COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

FELIX ASCHER MORENO 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1643-96-4 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 FEBRUARY 18, 1997 

BARBARA J. MORENO 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY 

James H. Chamblin, Judge 

 Richard P. Buzan (Kellogg, Krebs & Moran, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Walter C. Jacob (Walter C. Jacob, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Felix A. Moreno (husband) appeals the trial court's finding 

of contempt for husband's failure to pay child support. Husband 

raises the following questions: 1) did the trial court's denial 

of husband's motion to dismiss the court's show cause order for 

failure to pay child support constitute a final appealable 

decree; 2) was the trial court's final decree of divorce, 

incorporating the parties' property settlement agreement 

including child support payments approximately twice the amount 

required by statute, void; and 3) did the trial court err in 

finding husband in contempt for failure to pay child support 

pursuant to the final decree of divorce. We find that the trial 

court's denial of husband's motion to dismiss the show cause 

order was not an immediately appealable order. We further find 

that the trial court's final decree of divorce was not void and 

that the court was not obligated to make a determination of the 
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presumptive amount of child support under the statutory 

guidelines where the parties had agreed to the amount of support 

and did not seek the court's determination of the matter. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

 On July 20, 1993, a decree of divorce was entered which 

incorporated the parties' property settlement agreement. The 

property settlement agreement provided that husband would pay 

child support to Barbara J. Moreno (wife) for the parties' two 

children in the amount of $1,800 monthly. No exceptions were 

noted to the decree, and no appeal was taken. Notice of the 

decree being presented for entry was not given to husband 

pursuant to a waiver of notice executed by husband on May 28, 

1993. 

 At wife's request, on July 17, 1995, a show cause order was 

entered against husband for his failure to pay child support. 

Husband moved to dismiss the show cause order arguing that the 

underlying decree of divorce was void because the award of child 

support did not comply with the provisions of Code §§ 20-108.1 

and 20-108.2. Husband asserted that the court's final decree of 

divorce was void because the divorce decree made no reference to 

the presumptive child support guidelines and because the trial 

court failed to make written findings that application of the 

presumptive child support guidelines would be unjust or 

inappropriate. A decree denying husband's motion was entered 

November 6, 1995. Subsequent to trial on the issues relating to 

the show cause order, the trial court issued a letter opinion, 
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dated December 4, 1995, finding husband in contempt for failure 

to pay child support in accordance with the provisions of the 

final decree of divorce. 

Timely Appeal

 Wife asserts that husband failed to timely appeal the trial 

court's November 6, 1995 denial of husband's motion to dismiss 

the show cause order. 

 This Court 

 has appellate jurisdiction over final decrees 

of a circuit court in domestic relations 

matters arising under Titles 16.1 or 20, and 

any interlocutory decree or order involving 

the granting, dissolving, or denying of an 

injunction or "adjudicating the principles of 

a cause." Code §§ 17-116.05(3)(f) and (4). 

A final decree is one "`which disposes of the 

whole subject, gives all the relief that is 

contemplated, and leaves nothing to be done 

by the court.'" 

Erikson v. Erikson, 19 Va. App. 389, 390, 451 S.E.2d 711, 712 

(1994) (citations omitted). The trial court's denial of 

husband's motion to dismiss the show cause order did not 

constitute a final decree because it did not dispose of the whole 

subject and leave nothing to be done by the court. See id. To 

the contrary, the trial court had to proceed with the show cause 

hearing. Nor was the court's order an interlocutory decree 

granting an injunction. Accordingly, unless the trial court's 

denial of husband's motion constituted an interlocutory decree 

that "adjudicate[d] the principles of the cause," this Court does 

not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the denial. 

 An interlocutory decree adjudicates the principles of a 
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cause where "`the rules or methods by which the rights of the 

parties are to be finally worked out have been so far determined 

that it is only necessary to apply those rules or methods to the 

facts of the case in order to ascertain the relative rights of 

the parties, with regard to the subject matter of the suit.'" 

Pinkard v. Pinkard, 12 Va. App. 848, 851, 407 S.E.2d 339, 341 

(1991) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 142 Va. 244, 252-53, 128 S.E. 524, 

527 (1925)). The trial court's denial of husband's motion to 

dismiss the show cause order did not adjudicate the principles of 

the cause. The denial of the motion did not determine whether 

husband had cause for failing to pay his child support or what 

terms the court would impose for such failure. Further, the show 

cause order required husband to show cause why he should not be 

held in contempt for violation of provisions of the final decree 

of divorce pertaining not only to child support but payment of 

unreimbursed medical expenses, use of the parties' joint credit 

lines, and adjustment of life insurance benefits. The court's 

denial of husband's motion to dismiss did not address these 

matters as well. 

 Because the trial court's denial of husband's motion to 

dismiss did not adjudicate the principles of the cause, husband 

was without obligation or ability to appeal the court's denial. 

Accordingly, we find husband's appeal timely made. 
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Child Support

 Husband argues that the trial court's decree of divorce was 

void because the court incorporated in the decree the parties' 

property settlement agreement containing a child support 

obligation approximately twice the amount required by statute. 

Husband asserts that the trial court erred in not determining 

child support in accordance with Code §§ 20-108.1 and 20-108.2 or 

by failing to provide written findings that application of the 

presumptive child support guidelines would be unjust or 

inappropriate. 

 In relevant part, Code § 20-108.1 provides that "[i]n any 

proceeding on the issue of determining child support . . . the 

court shall consider all evidence presented relative to any 

issues joined in that proceeding." (Emphasis added.) Code 

§ 20-108.2 provides that "[t]here shall be a rebuttable 

presumption in any judicial or administrative proceeding for 

child support under this Title or Title 16.1 or 63.1 . . . that 

the amount of the award which would result from application of 

the guidelines . . . is the correct amount of child support 

. . . ." Although both code sections serve to provide a 

rebuttable presumption of the amount of child support to be paid, 

a trial judge may determine that the contractual amount of child 

support is fair and equitable without requiring evidence and 

without determining the precise presumptive amount of support. 

Where, as here, the trial judge can determine that the amount of 

agreed child support is fair and equitable insofar as the child's 
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best interest is concerned, the court may approve the agreement 

and deviate from the guidelines. Neither parent will be heard to 

complain that an agreed amount of child support exceeds the 

presumptive amount under the guidelines and should be set aside 

in the absence of fraud, coercion, or overreaching. The cases 

relied on by husband involved instances where child support was 

in dispute or where a party had specifically requested the court 

determine support. Such was the case in Scott v. Scott, where we 

found that "[a]s of the hearing date . . . no child support award 

was in effect and none had previously been entered. Since the 

[trial] court was setting child support for the first time, the 

hearing was an initial child support hearing and the trial court 

erred in considering only those factors relevant to a change in 

circumstances." 12 Va. App. 1245, 1247, 408 S.E.2d 579, 581 

(1991) (emphasis added.) 

 Here, the trial court incorporated into its final decree of 

divorce the parties' property settlement agreement which 

specifically provided for child support. Prior to the decree of 

divorce, husband voluntarily executed a waiver of notice. 

Unlike the circumstances in Scott, at no time did husband object 

to the decree provisions as they pertained to child support nor 

did he request that an amount of child support different from 

that provided for in the property settlement agreement be 

entered. Further, at no time prior to husband's motion to 

dismiss the show cause order was the amount of child support ever 

disputed or in any way questioned. 
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 In Spagnolo v. Spagnolo, we held that: 

 a trial judge is not required to accept or 

adopt an agreement made by the parents 

regarding child support if the amount of 

child support is in dispute. . . . "[I]f the 

amount of child support is in dispute, in 

spite of a prior agreement, the trial court 

must address `the issue of determining child 

support.'" 

20 Va. App. 736, 743-44, 460 S.E.2d 616, 619 (1995) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly, if the husband or wife 

had disputed the amount of child support, despite the parties' 

property settlement agreement, the court would have been required 

to apply the guidelines in determining support. However, as the 

parties did not dispute support, we find that the trial court did 

not err in accepting the parties' mutually agreed upon child 

support provisions. We are aware of neither holding nor statute 

that requires a trial court to hear evidence on the matter of 

child support where the parties have agreed to the amount of 

support and do not seek the court's determination of the matter. 

 Further, we concur with the trial court's finding that the 

resources of both the court and the parties would be wasted by 

requiring a trial judge to sua sponte require parties to litigate 

a settled matter. 

 We also note that assuming, arguendo, that husband or wife 

had disputed the amount of child support, the trial court, once 

it had determined the presumptive amount of child support, could 

have deviated from that amount if such deviation was justified by 

the Code §§ 20-108.1 and 20-108.2 factors. Because these factors 
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may be reflected in the property settlement agreement, the 

agreement may therefore be the basis for deviating from the 

guidelines. See id. at 744, 460 S.E.2d at 619. 

Contempt

 Finding the divorce decree was not void and that the record 

contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding 

of contempt, we hold the trial court did not err in holding 

husband in contempt. 

 Affirmed.