" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REVIEW NO. 

09–1583 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Report and Findings 

Transmitted to the 

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

on December 2, 2009 

and released publicly pursuant to H. Res. 895 of the 

110th Congress as amended 

December 2009 


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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

55–497 

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

REVIEW NO. 

2009

09–1583 

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF 

REPRESENTATIVES 

Report and Findings 

Transmitted to the 

Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 

on December 2, 2009 

and released publicly pursuant to H. Res. 895 of the 

110th Congress as amended 

December 2009 


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(II) 

OFFICE OF 

CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 

BOARD 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

DAVID SKAGGS, Chair 

PORTER GOSS, Co-Chair 

YVONNE BURKE 

KAREN ENGLISH 

ALLISON HAYWARD 

JAY EAGEN 

WILLIAM FRENZEL 

ABNER MIKVA 

LEO J. WISE, Chief Counsel & Staff Director 

OMAR S. ASHMAWY, Investigative Counsel 


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REPORT 

Review No. 09–1583 

The Board of the Office of Congressional Ethics (hereafter the 

‘‘Board’’), by a vote of no less than four members, on November 20, 

2009, adopted the following report and ordered it to be transmitted 

to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct of the United 

States House of Representatives. 

SUBJECT: Representative C.W. Bill Young 

NATURE OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION: In Fiscal Year 2009, 

Representative C.W. Bill Young authored several earmarks for clients of PMA Group, Inc. (hereafter ‘‘PMA’’). During campaign cycles 2008 and 2010, Representative Young received contributions to 

his campaign committee and ‘‘Leadership PAC’’ from PMA’s PAC, 

PMA employees, the PACs of PMA clients for whom he authored 

earmarks, and the employees of those clients. 

If Representative Young solicited or accepted contributions or 

other items of value in exchange for or because of an official act, 

or solicited or accepted contributions or other items of value in a 

manner which gave the appearance that the contributions were 

linked to an official act, then Representative Young may have violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (Bribery), 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (Illegal Gratuities), 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (Gifts to Federal Employees), and House 

Rules and Standards of Conduct. 

RECOMMENDATION: The Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics recommends that the Committee on Standards of Official 

Conduct dismiss the above allegations. 

VOTES IN THE AFFIRMATIVE: 6 

VOTES IN THE NEGATIVE: 0 

MEMBER OF THE BOARD OR STAFF DESIGNATED TO 

PRESENT THIS REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT: Leo Wise, Staff Director & Chief 

Counsel. 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 3 

A. Summary of Allegations ....................................................................... 3 

B. Jurisdictional Statement ...................................................................... 3 

C. Procedural History ............................................................................... 3 

D. Summary of Investigative Activity ..................................................... 4 

II. THE OCE UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT REPRESENTATIVE 

YOUNG REQUESTED EARMARKS FOR PMA CLIENTS IN CONNECTION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS HE RECEIVED ....... 6 

A. Relevant Law, Regulations, Rules or Standards of Conduct ............ 6 

B. Earmark Process ................................................................................... 9 

C. Campaign Fundraising ......................................................................... 10 

D. Relationship with PMA ........................................................................ 10 

E. Perception of Corporate Donors .......................................................... 11 

III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 12 

IV. INFORMATION THE OCE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS ................. 12 


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1 H. Res. 895, 110th Cong. § 1(e) (2008) (as amended). 

2 A preliminary review is ‘‘requested’’ in writing by members of the Board of the OCE. The 

request for a preliminary review is ‘‘received’’ by the OCE on a date certain. According to H. 

Res. 895 of the 110th Congress (hereafter ‘‘the Resolution’’), the timeframe for conducting a preliminary review is 30 days from the date of receipt of the Board’s request. 3 According to the Resolution, the Board must vote on whether to conduct a second-phase review in a matter before the expiration of the 30-day preliminary review. If the Board votes for 

Continued 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CITATIONS TO LAW 

Review No. 09–1583 

On November 20, 2009, the Board of the Office of Congressional 

Ethics (hereafter the ‘‘Board’’) adopted the following findings of fact 

and accompanying citations to law, regulations, rules and standards of conduct (in italics). The Board notes that these findings do 

not constitute a determination of whether or not a violation actually occurred. 

I. INTRODUCTION 

A. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

1. There is not substantial reason to believe that Representative 

Young solicited or accepted contributions or other items of value in 

exchange for or because of an official act, or solicited or accepted 

contributions or other items of value in a manner which gave the 

appearance that the contributions were linked to an official act. 

B. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

2. The allegations that were the subject of this review concern 

Representative C.W. Bill Young, a Member of the United States 

House of Representatives from the 10th District of Florida. The 

Resolution the United States House of Representatives adopted creating the Office of Congressional Ethics (hereafter ‘‘OCE’’) directs 

that, ‘‘[n]o review shall be undertaken . . . by the board of any alleged violation that occurred before the date of adoption of this resolution.’’ 1 The House adopted this Resolution on March 11, 2008. 

Because the conduct under review occurred after March 11, 2008, 

review by the Board is in accordance with the Resolution. 

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

3. The OCE received a written request for a preliminary review 

in this matter signed by at least two members of the Board on July 

6, 2009. The preliminary review commenced on that date.2 The preliminary review was scheduled to end on August 5, 2009. 

4. At least three members of the Board voted to initiate a second 

phase review in this matter on August 5, 2009. The second phase 

review commenced on August 6, 2009.3 The second-phase review 

was scheduled to end on September 20, 2009. 


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a second-phase, the second-phase begins when the preliminary review ends. The second-phase 

review does not begin on the date of the Board vote. 4 Id. at § 1(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2008). 

5. The Board voted to extend the 45-day second phase review by 

an additional 14 days, as provided by the Resolution, on September 

17, 2009. Following the extension, the second-phase review was 

scheduled to end on October 5, 2009.4

6. The Board voted to refer the matter to the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct for dismissal and adopted these findings on November 20, 2009. 

7. This report and findings were transmitted to the Committee 

on Standards of Official Conduct on December 2, 2009. 

D. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

8. Due to the nature of the allegations in this review, the OCE’s 

investigation required the collection of information from a number 

of sources. 

9. The OCE reviewed publically available records of campaign 

contributions to the campaign committees of Members of the House 

Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (hereafter ‘‘Defense Subcommittee’’) from recipients of earmarks during the 2008 and 2010 

campaign cycles. The review included campaign contributions to 

the leadership political action committees (hereafter ‘‘PACs’’), if 

any, of these Members. 

10. Specifically, the OCE reviewed campaign contributions to 

these Members from donors that were affiliated with the lobbying 

firm of Paul Magliocchetti and Associates Group, Inc. (hereafter 

‘‘PMA’’), i.e., contributions from the PMA PAC, PMA employees, the 

PACs of corporate clients of PMA (‘‘PMA clients’’) and employees of 

PMA clients. 

11. The OCE also reviewed campaign contributions to Members 

of the Defense Subcommittee from PACs of non-PMA clients, and 

employees of non-PMA clients. 

12. Beyond Members of the Defense Subcommittee, the investigation included a review of campaign contributions from PMA clients and non-PMA clients to Representatives who are not on the 

Defense Subcommittee, but authored defense earmarks for PMA 

clients and non-PMA clients. 

13. The OCE requested information from forty PMA clients that 

received earmarks from Members of the Defense Subcommittee for 

fiscal years 2008 to 2010. 

14. All of the PMA clients that the OCE contacted cooperated 

with the investigation, except for two. 

15. Aeroflex and Kimball and Associates are the only PMA client 

that refused to cooperate with the investigation. 

16. Thirty-eight PMA clients and Representatives’ offices produced documents totaling approximately 200,000 pages. These 

PMA clients also made witnesses available for interviews upon request of the OCE. 

17. Based on the information discovered during the review of the 

produced documents, the OCE interviewed twenty-six individual 

PMA client witnesses. 


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18. In addition, the OCE interviewed six witnesses who were formerly employed as lobbyists with PMA during the 2008 and 2010 

campaign cycles. 

19. In sum, the OCE requested and received documentary, and 

in some cases testimonial, information from the following sources: 

(1) 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(2) AAR Composites; 

(3) Advanced Acoustic Concepts; 

(4) Advanced Concepts & Technologies Intl.; 

(5) Aircraft Interior Products; 

(6) Applied Global Technologies; 

(7) Argon ST; 

(8) Boeing Corporation; 

(9) Carnegie Mellon University; 

(10) Coda Octopus Group; 

(11) Concurrent Technologies Corporation; 

(12) Conemaugh Health Systems; 

(13) Cryptek; 

(14) DDL OMNI Engineering; 

(15) DRS Technologies; 

(16) EM Solutions; 

(17) General Atomics; 

(18) General Dynamics; 

(19) Goodrich Corporation; 

(20) Innovative Concepts, Inc.; 

(21) ITT Corporation; 

(22) Lockheed Martin Corporation; 

(23) MobilVox; 

(24) NuVant Systems, Inc.; 

(25) Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(26) Parametric Technology Corporation; 

(27) Planning Systems Inc.; 

(28) Profile Systems; 

(29) Prologic, Inc.; 

(30) QTL Biosystems; 

(31) RaySat Antenna Systems; 

(32) Rockwell Collins; 

(33) Samueli Institute; 

(34) Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(35) Teledyne Continental Motors, Inc.; 

(36) Teledyne Controls; 

(37) Windber Research Institute; 

(38) Xunlight Corporation; 

(39) Vice President, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(40) Chief Administrative Officer, 21st Century Systems, 

Inc.; 

(41) Vice President for Communications, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(42) PAC Treasurer, 21st Century Systems, Inc.; 

(43) General Manager, AAR Composites; 

(44) Chief Operating Officer, AAR Composites; 

(45) Chief Executive Officer, Applied Global Technologies; 

(46) Vice President, Applied Global Technologies; 

(47) PAC Treasurer, DRS Technologies; 


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(48) President, DRS Technologies; 

(49) Chief Operating Officer, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(50) Chief Executive Officer, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(51) Director, Optimal Solutions & Technologies; 

(52) CEO, Samueli Institute; 

(53) Vice President, Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(54) Congressional Affairs Director, Sierra Nevada Corporation; 

(55) Assistant to Business Development Director, Teledyne 

Continental Motors, Inc.; 

(56) Business Development Director, Teledyne Continental 

Motors, Inc.; 

(57) PAC Treasurer, Teledyne Controls; 

(58) General Manager, Teledyne Controls; 

(59) Vice President, Teledyne Controls; 

(60) Director of Contracts, Teledyne Controls; 

(61) Contract Administrator, Teledyne Controls; 

(62) Legislative Affairs Director, Teledyne Controls; 

(63) Associate General Counsel, Teledyne Controls; 

(64) President, Teledyne Controls; 

(65) PMA Lobbyist 1; 

(66) PMA Lobbyist 2; 

(67) PMA Lobbyist 3; 

(68) PMA Lobbyist 4; 

(69) PMA Lobbyist 5; 

(70) PMA Lobbyist 6; 

(71) The Chief of Staff of Representative Young; and 

(72) Representative Young. 

II. THE OCE UNCOVERED NO EVIDENCE THAT REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG REQUESTED EARMARKS FOR PMA CLIENTS 

IN CONNECTION WITH CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS HE 

RECEIVED 

A. RELEVANT LAW, REGULATIONS, RULES OR STANDARDS OF CONDUCT

20. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)—Bribery of public officials and witnesses 

‘‘(b) Whoever— 

(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, 

accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 

(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act 

. . . .’’ 

21. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)—Illegal Gratuities 

‘‘(c) Whoever— 

(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty— 

(B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or 

agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for 


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5 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 79. See also United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 

U.S. 398, 404 (1999). 6Memorandum of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay. Accessed online on June 24, 2009 

at http://ethics.house.gov/Investigations/Default.aspx?Section=18. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 147. 

10Memorandum of the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Recommendations for disposition of the complaint filed against Representative DeLay. Accessed online on June 24, 2009 

at http://ethics.house.gov/Investigations/Default.aspx?Section=18. 11 Id. 12 House Ethics Manual (2008) at 147. 

or because of any official act performed or to be performed 

by such official or person . . . .’’ 

22. ‘‘An illegal gratuity . . . may constitute merely a reward for 

some future act that the public official will take (and may have already determined to take), or for a past act that he has already 

taken.’’ 5

23. House Rules and Standards of Conduct 

‘‘[T]he scope of the House standards of conduct in this area 

is broader than that of the criminal bribery statute . . . the 

House standards of conduct generally preclude any link between the solicitation or receipt of a contribution and a specific 

official action.’’ 6

‘‘Put another way, there are fundraising activities that do not 

violate any criminal statute but well may violate House standards of conduct.’’ 7

‘‘[T]here are certain proffered campaign contributions that 

must be declined, and certain fundraising opportunities that 

must be forgone, solely because they create an appearance of improper conduct.’’ 8

‘‘[N]o solicitation of a campaign or political contribution may 

be linked to an action taken or to be taken by a Member or employee in his or her official capacity.’’ 9 In addition, a Member 

may not accept any contribution that is linked with any specific 

official action taken or to be taken by that Member.’’ 10

‘‘It is probably not wrong for the campaign managers of a legislator to request contributions from those for whom the legislator has done appreciable favors, but this should never be presented as a payment for the services rendered. Moreover, the 

possibility of such a contribution should never be suggested by 

the legislator or his staff at the time the favor is done. Furthermore, a decent interval of time should be allowed to lapse so 

that neither party will feel that there is a close connection between the two acts. The Standards Committee has long advised 

Members and staff that they should always exercise caution to 

avoid even the appearance that solicitations of campaign contributions are connected in any way with an action taken or to 

be taken in their official capacity.’’ 11

‘‘[A] Member should not sponsor or participate in any solicitation that offers donors any special access to the Member in the 

Member’s official capacity.’’ 12


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13 Id. at 151 (citing Code of Ethics for Government Service, ¶5). 14 Id. at 151 (citing Code of Ethics for Government Service, ¶10). 

‘‘[G]overnment officials should ‘never discriminate unfairly by 

the dispensing of special favors or privileges to anyone, whether 

for remuneration or not.’ ’’ 13

‘‘ ‘[P]ublic office is a public trust,’ and the public has a right 

to expect House Members and staff to exercise impartial judgment in performing their duties.’’ 14

24. 5 U.S.C. § 7353—Gifts to Federal Employees 

‘‘(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b), no Member of Congress—shall solicit or accept anything of value from a person— 

(1) seeking official action from, doing business with—the individual’s employing entity; or 

(2) whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual’s official duties. 

(b)(1) Each supervising ethics office is authorized to issue 

rules or regulations implementing the provisions of this section 

and providing reasonable exceptions as may be appropriate. 

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), a Member, officer, or 

employee may accept a gift pursuant to rules and regulations established by such individual’s supervising ethics office pursuant to paragraph (1) 

(B) No gift may be accepted pursuant to subparagraph 

(A) in return for being influenced in the performance of an 

official act.’’ 

25. House Ethics Manual—Soliciting Campaign and Political 

Contributions 

While the federal gift statute (5 U.S.C. § 7353) broadly restricts the ability of 

House Members and staff to solicit things of value from virtually anyone, even when no personal benefit to the solicitor is 

involved, legislative materials concerning the statute state that 

it does not apply to the solicitation of political contributions. 

Consistent with those materials, the Standards Committee has 

long taken the position that the restrictions on solicitation set 

forth in that statute do not apply to political solicitations. However, in soliciting campaign or political contributions, Members 

and staff are subject to a number of other restrictions, as follows. 

A Contribution linked to an Official Action May Not Be Accepted 

. . . no solicitation of a campaign or political contribution 

may be linked to any action taken or to be taken by a Member 

or employee in his or her official capacity. 

In a similar vein, a Member or employee may not accept any 

contribution that the donor links to any official action that the 

Member or employee has taken, or is being asked to take. In 

this respect, a campaign or political contribution is treated like 

any other gift, and acceptance of a contribution in these circumstances may implicate a provision of the federal gift statute 

(5 U.S.C. § 7353) or the criminal statutes on bribery and illegal 

gratuities. 


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15 Rule 9 of the OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS, RULES FOR THE CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATIONS 11 (2009) provides that ‘‘[t]he Board shall refer a matter to the Standards Committee for 

further review if it determines there is a substantial reason to believe the allegation based on 

all the information then known to the Board.’’ 16Memorandum of Interview of Rep. Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l2). 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. at 09–1583l3. 22 Id. at 09–1583l2. 23 Id. at 09–1583l2. 24 Id. at 09–1583l3. 25Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young’s Chief of Staff (Exhibit 2 at 09– 

1583l5). 

26. Based on the facts collected by the OCE, the Board concludes 

there is not substantial reason to believe the allegations that are 

the subject of this review. 15

B. EARMARK PROCESS

27. Representative C.W. Bill Young represents the 10th Congressional District of Florida. 

28. The process for handling Representative Young’s requests for 

earmarks to the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee is 

initially managed by his Congressional office staff.16 However, he 

reviews every request and meets with the representatives of the 

companies on whose behalf he makes the request. 17

29. Representative Young refuses to meet with lobbyists and repeatedly pointed out to the OCE that he does not meet with any 

lobbyists—to include former employees of PMA.18 When he meets 

with the representatives of companies for whom he requests earmarks, it is his practice to meet only with the companies’ principals 

without a lobbyist present. This practice carries to even brief interactions with lobbyists.19 According to Representative Young, if a 

lobbyist makes contact with him regarding a project or an earmark 

request, the Congressman tells the lobbyist to send his client instead.20

30. While members of his staff might have had interactions with 

PMA lobbyists, Representative Young has never met with a PMA 

lobbyist on any matter and could not recall an instance when a 

PMA lobbyist attempted to lobby him.21

31. Representative Young’s office only requests earmarks for 

companies in his district.22 In vetting those requests, his office has 

several rules. Representative Young’s primary rule is that the request must be for a project that the Department of Defense wants. 

Representative Young’s policy is to not request earmarks for ‘‘startup’’ ideas.23

32. Whether a company has contributed to his campaign is not 

a factor in the Congressman’s decision whether or not to request 

an earmark for a particular entity.24

33. Representative Young’s Chief of Staff also explained that on 

a number of occasions companies who were clients of PMA did not 

use PMA to lobby their office. Instead, the company would use lobbyists from a different firm or no lobbyist at all.25


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26 Contribution amounts are derived from reports filed with the Federal Election Commission 

by Congressman Bill Young Campaign Committee and Victory PAC. 27 Id. 28Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l3). 29 Id. 30Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young’s Chief of Staff (Exhibit 2 at 09– 

1583l5). 31 Id. 32 Id. 33Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l3.) 34 H.R. 3222, Pub. L. 110–116 (2008); H.R. 2638, Pub. L. 110–329 (2009); and H.R. 3326, 111 

Cong. (2009). 35Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l2). 36Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young’s Chief of Staff (Exhibit 2 at 09– 

1583l5). 

C. CAMPAIGN FUNDRAISING

34. During campaign cycles 2008 and 2010, Representative 

Young accepted approximately $68,600 in campaign contributions 

from PMA’s PAC and employees and from the PAC and employees 

of PMA clients.26

35. Congressman Young does not have a full-time, ongoing fundraising process.27 According to the Congressman, he does not raise 

significant amounts of money, in comparison to his peers, for his 

campaign and does not contribute ‘‘dues’’ to the National Republican Congressional Committee as is expected of him.28

36. The Congressman does not organize fundraisers and does not 

make phone calls or write letters requesting contributions.29 Representative Young’s Chief of Staff is the individual who is primarily 

responsible for directing the Congressman’s campaign and fundraising activities. He does this in his ‘‘free time.’’ 30 Representative 

Young’s Chief of Staff confirmed that the Congressman does not actively fundraise.31 Instead, community members will offer to hold 

a fundraising event to benefit his campaign and Representative 

Young will participate.32

37. As a matter of policy, Representative Young does not have 

fundraising events during the defense bill mark-up.33

D. RELATIONSHIP WITH PMA

38. During the time period of the 2008 and 2010 campaign cycles, six corporate clients of PMA were awarded earmarks requested by Representative Young. 

39. The PMA clients that received earmarks during this period 

are: 

(a) DRS Technologies (Requested, $19,800,000); 

(b) General Dynamics (Requested, $16,200,000); 

(c) Concurrent Technologies Corporation (Requested, 

$7,200,000); 

(d) Coda Octopus Group (Requested, $4,000,000); 

(e) AAR Composites (Requested, $1,600,000); and 

(f) Information Technology and Application Corp. (Requested, 

$1,600,000).34

40. Representative Young explained to the OCE that his interaction with the companies, if any, was directly with employees of 

the companies.35 Congressman Young’s Chief of Staff indicated 

that in some instances their office was not approached by PMA, but 

by another lobbying agency representing the entity.36


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37Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l3). 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Email from AAR, dated May 6, 2008 (Exhibit 3 at 09–1583l8). 45Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l3). 46Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young’s Chief of Staff (Exhibit 2 at 09– 

1583l5). 47Memorandum of Interview of Representative Young (Exhibit 1 at 09–1583l3). 48 Id. 

41. While Representative Young knew Mr. Paul Magliocchetti 

from when Mr. Magliocchetti worked for the committee, he has no 

personal relationship with him or with any other former PMA principal or employee.37

42. Representative Young’s only interaction with a former PMA 

employee was an individual who served as an escort on several 

Congressional Delegation trips.38 However, the individual left PMA 

before the issues that are the subject of this Review began.39 With 

this exception, Representative Young has had no personal interaction with PMA or its lobbyists. 

43. PMA has only contributed to Congressman Young’s campaign on one occasion.40 Mr. Rich Efford, a former PMA lobbyist, 

attended a fundraising event and made a contribution from PMA’s 

PAC.41 Representative Young highlighted the fact that Mr. Efford 

had not been invited to the event and came of his own accord.42

Mr. Efford had never lobbied the Congressman on a project previous to the event or afterwards.43

E. PERCEPTION OF CORPORATE DONORS

44. There is evidence that some of the commercial entities seeking earmarks from Representative Young believe that a political 

donation to him has an impact on his decision to author an earmark for that donor.44

45. However, Representative Young and his Chief of Staff 

credibly articulated a process that separates the Member’s legislative activities and his campaign fundraising activities.45 Representative Young achieves this separation by eliminating his and his 

legislative staff’s role in the campaign’s fundraising operation.46

Representative Young further separates his fundraising and legislative activities by not holding fundraisers during the mark-up of 

the appropriations bill.47

46. Representative Young explained to the OCE that he operates 

their campaign and Congressional office in this manner to prevent 

even the appearance that their legislative acts are influenced by 

contributions to their campaign or PAC.48

47. The Board notes that one risk associated with this is the possibility of an appearance of a conflict of interest if, out of ignorance, 

the Member’s campaign accepts a contribution near in time to a 

legislative act that has an impact on the individual or entity making the contribution. This potential for an appearance of a conflict 

may explain why companies requesting an earmark appear to 

think that a contribution to the respective campaign or PAC affects 

the ultimate receipt of an earmark. The House Ethics Manual is 


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unclear as to what obligations, if any, are placed on a Member to 

discourage or disabuse an entity of that impression. 

III. CONCLUSION 

48. For these reasons, the Board recommends that the Standards Committee dismiss the above described allegations concerning 

Representative Young. 

IV. INFORMATION THE OCE WAS UNABLE TO OBTAIN AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS 

49. In every instance, the OCE asked the recipient of an OCE 

request for information to identify any information they withheld 

and the reason they were withholding it. However, absent the authority to subpoena the evidence in possession of the witness, it is 

impossible for the OCE to verify if information was withheld, but 

not documented. 

50. In some instances documents were redacted or specific information was not provided. For instance, DRS Technologies provided 

evidence responsive to the OCE’s Request for Information but indicated they would not provide any information regarding their ‘‘Legislative Strategy.’’ 

51. In at least one instance, the OCE had reason to believe a 

witness withheld information requested, but did not comply with 

the OCE’s request that they identify what was being withheld. Specifically, Boeing Corporation represented that they had fully cooperated. However, Boeing Corporation indicated that they had no 

electronic mail responsive to the OCE’s Request for Information. 

The OCE then received, from another source, electronic mail to and 

from Boeing Corporation that were in fact responsive to the OCE’s 

request. 

52. The Board also notes that while the OCE was able to interview six former employees of PMA that provided general information on PMA and its business practices, many remaining former 

employees either refused to consent to interviews or did not return 

calls from the OCE. In addition, the OCE was unable to obtain any 

evidence within PMA’s possession. 

53. The Board makes the recommendation contained in this referral based on the factual record before it. Given its recommendation to dismiss, the Board does not recommend the issuance of subpoenas, but recognizes that the Committee on Standards of Official 

Conduct may determine otherwise. 


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bjneal on DSK2TWX8P1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 25 here 55497A.005
18 


bjneal on DSK2TWX8P1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 26 here 55497A.006
19 


bjneal on DSK2TWX8P1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 27 here 55497A.007
20 


bjneal on DSK2TWX8P1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 28 here 55497A.008
21 


bjneal on DSK2TWX8P1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 29 here 55497A.009