aware of, I do have some concerns 

about the $1.3 million for the Me ́rida Initiative that has not been 

allocated nor put to use as soon as possible. I know we have talked 

to some of the witnesses, and they are moving this as quickly as 

possible, and we certainly encourage and will be talking about this. 

Secretary Jacobson, I know this is being moved quicker, and we 

appreciate all that work. 

I look forward, also, to working in the next few months to facilitate an increase in the pace of this funding and working with the 

Chairman, also, on this particular issue. 

I think, as President Caldero ́n said in his address to Congress 

last week, restoring public security will not be easy and will not 

be quick. This is a battle that has to be fought because the future 

of the families are at stake. 

That is why it is essential that we continue the good work that 

we all have initiated with the Me ́rida program by supporting continued funding to ensure the security of the southern border going 

forward. 

As an important part of the House war supplemental, that is 

also, as you know, part of that funding will be part of that House 

war supplemental. Those who live in the southern border and communities are in the front line of the U.S.-Mexico policy, and I think 

whether you are in California or Arizona, Texas, New Mexico, and 

other parts, we understand why this is important. 

The continued funding for Me ́rida benefits not only Mexico but 

also, ultimately, U.S. security and prosperity, also, as well. 

Representing the Texas border, I support the President’s supplemental funding request to augment efforts to secure the American 

southern border. We might have to work some of the details, but 

we will look forward—Congress, both the House and the Senate, 

working with the White House on this issue. 

It is also—I want to thank some of the border Members that— 

as you recall, back in April, we requested over $500 million in 

emergency funding to support this. I know both on the Republican 

and on the House side, we have been pushing for this because it 

is important to secure the border. 

Again, we are interested, also, in learning more details about the 

President’s proposal for deployment of the National Guard in the 
3 

southern border. I think this, working along with our State, Federal, local law enforcement officials so we can accomplish more and 

cooperate in making sure that we secure the border. 

For today’s hearing, I look forward to hearing our witnesses’ perspective about the implementation of the Me ́rida Initiative up to 

now and their thoughts on the next steps for the program, the four 

pillars that I think we have talked about. I want to hear about 

their impressions regarding the on-going violence in Mexico and 

the potential for increased violence along the southern border and 

ways that we can improve the infrastructure and ensure a safe environment for our families and businesses. 

I thank the witnesses for joining us today and the Members for 

their participation. 

The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on the Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism, 

the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller, for an opening statement. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate your introduction of me as well, and I certainly want 

to recognize that you, as well, have been—you are renowned in the 

Congress, certainly, as an advocate for strong border security and 

increasing assets and resources to the border, particularly the 

southwest border. 

In fact, I was just noting that—and I would congratulate you on 

the recent announcement about the airspace that is been approved 

for the UAVs along Texas. I know there is—they are looking at a 

station in Corpus Christi as well. As you mentioned, one of my 

principle advocacies is northern border, but believe me, we are all, 

on the northern border, are well aware of the challenges that are 

happening on the southern border as well. 

I think additionally, this announcement this week by President 

Obama about the 1,200 National Guard troops to the southern border as well as in looking for the other $500 million is very significant. It is certainly an important first step, although, I think many 

feel that we still have a long way to go there, and we would like 

to see some additional, particularly National Guard, deployed along 

the border there. I think the President would find a huge amount 

of support in the Congress on both sides for that kind of action. 

This is going to be a very interesting hearing. Over the past 3 

years, Mexico has seen the murder of more than 14,000 people. 

That is more than 12 deaths every single day just related to drug 

violence. Of course we, unfortunately, have seen much of that violence cross into the United States. We have seen the recent murder 

in Arizona of the rancher, Mr. Krentz, and then the shooting of the 

sheriff—the county sheriff there in Pinal County, Louie Puroll, 

both by suspected drug smugglers. 

According to the 2009 National drug threat assessment, Mexican 

gangs, as they say, are the biggest organized crime threat to the 

United States. They are operating in at least 230 of our cities and 

towns where they are the dominant wholesale drug traffickers in 

the United States. Street gangs operate in every State in the 

United States and distribute illegal drugs and are often responsible, obviously, for crimes and violence in our cities across America. 
4 

In an effort to combat the growing threat of drug-related violence, the United States and Mexico announced this Me ́rida Initiative in October 2007. Since then, Congress has appropriated over 

$1.3 billion for this program in Mexico and almost $300 million as 

well for related programs in the Centrals and the Caribbean as 

well under the theory that improved security and reforms in these 

countries will improve security in our own country. 

This program has drawn bipartisanship support, and this hearing is an opportunity to examine some of the implementation 

delays which have limited the success of the program. Again, we 

will be looking forward to the witnesses today for their insight on 

how that is happening. 

DHS, especially CBP and ICE as well play a critical role in stopping this violence and providing important support and training to 

their counterparts in Mexico. Under President Caldero ́n’s leadership, there are 45,000 Mexican military troops deployed to try and 

break the hold drug cartels have had over parts of Mexico. 

With the help of these funds, President Caldero ́n is establishing 

a new police force and is seeking to root out corruption in the legal 

system. 

I think it is very important to include this in the record. To demonstrate that, while we are very concerned about the violence and 

the threat posed to the United States, that we recognize the government of Mexico’s efforts in this regard. In many ways, the increase in violence shows that security efforts, both in the United 

States and Mexico are working in threatening the cartels. 

However, I would note that while the cooperation between our 

two countries is at an all-time high, I would just on a personal 

note, make a comment about what President Caldero ́n said last 

week about the Arizona immigration law when he was addressing 

a joint session of Congress. I thought that his comments were extremely inappropriate, quite frankly. 

Our Nation and its States have a sovereign duty to secure our 

borders and protect our citizens, and many of us took offense to the 

interference by President Caldero ́n when Mexico’s own immigration 

laws are, in many ways, much stricter than ours, including Article 

67 that demands that federal, state, and municipal law enforcement confirm the legal presence of individuals. I think violators 

there face 2-year felony—incarcerated. 

The reality is that there is a crisis at our borders that requires 

legislative action. If Congress doesn’t act to secure our borders and 

ensure that the Department of Homeland Security is held accountable for enforcing existing laws, additional States will be forced to 

act unilaterally. 

Mr. Chairman, I certainly look forward to working together with 

you and everybody on the committee to ensure that the Department of Homeland Security and all the affected agencies have the 

necessary tools, the resources and the authorities to secure our border and enforce the law. I yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on 

the Western Hemisphere, the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Engel, for an opening statement. 
5 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. For many, 

many months now, you and I have been speaking about how we 

could collaborate together, both of our subcommittees, to put together this very important panel and this very important issue. I 

am delighted that this morning everything has come to fruition. We 

have been talking about this for a long time and, obviously, this 

is a very, very important subject. 

As Chair of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee, I can tell you that I get inquiries about 

this all the time. 

As a father whose son just graduated last week from the University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona, I can tell you that that is all 

people have been talking about in Arizona whether you agree with 

the new law or don’t. I don’t. But people are talking about it. It 

is a serious concern, and it is something that we have to come to 

grips with securing our border. 

On Tuesday, President Obama announced that he will deploy 

1,200 National Guard troops to our southern border and will request an additional $500 million from Congress for border security. 

I have strongly supported President Obama on the Me ́rida Initiative and firmly agree with the President that we must move ahead 

with comprehensive immigration reform. 

Today, I would like to receive more information from our administration witnesses on precisely what the role of the National 

Guard will be at the U.S.-Mexico border and how long the troops 

will remain there. 

Now, while I think that putting the guards at the border is something that the President had to respond to, the deployment of National Guard troops must not replace or undermine crucial security 

and law enforcement efforts being carried by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, which is ATF, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, which is known as ICE, and Customs and 

Border Protection, CPB, in cooperation with our partners in Mexico. 

While I respect the President’s decision to send National Guard 

troops to the southern border and I think it was the only thing he 

could do, let us first recognize what the National Guard is not. It 

is not a law enforcement or police force. The military is banned 

under the law in conducting domestic policing operations. That is 

not to say that the National Guard cannot fill gaps in intelligence 

collection and communication in the short term, but this is really 

a temporary bandage at best. 

I hope the Obama administration will work with Congress to 

quickly develop a plan to further strengthen ATF, ICE, and CBP, 

the key agencies who work closely on a daily basis with their Mexican counterparts on intelligence sharing and efforts to curb the illegal flow the firearms and bulk cash south and illicit drugs north. 

Strengthening these agencies and their continuing working relationships with the Mexican government is ultimately what will 

make our shared border safer and our critical relationship with 

Mexico closer and more grounded in trust and mutual cooperation. 

A National Guard presence at the U.S.-Mexico border, while 

needed now, must not be a long-term strategy. 
6 

Finally, any National Guard activity at our shared border must 

be coordinated with the Mexican government and transparent in a 

way that bolsters our joint goals for the Me ́rida Initiative. 

Moreover, any deployment of the National Guard must not be 

seen as a campaign against immigrants. The United States is a nation of immigrants and our efforts must only underscore that this 

country is strengthened and renewed by the contributions of immigrants. 

However, our laws do have to be obeyed. I believe that the 

United States has no more important friend in this hemisphere 

than Mexico. By welcoming President Caldero ́n for a state visit last 

week, President Obama made it clear that the U.S.-Mexico relations are a priority and will continue to remain at the top of his 

foreign policy agenda. 

I listened to President Caldero ́n’s statement. I liked what he 

said, and I think that it was good that he gave us his perspective 

of how we should be working our laws. After all, we share the border and what happened on one side of the border effects everybody 

on the other side of the border. 

Security assistance to Mexico is essential, and as we focus on the 

next phase of the Me ́rida Initiative, I would like to offer a few 

thoughts. 

First, we must continue to expedite Me ́rida Initiative assistance 

to Mexico. A report that I commissioned from the Government Accountability Office in December found that only 2 percent of Me ́rida 

funds had been spent through September 30, 2009. Fortunately, assistance is now moving more quickly with $159 million in training 

equipment provided to Mexico by May 11. 

As President Caldero ́n confronts his country’s brutal drug cartels 

head on, we must continue to cut through our own Government’s 

red tape to get assistance flowing as fast as possible. 

Second, I am pleased that the Senate supplemental appropria- tions bill includes $175 million in funding for the next phase of the 

Me ́rida Initiative, including key resources for judicial reform. Mexico’s 2008 constitutional reform requires that the country transition 

to a new judicial system at the state and federal levels by 2016. 

Our excellent USAID judicial reform work is focused on a few 

Mexican states, and I hope this additional funding will help expand 

these programs throughout the country. 

As I have done before, I will work with my colleagues in the 

House to ensure that funds for Mexico are included in our supplemental appropriations bill. 

Finally, as I have said many times before, security assistance 

alone is not enough. It is unacceptable that the United States not 

only consumes the majority of the drugs flowing from Mexico but 

also arms the very cartels which contribute to the daily violence 

devastating Mexico. 

While I am pleased that President Obama has developed a strategy to curb illegal firearms trafficking to Mexico, much remains to 

be done. I urge the Obama administration to enforce the existing 

ban on imported military-style weapons being trafficked at an 

alarming rate from the United States across the border into Mexico. This import ban, which is not a ban on assault weapons, this 

import ban which was authorized by provisions in the 1968 Gun 
7 

Control Act was enforced during the administrations of President 

George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton but abandoned by President 

George W. Bush. 

President Bush’s administration quietly abandoned enforcement 

of this import ban. Big mistake as far as I am concerned. So President Obama needs to reinstate it and, as a result of the abandonment of the enforcement of the import ban, the U.S. civilian firearms market is flooded with imported, inexpensive military-style 

weapons. A return to enforcement of the existing import bans requires no legislative action and would be a win-win for the United 

States and Mexico. 

I firmly believe that starving Mexico’s brutal drug cartels of military-style weapons will make all of us in the United States and 

Mexico much safer. 

Now it is my pleasure to thank you, Chairman Cuellar. It is a 

pleasure collaborating with you on today’s hearing. I look forward 

to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. Iit is now 

my pleasure to call on my Ranking Member, my good friend, 

Connie Mack of Florida. 

[The statement of Mr. Engel follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ELIOT L. ENGEL

MAY 27, 2010 

It is a pleasure to hold today’s joint hearing with my good friend, Chairman 

Cuellar, and the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global 

Counterterrorism. 

On Tuesday, President Obama announced that he will deploy 1,200 National 

Guard troops to our southern border and will request an additional $500 million 

from Congress for border security. I have strongly supported President Obama on 

the Me ́rida Initiative and firmly agree with the President that we must move ahead 

with comprehensive immigration reform. Today, I would like to receive more information from our administration witnesses on precisely what the role of the National 

Guard will be at the U.S.-Mexico border and how long the troops will remain there. 

The deployment of National Guard troops must not replace or undermine crucial 

security and law enforcement efforts being carried out by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in cooperation with our partners 

in Mexico. While I respect the President’s decision to send National Guard troops 

to the southern border, let’s first recognize what the National Guard is not: It is 

not a law enforcement or police force. The military is banned under the law from 

conducting domestic policing operations. That is not to say that it the National 

Guard cannot fill gaps in intelligence collection and communication in the shortterm, but this is really a temporary bandage, at best. I hope the Obama administration will work with Congress to quickly adopt a plan to further strengthen ATF, 

ICE, and CBP—key agencies who work closely on a daily basis with their Mexican 

counterparts on intelligence sharing and efforts to curb the illegal flow of firearms 

and bulk cash south and illicit drugs north. Strengthening these agencies and their 

continuing working relationships with the Mexican Government is ultimately what 

will make our shared border safer and our critical relationship with Mexico closer 

and more grounded in trust and mutual cooperation. A National Guard presence at 

the U.S.-Mexico border must not be a long-term strategy. 

Finally, any National Guard activity at our shared border must be coordinated 

with the Mexican Government and transparent in a way that bolsters our joint 

goals for the Me ́rida Initiative. Moreover, any deployment of the National Guard 

must not be seen as a campaign against immigrants. The United States is a nation 

of immigrants and our efforts must only underscore that this country is strengthened and renewed by the contributions of immigrants. 

I believe that the United States has no more important friend in this hemisphere 

than Mexico. By welcoming President Caldero ́n for a state visit last week, President 

Obama made it clear that U.S.-Mexico relations are a priority and will continue to 

remain at the top of his foreign policy agenda. 
8 

Security assistance to Mexico is essential, and as we focus on the next phase of 

the Me ́rida Initiative, I would like to offer a few thoughts: 

First, we must continue to expedite Me ́rida Initiative assistance to Mexico. A report that I commissioned from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in December found that only 2 percent of Me ́rida funds had been spent through September 30, 2009. Fortunately, assistance is now moving more quickly with $159 million in training and equipment provided to Mexico by May 11. As President 

Caldero ́n confronts his country’s brutal drug cartels head on, we must continue to 

cut through our own Government’s red tape to get assistance flowing as fast as possible. 

Second, I am pleased that the Senate supplemental appropriations bill includes 

$175 million in funding for the next phase of the Me ́rida Initiative, including key 

resources for judicial reform. 

Mexico’s 2008 constitutional reform requires that the country transition to a new 

judicial system at the state and federal levels by 2016. Our excellent USAID judicial 

reform work is focused on a few Mexican states, and I hope this additional funding 

will help expand these programs throughout the country. 

As I have done before, I will work with my colleagues in the House to ensure that 

funds for Mexico are included in our supplemental appropriations bill. 

Finally, as I have said many times before, security assistance alone is not enough. 

It is unacceptable that the United States not only consumes the majority of the 

drugs flowing from Mexico, but also arms the very cartels which contribute to the 

daily violence devastating Mexico. 

And, while I am pleased that President Obama has developed a strategy to curb 

illegal firearms trafficking to Mexico, much remains to be done. I urge the Obama 

administration to enforce the existing ban on imported military-style weapons being 

trafficked at an alarming rate from the United States across the border into Mexico. 

The import ban—which was authorized by provisions in the 1968 Gun Control Act— 

was enforced during the administrations of Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill 

Clinton. President George W. Bush’s administration quietly abandoned enforcement 

of the import ban. As a result, the U.S. civilian firearms market is flooded with imported, inexpensive military-style weapons. 

A return to enforcement of the existing import ban requires no legislative action 

and would be a win-win for the United States and Mexico. I firmly believe that 

starving Mexico’s brutal drug cartels of military-style weapons will make all of us 

in the United States and Mexico much safer. 

Thank you, Chairman Cuellar. It is a pleasure collaborating with you on today’s 

hearing, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman—both Chairmen, all Chairmen, whoever are Chairmen here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MACK. I just want to thank them all. I also want to thank 

our witnesses for being here today. 

First, I feel the need to address President Caldero ́n’s recent visit 

to the United States. The visit increased awareness of the relationship between Mexico and the United States. It also raised a few 

red flags, and I would like to talk about one of those just for 1 

minute. 

During his address to Congress, President Caldero ́n said that the 

United States needs to enact new, stricter gun laws. As a strong 

supporter of the Second Amendment, I strongly disagree. 

I think we should enforce the gun laws that we have on the 

books right now. We cannot allow others to use this situation in 

order to advance their gun-ban agenda here in the United States. 

The fact is this is really a border issue. 

We need to strengthen security on our borders and utilize the 

funds we have appropriated from the Me ́rida Initiative to address 

the violence and illegal activities originating from Mexico. Mexico 

is facing extreme violence that is increasing in scope and brutality. 
9 

A war is waging across our southern border that has killed over 

14,000 individuals since 2008. U.S. assistance is now more important than ever. If implemented successfully, this assistance will increase security on both sides of the border. 

As we evaluate U.S.-Mexico security cooperation and the next 

steps for the Me ́rida Initiative, we must look at what we have accomplished and what has happened to date. 

It is my understanding that less than 2 percent of what we have 

appropriated for Mexico over the past 3 years has actually found 

its way onto the ground. This is completely unacceptable. At this 

rate, we cannot tell taxpayers that this money is working to make 

this safer. 

Why have we been unable to provide time-sensitive, targeted assistance? I hope that the witnesses can address that. 

President Caldero ́n, the people of Mexico, the military, and the 

Mexican government have bravely fought against the drug trafficking organizations, and I applaud them for their endless courage. 

Given the proximity and partnership between the United States 

and Mexico, it is in the U.S. interest to prioritize this fight against 

illegal drug trafficking and move the money through the pipeline 

so the program can be implemented without delay. 

The longer it takes the United States to provide targeted assistance, the more difficult it is to uproot the sophisticated drug network. For example, Mexico has its own porous southern border 

through which the strongest Mexican drug trafficking gangs have 

made deep inroads with Central America gangs. 

As a result of this arrangement, the Mexican cartels have a refined trafficking network, and the northern triangle, Honduras, 

Guatemala, and El Salvador, have murder rates that roughly double that of Mexico. 

The Me ́rida Initiative incorporates Central America and the Caribbean in order to counter this balloon effect of the drug trade. Yet 

only small amounts of aid have been spent in these regions. 

Meanwhile, drug-related threats to freedom, security, and prosperity in South America cannot be ignored. The free flow of illicit 

drugs through Venezuela continues unchecked. Both Peru, Paraguay have recently declared a state of national emergency in response to increasingly territorial control of armed groups with ties 

to narco-terrorists. Now Jamaica is following suit. The drug trade 

is a complex problem that threatens to destabilize countries 

throughout the entire hemisphere. 

I am a co-sponsor of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act led by my counterpart, Chairman Engel, which establishes a commission to provide comprehensive oversight of our 

domestic- and hemisphere-related drug policies. 

I want to thank my colleague once again for spearheading that 

initiative. It has been a pleasure working with you on that. 

In addition to better management of our current drug policies, 

we also need to establish a comprehensive, regional drug strategy. 

A comprehensive strategy must include increasing opportunities 

within the formal workforce by bolstering economies in the hemisphere. 

The Northern America Free Trade Agreement has established 

more jobs on both sides of the border, and Mexico will continue to 
10 

reap the benefits as it further liberalizes its domestic economy. Assistance in this effort is an important step in taking power from 

the drug cartels while creating strong commercial ties between our 

nations. 

Passing the pending trade agreements with Colombia and Panama will further weaken drug trafficking organizations, and I encourage the administration, I encourage my colleagues in the 

House to—the administration should move forward with it, and my 

colleagues in the House should speak out in support of both the Colombia and Panama free trade agreements. 

Establishing respect for the rule of law and increasing enforcement of legal standards is another long-term effect required of any 

successful strategy. The Me ́rida Initiative incorporates this aspect 

through police and judicial reform. However, to be successful, it 

must integrate an expanded long-term approach within the individual countries across the region. 

Me ́rida was designed to provide a comprehensive approach. At 

this point, however, little about the implementation appears comprehensive. These issues must be addressed as we discuss next 

steps to the Me ́rida Initiative. 

Also, I would like to take a moment to address the current and 

related issue of concern. In my opinion, the new Arizona immigration law strikes a severe blow to the principles of freedom that define our country. There is no question that our Nation’s immigration policies are in dire straits. We all agree that inaction by both 

the Bush administration and the Obama administration has compounded this problem and forces States like Arizona to take drastic 

measures. However, the requirement of law enforcement officials to 

stop anyone based upon reasonable suspicion flies in the face of the 

freedoms we believe in, in this Nation. 

We must improve our border security, both north and south, and 

make certain that we have sufficient resources in place to enforce 

our immigration laws. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses and having the opportunity to discuss how we can improve the Me ́rida Initiative. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much. 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full Committee on 

Homeland Security, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome 

my colleagues from the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere 

from the Committee on Foreign Relations. 

Over the last several years, the Committee on Homeland Security has examined the issue the border violence and the role of the 

U.S. Government in confronting one of the principle causes of violence, drug trafficking organizations. 

The Department of Homeland Security and its numerous law enforcement partners have battled these organizations for years, but 

many challenges remain. The Mexican government has scored significant victories against drug trafficking organizations, but the 

crackdown has fueled an escalation in violence throughout Mexico 

and along our shared border. 
11 

In the last 3 years alone, there have been over 22,000 drug-related murders in Mexico. Unfortunately, our Nation, also, is not 

immune to this violence. American citizens have been killed in 

Mexico, and individuals associated with the U.S. consulate in 

Jua ́ rez were murdered earlier this year. At the same time, Americans are increasingly concerned about the potential violence for increased violence on the U.S. side of the border. It is also too clear 

that drug trafficking and violence is not just Mexico’s problem; it 

is also an American problem. We must do more to combat these 

problems on this side of the border. 

President Obama’s announcement this week regarding National 

Guard personnel and supplemental funding for the border is an acknowledgement of that concern. I applaud his on-going commitment to securing the region. 

Regarding Mexico, over the last 3 years, Congress has appropriated $1.3 billion for the Me ́rida Initiative for vital equipment 

and training. However to date, as already been said, Mexico has 

only received a fraction of the funding the United States has 

pledged for this program. Specifically, records show Mexico has received just $151 million of the $1.3 billion appropriated so far. 

It is critical that we review existing processes to ensure that this 

assistance is being provided as efficiently as possible while still ensuring accountability. That brings us to the question before us 

today. 

What is next for the Me ́rida Initiative? As we move forward with 

the next stage of the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation, we must 

build on the lessons learned over the last 3 years. I understand the 

assets and experience the Department of Homeland Security brings 

to the table in these matters. I would like to see DHS play a greater leadership role in the U.S.-Mexico security cooperation going forward. 

I also look forward to a dialogue on the challenges facing Mexico 

and the United States-Mexico border region and how best to confront those challenges to have a more secure future. 

Additionally, Mr. Chair, I would like to say part of that has to 

be—involve those American citizens who live along the border. 

Sometimes, we think here in Washington we know all the answers, 

but as you and I know very well, sometimes, a little common sense, 

going and talking to people who live it every day is better than people in Washington. So I look forward to some of our panelists and 

the suggestions they might offer in this hearing. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded 

that, under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record. I now welcome the first panel of witnesses. 

As you know, Members, we do have two panels. 

The first panel—our first witness, Ms. Roberta Jacobson is deputy assistant secretary of the Department of State’s Bureau of 

Western Hemisphere Affairs. She has served in a variety of key 

State Department and management positions including the director 

of policy, planning coordination in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs which covers a variety of key issues throughout the 

hemisphere. 
12 

Certainly, I appreciate the work you did for the initial work on 

Me ́rida, and we thank you for that as you began a career with the 

State Department in 1988. 

Our second witness, Ms. Mariko Silver, is the deputy assistant 

secretary of international policy and acting assistant secretary for 

international affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. In 

this capacity, Ms. Silver manages a Department-wide approach to 

DHS international engagement. 

Prior to joining DHS, Ms. Silver served as policy adviser for innovation, higher education, economic development in the office of 

then-Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano. Welcome. 

Our third witness is Mr. Alonzo Pen ̃ a. He is the deputy assistant 

secretary for operations for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE. Prior to accepting this position, he served as the 

DHS attache ́ at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City where he was the 

Department’s senior diplomat and liaison to the government of 

Mexico. 

Previously, Mr. Pen ̃ a served as a special agent in charge of ICE 

office of investigations in Phoenix, Arizona where he was responsible for overseeing all ICE investigative activities in the Nation’s 

business human smuggling corridor. 

Also, Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I also credit 

him to be one of the founders for the BEST program that got started in Laredo, Texas. As you know, it is now expanded to other 

areas. We thank you for that work. 

Our fourth witness is Mr. Allen Gina. He is the acting assistant 

commissioner of office of intelligence and operations coordination of 

the U.S. Customs Border Protection. Throughout his career, Mr. 

Gina has held numerous manager positions including program 

manager of the anti-smuggling division, director of the industry 

partnership program, director of the outbound programs, and director of the office of border security. Mr. Gina began his career in 

1983 as a Customs inspector, the frontline of the U.S. Customs 

Service. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted 

in the record. I now ask the witnesses to summarize their statements for 5 minutes beginning with Ms. Jacobson. Again, welcome 

to this joint committee. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERTA JACOBSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Engel, 

Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Ranking Members Mack and 

Miller and all the Members of this committee. 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify here today along 

with my colleagues in the interagency on the U.S.-Mexico relationship and the Me ́rida Initiative. 

As you all know, on May 19, President Obama welcomed President Caldero ́n to the White House. They reaffirmed their commitment to improving the lives of all our citizens in both countries, 

building upon our deep ties and working with mutual respect and 

responsibility across a broad range of issues. 
13 

They recognized that the United States and Mexico share responsibility for defeating and dismantling illicit criminal networks that 

traffic drugs into the United States and illegal weapons and illicit 

revenues into Mexico. When it was launched in 2007, the Me ́rida 

Initiative was a partnership among governments of the United 

States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America to confront 

these transnational gangs and organized crime syndicates that 

plagued the region. 

We have now broadened our focus on include the Caribbean 

under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, renamed our Central America efforts the Central American Regional Security Initiative and are focusing on ways to improve citizen safety. Something 

consistently ranked high among societal concerns in all countries 

of the region. 

Beginning with the Me ́rida Initiative and moving beyond Me ́rida 

in Mexico, the United States has forged strong partnerships to enhance citizen safety and a variety of U.S. agencies are working 

with the Mexican government to implement Me ́rida projects. 

At bilateral meetings in the past 18 months culminated with the 

March 23 high-level group meetings in Mexico co-chaired by Secretary Clinton, the governments of the United States and Mexico 

agreed on new goals to broaden and deepen our cooperation. Future 

programs to increase Mexican capacity and institutionalize our 

partnership will focus on four areas. 

First, the United States and Mexico will continue to collaborate 

to disrupt and dismantle organized criminal groups. Each country 

will conduct operations on their own territory, but we will coordinate our efforts and increasingly share the information necessary 

to combat these organizations which do not respect borders. 

Second, the United States will accelerate support for Mexico’s efforts to institutionalize criminal justice reforms, to sustain the rule 

of law, and respect for human rights. 

Third, our goal is to create a 21st Century border that will advance citizen safety while increasing our global competitiveness 

through efficient and secure flows of two-way commerce and travel. 

Finally, the United States will provide support for programs to 

build strong and resilient communities in targeted geographic 

areas as Mexico addresses the social and economic needs of communities under threat by criminal organizations. 

We have agreed with the government of Mexico to work together 

in several of the most affected communities including Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez. Our efforts in Jua ́ rez are being taken in conjunction with 

President Caldero ́n’s plan, Todos Somos Jua ́ rez, ‘‘we are all 

Jua ́ rez,’’ which contains strong community input for new socio-economic opportunities to provide choices to the citizens of that city. 

We are also supporting Mexico’s implementation of comprehensive criminal justice reforms through the professionalization of police and prosecutors, judicial exchanges, and partnerships between 

Mexican and U.S. law schools. 

As of March 2010, over 5,000 Mexican federal and state officials 

from law enforcement and judicial agencies have participated in 

newly designed training programs. 

The Office of National Drug Control Policy and the State Department hosted a bi-national drug demand reduction conference in 
14 

February which, among other goals, shared best practices between 

U.S. and Mexican participants. Prompt implementation of the 

Me ́rida Initiative and ensuring that U.S. taxpayer dollars are spent 

effectively and efficiently is a top priority. 

With the signing of required agreements with the Mexican government and additional personnel in place to monitor the new programs, the pace of implementation has increased dramatically. Our 

current estimate shows that over $420 million of fiscal year 2008 

and 2009 funds are actively supporting equipment, training, and 

technical assistance through the Me ́rida Initiative. 

A letter of agreement obligating 287 additional million dollars in 

INL funding for the State Department was just assigned clearing 

the way for those funds to move. Nearly all aviation assets will be 

delivered by the end of 2011, in some cases, almost 2 years ahead 

of normal procurement timelines. 

Nonintrusive inspection equipment has been delivered and is being used to good effect as a recent $3 million cash seizure in 

Mexico City demonstrated. Justice sector programs and human 

rights activities including assistance to victims and witnesses, support to civil society groups are well underway and will expand as 

our pace picks up. 

Finally, while Me ́rida does not envision any law enforcement operations, the enhanced cooperation and coordination that results 

from this relationship contributes to our fight against well-known 

drug lords, and I have enumerated some of those in my written testimony. 

The United States Government has taken an aggressive approach to combating illicit trafficking and firearms by promoting 

the capabilities of States in the hemisphere to control, secure, destroy excess National stockpiles and mark and trace firearms. Our 

operational efforts have been complemented by Me ́rida-funded 

equipment and capacity-building. 

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of the 

Members of both of these subcommittees for your support of our engagement with Mexico over the past few years. It has been greatly 

helpful in guiding your efforts. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERTA JACOBSON

MAY 27, 2010 

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, and Members of the committee: Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify, along with my interagency colleagues on the United 

States-Mexico relationship and the Me ́rida Initiative. 

The U.S.-Mexican bilateral relationship has never been stronger than it is right 

now. And it continues to grow stronger still, based not on personal ties or shortterm projects but on the kind of strong, multi-layered institutional ties that endure 

and evolve. 

On May 19, President Obama welcomed President Caldero ́n to the White House. 

The Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to improving the lives of all citizens 

in both our countries, building upon our deep ties and working with mutual respect 

and mutual responsibility across a broad range of issues. 

These include economic competitiveness and clean energy, building a 21st Century 

border, and reaffirming our mutual commitment to confront organized criminal organizations that represent a serious threat to the security and well-being of Mexicans and Americans. Presidents Obama and Caldero ́n recognized that the United 

States and Mexico share responsibility for defeating and dismantling the illicit 
15 

criminal networks that traffic drugs into the United States and illegal weapons and 

illicit revenues into Mexico, which fuel much of the crime and violence in Mexico 

today. 

The Presidents reviewed and endorsed the work of the U.S.-Mexico Me ́rida Initiative High Level Group, which met on March 23, 2010. The meeting was chaired by 

Secretary Clinton and her Mexican counterpart, in Mexico City, to lay out a shared 

vision for on-going and future security cooperation between the United States and 

Mexico. 

These high-level meetings and joint efforts are a testament to the strength of the 

relationship between our two governments. In addition, it exemplifies the United 

States’ commitment to assist Mexico and our responsibility to address transnational 

crime, including demand for drugs, and illicit traffic in firearms and bulk cash. 

SECURITY SITUATION

The unprecedented levels of violence in Mexico, especially along the shared border 

with the United States, undermine Mexico’s economic recovery and rob young people 

of opportunities for education, work, and social advancement. The violence and the 

corruption engendered by the cartels also undermine the democratic institutions 

needed for governance that is accountable and responsive to the needs of its people. 

Since December 2006, over 22,000 people have been killed, and countless others 

wounded, kidnapped, extorted, or threatened in relation to this violence. We are seeing new and well-organized battle tactics with the criminals using stolen vehicles 

to block roads to prevent government reinforcements from arriving. In Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez, the Jua ́ rez drug trafficking organization has hired the violent cross-border 

Barrio Azteca gang to conduct its contract killings. 

ME ́ RIDA INITIATIVE

When it was launched in 2007, the Me ́rida Initiative was a partnership among 

the governments of the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America 

to confront the violent transnational gangs and organized crime syndicates that 

plague the entire region. We have now broadened our focus to include the Caribbean 

under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, renamed our Central America efforts 

as ‘‘CARSI’’ (the Central America Regional Security Initiative), and are focusing on 

ways to improve citizen safety—something consistently ranked high among societal 

concerns in all countries of the region. The security challenges in the region are profoundly interconnected. Accordingly, our initiatives are grounded in a common strategic vision and coordinated through interagency meetings and working groups that 

ensure comprehensive and coherent planning and implementation. While these initiatives are mutually reinforcing, and share broad objectives, they reflect differing 

regional challenges and dynamics and thus vary considerably in size, level of U.S. 

support, complexity, and level of development. The combination of a common strategic approach and distinct, but interlocking, regional initiatives provides the necessary unity of effort as well as the flexibility necessary to help address unique circumstances that vary by country or sub-region. 

Beginning with the Me ́rida Initiative and moving ‘‘Beyond Me ́rida’’ in Mexico, the 

United States has forged strong partnerships to enhance citizen safety in affected 

areas to fight drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, illicit arms trafficking, 

money-laundering, and demand for drugs on both sides of the border. To do this a 

variety of U.S. Federal agencies—including the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense—are working with the Mexican 

government to implement the Me ́rida projects. 

At bilateral working group meetings in the past 18 months, culminating with the 

March 23 Me ́rida High Level Group meeting in Mexico, the governments of the 

United States and Mexico agreed on new goals to broaden and deepen our cooperation to effect lasting change. We are accelerating our efforts to support stronger 

democratic institutions in Mexico, especially the police and justice sector, expanding 

our border focus beyond interdiction of contraband to include facilitation of legitimate trade and travel, and cooperating in building stronger communities that are 

resistant to the corrupting influence of organized crime. Future programs to increase Mexican capacity and to institutionalize our partnership will focus on four 

goals: 

• Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups.—The United States and Mexico will continue to collaborate to disrupt and dismantle organized criminal groups. Each 

country will continue to conduct security operations within its own territory, but 

we will coordinate our efforts and increasingly share the information necessary 

to combat drug trafficking organizations that do not respect borders. We plan 
16 

to disrupt the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) by focusing our efforts on 

intelligence collection and analysis, training and equipping special units, enhancing police and prosecutors’ investigative capacity, conducting targeted investigations against money laundering, improving interdiction capability, and 

by supporting effective command and control centers across Mexico. We will put 

pressure on all aspects of the cartels’ business operations, interdicting the weapons used in the commission of their crimes and the illicit proceeds of their enterprises as well as the drugs and other contraband they traffic. Our two countries have already started work in these areas and we will deepen our cooperation in years to come. • Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and Respect for Human 

Rights.—The United States will continue to support Mexico’s efforts to institutionalize justice sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human 

rights. We will continue institution-building with security and justice sector institutions at the federal level and expand these efforts to include additional federal, state, and local institutions. Federal constitutional reforms passed in 2008 

require transformation of all state and federal systems from a written inquisitorial system to a more transparent oral and adversarial system by 2016. The 

United States has long supported Mexico’s criminal justice reforms at the state 

level and we continue to do so, while also supporting federal criminal justice 

reform. We are providing assistance on a range of activities, including 

professionalization of justice sector personnel, systems development, access to 

justice, and strengthening respect for human rights. Projects to strengthen 

democratic institutions, centered on engagement with civil society and the promotion of respect for human rights, will help assure citizens that their justice 

systems are more effective and accountable. In the long term, this will serve to 

increase citizen trust in justice sector institutions, encouraging closer collaboration between government officials and citizens in the fight against organized 

crime. The capacity to quickly and efficiently prosecute those arrested, in accordance with due process, and to incarcerate those found guilty in secure and 

humane facilities must keep pace with the success of law enforcement efforts. • Create a 21st Century Border.—Our goal is to create a 21st Century border that 

will advance citizen safety while increasing our global competitiveness through 

efficient and secure flows of two-way commerce and travel. Overall, our cooperation with Mexico is designed to intercept threats before they can cause harm 

to a country or its citizens. We are working to stop the flow of drugs and human 

trafficking to the north, and guns and cash to the south. In some cases, the 

most effective approach to security is to redistribute law enforcement resources 

to screen people and cargo before they near the actual border, or even arrive 

in North America. Interior checkpoints combined with secure transit corridors 

may be reinforced by modern technology that determines whether sealed containers have been opened or whether trains or trucks have stopped along route. 

These approaches aim to prevent flows of dangerous goods and people from getting to the border, thereby speeding legitimate trade and travel across the border itself. By seeking to institutionalize these improvements, and supporting 

the government of Mexico’s efforts to modernize both their customs and immigration capacities, we anticipate continuing enhancements in our joint management of the U.S.-Mexico border. 

• Build Strong and Resilient Communities.—As Mexico addresses the social and 

economic needs of communities under threat by criminal organizations, within 

a framework based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, the United 

States will provide support for programs in targeted geographic areas. The recent downturn in economic growth and remittances underscores the importance 

of ensuring that communities see a net benefit from our joint efforts. With Mexico taking the lead, U.S. programs will leverage support for greater community 

involvement in developing a culture of lawfulness, as well as addressing socioeconomic challenges in the community, including stemming the flow of potential 

recruits for the cartels by helping to promote constructive, legal alternatives for 

young people. Strong communities with confidence in local authorities to protect 

them are key partners in realizing our shared goals. 

Broadly, and within this context, we are moving away from big ticket equipment 

and into an engagement that reinforces progress by further institutionalizing Mexican capacity to sustain adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights, 

build strong institutions, promote full civil society participation, transform the nature of our borders, and by providing intensive technical assistance and training. 

We have also agreed with the government of Mexico to work together in several 

of the most affected Mexican communities, including Ciudad Jua ́ rez. In February, 

our governments held a bilateral planning session in El Paso, Texas to discuss op-
17 

tions for improving the citizen security and violence situation in Jua ́ rez. Our discussions spanned various topics including: (1) Improving intelligence collection and 

analysis and using the resulting information to lead law enforcement operations and 

investigations; (2) developing standard procedures for securing a crime scene and 

collecting evidence; (3) elaborating a plan for safe, secure and humane detention facilities; and (4) beginning a process to vet active State and local police officers and 

weed out corrupt actors. 

We are beginning to determine with our Mexican partners where U.S. assistance 

could best be applied in Jua ́ rez, and we have offered a range of assistance, including, but not limited to, reform of state and local police, internal controls, assistance 

to prosecutors and judges, corrections work, as well as technical assistance. Our efforts in Ciudad Jua ́ rez are being taken in conjunction with President Caldero ́n’s 

plan ‘‘Todos Somos Jua ́ rez’’ (We Are All Jua ́ rez) which calls for new socio-economic 

opportunities providing choices for the beleaguered youth and citizens of the city. 

The plan has extensive programs in education, drug demand reduction, health, and 

security and includes a robust and regular consultation with civil society groups. 

One of the many complicating factors in Ciudad Jua ́ rez is that state and municipal 

elections are scheduled for July 4 and it is likely that many key interlocutors will 

change. This is not a deterrent to working in Jua ́ rez, but an additional challenge. 

IMPLEMENTATION OF ME ́ RIDA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES

The United States is supporting Mexico’s implementation of comprehensive justice 

sector reforms through the professionalization of police and prosecutors, systems development, judicial exchanges, and partnerships between Mexican and U.S. law 

schools. As of March 2010, 5,500 federal and state officials of all levels from lawenforcement and judicial agencies have participated in newly designed training programs. For example, over 4,300 police officers graduated from the Federal Police 

(SSP) Basic Investigation Techniques course in San Luis Potosı ́ and are deployed 

throughout Mexico. Through expert-to-expert exchanges, programs, and workshops, 

Mexico’s criminal-justice institutions are working with U.S. law enforcement and 

prosecutorial offices to build capacity to combat organized criminal activities that 

impact both Mexico and the United States. 

Mexican Customs, with U.S. Customs and Border Protection support, will establish a customs training academy in Mexico to promote professionalization of new 

customs inspectors. The Department of Homeland Security has provided assistance 

to Mexican Customs including: Training of canine teams; training on inspection 

techniques; and curriculum development on customs investigations, with investigative training to begin this year. We have provided scanners, X-ray machines, and 

other non-intrusive inspection equipment to enhance Mexican authorities’ ability to 

detect illicit goods at key checkpoints and land and air ports of entry. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is developing an investigator training program 

for Mexican Customs officials. Training classes are scheduled to begin in August 

2010. 

The Office of National Drug Control Policy and the U.S. State Department cohosted a Binational Drug Demand Reduction Conference in February 2010, which 

among other goals, sought a greater understanding of the use of media in successful 

demand reduction efforts as well as share best practices between the U.S. and Mexican participants. Twenty-three Mexican states are scheduled to offer a minimum of 

60 hours of anti-corruption education during the 2009–2010 school year, targeting 

1 million secondary school students. 

Prompt implementation of the Me ́rida Initiative and ensuring that U.S. taxpayer 

dollars are spent in an effective and efficient manner is a top priority for the administration. As a result of the Me ́rida Initiative, we have created new implementation 

structures with the Mexican government, a government unaccustomed to U.S. foreign aid requirements, in order to ensure increased inter-agency and binational communication. For example, we have developed a bilateral implementation working 

group between our two governments which meets monthly in Mexico City and have 

just opened our Bilateral Implementation Office, also in Mexico City. 

With the signing of the Letters of Agreement and with additional personnel in 

place to monitor the new programs, the pace of implementation has increased dramatically. Our current estimate shows that over $420 million of fiscal year 2008 and 

part of fiscal year 2009 funds are actively supporting equipment, training, and technical assistance through the Me ́rida Initiative. A Letter of Agreement that obligated 

$287 million in fiscal year 2009 International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

(INCLE) funds was just signed and will be used to further support equipment, training, and technical assistance. Five Foreign Military Financing-funded Bell helicopters were delivered in December 2009, after an expedited procurement process. 
18 

1 N.B., Arturo Beltran Leyva was killed in the course of his attempted capture in December 

2009 (Beltran Leyva Cartel). 

Two additional Bell helicopters and three Blackhawk helicopters are scheduled to 

be delivered in October 2010, and nearly all aviation assets will be delivered by the 

end of 2011—in some cases nearly 2 years ahead of ‘‘normal’’ procurement timelines. 

Non-intrusive inspection equipment has been delivered. Training equipment, polygraph units, and biometric equipment has also already been delivered. Justice sector 

programs and certain human rights activities, involving judicial exchanges, police, 

prosecutor and corrections training, assistance to victims and witnesses, and support to civil society groups working on citizen security, are also under way and will 

continue, as the pace of implementation continues to increase. 

Finally, while the Me ́rida Initiative does not fund any law enforcement operations, the enhanced cooperation and coordination that results from this enhanced 

bilateral relationship contributes to our fight against well known drug lords. For example: • Arrest of Arturo Beltran Leyva, December 2009 (Beltran Leyva Cartel);1

• Arrest of Carlos Beltran Leyva, December 2009 (Beltran Leyva Cartel); • Arrest of Eduardo Teodoro ‘‘El Teo’’ Garcia Simental, January 2010 (Arellano 

Felix Cartel); 

• Arrest of Jose Antonio ‘‘Don Pepe’’ Medina Arreguin (‘‘King of Heroin’’), March 

2010 (La Familia Michoacana); 

• Arrest of Gerardo ‘‘El Indio’’ Alvarez Vasquez, April 2010 (Beltran Leyva Cartel). 

In the United States, too, this cooperation has paid off. Operation Xccelerator resulted in the arrest in several countries of more than 750 individuals associated 

with the Sinaloa cartel in February 2009. Operation Coronado led to the arrest of 

303 alleged members of the La Familia Michoacana in the United States in October 

2009, with 1,186 arrests made over the 44-month project. 

FULFILLING OUR SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY

It is also important to discuss the actions that this administration is taking to 

fulfill its share of the responsibility to address factors within our borders that are 

contributing to this shared challenge: Illicit flows of arms and ill-gotten profits to 

Mexico and our domestic demand for drugs. 

ICE and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) are 

working jointly on weapons seizures through Armas Cruzadas and Project Gun Runner. ATF also rolled out the pilot of the bilingual ‘‘Spanish’’ eTrace to Mexico and 

Central America. This system allows Mexican investigators to trace weapons known 

to originate from the United States and will assist law enforcement officials in determining trafficking routes and major arms traffickers. 

The United States Government (USG) has also taken an aggressive approach to 

combat illicit trafficking in arms by promoting the capabilities of states in the hemisphere to control, secure, and destroy excess national stockpiles as well as to mark 

and trace firearms. USG operational efforts have been complemented by Me ́ridafunded equipment and capacity building efforts. Four Integrated Ballistics Identification Systems (IBIS) have been provided to forensics labs in Mexico to assist with 

tracing weapons used in crimes. Non-intrusive inspection equipment is also being 

provided to Mexican agencies to help with the detection of guns, money, and drugs. 

The USG has sponsored three bilateral conferences on arms trafficking, the first 

with the U.S. Departments of Justice, State, and Homeland Security at the ministerial level, followed by two DOJ-organized programs at the working level focusing on 

Mexico’s northern and southern borders. 

The U.S. Government has also launched several operational initiatives to disrupt 

the bulk cash smuggling that cartels use to bring the proceeds of drug sales in the 

United States back to Mexico. Through a Bilateral Money Laundering Working 

Group, Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agencies are cooperating to create the 

programs and strategies that will improve coordination in the area of investigations 

and prosecutions, bulk cash seizures, and the overall reduction of money laundering 

activities. The USG, through the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security and 

Treasury, are coordinating operational and capacity building programs with their 

Mexican counterparts. 

Finally, the administration is putting a renewed emphasis on reducing demand 

for drugs here in the United States, which is the largest driver of the cartel activity 

that threatens Mexico. These efforts, led by the White House Office of National 

Drug Control Policy, will, over the long-term, reduce the market that brought these 

cartels into business in the first place. 
19 

The United States and Mexico are committed to improve the lives of all citizens 

in both our countries, building upon our deep ties, and working with mutual respect 

and mutual responsibility. We will continue to work closely with the Government 

of Mexico through the Me ́rida Initiative and other avenues to achieve these goals. 

Thank you for your support of the Me ́rida Initiative. I look forward to continuing 

to work with the Congress and I will be happy to answer any of your questions. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I now recognize Ms. Silver to summarize her statements for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MARIKO SILVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Ms. SILVER. Chairman Cuellar and Engel, Ranking Members 

Miller and Mack, Chairman Thompson and all the Members of the 

subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today about the Department of Homeland Security’s relationship 

with Mexico and the future of that relationship. 

The security situation in parts of Mexico, especially along the 

border, remains volatile and deeply concerning. Violence between 

and among drug trafficking organizations has escalated in some 

places to unprecedented levels. Further, incidents of violence tied 

to drug trafficking have also affected U.S. persons. 

The situation in Mexico very much has our attention. I know 

that many in border communities are deeply concerned about the 

developments in Mexico. We are focused on stemming the violence 

in Mexico and protecting the United States. 

Communities like Laredo, Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana, San Diego— 

Ciudad Jua ́ rez, El Paso, and Matamoros-Brownsville have traditionally been at the heart of our bi-national relationship. These 

communities share strong social, cultural, economic, and familial 

ties. These relationships even further heighten the need for the 

United States and Mexico to work jointly to ensure that our shared 

border is secure and that the communities along the border are 

thriving, economically vibrant places in which private citizen safety 

is not in doubt. 

I will note that we have not seen the violence levels spike in U.S. 

border communities in parallel to spikes in Mexico. This is, I believe, a testament to the strength of these communities and to the 

hard work of State, local, and Federal law enforcement. 

For example, Ciudad Jua ́ rez is one of the most dangerous cities 

in the hemisphere. Whereas, El Paso is one of the safest large cities in the United States. 

But the violence in parts of Mexico is a homeland security concern, and the administration is actively working with Mexico and 

with border communities to address this. As you are, no doubt, 

aware—I know you are aware. On Tuesday, as part of his comprehensive plan to secure the southwest border, President Obama 

announced he will request $500 million in supplemental funds for 

enhanced border protection and law enforcement activities. 

The President will also order a strategic requirements-based 

temporary utilization of up to 1,200 National Guard to provide a 

bridge to longer-term enhancement and border protection and law 

enforcement personnel. This augmentation is in addition to the 
20 

more than 300 National Guard personnel current participating in 

counternarcotics missions along the southwest border. 

These National Guard personnel will be supporting civilian law 

enforcement and will not themselves be engaged in direct law enforcement action. The National Guard will provide intelligence and 

intelligence analysis, surveillance and reconnaissance support. 

The additional National Guard will augment the President’s unprecedented and on-going border protection and security efforts. 

This augmentation is just one part of our multi-layered effort to 

target illicit networks that traffic in people, drugs, illegal weapons, 

and money. 

With the support of the National Guard and through the southwest border initiatives, the Me ́rida Initiative, and other on-going 

efforts, we will continue to put increased pressure on transnational 

criminal organizations. An important part of this multi-layered 

strategic approach is our relationship with Mexico. 

As highlighted in the state visit President Obama hosted for 

President Caldero ́n last week, this relationship has evolved in extraordinary ways over the last few years. The state visit reflected 

the depth, breadth, and importance of our partnership. 

Though security rightly continues to be a central focus of our relationship, Presidents Obama and Caldero ́n emphasized that the 

relationship is far more comprehensive especially in the realm of 

border management. Presidents Obama and Caldero ́n described the 

approach to our shared border that is based on shared responsibility for managing the border, which includes security and expediting trade and travel. 

To this end, a critical part of the way forward is changing how 

we see the border. We must move beyond seeing border management as simply guarding and policing the jurisdictional line between the United States and Mexico. We must avoid the false dichotomy between economic prosperity and border security. We 

must not see our interest in Mexico as being defined solely in terms 

of assistance and ad hoc collaboration. 

As part of our overall approach to homeland security, we need to 

work together with international partners, including Mexico, to 

intercept and neutralize threats at the earliest possible point. We 

need to focus law enforcement resources on the people or goods we 

know are dangerous or about which we know the least. We need 

focus on expediting the goods and people we know are not dangerous. This kind of risk segmentation is an essential element to 

a layered approach. 

There are, of course, areas that still need to be further developed. 

Though Mexico has taken tremendous steps forward, corruption remains an area of concern as do low prosecution rates. These objectives are not simple, and this endeavor will take time, but we are 

committed. 

We must also, of course, ensure that our border security and law 

enforcement needs are met here at home. 

While DHS recognizes these challenges, I am optimistic about 

what we can accomplish with Mexico, and I believe that, with a 

reasoned and careful approach to border management, we can enhance both security and trade. 
21 

DHS appreciates the support Congress has shown for our work 

and your support for the relationship between the United States 

and Mexico. We look forward to working with Congress as we realize our new vision for border management. 

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to 

take any questions. 

[The statement of Ms. Silver follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARIKO SILVER

MAY 27, 2010 

Chairmen Cuellar and Engel, Ranking Members Miller and Mack, and all the 

Members of the subcommittees, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today about the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) relationship with Mexico, and the future of that relationship. 

As you know, President Obama hosted Mexican President Felipe Caldero ́n for an 

official state visit last week. It was clear from this visit that the United States’ relationship with Mexico has evolved in extraordinary ways over the last few years, and 

the visit reflected the depth, breadth, and importance of our relationship. Although 

security has rightly been a central focus of our recent engagement, Presidents 

Obama and Caldero ́n emphasized that the relationship is far more comprehensive, 

especially in the realm of border management. The approach the Presidents envision 

is one based on shared responsibility and the need for coordinated approaches to 

tackling security issues, facilitating trade and travel, and managing other issues affecting the border. The state visit signals the beginning of a new era of cooperation. 

The security situation in parts of Mexico, especially along the border, remains 

volatile and deeply concerning. Violence between and among drug trafficking organizations has escalated in places like Ciudad Jua ́ rez to unprecedented levels. Criminals are also targeting their violence at Mexican law enforcement and other Mexican government officials, and they are impacting the daily lives of innocent Mexican 

citizens. There have also been incidents of violence that have affected U.S. persons 

in Mexico, notably the murders of the persons associated with the U.S. consulate 

in Jua ́ rez. Additionally, the violence has created fear and uncertainty in U.S. border 

communities. The murder of Arizona rancher Robert Krentz and the potential connection to cross-border violence is of tremendous concern. Although we have not 

seen violence levels in U.S. border communities or elsewhere in the United States 

that approach what is occurring in parts of Mexico, we remain deeply concerned and 

the situation very much has the Department’s attention. We clearly recognize that 

the violence in Mexico, and the cartels’ associates and activities in the United 

States, remain homeland security threats—threats which Secretary Janet Napolitano and the Department are committed to addressing head-on. 

A centerpiece of this administration’s response to this threat is the Southwest 

Border Initiative announced in March 2009. As Secretary Napolitano has explained, 

‘‘we must strategically deploy our border security personnel in the roles and locations where they are best able to counteract illegal smuggling of goods, people, 

drugs, weapons, and currency—while simultaneously supplementing their efforts 

with the right mix of technology and infrastructure so that they can do their jobs 

effectively.’’ I would like to highlight some of what DHS is doing along the border: 

• More than 23,000 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents and officers, and 3,300 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel, 

deployed along the southwest border; 

• A surge of CBP Border Patrol agents, equipment, and patrols in key border 

entry points in Arizona; 

• Ten ICE-led Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) along the southwest border and one in Mexico City—and ICE has recently doubled the number 

of agents assigned to these teams; 

• Targeted, intelligence-driven southbound inspections to interdict illicit bulk 

cash, firearms, and ammunition and keep them from crossing the border into 

Mexico; 

• For the first time, DHS is screening 100 percent of southbound rail shipments 

for illegal weapons, drugs, and cash; 

• State-of-the-art technology to support enforcement efforts deployed strategically 

along the southwest border, including 23 additional Z-Backscatter Vans over the 

last 2 years to augment nine previously in place, which help CBP identify 

anomalies in passenger vehicles; 
22 

• CBP International Liaison Units, working hand-in-hand with Mexican federal, 

state, and local law enforcement authorities with the common goal of border 

safety and security; 

• Deployment of the DHS Illegal Drug Project in Nogales, Arizona and El Paso, 

Texas to refer certain drug trafficking cases to Mexican authorities for prosecution, and the anticipated expansion of this program to other areas; 

• The Border Violence Protocols, which formalize a system of bi-national communication during and after cross-border incidents have been successful at improving communication between CBP and the Government of Mexico (GOM); 

• OASISS (Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security), a 

joint initiative between the United States and Mexico, under which GOM agrees 

to prosecute certain alien smugglers in Mexico in cases where the United States 

declines prosecution and endangerment of the smuggled aliens can be proven; 

• A bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico to build a new 

cross-border communications network for public safety and law enforcement organizations that will improve security along the shared border by allowing for 

effective coordination between participating Federal, State, local, and Tribal incident and emergency responders; and 

• The recently announced authority to fly unmanned aerial vehicles over portions 

of Texas. 

We are seeing results. In the first year of the Southwest Border Initiative, DHS 

seized the following at the southwest border: 

• $85.7 million in currency—a 14 percent increase over the same period the previous year; 

• $29.7 million in southbound seizures—a 39 percent increase over the same period the previous year; 

• 1,425 firearms—a 29 percent increase over the same period the previous year; 

and 

• 1.65 million kilograms of drugs—a 15 percent increase over the same period the 

previous year. 

In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) seized 64,918 pounds of marijuana 

from October 1, 2008, to May 1, 2010. 

Our security work cannot stop at the border. As part of DHS’ efforts to aggressively counter the threat posed by the cartels, DHS has dramatically improved our 

relationship and partnership with Mexico. Secretary Napolitano has made our relationship with Mexico a top priority for the Department. In President Caldero ́n and 

his administration we have extraordinary and courageous partners. As Secretary 

Napolitano put it, ‘‘our strategy also focuses on forging unprecedented partnerships 

with Mexican law enforcement as we work together to combat the shared threats 

to our mutual security. Mexico, under the strong leadership of President Caldero ́n 

and his administration, has been conducting a valiant campaign to disrupt and dismantle the drug cartels that pose the threat of cross-border violence.’’ The Secretary 

has traveled to Mexico multiple times, and she routinely meets and consults with 

her counterparts from GOM. Under Secretary Napolitano’s leadership, the Department is constantly pushing to find new ways to partner and work with Mexico in 

order to address common security issues. The Secretary recently summed up the relationship by saying that, ‘‘[w]e are working with the Mexican government to build 

new collaborative efforts that will strengthen border enforcement by improving 

cross-border communications, coordinating enforcement against drug smuggling, improving the security of shared ports and of the aviation system, increasing law-enforcement-related information sharing, expanding law enforcement training, and 

strengthening trade.’’ 

I would like to offer a few examples of the unprecedented collaboration and partnership between DHS and counterparts within the Mexican government on security 

and law enforcement issues: 

• In February, Secretary Napolitano signed a Declaration of Principles of Cooperation with Mexican Secretary of Public Safety (SSP) Genaro Garcı ́a Luna, 

which allows for the expansion of coordinated intelligence sharing and joint 

strategic, intelligence-driven plans in border corridors. 

• In March, the Secretary signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with both Secretary Garcı ́a Luna and Mexican Interior Secretary Fernando Francisco GomezMont to allow ICE to share select criminal history information with Mexican 

law enforcement about some Mexican nationals who are being repatriated and 

who have been convicted of felonies in the United States. 

• DHS and GOM have made great strides in securing legitimate travel, including: 

• Implementing the Joint Security Program at the Mexico City airport, which 

allows for CBP officers to work side-by-side with Mexican federal law enforce-
23 

ment to interdict high-risk passengers, contraband, and other dangerous or 

illicit items; and • CBP and Mexico’s National Institute of Migration agreed to develop a bilateral background check process that will allow Mexican citizens potential 

membership in the Global Entry program, which offers expedited clearance 

into the United States for low-risk air travelers. This effort will seek to include those already participating in SENTRI, a program that expedites land 

border crossings. SENTRI members’ enrollment will be voluntary and free, 

and it is anticipated that this effort will immediately benefit more than 

80,000 Mexican SENTRI members. Future enhancements may include a reciprocal program for U.S. citizens traveling to Mexico. • DHS’ U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US–VISIT) office worked with Mexico’s Department of the Interior to address expanded use 

of biometrics and assisted in the development and review of technical business 

requirements to incorporate biometrics into the data management system used 

by Mexican Immigration (the Integrated System for Migration Operations). In 

May 2010, Mexican Secretary of Interior Fernando Gomez-Mont noted that this 

biometric technology is being implemented along Mexico’s southern border and 

is allowing Mexican immigration officers to capture biometrics for interdicted illegal immigrants coming from Central America into Mexico. • ICE’s Operation In Plain Sight, an investigation that targeted transportation 

companies in Arizona that facilitate human smuggling, included unprecedented 

information sharing and collaboration with Mexican law enforcement, which led 

to parallel enforcement actions by SSP against human smugglers. • Mexico’s Navy is an active participant in the USCG coordinated biannual MultiLateral Counter Drug Summit, during which participating law enforcement 

agencies share, and exchange ‘‘best practices,’’ and develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter threats along the southwest border. 

Further, with Secretary Napolitano’s support, DHS is an active participant in the 

Department of State (DOS)-led Me ́rida Initiative. DOS has responsibility for policy 

oversight and for disbursing the appropriated Me ́rida funds, with DHS and other 

U.S. Interagency partners participating in the initiative. A few examples of what 

DHS has done through Me ́rida include the following: • CBP provided training for Mexican Customs on canine handlers, training for 

Mexico Customs Academy instructors on law enforcement and interdiction 

methods, training to Mexican Federal Police (SSP) on non-intrusive inspection 

equipment, polygraph, and internal controls system training for Mexican law 

enforcement; • ICE is establishing vetted Mexican law enforcement units, providing training 

for SSP recruits on basic investigative techniques, and training for senior officers on undercover investigations; and 

• The U.S. Coast Guard is assisting in procuring aircraft and associated training 

for Mexico’s Navy. 

Should you desire more information on DHS’ participation to date in Me ́rida Initiative programs, we would be happy to provide such information. 

Reflected in all of these initiatives and programs, and a myriad of other interactions from the field level to senior departmental leadership, is that the United 

States and Mexico are closer now than we have ever been. And the successes we 

have achieved demonstrate the value of our work together. Strong partnerships with 

international counterparts are particularly essential when we are dealing with 

shared problems like the transnational drug trade and human smuggling and trafficking—but the same lesson applies for border management more generally: we can 

only manage our side of the border. We need our Mexican partners to manage their 

side, and we are both better served if our respective leadership recognizes and seeks 

to build upon our shared interests. DHS is primed to elevate our relationship to the 

next level. Before describing what we envision for this new era and for 21st century 

border management and security, I would like to sketch some of the history that 

has led us to where we are now. 

During the 1980s, it became increasingly obvious that the economic future of the 

United States was linked to the economic success of its North American partners. 

Since that time, it has become increasingly apparent that the competitiveness of the 

United States in the global economy is in part a function of the competitiveness of 

the North American supply chain. At the same time, close engagement on economic 

issues has helped pave the way for close engagement in other areas. 

The Me ́rida Initiative heralded a change in the nature and extent of collaboration 

with Mexico on security and law enforcement issues. Although the Me ́rida Initiative 

began as a fairly straightforward foreign assistance program with a focus on equipment purchases, it has evolved into a much broader security partnership, generally 
24 

framed around four subject areas: (1) Disrupting Organized Criminal Groups; (2) Institutionalizing Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights; (3) 

Creating a 21st Century Border; and (4) Building Strong and Resilient Communities. Although there have been some challenges with Me ́rida, it has helped lead 

to increased collaboration, understanding, cooperation, and trust. 

There are of course areas that still need to be further developed. Though Mexico 

has taken tremendous steps forward, corruption remains an area of concern, as do 

low prosecution rates. While DHS recognizes these challenges, we believe that there 

is a strong foundation of cooperation to build upon and that with a reasoned and 

careful approach to border management we can enhance both security and trade 

through collaboration and the implementation of effective strategies. The United 

States and Mexico will continue to work together to secure the legitimate flow of 

goods and people—segmenting those flows so that we can focus law enforcement resources on the people or goods we know are dangerous or about which we know the 

least—and facilitating and expediting the movement of goods and people we know 

are not dangerous. 

Presidents Obama and Caldero ́n addressed this vision of the border last week. 

Their joint statement explained that, ‘‘the Twenty-First Century Border must ensure the safety and security of residents in communities along both sides of the border and affirmed the mutual interest of Mexico and the United States to prevent 

entry into our countries of people who pose a threat to the national security of both 

nations.’’ The Presidents’ border vision also recognizes the importance of facilitating 

lawful trade and travel—that we need to ‘‘develop [the border] and manage it in a 

holistic fashion and in ways that facilitate the secure, efficient, and rapid flows of 

goods and people and reduce the costs of doing business between our two countries.’’ 

As the Presidents indicated, this requires us to move beyond seeing border management as simply guarding and policing the jurisdictional line between the United 

States and Mexico. Threats can materialize long before they reach the border, and 

we need to leverage opportunities to intercept and neutralize threats before they 

reach the U.S. border. Enforcement at the border—between and at ports of entry— 

is a necessary component of any border security plan, but it should be part of a 

more comprehensive approach, through which we engage domestically, at the border, and abroad to secure the safety of United States. 

We are already taking steps to implement the Presidents’ vision of a safe, secure, 

and prosperous 21st century border. During the state visit, the United States and 

Mexico released a Declaration of Principles (DOP) setting forth the vision in concrete form. The DOP creates an Executive Steering Committee that will be made 

up of senior officials from the U.S. and Mexican governments to oversee implementation of a first-ever bi-national 24-month plan of action. Broadly speaking, the border vision and DOP address the three components of border management: Border 

security; legitimate travel; and trade. 

Further, this vision recognizes the importance of border communities. Communities like Laredo-Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana-San Diego, Nogales-Nogales, Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez-El Paso, and Matamoros-Brownsville have traditionally been at the heart of 

our bi-national relationship. In these communities, crossing the border is often a 

daily occurrence as these communities share strong social, cultural, economic, and 

familial ties. Both of our countries need to work jointly to ensure that they are 

thriving, economically vibrant places in which private citizens’ public safety is not 

in doubt. DHS is committed to working with border communities to address border 

crime and security, including through field-level partnership of DHS agents and officers, and with programs such as the Operation Stonegarden grant program. 

In short, the way forward for the U.S.-Mexico relationship is to move away from 

a hard dichotomy between economic prosperity and border security. Further, we 

must move away from seeing our security interests in Mexico as being defined in 

terms of assistance and ad hoc collaboration. Instead we need to systematically 

work with Mexico as partners to address common issues and challenges along the 

border. As part of our partnership with Mexico, providing assistance—be it technology, training, or equipment—will and must remain a central part of our relationship, but assistance is only one part of a larger, comprehensive approach. We believe 

that, through this new framework and this deepening relationship with Mexico, we 

will enhance our economic competitiveness, security, and safety. The United States’ 

and Mexico’s shared goal is to ultimately fragment the cartels—benefiting both U.S. 

citizens and the people of Mexico. 

I am optimistic about what we will accomplish with Mexico, but our objectives are 

not simple and this endeavor will take time. We must be prepared for a multi-year 

effort, and we must be prepared for setbacks that may occur. We also must be prepared to assert, when needed, our own prerogatives in terms of ensuring that our 

border security and law enforcement needs are met. DHS will be unyielding and 
25 

vigilant in fulfilling the responsibility that has been placed with us to keep the 

American public safe. 

DHS appreciates the support Congress has shown for our work, and for its support of the United States’ relationship with Mexico through the Me ́rida Initiative 

and otherwise. We look forward to working with Congress as we realize the border 

vision. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to take any questions you may have. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I now recognize Mr. Pen ̃ a to summarize his statements for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALONZO PEN ̃ A, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Chairmans Cuellar, Engel, Thompson, Ranking Members Miller and Mack, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss ICE’s role in 

our Nation’s effort to confront transnational criminal organizations. 

As you know, ICE conducts intelligence-driven investigations 

through collaboration with our Federal, State, local, and foreign 

partners. These multi-agency investigations are enabled by robust 

cross-border coordination and information sharing with Mexico. 

ICE works to detect, disrupt, dismantle cross-border criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of guns, drugs, money, and people 

across our borders. 

Prior to my current position at ICE, I served as a DHS attache ́

at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City. I also served as a special agent 

in charge in Phoenix and in San Antonio where I oversaw the ICE 

investigative activities of our Nation’s two busiest smuggling corridors. So I am very familiar with the topics and the subjects that 

we will be discussing today. 

Over a third of ICE’s personnel are currently located in offices 

along the southwest border. At the direction of Secretary Napolitano, ICE will increase its personnel along the southwest border 

and, beginning on June 1, to counter transnational smuggling networks and enhance U.S.-Mexico border cooperation. 

We are continuing to expand the BEST program which currently 

operates in ten locations along the southwest border to include the 

formation of the first-ever Mexico BEST in Mexico City. 

The ICE-lead multi-agency investigative teams leverage the combined authorities and resources of its participants to make the border more secure. Part of our efforts include anti-smuggling operations such as Armas Cruzadas which combats firearms smuggling 

and Operation Firewall, which combats bulk-cash smuggling. 

Since the inception of Armas Cruzadas in 2008, the operation 

has resulted in the seizure of over 3,800 weapons, $10.5 million in 

U.S. currency, and 749 arrests. In the past 5 years, Operation Firewall has resulted in almost 4,000 seizures totaling more than $302 

million and the arrest of 679 individuals. 

I would also like to mention an important study that has just recently been completed by the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. This was done in collaboration with ICE. The study was done in conjunction with DEA and 

also with the government of Mexico, and it was commissioned to 

examine the movement of illicit proceeds across our border. 
26 

I am pleased to report that the study provides a strategic overview of the criminal proceeds supply chain. The study’s findings 

and results will be released in a joint U.S.-Mexico money laundering strategy planning meeting June 2 in Mexico City. 

ICE is committed to addressing criminal activity and violence in 

the border communities that unite our two countries especially Ciudad Jua ́ rez and El Paso. 

Since March, ICE suspended the removal of all Mexican nationals with criminal records to Ciudad Jua ́ rez. Our strategy is to reduce the number of individuals susceptible to recruitment or exploitation by cartels. 

ICE’s El Paso BEST is working collaboratively with Mexico’s intelligence unit called Unitos to address four primary threats in the 

El Paso-Jua ́ rez corridor. Drug smuggling, weapons violations, 

money laundering, human smuggling, and trafficking. 

In addition, we are leading DHS’s unity of effort in El Paso to 

set up the conditions for increased security, stability, rule of law, 

and the freedom of movement. To this end, we are working intimately with CBP, our Federal, State, and local partners to both secure the El Paso area and support the government of Mexico’s efforts to curb violence in Ciudad Jua ́ rez. 

The Me ́rida Initiative institutionalizes our partnership with Mexico and provides the framework to disrupt organized criminal 

groups, to strengthen institutions, create a 21st Century border, 

and build strong and resilient communities. Our success hinges on 

this important partnership with Mexico. 

In support of Me ́rida and coordination with the Department of 

State, ICE is expanding its training and technical assistance programs in Mexico. We designed a 10-week criminal investigator 

course for a team of Mexican customs special agents that will be 

graduated in the summer 2010. Upon conclusion, this team will 

work closely with ICE and CBP on cooperative operations. 

In the November 2009, ICE special agents provided an unprecedented, undercover operations training course to 42 Mexican federal police officers from the agency known as SSP. We are providing training on criminal investigative methods to over 4,000 

SSP officers and recruits at their new academy in Mexico. Recently, 

we provided a 2-week intensive child exploitation training course 

to 50 Mexican officials. 

We remain committed to strengthening the professional investigative capacity of Mexican law enforcement entities. Enhancing 

public safety along the southwest border remains an enormous 

prior for the Department of Homeland Security and ICE. 

As the Me ́rida Initiative heads into a new era, ICE will remain 

a strong partner for the U.S. interagency and for the government 

of Mexico and our counterparts. 

Thank you for your continued support to ICE and to the Department of Homeland Security. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you may have. Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Pen ̃ a follows:] 
27 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALONZO PEN ̃ A

MAY 27, 2010 

INTRODUCTION

Chairmen Cuellar and Engel, Ranking Members Miller and Mack, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees: I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the role of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 

the Nation’s coordinated international response to southwest border violence. ICE 

conducts intelligence-driven investigations through collaboration with our Federal, 

State, local, and foreign partners. These multi-agency investigations are enabled by 

robust, cross-border coordination and information sharing with Mexico. ICE has the 

largest force of investigators in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 

we protect our borders—north and south—by investigating groups who exploit 

weaknesses in our legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems. With more than 

6,500 special agents worldwide, ICE works to detect, disrupt, and dismantle crossborder criminal networks engaged in the smuggling of people, narcotics, bulk cash, 

and weapons across our borders. 

As Secretary Napolitano has testified before, the criminal activities and violence 

of the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico is not only an international threat; 

it is a homeland security issue in which all Americans have a stake. ICE is focused 

on countering the illicit activities that occur related to our shared border with Mexico. Assistant Secretary Morton and I remain firmly committed to ensuring that our 

borders are secure and curbing the bilateral flow of contraband including, guns, 

money and drugs. 

Before accepting the position as ICE’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, 

I served as the DHS Attache ́ at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. In that position, 

I was the Department’s senior representative and liaison to the government of Mexico. It was my responsibility to foster greater law enforcement cooperation with 

Mexico and other partners in the region. Before that, I was the Special Agent-inCharge (SAC) of the ICE Office of Investigations in Phoenix, Arizona, where I 

oversaw all ICE investigative activities in one of the Nation’s busiest smuggling corridors. Immediately prior to my position in Phoenix, I served as the SAC of the ICE 

Office of Investigations in San Antonio. Based on my previous experiences, I am 

very familiar with today’s subject, and I look forward to discussing it with you. 

Before addressing our Me ́rida activities, I will address our efforts to protect our 

homeland and secure our southwest border. 

Summer Surge Operations 

Over a third of ICE’s personnel are currently located in offices along the southwest border. At the direction of Secretary Napolitano, ICE will dramatically increase 

its personnel along the southwest border beginning on June 1 as part of a global 

strategy to counter cartel operations and enhance border security. These added resources will increase the ability of our border offices to not only respond to CBP 

interdictive activity, but also to conduct proactive investigations targeting 

transnational criminal organizations. Specifically, ICE personnel will: • Deploy to the Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) and Field Intelligence 

Groups (FIGs) to collect intelligence against cartel leadership in support of Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) and Special Agent in Charge 

(SAC) operations. • Conduct immigration enforcement surge operations aimed at identifying, arresting, detaining, and expeditiously removing violators of U.S. immigration laws 

along the southwest border. • Enhance BEST investigations and operations focused on targeting cartel leaderships and their smuggling corridors. 

• Temporarily assign ICE personnel to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 

Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center to assist the 11 BESTs (10 along the 

southwest border and Mexico City) with cartel-related investigations. 

• Target the movement of illicit proceeds between the United States and Mexico 

through ports of entry and by electronic methods (i.e. banks, money service 

businesses, etc.) through Operation Overload in conjunction with the Government of Mexico; and 

• Focus on gang activity and arresting gang members who facilitate criminal activity for the cartels through Operation Community Shield. 

Let me take this opportunity to note, however, that ICE investigative activity 

takes place not only along the physical border, but also throughout the United 

States and in its 43 Attache ́ offices worldwide. Because the activities of 

transnational criminal organizations affect the entire United States, every one of 
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our offices throughout the country and the world plays a critical part in ICE’s mission and contributes every day to securing our homeland. That said, I would like 

to specifically address our activities along the southwest border. 

Dismantling Cross-Border Criminal Networks Through BESTs Along the Southwest 

Border 

ICE continues to expand the BEST program, which currently operates in ten locations in the United States along the southwest border. Depending on the unique law 

enforcement needs within ICE’s various areas of responsibility, BESTs often include 

members from other Federal agencies such as CBP, DEA, ATF, the FBI, as well as 

State and local law enforcement agencies. A number of BEST locations also include 

foreign law enforcement, including Mexican officers. 

Last August, Secretary Napolitano announced the formation of the first-ever Mexico-based BEST. When fully operational, the Mexico City BEST will be a bilateral, 

multi-agency taskforce that enhances the sharing of information and expertise between ICE and the government of Mexico’s investigations. 

From November 19, 2009, through March 12, 2010, ICE BESTs seized 3,514 

pounds of cocaine, 17,689 pounds of marijuana, 176 pounds of methamphetamine, 

23 pounds of crystal methamphetamine, and 254 pounds of ecstasy. Over the same 

period, ICE BESTs seized 296 weapons, 125 vehicles, and $965,000 in United States 

currency and monetary instruments. 

Our efforts to dismantle cross-border criminal organizations are producing results. 

For instance, in the area of weapons smuggling, in April 2009, the El Paso BEST, 

in collaboration with the El Paso Police Department and ATF, arrested two individuals identified as working for a drug trafficking organization in Mexico. BEST 

agents conducted an undercover meeting in which two Mexican individuals provided 

a list of weapons and a good faith deposit of $148,000 for the firearms. The purchase 

wish-list included 20 revolvers, 75 semi-automatic handguns, 320 rifles, 300 machine guns, 52 grenade launchers, and several thousand rounds of ammunition. The 

individuals agreed to pay $1.9 million in United States currency for the weapons. 

A total of four people were indicted in the investigation. Three have been sentenced; 

the fourth is a fugitive believed to be hiding in Mexico. 

Intelligence Support to ICE Investigations Along the Southwest Border 

A robust intelligence and information-sharing mechanism is critical to dismantling transnational criminal organizations operating along the southwest border. 

ICE draws on its intelligence programs, such as the BVIC and its FIGs, to execute 

its law enforcement operations successfully. Over the past year, ICE deployed additional intelligence analysts and officers to our offices along the southwest border, 

Mexico, and to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). These key personnel support 

ICE investigations with their subject matter expertise on transnational criminal organizations engaging in money laundering, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, 

alien smuggling, and counter-proliferation. 

ICE’s BVIC has served as a centralized mechanism to support operations conducted through the BEST teams and with the government of Mexico. ICE co-located 

the BVIC at EPIC to enhance information sharing between our law enforcement 

partners. ICE’s partnership with ATF’s EPIC Gun Desk, for example, has helped 

coordinate firearms tracing efforts and identified smuggling routes between the 

United States into Mexico. 

With the recent upsurge in violence in Jua ́ rez, the BVIC is actively developing 

actionable intelligence on drug cartels and their associates, and is working with our 

interagency partners. For example, on March 31, BVIC research worked in concert 

with the EPIC Airwatch Command to positively identify a known drug trafficker 

who was seeking to purchase a plane for ostensibly illicit purposes. The information 

resulted in the seizure of a small aircraft valued at $1.1 million. 

ICE’s FIGs also play a critical role in building actionable intelligence against the 

DTOs. FIG El Paso, for example, supports DRO, BEST El Paso, and BEST Las 

Cruces. Following the murders of the persons associated with the United States 

Consulate in Ciudad Jua ́ rez, FIG El Paso was instrumental in identifying Barrio 

Azteca (BA) gang members who crossed into the United States following the murders. Additionally, Intelligence Officers assigned to support Operation Knockdown 

were responsible for arresting a high-level BA member based on actionable intelligence. 

In furtherance of information sharing to support ICE’s law enforcement initiatives, ICE created a Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF). This cyberspace task 

force, comprised of ICE and Government of Mexico personnel, will post investigative 

information through a Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) portal. This 

initiative intends to use the HSIN WVTF portal as the primary mechanism for shar-
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ing firearms-related investigative information and intelligence that will lead to 

ready identification and the routine disruption of illicit trans-border activities that 

support weapons smuggling between the United States and Mexico. 

ICE is committed to partnership in this critical area. To facilitate bilateral sharing of law enforcement information, ICE is supporting the Department’s efforts to 

develop a stand-alone web-based tool, Law Enforcement Information Sharing Service International (LSI). This tool will allow task force personnel to better understand 

patterns and trends in international organized crime and promote early detection 

of organized crime threats. In addition, LSI will provide better identification of partner countries impacted by U.S.-based criminal organizations, resulting in earlier collaboration and better investigations. 

Targeting Transnational Criminal Organizations and Pursuing Money Laundering 

and Bulk Cash Smuggling Investigations 

Transnational criminals attempt to exploit lawful movement and transportation 

systems to create alternative, illicit pathways through which people and narcotics, 

illicit proceeds, and weaponry can cross the border. As DHS’s largest investigative 

agency, ICE plays a critical role in the layered approach to border security. Our 

anti-smuggling operations, including Operation Armas Cruzadas and Operation 

Firewall, are critical to the identification, disruption, and dismantling of 

transnational gangs. 

On August 11, 2009, ICE officially launched the Bulk Cash Smuggling Center 

(BCSC), which is co-located at the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) in 

Williston, Vermont. The BCSC is a 24/7 investigative support and operations facility 

providing real-time tactical assistance to the field. Since its inception, the BCSC has 

initiated 167 bulk cash smuggling investigations, which have resulted in over 35 additional arrests and over 70 additional seizures. 

The final point on ICE’s efforts in developing intelligence-driven investigations 

must include a mention of a key study launched in October 2009 by the DHS Office 

of Counternarcotics Enforcement in collaboration with ICE. The study was done in 

conjunction with the government of Mexico and received significant contributions 

from the DEA. This study was commissioned to examine the movement of illicit proceeds between the United States and Mexico. I am pleased to report that the study 

was just recently completed and it provides a critical strategic overview of the criminal proceeds ‘‘supply chain.’’ It identifies key nodes and vulnerabilities that we can 

use to disrupt bulk cash smuggling and money laundering. This first-ever bilateral 

study will assist United States law enforcement in developing strategic approaches 

to dismantling the financial infrastructure of transnational criminal organizations. 

The study’s factual findings and results will be released at a joint United States/ 

Mexico Money Laundering Strategy Planning meeting on June 2. 

Operation Armas Cruzadas 

Operation Armas Cruzadas is a comprehensive, collaborative, intelligence-driven, 

systematic effort in partnership with the government of Mexico to identify, disrupt, 

and dismantle the criminal networks that illicitly transport arms across the border. 

From March 25, 2009, through March 12, 2010, Armas Cruzadas yielded the seizure 

of 125 firearms, 13,386 rounds of ammunition, and several criminal arrests. Since 

its creation, the Operation has resulted in the seizure of 3,877 weapons, 396,414 

rounds of ammunition, and nearly $10.5 million in U.S. currency and monetary instruments, as well as in the criminal arrests of 749 individuals. This bilateral law 

enforcement and intelligence-sharing operation between United States and Mexican 

law enforcement agencies has helped to curtail drug cartels and criminal organizations that seek to acquire powerful and dangerous firearms that perpetuate the violence in Mexico along the southwest border. 

Operation Firewall 

ICE’s Operation Firewall disrupts the movement and smuggling of bulk cash en 

route to the border, at the border, and internationally. Through partnerships and 

collaboration with Federal, State, and local law enforcement officers, and international law enforcement partners such as Mexico, ICE targets the lifeblood of these 

criminal organizations. During fiscal year 2009, Operation Firewall efforts in Mexico 

resulted in nine seizures totaling over $18 million and the arrest of five individuals 

by Mexican authorities. Thus far in calendar year 2010, Operation Firewall efforts 

at the Mexico City International Airport have resulted in five seizures totaling $3.1 

million. ICE Attache ́ Mexico City is receiving robust support from the government 

of Mexico in conducting Operation Firewall. Since its inception in 2005, Operation 

Firewall has resulted in 3,946 seizures totaling more than $302 million and the arrests of 679 individuals. These efforts include 205 international seizures of more 

than $112 million and 140 international arrests. 
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In September 2009, ICE agents and our international partners made the largest 

bulk cash container seizure in Colombian and U.S. history. More than $41 million 

in U.S. currency secreted in shipping containers found in ports in Mexico and Colombia was seized as a result of this ICE-led investigation. Bilateral cooperation 

with our foreign law enforcement partners has significantly furthered ICE’s mission 

to disrupt the criminal organizations that are smuggling narcotics into the United 

States, and smuggling bulk cash shipments out. 

Investigations informed by operational intelligence continue to produce successful 

criminal prosecutions. For example, in March, a vehicle stop was initiated by St. 

Louis County, Missouri law enforcement based on surveillance of a vehicle that was 

suspected of transporting illicit currency. The BCSC was contacted to provide realtime tactical intelligence to support the interdiction officers on scene. Ultimately, 

the information developed assisted officers in the seizure of $283,080.00 and the indictment of four suspects with ties to Mexico. ICE’s BCSC is able to quickly crosscheck information received on bulk cash seizures against its various systems that 

provide access to financial violations, border encounters, immigration status, and 

other criminal intelligence information. Information regarding bulk cash seizures is 

now shared between ICE’s BCSC and the National Seizure System (NSS) at EPIC. 

Transnational Gangs 

Transnational gangs perpetrate numerous violations within ICE’s purview, including human smuggling and trafficking, narcotics smuggling and distribution, identity 

theft and benefit fraud, money laundering, weapons smuggling and arms trafficking, 

cyber crimes, kidnapping, extortion, and export violations. These gangs often conspire with other dangerous criminal organizations, which allow them to mature from 

small autonomous criminal groups into larger, international criminal enterprises. 

The key to ICE’s success against gangs is our ability to use a multifaceted approach to attacking violent crime by applying appropriate investigative strategies 

and law enforcement authority. For example, in November 2009, under ICE’s Operation Community Shield Program, ICE agents initiated ‘‘Project Big Freeze’’ to combat street gangs, prison gangs, and outlaw motorcycle gangs in the United States 

specifically conducting business on behalf of DTOs, including those that operate 

along the southwest border. 

The impetus for Project Big Freeze was the National Drug Threat Assessment report by the Justice Department’s National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). This 

2009 report identified gangs as a significant threat to the United States. The report 

classified 28 gangs as exceedingly dangerous due to their involvement with crossborder criminal activity linked to Mexican and Asian DTOs. 

Project Big Freeze involved more than 115 law enforcement agencies at the Federal, State, and local levels, and resulted in the arrest of 517 gang members and 

associates from 88 gangs across 83 cities throughout the United States. Forty-one 

of the arrested individuals were present illegally in the United States and 240 were 

from 15 gangs affiliated with Mexican DTOs. As part of this initiative, agents seized 

725 pounds of marijuana, 7 kilograms of cocaine, 142 grams of heroin, 87 grams of 

crack cocaine, 29 grams of methamphetamine, 47 firearms, and more than $100,000. 

Finally, dismantling criminal organizations also requires robust criminal prosecution. To assist United States Attorneys with increased caseloads resulting from 

ICE’s increased enforcement, we are loaning ICE attorneys to serve 2-year terms 

as Special Assistant United States Attorneys (SAUSAs). Currently, ICE has six 

SAUSAs stationed along the southwest border. ICE has developed an agreement 

with the Department of Justice to increase this number in the coming months. 

ICE’s Efforts in Ciudad Jua ́ rez 

ICE recognizes the severity of the violence and illicit activity in Ciudad Jua ́ rez. 

We intend to use, to the greatest extent possible, all of our available resources to 

address this problem strategically, following the lead of the Mexican Government. 

Since March 3, 2010, ICE has suspended until further notice the removal of Mexican nationals with criminal records to Ciudad Jua ́ rez. Temporary cessation of the 

removal of criminal aliens to Ciudad Jua ́ rez can reduce the number of individuals 

susceptible to recruitment or exploitation by cartels and criminal gangs upon repatriation to Mexico. The El Paso BEST is working collaboratively with Mexico’s Tactical-Operative Intelligence Unit (UNITO) Jua ́ rez taskforce, and will address the following four primary threats in the El Paso-Jua ́ rez corridor: (1) Narcotics smuggling; 

(2) weapons violations; (3) money laundering; and (4) human smuggling/trafficking. 

ICE is leading the DHS Unity of Effort in El Paso. To this end, ICE is working 

intimately with CBP and our State and local partners to design a comprehensive 

enforcement strategy to both secure the El Paso area and support the Government 

of Mexico’s efforts to stop the violence in Ciudad Jua ́ rez. 
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I would like to share an example of the real results ICE and its law enforcement 

partners are achieving in El Paso. ICE agents in El Paso participated in ‘‘Operation 

Knockdown,’’ a coordinated effort by DEA, FBI, and El Paso law enforcement agencies targeting BA gang members from March 18–21, 2010. BA gang members are 

allegedly responsible for the murders of three individuals associated with the United 

States Consulate in Ciudad Jua ́ rez on March 13, 2010. BA gang members are also 

involved in smuggling drugs from Mexico into the United States for distribution 

throughout the country, and are suspected of committing assassinations for the 

Jua ́ rez Cartel. ICE agents have made a total of 23 criminal arrests of United States 

citizens and Mexican nationals for violations of Federal and State law. 

Initiatives with the Government of Mexico 

Now I’d like to turn to ICE’s work related to the Me ́rida Initiative. The Me ́rida 

Initiative institutionalizes our partnership with Mexico and provides the framework 

to: Disrupt organized criminal groups; strengthen institutions; create a 21st Century 

border; and build strong and resilient communities. Our success in battling the violence on the southwest border hinges on this partnership, both at home and abroad. 

I want to stress that our working relationship with fellow law enforcement and civilian agencies in Mexico is extremely positive and well-coordinated. We have forged 

productive working relationships, and President Caldero ́n’s commitment to defeat 

drug cartels provides strong leadership for the government of Mexico and the Mexican public. In coordination with the Department of State, ICE is expanding its law 

enforcement training and outreach programs in Mexico and strengthening its efforts 

to curb illicit activity at or related to the border. 

In April 2010, ICE expanded the Illegal Drug Program (IDP) to El Paso, Texas. 

The program began last fall as a pilot program in Nogales, Arizona, with protocols 

between the Mexican Office of the Attorney General (PGR), ICE, and CBP. The IDP 

enables PGR to prosecute cross-border drug smugglers when the United States Attorney’s Office determines that Mexico is a more suitable jurisdiction for prosecution, often due to evidentiary issues. The program became operational on October 

24, 2009, and has already produced results in Nogales, Arizona. Since its inception, 

24 defendants were arrested as a result of 17 separate seizures, with a total combined weight of 887.71 pounds of marijuana, 52.31 pounds of cocaine, and 6.11 

pounds of heroin. The 24 defendants were referred for prosecution in Mexico. On 

March 11, 2010, the PGR notified ICE that the first two completed cases had resulted in a 10-year prison sentence for each defendant. This partnership has enabled us to increase enforcement against individuals directly involved with drug 

trafficking organizations (DTOs) operating in the area. 

In August 2007, the Mexican Tax Administration Service (SAT), Mexican Customs, CBP, and ICE signed a Bilateral Strategic Plan to fight cross-border crime. 

This plan strengthened our collaboration by expanding institutional cooperation 

mechanisms. Secretary Napolitano recently signed a Declaration of Principles with 

the Mexican Minister of Finance, and DHS, ICE, CBP, SAT, and Mexican Customs 

signed an updated version of the corresponding Bilateral Strategic Plan, which identifies several priority initiatives. Under the December 2009 plan, ICE will begin 

next month an unprecedented investigative training course for Mexican Customs-enforcement personnel, modeled after the ICE Special Agent training, which is scheduled to be completed in June 2010. Funded by the Me ́rida Initiative, this comprehensive curriculum will prepare Mexican Customs officials to assume expanded 

investigative responsibilities and graduates will better understand United States 

and Mexican customs laws and law enforcement best practices. Increased investigative capabilities will support the prosecution of criminal customs violations in Mexico and will improve bilateral information sharing and investigative efforts. These 

new capacities will help the government of Mexico to stem the abuse of the international shipping systems that enables organized crime to bring contraband into the 

United States. 

ICE participates in a bilateral arms working group, Grupo de CoordinacionArmas, with United States Embassy law enforcement partners and the Government 

of Mexico. This working group focuses on efforts to combat arms trafficking/smuggling. Every 2 weeks, the ICE Attache ́ office in Mexico City obtains seizure summaries, including names of suspects and lists of arms and munitions seized, and 

provides that information to analysts. 

ICE is also sharing critical information with Mexican authorities to assist them 

in their fight against the DTOs. On March 23, 2010, Secretary Napolitano signed 

an unprecedented arrangement with Governance Secretary Gomez-Mont and Secretary of Public Safety General Garcia Luna in Mexico that memorializes DHS’s effort to share criminal history information electronically with Mexican law enforcement about Mexican nationals who are being repatriated from the United States 
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and who have been convicted of certain felonies in the United States. Our technical 

team is working with the Ministry of Public Safety (Secretarı ́a de Seguridad 

Pu ́ blica) (SSP) to finalize the technological requirements to enable live electronic exchange of this information. 

As previously mentioned, ICE is in the process of building its Mexico City BEST 

unit, which is being supported by Me ́rida funding and will be a bilateral task force. 

This elite unit will support Mexican Government investigations into a wide variety 

of criminal activity in Mexico and support on-going U.S.-based investigations. 

Finally, ICE is enabling Mexican law enforcement officials to perform their duties 

more effectively by providing training and technical assistance. For instance, among 

other programs, we have provided training on arms trafficking, cyber crimes, basic 

criminal investigative methods, special investigative techniques to SSP officers, as 

well as global trafficking in persons, child sex exploitation, and information-sharing 

platform training. We have also planned trainings in ethics and gang investigations. 

We remain committed to our cross-training efforts to build the investigative capacity 

of Mexican law enforcement entities. 

All of these programs and initiatives are examples of our growing collaboration 

with the government of Mexico. The challenge of fighting transnational crime is 

enormous, and one that we share. Our Mexican colleagues have brought incredible 

creativity and dedication to these efforts. We are optimistic that we are heading in 

the right direction by working together and finding new and inventive ways to combat transnational threats. 

CONCLUSION

Enhancing public safety along the southwest border remains an enormous priority 

for the Department and ICE. We have taken important steps to improve security 

along the border by instituting several initiatives and pursuing strong partnership 

with other Federal agencies, State, and local law enforcement, and the government 

of Mexico. We are beginning to see real results from our efforts, and we will continue to prioritize this important mission. I assure you that ICE takes this issue 

very seriously. We will continue to utilize our broad jurisdiction and ability to forge 

strategic partnerships with our fellow law enforcement agencies, both here and 

abroad. As the Me ́rida Initiative heads into a new era, ICE will remain a strong 

partner for the U.S. interagency and our government of Mexico counterparts. 

Thank you for your continued support of ICE and our homeland security mission. 

Your support is vital to the work of ICE. Moreover, your continued interest and 

oversight of our actions is important to the men and women at ICE, who work each 

day to ensure the safety and security of the United States. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 
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Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Pen ̃ a. 

I now recognize Mr. Gina to summarize his statement for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALLEN GINA, ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS COORDINATION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. GINA. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Members, and Members of the 

subcommittees, it is a privilege and honor to appear before you 

today to discuss the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

and particularly the tremendous efforts of our men and women in 

the field. 

My testimony today focuses on CBP’s efforts to increase overall 

border security as well as identify CBP’s partnerships and cooperative efforts with the government of Mexico. Of particular note is 

the support CBP receives from the Department of State and our 

very close working relationship with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Our work is transnational, and we look to leverage our 

combined strengths to combat violence along the southwest border. 

CBP has a workforce of over 58,000 employees and, during the 

first 6 months of fiscal year 2010, we seized nearly 1.8 million 

pounds of drugs. This is in addition to the 3.7 million pounds 

seized during fiscal year 2009. 

The first half of fiscal year 2010, we also encountered 113,000 inadmissible aliens at our ports of entry and apprehended 245,000 illegal aliens between our ports of entry. 

CBP has seen the overall apprehensions of illegal aliens between 

the ports of entry decrease from over the past decade from a high 

point of over 1.6 million apprehensions in fiscal year 2000 to 
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556,000 in fiscal year 2009. This decrease demonstrates the effectiveness of our layered approach to security which is comprised of 

a balance of tactical infrastructure, technology, and personnel. 

While it is becoming substantially harder over the past 10 years 

to cross the southwest border, we do recognize that a lot of work 

still needs to be done. In addition to the drugs seized and the inadmissible and illegal aliens encountered and apprehended, CBP also 

increased its use of pulse-and-surge strategies for outbound operations on the southwest border. 

Current statistics show a relative success in the effectiveness of 

interdicting outbound currency since the start of those focused outbound activities. In comparison, 10.1 million in outbound currency 

was seized in fiscal year 2008 and 37.1 million in fiscal year 2009. 

While we have worked to increase our border security efforts at 

home, a vital key to our overall success will be for CBP to continue 

enhancing and building upon our partnerships with Mexico. As 

part of the Me ́rida Initiative, CBP currently provides canine training to Mexican customs officials and provides nonintrusive inspection and examination training to personnel of Mexico’s public safety office. 

Additionally, we perform numerous other capacity-building related activities in support of our counterparts in Mexico to include, 

in part, support with the newly established Mexican Customs 

Academy, helping Mexico develop aviation risk management protocols, support of the Mexican federal police and developing capabilities between the Mexican ports of entry, joint outbound-inbound 

enforcement operations with our Mexican counterparts as well as 

other related activities. 

In order to streamline cooperation and allow for greater interoperability locally, CBP offices are also providing the local Mexican 

customs offices with border interdiction and inspection training. 

As we have enhanced our collaboration with our neighbors to the 

south, CBP continues to build upon our partnerships in the United 

States. Working with Federal, Tribal, State, and local law enforcement and ICE, which is our investigative arm, and public safety organizations, we employ a collaborative enforcement approach 

against criminal organizations, capitalizing on the capabilities and 

resources of strategic partnerships. 

Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work of U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection and, particularly, about our collaborative efforts with 

the governments of Mexico to increase security along the southwest 

border. 

CBP is committed to securing our Nation’s borders and safeguarding our way of life. The border is a dynamic environment, and 

we strive to meet the demands of today as well as the challenges 

of tomorrow. 

I will be glad to answer any questions you have, and thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Gina follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALLEN GINA

MAY 27, 2010 

Chairmen Cuellar and Engel, Ranking Members Miller and Mack, and Members 

of the subcommittees, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to 
39 

discuss the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), particularly the tremendous dedication of our men and women in the field. 

My testimony today focuses on CBP’s efforts to increase overall border security 

as well as CBP’s partnerships and cooperative efforts with the government of Mexico. These efforts are key components of the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy in which CBP plays a crucial role. With greater resources than 

ever before along the southwest border and historic partnerships with Mexico, I am 

confident that these efforts have yielded concrete results. That said, we will continue to build upon our capabilities to further improve the security of our borders. 

Key to our success is our ability to leverage partnerships with Federal, State, local, 

and Tribal governments in the United States, as well as with our Mexican counterparts. Our work is transnational, and we look to leverage our combined strengths 

to combat violence along the southwest border. 

CBP has a workforce of over 58,000 employees and is the largest uniformed Federal law enforcement agency in the country. During the first 6 months of fiscal year 

2010, CBP seized nearly half a million pounds of drugs and encountered more than 

113,000 inadmissible aliens at our ports of entry. We also seized over 1.3 million 

pounds of drugs, made 245,000 apprehensions, and seized more than $8 million in 

currency between our ports of entry. Compared to previous years, CBP has seen the 

overall apprehensions of illegal aliens decrease from our highest point of over 1 million apprehensions in fiscal year 2000. These numbers demonstrate the effectiveness 

of our layered approach to security, comprised of a balance of tactical infrastructure, 

technology, and personnel at our borders. 

Some Mexican cities along the border continue to experience high levels of drugrelated violence. Despite isolated instances of violence, we have not seen violence 

on the U.S. side of the border on the same scale as the violence that our Mexican 

counterparts are battling every day. Today, Ciudad Jua ́ rez is considered the most 

dangerous city in the Western Hemisphere while, El Paso, right across the border, 

is considered one of the safest cities in the United States. Still, violence on the U.S. 

side of the border remains a threat. Our personnel—among the most highly trained 

and best equipped in the United States—are poised to meet it. 

BORDER SECURITY BETWEEN THE PORTS OF ENTRY

In deploying resources between the ports of entry, the Border Patrol seeks to incorporate the appropriate mix of tactical infrastructure, technology, and personnel 

to allow us to confront the criminal element. This three-pronged strategic balance 

of resources reflects the reality that one of these elements cannot, in and of itself, 

secure our Nation’s borders. Personnel provide the flexibility to engage the criminal 

element; tactical infrastructure supports response by either providing access to the 

Border Patrol or extending the time needed for the response; and technology allows 

us to detect entries and to identify and classify threats. 

Over the past year, we have significantly strengthened each of the three major 

elements of our border security approach. Currently we have over 20,000 Border Patrol Agents on-board Nation-wide, more than ever before in the history of the Border 

Patrol. As of May 14, 2010, we had approximately 646 miles of fencing constructed 

along the southwest border. We have purchased and deployed 41 mobile surveillance 

systems (MSSs) to provide added radar and camera coverage along the borders, with 

plans to purchase additional off-the-shelf technology in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal 

year 2011. The work performed by CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM) augments 

these systems, providing 284 aircraft and 253 marine vessels located at 79 operating 

branches, units, and support sites across the Nation. CBP additionally uses six Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) and associated ground control stations as a more 

sustained surveillance platform. CBP has been working extensively with the Federal 

Aviation Administration on expanding UAS flights into airspace along the Texas/ 

Mexico border, and recently obtained approval for UAS flights in West Texas effective June 1, 2010. 

CBP’s Border Patrol International Liaison Units continue to play an integral part 

in the Border Violence Protocols established between the United States and Mexico 

to improve communication and ensure timely deployment of resources on both sides 

of the southwest border and maintain positive working relationships with their 

Mexican counterparts. These alliances increase border security and ensure expedited response times to critical border incidents through coordinated efforts with 

Mexican authorities, as well as Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. 

BORDER SECURITY AT THE PORTS OF ENTRY

The fiscal year 2010 President’s budget requested additional CBP Officers, Border 

Patrol agents, and support for the expansion of CBP’s License Plate Reader pro-
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gram, which assists in combating southbound firearms and currency smuggling. 

Congress provided those funds, and additionally provided funds for Non-Intrusive 

Inspection equipment, as well as additional Border Patrol agents and CBP Officers 

particularly to staff outbound operations. CBP remains committed to continuing 

southbound border enforcement efforts to combat the smuggling of firearms and currency to Mexico. 

In March 2009, CBP created the Outbound Programs Division within its Office 

of Field Operations. This division creates plans to stem the outbound flow of firearms, currency, stolen vehicles, and fugitives from the United States. CBP also increased its use of ‘‘pulse and surge’’ strategies for outbound operations on the southwest border. Current statistics show an increase in the effectiveness of interdicting 

outbound currency since the start of increased, focused outbound operations: $11.1 

million in currency was seized in fiscal year 2007, $10.1 million in fiscal year 2008, 

and $37.1 million in fiscal year 2009. In fiscal year 2011, we will continue to 

strengthen the use of these operations along the southwest border and to build on 

the current cooperative efforts with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies. 

INCREASED PARTNERSHIPS WITH MEXICO

While we have worked to increase our border security efforts at home, we are continuing to enhance and build upon our robust partnerships with our neighbors in 

the Western Hemisphere. A key component of these efforts is the Me ́rida Initiative, 

a multi-year assistance plan to help Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti combat the threats of drug trafficking, transnational crime, and 

money laundering. In fiscal year 2009, CBP established an inter-office Me ́rida Committee to coordinate with other Federal law enforcement components, the rest of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of State, and the Department of Justice on implementation actions. 

CBP has also led several training efforts with various Mexican government entities. One effort involves currency, narcotics, and firearms detection training of Mexican Customs Canine Detection Units at the Canine Center in El Paso, Texas. We 

began this training in January 2010 and will conclude it in August 2010. Through 

this effort, CBP will train 44 canine detection teams, including six canine trainers. 

In addition, officers of the Mexico Secretariat of Public Safety (SSP) stationed in 

Nogales, Mexico, have been trained by CBP in urban close quarters combat, first 

aid, all-terrain vehicle operation, and hidden compartments detection. This training 

will enhance the capabilities of Mexican authorities in performing their missions. 

In addition, CBP officers are providing advanced non-intrusive inspection training 

for SSP officers on backscatter X-ray vans in Mexico City. This training began on 

April 19, 2010 and ended on May 21, 2010, and occurred in a series of five weeklong classes with 10 SSP officers attending each class. In order to streamline operations and allow for greater local interoperability, CBP officers are training local 

Mexican Customs officers on basic inspection and interdiction techniques, known as 

Basic Border Interdiction Training. The training is conducted by CBP officers stationed at a U.S. Port of Entry, for classes of 8 to 10 Mexican Customs officers from 

the corresponding Mexican port of entry (e.g., Nuevo Laredo for Laredo training). 

There are nine training sessions planned between April and August 2010, three of 

which have been completed to date. 

In addition to our engagements here in the United States, CBP has an attache ́

office located at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. This office oversees CBP operations in Mexico, including border operational support at and between the ports of 

entry, bilateral coordination to secure our shared border, as well as training for 

Mexican government agencies. Additionally, the attache ́’s office is the CBP Commissioner’s representative in Mexico and provides CBP subject matter expertise to the 

ambassador and interagency groups within the U.S. embassy in Mexico City in support of the U.S. Government’s trade, travel, and security agendas. Interagency cooperation at the embassy level is essential to ensure that the right structures and 

mechanisms are in place to oversee the implementation of Me ́rida programs. 

In order to increase information-sharing, CBP’s Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination (OIOC) has placed an intelligence analyst in Mexico City at an 

SSP facility for a mutual 30-day utility assessment. This initial deployment has increased integration between U.S. and Mexican intelligence efforts. CBP and SSP 

will evaluate their long-term requirements to assess whether the post should be extended or become permanent. 

CBP continues to work with the Mexican government in the development of increased ground-based law enforcement surveillance and interdiction capabilities, including the detection of U.S./Mexican border air intrusions. The primary means of 
41 

detecting air intrusions is a large radar network, monitored at CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, California. Personnel at the AMOC 

detect northbound aircraft that land just south of the U.S./Mexico border or continue into U.S. airspace, and coordinate appropriate CBP and or Mexican groundbased interdiction forces to bring these situations to a law enforcement resolution. 

This coordination has been particularly effective with the emerging threat faced by 

the use of ultra-light aircraft by drug smuggling organizations. Neither country’s 

ultra-light aircraft detection capability is perfect, but with added cooperation we are 

more effective in the performance of our collaborative mission to detect and combat 

these operations. 

Another coordinated effort is the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS), a bi-national initiative designed to increase the ability 

of the U.S. and Mexican governments to prosecute alien smugglers and human traffickers on both sides of the border. Conducted in cooperation with Mexico’s Attorney 

General’s Office (PGR), through OASISS, select alien smuggling cases that are declined by United States Attorney’s Offices are subsequently turned over to the Government of Mexico for prosecution under Mexico’s judicial system. Since its inception on August 17, 2005, the OASISS program has generated 2,031 cases and led 

to the prosecution of 2,290 principal defendants in Mexico. 

CBP will continue to assist the Government of Mexico in maintaining a counterdrug effort, including command, control, communications, and information support. 

INCREASED PARTNERSHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES

As we have enhanced our collaboration with our neighbors to the south, CBP also 

has continued to build upon our partnerships within the United States. Initiated in 

September 2009, the Operation Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) 

is a multi-agency operation in the Sonora-Arizona Corridor involving over 50 Federal, Tribal, State, and local law enforcement and public safety organizations. ACTT 

employs a collaborative enforcement approach against criminal organizations, capitalizing on the capabilities and resources of our strategic partners. The intent is 

to deny, degrade, disrupt, and ultimately dismantle criminal organizations and their 

ability to operate; engage communities to reduce their tolerance of illegal activity; 

and establish a secure and safe border environment, which will ultimately improve 

the quality of life of affected communities. While ACTT’s initial focus is on Arizona, 

as it continues to evolve, focused operations will transition to other operational corridors. 

CBP continues to work with its partners in the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(DEA) and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area centers to expand the ability 

of the United States Government to exploit information from Federal law enforcement agencies to target and disrupt drug traffickers and drug trafficking organizations. These operations utilize established locations to gather information regarding 

travel patterns to provide actionable intelligence on drug trafficking and smuggling 

activity with a nexus to the border. To further these operations, CBP has established positions at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Organized Crime 

Drug Enforcement Task Force Fusion Center, and the DEA Special Operations Division. 

These partnerships enhance interaction with the intelligence community and law 

enforcement agencies to more effectively facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable drug-related intelligence in support of drug trafficking and 

money laundering investigations throughout the southwest border, Mexico, and the 

United States. CBP remains a partner with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces to prevent the illegal flow 

of drugs, weapons, and currency across the southwest border, including the interdiction of outbound shipments of firearms and bulk currency. 

CONCLUSION

Chairmen and Members of the subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to 

testify about the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and particularly 

about our collaborative efforts with the government of Mexico to increase security 

along the southwest border. CBP is committed to securing our Nation’s borders and 

safeguarding our way of life. The border is a dynamic environment and we strive 

to meet the demands of today, as well as the challenges of tomorrow. 

I will be glad to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes 

to question the witnesses. I now recognize myself for questions. 
42 

Ms. Jacobson, a Me ́rida question, and then I will talk about some 

border issues. 

I believe, in 2010, there was about—up to the start of 2010, there was about $130 million of the $800 million that have been appropriated or sent over to Mexico in the Me ́rida. What is that number 

now, No. 1? How is the delivery being expedited? What is the plan 

for moving forward now to expedite the work? 

I know you and I have talked a lot about this, but I just want 

to see what is—you know, have we improved that number? What 

is the plan to expedite this? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we have improved our processes. The beginning of the 

Me ́rida Initiative, up until, I think, you know, the last year or so 

really took us a long time to get started. We have to remember that 

we went from a program where the U.S. Government in Mexico 

had about $40 million a year on average dedicated to counternarcotics and counter-criminal organizations to an immediate leap 

of $400 million in the first year and then beyond, obviously. 

We had a lot of processes and systems to set up not only within 

the U.S. Government but, frankly, with the Mexican government 

which has never been a large-scale recipient of U.S. aid. So working together, we set up a number of structures that I think are now 

in place that really do speed the assistance greatly. 

We have increased our personnel in Mexico to implement the aid, 

both to make sure the contracts are let and things are delivered 

and work with their Mexican counterparts by 275 percent. We have 

55 people. We used to have about 19. 

We have increased the personnel here in Washington to make 

sure that we are doing things as rapidly as possible, turning 

around the requests for specific information. We have also set up 

a bilateral implementation working group in Mexico that meets 

once a month. We have all of the U.S. agencies represented at our 

embassy in Mexico. They meet with their counterparts and make 

sure that funds are flowing, equipment being organized, training 

set up and scheduled, et cetera. 

Our view is that, at this point, in terms of funds that are actively 

implementing programs, we are well over $400 million. That is, 

there are things either purchased and awaiting delivery. There 

may be courses that are already scheduled but haven’t taken place. 

In some cases, they are equipment that is delivered but haven’t 

had bills certified yet. 

But we believe that we are making much greater progress in 

moving the equipment. As I said, I think one of the very biggest 

pieces of this in terms of the funding that we are moving ahead 

more rapidly on is aviation. 

We will be able to move ahead on aviation, especially rotary wing 

helicopter aviation much more quickly than had originally been 

planned under normal procurement pipelines with DOD and others. 

So we feel like this year, that is fiscal year 2010, we are going 

to see a dramatic acceleration and that we will be well over $600 

million by the end of this calendar year. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Again, thank you for moving that process. 

I would ask you before the end of the day today if you can provide 
43 

the committee a timetable as to where each of the items will be delivered and what date. I know that, at the beginning of the year, 

you all did that, but I want to see what the expedited is. So just— 

I know you had it like this month, this will be delivered; this 

month, this will be delivered until the end of the year and next 

year. 

So if you don’t mind, I am sure y’all have that available already. 

If you can turn that in to our committees? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Sure. We would be delighted. At this point, I 

talked about 5,000 police officials, we have also worked with over 

8,000 in the criminal justice and judicial agencies and nongovernmental agencies in terms of training and exchanges on criminal 

justice issues. 

So it is getting to be a very long list of deliveries, which is a good 

thing. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Good. Moving on to border security. 

This is a question for Ms. Silver and Mr. Pen ̃ a and Mr. Gina, 

whoever wants to answer this. 

I know that talking to the Chairman, Mr. Thompson, on this 

issue, what is the overall strategy of the Federal Government to 

provide security so you can incorporate the State, Federal, and 

local as an example? I don’t see Mr. McCaul here, but I know we 

have talked about it. 

Like, for example, in Texas, the State there has said that they 

have a quote, and this is their words, ‘‘a secret plan’’ for securing 

the border. Now, I have asked Federal what they meant by ‘‘secret 

plan.’’ I mean, I don’t think this is time to have secret plan for securing the border. I think this is a time where we ought to coordinate, communicate with the State, local, and Federal. 

Is there something that you can provide us, and you can just 

briefly talk about this? If there is an issue, what is Arizona—you 

know, for example, what is the role of the Federal Government, 

what is the role of the State government, what is the role of the 

local government? In Texas, you know, what is the role? Because 

I know there is different threads and assessments on that. 

Now, I understand there is a task force. I understand all of that. 

There is joint task forces. I know there is, you know, the BEST. 

I understand that. But there is not got to be an overall strategy 

so we know what the Federal Government is going to do, what the 

State government’s role is, what the local government is. 

If you can briefly talk about then, and then I would like to see 

that in writing. 

Ms. SILVER. I think multiple of us are going to take a shot at this 

one. 

Overall, as I mentioned, of course, we have a multi-layered security approach, and so that means not only that the components of 

DHS but also the components of Federal law enforcement in other 

departments and, also, of course, working very closely with State 

and local, the Secretary—as a former Governor—is very aware of 

the importance of working with State and local governments. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I am sorry. I don’t mean to interrupt. That is the 

standard language statement about we are working closely together. But if you put a lifetime situation, does—let us say the 

local sheriff know exactly what his role is going to be or she? Does 
44 

the deputy of public safety or State trooper of a particular State 

know what they are supposed to do? 

Who is in charge? Who does the coordination? I just want to see 

if there a coordination plan. I know the statements—we are all 

working very closely. We know this, but if something happens, how 

do we know whose role, what is the defining roles as to what we 

do? I want to see that in writing. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Absolutely. So, first of all, my role as international. I am familiar with what we do on the border. We do have 

an effort underway, for example, in Arizona which we call the ACT 

which some of my colleagues can talk about which integrates all 

those pieces and really brings Federal, State, and local together. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Congressman, we do, again, under the leadership of 

Secretary Napolitano have a—it started with Arizona as a focal 

points with a coordination between CBP, ICE, and other Federal, 

State, and local law enforcement agencies. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Mr. Pen ̃ a, let me interrupt you. So starting 

with Arizona. So does that means there is nothing in New Mexico, 

California, or Texas? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. No, sir. What we are doing is this is a process that 

will be expanded across the border. Initially, the initial phase of 

this operation started in Arizona. We have planning and we are coordinating the expansion of that program across the border. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay, so starting to expand that program. So that 

means we haven’t gotten to New Mexico, California, and Texas yet? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. We are in the process, again, sir—to answer—the discussions are to expand what we started, the coordinated effort in 

Arizona. We wanted to make sure that we would get it right, see 

it work, bring all the partnerships, as you very well explained, 

State and local, Federal, all the agencies in a coordinated manner 

and then institute it and ensure that we could have a unified command, a unity of effort working together addressing the problem 

and, as it would work and bring it across the border, sir. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. The reason I am saying that, I am not being 

critical, but an example. We were at the Washington birthday celebration. We had Alan Bersin there. You were there. We had other 

folks there. There was a situation that there was fighting across 

the river—gunfights, and you showed me some pictures where they 

had those weapons out there. 

I was watching what was happening next door. It was like, you 

know, are we going to close the bridges? Are we not going to do 

this? The city manager was involved. In other words, it looked like 

there were different pieces together. 

My thing is, is there an overall strategy that not only includes 

ICE but ATF, DEA, FBI, State, local? I just want to know is there 

an overall strategy that I can see. I have never seen it, and maybe 

you do have it, and maybe it is secret like we have it in Texas. 

But is that available so we can see? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. I believe there is, sir. Again—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. I believe. Yes or no? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Yes, there is. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Can we see that at the end of the day? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. I guess we will make it available. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. 
45 

Ms. JACOBSON. Mr. Chairman, to that point—— 

Mr. CUELLAR. Again, I am not trying to be critical, but I just— 

I just want to make sure we have an overall strategy because I 

have seen certain things at the border, and it looks like, you 

know—and the standard language is we are working closely with 

our State, Federal, local. I have heard that. 

But I want to see if there is a—it is like a top-off practice. Is 

there a top-off—if some happening, this is what the role of the 

sheriff is, this is the role of the local police, this is role of the DPS, 

this is the role of the different DEA, ATF, ICE, Border Patrol, Customs, et cetera? I just want to see that because I don’t know if I 

have ever seen that, and I am have interested in that. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. I will say, sir, when you asked the question a few minutes ago, we started in Arizona. We have started a plan in El Paso. 

We are moving across to the east. We should be in your jurisdiction 

very soon. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. But notice your answer: We started off in 

Arizona. We are expanding—which means that if you are just 

starting to expand, that means that there is not an overall coordinated plan for the border because if you are starting to expand, 

that means that there is not an overall border almost 2,000 miles 

of border. 

It is like the FBI. We are doing 28 miles. What about the rest 

of the almost 2,000 miles? I don’t want to get into FBI. I know we 

talked about that. 

But my time is up—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. Mr. Chairman, can I make a comment? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Particularly, coming from the State of Arizona 

where the problems are so bad, I would just like this committee or 

joint committees—I mean, if we are going to use Arizona as the 

model to expand on, I believe that Members of Congress really 

have to be more engaged and involved because our problems down 

in southern Arizona, even to this day, as we all know, are really 

out of control. 

So I just want to make sure if this is going to be the model and 

we know, you know, more precisely with the recent homicide of Rob 

Krentz, the rancher down there, where we are still not working as 

well as we need to be with our local, our State, and our Federal. 

We need to get this right before we use this as a National model, 

and I am really concerned about what is happening down in southern Arizona. 

Mr. CUELLAR. As the Chair said, Mr. Thompson, the local 

input—what is the local input of the sheriffs and police? What is 

the local of the State police? Of course, making sure we coordinate 

with our Federal brothers and sisters, you know, DEA, ICE and all 

that. 

I am not faulting any of you, but I want to see, by the end of 

the day, the full coordinated plan for border security, how we coordinate and communicate on that. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Well there is, again, sir, there is the southwest border 

strategy that has been put together and then with coordination 

through OMDCP recently announced the implementation plan of 
46 

that. Again, what I am referring to—what we are doing in Arizona 

is one part of this overall strategy. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. Again, my time is up, but I certainly want 

to allow the other—but I think it is so important that we coordinate. You know, the language about we work closely and all that, 

but I have seen it. I saw it when that situation came up and it 

looked like everybody was running around, and I don’t know who 

was in charge of that. 

Quite honestly, you know, the next door—as you know, the next 

door was the coordinating plan, I don’t know who was in charge. 

I want to know who is in charge for the southern border itself. 

At this time, I would like to recognize—again, I want to say you 

guy are doing a great job. I appreciate it. But I want to see that 

plan. 

I recognize now Mrs. Miller for questions. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I will just pick up my questioning on what has been said 

by the Chairman and the gentlelady from Arizona, who is painfully 

aware, much more than certainly many of us, of what is happening 

on the border there. 

But it is interesting listening as we talk about coordination and 

how important it is for all of the stakeholders to have a coordinated 

effort and all work together, which is absolutely critical. That is 

key. We have to do that from the Federal level to the State level 

to the county level, every agency. 

So I was rather stunned just—I think it was last week—when 

the assistant secretary of ICE, Mr. Morton, stated that ICE may 

not process or deport aliens arrested and identified as being in the 

country illegally by the Arizona law enforcement. 

Mr. Pen ̃ a, I am not sure if you would want to comment on that. 

But I guess my question is has that been a directive to your department that anyone that is picked up under the Arizona law is 

not to be deported and processed? Will you be following that directive? How does that—how is that coordinating the Federal agencies 

with the wishes of the State government? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Well, there is no directive, ma’am, that we will not enforce the law in Arizona. What I believe Mr. Morton was saying is 

that we do have prosecutor discretion and, with the resources that 

we have, we are going to prioritize our resources at the criminal 

aliens—you know, with the resources we have, we have to 

prioritize and go after those aliens that are affecting public safety 

and the security of the State of Arizona. There is no directive that 

says we will not take referrals from State and locals. 

We have a program in Arizona called LEAR, Law Enforcement 

Area Response, in which we currently do that. We respond. We 

have 24/7 coverage to all State and local law enforcement agencies 

that refer calls to us. 

Again, I think what he was referring to is that, you know, within 

our resources, we have to exercise our prosecutorial discretion. We 

cannot take every single referral that comes to us. We have to 

prioritize those. 

Mrs. MILLER. And appreciate that. I hope he will clarify his 

statements if that is really what he meant because I think there 
47 

was a lot of consternation all throughout the country that somebody from ICE would make such a statement as that. 

If I could ask a little bit. I was looking at all of the slides that 

you put up on the PowerPoint about particularly the guns which 

is stunning. There is a lot of debate in the Congress here about 

what the President said last week—President Caldero ́n—about the 

gun laws of America, et cetera. 

Could you talk a little bit about the guns that you were showing 

there? They didn’t—I mean, I don’t know what kind of guns they 

look like, but they look to me—and I have heard often enough— 

that many of the guns, if not most of the guns being used in Mexico, are coming from other countries, perhaps China, whatever, to 

Venezuela. They find their way up from the southern border of 

Mexico and that many of them can’t really be tracked because they 

don’t have proper identification on them. 

What were those guns that we were looking at there? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Ma’am, those are guns that have been seized recently 

south of the U.S. border about, I believe it was about 150 miles 

south of the U.S. border from Texas. It is what is referred to as 

the ZETA training camp. ZETAs are the former military deserters 

that are the enforcement arm of the Gulf cartel. That, hopefully, 

expresses the commitment of the Mexican government. 

They found that cache of weapons in a seize. There were also 

some hand grenades and other types of munitions there. We believe 

that many of the weapons—and, again, whether they are coming 

from the United States or whether they are coming from other 

countries through the southern border, we are very concerned 

about the firepower that the cartels are getting a hold of in Mexico, 

and we want to—— 

Mrs. MILLER. Absolutely. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. We want to work as closely with our partners at ATF 

and CBP to do everything we can with our Mexican partners to 

prevent the flow of those weapons into Mexico because they are not 

at all averse of using the weapons that they are acquiring. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. If I could ask one question of Ms. 

Jacobson. You were talking in regards to some of the hardware and 

equipment that you were purchasing, aviation and the rotary 

wings. Now I have heard that there has been five or six Hueys that 

have been purchased and, you know, what kind of hardware are 

you purchasing? I mean, we are never going to have enough personnel. We have to use hardware. We have to use equipment. We 

have to use technology, et cetera. 

Then how would that be stationed? Is that CBP that would be 

flying those or the National Guard? How is that going to work? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Let me be clear. I am sorry. The aviation assets 

that are being purchased with being purchased under the Me ́rida 

Initiative foreign assistance package for Mexican authorities to use 

in this particular case. In the case of aviation of helicopters, there 

are basically two types of helicopters that are being provided to the 

Army and the Navy as well as to the Federal police. 

To the Army and the Navy, the Army, we have provided Bell 412 

helicopters and some of those have already been delivered. More 

will be delivered by the end of this calendar year. To the Navy, 
48 

they will be purchasing the naval equivalent of the Blackhawk, the 

UH–60. Those will be delivered, I believe, in 2011. 

On the police side, the Mexican police, as they expand their Federal police, in part, to take over the role that the military has 

played, they have also purchased Blackhawks. Three of those will 

be delivered this calendar year, some additional ones next year. 

They will be moving—they have purchased more than twice as 

many as we are purchasing for them on their own. So they are 

building a fleet, but we are assisting them with that and assisting 

with the training. 

Their goal is to be able to station those throughout the country 

to have rapid reaction response because the traffickers are spread 

out, are in some very inaccessible areas, at times. They want the 

ability to get a unit to an incident or a situation against traffickers 

very quickly. So the aviation support is critical for that rapid response. 

There are lots of other pieces of equipment and technology, 

whether that is computer hardware and software or the nonintrusive inspection equipment to search for contraband that are also 

part of our initiative. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Mrs. Miller. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York, 

the Chairman, Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You had started your 

questioning by asking a number of things that I was concerned 

with. I just want to reiterate and ask Ms. Jacobson. 

We are all very concerned with the slow level of pace of money 

that is flown from Me ́rida. I know that you said that you are addressing it and that we expect to see more money flowing. 

As I mentioned before, a GAO commission report that I commis- sioned found, at the end of September 2009, of the $830 million in 

Me ́rida funding, only $26 million, which is 2 percent, had been 

spent. We are very concerned about that. 

You know, if we don’t see any real progress, it is very hard. 

Funds are difficult to come by. There is going to be a move to slash 

funding or to zero out funding. 

So I just want more assurances from you as the State Department is cutting through the red tape and how much assistance do 

you think will reach Mexico by the end of 2010? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

support on these issues. 

We are confident that we are accelerating the pace; that the 

structures we needed to put in place, which did take some time, I 

acknowledge. Certainly things like letters of agreement, which are 

legal requirements in order to deliver assistance, took us quite a 

while to negotiate with our Mexican partners. They were very new 

and different than we had ever done before, but we have now completed two of those letters of agreement, both for 2008 and 2009, 

moving ahead with 2010 now. 

I think all of the procurement processes that we are undertaking 

are moving much more smoothly as well. So I think the structures 

are in place and things are clearly moving more rapidly. You abso-
49 

lutely have our commitment that this is the highest priority, is to 

cut through the bureaucracy, cut through some of the knots that 

we have had and move this equipment and training much more 

quickly. 

And very optimistic that, by the end of this calendar year, we 

will be in the range of $6- to $700 million actively against programs as compared to where we are now. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I hope so. Let me ask you one other question 

that is very important to me because you and your Mexican counterparts have developed specific goals and metrics to evaluate the 

success of the Me ́rida Initiative. Why were no metrics included to 

assess efforts to reduce the illegal flow of firearms from the United 

States to Mexico? Will you consider this decision? I think that is 

key. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you. We did not include that particular 

metric, in part, because, while Me ́rida Initiative funds are being 

used for training of Mexican entities in capacity building, things 

like training in the Spanish language ATF program, eTrace, which 

I think is critical for our Mexican partners to be able to trace weapons that are seized by those in the picture, that has begun now. 

The funding, for example, for eTrace was not under the Me ́rida 

Initiative because that was a domestic program. So it was a relatively small part of Me ́rida per se. And so it wasn’t used as an 

overall metric which was negotiated with our Mexican counterparts. 

Surely, it is something that we both are going to be working on 

and focusing a great deal of attention on how we can increase the 

amount of weapons seized that are traced because that is critical 

for our law enforcement community to be able to do those investigations back home and know where guns are coming from. 

So that is an area that we are going to be continuing to work 

on and hoping to see great progress on even if there is not a specific metric in our list. 

But I will also say that the metrics that were developed at the 

beginning of Me ́rida, which we are reviewing now to see how we 

are stacking up, are also going to be a work-in-progress as we look 

to adjust those because the situation may change on the ground or 

we have new programs under our four pillars. 

So we will be taking a look at that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, again, I want to, you know, reassert my assertion that the Obama administration ought not to continue to follow 

in the steps of the George W. Bush administration which is to put 

its head in the sand when it comes to the illegal flow of weapons. 

Under Bill Clinton’s administration and George H.W. Bush’s administration, they were going after the illegal arms that were flowing south of the border. As I mentioned in my testimony—in my 

opening statement—there is no new law that Congress has to pass 

to implement this. I just am bewildered as to why the Obama administration has not moved for forcefully in this regard. 

Let me ask the other three panelists, what will the National 

Guard be doing at the U.S.-Mexico border that your agencies would 

be unable to do? CBP, ICE, and ATF? 
50 

How specifically is the Obama administration building capacity 

for CBP, ICE, and ATF so that they can eventually replace National Guard troops at the border? 

Ms. SILVER. Thank you for the question. 

As was mentioned, I think, before, the focus of the Guard is to 

support and supplement the work that we already do on the border. Primarily, they will be doing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of our folks who are actually the boots on 

the ground at the border. 

We will be working over the coming months to continue to increase over and above the 80 percent increases that we have seen 

to continue to increase the boots-on-the-ground Border Patrol in 

particular on the southwest border. As part of the package, there 

is $500 million requested that is going to be requested for additional support to build up that Border Patrol function. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Pen ̃ a. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Yes, Chairman Engel. ICE will be using the National 

Guard personnel to augment our intelligence capabilities along the 

border. Currently, we are doing that with TDY personnel from 

other offices to augment our staff along the southwest border. That 

is the primary function that we will be using the National Guard 

resources that come to ICE. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Gina. Could you push your button? 

Mr. GINA. Can you hear me now, sir? 

Mr. ENGEL. Yes. 

Mr. GINA. I apologize. 

As Ms. Silver had said, you know, for CBP, even though the details and the plans are still yet to be finalized, they will be primarily surveillance and reconnaissance. What they have been used 

for in the past is for what is referred to as entry identification 

teams. They support listening posts and observation posts and remote video facilities such as sky-watch operators, the equivalent of 

very large—some would say it is a cherry picker—to observe that 

is happening. 

Also, what the Guard has been in support of us in the past is 

for engineering support, air support and, also, the helping of planning support. 

Mr. ENGEL. I have one final question for Ms. Silver. But before 

I have a question for you, Mr. Gina. 

Are you from New York? Because you sound like me. 

Mr. GINA. Yes, sir. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GINA. I appreciate your dialect, sir. I understand you very 

well. 

Mr. ENGEL. I can always pick a New Yorker out in a crowd. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ENGEL. Ms. Silver, in your testimony, you cite concerns 

about recently tragic killings of persons associated with the U.S. 

consulate in Jua ́ rez, an Arizona rancher, Robert Krentz. I heard 

Ms. Giffords, the other night, doing an hour special order and reading letters that she had gotten from her constituents. 

I was really very moved by it because it really opened my eyes 

to the very, you know, real difficulties that people are experiencing 
51 

in southern Arizona. So if we talk about—in your testimony, you 

know, you talk about your concerns about these killings of people. 

You know, what implications might these incidents have for border security? Are they signals that U.S. persons are being targeted 

where before they were not? Are they an indication that spill-over 

violence is becoming more likely? 

Ms. SILVER. I very much appreciate the concern and we, certainly, are concerned about it as well. 

In fact, there are on-going investigations in both of those cases, 

and ICE is involved in those investigations, so I would hold my 

comments until the investigations have been completed. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. I would appreciate it, if when it is completed, 

you would let both of our subcommittees know. 

Thank you. It is now my pleasure to call on my Ranking Member, Connie Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all, again, for your testimony and answering our 

questions. I know it is not always easy, but I think, you know, 

there is a lot of frustration. There is just a lot of anger, frustration. 

There is not a lot of faith or belief that the Federal Government 

is prepared to handle the problems that we face, whether it is the 

security on the border or whether it is implementing the Me ́rida 

Initiative. 

I mean, I think there is just a lot of frustration. So, you know, 

some of our questions, I think, are coming from that that we are 

frustrated, our constituents are frustrated. I know you are frustrated. 

But, you know, I think we want to see—when the Congress acts, 

as it has on the Me ́rida Initiative, we want to see things done. I 

mean, we are watching what is happening in Mexico with the drug 

cartels and what it’s doing not only to Mexicans and Mexico but 

what it’s doing to the United States. 

So it is critically important that, when we begin a program such 

as Me ́rida, that we—if there are problems, if there are things that 

are slowing it down, if something needs to happen, you need—we 

need to know about it. We need to make sure that those barriers 

are eliminated so we can get the job done. That is what the American people want. They want to see their tax dollars—if we are 

going to commit their tax dollars, they want to see the job get done. 

There is no reason why in the United States of America, we cannot—there is no reason that we are not successful in taking on the 

drug cartels in Mexico and securing our borders and creating a security and safety here at home for American citizens. 

So with that, Ms. Jacobson, what—do you have now a standard 

and a way to evaluate how Me ́rida has—how well we are doing? 

I mean, there a clear understanding of the goals and what we 

are trying to accomplish and if we are there? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Congressman. We do share every 

frustration in terms of wanting to do things faster, better. We are 

all working on that, and we greatly appreciate, frankly, the help 

that both of these subcommittees has given to us on this. 

I think we have a good way of evaluating whether or not individual programs are beginning to have an impact on institutions, 

structures. As I talked about the nonintrusive inspection equip-
52 

ment and the number of seizures that we have seen—a $3 million 

seizure in Mexico City not long ago. We have seen a significant 

number of arrests by the Mexican government of cartel leaders 

and, clearly, some of the violence that we are seeing is the breakdown of those structures because leaders have been removed from 

the operation. 

But we are also seeing—and this is much harder to measure. 

What we are seeing and what we began to see from the very beginning of the initiative is, because of the commitment of President 

Caldero ́n and his officials I think and a commitment on our part, 

is much greater cooperation and sharing of information such that 

these organizations can no longer assume that information the 

Mexican government has will not be shared with us for use on our 

side of the border and vice versa. 

That, I think, is one of the most important and longest-lasting 

results of this initiative and the collaboration is our ability to work 

together, whether it is coordinated or joint operations for contraband coming—— 

Mr. MACK. If I may—and I appreciate that. But, you know, we 

expected that a long time ago. I mean, we are looking for the assets 

on the ground. You know, we want to see results. I mean, you 

know, if we are going to—if the taxpayers are going to entrust us 

for their safety and security, we want to see—we understand—and 

as the Chairman said earlier, there is a lot of, you know, communication, and that is great. We need that. 

But that should have happened a long time ago. You know, the 

frustration is, is that we have obligated a lot of money to secure 

our borders, to secure safety for our citizens, and to help Mexico 

fight the drug cartels. I think the frustration is that all of the good 

things that you are talking about are great, but it is frankly—it 

needs to—we need to be much farther ahead of the game than we 

are right now. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to, if I could, get on another question 

about border security. It goes along the same, you know, lines of 

questioning. 

It seems like there is a lot of reaction right now primarily because of the Arizona law. That has kind spurred this new attention 

to the border. I am not saying there hasn’t been attention to the 

border, but with the National Guard and some more money—is 

there a plan in place right now to secure the border? I mean, is 

there an overarching plan right now that—what else do you need? 

You know, this is the time. This hearing is the time and the opportunity to talk about what else you need, and let us not wait to have 

to react to the next crisis. Let us get ahead of this. 

So if you could, tell me what the plan is, or are we just reacting 

to what is happening with the Arizona law? 

Ms. SILVER. I would say certainly it is not just a reaction to the 

Arizona law. Over the past 16 months and since the President and 

Secretary Napolitano have taken up their offices, drug seizures are 

up, illegal weapons seizures are up, immigrant apprehensions are 

down. 

These are all major milestones in our effort to secure the southwest border. The Border Patrol is better staffed today than at any 

time in its 85-year history. Over the last year, we have signifi-
53 

cantly increased the number of boots on the ground on the border 

but, also, our intelligence assets working on southwest border-related issues and, as Roberta said, our cooperation with Mexico. 

So all of this is part of a comprehensive multi-layered strategy, 

and the National Guard is just one piece of that. 

Mr. MACK. Well, you can understand how maybe the rest of 

America sees it as: Why weren’t we don’t this all along? If we have 

this crisis on the border, if we have the security problems and the 

safety of Americans—Americans are at risk, why do you have to 

wait until a law is passed in Arizona that creates some controversy 

to then put more assets to the border? 

Ms. SILVER. If I may, I think that is exactly why we didn’t wait. 

The tripling of intelligence and analysts along the southwest border, the increase of 80 percent of boots on the ground of CBP officers on the southwest border, those things didn’t happen yesterday. 

They happened before this. As I said, the National Guard is part 

of this multi-layered approach. 

Mr. MACK. So is the National Guard just a PR move? 

Ms. SILVER. It is part of a multi-layered approach. It is something that we all keep in our toolkit. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much. At this time, I recognize the 

Chairman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson. 

The gentleman from Mississippi. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank our witnesses for their testimony, also. 

We are spending a lot of money, $1.3 billion, on the first initiative. There is a question as to how much is spent versus obligated. 

But in the mind of a lot of people who live along the border, you 

know, perception is reality. 

If the feeling is the border is no safer because of the money being 

spent, then somehow we need to fix the problem. Money is one 

part. What the Chairman talked about earlier—this strategy or 

plan. 

Mr. Chairman, I will help you expand your request because it appears that every agency has a plan or strategy, but we don’t have 

a DHS border security plan or strategy, and that is what we really 

need. 

We used to press Secretary Chertoff for the same thing, and I 

will surely press Secretary Napolitano to make sure that we get it 

because it is absolutely important. 

The other part that I would say to our witnesses, because perception is reality, we absolutely need to involve people who live along 

the border as part of your due diligence for trying to get a handle 

on this problem. 

Sometimes, we give the impression that just because we work for 

the Government we know everything. I am convinced that people 

who live in an environment and have survived in an environment 

can be a plus from an informational standpoint. I would encourage 

you to do that, also. 

Now, early on, we had information that, when State Department, 

which has the primary mission—DHS had some misgivings about 

the relationship and the coordination. 
54 

Ms. Jacobson, for the record, have we resolved the communication, the issues from your standpoint? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think we have, Mr. Chairman. I think that we 

are working extremely well together with ICE and CBP and, frankly, all of our law enforcement and other colleagues from DHS, DOJ, 

Treasury, et cetera. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Ms. Silver. 

Ms. SILVER. I would certainly agree with that. DHS now has a 

much stronger representation at the embassy, for example, in Mexico City where a lot of the discussion happens that leads to the decisions about deployment of Me ́rida funds. 

But I would also like to address, if I may, your first comment. 

It is been just about a year since the southwest border initiative 

was announced that provided a comprehensive view of how DHS as 

a whole and DHS components as a sum of the parts were going to 

deploy on the southwest border. That is the initiative that has 

borne the fruit that I described earlier. 

In terms of collaborating with State and locals, obviously, we 

have Stonegarden grants and things like that. We also do monthly—in fact, yes, monthly calls with State and local law enforcement. We certainly recognize the value and the importance in fact, 

the critical importance of engaging with the people who actually 

live in these communities. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Pen ̃ a. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Sir, just this week, ICE had two individuals—we had 

a representative from the border state of Tamaulipas here with us 

who formerly was the mayor of the city of Reynosa. We also had 

another individual that formerly worked for the PGR that is actively involved in what is taking place in Mexico. 

We brought them up to give us information on three things: You 

know, what is currently happening in Mexico, why is it happening, 

what should we be doing to address it? 

So we are trying to work with the people on the border. We do 

that with our partners. As I said earlier, you know, we think that 

one of our key assets that ICE brings in part of the Department 

strategy is the border enforcement security task forces which are 

made up of State and local officers as well as our Federal partners 

so that we can have the whole picture, just not the Federal picture, 

just not what we see. 

So we certainly support that. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Let me give you some of the conflict that Members of Congress have sometimes. In your testimony, you state that 

ICE will dramatically increase its personnel along the southwest 

border beginning next month. 

Well, if we look at the President’s proposal that was announced 

this week, he calls for additional personnel for CBP but not for 

ICE. I think it would be helpful to us if you could explain where 

you are going to find these people all of a sudden to deploy to the 

border. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Well, currently, the people that I refer to in the testimony are people that we are assigning from other offices. They are 

temporarily assigned there to surge during this period starting on 

June 1 to the end of the fiscal year. But they are coming from other 

offices, sir. 
55 

Mr. THOMPSON. So this is—well, I guess sort of the purpose of 

the surge is to do what? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Well, we are hoping that we can bring more cases and 

develop information and working against the cartels that are operating along the border and disrupt and dismantle those cartels, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I appreciate your openness, but the challenge we 

have is that unless we add to the numbers, you are moving a problem or an issue from one part of the country to another. The question is we could do better either increasing the number of ICE 

agents and you would not have to worry about the surge. 

So I guess the obvious question is do you have enough personnel 

to address this problem? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Well, I certainly will say that we would welcome additional resources, absolutely. 

Mr. THOMPSON. You ran a budget request? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Yes, I am. 

Mr. THOMPSON. It did not request any? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. We are trying to address that, sir. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you are aware that no new agents were requested? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Sir, I think we are working where we can, through the 

means and methods that we have, to ensure that we can stay pace 

with the growth of CBP and the others along the border. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I will let somebody else ask it a different 

way, but I don’t want to put you on the spot. 

I know if OMB don’t want you to answer the question—don’t 

worry about it. We have heard these kind of answers before. 

I yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me just add to this, look, if there was an overall plan and 

they said, if we add another $500 million, we will cover this 

amount, add this—if they are talking about adding—I believe the 

administrator’s plan is to add 1,200 agents. That is probably Border Patrol, nothing against Border Patrol. I support that. 

But it is just like if you have a cop on the beat, and if you have 

investigators to investigate the crimes, just like you don’t have ICE 

investigators, you are not going to go anywhere. That doesn’t even 

cover the prosecutors and the other—you know, downstream, all 

the things that we have. 

That is why there was a plan—we would say, if you add $100 

million, this was where it would go to. If you add $200 million, this 

is what it would cover—not just say add agents but not add the investigators which, I believe, that is where the Chairman was going 

for. 

At this time, the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Gina, I have long been concerned about the 

impact of border violence on CBPOs and Border Patrol agents. In 

fact, when the Foreign Affairs Committee held its markup of the 

Me ́rida Initiative authorizing legislation, I offered an amendment 

requiring a report on the impact of Me ́rida funds in reducing violence against U.S. and Mexican border personnel 

I understand that in fiscal year 2009, there were nearly 1,100 assaults on Border Patrol agents and, based on CBP statistics, if kept 
56 

at their current pace, assaults will reach or surpass that number 

in fiscal year 2010. 

What resources do CBPOs and Border Patrol agents have in 

terms of personal protective equipment and training to ensure their 

safety and the protection of lawful travelers? 

Mr. GINA. Thank you, sir. All of our Border Patrol agents and 

our CBPOs are trained in the appropriate use of force. They all 

have the appropriate equipment. Particularly on our Border Patrol, 

we have specially-equipped their vehicles and gave them other 

types of tactical equipment to prevent or to at least defend themselves against the type of assaults, primarily rockings, that you allude to. We take this situation very seriously, and we have also, 

just most recently, expanded our border security protocols with our 

counterparts in Mexico in order so that there is a much more enhanced response to any types of incident of violence along the border. 

So anything that would happen on the north side is immediately 

addressed as well as coordinated with our counterparts on the 

south so that, if the individuals are, in fact, trying to abscond back 

into Mexico, appropriate response by our Mexican counterparts can 

be taken. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Has it been working well? 

Mr. GINA. I think that while there is always room for improvement and enhancement, I think there has been tremendous reception on our Mexican counterparts in order to engage. I believe that 

they recognize the severity of the problem and are doing everything 

that they can to assist us in stopping this violence. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay. Thank you. Again, for Mr. Gina, with regard to SBInet, earlier this year Secretary Napolitano announced 

her intention to redeploy $50 million of stimulus funds designated 

for SBInet Block One to deploy other commercially available technology along the border. What is the status of the technology deployment? 

Mr. GINA. As you alluded to, I think SBInet, the Secretary and 

others realized that there were challenges with that program. So 

she, in part, suspended any further advancement until a review 

can be done. That review is being done as we speak, and so I will 

have to get back to you as part of the official record once that review is done. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. When do you anticipate it being done? 

Mr. GINA. I will have to get back to you. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Completed? 

Mr. GINA. I will have to get back to you on the completion date. 

I know it is currently on-going now and should be completed shortly. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Please do. Thank you. 

Mr. GINA. Thank you. 

Mr. CUELLAR. At this time, the Chair recognized former Chair of 

the committee, the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to have 

you as the Chairman of this committee. As you know, I had the 

pleasure of doing your job for about 3 years. In that time, I think 

we probably had about a dozen or so hearings on border issues. 
57 

By the way, not just the border issues at the southern border but 

the issues that Mrs. Miller, for example, is very concerned about, 

what is happening at the northern border as well as, of course, all 

the coastline that we have—not just in places like California but, 

for example, Maine has an incredible amount of coastal area and 

most people don’t realize it, or let us say Puerto Rico or Hawaii. 

So when we are talking about how people get into our country 

or how drugs get into our country or how contraband gets into our 

country, it is not just from the southern border, I will remind people. Also remind them that the terrorists, to date, that we have 

seen come, for example, the Millennium Bomber came across the 

northern border. He didn’t come from the southern border. 

So I am pleased that we are having this discussion about the relationship with Mexico and what is happening on the southern border, but this is just the tip of the iceberg. I also want to remind 

people—those who think that the Congress or Washington has 

done nothing in the last few years to address this—that that certainly just isn’t true. 

For example, with respect to the Border Patrol, we have increased, in the last 5 years, the Border Patrol from 4,000 people 

to 20,000 people. Think if your business grew that way. All the 

problems you would have. 

In fact, Chief Aguilar said to me, you know, Loretta, I need time 

to inculcate these people, to make them understand the culture of 

our Border Patrol because, over 50 percent of my people have 

served less than 2 years in the Border Patrol. 

These are very important issues as we try to address and put the 

right manpower to what is going on. Yes, we have redirected, unfortunately, Mrs. Miller, you know what. Some have come from the 

north to come down when we have had surges of this type. 

Now, remember also, we sent the National Guard before. I also 

sit on the Defense Committee. We have got unmanned aerial taking a look. We have other special projects I am, quite frankly, not 

allowed to speak about in open hearings. We have had our National Guard at the border. 

The Me ́rida project, in fact, is about helping Mexico help itself. 

It is not even about monies on our side. It is about understanding 

that we have a partner in this to try to figure out what is going 

on at the border and to help them to get up to speed where they 

need to be. 

We have, also, by the way, started to check people going from the 

United States into Mexico because that is where the cash and the 

firearms are going the other way. Of course, the more we are able 

to clamp down on the border, like with anything else—water seeks 

the easiest way to go. When we clamp down, then it seeks other 

ways to go. 

When we clamp down and the drug profit comes down, the drug 

traffickers search or looking for another way in which to make 

money. That is, of course, that one of those trails that takes drugs 

can also take people. You have just to see the escalation of the 

price of what it costs a person to come, let us say, from Mexico into 

the United States to understand, in some ways, we are being effective. 
58 

The violence, to a large part, has been about the drug cartels. 

Yes, it is bleeding over and, believe me, my family is originally 

from Arizona. I have plenty of family on that southern border. 

Don’t believe that I don’t. So I hear it all day long about what is 

going on over there. 

But I want to set the record straight here. This committee and 

much of the Congress has been working very hard to put money, 

to put assets, to put training, to put intelligence, to work on having 

the different pieces of government work together—memorandums 

of understanding between our people who work with firearms and 

our CBP. 

At the land borders, just in the stimulus package—and our 

Chairman knows this—we put a lot of money to redo the land ports 

where people come across because it is also about commerce. So 

there has been a lot done, but you can see the frustration. You can 

see my frustration because we want this solved. 

It is not an easy problem, and the more we block the places, the 

more people will go through more unaccessible places. If you have 

been on that southern border, you have seen the types of terrain. 

It becomes more difficult. Yes, SBInet, as you know, Mr. Chairman, 

was hell for me to have to put up with the lies and the promises. 

I am glad, finally, we have an administration that has clamped 

down on it and said let us take a look and see what we really have 

to do about that. 

Last, let me tell you, the U.S. Coast Guard has had an important 

thing on this, too, because as I said, it is not just the land border. 

Drugs are coming in through submerged vehicles, submarines, 

homemade submarines. You would be amazed at the things that we 

see happening. 

So I just want to set the record straight for the American people. 

This Congress has been working very hard—and I know many people at the Department have been working very hard. We have just 

got to work harder and better, faster so we can take care of this 

situation. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. 

Members, we have—actually, the screen is backward. I can’t read 

it. We have got about 6 minutes and a half. I am going to have Ms. 

Lofgren ask some questions and after that, Members, as you know, 

we have four votes. 

I am going to ask the panel and the other folks here just to bear 

with us. We will ask Ms. Lofgren if we can try to keep this to 5 

minutes. We will run off, and then we will come right back after 

this. 

As you can see, it has been a very engaged questioning on this, 

and we appreciate everybody coming back after the questions. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just a couple of observations. When people say we should retake 

the border, it assumes that, at one time, we had the border sealed. 

I think it is important historically to note that that never was the 

case. I mean, you go back 30, 40 years, there was virtually no, you 

know, border control for most of that land border in the south. 
59 

Now the country has decided—and I think it is appropriate—that 

we are going to change that. We have made tremendous strides forward in changing that, as my colleague from California has noted. 

But that is not the only issue that we face. Clearly, we need to 

take tough steps at the border, but we also need to rationalize and 

reform our immigration laws. I mean, it is a package that we need 

to do, it seems to me. I am hopeful that we can work together in 

a bipartisan way to make that happen. 

I want to get a little bit into the drug cartel issue which I think 

is certainly separate from the immigration issue and of legitimate 

concern to all of us. The president of Mexico mentioned in his 

speech to us there are tremendous concerns about weapons coming 

south from the United States. I remember, you know, 4 years ago 

meeting with the attorney general of Mexico who expressed the 

same concern. 

I will never forget his comment. He said, we don’t have a Second 

Amendment. You do. We respect that you do and you have a right 

to your own constitution, but surely, there must be something you 

can do about machine guns and assault weapons coming to our 

country consistent with your own institution. 

Mr. Mack said, you know, he admires the Second Amendment. 

We are not going to reinstate the assault-weapons ban. That is not 

going to happen. I know that. Personally, actually, I disagree with 

that, but I recognize that is not going to happen. 

So here is the question. What do we do consistent with the Second Amendment to stop that flow of assault weapons into Mexico? 

They have lost—23,000 Mexicans have been murdered in Mexico by 

the cartels. So I don’t know who is best suited to answer that question, but we have got to step up to that, stop the flow consistent 

with the Second Amendment because we are not changing the assault-weapon ban, much to my chagrin. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I will take the first piece, and then I will let my 

colleagues also speak. 

As part of the southwest border initiative that I mentioned earlier that the Secretary initiated—that the President initiated together with the Secretary, we instituted southbound inspections for 

the first time targeting exactly that issue. We have seen a major 

jump up in firearms seizures partly because of that and because of 

the increased focus of our folks on the border on seizures of firearms. So we are very concerned with it. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me ask. Is there anything—there is a tremendous number of gun shops right near the border. I mean, way more 

guns sold than there is the population near that border. It is pretty 

clear that the market is not the people who live there. 

Is there anything we can do with ATF to just do more of law enforcement about assault-weapons sales and all of those gun shops 

right along the border? 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Ma’am, one of the first things that Assistant Secretary 

Morton did when he came in and took the helm of ICE was to get 

with his friend and partner, Director Melson from the ATF, and 

sign an agreement to where we are going to cooperate and work as 

closely as we can with ATF to stem the flow of firearms. 

Mr. Morton and Mr. Melson have traveled to Mexico together to 

address the issue. It is a huge issue, ma’am. We are working very 
60 

closely with our CBP partners on how can we better interdict the 

outbound movement of the weapons. How can we better collect 

intel on who in the United States is conducting what they call a 

‘‘straw purchase’’ where somebody goes in and purchases the weapon but the purpose of that weapon is to smuggle it into Mexico. 

We have, as I said, a project that we named ‘‘Armas Cruzadas’’ 

which is totally focus on dedicated resources to stopping the flow 

of weapons into Mexico. ATF has a similar project—they work 

hand in glove—called ‘‘Gunrunner’’ where we are working together 

to stop the flow of the weapons. 

We are developing informants where we can to find out who— 

because as you well state, the Second Amendment allows people to 

go into gun stores every day and purchase weapons. So we have to 

work as smart as we can and as best we can to find out who is 

purchasing them for illegal purposes, and then we have to be patient and conduct surveillance and operations to see if we have to 

wait because a violation doesn’t take place until they try to smuggle them out of the country. 

We have to work very closely with Mexico so that Mexico, when 

they have weapons seized in Mexico, that we get the information 

so ATF can trace those weapons and then we can do investigations 

on the U.S. side of the border who purchase those weapons, who 

may have smuggled them. 

Ms. LOFGREN. My time is up, but I just want to say that the people who I know in my district and who I have met who believe— 

are hunters, they have guns, they believe in the Second Amendment, I respect them. But I don’t think their passion for the Second 

Amendment extends to passion for the drug cartels getting machine guns. 

Please, do what you can and let us know how we can help you 

in that quest. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you. Thank the gentlewoman from California. 

Members, we are going to go out. If three of the Members, Ms. 

Giffords, Ms. Lee, and Mr. Green—that will be the order that we 

will go in unless somebody else shows up here. 

The first vote is 15 minutes, and we have got about 4 minutes 

left or less than 4 minutes. Then, after that, three 5-minute votes. 

So I assume we will probably be back in about 30 minutes. So 

there is about 30-minute, and if y’all want to take a break for 30 

minutes, and we will come back right after that. 

This meeting will be held for recess for about 30 minutes or so. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CUELLAR. The subcommittees will come back to order. I believe we left off at this time. The next line questions will be the 

gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank our panel. Many of you I have worked with closely. 

I want to thank the Chairman for his work on the Me ́rida Initiative. We introduced an amendment on this many years ago and 

then visit President Caldero ́n in Mexico City. 

He is very strongly committed, I think, to securing his country 

and taking on the drug cartels head-on, which is a very dangerous 

proposition. 
61 

I wanted to touch on a couple of issues. The first one: Since we 

passed the Me ́rida Initiative—and if I am being redundant, I apologize—it just seems like it has taken a very long time to get the helicopters, the military assets, and hardware down where they are 

needed where they could be most effective. I wanted to see if you 

could comment on that. 

I have also had some reports that—in defense of the State Department, it is not the State Department holding this up, rather, 

it is some components within the DOD that have been part of the 

problem. 

Ms. Jacobson. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

I thank anyone who would like to say something in defense of 

the State Department—— 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. JACOBSON. We think that we have overcome a great deal of 

the roadblocks that were in the way on aviation. President Obama 

announced last week when President Caldero ́n was here that we 

were accelerating the aviation transfers. We believe most of the 

aviation will be delivered to Mexico by the end of next year—of calendar year 2011—2011. But there will be significant deliveries this 

calendar year, 2010. 

It is true that some of those procurements ran up against, frankly, a very long queue of waiting purchases, including the U.S. Army 

and other countries. It is very difficult to sort of jockey those priorities adequately for our own security and, obviously, security of 

other allies. 

So I think with a lot of hard work by the Department of Defense 

and the Department of State, we have overcome some of those 

roadblocks. We are very grateful to Secretary Gates for taking a 

close look at this and accelerating the pace of those deliveries. 

So we are confident that we will be moving—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. We passed this last Congress. Now, you are saying 

it may take another year. There is a lot of frustration, I think, in 

the Congress and with respect to this initiative—you know, I know 

Secretary Gates will tell you that the helicopters is probably the 

hardware that is most in demand right now. 

Is it just a—it is a procurement issue, it sounds like to me. Are 

they not manufacturing them fast enough? Or is the Mexican-U.S. 

border not a priority? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think in terms of the aviation—and I want to 

speak about the aviation separate from other form of equipment 

and technology like the nonintrusive inspection equipment, the 

gamma ray X-ray machines and those sorts of things because those 

are moving ahead, I think, pretty rapidly now. There were some 

procurement issues there, too, but we have had been able to overcome those. 

On the aviation assets, I think a lot of it is demand. There is a 

huge amount of demand for some of these kinds of helicopters. 

Anything, of course, that is in the U.S. inventory, obviously, is difficult to get jumped in the queue. 

As I said earlier, I think, in the case of the aviation, some of 

these items weren’t scheduled to be delivered until 2013, and they 
62 

will be delivered by the end of 2011. So I know there is frustration, 

but there are deliveries this year and next year. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, anything we can do to speed that up—— 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. MCCAUL. The President came out with this initiative, $500 

million, 1,200 National Guard. The Governor of the State of Texas 

requested 1,000 National Guard just for Texas alone. Do you know where that $500 million is going to go, Ms. Silver? 

Ms. SILVER. I believe that is still being determined, the details 

of that. But to a large extent, it is in support of law enforcement, 

DHS and DOJ. 

Mr. MCCAUL. One issue that I know the Chairman and I have 

worked on and that is very important, particularly in Texas, are 

the UAVs. I think these can be incredibly helpful in terms of surveillance technology on the border. 

We know that the virtual fence will not be completed—now, I am 

hearing until 2016, which is another delay that is frustrating to 

hear. But I would urge the administration to use some of that 

funding for UAVs. 

Arizona has three UAVs. Texas has zero. We have zero UAVs on 

the Texas-Mexico border. I know that one has now just recently 

been approved to be dispatched to the Big Bend area, and I understand Arizona has a lot of smuggling. 

But Texas is right across from one of the most violent cities in 

the world, that being Jua ́ rez. Of course, we have had U.S. officials 

being targeted there—Nuevo Laredo, Matamoras—getting very, 

very dangerous with the heightened conflict between the Gulf Cartel, the Zetas, and the—in Jua ́ rez cartels. 

So I would urge the administration to put some of that funding 

into UAVs. 

I don’t know if there was any other comment to that or what else 

you believe needs to be done. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Well, the comment relative to the UASs or UAVs is 

absolutely right, Congressman. That has been worked out between 

DHS, CBP, and FAA relative to the—for the operating area, and 

it will be flying in West Texas I have been told on or about June 

1 of this year. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I do appreciate that. But in closing, you know, I 

do think that you have three of the Arizona border, and now we 

have a newly released one in Texas, but we need more. 

With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank the gentleman from Texas. At this point, I 

want to recognize the gentlewoman from Arizona, Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Miller. 

I think this committee could actually last a couple of days. I 

know our panelists wouldn’t be so excited to sit here, but as you 

can tell from the level of frustration that you hear from Members 

of Congress, this is a very, very serious issue. 

I and my counterpart, Ann Kirkpatrick, are the only ones here 

that are from southern Arizona, by far the worst part of the U.S.- 

Mexico border, and the numbers speak for themselves. 

I believe that three of our panelists have spent time in Arizona. 

We appreciate your service there. The issue is representing the 
63 

Eighth Congressional District, which is directly on the border. Yes, 

we have seen an increase in assets along the I–19 corridor in the 

Nogales area. 

But when you get out to the area where Bill McDonald, who is 

going to be on the next panel—and I hope that you can stick 

around to hear his testimony. When you are out in Cochise County, 

the area where Bill Krentz was murdered, you can drive for hours, 

literally, at a time and not see a Border Patrol agent now. 

For those individuals who are on the border directly with the violence that is spilling over, with—and I encourage Members to actually read the documentation put together about the narcotrafickers, what we are up against. We are outmanned. We are 

outgunned. We are out-resourced. 

We honor, and we are so pleased that the President has committed National Guard troops now to the southwest border. The 

issue is: Where are those troops going to go? Are they going to be 

sitting at desks, or are they going to be actually deployed directly 

on the border? Not 20 miles back or 30 miles back or in an office. 

What we need are the resources directly on the border. 

This is incredibly frustrating. I serve on the Armed Services 

Committee. We are allocating billions—in fact, hundreds of billions 

of these dollars to go abroad to protect other people’s borders, to 

protect other citizens yet, for the Krentz family the McDonald family, the—family, all of those ranchers that live in those areas, every 

single day, we receive reports about their homes being invaded, 

about fences being cut, about cattle being steered into other people’s ranches. 

This is devastation what is happening to U.S. citizens. So there 

is an extraordinary amount of frustration. The border is a big 

place. It is a wide-open place. As we have heard earlier, we have 

not done a good job historically in the past. 

You know, I am very pleased that not only are we going to have 

National Guard troops deployed, but that the House Appropriations 

Committee also released a war supplemental bill that also includes 

over $200 million for agency, $9 million to build three Border Patrol forward-operating bases—again, we need them on the border, 

not 20 or 30 miles back—$50 million for Operation Stonegarden, 

and over $8 million for training for new CBP officers and Border 

Patrol agents. 

This is in light of having a budget that recently cut Border Patrol 

agents. So I want to make sure that we continue to go in the right 

direction and we don’t fall back to thinking that the border is secure. 

I am not sure who is the best person to answer this, but I would 

like to really get some answers on where the National Guard is 

going to go, what type of personnel is going to be deployed, the responsibilities and the type of authorization that they are going to 

have. 

I am also curious as well to understood whether or not they will 

be given very clear guidance in terms of rules of engagement and 

whether they are able to protect and defend themselves, because 

when we had the Guard on the border last time with Operation 

Jumpstart, different missions, different set of situations on the 
64 

ground, but when they were not allowed to protect and defend 

themselves, I mean, as said earlier, perception is reality. 

When they had to return around and retreat, it is almost like not 

having United States military on the border. So I am not sure— 

I don’t know Ms. Silver, Mr. Pen ̃ a, Mr. Gina—who the best person 

is to answer that, but if you would, please. 

Ms. SILVER. As I mentioned before, some of the details are obviously still being worked out. I think, to your first point or your earlier point, the deployment of the National Guard and the presence 

of the Guard personnel will enable CBP and ICE, for example, to 

free up personnel to be at the border, to your point about needing 

the boots on the ground at the line. 

So that is part of the thinking of the National Guard at the border. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. So Ms. Silver, the Guard is not then going to go 

directly to the border? They are just going to be in an administration capacity? We are not actually going to have them directly patrolling or on the border. Is that correct? 

Ms. SILVER. I wouldn’t put it in terms of an administration capacity, but they are going to be, as my colleague mentioned earlier, 

entry identification teams, intelligence, and reconnaissance support 

primarily. So that is the focus of the Guard. 

In terms of your question about whether or not they will be 

armed, it will depend on their mission. Those who don’t need to be 

armed, won’t need to be armed. But those who are in a position 

where they might need to defend themselves will be appropriately 

equipped, absolutely. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Okay. In my opinion, that is not good enough. We 

need to have the National Guard on the border. I am not talking 

about where they were before, on the I–19 corridor and near 

Nogales. Other Members can speak for their areas. 

But we need to have them out in Cochise County where, again— 

and just look at the numbers. It is true, Ms. Silver, and you talked 

about that that apprehensions are down, but down from what? Six 

and 700,000 per year? 

Yes, it is true, we had 240,000 apprehensions last year in the 

Tucson sector. Imagine what that is like. You guys know. I mean, 

what it is like every single day to process between 700 and 1,100 

people. What happens with Operation Streamline is that they get 

through the first 70 or 100 and then you could have the really bad 

guys. But Streamline is closed at that point. 

So then we deport those. We are not actually incarcerating those 

folks. We are also using direct agents. Instead of them being back 

on the ground, they are becoming paper pushers. They are responsible then for doing all the processing where we could have a clerk, 

frankly, do this like other law enforcement agencies do. 

Why do we need to have a Border Patrol officer doing that? It 

needs to be completely reworked. 

We need to secure the border. It is absolutely imperative. Having 

the Guard down there is great, but we need them actually on the 

border, at the border, not sitting in an office. That is totally unacceptable. 

You know, the other area—and I know my time is up, but I want 

to just touch on something because it really matters. 
65 

Again, I hope that you can sit around and you can hear the testimony from the only person that is going to be here today that actually has to live with the problems with border security directly, 

whose direct life and direct livelihood is being affected by this. 

The Border Patrol, as they are currently deployed in the Tucson 

sector, are deployed far away from the border. Like I said, you can 

drive for a long time and not see a Border Patrol agent on the border. So we have the strategy that was concocted maybe here in 

Washington where we try to apprehend people 20, 30, 40, 50 miles 

back. We do it with checkpoints. We do it with operating bases. 

In the rural areas, we are not watching the border. Then it becomes a lot harder to apprehend people once they are in. We have 

these high-speed chases, and then we become responsible. It is very 

expensive for our local law enforcement, expensive for our hospitals. 

If we stop people at the border before they come in, we could 

save a whole bunch of agencies a whole bunch of time. Again, Tucson is built up. I know the Tucson sector is built up, but out in the 

rural areas—and I encourage you to come down. Come down, let 

us show you around. Then you see for yourself whether or not the 

border is secure. Because I promise you that it is not. 

Mr. Pen ̃ a. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Congresswoman, thank you for the opportunity to address that. 

We will work as closely as we can to get the best optimum use 

of the National Guard for ICE. Again, we are the investigative 

component. We are not the interdictors. We are not on the line. 

We are working very closely—I can assure you that I personally, 

as the No. 2 person of our agency, has been on two phone calls and 

one actually met with the ranchers from Arizona here to discuss 

the murder of Mr. Krentz and what we are doing to address that. 

Again, I just want to emphasize that we are the investigative 

component. We believe a big part of what we need to do is engage 

Mexico more. 

Another big piece of what we do is the repatriation of the aliens 

who are apprehended in the United States. We are trying to work 

with Mexico to allow us to repatriate their citizens to the Interior 

instead of to the border. That is a very costly proposition for us because we have to do that by plane. 

But we are looking for every—— 

Ms. GIFFORDS. If you will just excuse me because I know time 

is running thin. 

We understand that. What we would like you to do is have less 

work. You know, if we can prevent people from coming in, we need 

less ICE agents. 

So, Mr. Gina, please. 

Mr. GINA. Congresswoman, you know, I know CBP shares your 

concerns, and your area as well as the whole rest of the border is 

a priority. As you know very well, our deputy commissioner, Chief 

Aguilar, used to oversee that sector, and he lived in that community as well as many of our own officers work as well as their families live in that community. 

I know the Border Patrol has a very robust strategy of technology, personnel, and infrastructure. I will take that message back 
66 

to our commissioner and will arrange for an overview of that strategy. 

But all of your comments and all of your points are very well 

taken, and I will bring that back to the commissioner. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one last question. 

Can you please address why the Border Patrol are not directly 

on the border and why our strategy is to have them 20, 30, or 50 

miles back? 

Mr. GINA. Well, I will stand corrected maybe by my Border Patrol colleague. I myself, as the Chair had indicated, was a uniformed officer as an inspector at CBPO. 

The strategy, you know, is employed at different locations in different manners. If you are in a very high, densely populated area 

where an individual who is crossing the border needs to be addressed immediately, I believe our Border Patrol are right there on 

the border. 

In certain other areas where, either through infrastructure or because of the wide-open area, allows for a different type of response 

capability, I think that is the strategy and that is why certain— 

at least perception is that some are off, some are on. 

But I believe, because of the terrain and the type of environment, 

I believe their response protocols are trying to achieve the exact 

same intent. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you. I appreciate the honest answer in 

that. 

Mr. Chairman, if I could just conclude. That is the problem. Because what happens with that strategy out in the rural areas is 

that you are basically allowing for citizens of Arizona, residents, to 

use their land, their property as then a place then to do the apprehensions. What we have is these high-speed chases. We have a tremendous amount of deaths. We have destruction on both sides. 

We really need to relook at the strategy. Yes, some fencing has 

gone up which helps. But the thing is that people cut the fence. 

They will go over the fence. They will go under the fence. They will 

go through the fence. 

So without anyone actually watching the fence and being able to 

respond when someone goes through the fence, it is really like actually having no fence at all. All you need is a good, you know, 

blow torch or some sort of shears to cut through the fence. 

So we really—I implore you to relook at the strategy for the rural 

area, particularly in Cochise County. This is where we have a 

major part of the problem. Yes, we appreciate there is more MSs 

coming. We have more graduating horse patrols. I mean, I am 

not—and the new sector chief is doing a good job. It is just not 

enough. It is just, frankly, not enough. 

I look forward to following up with you to see how, again, we can 

change the strategy for this one area that is being so hard hit. 

These folks are really, really suffering out there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank the gentlewoman from Arizona. 

Let me just make one point before I go to the gentleman from 

Texas. 
67 

The issue that you brought up about the National Guard—my 

understanding is they are going to come in and do recon, intelligence, the analysis of the intelligence, counterdrug, all that. 

But I have heard in the past that they—I have heard some of 

the CBP folks say, well, they came in, are doing some office work, 

so that frees one of our agents to go out in the field. 

Why do we need to get a National Guard to come in and free a 

Border Patrol from behind a desk? Hire a clerk. Hire support staff. 

I mean, there is no need to come in and bring a National Guard. 

I have heard that from CBP. 

So please—following up on the line that Ms. Gifford said—please, 

as you utilize the folks—and my understanding is that, in the past, 

the National Guard for the other operation, it was not Border Patrol. But my understanding is that might be expanding over to do 

State and local so they can be assigned to those law enforcement. 

But please, I don’t want to hear again that they are bringing National Guard to free up a Border Patrol so he or she can go to the 

field. Hire somebody else to do that office work instead of bringing 

the National Guard. 

At this time, I would like—— 

Mr. ENGEL. Chairman. Before you go on, I want to second what 

you said. But I also want to comment on what Ms. Giffords has 

been saying throughout. 

She is the one, with her district, dealing with the major problem 

on the Arizona-Mexico border. She knows what the problem is. Her 

constituents tell her. She knows. She has gone down there. She has 

been receptive. She hears the same thing time and time and time 

again that we need to protect our people that live in the area 

around the border. 

I think that, if a government cannot protect its own people, then 

what is the purpose of our Government? I mean, just the basic 

thing that a government is supposed to do is to protect its own people. 

So Ms. Giffords, I want to just commend you, not only for bringing this up because it, obviously, has very much importance to you 

and your district. But it really has importance to the United States 

as a whole because that is a long, long border with Mexico, and we 

have a long, long border with Canada as well and potential problems could happen there in the international world of international 

terrorism. I mean, we don’t know what is happening. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, if I still may, we had an incursion 

just 2 weeks ago into our airspace of an ultralight, and two F–16s 

were scrambled. The guy turned around and went back home. I 

couldn’t imagine looking over your shoulder and seeing two F–16s 

on your tail. 

But NORAD has documented about 200 incursions into our airspace, some going up a couple hundred miles north. They build 

these very low-flying airplanes that are not currently regulated in 

the 1930 Tariff Act with several hundred bails of drugs. They just 

pop over the border. They drop them. They go back. 

You know, let us say you don’t care about the ranchers in 

Cochise County, let us say Members say, well, it is not my constituency, I don’t care about that. You should care about what is being 
68 

brought into the United States that we don’t understand, whether 

they are weapons, whether it is bioterrorism. 

I mean, who knows. Because the gaining hole in Arizona has 

been so widely publicized, anyone in the world knows, if they want 

to come into the United States illegally, bring in something, that 

is the most porous part. That is the soft underbelly. 

So, again, I just can’t emphasize enough how important it is to 

get this right out in the rural parts of southern Arizona. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, I want to thank you for calling all this to our 

attention and for saying, you know, what you have been saying 

straight along. I think your constituents are well-served by you, 

and I think we ought to listen to you. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much. Again, I do ask one thing. 

I know we always do this. Our panels of experts here, I would ask 

you to just respectfully—I know you are busy; we are all busy—respectfully sit and listen to the second panel so we can hear some 

of the local folks on that. 

So I would ask you—I know we are all busy, but I would ask you 

to just sit with us. 

At this time, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 

Smith. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me say to the witnesses, I have been at another committee 

hearing all morning, so I may have missed some answers that 

would respond to some of my questions. 

But my first question is to follow up on the Chairman’s point 

about the National Guard. 

I think, Ms. Jacobson, you may be the best one to answer that. 

A couple of days ago, the administration announced that they were 

sending 1,200 National Guard people to the border. The entire implication, the entire suggestion behind the announcement was to 

shore up border security and to reduce that flood of illegal immigration across our border. 

I am told—and I would like for you to either confirm or deny a 

State Department statement today that said that those 1,200 folks 

from the National Guard that were going to be directed to the border have nothing whatsoever to do with illegal immigration. 

Have you heard that statement by the State Department today? 

Or are you familiar with it? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I am not familiar with that statement. The State 

Department, obviously, doesn’t have the lead role on the National 

Guard deployment. So I would like, if I could, to turn to Ms. Silver, 

who has the lead on this and can really answer the question. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Great. Okay. 

Ms. SILVER. Thanks for the question. As a said earlier, some of 

the details certainly are still being worked out. But it is true that, 

as I understand it right now, I did see the statement that it is not 

intended to be an immigration enforcement mission. 

The idea is, as has been said, I think, to be the eyes and ears 

rather than the hands, if you will. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. That was absolutely incredible to me because it seemed to me to be an absolute contradiction of what the 

administration was suggesting just a couple of days ago for the 
69 

State Department to come out today and say it has nothing to do 

with illegal immigration, because I thought that was exactly what 

we were trying to do to secure our border is try to reduce illegal 

immigration. 

But what it said to me is, with this administration, you always 

have to either look behind the words or wait for the details or you 

can’t believe what you hear because the entire implication was border security, 1,200 National Guard folks going to the border. 

Now, the State Department, apparently, that you just confirmed, 

says the opposite. So I don’t know what to believe. Do we believe 

the administration and the President, or do we believe the State 

Department today, or was the President, shall we say, happy to 

have the American people rely upon the common-sense meaning of 

what he was saying even if that wasn’t accurate? 

Ms. SILVER. If I may, I don’t think the two things are necessarily 

in conflict. I think, as I read the statement—and I don’t have it in 

front of me. I apologize. 

But I think, as I saw it, it is a question of whether the National 

Guard will actually be, as we just discussed, right there on the border enforcing immigration law. That was the differentiation. But 

the National Guard will be in support of ICE and CBP who do enforce immigration. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. So you are now saying that the National 

Guard will, in fact, have a role in reducing illegal immigration? 

Ms. SILVER. As you said, border security is a complex set of 

issues involving the movement of people, also, the movement of 

drugs and guns and money. We will be looking at all of those 

things. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. But, again, the State Department did say 

today it wasn’t going to be involved with immigration. Right? 

Maybe they should have refined that statement and said maybe not 

directly but indirectly or something like that? 

Ms. SILVER. Now I am not sure I was looking at exactly the same 

statement as you are. I did see some written language, but I think 

the differentiation was intended to be what I just described. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. You described it as a backup to try 

to reduce illegal immigration and secure the border. Is that right? 

Ms. SILVER. The National Guard will be in support of our law enforcement on the border, yes. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. I hope you are right. To me, that is 

not exactly what the State Department said today, but I am glad 

you clarified it to that extent. 

Let me get to my other questions. By way of background—and 

it has probably been already brought out today. But in the last 31⁄2

years, as of last week, 22,700 people have been killed along the 

border between the United States and Mexico. 

To put that in perspective, that is five times as many people who 

have been killed in Iraq. It is just an incredible figure. The border, 

apparently, is a war zone. 

Yet on the Me ́rida Initiative, we have only spent, I believe, as of 

last month, $250 million out of the $830 million that were approved. Maybe you can answer this question today, but why is it 

we have not spent the money by 21⁄2 years after the Me ́rida Initia-
70 

tive was approved? What is the need for more funds until we have 

really used the $830 million that have already been approved? 

I don’t know if Mr. Pen ̃a or Mr. Gina—I don’t know who the best 

person to answer that question—okay. Ms. Jacobson? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Congressman. I think it would be me 

since the money was allocated to the State Department. 

We really are very concerned that the money be spent as quickly 

as possible, that equipment and training get to Mexico as quickly 

as possible. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. My first question is: Why hasn’t it been 

spent? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, what we had to do with Mexico—first of all, 

I would say that our figures of how much has been spent are about 

$425 million that is actively working against projects. My hope 

is—— 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. We just got the figure a couple of 

minutes ago that it was $230 million. So your figure is more current than that, apparently. 

Ms. JACOBSON. I think it may count what has been disbursed differently. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Active projects where things are en route. But 

that is our figure of how much we think is—— 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Even given that expansive figure, that is 

still only half the funds roughly. 

Ms. JACOBSON. Right. I think that we still have a lot to do to 

make sure that these things get done quickly. But I will tell you, 

we had a lot of structures to set up with the Mexican government 

which was not used to foreign assistance from the United States. 

We had to agree on exactly how the money was going to be spent. 

Certain of those funds were not actually given to the State Department after being appropriated for some months. We had spending plans. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Right. 

Ms. JACOBSON. So it is not that it is a satisfactory time schedule 

yet. We are moving things much more quickly now because we 

have those procedures in place. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. Are those funds going to be suffi- cient—the $830 million? 

Ms. JACOBSON. At this point, Congress has actually appropriated 

just over $1 billion for Mexico. We think those funds are going to 

be incredibly important in making a real difference in our relationship and cooperation with Mexico. But the President has requested 

additional funds in fiscal year 2011 because we think that there is 

more work that we need to do. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. How do you know you need additional funds 

if you have actually spent less than half of what has already been 

approved? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I guess I would say that part of the way we 

know that is that we know what those funds are going to be used 

for in most cases even if the equipment has not been delivered, the 

training not carried out. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. How long is it going to take those additional 

funds to be used? 
71 

Ms. JACOBSON. My hope would be that, by the end of this cal- endar year, we would be up in the neighborhood of $600 million to 

$700 million that will be spent. I would expect that, as these procedures are improved, we are accelerating the rate of distribution of 

these funds so that we would not be so far behind. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Again, my question is: How many years 

would you expect it to take for us to use up all the money that has 

already been approved—the $830 million plus the additional getting us to, as you said, close to over $1 billion? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Right. My assumption would be the $1.1 billion or $1.2 billion that has been appropriated already at this point, 

which is up through fiscal year 2010, I would assume that we will 

be expending those funds through calendar year 2011, but that 

would be the majority of it spent as these programs accelerate and 

we get ahead of delivery. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. So you expect to spend over $600 million in 

the next 2 years, in other words? 

Ms. JACOBSON. I do expect to be spending significantly more. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Any additional funds would be used after 

that 2 years? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Would be used after, let us say, a year and a half. 

They would be programmed and spent thereafter. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. 

Ms. JACOBSON. We do those sequentially, as you know. 

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank the gentleman from Texas. 

At this point, I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from 

California, Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me welcome our panelists. Just for the record, border security, I think, will only work if it is part of a comprehensive immigration policy. No one disagrees with border security. 

I agree. I was very happy to hear Ms. Giffords talk about some 

of her ideas and some of the real issues that she is dealing with 

each and every day as it relates to the border. 

I represent a district in California with a large immigrant population. Of course, we all are opposed to Arizona’s new law. I was 

born and raised in El Paso, Texas, and have watched with dismay 

the violence that is taking place in Ciudad Jua ́ rez. 

My family lives in Arizona, and so I have a real deep understanding—not as Ms. Giffords has in terms of right now being on 

the border—but I really understand the necessity for border security but, also, as a part of comprehensive immigration reform. 

President Caldero ́n was right in talking about the direct relationship between the repeal of the assault-weapons ban and an increase in the violence in Mexico. I believe, in many ways, that our 

policies really have helped fuel the violence in Mexico. 

I associate myself with the remarks of Congresswoman Lofgren. 

We cannot really ignore this. I, too, understand that it is not realistic, at least politically right now, to believe that the assault-weapon ban is going to be reinstated, but I will tell you one thing. I 

think that those who oppose reinstating the assault-weapons ban 

really do have some responsibility with the carnage taking place in 
72 

Mexico and in urban communities in America. I fully support the 

Second Amendment. 

So, you know, your response to what you are doing as it relates 

to stopping the flow of assault weapons into Mexico was fine. That 

is within the confines of the law. It is just unfortunate we don’t 

have a law that will make your job a lot easier and that would help 

save lives in our neighbors to the south. 

With regard to human rights, international and local human 

rights organizations continue to document a lack of measurable 

progress in human rights in priority areas outlined in the Me ́rida 

Initiative. One of the priority areas is ensuring that—I think it is 

judicial authorities investigate and prosecute members of the federal police and military forces who have been credibly alleged to 

have committed violations of human rights. 

According to these organizations, to date, I think it is only a single, one, human rights violation perpetrated since 2007 by a member of the military has resulted in a trial and upheld to conviction. 

Even though, it is my understanding that the National Human 

Rights Commission has received about 3,400 reports of human 

rights and related complaints committed by members of the military since December 2006. 

Even the State Department’s latest annual country report on 

human rights practices states that human rights abuses range 

from unlawful killings by security forces to kidnappings, physical 

abuse, arbitrary arrest and detention, confessions coerced through 

torture, and forced disappearances by the army and police. 

So given all of this well-documented troubling human rights pictures, I am trying to understand how the State Department and 

Congress can justify the release of any more money which are conditioned, mind you, on concrete progress on key human rights 

areas. Or is that just something that was put into writing and stated as a policy without any real commitment to follow up on that? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Congresswoman, thank you very much. I greatly 

appreciate the question and the opportunity to make very clear 

that the commitment that the administration has to upholding 

standards of human rights and to working with the Mexican government, which has made improving the human rights situation a 

primary part of their policy, is incredibly important to us and 

something that we are working on very hard. 

I think there are some reasons for us to look at structures and 

processes that give us some reason for optimism, but I think there 

are still a lot of individual cases and prosecutions to be followed up 

on and things that we need to be concerned about and to monitor. 

So I think both are the case, and we are very much engaged in 

that. We have created, under Ambassador Pascual in Mexico, a bilateral human rights dialogue with the Mexican government which 

will meet three times a year and has already met twice sort of in 

an ad hoc way but is a structure to give some to our relationship 

on human rights to allow us to bring these issues to the table with 

all of the Mexican government players, military authorities, judicial—sorry—the attorney general’s office, the police and others, to 

discuss these issues in a way that we hope will lead to improved 

resolution, better understanding, and transparency about what 

may be taking place. 
73 

Ms. LEE. But how can we release funds for the initiative if, in 

fact, we conditioned these funds on concrete progress in human 

rights areas and, in fact, only one out of 3,400, you know, allegations or reports have even been addressed? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I think the National Commission on Human 

Rights and the number of allegations that they receive, their process of returning those over to the agencies is not a process that always results in a court case or a conviction, it is true. I am not arguing that we are necessarily satisfied yet that the institutions 

have responded to all of those complaints. 

But the National Commission on Human Rights does not—those 

are not a list of cases that all were recommended for prosecution. 

The agencies have to look into the allegations and get back to the 

National Human Rights Commission. 

I think one of the most important things that has happened in 

Mexico recently is the discussion in the congress about human 

rights issues and the power of the National Human Rights Commission and the passage in their senate of stronger laws to allow 

the CNDH, the National Human Rights Commission, to have more 

authority to implement their—— 

Ms. LEE. Okay. But let me ask, would the well-documented facts 

of unlawful killings by security forces, kidnappings, physical abuse, 

arbitrary arrest, detention, rapes—we still feel that concrete 

progress is being made to the extent that we can release the funds? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We do believe that enough progress is being made 

that we should release the funds which also—and I think the funds 

are important because they are part of how we help improve 

progress further. There is training in there that is focusing on 

human rights along with the U.N. There is new courses. There is 

investigative procedures. There is internal affairs offices that are 

going to, in fact, focus OIG. All of that is part those funds, and that 

is part of the reason we think it is important to move ahead with 

them because we also do think that we are seeing increased responsiveness. 

Ms. LEE. So you think there is progress? 

Ms. JACOBSON. It does not mean that we do not still see allegations, and we do not still think more needs to be done. 

Ms. LEE. Well, I don’t see how you call that progress. 

But thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes. Thank the gentlewoman from California, Ms. 

Lee. 

Now, move on to the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Lee. We will 

go ahead and recognize Ms. Lee from Texas before we move to the 

second panel. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This is an excellent hearing, and I thank you for your indulgence. 

We are holding a hearing in Judiciary on the oil spill, and I 

apologize that I am in between two hearings, but I would not have 

wanted to miss what I think has to be the crucial issue of the time, 

and that is securing America’s homeland, securing her border, and 

working to ensure that we have an effective partnership with our 

neighbors. 
74 

The president of Mexico was quite welcome last week, but I believe that he generated quite a bit of interest and controversy as 

to the thoughts and ideas of how the relationship with the United 

States should continue or be structured. 

But I think he was speaking from the perspective of wanting 

help and wanting to ensure our partnership. So I will pose questions along those lines as to how effective the initiative has been, 

the Me ́rida Initiative has been, the amount of monies being expended. 

But first of all, let me ask a general question. 

It is my understanding that a proposal has been offered by the 

White House for 1,000 National Guard troops at the border. Can 

I have Secretary Jacobsen comment and Secretary Silver comment 

on that proposal? Is that anything before you? Is that something 

that has been recommended by these two agencies? What is your 

knowledge about the time frame or the actual reality of those thousand troops going to the border? 

Ms. SILVER. Thank you, Congresswoman. I believe the number is 

1,200 National Guard troops, and we are looking, right now, as an 

interagency, as deployment time lines and that sort of thing. I 

think that has not been decided yet. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Okay. So is that something that Homeland Security requested? 

Ms. SILVER. Homeland Security was involved in the interagency 

process that determined that this was the best next step. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Then what is the role that these 1,200 National Guard troops will play? 

Ms. SILVER. They will play primarily intelligence, intelligence 

support, reconnaissance roles in support of the law enforcement 

folks we have on the border and will continue to put on the border. 

They will provide us an opportunity to bridge as we develop further 

the already quite robust Customs and Border Protection and ICE 

authorities that we have—ICE personnel that we have on the border. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Was the State Department part of the interagency analysis? So what was the analysis that you utilized to 

come to that conclusion? 

Ms. JACOBSON. We were certainly part of the discussion in the 

interagency group, yes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So what was the discussion? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, the State Department’s role in all of this, 

really, is the implications of whatever decision is made on homeland security which is not State’s functions, what the implications 

of that may be on foreign policy. We were certainly engaged in that 

debate and how this might be viewed by Mexico. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What is your perspective on how this might 

be viewed by Mexico? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I think, in fact, we have seen the way it has 

been viewed by Mexico. Over the last 2 days, the Mexican government has put out a statement from its foreign ministry. I think 

that the statement is very measured and talks about how this is 

part of a comprehensive strategy to reduce violence along the border. 
75 

So I think the conversations with the Mexican government in 

terms of what the deployment would be intended to do, which is 

to reduce contraband in both directions and to support our law enforcement efforts by DHS and DOJ along the border was well understood by Mexico. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me ask a question—I would probably second-guess that. 

But Ms. Jacobson, in your testimony, you talk about the shared 

goal of building a 21st Century border. Could you explain what 

that means? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Sure. I think one of the things that we realized 

as we got the Me ́rida Initiative under way was that we had focused 

on National capacity in Mexico. We had not had a geographic focus 

when Me ́rida began. 

One of the things we felt pretty strongly as we got into the program and, also, as developments changed along the U.S.-Mexican 

border, was that we needed to look at the border itself. We needed 

to look at how we could improve security on both sides of the border. We needed to look at how we could facilitate trade and travel. 

So, really, what we are—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So you are looking at it comprehensively? 

Ms. JACOBSON. Correct. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I only have a short period of time. 

Mr. Pen ̃a and Mr. Gina, if you would quickly talk about troops 

on the border and whether you believe this initiative, the Me ́rida 

Initiative, is working. 

Mr. GINA. Congresswoman, thank you. As I testified earlier, at 

least the role of CBP relative to Me ́rida, we are performing canine 

training for our Mexican counterparts. We are performing non-intrusive inspection and examination training for our Mexican counterparts. We are also supporting them in their Mexico reestablishment of a new customs academy. 

We have gotten tremendous support from the State Department. 

All of those things that I have mentioned have already begun, and 

we are embarking on them. As alluded to, I think a more comprehensive approach would be the key to success. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Troops on the border? 

Mr. GINA. The troops on the border, as Ms. Silver indicated, I 

think those details are still being worked out, but as she alluded 

to, they will be used primarily for surveillance and reconnaissance 

in support of CBP officers. Thank you. 

Mr. PEN ̃ A. Congresswoman Lee, ICE is going to have a number 

of National Guard assigned to us, and they will be functioning in 

an intelligence capacity. They will be helping analyze and collect 

and disseminate intelligence to our agents as we are the investigative arm of the Department. We are not the interdictive arm. So 

their function would be to support our investigations through robust intelligence. 

As far as the Me ́rida is concerned, ICE is actively involved in 

building institutional relationships with our Mexican partners 

through training. That is probably one of the biggest areas that we 

are working. We have trained federal police officers on undercover. 

Mexico passed a law to allow their officers to do undercover, some-
76 

thing they previously had not had authorization to do in their 

country. 

We are working to ensure that they get the training that they 

will need for that. We are also helping train their new recruits as 

they come in, and we have anticipation of training about 4,000 federal police officers. 

We are also involved in training the first special agents for the 

Mexican customs service. They have not had—Mexico is changing 

their customs service from pretty much a revenue-collection to 

more of a risk-based program, and we are involved in that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. Chairmen, plural, thank you very much. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much. 

Before we move to the second panel, Mrs. Miller for a statement. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much. Just quickly, believe me, I 

am incredibly sympathetic and very concerned about what is happening on the southern border. 

But I will be remiss if I didn’t mention something about the 

northern border because, as has been talked about here today, in 

addition to the troop—the National Guard troop deployment and 

other things that are going to happen, we are going to be looking 

at a surge, possibly, probably a surge from ICE agents and CBP. 

I can guess where those are going to come from. That is probably 

the northern border. I just mention that. I want to be on record because I do have consternation that we could be exposed on the 

northern border. 

Again, I am totally sympathetic of what is happening on the 

southern border, but the northern border—we have no canine units 

at all on the two busiest commercial arteries on the northern border at all. We don’t have any. 

We have been trying to get some, and we can’t get any. So we 

are not even able to apply for Stonegarden grants, which has been 

a great force multiplier. We were to get a UAV mission and, of 

course, those are all going to the southern border. So we are not 

getting any. 

So I only mention this. I just want to be on record. We are talking all these resources away from the northern border to supplement what is happening on the southern border. I understand the 

problems. 

But in anything happens on the northern border, I just mention 

this—I don’t think it is a good policy for us to be so completely exposed in putting everything at the expense of the northern border 

as well. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mrs. Miller. 

Before we move on the second panel, again, I want to say thank 

you to all of you. I know you all worked very hard. 

Ms. Jacobson, Ms. Silver, Mr. Pen ̃ a, Mr. Gina, we thank you very 

much and, of course, everybody that works along with you. 

So we appreciate it. I know we have tough questions, but that 

is part of the legislative oversight that we have to do. 

But we do appreciate the work. 

At this time, I will go ahead and hand the gavel over to the gentleman from New York who is going to introduce the second panel. 
77 

I do ask for the first panel just stay around a little bit and listen 

to some of the other folks here. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you can tell, we had 

a lot of interest in this hearing today, and I am glad that our two 

subcommittees combined to bring this together, not only two subcommittees but two committees as well. This is very, very important. 

I am now pleased to introduce our distinguished second panel, 

our private witnesses. There are three. As I call you, please come 

up and—well, let us get the name plates changed, and then I can 

call everybody. 

Mr. CUELLAR. I just want to note for the record, I want to thank 

Mr. Pen ̃a, Ms. Jacobson that are staying here from the first panel. 

I had asked the other folks to stay in so that they can listen to the 

second panel, the ambassador and to the ambassador and other 

folks here, but I do want to thank, in particular, Mr. Pen ̃ a and Ms. 

Jacobson for being here. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. So, now, let me introduce our distinguished 

second panel. Firstly, Ambassador John Negroponte is vice chairman of McLarty Associates. Ambassador Negroponte has led a distinguished career in National security and diplomacy having served 

as director of National intelligence, deputy secretary of State, and 

U.S. ambassador to Mexico and Honduras. 

Ambassador, that is quite a distinguished litany of positions. 

Dr. Shannon O’Neil is Douglas Dillon fellow for Latin American 

studies at the Council of Foreign Relations. 

I was going to turn to Gabrielle Giffords to introduce Mr. McDonald, so we will give her a chance to do that when she comes back 

because I know that you are from Arizona, the home State, and 

Gabrielle Giffords, as I mentioned before, is an important Member 

of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee and a leader on U.S.- 

Mexico security cooperation. 

So when she comes back, I will let her say some nice things 

about you, Mr. McDonald. 

Ambassador Negroponte. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, VICE CHAIRMAN, 

MC LARTY ASSOCIATES 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Cuellar 

and Ranking Members. 

I have a prepared statement which I ask be submitted for the 

record. In addition, I would just like to make a few brief comments. 

As a retired Government executive with a total of 44 years of 

Federal service, most of them as a diplomatic officer, I have had 

a number of assignments where issues concerning transnational 

crime and narcotics enforcement were an important part of my job. 

This goes back as far as my assignment to the United States embassy in Quito, Ecuador, from 1973 to 1975 where one of my jobs 

was to serve as the embassy’s narcotics coordinator. 

I have also had extensive experience dealing with Mexico, especially as ambassador to that country in 1989 to 1993, a period 

when we both conceived and negotiated the landmark North American Free Trade Agreement. 
78 

Perhaps, most relevant to this hearing, I was deputy secretary 

of state during the last 2 years of the—administration and played 

an early role in launching the Me ́rida Initiative working with assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere, state Ambassador Thomas Shannon and Ambassador David T. Johnson, the assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs. 

Much has already been said this morning about the Me ́rida Initiative, so I would like to limit myself to the following summary 

points. 

First, with a common 2,000-mile border with Mexico and an everincreasing interdependent relationship, the United States has a 

National security interest in assisting the country and government 

of Mexico in dealing with drug trafficking organizations, in improving its police efforts, and in strengthening the administration of 

justice and the rule of law. 

Second, President Caldero ́n’s request to President Bush in 2007 

for urging cooperation in dealing with these issues represents an 

unprecedented level of Mexican government interest in United 

States’ advice and assistance in a realm previously considered too 

sensitive for foreign engagement for reasons of national sovereignty. 

Third, having just returned from a 3-day visit to Mexico yesterday afternoon, I am more convinced than ever that the government 

of Mexico is committed to succeed in this struggle; that important 

strides are being made, and that their efforts to restore a climate 

of law and order will ultimately be successful. 

I was especially impressed by progress that has been made improving Mexico’s federal police since I visited Mexico as the director 

of National intelligence a number of years ago. 

Fourth, as a practical matter, the Me ́rida program has been in 

effect barely 2 years. All things considered, significant progress has 

already been made. But Rome was not built in a day, and Me ́rida 

is not going to succeed in just 2 or 3 years. 

This is a project of a decade. That is about the time it took for 

Plan Colombia to really bear fruit. But this is a critical time nonetheless. President Caldero ́n took office in December 2006. His commitment to this enterprise is incontrovertible reflecting the kind of 

political will indispensable to success. 

We cannot pass up this opportunity to help a good neighbor in 

need. 

There are a couple of other points I would like to make, Mr. 

Chairman, in light of some of the testimony that I heard this morning. I suppose the two most important points have to do, first of 

all, with the question of what this war has cost Mexico because we 

talk—obviously, in our own domestic process, we talk about what 

the Me ́rida Initiative costs the United States. It is appropriate that 

we do that. 

But I think we should all bear in mind that, since the Caldero ́n 

administration came into office about 31⁄2 years ago, there have 

been 23,000 deaths in Mexico in this struggle. In terms of—in fiscal 

terms, in the first 3 fiscal years of the Caldero ́n administration, 

they have spent $13 billion—roughly ten times the initial tranche 
79 

of the Me ́rida Initiative—dollars in their funds to carry out this effort. 

So this is not a question of us contributing resources and monies 

and blood and treasure where there it is a corresponding commitment on the side of our friend which is dealing with this problem. 

They have more than demonstrated their commitment to dealing 

with this problem. 

Second, I think that, if there is one single issue that we could 

act upon on our side of the border that could really have a material 

influence on the struggle inside of Mexico, it would be the question 

of southbound inspections because one just repeatedly hears the 

complaint in Mexico that not enough is being done on our part to 

stop the flow of bulk cash and of sophisticated weaponry that ends 

up in the hands of traffickers and criminals in Mexico. 

I know that there are issues, particularly with respect to weapons. But whatever is done about the assault ban, whether it is reinstated or not, it is a violation of United States law to export a 

weapon without a license. So I think there are probably steps within the existing framework of law that can be taken, particularly in 

terms of southbound inspections that could contribute significantly 

to ameliorating the situation south of the border. 

Then last, let me just say by way of conclusion that compared to 

when I was ambassador to Mexico from 1989 to 1993, I think the 

atmosphere of cooperation between our two governments on these 

difficult issues has improved substantially. I think we have to credit the existing Mexican government for having accomplished that. 

I would just cite one example to illustrate that point. That is on 

the issue of extraditions. There are literally dozens, if not, hundreds of extraditions that have taken place from Mexico to the 

United States of narco-criminals, whereas, that was virtually unheard of 20, 25 years ago for a variety of reasons. 

So that is just one example among many of how much cooperation between the two countries has improved in this area. I think 

it deserves our continued encouragement and support. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Negroponte follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN D. NEGROPONTE

MAY 27, 2010 

Chairman Thompson, Chairman Engel: It is a pleasure to appear before you today 

to address the issue of the next steps for the Me ́rida Initiative. 

By way of background, let me say that the issues of governance and security as 

affected by criminal behavior has been a theme encountered at numerous different 

times during my Government career. To cite but three examples, when I served as 

Political Counselor at the United States Embassy in Quito, Ecuador from 1973 to 

1975 I also served concurrently as the Embassy’s Narcotics Coordinator. At that 

time there was already serious concern about the flow of cocaine from Bolivia and 

Peru through countries such as Ecuador and Colombia. Second, from 1989 to 1993 

I served as Ambassador to Mexico where the fight against drug trafficking had become a major issue in the U.S.-Mexico relationship. And third, as Deputy Secretary 

of State in the last administration from 2007 to 2009, working with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Ambassador Thomas Shannon, I 

oversaw the development and presentation of our Me ́rida plan to the United States 

Congress. 

Given this trajectory of working on narcotics-related issues off and on for more 

than 35 years, one might ask what is different and what has changed, and does this 

experience give us any guidance as we look to the future? I suppose my first point, 
80 

though obvious is still worth making; problems with narcotrafficking remain with 

us to this day notwithstanding the enormous blood and treasure that has been expended up and down the length of the hemisphere to deal with these issues. So, we 

all must agree that this is a long-term issue to which there are no quick fixes. We 

need strategic patience. 

But there have been significant shifts and developments over those decades; advances and retreats; improvements and setbacks. And while this is a long-term 

problem requiring strategic patience, this is not to say that nothing can be done, 

that any effort is doomed to failure, that there is no plan or course of action that 

can propel us towards a better state of affairs in the short- and medium-term. Quite 

the contrary, we have seen instances where concerted national action integrated 

with effective international support can bring about very encouraging results. A little more than a decade ago, Colombia was in dire straits with rampant criminal violence, loss of vast territorial extensions to insurgent and criminal control and little 

hope for the future. Today, through the heroic efforts of the Colombian people, government, and armed forces, there has been a dramatic turnaround in the situation. 

Government has restored control to previously denied areas. Institutions of democratic governance have been revitalized and Colombia’s economy is on the march as 

an investment and tourist destination, as I was personally able to witness when I 

represented the United States at the Annual OAS General Assembly in Medellin in 

June of 2008. In prior years, Medellin had been off-limits to international visits of 

this kind because it was so engulfed by criminality. 

I mentioned my service in Mexico from 1989 to 1993. During those years, Mexico 

was a transit country and the cartels were principally Colombian. There was no 

‘‘Jua ́ rez Cartel’’ or ‘‘Tijuana Cartel.’’ Nor was there significant domestic drug consumption. Though there was collaboration between U.S. and Mexican authorities, it 

was fitful, reluctant, and on occasion interrupted because of one controversy or another. Most notably and notoriously the snatching of Humberto Alvarez Machain, 

a Mexican doctor, from his office in April 1990 by bounty hunters, who thereafter 

delivered him to DEA agents in the United States where he was held and eventually tried in connection with the murder of DEA Agent Camarena in Guadalajara, 

Mexico, in 1985. Notwithstanding the fact that Alvarez Machain was eventually acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence, his case cast a shadow of uncertainty over 

U.S./Mexico counter-narcotics cooperation for at least 3 years. 

Moving quickly to the situation which prevails today, the atmosphere of collaboration between our two countries is at an unprecedented level. Gone is the hesitation 

of earlier years. Very shortly after taking office President Caldero ́n of Mexico 

proactively sought full-fledged United States assistance in dealing with the problems associated with narcotrafficking. The Me ́rida Initiative, whose history is well 

known to the committees, is the result. It will soon come up for renewal. There is 

no doubt whatsoever in my mind that this initiative deserves continued and even 

increased U.S. Government support for a number of reasons. 

First, there is strong and unequivocal commitment on the part of the Mexican 

government to deal effectively with these issues. They have spent thousands of lives 

and billions of pesos to squarely confront the threat. They have adopted a ‘‘Whole 

of Government’’ approach and seem prepared to make the kinds of police and judicial reforms, among others, that augur well for durable solutions. 

Second, the level of interest in collaborating with the United States is unprecedented. That the government of Mexico, under the leadership of President Caldero ́n 

should reach out to the United States in the way it has invites us, indeed obliges 

us, to make a positive reciprocal response. 

Third and last, our own National security interests are directly affected. We share 

a common 2,000-mile border. Can we reasonably expect that the cities and towns 

along our side of the border will remain immune to the effects of criminal violence 

on the other side of the Rio Grande? What about the longer-term economic impacts 

if effective security is not encouraged and reinforced now—impacts on trade, investment, and overall prosperity of our border region? Hundreds of thousands of jobs 

are at stake, not to mention the quality of life and aspirations of millions of residents on both sides of our common border. 

By extending the Me ́rida Initiative beyond its initial 3-year period we would be 

bringing vital encouragement and support to a friendly government determined to 

address the serious challenges it faces. With our continued and consistent assistance, I am sure they can succeed. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Ambassador. 

Ms. O’Neil. 
81 

STATEMENT OF SHANNON K. O’NEIL, DOUGLAS DILLON FELLOW FOR LATIN AMERICA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 

RELATIONS 

Ms. O’NEIL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and other distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is my great honor to appear today to talk to you about U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. 

As been mentioned already, in the last 31⁄2 years of the Caldero ́n 

administration, over 23,000 people have been killed in drug-related 

violence in Mexico. By many accounts, Mexico today ranks more 

violent than Iraq or Afghanistan. 

The crime-represented violence in Mexico is not new. Mexico has 

always been a supplier of illegal markets to the United States. Disputes in these types of businesses have often been settled with 

blood in the streets. 

But in recent years, there have been significant changes, and 

this has transformed the scope and the scale of the bloodshed. The 

first serious change has been the scale of Mexico’s narcotics operations. U.S. demand has grown and diversified as has demand from 

Europe, from Russia, from Latin America, including from Mexico 

itself. 

This has upped the stakes in Mexico for these drug-trafficking 

organizations. In response, they developed increasingly sophisticated intelligence, money laundering, and enforcement arms. 

Second, Mexico has become the power base of the drug trade in 

the Western Hemisphere. After four decades and billions of dollars, 

one unintended consequence of the U.S. war on drugs has been to 

move the epicenter of these illegal criminal networks from Colombia to our border. 

Third, Mexico’s democratization in the 1990s upset longstanding, 

unwritten agreements between the ruling political party and favored drug-trafficking organizations. As the ruling—political monopoly eroded, so too did their ability to control the drug-trafficking 

organizations bringing uncertainty and then increased violence to 

these markets. 

Now, in response to these longer-term changes, Caldero ́n has 

made the war on narco-trafficking his signature issue. This government strategy of directly attacking the cartels has also increased 

violence in the last few years. 

Now, the stream of bad news from Mexico overshadows one positive aspect of the last 3 years, and that is unprecedented U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. Now, the United States and Mexico should 

build on the strong basis of the Me ́rida Initiative, keep the best of 

this program while developing a more comprehensive approach to 

security cooperation, one that really recognizes the complex and 

intertwined realities of U.S.-Mexico relations today. 

So as the Me ́rida Initiative reaches the end of its initial 3-year 

period, there are some changes in U.S. security support that are 

necessary, and these include the following. 

First is greater support for Mexico’s judicial reform process. Establishing the rule of law is, perhaps, the crucial element and the 

potential Achilles’ heel for Mexico’s security going forward. 

In 2008, Mexico passed judicial reform that will transform the 

justice system, including introducing oral trials, giving greater access to public defenders, and creating tougher tools to combat orga-
82 

nized crime. It is the implementation of these changes that are 

going to matter for future security in Mexico. 

This will entail a monumental task over the next 6 years. It will 

mean creating new courtrooms for hearings, revamping law school 

curriculums, retraining sitting judges and some 40,000 active lawyers, building the capacity of Mexico’s investigative police and its 

cooperation with the prosecuting attorneys, and transforming the 

current judicial and law enforcement culture. The United States 

can help here with both monetary and human resources in this effort. 

The second issue is the United States support state and local police reform. While the professionalization of the federal police is underway, as Ambassador Negroponte spoke of, very little has been 

done on the state and local level. 

With all security in the end being local, the safety of Mexico’s 

citizens and of the U.S.-Mexico border will depend on reforming 

and professionalizing the local police. These hundreds of thousands 

of officers which represent some 90 percent of Mexico’s police 

forces, need better training, vetting, equipment, and career opportunities similar to those being designed at the federal level. 

While Mexico will have to do most of this investment, the United 

States can and should participate. 

Third, the United States should support programs that get at the 

underlying socio-economic factors that lead to greater criminality 

and violence. The recruiting pool for organized crime grows where 

there are no other economic options. 

Mexico’s slow growth, its weak public education system, and its 

development challenges have left many families on the margin. The 

programs to address these underlying socio-economic factors, while 

mostly will depend on the Mexican government, private sector, and 

society—there is also a role the United States can play. 

It can play in facilitating the fusion of best practices, funding 

pilot programs, and assisting the evaluation of what works and 

doesn’t work at a local level. 

Finally, the United States still needs to get its own house in 

order, and this means more aggressively dealing with the guns, the 

money, and the demand for drugs that fuels this violent business. 

The good news is much of this is already happening. The U.S. 

and Mexico governments recently unveiled a revised strategy for 

continued security operations and cooperation that addresses some 

of these issues. This new structure is more ambitious, demanding 

a longer-term commitment from both governments across administrations, but it is also more promising because it recognizes the 

complicated realities of Mexico’s drug war. 

As the murders pile up, it remains uncertain whether politicians 

in both countries will have the patience to see this strategy 

through because it is going to be a long-term strategy. But if they 

do, there is a chance, 10 years from now, that things will be better 

in Mexico. If they don’t, both countries will be facing the same 

challenges a decade from now. 

Solidifying the good in today’s strategies and building on them 

far into the future should be the basis for the next phase of U.S.- 

Mexico security cooperation. 

Thank you. 
83 

[The statement of Ms. O’Neil follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHANNON K. O’NEIL

THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2010 

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps no other country is as intertwined with the United States as Mexico. 

Mexico is the United States’ third-most important trading partner—and its second 

largest export market, with 22 out the 50 U.S. States counting Mexico as their No. 

1 or 2 destination. Mexico is the third-largest foreign supplier of oil to the United 

States, providing stability in this often volatile market. It is the largest source of 

U.S.-bound migration, the homeland of nearly 12 million U.S. residents, or nearly 

one-third of the foreign-born population. The United States and Mexico are also 

closely tied in their security—sharing a 2,000-mile border that is traversed by the 

same transnational criminal networks. It is this last issue that dominates the headlines, and these proceedings, today. 

The most immediate factor bringing Mexico to the fore is the increasing levels of 

violence. Over the last 31⁄2 years of the Caldero ́n administration over 23,000 people 

have died in drug-related killings. By many accounts Mexico now ranks as more violent than Iraq or Afghanistan. Ciudad Jua ́ rez, just across the Rio Grande from El 

Paso, Texas, is the homicide capital of the world. The start to 2010 has been particularly bloody—with nearly 4,000 drug-related deaths. While most of these have 

continued to be concentrated in hotspots such as Ciudad Jua ́ rez in Chihuahua and 

in the states of Sinaloa, Durango, and Guerrero, the quieter border state of 

Tamaulipas recently exploded as two previously allied drug cartels turned on one 

another. In addition, several high-profile civilian murders occurred—involving innocent students as well as three people associated with the U.S. consulate in Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez—questioning the governing theory that the deaths are primarily between 

drug traffickers themselves. 

As worrisome as the death count is the changing nature of the drug market and 

the Mexican trafficking organizations. While the United States remains the world’s 

largest consumer, demand in Europe, Russia, China, and Latin America (including 

Mexico) is on the rise. These organizations have taken full advantage of expanding 

markets to increase their profits and global reach. Mexican drug cartels now boast 

global networks, reaching far into the United States, into South America, and even 

into West Africa and Europe. The scale and complexity of their operations increases 

the challenge for local, national, and international law enforcement. These organized criminal operations are also branching out into other businesses within Mexico and on the U.S.-Mexico border—including human smuggling, kidnapping, and 

extortion. Many of Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations are developing into illicit 

multinational conglomerates. 

Yet the constant stream of bad news overshadows one positive aspect of the last 

3 years: Unprecedented U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. The United States and 

Mexico should build on the strong basis of the Me ́rida Initiative, taking the best of 

this initial framework for cooperation while putting forward a more comprehensive 

approach to security cooperation, one that recognizes and supports the intertwined 

realities of U.S.-Mexico relations today. This program should focus particularly on 

strengthening Mexico’s democratic rule of law, on working with local and state and 

well as national agencies to improve security, and it should begin to address the 

deep-seated socioeconomic inequalities and dislocations that leave so many in Mexico susceptible to criminal pursuits. It is only through serious institution building 

and structural changes that the situation both on and south of the border will 

change in the long term. 

MEXICO’S EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION

When Caldero ́n declared a war on narco-trafficking just days after his inauguration in 2006, he confronted a decades-long problem. Mexico has traditionally been 

a supplier of illegal markets to the United States, from alcohol in the prohibition 

era, heroin during WWII, marijuana throughout the 1960s counterculture, and in 

recent years a variety of drugs including cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and 

methamphetamines. These illegal businesses had long been a source of violence, 

since without access to legal channels, market and contract disputes were settled 

through blood in the streets. 

Nevertheless, significant changes have occurred in recent years to transform this 

long-standing dynamic—and not for the better. One is the scale of Mexico’s drugbased operations. Domestic demand for drugs in the United States has grown and 
84 

diversified over the few last decades, and Mexico has increasingly become its primary supplier. For instance, while in 1990 50 percent of cocaine bound for the 

United States came through Mexico, today it is 90 percent. Mexico is also a major 

source of heroin, meth, and marijuana for the U.S. market. Rising demand for illegal drugs worldwide has also expanded the size and stakes of the illicit market. 

As important, U.S. counternarcotics efforts elsewhere in the region shifted the epicenter of the drug trade to Mexico. Space for new contenders opened up as Caribbean interdiction efforts pushed drug transit overland through Mexico, and military 

operations in Colombia broke up their notorious cartels. Mexican organizations now 

control the trade in the Western Hemisphere, reaching down into source countries 

such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, transiting products up through Central America and Mexico, and delivering them throughout the United States. This reach was 

recognized in the 2008 Department of Justice National Drug Threat Assessment report that states ‘‘Mexican drug trafficking organizations represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States.’’ In the last 2 years they have only expanded operations, now controlling most of the wholesale cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine distribution in the United States as well as much of the marijuana 

distribution. As they gained power and influence, Mexican organized crime groups 

have become increasingly sophisticated—professionalizing their intelligence, money 

laundering, and enforcement arms. 

Mexico’s democratization has also been a factor in the escalation of violence the 

country faces today. This drawn-out process throughout the 1990s undermined old 

deals between some members of the ruling PRI political party and particular drug 

trafficking organizations. As the PRI’s political monopoly ended, so did its control 

over the drug trade. This allowed existing organizations to assert their independence from the government. It also opened up the space for new entrants to the market, increasing competition. Further legacies of the PRI’s 70 years in power—in particular the political manipulation of the judicial branch and law enforcement more 

generally, which limited their professionalization and enabled widespread corruption—further aggravated the situation by leaving the recent democratic governments with only weak tools to counter increasingly aggressive criminal organizations. 

These long-term economic and political processes—more lucrative opportunities, 

heightened competition, and changes to the political game—created dramatic uncertainty in the market. Violence was already increasing when Caldero ́n took office in 

2006. He quickly responded by sending troops into Mexico’s streets. Over the last 

31⁄2 years Caldero ́n has spent billions to arm and mobilize some 45,000 military 

troops, sending them to hot-spots throughout Mexico to take back the streets from 

increasingly powerful drug cartels. The surge in operations against the drug trafficking organizations has led to record numbers of interdictions and arrests in Mexico, as well as extraditions to the United States. 

The Caldero ́n government has also worked to transform federal law enforcement 

and judicial institutions engaged in the war against narcotraffickers. This has 

meant reorganizing, rebuilding and expanding the federal police force under the control of the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP). It has also meant embarking on a 

far-reaching process of judicial reforms, starting with the 2008 legislative and constitutional changes that, once implemented nation-wide by 2016, will fundamentally 

transform Mexico’s judicial system. 

FORMING A U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY AGENDA

With security his signature policy issue, Caldero ́n reached out to his northern 

neighbor, asking for assistance. After years of security assistance largely bypassing 

Mexico on its way to Colombia and the Caribbean, in 2008 Presidents Bush and 

Caldero ́n launched the Me ́rida Initiative. This 3-year program provides some $1.3 

billion dollars in security aid to Mexico to fund the purchase of substantial military 

equipment and technology, as well as to provide training and other support for domestic law enforcement and judicial reforms, and to strengthen accountability and 

oversight within government agencies. In addition to the outlay of financial resources, the two governments began a slow process of trust-building through structured interagency interactions, stepped up training programs, and increased information sharing to combat transnational organized criminal networks. 

At the same time, the United States has substantially increased resources for this 

side of border, expanding Customs and Border Protection (CBP) patrol from 12,000 

agents in 2006 to today’s 20,000. The Obama administration has substantially increased the number of border enforcement security task force personnel, ICE intelligence analysts, and border liaison officers along the U.S-Mexico border. 
85 

ASSESSING THE ME ́ RIDA INITIATIVE

With security cooperation historically lagging behind U.S.-Mexico economic, social, 

and even political ties, the Me ́rida Initiative has been a welcome remedy. It represents a strong basis for building long-term cooperation and trust between the 

United States and Mexico. It has also produced concrete outcomes and benefits. The 

two governments have worked together on Project Coronado to detain over 300 

members of the La Familia Michoacana cartel in the United States in October 2009. 

Intelligence sharing and cooperation also played crucial roles in the takedowns of 

drug kingpins Arturo Beltra ́n Leyva and Carlos Beltra ́n Leyva in December 2009, 

Teodoro Garcı ́a Simental in January 2010, and Jose ́ Antonio ‘‘Don Pepe’’ Medina 

Arreguin, the ‘‘King of Heroin,’’ in March 2010. Since the start of Caldero ́n’s term, 

nearly 100 tons of cocaine, 6,500 tons of marijuana, and 950 kilograms of heroin 

have been seized; as have 70,000 small and large caliber arms, nearly 5,000 grenades; and over 400 million dollars. Nevertheless, the program as initially conceived 

and implemented has some limitations. 

First, it is just not enough money. Totaling $1.3 billion dollars destined for Mexico 

over 3 years, Me ́rida pales in comparison to the assistance provided to the United 

States’ other main hemispheric partner in the fight against narcotrafficking: Colombia. This is true even after a decade of assistance to Colombia, and a general proclamation of its ‘‘success’’ in Washington and Bogota ́ in defeating the threat to the 

state posed by the drug cartels and guerrilla insurgency. 

Second, the spending so far has been focused too narrowly on military and law 

enforcement hardware. This emphasis is in part due to the Mexican government’s 

preferences and long lag times for equipment procurement. But it also reflects a 

misunderstanding of Mexico’s fundamental challenge. Mexico’s main problem is the 

weakness of its law enforcement and judicial institutions. This is part of the PRI 

legacy, as these branches of government were used for political benefit—to control 

rather than protect the population. While democratization and political competition 

quickly changed the executive and legislative branches, they did little to transform 

the third branch of government or law enforcement more generally. Instead, impunity reigns, with the likelihood of being prosecuted, much less convicted, for a crime 

being extremely low. Most of Mexico’s police forces have never received proper training or resources, making them largely incapable of conducting objective and thorough investigations. Levels of corruption remain quite high, as accountability mechanisms are nonexistent or defunct. Without capable and clean courts and cops, this 

battle cannot be won. 

Third, Me ́rida funds did not provide for state and local level initiatives. U.S.-supported efforts to rebuild and expand the federal police force through vetting and 

training programs are vital to improving security in Mexico. But this body will remain less than 10 percent of Mexico’s total police forces. Indeed, Mexico’s lawlessness is most intractable at the state and local level—it is there that police forces 

are most likely to face the Faustian bargain of ‘‘money or death’’ from organized 

crime. With all security, in the end, local, the safety of Mexico’s citizens (and of the 

U.S.-Mexico border) will depend on reforming and professionalizing local and state 

police. 

Finally, the Me ́rida Initiative overlooks three U.S.-based factors that perpetuate 

the drug trade and drug violence: Guns, money, and demand. All serious studies 

show that the vast majority of the guns used by the drug trafficking organizations 

come from the United States. This includes cartel favorites such as AR–15s and 

AK–47-style semi-automatic rifles. 

Some say that if the Mexican cartels did not get their guns from the United 

States, they would buy them elsewhere. That is likely true, though those markets 

may not be as accessible (and cheap) as the one right next door. But more important, this trafficking in arms breaks current U.S. laws. It is illegal to sell weapons 

to foreign nationals or to ‘‘straw buyers’’ who use their clean criminal records to buy 

arms for others. It is also illegal to export guns to Mexico without a license. For 

the thousands of guns each year that end up in the hands of drug traffickers, at 

least one if not more of these U.S. laws has been broken. As the United States asks 

Mexico to uphold its laws at great monetary and human cost, it should enforce its 

own laws. 

As important as guns is the money. Estimates range widely, but most believe 

some $15–30 billion heads across the U.S. border each year into the hands of Mexican drug trafficking cartels. This number rivals legal flows from remittances and 

from oil exports, and far outweighs the $300–400 million in aid provided by the 

Me ́rida Initiative for the ‘‘good guys.’’ Targeting illicit funds is one of the most effective ways of dealing with drug trafficking. It is this money that buys guns, people, 

and power. Washington has begun working to staunch these financial flows through 
86 

efforts such as the addition of Mexican cartel members to the U.S. drug kingpin list, 

helping strengthen Mexico’s financial intelligence unit, and beginning to check the 

flow of goods not just north but south across the border in particular locations. But 

the United States should build up the infrastructure needed to seriously investigate 

south-bound cargo, bring many of the advances made in tracing terrorist financing 

since 9/11 to fighting organized crime next door, and continue and deepen bilateral 

cooperation and intelligence sharing to dismantle money-laundering networks in 

order to increase the cost of doing business for these trafficking organizations. 

Law enforcement is not enough. The United States needs to shift the emphasis— 

and resources—of its drug policy toward demand reduction. Studies show that a dollar spent on reducing demand is far more effective than a dollar spent on eradication and interdiction abroad, and that money spent domestically on rehabilitation 

is five times more effective than that spent on conventional law enforcement. This 

means expanding domestic drug treatment and drug education programs among 

others. Reduced U.S. demand would also lower the drug profits of the Mexican trafficking organizations, diminishing the threat faced by the Mexican government. 

BEYOND ME ́ RIDA

As the Me ́rida Initiative nears the end of its initial 3-year period, strong U.S. support for Mexico should continue. But changes to the nature and structure of U.S. 

security assistance are in order. These include: 

Greater support for Mexico’s judicial reform process. This is perhaps the crucial 

element—and potential Achilles heel—for Mexico’s democratic rule of law. Today 98 

percent of perpetrators remain free. Critics argue that many of those convicted are 

often innocent, or if not just too poor or unconnected to buy their freedom. 

Mexico’s 2008 judicial reform touches on virtually all aspects of the judicial sector, 

including police, prosecutors, public defenders, the courts, and the penitentiary system. It includes significant changes in Mexican criminal procedures through the introduction of new oral adversarial procedures, alternative sentencing, and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; it grants new measures to promote greater 

access to justice for both defendants and victims of crime; it revises roles for law 

enforcement and public security agencies to administer justice; and it introduces 

tougher tools for combating organized crime. 

While there on paper, the implementation of these changes is what will matter 

for future security. This entails a monumental task over the next 6 years—creating 

new courtrooms for hearings, revamping law school curriculums, retraining sitting 

judges and the 40,000 active lawyers, building the capacity of Mexico’s investigative 

police and their coordination with prosecuting attorneys, and transforming the existing culture of judicial and law enforcement more generally. In the end, however, creating a more professional, open, transparent, and effective judicial system is the 

lynchpin for establishing a democratic rule of law. The United States can help Mexico with both monetary and human resources in this massive effort. 

Greater support for state and local level police reform. While the 

professionalization of the federal police is underway, very little has been done at the 

state and local level—comprising over 90 percent of Mexico’s law enforcement forces. 

Mexico is now debating whether to absorb the existing municipal forces (which number over 2,000) into 32 state-level forces. The perceived advantages of this approach 

are streamlined capabilities, enhanced operational effectiveness, easier cross-border 

and state-to-state security cooperation and, ultimately, reduced corruption. 

Critics contend that the disbursement of forces might then be subject to party and 

gubernatorial politics rather than local needs, and that centralized control may undermine efforts at community policing—a model that has been quite successful with 

crime and gangs in the United States as well as in Italy. 

But whatever the outcome and ultimate federal structure, these hundreds of thousands of officers need better vetting, training, equipment, and career opportunities. 

While Mexico will have to invest the most, the United States can and should participate. 

Support for programs that get at the underlying socioeconomic factors that beget 

criminality and violence. The recruiting pool for organized crime grows when there 

are no other economic options. Mexico’s slow growth, its weak public education system, and its development challenges have left many families and young people on 

the margins. It is not a coincidence that the extremes of socioeconomic instability 

and today’s violence coexist in Ciudad Jua ́ rez. Some 40 percent of Jua ́ rez youth neither work or study—leaving them without hope for a better future, and susceptible 

to the growing underworld of gangs and crime. The challenge of addressing these 

underlying socioeconomic factors, and reknitting Mexico’s social fabric in places such 

as Ciudad Jua ́ rez, is what Mexico struggles most with today. In addition to a func-
87 

tioning police and court system, Mexico needs a better and more open education system, and programs for early intervention and professional development for at-risk 

youth. As with judicial and police reforms, these programs too will mostly depend 

on the Mexican government, private sector, and society. But there is an important 

role the United States can play, facilitating the diffusion of best practices from similar experiences in other countries (including our own), funding pilot programs, and 

assisting in the evaluation of what does and does not work at the local level. Fundamental socioeconomic changes will not only improve Mexico’s security situation, it 

will also affect other contentious issues in U.S.-Mexico relations, particularly the 

north-bound flow of undocumented migrants. 

The good news is that much of this is already happening. The U.S. and Mexican 

governments recently unveiled a revised strategy for continued bilateral security cooperation, framed by the notion of ‘‘co-responsibility’’ and based on four pillars: Disrupting the ability of organized crime to operate, strengthening institutions to sustain the rule of law and human rights, building a 21st-century border, and fostering 

strong and resilient communities. 

The third and fourth pillars of the new joint strategy will expand beyond the previous military focus on dismantling drug trafficking organizations and reforming 

law enforcement institutions to incorporate initiatives that aim to improve cross-border flows and surveillance, and to address the social and economic factors that underpin the violence. 

These new strategic priorities will increase the inspection of vehicles going south 

(not just north), while also moving much of the vigilance away from the actual border through programs to certify cargo at plants. It also means that U.S.-Mexico cooperation will include local-level operations, beginning to reform the vast municipal 

and state police forces and developing community-level social programs and initiatives to rebuild neighborhoods crippled by poverty and crime. The starkest shift is 

in how funding will be spent: While over half of the allocated Me ́rida funds have 

gone to military equipment and training, much of the requested $310 million for the 

program’s 2011 budget, $207 million, will be targeted at Mexico’s judicial reforms 

and programs on good governance. 

This new structure is more ambitious, demanding a long-term commitment and 

policy consistency across administrations on both sides of the border. Successful programs focused on building institutions and economic opportunity are much harder 

to deliver than helicopters or boats. But they also hold more promise for long-term 

solutions, as they recognize the complicated realities of Mexico’s drug war and the 

limitations of military hardware in changing the tide. 

The United States should prioritize efforts that will assist Mexico in pushing 

through the reforms that will actually matter, changing today’s violent dynamic for 

the long-term. Partnerships between the United States and a wide range of agencies 

and participants at Mexico’s federal, state, and, most importantly, local levels will 

be vital for the coordination and pooling of resources and expertise. 

Even as the death toll in Mexico continues to mount, there are reasons for optimism. With U.S. assistance, Caldero ́n’s government has made significant strides in 

professionalizing the federal police force. In addition, the 2008 judicial reform, when 

finally implemented, should increase transparency and accountability, and finally 

end today’s impunity. 

The lessons from the United States, Italy, and other countries that fought entrenched organized crime on their own turfs show that it is possible to overcome 

these challenges. But they also show that there is no quick or easy solution. 

BEYOND CALDERO ́ N

The results of the comprehensive approach underway today will only appear in 

the longer-term. It is the next generation of young people that will benefit from better schools, better jobs, and from prevention programs for at-risk youth. Realistically, it will also take a generation to transform Mexico’s police and courts, creating 

systems where impunity is the exception, not the rule. 

President Caldero ́n is now over half way through his 6-year presidential term. 

While 2 years is a long time in electoral politics, the 2012 presidential election is, 

as of now, the PRI’s to lose. Even if Caldero ́n’s PAN hangs onto the presidency, 

there will be a new dynamic and team in place in the executive branch by the end 

of 2012. The United States needs to start laying the groundwork for this transition 

now, to lock in the advances made thus far in bilateral cooperation while also shifting its focus toward the institutional strengthening necessary for sustainable change 

over time. 

While working with the government and Mexican political parties and leaders, the 

United States should also engage Mexico’s broader society. One of the most positive 
88 

aspects of Mexico’s economic and political transition of the last 2 decades has been 

the expansion of its middle class and civil society. While often seen as a country 

of ‘‘haves’’ and ‘‘have-nots,’’ NAFTA and Mexico’s broader economic opening, stable 

economic growth, and the sustained flow of remittances back home have enabled the 

rise of a Mexican middle class—now some 30 million strong. This middle class ensured Mexico’s democratization in 2000 by voting for opposition PAN candidate 

Vicente Fox, and pushed Caldero ́n’s candidacy over the top in 2006. They share the 

aspirations of the middle class in this country—economic security, opportunities for 

their children, and safety in their streets. As voters, this group is essential for future legislative and presidential candidates. As such, this economic and voting bloc 

can be a strong ally for the United States and Mexican reformers intent on establishing and strengthening a democratic rule of law. They will also be important for 

other issues in U.S.-Mexico relations, such as immigration, economic growth and 

competitiveness, environmental change or creating a more modern border. 

In the last 2 decades we have also seen a steady expansion of Mexico’s independent civil society (with many leaders coming from the expanding middle class). 

While encountering resistance at times, these organizations have been important in 

pushing and deepening Mexico’s democracy. The passage of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act in 2002—one of the most critical elements for increasing transparency 

and accountability in the government—was the direct result of pressure from civil 

society organizations. So too was the sweeping 2008 judicial reform that will, once 

implemented, fundamentally change Mexico’s court system. 

As public opinion polls of the middle class and other sectors of society, as well 

as the activities of new civil society organizations show, the goals of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation are not just shared by governmental elites. The good news is that 

democratic rule of law and stronger, more accountable institutions have deep seated 

support throughout Mexico. This indigenous groundswell can help push reluctant 

politicians to consider the long-term benefits of such reforms that may at times have 

short-term costs. 

As the murders pile up daily along the border and elsewhere in Mexico, it remains 

uncertain whether politicians in both countries will have the patience to see this 

strategy through. If they do, there is a chance 10 years from now that things will 

be better in Mexico. If they don’t, both countries will be facing the same challenges 

in a decade. Solidifying the good in today’s strategies, and building on them far into 

the future, should be the basis for the next phase of U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much. 

I introduced Mr. McDonald, but I said I would leave the real introduction for my good friend, Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords. 

Congresswoman Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. McDonald, for being here today. 

When I came in earlier, I almost didn’t recognize Mr. McDonald 

because, frankly, this is the way that we are used to seeing him, 

out there on the ranch, you know, so glad to have you. I don’t suspect I will be seeing you in a suit much more often down in Cochise 

County. But we are absolutely delighted that he is here. 

Bill is a fifth-generation rancher for southern Arizona, and his 

family is been ranching their land for over 100 years, a very long 

period of time. Bill is going to talk to us about the reality of being 

on the U.S.-Mexico border and, frankly, all our panelists have been 

terrific, but it is very abstract to talk about what it is like to be 

on the border compared to actually your livelihood, your life, your 

friends, your neighbors, your family. 

In fact, in reading Mr. McDonald’s comments, he talks about 

what the legacy is really to his family and whether or not he wants 

to have his family continuing to live on this area because it has 

changed so much over the years. 

Mr. McDonald is a graduate of ASU. He began managing his 

ranch full time in 1975. He is the past president of the local cattlemen’s association and has served on the executive board of the Ari-
89 

zona Cattle Growers Association. He has been very active in this 

immigration issue and the discussions over border security and put 

forward a very comprehensive plan. 

Mr. McDonald is also the founder of Malpai organization, a borderlands group that is designed to preserve the hundreds of thousands of miles of land in perpetuity. This is land that needs to be 

protected and preserved and continue to be ranched with all of the 

growth that we are having in southern Arizona. 

But I am pleased that he has come all the way to really talk 

about, first-hand—I mean, again, it is abstract to talk about 

Me ́rida, what is happening, all the Border Patrol, and we are going 

to hear from him invaluable information, his direct insight of what 

it is really to live and work along the U.S.-Mexico border. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McDonald. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. McDonald, we are all ears. 

STATEMENT OF BILL MC DONALD, RANCHER, DOUGLAS, 

ARIZONA 

Mr. MCDONALD. Well, thank you, Chairman Engel. 

Thank you for the introduction, Congresswoman Giffords. 

Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Members Miller and Mack, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee staff and guests, I appreciate this opportunity to talk about the impact of border crossing 

on rural life in southeastern Arizona and southwestern New Mexico along the border which is where we operate our ranch. 

For most of the 20th Century at least, although this has been a 

difficult place to make a living, it is been a peaceful place, a beautiful place to live. The borderline itself is a casual thing, as I think 

a Member of the committee mentioned earlier. 

Ranch hands and seasonal farm workers would go back and 

forth, and that included Americans working in Mexico at times. Nobody paid a great deal of attention to it, frankly. 

About 25 years ago with the completion of a highway between 

Janos, Chihuahua, and all of—Sonora in Mexico, it suddenly provided much greater access for people from other places further 

south in Mexico and other countries to get to our area. We began 

to see an uptick in drug smuggling and other activity, but it was 

not really at an impressive stage for those of us who lived there. 

Around 9 years ago, after 9/11 when there was much tighter enforcement of ports of entry and ramping up of enforcement in other 

areas, we started to see a real heavy flow of activity, and it resulted in mountains of trash in the landscape. Water is our lifeline 

out there, as you can imagine. Arid southwest for our animals as 

well as for the wildlife, and we would lose thousands of gallons of 

water storage when people would leave valves on or cut water lines 

or break off floats and water troughs. That still goes on. 

Wildfires get started on a regular basis. Gates left down, fences 

are cut. There are trails made by human traffic going over the 

same places to the point that we have gully erosion as a result. 

Our roads are torn up from the use of the Border Patrol almost 

practically exclusively now. We use them a small percentage of the 

time in comparison. 
90 

These are significant costs to us in equipment repairs and extra 

days of work, not to mention the negative impact it has on our resources and landscape. 

But we have hung in there and kept hoping it would get better. 

It has gotten worse. In the last 3 to 5 years, the character of the 

crossers has begun to change, although we still have poor people 

coming across just looking to better their lives, and we certainly 

have empathy for them even though they are illegal. We now have 

these individuals who are often dressed in dark clothing and they 

have their water jugs painted black, and we know that, you know, 

they are doing their work at night. 

They are arrogant. They are brazen. They are often armed. They 

go out—they go north at night with their cargo, whether they happen to be human beings or drugs or a combination. When they 

leave the cargo off and they head south, they often engage in criminal activities. We have had a big uptick in break-ins increasingly 

with people still in their homes. 

You know, we live in an east-west facing canyon, which we are 

just lucky. We have two big mountains on either side of us. It is 

hard to get to us, and yet we have had a couple of break-ins in the 

last year. That compares to none 100 years previous. 

People in north-south facing canyons and the foothills and the 

valleys, the number of break-ins there—when you consider the population per capita, it is huge. 

Things reached a new level with the murder of Rob Krentz 2 

months ago today, my very good friend and ranching neighbor 

whose family and ours have been neighbors for 100 years. The 

tracks of the killer led into Mexico, the shell casings found there 

indicate that it was possibly from a gun that had been stolen in 

the area the night before. 

Rob was doing nothing more than checking the waters in his pasture. It could have happened to me. Where he was killed was just 

a mile from our fence. 

Since that tragedy, we have seen some changes in the Border Patrol’s efforts I think, but the activity continues unabated. Just last 

week, a birdwatcher was stopped from going into one of the canyons by an armed drug smuggler who just told him he shouldn’t 

go in there. 

Forest service employees in the area are told that they have to 

go out in pairs. We don’t have that luxury on our ranches. 

There is an on-going effort of intimidation, in my opinion—the 

ranch just to our south, which is still in the United States—of vandalizing infrastructure to that ranch and trying to force that individual to leave. In Mexico, we hear from our Mexican counterparts 

that when that happens, people with ties to drug activity usually 

come in control of the ranch. 

Our own Government’s policy of funneling border crossers into 

the most rural and formidable terrain is responsible for what we 

are now enduring. Our area has become a de facto demilitarized 

zone, so to speak. 

This is the place that I have poured my heart and soul into my 

whole life and where we raised our daughter and our family has 

lived since 1907. But as the Congresswoman mentioned, I am not 

sure I want my grandchildren to be raised there now. 
91 

What can be done? I am running out of time, but there is four 

things—communications are abysmal down there whether you are 

talking about landowner to agent or agent to agent or agent to 

other law enforcement agencies. 

We need much more technology, including mobile surveillance 

system. We don’t really want to steal them from the northern border or from other sectors. We need them built, and we need them 

out there. 

More air support, like helicopters, even C–130s, horse-patrol 

units are very effective out there. We don’t have nearly enough of 

that. We also need, as mentioned, the agents to be on the border. 

We need to look at deterrence rather than just how many drugs 

and people we can capture. I think the Me ́rida agreement is tremendous, and it is a long-term solution, but it is long term. 

Immigration reform, I had high hopes for, I don’t know when 

that is going to happen to actually get a bill through that would 

do more good than harm. But there is no debate about what the 

Federal Government’s responsibility is. 

On behalf of those who live near the border, I respectfully request that the Federal Government do its job now—secure the border, protect our citizens from foreigners who enter and mean to do 

us harm. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. McDonald follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL MCDONALD

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify at this joint hearing on U.S.-Mexico Security. My name is Bill McDonald and I am the fifth generation on my family’s 

103-year-old ranch in the far corner of southeastern Arizona. The southern boundary of the ranch lies approximately 5 miles north of the Mexican border while the 

headquarters lie 7 miles north of the border in Sycamore Canyon which runs eastwest in the Peloncillo Mountains near the New Mexico line. 

Border crossers, going both ways, are not new to our area. As long as I can remember, and long before, ranch hands and cowboys from northern Chihuahua and 

Sonora have crossed to work in southern Arizona and New Mexico and some American cowboys periodically went into Mexico to get work as well. The border was casual and the area was peaceful for years. About 25 years ago, a highway was completed between Agua Prieta, Sonora and Janos, Chihuahua. The highway parallels 

the border for several miles and gives prospective border crossers much easier access to the area. Still, the numbers of crossers did not become problematic for local 

residents until 10 years ago or so. Large amounts of trash, cut pasture fences, floats 

broken off in water troughs, water lines cut and precious stored water lost, trails 

made by humans so deep that they start gully erosion, forest fires that are started 

by campfires or perhaps even deliberately and the corresponding ramping up of the 

Border Patrol response which has caused a ten-fold use of ranch two-track roads 

and the county dirt road; all of this has cost ranchers dearly in repairs, extra cattle 

work, and destruction of the landscape. Still, most ranchers just continued to try 

to live with it. 

In the last 3 years to 5 years, however, the character of the crossers has taken 

an ominous turn. They often wear black and paint their water jugs black. They pass 

by our ranch house so close at night that you can hear them talking between the 

barks of our dogs. We, who live in a deep east-west canyon and had never had a 

break-in, had two occur in 2009. Neighbors to the north who live in north-south facing canyons, or in the valley, have experienced many more. A few years ago, Congresswoman Giffords began arranging meetings between the Border Patrol and 

southern Arizona ranchers. The Border Patrol also began regularly attending meetings of the Malpai Borderlands Group, an organization that was formed by the 

ranchers and some conservationists 16 years ago to support the beautiful open space 

landscape of the area against subdivision and has become a model for cooperation 

in public and private land management. It was at one of these meetings, when the 

discussion turned to the fact that some crossers were now armed with automatic 
92 

rifles, and were becoming increasingly brazen, that Rob Krentz, whose family has 

also ranched here for 103 years, made the observation that if things continued as 

they were, it was inevitable that someone would be killed. On March 27, Rob went 

out on his All-Terrain Vehicle to check the waters in one of his pastures. He never 

came back. His body was found late that night. The tracks of the killer were followed to the Mexican border. 

Since his death, things have hardly slowed down. Recently, a bird watcher trying 

to enter Horseshoe Canyon in the Chiricahua Mountains, across the valley from the 

Peloncillos, was turned back by an armed drug smuggler who warned him to stay 

out. It’s public land, but it’s dangerous for the public to use. The number of such 

incidents and the actual crimes per capita are enormous considering the small population that resides here. Forest Service employees and many others who work for 

Government agencies now can only go out on the land in pairs. I, like most ranchers, can’t afford to hire someone just to tag along, and so I mostly still work alone, 

although I try to be careful about who approaches me. My roots are here and I and 

my wife aren’t going to be run off. As Rob Krentz’s brother Phil said, ‘‘I’m not going 

to let them whip me down. I’m here until something gets done about this or I myself 

am killed. The question is: Do I want my grandchildren to be raised here as my 

daughter was and all my family going back to 1907? I don’t have any grandchildren 

yet and I’m glad I don’t because, yes, I would be afraid for them.’’ A solitary ranch, 

miles from the nearest neighbor, is very vulnerable. 

It is our own Government’s policy of forcing the illegal crossers into the most 

rural, most formidable terrain that is responsible for the traffic we are enduring. 

The crossings, both drugs and people are, of course, being controlled by the Drug 

Trafficking Organizations and they are not deterred by high mountains, steep canyons, brush, or scarce water, and certainly not by high fences in the middle of nowhere. So what can be done? • There is a real need for better communications. For years we have incredulously 

pointed out that the Douglas and Lordsburg sectors, working side by side, could 

not talk to each other because Douglas had digital radios and Lordsburg analog. 

Since the murder of Rob Krentz, a way has been found to sort-of work around 

that issue but communication remains a challenge. The two forward operating 

bases that are established in the area cannot be reached by nearby residents 

except by physically going there. Cell phone service is patchy everywhere and 

nonexistent in some places. Communication between the Border Patrol and 

other law enforcement is a struggle and often isn’t possible. • There is a need for more technology that works and the additional necessary 

personnel to operate it. Especially useful have been the mobile surveillance systems. We need more of them. Months ago I signed an agreement to allow one 

to be set up on our private land. We still haven’t seen it. What is not needed 

is silver bullet, pie-in-the-sky stuff. There is no easy answer or one size that 

fits all. 

• There is a need here for more air support. There is also a need for increased 

horse patrol units. Whether it’s light helicopters or C–130s, air support working 

with the horse patrol has been a winning combination in the mountains, but 

it’s all too rare. 

• We believe the bulk of the agents should be on the border, not 10, 20, 30 or 

more miles from it. Deterrence should be the goal, not capture. Until such time 

as an appropriate number of agents can be recruited and trained, the National 

Guard should be called in, and this time with bullets in their guns. The agents 

need the appropriate training, gear, and firepower and authority to use it in 

order to be able to stay right on the border. In support of this we need many 

more forward operating bases, approximately one per every 12 miles. 

• Agents who work in rural areas that are high-traffic areas should draw hardship duty pay. Veteran agents should be returned often to areas where they 

have knowledge of the terrain. We still have too many greenhorns burning up 

gas just trying to figure out where they are. A few Special Forces agents who 

can stay out for an extended period of time (as opposed to working in shifts) 

are currently deployed here, but we don’t know for how long. An evaluation of 

the Border Patrol’s effectiveness in rural areas using this method, versus the 

traditional shift method of deployment, would probably a useful exercise. 

• Funding for ‘‘Operation Stonegarden’’ needs to be increased. Local and State 

law enforcement agencies near the border have a hugely disproportionate expense in dealing with criminal aliens compared to their colleagues in other 

locales. 

• Streamline the claims process for recovery of damages caused by illegal aliens 

to ranches and homes. Our neighbor to the south (still in the United States) 

has had their ranch subjected to a campaign of vandalism intended to intimi-
93 

date them into quitting. In Mexico, where this has happened, it has resulted 

in persons with connections to drug trafficking obtaining the ranch. • Operation Streamline, which ensures that repeat border crossers serve time in 

jail, needs full funding and support. Where this has been implemented, illegal 

crossings have been significantly reduced. To ensure timely prosecution, the 

funding for State and Federal Attorneys’ Offices must be funded to the appropriate levels. • It is the opinion of most ranchers here that money spent for high fences or 

other physical barriers would be better spent on the aforementioned items. 

I certainly support the Me ́rida Agreement and believe that working with other 

countries more effectively and cooperatively to address the criminal activities that 

plague our border is the long-term approach that has the best chance for success. 

Some type of immigration policy reform that does not even remotely involve amnesty would also be helpful, but unfortunately appears unlikely to happen soon. For 

the present, the Federal Government’s responsibility is to secure our borders and 

protect our citizens. We need to do it now. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much, Mr. McDonald. That was 

a very heartfelt, personal, on-the-spot account. I thank you for your 

courage. 

I have to leave in a little while, but before I go, I want to ask 

Mr. Negroponte and thank our first panelists before I do that. I 

will let you go. Thank you for hanging around. 

Mr. Cuellar. That includes Mr. Pen ̃ a also. If you all need to 

leave, thank you very much for waiting here. We appreciate it and 

duly noted. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Ambassador, President Caldero ́n has used the military and federal police to restore order in the north of Mexico because local police forces are often seen as too corrupt. So I would like you to comment on that. 

Do you think the Mexican military has been more effective at insulating themselves from the influence of drug cartels than the 

local police have? Or do they risk being corrupted and then one of 

the risks of using the military for domestic law enforcement purposes? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, certainly, when I served in Mexico, there 

was a concern about involving the military in narcotics enforcement. They always used them for eradication but not necessarily 

for much else. 

But I think that is water over the dam now. The decision was 

made 8 or 10 years ago to engage the Mexican military more intensely in the counternarcotics struggle, and I think that is just a 

fact of life. 

But I think there is also a desire on the part of the Mexican government to beef up civilian police so that, eventually, it can really 

step into the breach. You see an example of that in Jua ́ rez now 

where the federal police took over the administration of law enforcement in Jua ́ rez about 6 weeks ago. That is work in progress. 

I think that the new federal police has really shown substantial 

results in recent years through better training, better resources. 

They now recruit college graduates. They recruited 4,500 college 

graduates last year in the police force, which is unheard of in earlier years. 

I did like to echo something that Ms. O’Neil said which is there 

is also a really urgent need for reform of the state and local police 

in Mexico. There is even an idea being talked about of just having 

state police and consolidating the municipal police forces into the 
94 

state police so that you are dealing with only 32 state police forces. 

There is 31 states and then the capital of Mexico City rather than 

some 2,000 different municipalities. 

That is something that is being debated in the Mexican body 

politic, and I think it would be a very interesting reform to look 

at. 

But in any event, I would agree that state and local police need 

better training, better standards. That should be—and I expect it 

to be one of the new areas of focus of the government of Mexico. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. I was also interested in hearing you say 

that cooperation between Mexico and the United States currently 

is better than it has ever been; that they are working with us on 

so many different things, including extradition and things like that. 

I happen to think that President Caldero ́n is a very courageous 

man. I think that—as Ms. O’Neil said, there has been an uptick in 

violence by the cartels because the cartels want to show him who 

is boss. So if he is going to crack down on the cartels, they are 

going to increase their violence because they want to show the 

world that they have the upper hand. 

But I think that any upper hand they may have will be paled by 

a concerted effort by Mexico and the United States to say that we 

are not going to tolerate it anymore. So I welcome President 

Caldero ́n and I am really happy that he is working so closely with 

us and doing what he is doing. 

I will now turn the hearing over to my co-chair, Mr. Cuellar. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman Engel. I 

know you have to run, but I want to say thank you very much, and 

I hope we get to continue doing this because, when we talk about 

foreign affairs, Me ́rida in particular and, of course, border security, 

it goes hand in hand. 

At this time, I will have my Ranking Member—actually, since we 

started off, it would be Mr. Mack. I am sorry. 

Mr. MACK. I think the right thing to do is to go ahead and let 

the Ranking Member go. Why don’t you go ahead? 

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. Why don’t we let Mr. McCaul go ahead? 

Mrs. MILLER. All right. I better just go. All right. We will flip a 

coin here. 

VOICE. What a gentleman. 

Mrs. MILLER. All these gentlemen. 

Let me thank the witnesses for coming. 

Mr. McDonald, I have been in Congress about 8 years, and hear 

a lot of experts—and you are all wonderful and great—but I will 

tell you, just having somebody from the heartland and speaking 

from their heart is very helpful—very helpful. 

I have got to just ask you, sir, what do you think about the Arizona law? You know, the whole country is into a debate about what 

is happening with this law. What is your thought about—do you 

think your State government overreacted? Do you think they are 

not reacting swiftly enough? Do you think Arizona ought to be able 

to pass a law like that? What do you think about that law? 

Mr. MCDONALD. Frankly, it doesn’t address our problem where 

we are, but I am happy to see that it brought attention to the problem. It wasn’t always the kind of attention, I guess, that we want. 
95 

I guess we will wait and see about the constitutionality of it. I 

know some of the cities are concerned that it might put their, you 

know, individual policemen at some, you know, risk of—some liability there. So that is a concern. 

But, you know, it is just frustration, as has been expressed all 

day in this room. The Federal Government is not doing the job. So, 

you know, I think, again, as expressed, we may see more of this 

if the job is not done because the problem is very, very real. 

Mrs. MILLER. I think that is true. There are many of us that feel 

it is just a manifestation of the frustration level that you are seeing 

there, and we will hope for the best certainly. But you are absolutely right. The Federal Government is not doing what we need 

to do, although, we mentioned that we have all been talking here 

about the National Guard and the deployment of the troops. And 

1,200, it is a good first step. There is a lot of talk we should have 

6,000 or whatever we think the number is. 

What is your thought on that just from a rancher down there? 

As the Guard comes, what would you expect them to be doing 

there? How would you—let us say you were in charge. Here is a 

Guard unit. What would you do? 

Mr. MCDONALD. Well, I think it is a stopgap. I think that you 

have the Guard there, and I would, like the Congresswoman said, 

I would favor having them on the border as a presence. 

Again, we need to talk about deterrence, not how many people 

we catch and how many we miss and, especially, the criminal element. But the National Guard is not a long-term solution. It is just 

what we had to have until we can get trained. I want to emphasize 

trained because we have Border Patrol agents that spend a good 

deal of their time trying to figure out where they are when they 

get out there. 

If you all—and you are all welcome to come down to the country 

and see it. It is not—you know, it is a tough country. You have got 

to learn it. By the time they it, they are usually off somewhere 

else. You know, the turnover rate is so high, it is difficult. 

So, you know, the Border Patrol—I am sorry. The National 

Guard is a stopgap, but in the end, we need agents, and we need 

more trained agents. We might even want to look at this idea of 

shifts because, right now, we have some special forces, as I understand, Border Patrol down there that can actually go up in the 

mountains and stay there for a while. They don’t have to come off 

on 8-hour shifts or whatever. We are interested to see how effective 

that is because they are certainly the lookouts for the drug people 

who are staying up there in the mountains. They are not leaving 

on 8-hour shifts. 

Mrs. MILLER. That is the old saying. Peace through strength. As 

you say, a deterrent, just a visual of them knowing that you have 

that kind of strength down there with National Guard troops deployed and using technology. It is a mix, I think, of all these various dynamics. 

Mr. MCDONALD. Yes. I just want to comment that, you know, the 

worst thing that they did was when they put National Guard 

troops down there without any bullets in their guns, and they 

quickly found that out on the other side. We saw an uptick in just 

their audaciousness, their brazen behavior after that. 
96 

I mean, they take their cues. You know, and they say, if they are 

not going to take this very seriously, we are going to step it up a 

little bit. 

Mrs. MILLER. Actually, when I was down there last time, I was 

watching the National Guard troops build a fence. Maybe hire a 

contractor to build the fence. The National Guard ought to be doing 

something else was my opinion. 

But I know a lot of the Guard troops were doing those kinds of 

things. 

Just one other question I would have for Mr. Ambassador and 

Ms. O’Neil as well I think. 

I thought it was very interesting and absolutely true, I am certain of what we need to do to change the culture in Mexico in regards to the judiciary and the system and the rule of law in all of 

these kinds of things. I do think that is so important that they 

have a political will. You mentioned about the extraditions which 

is a fantastic thing and should be of note. 

We certainly all applaud what is happening there, but I just 

wonder if you could expand a little bit on what you witnessed—you 

said you just got back from a trip in Mexico—in regards to that. 

How was—my husband is a judge. I mean, I am interested—I think 

our entire system—we are a rule of law nation. Until you can be 

doing kinds of things in the law schools with the students and really changing this whole culture, it is such a critical thing. I know 

it is not short-term, but long-term it’s so important. 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, my principle purpose in going down 

there was to attend an economic conference sponsored by the Council of the Americas, of which I am chairman. So I didn’t get that 

much into the judiciary part, but I did visit the secretariat for the 

federal police. 

I got to visit their command center that they have constructed 

which has built up this very, very impressive kind of war room, if 

you will, where they have databases from all over the country. 

They have very good information tools to keep much better track 

of what is going on in the country, transparency. 

We talked quite a bit about the efforts to improve the quality of 

the national police force, as I mentioned, the college-educated policemen, which I think is a great step forward. 

So I think that is certainly going to go hand-in-hand with efforts 

to improve the judicial system. But on that part, perhaps, I will 

turn it over to Ms. O’Neil, who I know has focused on this issue 

quite a bit. 

Ms. O’NEIL. This is going to be Mexico’s crucial issue if they can 

establish a rule of law there. Of course, as we know, there are a 

lot of things against it. There is corruption. There is incredibly high 

impunity. Only 2 percent of criminals are ever put in jail for the 

crimes that are committed. 

But I do think there are some positive steps there. We have seen 

a judicial reform that passed in 2008 that, if implemented over the 

next 6 years—it has an 8-year period to implement. There is 6 to 

go—will make a fundamental difference in terms of transparency, 

accountability, openness, and effectiveness. 

One thing Mexico has going for it, which is often overlooked in 

discussions in the United States, I believe, is how much it is trans-
97 

formed not just in terms of democratization or opening up economically, but in terms of its society over the last 15 or 20 years. 

One thing we have seen is the expansion of Mexico’s middle 

class. It is now 30 million strong. It is a third of the population. 

They want the kinds of things that the American middle class 

wants. 

You know, they want education for their kids. They want economic opportunities. They want safety in their streets. They want 

rule of law. 

Many of the civil-society organizations that we have seen blossoming, new organizations that have been pushing for rule of law 

are coming from this group. So in that group, there is an indigenous base that are allies of the United States and the reformers 

in Mexico in transforming the justice system and implementing 

rule of law. 

So there are partners there for us to work with not just in the 

Mexican government, of which they are quite strong partners, but 

more broadly in Mexico as we go forward with the Me ́rida Initiative or other things that will be important. 

So there is a positive aspect here to think about especially for 

this issue, which is so crucial, the rule of law. 

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Ranking Member Miller. 

Now my colleague from Arizona, Representative Giffords, is 

given 5 minutes for questions. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

This is a fascinating panel. I mean, from Ambassador 

Negroponte, we have sort of the, you know, the political, and then 

we have the academic with Ms. O’Neil, and then we have the practical with Mr. McDonald. 

We really see sort of the all of what we in Congress have to face. 

I mean, we have good data, good information. You know, we have, 

you know, the political reality of how we get stuff done. But then 

we have here someone that actually has to live with the consequences of our action or our inaction. 

I am sorry that some of the agency folks had to leave, but I know 

this hearing is generally about the Me ́rida agreement which I supported. But when the Me ́rida agreement was brought forward, it 

was done behind closed doors. Congress, at that time, was not 

asked, was not engaged in the discussion of how this money would 

be spent, the best way, where would it go, how would it be allocated. 

Then, of course, we found out about it. Then we had some questions because there were a lot of issues in the Me ́rida agreement 

that just weren’t taken into consideration. That is why we have 

these hearings and open process and the dialogue. That is why we 

have a representative democracy. 

So we were able to make some changes. I also thought it was fascinating when we had one of our first hearings on the Me ́rida 

agreement, finally, and Chairman Engel, I believe, was chairing at 

that point. We had folks testifying saying, well, everyone supports 

this when, you know, even our local U.S. law enforcement officials—and, of course, when I went back to our sheriffs and I went 
98 

back to our local ICE agents and Border Patrol, they never even 

heard of the Me ́rida agreement. 

So, you know—and their concern wasn’t that we shouldn’t be 

sending money, resources to our Mexican counterparts. Absolutely. 

But what about us? What about Americans? What about the folks 

that are actually living on the border? 

It just goes to show the decisions that are made here in Washington, like the SBInet which was mentioned earlier—and I know 

we have beaten a dead horse there. But it is an excellent example 

of deciding how we are going to secure the border, spending millions of dollars but not actually working in consultation with the 

local border patrol or with the folks that actually live on the 

ground. 

So, Mr. McDonald, you know, if I can turn to you and have some 

perspective of what it is like working with the Border Patrol. If you 

could please just enlighten us. What is working? What is not working? You know, I know that we have an increase in resources. We 

have better communication than we had in the past. 

But, if you could, please highlight for all of us your thoughts 

from this. 

Mr. MCDONALD. Well, Congresswoman Giffords, I have to give 

you a lot of credit for bringing the Border Patrol and the ranchers 

together. You did that, you know, really before anybody else had 

made the effort, and it was a great initiative, and we have made 

some strides. 

But it is difficult because of the high turnover rate in the Border 

Patrol. It is a real challenge to try to establish relationships or continuity in the way things are done. I think that we have made 

some common-sense suggestions that they have picked up on like, 

you know, don’t bring in a whole group of new people and all the 

old ones leave at the same time. You can’t do that down there. The 

geography of the place is too difficult. There is too much to learn. 

But, again—and I think there is a sincere effort on both sides, 

but it is challenging because of the constant changing of personnel. 

On a practical side, the communications problem is just horrible. 

I mean, I have got a forward-operating base 4 miles from my 

house. If I want to contact them, if I have an issue at the ranch, 

I have to physically go there. They have a phone line that is there 

from the previous person who lived on that site previously—it is an 

old ranch headquarters—and they have never activated the phone 

line even though I have been after them for over a year. I don’t 

know what it takes to get that done. 

We had an elderly resident near another forward-operating base 

who had the same problems. She was literally hostage inside of her 

house, had the doors locked with some menacing individuals outside, couldn’t reach anybody. 

Supposedly, Arizona sector can now talk to the Lordsburg sector. 

Douglas and Lordsburg working in the same area had—Lordsburg 

had analog radios, Douglas had digital radios. They couldn’t talk 

to each other. 

This went on, as you know, for a few years. They have now kind 

of worked around that, but it still doesn’t work as well as it should. 
99 

The Border Patrol has a very hard time talking to other law enforcement. I understand that is some kind of an encryption problem 

that they haven’t worked out yet. 

So the communication down there is just really, really tough. You 

know, you wonder why—sometimes, you wonder how they get anything done in the face of it. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Mr. McDonald, some of my colleagues, before I arrived in the Congress, worked hard to extend the pedestrian fencing out in that area. Maybe some of our colleagues believed that, 

since we built a lot of fencing, that the problem is taken care of. 

But, obviously, you know, that is your area, your community. 

Can you talk about what has been effective and not been effective 

about the fencing? 

Mr. MCDONALD. Well, I appreciated Chairman Thompson’s message about common sense and talking to locals. As you know because you went out with us, you know, we took the Border Patrol 

officials and yourself and others to show them where it made sense 

to have vehicle barriers and where it didn’t make sense. But when 

the actual time came, they just strung them all of the way across 

there. 

They have been effective in some places. In other places, the fact 

that they have a road there now has given them access—them 

being the smugglers—access to places that they didn’t have before 

because the terrain prevented them. 

The Border Patrol is not on that road very often, so they are not 

making very good use of it. So we wonder what was really done. 

As far as having a pedestrian fence out there, you know, it is not 

going to deter people who go down steep canyons, over boulders in 

the middle of the night. They go in places that I can barely negotiate by horse in the daytime. A fence means absolutely nothing to 

them. 

You know, you need the boots on the ground, basically. If you 

had that, a fence might be some help, but it is going to be a tremendous cost, and I think that the money could be better spent in 

other places. 

Now, this is not to say there aren’t places the fence hasn’t been 

very effective, but it is a site-specific thing. It is not a cure-all. It 

is not a one-size-fits-all silver bullet. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. McDonald. 

Mr. Chair, I know my time is up, but I appreciate the time. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Mack. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for being here and your testimony. I 

would especially like to thank Mr. McDonald for being here. 

You know, I was very impressed with your opening statement, 

with your testimony. The Congress needs to hear more and more 

of it, and I thought you laid it out in a way that an expert sitting 

in an office here in Washington could never do. 

So thank you so much for being here. 

I would like to start on the Me ́rida Initiative and ask the ambassador. Since you were involved in the writing—the original Me ́rida 

Initiative, what are your thoughts? Do you think that we are on 

track? Do you think we are behind? Do you think there needs to 

be adjustments? 
100 

You know, what are kind of your thoughts on where we are now 

as what was envisioned when it first began? What your thoughts 

on are moving forward? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, as I said in my statement, Congressman 

Mack, this is, I think, a project of 5 or 10 years. I don’t think we 

can expect to see decisive or conclusive results in a shorter period 

of time than that. 

So we are only in the second or third year, and I think that probably the most important thing is, as we have said already several 

times this morning, the strong political commitment of the government of Mexico and the positive actions that flow from that. So I 

think we are on the right track. 

Adjustments to the plan, I think, as we go forward and we gain 

experience, I think we need to look at what it is we—how we might 

want to shape the program going forward, make adjustments here 

and there. 

To Congresswoman Giffords’ point about the initiative having 

originally been done behind closed doors, I don’t think it was so 

much that as the fact that we were in a kind of a Catch-22 situation because the government of Mexico wanted to give us its ideas 

about what to do before we went forward with some kind of a proposal. So we were in a bit of a vicious circle. 

But with the couple of years that have now gone by, I think that 

we have had the opportunity to have the very dialogue that you are 

talking about. 

But initially, the government of Mexico didn’t want us to put 

anything forward to the Congress until they had had their—and, 

rightfully so—I mean, they were the ones who were going to be 

both the beneficiaries and the implementers of this. 

But I think we are on the right track. Police improvements, the 

judicial reform—and I have got to dwell just a little bit more on 

this question of the southbound inspections because I think that is 

an area that is more within our sovereign control to effect, the 

movement of cash and the movement of arms. 

I think that is an area where I think we can do something, and 

I think it is where the government of Mexico hopes and expects 

that we will do something. 

Mr. MACK. You know, I am happy to hear you talk a little bit 

about a time line. This is a 5-, 10-year, you know, kind of time line 

that we are looking at. I know that is not set in stone, but this is 

kind of where your thought process has to be. 

Was there any consideration or what is your thought about, you 

know, President Caldero ́n, I think, has another 2 years or 21⁄2

years—do we have—do we feel strong enough in the relationships 

that have been built now throughout the entire government in 

Mexico that, when he leaves and there is a new president, if they 

will be as committed to this as President Caldero ́n? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, of course, we don’t know how the Mexican political process is going to unfold, but I think the critical point 

is President Caldero ́n does have another 21⁄2 years to go. There is 

strong political commitment. This is the time to sort of build the 

momentum, if you will. So the hope would be that 21⁄2, 3 years 

from now, that the momentum would have been consolidated and 
101 

you can rely upon it moving forward no matter who happens to be 

in political office. 

The other point I would make—and to what Ms. O’Neil said earlier—I think there is a growing political consensus within Mexico 

itself—I mean, the outrage is palpable when you go down there— 

that they want to do something about this problem. They want to 

get their lives back. 

I think President Caldero ́n’s initiative and the Me ́rida process 

and the reform process are seen as ways of achieving that. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. Ms. O’Neil, do you want to—would you 

like to comment? I saw you kind of nodding. 

Ms. O’NEIL. Well, let me just add—and I agree with all of the 

ambassador’s comments—that, yes, we have 21⁄2 years to lock a lot 

of these things in. In part, that is working with the government. 

But, in part, it is reaching out to others in Mexican society, the private sector, you know, civil society groups, other type of groups to 

do these things. 

Another aspect in Mexico is that Mexico now, as a full democracy, is also like ours, a federal system. So states are very important in this process and, particularly, as we move from just looking 

at the federal government to working at the local level and focusing 

on reforming local police, state-level police, or local police. 

There are cooperation and back-and-forth that can be started and 

implemented that, you know, whatever happens at the national 

level, there can be a lot of back-and-forth, particularly, across the 

border, which I think would be quite useful for Mexico but for the 

United States and many of the issues that we have talked about 

today. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, if I may just one more to the ambassador. 

You know, what we have seen over the past couple of years, has 

the government—as they become more active in fighting the drug 

cartels in the north, we have seen a lot of the flow the drugs and 

other things moving south. I know that this was contemplated and 

understood that this was, you know, going to happen. 

Are you comfortable or confident that the Me ́rida Initiative addresses well enough that shift so that we don’t have kind of move 

it from the northern part of Mexico and then kind of have this open 

border in the south and ultimately leave through Venezuela and 

then back up through the Caribbean? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I think it is an issue. I think there is no 

question about it. One of the things that I was briefed on when I 

went down to Mexico and visited the police was the fact that a lot 

of the flight tracks now of the cocaine flights coming up from South 

America are going into Central America, notably, Guatemala and 

Honduras. 

In fact, it was quite stunning to me the number of flights suspected of going into those Central American countries. So I think 

that is going to require more time going forward and more time 

and attention. 

As far as Venezuela is concerned, that has been a problem for a 

number of years now. The number of cocaine and narcotics flights 

going out of Venezuela over to Africa and over to Europe—and that 

is a problem of serious concern. 
102 

Mr. MACK. Do you feel—sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

Do you feel that the structure of the Me ́rida Initiative is capable 

to adjust to the change of the shipment of drugs going south in 

Mexico? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Well, I certainly think it is capable of doing 

that. I think the priority at the moment is Mexico, but all of these 

problems need attention. I think it is a question of juggling these 

priorities. 

Mr. MACK. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Mack. 

At this time, I will recognize the other gentlelady from Arizona, 

who serves with us in homeland and has the knowledge and the 

experience, and we appreciate her input and her work in our homeland security. 

So, Mrs. Kirkpatrick, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Five minutes plus. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. This is has been a great hearing. 

I want to thank my colleague, Representative Giffords, for your 

good work in securing the border. 

Mr. McDonald, thank you for testifying today. 

You know, this has been an issue that I have been working on 

since I was in the State legislature. I was in the legislature when 

we passed the eVerify law. We did that out of frustration that the 

Federal Government wasn’t doing anything. So I really hope that 

we will take this opportunity to make some significant steps to secure the border. 

But in my days even at the legislature talking with ranchers, you 

know, my mother’s family were ranchers over in the Snowflake 

area. They have a—Creek ranch. 

So I know about what it is like. You know, you are out there constantly mending fences and finding your calves. It is not an easy 

job, and I thank you for what you do. 

But talking about them about the fence, you know, they said, 

look, a fence doesn’t work for us because our cows get caught in 

it. So I think we have to be very careful to use the right steps to 

secure the border. I agree with you that manpower is critical. 

I do think the National Guard is a short-term solution. We do 

need the boots on the ground, but I have asked for 3,500 Border 

Patrol agents to be trained and deployed by the end of next year 

because that, not only, will bring good-paying jobs to the area but 

also a stable security force. 

But I just want to ask you, in your years on your ranch, have 

you ever been in the position where you had to call the Border Patrol? 

Mr. MCDONALD. Oh, yes. I mean, we certainly have. I haven’t 

ever felt, you know, that my life was necessarily in danger but, 

again, the crossers—some of them now bring a different attitude. 

I mean, I have literally had people wait at the ranch when we 

weren’t there to ask for a drink of water, and they were thirsty 

people. I mean, you get that class of people across border. 
103 

But more lately, it is like they come around and they start demanding things. There is a certain, you know, threat behind it if 

you don’t comply. 

So you are in there trying to fix them something to eat and, at 

the same time, trying to figure out how am I going to get a hold 

of the Border Patrol this time. It is like Russian roulette trying to 

find, you know, a number that works. 

So, yes, it is very frustrating. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. So you don’t—you know, the telecommunications problem is huge. We have been trying to work on interoperability because we just do not have that communication. Although 

my district goes from the Utah border down to Duncan, I don’t 

have any of the border area. 

But what we are finding is that they are crossing your ranch, 

they are coming up through the back roads headed north to the 

interstate. It is really putting a lot of people at danger. 

But it troubles me that you don’t have a single number that, 

even if you had telecommunications, that you could call and reach 

the Border Patrol. So there is nothing like a 9–1–1 Border Patrol 

number? 

Mr. MCDONALD. It is really frustrating. We just had another 

shift change or, you know, they brought in a group of new people, 

and they were very good about giving us this new list of numbers. 

The next day, one of the ranchers there had an issue, called every 

single number on that list, couldn’t get through to any of them. 

Mrs. KIRKPATRICK. Well, that is very troubling. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope we can look into that because you don’t 

have much time to call for help when you are out there. That really, really concerns me. 

So, again, I want to thank all of the panel and thank the Chairman for putting this together. Excellent. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank the gentlewoman from Arizona. 

At this time, I would recognize the gentleman from Texas, my 

colleague, my friend, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank the panel. 

Mr. McDonald, thank you for your vivid description of life on the 

border. I am from a border State. In fact, I guess everybody here 

is. But we try to get Members from other parts of the country to 

come down to the border. I know Gabrielle has done that. I have 

tried to do that, Mr. Cuellar, because you really can’t understand 

it until you get down there. 

Your testimony, I think, helps. I agree with your point that—I 

think whether it is Border Patrol or, you know, whatever it is, they 

need to be working more with the local ranchers and the border 

sheriffs who know the area. 

For instance, on the fence issue, I think, in some areas, in the 

populated areas, that makes sense. But in the non-populated areas, 

we need to have better technologies that can secure the border. 

I think one of the best points that you have made today is a 

problem within CBP, and that is these agents—the turnover and 

rotation. You don’t know who to call. 

Mr. Chairman, I don’t know how we fix that, but I think that is 

an institutional problem within Border Patrol that we need to fix 
104 

and bring people that know the area. Hire agents that are from 

New Mexico or from Arizona or from Texas who speak the language and can fit in better and they know the terrain. 

The National Guard—I agree with you, also. I don’t want to see 

them pushing paper. I don’t think that is what the Guard is 

trained to do. I assume you agree with that as well that these 

Guard forces coming down should be in a more operational capacity 

than sitting behind a desk. 

Would you agree with that assessment? 

Mr. MCDONALD. Yes. I definitely would, yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. Then, finally, you know, I know the Arizona 

law is controversial. I think it is a response to the Federal Government not doing its job because we should be enforcing the law, and 

we are not. 

We had the director of ICE come out just recently saying that he 

may not even enforce—if the Arizona law is enforced, he is not 

going to help in terms of taking these illegals and deporting them. 

That is a total breakdown in the system. 

I assume you disagree with that, too, the fact that the director 

of ICE would make some sort of a comment like that. 

Mr. MCDONALD. Well, I don’t think it is helpful. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Then another—I thought another excellent point 

you made that only locals would know about—and I agree with 

you. The 10-year span that you talked about, we could cross the 

border 10, 15 years ago and not be worried about our safety. We 

had a brucera program that worked pretty well as kind of a guestworker permit program. But that is all changed. 

Now it is not just the migrants crossing; it is the more dangerous 

drug trafficking, highly-armed individuals that are crossing 

through these ranches. 

You mentioned the idea of them actually taking over some of the 

ranches on the border, and I think that may be, unfortunately, a 

more well-kept secret. But I have heard anecdotally of cartels buying ranches on the U.S. side of the border so they can easily—more 

easily facilitate the crossing of drugs. 

Do you have any anecdotal information—— 

Mr. MCDONALD. I don’t have anything on the U.S. side, but within our site, there is a peak called—Peak, that ranch came up for 

sale, and I am told by the Mexican ranchers down there that the 

person who bought it has ties to the drug trafficking organizations. 

I mentioned my neighbor south of me is being harassed on a constant basis, and he is about ready to give up, and we are worried 

that—you know, you don’t know who buys these ranches. You 

know, our ranches—nobody wants to live down there right now because of what we are going through. They are taking away every 

reason that you would want to live out in the country. 

So who is going to buy them? You have to be suspicious of anybody who is going to buy one of these ranches right now. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think they are destroying our way of life on this 

side in the United States. It makes sense for them, when they have 

billions of dollars, to buy these ranches on the U.S. side to facilitate 

their trafficking. 

Mr. MCDONALD. I think it is something we really have to watch. 
105 

Mr. MCCAUL. That is a great local issue that a lot of people sitting up here in Washington are not aware of. Thank you for bringing that to us. 

Ambassador, just a couple of quick questions. Thank you for your 

leadership on the Me ́rida Initiative. I know you spent a lot of work 

and hard time putting that together. 

You talked a lot about the southbound traffic which I agree in 

terms of guns and cash that cuts them off if we can get their cash 

going back into Mexico. The BEST team down there, I think, are 

working pretty well. I would like to see that enhanced more on this 

side. 

But what do you have to say about on the Mexican side in terms 

of don’t they have a responsibility to provide inspections as well 

with traffic coming from the United States into Mexico? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Oh, absolutely. There is no question about it. 

They have got to build up that capability. As you know, it used to 

be that you could just drive—you could just get waved right across 

the border with not even the most cursory of examinations 20, 30 

years ago. That is the way it worked. 

That whole culture and that whole notion of border crossing from 

north to south has to change. Definitely—and I think the Mexican 

government acknowledges that they have a responsibility. 

But while they are building up that capability, I think we can 

also be helpful. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I think so, too. Having just visited Laredo and then 

I was in El Paso not too long ago, we were beefing up our side. But 

there is really nothing on the Mexican side to inspect vehicles coming in. 

In fact, I would indulge the Chair just for two quick points. 

As my colleague from Florida mentioned, I am very concerned 

about what is going to happen in 2 years politically down there. 

And I know you probably can’t answer this question. 

But the president of Mexico serves for one term, a 6-year term. 

I am very concerned about who the successor is going to be and 

what the climate is going to look like. I am also very concerned 

about the influence that Hugo Cha ́vez has in Mexico in terms of 

the political process. 

I think the worst thing that could happen would be if a Chavezbacked candidate won the presidency in Mexico. It would take not 

only the Me ́rida Initiative down the wrong path that, I think, from 

an economic standpoint, would be a disaster for Mexico. 

Would you care to comment on that? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. As we both have said, it is difficult to foresee 

what is going to happen. But what I would say is, first of all, Mexico has consistently and constantly, over a 70-year period, changed 

presidents every 6 years. There has not been any interruption to 

that process since 1934. 

Secondly, the idea that any Mexican government would emerge 

that was under some kind of foreign influence or backing is just totally alien to my understanding and experience with Mexican politics. I think they are very proud. They are very proud of their own 

system and their own country. Whoever becomes the next president 

of Mexico is going to be his own president. 

Mr. MCCAUL. They have intense national pride and sovereignty. 
106 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. Right. 

Mr. MCCAUL. But I guess my question is: Do you believe that 

there are Chavez forces, though, in play in Mexico? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. If there are, I don’t think they are particularly 

significant. Second, I think that the one issue on which Mexicans 

across the entire political spectrum agree is the centrality of the 

United States-Mexico relationship. It is where the overwhelming 

amount of economic and social activity takes place. It is where 85, 

90 percent of their exports go. It is where all the movement of people back and forth are. We are the country where there are some 

25 million Americans of Mexican descent. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Yes. That is a good point. In closing, you mentioned the strategic patience with Me ́rida. I understand it is implementing this is an enormous challenge. I get that. 

But there are a lot of us running out of patience, and the American people are on this issue. I would encourage you to move this 

thing as quickly as we can. 

I know there is, I think, a conference coming up in Cancu ́n—is 

that correct—with the Mexicans? Is that correct? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I am not aware. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I hope that, on our side, we can make great 

progress at that conference. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul. 

Let me just say, as we start to conclude, I want to thank all of 

witnesses for being here—the panel. 

Mr. McDonald, I appreciate the work—it is interesting what you 

are talking about is what I have heard down there in South Texas. 

So I guess it doesn’t matter what part of the border, it is the same 

thing. I have heard from my ranchers. People used to come across 

years ago were different folks that, you know, they could come in 

and you would offer them water and all that. Now, it is just a little 

difference, though. 

I appreciate your comments, your personal experience on that. I 

appreciate that. 

Ms. O’Neil, I appreciate all your good writings. I appreciate what 

you do for that part of the area. I think it is so important that we 

don’t forget about South-Central America. So I appreciate your 

writings. 

Mr. Ambassador, you have got a wealth of experience from being 

an ambassador to the director of—the first director of national intelligence. As you know, homeland—and I have got to take advantage of this, we also do intelligence, so I have to ask you one particular question, if you don’t mind. 

You were the first director of national intelligence. In the 5 years 

since its creation, the office of the director of national intelligence 

has matured, achieved some positive results, but still it encounters 

significant obstacles. 

In your opinion, what authority—what authorities does the next 

DNI who will be the fourth, I believe—the fourth in 5 years—need 

to succeed? 

Mr. NEGROPONTE. I think the creation of that position was the 

product of political compromise back in 2004. There was the impulse for the creation of the job was, of course, both the 9/11 Com-
107 

mission’s report and then the WMD fiasco with respect to Iraq. 

That kind of made it inevitable that there was going to be some 

kind of reform. 

You will recall it took place during an election year. But because 

of the political compromises that were involved, I think the position 

was not given sufficient authority in either the budgeting area or 

in the hiring and firing area. 

So, effectively, what the DNI became was, first of all, a coordinator. That is an important role, no question about it—the coordinator of these 17 agencies—and the principle intelligence adviser 

of the President—also, another important role. 

But as far as really having clout vis-a`-vis the direction of the entire intelligence community, I think the director needs more authority in budgetary preparation and in hiring and firing of the individual intelligence agency chiefs. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Okay. I want to thank, again, the first and, of 

course, the second panel. Thank you for your time. As you know, 

this has been—we got a lot of participation. So I really appreciate 

this, having Members from both committees—I know Mr. Engel is 

not here. I do want to thank him for his work and, of course, the 

committee. 

I certainly want to thank the staff, both the Majority and the Minority staff, for the good work that they do because trying to put 

two panels together and trying to put two subcommittees together, 

it takes a lot of time and coordination. 

So I want to thank everybody for being here and for the work 

that they have done. So I thank the witnesses again for the work 

that they have done and the Members for their questions. 

Members of the subcommittee may have additional questions for 

the witnesses and, again, we ask that you respond to them as soon 

as possible to those questions. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittees stand adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

(109) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN ELIOT L. ENGEL OF NEW YORK FOR ROBERTA JACOBSON

Question 1. Specifically, what is Mexico doing at or near the border with the 

United States to stop the illegal trafficking of weapons into Mexico? Have they intensified their efforts in recent years? If so, how? 

Answer. The Mexican government, using its own resources as well as those provided through the Me ́rida Initiative, has been working to improve the control of its 

borders. Some of these efforts are specifically targeted at illicit arms trafficking, others are broader in scope with the intent to interdict all illicit activities, to include 

illegal arms. 

The Government of Mexico (GOM) is deploying its new Vehicle Screening System 

(SIAVE) at all land ports of entry and is working to reduce processing times and 

increase accuracy. The system scans license plates and checks the information 

against Mexico’s ‘‘Plataforma Mexico’’ database. Through Me ́rida Initiative funding, 

the USG has supported development of this database. When fully implemented, 

SIAVE will conduct 100 percent screenings of southbound vehicles and aid in identifying vehicles and persons who merit a more intensive secondary screening. 

For the purpose of conducting the secondary inspections, the GOM is deploying 

appropriate and effective non-intrusive inspection technology along the border. Mexico currently has 52 Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) units in place, 

and Me ́rida Initiative funding has been provided for ion scanners and mobile 

gamma ray systems. Mexican Customs and Federal Police have worked closely with 

the U.S. Embassy to ensure this scanning equipment has the best capabilities for 

detection of concealed arms. 

In building the total capacity of Mexican agencies to staff and operate a functioning port of entry, the Government of Mexico is engaged in a number of ways 

to build the capacity of Mexican Customs. Drawing upon the expertise of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Mexican Customs is establishing a training academy with the intent to produce their own law enforcement professionals at all ports 

of entry. For intermediate skills training at this new academy, the Government of 

Mexico, with assistance from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), is 

developing a 10-week training course to prepare experienced Mexican Customs inspectors to assume expanded duties that will include investigative responsibilities. 

Additional CBP activities involve the training of Mexico Secretariat of Public Security officers on Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment for the detection of contraband and Mexico Customs officials on basic inspection techniques. Additionally, assistance is being provided to procure and train Mexico Customs Canine detection 

units as well as to provide International Border Interdiction Training and International Seaport Interdiction Training. 

On December 30, 2009, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 

(ATF) introduced a Spanish-language version of its eTrace program, which allows 

Mexican counterparts to enter information about recovered crime guns into the data 

system at ATF’s National Tracing Center. eTrace enables the Mexicans to analyze 

trace data from weapons seized in Mexico to develop investigative leads and to identify trends and patterns relating to illegal arms trafficking. ATF, using Me ́rida Initiative funding, is training the Mexican Attorney General’s (PGR) personnel in the 

use of the system. 

Question 2. You and your Mexican counterparts have developed goals and metrics 

to evaluate the success of the Me ́rida Initiative. Why were not metrics included to 

assess efforts to reduce the illegal flow of firearms from the United States to Mexico? Will you reconsider this decision? 

Answer. We recognize that we must do more in the United States, not only to reduce the demand for illegal drugs, but also to stem the tide of weapons and bulk 

cash going south across our border. When devising the metrics, we agreed to focus 
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our efforts on measuring the results of Me ́rida Initiative foreign assistance. We are 

currently reviewing our metrics with regard to the new four pillar strategy. 

We will also raise your concern with the Department of Homeland Security and 

the Department of Justice as they have the lead on arms trafficking issues in the 

USG. 

Question 3. You and your Mexican counterparts recently announced a new strategy, often referred to as ‘‘Beyond Me ́rida,’’ which broadens the scope of bilateral security efforts and focuses more on institution-building than on technology and equipment transfers. 

This new strategy is partially in response to violence in border cities such as Ciudad Jua ́ rez. Clearly, time is of the essence which means that waiting for the fiscal 

year 2011 Me ́rida appropriations to be approved will take far too long. 

How do you plan to get more institution-building funding to Mexico—and specifically to border cities like Ciudad Jua ́ rez—as soon as possible? Can we reprogram 

funds to make this happen? How soon will this new strategy take hold? 

Answer. We are not waiting for our fiscal year 2011 funds to begin implementing 

the new ‘‘Beyond Me ́rida’’ strategy of this administration. The emphasis on the four 

pillars (Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups; Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain 

Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights; Create a 21st Century Border; and 

Build Strong and Resilient Communities) has already begun. In some cases, we 

have agreed with the Mexican government to adapt on-going programs to reflect 

these new priorities. In others, re-programming may be necessary. 

The Mexican response in Jua ́ rez is an excellent example of the way the State Department and Me ́rida Initiative support the Mexican government. The response— 

including a transition to Mexican federal police lead in coordination of operations 

in the city, and the ‘‘We are all Jua ́ rez’’ initiatives on the socio-economic side—was 

conceived and initiated by the Caldero ́n government after President Caldero ́n made 

numerous visits to Jua ́ rez earlier this year and Mexican government officials engaged in significant outreach to community leaders. We are now working with the 

Mexican Government to see where we might use Me ́rida Initiative resources to assist. 

Me ́rida funds have already paid for the training of a number of the federal investigators that are now in place in Ciudad Jua ́ rez, as well as training and equipping 

some of the specialized units that are supporting operations in and around the city. 

Community outreach efforts have always been an important part of the Me ́rida 

Initiative, and are now more explicitly a focus under the fourth pillar: Building resilient communities. USAID officers in Mexico have been meeting with community 

leaders in Jua ́ rez and El Paso, and are working with the Mexican government to 

see what more could be done in this area. 

Question 4a. There have been a series of incidents of violence directed at U.S. 

Government interests in Mexico, including the March 13 murder of three persons 

with links to the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Jua ́ rez and incidents at the U.S. consulates in Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey. 

What is the U.S. Government doing to heighten security for the consulates and 

the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City? Do we plan to heighten security to the same level 

as that found in our diplomatic mission in Colombia? 

Answer. We have no higher priority than the well-being of our employees and the 

security of the people visiting the Embassy and our Consulates in Mexico. 

Question 4b. What steps are we taking to increase hardship differential and danger pay for U.S. personnel serving in Mexico? 

Answer. Mission Mexico regularly reviews and adjusts its security posture as appropriate. We do not publicly discuss the details of our security posture so as not 

to compromise any of the specific safeguards that we take but would be glad to provide you with a briefing on measures. 

Question 4c. Do you see this pattern of violence directed at U.S. interests escalating in the near future? 

Answer. We are monitoring the security situation on the ground very closely and 

will continue to do so. 

Question 5a. More than 4 years have passed since dozens of women were tortured 

and sexually assaulted by police officers during operations on May 3–4, 2006 in San 

Salvador Atenco, and still no one has been brought to justice. 

In July 2009, after a 3-year investigation, a Federal Special Prosecutor from the 

Attorney General’s Office issued a report identifying 34 members of the state security forces as being responsible for these abuses. The Attorney General’s Office then 

transferred jurisdiction over the prosecution of these individuals to the Mexico State 

Attorney General’s office. Yet, nothing further has taken place. 

What has the State Department done to urge the federal and state Attorney General’s offices in Mexico to take swift action in the San Salvador Atenco case? 
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Answer. San Salvador Atenco is one of the cases that the U.S. Government follows 

closely and on which we provide updates in the annual Human Rights Report. We 

have raised this case with the Mexican Attorney General’s office, the Ministry of 

Government (charged with implementing human rights and internal affairs standards throughout the federal government), and the National Commission on Human 

Rights. 

Question 5b. More broadly, what is the State Department doing to help ensure 

that Mexican civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities are investigating and 

prosecuting members of the federal police and military forces who commit human 

rights violations? 

Answer. In February we initiated a human rights dialogue with the Government 

of Mexico. The objectives are to increase bilateral human rights cooperation in priority areas, clarify and strengthen the institutional capacities to address information requests on alleged human rights violations, share best practices, and promote 

relevant training activities. Formal meetings will take place on a tri-annual basis, 

with ad hoc meetings called as agreed upon by the two parties. The dialogue will 

address such issues as military justice, prevention of torture, criminal justice and 

security reform, and strategies for dialogue between the Mexican government and 

civil society, among other issues. As of May 2010, there were three meetings of the 

human rights dialogue, with the fourth scheduled for July. Democracy, Human 

Rights and Labor (DRL) Assistant Secretary Posner led the U.S. side during the 

most recent session in April. 

Additionally, under the Me ́rida Initiative, federal police training programs have 

incorporated modules on respect for human rights. Through May 2010, roughly 

4,500 federal police officers had received this training. USAID is supporting the participation of human rights and other NGOs in justice sector reforms, so that these 

NGOs are better equipped to provide oversight and educate citizens on their roles 

and responsibilities in the new system. USAID also supports the United Nations 

High Commissioner on Human Rights’ (OHCHR) office in Mexico to work with 

Mexican government agencies to strengthen observance of human rights. The Mexican Supreme Court and Customs have both agreed to let OHCHR observe their inhouse human rights training, and provide technical assistance to improve their curricula. We also support, through USAID, the Citizen Participation Councils that 

provide a bridge between civil society and the Government of Mexico on security 

issues. 

Question 6. Does the USG have a comprehensive strategy for engaging with the 

Mexican government on employment policy and worker rights? What is it? 

Answer. Strengthening respect for worker rights and promoting corporate social 

responsibility around the world are critical to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals of 

promoting democracy, human rights, free trade, and international development. The 

USG promotes worker rights and seeks to enhance employment policy in Mexico 

through consistent labor diplomacy with the Mexican government. 

In addition, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) 

signed on September 14, 1993, provides a mechanism for member countries to ensure the effective enforcement of existing and future domestic labor standards and 

laws without interfering in the sovereign functioning of the different national labor 

systems. The NAALC creates several institutions: a Ministerial Council; National 

Administrative Offices (NAOs) in each labor department; and a Secretariat. Each 

institution is tasked with promoting labor rights through exchanges, cooperative 

programs, and a range of consultative and dispute settlement processes. 

Question 7. Has USG raised the Mexican mine workers case with the Government 

of Mexico and what has been the response? 

Answer. The USG has raised the mine workers’ situation at Cananea, Sonora 

with the Government of Mexico (GOM) and has encouraged the peaceful resolution 

to this long-running conflict while adhering to applicable international labor standards. The USG has also met with the mining chamber, the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity 

Center, and the miners’ union on this issue. 

The GOM, through its Labor Department (STPS), provided a dossier of the legal 

proceedings on the strike at Cananea and stated that they followed the law to the 

letter in this situation. On February 11, the labor arm of the Mexican Supreme 

Court issued a ruling in favor of the employer, Grupo Mexico, and ended the nearly 

3-year strike. The federal government enforced the judicial decision on the evening 

of June 6. Sources differ on the level of force used to remove the miners from 

Cananea. Local representatives of the miners’ union and a USW representative assert that federal and state law enforcement authorities used violence to remove the 

miners from Cananea. The GOM states that the situation was resolved with no violence and minimal disturbance. 
112 

The USG continues to monitor the situation and urges a peaceful resolution to 

the dispute. 

Question 8. Last October, the Mexican government fired 44,000 members of the 

Mexican Electrical Workers’ Union. A complaint was recently filed with the USG 

under the NAFTA labor side agreement. Can you describe what engagement you 

have had with the Mexican government on this case? 

Answer. The Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas (SME) was the union that represented 44,000 active workers and 22,000 retired workers from the Luz y Fuerza 

del Centro (LFC) power distributor in Mexico City and surrounding areas. When 

LFC was dissolved by presidential decree, the Government of Mexico (GOM) states 

that the SME was also dissolved, asserting that there can be no collective or individual contracts with a company that no longer exists. Lawyers on both sides claim 

to have legal cover for their positions. The SME has submitted a complaint to the 

United States under the NAALC and is expected to submit a complaint to Canada, 

pending a Mexican Supreme Court decision on the case. 

In December, Embassy Mexico City arranged and accompanied a delegation of 

U.S. and Canadian union workers to a meeting with Mexico’s Labor Department 

(STPS) to discuss the case. Our embassy has remained in regular contact with STPS 

and the SME since that meeting and has followed the NAALC submission and the 

SME’s court cases closely. 

Embassy Mexico City is also in touch with the American Chamber of Commerce, 

the AFL-CIO’s Solidarity Center, and the electricians’ union on this issue. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN HENRY CUELLAR OF TEXAS FOR ALLEN GINA

Question 1. What efforts has CBP taken to combat the smuggling of firearms and 

currency to Mexico? What would help CBP increase its ability to conduct southbound inspections? 

Answer. The United States Border Patrol has combined efforts with the Office of 

Field Operations personnel to assist them in combating smuggling weapons and currency into Mexico by augmenting their forces with 116 Border Patrol Agents. CBP 

personnel are also assigned to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Border 

Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) along the southwest border. One of the focuses of BEST is the interdiction of firearms and currency entering Mexico illegally 

and undeclared. 

On March 12, 2009, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) re-established the Outbound Program Office in response to the on-going issues pertaining to violence and 

firearms smuggling on the southwest border (SWB), to increase outbound operations 

on a pulse and surge basis. 

CBP outbound efforts ensure that there are trained CBP officers and Border Patrol agents able to conduct outbound operations; adequate outbound facilities, equipment, and technology; cooperation with international and other government law enforcement agencies; and adequate automated targeting assistance to identify violators. CBP employs a ‘‘pulse and surge’’ strategy for outbound operations on the 

southwest border. ‘‘Pulse and surge’’ operations involve allowing for immediate 

stand-down of outbound inspections to manage traffic flow departing the port of 

entry. 

CBP officers along the SWB seized over $37 million in bulk currency (in 419 incidents) and 109 firearms leaving the United States in fiscal year 2009. 

In fiscal year 2010, CBP continues to strengthen the ‘‘pulse and surge’’ operations 

along the SWB, and to build on the current cooperative efforts with Federal, State, 

local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies. CBP officers along the SWB have seized 

over $13.5 million in bulk currency (in 427 incidents) and 196 firearms leaving the 

United States as of June 22, 2010. Additionally, in fiscal year 2009, CBP effected 

7 bulk currency seizures over $1,000,000; the largest southbound bulk currency seizure effected by CBP officers in fiscal year 2010 to date has been $462,230. 

CBP has also detailed additional CBP officers (approximately 120—of which 63 

are in Texas) to identified SWB ports of entry to support port operations—to include 

conducting 24/7 southbound operations. The intent of these temporary details is to 

utilize a collaborative, cooperative enforcement approach that leverages the capabilities and resources of a variety of Federal, Tribal, State, and local law enforcement 

and public service agencies against individuals and criminal organizations that are 

involved in cross-border activity. An additional 167 CBP officers will be detailed to 

the SWB in the coming months—increasing the number of ports that can conduct 

24/7 southbound operations. 

Additionally, CBP is also conducting the following activities: 
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Targeting 

The National Targeting Center—Cargo (NTC–C) is conducting research on weapons shipments exported from the United States destined to legitimate entities in 

Mexico. Through the NTC–C, such shipments are being identified and examined at 

the U.S. port of export to verify contents and quantities. Confirmation is obtained 

from Mexican authorities regarding the shipments, orders, and expected delivery. 

These efforts help ensure the legitimacy of the shipments, and reduce the possibility 

of diversion. 

Rail Inspections 

All eight railroad crossings on the U.S.-Mexico border are conducting 100 percent 

scanning of outbound rail cars. Notification protocols have been developed with 

Mexican Customs for the inspection of suspect rail cars, since the cars themselves 

are on Mexican soil immediately after the U.S. Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) scan. 

Currency/Firearm Detection Canine Teams 

The SWB has 16 permanently assigned currency/firearm detector dog teams deployed to our ports of entry. CBP anticipates deploying at least four more teams in 

fiscal year 2011. 

Low Energy Mobile X-ray Units 

CBP has identified low energy mobile NII imaging systems well suited to scan 

outbound personally owned conveyances for contraband. During pulse and surge operations, these systems can be moved from inbound usage to scan for contraband 

in conveyances leaving the country. 

There is currently a total of 22 low energy mobile imaging systems deployed to 

our ports of entry along the SWB. 

License Plate Readers 

In fiscal year 2010, CBP is increasing efforts in outbound operations and installing outbound license plate readers (LPRs) along the southwest border to increase 

the seizures of firearms and currency and the interdiction of stolen vehicles and fugitives. CBP has 48 outbound LPR lanes at 14 Southern Border crossings. The remaining 70 southern border outbound lanes are not currently outfitted with outbound LPRs. The 48 outbound lanes are undergoing a status review for functionality 

and accuracy, and CBP is planning for the installation of second generation LPRs 

at the remaining outbound lanes. Site surveys have been planned for the remaining 

70 lanes to ensure that the sites are amenable for LPR installation. 

Bi-lateral Operations 

As part of CBP’s efforts to address the threat posed by multi-national drug trafficking organizations operating along the SWB, we have begun working with Mexican Customs (MXC) to push our borders—to include establishing MXC-vetted units 

to coordinate enforcement activities (i.e., inbound and outbound) at our ports of 

entry. 

By operating at paired ports of entry, bi-national enforcement efforts maximize 

the number of locations covered and the number of inspections conducted; reduce 

duplication of effort; maintain control of legitimate trade and travel; and reduce the 

possibility that travelers would be subjected to dual inspections. A total of seven operations were conducted in fiscal year 2009 and an average of two operations per 

month is being conducted during fiscal year 2010. 

Outbound Training 

In fiscal year 2010, CBP implemented the Outbound Enforcement Operations/Outbound Inspections National Training Program. The 8-day course provides comprehensive basic training in outbound enforcement operations for all port environments. During fiscal year 2010, CBP has conducted eight (8) courses at the CBP 

Advanced Training Center in Harpers Ferry, WV. 

Interagency Cooperation 

CBP has worked closely with various Federal agencies in the apprehension of 

criminal elements and interdiction of illicit proceeds and firearms being smuggled 

into Mexico. This activity is exemplified through activities such as: 

• Involved in multi-agency conferences (i.e., with Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]; and the Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives [ATF]) to jointly develop new enforcement initiatives 

along the southwest border in the fight against those persons and organizations 

involved in crime, specifically the inbound and outbound international trafficking of bulk currency, firearms, ammunition, and explosives. 
114 

• Assisted the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 

coordinating their investigations with outbound surge operations targeting 

Mexican Drug Cartels members and currency smuggling operations (including 

recently via ‘‘Operation Deliverance’’). This multi-agency effort was closely coordinated with CBP to identify conveyances and subjects of interest entering 

the United States or subjects attempting to flee to Mexico. Seven wanted persons were arrested at our ports of entry and CBP officers assisted in the arrest 

of 19 wanted persons and seizure of $145,000 outside the ports of entry. 

• Permanently detailed CBP personnel to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 

to actively work with other Federal agencies in targeting multi-national criminal enterprises. In addition to sharing CBP seizure data, CBP personnel assigned to EPIC research law enforcement databases for actionable information 

to disseminate to the ports on any currency or weapons violations. CBP personnel are also actively involved with ATF agents assigned to the Gun Desk. 

The overall mission of Gun Desk is to identify, investigate, and stop illegal firearms traffickers, particularly those who supply firearms to drug trafficking organizations, young criminals, and gangs. 

• Coordinated with the DEA and the Treasury Department’s FINCEN in developing and reviewing lists of conveyances other than personally owned vehicles 

that may be utilized to transport bulk currency out of the United States. 

• Routinely worked with investigators of other Federal agencies at our ports of 

entry in interdicting exports of bulk currency and firearms destined to criminal 

enterprises in Mexico. Information provided by agents from other Federal agencies has resulted in significant seizures of bulk currency and firearms destined 

to Mexico. 

• Supported ICE’s Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) at all Southwest Border Sites. 

Question 2a. Challenges remain regarding implementation of an effective southbound inspection strategy. The United States only periodically conducts southbound 

inspections and Mexican authorities check less than 10 percent of vehicles entering 

Mexico. 

Please describe the obstacles that CBP and Mexican authorities have faced in implementing southbound inspections. 

Question 2b. How is DHS working with Mexican Customs to strengthen their inspections processes at their ports of entry? 

Answer. In accordance with the bi-national plan for Coordinated Southbound Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Mexican Customs (MXC) 

initiated coordinated operations along the U.S.-Mexico international border in fiscal 

year 2009 which are currently on-going. The locations for each operation were mutually decided upon by CBP and MXC. CBP is providing training to MXC in basic border interdiction and inspectional techniques and methods to support Coordinated 

Southbound Operations. CBP and MXC mutually identified nine (9) locations where 

training was originally to be conducted April 2010 through August 2010. The Basic 

Border Interdiction (BBI) training is now being expanded from the original nine (9) 

ports of entry to cover all Ports of Entry along the shared U.S.-Mexico border. The 

training is currently scheduled to be completed by the end of September. Upcoming 

steps will also include the scheduling of follow-on International Border Interdiction 

Training (IBIT) for those MXC officers who have thus far attended the BBI course. 

One of the obstacles the CBP and MXC experienced was the lack of trust that 

arises from poor communication. However, both countries have been working to 

remedy this by establishing a mechanism to improve communications, discuss port 

security issues, coordinate enforcement efforts while also planning collaborative 

ways to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

CBP and MXC have established Bi-national Security Committees at all southwest 

border ports of entry so that U.S. port managers can regularly meet and work with 

their MXC counterparts to discuss enforcement issues (northbound and southbound) 

and ways to facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and travel. 

Additionally, CBP has been working with MXC to include establishing MXC vetted units, to coordinate enforcement activities (i.e., inbound and outbound) at our 

ports of entry. To further assist MXC, CBP has also provided BBI training to these 

vetted units to assist them in the interdiction of north and southbound contraband. 

To assist Mexican Customs to strengthen their inspections processes at their ports 

of entry CBP will seek to expand and establish long-term cooperative bi-national 

law enforcement efforts along the border with Mexico, such as: 

• sharing basic seizure information to identify trends and members of criminal 

organizations—to further lawful enforcement efforts while protecting privacy 

and civil rights; 
115 

• leveraging and sharing license plate reader information—to include certain law 

enforcement alerts (i.e., stolen vehicle alerts; AMBER alerts; wanted fugitive 

alerts; etc.); 

• expanding joint operations focused on identifying violators and leveraging assets from both countries—with an emphasis on exploiting intelligence based information to target illicit proceeds and firearms; 

• leveraging the CBP’s collaborative efforts with Mexico to assist other U.S. law 

enforcement agencies in the identification, arrest, and prosecution of members 

of international drug trafficking organizations; and 

• continuing and expanding assistance to increase Mexico’s law enforcement capacity via the Me ́rida initiative, wherever possible. 

Question 3a. Both ICE agents and CBP officers have been dispatched to provide 

training to Mexican federal police and Customs inspectors in a variety of areas. 

How would you assess Mexico’s progress in implementing reform at the federal 

level? 

Answer. Assessments on the Me ́rida Initiative’s impact and assistance to Mexican 

agencies in implementing reforms is best addressed by the Department of State. 

Question 3b. Please describe the assistance and training your agencies have provided. 

Answer. 

Equipment Issuance: 

• Department of State; Narcotics Affairs Section provided equipment to the Ministry of Public Security (SSP) to facilitate their operations. 

• 10 ATV, 4 motorcycles. 

• 50 GPS, 15 binoculars. 

• 30 rechargeable flashlights. 

• 1 Stinger Spike System (controlled tire deflation device). 

• 10 manual entry tool backpacks. 

• 1 manual entry tool kit (includes bolt master tool, mono-shock ram tool, and 

hallagan tool). 

• The Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, Police Department will also receive 20 Gazelle Police Bicycles. 

• SSP will be able to utilize the donated ATVs and off road motorcycles to conduct 

operations in remote areas around Nogales, Sonora in support ACTT operations. 

• In March 2010, SSP Officers responded to a request by Border Patrol regarding 

individuals damaging the International boundary fence. SSP was able to apprehend six subjects and seized the acetylene torch being utilized to cut the fence. 

• On March 23, 2010, SSP received anonymous information about a drug smuggling incident on the west side of Nogales, Arizona. Using donated GPS devices, 

SSP Officers were able to track and seize a considerable amount of marijuana. 

• In March of 2010 SSP discovered four AK47 rifles, one UZI sub machine gun, 

several rounds of ammunition, a tactical vest and a hand grenade. 

• On May 26, 2010, SSP Officers discovered two tunnels branching off the Grand 

Tunnel that were dug by smugglers. 

ICE Training 

ICE has organized and conducted several training efforts through the Me ́rida Initiative, including the following: 

• ICE conducted a U.S. immigration law and officer defense and safety tactics 

train-the-trainer course for Mexican immigration officials in March 2010. Several iterations of the course are scheduled in the future. 

• ICE conducted arms trafficking and cyber crimes training for 200 senior SSP 

officers in August 2009. 

• ICE provided an unprecedented undercover training course to 42 SSP officers 

in November 2009. 

• ICE taught basic criminal investigative methods at the SSP Academy in San 

Luis Potosı ́. As of January 2010, 26 ICE special agents have trained over 4,000 

Mexican recruits. 

ICE also has several planned trainings supported by the Me ́rida Initiative: 

• ICE conducted Fraud Document Training for the National Institute of Migration from July 12–16, 2010. 

• ICE has designed a 10-week criminal investigator course for a team of Mexican 

Customs and Mexico’s Tax Administration Services officials that will begin in 

August 2010. Upon conclusion, this team will work closely with ICE and CBP 

on joint operations. 

• ICE is planning a gang investigations training for SSP in September 2010. 
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Canine Training 

The CBP Canine Program at El Paso, Texas is currently conducting three consecutive sessions for 44 canine detection teams in the disciplines of narcotic and currency/firearms detection beginning on January 18, 2010 until August 13, 2010. For 

sustainability, this program also includes three (3) Train-the-Trainer courses for six 

(6) Mexico Customs (MXC) canine instructors who will form the foundation of their 

own canine training program. 

An additional 44 canine detection units are being trained for MXC. In addition, 

the train the trainer concept allows MXC to develop their own canine academy program. 

Non-Intrusive Inspection Training 

CBP has completed Non-Intrusive and Inspection and Examination (NIIE) training for SSP in Mexico City on five (5) ZVB X-Ray Vans provided by the State Department under Me ́rida funding. The training for 50 SSP officers began on April 19, 

2010 and ended on May 21, 2010 and was designed to enhance SSP’s ability to use 

the ZVB X-Ray vans more effectively and increase narcotics seizures over time. 

A total of 50 SSP operators were trained on image interpretation. In addition, according to SSP reports a passenger bus was targeted for inspection by the SSP and 

was referred to the Mobile VACIS X-Ray System for a non-intrusive inspection. An 

anomaly was detected by the operator of the VACIS and a subsequent inspection 

of the bus resulted in the discovery of approximately 157 kilograms of cocaine. 

Mexico Customs Academy Support 

Mexico Customs is in the process of establishing its own academy similar to the 

CBP Field Operations Academy (FOA) to train their 800 newly hired officers. The 

FOA conducted a gap analysis of the new MXC Academy basic curriculum and presented their conclusions on December 31, 2009, with an outline of its recommendations to enhance the training curriculum. 

On May 10, 2010, CBP began an unprecedented Train-the-Trainer program for 13 

Mexico Customs Academy instructors at the Federal Law Enforcement Training 

Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. The students successfully completed all the requirements and graduated on May 28, 2010. The program provided law enforcement-focused topics such as Anti-terrorism, Officer Safety, Tactical Response, and 

Questioning and Interviewing Techniques. Upon graduation the MXC instructors 

immediately began to instruct 800 new MXC officers beginning in June 2010. 

Border Interdiction Training 

CBP is providing Basic Border Interdiction Training (BBIT) to MXC personnel at 

the 27 Ports of Entry along our shared borders. This training significantly increases 

the interaction between the two agencies at the Ports of Entry and fosters a cooperative approach to border management. In addition, MXC BBIT graduates are scheduled to attend a week-long International Border Interdiction Training at the training facility at McAllen, Texas over the coming year. 

Furthermore, 57 SSP Officers received hidden compartment, close quarters urban 

combat, first responder, and ATV training at the Nogales Border Patrol Station. 

Question 3c. What challenges have your personnel encountered? Accomplishments? 

Answer. 

Accomplishments: 

• On May 24, 2010, two (2) agents from Tucson Border Patrol Sector were detailed to SSP in Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexico to support Alliance to Combat 

Transnational Threats (ACTT). They will coordinate and develop operations, 

share information, and facilitate joint training. 

• Department of State; Narcotics Affairs Section provided equipment to the SSP 

to facilitate their operations. 

Challenges: 

The socio-political-economic environment poses a significant challenge to capacity 

building. This includes: 

• Continued violence that plagues border communities; 

• Disparate economic differences between our two countries; 

• Acute differences in the procurement, deployment, and use of technology to enhance border security; 

• 2012 elections and possible resulting shifts in GOM policies and/or priorities; 

and 

• The mid- to long-term impact of the economic downturn in Mexico. 

In particular, violence by criminal elements affects many parts of the country, including urban and rural areas. The U.S.-Mexico border region, including cities such 
117 

as Tijuana, Ciudad Jua ́ rez, Nuevo Laredo, Nogales, and Reynosa are of particular 

concern to CBP. 

Obtaining lists of training participants who meet professional and ethical standards of Mexico and the United States has also been a challenge. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN HENRY CUELLAR OF TEXAS FOR ALONZO R. PEN ̃ A

Question 1. Trafficking is not just happening in a northbound flow. It is a circular 

flow. 

What additional measures might be needed in order to improve current U.S. efforts to address drug demand, arms trafficking, and bulk cash smuggling? 

Answer. Information exchange and close operational coordination are key factors 

to successfully interdicting bulk cash as it moves through United States and Mexican cities on its way to/from the border. In order to promote these efforts, on June 

2, 2010, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) led a 2-day, multi-agency, bi-lateral training conference to present the results of the 2010 United States/ 

Mexico Bi-National Criminal Proceeds Study (CPS). The CPS uses a supply chain 

approach to examine the movement of illicit proceeds in the United States and Mexico. It identifies the various operational nodes present in the movement of illicit proceeds, which allows law enforcement (both in the United States and Mexico) to focus 

their efforts and limited resources on those nodes in the illicit supply chain that are 

most critical to criminal enterprises. Identifying, targeting, and carrying out enforcement actions against these nodes will have the effect of creating maximum disruption within an organization. This study benefited greatly from having full participation of the government of Mexico. 

The challenge of eliminating the illegal flow of weapons is larger than one Federal 

agency and requires close coordination, shared intelligence, and harmonized investigations. ICE, in partnership with CBP, as well as other Federal, foreign, State, 

and local law enforcement officials, expanded its on-going border crimes initiative 

by creating a multi-agency initiative called the Border Enforcement Security Task 

Force (BEST). The task forces are designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among the participating agencies focusing toward the identification, 

prioritization, and investigation of emerging or existing threats as they relate to 

narcotics and contraband smuggling as well as criminal organizations seeking to illegally export weapons out of the United States. 

ICE continues to use the Border Violence Intelligence Cell (BVIC) to focus on supporting efforts to combat weapons smuggling along the U.S.-Mexico border. The 

BVIC, housed at the El Paso Intelligence Center, serves as a central point for analyzing all-source intelligence, analyzing trends in firearms smuggling and referring 

investigative and operation leads to U.S. and foreign partner agencies, to help facilitate the timely sharing of intelligence and threat information. 

Traditional metrics of arrests, indictments, convictions, disruptions, 

dismantlements, and seizures are valuable in gauging the effectiveness of ICE efforts to address drug demand, arms trafficking, and bulk cash smuggling. 

Question 2. Last August, Secretary Napolitano announced the creation of the Mexico-based Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST). 

What is the status of this BEST unit? Has the unit been successful? 

What steps have ICE and the Mexican government taken to safeguard this BEST 

from corruption? 

Answer. Response is For Official Use Only and is retained in committee files. 

Question 3. Both ICE agents and CBP officers have been dispatched to provide 

training to Mexican federal police and Customs inspectors in a variety of areas. 

How would you assess Mexico’s progress in implementing reform at the federal 

level? 

Please describe the assistance and training your agencies have provided. 

What challenges have your personnel encountered? Accomplishments? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN ELIOT L. ENGEL FOR ALONZO R. PEN ̃ A

Question. You said in response to a question by Rep. Lofgren that the U.S. Government is undertaking greater efforts to interdict weapons at the border into Mexico. Please describe these efforts in detail, what types and numbers of weapons are 

being captured over certain periods of time, and how this is leading to the indictment of weapons traffickers, straw purchasers, and gun sellers engaging in illegal 

behavior in Mexico and the United States. 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 
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QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN HENRY CUELLAR OF TEXAS FOR MARIKO SILVER

Question 1. As the Me ́rida Initiative’s focus shifts to building capacity and institution building, explain how this change will affect DHS operations in Mexico. 

Please discuss the number and types of personnel DHS has dispatched as part 

of the Me ́rida Initiative? 

How will this focus shift affect on-going DHS efforts? 

Answer. DHS has been deeply involved in the discussions and planning concerning the future of the Me ́rida Initiative. DHS engagement on Me ́rida Initiative 

programs has been, primarily through capacity and institution programs, so as 

Me ́rida’s focus shifts, DHS anticipates continued, and perhaps increased, use of its 

expertise and experience in the form of training. 

For the most part, DHS component personnel dispatched to Mexico as part of 

Me ́rida Initiative programs have been officers and agents and other experts who 

have delivered specific training or other advisory assistance. U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attache ́ Mexico City representatives and ICE domestic 

personnel have supported these training activities. In addition, ICE collaborates 

with interagency partners in joint training efforts, such as the Mexican Ministry of 

Public Security academy, which occurred in San Luis Potosı ́ in 2009. 

As part of the Me ́rida Initiative, CBP has provided over 5,000 man-hours of capacity-building assistance since January 2010 involving Agents, Officers and subject 

matter experts. CBP anticipates that they will receive additional training requests 

from the Government of Mexico for technical assistance and capacity building support beginning in the next fiscal year. Currently, CBP is working with the Department of State (DOS) to ensure that the additional training can be funded through 

existing and/or previously allocated Me ́rida Initiative funds; this is essential as 

CBP’s ability to provide additional training is dependent upon funding from the Department of State. Additionally, to increase the effectiveness of the training, CBP 

has been providing assistance to Mexico Customs, Immigration, and Federal Police 

officials as they develop their training requirements. 

Much of the capacity-building efforts for Me ́rida have been focused on providing 

train-the-trainer-type instruction, which utilized CBP facilities in El Paso, Texas 

and Glynco, Georgia. This includes developing specific curriculum for instructors in 

Spanish for Canine Handler Instructors and Mexico Customs Academy Instructors. 

CBP has trained 14 Mexico Customs Academy instructors and six Canine Handler 

Instructors for Mexico Customs this year. These instructors have already instructed 

nearly 1,000 Mexican basic customs officers and canine handlers. The continuation 

of these programs will eventually allow Mexico to develop their own academy programs lessoning the need to depend upon U.S. infrastructure to provide training facilities. 

Working with Mexico as it reforms and strengthens its law enforcement and other 

institutions will provide substantial benefits to DHS and positively affect our operations and efforts there. 

Question 2. During the hearing, you responded that previous communication 

issues between the State Department and DHS have been resolved. Please provide 

examples of increased representation for DHS. 

Answer. DHS has been an active participant in the Me ́rida Initiative process. 

DHS is represented at each step of the implementation and oversight architecture. 

For example, Secretary Napolitano is part of the High Level Consultative Group, 

which sets the strategic direction for Me ́rida. Secretary Napolitano traveled to Mexico City to attend the HLCG meeting in March 2010. Deputy Secretary Lute participated in the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) meeting in January 2010. The PCG 

sets policy and monitors the progress on the strategic direction—set by the HighLevel Consultative Group—and the broad country and bilateral efforts. DHS senior 

leadership also regularly participate in the National Security Staff-led Mexico Interagency Policy Committee and 21st Century Border Interagency Policy Committee, 

both which regularly consider policy issues concerning or related to the Me ́rida Initiative. 

At the U.S. Embassy, the DHS Attache ́, CBP Attache ́, and ICE Attache ́ are part 

of the country team and are involved in a number of different aspects of the fieldlevel implementation of Me ́rida. DHS components chair the following Me ́rida Initiative working groups: 

• CBP-Mexico chairs the 21st Century Border working group and the GC Armas 

work group. 

• ICE-Mexico chairs the Money Laundering working group. 

Further, the Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS) of the Embassy (which is responsible 

for handling the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funds) has one fulltime CBP officer on its staff. Finally, the DHS Attache ́ is a key decision-maker on 
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Me ́rida issues within the Embassy Inter-Agency team and has an open dialogue 

with the NAS Director on how DHS can become more involved in the Me ́rida proc- ess. Question 3. Last year, the Homeland Security Committee asked DHS whether it 

had received additional funding or staffing resources to carry out its role in the 

Me ́rida Initiative. DHS replied it had not. 

Is that still the case? How is DHS fulfilling its responsibilities under the program? 

Answer. DHS components involved in Me ́rida Initiative programs, through Interagency Agreements (IAA), are being reimbursed for the personnel expenses for those 

participating in Me ́rida Initiative programs. Since the Me ́rida Initiative is a temporary program, DHS components have not requested funding for the hiring of permanent additional personnel solely for Me ́rida Initiative engagements, but have instead utilized, and continue to utilize, its organic personnel assets (trainers, managers, etc.) to meet Me ́rida Initiative needs. 

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN ELIOT L. ENGEL FOR MARIKO SILVER

Question. You said in response to a question by Rep. Lofgren that the U.S. Government is undertaking greater efforts to interdict weapons at the border into Mexico. Please describe these efforts in detail, what types and numbers of weapons are 

being captured over certain periods of time, and how this is leading to the indictment of weapons traffickers, straw purchasers, and gun sellers engaging in illegal 

behavior in Mexico and the United States. 

Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is committed to disrupting the link between firearms trafficking and drug trafficking on the southwest 

border that has facilitated the acquisition of increasingly powerful and sophisticated 

weaponry. Criminal organizations require a consistent supply of firearms and ammunition to defend their territory, eliminate rivals, enforce business dealings, challenge government operations, and control organization members. ICE and its law 

enforcement partners typically see a variety of rifles and pistols. The following 

weapons are most commonly used by drug traffickers and constitute the types of 

weapons seized by ICE during its investigations of individuals and groups moving 

weapons from the United States into Mexico: 9 mm pistols; .38 Super pistols; 7.62 

mm rifles, .223 rifles; 5.7 mm pistols; 45-caliber pistols; high-capacity, military-style 

AR–15 type rifles; and AK–47-type rifles. ICE engages in the following programs to 

combat illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking from the United States into Mexico, to 

improve intelligence and information sharing, and to support Mexico’s broader efforts to deny transnational criminal organizations access to arms: 

Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST).—The 17 ICE-led BEST units (10 

on the southwest border, 3 on the northern border, 3 in seaports, and 1 in Mexico 

City) leverage Federal, State, local, Tribal, and foreign law enforcement resources 

to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations exploiting vulnerabilities on the 

border. The presence of the Mexican Secretarı ́a de Seguridad Pu ́ blica (SSP) is key 

to the success of the BEST program on the southwest border. Five Southwest Border BESTs (Tucson, San Diego, Phoenix, Yuma, and Laredo) have SSP embedded 

officers. SSP has committed to staffing its personnel in the remaining Southwest 

Border BESTs (located in El Paso, Rio Grande Valley, Imperial Valley, Las Cruces, 

and Deming). The Mexico City BEST is composed of SSP officers. 

From 2005 to April 30, 2010, BESTs seized 3,086 weapons and 408,402 rounds 

of ammunition. 

Operation Armas Cruzadas.—As part of the BEST initiative, in June 2008, ICE 

launched Operation Armas Cruzadas to combat weapons smuggling into Mexico and 

to partner with Mexico in targeting arms smuggling networks. In January 2009, 

ICE initiated a surge operation along the southwest border to promote Operation 

Armas Cruzadas as part of the Southwest Border Initiative. The Border Violence 

Intelligence Cell serves as ICE’s central point for analyzing weapons-related intelligence and for referring operational leads to U.S. and foreign partner agencies. Furthermore, ICE will expedite the gathering, analyzing, and distributing of intelligence related to cross-border arms smuggling and trafficking by using the Homeland Security Information Network Weapons Virtual Task Force (WVTF) portal. It 

is expected that the WVTF system will eventually incorporate any Mexican law enforcement action results or intelligence. In addition, through the Blue Lantern Program, ICE has been providing to the U.S. Department of State (DOS) an increasing 

number of end-use verifications of firearms exported from the United States to Mexico. 

From June 2008 to April 1, 2010, Operation Armas Cruzadas was responsible for 

749 criminal arrests and seizing 3,877 weapons and 396,414 rounds of ammunition. 
120 

Border Liaison Officer (BLO) Program.—ICE has designated over 50 Special 

Agents as BLOs, who work closely with Mexican law enforcement to fight 

transnational crime, including arms trafficking and smuggling. The BLO program 

allows an open and cooperative working relationship with Mexican law enforcement 

authorities while enhancing bilateral capabilities to effectively respond to cross-border criminal activity. 

Counter-Proliferation Investigations (CPI) Unit—Exodus Command Center 

(ECC).—One of the most effective tools available to ICE in combating drug trafficking organizations and the weapons smuggling networks that support them are 

the various export statutes that ICE enforces, specifically the Arms Export Control 

Act (22 U.S.C. § 2778) and Outbound Smuggling (18 U.S.C. § 554). The ECC is the 

conduit between ICE agents and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers in 

the field and the export licensing agencies in Washington, DC, that regulate the export of firearms. The ECC is an integral component in supporting prosecutions of 

weapons smugglers and the violent criminal organizations they supply. In addition 

to license determinations (i.e., the process by which licensing agencies determine 

whether a commodity requires an export license), the ECC also supports requests 

for registration histories of individuals and companies—an important tool in conducting complex smuggling investigations. The ICE CPI Unit works directly with 

BEST agents to facilitate their requests for acquisition and use of flash weapons 

during proactive undercover investigations. 

The goal of the ICE weapons smuggling programs is to identify, arrest, and convict the weapons traffickers and illegal gun purchasers involved in procuring weapons for criminal organizations. The ICE programs outlined above have: Improved intelligence and information sharing relating to illegal weapons smuggling/trafficking 

with our Federal, State, local, and international law enforcement partners; increased the interdiction of illegal weapons shipments to Mexico; enhanced cooperation with international partners in weapons smuggling/trafficking investigations; 

and increased the likelihood of successful Federal prosecution for illegal weapons 

trafficking. While these programs have resulted in sizeable seizures of weapons and 

arrests, they also provided for engagement with our Mexican partners. By working 

with our Mexican partners via the SSP officers assigned to the BESTs, through the 

Border Liaison Officers and most importantly, through the ICE special agents assigned to our offices in Mexico, ICE is obtaining information on Mexican weapons 

seizures that can be used in the prosecution of weapons traffickers and illegal gun 

purchasers in the United States. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN HENRY CUELLAR OF TEXAS FOR SHANNON K. O’NEIL

Question 1. In your testimony you note that the Me ́rida Initiative has been a welcome remedy for U.S.-Mexico security cooperation. However, you believe the program as initially conceived and implemented has some limitations. Please explain 

the limitations of the Me ́rida Initiative. 

Answer. The main limitations of the Me ́rida initiative included its initial 

prioritization of the acquisition of hardware, leaving much of the work of institution 

building to later stages. Given the much longer time horizon necessary for improvements in the functioning and professionalization of institutions, this work should 

have been, and should be now, prioritized by both U.S. and Mexican policymakers, 

and by the funding we provide to Mexico for security oriented cooperation. 

The second limitation of the initial design was its focus almost exclusively on the 

national level. With all security, in the end, being local, limiting cooperation to national institutions will not provide a long-term solution for Mexican and U.S.-Mexican security. 

Question 2. What do you think should be the next steps for the Me ́rida Initiative? 

Should future assistance be targeted more towards the local level or should it remain focused at the federal level? Is enough being invested at the state and local 

levels in police and judicial reform? 

Answer. In the next steps of the Me ́rida Initiative, the United States should work 

with Mexico at the state and local level as well as at the national level. Mexico’s 

state and local police comprise the vast majority of law enforcement (and will continue to do so even if Mexico consolidates local municipal forces at the state level). 

The same goes for the vast majority of criminal investigations and trials. As a result, to truly strengthen Mexico’s democratic rule of law—the only long-term solution for today’s violence—will require professionalization of these state and local institutions. Recognizing this, the United States should work with Mexico at these levels, investing in both law enforcement and judicial institutions, as well as assistance 

for social and economic programs to provide alternative legal livelihoods. 
121 

Question 3. To what extent does the new strategy for the Me ́rida Initiative strike 

the correct balance between support for law enforcement programs and drug interdiction efforts versus institution building and rule of law activities? In particular, 

how do you see the new strategy playing out in Ciudad Jua ́ rez? 

Answer. In places such as Ciudad Jua ́ rez, there is a need to reestablish peace and 

security in the streets. But as the rising violence over the last few years—even with 

the influx of Mexican military and federal police forces—suggests, this will not be 

possible in a sustainable way without strengthening local institutions. This includes 

local police, courts, city government, and community organizations. Both Ciudad 

Jua ́ rez’s economic boom and crime boom in recent years have highlighted the weakness of these institutions, and of the social fabric of this city more generally. Constructing, or reconstructing, a community is a complicated task, and will require a 

multifaceted approach that moves far beyond drug interdiction. 

For the United States, the role played in Ciudad Jua ́ rez should help strike this 

balance, focusing as much on the weak institutions and ties that allow violence— 

whether drug- or gang-related—to flourish as much as on drug interdiction itself. 

If a more comprehensive strategy is followed, then the opportunity to reduce levels 

of crime and violence for the long term exists. If the governments focus their efforts 

primarily on kingpins and cartels, then the names of the leaders may change (with 

potential arrests or killings) but the underlying violent dynamics will continue. 

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