IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

No. 71335-3-1 (Consolidated with Nos. 71336-1-1 and 71337-0-1) DIVISION ONE

Wo In re the Dependency of: B.I.T. (DOB: 10/11/06) G.J.T. (DOB: 05/06/04) S.G.T. (DOB: 01/03/02), Minor children. ROSA MARIA TORRES, Appellant,

v. STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, Respondent. CA mUNPUBLISHED CO FILED: September 15. 2014

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### Cox, J. —Rosa Torres appeals the trial court's orderterminating her 

### parentalrelationship with her three children, B.I.T., G.J.T., and S.G.T. Torres's sole contention on appeal is that RCW 13.34.190, which requires a court tofind thattermination is in the "best interests ofthe child," is unconstitutionally vague. Because Torres does not show how the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts ofher case, we affirm the trial court's order. 

### The following facts found by the trial court are unchallenged on appeal. Rosa Torres is the mother of B.I.T., born October 11, 2006; G.J.T., born May 6, 

### 2004; and S.G.T., born January 3, 2002. On July 13, 2010, a court found allNo. 71335-3-1 (Consolidated with Nos. 71336-1-1 and 71337-0-1) three children dependent and removed them from Torres's care. The Department ofSocial and Health Services (DSHS) offered Torres services 

### designed to address her parental deficiencies, including mental health counseling, a psychiatric medication evaluation, a parenting assessment, and 

### occupational services at the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Adeaf advocate fromthe Hearing, Speech and Deafness Centeroffered Torres assistance in obtaining communication devices, assistive devices for her home 

### and interpretingservices for medical appointments. Torres participated only 

### minimally inthese services and did not make any progress in correcting her parental deficiencies. 

### DSHS filed a petition to terminate Torres's parental rights on January 15, 

### 2013. Following a seven-day trial, the courtfound that Torres's mental health condition rendered her unfitto parent and that termination was in the children's best interests. Torres appeals. DUE PROCESS AND RCW 13.34.190 Torres asserts that RCW 13.34.190 is unconstitutionally vague and 

### violates a parent's rightto due process because itprovides trial courtswith 

### noguidelinesfor determining whentermination isinthe "best interests of the child." We disagree. RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190 provide a two-step process that 

### must be followed before a court may terminate parental rights. First, the courtNo. 71335-3-1 (Consolidated with Nos. 71336-1-1 and 71337-0-1)

must determine whetherthe following six factors have been proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: (a) Thatthe child has been found to be a dependent child; (b) Thatthe court has entered a dispositional order pursuantto RCW 13.34.130; (c) Thatthe child has been removed or will, at the time ofthe 

### hearing, have been removed from the custody ofthe parentfor a period ofat least six months pursuantto a finding ofdependency; (d) Thatthe services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all 

### necessary services, reasonably available, capable ofcorrecting the 

### parental deficiencies withinthe foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided; 

### (e) That there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so thatthe child can be returned to the parent inthe nearfuture. . . .; and 

### (f) That continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable 

### and permanent horned 

### Only ifthe court finds all six ofthesefactors does the court then determine whethertermination of the parent-child relationship "is in the best interests of the 

### child."2 Thisfactor must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.3 The statute does not define "best interests ofthe child." As the Washington Supreme Court has explained, 

### [Criteria for establishing the best interests for the welfare of the child are necessarily absent, since each case presents its own 

### peculiarfacts and circumstances, and the complexity ofthese, as well as the need for individualized treatment, militates againstthe 1 RCW 13.34.180(1). 2RCW13.34.190(1)(b). 3 In re Welfare ofA.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). 3No. 71335-3-1 (Consolidated with Nos. 71336-1-1 and 71337-0-1) mandatory consideration ofcertain specified factors in every case.

. . . Were the legislature to define the terms in question more precisely than ithas already done, the result mightwell be an inflexibility that deterred ratherthan promoted the pursuit ofthe child's best interests.141 

### We reviewthe constitutionality of a statute de novo.5 Astatute is presumed to be constitutional, and a party challenging that presumption bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubtthatthe statute is unconstitutional.6 

### "Inany vagueness challenge, the first step is to determine ifthe statute in 

### question is to be examined as applied to the particularcase or to be reviewed on its face."7 It is well-settled lawthat a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not involve FirstAmendment rights must be decided as applied to the particular facts of a case.8 As a result, we willnot consider a facial challenge to a statute 

### on vagueness grounds when FirstAmendment interests are notinvolved.9 Torres has made no argumentthat RCW 13.34.190 was vague as it 

### applied to the particularfacts of her case. Instead, she argues only that the statute "lacks the necessary guidance to protect against arbitrary enforcement 

### and to provide for effectiveappellate review." Torres's challenge to the "best interests" standard is a purely facial one. Because RCW 13.34.190 does not

4 In re Welfare ofAschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 697-98 n.5, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980).5 In re Dependency of K.R.. 128Wn.2d 129, 142, 904 P.2d 1132(1995). 6In re Dependency of U.S.. 128 Wn. App. 108, 115, 114P.3d 1215 (2005).7 City of Spokane v. Douglass. 115Wn.2d 171, 181, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). 8jd, at 182. 9]d 4No. 71335-3-1 (Consolidated with Nos. 71336-1-1 and 71337-0-1) involve First Amendment interests, we will not consider herfacial challenge to the statute. Consequently, Torres has not met her burden to prove the statute is unconstitutional. We affirm the orderterminating Torres's parental rights. 

# 6dkJ.

WE CONCUR: