In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-22-00194-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 1704962R

Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

JAMIE FUENTEZ RAMIREZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jamie Fuentez Ramirez was convicted of six counts of aggravated 

assault on a public servant (while using a deadly weapon), one count of unlawful 

possession of a firearm, and one count of evading arrest. Ramirez received 

concurrent sentences of twenty years in prison for the aggravated-assault counts, eight 

years for the unlawful-firearm-possession count, and two years for the evading arrest

count. Ramirez now appeals, claiming that (1) the punishment charge improperly 

instructed the jury that he was eligible to receive good-conduct time credit in prison

and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault in

count seven. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

North Richland Hills police officer Aaron Dixson received a call to assist 

Watauga police with a welfare check on a man who was “possibly suicidal, possibly 

intoxicated, [and] possibly armed with a firearm.” Officer Dixson spotted a man and 

a car matching the call’s description at a Racetrac gas station. Officer Dixson 

identified the man as Ramirez. 

Officer Dixson approached Ramirez as he was standing outside his pickup 

truck, uneasy on his feet. Ramirez was drinking out of a large beer bottle. Because

Racetrac is a “licensed premises,” Officer Dixson felt justified in detaining Ramirez
3

for unlawfully consuming alcohol.1 And because there had been reports that Ramirez 

might be armed, Officer Dixson pulled out his firearm and ordered Ramirez to display 

his hands. Ramirez responded by quickly retreating into his truck. 

Ramirez closed the door and started rummaging in the center console. Two 

other North Richland Hills police officers arrived to provide backup for Officer 

Dixson. Ramirez suddenly drove off. 

A chase ensued, and eventually six police cars were following Ramirez. Police 

used a tire-deflation device, which damaged the tires and slowed Ramirez’s truck. 

Ramirez continued driving on flat tires until he reached his aunt’s house. After he 

stopped, and while still in the truck, Ramirez held up and displayed a handgun to the 

officers who had gathered.

Among the officers at Ramirez’s aunt’s home were Officer Dixson, Officer 

Robert Rife, Officer Chris Lizak (and his police dog), Officer Joseph Campbell, 

Officer Matthew Boyd, Watauga Sergeant Marshall McGee, and Lieutenant John 

Richerson. Also present was Officer Alex Hetler, who addressed Ramirez through a 

PA system and told him to get out of the truck so that they could “put a peaceful 

resolve to all this.” Ramirez was on the telephone with his aunt at the time; he told 

1A person commits an offense if he consumes beer on the premises of a retail 

dealer licensed for off-premise consumption of alcohol. Tex. Alco. Bev. Code Ann. 

§ 101.72(a).
4

her, and she relayed to police, that “he was going to start shooting if [they] didn’t stop 

yelling at him.” 

Ramirez got out of his truck and walked toward the house, but his angle of 

travel took him toward the officers who were behind cars parked on the street. The 

police ordered him to drop his gun, but he continued walking to a point where the 

officers’ “cover was almost compromised.” Three times, Officer Dixson fired a 

“bean-bag” shotgun at Ramirez, with two rounds hitting Ramirez along his beltline. 

Ramirez then raised and began firing his weapon. Video from Officer Dixson’s dash 

camera indicates that Ramirez fired at least three shots. Several of the officers 

returned fire, and Ramirez was injured. 

Ramirez was charged with seven counts of aggravated assault on a public 

servant with a deadly weapon, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and one 

count of evading arrest. The State waived one of the aggravated assault counts during 

trial, and a jury convicted Ramirez of the other counts. 

II. ERRONEOUS GOOD-CONDUCT-TIME INSTRUCTION

In his first point, Ramirez complains that the trial court’s punishment charge 

erroneously informed the jury of the possibility that Ramirez could receive credit for

“good-conduct time” while in prison. The State concedes that this part of the charge 

was in error, and we agree. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a)

(mandating parole-related, punishment-stage instruction to give jury, but excluding 

any mention of good-conduct time); Bailey v. State, No. 02-22-00186-CR, 2023 WL 
5

5766138, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 7, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (holding that it was error to include similar good-conducttime instruction); Weaver v. State, No. 02-21-00081-CR, 2022 WL 2978730, at *5 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth July 28, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (same). Ramirez did not object to this instruction at trial.

Having determined that there was unobjected-to error in the charge, we must 

conduct the appropriate harm analysis. Unpreserved charge error warrants reversal 

only when the error resulted in egregious harm. Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 298 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) 

(op. on reh’g); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.19. The appropriate inquiry for 

egregious harm is fact- and case-specific. Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013); Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

In making an egregious-harm determination, we must consider “the actual 

degree of harm . . . in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, 

including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of 

counsel[,] and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a 

whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; see generally Gelinas, 398 S.W.3d at 708–10 

(applying Almanza). Errors that result in egregious harm are those “that affect the 

very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right, vitally affect the 

defensive theory, or make a case for conviction clearly and significantly more 

persuasive.” Taylor, 332 S.W.3d at 490 (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 172). The 
6

purpose of this review is to illuminate the actual, not just theoretical, harm to the 

accused. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.

Looking at the punishment charge as a whole, we note first that the jury was 

instructed that no one could predict how parole laws and good-conduct time might be 

applied to Ramirez and that it was not to consider the extent to which good-conduct 

time and parole may be applied to Ramirez. The record does not indicate that the jury

failed to deliberate and decide the case based on the instructions contained in the 

charge. See Bailey, 2023 WL 5766138, at *6; Weaver, 2022 WL 2978730, at *5. As in 

Bailey and Weaver, the jury here did not send any notes regarding parole, time credit for 

good conduct, or how those issues would affect Ramirez’s punishment. See Bailey, 

2023 WL 5766138, at *6; Weaver, 2022 WL 2978730, at *5.

Second, the state of the punishment evidence does not make it more likely that 

the good-conduct-time instruction harmed Ramirez. The jury had heard how 

Ramirez—who was afforded several opportunities to peacefully end the situation—

got out of his truck, aimed a handgun at a group of police officers, and started firing. 

And though his sentences were not enhanced, the jury was presented with evidence 

that Ramirez had been convicted of, and served a five-year probated sentence for,

felony driving while intoxicated before committing the charged offenses. The jury 

assessed sentences of twenty years’ confinement for each of the aggravated-assault 

counts, eight years’ for the unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm count, and two years’ for 

the evading-arrest count. Except for the firearm-possession sentence, these 
7

punishments are not near the maximum of the offenses’ respective ranges.2 

Accordingly, it would not appear that the good-conduct-time instruction had an effect 

on the jury’s evaluation of the punishment evidence.

Third, neither the State nor the defense alluded to good-conduct time during 

their arguments at punishment. This factor weighs against a finding of egregious 

harm. See Weaver, 2022 WL 2978730, at *6.

Finally, Ramirez argues that “his recognized diminished capacity was hotly 

contested” and speculates that the jury would have assessed a shorter prison term had 

the good-conduct-time instruction not appeared in the court’s charge. But this

speculation amounts to theoretical harm; it does not support a finding of the actual 

harm required for reversal. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.

All of the factors in this case weigh against a conclusion that Ramirez suffered 

egregious harm. We overrule his first point.

III. SUFFICIENCY—COUNT SEVEN

In his second point, Ramirez attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 

his conviction in count seven—specifically that the evidence is insufficient to show 

2The punishment range for aggravated assault is confinement for five to ninetynine years or life. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32(a) (range for first-degree felony), 

§ 22.02(b)(2)(B) (aggravated assault where victim is public servant is first-degree 

felony). The range for both unlawful possession of a firearm and evading arrest is

two to ten years. Id. § 12.34(a) (range for third-degree felony), § 38.04(b)(2)(A) 

(evading arrest with vehicle is third-degree felony), § 46.04(e) (unlawfully possessing 

firearm is third-degree felony)..
8

that he threatened Officer Boyd with imminent bodily injury. Because a rational juror 

could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that Ramirez threatened Officer 

Boyd with imminent bodily injury, we overrule Ramirez’s sufficiency point.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found 

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to 

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable 

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 

2789; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622.

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code 

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. We may not re-evaluate the 

evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. 

Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences 

are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative force when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App.

2015); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court 

conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but 

must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”). We must presume that the 
9

factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must 

defer to that resolution. Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448–49.

A person commits the offense of assault if he “intentionally or knowingly 

threatens another with imminent bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(2). 

A person commits aggravated assault if he “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during 

the commission of the assault.” Id. § 22.02(a)(2). The offense is a first-degree felony 

if it is committed “against a person the actor knows is a public servant while the 

public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty.” Id. § 22.02(b)(2)(B).

B. SUFFICIENT PROOF OF AN IMMINENT THREAT

Ramirez complains that the State failed to prove that he “did then and there 

intentionally or knowingly threaten imminent bodily injury to M. Boyd, a public 

servant.” Ramirez notes Officer Boyd’s absence from trial and argues that, therefore, 

there is no evidence Ramirez threatened him personally. Contrary to Ramirez’s 

implication, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not “define[d] assault by 

threat as requiring a [particular] victim’s perception of the threat.” Olivas v. State, 

203 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The important question is “whether the 

assailant acted in such a manner as would under the circumstances portend an

immediate threat of danger to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Id. at 347.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that 

Ramirez pulled a handgun, aimed it, and began firing in the direction of all the 

officers, including Officer Boyd. Specifically, Sergeant McGee testified that he was in 
10

a group of officers that included Officer Boyd and that Ramirez was firing toward the 

officers on either side of him.3 He clarified that the gun was pointed at him and 

“everybody else,” and he was convinced that one of the officers was going to be shot. 

See Robinson v. State, 596 S.W.2d 130, 133 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“While it is true 

that the threat must be of imminent infliction of bodily injury or death, it is also true 

that the display of a deadly weapon of and within itself constitutes a threat of the 

required imminent harm.”); see also Cantu v. State, 953 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1997, pet. ref’d) (holding that pointing loaded gun at 

pursuing officer is threatening conduct supporting aggravated-assault conviction)

Further, although Officer Boyd did not testify, the jury could have inferred 

from the circumstances that Ramirez threatened him too, with imminent bodily injury. 

The other five officers at the scene all testified that they feared for their lives when 

the shooting began. Given that Officer Boyd was in the middle of that same group, it 

was reasonable to conclude that the circumstances were such that they would portend 

an immediate threat to a person of reasonable sensibility in Officer Boyd’s position. 

See Olivas, 203 S.W.3d at 347; Sosa v. State, 177 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that, even though victim did not testify, evidence 

was sufficient to support conviction for aggravated assault where defendant held gun, 

3A diagram introduced at trial essentially placed Officer Boyd in the middle 

(though standing toward the rear of the group) of the six police officers at whom 

Ramirez fired his weapon. 
11

demanded money, and walked in and out of bedroom where victim remained on the 

floor). We overrule Ramirez’s second point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Ramirez’s two points, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 18, 2024