Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1702-PC-337 |February 12, 2018 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Adrian Edwards

Pendleton, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Adrian Edwards,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 12, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A05-1702-PC-337

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kurt M. Eisgruber, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G01-0408-PC-145104

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1702-PC-337 |February 12, 2018 Page 2 of 18

Case Summary

[1] Pro-se Appellant-Petitioner Adrian Edwards (“Edwards”) appeals the denial of 

his petition for post-conviction relief, challenging his convictions for two counts 

of Murder, a felony,1 and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Murder, a Class 

A felony.2 We affirm.

Issues

[2] Edwards articulates seven issues for review. We address those issues that are 

not waived, res judicata, or procedurally defaulted,3 which we consolidate and 

restate as the following three issues:

I. Whether Edwards was denied the effective assistance of 

trial counsel;

 

1

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 

2

I.C. § 35-41-5-2.

3

Post-conviction procedures do not afford the petitioner with a super-appeal, and not all issues are available. 

Rouster v. State, 705 N.E.2d 999, 1003 (Ind. 1999). Rather, subsequent collateral challenges to convictions 

must be based on grounds enumerated in the post-conviction rules. Id. If an issue was known and available, 

but not raised on direct appeal, it is waived. Id. If it was raised on appeal, but decided adversely, it is res 

judicata. Id. Most free-standing claims of error are not available in a post-conviction proceeding because of 

these doctrines. Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1215 (Ind. 1998). Thus, we do not address Edwards’s 

claim that the trial court erred in admitting a portion of a police officer’s testimony, which Edwards considers 

invasive of the jury’s province, except as it relates to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. Nor do we address 

Edwards’s claim that fundamental error occurred at sentencing in the denial of his right of allocution. He did 

not pursue this claim on direct appeal or at the post-conviction hearing, but summarily mentions the alleged 

deprivation in his appellate brief. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1702-PC-337 |February 12, 2018 Page 3 of 18

II. Whether he was denied the effective assistance of appellate 

counsel; and

III. Whether the post-conviction court abused its discretion in 

the issuance of subpoenas for post-conviction witnesses. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] The facts underlying Edwards’s convictions were recited by a panel of this 

Court on direct appeal, as follows:

On May 29, 2004, Djuan Edwards (Djuan), Adrian’s cousin, 

shot Jermaine Foster and Michael Solomon, injuring Foster and 

killing Solomon. Foster called 911 for help and identified Djuan 

as the shooter. April Adkisson had seen the shooting and also 

called 911, describing the suspected shooter, the direction in 

which he fled, and his vehicle. At that time, Adkisson was 

dating Michael Moss, who knew Djuan. Foster, Moss, and 

Adkisson identified Edwards as the shooter.

At some point following the shooting, Djuan spoke to Adrian 

about the witnesses, explained that he was planning to turn 

himself into the authorities, and said, “[n]o witnesses, no 

case....” Tr. P. 490, 597, 601, 679. On June 1, 2004, Djuan 

turned himself into the authorities, and on June 3, he learned that 

Foster, Moss, and Adkisson were listed as witnesses for the State.

Djuan instructed Adrian, Brandon Hardiman, and Chris Ealy to 

notify him if they saw Moss or Foster. On June 10, 2004, officers 

discovered Moss, dead, in his front yard. He had been shot 

multiple times. Upon entering Moss’s residence, the officers 

discovered Adkisson, who was also dead and had sustained 

multiple gunshot wounds. That same morning, Hardiman was 
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awoken by Adrian, who stated that he had entered Moss’s home 

and “shot the bitch in the face...” Id. At 504, 590-91, 632, 653.

On August 11, 2004, the State charged Adrian with two counts of 

murder and three counts of class A felony conspiracy to commit 

murder. On January 13, 2006, the State filed a notice of intent to 

offer recordings of Djuan’s telephone calls made from jail into 

evidence. Adrian objected, but on March 22, 2006, the trial court

granted the State’s motion. At trial, Hardiman identified the 

voices of the individuals speaking on the recordings. Among 

other things, the recordings reveal that on June 2, 2004, Djuan 

asked Hardiman, “what y’all being doing—huntin’ and sh*t[?]” 

Id. At 529-30. Adrian told Djuan, “the only thing they got is no 

witness[es].” Id. At 531. Adrian also informed Djuan, “I’m 

tryin’ to have your back....” Id. On June 10, 2004, after officers 

discovered the bodies of Moss and Adkisson, Djuan told Ealy, 

“Well, you got to buy that one for me, too, man ... for real cause 

that’s the last car I need...” Id. At 568, 570-71. Djuan went on 

to say, “but please man, make sure you do that for me,” and Ealy 

responded, “Yeah – I’m gonna buy it.” Id. At 571. Later that 

day, Djuan told Ealy that he needed to buy a blue car, which 

Ealy understood to mean that Foster was to be killed. Id. At 647-

48.

A three-day trial began on March 27, 2006, and on March 30, the 

jury found Adrian guilty as charged. On April 21, 2006, the trial 

court found that Adrian’s convictions for conspiracy to commit 

the murders of Moss and Adkisson merged, respectively, into his 

convictions for murdering those individuals. The trial court 

sentenced him to fifty-five years imprisonment for each murder 

conviction and to thirty years for the conspiracy conviction 

relating to Foster, to be served consecutively, for a total of 140 

years imprisonment.
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Edwards v. State, No. 49A02-0705-CR-383, slip op at 1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 

2008), trans. denied.

[4] On appeal, Edwards argued that the trial court erroneously admitted into 

evidence recordings of Djuan’s telephone calls made from jail and that there 

was insufficient evidence to support the murder and conspiracy convictions. Id. 

Edwards’s convictions were affirmed. Id.

[5] On September 8, 2008, Edwards filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 

Subsequently, Edwards’s public defender withdrew representation; Edwards 

proceeded pro-se. On January 29, 2016, Edwards was granted leave to file an 

amended petition for post-conviction relief. Therein, Edwards alleged

ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel and fundamental trial error. The 

post-conviction court conducted a hearing on March 1, 2016, at which brief 

testimony from trial counsel was heard. On February 1, 2017, the postconviction court entered its findings, conclusions thereon, and order denying 

Edwards post-conviction relief. Edwards now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

Post-Conviction Appeal Standard of Review

[6] A defendant who has exhausted the direct appeal process may challenge the 

correctness of his or her conviction and sentence by filing a post-conviction 

petition. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002). Post-conviction 

proceedings are civil in nature and a defendant must establish his claims by a 
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preponderance of the evidence. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 

2000). A petitioner who has been denied post-conviction relief appeals from a 

negative judgment, and to the extent that his appeal turns on factual issues, he 

must convince this Court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and 

unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. 

Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 745. We do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal 

conclusions, but accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.

Effectiveness of Trial Counsel

[7] Edwards contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. As our Indiana 

Supreme Court has observed:

[t]his Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

under the two components set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the 

defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This requires a showing that counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and that the errors were so serious that 

they resulted in a denial of the right to counsel guaranteed the 

defendant by the Sixth Amendment, id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defendant. Id. To establish prejudice, a defendant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome. Id.

Wentz v. State, 766 N.E.2d 351, 360 (Ind. 2002).
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[8] First, Edwards claims that his trial counsel “fail[ed] to challenge Opinion 

Witness Testimony for Drug Codes and Jargon that were false and misleading 

in violation of the Article I, section 12, 13, and 23 of the Indiana Constitution 

and [the] 5

th, 6th, and 14th Amendment[s] to the United States Constitution.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. He complains that Indianapolis Police Detective Wagers 

(“Det. Wagers”) provided testimony that was “incredible due to the fact Det. 

Wagers did not possess the Skills or the prior educational abilities in Voice 

recognition to determine the accuracy of the Identification of the persons 

through [the] Marion County jail phone system” and that Det. Wagers 

“testified about alleged Code Words that were used during phone calls to Order 

the killing of the victims in this case.” Appellant’s Brief at 8-9. 

[9] Edwards apparently refers to recorded telephone conversations discussed on 

direct appeal, as follows:

Here, Hardiman, a cousin of Djuan and Adrian, and Ealy, a 

close friend, identified the caller as Djuan and identified the 

voices of Adrian and the other participants of the various 

recorded telephone conversations. Hardiman and Ealy were able 

to make the respective identifications based on their long 

acquaintances with Adrian and the other participants. The 

authentication was corroborated by Marion County Sheriff’s 

Department employees charged with running the jail telephone 

system and the Indianapolis Police Detectives who obtained and 

reviewed the calls.

Edwards, slip op. at 2.
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[10] At the post-conviction hearing, Edwards elicited very brief testimony from his 

trial counsel and the trial counsel for one of the co-defendants. Edwards did 

not question counsel as to strategic reasons for making or withholding 

objections during police testimony that either corroborated voice authentication 

or explained the witnesses’ understanding of particular jargon. Edwards did 

not direct the post-conviction court to specific instances of alleged improper 

testimony. In short, Edwards failed to develop this contention of trial counsel 

error at the post-conviction hearing. 

[11] On appeal, Edwards likewise fails to develop an argument clearly identifying 

his trial counsel’s perceived deficiencies. On one hand, Edwards observes that 

“Counsel made many objections to Det. Wagers testifying about these phone 

conversations and the Trial Court overruled the Objections.” Appellant’s Brief 

at 9. On the other hand, he argues that counsel withheld appropriate 

objections, yet he does not direct us to specific portions of the record to support 

this contention. “In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel due to the 

failure to object, a defendant must prove that an objection would have been 

sustained if made and that he was prejudiced by the failure.” Wrinkles v. State, 

749 N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind. 2001). In this instance, we are presented with a 

bald assertion and lack record citations to particular testimony Edwards finds 

objectionable; we are thus unable to discern whether additional objections if 

lodged by counsel would have been sustained. 

[12] Edwards suggests that his counsel should have procured a voice-identification 

expert and he discusses at some length the requirements for admissibility of 
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expert testimony and the scientific principles relative to the uniqueness of each 

person’s voice. Edwards fails, however, to acknowledge that his voice was 

identified by his cousin and his friend; he does not explain how he was 

prejudiced by the omission of a voice expert. 

[13] Edwards also claims that his trial counsel was “ineffective for failing [to] 

challenge that No Overt Act was proven for a Conspiracy to Commit Murder.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. This is, at bottom, a claim that counsel failed to 

recognize that insufficient evidence supported Edwards’s conspiracy conviction. 

The State alleged an overt act of locating victims. The overt act in a conspiracy 

count may be performed by either the accused or a person with whom he 

agreed. Minnifield v. State, 512 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (Ind. 1987).

[14] On direct appeal, Edwards obtained review of the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting each of his convictions:

To convict Adrian of murder, the State was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally 

killed another human being, specifically, Moss and Adkisson. 

I.C. § 35-42-1-1. To convict Adrian of conspiracy to murder 

Foster, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he agreed with another person to commit that murder. 

Id.; I.C. § 35-41-5-2.

A murder conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial 

evidence. Franklin v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1237, 1241 (Ind. 1999). 

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient if inferences may reasonably 

be drawn therefrom to enable the factfinder to find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The uncorroborated 

testimony of one witness, including an accomplice, may be 
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sufficient, by itself, to sustain a conviction on appeal. Toney v. 

State, 715 N.E.2d 367, 369 (Ind. 1999).

Here, although there was no forensic evidence linking Adrian to 

the crimes, Hardiman and Ealy testified at length regarding their 

knowledge of the plan to hunt down and kill Moss, Adkisson, 

and Foster at Djuan’s request. Both men also testified that 

Adrian actively participated in the crimes. And Adrian testified 

that he did, in fact, state “no witnesses, no case [against Djuan],” 

tr. P. 735, on at least one occasion. Hardiman and Ealy both 

recalled Adrian making the statement at other times as well. 

Adrian admitted that he owned two shotguns, a type of weapon 

used in the murders. Hardiman and Ealy both testified that 

Adrian told them that he kicked in the door to Moss’s residence –

which was, in fact, kicked in – and then shot Adkisson. Indeed, 

Adrian still had a gun in his hand when he relayed the story to 

Hardiman. Id. At 503. Moreover, the recordings of telephone 

conversations between Djuan, Adrian, and others include coded 

instructions from Djuan to kill Moss, Adkisson, and Foster, and 

the other participants’ agreement to commit the murders.

As a whole, we find that this is sufficient circumstantial evidence 

to support Adrian’s convictions. Adrian emphasizes the lack of 

forensic evidence and directs our attention to alleged 

inconsistencies in the testimony of Hardiman and Ealy, but these 

amount to requests that we reweigh the evidence and judge the 

credibility of witnesses – practices in which we do not engage 

when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction.

Edwards, slip op. at 4. In the face of sufficient evidence supporting Edwards’s 

convictions, he cannot show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to draw 

attention to alleged insufficiency.
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[15] Edwards also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move 

to sever his trial from that of Djuan. Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-9(b)(2) then 

provided:

Two (2) or more defendants can be joined in the same indictment 

or information when:

each of the defendants is charged as a conspirator or party to the 

commission of the offense and some of the defendants are also 

charged with one (1) or more offenses alleged to be in furtherance 

of the conspiracy or common scheme or plan; however, a party 

to the commission of an offense or conspirator need not be 

designated as such in the indictment or information[.] 

[16] During the post-conviction hearing, Edwards questioned counsel about 

severance. Djuan’s counsel responded that she “did not believe” she moved for 

severance and Edwards’s counsel testified that he “didn’t remember” whether 

or not he filed a motion to sever. (P-C.R. App. at 109, 111.) Even if we assume

that there was, in fact, no motion for severance made, Edwards cannot show 

that counsel was deficient without also showing that there were grounds for 

severance and a motion would have been granted. See Smith v. State, 465 

N.E.2d 1105, 1121 (Ind. 1984) (recognizing that, where alleged co-conspirators 

are joined for trial upon statutory authority, a motion for severance must be 

supported by adequate grounds). 

[17] According to Edwards, “the evidence at trial was confused and conflicted as to 

which defendant was charged with what Murder” and “the jury could have 

easily presumed that both were involved in both murders which was not true.” 
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Appellant’s Brief at 18. Edwards fails to provide any citation to relevant legal 

authority or corresponding argument, but instead baldly asserts that he suffered 

prejudice from potential jury confusion. “On review, we will not search the 

record to find a basis for a party’s argument, nor will we search the authorities 

cited by a party in order to find legal support for its position.” Young v. Butts, 

685 N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, we hold pro se litigants 

such as Edwards to the same performance standards as practicing attorneys. 

See e.g., Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

Edwards has waived his claim for failure to provide cogent argument. See 

Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).

[18] Finally, Edwards claims that his trial counsel was “ineffective for failing to 

move for [a] single episode of criminal conduct for the Conspiracy charge and 

require Edwards Sentences be ran concurrent due [to] the balancing of the 

Mitigation and Aggravating facts.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. Edwards’ 

corresponding argument is unclear; as best we can discern, he believes that 

counsel should have pointed out at sentencing that Conspiracy to Commit 

Murder is not defined as a crime of violence in the consecutive sentencing 

statute, Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2, and that his crimes were a single 

episode of criminal conduct, according to that statute.4

 

4

Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(b) defines an “episode of criminal conduct” as an “offense or a connected 

series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance.” Although he does not develop a 

factual argument relative to his offenses, Edwards seems to be persuaded that the foregoing statute requires 

fully concurrent sentences for offenses that constitute an episode of criminal conduct. He is incorrect. 

Rather, the statute imposes various limitations for an episode of criminal conduct. At the time of Edwards’s 
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[19] Edwards seems to suggest that proper argument on the part of his counsel could 

have prevented the imposition of consecutive sentences. We disagree. A single 

aggravating circumstance may justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. 

Gilliam v. State, 901 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The presence of 

multiple victims is one such aggravating circumstance.” Id. Edwards has not 

demonstrated that counsel performed deficiently because he did not obtain 

concurrent sentences for Edwards.

Effectiveness of Appellate Counsel

[20] The two-pronged standard for evaluating the assistance of trial counsel first 

enunciated in Strickland is applicable to appellate counsel ineffective assistance 

claims. Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ind. 1997). Claims of 

ineffectiveness of appellate counsel will generally fall into three basic categories: 

(1) denial of access to an appeal, (2) waiver of issues, and (3) failure to present 

issues well. Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 724 (Ind. 2013). Edwards claims 

that his appellate counsel failed to raise meritorious issues; thus, his claim is 

based upon the waiver of issues category. In order to show that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal, thereby resulting in waiver for 

collateral review, “the defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of 

 

sentencing, subsection (c) provided in part: “except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms 

of imprisonment ... to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of 

criminal conduct shall not exceed the presumptive sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony 

higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted.” 
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adequate assistance, and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential.” Ben-Yisrayl, 738 

N.E.2d at 260-61.

[21] To evaluate the performance prong when counsel waived issues upon appeal, 

we apply the following test: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and 

obvious from the face of the record and (2) whether the unraised issues are 

clearly stronger than those raised. Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at 724. If the analysis 

under this test demonstrates that appellate counsel performed deficiently, we 

then evaluate the prejudice prong. Id. This requires an examination of whether 

the issues that appellate counsel failed to raise would have been clearly more 

likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial. Id. Appellate courts 

should be particularly deferential to an appellate counsel’s strategic decision to 

include or exclude issues, unless the decision was “unquestionably 

unreasonable.” Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194 (Ind. 1997).

[22] Edwards contends that his appellate counsel should have argued that the trial 

court improperly admitted Detective Wagers’ testimony explaining what he 

perceived to be code words used during recorded jail conversations. The postconviction court observed that Edwards failed to support his bald assertion:

At the evidentiary hearing, the Defendant did not present any 

evidence from appellate counsel regarding why she did not raise 

this issue, and thus without impermissible speculation, it is 

impossible to determine why counsel selected and rejected the 

various available issues. While the issue that the Defendant now 

touts might have been an issue that possibly could have been 

raised on appeal, he makes no showing that this issue was clearly 

stronger than ones that appellate counsel ultimately chose. 
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Certainly, allowing a case detective to testify regarding the 

meaning of “coded” language is not without precedent. See e.g. 

United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009). 

Moreover, in addition to failing to elicit specific testimony from 

appellate counsel, the defendant has also failed to provide 

specific citations in the record where he believes the case 

detective’s testimony was improper. Most fundamentally, the 

Defendant’s unsupported assertions do not, “show from the 

information available in the trial record or otherwise known to 

appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present a 

significant and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be 

explained by any reasonable strategy.” Stevens v. State, 770 

N.E.2d 739, 760 (Ind. 2002). And consequently the Defendant 

has failed to meet his burden of proof on these claims.

(App. at 101-02.) We, like the post-conviction court, have nothing beyond a 

bald assertion. Edwards does not direct us to specific instances in the record 

where allegedly inadmissible testimony was permitted and he does not present 

legal argument as to the strength of the omitted appellate issue. 

[23] Edwards also summarily asserts that appellate counsel should have challenged

the lack of an overt act to support the conspiracy conviction and the lack of 

eyewitnesses, and should have raised issues regarding non-severance, invasion 

of the jury’s province, and sentencing error. As we have previously discussed, 

appellate counsel raised an issue of sufficiency of the evidence and Edwards’s

convictions were affirmed. To the extent that he attempts to support an 

allegation of ineffective appellate assistance with unsupported claims of trial 

counsel ineffectiveness or trial error, he cannot prevail. Edwards has failed to 

show that his trial counsel was ineffective, and his claims of ineffective 
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assistance of appellate counsel premised upon trial counsel’s alleged 

deficiencies must also fail. Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1168-69 (Ind. 2001).

[24] Appellate counsel is presumed effective, and Edwards did not show that 

appellate counsel omitted an obvious issue with a greater chance of success 

than those issues actually raised. Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not 

err in denying post-conviction relief on grounds of ineffectiveness of appellate 

counsel.

Issuance of Subpoenas

[25] Edwards contends that the post-conviction court abused its discretion when it 

denied his requests for the issuance of subpoenas to some potential witnesses.

[26] Our Post-Conviction Rules provide, in relevant part:

If the pro se petitioner requests issuance of subpoenas for 

witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner shall 

specifically state by affidavit the reason the witness’ testimony is 

required and the substance of the witness’ expected testimony. If 

the court finds the witness’ testimony would be relevant and 

probative, the court shall order that the subpoena be issued. If 

the court finds the proposed witness’ testimony is not relevant 

and probative, it shall enter a finding on the record and refuse to 

issue the subpoena.

Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(9)(b). Under this rule, a post-conviction court has 

discretion to determine whether to grant or deny the petitioner’s request for a 

subpoena. Pannell v. State, 36 N.E.3d 477, 486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We will 
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find that a post-conviction court has abused this discretion if its decision is 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

[27] Edwards requested subpoenas for six post-conviction witnesses; the two 

subpoenas directed to trial counsel were issued. However, the post-conviction 

court denied the requests for subpoenas to Hardiman, Ealy, Djuan, and Tia 

Thomas (Edwards’s girlfriend at the time of the murders), entering findings in 

each instance that the evidence sought was not germane to the proceedings.

[28] Edwards claims that Hardiman, Ealy, and Djuan would each be expected to 

recant prior false trial testimony and/or police statements. As for Thomas, 

Edwards anticipated that she would testify, consistent with her trial testimony, 

that Edwards had been with her at the time of the murders of Moss and 

Adkisson. 

[29] The post-conviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying subpoenas for 

Hardiman, Ealy, and Djuan based upon their alleged recantations. Postconviction proceedings are not designed to permit attacks on witness credibility, 

but rather to address issues demonstrably unavailable at trial and on direct 

appeal. Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002). Although Edwards 

might arguably have pursued a claim of newly-discovered evidence if 

Hardiman, Ealy, and Djuan were willing to recant prior testimony, he has not 

done so. He brought a post-conviction proceeding alleging ineffectiveness of 

counsel and has made no showing that post-trial witness recantations were 

relevant to his counsel’s performance. Likewise, the anticipated testimony from 
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Thomas does not appear germane to the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel. 

Because none of the anticipated testimony pertained to Edwards’s claimed basis 

for post-conviction relief, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

denial of the issuance of the requested subpoenas. 

Conclusion

[30] Edwards has failed to show that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and 

unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction 

court. Edwards has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion in the issuance of 

subpoenas. Thus, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment denying 

Edwards post-conviction relief.

[31] Affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.