alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
     THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM
     CONSOLIDATED  UNAUDITED  CONDENSED  FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  FILED  WITH  THE
     COMPANY'S  JUNE 30, 2000,  QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB AND IS QUALIFIED
     IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>         0001083162
<NAME>       Golen Opportunity Development Corporation
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Dollars

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         3,631
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               12,632
<PP&E>                                         2,520,656
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 2,533,288
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          422,010
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       255
<OTHER-SE>                                     313,838
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   2,533,288
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               76,927
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  136,643
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             27,451
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (87,167)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (87,167)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (87,167)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.34)


</TABLE>
795 A.2d 851

#### IN THE MATTER OF BRIAN D. MCARDLE, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW (ATTORNEY NO. 018141985).

April 29, 2002.

ORDER

This matter having been duly presented to the Court pursuant to *Rule*1:20-10(b), following a motion for discipline by consent of BRIAN D. McARDLE of SUCCASUNNA, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1986;

And the Committee on Attorney Advertising and respondent having signed a stipulation of discipline by consent in which it was *474agreed that respondent violated *RPC*7.1(a)(1) (making false and misleading communications about lawyer’s services) and Opinion 25, 153 *N.J.L.J.*1298, 7 *N.J.L.*2250(1998);

And the parties having agreed that respondent’s conduct violated *RPC*7.1(a)(1) and Opinion 25 153 *N.J.L.J.*1298, 7 *N.J.L.*2250(1998); and that said conduct warrants a reprimand;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having determined that a reprimand is the appropriate discipline for respondent’s ethics violations and having granted the motion for discipline by consent;

And the Disciplinary Review Board having submitted the record of the proceedings to the Clerk of the Supreme Court for the entry of an order of discipline in accordance with *Rule*1:20—16(e);

And good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that BRIAN D. McARDLE of SUCCASUNNA is hereby reprimanded; and it is further

ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Disciplinary Oversight Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.
#### JOSEPH P. SAYERS, Sr., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS, v. ALFRED RANGER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

See same case below: 16 *N. J. Super.*22.

*Mr. Edison Hedges*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Robert Peacock*for the respondent.

January 21, 1952.

Denied.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF


THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002






| |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
| | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for
    the fiscal period ended March 31, 2005 (the
    Report) fully complies with the applicable
    requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
    Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
|
| | (2) the information contained in the Report fairly
    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
    results of operations of the Company.                                                                                             



| |                    
| | -------------------
| | /s/ Robert F. Olson
| |                    



| |                                      
| | -------------------------------------
| | Robert F. Olson                      
| | Chairman of the Board,               
| | President and Chief Executive Officer
Municipal Court of Lebanon,

No. 4454.

#### Armand Racine *& a. v.*Leon Armstrong.

Submitted January 4, 1956.

Decided February 7, 1956.

*97
      *Robert A. Jones*for the plaintiff, furnished no brief.

*Richard C. Duncan*for the defendant.

Duncan, J.

The defendant’s exception to the verdict presents only questions of law apparent upon the face of the findings and rulings. *Eastman*v. *Waisman,*94 N. H. 253, 254. His brief raises no question concerning the right of the plaintiffs to maintain the action without joining the remaining tenants in common. The reserved case establishes that the defendant made no express agreement to pay the rent. It further states that there was no evidence that his wife intended to pledge his credit, or of his “failure to provide her with the necessary item of lodging.”

In the absence of a different agreement, or of objection by her co-tenants the defendant’s wife was entitled to occupy the premises without obligation to account to them. *Berry*v. *Whidden,*62 N. H. 473. As between herself and the co-tenants her duty at most was to answer to them in equity or in special assumpsit. See *Nixon*v. *Bonenfant,*97 N. H. 230, 232; RSA 507:3. She was competent to contract for the rent *(Ross*v. *Knox,*71 N. H. 249; *McConnell*v. *McConnell, 75*N. H. 385) and the defendant would not bo liable if the plaintiffs in fact relied solely upon her credit. *Hill*v. *Goodrich,*46 N. H. 41.

The capacity in which the defendant occupied the premises was a question of fact determinable by the trial court. So far as appears from the findings, he originally occupied the premises in the right of his wife *(Noyes*v. *Hemphill,*58 N. H. 536, 537) with whom the plaintiffs had their transactions relating to occupancy. In doing so, the defendant incurred no obligation to pay the rent, unless some agreement could be implied in fact. His use and occupancy without more gave rise to no presumption of an undertaking to pay rent. *Welcome*v. *Labontee,*63 N. H. 124; *Savings Bank*v. *Getchell,*59 N. H. 281. See also, *Parsons*v. *McLane,*64 N. H. 478.

There was evidence however relating to the defendant’s continued occupancy after demand upon him for the rent. Whether a promise by him to pay the rent was implied in what thus occurred was likewise a question of fact for the trial court. *McConnell*v. *Lamontagne,*82 N. H. 423. *Bickford*v. *Dane,*58 N. H. 185; *Welcome*v. *Labontee, supra.*It must be taken to have been *98determined upon competent evidence. *McConnell*v. *McConnell,*75 N. H. 385, *supra.*While the amount of the verdict does not appear there is no indication that it was for more than the fair rental value of the premises for the period following demand upon the defendant.

Since the evidence is not before us and its sufficiency is not brought in question, it is presumed to have supported the verdict. *Lupien*v. *Rousseau,*98 N. H. 459. No errors appear upon the face of the findings and rulings, and it follows that the order is

*Judgment on the verdict.*

All concurred.
§ 80.911 VHF transmitter. ( a ) The transmitter must be capable of transmission of G3E emission on 156.800 MHz, 156.300 MHz, and on the ship-to-shore working frequencies necessary to communicate with public coast stations serving the area in which the vessel is navigated.
( b ) The transmitter must be adjusted so that the transmission of speech normally produces peak modulation within the limits 75 percent and 100 percent.
( c ) The transmitter must be certificated to transmit between 20 watts and 25 watts, on each of the frequencies 156.300 MHz, 156.800 MHz and on ship-to-shore public correspondence channels, into 50 ohms effective resistance when operated with a primary supply voltage of 13.6 volts DC.
( d ) When an individual demonstration of the capability of the transmitter is necessary the output power requirements prescribed in this paragraph must be met as follows: ( 1 ) Measurements of primary supply voltage and transmitter output power must be made with the equipment drawing energy only from ship's battery;
( 2 ) The primary supply voltage, measured at the power input terminals to the transmitter, and the output power of the transmitter, terminated in a matching artificial load, must be measured at the end of 10 minutes of continuous operation of the transmitter at its full power output.
( 3 ) The primary supply voltage must not be less than 11.5 volts.
( 4 ) The transmitter output power must be not less than 15 watts.
( 5 ) For primary supply voltages, measured in accordance with the procedures of this paragraph, greater than 11.5 volts, but less than 12.6 volts, the required transmitter output power shall be equal to or greater than the value calculated from the formula
P = 4.375(V)−35.313 where V equals the measured primary voltage and P is the calculated output power in watts.” [51 FR 31213, Sept. 2, 1986, as amended at 54 FR 40059, Sept. 29, 1989; 63 FR 36607, July 7, 1998]
EXHIBIT 31.2 

 

CERTIFICATION 

 

I, Jennifer L. Cue, certify that: 

 

1. I havereviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Jones Soda Co. 

 

2. Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respectto the period covered by this report. 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financialstatements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing equivalent functions): 

 

a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Dated as of August 12, 2005.
No. 11-9352.

#### Navajar *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Joan L. Larsen,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

October 26, 2016

d1017 

# Order

Clerk October 26, 2016

151448(33)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v SC: 151448

COA: 323458

Washtenaw CC: 75

- 009781

- FC

HOWARD HUGHES, III,

Defendant

- Appellant.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s December 22,

2015 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was

entered erroneously.
----

            COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1048/2005

of 13 June 2005         

amending Regulation (EC) No 2032/2003 on the second phase of the 10-year work programme referred to in Article 16(2) of Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market (1), and in particular Article 16(2) thereof,

Whereas:

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Regulation (EC) No 2032/2003 is amended as follows:

Article 2

Entry into force

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 13 June 2005.

For the Commission

Stavros DIMAS            

Member of the Commission

----

(1)OJ L 123, 24.4.1998, p. 1. Directive as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 (OJ L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1).

(2)OJ L 307, 24.11.2003, p. 1.

(3)OJ L 228, 8.9.2000, p. 6. Regulation as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2032/2003.

(4)OJ L 258, 26.9.2002, p. 15.

----

ANNEX I

Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 2032/2003 is amended as follows:

----

ANNEX II

                  ‘ANNEX II

EXISTING ACTIVE SUBSTANCES AND PRODUCT TYPES INCLUDED IN THE REVIEW PROGRAMME (1)

----

(1)  Contact details of participants are specified at http://ecb.jrc.it/biocides.

----

ANNEX III

Annex III to Regulation (EC) No 2032/2003 is amended as follows:

----

ANNEX IV

Annex V to Regulation (EC) No 2032/2003 is amended as follows:

----

ANNEX V

                     ‘ANNEX VI

COMPETENT AUTHORITIES, AS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 5(4) AS OF 1 MARCH 2005                        

BELGIUM

CZECH REPUBLIC

DENMARK

GERMANY

ESTONIA

GREECE

SPAIN

FRANCE

IRELAND

ITALY

CYPRUS

LATVIA

LITUANIA

LUXEMBOURG

HUNGARY

MALTA

NETHERLANDS

AUSTRIA

POLAND

PORTUGAL

SLOVENIA

SLOVAKIA

FINLAND

SWEDEN

UNITED KINGDOM

ICELAND

NORWAY

----

ANNEX VI

                     ‘ANNEX VII

EXISTING ACTIVE SUBSTANCES THAT WERE NOT IDENTIFIED BY 28 MARCH 2002 BUT MAY REMAIN ON THE MARKET UNTIL 1 SEPTEMBER 2006                        

----

ANNEX VII

                     ‘ANNEX VIII

EXISTING ACTIVE SUBSTANCES THAT WERE NOTIFIED BUT IN RESPECT OF WHICH NO DOSSIER WAS SUBMITTED OR ACCEPTED AS COMPLETE AND FOR WHICH ANOTHER PRODUCER, FORMULATOR, ASSOCIATION, OTHER PERSON OR MEMBER STATE HAS INDICATED AN INTEREST TO TAKE OVER THE ROLE OF PARTICIPANT

----
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4227

To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that the mandatory retirement age for members of the Capitol Police be made the same as

the age applicable to law enforcement officers.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 14, 1994

Mr. MANTON (for himself, Mr. ROSE, and Ms. DUNN) introduced the following

bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Post Office and Civil

Service and House Administration

A BILL

To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that the

mandatory retirement age for members of the Capitol

Police be made the same as the age applicable to law

enforcement officers.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. AMENDMENTS.

4 (a) CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM.—The first

5 sentence of section 8335(d) of title 5, United States Code,

6 is amended by striking ‘‘55’’ and inserting ‘‘57’’.

7 (b) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM.—
2

•HR 4227 IH

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 8425 of title 5,

2 United States Code, is amended—

3 (A) in the first sentence of subsection (b)

4 by striking ‘‘member of the Capitol Police or’’

5 and ‘‘member or’’;

6 (B) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub7 section (d); and

8 (C) by inserting after subsection (b) the

9 following:

10 ‘‘(c) A member of the Capitol Police who is otherwise

11 eligible for immediate retirement under section 8412(d)

12 shall be separated from the service on the last day of the

13 month in which such member becomes 57 years of age

14 or completes 20 years of service if then over that age. The

15 Capitol Police Board, when in its judgment the public in16 terest so requires, may exempt such a member from auto17 matic separation under this subsection until that member

18 becomes 60 years of age. The Board shall notify the mem19 ber in writing of the date of separation at least 60 days

20 before that date. Action to separate the member is not

21 effective, without the consent of the member, until the last

22 day of the month in which the 60-day notice expires.’’.

23 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section

24 8415(d) of title 5, United States Code, is amended
3

•HR 4227 IH

1 by striking ‘‘(a) or (b)’’ and inserting ‘‘(a), (b), or

2 (c)’’.

Æ
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 5080

To repeal the Postal Service monopoly on first class mail.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 22, 1994

Mr. COX introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the

Committees on Post Office and Civil Service and the Judiciary

A BILL

To repeal the Postal Service monopoly on first class mail.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS

4 (a) The Postal Service is responding to increasing

5 competition from telecommunications services, electronic

6 mail, fax, computer modems, cellular technology, overnight

7 delivery, and other market competition by seeking a le8 gally-granted price increase for its monopoly business of

9 so-called ‘‘first class’’ mail.

10 (b) The normal market response to increased com11 petition is price reductions, not price increases.
2

HR 5080 IH

1 (c) The magnitude of the price increase being sought

2 by the Postal Service is over 10 percent.

3 (d) The hoary arguments against robust competition

4 in the mails have been thoroughly disproved (for example,

5 while the Postal Service claims rural delivery could be cur6 tailed as a result of increased competition, it presently re7 fuses to deliver to many addresses in the United States;

8 whereas United Parcel Service even now delivers to every

9 address in the United States).

10 (e) Ending the abusive legal monopoly conferred on

11 the Postal Service by the so-called ‘‘private express stat12 utes’’ will improve consumer choice and reduce prices.

13 SEC. 2. MONOPOLY REPEALED

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 6 of title 39, United

15 States Code, and sections 1693 through 1699 of title 18,

16 United States Code, the provisions of law effectively grant17 ing the Postal Service a monopoly on first class mail, com18 monly referred to as the ‘‘private express statutes,’’ are

19 repealed.

20 (b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

21 (1) TITLE 39, UNITED STATES CODE.—The

22 item relating to chapter 6 in the table of chapters

23 for part I of title 39, United States Code, is re24 pealed.
3

HR 5080 IH

1 (2) TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE.—The

2 items relating to sections 1693 through 1699, re3 spectively, in the table of sections for chapter 83 of

4 title 18, United States Code, are repealed.

Æ
No. 11-6180.

#### Udeozor, aka Obioha, aka Obiaha *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
No. 10-10832.

#### Gibbs *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Dismissed and Opinion Filed December 5, 2017 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-17-00692-CV 

DONNY JOE CURRY, Appellant 

V. 

A. HENDERSON, ET AL., Appellees 

On Appeal from the 354th District Court 

Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 84319 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart 

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright 

The docketing statement and clerk’s record in this case are past due. By postcard dated 

June 20, 2017, we informed appellant the docketing statement in this case was due. We 

cautioned appellant that failure to file the docketing statement within ten days might result in the 

dismissal of this appeal without further notice. By letter dated August 23, 2017, we informed 

appellant the clerk’s record had not been filed because appellant had not paid for the clerk’s 

record. We directed appellant to provide, within ten days, written verification of payment or 

arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record or written verification appellant had been found 

entitled to proceed without payment of costs. We cautioned appellant that failure to do so would 

result in the dismissal of this appeal without further notice. To date, the clerk’s record has not 
 –2– 

been filed and appellant has not provided the required documentation regarding the clerk’s 

record. 

We dismiss this appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b); 42.3(b), (c). 

170692F.P05 

 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

DONNY JOE CURRY, Appellant 

No. 05-17-00692-CV V. 

A.HENDERSON, et al., Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 354th District Court, 

Hunt County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 84319. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. 

Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellees A. HENDERSON, ET AL., recover their costs of this 

appeal from appellant DONNY JOE CURRY. 

Judgment entered December 5, 2017.