DOT-FTA-MA-26-5019-03-01 

DOT-VNTSC-FTA-03-01 

The Public Transportation System 

U.S. Department Security and Emergency Preparedness of Transportation


Federal Transit Planning Guide
 Administration 

U.S. Department of Transportation January 2003


Research and Special Programs Administration Final Report


John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center


Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142-1093


FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 

FTA 

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 

January 2003 

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 

Final report 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 

The Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness 

Planning Guide 

5. FUNDING NUMBERS 

U3066/TM363 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

John N. Balog, Annabelle Boyd, James E. Caton 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

U. S. Department of Transportation 

Research and Special Programs Administration 

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 

55 Broadway, Kendall Square 

Cambridge, MA 02142-1093 

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT 

NUMBER 

DOT-VNTSC-FTA-03-01 

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 

ADDRESS(ES) 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Transit Administration 

Office of Program Management, 

Office of Safety and Security 

Washington, DC 20590 

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 

DOT-FTA-MA-26-5019-03-01 

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 

Recent events have focused renewed attention on the vulnerability of the nation’s critical infrastructure to major events, 

including terrorism. The Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide has been 

prepared to support the activities of public transportation systems to plan for and respond to major security threats and 

emergencies. It emphasizes the importance of developing critical relationships, preparing strategies and policies, and setting 

training and funding priorities. It offers practical guidance for planning effectively, spending wisely, and making the public 

transportation infrastructure safer. This Guide builds on a previous Federal Transit Administration (FTA) publication, the 

Transit System Security Program Planning Guide. This earlier publication is available on the Guide CD-ROM. This Guide is 

based on research to identify practical steps that systems can take to be better prepared for all emergencies. These 

recommendations support the industry’s commitment to prevent those events that can be prevented and to minimize the impact 

of those that cannot. Emphasizing balanced, common sense measures, this Guide helps transportation systems answer many 

questions. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS 

Public Transportation, Transit, System, Security, Emergency Preparedness, Terrorism, Plan, 

Prevention, Incident Command, Safety, Law Enforcement, Policy, Management, Threat, 

Vulnerability, Crime, Bus, Rail, Paratransit, Employee, Procedures, Passenger, Police 

15. NUMBER OF PAGES 

194 

16. PRICE CODE 

17. SECURITY 

CLASSIFICATION 

OF REPORT 

Unclassified 

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CLASSIFICATION 

OF THIS PAGE 

Unclassified 

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CLASSIFICATION 

OF ABSTRACT 

Unclassified 

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METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS 

ENGLISH TO METRIC METRIC TO ENGLISH

LENGTH (APPROXIMATE) LENGTH (APPROXIMATE) 

1 inch (in) = 2.5 centimeters (cm) 1 millimeter (mm) = 0.04 inch (in) 

1 foot (ft) = 30 centimeters (cm) 1 centimeter (cm) = 0.4 inch (in) 

1 yard (yd) = 0.9 meter (m) 1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft) 

1 mile (mi) = 1.6 kilometers (km) 1 meter (m) = 1.1 yards (yd) 

1 kilometer (km) = 0.6 mile (mi) 

AREA (APPROXIMATE) AREA (APPROXIMATE) 

1 square inch (sq in, in2) = 6.5 square centimeters 

(cm2

) 

1 square centimeter (cm2

) = 0.16 square inch (sq in, in2) 

1 square foot (sq ft, ft

2

) = 0.09 uare meter (m2) 1 square meter (m2) = 1.2 square yards (sq yd, 

yd2

) 

1 square yard (sq yd, yd2) = 0.8 square meter (m2) 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.4 square mile (sq mi, mi2) 

1 square mile (sq mi, mi2) = 2.6 square kilometers 

(km2

) 

10,000 square meters (m2

) = 1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres 

1 acre = 0.4 hectare (he) = 4,000 square meters (m2) 

MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE) MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE) 

1 ounce (oz) = 28 grams (gm) 1 gram (gm) = 0.036 ounce (oz) 

1 pound (lb) = 0.45 kilogram (kg) 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb) 

1 short ton = 2,000 

pounds (lb) 

= 0.9 tonne (t) 1 tonne (t) = 

= 

1,000 kilograms (kg) 

1.1 short tons 

VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) 

1 teaspoon (tsp) = 5 milliliters (ml) 1 milliliter (ml) = 0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz) 

1 tablespoon (tbsp) = 15 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 2.1 pints (pt) 

1 fluid ounce (fl oz) = 30 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 1.06 quarts (qt) 

1 cup (c) = 0.24 liter (l) 1 liter (l) = 0.26 gallon (gal) 

1 pint (pt) = 0.47 liter (l) 

1 quart (qt) = 0.96 liter (l) 

1 gallon (gal) = 3.8 liters (l) 

1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft

3

) = 0.03 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3) 

1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd3) = 0.76 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd3) 

TEMPERATURE (EXACT) TEMPERATURE (EXACT) 

[(x-32)(5/9)] °F = y °C [(9/5) y + 32] °C = x °F 

sq

QUICK INCH - CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION 

0 1 2 3 4 5

Inches 

Centimeters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

QUICK FAHRENHEIT - CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSION 

°F -40° -22° -4° 14° 32° 50° 68° 86° 104° 122° 140° 158° 176° 194° 212° 

°C -40° -30° -20° -10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° 

For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and 

Measures. Price $2.50 SD Catalog No. C13 10286 Updated 6/17/98 

ii 
Acknowledgments 

The Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide reflects the 

results of research conducted by the McCormick, Taylor & Associates, Inc. research team. This Guide 

builds on a previous Federal Transit Administration (FTA) publication, the Transit System Security 

Program Planning Guide. The Guide draws on research sponsored by the Federal Transit 

Administration and conducted in the Transit Cooperative Research Program, which is administered by 

the Transportation Research Board of the National Research Council. Upon acceptance by the TCRP 

Project Panel for Project J-10A, the contractor’s final report was delivered to FTA. After delivery, an 

independent assessment was conducted by FTA staff for FTA approval. The report was then subject to 

FTA’s revision and publication process through the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center. 

John Balog, of McCormick, Taylor & Associates, Inc. and Annabelle Boyd and Jim Caton, of Boyd, 

Caton & Grant Transportation Group, Inc. were responsible for the research, development, and 

preparation of this guide and its accompanying CD-ROM. Valuable assistance in the editing and 

preparation of this guide was provided by Peter N. Bromley and Jamie Beth Strongin, of McCormick, 

Taylor & Associates, Inc. and Anne Singleton, of Boyd, Caton & Grant Transportation Group, Inc. 

For their guidance and technical direction, the authors give special thanks to Mr. Robert Jamison, Ms. 

Susan Knisely, Mr. Harry Saporta, Mr. Jerry Fisher, Mr. Len Diamond, and Mr. David Martin of FTA. 

Special thanks are also given to: Ms. Maureen A. Milan, Mr. Gerald L. Blair, Mr. Cecil Bond, Mr. John 

David Claflin, Ms. Dorothy W. Dugger, Ms. Polly L. Hanson, Mr. Randy Isaacs, Mr. Thomas C. 

Lambert, Mr. Paul J. Lennon, Mr. William T. McArdle, Dr. Fran Nielsen, Mr. James D. O'Donnell, Mr. 

Robert L. Smith, Mr. Eugene Wilson, Jr., Ms. Rhonda M. Crawley, Mr. Brian Cronin, Mr. Jeffrey G. 

Mora, Mr. Robert Adduci, Mr. Scott Bogren, Ms. Karen Wolf-Branigan, Mr. Greg Hull, Ms. Vivienne 

Williams, Ms. Joedy W. Cambridge, Dr. Peter Shaw, and Mr. S. A. Parker. 
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Table of Contents 

Foreword......................................................................................................................................... xv

1 Executive Overview .................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Building Vision............................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Managing Uncertainty .................................................................................................... 2

1.2.1 Location Makes a Difference ........................................................................... 2

1.2.2 Vigilance is the Best Defense........................................................................... 4 

1.2.3 Security Should Be Responsive to Available Resources.................................. 4 

1.2.4 Other Recommendations .................................................................................. 5 

1.3 Investment in Security and Emergency Preparedness .................................................... 7

2 Security and Preparedness in a Diverse Industry..................................................................... 13

2. Diversity in Public Transportation................................................................................ 13 

2. Existing Threat Management Process........................................................................... 14 

2. Implications for Terrorism............................................................................................ 14 

2. Meeting the Threat........................................................................................................ 16 

2. System Security and Emergency Preparedness (SSEP)................................................ 17 

2. Benefits of SEPP........................................................................................................... 18 

2. Steps in the Program..................................................................................................... 20

3 Developing the Security and Emergency Preparedness Program (SEPP) ............................... 23

3.1 Authority....................................................................................................................... 23 

3.2 Goals and Objectives .................................................................................................... 26 

3.3 Organization ................................................................................................................. 27 

3.3.1 Management Level ......................................................................................... 28 

3.3.1.1 Top Management ............................................................................. 28

3.3.1.2 Division and Department Heads....................................................... 28

3.3.2 Managers ........................................................................................................ 29

3.3.2.1 Supervisors....................................................................................... 29 

3.3.2.2 Employees........................................................................................ 29 

3.3.2.3 Proactive Security Committee.......................................................... 30 

3.3.2.4 Security Breach Review Committee ................................................ 30 

3.3.2.5 Function within Program.................................................................. 31 

3.4 Resources...................................................................................................................... 33

3.4.1 Personnel ........................................................................................................ 34 

3.4.2 Budget ............................................................................................................ 34 

3.4.3 Management Support...................................................................................... 34 

3.5 Deliverables.................................................................................................................. 34

3.6 Schedule........................................................................................................................ 35

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3.7 Assign Tasks and Perform Work .................................................................................. 36 

3.8 Preparing the SEPP....................................................................................................... 36

3.9 Comprehensiveness of the Plan .................................................................................... 37 

3.9.1 Purpose ........................................................................................................... 37 

3.9.2 Scope .............................................................................................................. 37 

3.9.3 Responsibilities .............................................................................................. 37 

3.9.4 Implementation............................................................................................... 38 

3.10 Clarity of the Plan......................................................................................................... 38 

3.11 From Plan to Procedure ................................................................................................ 38 

3.12 Growth of the Plan........................................................................................................ 39 

3.13 Integrating the SEPP into Local Planning .................................................................... 39 

3.13.1 Local Government.......................................................................................... 39 

3.13.2 State Government Emergency Planning Program .......................................... 42 

3.13.3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Requirements................................. 44 

3.13.4 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)............ 44 

3.13.5 Inter-organizational Emergency Memoranda of Understanding .................... 46 

4 Capabilities Assessment .......................................................................................................... 47

4.1 Establish the Team........................................................................................................ 47 

4.2 Program Review ........................................................................................................... 48

4.2.1 Existing Plans................................................................................................. 48 

4.2.2 Security Master Planning ............................................................................... 49 

4.2.3 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Review and Development................... 49 

4.2.4 Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Planning............................................ 50 

4.2.5 Facility or On-Site Security Review............................................................... 55 

4.3 Documenting Results.................................................................................................... 56 

4.3.1 Note on Use.................................................................................................... 56

5 Reducing Threat and Vulnerability ......................................................................................... 65

5.1 Asset Analysis .............................................................................................................. 65 

5.2 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences ................................................................. 68 

5.2.1 Threats............................................................................................................ 68 

5.2.2 Vulnerabilities ................................................................................................ 68 

5.2.3 Scenario Analysis ........................................................................................... 70 

5.2.4 Consequences ................................................................................................. 72 

5.2.5 Prioritized Listing of Vulnerabilities.............................................................. 73 

5.2.6 Developing Countermeasures......................................................................... 73 

5.2.7 Rings of Protection......................................................................................... 74 

6 Procedures for New Threats .................................................................................................... 79

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6.1 Sample Bomb Threat Procedures.................................................................................. 79 

6.1.1 Threats by Phone ............................................................................................ 79 

6.1.2 Threats by Mail .............................................................................................. 80 

6.1.3 Manager’s Responsibility............................................................................... 80 

6.1.4 Executing the Response.................................................................................. 80 

6.1.5 Search Plans ................................................................................................... 81 

6.1.5.1 No Bomb Found............................................................................... 82 

6.1.5.2 Unusual or Out-of-Place Object Found............................................ 82 

6.1.5.3 After-Action Plan............................................................................. 83 

6.2 Managing Hoaxes and Unusual or Out-of-Place Objects ............................................. 83 

6.3 Response to Calls of Reports Suspecting a Chemical Agent Release........................... 88 

6.3.1 Responding to an Actual Chemical or Biological Agent Release .................. 90 

6.3.2 Support Community Response ....................................................................... 92 

6.4 Release of Sensitive Information to the Public............................................................. 93

7 Training and Exercising .......................................................................................................... 97

7. Principles of Training for Preparedness........................................................................ 97 

7. Existing Training Programs .......................................................................................... 97 

7. Exercising for Preparedness........................................................................................ 100 

7. Building a Progressive Exercise Program................................................................... 103 

7. Designing Exercises.................................................................................................... 104 

7. Exercise Evaluation .................................................................................................... 106 

8 Design and Technology Review............................................................................................ 111

8.1 Security by Design...................................................................................................... 111

8.2 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime Prevention

.................................................................................................................................... 112 

8.3 Security Technology................................................................................................... 116 

8.4 Considerations from the Department of Justice.......................................................... 117 

8.5 Assessing Technology Options................................................................................... 122 

8.5.1 Available Technologies................................................................................ 122

8.5.1.1 Considerations for Technology Evaluation.................................... 125

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms................................................................................................... 129

Appendix B: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorism Vulnerability Self-Assessment.. 139

Appendix C: Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems................ 149

Appendix D: Detailed Capabilities Assessment Worksheet......................................................... 157

Appendix E: Sample Grant Processing Guidelines ...................................................................... 169

Appendix F: A Memorandum of Understanding Between [Local Public Safety Agency] and the 

[Local Transit Agency] ........................................................................................... 171

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

List of Figures 

Figure 1: Requirements for Security and Emergency Preparedness................................................. 9

Figure 2: Elements of Protection .................................................................................................... 12

Figure 3: Common Threats and Evaluation Matrix ........................................................................ 15

Figure 4: System Security Approach to Prevention and Response................................................. 19

Figure 5: Steps in the System Security Methodology..................................................................... 20

Figure 6: Coordination with Local Systems ................................................................................... 21

Figure 7: Activities to Develop the SEPP....................................................................................... 24

Figure 8: Resources for SEPP......................................................................................................... 34

Figure 9: Sample Assignment Matrix............................................................................................. 36

Figure 10: Agencies Involved in Planning ..................................................................................... 41

Figure 11: Possible Transportation Responsibilities....................................................................... 43

Figure 12: Capabilities Assessment Program Review .................................................................... 48

Figure 13: Transportation System Resources ................................................................................. 54

Figure 14: Characteristics of Transportation Sites.......................................................................... 56

Figure 15: Threat and Vulnerability Process .................................................................................. 66

Figure 16: Scenario Evaluation Criteria ......................................................................................... 72

Figure 17: Sample Rings of Protection........................................................................................... 75

Figure 18: Active Security Strategies for Bus Vehicles ................................................................. 77

Figure 19: Response to Chemical and Biological Threats.............................................................. 85

Figure 20: Planning, Training, and Exercising Inter-Relationships.............................................. 102

Figure 21: Sample Decontamination Scene Staging Area Schematic........................................... 163

Figure 22: Sample Operational Shifts........................................................................................... 167

List of Tables 

Table 1: Program of Commitments .................................................................................................. 1

Table 2: Industry Security Snapshot, Fiscal Year 2000.................................................................. 10

Table 3: Law Enforcement or Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2000 ............................................. 10

Table 4: US Public Transportation Inventory................................................................................. 13

Table 5: Program Roles and Responsibilities Matrix ..................................................................... 31

Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment................................................................. 57

Table 7: Transportation Assets ....................................................................................................... 67

Table 8: Threats from Terrorism .................................................................................................... 69

Table 9: Relevant Bus Scenarios .................................................................................................... 71

Table 10: Relevant Rail Scenarios.................................................................................................. 71

Table 11: Public Transportation Countermeasures......................................................................... 76

Table 12: Categories of Potentially Sensitive Information............................................................. 94

Table 13: Preparedness Review of Training Programs................................................................. 101

Table 14: Exercise Development Checklist.................................................................................. 105

Table 15: Checklist for Evaluating the Transportation Emergency Exercise Program................. 106

Table 16: Security by Design - WMATA..................................................................................... 115

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Acronyms 

ARC American Red Cross 

ATTF Anti-Terrorism Task Force 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear 

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

CPTED Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

CWA Clean Water Act 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

EMA Emergency Management Agency

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOP Emergency Operating Procedures 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ESFs Emergency Support Functions

FBI U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHWA U.S. Federal Highway Administration 

FRA U.S. Federal Railroad Administration 

FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 

FRP Federal Response Plan

FTA U.S. Federal Transit Administration

FTE Full Time Equivalent

FY Fiscal Year 

GIS Geographical Information System

HAZMAT Hazardous Materials 

IAP Incident Action Plan

IC Incident Commander 

ICS Incident Command System

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee 

MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response Systems 

MOA Memorandum of Agreement 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OSC On-Scene Coordinator 

OSHA U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration

SAR Search and Rescue

SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

SCP Situation Crime Prevention

SEOC State Emergency Operations Center 

SEPP Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan 

SERC State Emergency Response Commission

SOP Standard Operating Procedures 

SSPP System Safety Program Plan 

UC Unified Command 

USC United States Code 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

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Preface 

The events of September 11th emphasized the responsibilities placed on industry to keep 

the nation’s communities safe and moving. Transit systems are inherently “open” 

environments. They are designed to move people quickly through an urban area, and, 

therefore, must provide unimpeded, easy access to passengers. In addition, they are 

intended to make low-cost transportation alternatives available to everyone, and, 

therefore, must have cost structures that support affordable transportation. 

Over the past year, gains in protection and preparedness have required tremendous 

management initiative, interagency coordination, and financial investment. At many 

agencies, major projects and ongoing programs for maintenance and operational upgrades have been delayed or re-directed to provide the resources and personnel necessary 

to address security and preparedness requirements. 

The industry’s willingness to experiment with different alternatives; to share information; 

and to support federal, state, and local partners in homeland security has promoted rapid 

advancement in security and preparedness programs. Agencies have learned what works, 

and, just as importantly, what does not work, in their operating environments. Managers 

and executives have had to make difficult decisions regarding the trade-offs inherent in 

cost, mobility, and security, using increasingly sophisticated risk assessment processes. 

Defending against terrorism is not new to industry. Since the early 1990s, the nation’s 

100 largest rail and bus properties, which combined move approximately 85 percent of all 

passengers who use public transportation, have been working to address the credible 

threat from terrorism. Well before the al-Qaeda attacks in this country, two decades of 

bombings and assaults in Europe, the Middle East, India, and Latin America 

demonstrated the inherent susceptibility of the public transportation infrastructure to a 

broad range of terrorist methods and weapons. These experiences informed the plans, 

training, and exercising which sustained industry preparedness throughout the 1990s. 

For more than a decade, Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has supported industry 

programs for security and preparedness through training, research, guidelines and even 

regulation. Forty-nine CFR Part 659, which went into effect on January 1, 1998, requires 

all rail transit agencies to document their security and preparedness programs in System 

Security Program Plans, reviewed and approved by State Oversight Agencies. Ongoing 

FTA auditing of this requirement ensures that agency plans and procedures are up-to-date 

and address a range of contingencies. 

Working with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Intelligence and Security, 

FTA has also coordinated closely with national domestic preparedness programs, 

developed after the 1995 sarin release on a Tokyo subway killed 12 and sent thousands of 

others to local hospitals. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 

1996 (more commonly known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici bill) initiated an ambitious 

program to provide training and equipment for first responders to deal with terrorist 

incidents, including those involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in 120 of the 

highest risk cities in the country. The presence of public transportation infrastructure was 

a defining characteristic in this initial assessment of risk, which has been expanded and 

amended to include a mixture of 157 cities and counties. 

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Public transportation police and operations personnel have been active partners in these 

programs, and also have participated in the Land Transportation Antiterrorism Training 

Program developed cooperatively between U.S. DOT and the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center (FLETC). Combined, over the last 5 years, these programs provided the 

opportunity for transportation agencies to develop preliminary plans and programs for 

addressing terrorism and WMD. Community drilling and exercise programs have always 

been a significant component of public transportation emergency preparedness, and were 

continually emphasized prior to September 11. 

Since the attacks in New York and Washington, FTA has continued to work closely with 

the public transportation industry. In response to new threats of terrorist activity, FTA 

launched a multipart transit security initiative. This program includes the following 

elements: 

⇒ Security assessments: FTA deployed teams, comprised of experts in anti- and 

counter-terrorism, transit operations, and security and emergency planning, to 

assess security at 36 transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of 

their ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an attack. Each 

assessment includes a threat and vulnerability analysis, an evaluation of security 

and emergency plans, and a focused review of the agency’s unified command 

structure with external emergency responders. FTA plans to extend the assessments 

to additional agencies after the first 36 assessments are complete. 

⇒ Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance to the 60 

largest transit agencies on security and emergency plans, and emergency response 

drills. 

⇒ Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants (up to $50,000) 

for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills. FTA has awarded 

$3.4 million to over 80 transit agencies through these grants. 

⇒ Security training – Connecting Communities Forums: FTA is offering free 

emergency preparedness and security training to transit agencies and their local 

responders through its Connecting Communities Forums. These forums are being 

offered throughout the country and are designed to bring together small and 

medium-sized transit agency personnel with their local public safety agencies, 

including law enforcement, fire and emergency medical services, and specialized 

units for hazardous materials and explosives ordinance disposal. These forums 

provide participants with the opportunity to: 

⇒ network and coordinate with your local transit, police, fire, and 

emergency officials to share the latest techniques, strategies and best 

practices; 

⇒ understand the role of a transit agency in responding to 

emergency/disaster situations in your community; 

⇒ discuss how to activate alternative transportation methods within your 

community during a crisis; 

⇒ identify the elements, people, organizations, procedures, equipment and 

facilities needed for an effective emergency management program, as 

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well as understand how the interaction of these elements affects the 

management of emergency situations; 

⇒ discuss existing transit system emergency management, disaster 

recovery, and security plans; 

⇒ explore the interagency role in handling emergency response; and 

⇒ understand the roles and responsibilities of community officials, transit 

system personnel, emergency response personnel (police, fire, EMS, 

OEM, and hospital) and media during an emergency. 

⇒ Attendees will also receive a wealth of resources and visual guides to 

educate their agency’s employees on the lessons learned from the 

forums. 

⇒ Security training – National Transit Institute: In addition, through NTI, FTA 

created two courses for specifically for the transit industry, to support suspicious 

activity/awareness training and to promote safe and effectiveness management of 

security reports and incidents. These courses, developed in cooperation with transit 

agencies, labor unions, and security professionals not only help a transit system 

“harden the target” relative to terrorism, but also will improve its overall security – 

helping to reduce all levels of crime. These courses are available through a variety 

of delivery mechanisms including direct deliveries and train-the-trainers. 

⇒ The System Security Awareness for Transit Employees course is targeted 

directly at front-line employees and supervisors who have direct contact 

with the public or the vehicles and facilities used by the public. The 

course covers skill sets for observing, determining and reporting people 

and things that are suspicious or out-of-place. It encourages employees to 

use common sense when faced with various circumstances so operations 

can run safely, smoothly, and efficiently. A focus is also placed upon an 

employee’s initial priorities at the scene of a threat or incident. The time 

needed to deliver the course content will range from two to four hours 

depending on the job functions of the class participants and the level of 

detail an agency wishes to cover. 

⇒ Security Incident Management for Transit Supervisors is a two-hour addon course for road supervisors, dispatchers, foremen, and other front-line 

managers. The course addresses a transit front-line manager’s 

fundamental responsibilities: communication, information gathering and 

analysis, hazard and risk identification, decision making, and plan 

implementation. Several scenario-based exercises allow students to solve 

problems and apply the skills presented in the programs. 

⇒ Research and development: FTA increased the funding of its safety- and securityrelated technology research and has accelerated the deployment of the PROTECT 

system, a partnership with the Department of Energy to test and deploy chemical 

sensors in public transportation stations, tunnels and vehicles. The program is 

pursuing a systems approach to the problem of release detection and management, 

including modeling and simulation to identify the most effective application of 

sensor-based technology, communications systems, automated decision support 

systems, decontamination procedures and technology, training tools, and exercise 

and response planning. FTA has also initiated a unique research partnership with 

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

the Transportation Research Board (TRB) and the American Public Transportation 

Association (APTA) to support targeted, rapid response research to a range of 

policy issues identified by transit executive leadership. 

⇒ Memorandum of Understanding with TSA: FTA has been working closely with 

TSA and the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), which may ultimately 

incorporate TSA as part of a new Department of Homeland Security. In this 

capacity, FTA is developing a Memoranda of Understanding to outline roles and 

responsibilities in the Federal strategy to protect the nation’s critical transportation 

infrastructure. 

⇒ Transit System Protective Measures to Support Responses to the Homeland 

Security Advisory System (HSAS): FTA is supporting the development of transit 

system protective measures to promote a consistent and effective transit industry 

response to threat conditions defined by the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). The FTA response model supplements the HSAS model with Black and 

Purple designations for further refine transit industry activities when an event is in 

progress and during the post-event recovery of transit services and facilities. The 

guidance document outlines protective measures in relation to the direction 

provided by DHS. 

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Foreword 

Foreword 

Attention to security and emergency preparedness is a natural corollary to the public 

transportation industry’s existing safety culture. Security and emergency preparedness 

programs protect both the community and the system. They keep the system operational 

and effective, even under adverse conditions. 

The Public Transportation System Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning 

Guide builds on two previous Federal Transit Administration (FTA) publications. 

These are the Transit System Security Program Planning Guide1

 and the Transit 

Security Handbook2

. These earlier publications are available on the Guide CD-ROM. 

This Guide is based on research to identify practical steps that systems can take to be 

better prepared for all emergencies. These recommendations support the industry’s 

commitment to prevent those events that can be prevented and to minimize the impact of 

those that cannot. Emphasizing balanced, common sense measures, this Guide helps 

transportation systems answer many questions. 

⇒ Who at my system should be responsible for security and emergency 

preparedness? 

⇒ What is my system’s current level of security and preparedness? 

⇒ What additional threats should we consider for our operations? 

⇒ What steps can we take to identify and prioritize action for mitigating and 

managing these threats? 

⇒ How can we cooperate more effectively with law enforcement and other 

emergency responders? 

Organization of Guide 

This Guide is organized into eight sections and six appendices. 

⇒ Executive Overview presents an overview of the Guide, highlighting key 

activities to be performed by public transportation systems to enhance prevention 

and to improve response capabilities. This section will be most useful to midand senior level managers who must evaluate the system’s current level of 

preparedness and implement programs to address the impacts of changing threat 

conditions. 

⇒ Preparedness in a Diverse Industry identifies the challenges of security and 

preparedness in the public transportation industry. It emphasizes the necessity of 

tailoring practices to address the diversity of operations and services provided by 

the more than 7,500 local systems receiving some form of federal assistance. 

1 Balog, John N., Anne N. Schwarz, and Bernard C. Doyle, Transit System Security Program 

Planning Guide, US Department of Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, November 

1997. 2

 Boyd, M. Annabelle and M. Patricia Maier, Transit Security Handbook, US Department of 

Transportation, Federal Transit Administration, May 1998. 

xv 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Foreword 

⇒ Developing the Security and Emergency Preparedness Program (SEPP) 

provides guidance on how transportation systems can develop internal security, 

incident management systems, and external plans for coordinating with local law 

enforcement, other local responders, local planning agencies, and state or federal 

agencies. While this section emphasizes planning for terrorism, basic principles 

and concepts are applicable to all emergency situations. This section also 

includes recommendations for applying the SEPP Planning Template on the 

Guide CD-ROM to create documentation for the system’s program. 

⇒ Capabilities Assessment supports the efforts of transportation systems to 

evaluate their current level of security and emergency preparedness. It provides 

a summary checklist for documenting findings, as well as recommendations for 

consideration by the team conducting the assessment. 

⇒ Reducing Threats and Vulnerabilities describes the methodology used to 

conduct a threat and vulnerability assessment. It emphasizes techniques to 

support recommendations appropriate to the unique requirements of each 

system’s operation. 

⇒ Procedures for New Threats provides sample procedures and recommendations 

for managing threats in the new environment. It includes managing bomb 

threats; managing hoaxes and unusual or out-of-place packages and substances; 

responding to a possible chemical agent release; and managing the dissemination 

of information to the public. 

⇒ Training and Exercising highlights those elements of existing public 

transportation training and supervisory programs that can be revised or updated 

to reflect new requirements resulting from heightened threat conditions. This 

section also describes those activities that can be performed to integrate the 

transportation system into community-based exercises, and to develop and 

conduct tabletops, drills, and full-scale exercises. 

⇒ Design and Technology Review explains available design strategies and 

technologies to support improved public transportation security and to enhance 

both normal and emergency operations. This section concludes with a list of 

considerations appropriate to all transportation systems investigating technology 

procurements. 

⇒ Appendix A: Glossary of Terms provides an explanation of terms used in this 

document. 

⇒ Appendix B: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Vulnerability SelfAssessment provides the worksheets used by local law enforcement to identify 

potential targets for terrorist activity and to report these targets, as part of a 

jurisdictional assessment, to the FBI. 

⇒ Appendix C: Security Contacts for the Top 35 Transportation Systems 

provides contact information for transportation police and security departments 

with experience in developing security and emergency preparedness programs. 

xvi 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Foreword 

⇒ Appendix D: Detailed Capabilities Assessment Worksheet provides additional 

questions for consideration when conducting the capabilities assessment 

described in Section 4 of the Guide. 

⇒ Appendix E: Sample Emergency Grant Processing Guidelines provides 

information that can be used to establish grants for emergency preparedness 

drills. The purpose, goals and objectives, requirements, and sample eligible 

expenses are outlined. 

⇒ Appendix F: A Memorandum of Understanding Between [Local Public 

Safety Agency] and the [Local Transit Agency] provides a sample language 

for a Memorandum of Understanding to support coordinated emergency 

preparedness between the public transit system and emergency responder 

agencies in its surrounding community. 

Public Transportation Security and Emergency Preparedness Guide CD-Rom 

To supplement information provided in this Guide, a CD-ROM is included that contains 

over 200 documents, prepared by federal and state organizations, industry associations, 

law enforcement, emergency management organizations, and the military. These 

documents explain the roles and responsibilities of the 47 Federal agencies involved in 

homeland security and provide useful technical assistance on a range of security and 

emergency management subjects. Sample procedures and model plans for transportation 

operators are also included on the Guide CD-ROM. These tools, most of which can be 

downloaded as Microsoft Word files, encourage the ready transfer of lessons learned. 

The CD-ROM contains an interactive shell to support easy navigation of contents and 

display of materials. 

Assumptions Used in Guide Development 

This Guide was written using the following assumptions. 

⇒ The Guide serves as a primary focus to provide a single resource to support 

security and preparedness planning in the transportation environment. 

⇒ Executive Overview is directed towards an audience of management personnel 

who must understand the challenges, management principles, and potential 

transportation roles and responsibilities sufficient to guide planning efforts for 

major events, including WMD terrorism. The remainder of this Guide, including 

the CD-ROM, is directed at those personnel with responsibilities of developing, 

implementing, and evaluating policies, procedures, training, and exercises to 

support security and emergency preparedness. 

⇒ This Guide presumes it is the responsibility of transportation operators to 

heighten their concern for critical infrastructure protection and be willing to 

improve and increase integration with the local community preparedness effort. 

This Guide does not answer questions concerning levels of involvement. Rather, 

this Guide describes how transportation personnel can identify resources, 

capabilities, and needs to actively seek improvement and integration into the 

community homeland security initiative. 

xvii 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Foreword 

⇒ The majority of recommendations in this Guide build on existing safety, security, 

and emergency management practices in public transportation. Many 

transportation systems located in large urbanized areas have initiated 

comprehensive planning, technology, and training programs with resources and 

capabilities not available to smaller transportation operators. This Guide should 

provide these larger systems with useful tools to support their ongoing review of 

program implementation. 

⇒ For smaller systems, with less experience in critical infrastructure protection, this 

Guide should provide an overview of key issues to consider. Templates, policies 

and procedures, located on the Guide CD-ROM, support implementation of 

tailored practices to enhance physical security and emergency preparedness. 

⇒ The authors of this Guide recognize the special burdens placed on small and 

some medium systems in addressing heightened security concerns. In response 

to pressures that these systems may be under to develop documentation for 

security and emergency preparedness programs, tools and templates available on 

the CD-ROM support easy integration of standard practice and lessons learned 

into transportation procedures and rulebooks. 

⇒ Without investing the time to read this Guide and to build partnerships with local 

law enforcement and other emergency responders, small and medium operators 

who use the CD-ROM templates will not receive their full benefit. These 

systems may run the risk of advertising a level of preparedness in their 

documentation that is not reinforced in training, exercising, and coordination 

with local responders. 

⇒ The Guide emphasizes the capacity of the transportation system to communicate 

with first responders (fire fighters, police officers, and other federal, state, and 

local agency personnel) and build on those existing emergency management 

experiences and capabilities. Using established concepts, such as the Incident 

Command System (ICS) and all-hazards management, this Guide explains how 

transportation systems can improve coordination with their communities during 

emergencies, including those incidents involving weapons of mass destruction 

agents or devices. 

⇒ This Guide draws on the existing body of open-source knowledge compiled by 

federal, state, and local agencies and practitioners, analysts, and transportation 

operations personnel regarding the management of WMD terrorism (much of 

which is included on the CD-ROM). Special emphasis has been placed on the 

results of studies and assessments detail lessons learned from the response to the 

September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 

xviii 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Executive Overview 

1 Executive Overview 

Recent events have focused renewed attention on the vulnerability of the nation’s 

critical infrastructure to major events, including terrorism. This Guide has been 

prepared to support the activities of public transportation systems to plan for and 

respond to major security threats and emergencies. It emphasizes the importance 

of developing critical relationships, preparing strategies and policies, and setting 

training and funding priorities. It offers practical guidance for planning effectively, 

spending wisely, and making the public transportation infrastructure safer. 

1.1 Building Vision 

Major incidents, such as train accidents, fires, floods, violent crime, and terrorist 

attacks, have been an issue for public transportation since the first vehicles were 

placed into service more than a century ago. During these events, personnel from 

multiple disciplines and agencies must come together to manage the incident, 

performing such tasks as perimeter and traffic control; rescuing or evacuating 

passengers; supporting the transportation of emergency responders and equipment; 

managing victims and their families; controlling crowds; repairing facilities; 

communicating with the media; and restoring service. 

Emergency management in public transportation is constantly evolving, 

incorporating lessons learned from major events, as well as facing new threats. 

Public transportation systems at the forefront of security and emergency 

management offer the vision illustrated in Table 1 to guide industry efforts for 

enhanced capabilities. This vision supports the industry’s activity to manage 

current threats and reinforces a strong tradition of emergency operations. 

Table 1: Program of Commitments 

COMMIT to a program that enables the public transportation system to: 

⇒ PREVENT incidents within its control and responsibility, effectively protect 

critical assets; 

⇒ RESPOND decisively to events that cannot be prevented, mitigate loss, and 

protect employees, passengers, and emergency responders; 

⇒ SUPPORT response to events that impact local communities, integrating 

equipment and capabilities seamlessly into the total effort; and 

⇒ RECOVER from major events, taking full advantage of available resources and 

programs. 

In adopting this vision, planning is more of a process than a product. Planning 

identifies potential targets and risks, vulnerabilities to various forms of attack, 

crime, and natural disaster, and allows these targets to be hardened and the risks to 

be mitigated. It also allows for modifications and amendments to procedures and 

operations based on experience and lessons learned. Planning provides the agency 

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an opportunity to ensure redundancy in critical system operations, including 

personnel for all major functions. It supports a flexible approach that can be 

expanded or contracted based on available personnel, resources, capabilities, and 

needs. 

1.2 Managing Uncertainty 

Legendary Coach John Wooden's somber reminder that "failure to prepare is 

preparing to fail" applies to the challenge of preparing for terrorism and other 

major events in the transportation environment. During these events, response 

decisions must be executed very quickly to prevent additional harm. 

The capability to perform effectively with uncertainty is the result of practice and 

self-assessment. Systems that know their own strengths and weaknesses, and have 

invested in developing core capabilities, skills, and knowledge, will be better off. 

Not only will they succeed in managing responses to terrorist attacks, but in 

handling all events with the potential to result in the loss of life and property. 

Terrorism is a rare occurrence. Even more traditional emergencies, such as major 

accidents, hazardous material spills, natural or technological disasters, and riots 

happen infrequently. A bus or rail supervisor may experience only one of these 

events in his or her entire career. 

Given this lack of frequency, it is difficult to expect competency in these highly 

charged situations. Yet, the consequences of poor decision-making in response to 

extraordinary events are grave. Unless adequate preparation is provided, 

transportation personnel may be unable to mobilize effectively to manage critical 

incidents on their systems and to support community response when most needed. 

General advice, prepared by sources ranging from industry associations, to the 

Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), reinforces previous findings that security and emergency preparedness are 

not one-size-fits-all propositions. There is no universal cookbook-forpreparedness, and there are no assurances that even the most protected assets will 

not be targeted. However, within this framework of uncertainty, evidence does 

suggest that: 

⇒ location makes a difference; 

⇒ vigilance is critical; and 

⇒ resource availability must be respected. 

1.2.1 Location Makes a Difference 

According to the FBI, what makes a specific facility or location attractive 

to a terrorist is not always easy to identify. Based on current 

intelligence, the FBI urges transportation systems serving communities 

with the following characteristics to consider themselves at a higher level 

of risk: 

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⇒ availability of targets with symbolic meaning for the United States 

government or its culture and way of life; 

⇒ availability of targets with precursor elements for major 

destruction (chemical or nuclear/radiological material); 

⇒ availability of targets whose destruction would provide the 

potential terrorist element (PTE) with visibility and prestige; 

⇒ availability of targets with the potential to significantly impact not 

only a single community, but also a state and the nation; 

⇒ availability of high-value targets (e.g., high replacement costs, high 

commercial impacts of delay and destruction, high loss on US 

economy); 

⇒ availability of major targets that provide relative ease of access 

(ability of PTE to ingress and egress with equipment and personnel 

required for attack); and 

⇒ availability of targets that would produce mass casualties (in 

excess of 500 persons). 

In a cooperative partnership with state and local law enforcement, the 

FBI has requested completion of vulnerability self-assessments 

emphasizing the above characteristics for each community. Appendix B 

contains the full vulnerability self-assessment supplied by the FBI, which 

is also included on the Guide CD-ROM. Using this worksheet, 

transportation systems should attempt to identify the specific 

vulnerabilities of their facilities. Based on the results of this assessment, 

the transportation organization may wish to share a copy with local law 

enforcement, or to include a representative from law enforcement in the 

assessment process, to support their understanding of the transportation 

function and role in the community. 

Tools discussed in this Guide, including the Capabilities Assessment 

(Section 4) and the Threat and Vulnerability Assessment (Section 5), will 

help transportation personnel evaluate the specific requirements of their 

operations. 

It should be noted that neither the FBI Vulnerability Self-Assessment, 

nor the additional tools provided in this Guide are definitive in their 

findings. Their use by law enforcement and industry professionals does 

not mean that a terrorist event cannot occur in a rural community or 

small or medium-sized city. It only means that, in the words of terrorism 

analyst Brian Jenkins, “attacks in such areas are less likely.” As he 

reports: 

“Historically, the United States, although a comparatively violent 

country, has not suffered high levels of terrorist violence. Within the 

United States, six major metropolitan areas (New York, Miami, 

Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles) account 

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for a majority of the terrorist incidents [including active investigations 

and interdictions].”

3 

1.2.2 Vigilance is the Best Defense 

All sectors indicated that the most important threat reduction measure is 

vigilance on the part of the transportation system’s staff, their awareness 

of anything out of the ordinary, and their prompt communication of that 

information to the organization’s security team or management. 

To this end, management should promote awareness and encourage 

familiarity with the spectrum of threats. Some questions to consider are 

listed below. 

⇒ What types of weapons might be used against public 

transportation vehicles, operators or passengers? 

⇒ How can system personnel recognize a chemical or biological 

incident? 

⇒ What are special conditions that could be observed by operators, 

maintenance personnel, and passengers? 

⇒ How can transportation staff and passengers be effective eyes 

and ears for the community? 

Procedures, training, and reinforcement should be provided to all 

employees to make sure that they understand what constitutes an unusual 

event and what they should do upon observing one. Managers should be 

committed to developing internal procedures for handling reports of 

unusual activity or objects and should encourage their enforcement. 

These procedures, when integrated into day-to-day operations, may have 

other benefits as well. Improved internal coordination and reports from 

the field may encourage better system housekeeping and more 

responsive maintenance practices for quality-of-life issues, such as 

burned-out light bulbs and over-grown shrubbery. To receive maximum 

benefit, consistency in the system’s approach to security and awareness 

is critical. It hurts the program when managers speak passionately about 

the importance of security and then fail to deliver support and 

encouragement to employees who report incidents meeting system 

criteria that are later revealed to be of little or no consequence. 

1.2.3 Security Should be Responsive to Available Resources 

Cost is a legitimate criterion in designing security and preparedness 

measures. Many of the security measures recommended by federal, 

state, and local systems have also been found to contribute to the 

3 Jenkins, Brian Michael, Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and 

Serious Crime: An Executive Overview, Mineta Transportation Institute, MTI Report 01-14, 

October 2001, Page 2. 

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efficiency of public transportation operations (vehicle locating systems, 

multimodal communications), passenger safety (design and materials 

used in station and coach construction), and making systems more 

convenient and attractive to passengers (good lighting, clean interiors, 

timely information on system status, visible presence of staff), and to 

reducing ordinary crime [closed-circuit television (CCTV), high-profile 

and undercover patrolling]. 

Many of these measures involve only modest expenditure. For example, 

improving liaison with local police and other emergency responders, 

establishing crisis management plans, conducting exercises, and putting 

procedures in place for handling bomb threats and suspicious objects are 

not costly undertakings. 

1.2.4 Other Recommendations 

Other recommendations to transportation executives are included below. 

⇒ Develop a security and emergency preparedness program 

(SEPP) plan. In many cases, this plan will bring together many of 

the system’s existing activities, integrating them into an overall 

security and preparedness effort, rather than a disparate set of 

technologies and procedures. Use the CD-ROM templates and 

tools to support documentation of the plan, communication with 

employees, and coordination with local responders. 

⇒ Consider a security staff position. If at all feasible, it is 

recommended that every transportation system assign security 

planning and preparedness assessment responsibilities to a single 

individual. Clear leadership in planning is critical. 

⇒ Take a balanced approach, commiserate with system resources 

and capabilities. Threat levels and protection requirements vary 

with the size of the community and the features of the service area. 

Evaluate threats and vulnerabilities using realistic scenarios that 

identify those elements of service with the potential for mass 

casualty events. Preparation should focus on the most likely 

threats in order to insure that budgets and human capital are 

distributed appropriately. Transportation activities should be 

coordinated with each community’s ongoing emergency planning 

effort and integrated into mutual aid agreements and the state 

emergency operations plan. 

⇒ Plan first, then spend. Extreme spending in response to a recent 

crisis is not sustainable over the long-term. Security and 

emergency preparedness programs must be accountable for their 

return on investment. Managers must be careful not to initiate 

programs that will eventually fall into disrepair under a different 

set of threat conditions. 

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⇒ Get involved. A national effort is underway to address the many 

institutional issues that have challenged emergency preparedness 

programs for the last decade. Transportation organizations should 

work to be included in this process. Transportation organizations 

also offer valuable resources to support their communities. These 

resources should be identified and incorporated into the overall 

homeland security effort. 

⇒ Identify an adequate level of preparedness. Every 

transportation system should set goals by which to assess its state 

of readiness. These goals will help establish benchmarks to 

determine how much preparedness is enough and establish funding 

and training priorities to meet that level. For example, 

transportation providers may play a special role in the sheltering or 

evacuation of communities and the management of medically 

vulnerable populations. In this case, emphasis should be placed on 

reviewing or developing plans and procedures to promote and 

assess readiness in this area. 

⇒ Emphasize readiness in system activities. Role-playing in 

operator meetings and tabletop simulations, answering questions 

addressed to staff, and practicing drills and interagency exercises 

are vital to ensure that employees and local responders are familiar 

with plans and equipment and develop needed skills. Interacting 

through exercises also provides an opportunity for systems to 

develop working relationships and mutual trust. 

⇒ Develop robust emergency management plans based on an allhazards approach. When multiple systems that may or may not 

be familiar with one another respond to a disaster, their 

management teams need to be highly integrated to avoid confused, 

delayed, or redundant response efforts. An emerging paradigm of 

operational command, known as the incident command system 

(ICS), is now widely adopted by state and local response agencies. 

Transportation providers should ensure that they are able to access 

this system. Local law enforcement can be a valuable resource in 

explaining ICS and clarifying transportation roles and 

responsibilities. 

⇒ Plan for public reassurance. A public affairs function can impact 

preparedness because it gathers, packages, and disseminates 

crucial information from the government to the public. The media 

play a critical role in both warning and informing the public. 

Terrorism broadcasts in real-time have powerful impacts on 

citizens. Providing accurate and timely information throughout a 

crisis can establish and maintain public trust in the government, 

calm anxieties, and instruct the public regarding actions they 

should and should not take. Recent experience has shown that 

inconsistent messages from different portions of government can 

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have significantly negative impacts. It is also vital that the chief 

executive and key staff members are available to the media to both 

inform and reassure the public with a clear and consistent message. 

1.3 Investment in Security and Emergency Preparedness 

It is important to recognize that security and emergency planning in public 

transportation includes not only the system, including its employees, facilities, 

passengers, and operations, but also those local agencies upon which the system 

relies for public safety support: 

⇒ local responders (police, fire, emergency medical services, coroner, and local 

public health department); 

⇒ planning organizations [local emergency management agency (EMA), local 

emergency planning committee (LEPC), and local government]; and 

⇒ mutual aid partners and regional agencies (who provide critical support 

during an emergency and support coordinated planning activities). 

As indicated in Figure 1, the level of activity required by the public transportation 

system for security and emergency planning typically has a direct correlation to: 

⇒ the number of passengers moved by the system; 

⇒ the number of fixed facilities operated by the system; and 

⇒ the number of local jurisdictions within the system’s service area. 

Increasing numbers of passengers and facilities bring the potential for increased 

loss, which requires more sophisticated protection and preparedness capabilities. 

Transportation systems serving multiple jurisdictions must extend additional 

resources for coordination and incident response. This often requires the capacity 

to develop a Memoranda of Understanding and other formal agreements for mutual 

aid and support. 

The relationships depicted in Figure 1 are reflected in the resources currently 

allocated to security by industry. Disproportionately, these resources are assigned 

to the (relatively) small number of systems that serve large urban areas. 

⇒ Collectively, the nation’s 75 largest public transportation systems devote just 

over 4 percent of their annual operating funds to security personnel and 

equipment. These systems serve the nation’s top 50 cities, and move 85 

percent of all passengers who use public transportation.4 

⇒ Most of these systems provide fixed-route bus services; approximately 40 

also have heavy, light, and/or commuter rail systems. All of these systems 

4 As reported to the NTD for FY 2000, the 7 largest public transportation systems each provide in 

excess of a million passenger trips every day; the next 5 largest agencies provide in excess of 

500,000 passenger trips. Each of the remaining top 35 agencies moves more than 100,000 

passengers daily. Lastly, the remaining 40 systems, rounding out the top 75, provide between 

50,000 and 100,000 daily trips. 

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provide paratransit service in accordance with the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements and community agreements. 

⇒ Heavy and commuter rail systems typically have their own sworn police 

departments or a dedicated unit of local law enforcement. In most instances, 

these operations are multimodal, so police responsibilities often extend to bus 

and paratransit operations. Appendix C provides a listing of transportation 

law enforcement and security contacts at these agencies. 

⇒ Of the remaining systems in the top 75, a few bus-only and bus-light rail 

operations have sworn transportation police. Many more have security 

departments that oversee contractual arrangements with local law 

enforcement or non-sworn security personnel for security support and fare 

enforcement. 

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Figure 1: Requirements for Security and Emergency Preparedness 

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Tables 2 and 3 both illustrate valuable industry resources currently devoted to security. 

Table 2: Industry Security Snapshot, Fiscal Year 2000 

Category of % of Total Total % of Annual Average Cost Average Cost 

Transportation U.S. Annual Operating of Security of Security per 

System Ridership, Unlinked Expenses per Rail Bus 

(by ridership) FY 2001 Passenger Spent on Passenger Passenger 

Trips Security Unlinked Trip Unlinked Trip 

Top 75 

Transportation 85 percent 8 billion 4.2% $0.18 $0.04 

Systems 

Systems 7 percent

76 to 150 

660 million .05% $0.02 

Systems 5 percent

101 to 500 

450 million .05% <$0.01 

Remaining 

Systems 3 percent 300 million .03% < $0.01 

(approx. 7,000) 

Table 3: Law Enforcement or Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2000 

Category of % of Total Total Average Cost Average Cost Security 

Transportation US Annual to Deploy a to Deploy a Personnel per 

System Ridership, Unlinked Full-time Law Full-time Million 

(by ridership) FY 2001 Passenger Enforcement Security Unlinked 

Trips Officer Guard Passenger 

Trips 

Top 75 

Transportation 85 percent 8 billion $70,000 $50,000 1.28 

Systems 

Systems 7 percent 660 million $50,000 $35,000 .04 

76 to 150 

Systems 5 percent 450 million 

101 to 500 

Remaining 3 percent 300 million 

Systems 

⇒ Systems falling between 76 and 150 in terms of ridership provide between 

50,000 and 10,000 passenger trips each weekday. Primarily, these trips are 

comprised of fixed-route and demand-response paratransit service. The 

larger systems in this category may have a designated security function to 

oversee a contract with local law enforcement or non-sworn security. In a 

few instances, these systems have dedicated units of local law enforcement. 

However, the majority of these systems rely on operator and supervisor 

training, security technology, and close coordination with local law 

enforcement to protect passengers and respond to incidents. These systems 

often emphasize the critical role played by operators and supervisors in 

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maintaining controlled environments on their vehicles, as well as the legal 

responsibility of local law enforcement for the criminal offences occurring 

on the streets and sidewalks of its jurisdiction. 

⇒ The nation’s remaining operators (small motor bus, paratransit, and rural and 

community service), who collectively provide eight percent of all trips on 

public transportation, have no dedicated security personnel. Security is 

addressed as part of general safety; risk management, operations, or facilities 

maintenance. Some of these systems may have contracts with local law 

enforcement or private security for limited program support or special events. 

These systems typically have very limited resources for security 

considerations and limited experience in managing security-related threats. 

If an event should arise, these systems typically work closely with their 

primary clients to resolve the situation. A client list may include public 

transportation boards, community organizations, or regional programs. 

This Guide recommends that, wherever possible, transportation personnel coordinate 

with their local partners to invest in strategies that promote integrated assessment of 

threat and response capabilities. The coordinated management of security and 

preparedness issues enhances the system’s ability to protect critical assets from those 

events that can be prevented and mitigated. 

Figure 2 (on the last page of this section) illustrates the elements of protection in the 

transportation environment. 

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SECURITY MANAGEMENT 

Police/Security Department 

--Roles & Responsibilities 

--Deployment 

--Procedures 

--Bomb Threat Management 

Transit Management and Employees 

--Roles & Responsibilities 

--Awareness 

--Emergency Procedures 

--Reporting and Managing Suspicious 

Activity 

SECURITY PLANNING 

System Security Program 

System Security Program Plan 

Information Security Plan 

Long-range Security Technology 

Plan 

Capital Improvement Plan 

Security Personnel Management 

Plan 

PROTECT 

CRITICAL 

ASSETS 

THREAT & VULNERABILITY 

RESOLUTION 

Asset Identification 

Threat Identification 

Scenario Analysis 

Vulnerability Prioritization 

Countermeasures 

Ongoing Evaluations 

PHYSICAL SECURITY & 

PROCEDURES 

Access Control 

CCTV 

Communications Systems 

Information System Security 

Intrusion Detection 

Materials Technology 

Blast Hardening/Mitigation 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

Emergency Plan 

Terrorism Response Plan 

Training and Drills 

Coordination with Local 

Public Safety Agencies 

Figure 2: Elements of Protection 

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Security and Preparedness in a Diverse Industry 

2 Security and Preparedness in a Diverse Industry 

There are over 7,500 local public transportation systems in the United States today. 

The main challenge of the federal government is to encourage security and 

preparedness programs that will protect them all. This may seem like an impossible 

task when taking a closer look and comparing the many different systems across the 

country to each other. Each system has a unique way of carrying out security 

measures that best suit each particular system’s needs. 

Table 4 illustrates the diversity of the nation’s public transportation network. 

Table 4: US Public Transportation Inventory 

INVENTORY Motor Heavy Light Demand Ferry Commuter TOTALS Bus Rail Rail Response Boat Rail 

Number of 2,262 14 33 5,254 28 18 7,609 Systems 

>1,000 10 Buses 

999>500 20 Buses 

499>200 38 Buses 

199>50 404 Buses 

<49 Buses 1,790 

Number of

Employees 195,548 45,155 6,048 47,509 3,433 22,399 320,092 

Number of 75,754 10,301 1,205 32,899 124 4,907 125,190 Vehicles 

Unlinked 

Passenger 

Trips 

5.8 

billion 

2.7 

billion 

315 

million 

113 

million 

52 

million 

421 

million 

9.4 

billion 

Operating 

Expenses 

$11.1 

billion 

$3.5 

billion 

$600 

million 

$1.3 

billion 

$270 

million 

$2.5 

billion 

$19.3 

billion 

Average $0.69 $0.96 $0.58 $1.60 $1.32 $3.40 Fare 

2.1 Diversity in Public Transportation 

Every day in the US, publicly funded transportation systems provide approximately 

32 million passenger trips. These systems serve commuters, students, tourists, 

people of age, persons with disabilities, and others who rely on trains, buses, 

ferries, vans, and other accessible vehicles and facilities to reach their final 

destinations. The public transportation infrastructure is varied and dynamic, 

including: 

⇒ the nation’s largest system, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority 

(MTA) New York City Transit (NYCT), which employs 40,000 

professionals and transports over 8 million daily passengers, using one of the 

world’s largest networks of bus and rail vehicles and supporting 

infrastructure; 

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⇒ a medium to small sized bus system in the Midwest, serving a mixed ruralsmall urban regional area, and providing 7,000 daily passenger trips; and 

⇒ a non-profit, demand-responsive system in the southwestern United States, 

with two vans and a car pool program, serving an isolated rural community 

with volunteer drivers, providing 30 daily passenger trips. 

2.2 Existing Threat Management Process 

The public transportation industry faces many threats, all of which have the 

potential for disrupting local communities, causing casualties, and damaging and 

destroying public and private property. At a national level, the industry will be 

affected by several major events each year; ranging from floods, earthquakes, 

hurricanes, tornados, major accidents, hazardous materials spills, fires, violent 

crime, and, potentially, terrorism. 

Figure 3 provides common categories of threats and a typical evaluation matrix for 

determining the relative impacts of these threats, based upon the likelihood that the 

threat will result in an actual event and the expected severity of the consequences 

should that event occur. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) use this tool to support the activities 

of communities in developing threat mitigation programs and emergency plans. 

Using this approach, a small operator in Ohio may determine that the threat of 

tornados is sufficient to justify a sky-watcher training program for key field 

personnel. A large provider in southern California may invest in the development 

of design criteria to enhance structural integrity and redundancy in power and 

communications to support earthquake resistance and rapid restoration of service. 

This evaluation process is iterative, ongoing, and responsive to new and emerging 

threats. 

2.3 Implications for Terrorism 

In this era of heightened concern regarding terrorism, transportation managers 

have good reason to attend to the security and preparedness of their operations. 

Threat assessments issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have 

consistently placed public transportation at the top of the critical infrastructure 

protection agenda, along with airports, nuclear power plants, and major utility 

exchanges on the national power grid. 

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Improbable 

Remote 

Occasional 

Probable 

Frequent 

Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible Likelihood 

Severity 

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Security and Preparedness in a Diverse Industry 

CATEGORY 

LIKELIHOOD OF 

OCCURRENCE 

SEVERITY OF 

OCCURRENCE 

HAZARD TYPE (SEE BELOW) (SEE BELOW) 

NATURAL 

Drought 

Earthquake 

Flash flooding 

Flooding (river or tidal) 

High winds 

Hurricane 

Landslide 

Tornado 

Wildfire 

Winter storm 

TECHNOLOGICAL 

Dam failure 

Energy or fuel shortage 

Hazmat or oil spill (fixed site) 

Hazmat or oil spill (transport) 

Major structural fire 

Nuclear facility incident 

Water system failure 

SOCIETAL 

Civil unrest or riot 

Strike 

Civil panic or looting 

SECURITY 

Violent crime (Part I crime) 

Other crime (Part II crime) 

Bomb threats 

Chem-bio-nuclear agent threats 

Workplace violence 

Explosive device/detonation 

Chem-bio-nuclear device/release 

Other terrorism 

LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE 

Frequent: Event will occur 

Probable: Expect event to occur 

Occasional: Circumstances expected 

for that event; it may or 

may not occur 

Remote: Possible but unlikely 

Improbable: Event will not occur 

SEVERITY OF OCCURRENCE 

Catastrophic: Disastrous event 

Critical: Survivable but costly 

Marginal: Relatively inconsequential 

Severity 

Likelihood Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 

Frequent 

Probable 

Occasional 

Remote 

Improbable 

Negligible: Limited or no impact 

Figure 3: Common Threats and Evaluation Matrix 

Acts of terrorism have many common characteristics both in the United States and 

other areas of the world. To guide the threat posture for the emergency planning 

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and response community, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) 

provides the following observations regarding terrorist acts.5 

⇒ All terrorist acts are crimes. Most involve violence or threats of violence. 

⇒ Terrorists target civilians; where they work, live, and congregate. 

⇒ Terrorist actions are designed to receive maximum publicity. 

⇒ Terrorist actions are intended to produce effects beyond immediate physical 

damage, to instill fear and devastation in the civilian population. 

⇒ Once a terrorist incident is underway, the success rate is nearly 75%. The 

presence of suicide bombers raises the success rate to over 95%. 

⇒ Law enforcement, fire, rescue, and emergency management personnel may 

not be better trained or equipped than terrorists. 

⇒ Terrorists will not have the same perspective as first responders regarding 

consequences of the initial event, and may attempt to exploit the 

vulnerability of first responders arriving on an emergency scene by using 

secondary devices or staging attacks involving other weapons. Worldwide, 

secondary devices will be deployed about 50% of the time. 

⇒ The American public now expects that an extraordinary rescue effort will 

occur after any terrorist incident. 

⇒ The tactics of terrorism are constantly changing, yet the basic objectives 

remain the same: to create fear and mistrust in government. 

⇒ The events of September 11 established a new benchmark in sophistication 

of terrorist attacks, demonstrating advancing skills and willingness to kill 

thousands of people indiscriminately. 

⇒ Responders should be prepared for terrorist incidents that escalate in scope 

and magnitude. 

⇒ Terrorist acts are not accidents or disasters; they are intentional actions 

designed to inflict civilian casualties. 

2.4 Meeting the Threat 

For most transportation systems, addressing this threat requires activities designed 

to: 

⇒ recognize and prevent potential security incidents and emergencies; and 

⇒ enhance response capabilities. 

At many systems, developing a security and preparedness program is a central 

component of these activities. The first step in creating this program is often to 

build consensus in two critical areas: 

⇒ Where is the risk? 

⇒ Whose responsibility is it? 

5 Enhancing Fire Service Response to Today’s Terrorism Threat, 

http://www.iafc.org/downloads/index.shtml. 

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The first question focuses on the system’s ownership of risk. Managers must 

understand which parts of its operation are at risk and why. By evaluating risk, 

managers are determining their needs to ensure that the organization does not spend 

valuable resources on unnecessary safeguards while, at the same time, exposing 

itself to unprotected loss. 

Responsibility refers to conscious decisions about whether to deny, accept, or 

transfer risk. Responsibility and accountability for security should determine 

resource investment. At all times, managers should remember that no decision or 

avoidance of decision-making is still a decision. 

2.5 System Security and Emergency Preparedness (SSEP) 

System security and emergency preparedness (SSEP) offers a valuable tool to 

support the efforts of transportation managers to answer system security questions. 

System security is defined as: 

the application of operating, technical, and management techniques and principles to the 

security aspects of a system throughout its life to reduce threats and vulnerabilities to the 

most practical level through the most effective use of available resources 

⇒ System security provides a structured methodology for analyzing threats and 

weighing the consequences of the cost of their resolution against the 

capabilities of the system to fund improvements. 

⇒ This process builds on the transportation industry’s strong safety culture, 

applying analysis techniques and management processes traditionally used 

for safety hazards to security threats and vulnerabilities. 

⇒ System security identifies security and emergency preparedness measures 

that protect both the community and transportation employees, while keeping 

the system operational and effective, even under adverse conditions. 

⇒ This process allows the system, whatever its size, service, or operating 

environment, to implement the most effective security and preparedness 

program possible within its available resources. 

Within the context of this approach, emergency preparedness is a central feature of 

the program, ensuring the capability to mitigate and manage those events that 

cannot be prevented. Emergency preparedness is defined as: 

a uniform basis for operating policies and procedures for mobilizing public transportation 

system and other public safety resources to assure rapid, controlled, and predictable 

responses to various types of transportation and community emergencies 

System security promotes an integrated approach to protection, identifying how all 

system activities come together as part of an interdependent system that deters, 

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detects, assesses, and responds to threats. As indicated in the Figure 4, this process 

has the following components: 

⇒ physical resources to delay and deter the adversary; 

⇒ equipment installed to detect and assess alarms and support surveillance; 

⇒ personnel used for security systems management, operations, and response; 

⇒ procedures essential for system operation and effectiveness; and 

⇒ training, exercising, and assessment to assure response capabilities. 

2.6 Benefits of SEPP 

Because security has historically been managed as part of day-to-day transportation 

operations, many systems may not recognize the benefits of preparing a formal 

security plan. Yet, the planning process: 

⇒ provides a systematic vision for its security and preparedness activities; 

⇒ enhances the system’s ability to coordinate with local authorities; 

⇒ supports development of best practices and technology programs; and 

⇒ provides the basis for training and exercises. 

In an era of heightened public concern and expectation, formal security planning 

ensures that the public transportation system is doing all that it can to leverage 

limited resources for physical protection and effective emergency response. 

By investing time and money in security and preparedness efforts, transportation 

managers can reduce the likelihood of adverse effects on employees, passengers, 

and the environment, as well as help to avoid costly losses that would result from a 

major event. This program can also be a valuable tool for maintaining operational 

integrity. 

Some of the benefits of implementing a SEPP include: 

⇒ safeguarding employees, passengers, first responders, the community, and 

the environment; 

⇒ reducing litigation risk, insurance costs, and theft; 

⇒ reducing the risk of vandalism and sabotage by employees and nonemployees; 

⇒ improving relationships with local authorities and surrounding communities; 

⇒ providing a mechanism for personnel control and accounting ; and 

⇒ supporting effective crisis communications internally and with passengers. 

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DETERRENCE 

DETECTION 

DELAY 

RESPONSE 

ELEMENTS 

9 REPUTATION 

9 SECURITY POLICIES 

AND PROCEDURES 

9 THREAT 

ASSESSMENT 

9 VULNERABILITY 

ANALYSIS 

9 FENCING 

9 LANDSCAPING 

9 BARRIERS 

9 SECURITY DESIGN 

FEATURES 

9 SIGNS 

9 SURVEILLANCE 

SYSTEMS 

9 I.D. CHECKS 

9 ESCORTS 

9 VEHICLE SEARCHES 

9 ELECTRONIC 

ACCESS CONTROL 

9 UNIFORMED 

PERSONNEL 

9 EMPLOYEE 

AWARENESS 

9 SECURITY 

MATERIALS 

SELECTION 

ELEMENTS 

9 SENSORS 

9 MONITORS & ALARMS 

9 SURVEILLANCE 

TECHNOLOGY 

9 INTRUSION 

DETECTION 

9 "PANIC" BUTTONS 

9 EMERGENCY 

PHONES 

9 UNIFORMED AND 

UNDERCOVER 

PERSONNEL 

9 EMPLOYEE 

AWARENESS 

9 EXPLOSIVES 

DETECTION 

9 DATA COLLECTION/ 

INTELLIGENCE 

9 COORDINATION WITH 

LOCAL LAW 

ENFORCEMENT 

ELEMENTS 

9 SECURITY 

MATERIALS 

SELECTION 

9 BOLTS, FASTENERS 

& FLUSH SURFACES 

9 EMPLOYEE 

AWARENESS 

9 FENCING 

9 ACCESS/EGRESS 

CONTROL 

9 ALARMS 

9 PUBLIC 

ANNUNCIATOR 

SYSTEMS 

ELEMENTS 

9 RAPID AND 

EFFECTIVEINCIDENT 

MANAGEMENT 

9 EMPLOYEE 

AWARENESS 

9 LEGAL 

DOCUMENTATION 

9 REPUTATION 

CYBER 

SECURITY 

BLAST 

MITIGATION 

OTHER 

CONSIDERATIONS 

Figure 4: System Security Approach to Prevention and Response 

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2.7 Steps in the Program 

For most systems, this program consists of the following seven steps, which are 

also depicted in Figure 5. 

System Security Program 

Security Policy 

Security Plan 

Security Procedures 

Final Review/Assessment Identify Critical Assets 

Implement Controls Threat and 

Vulnerability 

Management 

Identify Threats to Assets 

Threat Scenarios 

Quantify Threats 

Design/Control Threat Analysis 

Recommendations 

Identify Standards and 

Requirements 

Identify Controls to Prevent/ 

Mitigate Vulnerabilities 

Identify Consequent 

Vulnerabilities 

Risk Management 

Vulnerability Analysis 

Figure 5: Steps in the System Security Methodology 

⇒ Step 1: Designate an organizational capability to manage security issues for 

the system. For small systems, this assignment can be part-time for a single 

employee. For the nation’s larger systems, dedicated transportation police 

perform this function. 

⇒ Step 2: Create a Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning (SEPP) 

Team. For small systems, this can be the existing Bus/Vehicle Operators 

Committee or an Ad Hoc Committee, including representatives from systems 

served or contractors used to provide service. Larger systems may have 

several distinct committees (security planning, security operations, security 

breach review, as well as committees that focus on emergency management 

and coordination with local responders). 

⇒ Step 3: Perform a SEPP capabilities assessment to develop a snapshot of the 

system’s current level of readiness. If applicable, the system should also 

identify baseline security practices that are consistent across its operations or 

modes of service. 

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Most transportation systems work closely with local public safety agencies, local 

planning organizations, and regional or mutual aid partners in creating their 

programs. Figure 6 demonstrates how these activities are coordinated at many 

systems. 

Activity 

Transportation 

Security 

Manager 

Transportation 

Police/Securit 

y Department 

Security & 

Emergency 

Preparedness 

Planning 

Team 

Local 

Public 

Safety 

Agencies 

Local 

Planning 

Agencies 

Regional/Mutual 

Aid Agencies 

Perform Capabilities 

Assessment 

Identify Assets 

Identify Threats 

Identify 

Vulnerabilities 

(Perform Scenario 

Analysis; FBI SelfAssessment 

Worksheet) 

Prioritize 

Vulnerabilities 

Establish Physical 

Security Baseline 

Identify Other 

Measures 

Establish 

Preparedness Planning 

and Procedures 

Conduct Training, 

Exercises, and 

Evaluation 

Maintain Interagency 

Coordination 

Update Plans and 

Training 

Commit to 

Institutional Learning 

Lead Role 

Support/Review Role 

No Likely Role 

Figure 6: Coordination with Local Systems 

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⇒ Step 4: Conduct a Threat and Vulnerability Assessment to identify critical 

assets, vulnerability to specific threats, based on the likelihood of occurrence 

and the severity of occurrence (given current security baselines and/or 

practices), and to develop passive and active counter-measures for addressing 

prioritized vulnerabilities. 

⇒ Step 5: Develop a System Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan to 

describe system roles and responsibilities for these activities. Small systems 

may have one combined plan. Larger systems may have multiple plans 

(System Security Plan, Basic Emergency Plan and Incident Annexes, and 

Terrorism Response Plan). The Guide CD-ROM provides a complete 

template for this plan. 

⇒ Step 6: Develop a work plan for implementing countermeasures. This may 

include, in the short-term, issuing bulletins to operators and meeting with 

local law enforcement. Long-term implementation measures include 

developing annual programs for exercising emergency notification and 

response procedures and developing a master plan for CCTV implementation 

at the system. 

⇒ Step 7: Emphasize readiness in all system activities, including role-playing 

in operator meetings, tabletop simulations, what if exercises, tabletop 

simulations, drills, and interagency exercises are vital to ensure that 

transportation employees and local responders are familiar with plans and 

equipment and develop needed skills. Interacting through exercises also 

provides an opportunity for systems to develop working relationships and 

mutual trust. 

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3 Developing the Security and Emergency Preparedness Program 

(SEPP) 

Creating a security and emergency preparedness program (SEPP) formalizes top 

management’s commitment. Without clear management authority and written 

policies and procedures, the system’s activities for security and emergency 

preparedness will remain vulnerable to misunderstandings and confusion in the 

field. Heightened public accountability also encourages prudent transportation 

management to commit its program in writing. 

⇒ Documented programs are more credible to employees, local law 

enforcement and emergency planning agencies, ridership associations, and 

the media. A written plan issued under executive management signature 

conveys a level of professionalism and commitment appropriate to a system 

dedicated to the safe and secure transportation of passengers. 

⇒ The process of documenting the program encourages the identification of 

opportunities for physical security enhancements, technology acquisition, 

operations improvements, and greater coordination within the system, with 

local law enforcement and/or other response agencies. 

⇒ Review of the program also identifies weakness in current practices, provides 

a management tool to support revision of procedures, and enhances 

enforcement and implementation of the program. 

⇒ A written plan can be used to train and simulate exercises with personnel, 

ensuring that employees understand what is required in a variety of 

situations. 

⇒ A written plan can be shared with local response agencies, to increase their 

understanding of transportation operations and security priorities. 

⇒ A written plan supports brainstorming and proactive identification of what 

could happen and how the system would ideally like to respond. 

⇒ A written plan can be a priceless resource in an actual emergency. 

Figure 7 identifies activities that can be performed by a transportation system to 

develop its SEPP. 

3.1 Authority 

At a particular transportation system, security and emergency preparedness 

management responsibility generally should be assigned to one person. The FTA 

highly recommends that a full-time person be designated to these responsibilities, 

however if circumstances don’t allow for a full-time person an upper level 

management person should be in charge of this effort, even if he or she has other 

responsibilities. 

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AUTHORITY: Assign responsibilities and priorities 

for the program and establish requirements for 

internal and external coordination and plans. 

GOALS & OBJECTIVES: Identify the program’s 

vision for short- and long-term activities. 

ORGANIZATION: Identify roles of the security 

manager and supporting committees and/or teams. 

RESOURCES: Set a budget identifying resources 

for planning, protection, and preparedness. 

DELIVERABLES: 

S Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan 

S Capabilities Assessment & Report 

S Threat and Vulnerability Assessment 

S Procedures for Managing New Threats 

S Training & Exercising Program 

S Design & Technology Review 

SCHEDULE: Identify key dates for activities 

associated with deliverables and their updates. 

ASSIGN TASKS & PERFORM WORK: Identify 

specific activities and who will perform them. Be 

sure to track assignments to total completion. 

Figure 7: Activities to Develop the SEPP 

The person assuming this role can coordinate a number of important functions, 

such as: 

⇒ developing plans and policies; 

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⇒ managing annual capabilities and threat and vulnerability assessments; 

⇒ establishing relationships with law enforcement agencies and other 

responders; 

⇒ developing and managing incident and unusual event reporting systems; 

⇒ boosting employees’ security awareness; 

⇒ referring security breaches for investigation; 

⇒ coordinating emergency response; and 

⇒ periodically assessing the system’s security program. 

In recognition of system-to-system variations, this Guide uses the term security 

manager to refer to the person ultimately responsible for the SEPP at each 

transportation system. No single staffing recommendation is adequate for all 

transportation systems; each security program must be developed and evolve to 

address local conditions and resources. 

⇒ Depending on the size and resources of the system, the security manager may 

be the Chief of Transportation Police or the Director of the system’s Security 

Department, with in-house or contracted sworn and non-sworn personnel to 

support passenger, employee and facility protection, and emergency 

response. 

⇒ For smaller operations, the Chief Operations Officer, the Director of Safety, 

the Risk Manager, or the Facilities Manager may incorporate these activities 

into their duties, supported by a committee comprised of operating and 

administrative personnel, coordinated with local law enforcement. 

⇒ Rural and community transportation providers have tapped a wide range of 

personnel for this function, including part-time dispatchers with previous law 

enforcement experience, supervisors or operators who manage other system 

committees, or the human services liaison with the local community planning 

organization. An ad hoc committee or another type of planning team can 

also support this function. 

In determining the appropriate designation of responsibility for security and 

emergency preparedness, the transportation system may wish to consider which 

function can best: 

⇒ validate routine practices already in place for managing security incidents, 

accidents, and medical emergencies; working with hazardous materials; 

preparing for spills; and managing conflicts or disorderly conduct on-board 

vehicles; 

⇒ expand existing employee management and supervision practices to more 

fully address security and emergency planning; and 

⇒ consolidate these practices, to develop an integrated program, coordinated 

with local response and planning agencies. 

Whatever organizational structure is established by the transportation system, this 

Guide recommends that the security manager: 

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⇒ become a direct report to the system’s executive director; 

⇒ receives a separate budget line item for security activities; 

⇒ receives clear authority for signing off on policies, procedures, construction 

projects, and plans; and 

⇒ receives authority in overseeing the inclusion of security or emergency 

preparedness issues in the system’s procurement and contracting process. 

3.2 Goals and Objectives 

The public transportation system can consider many possible goals for the program 

that should emphasize the major elements to be accomplished. 

⇒ Develop a coordinated program to ensure that the transportation system, local 

emergency responders, and local planning agencies work together to identify 

vulnerabilities to acts of terrorism and other emergencies. 

⇒ Encourage clear definition of security and emergency response roles and 

responsibilities, both within the transportation system and with local 

responders. 

⇒ Support implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) for major 

events occurring in the community. 

⇒ Promote greater consistency in local, state, and federal requests for program 

funding, training, and exercising involving public transportation. 

⇒ Identify and review the role of public transportation in community plans. 

⇒ Develop an inventory of available equipment and resources that the 

transportation system can contribute to community emergencies. 

⇒ Establish joint policies and procedures for evacuation and in-place protection 

in the event of contamination by chemical, biological, or radiological agents. 

⇒ Identify how public transportation personnel should support scene 

management requirements at a major incident, including staging for mass 

casualties, search and rescue, and debris removal. 

⇒ Identify how public transportation can support management of medically 

vulnerable populations during major emergencies. 

⇒ Coordinate plans for special events in the community, such as fairs, concerts, 

and fireworks displays. 

Objectives are specific measures required to implement goals. The public 

transportation system can consider many possible objectives for the program that 

should emphasize the more day-to-day elements to be accomplished. 

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⇒ Ensure that all transportation system employees and contractors: 

o understand the requirements of the program; 

o make security and preparedness a primary concern while on the job; 

o cooperate fully with the system regarding any incident investigation; and 

o raise security and emergency preparedness concerns to management. 

⇒ Review current system safety, security, and emergency policies, procedures, 

and plans. Identify needed improvements among these documents. 

⇒ Develop and implement plans for addressing identified improvements. 

⇒ Coordinate with local public safety, community emergency planning, and 

human services agencies to address security and emergency preparedness, 

including participation in formal meetings and committees. 

⇒ Develop, disseminate, and incorporate procedures pertinent to system 

activities into training for security and emergency preparedness. 

⇒ Provide adequate driver training and continuing instruction for all employees 

and contractors regarding security and emergency preparedness. 

⇒ Ensure performance of at least one emergency exercise annually. 

⇒ Add a permanent agenda item oriented toward security and emergency 

preparedness matters on all standing safety and risk management 

committees. 

⇒ Ensure status reporting from operating, training, and human resource 

departments to determine the level of compliance with system security and 

emergency preparedness policies, rules, regulations, standards, codes, and 

procedures to identify changes or new challenges as a result of incidents or 

other operating experience. 

⇒ Ensure that the system’s current organizational committee structure provides 

sufficient opportunity to: 

o identify security conditions and problems at the system; 

o organize incident investigations; 

o develop and evaluate corrective actions; 

o develop strategies for addressing system security problems; 

o coordinate the sharing of security responsibilities and information; and 

o coordinate interaction with external agencies. 

3.3 Organization 

While it is often said that security is everyone’s responsibility, developing a 

program organization that clearly identifies security responsibilities can be 

challenging. In meeting this challenge, transportation systems typically organize 

activities by transportation system management level and function within the 

program. 

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These two approaches are discussed below. Sample organizational responsibilities 

are provided for both classification systems. 

3.3.1 Management Level 

By clarifying relationships between and among management levels 

within the system, a well-documented program supports the ability of the 

security manager to be proactive when addressing security and 

preparedness concerns. The security manager understands his or her role 

in the system and which management personnel have responsibility for 

approving, reviewing, and enforcing security policies and procedures. 

3.3.1.1 Top Management 

Top management is accountable for the safety and security of the system 

and the effectiveness of emergency response. Program responsibilities 

are typically identified for the executive director or general manager and 

the vice president or assistant general manager. 

3.3.1.2 Division and Department Heads 

Division and department heads are responsible for the security and 

preparedness of their divisions and departments, including employees, 

facilities, equipment, operations, and services provided. Additional 

responsibilities may include: 

⇒ reviewing new security activities to determine how they impact the 

areas for which each manager is responsible; 

⇒ developing implementation strategies for security-related activities to 

be assigned within the department safety and security action plans; 

⇒ planning fiscal requirements of security activities; and 

⇒ sharing security concerns and ideas for improvement. 

Program responsibilities are typically identified for the following: 

⇒ Director of Law Enforcement or Security; 

⇒ Director of Transportation Development; 

⇒ Director of Communications and Marketing; 

⇒ Director of Finance; 

⇒ Director of Rail Services; 

⇒ Director of Bus Operations; 

⇒ Director of Maintenance; 

⇒ Director of Human Resources; and 

⇒ Director of Legal Services. 

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3.3.2 Managers 

Other types of managers are responsible for the security and 

preparedness of their sections, including employees, facilities, 

equipment, operations, and services provided. They are also responsible 

for conducting inspections and evaluating threats, vulnerabilities, and 

security concerns. The security manager, system safety manager, 

facilities manager, and/or risk manager are typically responsible for 

developing and monitoring implementation of the SEPP and reporting to 

top management. 

3.3.2.1 Supervisors 

Supervisors are responsible for the security and preparedness of their 

units, including employees, facilities, equipment, operations, and 

services under their supervision. They are also responsible for 

conducting inspections and evaluating threats, vulnerabilities, and 

security concerns. Typical personnel include the following: 

⇒ Rail Operations Supervisor, 

⇒ Controller and Trainer; 

⇒ Bus Operations Supervisor, 

⇒ Dispatcher and Trainer; and 

⇒ Rail and Bus Maintenance Supervisors. 

3.3.2.2 Employees 

Each employee is responsible for working safely, securely, and for 

following established rules, procedures, policies, and safe work practices. 

All employees are responsible for: 

⇒ considering the security of passengers, vehicles, and facilities in the 

performance of all of their regular activities and 

⇒ offering suggestions for the improved security of transportation 

passengers, vehicles, and facilities to their division or department 

head, the system security manager (SSM), or to members of 

appropriate committees. 

Employee security program responsibilities are typically identified for: 

⇒ Bus Operator; 

⇒ Rail Operator; 

⇒ Bus or Rail Maintainer or Mechanic; 

⇒ Maintenance of Way Maintainer; 

⇒ Claims Processor; 

⇒ Revenue Collector; 

⇒ Employee Coordinator; and 

⇒ Environmental Program Coordinator 

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3.3.2.3 Proactive Security Committee 

This committee generally reports to top management through the chief 

operating officer or director of operations. The major task of this 

committee is to identify and resolve potential security risks that the 

transportation system may encounter. This is often accomplished by 

review and assessment of the following areas: 

⇒ conduct system-wide security assessments to identify and to 

eliminate or lessen potential security concerns in existing facilities; 

⇒ review of new facility designs to ensure that security principles have 

been incorporated into the design; 

⇒ review of existing training programs and development of additional 

training programs, based on security needs identified by the 

committee; 

⇒ review of existing and proposed security policies, rules, regulations, 

standards, codes, and procedures to identify and neutralize potential 

security problems; 

⇒ identify organizational issues that may contribute to recurring 

security incidents or less effective responses to incidents; 

⇒ promote security awareness through campaigns and security related 

events; and 

⇒ assess response readiness by conducting simulation drills and 

readiness exercises. 

3.3.2.4 Security Breach Review Committee 

This committee also typically reports to top management through the 

chief operating officer or director of operations. This committee often 

consists of the same 

members as the proactive 

security committee, and 

additional representatives 

from outside agencies, 

such as local law 

enforcement and the 

public, whose presence 

the committee members 

feel would be useful. 

The major task of the 

committee is to identify 

Security Integration 

Functions provided by the Proactive Security and 

Security Breach Committees are an integral part of 

public transportation agency system development 

and operations. 

isolated, but should be integrated into the agency’s 

decision-making process (for example during the 

design review of a system modification). l 

ensure that all security issues that affect or will 

affect system operations are evaluated from a 

security perspective. 

These committees should not be 

This wil

security breaches and to review incidents to determine if the breach 

occurred because of: 

⇒ inadequate or ineffective policies or procedures; 

⇒ failure by employees to properly follow policies or procedures; 

⇒ an identified, accepted risk; 

⇒ unforeseen actions against the transportation system; or 

⇒ some combination of the above. 

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This committee has the authority to propose or recommend additions or 

changes to policies and procedures. It can further recommend specific 

courses of action to prevent or minimize security breaches of a similar 

nature. 

3.3.2.5 Function within Program 

Once management roles have been clarified, the program can establish 

the specific activities to be performed. A program matrix is often used to 

document this activity. This matrix can stand-alone but is recommended 

to be incorporated into the overall management matrix of the 

organization to insure that security is part of all management review and 

decisions. This matrix identifies tasks for the program by operating 

department, often specifying the level of responsibility using the 

following conventions: 

⇒ P, Primary Task Responsibility. The identified participants are 

responsible for the preparation of the specified documentation. 

⇒ S, Secondary or Support Responsibility. The identified 

participants are to provide support to accomplish and document the 

task. 

⇒ C, Comment Responsibility. The identified participants are to 

review and provide comment on the task or requirement. 

⇒ A, Approval Responsibility. The identified participants are to 

review, comment, and subsequently approve the task or requirement. 

Table 5 presents a sample for consideration by transportation systems, 

organized according to the sections of the Security and Emergency 

Preparedness Plan contained on the Guide CD-ROM. 

Table 5: Program Roles and Responsibilities Matrix 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

PARAGRAPH 

NUMBER TASK OR ACTIVITY 

Manag

ement 

Operations 

Maintena

nce 

Security or 

Safety 

Training 

Engineering 

Human 

Resources 

Risk 

Manag

ement 

1.0 System Security Program 

Introduction 

A A C P C C C C 

1.1 Purpose of System Security 

Program Plan and Program 

A A C P C C C C 

1.2 Goals, Objectives, & Tasks for 

the Program 

A A C P C C C C 

1.3 Scope of Program A A C P C C C C 

1.4 Security & Law Enforcement A A C P C C C C 

1.5 Management Authority & Legal 

Aspects 

A A C P C C C C 

1.6 Government Involvement A A C P C C C C 

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Table 5: Program Roles and Responsibilities Matrix 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

PARAGRAPH 

NUMBER TASK OR ACTIVITY 

Manag

ement 

Operations 

Mainten

ance 

Security or 

Safety 

Training 

Engineering 

Human 

Resources 

Risk 

Manag

ement 

1.7 Security Definitions A A C P C C C C 

2.0 System Description C C C P C C C C 

2.1 Background & History of 

System 

C C C P C C C C 

2.2 Organizational Structure C C C P C C C C 

2.3 Human Resources C C C P C C C C 

2.4 Passengers C C C P C C C C 

2.5 Services or Operations C C C P C C C C 

2.6 Operating Environment C C C P C C C C 

2.7 Passenger, Vehicle, & System 

Safety program Plan 

C C C P C C C C 

2.8 Current Security Conditions A A C P C C C C 

2.9 Capabilities & Practices A A C P C C C C 

3.0 Management of the System 

Security Plan 

A A C P C 

3.1 Responsibility for Mission 

Statement & System Security 

A A C P C C C C 

3.2 Management of the Program A A S P S S S S 

3.2.1 General Manager A C S S S S S S 

3.2.2 Chief Operating Officer A A S S S S S S 

3.2.3 System SSM A A C P S S S S 

3.3 Division of Security 

Responsibilities 

A A C P C C C C 

3.3.1 Job-specific Security 

Responsibilities 

C A S P S S S S 

3.3.2 Operations Division 

Responsibilities 

A P S S S S S S 

3.3.3 System SSM & Contract Law 

Enforcement 

A A S P S S S S 

3.3.4 Proactive Security Committee C A S P S S S S 

3.3.5 Security Breach Review 

Committee 

C A S P S S S S 

4.0 System Security Program: 

Roles & Responsibilities 

C S S P S S S S 

4.1 Planning S S S P S S S S 

4.2 Proactive Measures S S S P S S S S 

4.3 Training S S S P S S S S 

4.4 Day-to-Day Activities S S S P S S S S 

5.0 Security Program Threat & 

Vulnerability Identification, 

Assessment, & Resolution 

C P P P C P S C 

5.1 Threat & Vulnerability 

Identification 

C P C P S S S C 

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Table 5: Program Roles and Responsibilities Matrix 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 

PARAGRAPH 

NUMBER TASK OR ACTIVITY 

Manag

ement 

Operations 

Mainten

ance 

Security or 

Safety 

Training 

Engineering 

Human 

Resources 

Risk 

Manag

ement 

5.1.1 Security Testing and 

Inspections 

C P C S S S S C 

5.1.2 Data Collection C P S S S S S S 

5.1.3 Reports C P S S S S S S 

5.1.4 Security Information Flow C P S S S S S S 

5.2 Threat & Vulnerability 

Assessment 

C C S P S S S S 

5.2.1 Responsibility C C S P S S S S 

5.2.2 Data Analysis C F S P S S S S 

5.2.3 Frequency & Severity C C S P S S S S 

5.3 Threat & Vulnerability 

Resolution 

C P C P S S S S 

5.3.1 Emergency Response A A S P S S S S 

5.3.2 Breach Investigation A A S P S S S S 

5.3.3 Research and Improvements A A S P S S S S 

5.3.4 Eliminate, Mitigate, or Accept A A S P S S S S 

6.0 Implementation & Evaluation of 

System Security Program Plan 

C P C P S S S C 

6.1 Implementation Goals & 

Objectives 

C P C P S S S C 

6.2 Implementation Schedule C P C P S S C 

6.3 Evaluation C P C S S S S S 

6.3.1 Internal Review – Management C C C P S S 

6.3.2 External Audits S P S S S S S S 

7.0 Modification of the System 

Security Program Plan 

S P S S S S S S 

7.1 Initiation C C S P S S S S 

7.2 Review Process C P S P S S S S 

7.3 Implement Modifications P P S P S S S S 

3.4 Resources 

To be effective, the program must have adequate resources to perform its identified 

activities. As indicated in Figure 8, program resources are commonly categorized 

as: 

⇒ personnel; 

⇒ budget; and 

⇒ management support. 

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3.4.1 Personnel 

Who is available to perform program activities, including in-house personnel, 

contractors, local law enforcement personnel, other responders, and local 

emergency planning agencies and committees? Security and emergency 

preparedness is an agency-wide activity. Cross-training of personnel is critical to 

promote effective emergency response and increase security awareness. 

3.4.2 Budget 

How much money is available, both in the short and long term, to fund physical 

protection, training, and preparedness enhancements? Are additional funding 

sources available from federal, state, local, and/or private sources? Are expenses 

for emergency response accounted for by the agency? 

3.4.3 Management Support 

How much authority does the security manager have to develop and implement the 

program? Will supervisors enforce these plans and procedures? 

Personnel Budget 

Management 

Support 

Figure 8: Resources for SEPP 

Each transportation system should determine the resources available to develop and 

manage the program. This Guide recommends preparation of a budget for the 

program to clarify the resources allocated for activities and to support prioritization 

of activities. 

3.5 Deliverables 

The activity performed by the security manager and supporting personnel (whether 

a designated committee, internal transportation police or security department, 

contractor, or closer coordination with local law enforcement and fire services) 

requires an abundance of program resources. This Guide recommends that, 

whatever the size of the transportation system, the program needs to commit to the 

development of the following: 

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⇒ Security and emergency preparedness plan (SEPP) to document the system’s 

program, organization, roles, and responsibilities. This may be supported by 

other emergency plans and procedures, emerging from coordination with the 

local community’s planning process. 

⇒ Capabilities assessment and report to identify the system’s current activities 

for security and emergency preparedness and to make recommendations 

regarding the update or revision of existing plans, procedures, and training 

programs. See Section 4 of this Guide for more information. 

⇒ Threat and vulnerability assessment to identify how heightened concerns 

over terrorism and other emergencies may create new risks for the operations 

and to recommend countermeasures for their resolution. See Section 5 of 

this Guide for more information. 

⇒ Procedures for managing new threats to 

ensure that transportation personnel 

understand how to manage response to 

unusual events that may involve 

chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear agents. See Section 6 of this 

Guide for more information. 

⇒ Training and exercising to test and 

evaluate the system’s emergency 

response preparedness and to encourage coordination with local responders. 

See Section 7 of this Guide for more information. 

⇒ Design and technology review to investigate design concepts and security 

equipment. Technology that may improve facility and vehicle protection is 

available. See Section 8 of this Guide for more information. 

3.6 Schedule 

The security manager should prepare a schedule to help ensure that all activities are 

identified, assigned, coordinated, and tracked. As a rule of thumb, most systems 

require 12 to 18 months to complete the initial deliverables specified above. Many 

systems, depending on their size, perform annual or biennial reviews and updates, 

which typically are completed over a 3-month period. When setting a schedule for 

program activities, this Guide encourages transportation systems to use the 

SMART mnemonic. 

When developing schedules, it is important to remain realistic regarding the 

amount of time allocated for review, revision, and evaluation. This practice is 

critical when system activities will be coordinated with local law enforcement and 

emergency planning agencies, whose staff may have scheduled monthly meetings 

for review of submitted materials from local organizations. 

SPECIFIC 

MEASURABLE 

ACHIEVABLE 

REASONABLE 

TIMETABLE 

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3.7 Assign Tasks and Perform Work 

Figure 9 identifies a standard project management configuration for documenting 

ownership of specific deliverables. Dark circles indicate primary responsibility 

whereas white circles indicate supporting responsibility. Assignments for project 

deliverables should be a two-way negotiation beginning with deliverable definition 

and delegation. The negotiation should end with acceptance by the designated 

personnel for the responsibility to complete the deliverable in the required time. 

TEAM 

MEMBER 

TEAM 

MEMBER 

TEAM 

MEMBER 

SECURITY 

MANAGER 

TEAM 

MEMBER 

TEAM 

MEMBER 

SEPP 

Program Plan 

T&V 

Assessment 

Training and 

Exercises 

Updates and 

Revisions 

Capabilities 

Review 

Procedures 

Update 

Design and 

Technology Review 

Figure 9: Sample Assignment Matrix 

3.8 Preparing the SEPP 

On the CD-ROM accompanying this Guide, there is a folder that contains a 

planning template that can be used by transportation personnel to create their 

system’s own SEPP. This template is not intended to be the end product for any 

transportation system. It should be customized to reflect local needs and issues, 

documenting actual activities performed by the system. 

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3.9 Comprehensiveness of the 

Plan 

When completing the draft 

template, management and its 

supporting committees should 

examine the plan to ensure that 

it is comprehensive. SEPP plans 

should address all system 

activity for security and emergency preparedness. To meet 

this objective, make sure the 

plan adequately addresses the 

purpose, scope, responsibilities, 

and implementation involved 

with the plan. 

3.9.1 Purpose 

Employee Considerations 

During major emergency/disaster conditions one 

consistent and successful activity employers have 

discovered is that in order for their employees to 

report to, and remain at work, they must be 

comfortable that their families are safe and 

unharmed. loyers should develop plans and 

procedures that allow a designated agency 

representative(s) to locate employee family members 

so that indirect communication can be maintained. 

The agency should encourage employees to maintain 

and submit, for example, a Family Member Locator 

Plan that details contact information for family 

members and loved ones. 

The agency’s plan and/or procedures should provide 

policies on what and how information will be 

disseminated and collected. Each employee should 

be given a copy of the plan and policy and share this 

with his/her own family members. 

Emp

SEPP plans usually contain a statement, often at the beginning of the 

plan, describing the reason it is being established and any associated 

goals. This purpose provides a key motivator for the system and is often 

unique to the culture and operation of the service. It should be stated that 

the security plan is an integral portion of the safety plan and program. 

3.9.2 Scope 

SEPP plans should define the level of organization covered. Does it 

include planning, design, construction, and procurement, or only 

revenue-service? How extensively are human resources, passenger 

services, legal counsel, and risk management involved in the 

implementation of the plan? The plan should also include specific 

information about the personnel, equipment, facilities, and services being 

covered. 

3.9.3 Responsibilities 

SEPP plans assign appropriate responsibilities to operators, supervisors, 

managers, and department heads. For instance, management is 

responsible for general compliance in order to satisfy the requirements 

and goals of the plan. The human resource department is responsible for 

implementing specific penalties and disciplinary actions to ensure 

enforcement of the policy. Department supervisors may also need to 

take on this disciplinary role. These responsibilities must be clearly 

defined for effective implementation. 

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3.9.4 Implementation 

SEPP plans should provide for implementation and ongoing evaluation. 

They should define the reports, inspections, training, committee 

meetings, and/or other activities to ensure that employees fully 

understand the system’s security and emergency response procedures. 

3.10 Clarity of the Plan 

Management should examine the plan to see if it is clear, concise, and accurate. 

SEPPs should not require activities or commit to programs that are not feasible for 

the system or unfamiliar to employees. Plans should be clear, concise, and 

accurate. 

⇒ The plan should be readable and its meaning should be clear. It must have 

the appropriate procedures and practices referenced. 

⇒ The plan should not attempt to document and explain every security and 

emergency activity performed by employees. Rather, the plan should 

provide a security management tool that emphasizes processes, roles, 

responsibilities, and accountability. Specific procedures should be 

referenced, but not included. 

⇒ Most security plans will be publicly available under the Freedom of 

Information Act (FOIA). In the event of a potential legal action or media 

inquiry, these plans must describe system operations. An incomplete or inprogress plan is far preferable to a plan that exaggerates security capabilities 

and requirements. Those who must implement the plan and earn additional 

respect and credibility for the security program will also appreciate accuracy. 

3.11 From Plan to Procedure 

Management should examine the relationship between the plan and its supporting 

procedures. SEPP plans should explain how the program will be managed and how 

general policies will be addressed by the system. 

⇒ Procedures should detail how things are actually done. Procedures give 

plans their teeth and operating reality, but are not included as part of the plan 

(only referenced). 

⇒ The system’s rulebook, bulletins, notices, or special orders should 

consistently address the activity required in the SEPP plan. 

⇒ In the event that few procedures are documented for the program, some 

employees may resist an effort to create them. But, what happens when they 

are not there? How will an off-peak emergency be managed if no one has 

contact names and phone numbers, or knows how to reach a specific agency 

(the coroner’s office, for example) or a specialized vendor to make an 

immediate repair on a vital piece of security equipment? 

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3.12 Growth of the Plan 

Management needs to examine the plan to make sure it can grow with the program. 

SEPP plans should remain open to change based on new risks and vulnerability, 

especially following an incident. Management of training exercises and actual 

incidents provides some of the greatest opportunities to improve processes, 

policies, and procedures. This offers a small window of opportunity to make 

changes while organizational inertia is temporarily suspended. Management 

should ensure that the plan takes advantage of these special conditions and 

circumstances. 

3.13 Integrating the SEPP into Local Planning 

Effective response does not happen by accident. It is the result of planning, 

training, exercising, and intra/interagency cooperation, coordination, and 

communication. Integration into the local community’s emergency planning 

process is central to the success of the SEPP and to the preparedness of the system. 

In the SEPP, the transportation system will have defined its internal processes for 

identifying security events, mitigating their consequences, and managing effective 

response. For some systems, the process of preparing the SEPP and documenting 

preparedness for security and other events may be sufficient planning. For other 

systems, the SEPP is but one in a series of plans that document the system’s 

emergency response capabilities and performance requirements. Whatever the 

system’s position and resources regarding the appropriate documentation of its 

emergency program, coordination with the local community is essential to 

successfully fulfill all SEPP functions. These include proactive planning, 

exercising and training, threat mitigation, consequence management planning and 

implementation, and an after action report. 

Local, state, and federal emergency managers use an all-hazards approach in 

developing comprehensive preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery plans 

for man-made and natural disasters. Planners set up basic disaster functions (i.e., 

rescue, sheltering, and medical care) and assign agencies and volunteer groups at 

the local, state, and federal levels to carry them out. Responders have the 

responsibility to implement these plans and to work within their legal authorities 

and capabilities to resolve critical incidents. The transportation system should be 

included in this process and reflect its activities as appropriate. For review and 

consideration, sample transportation emergency plans are included on the Guide 

CD-ROM. 

The agencies in Figure 10 are considered key players in planning for and 

responding to WMD terrorism and other major emergencies. 

3.13.1 Local Government 

Local governments have primary responsibility in planning for and 

managing the consequences of a terrorist incident using available 

resources in the critical hours before state and federal assistance can 

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arrive. Public transportation systems coordinate their emergency 

response functions through integration into this local planning effort. 

Though local planning guidelines will direct initial response to acts of 

terrorism and other major events, these guidelines reflect requirements 

specified by state and federal agencies for incorporating additional 

resources to manage major events. 

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TIER ONE: LOCAL PLANNING AND RESPONSE 

LOCAL 

EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY (EMA) 

LOCAL 

EMERGENCY 

PLANNING 

COMMITTEE 

(LEPC) 

MEDICAL 

RESPONDERS 

(HOSPITALS, 

CLINICS, 

DOCTORS) 

LOCAL EMERGENCY 

RESPONDERS 

(LAW ENFORCEMENT, FIRE, 

EMS, HAZMAT, ETC.) 

OTHER LOCAL RESPONDERS: 

CERTs; PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION; 

PUBLIC WORKS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS; 

VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS, ETC. 

TIER TWO: REGIONAL AND STATE PLANNING AND RESPONSE 

REGIONAL 

MUTUAL AID 

RESPONDERS 

(OTHER LOCAL 

JURISDICTIONS) 

STATE 

EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY OR 

DEPARTMENT OF 

PUBLIC SAFETY 

STATE LAW 

ENFORCEMENT 

AND FIRE 

SERVICES 

STATE 

DEPARTMENT OF 

PUBLIC HEALTH 

STATE 

DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

STATE NATIONAL 

GUARD 

OTHER STATE 

DEPARTMENTS 

AND RESOURCES 

TIER THREE: FEDERAL PLANNING AND RESPONSE 

OFFICE OF 

HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

NUCLEAR 

REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

FEDERAL BUREAU 

OF 

INVESTIGATION 

DEPARTMENTS OF 

HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES, 

TRANSPORTATION, 

AND ENERGY 

FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY 

U.S. MILITARY 

(INCLUDING 

COAST GUARD 

AND CORPS OF 

ENGINEERS) 

ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

CENTERS FOR 

DISEASE 

CONTROL 

Figure 10: Agencies Involved in Planning 

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Federal departments and agencies have developed plans and capabilities 

for an integrated federal response to terrorist incidents and other major 

emergencies. This response network is detailed in the Federal Response 

Plan (FRP), including its Terrorism Incident Annex. The FRP is 

managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and 

addresses the following federal regulations: 

⇒ US Public Law 920, as amended (US Civil Defense Act); 

⇒ US Public Law 93-288, as amended (Robert T. Stafford Act); 

⇒ US Public Law 99-499, as amended (Superfund Amendment and 

Reauthorization Act [SARA] of 1986); 

⇒ Federal regulations 10 CFR 70, 10 CFR 71, 10 CFR 73, 44 CFR 

350, 49 CFR 171, 49 CFR 172, 49 CFR 173, 49 CFR 177; 

⇒ NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Revision 1 and related Guidance 

Memoranda; 

⇒ FEMA REP-5: Guidance for Developing State, Tribal, and Local 

Radiological Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness for 

Transportation Accidents; 

⇒ Federal Response Plan (for Public Law 93-288, as amended); 

⇒ Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), as 

amended; and 

⇒ National Guard Regulation (AR) 500-1/National Guard Regulation 

(AF) 55-5. 

Through these requirements, federal agencies have identified specific 

responsibilities to be carried out or required by state departments and 

government. This combined system has generated three primary sets of 

guidelines for local governments, promulgated by state governments in 

response to federal requirements. Public transportation systems, in their 

programs for local emergency response planning, must work within this 

established framework. 

3.13.2 State Government Emergency Planning Program 

State government programs typically require county-level emergency 

management, administered by county emergency management agencies 

(EMAs) or equivalent organizations, and may require or recommend 

municipal programs for urbanized areas meeting specific requirements. 

These state regulations also typically specify conditions to be met for 

receipt of state funds and resources in the event of an incident that 

overwhelms local resources. State requirements are usually coordinated 

with US Public Law 93-288 (Robert T. Stafford Act) and overseen by 

FEMA as requisites for the receipt for funding in the event of 

presidential declarations of disaster. 

State requirements for emergency planning are typically detailed in the 

state emergency operations plan (EOP) that addresses state-wide 

activities to be performed in the event of occurrences that exceed the 

capabilities of local and regional resources. For planning purposes, these 

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events typically include natural disasters, technological hazards, civil 

emergencies, and national security events. 

Public transportation roles and responsibilities, typically identified in 

state EOPs and organized according to the ESF structure, appear in 

Figure 11. 

TRANSPORTATION SERVICE FRP ESFs AGENCY 

Community Evacuation & Shelter; 

Transport of Responders & Equipment 

ESF #1 

Transportation 

Department of Transportation 

Transport of Communications 

Equipment, Infrastructure, & 

Dispatchers 

ESF #2 

Communications 

National Communication System 

Damage Assessment, Emergency 

Repair, & Traffic Control 

ESF #3 

Public Works/ 

Engineering 

Corps of Engineers 

Transport of Equipment, Meals and the 

Provision of Shelter to Responders 

ESF #4 

Firefighting 

Department of Agriculture/ 

Forest Service 

Rosters of Mobility-impaired & Transitdependent Residents, Public Information 

ESF #5 

Information/Planning 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) 

First Aid Training, Vehicles to Support 

Victim Transport & Supplies, Managing 

School Children & Mobility-Impaired 

ESF #6 

Mass Care 

American Red Cross 

Vehicles; Towing Equipment; 

Generators and Other Essential Items 

ESF #7 

Resource Support 

General Services Administration 

N/A ESF #8 

Health/Medical Services 

Health & Human Services and other 

Public Health Services 

Metal Workers & Other Skilled or 

Specialized Labor or Equipment 

ESF #9 

Urban Search & Rescue 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) 

Contractors for clean-up, Traffic Control ESF #10 

Hazardous Materials 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Vehicles for Transportation of Goods & 

Supplies 

ESF #11 

Food 

Department of Agriculture 

Fuel & Electricity ESF #12 

Energy 

Department of Energy 

Figure 11: Possible Transportation Responsibilities 

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Typical objectives for state EOPs include: 

⇒ maximizing the protection of lives and property; 

⇒ ensuring state and local capabilities are in place for emergencies; 

⇒ ensuring that the government is able to survive and continue to 

provide essential services under adverse conditions; 

⇒ supporting local units of government, as necessary; 

⇒ describing standards regarding training and exercising activities, 

plan maintenance, and other preparedness activities; and 

⇒ ensuring that all current state and federal government planning 

requirements are met, maintaining eligibility for receipt of federal 

funds and support. 

Most state EOPs are divided into a basic plan and annexes. The basic plan focuses 

first and foremost on the assignment of emergency responsibilities and general 

operations policies. The annexes elaborate on the emergency responsibility 

assignments made in the basic plan and are of principal value to those within an 

agency or department who are responsible for carrying out such assignments. 

Annexes often mirror emergency support functions (ESFs) specified in the federal 

response plan. 

3.13.3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Requirements 

NRC requirements mandate a comprehensive emergency response and 

exercising program to protect public health and safety in communities 

that support nuclear reactors and commercial nuclear power plants. This 

program must address: 

⇒ on-site emergency response and evacuation at the nuclear power 

plant; and 

⇒ off-site response and evacuation for the community surrounding 

the nuclear power plant, including a plume emergency planning 

zone with a radius of 10 miles from the plant and an ingestion 

planning zone within a radius of 50 miles from the plant. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approves on-site plans. 

Approval of off-site plans is coordinated between the NRC and FEMA. 

Both onsite and offsite plans must be approved for every nuclear plant to 

obtain and retain an operating license. 

3.13.4 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 

The EPCRA is also known as Title III of the superfund amendments and 

reauthorization act (SARA) regulations that specify requirements for 

businesses and for federal, state, and local governments regarding 

emergency planning and community right-to-know (CRTK) reporting for 

hazardous chemicals. The CRTK provision in the EPCRA helped to 

increase awareness of chemicals in local communities and the releases of 

these toxins into the environment. Most State legislatures have also 

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enacted CRTK laws that are consistent with federal law. As a result, 

states and communities, working with the industry, are better able to 

protect public health and the environment. Congress enacted the EPCRA 

regulations to benefit communities. The main goals of the law are: 

⇒ to provide a basis for each community to develop and tailor a 

chemical emergency planning and response program to suit the 

community’s needs and 

⇒ to provide the public with a right-to-know attitude to identify, 

quantify, locate, and determine the physical and chemical 

properties of hazardous substances in the community. 

Under the federal EPCRA law, local emergency planning committees 

(LEPCs) must be established for each community. The LEPC must 

develop an emergency response plan and review it at least annually 

thereafter. Section 321 of EPCRA states that nothing in EPCRA will 

preempt any state or local law. Thus, existing state law governs local 

emergency management planning as long as it meets the requirements of 

EPCRA. Most states have determined that planning by local emergency 

management jurisdictions will meet the requirements of EPCRA, if it 

integrates EPCRA requirements into the existing multi-hazard functional 

plan. A basic emergency management plan that addresses the following 

functions normally will fulfill the requirement for local emergency 

planning under Section 303 of EPCRA: 

⇒ warning; 

⇒ shelter and mass care; 

⇒ evacuation; 

⇒ emergency public information; 

⇒ resource management; and 

⇒ hazardous materials response. 

In most situations, the LEPC does not develop a separate plan, but assists 

local governments in carrying out emergency planning related to 

hazardous materials. In this capacity, the LEPC provides an important 

resource useful to all local responders, ensuring that each local 

emergency response plan: 

⇒ identifies facilities and transportation routes of extremely 

hazardous substances; 

⇒ describes emergency response procedures, (onsite and offsite) for 

facilities and operations that manage hazardous materials; 

⇒ designates a community emergency coordinator and facility 

coordinator(s) to implement the plan; 

⇒ describes methods for determining the occurrence of a release, the 

probable affected area, and population; and performing release 

notification 

⇒ describes community and industry emergency equipment, 

facilities, and the identity of persons responsible for them; and 

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Developing the Security and Emergency Preparedness Program (SEPP) 

⇒ outlines evacuation plans; 

⇒ describes a training program for emergency response personnel 

(including schedules); and 

⇒ presents methods and schedules for exercising emergency response 

plans to emergency medical personnel, fire service, and law 

enforcement agencies. 

3.13.5 Inter-organizational Emergency Memoranda of Understanding 

Inter-organizational Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or 

Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) can serve as the basis of mutual 

acknowledgement of the local, state, region, and Federal resources that 

each organization may provide during emergency response and recovery 

efforts. MOUs can take many different forms including formal or 

written as well as oral agreements6

. Public transportation systems 

developing or entering inter-organizational MOUs may choose to include 

the following elements: 

⇒ A list of participating emergency response organizations, including 

contact information of approving officials 

⇒ Definition of jurisdictional boundaries for primary responding 

organizations 

⇒ Detailed definition of the chain of command and control, 

communication, and evacuation procedures and responsibilities to 

followed at the scene of the incident 

⇒ A statement to address potential changes in protocols 

⇒ Identification and description of equipment resources to be made 

available for incident response 

⇒ Description of public transportation system personnel and their 

duties 

⇒ Training and exercising responsibilities 

⇒ Provisions for revision(s) to the MOU 

⇒ Provision for the identification and documentation of costs to be 

tracked for potential reimbursement 

6

 Appendix F provides a sample Memorandum of Understanding between a public transportation 

agency and a local public safety agency. 

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4 Capabilities Assessment 

There is growing recognition that, in order to be truly effective in the new threat 

environment, transportation systems should commit to the first directive of system 

security, which is to prevent first, then be prepared to respond. 

Capabilities assessment provides an opportunity for the transportation system to 

take a step back from day-to-day operations, and to identify its security and 

emergency preparedness activities as part of a comprehensive program. In this 

assessment, the transportation system evaluates its existing capability to: 

⇒ reduce the threat of crime and other intentional acts; 

⇒ recognize, mitigate, and resolve incidents that occur in service and on system 

property; 

⇒ protect passengers, employees, emergency responders, and the environment 

during emergency operations; and 

⇒ support community response to a major event. 

This activity also contributes three key elements the SEPP program: 

⇒ an inventory of resources available to support response to an emergency 

event (either on the transportation system or in the surrounding community); 

⇒ a list of roles and responsibilities for the transportation system in managing 

incidents on its own property and in supporting community response; and 

⇒ notebooks for all major facilities containing critical information for on-scene 

responders. 

The results are documented in a checklist or report delivered to top management, 

and used to guide both the threat and vulnerability assessment (discussed in Section 

5 of this Guide) and the preparation of recommendations for activities to be 

performed in the SEPP plan. Table 6, at the end of this section, contains a 

summary findings checklist, followed by a detailed worksheet that can be used to 

guide the capabilities assessment. 

4.1 Establish the Team 

The system’s security manager, supported by system security and/or preparedness 

committees, a consultant, or an ad hoc planning team, initiates the assessment by 

assembling a multidisciplinary team with sufficient expertise in transportation 

operations, security, and emergency response to yield a comprehensive approach 

without draining scarce resources of the system. 

To solicit support from local response and planning agencies, the security manager 

should also consider inviting participation from local public safety agencies. In 

addition, team members may use existing relationships to seek public safety 

personnel review of relevant planning areas, such as security procedures for 

managing bomb threats, unusual events reports, and abandoned items or suspicious 

substances. The security manager may also consider giving a presentation 

regarding the team’s activities to local law enforcement, fire and medical services, 

and the local EMA or LEPC. 

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Capabilities assessments can demonstrate to the local community that 

transportation management is genuinely concerned about security, emergency 

preparedness, accountability, and has the best interests of the community in mind 

when managing facilities and continuing service. 

4.2 Program Review 

Depending on the system’s current level of security and emergency preparedness, 

the team may conduct its initial activities by reviewing existing plans and 

procedures or by documenting existing practices that may not be formally 

committed to writing. Whatever the system’s status, the team should consider 

emphasizing the areas illustrated in Figure 12. 

SECURITY 

MASTER 

PLANNING 

ACTIVITIES 

PROGRAM REVIEW 

EXISTING 

PLANS 

STANDARD 

OPERATING 

PROCEDURE 

(SOP) REVIEW 

AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS/ 

DISASTER 

PLANNING 

FACILITY/ONSITE SECURITY 

REVIEW 

Figure 12: Capabilities Assessment Program Review 

Once the team has been established, the real work of the assessment begins. This 

activity requires the team to: 

⇒ identify all activities currently performed by the system to address security 

and emergency response issues and 

⇒ display the system’s physical security, management, training, and emergency 

response capabilities. 

4.2.1 Existing Plans 

The capabilities assessment typically begins by reviewing the system’s 

existing plans for safety, security, and emergency response, if they are 

developed or available. These include: 

⇒ System Safety Program Plan; 

⇒ System Security Program Plan; 

⇒ Safety and Security Certification Program Plan; 

⇒ Emergency Operations Plan; and 

⇒ Terrorism or Homeland Security Plan. 

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These plans should be reviewed for content addressing security and 

emergency preparedness activities. When conducting this assessment, 

the system may be in the process of developing its SEPP plan, so this 

activity provides an additional opportunity to review practices under 

consideration for the SEPP plan. 

At the conclusion of this component of the assessment, the team should 

indicate in the assessment checklist the progress of the system’s planning 

process, document the types of activities are documented in these plans, 

and clearly identify the system’s planning assumptions regarding 

response to a major terrorist event on its property. 

4.2.2 Security Master Planning 

The program review generally considers the short and long term security 

design requirements currently in place, as they relate to facility 

infrastructure, policies and procedures, security operations, and existing 

security systems. These master planning elements typically include the 

following: 

⇒ the system’s physical security measures to delay and deter the 

potential offender and to ensure heightened awareness regarding 

potential threats and vulnerabilities; 

⇒ the system’s equipment and procedures in place to detect and 

assess unauthorized and/or unusual or unattended activities, 

packages, and substances; 

⇒ the system’s technology used for security systems management, 

operations, and response; and 

⇒ the system’s procedures essential for effective security system 

operation. 

At the conclusion of this component of the assessment, the team should 

indicate in the assessment checklist what security equipment and 

procedures are currently in place at the system and general assessments 

regarding the level of procedural integration of this equipment into 

transportation operations. 

4.2.3 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Review and Development 

The program review also addresses the system’s current process to 

ensure SOP development and documentation, including: 

⇒ the system’s policy regarding employee responsibilities for the 

identification and reporting of unusual conditions; 

⇒ the provision of appropriate personnel and resources to ensure 

effective notification and management of these conditions, 

coordinating with local emergency responders as appropriate; and 

⇒ the system’s training, exercising, and assessment to initiate and 

maintain response capabilities and coordinate with local 

responders. 

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It is axiomatic in security that employees and contractors can serve as the 

eyes and ears of a system-wide security effort. Employees and 

contractors see much that occurs in and around the transportation 

operation and are in a good position to notice when something or 

someone seems out-of-place. Training and awareness measures can 

transform employees and contractors into a natural surveillance system. 

Security managers may reinforce personnel training in security practices 

through bulletins, e-mailed security reminders, security tips posted on the 

system’s intranet, advice and contact numbers in internal publications, 

and the distribution of security-related videos, pamphlets, wallet-cards, 

and posters. This activity should also be identified in the assessment. 

Most transportation systems typically investigate unusual occurrences, 

reported incidents, and security breaches. Where appropriate, 

transportation management may refer such incidents to legal counsel for 

review. Any suspected illegal activity should be reported for referral to 

law enforcement. Criteria for these investigations should be identified in 

the assessment, and typically include: 

⇒ doors not secured, holes in fence lines, indication of illegal entry; 

⇒ unauthorized egress by personnel in restricted areas of the facility; 

⇒ signs of vehicles in restricted areas along pipelines, fence lines, 

electrical substations, or remote plant security gates; 

⇒ individual asking for technical information about the facility that 

could be used by an adversary to cause harm; 

⇒ unexplained disruptions in service; 

⇒ unexplained loss of parts and equipment; 

⇒ unexplained illness of many transportation employees ; and 

⇒ major cyber attack against internal process control systems. 

At the conclusion of this component of the assessment, the team should 

indicate in the checklist whether policies and procedures have been 

developed to address particular security and preparedness topics and 

whether employees have received training on new procedures. 

4.2.4 Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Planning 

The program review also assesses system activity to review or develop 

response contingencies for security events that impact facility operations 

and personnel, resulting in emergencies. This activity also may address 

the review or development of procedures to protect life and assets, and to 

maintain continuity of business systems and operations in response to 

acts of terrorism and extreme violence. Efforts assessed might include 

developing contingency plans and procedures, creating comprehensive 

emergency plans, and providing training sessions to staff. 

Emergency response and crisis management are natural functions that 

responsible security managers may perform for their systems. Proper 

crisis management may prevent an intrusion or attack from becoming a 

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major incident. In the transportation industry, emergency response and 

crisis management functions are especially complicated and may require 

specialized knowledge on the part of responders. A few measures that 

managers may currently perform include activities to: 

⇒ implement an emergency response plan that fits system needs and 

resources; 

⇒ Provide employees with information regarding the well-being of 

family members; 

⇒ account for employees and visitors during emergencies; 

⇒ attempt to preserve evidence for later investigations; and 

⇒ manage a crisis communication system for key personnel and 

security staff so that they can: 

o signal for help surreptitiously (with duress alarms, for 

example); 

o keep a small incident from escalating into a large one; and 

o easily contact other key staff members during a crisis (by any 

means, including intercoms, mobile and land-line telephones, 

e-mail, and two-way radios). 

At the conclusion of this component of the assessment, the team should 

indicate emergency response and planning activities performed and 

identify, based on this activity, the likely roles and responsibilities 

assumed by the transportation system in supporting emergencies on its 

property and within the community. 

A sample listing of activities that could be performed during emergencies 

includes: 

⇒ emergency evacuation of citizens from affected area(s), 

coordinated with local law enforcement, the local Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC), the state Department of Transportation, 

and local highway, bridge and tunnel authorities; 

⇒ identification and transportation of citizens with disabilities and 

those citizens dependent on public transportation who may be 

unable to reach an evacuation staging area; 

⇒ evacuation of schools and day-care centers, and support for 

managing the reuniting of parents and children in the immediate 

aftermath of a major event; 

⇒ temporary or in-place sheltering of evacuated citizens in airconditioned or heated vehicles and stations; 

⇒ transportation, in-facility transfer, or evacuation of hospitals, 

nursing homes, hospices, and other community and private 

facilities; 

⇒ transportation of emergency workers and volunteers to and from an 

emergency staging site; 

⇒ transportation of meals, goods, and supplies to an affected area for 

victims, emergency responders, or to support recovery operations; 

⇒ provision of respite facilities and vehicles for emergency workers; 

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⇒ communications support for emergency responders (using handheld and on-board vehicle radios, alpha-numeric pagers and Palm 

Pilots, cell phones, transportation dispatch facilities, and 

transportation communications infrastructure); 

⇒ identification of routes and schedules to support the safe 

transportation of emergency responders, public utilities, support 

personnel, and other essential responders to an incident site or 

staging area; 

⇒ provision of vehicles and equipment to support emergency 

operations and incident stabilization; 

⇒ provision of estimates and information regarding the application of 

available resources to the movement of people or supplies; 

⇒ provision of skilled craftsmen and heavy equipment to support 

initial debris removal during search and rescue operations; 

⇒ provision of fuel, parts, supplies, and mechanics to support the 

maintenance of emergency vehicles; 

⇒ provision of damage assessments and emergency repairs; and 

⇒ provision of public information on agency websites and using 

public relations facilities and capabilities. 

Untested response capabilities for weapons of mass destruction, explored 

by several communities over the last five years as part of the NunnLugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program, include the following: 

⇒ use of transportation sprinkler systems and water supplies to 

support mass decontamination; 

⇒ use of vehicle wash and maintenance facilities to decontaminate 

emergency vehicles and equipment; 

⇒ provision of vehicle support for warm zone operations with trained 

bus operators using personal protective equipment (PPE); 

⇒ use of vehicles or facilities as temporary morgues; 

⇒ use of on-scene vehicles to provide barriers, shields, and shelter for 

contaminated, or potentially contaminated, victims who must 

disrobe; 

⇒ use of in-place, transportation system contracts with hazardous 

waste management companies to support site clean-up and 

decontamination; 

⇒ use of transportation personnel with basic first-aid training to 

support emergency or secondary triage and tagging of victims; 

⇒ use of transportation vehicles for mobile command posts and 

secondary backup communications centers; and 

⇒ integration of automated station and vehicle announcements and 

passenger information displays with local and regional ITS 

technology to support centralized management of passenger, 

pedestrian, and vehicle management from the community’s 

emergency operations center (EOC). 

At the conclusion of this component of the assessment, the transportation 

system should also complete the worksheet displayed in Figure 13 

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designed to communicate its response capabilities and resources to the 

local emergency planning community. 

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Vehicles Provided by Transit System -- Please Complete Information 

on Available Vehicles: 

Facilities Provided by Transit System -- Please 

Check If Available: 

S Communications center 

S Evacuation shelter for 

_____persons 

S Evacuation shelter for 

_____persons 

S Evacuation shelter for 

_____persons 

S Evacuation shelter for 

_____persons 

S First aid and care center S Goods and supplies storage center 

S Other: 

Services Provided by Transit System -- Please 

Check If Available: 

S Surplus transportation for emergency response 

personnel 

S Shelter or respite facilities for emergency 

response personnel 

S Transport of emergency equipment and 

supplies 

S Evacuation assistance S Public information 

S Transportation of “medically fragile” 

populations 

S Communications support 

S Traffic control/roadblocks/barriers 

S Damage assessments and emergency repairs 

S Other:

_________________ 

S Other:

_________________ 

S Other:

_________________ 

Vehicle Type 

Number pacity LiftEquipped Heating/Air Conditioned 

Buses 

Rail 

Cars 

Other 

Passenger 

Support 

Vehicles 

Equipment Provided by Transit System -- Please Check If Available: 

Communications: 

____2-way radios ____Cellular Phones 

____Hand-held radios ____Palm pilots 

____

Radio trunking capabilities ____Internet-based 

____

Automated dispatch ____Mobile data terminals 

____Alpha-numeric pagers ____Other 

Other: 

____Generators ____Towing Equipment 

____Metal working ____Vehicle cleaning 

____

Fueling/maintenance facilities ____Other 

Perso

System 

Gener

S S S 

S S S S 

Specia

Inform

Please 

S S 

S 

S 

S 

Size/Ca

Figure 13: Transportation System Resources 

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4.2.5 Facility or On-Site Security Review 

The program review concludes with an assessment of ongoing activity to 

review the system's physical and procedural security systems and 

exposures. Findings from past and current threat and vulnerability 

assessment and design reviews may be of particular significance. 

The conditions surrounding a security effort change constantly. 

Employees come and go, a facility’s contents and layout may change, 

various threats wax and wane, and operations may vary. Even such 

mundane changes as significant growth of bushes or trees around a 

facility’s exterior may affect the security plan (by shielding the view of 

any intruders). The assessment should document activities performed by 

managers to review their security measures periodically, as well as 

whenever facilities or other conditions change significantly. It may also 

be useful to system activity for the following: 

⇒ update risk assessments and site surveys; 

⇒ review the level of employee and contractor compliance with 

security procedures; 

⇒ consider whether those procedures need modification; and 

⇒ establish ongoing testing and maintenance of security systems 

(such as access control, intrusion detection, and video 

surveillance). 

Figure 14 provides an example of the types of information typically 

collected during this phase of the assessment. This information can also 

support preparation of information folders or notebooks for each major 

facility. These materials can support emergency responders who may 

not be familiar with the site, and also enhance the system’s capabilities to 

identify resources. 

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⇒ Location or address and nearby businesses and resources 

⇒ Type of facility and typical uses by employees and passengers 

⇒ Daytime or nighttime population 

⇒ 24-hour points of contact 

⇒ Voice, pager, beeper, and email information for facility 

⇒ Unique hazards in facility (traction power, hazardous material storage, etc.) 

⇒ Past threat history 

⇒ Key dates for community 

⇒ Floor plans and blue prints 

⇒ Photos (ground level, aerial, key exits and entrances, proposed staging 

areas) 

⇒ Heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC) system characteristics 

⇒ Blast analyses (if performed) 

⇒ Procedures for controlling ventilation in response to toxic material release 

⇒ Location of vents to street level and air out-take locations 

⇒ Communications capabilities, accounting for radio dead spots and 

emergency phones 

⇒ Location of equipment rooms and available power, water, and lighting 

(primary and backup) 

⇒ Pre-designated emergency response support locations, including 

predetermined evacuation sites, command posts, and decontamination 

facilities 

⇒ Evacuation plans 

Figure 14: Characteristics of Transportation Sites 

4.3 Documenting Results 

At the completion of this assessment, the team should have an understanding of 

where the system is in terms of its current program. This understanding of the 

system’s security and emergency preparedness capability can be documented in a 

memorandum, minutes from team meetings, or in a checklist, like the one provided 

in Table 6. 

4.3.1 Note on Use 

The checklist has been prepared to summarize issues for consideration by 

transportation personnel in reviewing the security and emergency 

preparedness of their current operations. Its objective is to help each 

system identify its current baseline regarding security and emergency 

preparedness activities. This checklist is generic and must be tailored by 

the system to its particular operation, facilities, personnel, and 

assessment of need. To support tailoring, this checklist provides four 

check boxes for responding to questions. 

⇒ YES indicates the system performs the activity. 

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⇒ NO indicates the system does not perform the activity, but perhaps 

should consider it. 

⇒ N/A indicates the activity is not applicable to the operation, size, 

mode of service, or management of the system. 

⇒ COMMENT indicates that the transportation system has made an 

observation or finding regarding that specific activity. Comments 

should be attached to the checklist using additional sheets of paper. 

A detailed worksheet is located in Appendix D that provides additional 

information to determine the applicability of a particular checklist item to 

a system’s operation. 

Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

Section 1: Security Awareness & Threat Management 

1. Does your system check the Homeland Security Advisory Threat Condition 

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

2. Has your system performed a Terrorism Vulnerability Self-Assessment, as recommended 

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in cooperation with local law enforcement (see 

Appendix B)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

3. Does your system receive threat information and warnings from local law enforcement, 

state agencies, or other systems regarding local threat levels? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

4. Do personnel at your system keep informed of major community activities and events? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Are personnel at your system aware of ongoing law enforcement concerns regarding 

specific communities or events that may be targeted for terrorist activity? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

6. Have system personnel been trained to challenge people who do not appear to belong in 

restricted areas or who do not have the appropriate identification displayed? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

7. Does the system have procedures in place for reporting these occurrences in a manner 

that supports appropriate evaluation and decision-making by supervisors and management? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

8. Does the system have procedures in place for reporting these occurrences in a manner 

that supports appropriate evaluation and decision-making by supervisors and management? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

9. Does your system have policies in place to ensure that security, operations or 

maintenance personnel routinely check unattended public or open areas, such as rest 

rooms, stairways, parking garages, and elevators for unusual, out-of-place, or abandoned 

items? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

10. Has the system trained personnel on recognizing and reporting unusual, out-of-place, 

or unattended objects? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

11. Has your system reviewed its policies for managing these objects (i.e., identifying lostand-found items and reporting suspicious objects to management for further review)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

12. Has your system incorporated security checks into policies for pre-trip inspections, 

vehicle cleaning, and vehicle fueling? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

13. Have appropriate personnel at your system received and reviewed security and 

emergency management materials from the FTA? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

14. Have appropriate personnel at your system received security or emergency 

management training from the FTA or another source? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

Section 2: Security & Preparedness Planning 

1. Has management accepted responsibility for security vulnerabilities during the design, 

engineering, construction, testing, start-up, and operation of the transportation system 

related to rehabilitations, extensions, and modifications? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

2. Has Executive Management endorsed a policy to ensure that security vulnerabilities are 

identified, communicated, and resolved through a process promoting accountability for 

decisions made? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

3. Does your system have clear and unambiguous lines of authority and responsibility for 

ensuring that security is addressed at all organizational levels within the operation (including 

contractors)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

4. Does your system have access to personnel with security management experience, 

knowledge, skills, and abilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Does your system ensure that resources are effectively allocated to address security 

considerations? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

6. Is the protection of passengers, employees, contractors, emergency responders, and the 

general public a priority whenever activities are planned and performed at the system? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

7. Wherever possible, does your system guide design, engineering, and procurement 

activity with an agreed-upon set of security standards and requirements (including design 

criteria manuals, vehicle specifications, and contracting guidelines)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

8. Does your system routinely evaluate its capabilities to provide adequate assurance that 

the public and employees are protected from adverse consequences? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

9. Has your system committed to developing security mitigation measures to prevent and 

manage security vulnerabilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

10. Has your system appropriately documented its security measures in plans, procedures, 

training, and in project requirements, specifications, and contracts? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

11. Does your system have a formal system security program documented in a system 

security program plan? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

12. If yes, is the security plan current, reflecting current security operations and system 

configuration? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

13. If no, does your system have plans in place to develop a security plan? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

14. If no, prepare a brief list of all activities performed at your system that address security 

and preparedness concerns. (Include procedures for handling difficult people, 

workplace violence program, bomb threat management plan, procedures for identifying 

and reporting unusual occurrences, facility and vehicle evacuation and search 

procedures, coordination with local law enforcement, etc.) 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

Section 3: Security & Preparedness Management 

1. Does your system have a police or security department to implement the security 

program? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

If yes, please describe organization and existing capabilities of this department? 

Attach description. 

2. If no, does your system use adjunct security personnel to support security for 

administrative and non-revenue facilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

1. If no, describe the activities performed by your system to coordinate security response 

with local law enforcement? Include MOUs and any reports that may be received 

regarding the occurrence of crime at the transportation system. 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

Attach description. 

4. Does your system have specific plans for managing bomb threats, threats regarding the 

release chemical, biological or radioactive materials, and/or threats against specific 

individuals? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Does your system have specific plans to guide facility and vehicle evacuations and 

searches for unusual, out-of-place, or unattended packages? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

6. Does your system coordinate with local law enforcement to ensure timely and effective 

response to identify a potential explosive device or other hazardous material? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

7. Does your system coordinate its security activities with neighborhood watch programs, 

other community and business security programs, and school safety programs to support 

integrated and coordinated approaches to shared problems? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

8. Has your system reviewed its procedures for managing mail and deliveries to assess 

security considerations? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

9. Are your employees trained to recognize and report threatening behavior and those 

activities that could be associated with the placement of an explosive device or the potential 

release of a hostile agent into the transportation environment? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

10. Do your employees understand their roles and responsibilities for protecting 

passengers, other employees, and the general public from security threats? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

11. Have your employees received security-related training for dispute resolution and 

conflict management? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

12. Has your system developed a program to address workplace violence? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

13. Has your system provided local law enforcement and public safety organizations with 

transportation awareness training? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

Section 4: Threat & Vulnerability Assessment 

1. Has your system ever conducted a formal threat and vulnerability assessment? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

2. Does your system have a current listing of its critical assets? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

3. Does your system have a current description of physical and procedural security 

measures in place to protect these assets? 

4. Does your system have a current assessment of specific threats to its operation? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Has your system identified worst-case scenarios regarding security vulnerabilities to acts 

of terrorism and extreme violence? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

6. Has your system ever assessed its capabilities to identify and manage those activities 

that may indicate the release of a hostile agent in the transportation environment or 

placement of an explosive device? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

7. Does your system have a prioritized listing of current security vulnerabilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

8. Does your system have a current program in place to implement security measures that 

address these vulnerabilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

Section 5: Physical Security 

1. Does your system provide access control systems to protect administrative and nonrevenue facilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

2. Does your system require that employees wear badges or other forms of identification? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

3. Does your system have procedures in place to verify access authorization for visitors, 

contractors, and delivery personnel? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

4. Does your system have procedures to log non-routine entries (e.g., visitors, personnel 

during off-shift, and personnel not normally assigned) to administrative and non-revenue 

facilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Does your system have procedures to verify the identity of a visitor before issuing a 

badge, pass, or credential? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

6. Does your system have procedures to verify the access authorization of vehicles before 

they can be parked within 50 feet of administrative and non-revenue facilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

7. Does your system have inventory control procedures for access badges, uniforms, and 

equipment? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

8. Does your system have procedures for reporting stolen badges, uniforms, or equipment? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

9. Does your system issue advisories or bulletins regarding potential security threats? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

10. Does your system screen personnel and packages before providing access to secure 

facilities (control center, revenue collection facilities, etc.)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

11. Does your system authorize the search of hand-carried items or packages entering or 

leaving a security area? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

12. Does your system provide perimeter controls for administrative and non-revenue 

facilities, including fencing, gates, motion-detected lighting systems, etc.? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

13. Does your system routinely patrol and/or inspect exterior security area perimeter 

barriers to verify integrity and detect unauthorized objects or conditions (e.g., excessive soil 

erosion under fence)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

14. Does your system follow pre-determined procedures to lock down and open 

administrative, non-revenue and passenger facilities each day? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

15. Does your system have procedures to control the issuance of keys and combinations to 

locks and control panels? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

16. Are your administrative and non-revenue facilities protected with intrusion detection 

alarm systems? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

17. Are your administrative and non-revenue facilities covered by CCTV? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

18. Identify other security systems in place to protect your system’s administrative and nonrevenue facilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

19. Does your system use security technology to support monitoring and management of 

passengers in stations, terminals, and on vehicles (examples include CCTV, emergency 

telephones, designated passenger waiting areas; emergency alarms on buses, alarms and 

intercoms on trains, and public address systems in stations)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

20. scribe this technology. 

Attach description. 

If yes, please de

21. Has your system conducted blast hardening or mitigation as part of the station and 

administrative facility design or renovation process? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

22. Do vehicle barriers, blast barriers, or other perimeter controls that limit or deny direct 

vehicle access to critical assets protect your facilities? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

23. Please describe the security technology used by your police or security department (if 

applicable). 

Attach description. 

Section 6: Emergency Response Capabilities 

1. Does your system have an emergency plan? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

2. Does your system have emergency operating procedures? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

3. Does your system have an incident response plan for terrorism, as an appendix to the 

emergency plan or as a separate plan? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

4. Does your system coordinate with local public safety organizations on the development, 

implementation, and review of the emergency plan and procedures? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Does your emergency plan specify use of the incident command system? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

6. Have your employees been trained in the emergency plan and procedures? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

7. Does your system conduct routine simulation drills, tabletop exercises, and refresher 

training? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

8. Does your system coordinate its drilling and training for emergency response with local 

public safety organizations? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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Table 6: Summary Findings – Capabilities Assessment 

9. Does your system conduct briefings of after-action reports to assess performance during 

the simulation drill or exercise and identify areas in need of improvement? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

10. Have members of your system participated in domestic preparedness training programs 

sponsored by the federal government (FEMA, FBI, DOD, etc.)? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

11. Has your system participated in capabilities assessment readiness (CAR) exercise 

programs supported by the local EMA? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

Section 7: Previous Experience 

1. Has your system experienced an emergency in the last 12 months? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

2. If yes, were you satisfied with the system’s level of response? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

3. Has your system received a bomb threat in the last 12 months? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

4. Has your system evacuated its facilities in the last 12 months as the result of a bomb 

threat? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

5. Has your system conducted a physical search of a facility in response to a bomb threat? 

□ Yes □ No □ N/A □ Comment 

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5 Reducing Threat and Vulnerability 

Threat and vulnerability assessment provides an analytical process to consider the 

likelihood that a specific threat will endanger the system. Using the results of the 

capabilities assessment (discussed in Section 4 of this Guide), the threat and 

vulnerability analysis can also identify activities to be performed to reduce risk of 

an attack and mitigate its consequences. 

These assessments typically use a combination of quantitative and qualitative 

techniques to identify security requirements, including historical analysis of past 

events, intelligence assessments, physical surveys, and expert evaluation. When 

the risk of hostile acts is greater, these analysis methods may draw more heavily 

upon information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies regarding the 

capabilities and intentions of the aggressors. For example, recent experience with 

anthrax-tainted mail resulted in nation-wide dissemination of procedural changes 

for managing packages and letters, reflecting intelligence from the FBI and 

recommended practice from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC). 

Effective threat and vulnerability assessments typically include five elements: 

⇒ asset analysis; 

⇒ target or threat identification; 

⇒ vulnerability assessment; 

⇒ consequence analysis (scenarios); and 

⇒ countermeasure recommendation. 

These elements and their inter-relationships are presented graphically in Figure 15. 

5.1 Asset Analysis 

In security terms, assets are broadly defined as people, information, and property. 

In public transportation, the people include passengers, employees, visitors, 

contractors, vendors, nearby community members, and others who come into 

contact with system. Information includes operating and maintenance procedures, 

vehicle control and power systems, employee information, computer network 

configurations and passwords, and other proprietary information. The range of 

property that a security effort might wish to protect is presented in Table 7. 

In reviewing assets, the transportation system should prioritize which among them 

has the greatest consequences for people and the ability of the system to sustain 

service. These assets may require higher or special protection from an attack. In 

making this determination, the system may wish to consider: 

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Figure 15: Threat and Vulnerability Process 

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Table 7: Transportation Assets 

⇒ Passenger stations, stops and 

shelters 

⇒ Tenant facilities in passenger 

stations 

⇒ Passenger vehicles 

⇒ Structures (underground, atgrade and elevated) 

⇒ Passenger parking lots 

⇒ Vehicle control systems 

⇒ Communications systems 

⇒ Heavy maintenance facilities 

⇒ Service and inspection facilities 

⇒ Maintenance vehicles and 

equipment 

⇒ Backup power systems 

⇒ Fuel farms and generators 

⇒ Alternative fuel storage facilities 

⇒ Switches, signals and 

interlockings 

⇒ Grade crossings and automatic 

warning devices (gates, bells, 

flashers, and signs) 

⇒ Electrification Systems (3rd rail, 

overhead catenaries) 

⇒ Operations control centers 

⇒ Revenue collection facilities 

⇒ Vehicle storage facilities 

⇒ Wayside support and 

maintenance facilities 

⇒ Ancillary facilities and storage 

⇒ Employee parking lots 

⇒ Administrative facilities 

⇒ Transportation police/security 

facilities and communications 

systems 

⇒ the value of the asset, including current and replacement value; 

⇒ the value of the asset to a potential adversary; 

⇒ where the asset is located; 

⇒ how, when, and by whom an asset is accessed and used; and 

⇒ what is the impact, if these assets are lost, on passengers, employees, public 

safety organizations, the general public and the public transportation operation? 

Based on current intelligence, the FBI urges transportation systems serving 

communities with the following characteristics to consider themselves at a higher 

level of risk: 

⇒ availability of targets with symbolic meaning for the US government or the 

national culture and way of life; 

⇒ availability of targets with precursor elements for major destruction (chemical, 

nuclear, or radiological material); 

⇒ availability of targets whose destruction would provide the potential terrorist 

element (PTE) with visibility and prestige; 

⇒ availability of targets with the potential to significantly impact not only a single 

community, but also a state and the nation; 

⇒ availability of high-value targets (e.g., high replacement costs, high 

commercial impacts of delay and destruction, high loss on U.S. economy); 

⇒ availability of major targets that provide relative ease of access (for ingress and 

egress with equipment and personnel required for attack); and 

⇒ availability of targets that would produce mass casualties (in excess of 500 

persons). 

In a cooperative partnership with state and local law enforcement, the FBI has 

requested completion of vulnerability self-assessments, emphasizing the above 

characteristics for each community. Appendix B contains the full vulnerability 

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self-assessment supplied by the FBI, which is also included on the Guide CDROM. 

Using this worksheet, transportation systems can identify which assets in their 

operations would produce the greatest losses to the system and the community. 

Based on the results of this assessment, the transportation organization may wish to 

share a copy with local law enforcement or to include a representative from law 

enforcement in the assessment process, to support their understanding of the 

transportation function and role in the community. 

5.2 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences 

Information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences is presented 

below. 

5.2.1 Threats 

A threat is any action with the potential to cause harm in the form of 

death, injury, destruction, disclosure, interruption of operations, or denial 

of services. System facility threats include a number of hostile actions 

that can be perpetrated by criminals, disgruntled employees, terrorists, 

and others. 

Threat analysis defines the level or degree of the threats against a facility 

by evaluating the intent, motivation, and possible tactics of those who 

may carry them out. The process involves gathering historical data about 

hostile events and evaluating which information is relevant in assessing 

the threats against the facility. Some of the questions to be answered in a 

threat analysis are displayed below. 

⇒ What factors about the system invite potential hostility? 

⇒ How conspicuous is the transportation facility or vehicle? 

⇒ What political event(s) may generate new hostilities? 

⇒ Have facilities like this been targets in the past? 

Possible methods of carrying out hostile actions in the transportation 

environment are depicted in Table 8. Historical examples are provided 

for reference and consideration, as well as the types of weapons typically 

used in these attacks. 

5.2.2 Vulnerabilities 

A vulnerability is anything that can be taken advantage of to carry out a 

threat. This includes vulnerabilities in the design and construction of a 

facility, in its technological systems, and in the way a facility is operated 

(e.g., security procedures and practices or administrative and 

management controls). Vulnerability analysis identifies specific 

weaknesses with respect to how they may invite and permit a threat to be 

accomplished. 

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Table 8: Threats from Terrorism 

Type of Attack Historical Example Type of Weapons 

1995 GIA bombing of Paris Metro Planted Devices 

HAMAS suicide bombs on Israeli buses Suicide Bombs 

Explosive and (ongoing) 

Incendiary 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania Vehicle Bomb

Devices and Kenya 

2001 World Trade Center; Proximity Bombs; 

1990s abortion clinic bombings in GA; Incendiary Deices; 

1995 Oklahoma City Bombing Secondary Devices 

Exterior Attacks

2001 militant assaults on Indian-held mosques 

in Kashmir 

Rocks and Clubs; 

Improvised Devices; 

Molotov cocktails 

Stand-off Attacks Tamil Tiger’s July 2001 mortar attack & Anti-tank rockets; 

bombing of Sri Lanka’s National Airport Mortars 

Pistols; 

Ballistics Attacks Long Island Railroad Shootings; Columbine Handguns; 

High School Submachine guns; 

Shotguns 

Networked/ 

Inside Access: 

- Forced Entry 

- Covert Entry 

- Insider 

Compromise 

- Visual 

Surveillance 

- Acoustic/ 

Electronic 

Surveillance 

Amtrak Sunset Limited derailment 

1996 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 

taking of Japanese Ambassador’s resident and 

500 guests in Peru (access through disguise 

as waiters at the party) 

Hand, power and thermal 

tools; 

Explosives 

False credentials; 

Stolen uniforms and 

identification badges 

False pretenses, cell 

operations

Binoculars; 

Photographic Devices 

Listening Devices; 

Electronic-emanation 

surveillance equip. 

Cyber Attack Code Red Worm (2002) Worms, Viruses, Denial of 

Service Programs 

Chemical, 

Biological, 

Radiological, & 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin Gas Release in Chemical, biological, or 

radiological or nuclear 

Nuclear (CBRN) Tokyo Subway aerosolized 

Agent Release 

Vulnerabilities are commonly prioritized through the creation of 

scenarios that pair identified assets and threats. Using these scenarios, 

transportation agencies can evaluate the effectiveness of their current 

policies, procedures, and physical protection capabilities to address 

consequences. 

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5.2.3 Scenario Analysis 

Scenario analysis requires an interpretive methodology that encourages 

role-playing by transportation personnel, emergency responders, and 

contractors to brainstorm ways to attack the system. By matching threats 

to critical assets, transportation personnel can identify the capabilities 

required to support specific types of attacks. This activity promotes 

awareness and highlights those activities that can be preformed to 

recognize, prevent, and mitigate the consequences of attacks. 

The FBI recommends that transportation systems focus on the top 10% 

of identified critical assets (at a minimum). Using these assets, 

transportation personnel should investigate the most likely threats, 

considering the range of attack objectives and methods that may be used 

(such as disruption of traffic, destruction of bridge or roadway, airborne 

contamination, hazardous materials accident, and threat or attack with 

explosives intended to disrupt or destroy). The system should also 

consider the range of perpetrators, such as political terrorists, radicals, 

right-wing extremists, disgruntled employees, disturbed copycats, and 

others. 

When conducting the scenario analysis, the system may choose to create 

chronological scenarios (event horizons) that emphasize the worst 

credible scenario as opposed to the worse case scenario. Experienced 

transportation personnel, who have participated in transportation wargaming, recommend the investigation of worst-case scenarios. Results 

from this analysis are far more likely to produce recommendations 

appropriate for the size and operation of the system. Based on this type 

of assessment, as indicated in Tables 9 and 10, the transportation system 

may determine certain scenarios as relevant to bus and rail service. 

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Table 9: Relevant Bus Scenarios 

Bus Assets Most Probable Threats 

Bus stations 

and/or terminals 

⇒ High-yield vehicle bomb near station 

⇒ Lower-yield explosive device in station 

⇒ Armed hijacking, hostage, or barricade situation in station 

⇒ Chemical, biological, and nuclear release in station 

⇒ Secondary explosive device directed at emergency responders 

Bus vehicles 

⇒ Explosives placed on or under bus 

⇒ Improvised explosive device (pipe or fire bomb) on bus 

⇒ Chemical, biological, or nuclear release on bus 

⇒ Armed assault, hostage, or barricade situation on bus 

⇒ Secondary explosive device directed at emergency responders 

Fuel storage 

facilities ⇒ Explosives detonated in or near fuel facilities 

Command 

Control Center 

⇒ Physical or information attack on train control system 

⇒ Physical or information attack dispatch system 

⇒ Armed assault, hostage, or barricade situation 

⇒ Explosive device near or in Center 

⇒ Sabotage of train control system 

Table 10: Relevant Rail Scenarios 

Rail Assets Most Probable Threats 

Stations 

⇒ High-yield vehicle bomb near stations 

⇒ Lower-yield explosive device in station 

⇒ Armed hijacking, hostage, or barricade situation in station 

⇒ Chemical, biological, and nuclear release in station 

⇒ Secondary explosive device directed at emergency responders 

Track/signal 

⇒ Explosive detonated on track 

⇒ Chemical, biological, nuclear release on track 

⇒ Signal and/or rail tampering 

Rail cars 

⇒ Explosives placed on or under rail car 

⇒ Improvised explosive device (pipe/fire bomb) on rail car 

⇒ Chemical, biological, nuclear release on rail car 

⇒ Armed assault, hostage, or barricade situation on rail car 

⇒ Secondary explosive device directed at emergency responders 

Power 

substations ⇒ Explosive detonated in or near substation 

Command 

Control Centers 

⇒ Physical or information attack on train control system 

⇒ Physical or information attack dispatch system 

⇒ Armed assault, hostage, or barricade situation 

⇒ Explosive device near or in Center 

⇒ Sabotage of train control system 

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5.2.4 Consequences 

For each scenario, the transportation system should attempt to identify 

the costs and impacts using a standard risk level matrix, which supports 

the organization of consequences into categories of high, serious, and 

low. Consequences are assessed both in terms of severity of impact and 

probability of loss for a given threat scenario, as presented in Figure 16. 

Very Easy 

Relatively Easy 

Difficult 

Very Difficult 

Too Difficult 

Vulnerability Impact 

A I 

B II 

C III 

D IV 

E 

Loss of life

Serious injuries, major service impact, >$250k damage

Minor injuries, minor service impact, <$250k damage

No injuries, no service impact 

Criticality Matrix 

I I III IV 

AHHS S 

BHHS L 

CHS L L 

DS L L L 

ESL L L 

I

H = High 

S = Serious 

L = Low 

Figure 16: Scenario Evaluation Criteria 

Scenarios with vulnerabilities identified as high may require further 

investigation. Scenario-based analysis is not an exact science but rather 

an illustrative tool demonstrating potential consequences associated with 

low-probability to high-impact events. To determine the system’s actual 

need for additional countermeasures, and to provide the rationale for 

allocating resources to these countermeasures, the system should use the 

scenarios to pinpoint the vulnerable elements of the critical assets and 

make evaluations concerning the adequacy of current levels of 

protection. Examples of vulnerabilities that may be identified from 

scenario-based analysis include the following: 

⇒ accessibility of surrounding terrain and adjacent structures to 

unauthorized access (both human and vehicular); 

⇒ site layout and elements, including perimeter and parking that 

discourage access control, support forced or covert entry, and 

support strategic placement of explosives for maximum damage; 

⇒ location and access to incoming utilities (easy access for offenders); 

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⇒ building construction with respect to blast resistance (tendency 

toward progressive collapse, fragmentation, or no redundancy in load 

bearing); 

⇒ sufficiency of lighting, locking controls, access controls, alarm 

systems, and venting systems to support facility control; and 

⇒ information technology (IT) and network ease-of-penetration. 

5.2.5 Prioritized Listing of Vulnerabilities 

At the conclusion of the scenario-based analysis, the transportation 

system should have assembled a list of prioritized vulnerabilities for its 

top 10% critical assets. Typically, these vulnerabilities may be organized 

into the following categories: 

⇒ lack of planning; 

⇒ lack of coordination with local emergency responders; 

⇒ lack of training and exercising; and 

⇒ lack of physical security (access control, surveillance; blast 

mitigation, or chemical, biological, or radioactive agent protection). 

These vulnerabilities should be documented in a confidential report or 

memorandum for the system’s executive director. 

5.2.6 Developing Countermeasures 

Based on the results of the scenario analysis, the system can identify 

countermeasures to reduce vulnerabilities. Effective countermeasures 

typically integrate mutually supporting elements. 

⇒ Physical protective measures designed to reduce system asset 

vulnerability to explosives, ballistics attacks, cyber attacks, and the 

release of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) 

agents. 

⇒ Procedural security measures, including procedures to detect and 

mitigate an act of terrorism or extreme violence and those employed 

in response to an incident that does occur. 

In identifying these measures, the system should be able to answer the 

following questions. 

⇒ What different countermeasures are available to protect an asset? 

⇒ What is the varying cost or effectiveness of alternative measures? 

In many cases, there is a point beyond which adding countermeasures 

will raise costs without appreciably enhancing the protection afforded. 

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5.2.7 Rings of Protection 

As illustrated in Figure 17, security tends to emphasize rings of 

protection, meaning that the most important or most vulnerable assets 

should be placed in the center of concentric levels of increasingly 

stringent security measures. For example, a transportation system’s 

control center should not be placed right next to the building’s reception 

area, rather, it should be located deeper within the building so that, to 

reach the control center, an intruder would have to penetrate numerous 

rings of protection, such as a fence at the property line, a locked exterior 

door, an alert receptionist, an elevator with key-controlled floor buttons, 

and a locked door to the control room. 

Other prevention strategies involve cooperation with law enforcement 

agencies, security staff in other systems, and industry associations in 

order to share threat information. It is useful to know whether other 

transportation systems in an area have experienced threats, stolen 

uniforms or keys, or a particular type of criminal activity, in order to 

implement appropriate security measures. Table 11 provides a sample 

list of typical countermeasures from threat and vulnerability assessments. 

In the assessment, the team may consider both passive and active 

strategies for identifying, managing, and resolving threats to the system’s 

operation. Team members should provide appropriate expertise in both 

these strategies. 

Passive strategies include all security and emergency response planning 

activity, outreach with local law enforcement, training, evacuation and 

business continuity and recovery plans, employee awareness, public 

information, and passenger training. Passive responses also include 

security design strategies, supported by crime prevention through 

environmental design (CPTED) and situational crime prevention (SCP) 

methods, such as landscaping, lighting, and physical barriers (planters or 

bollards). 

Active strategies include security technology, such electronic access 

control, intrusion detection, closed circuit TV, digital recorders, 

emergency communications systems, and chemical agent or portable 

explosives detectors. Active systems also include personnel deployment. 

It is important to consider the entire lifecycle cost when evaluating 

security solutions. Technology options may require a substantial onetime investment, supported by fractional annual allocations for 

maintenance and vendor support contracts. Personnel solutions are 

generally more expensive. Figure 18 depicts active strategies in use on 

bus vehicles around the country. 

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INNER RING 

 alert personnel 

 door and cabinet locks 

 network firewalls and 

password controls 

 visitor escort policies 

 document shredding 

 access control devices 

 emergency 

communications 

systems 

 secure computer room 

 motion-activated 

closed-circuit 

television 

OUTER RING 

 lighting 

 fences 

 gates 

 bollards 

 walls 

 trenches 

 intrusion 

detection 

sensors 

 guards on 

patrol and 

posted at 

property-line 

access points 

MIDDLE RING 

 locked doors 

 receptionist 

 badge checks 

 access control 

system 

 window bars 

 parcel 

inspection 

 turnstiles 

Figure 17: Sample Rings of Protection 

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Table 11: Public Transportation Countermeasures 

Access Control Surveillance Blast Mitigation WMD Age

nt Protection 

COUNTERMEASURES 

Planning Coordin

atio

n with Local 

Responders Training and Exercising 

Physical Security 

Identifying Unusual or Out-of-Place Activity X X X 

Security Screening and Inspection Procedures X X X 

Enhancing Access Control for 

Stations/Vehicles 

X X 

Securing Perimeters for Non-revenue Areas X X X 

Denying Access to Authorized-only Areas X X 

Securing Vulnerable Areas (target hardening) X X 

Removing Obstacles to Clear Line-of-Sight X X X 

Protecting Parking Lots X X X 

Enhanced Access Control for Control Center X X X 

Securing Critical Functions and Back-ups X X X 

Promoting Visibility of Uniformed Staff X X X 

Removing Spaces that Permit Concealment X X X X 

Reinforcing Natural Surveillance X X X 

Procedures for Vehicle and Station 

Evacuations 

X X X 

Coordination with Community Planning Efforts X X X X 

Backing up Critical Computer Systems X X 

Revising Lost-and-Found Policies X X X 

Securing Tunnels and Elevated Structures X X 

Elevating/securing Fresh Air Intakes X X X 

Protecting Incoming Utilities X X 

Establishing Mail-handling Procedures X X X X 

Identifying Appropriate Personal Protective 

Equipment and Training X X X X 

Preparing Response Folders and Notebooks 

for Facilities and Vehicles 

X X X 

Familiarization Training for Local Emergency 

Response Agencies 

X X X 

Planning for Scene Management and 

Emergency Response 

X X X X 

X X 

X X X 

X X X X 

X X 

X X 

X X 

X X X X 

X X X 

X X X 

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Two-way Radios Panic Button Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) and 

Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) 

Operator Shields Cameras On-board Vehicles 

Figure 18: Active Security Strategies for Bus Vehicles 

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6 Procedures for New Threats 

This section provides recommendations for procedures in the transportation 

industry to manage new and heightened threats. The four procedures discussed in 

this section are as follows: 

⇒ sample bomb threat procedures; 

⇒ managing hoaxes and unusual or out-of-place objects; 

⇒ response to calls of reports suspecting a chemical agent release; and 

⇒ release of sensitive information to the public. 

6.1 Sample Bomb Threat Procedures 

The most popular method of making bomb threats is by telephone. It is important 

that as much information as possible be received from the caller. All bomb threats 

should be taken seriously. However, experience has shown that most anonymous 

threat calls are a hoax, intended to create an atmosphere of anxiety and panic in 

order to interrupt normal activities. Therefore, absent positive target identification 

(PTI) indicators or other credible information, an evacuation may not be considered 

appropriate. 

6.1.1 Threats by Phone 

All persons who could receive a telephone bomb threat should be taught 

how to handle the situation effectively. If a call is received, the 

following procedures should be followed. 

⇒ Stay calm, be courteous, and do not display fear. 

⇒ Activate a telephone recording unit, if available. 

⇒ Listen carefully during or immediately after the conversation. 

Take notes of the exact time the call was received, the exact words 

of the caller, and all details such as the sex of the caller, his/her 

accent or attitude, background noises, and motive. Use a bomb 

threat checklist to record the details of the call. 

⇒ Explain consequences of an explosion. Advise the caller that the 

station, building or facility may be occupied and the explosion 

could result in death or serious injury to many innocent people. 

⇒ Keep the caller talking. The more the caller says, the more helpful 

the information may be during the threat evaluation phase. If the 

caller does not indicate the location of the bomb or the time of 

detonation, ask him/her what time it is to go off and where it is 

located. 

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⇒ After the phone call, notify the appropriate supervisor. Do not 

discuss the call with anyone else unless authorized to do so or 

required by law. Follow proper procedures to “tag” call for further 

police investigation. 

6.1.2 Threats by Mail 

The following are instructions on how to handle bomb threats received 

by mail. The most likely recipients are mailroom personnel and 

administrative personnel. 

⇒ Place all papers and envelopes associated with the threat in a bag 

or large envelope (clear plastic bag if possible). Pick up any bomb 

threat note only by the edge. 

⇒ Do not handle the written threat any more than absolutely 

necessary. 

⇒ Do not allow anyone else to touch the note unless specifically 

authorized by a security representative or senior management. 

6.1.3 Manager’s Responsibility 

In the case of a bomb threat, the appropriate manager should assess the 

seriousness of the threat using the following bomb threat assessment and 

bomb threat response guidelines. He/she should also, if appropriate, 

notify law enforcement authorities. 

BOMB THREAT ASSESSMENT 

Is the threat credible? 

Consider: 

⇒ time of day and day of week; 

⇒ mode, telephone or mail; 

⇒ identity of caller, male/female, 

young/old, drunk, foul language, 

disgruntled employee or patron; 

⇒ specificity of the threat, time, 

location, type of explosive device; 

and 

⇒ possibility of access to allow 

placing of the device. 

Does the threat contain positive target 

identifications (PTIs)? 

Did the caller identify: 

⇒ time the bomb is to detonate; 

⇒ target to be destroyed; 

⇒ bomb’s construction, shape, or 

description; 

⇒ bomb’s location; or 

⇒ bomb threat response. 

6.1.4 Executing the Response 

⇒ Use a public service address announcement, telephone cascade, 

messenger, or other local notification plan. 

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⇒ Determine who is to search and in what area. In general, 

employees should search their own area to determine if there are 

any suspicious objects. Those who are most familiar with the 

common areas should search them. All search activity should be 

predetermined and voluntary. 

WHAT IS THE PROPER RESPONSE? 

Do not evacuate? This may be an appropriate response if there have been a number of 

recent, publicized hoax bomb threats in the area; if the caller seemed to 

be drunk; if the caller was a young child; or if it is called in during a 

beautiful Friday afternoon about an hour or so before quitting time. This 

is especially true when no PTIs were provided in the bomb threat call. 

Conduct a limited or 

general search of the 

facility? 

Searches are usually the most appropriate choice and should generally be 

the chosen response, especially if no PTIs or only one PTI was given in 

the threat. 

Order limited 

evacuation, general 

evacuation, or move to 

a safe haven? 

Evacuations are usually ordered only when the call is judged to be 

serious, the threat credible; there is insufficient time to conduct a 

thorough search; and, the judgment is made that passengers and 

employees will be at less risk evacuating or moving to a safe haven than 

remaining in place and seeking cover. If two or more PTIs are given in 

the bomb threat call, an evacuation may be in order. Evacuation areas 

should be searched, cleared and secured prior to use when possible. 

⇒ Notify public law enforcement and emergency services as 

appropriate; notify immediately if an unusual or out-of-place 

object is found. 

⇒ If appropriate, determine who is to be evacuated and to what 

location. 

⇒ If evacuation is ordered before a search is done, determine for how 

long. Consider available options if the weather is inclement. 

Consider possible effect on operations if evacuation occurs at or 

near a shift change. 

⇒ Ensure that procedures are in place to account for all persons 

ordered to evacuate and determine that they have in fact evacuated 

and there is an orderly shutdown of operations. Be sure to evaluate 

evacuation site for secondary devices. 

⇒ Coordinate with local authorities to determine if the area needs to 

be searched and who will determine that operations can resume 

and people can return to their workstations. 

6.1.5 Search Plans 

A predetermined search should be organized. It is not effective to 

delegate the search to the police alone because they are unfamiliar with 

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the area and do not know which objects in the facility would look 

unusual or out of place. The employees assisting in this search should be 

pre-designated volunteers and have had training in search techniques. 

The most effective search is possible when all employees are calmly told 

about the bomb threat and the reason for the search and are then asked to 

check their familiar areas for suspicious objects. Teams should be 

organized to search common areas. A search team leader should be 

designated and a notification protocol developed to report search results 

to the facilities manager. A plan should be developed to designate who 

is responsible for searching a specific area. For example, security 

personnel may search restrooms and outside areas, while maintenance 

staff may search LAN and electrical rooms. 

The objective of the search activity is to search for and report unusual or 

out-of-place objects. There are several points to be stressed within 

search plans. 

⇒ The search should be systematic (divide the facility into search 

areas), it should be thorough, and it should be done calmly. 

System personnel should also search on a voluntary basis. Identify 

the areas that are most accessible to outsiders and the areas that are 

most vulnerable. Search these first. 

⇒ When searching a room, the room should first be searched from 

floor to waist height, then from waist height to eye level, and 

finally from eye level to ceiling. If the room has a false ceiling, the 

false ceiling should also be inspected. 

⇒ No one should move, touch, or jar any unusual or out-of-place 

object or anything attached to it. The removal or disarming of a 

bomb must be left to law enforcement professionals. 

6.1.5.1 No Bomb Found 

If no bomb (or object) is found, the facilities manager should advise 

employees, police, and local management and return the operation to 

normal activity. 

6.1.5.2 Unusual or Out-of-Place Object Found 

If an unusual or out-of-place object is found, the search team coordinator 

and the station manager should do the following. 

⇒ Stress again to personnel not to touch or move the object. 

⇒ Evacuate personnel from the surrounding area. 

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⇒ Prevent re-entering of the evacuated area. 

⇒ Inform the police to take charge of getting the object deactivated or 

removed. 

⇒ After the object has been removed, finish searching to ensure that 

no other bombs have been placed. 

6.1.5.3 After-Action Plan 

An after-action report, including incorporation of lessons learned, should 

be prepared immediately after resolution of the event. A formal 

debriefing of the event should occur with key management personnel. 

6.2 Managing Hoaxes and Unusual or Out-of-Place Objects 

Figure 19 presents the scope of possible events that may occur on transportation 

property and in the community served by the system. These events range from 

threats and hoaxes to extended campaigns involving multiple attacks. 

Analysis from the FBI indicates that the vast majority of threats and reported 

suspicious materials and packages will be revealed as common substances, lost or 

misplaced items, or normal occurrences in the transportation environment (train 

dust, cleanser residue, etc.). However, each of these events must be approached as 

a potential incident. Transportation personnel have a several possible actions 

available to them when responding to hoaxes and threats. Above all, the 

transportation system should invest in training personnel on the appropriate actions 

to take in these situations. 

Safe investigation of reports and threats, proficient incident size-up, and effective 

communications and supervision will not only enhance the system’s ability to 

recognize and manage an actual attack, but will also build confidence and provide 

an in-the-field training program. Debriefing of major threat report responses will 

further teach employees to proceed in a manner that best protects them, their fellow 

workers, and the system’s passengers, facilities, and vehicles. 

Transportation personnel should understand that, according to the FBI, hoaxes and 

threats should be expected to continue, and perhaps even escalate in frequency. 

The following guidelines may provide transportation personnel with useful advice 

when developing their programs, procedures, training, and exercise schedules. 

⇒ Managing an actual hoax event should not be the first time a transportation 

employee is considering what should be done. Even obvious hoaxes relating 

to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incidents have the 

potential to cause panic and generate negative publicity. These events 

require a much different response than bomb-threats, and only training, 

exercise, and technology can provide the necessary knowledge and 

awareness. Transportation systems should have plans and procedures in 

place for managing these events, so that employees will not be taken by 

surprise. 

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⇒ These events often take the form of written and phone threats; suspicious 

packages with signs and notes; suspicious powders and liquids left on 

turnstiles and public transportation vehicles, on station floors or in trash cans 

or restrooms; abandoned spray canisters, gloves, or masks; and the use of 

mace and machine oil to replicate chemical and biological agent 

characteristics. 

⇒ Whenever possible, transportation personnel should remain sensitive to the 

reality that hoaxes deplete limited community resources and, in extreme 

periods, challenge the capabilities of local responders to provide basic 

services. Do not call local responders or hazardous materials units as a 

default position. 

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Figure 19: Response to Chemical and Biological Threats 

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⇒ Develop procedures for taking threat calls and reviewing suspicious letters 

and packages received in the mail (building on the bomb threat procedures 

outlined above). 

⇒ Transportation employees and the riding public will be the source of most 

reported suspicious substances and packages. In managing these reports, 

transportation personnel will be expected to: 

o receive news of a suspicious substance or package in a calm and 

reassuring manner; investigate the report using safe practices and from a 

safe vantage point; coordinate with transportation supervisory and 

dispatch personnel regarding appropriate action, maintenance clean-up or 

collection; hazardous materials clean-up; notification of local responders; 

notification of local hazardous materials response unit; evacuation; or 

other resolution; 

o have equipment prestaged to cordon off 

areas and to collect 

the names of 

potentially affected 

passengers and 

personnel; 

o maintain a strict 

posture regarding 

investigation and 

prosecution of 

perpetrators of hoaxes 

and threats (the USA 

PATRIOT ACT 

makes special 

provisions for threats 

against public 

transportation, 

dramatically 

increasing the 

seriousness of this 

activity and its legal 

consequences); 

o have and use internal 

procedures for 

managing hoaxes and 

threats, and 

distinguish escalating 

patterns of activity 

that may portent 

actual attacks; and 

o coordinate closely 

with local, state, and 

federal law 

USA PATRIOT ACT 

The Act outlaws terrorist attacks and other actions of 

violence against mass transportation systems. 

Offenders may be imprisoned for life or any term of 

years, if the conveyance is occupied at the time of the 

offense, or imprisoned for not more than twenty years 

in other cases, section 801. Under its provisions, it is a 

crime to willfully: 

• wreck, derail, burn, or disable mass transit; 

• place a biological agent or destructive device 

on mass transit recklessly or with the intent to 

endanger; 

• burn or place a biological agent or destructive 

device in or near a mass transit facility 

knowing a conveyance is likely to be 

disabled; 

• impair a mass transit signal system; 

• interfere with a mass transit dispatcher, 

operator, or maintenance personnel in the 

performance of their duties recklessly or with 

the intent to endanger; 

• act with the intent to kill or seriously injure 

someone on mass transit property; 

• convey a false alarm concerning violations of 

the section; 

• attempt to violate the section; 

• threaten or conspire to violate the section 

when the violation involves interstate travel, 

communication, or transportation of materials 

or that involves a carrier engaged in or 

affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 18 

U.S.C. 1993. 

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enforcement officials to ensure that they remain in the loop regarding 

both emergency response planning and the identification of groups or 

individuals who are both motivated and capable of employing chemical 

or biological agents against civilians. 

⇒ Both transportation and local response must have the capability to quickly 

and accurately determine the legitimacy of threats in order to dispel panic. 

⇒ Hoaxes must be treated as actual events until proven otherwise, thus 

demanding the coordinated response of police, fire, and public health 

officials. 

⇒ The incident command system (ICS) should to be utilized in handling hoax 

events. Without properly defined command structures in the highly stressful, 

emotional, and confusing scenario of a CBRN scare, conflicting orders can 

lead to a rapid breakdown in procedure. 

⇒ Hoaxes require a response by many local agencies, and often various federal 

agencies including the FBI and EPA, thus the pre-establishment of 

interpersonal relationships is recommended. Efficient and compatible 

interagency communication systems must be developed to facilitate 

cooperation. 

⇒ Public communication protocols and a local media partnership should be 

established prior to the onset of an event. A spokesperson, whose job is to 

facilitate constant contact with the public, should be designated. 

⇒ In more serious hoaxes, it may be necessary to have a chief executive and 

key staff available to the media in order to inform and reassure the public 

with a clear, consistent message. These emergency management 

relationships with the media should be established well before an event arises 

so that mutual trust is ensured. 

⇒ With simple awareness campaigns, the public can be educated to recognize 

the difference between an obvious hoax and a potential threat. 

⇒ Hoaxes should be seen as opportunities for surprise exercise. The response 

community needs to expect that terrorism in all forms will aim to catch 

victims off guard, and the more they practice under these conditions, the 

better. 

⇒ Standard procedure can be developed that allows for systems to continue 

with an event, once it has been determined that there exists no real threat, as 

if they were conducting an interagency exercise. This will allow for full 

analyses of readiness and further develop the working relationships required 

to respond to future hoaxes and actual events with increased efficiency. 

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⇒ All hoaxes should have after-action reports conducted to define areas for 

improvement. 

6.3 Response to Calls of Reports Suspecting a Chemical Agent Release 

Transportation systems must now be prepared to respond to investigate a suspected 

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agent release or dispersal 

device. This threat co-exists with the industry’s ongoing concern regarding 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mass shootings, and flammable materials. 

Until the CBRN event is confirmed, many dangers exist for those station managers, 

maintenance personnel, supervisors, transportation police, and other transportation 

employees who may be assigned to investigate an initial report. These personnel 

will already be stationed near but, not affected by, the scene. 

In most cases, these incidents will involve an unknown substance, suspicious 

package, or report of a suspicious activity that can safely be investigated and 

resolved quickly, using elements specified in Procedure Two. However, it is 

possible that transportation personnel, approaching an incident site in a station or 

evacuation assembly area, may immediately be faced with mass casualties (e.g., 

trauma, chemically contaminated, and psychosomatic) as well as major scene 

control challenges. 

Situational awareness, therefore, is critical to effective response. As transportation 

personnel near the scene, the extent of the incident should become apparent. The 

following actions should be used as a guide for approaching the scene of what 

appears to be a WMD event with multiple casualties. 

⇒ Approach the scene from upwind and upgrade. Ensure other responders do 

the same. Upwind distance for a possible chemical incident is at least 300 to 

1,000 feet for an explosives related incident. 

⇒ Be aware of the need for protection from possible contamination. If personal 

protective equipment (PPE) is available, and if transportation personnel are 

appropriately trained, put it on. Otherwise, observe upwind distance 

parameters. 

⇒ From a safe vantage point, attempt to determine the exact location(s) of agent 

dissemination. Observe patterns or clusters in the severity of symptoms 

demonstrated by victims, and also observe where the ambulatory victims 

have assembled. 

⇒ From a safe vantage point, attempt to establish communications with 

transportation personnel in the scene. These personnel may be contaminated, 

incapacitated, or unable to support response action. Obtain their status and 

location. 

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⇒ Observe the scene and do not attempt rescue. Immediate and accurate field 

reports are the best way to help the victims and ensure the greatest good for 

the greatest number. 

⇒ Look for the following: 

o exact location of incident; 

o nearest upwind street access; 

o estimated number of casualties; 

o signs and symptoms of casualties; 

o the presence of oily liquids, vapors, clouds, and mists; 

o unusual odors; 

o weather conditions; 

o other resources available to support immediate evacuation from the scene 

and initial decontamination (sprinkler system, nearby swimming pool or 

lake, dirt or sand, towels or cloth); and 

o information available on possible perpetrators, including physical 

descriptions, make and/or model of vehicles, or other identifying 

characteristics. 

⇒ Report incident to transportation dispatch, summarizing what was observed. 

⇒ As appropriate to internal system procedures, establish (or support already 

established) command. Transportation personnel are the on-scene authority 

figures immediately following the incident and will be integrated into the 

ICS established by local responders upon their arrival. 

⇒ Control the scene by: 

o establishing an outer incident perimeter to provide safe ingress and 

egress for arriving responders; 

o isolating the hazard area and controlling walking casualties (using voice, 

bull horn, or public address system) to direct them upwind and upgrade 

from the incident site, but away from the evacuation site; 

o observing unusual activity (perpetrators may be nearby or could be 

among the injured); and 

o anticipating the potential for multiple hazard locations that may require 

re-defining outer (and inner) operational perimeters. 

⇒ Reassure walking casualties, discouraging self-evacuation from a safe 

distance. Tell them that help is on the way. 

⇒ Be aware of site security and check for snipers, secondary devices, 

suspicious packages, or other threats. 

⇒ Monitor weather and wind. Remain upwind of the scene release. 

⇒ Identify water supply or other decontamination materials in vicinity 

(sprinkler system, pool, pond, dirt, clean fabric, etc.). 

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⇒ Identify staging areas: 

o if practical, position first arriving units and responders upwind and 

uphill; 

o direct other units to approach from upwind and uphill if possible; 

o avoid stacking units where they interfere with each other's evacuation 

route; 

o avoid line-of-sight staging with suspected explosive devices; 

o strictly enforce staging instructions; 

o consider having units back into position so that they can leave the scene 

efficiently, and 

o avoid vapor clouds, mist, and unknown liquids. 

⇒ Maintain communications with dispatch. Notify dispatchers of any changes 

in weather conditions, available site resources, and condition of assembled 

victims. 

⇒ Await other transportation personnel and first responders. Remember that 

the incident scene is also a crime scene and all precautions need to be taken 

to preserve evidence. 

6.3.1 Responding to an Actual Chemical or Biological Agent Release 

If investigation reveals a chemical or biological agent release in a 

transportation vehicle, station, or facility, the system requires a wellplanned, integrated, and coordinated response. Some of the major issues 

that will require attention during management and control of a chemical 

terrorist incident include: 

⇒ event recognition or agent detection; 

⇒ reporting and notification; 

⇒ isolation of agent release; 

⇒ evacuation of scene (upwind, uphill, up-river) or shelter-in-place; 

⇒ isolation of scene or perimeter control; 

⇒ crowd control (near perimeter and at evacuation site); 

⇒ status briefings and updates to arriving responders; 

⇒ staging of emergency response vehicle to avoid contamination, yet 

hasten ability to reach evacuation site with hoses; 

⇒ traffic rerouting, congestion, and control; 

⇒ mass casualty decontamination, triage and medical management; 

⇒ disposition of the deceased; 

⇒ hospital casualty overload; 

⇒ public fear; 

⇒ public information dissemination; 

⇒ spread of contamination; 

⇒ safety and welfare of emergency responders; 

⇒ evidence identification and preservation; and 

⇒ suspect identification, arrest, and criminal prosecution. 

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To assure its capabilities to respond effectively under these highly 

adverse conditions, the transportation system should perform the 

following steps. 

⇒ Review the lessons learned from the Tokyo Sarin gas release and 

its impacts on both emergency response and transportation 

operations. 

⇒ Perform a threat and vulnerability assessment to identify likely 

targets and current preparedness capabilities (described in Section 

5 of this Guide). 

⇒ Complete the FBI’s Vulnerability Self-Assessment, and share 

significant findings with local law enforcement (described in 

Section 5 and included in Appendix B of this Guide). 

⇒ Review the system’s capabilities and current level of preparedness 

for emergency response (Appendix D contains a detailed 

worksheet to support this assessment). 

⇒ Invest in the Incident Command System (ICS). Know how this 

system would be applied in a minor and major incident, and work 

closely with local responders to improve capabilities through 

planning, training, and exercising (on this site). 

⇒ Understand the Unified Command Structure and its benefits to 

multi-agency incident response. Unified command provides all 

agencies with responsibility for the incident with an understanding 

of one another’s priorities and restrictions. 

⇒ Develop and revise emergency plans and procedures to address 

chemical and biological events, emphasizing the specific facility’s 

needs and resources; a system by which to account for employees 

during emergencies; and a crisis communication system for key 

personnel and security staff so that they can (1) signal for help 

surreptitiously when necessary (e.g., with duress alarms), (2) keep 

a small incident from escalating into a large one, and (3) contact 

other key staff easily during a crisis (by means of intercoms, 

mobile and land-line telephones, email, and two-way radios). 

⇒ Develop training and exercises to direct and assess management of 

actual attacks that are small in scale and generally produce fewer 

casualties than conventional bombs or attacks involving firearms. 

⇒ Use Guidelines for Managing Suspected Chemical and Biological 

Agent Incidents in Rail Tunnel Systems as a resource for 

developing operating policies.7 

7 Available from Argonne National Laboratory at 630-252-3235. 

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⇒ Use Emergency Preparedness for Transit Terrorism as a resource 

in developing policies, plans, and procedures for managing major 

incidents.8 

⇒ Use guidelines prepared by the US Army Soldier and Biological 

Chemical Command (SBCCOM) for mass decontamination and 

mass casualty incident response.9 

⇒ Understand the system’s ventilation system, including the impacts 

of vehicle movement and vehicle HVAC systems on airflow. 

⇒ Develop procedures for vehicle control, station ventilation, and 

station evacuation, ensuring that evacuation sites remain upwind 

from both the release site and the station ventilation system. 

⇒ Understand public fear and how it can be assuaged both during 

response to an incident and in the aftermath of a successful attack 

or ongoing campaign. 

⇒ Understand that persons affected by a chemical release may 

attempt to self evacuate to area hospitals and medical facilities, 

thus requiring notification of these institutions of the possible 

contaminated victims en route. 

6.3.2 Support Community Response 

The transportation system should be prepared to support emergency 

response to a major chemical or biological release occurring within its 

service area. Integration into emergency response planning and 

coordination with local responders, all activities required for the 

management of incidents on transportation property, will also serve to 

enhance the capabilities of the transportation organization to support the 

community during a major crisis, especially one involving WMD agents. 

A key goal of the Emergency Plan is to establish Unified Command 

with local responders. Unified Command allows all agencies with 

geographical, legal, or functional responsibility to establish a common 

set of incident objectives and strategies, and a single plan for action. 

Using the Unified Command, the public transportation system 

coordinates with local police, fire, and Emergency Medical Services 

(EMS) personnel to ensure that: 

⇒ one set of objectives is developed for the entire incident, 

⇒ a collective approach is used to develop strategies to achieve 

incident goals, 

8 Available at http://www4.trb.org/trb/homepage.nsf/web/security. 9

 Available for download at http://www2.sbccom.army.mil/hld. 

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⇒ information flow and coordination is improved between all 

jurisdictions and agencies involved in the incident, 

⇒ all agencies with responsibility for the incident have an 

understanding of joint priorities and restrictions 

⇒ each agency is fully aware of the plans, actions, and constraints of 

all others, 

⇒ the combined efforts of all agencies are optimized, and 

⇒ duplicate efforts are reduced or eliminated, thus reducing cost and 

chances for frustration and conflict. 

6.4 Release of Sensitive Information to the Public 

Publicly available information can appear in many forms, including 

annual reports, media releases, brochures and other promotional 

materials; Internet web sites and on-line documents; automated or 

personally-conveyed information; and public records. 

The term sensitive information refers to any information that would 

allow a malicious actor to select, or gain information about, a target 

without the need to physically access it. The following questions will 

assist security professionals in reviewing sensitive information that has 

been, or could be, made publicly accessible. 

⇒ Has the information been cleared and authorized for public 

release? 

⇒ What impact could the information have if it was inadvertently 

transferred to an unintended audience? 

⇒ Does the information provide details concerning security 

procedures and capabilities? 

⇒ Does the information contain personnel information such as 

biographical data, addresses, etc.? 

⇒ How could someone intent on causing harm misuse the 

information? 

⇒ What instructions should be given to legitimate custodians of 

sensitive information with regard to disseminating the information 

to other parties, such as contractors? 

⇒ Could this information be dangerous if it were used in conjunction 

with other publicly available information? 

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⇒ Could someone use the information to target personnel, facilities, 

or operations? 

⇒ Could the same or similar information be found elsewhere? 

⇒ Does the information increase the attractiveness of a target? 

Knowledge concerning the threat environment will assist transportation 

operators in deciding on the level of vigilance with which they review 

sensitive information. Risk from the public availability of sensitive 

information comes from both determined and opportunistic threats. 

Table 12 identifies generic categories of sensitive information that, if 

released to the public domain, could place transportation elements at 

greater risk from determined threats. Transportation operators are 

encouraged to use these categories when evaluating the dissemination of 

potentially sensitive information. 

Table 12: Categories of Potentially Sensitive Information 

TYPE OF INFORMATION EXAMPLES 

Locations & Functions 

Critical assets10 High capacity and redundant assets 

Network topology maps Intersections or congestion points 

Exposed or unprotected assets Bridge and over-surface assets 

Unmanned assets SCADA-controlled assets 

Hazardous materials Industrial chemicals or waste storage 

Contingency gathering areas Emergency meeting points and stations 

Assessments 

Vulnerability or risk assessments assessments 

Hypothetical impact assessments Environmental impact assessments 

Assessments of drills or exercises scenario debriefings 

Facility limitations Natural hazard high-risk limits 

Facility capacities Redundant capacities 

Specific location or function ranked data Quantitative comparisons of assets 

Operations 

Physical and cyber security plans Facility and IT security measures 

Security 

Contingency 

Heightened risk operating procedures Contingency protection measures 

10 This term refers to the data, communications, energy, and operational systems or structures 

necessary to sustain business continuity. 

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Table 12: Categories of Potentially Sensitive Information 

TYPE OF INFORMATION EXAMPLES 

Hypothetical emergency scenarios stoppage scenarios 

Emergency response procedures Facility evacuation criteria 

Business continuity plans Details concerning shifts in production 

High-risk operating procedures Critical processes in production 

Facility designs Blueprints and photos 

Operating manuals Emergency power-down procedures 

Meeting minutes Highlights of recent security concerns 

Interdependencies 

Personnel information Addresses, contact information, etc. 

Energy sources Regular or backup energy sources 

Communications assets and procedures Repeating stations and radio protocols 

Transportation methods Routes use for hazmat transportation 

Key suppliers Safety equipment manufacturers 

Operational 

Key clients Potential targets for disruption 

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7 Training and Exercising 

This section outlines 

considerations for training and 

exercising programs to support 

core competencies in those 

areas essential for responsible 

decision-making and effective 

implementation of emergency 

response in the transportation 

environment. 

Transit Safety & Security Program 

The Federal Transit Administration and the 

Transportation Safety Institute’s Safety and Security 

Division offer courses in Transit System Security, 

Effectively Managing Transit Emergencies, Transit Rail 

Incident Investigation, Response to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, Threat Management & Response to Bus 

Hijacking, Emergency Response and Access to 

Alternative Fueled Vehicles, and Crime Prevention 

Through Environmental Design. 

7.1 Principles of Training for Preparedness 

When evaluating the transportation system’s training and exercising needs, it is 

important to remember that: 

⇒ training should reflect security and emergency plans and procedures; and 

⇒ exercises are conducted to assess the quality of both the training and plans, 

and to provide valuable feedback in the planning process. 

The purpose of training for security and emergency preparedness is to provide 

transportation system personnel with the specific knowledge necessary to perform 

the critical functions required in system plans and procedures. Training, in this 

regard, may be highly technical, geared specifically to the responsibilities of an 

individual employee to support the system during an emergency (e.g., procedures 

for powering up or down rail service, performing notification and incident 

reporting, or managing bus vehicle evacuations). 

Other types of training may emphasize collaborative activities performed by 

transportation employees, in concert with local law enforcement, fire and 

emergency medical services, and other local agencies to support capabilities to 

accomplish group tasks. In emergency management, the goal of this type of 

training is to bring individuals, teams, and organizations to a state from which they 

can accomplish required activities quickly, efficiently, and effectively. 

7.2 Existing Training Programs 

Around the country, transportation systems of all sizes provide a wide range of 

training for their employees, contractors, and local public safety agencies. This 

training addresses many issues pivotal to effective security and preparedness, 

including basic awareness, reporting emergencies, managing conflicts, evacuating 

vehicles, and facilities and other safety and security activities. 

In the transportation environment, training for safety, security, and emergency 

preparedness is performed to ensure that: 

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⇒ applicable management, operations, and maintenance rules, procedures, and 

plans are effectively documented and conveyed to those responsible for their 

implementation; 

⇒ manuals showing how to administer, operate, and maintain the system’s 

safety and security equipment and facilities are understood by those 

responsible for their use; 

⇒ safety-related rules and procedures for management, operations, and 

maintenance personnel are documented and effectively implemented by all 

employees as required; 

⇒ emergency procedures have been developed, documented and are 

successfully implemented by all personnel as required, including public 

safety personnel (if appropriate); 

⇒ transportation personnel and local emergency responders understand the 

hazards of the transportation environment; and 

⇒ an adequate level of preparation is maintained for a possible emergency. 

Training typically addresses rules, policies, and procedures, as well as many of the 

National Transit Institute 

In addition to its Train-the-Trainer program and its 

commitment to provide training, education and 

clearinghouse services in support of public 

transportation, NTI recently developed the System 

Security Awareness for Transit Employees and 

Security Incident Management for Transit Supervisors 

courses to address the heightened need for interactive 

training for front-line personnel and supervisors. 

hazards in the transportation 

environment (e.g., live power, 

track and roadway safety, 

hazardous materials and 

alternate fuels, medical 

emergencies or blood-borne 

pathogen awareness, personal 

safety, and injury prevention). 

Some transportation systems 

have established an emergency 

response agency familiarization 

program that provides orientation for local law enforcement, fire personnel, and 

medical services regarding the transportation environment and its vehicles. 

Many transportation systems have also initiated basic security awareness or first 

responder awareness training, which emphasizes topics, such as: 

⇒ understanding the specific threats from explosives, incendiary devices, and 

toxic materials (chemical, biological, or radiological agents) and the risks 

associated with them in an incident; 

⇒ understanding the potential outcomes associated with an emergency created 

when explosives, incendiary devices, or toxic materials are present; 

⇒ the ability to recognize the presence of these devices and materials; 

⇒ the ability to identify the classes of chemical agents, if possible, using signs 

and symptoms; 

⇒ the ability to reference laminated cards and other automated and manual 

checklists to support initial response activities and incident reporting; and 

⇒ proper use of personal protective equipment, such as escape hoods and gas 

masks. 

Public transportation systems that routinely work with hazardous materials have 

certain advantages in this regard, as they are already familiar with EPA regulations 

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regarding hazardous materials spills, response plans, support training, and 

coordination programs with their local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) 

and state emergency response committees (SERCs). 

In response to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) or 

environmental requirements, transportation systems also have developed 

emergency plans for the evacuation of key infrastructure facilities and vehicles. 

These plans specify the recommended sequence of actions to be taken by 

transportation system personnel in the event of an emergency, including a security 

incident. Training provided for these plans may include recognition of the 

emergency, establishing proper notification procedures, and implementing an 

appropriate response to the emergency. 

Many proactive transportation 

systems, deeply concerned by the 

Tokyo Sarin gas release, have 

supported the development of first 

response training for WMD 

incidents in their local 

communities and states, in 

partnership with other agencies 

(such as the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police), 

FTA’s Transportation Safety 

Institute (TSI), the National 

Transit Institute (NTI) at Rutgers, 

and the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center (FLETC). 

Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center 

FLETC’s Security Specialties Division designs, 

develops and conducts training courses related to 

antiterrorism, bombs and explosives, 

counterterrorism, crisis management, patrol 

procedures, physical security, tactical applications 

and transportation security. s a 

specialized training facility to demonstrate and 

validate state-of-the-art hardware and procedures 

relating to antiterrorism and physical security. 

The Division operate

Basic awareness and conflict management training, provided through the National 

Safety Council (NSC) and the Rural Transportation Assistance Program (RTAP), 

as well as partner programs in first aid and the management of passengers with 

disabilities and medically fragile passengers (with the American Red Cross, 

community groups and hospitals, and rider associations), have been developed to 

support a variety of transportation needs that also emphasize security and 

emergency preparedness capabilities in small and rural operations. 

Transportation systems (particularly those without dedicated transportation police 

departments) may not yet have conducted formal needs assessments to identify 

training issues associated with terrorism and emergency preparedness, such as the 

following: 

⇒ implementing the ICS in transportation emergencies; 

⇒ coordinating incident command within an unified command structure; 

⇒ critical incident protocols for joint partnership with local public safety 

agencies; 

⇒ emergency planning for terrorism; 

⇒ decontaminating passengers, employees, and equipment; 

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⇒ managing mass casualties (coordination with emergency responders and 

hospitals); 

⇒ community evacuations (procedures and legal issues); 

⇒ managing public information; and 

⇒ managing victims, affected families, impacted employees, and community 

need for information. 

Wherever the transportation system may be in its training program, Table 13 

provides a useful tool to assess the extent to which current training addresses key 

security and emergency preparedness issues. Completion of this table will also 

help to identify opportunities for including or expanding training on these topics, 

particularly in areas related to WMD terrorism. 

7.3 Exercising for Preparedness 

Emergency preparedness is a continuous process with the three integral functions 

of planning, training, and exercising. Each function is dependent upon the other 

two functions and should not be viewed in isolation. Figure 20 illustrates this 

relationship. 

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Table 13: Preparedness Review of Training Programs 

TYPE OF 

TRAINING 

SECURITY AND EMERGENCY 

PREPAREDNESS CONSIDERATIONS 

Awareness Reporting a

n Incident 

Coordin

atio

n with Law E

nforcement 

Emerg

ency & Security es 

Emerg

ency First Aid 

Station and Vehicle Evacuation 

Managing T

hreats and Mail 

Managing S

uspicious Packages 

WMD: Signs and Symptoms 

Emerg

ency Plan & EOC Activ

ation 

Threat & Vulnerability Assessment Hazardo

us Materials Response 

Evacuating the Medically Fragile Protecting a

n Emerg

ency Scene 

C

onflict M

ana

g

e

m

ent 

Debriefing 

Initial 

Refresher 

Certification 

On-the-Road 

On-the-Rails 

Industrial Safety 

& Security 

Personal 

Emphasis 

Training (PET) 

Safety Meetings 

Safety Ride 

Checks 

Video & 

Interactive 

Familiarization 

Special Topic 

Safety/Security 

Committee 

Procedur

9 = Addresses Issue, Blank = Does Not Address Issue 

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PLANNING 

TRAINING EXERCISING 

Tasks Doctrine & Concepts 

Feedback Feedback 

Feedback 

Situations 

Figure 20: Planning, Training, and Exercising Inter-Relationships 

Once plans and procedures have been developed and personnel have been trained 

to implement them, the transportation system is then ready to conduct an exercise 

to determine if the planning is adequate to satisfy anticipated needs and personnel 

are properly trained. 

A comprehensive exercise program is one of the best means for assessing 

emergency plans and procedures, determining the readiness of emergency 

responders, resolving questions of coordination, clarifying roles and 

responsibilities and promoting awareness of potential threats and hazards. 

Exercises are the most practical, efficient, and cost effective method to prepare for 

disasters and crises. The aim for any transportation system should be to develop a 

progressive exercise program, a long-term approach in which exercises are 

planned, conducted, and evaluated as building blocks to competency in crisis 

management. 

There are two primary benefits of such a program. First, transportation system 

personnel practice their emergency operating procedure roles and gain proficiency. 

Second, the coordination among transportation systems and local emergency 

response agencies is dramatically improved. It is common for emergency 

preparedness forces to be unfamiliar with the vehicles and facilities operated and 

maintained by the local transportation system. Likewise it is common for 

transportation system professionals to be unfamiliar with the procedures and 

equipment used by local law enforcement and fire and emergency medical services. 

These mutual benefits arise from exercising, evaluating the exercise (debriefing), 

and acting upon those lessons learned. An exercise has immense value when it 

leads to individual and/or collective improvement. 

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7.4 Building a Progressive Exercise Program 

A progressive exercise program requires commitments from the transportation 

system and community public response agencies to plan and conduct increasingly 

more challenging exercises over a period of time. Implementation of such a 

program allows the collective community to achieve and maintain competency in 

executing the transportation and local emergency response plans. 

There are five major types of exercises that comprise this program, each with a 

different purpose and requirements. 

⇒ An orientation seminar is an informal discussion designed to familiarize 

participants with roles, plans, procedures, and resolve questions of 

coordination and assignment of responsibilities. 

⇒ A tabletop exercise simulates an emergency situation in an informal, stressfree environment. It is designed to elicit discussion as participants examine 

and resolve problems based on existing crisis management plans. 

⇒ A drill is a set of supervised activities that test, develop, or maintain skills in 

a single response procedure (e.g., communications, notification, lockdown, 

and fire) and the possible or probable interaction with local government 

agency functions (e.g., incident command posts, rescue squad entry, and 

police perimeter control) that will involve actual field response. Drills help 

prepare for more complex exercises in which several functions are 

simultaneous coordinated and tested. 

⇒ A functional exercise is a fully simulated interactive exercise that tests one or 

more functions in a time-pressured realistic situation that focuses on policies, 

procedures, roles, and responsibilities. 

⇒ A full-scale exercise evaluates the operational capability of emergency 

response management systems in an interactive manner. It includes the 

mobilization of emergency personnel and the resources required to 

demonstrate coordination and response capability. A full-scale exercise tests 

total response capability in a manner as closely resembling a real emergency 

as is possible. 

Many systems prefer to start out on a small scale and move toward more 

sophisticated exercises. This process builds experience, confidence and success for 

the program, within both the transportation system and the local response 

community. FEMA, the Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness, 

and the National Response Team11 (NRT) all recommend that systems work their 

way through a consistent and dedicated program, building from orientation 

11 A group of 14 Federal agencies, including the US DOT, FEMA, and EPA, responsible for 

coordinating federal planning, preparedness, and response actions related to oil discharges and 

hazardous substance releases. 

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seminars and tabletops, to drills and functional exercises, and lastly, to full-scale 

exercises. 

As part of its program for national preparedness and capabilities assessment, 

FEMA urges local communities to perform one full-scale exercise every three 

years, with tabletops and functional exercises conducted during off years. Most 

LEPCs perform one full-scale exercise every five years, though many are now 

working toward implementing a biennial exercise schedule. 

Each transportation system should consider several factors in deciding the scope of 

its exercise program (particularly if initiating the first exercise). 

⇒ How fixed are system emergency response plans and procedures? Have they 

ever been used in actual situations, or are they still in progress? 

⇒ What is the nature and extent of risk posed by various threats located in or 

near the transportation system? 

⇒ What are the existing response capabilities of the community? 

⇒ What level of funding is available to support the exercise? 

⇒ Is the system scheduled to participate in other exercises, tabletops, or drills 

within the next 6 to 12 months? 

In answering these questions, the system can determine if it should take advantage 

of orientation seminars and tabletops to communicate emergency response 

concepts and planning principles to its personnel and familiarize local responders 

with the transportation environment; or if previous response experience and 

perceived need and opportunity suggest a more ambitious course. 

7.5 Designing Exercises 

The CD-ROM for this Guide contains several references on developing exercises. 

Scenarios, which provide the overall outline of how an exercise will be conducted, 

typically include an event narrative (to get all participants on the same page and set 

conditions), a major and detailed sequence of events, problems or messages, and 

expected actions. Scenarios also contain objectives and evaluation criteria to be 

used by the system to evaluate its performance and support debriefing and 

critiques. Some key issues to consider when planning exercises are presented 

below. 

⇒ What are the highest priority natural, technological, or man-made hazards or 

threats to the system? 

⇒ What physical or geographical components of the transportation operation 

are most vulnerable to these threats? 

⇒ What agencies and personnel need to participate in an exercise? 

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⇒ What preparedness functions are most in need of rehearsal? 

A realistic exercise scenario provides the best opportunity for a response 

organization to evaluate its emergency plan, training, and overall preparedness to 

operate under emergency conditions. There are several ways to incorporate realism 

into an exercise scenario. Extensive information regarding scenario development is 

also provided on the Guide CD-ROM. Table 14 provides some tips on how to 

develop an exercise. 

Table 14: Exercise Development Checklist12 

1. ASSESS TRAINING NEEDS 

⇒ Analyze the threats and hazards 

⇒ Determine suitable exercise types 

⇒ Assess capability 

⇒ Conduct pre-exercise drills or 

rehearsals 

2. DEFINE THE SCOPE 

⇒ Subject of exercise 

⇒ Location of exercise 

⇒ Participants in exercise 

⇒ Functions to be tested 

3. WRITE A STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 

⇒ Prepare pre-exercise notification 

⇒ Obtain support from project team 

⇒ Coordinate with participating personnel 

and organizations 

⇒ Schedule the exercise and develop 

planning milestones 

⇒ Coordinate logistics, such as facilities, 

equipment, and support 

⇒ Organize design and evaluation teams 

4. DEFINE EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 

⇒ Verify the ability to respond to an 

emergency situation 

⇒ Validate train operator, controller, and 

field supervisor training 

5. WRITE MAJOR DETAILED EVENTS 

⇒ Plan exercise enhancements or 

props, maps, color cards, computers, 

radios, etc. 

⇒ Prepare evaluation plan and 

checklists 

⇒ Nominate an evaluation team to 

determine how objectives will be 

evaluated and how actions by 

participants will be monitored and 

measured against plans and 

procedures 

6. IDENTIFY EXPECTED ACTIONS 

⇒ Reference procedures, rules, plans, 

and training 

7. PREPARE MESSAGES/PROBLEMS 

⇒ Conduct pre-exercise briefings 

⇒ Plan post exercise actions 

⇒ Issue final exercise report or afteraction report 

8. TRACK EXERCISE-RELATED COSTS 

⇒ Wages 

⇒ Materials and supplies 

⇒ Contractors 

⇒ Emergency services 

12 In 2002, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) began issuing and administering grants for 

the performance of Emergency Preparedness Drills for the top 100 transit agencies. In FTA’s 

Grant Processing Guidelines, exercise goals and objectives, drill requirements, and eligible 

expenses were identified. The “Fact Sheet” for the guidelines is in Appendix E. 

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7.6 Exercise Evaluation 

The extent and depth of the evaluation should be based on the transportation 

system’s internal objectives, the participating agencies’ needs and resources, and 

any state and federal technical assistance that may be available. State guidelines 

for CAR reviews, several of which are included on the Guide CD-ROM, provide 

useful checklists for consideration. FEMA and EPA both have evaluation guides, 

also presented on the CD-ROM, to support this effort. A sample evaluation 

checklist for the exercise program is provided in Table 15. 

Table 15: Checklist for Evaluating the Transportation Emergency Exercise Program 

Attribute 1: The System Has Established an Emergency Management Exercises Program 

1.1 Designated responsibility is identified to coordinate the development and implementation 

of emergency management exercises. 

1.2 The designated staff with responsibility for coordinating the system’s Emergency 

Management Exercise Program has adequate access to top management and to 

required resources to conduct or participate in the exercises. 

1.3 The designated staff coordinates closely with the local emergency planning community 

(EMA, LEPC) and local law enforcement to remain apprised of community exercises and 

to encourage system participation in those exercises. 

1.4 The system seeks out technical assistance from various levels of government and 

private entities during the exercise planning. 

1.5 Actual disaster or emergency operations experience is factored into exercise planning. 

1.6 Results from the system’s capabilities assessment, vulnerability self-assessment, and 

ongoing threat and vulnerability assessment are factored into the exercise planning. 

1.7 Identified corrective actions, lessons learned, and new technology and/or procedures are 

factored into exercise planning. 

Attribute 2: The System Exercises its Emergency Plan and Procedures on an Annual 

Basis 

2.1 The system sponsors and conducts a functional, full-scale, or tabletop exercise annually. 

2.2 The system participates in one or more functional, full-scale, or tabletop exercise 

sponsored by Federal, State or local government department/agency annually. 

Attribute 3: A multi-year exercise schedule is published and maintained. 

3.1 The system incorporates regulatory required local, state, and federal-sponsored 

exercises into its schedule. 

3.2 The schedule is updated and published at least semiannually. 

3.3 The schedule is developed in consultation with local and state agencies. 

Attribute 4: Exercises for System Support to Hazard-Specific Programs Comply With 

Necessary Regulatory Requirements 

4.1 Radiological emergency preparedness (REP) exercises are conducted (if transportation 

support is provided). 

4.2 Chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program (CSEPP) exercises are conducted 

(if transportation support is provided). 

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Table 15: Checklist for Evaluating the Transportation Emergency Exercise Program 

4.3 Dam emergency action plan (EAP) exercises are conducted as required by the Federal 

Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 

4.4 SARA Title III exercises are conducted (if transportation support is provided). 

Attribute 5: The System Has Exercised its Emergency Plan and Supporting Procedures 

Using A WMD Terrorism Response Scenario in the Past Two Years 

5.1 The system has conducted or participated in a tabletop or functional exercise using a 

WMD terrorism scenario. 

5.2 The system has conducted or participated in a full-scale exercise using a WMD terrorism 

scenario. 

5.3 The system has participated in a state or federal tabletop or functional exercise using a 

WMD terrorism scenario. 

5.4 The system has participated in a state or federal full-scale exercise using a WMD 

terrorism scenario within the past two years. 

Attribute 6: The System's Emergency Management Exercise Program Contains an 

Evaluation Component 

6.1 The system's exercise evaluation methodology is based on clearly delineated evaluation 

principles. 

6.2 The evaluation principles are formally documented, designed for easy use and 

implementation, and reviewed to ensure their ongoing validity. 

Attribute 7: The System Utilizes A Corrective Action Program or Lessons Learned to 

Strengthen its Emergency Management Program 

7.1 The system has developed corrective action guidance documents. 

7.2 Corrective action guidance is applicable to local agencies with emergency management 

responsibility. 

7.3 The corrective action program uses the lessons learned from exercises and actual 

disasters to modify the EOP and associated SOPs, checklists, field operating guides, 

and training manuals. 

For systems initiating this process, it may be useful to designate an experienced 

local responder or contractor as the exercise evaluator. This individual can 

review plans and procedures, support development of exercise objectives, and 

provide both a third-party assessment of performance and facilitate the group 

debriefing. 

There are several key issues to consider when developing and evaluating exercises. 

⇒ With regard to internal alerting, the system should demonstrate its 

capabilities to receive and process emergency calls and initiate emergency 

action. Twenty-four hour emergency contact information should be available 

for all key personnel. Sufficient personnel redundancy should be exercised 

to evaluate the agency’s capabilities around-the-clock operations for the 

duration of an emergency when warranted. 

⇒ In respect to the appraisal of a situation, decision-makers need to know the 

date, time and location of the incident. They also will want information about 

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injuries, signs and symptoms (if appropriate), weather conditions, terrain, and 

names of on-site personnel. A pre-printed response form should be used to 

assemble information to help determine the most appropriate action. System 

personnel should demonstrate their capability to perform an effective 

incident size-up and to define the critical issues of the incidents. 

⇒ Transportation procedures should be sufficient to ensure identification of the 

person in charge, the chain of command, the on-scene authority, and any 

technical, maintenance or media-relations personnel requirements. 

Transportation personnel should demonstrate the capability to bring these 

resources to the scene, to determine who will seek further help, if required, 

and how these personnel will communication with emergency responders 

(mobile telephone, radio, walkie-talkie, etc.). 

⇒ With respect to the use of on-scene tools, flow charts and checklists are 

valuable decision-making tools for condensing information. They should 

contain sufficient detail to ensure that all critical activities are covered. 

Letters of agreement and emergency response contracts should also be 

included. Transportation personnel should demonstrate their proficiency in 

using these materials. 

⇒ In regard to external alerting, the system should demonstrate its capability to 

notify fire and local law enforcement departments, emergency organizations, 

federal and state authorities, news media, and volunteer or off-duty workers. 

⇒ Concerning lead local responder’s, the system should also identify its 

capabilities to recognize the agency that will lead in responding to an 

emergency and to integrate it into the ICS established by this agency. 

⇒ With contact lists, the system should demonstrate that it has an accurate, upto-date telephone roster for emergencies that may include individuals within 

the organization, regulatory contacts, containment and cleanup equipment 

contractors, technical specialists, public health and environmental authorities, 

and the news media. For telephones not staffed 24 hours a day, the times 

they will be answered should be included. 

⇒ Concerning communications, the system should demonstrate the effective 

operation of the communications network to be used to support response, 

including operational procedures for the use of pagers, telephones and cell 

phones, public annunciation systems, and radios and the different frequencies 

used by various response organizations. System personnel should identify 

radio links among those performing similar functions and specify those who 

are allowed to use radios or telephones. Some equipment must be spark-free 

to avoid explosion and fire hazards. 

⇒ With respect to logistics, system personnel should demonstrate their 

capabilities to get people and equipment to the site, including the procedures 

to be followed to ensure sufficient support during the crisis and how crews 

will be supplied for the duration of the incident. 

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⇒ In relation to equipment and materials, the transportation system should have 

an equipment inventory identifying resources available to support emergency 

response. During exercises, transportation personnel should demonstrate 

their capabilities to identify and marshal appropriate resources based on the 

type of incident, the climate, scene access considerations, the speed of local 

law enforcement and fire services response, the availability of specialized 

contractors and prior agreements or contracts for services. Outside expertise, 

contractors, staff and equipment should be evaluated in advance. As 

appropriate, transportation personnel should know the calibrations and 

limitations of instruments used to identify and monitor substances. 

⇒ When dealing with issues around protective equipment, transportation 

systems should have a clear policy on its use. Transportation personnel 

trained to use this equipment should demonstrate their capabilities to 

consider the circumstances at the scene including climate, season, visual 

conditions, restriction of movement, and need for decontamination to ensure 

that protective equipment will not hinder performance. 

⇒ Transportation personnel should demonstrate their capabilities to establish 

their response organization, recognize roles of key personnel, and ensure the 

assignment of personnel with appropriate qualifications to appropriate duties 

at the scene. 

⇒ If the system has a formal written, mutual aid agreement with another 

agency, then personnel should demonstrate their capabilities to notify and 

request this support. The extent of the assistance agreed to will be 

considered in the overall evaluation of participation in the exercise. 

⇒ When coordinating with the news media, the transportation system should 

demonstrate its capabilities to support effective media relations and to 

coordinate with the media regarding the dissemination of information to help 

ensure public safety. 

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8 Design and Technology Review 

This section provides an overview of security design and technology solutions and 

mitigation measures available to support improved transportation security and 

preparedness in the operational environment. The CD-ROM for this section 

provides an inventory of design and technology alternatives for consideration by 

transportation personnel. 

Enhancing physical security in the transportation environment involves a unique 

combination of requirements driven by the identification of threats, the system’s 

expectation for passenger protection and security, the opportunities for integration 

of design and technology measures, the financial and physical constraints of the 

facility, vehicle and operation, and the technology available for a specific security 

function. 

Public transportation cannot be protected like commercial aviation. Trains, buses, 

and paratransit vehicles must remain readily accessible, convenient, and 

inexpensive for users. Passenger profiling (including the deployment of computer 

databases and networks), metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosive sniffers, hand 

searches, and armed guards, having become features of the landscape at airports, 

cannot be transferred easily to subway stations, bus stops, paratransit vehicles, 

automated guideway systems, ferries, and other surface transportation modes. The 

delays would be enormous, the costs prohibitive, and passengers would seek 

alternative transport options. 

This does not mean that nothing can be done. On the contrary, transportation 

operators and security officials, in areas more susceptible to terrorist attacks, have 

developed some effective security countermeasures. Although no one can entirely 

prevent terrorist attacks, good security measures can make terrorist operations more 

difficult, increase terrorist detection and identification, keep casualties and 

disruptions to a minimum, reduce panic, and reassure alarmed passengers in a 

crisis. Good security measures also assure employees and passengers on a daily 

basis that the system is safe and secure. 

8.1 Security by Design 

When designing facilities and procuring vehicles, transportation systems address a 

multitude of considerations, including security. In today’s environment, however, 

security has taken on new requirements that require facility design (architects) and 

transportation (planners and engineers) professionals to consider an enhanced range 

of threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. Balanced assessments of physical 

design and technology support the development of facilities and transportation 

services that effectively address needs for accessibility, mobility, security, and 

emergency preparedness. 

Physical design and security technology measures typically involve the use of 

barriers, ranging from fences and walls to electronic surveillance and intrusion 

detection devices, to prevent attacks on individuals and facilities and the theft or 

destruction of valuable items. Police and security personnel may be used to 

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monitor the barriers and control access to the facility through the barriers. Design, 

technology, and personnel security solutions can be integrated to deny terrorists 

what they seek. For terrorist organizations, attacks on protected facilities may 

generally: 

⇒ require more personnel than attacks on less secure facilities; 

⇒ require more sophisticated weaponry and tactics; and 

⇒ result in more casualties (e.g., killed, wounded, or taken hostage). 

Physical security measures may also have a positive psychological affect on 

personnel within the secure area, because the threat of violence is reduced, and the 

system’s commitment to security is visibly demonstrated. Of course, security 

design and technology have impacts on the transportation organization in terms of 

the costs to design, install, and maintain these measures. The costs must be 

weighed against expected benefits and available resources. 

8.2 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime 

Prevention 

Situational Crime Prevention strategies have as their basic premise that the physical 

environment can be changed or managed to produce behavioral effects that will 

reduce the incidence and fear of crime – and the perceptions of fear – thereby 

improving in the quality of life, and enhancing profitability for patronage. 

Like all situational crime prevention strategies, Crime Prevention Through 

Environmental Design (CPTED) has as one of its primary aims to reduce the 

opportunity for specific crimes to occur. Where CPTED differs from traditional 

target hardening strategies is that CPTED traditionally focuses on design 

techniques and use of a particular space. Its main goal is to create an environment 

that does not tolerate crime. 

Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) strategies use CPTED design solutions and 

integrate them with management policy and legal or prosecution measures. For 

example, to resolve pay phone fraud at a major transportation terminal, an SCP 

solution would involve both surveillance and environmental controls, and the 

provision of “call trace” facilities to private telephone subscribers. 

Both CPTED and SCP create physical and social conditions through environmental 

design in selected environments aimed at reducing both crime and the fear of 

crime. SCP typically addresses physical measures, modifies existing operating 

procedures, and addresses the specific nature of crime. 

While CPTED is invaluable in the initial design of the transportation system 

environment, SCP offers many advantages during the operational life cycle of the 

system. As opposed to other methods of crime prevention strategies that may 

require many years to produce a reduction in crime (e.g., Operation Head Start that 

intervenes in lives of three- to four-year-olds), SCP efforts reduce crime relatively 

quickly after intervention. These preventive measures are focused on reducing 

opportunities for specific forms of crime. Solutions for a particular crime in a 

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particular situation, however, will not necessarily work in other situations for other 

types of crime. Therefore, identifying and designing appropriate measures based 

on an accurate understanding of the success of offenders is essential. 

CPTED and SCP techniques stress the importance of including operations, 

maintenance, and security representatives during the design and procurement stages 

to aid in the specification, selection, installation, and acceptance of system 

components. The National Crime Prevention Institute, the American Society of 

Industrial Security, and the American Institute of Architects teach both strategies, 

emphasizing the designation, definition, and design of human space. 

⇒ Designation – the purpose or intention of the space 

⇒ Definition – the social, cultural, legal, and psychological ways that the space 

is defined 

⇒ Design – the prescribed or intended behaviors of the space 

Some major CPTED/SCP strategies are listed below. 

⇒ Provide clear border definition of controlled space. The borders of the space 

can be defined by using physical objects, like fences, signs, symbols, 

distinctive wall colors, or pictures. 

⇒ Provide clearly marked transition zones. Transition zones let people know 

when they are moving into the controlled space. 

⇒ Relocation of gathering areas. Gathering places can be placed where they are 

easy to monitor and where access can be controlled. 

⇒ Place safe activities in unsafe locations. Safe activities attract users and the 

system can monitor undesirable users. In essence, the activities will attract 

enough people, assuring that no undesirable behavior occurs without being 

seen. 

⇒ Place unsafe activities in safe locations. Unsafe activities can be placed in 

locations that permit public view and access control. 

⇒ Redesign the use of space to provide natural barriers. Conflicting activities 

can be located far apart, separated by a wall, building, or other activities. 

⇒ Improve scheduling of space. Activities can be scheduled to reduce the 

likelihood of conflicts and to make it easier to control behaviors. 

⇒ Redesign or revamp space to increase the perception of natural surveillance. 

The placement of windows, lines-of-sight, and walkways can increase the 

feeling of security by increasing the likelihood of surveillance, even without 

security cameras and other electronic monitoring devices. 

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⇒ Overcome distance and isolation. Natural surveillance can be facilitated. 

For example, communications equipment, such as payphones, provide access 

to assistance. The placement of restrooms near entrances facilitates 

surveillance of people entering and exiting buildings. 

Some CPTED/SCP planning principles and accompanying design strategies most 

often used in the transportation environment are listed below. 

⇒ Plan for concentric security zones and space transitions. Site selection, 

building clusters, individual building placement and internal configuration of 

buildings should incorporate the principle of concentric circles of increasing 

security and overt transitioning between spaces. The outermost ring or 

perimeter should be the first line of defense and should contain the public 

activities. Continuing inward, greater security measures should be 

incorporated as one approaches private or high-risk areas. Prominent use of 

signage, architectural elements, and natural or human made barriers should 

be utilized to signify the transition from public to semi-private to private 

space. Clear border definition should be provided for the controlled space. 

⇒ Implement natural surveillance. Legitimate users of the space, observers, or 

visitors to an area, and persons performing security functions for a space, 

should observe activities in their environment. Abnormal users should have 

the perception or reality that their behavior will be observed, while legitimate 

users feel secure knowing others are present. The prudent use of landscape 

materials should ensure clear sight lines at grade level and should not create 

areas of concealment or provide a climbing path to the upper levels of 

buildings. The use of glazing, the placement of amenities, the style of 

fencing materials and architectural elements should foster an open 

environment and eliminate areas of concealment. 

⇒ Provide natural access control. Legitimate users of the space should be made 

to feel welcome and secure, while discouraging the entry of undesirable 

users. Access to the site, parking areas, and accompanying structures should 

be well defined and incorporate a welcome or sense of arrival. The main 

entrance to a site, parking area, or structure should be sufficiently sized to 

accommodate the normally expected ingress and egress demands. 

Supplemental entry and exit ways should be securable or have the ability to 

be closed off. Signage and natural barriers should inform legitimate users of 

the space of appropriate directions and the rules pertaining to the areas, 

eliminating excuses for a user’s unacceptable behavior. 

⇒ Dictate territorial behavior strategies. Utilize the physical design, signage, or 

other elements to reinforce the sense of proprietorship within an area. The 

design of a space should reflect the designated purpose and function of the 

space. Clearly defined defensible space will enhance the users' sense of 

ownership, while denying criminals the anonymity they seek. Physical 

design should support the activities of the legitimate users of the space. 

Design of architectural elements and amenities should not attract undesirable 

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behaviors, such as loitering. Consider the potential for conflicting activities 

in a space. Provide natural barriers for these conflicting activities. 

⇒ Provide good lighting. Desired users of the space should encounter 

consistent, well-lit, clean spaces to enhance their feeling of safety. The 

designated purpose of lighting must be properly identified. If the purpose of 

lighting is to enhance the security of an area, it should be sufficient to 

support the principles of natural surveillance. The application of lighting 

should be uniform, consistent and contain overlapping zones of coverage. 

Special situations (e.g., CCTV surveillance, parking garages) will require 

further lighting analysis. 

SCP techniques can be implemented during system design, renovation, and/or 

response to specific crimes. The following two tables are examples of SCP 

technique utilization by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

(WMATA) and New York City Transit. 

WMATA designed its system for an open environment, optimizing employee and 

natural surveillance capabilities. The following table describes these features. 

Table 16: Security by Design - WMATA 

Area Addressed Preventative Efforts 

Supporting Columns • Decreased number to reduce cover for 

criminals 

Entrances, Exits, and Pathways • Designed long and straight pathways, 

stairways, and escalators 

• Eliminated corners to reduce shadows and 

decrease transient occupation 

Lighting and Maintenance • Used recessed lighting to reduce shadows 

and enhance the environment 

• Excluded public bathrooms in design to 

eliminate undesirable activity 

• Recessed walls and bars installed in front to 

discourage graffiti 

• Placed litter bins on platforms 

• Implemented policy directing the cleaning of 

graffiti and repairing of vandalism within 24 

hours of incident 

Security Devices • Installed CCTVs on the end of each 

platform, deterring criminals 

• Installed kiosks at entrances to platforms 

• Installed passenger-to-operator intercoms 

• Installed blue light boxes with emergency 

phones every 600 feet 

WMATA Transit Police and Personnel • Added formal surveillance of facility 

• Required to enforce all facility rules 

• Trained to report all maintenance problems 

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As a result of SCP’s flexibility, techniques of implementation are also effective in 

response to specific crimes. Target hardening at NYCT stations in the 1980s 

provides an example of the many SCP techniques employed in response to specific 

crimes. Select NYCT stations were experiencing the following fare evasion 

problems: 

⇒ Walking through unmanned “slam” gates to enter the paid-fare area; 

⇒ “Backcocking,” or turning back the arms of the turnstile, and squeezing 

through; 

⇒ Vaulting over waist-high turnstiles or low fence railings; and 

⇒ Using slugs at stations with antiquated mechanical turnstiles. 

The following table describes the changes implemented at the 110th Street and 

Lexington Avenue station in the Harlem District of upper Manhattan. 

Changes at NYCT 

110th Street and Lexington Avenue Station 

To reduce fare evasion, NYCT implemented the following changes: 

• Installed floor-to-ceiling railings, 

• Replaced older token devices with modern electronic models, and 

• Installed clerk-controlled “high wheel” turnstiles. 

8.3 Security Technology 

Once it is decided to use security technology to enhance surveillance and access 

control, technology systems must be considered part of a total security system and 

design approach. Each mechanical technique has distinct technological and 

operational characteristics and environmental reactions, along with differing 

requirements for installation and maintenance. To determine which security 

technology is the most cost effective and appropriate, each transportation system 

should consider the following questions. 

⇒ How will the system be used? Is the system designed to prevent 

unauthorized access or intrusion, or to provide support for investigation and 

apprehension of criminals? What are the protocols for responding to alarms? 

What resources are available to manage false alarms? What priorities are 

placed on the system as a deterrent to crime versus functionality as a vital, 

day-to-day component of the security program? Can multiple users benefit 

from the system? Can CCTV deployed on platforms support operations and 

dispatch, as well as the transportation security function? Each security 

situation is unique, which means that there are no packaged solutions. 

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⇒ What are the operational aspects of a required security system, and what is 

their priority? Clear identification and prioritization of need is an important 

first step when investigating security technology. Does the CCTV system 

need to record camera feeds? Does the system need to be monitored? How 

fast and clear must images be transmitted from a transportation station or 

parking lot to a centralized location? Transmission systems may be 

expensive or limit system functionality and capabilities. They should be 

thoroughly investigated. What are the requirements for backup systems in 

power and hardware? How are the alarms assessed for effectiveness (e.g., 

with CCTV, lights, horns, bells, or printed records)? Does the system have 

tamper alarms, self-tests, or lightning protection? Each security system 

requires careful forethought for implementation and operation. 

⇒ What are the environmental impacts that affect the security system? 

Examples of such conditions are weather, water or moisture, vegetation, and 

corrosion from dust, acid rain, and/or salt. The transportation environment 

can be challenging for electronic equipment. Housings, accessories, 

protective cabinets, and shielding should be considered to extend 

performance and reduce maintenance requirements. 

8.4 Considerations from the Department of Justice 

As a consequence of the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City 

during April 1995, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) assessed the vulnerability 

of federal facilities across the country and issued a report recommending minimum 

standards for building security. The DOJ’s recommendations included standards 

based upon risk levels for specific buildings determined on the basis of such 

criteria as daily population and amount of public contact and assessments by 

building security committees with representatives from each of the agencies in the 

building. 

The following is a list of the risk levels determined using DOJ criteria. 

⇒ Level V – Buildings with mission functions critical to national security (e.g., 

the Pentagon and the CIA Headquarters in Langley, VA). Tenant agencies 

secure the building according to their own security requirements. 

⇒ Level IV – Buildings with 451 or more federal employees, high level of 

contact with the public, more than 150,000 square feet of space, and highrisk tenant agencies with highly sensitive records. 

⇒ Level III – Buildings with 151 to 450 federal employees, moderate to high 

level of contact with the public, 80,000 to 150,000 square feet of space, and 

tenants that might include law enforcement agencies, government records. 

⇒ Level II – Buildings with 11 to 150 Federal employees, moderate levels of 

public contact, 2,500 to 80,000 square feet of space, and tenants that have 

routine missions. 

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⇒ Level I – Buildings with 10 or fewer federal employees, low levels of public 

contact or contact with only a small segment of the population, and 2,500 

square feet of space or less. 

Public transportation systems with multiple facilities of various types may want to 

evaluate them using a similar method to ensure that strategic and critical facilities 

are protected to the highest cost-effective level and others, at the other end of the 

spectrum, are accepted as they are and not protected. 

For all levels of facilities, DOJ recommended that 52 minimum security standards, 

including: 

⇒ perimeter security, such as the control of parking facilities, identification 

systems for parking, closed circuit television monitoring, lighting with power 

backup, and physical barriers; 

⇒ entry security, such as adequate shipping and receiving procedures, access 

control (including security guard patrols and intrusion detection systems with 

central monitoring), and screening and monitoring at entrances and exits; 

⇒ interior security, such as employee or visitor identification, access control of 

utility areas, emergency plans, and relocation of daycare centers; 

⇒ security planning, such as intelligence sharing among law enforcement and 

security agencies, adequate training and standards for security guards 

(including qualifications for unarmed and armed guards), grouping agencies 

with similar security requirements and risk levels, administrative procedures 

to minimize risk of crime to employees; and 

⇒ construction or renovation to reduce risks, such as installing Mylar film on 

exterior windows to prevent shattering, attention to blast standards, adequate 

construction standards, and street setbacks for new facilities. 

Based upon the DOJ standards, a building rated Level V (the highest risk) should 

have: 

⇒ a controlled parking facility with adequate lighting and all unauthorized 

vehicles parked in the facility being towed; 

⇒ CCTV camera surveillance with time lapse recording; 

⇒ lighting with emergency backup; 

⇒ adequate procedures for shipping and receiving; 

⇒ intrusion detection systems with central monitoring; 

⇒ life safety, e.g., fire detection and suppression systems that satisfy current 

standards; 

⇒ x-ray and magnetometer devices at public entrances and x-raying of all mail 

and packages; 

⇒ high security locks; 

⇒ photo identification for personnel; 

⇒ visitor control and screening; 

⇒ visitor identification accountability system; 

⇒ personal identification issuing authority; 

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⇒ controlled access to utility areas and emergency power for critical security 

systems; 

⇒ adequate occupant emergency plans, updated annually, and tested 

periodically; 

⇒ adequate intelligence sharing and control and common threat nomenclature; 

⇒ adequate training of security personnel, including guards; 

⇒ background security checks and/or security control procedures for service 

contract personnel; and 

⇒ Mylar film on exterior windows with standards for new construction that 

include blast resistance and setbacks from the street. 

By contrast, the standards for Level I (the lowest risk) facilities include: 

⇒ adequate exterior lighting with power backup; 

⇒ review of shipping and receiving procedures to determine vulnerabilities; 

⇒ upgraded life safety systems; 

⇒ high security locks; 

⇒ emergency power for critical security systems; 

⇒ occupant emergency plans and training; 

⇒ intelligence sharing and control and common threat nomenclature; 

⇒ security training for personnel and security guards; 

⇒ background checks and/or security control procedures for contract personnel; 

and 

⇒ review of current projects for blast standards and uniform standards for 

construction. 

Specific DOJ recommendations are excerpted below for each facility risk level. 

“M” indicates that the minimum standard should be applied, as specified in 

guidelines maintained by the General Services Administration (GSA). “F” 

indicates that the standard should be established based on facility-specific 

evaluation. “G” indicates that the standard is desirable (though not required), and 

“N/A” indicates that the standard is “not applicable.” 

DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

PERIMETER SECURITY I II III IV V 

Parking 

Control of facility parking G G M M M 

Control of adjacent parking G G G F F 

Avoid leases in which parking cannot be controlled G G G G G 

Leases should provide security control for adjacent 

parking 

G G G G 

Post signs and arrange for towing unauthorized 

vehicles 

F M M M 

ID system and procedures for authorized parking 

(placard, decal, card key, etc.) 

G M M M 

Adequate lighting for parking areas G G M M M 

Closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring 

CCTV surveillance cameras with time lapse video 

recording 

G F M 

G 

F 

G 

F M 

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DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

Post signs advising of 24 hour video surveillance G F F M M 

Lighting 

Lighting with emergency power backup M M M M M 

Physical barriers 

Extend physical perimeter with concrete and/or 

steel barriers 

N/A N/A G F F 

Parking barriers N/A N/A G F F 

DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

ENTRY SECURITY I II III IV V 

Receiving/Shipping 

Review receiving/shipping procedures (current) M M M M M 

Implement receiving/shipping procedures 

(modified) 

G F M M M 

Access control 

Evaluate facility for security guard requirements G F M M M 

Security guard patrol G G F F F 

Intrusion detection system with central monitoring 

capability 

G F M M M 

Upgrade to current life safety standards (fire 

detection, fire suppression systems, etc.) 

M M M M M 

Entrances/Exits 

X-ray and magnetometer at public entrances N/A G F F M 

Require x-ray screening of all mail/packages N/A G F M M 

Peepholes F F N/A N/A N/A 

Intercom F F N/A N/A N/A 

Entry control with CCTV and door strikes G F N/A N/A N/A 

High security locks M M M M M 

DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

INTERIOR SECURITY I II III IV V 

Employee/Visitor identification 

Agency photo ID for all personnel displayed at all 

times 

N/A F M M 

Visitor control/screening system G M M M M 

Visitor identification accountability system N/A G F M M 

Establish ID issuing authority F F F M M 

Utilities 

Prevent unauthorized access to utility areas F F M M M 

Provide emergency power to critical systems 

(alarm systems, radio communications, computer 

facilities, etc.) 

M M M M 

Occupant emergency plans 

Examine occupant emergency plans (OEP) and 

contingency procedures based on threats 

M M M M 

OEPs in place, updated annually, periodic testing 

exercise 

M M M M 

Assign & train OEP officials (assignment based on 

largest tenant in facility) 

M M M M 

Annual tenant training M M M M M 

G 

M 

M 

M 

M 

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DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

Daycare centers 

Evaluate whether to locate daycare facilities in 

buildings with high threat activities 

N/A M M M M 

Compare feasibility of locating daycare in facilities 

outside locations 

N/A M M M M 

DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

SECURITY PLANNING I II III IV V 

Intelligence Sharing 

Establish law enforcement agency/security 

liaisons 

M M M M 

Review/establish procedure for intelligence receipt 

and dissemination 

M M M M 

Establish uniform security/threat nomenclature M M M M M 

Training 

Conduct annual security awareness training M M M M M 

Establish standardized unarmed guard 

qualifications/training requirements 

M M M M 

Establish standardized armed guard 

qualifications/training requirements 

M M M M 

Tenant assignment 

Co-locate agencies with similar security needs G G G G G 

Do not co-locate high/low risk agencies G G G G G 

Administrative procedures 

Establish flexible work schedule in high threat/high 

risk areas to minimize employee vulnerability to 

criminal activity 

F G G G 

Arrange for employee parking in/near building 

after normal work hours 

F F F F 

Conduct background security checks and/or 

establish security control procedures for service 

contract personnel 

M M M M 

M 

M 

M 

M 

F 

F 

M 

DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS LEVEL OF SECURITY 

CONSTRUCTION/RENOVATION I II III IV V 

Install Mylar film on all exterior windows (shatter 

protection) 

G G F M M 

Review current projects for blast standards M M M M M 

Review/establish uniform standards for 

construction 

M M M M M 

Review/establish new design standards for blast 

resistance 

F F M M M 

Establish street setback for new construction G G F M M 

A full description of these standards is available in Vulnerability Assessment of Federal 

Facilities, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., June 28, 1995. 

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8.5 Assessing Technology Options 

Successful implementation of security technologies in the public transportation 

environment requires a process that addresses three key elements: 

1. Needs assessment 

2. Performance and cost evaluation 

3. Training and maintenance considerations 

Public transportation agency decision-makers responsible for security technology 

procurement and deployment – whether it is a single individual or a committee – 

should use a systems approach to technology selection no matter how simple or 

complex the process. The analysis of needs, performance, cost, training, and 

maintenance should consider all phases of project development, integration and 

testing when possible. 

Using the goals and objectives developed through the application of Section 3 

preparedness principles, the capability assessment in Section 4 and the assessment 

of threats and vulnerabilities based on strategies referenced in Sections 5 and 6, the 

public transit system should have a strong sense of its security technology needs. 

These activities will provide the public transportation system clear purposes for 

security technology deployment. The next step is to evaluate current technology 

performance and cost within the public transportation system’s security need 

framework. 

In response to the events of September 11, counter-terrorism technology is being 

developed at a pace that makes it difficult to assess the ability of new technologies 

to function as advertised and determine the relative value of different technologies. 

The absence of an independent testing organization for transportation systems (and 

others who must secure publicly accessible infrastructure) is a problem left 

unresolved by the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

(PCCIP) and successor organizations in the federal government. 

Budgetary decisions by federal, state, and local governments to make capital funds 

available for security technology enhance this problem, since no strategic plans 

have been developed to ensure that transportation operators are getting the best 

tools they need for their resources. The DOJ guidelines described above remain the 

only widely accepted set of objectives for security planning. While extremely 

useful, these guidelines address federal buildings, and are not generally applicable 

to the deployment of security technology in the transportation environment. 

8.5.1 Available Technologies 

Many families of technologies are now being offered to support 

homeland security and emergency management. 

⇒ Devices for gaining access control are primary devices for physical 

security, such as electronic access control systems, card reader 

technology, proximity technology, fingerprint systems, keyless 

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entry systems, telephone or keypad entry systems, and traditional 

lock-and-key technology. For non-revenue facilities, emphasis in 

this area generally focuses on integrating employee identification 

badges with parking lot and facility access control systems. For 

revenue areas, this technology strengthens the capability to protect 

restricted areas and deny access to those who do not belong. 

Biometric technologies (e.g., facial recognition devices) are rapidly 

advancing and now offer a number of devices that scan faces, 

fingerprints, retinas or other unique human identification 

characteristics. When integrated with CCTV, intrusion detection 

and facility management systems, biometric technology supports 

the smart monitoring of alarms and systems, reducing personnel 

costs and perhaps increasing overall system performance. 

⇒ Intrusion detection sensors (IDS) are customarily used to detect an 

intruder crossing the boundary of a protected area. They can be 

deployed on the interior or exterior of a building and are designed 

to operate in a variety of harsh environmental conditions 

compatible with the transportation environment. The detection 

function must be performed with a minimum of unwanted alarms, 

such as those caused by wind, rain, ice, standing water, blowing 

debris, animals, and other sources. 

⇒ CCTV surveillance establishes surveillance or visibility to enhance 

monitoring of areas, facilities, and transportation vehicles. 

Whether the CCTV system is being utilized for mobile 

surveillance or facility surveillance, many of the system 

components are similar (e.g., cameras, recording medium, etc.). 

The most obvious exception is the transmission medium, with the 

exception of wireless technology. Public transportation systems 

implement formal surveillance through CCTV to support efforts to 

deter those with criminal intent, reassure passengers that the area 

or vehicle is supervised, and identify offenders to help secure their 

conviction. The installation of passenger communication systems 

can extend the effectiveness of CCTV and of transportation 

personnel in responding to calls for advice or assistance. CCTV 

surveillance, whether on-board a transportation vehicle or at a 

system facility, can support implementation in a manner that 

creates a networked digital video system that simultaneously 

records digital video and indexes the date, time, and event 

effectively for archival storage. 

⇒ Automatic vehicle location (AVL) systems determine the real-time 

positions of transportation vehicles using onboard computers, 

electronic tags, and a positioning system (e.g., global, sign post, or 

dead-reckoning). This information is then relayed to a central 

location. Public transportation systems around the country are 

currently using AVL as the basis for advanced two-way 

communication, including mobile data terminal systems. 

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⇒ Mobile data terminal systems take AVL a step further and move 

the dispatcher and driver relationship into the digital age. Instead 

of just reporting the vehicle's position, mobile data terminal 

systems allow for real-time communication between the dispatcher 

and driver while allowing the driver to operate the vehicle. 

Currently, this equipment is being utilized primarily by the 

paratransit industry. 

⇒ Silent alarm and emergency signals are key tools in protecting the 

safety of the bus driver and passengers, especially with today’s 

heightened security needs. When integrated with a mobile data 

terminal and activated by the operator, the transportation or 

paratransit vehicle immediately transmits the emergency alert to 

the central dispatch center along with a current vehicle location 

derived from the on-board Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 

system. Dispatch center personnel then pass this alert on to local 

law enforcement personnel, who can send the closest unit to the 

vehicle’s location. This type of system often has special 

applicability for rural environments, where transportation vehicles 

may typically have long runs in secluded and sparsely populated 

areas. 

⇒ Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) apply advanced 

communication, information and electronics technology to solve 

existing transportation problems. In its simplest form, ITS is a 

data and information sharing mechanism. Where feasible, ITS 

programs take a building block approach to technology. Using 

computer, telecommunication, aerospace, defense sensors, and 

other smart technologies, upgradeable, stand-alone systems can be 

deployed to provide near-term benefits. Integrating these building 

blocks will facilitate more comprehensive and effective systems in 

the future. 

⇒ Scanner, sniffer, and sensor devices detect chemical and biological 

agents, nuclear materials, or even the presence of humans in a 

particular location. They also track the movement of people or 

things. 

⇒ Data mining and related database information technology is used 

to compile, correlate and analyze existing or developed 

information to look for patterns and clues. 

⇒ Information security technology is designed to support voice and 

data transmissions, networks, and electronic infrastructure to 

ensure that transportation systems are protected. Only authorized 

individuals are given access to critical facilities or areas of 

operations. 

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8.5.1.1 Considerations for Technology Evaluation 

Experienced transportation system authorities have identified several 

critical elements in successfully evaluating and selecting security 

technology. The more approaches considered, the more successful a 

transportation system may become in acquiring both the type and amount 

of technology to make a difference. 

Security budgets are always considerations, therefore decision-makers 

must be diligent in measuring the performance and cost of potential 

technology against the agency’s needs. The considerations identified 

below can be included in the decision-makers strategy for technology 

assessment and address the final two elements in security technology 

evaluation and deployment. 

⇒ Technology decisions should be made in the context of an overall 

strategic plan. Ideally, this should be the transportation system’s 

strategic plan, integrated with the community’s overall 

jurisdictional threat assessment and preparedness planning 

objectives for major facilities (if available and applicable). If such 

local plans do not exist, then the transportation system should 

consider creating a strategic plan to provide a context and 

framework against which to judge technology acquisitions. 

Veteran transportation managers recommend that, if there is no 

strategic plan for security technology, do not make any purchases. 

The negative consequences of poorly designed and ill-suited 

technology programs, which fall into disrepair, outweigh the 

potential for getting lucky. Failed technology purchases will 

become liabilities associated with the security program in future 

budget negotiations and will be difficult to overcome in the long 

term. 

⇒ Develop a project budget that includes hardware and software 

estimates, as well as estimates for testing and integration of the 

technology, training staff, administering or contracting for 

maintenance, and upgrades. Without proper and extensive cost 

analysis, technology may present numerous “hidden” costs. 

Finally, costs for the ongoing use of the technology (i.e., staffing to 

support CCTV monitoring, or intrusion detection alarm response) 

should be considered. 

⇒ When looking at a particular technology, evaluate multiple 

vendors. In the case of some technologies, there are relatively few 

vendors. In others, vendors are plentiful. Take the time to get to 

know a broad range of vendors and establish relationships with 

several of them. The development of vendor selection criteria can 

be useful and can be accomplished by contacting other 

transportation systems. The goal of developing the selection 

criteria is to assist in the evaluation of vendor bids. 

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⇒ Perform rigorous field-testing and observe demonstrations. 

Vendors make lots of claims about their products. However, each 

transportation system should test the technology against real-world 

applications. Experienced transportation system managers 

recommend field-testing several competing products in a formal 

evaluation to see which works the best. This process can be 

supplemented with recommendations from peers and agencies such 

as APTA and the Community Transportation Association of 

America (CTAA), which may have made similar acquisitions, and 

may be willing to share whatever research, literature and 

information about the product or technology used to support 

decisions. 

⇒ If practical, ensure inter-operability with emergency 

communications channels and equipment. This is not always easy 

or even possible, but it does make response and day-to-day 

working relationships easier in the long run. The best case is to 

coordinate strategic plans and technology acquisitions with local 

public safety agencies in the transportation system’s service area. 

Joint purchases of communications equipment and infrastructure 

should also be considered, as these may provide the most costeffective and practical way to ensure interoperability. 

⇒ Buy smart. Wherever possible, acquire technology that is scalable, 

upgradeable, expandable, flexible, and versatile. Seek to acquire 

products that can grow along with the transportation program 

without the need to be re-engineered to accommodate new tactics 

or even additional new technology. 

⇒ Develop technology skills. Informed professionals make the best 

technology decisions. With technology permeating almost every 

area of transportation operations and security and emergency 

management, it is necessary to acquire some basic familiarity and 

skill. Experienced transportation system managers emphasize that, 

if those procuring security technology do not develop technology 

skills and expertise, they may be unable to effectively procure, 

develop, sustain, and implement security technology programs. 

⇒ Create a trusted agent. Given that it would be virtually impossible 

for any single transportation operator to effectively test much of 

the sophisticated technologies that are newly available, 

consideration should be given to the creation of a trusted agent that 

is neutral and skilled. Various laboratories and engineering firms 

offer services to assess technology and support technology 

acquisitions. 

⇒ Establish protocols and procedures for the performance of 

background investigations for contractors and to secure sensitive 

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documents such as blueprints, security systems and technology 

information. Special care should be taken to ensure that 

confidential and secure information is not easily accessed through 

the development of user-access level protocols. 

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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 

Security and Emergency Preparedness Terms 

Assets: People, information, and property for which the public transportation system is 

responsible as legal owner, employer, or service provider. 

Assets (Critical): A sub-category of assets whose loss has the greatest consequences for 

people and the ability of the system to sustain service. These assets may require higher or 

special protection. 

Capabilities Assessment: A formal evaluation, conducted by the public transportation 

system, to identify the status of its security and emergency preparedness activities. This 

activity enables the system to determine its existing capacity to: 

⇒ Reduce the threat of crime and other intentional acts 

⇒ Recognize, mitigate, and resolve incidents that occur in service and on 

system property 

⇒ Protect passengers, employees, emergency responders, and the environment 

during emergency operations 

⇒ Support community response to a major event. 

Consequences: The severity of impact and probability of loss for a given threat scenario. 

Consequences may be measured in qualitative or quantitative terms. 

Countermeasures: Those activities taken to reduce the likelihood that a specific threat 

will result in harm. Countermeasures typically include the deployment and training of 

personnel, the implementation of procedures, the design or retrofit of facilities and 

vehicles; the use of specialized equipment, the installation of alarms/warning devices and 

supporting monitoring systems; and communications systems and protocols. 

Crime Prevention: The systematic study of the interrelationships among those who 

commit crime, the location where crime occurs, and the victims of crime to identify 

patterns, and develop operational and design/engineering strategies to reduce the 

likelihood of crime and public fear. Two central elements of crime prevention include: 

⇒ Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED): Set of design 

principles used by law public safety professionals, architects and engineers, 

to limit the ability of the physical environment to support criminal activity 

and public fear. 

⇒ Situational crime prevention (SCP): A set of management, policy, and legal/ 

prosecution measures applied within a physical space to address specific 

categories of criminal occurrences. SCP is often described as the operational 

equivalent of CPTED design principles. 

Disaster: An event, incident, or combination of incidents, not necessarily related to 

transit operations, that causes multiple injuries or widespread property damage on the 

system or in the public transportation system’s service area. 

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Emergency: A situation which is life threatening to passengers, employees, or other 

citizens, or which causes significant damage to any transit vehicle or facility that require 

assessment and repair, or which reduces the ability of the system to fulfill its mission 

within its service area. 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC): Special policy and incident management area, 

activated under certain conditions and staffed by representatives from the transit system, 

including top management, to serve as an information coordination point during special 

events or emergencies, and to authorize decisions that require/affect the legal authority of 

the system. 

Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP): Any transportation system procedure that 

details activities to be performed by transit employees when normal operations are not 

possible. 

Emergency Preparedness: a uniform basis for operating policies and procedures for 

mobilizing public transportation system and other public safety resources to assure rapid, 

controlled, and predictable responses to various types of transportation and community 

emergencies. 

Evacuation of Passengers: The controlled removal of passengers from a bus, train or 

other transit vehicle during an emergency situation. 

Incident Command System (ICS): A standardized on-scene incident management 

concept designed specifically to allow responders to adopt an integrated organizational 

structure equal to the complexity and demands of any single incident or multiple 

incidents without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries. Key terms include the 

following: 

⇒ Command/Incident Commander: The Command Function of an Incident 

Command System (ICS) is responsible for directing and/or controlling 

resources by virtue of explicit legal, agency, or delegated authority. The 

individual responsible for the overall management of the response is called 

the Incident Commander. The Command Function sets objectives and 

priorities and defines the ICS organization for the particular response. Even 

if other positions are not assigned, the Incident Commander will always be 

designated. 

⇒ Command Post: A location at the site of an incident designated as the place 

from which the incident will be managed and through which all activities and 

communications will be coordinated. 

⇒ Command Staff: The IC may appoint a person or persons to be in charge of 

specific staff functions including the Public Information, Safety, and Liaison 

functions. The members of the Command Staff report directly to the Incident 

Commander and will support, advise, and keep the other key functional 

managers informed. The Incident Commander may appoint functional 

managers responsible for specific tasks (operations, planning, logistics, and 

finance and administration). These tasks remain the responsibility of the 

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Glossary of Terms 

Incident Commander unless they are delegated to someone else. The tasks 

are as follows: 

o Operations: Operations Staff direct tactical actions to meet incident 

objectives, administer staging areas, and identify and utilize resources. 

o Planning: Planning Staff collect, evaluate, and display incident 

information; prepare an incident action plan; evaluate options; plan for 

demobilization; and maintain documentation. 

o Logistics: Logistics Staff provide adequate service and support to meet 

incident or event needs, including supplies, first aid, food, 

communications, transportation, and vehicle maintenance. 

o Finance/Administration: Finance and Administration Staff track 

incident costs, personnel and equipment records, claims, and 

procurement contracts; and provide legal expertise. 

⇒ General Staff: The group of incident management personnel comprised of: 

the Incident Commander or Unified Command, the Operations Section Chief, 

the Planning Section Chief, the Logistics Section Chief, and the 

Finance/Administration Section Chief. 

⇒ Incident Action Plan (IAP): Contains objectives reflecting the overall 

incident strategy and specific tactical actions and supporting information for 

the next operational period. The Plan may have a number of forms as 

attachments (e.g., safety plan). 

⇒ Operational Period: The period of time scheduled for execution of a given 

set of operation actions as specified in the IAP. Operational Periods can be 

various lengths, usually not over 24 hours. The Operational Period coincides 

with the completion of one planning cycle. 

⇒ Unified Command: A unified team that manages an incident by establishing 

a common set of incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished 

without loss or abdication of agency or organizational authority, 

responsibility, or accountability. 

Local Emergency Operations Plan: Plan developed by designated local emergency 

planning agencies to comply with State and/or local requirements. EOPs typically follow 

the general format specified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 

the Federal Response Plan, and often include a Basic Plan and supporting Annexes. 

Local Emergency Planning Agencies: Includes those agencies of local government with 

authority to plan for, and manage the consequences of, a major emergency within their 

jurisdictional boundaries. The agencies vary by community, and often include: local 

Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs); Local Emergency Planning Committees 

(LEPCs); municipal Offices of Emergency Management (OEMs) and local Departments 

of Public Safety (DPS). 

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Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MOA): A 

formal written agreement between the public transportation system and a participating 

agency, or among multiple agencies and the transit system, which defines respective roles 

during emergency situations 

Notification: The formal advising, by voice or in writing, of specific information about 

an incident by the process described in the emergency response procedure governing the 

incident. 

Participating Agency: Any fire, law enforcement, medical, governmental, or 

humanitarian agency that participates in any portion of a public transportation system’s 

emergency response. 

Progressive Exercise Program: Comprised of five categories of activities for testing 

and evaluating the capabilities of transportation personnel to manage emergency 

situations using existing plans, procedures and equipment. The categories in a 

progressive exercise program build on each other, in both complexity and level of 

assessment provided for transportation management. They include: 

⇒ An orientation seminar is an informal discussion designed to familiarize 

participants with roles, plans, procedures, and resolve questions of 

coordination and assignment of responsibilities. 

⇒ A tabletop exercise simulates an emergency situation in an informal, stressfree environment. It is designed to elicit discussion as participants examine 

and resolve problems based on existing crisis management plans. 

⇒ A drill is a set of supervised activities that test, develop, or maintain skills in 

a single response procedure (e.g., communications, notification, lockdown, 

and fire) and the possible or probable interaction with local government 

agency functions (e.g., incident command posts, rescue squad entry, and 

police perimeter control) that will involve actual field response. Drills help 

prepare for more complex exercises in which several functions are 

simultaneous coordinated and tested. 

⇒ A functional exercise is a fully simulated interactive exercise that tests one or 

more functions in a time-pressured realistic situation that focuses on policies, 

procedures, roles, and responsibilities. 

⇒ A full-scale exercise evaluates the operational capability of emergency 

response management systems in an interactive manner. It includes the 

mobilization of emergency personnel and the resources required to 

demonstrate coordination and response capability. A full-scale exercise tests 

total response capability in a manner as closely resembling a real emergency 

as is possible. 

Safety: Freedom from danger. 

Security: Freedom from intentional danger. 

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Glossary of Terms 

Security Breach: An unforeseen event or occurrence that endangers life or property and 

may result in the loss of services or system equipment. 

Security Incident: An unforeseen event or occurrence that does not necessarily result in 

death, injury, or significant property damage but may result in minor loss of revenue. 

Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan: The formal plan that documents the 

transportation’s system security program and also addressed the elements of that program 

that affect emergency preparedness for events resulting from intentional acts. 

Security Threat: Any intentional action with the potential to cause harm in the form of 

death, injury, destruction, disclosure, interruption of operations, or denial of services. 

System: A composite of people (employees, passengers, others), property (facilities and 

equipment), environment (physical, social, institutional), and procedures (standard 

operating, emergency operating, and training), which are integrated to perform a specific 

operational function in a specific environment. 

System Security: The application of operating, technical, and management techniques 

and principles to the security aspects of a system throughout its life to reduce threats and 

vulnerabilities to the most practical level through the most effective use of available 

resources. 

System Security Management: An element of management that defines the system 

security requirements and ensures the planning, implementation, and accomplishments of 

system security tasks and activities. 

System Security Program: The combined tasks and activities of system security 

management and system security analysis that enhance operational effectiveness by 

satisfying the security requirements in a timely and cost-effective manner through all 

phases of a system life cycle. 

Threat and Vulnerability Assessment: An evaluation performed to consider the 

likelihood that a specific threat will endanger the system, and to prepare 

recommendations for the elimination or mitigation of all threats with attendant 

vulnerabilities that meet pre-determined thresholds. These assessments typically include 

both revenue and non-revenue operations. Critical elements of these assessments 

include: 

⇒ Threat Analysis: Defines the level or degree of the threats against a specific 

facility by evaluating the intent, motivation, and possible tactics of those who 

may carry them out. 

⇒ Threat Probability: The probability a threat will occur at a specific facility 

during its life cycle (typically quantified as 25 years). Threat probability 

may be expressed in quantitative or qualitative terms. An example of a 

qualitative threat-probability ranking system is as follows: 

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o Frequent: Event will occur will occur within the system’s lifecycle (25 

years) 

o Probable: Expect event to occur within the system’s lifecycle (25 

years) 

o Occasional: Circumstances expected for that event; it may or may not 

occur within the system’s lifecycle (25 years) 

o Remote: Possible but unlikely to occur within the system’s lifecycle 

(25 years) 

o Improbable: Event will not occur within the system’s lifecycle (25 

years) 

⇒ Threat Severity: A qualitative measure of the worst possible consequences of 

a specific threat in a specific facility: 

o Category 1 - Catastrophic. May cause death or loss of a significant 

component of the transit system, or significant financial loss. 

o Category 2 - Critical. May cause severe injury, severe illness, major 

transit system damage, or major financial loss. 

o Category 3 - Marginal. May cause minor injury or transit system 

damage, or financial loss. 

o Category 4 - Negligible. Will not result in injury, system damage, or 

financial loss. 

⇒ Threat Resolution: The analysis and subsequent action taken to reduce the 

risks associated with an identified threat to the lowest practical level. 

⇒ Scenario analysis: An interpretive methodology that encourages role-playing 

by transportation personnel, emergency responders, and contractors to 

brainstorm ways to attack the system. This analysis uses the results of threat 

analysis, paired with the system’s list of critical assets. Transportation 

personnel use this analysis to identify the capabilities required to support 

specific types of attacks. This activity promotes awareness and highlights 

those activities that can be preformed to recognize, prevent, and mitigate the 

consequences of attacks. 

⇒ Vulnerability Analysis: The systematic identification of physical, operational 

and structural components within transportation facilities and vehicles that 

can be taken advantage of to carry out a threat. This includes vulnerabilities 

in the design and construction of a given transit facility or vehicle, in its 

technological systems, and in the way it is operated (e.g., security procedures 

and practices or administrative and management controls). Vulnerability 

analysis identifies specific weaknesses with respect to how they may invite 

and permit a threat to be accomplished. 

Unsafe Condition or Act: Any condition or act which endangers life or property. 

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Glossary of Terms 

Public Transportation Terms 

Public Transportation: Transportation by bus, or rail, or other conveyance, either 

publicly or privately owned, providing to the public general or special service (but not 

including school buses or charter or sightseeing service) on a regular and continuing 

basis. This term is also known as "mass transit," “public transit,” and "transit." 

Public Transportation System: A public entity responsible for administering and 

managing transit activities and services. Public transportation systems can directly 

operate transit service or contract out for all or part of the total service provided. Also 

known as “transit systems” and “public transit systems.” 

Other important terms include: 

Fixed-Route: Service provided on a repetitive, fixed-schedule basis along a specific 

route with vehicles stopping to pick up and deliver passengers to specific locations; each 

fixed-route trip serves the same origins and destinations, unlike demand response. 

Includes route deviation service, where revenue vehicles deviate from fixed routes on a 

discretionary basis. 

Intermodal: Those issues or activities which involve or affect more than one mode of 

transportation, including transportation connections, choices, cooperation and 

coordination of various modes. Also known as "multimodal." 

Mode of Service: A system for carrying transit passengers described by specific right-ofway, technology and operational features. Typically includes the following: 

⇒ Aerial Tramway: An electric system of aerial cables with suspended 

powerless passenger vehicles. The vehicles are propelled by separate cables 

attached to the vehicle suspension system and powered by engines or motors 

at a central location not on board the vehicle. 

⇒ Automated Guideway: An electric railway (single or multi-car trains) 

comprised of guided transit vehicles that operate without transit personnel 

on-board. Service may be on a fixed schedule or in response to a passenger 

activated call button. Automated guideway transit includes personal rapid 

transit, group rapid transit and people mover systems. 

⇒ Bus: A transit mode comprised of rubber tired passenger vehicles operating 

on fixed routes and schedules over roadways. Vehicles are powered by 

diesel, gasoline, battery, or alternative fuel engines contained within the 

vehicle. 

⇒ Bus Rapid Transit: A type of bus service that operates on exclusive 

transitways, HOV lanes, expressways, or ordinary streets. A BRT system 

combines intelligent transportation systems technology, priority for transit, 

rapid and convenient fare collection, and integration with land use policy in 

order to substantially upgrade bus system performance. 

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⇒ Cable Car: An electric railway with individually controlled transit vehicles 

attached to a moving cable located below the street surface and powered by 

engines or motors at a central location not on board the vehicle. 

⇒ Commuter Rail: A transit mode that is an electric or diesel propelled railway 

for urban passenger train service consisting of local short distance travel 

operating between a central city and adjacent suburbs. Service must be 

operated on a regular basis by, or under contract with, a transit operator for 

the purpose of transporting passengers within urbanized areas, or between 

urbanized areas and outlying areas. Such rail service, using either locomotive 

hauled or self propelled railroad passenger cars, is generally characterized by 

multi-trip tickets, specific station to station fares, railroad employment 

practices and usually only one or two stations in the central business district. 

⇒ Demand Response: A transit mode comprised of passenger cars, vans or 

Class C buses operating in response to calls from passengers or their agents 

to the transit operator, who then dispatches a vehicle to pick up the 

passengers and transport them to their destinations. A demand response 

operation is characterized by the following: (a) The vehicles do not operate 

over a fixed route or on a fixed schedule except, perhaps, on a temporary 

basis to satisfy a special need; and (b) typically, the vehicle may be 

dispatched to pick up several passengers at different pick-up points before 

taking them to their respective destinations and may even be interrupted en 

route to these destinations to pick up other passengers. The following types 

of operations fall under the above definitions provided they are not on a 

scheduled fixed route basis: many origins-many destinations, many originsone destination, one origin-many destinations, and one origin-one 

destination. “Paratransit” is another name for "Demand Response" service. 

⇒ Ferryboat: A transit mode comprised of vessels carrying passengers and/or 

vehicles over a body of water, and that are generally steam or dieselpowered. 

⇒ Heavy Rail: A transit mode that is an electric railway with the capacity for a 

heavy volume of traffic. It is characterized by high speed and rapid 

acceleration passenger rail cars operating singly or in multi-car trains on 

fixed rails; separate rights-of-way from which all other vehicular and foot 

traffic are excluded; sophisticated signaling, and high platform loading. 

⇒ Inclined Plane: A transit mode that is a railway operating over exclusive 

right-of-way on steep grades (slopes) with powerless vehicles propelled by 

moving cables attached to the vehicles and powered by engines or motors at 

a central location not on board the vehicle. Special tramway t vehicles have 

passenger seats that remain horizontal while the undercarriage (truck) is 

angled parallel to the slope. 

⇒ Jitney: A transit mode comprised of passenger cars or vans operating on 

fixed routes (sometimes with minor deviations) as demand warrants without 

fixed schedules or fixed stops. 

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⇒ Light Rail: Lightweight passenger rail cars operating singly (or in short, 

usually two-car, trains) on fixed rails in right-of-way that is not separated 

from other traffic for much of the way. Light rail vehicles are driven 

electrically with power being drawn from an overhead electric line via a 

trolley or a pantograph. Also known as "streetcar," "tramway," or "trolley 

car." 

⇒ Monorail: A transit mode that is an electric railway of guided transit vehicles 

operating singly or in multi-car trains. The vehicles are suspended from or 

straddle a guideway formed by a single beam, rail, or tube. 

⇒ Trolleybus: Electric rubber tired passenger vehicles, manually steered and 

operating singly on city streets. Vehicles are propelled by a motor drawing 

current through overhead wires via trolleys, from a central power source not 

on board the vehicle. 

Public Transportation Infrastructure: All vehicles, equipment, right-of-way, routes, 

support equipment and facilities, and buildings and real estate belonging to or operated 

by the public transportation authority. 

Public Transportation Operations Control Center: A public transportation system’s 

central control and communications facility for dispatching operations. Separate control 

centers are typically be used for different modes (i.e., bus, rail and paratransit/demandresponse operations). A few transit systems have co-located modal dispatching functions 

within a single control center. 

Service Area: The geographic boundaries which define the legal and/or management 

commitment of a public transportation system to provide service to passengers. 

Transit Operator: A transportation system employee who is certified by the system to 

drive or operate a transit vehicle in passenger service, and who must comply with the 

procedures and rules specified by the system. 

Transit Supervisor: A transportation system manager who has specific responsibilities 

in an emergency situation. The term supervisor typically refers to either a Line 

Supervisor (Rail) or a Street Supervisor (Bus), defined by the emergency response 

procedure governing a specific incident. 

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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorism Vulnerability Self-Assessment 

Appendix B: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorism Vulnerability 

Self-Assessment 

This vulnerability self-assessment is intended to help the transportation organization 

determine its vulnerability to terrorism and to assist local law enforcement in assessing 

the overall vulnerability of the community. It provides a worksheet that can be 

customized to the transportation-specific organization. The worksheet is intended to be a 

general guide. It may not include all issues that would be considered in every specific 

operation. Therefore, it is imperative to consider the unique character of the 

transportation organization: its functions, its general public image, and its overall public 

visibility. Consider both who may work in the organization and what the organization 

does. Assess the symbolic value of the organization to the public. 

Each worksheet section is ranked on a 20-point scale. Answering this self-assessment is 

a subjective process. The person that best knows the physical security and community 

value of the transportation organization should complete the worksheet. 

There are no firm guidelines on how to score a category. The person selected to 

complete the self-assessment, based on the uniqueness of the transportation organization, 

can best determine the score. Since the questions are subjective, give a best estimate 

when scoring each question. 

It is important to remember that the most important threat reduction measure is vigilance 

on the part of the transportation organization’s staff, their awareness of anything out of 

the ordinary and their prompt communication of that information to the organization’s 

security team or management. 

This assessment follows exactly the same format as the community assessment 

performed by local law enforcement to assist in preventing criminal acts committed by 

terrorists. Based on the results of this assessment, the transportation organization may 

wish to share a copy with law enforcement, or to include their representative in the 

assessment process, to support their understanding of the transportation function and its 

role in the community. 

This assessment should be conducted at least annually, and within the year if there is an 

increased threat of a terrorist event or whenever there is a significant change to the 

organization’s facilities or activities. 

Upon receipt of a high risk assessment, each law enforcement agency sheriff, chief of 

police, head, or his/her designated representative may forward that assessment, or other 

threat report, to the state Emergency Management Agency (or equivalent), to state law 

enforcement, or to the local FBI office. 

The Assessment 

To complete the assessment, circle the evaluated score on each scale for each question. 

Then total the scores and enter the total on the last page. Based on the total, use the score 

guide to assign an overall ranking to the transportation organization. 

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POTENTIAL TERRORIST INTENTIONS 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Are you aware of any terrorist threat to your organization? 

⇒ Are you aware of a history of terrorist activity in your area or your specialty? 

⇒ Are you aware of the level of capability of any suspected terrorist that you 

believe poses a threat to your organization? 

SPECIFIC TARGETING 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Have you obtained current information from law enforcement or other 

sources that your organization has been targeted by terrorists? 

⇒ What is the reliability of these information sources? 

⇒ What is your organization’s public visibility? 

⇒ Does the nature of your organization’s activity lead you to think it may be 

targeted? 

⇒ Are there activities that indicate possible terrorist preparations in your area or 

specialty? 

VISIBILITY OF YOUR FACILITY OR ACTIVITY WITHIN THE COMMUNITY 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Is your organization well known in the community? 

⇒ Do you regularly receive media attention? 

⇒ Is your organization nationally prominent in your field or industry? 

⇒ Are your location and the nature of your activity known generally to the 

public? 

⇒ Have you ever had an event or accident with potential health risks that 

attracted public attention to your facility? 

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ON-SITE HAZARDS 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Are hazardous materials, explosives or other dangerous items on your site? 

⇒ Do you store or use biologic or chemical materials that have the potential to 

be used as a threat or weapon? 

⇒ Do you store or use radioactive material at your site? 

⇒ Do you have a system to control access to hazardous materials, explosives or 

any other dangerous materials at your site? 

⇒ Can any products stored or used on your site be used as, or in the 

manufacture of a mass casualty weapon? 

⇒ Can any products stored or used on your site cause extensive environmental 

damage? 

POPULATION OF SITE, FACILITY, OR ACTIVITY 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Do you have more than 250 people normally present at your site? 

⇒ Do you have more than 1,000 people normally present at your site? 

⇒ Do you have more than 5,000 people normally present at your site? 

⇒ Do you hold events at your site that attracts large crowds? 

POTENTIAL FOR MASS CASUALTIES 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Do materials stored or used at your site have the potential to create mass 

casualties on-site? 

⇒ Do materials stored or used at your site have the potential to create mass 

casualties within 1 mile of your site? 

⇒ How many people live or work within one mile of your site? 500? 1,000? 

2,000? 5,000? More than 5,000? 

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SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND OVERALL VULNERABILITY TO AN 

ATTACK 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Does your organization have effective internal security procedures? 

⇒ What is the law enforcement presence in your area? 

⇒ What is the hardness, level of blast protection, etc. of your facilities? 

⇒ How accessible (security presence, access control, id badges, metal detection 

buffer zones, fences, etc.) is your facility? 

⇒ Are your assets and/or its potential recognized as a symbol? 

⇒ What level of public access is necessary for you to function? 

⇒ Can you control high-speed vehicle approaches to your facility? 

⇒ Do you have access control to your parking area? 

⇒ Do you conduct vehicle searches when entering facility grounds or parking 

areas? 

⇒ Do you employ detection/monitoring systems (video surveillance, intrusion 

detection systems, etc.)? 

⇒ Is your parking delivery area adjacent to or near your facility? 

⇒ Is your delivery area supervised during hours of normal business? 

⇒ Is your delivery area access blocked during hours that your business is 

closed? 

⇒ Do you have an on-site food service facility for employees and visitors? 

⇒ Is access to the water supply for your facility protected? 

⇒ Is access to the ventilation system for your facility protected? 

⇒ Do you have a way to quickly shut down the water supply or ventilation 

system for your facility? 

CRITICAL PRODUCTS OF SERVICES 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ What is the importance of your organization to the community? 

⇒ Is your organization critical to the local population, economy or government? 

⇒ Is your organization critical to the continuity of basic services? 

⇒ Is your organization critical to state or national commerce? 

⇒ What would be the social, economic or psychological ramifications of a 

terrorist attack against your organization? 

⇒ What is the nature of your assets: hazardous materials, uniqueness, potential 

danger to others, etc? 

⇒ How long would it take to restore your critical services/functions? 

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HIGH RISK PERSONNEL 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Do you have personnel that are critical to the continuing function of state or 

local government, basic services, utilities infrastructure, the community, the 

economy, or of inherent value to your business or agency? 

⇒ Do you have personnel that are critical for responding to a terrorist act? 

⇒ What would be the effect of a terrorist act against these high-risk personnel? 

ORGANIZATION COMMUNICATIONS 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

⇒ The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ 

⇒ Do you have a mass notification system (public address system, intercoms, 

alarms)? 

⇒ Do you have a secure communications network that can be relied upon 

during a crisis? 

⇒ Do you have a crisis response team? 

⇒ Is your crisis response team trained? 

⇒ Do you conduct regular exercises? 

⇒ Do local/regional emergency responders participate in your exercises? 

⇒ Does your Crisis Response Team have its own portable communications 

system? 

⇒ Can your Crisis Response Team communicate directly with emergency 

responders? 

⇒ Do you have an emergency law enforcement notification system such as a 

hot line, panic button or something similar? 

⇒ Is your alarm system tied into the local law enforcement department or do 

you have an alarm service? 

⇒ Are your systems tested regularly? 

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SECURITY AND RESPONSE 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Are your security forces’ staffing and training levels adequate? 

⇒ Do you have the capability to maintain a security presence in a high threat 

situation? 

⇒ Are additional security personnel available if requested? 

⇒ Are there affiliated agency/industry/organization support services available? 

⇒ Do you have trained disaster response teams within the organization? 

⇒ Do you have necessary specialty detection, monitoring, hazard assessment 

devices on hand and are they functional? 

⇒ Are local/regional law enforcement forces adequate and can they respond 

rapidly? 

⇒ Are local emergency responders familiar with your facility and its contents? 

⇒ Do you keep records on who visits your facility and where they go within the 

facility? 

POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PLANS 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Do you have a current crisis response/disaster plan? 

⇒ Does your plan include the types of crises you are most likely to encounter 

(e.g., fire, explosion, chemical release)? 

⇒ Are your employees familiar with the plan? 

⇒ Have you conducted crisis response and disaster drills and were they 

effective? 

⇒ Have you identified the critical functions of your workplace and do you have 

a plan for continuation of operation during an emergency? 

SECURITY EQUIPMENT 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Do you have a security system and is it current technology? 

⇒ Do you have an intrusion monitoring motion detector or an alarm system? 

⇒ Do your systems have backup if power is cut or fails? 

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⇒ Do you have security equipment that would detect leaks or ruptures of 

potentially hazardous materials? 

⇒ Do you have personnel protective equipment for your emergency response 

team appropriate for the hazardous materials at your facility? 

⇒ Is such equipment in working order and has it been inspected recently? 

COMPUTER SECURITY, CYBER-CRIME, AND CYBER-TERRORISM 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Is your site dependent on information technology such as computers and 

networks to accomplish its daily business activities? 

⇒ Is the information stored in your computer systems valuable? 

⇒ Do you have back-up power available for your computer systems? 

⇒ Do you make back-up copies of your data? 

⇒ Is your back-up data securely stored? 

⇒ Does your site have computers or networks connected to the Internet? 

⇒ Have you experienced problems with computer security incidents, such as 

computer viruses, worms, web-site defacements and/or denial of service 

attacks in the past? 

⇒ Do you have staff in place that are adequately trained and are available to 

monitor security warnings and take protective measures, such as loading 

system patches? 

⇒ Do you have technology security tools in place such as firewalls, intrusion 

detection systems or anti-virus software to protect your computer systems? 

⇒ Do you have a computer security policy, plan, and procedure that includes a 

computer security incident response team? 

SUSPICIOUS MAIL AND PACKAGES 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Is the mail for your facility opened in a secured area or an area isolated from 

the majority of personnel? 

⇒ Have the personnel who open mail received training on the recognition of 

suspicious mail and/or packages? 

⇒ Do you have specific procedures on how to handle suspicious mail and/or 

packages, including possible facility evacuation? 

⇒ Do you have a secure and contained location where any unusual or suspect 

deliveries or mail can be stored until proper authorities can evaluate the 

suspect items? 

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TELEPHONE, BOMB, AND OTHER TYPES OF THREATS 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Has your staff received training on how to handle bomb and other threat 

calls? 

⇒ Does your staff have a checklist of questions to ask the caller in case of a 

bomb or other threatening call? 

⇒ Does your facility have a plan on how to handle bomb and other threatening 

calls? 

⇒ Does your bomb threat plan include a system whereby your personnel would 

search your facility to identify suspicious objects to point out to emergency 

response personnel? 

⇒ Does your plan include a decision making process on whether to evacuate the 

facility? 

⇒ Are personnel familiar with the plan? Have evacuation drills been 

conducted? 

⇒ Is your plan coordinated with local law enforcement and the local phone 

company? 

EMPLOYEE HEALTH AND THE POTENTIAL FOR BIO-TERRORISM 

Low Vulnerability High Vulnerability 

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 

The following are issues to be considered in selecting your score. 

⇒ Do you have an occupational health safety program in place? 

⇒ Do you have a health professional working at your facility? 

⇒ Do you have a procedure in place to track the health of each employee and 

know if more than one employee has the same symptoms? 

⇒ Do you monitor the health status of employees on sick status or absent 

otherwise? 

⇒ Are employees encouraged to keep supervisors informed on any unusual 

health related event or condition? 

⇒ Are employees required to report any unusual conditions or substances 

encountered in the course of their normal duties, such as strange substances 

or odors from packaging or mail? 

⇒ Do employees know the proper procedures for emergency operation or shutoff of air handler, air circulating or ventilation systems? 

⇒ Do you keep a current list of employees, home addresses and emergency 

contact information? 

⇒ Do you have an emergency notification plan for employees (e.g. calling 

tree)? 

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TOTAL SCORE: ___________ 

SELF-ASSESSMENT EVALUATION 

20 LOW RISK 85 

86 LOW CAUTION 170 

171 HIGH CAUTION 255 

256 HIGH RISK 340 

If the total score for the transportation organization exceeds 256, and if local law 

enforcement has not been involved in the assessment, then the transportation system 

should notify them at once, including a copy of the assessment worksheet. 

Remarks and Unusual or Significant Issues 

Please list any important remarks that should be made concerning the self-assessment. 

Also, please list any unusual or significant findings that developed during your selfassessment. List significant hazardous materials that might be used as a terrorist weapon 

or any significant impact a terrorist act against your site may cause to the community. 

Please attach an additional sheet if necessary. 

Page 147 of 176 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Page 148 of 176
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Appendix C: Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation 

Systems 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority 

MTA New York City Transit 

370 Jay Street 

Brooklyn, NY 11201-3878 

John Jimerson 

(718) 243-4158 

jojimer@nyct.com

MTA Long Island Rail Road 

Jamaica Station Building 

93-02 Sutphin Blvd. 

Jamaica, NY 11435 

James O'Donnell 

(212) 878-1146 

jodonnel@mtahq.org

MTA Metro-North Commuter Railroad 

347 Madison Avenue 

New York, NY 10017-3706

Mark Campbell 

(212) 340-4913 

campbell@mnr.org

MTA Long Island Bus 

700 Commercial Avenue 

Garden City, NY 11530 

Barry Depperman 

(516) 542-0100 

bdepper@libus.org

MTA Staten Island Railway 

60 Bay St. 5th Floor 

Staten Island, NY 10301 

Thomas Odessa 

(718) 876-8271 

sirtpd@mail.con2.com

Regional Transportation Authority 

Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) 

Merchandise Mart Plaza, P.O. Box 3555 

Chicago, IL 60654-0555 

Beatrice Cuello 

(312) 432-8001 

bcuello@transitchicago.com

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Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation 

547 West Jackson Boulevard 

Chicago, IL 60669 

Frederick Leonard 

(312) 322-8911 

fleonard@metrarr.com 

Pace Suburban Bus 

550 West Algonquin Road

Arlington Heights, IL 60005-4412 

Melinda Metzger 

(847) 228-2302 

melinda.metzger@pacebus.com

Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (LACMTA) 

One Gateway Plaza 

Los Angeles, CA 90012-2934 

Dan Cowden 

(213) 922-3643 

cowdend@mta.net

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 

10 Park Plaza 

Boston, MA 02116 

William Fleming 

(617) 222-1100 

wfleming@mbta.com 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

600 - 5th Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20005 

Polly Hanson 

(202) 962-2150 

Phanson@wmata.com 

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority 

1234 Market Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19107-3780 

Richard Evans 

(215) 580-3640 

revans@septa.org 

San Francisco Municipal Railway 

401 Van Ness Avenue, Suite 334 

San Francisco, CA 94102

Robert Hertan 

(415) 554-7115 

robert_hertan@ci.sf.ca.us

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Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

New Jersey Transit Corporation 

NJ Newark Subway 

One Penn Plaza East 

Newark, NJ 07105-2248 

Joseph Bober 

(973) 378-6807 

jobber@njtransit.com 

NJ Hudson-Bergen 

One Penn Plaza East 

Newark, NJ 07105-2248 

James Decataldo 

(201) 209-2405 

James.Decataldo@wgint.com 

NJ Bus 

One Penn Plaza East 

Newark, NJ 07105-2248 

Joseph Bober 

(973) 378-6807 

jobber@njtransit.com 

NJ Commuter Rail 

One Penn Plaza East 

Newark, NJ 07105-2248 

Joseph Bober 

(973) 378-6807 

jobber@njtransit.com 

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority 

2424 Piedmont Road, N.E. 

Atlanta, GA 30324-3324 

Gene Wilson 

(404) 848-4900 

gwilson@itsmarta.com 

New York City Department of Transportation 

40 Worth Street, Room 1005 

New York, NY 10013 

Eduardo Cousillas 

(718) 391-2809 

ecousillas@nyct.com 

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Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Mass Transit Administration of Maryland 

6 St. Paul Street 

Baltimore, MD 21202-1614

Douglas DeLeaver 

(410) 454-7736 

Ddeleaver@mdot.state.md.us

King County Department of Transportation 

201 South Jackson Street, KSC-TR-0415 

Seattle, WA 98104-3856 

Carol Cummings 

(206) 684-2760 

carol.cummings@metrokc.gov

Metropolitan Transit Authority of Harris County, Texas 

1201 Louisiana Avenue 

Houston, TX 77208-1429 

Tom Lambert 

(713) 615-6409 

tl02@ridemetro.org 

Bay Area Rapid Transit District 

800 Madison Street 

Oakland, CA 94607-2688 

Gary Gee 

(510) 464-7022 

ggee@bart.gov

Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation Dist. of Oregon 

4012 Southeast 17th Street

Portland, OR 97202 

Bob Nelson 

(503) 962-4955 

nelsonb@tri-met.org

Miami-Dade Transit Agency 

111 N.W. 1st Street, 9th Floor 

Miami, FL 33128-1999 

Bonnie Todd

(305) 375-4240 

btodd@co.miami-dade.fl.us

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San Diego Metropolitan Transit Development Board 

San Diego Trolley 

1255 Imperial Avenue, Suite 900 

San Diego, CA 92101-7492

Bill Burke 

(619) 595-4947 

bburke@sdti.sdmts.com

San Diego Transit Corporation (SDTC) 

PO Box 122511 

100 16th Street 

San Diego, CA 92112 

Steve Blackwood 

(619) 238-0100 

steve.blackwood@sdmts.com

Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

1 PATH Plaza 

6th Floor 

Jersey City, NJ 07306 

Martha Gulick 

(201) 216-6258 

mgulick@panynj.gov

Port Authority of Allegheny County 

345 - 6th Avenue, 3rd Floor 

Pittsburgh, PA 15222-2527 

Bill McArdle 

(412) 255-1350 

wmcardle@portauthority.org 

Regional Transportation District 

1600 Blake Street 

Denver, CO 80202-1399 

David Genova 

(303) 299-4038 

david.genova@rtd-denver.com

Metropolitan Council – Metro Transit 

560 - 6th Avenue North 

Minneapolis, MN 55411-4398 

Jack Nelson 

(612) 349-7201 

jack.nelson@metc.state.mn.us

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Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Milwaukee County Transit System 

1942 North 17th Street 

Milwaukee, WI 53205 

Ronald Bollhoffer 

(414) 343-1772 

wackenhut@mcts.org 

Dallas Area Rapid Transit Authority 

1401 Pacific Avenue 

Dallas, TX 75266-0163 

Juan Rodriguez 

(214) 749-5901 

juanr@dart.org 

Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District 

1600 Franklin Street 

Oakland, CA 94612 

Bob Hughes 

(510) 891-4811 

bhughes@actransit.org 

Department of Transportation Services 

711 Kapiolani Boulevard, Suite 1200 

Honolulu, HI 96813 

Roger Morton 

(808) 848-4508 

rmorton@thebus.org

Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority 

1240 W. 6th Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 

John Joyce 

(216) 771-4953 

jjoyce@gcrta.org

Orange County Transportation Authority 

550 South Main Street 

Orange, CA 92863-1584 

Dan Jarvis 

(714) 265-4346 

djarvis@octa.net 

Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority 

3331 North 1st Street, Building C 

San Jose, CA 95134-1906

Raymond Frank 

(408) 321-7175 

raymond.frank@vta.org

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Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Regional Transit Authority 

6700 Plaza Drive 

New Orleans, LA 70127-2677 

Ruben Stephens 

(504) 827-7920 

rstephens@norta.com 

Bi-State Development Agency 

707 North First Street 

St. Louis, MO 63102-2595 

Willie McCuller 

(314) 982-1507 

wmcculler@bsda-transit.org 

Regional Transportation Commission of Washoe County 

2050 Villanova Drive 

Po Box 30002 

Reno, NV 89520-3002 

David Jickling 

(775) 335-1902 

djickling@rtcwashoe.com

Via Metropolitan Transit 

800 West Myrtle Street 

P.O. Box 12489 

San Antonio, TX 78212 

David Martinez 

(210) 362-2430 

david.martinez@viainfo.net

Detroit Department of Transportation – People Mover 

1301 East Warren Avenue 

Detroit, MI 48207 

Jerry Jones 

(313) 833-7111 

jerjon@ddot.ci.detroit.mi.us

Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority 

2910 East Fifth Street 

Austin, TX 78702 

Pamela Rivera 

(512) 389-7471 

pam.rivera@capmetro.org 

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Security Contacts at the Top 35 Largest Public Transportation Systems 

Connecticut Department of Transportation 

2800 Berlin Turnpike 

PO Box 317546 

Newington, CT 06131-7546 

Michael Morrison 

(860) 594-3053 

michael.morrison@po.state.ct.us

Other Contacts 

Port Authority Transit Corporation 

PA and NJ Administrative and Maintenance Facility

Lindenwold, NJ 08021 

Thomas Biehler 

(856) 963-7988 

TBiehler@drpa.org

Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc. 

181 Elicott Street 

Buffalo, NY 14205 

Joseph Riga 

(716) 855-7666 

joseph_riga@nfta.com 

Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District 

33 East U. S. Highway 12 

Chesterton, IN 46304-3514 

Robert Byrd 

(219) 926-5744 

robert.byrd@nictd.com 

San Mateo County Transit District 

1250 San Carlos Avenue, P.O. Box 3006

San Mateo, CA 94070-1306

Steven Frew 

(650) 508-7743 

frews@samtrans.com

Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority 

414 Walnut Street, Suite 408 

Cincinnati, OH 45202-3913 

William Desmond 

(513) 632-7604 

bdesmond@queencitymetro.com 

Page 156 of 176 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

Detailed Capabilities Assessment Worksheet 

Appendix D: Detailed Capabilities Assessment Worksheet 

Prevention 

⇒ Does the system check the Homeland 

Security Advisory Threat Condition every 

day 

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/)? 

⇒ Does the system receive threat information 

and warnings from local law enforcement, 

state agencies, or other transportation 

systems regarding threat levels? 

⇒ Do appropriate personnel at the system keep 

informed of major community activities and 

events? 

⇒ Are appropriate personnel at the system aware of ongoing law enforcement 

concerns regarding specific communities or events that may be targeted for 

terrorist activity? 

⇒ Does anyone representing 

the transportation system 

participate in the local or 

regional terrorism working 

group or other similar 

organization? 

⇒ Has anyone at the 

transportation system 

established a direct 

relationship with the FBI 

field office and the FEMA 

regional office with 

jurisdiction for the 

system’s service area? 

Federal Transit Administration 

Threat Levels 

FTA is supporting the development of transit system 

protective measures to promote a consistent and 

effective transit industry response to threat conditions 

defined by the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS). FTA response model supplements the 

HSAS model with Black and Purple designations for 

further refine transit industry activities when an event 

is in progress and during the post-event recovery of 

transit services and facilities. he guidance 

document outlines protective measures in relation to 

the direction provided by DHS. 

The 

T

Awareness 

⇒ Have system personnel been trained to challenge people who appear not to 

belong in restricted areas or who are not displaying the appropriate 

identification? 

⇒ Have system personnel been trained to recognize unusual, out-of-place, or 

unattended objects and to report them in a manner that supports appropriate 

evaluation and decision-making by supervisors and management? 

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⇒ Does your system have policies in place to ensure that security, operations, 

or maintenance personnel routinely check unattended public or open areas, 

such as rest rooms, stairways, parking garages, and elevators for unattended 

objects? 

⇒ Has your system incorporated security checks into policies for pre-trip 

inspections, vehicle cleaning, and vehicle fueling? 

⇒ Has your system reviewed its policies for lost and found items in light of the 

changing threat environment? 

⇒ Has your system developed a customer outreach program to provide 

passengers with instructions for reporting unusual, out-of-place activity or 

items? 

⇒ Have personnel in your system been trained to: 

o identify characteristics of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) use in 

the transportation environment; 

o recognize specific signs and symptoms related to WMD agent release; 

and 

o conduct incident size-up to ensure that appropriate information is 

reported from the scene to dispatch? 

Threat and Vulnerability Assessment 

⇒ Has the system considered the potential for terrorist acts against its facilities 

and personnel? 

⇒ Has the system identified the most likely locations for such acts? 

⇒ Does the system have a prioritized listing of current security vulnerabilities? 

⇒ Does the system have a current program in place to implement security and 

emergency preparedness measures that address these vulnerabilities? 

⇒ Has the system conducted a formal assessment to identify and resolve major 

vulnerabilities, including the following: 

o accessibility of surrounding terrain and adjacent structures to 

unauthorized access (both human and vehicular); 

o site layout and elements, including perimeter and parking, that 

discourage access control, support forced or covert entry, or support 

strategic placement of explosives for maximum damage; 

o location of incoming utilities and air intake vents (easy access for 

offenders); 

o building construction with respect to blast resistance (tendency toward 

progressive collapse, fragmentation, and no redundancy in load 

bearing); 

o sufficiency of lighting, locking controls, access controls, alarm 

systems, and venting systems to support facility control; 

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o availability of locations for hiding or planting devices or packages on 

platforms, in tunnels, near fueling, at off-hour vehicle storage facilities, 

and on passenger vehicles; and 

o information technology (IT) and network ease-of-penetration. 

⇒ Has the system participated in local law enforcement jurisdictional threat and 

vulnerability assessments? 

⇒ Has the system coordinated its threat and vulnerability assessment activities 

with local neighborhood watch programs? 

⇒ Do businesses and vendors in or near the transportation system coordinate 

programs? 

⇒ Have schools, hospitals, and other public service developed programs to 

support awareness? Do these programs extend to the transportation system? 

Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning 

⇒ Has the system reviewed its standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 

managing both internal emergencies and responding to community 

emergencies? 

⇒ Has the transportation system committed to using the incident command 

system (ICS) to integrate its response activity into the larger community 

effort? 

⇒ Has the transportation system committed to working with local and state 

public safety organizations to understand relevant terrorism response plans, 

SOPs, and the transportation system’s role in them? 

⇒ Has the system considered its role in community evacuation and in-place 

sheltering? 

⇒ Has the system worked with the local emergency planning community to predetermine evacuation routes and the transportation role in supporting 

evacuation or in-place sheltering? 

⇒ Has the system made certain that its equipment and capabilities for 

supporting community response to a terrorist incident are accurately 

represented in community plans and resource inventory documentation? 

⇒ Has the system initiated or completed internal planning efforts to ensure that: 

o an emergency contact list is developed and current, and the 

responsibility for call-outs is clearly identified; 

o employees have been issued quick reference guidelines for reporting 

and managing emergency situations on the system; 

o pre-determined guidelines have been developed for managing threats 

against the system, including procedures for receiving and evaluating 

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telephonic and written threats, conducting searches, evacuating 

facilities, and initiating partial or full-service shut-downs; 

o pre-determined staging areas have been identified for major sites 

served by the transportation system and identified as the most 

vulnerable to attack; 

o security and emergency response planning, coordination, and training 

is formalized and documented; 

o security and emergency response plans identify responsibilities of 

employees by function, employees are proficient in their 

responsibilities, and have received the appropriate training and 

exercising to carry out these responsibilities; 

o security and emergency response planning includes preparedness for 

multiple, concurrent events; 

o a system-wide service continuation, restoration, and recovery plan is in 

place, with responsibilities clearly identified; 

o revisions to standard operating procedures (SOPs), new SOPs and 

updates (based on security and emergency response planning activities) 

have been developed for signatures and distribution to be incorporated 

into training; 

o emergency drills and tabletop exercises are scheduled on a regular 

basis; 

o coordination and training with outside agencies is occurring on a 

regular basis and the system is effectively integrated into the 

community’s emergency management plans and activities; 

o media relations and system information control procedures and policies 

are established (both internal and external to system); 

o documentation of drills is maintained; drill critiques held; and 

recommendations are recorded and addressed with appropriate with 

follow-up; 

o emergency procedures are reviewed by the transportation system on a 

regular basis and updated as needed; 

o regular assessments of employee proficiency are conducted; 

o procedures exist for an alternate operations control center in the event 

of the evacuation of a primary facility; 

o support systems developed to provide post-incident support to 

customers and employees; 

o regular functional testing and inspection of emergency support 

equipment and systems (e.g., emergency phones, CCTV, alarms, 

onboard and in-vehicle equipment, two-way radios, fans, pumps, 

generators, etc.) is performed; 

o SOPs for HVAC operations in various emergency conditions have 

been reviewed; 

o contingency plans for loss of electrical power and radio or phone 

communications have been developed; and 

o pre-determined public address announcements for station platforms 

and on-board vehicles have been developed. 

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Incident Command System 

⇒ Do transportation personnel understand the special tensions between crisis 

and consequence management during a security incident and recognize that 

the ICS provides an ongoing tool for managing this tension and establishing 

joint priorities? 

ICS provides an important framework from which all responding agencies can 

work together. In any major incident, many local, state, and federal agencies may 

become involved. The challenge is to get the various agencies to work together in 

the most efficient and effective manner. The principles of ICS will enable state and 

local emergency response agencies to utilize common terminology, span of control, 

organizational flexibility, personnel accountability, comprehensive resource 

management, unified command, and incident action plans. 

The transportation system should use ICS in order to support the system’s ability to 

integrate with response activities. 

⇒ Key definitions, terms, acronyms, roles, functions, and responsibilities used 

by the local community to describe ICS and its application to manage local 

response, and to integrate this response with state and federal assets as they 

arrive on the scene of a major threat or actual event. 

⇒ Leadership and authority roles for crisis and consequence management at the 

local, state, and federal level, and how the transportation system remains 

aware of these different response levels and functions. 

⇒ Key elements of the transportation system’s situation and assumptions 

regarding its capabilities to identify, report, and manage a WMD incident on 

its property or to support response to an incident in the community (includes 

what resources, skills, and proficiencies transportation personnel do and do 

not have regarding WMD incidents, and what specialized functions must be 

provided by local, state, and federal agencies). 

⇒ Key elements of the transportation system’s situation and assumptions 

regarding its capabilities to recover from a WMD incident on its property or 

in the community, including expectations regarding the role of local, state, 

and federal resources to support recovery of costs incurred for personnel, 

equipment, damaged property, decontamination, structural damage, and other 

activities associated with both response and long term service restoration. 

⇒ The community’s approach to managing a major incident is often termed the 

concept of operations, which describes activities to support crisis and 

consequence management, and typically addresses many different areas of 

interest. 

o If there is a local incident site, an incident command post (ICP) will be 

established to manage emergency operations at that incident site. The 

local system with primary jurisdictional authority will designate the 

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incident commander. The incident commander will direct and control 

responding resources and designate emergency operating areas. 

o The crime scene boundary defines the crime scene. The crime scene 

may include the area referred to in technical operations as the red zone 

or working point. State, federal, or local law enforcement personnel 

may restrict access to the crime scene. Response activities within the 

crime scene may require special care in order to protect evidence. 

o The hazmat boundary defines the hazmat site, which is referred to in 

hazmat operations as the hot zone and may be termed the isolation area 

or exclusion zone by other responders, and may include the hazmat 

upwind warm zone, utilized for contamination control and rescue 

staging. Depending on the spread of contaminants, the hazmat site 

may include some or the entire crime scene. Entry into the hazmat 

boundary is normally restricted to response personnel equipped with 

personal protective equipment and using decontamination procedures. 

o The incident boundary includes the crime scene, the hazmat area, the 

cool zone or support zone used for incident support operations, such as 

resource staging or casualty collection, and areas where protective 

actions, such as shelter-in-place or evacuation, may be recommended 

or mandatory measures, such as a quarantine become imposed. Access 

to this area is normally controlled; if quarantine is implemented, egress 

may also be restricted. 

o The incident commander and the community EOC have typically 

established a division of responsibilities. The incident commander will 

normally manage field operations at the incident site and in adjacent 

areas. The EOC will normally mobilize and provide local resources, 

disseminate emergency public information, organize and implement 

large-scale evacuation, coordinate care for casualties, coordinate 

shelter and mass care for evacuees, arrange mortuary support, and, if 

local resources are insufficient or inappropriate, request assistance 

from other jurisdictions of the state. Does the transportation system 

understand how its field and EOC operations will coordinate with the 

community response? 

o As state and federal responders arrive, the response will transition from 

an incident command operation to a unified command arrangement. 

Does the transportation system understand its role in unified 

command? 

o If there is no local incident site, which may be the case in incidents 

involving biological agents, consequence management activities will 

generally be directed and controlled from the local EOC. An incident 

commander may be designated. When state and federal response 

forces arrive, the EOC may be used as a unified command operations 

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center. Is the transportation system prepared to coordinate with and 

support this type of response effort? 

Figure 21 displays a sample decontamination scene staging area schematic. Notice how 

the contamination reduction corridor is a limited access point to the hot zone. This is 

where emergency responders must remain extra careful to protect themselves and 

evidence from becoming contaminated. 

Figure 21: Sample Decontamination Scene Staging Area Schematic 

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Elements of Notification and Response 

⇒ Has the system reviewed its current emergency procedures to: 

o ensure that notification procedures support dispatch of the correct 

responders with the appropriate equipment and that all responders are 

aware of potential hazards (structural issues, electrical issues, 

suspected chemical or toxic agent) prior to his/her arrival at the scene; 

o ensure timely activation of the transportation system emergency 

operations center (EOC) or other specially-equipped facility from 

which transportation management can exercise direction and control, 

coordinating necessary resources in an emergency situation; 

o identify roles and responsibilities for transportation personnel 

conducting field operations at the scene in specific terms, so that 

operators and supervisors understand the limits of their responsibilities, 

particularly in hazardous conditions; 

o use escape hoods or pre-staged gas masks to support facility 

evacuation (requires training and exercising for all personnel involved 

in the program); 

o revise evacuation and shutdown procedures to consider secondary 

attacks and other environmental hazards; 

o manage information requests from victims, families, and relatives 

(applying the NTSB guidelines for airplane crashes may be 

appropriate); 

o evaluate activities to ensure ongoing liaisons with local emergency 

responders; 

o ensure the safety and security of passengers after the incident; 

o manage medically vulnerable passengers in community and vehicle 

evacuations; 

o prioritize decision-making regarding the need for medication, 

treatment, and hospitalization; 

o restore service or create alternatives with heightened security or road, 

bridge, and tunnel restrictions; and 

o issue public information. 

Other Considerations 

Other considerations for planning are listed in the following outline. 

⇒ Strategies and programs for initiating sustained relationships with local 

emergency planning organizations, ensuring that transportation systems are 

aware of the emergency management process in all phases. 

o Local communities must understand the resources and capabilities of 

transportation systems to support preparedness and response, as well as 

the hazards involved in operations based in the transportation 

environment. 

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o Local responders must also recognize the ways in which community 

traffic management decisions may affect transportation operations, 

providing additional response challenges. 

o Public transportation systems must learn what roles they can or are 

expected to play in the community response effort and must ensure that 

their employees are trained to proficiency and ready to provide this 

service safely and effectively. 

o Enforcement issues must all be resolved. For example, the issuance of 

evacuation orders, the management of children and those with serious 

medical conditions, the support of people of age and those with 

mobility, sensory and/or cognitive disabilities, the institution of inplace sheltering in transportation facilities (in response to a hazardous 

materials or CBRN incident at the transportation system), and the use 

of transportation facilities as mass care shelters. 

⇒ Strategies for overcoming friction and resistance from local public safety 

organizations, thus ensuring that transportation responders are not 

marginalized. 

o Public transportation concerns regarding incident staging, traffic 

control, managing passenger and employee safety, and restoration of 

service must be acknowledged in the local response effort and 

addressed in the response. 

o The jurisdictional authority and safety concerns of the transportation 

system must be addressed in all emergency response and management 

activities. 

⇒ Tools and techniques for supporting effective integration of the 

transportation system into new models and emerging structures for incident 

management at the local and state level. 

⇒ Strategies for ensuring that local responders are aware of unique hazards 

associated with the transportation environment, transportation equipment, 

and alternative fuel vehicles; 

⇒ Tools and systems to support strategic deployment of resources at the scene 

(to ensure availability, yet manage convergence and avoid premature 

commitment); 

o Scene management techniques to resolve inherent conflicts among 

competing priorities and practical approaches for promoting life safety 

priorities while preserving (as much as possible) evidence at any scene 

that may have criminal origins. 

o Tools for tracking resource and personnel expenditures devoted to 

emergency response, in keeping with requirements necessary for 

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reimbursement from FEMA, state and local agencies, FTA or other 

organizations, and for mutual aid partners and contractors. 

o Available classroom and simulation training and techniques for 

effectively conveying scene check-in, management, staging logistics, 

and incident documentation requirements to transportation employees. 

⇒ Recovery can be complicated by the presence of persistent agents, additional 

threats, extensive physical damages, and mass casualties. The community 

and the transportation system should consider their approaches to staffing 

and managing the operational periods required to stabilize the event and 

support long term recovery. 

Figure 22 (on the last page of this section) shows sample operational shifts of ongoing 

management modes in comparison to emergency response modes immediately following 

a security-related incident. The transportation system should expect that response to a 

major incident will result in multiple operational periods, comprised initially of 12 hour 

shifts, then giving way to longer planning phases as the incident is brought under control. 

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INCIDENT 

EMERGENCY MODE ON-GOING MANAGEMENT MODE 

INITIAL 

RESPONSE 

PHASE 

FIRST 

OPERATING 

PERIOD 

ACTIVATION 

PLAN 

TACTICAL PHASE 

SECOND 

OPERATING 

PERIOD 

THIRD 

OPERATING 

PERIOD 

TACTICAL 

PLAN 

TACTICAL 

PLAN FOR 

SECOND 

24-HOUR 

PERIOD 

STRATEGIC PHASE 

STRATEGIC 

OPERATIONAL 

PERIODS 

NEXT 

OPERATIONAL 

PERIOD PLAN 

7-DAY 

OPERATIONAL 

PLAN 

LONG-TERM 

PLAN 

0 

HOURS 

12 

HOURS 

24 

HOURS 

48 

HOURS 

7 

DAYS END 

TIME 

Figure 22: Sample Operational Shifts 

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Sample Grant Processing Guidelines 

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Sample Grant Processing Guidelines 

Appendix E: Sample Grant Processing Guidelines 

WHAT: Security/Emergency Management Grants for Emergency Preparedness Drills 

PURPOSE: To conduct emergency response drill(s) and exercise(s) designed to test and evaluate the 

transportation agency’s internal and external notification and response procedures and interagency 

communication and operations at the command post and incident scene. For transportation agencies 

conducting multiple exercises, at least one exercise should address a terrorist incident. 

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES: 

Testing effectiveness and ability of Emergency Management Plans at a minimum, this must 

include the items listed above in ‘Purpose.’ Examples of additional elements typically contained in 

an exercise include: 

1. Ability to work with regional and local emergency response personnel 

2. Communications link with passengers 

3. Identification of ICS components you are using 

4. Assignment of personnel to critical functions 

5. Protection of emergency scene e.g. power off, protection of personnel in right-of-way, etc. 

6. Initiation of evacuation procedures 

7. Coordination with other emergency responders 

8. Identification of staging area for equipment and personnel 

9. Notification to other supporting agencies 

10. Mitigation and recovery 

REQUIREMENTS: 

Pre-Grant: Identify pre-grant requirements, i.e., description of the exercise scenario, goals and objectives 

and budget for each drill. 

Progress Reporting: Identify progress reporting requirements, i.e., the dates each drill was completed and 

the date the After-Action Plan was completed. 

After-Action Report: This Report should be required as a condition of the grant award. 

PERIOD OF AVAILABILITY: Define a period of availability for receipt of funds 

SAMPLE ELIGIBLE EXPENSES: 

• Materials, supplies, rental equipment to conduct each drill 

• Consultant fees for technical assistance in the developing and evaluating the drills 

• Additional operating expenses that may be incurred, for example: alternative service provided due to 

service disruption 

• Emergency services agency expenses such as overtime wages and use of agency equipment and 

supplies 

• Wages related to the direct delivery of services in support of the drill 

INELIGIBLE EXPENSES: 

• Any capital expenses 

REVIEW CRITERIA: 

• Transportation agency should complete one full-scale drill at a minimum 

• Multiple drills including a tabletop exercise are encouraged 

• Interagency coordination with other first responders is critical 

• For metropolitan areas with more than one transit operator, transportation agencies are encouraged to 

submit one unified application 

• Cost should be proportionate to complexity of drills 

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

A Memorandum of Understanding between [Local Public Safety Agency] and the [Local 

Transit Agency] 

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Security and Emergency Preparedness Planning Guide 

A Memorandum of Understanding between [Local Public Safety Agency] and the [Local 

Transit Agency] 

Appendix F: A Memorandum of Understanding between [Local Public 

Safety Agency] and the [Local Transit Agency] 

Purpose 

This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is intended to document the intention of the 

[local transit agency] and [local public safety agency] to work together, on a continuing 

and lasting basis, toward maximum cooperation and mutual assistance in the areas of 

disaster response and emergency preparedness. To the maximum extent possible, the 

parties will develop joint programs for planning, training, conducting exercises, and 

responding to disasters impacting the [local transit agency] and/or [local public safety 

agency] or the community served by both agencies. Specifically, this MOU will address: 

The development of a mutual aid agreement between the [local transit agency] and the 

[local public safety agency] in the event of disasters, natural or manmade, that 

overwhelm the capabilities of either; 

The development of a joint exercise that requires the response of both entities in 

responding to disasters such as, but not limited to, an oil spill to the environment; 

The development of a coordinated response in event of terrorist use of weapons of mass 

destruction within the [local transit agency] or community served by the [local public 

safety agency] and in accordance with the Homeland Security Domestic Preparedness 

Program. 

Mutual Aid Agreement 

The State of [name of state] authorizes the state and its political subdivisions to develop 

and enter into mutual aid agreements for reciprocal emergency aid in case of emergencies 

too extensive to be dealt with effectively unassisted. 

It is in the best interest of the citizens of [name of community] for the [local public transit 

agency to enter into such a mutual aid agreement with [local public safety agency] to 

provide for expeditious emergency assistance, resources permitting, in the event of a 

catastrophic event or natural disaster in the city and/or surrounding county. 

The [local transit agency] desires to provide reciprocal assistance to [local public safety 

agency], resources permitting, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. 

Mutual Aid Agreements provide the mechanism that enhances and leverages existing 

capabilities. 

The process for creating a Mutual Aid Agreement between the [local transit agency] and 

the [local public safety agency] begins with: 

⇒ a working group will be established. This group will review current local, 

state, and federal laws to clearly identify any limitations to how each party 

will provide assistance during emergencies; 

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A Memorandum of Understanding between [Local Public Safety Agency] and the [Local 

Transit Agency] 

⇒ a draft agreement will be written (unless the law says otherwise) including 

the terms of the agreement, the participating parties, period of assistance, 

definitions of disasters or emergencies, and designating an authorized 

representative who can execute the agreement; 

⇒ the agreement will identify available services and resources, with some 

specific reference to the type of resources that can and cannot be used. 

Limitations will be spelled out also, to ensure the resources are not 

exhausted; 

⇒ the Agreement will identify exactly how to request assistance, for instance, 

the "trigger" for a request - a local emergency or disaster declaration; 

⇒ the Agreement will explain how the agency will request and what the 

expected committed response would be; 

⇒ the Agreement will identify who can make the request, and whether it should 

be written or oral. If possible a form will be developed clearly explaining 

what is needed and for what length of time; 

⇒ the Agreement will define operational procedures and explain who will 

maintain control of the resources provided and who will provide required 

maintenance for any equipment made available; 

⇒ the Agreement will make provisions for any food, housing, or 

communications support required for personnel who respond to an 

emergency or disaster; and 

⇒ the Agreement will define reimbursable expenses, including personnel, 

material, and equipment costs and for replacing damaged or destroyed 

equipment. 

Joint Oil Spill Exercise 

The [local transit agency] and [local public safety agency] intend to test capabilities and 

limitations of both entities in responding to an oil spill into the environment during a joint 

exercise in FY 2003. An Exercise Planning Team comprising of representatives from 

[local public safety agency]; [local transit agency]; and the [city/county] Emergency 

Operations Center will: 

⇒ define the type of exercise, develop an exercise scenario, and ensure active 

participation by [local transit agency] and [local public safety agency] 

response organizations; 

⇒ identify a list of key entities who will have responsibility for developing, 

controlling, and participating in the exercise; 

⇒ identify resources for developing and conducting the exercise; 

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A Memorandum of Understanding between [Local Public Safety Agency] and the [Local 

Transit Agency] 

⇒ establish a timeline for keeping such an approach on track; 

⇒ conduct the exercise; and 

⇒ review the lessons learned from the exercise and incorporate them into future 

response and exercise plans. 

Domestic Preparedness 

The [local transit agency] serves one of the 120 cities selected by the U.S. Department of 

Defense to receive extensive training to prepare the community for the potential of a 

terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. Army Chemical and 

Biological Command [conducted/will conduct] this training during the period [identify 

date]. [Local public safety agency] participated in this training with the [local transit 

agency]. 

The [local transit agency] will continue to coordinate development of its Domestic 

Preparedness Program with [local public safety agency]. Specifically, the [local public 

safety agency] will: 

⇒ coordinate with the [local transit agency] on its plans for responding to 

terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction planning and operations; 

⇒ encourage transit first responders to participate in training offered by the 

[local public safety agency]; 

⇒ invite [local transit agency] to participate in the development and conduct of 

the Biological Attack Tabletop Exercise and other follow-up exercises; 

⇒ collaborate with [local transit agency] in the purchase of response, detection, 

and decontamination equipment for incidents involving terrorist use of 

nuclear, biological or chemical agents to ensure the right mix of equipment is 

available for responding to such incidents; and 

⇒ provide reciprocal support, resources permitting, to the [local transit agency] 

in the event of an incident on an agency vehicle or in an agency facility. 

Agreement Modification Process 

Modifications to this agreement may be presented at anytime and shall be mutually 

agreed upon in writing after joint discussions involving both parties. 

This Agreement shall become effective when executed by both parties and shall remain 

in effect for a period of five (5) years, and shall automatically be renewed for successive 

five (5) year periods unless terminated by either party upon sixty (60) days prior written 

notice. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties' authorized officers have executed this Agreement 

on the date first above written. 

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