J-S10011-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TROY DILLARD,

Appellant No. 202 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 18, 2010

in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-09-CR-0003340-2010

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 31, 2015

Appellant, Troy Dillard, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of 

sentence imposed following his entry of a guilty plea to two counts of 

robbery and one count each of robbery of a motor vehicle, theft by unlawful 

taking of movable property, receiving stolen property, false imprisonment, 

simple assault, burglary, and conspiracy.1 He also entered a plea of nolo 

contendere to two counts of attempted kidnapping.2 On appeal, Appellant 

challenges the effectiveness of plea counsel. We affirm the judgment of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and (iv), 3702(a), 3921(a), 3925(a), 

2903(a), 2701(a)(1), 3502(a), and 903(a)(1), respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). 
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sentence and dismiss his ineffective assistance of counsel claims without 

prejudice.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

On October 18, 2010, Appellant entered a guilty plea and nolo contendere

plea to the above-listed offenses. The charges stem from his March 2010 

theft of a vehicle from the victim, Claire Forte, during which he and two 

other men attacked her and attempted to shove her into the trunk of her 

vehicle. On the same date Appellant entered his pleas, October 18, 2010, 

the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of not less than sixteen nor 

more than thirty-two years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file postsentence motions or a direct appeal.

On September 6, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to 

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on September 

12, 2012, claiming, inter alia, that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to 

file post-sentence motions and/or a direct appeal. The PCRA court held an 

evidentiary hearing on the petition on February 15, 2013. On July 17, 2013, 

the court granted the petition in part and ordered reinstatement of 

Appellant’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. On July 
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29, 2013,3 Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, and on 

August 2, 2013, he filed a supplemental post-sentence motion. On 

December 18, 2013, the court denied the motions following a hearing. This 

timely appeal followed.4

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the lower court erred in holding that plea counsel 

was not ineffective when he advised Appellant to enter a guilty 

plea without completing a thorough review of the discovery 

material, including the forensic evidence therein, he had not 

conducted a pre-trial investigation, and he failed to fully inform 

Appellant of the evidence contained within discovery?

2. Whether the lower court erred in holding that Appellant 

was not permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, which was 

unknowingly and involuntarily entered, and was induced by plea 

counsel’s misrepresentation about his review of discovery 

materials and his failure to convey information about evidence 

he either had in his possession or could have obtained with 

reasonable diligence[?][5]

____________________________________________

3 The last day of the 10-day period in which to file post-sentence motions, 

July 27, 2013, fell on a Saturday. Therefore, Appellant had until that 

Monday to file timely post-sentence motions. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

4

Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant timely filed a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal on February 19, 2014. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court entered an opinion on June 9, 2014. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

5

In the summary of the argument and argument sections of his brief, 

Appellant discusses this issue only in the context of ineffective assistance of 

plea counsel, arguing: “A manifest injustice occurred due to plea counsel’s 

stewardship of [Appellant’s] case, which was not within the range of 

competency demanded of criminal attorneys. [Appellant] was prejudiced by 

plea counsel’s incompetent representation, which resulted in an unknowing, 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).

Appellant’s issues on appeal challenge the effectiveness of plea 

counsel. The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s issues are not ripe for 

review in this direct appeal because “he has only raised and preserved his 

claims challenging the voluntariness of his plea in the context of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” (Commonwealth’s Brief, at 10; see also id. at 11-

15). Upon review, we agree with the Commonwealth. 

In Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme 

Court reaffirmed the general rule of Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 

726 (Pa. 2002), that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must await 

collateral review. See Holmes, supra at 563. The Holmes Court also 

recognized two limited exceptions to the deferral rule, both falling within the 

discretion of the trial court. See id. at 563-64. First, the Court held that 

trial courts retain discretion, in extraordinary circumstances, to entertain a 

discrete claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness if the claim is both apparent 

from the record and meritorious. See id. at 563. Second, the Court held 

that trial courts also have discretion to entertain prolix claims of 

ineffectiveness if there is good cause shown and the unitary review 

permitted is preceded by a knowing and express waiver by the defendant of 

the right to seek review under the PCRA. See id. at 564. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

involuntary and unintelligent guilty plea.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 39; see also 

id. at 15-16, 37-39). 
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Here, the facts of this case do not fall within the limited exceptions to 

the general deferral rule carved out by the Holmes Court. Therefore, 

Appellant cannot seek review of his ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. 

Accordingly, we dismiss Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

without prejudice, should he decide to include these claims in a timely-filed 

PCRA petition. See id. at 563-64; see also Commonwealth v. Stollar, 84 

A.3d 635, 652 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1798 (2014) (dismissing, 

pursuant to Holmes, appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

raised on direct appeal without prejudice to pursue them on collateral 

review).

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims dismissed without prejudice.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2015