Filed 5/30/13 In re E.T. CA2/8 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION EIGHT 

In re E.T., A Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B243407 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

L.T., 

 Defendant and Appellant; 

C.M., 

 Real Party in Interest. 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. CK92328) 

 

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. D. Zeke 

Zeidler, Judge. Reversed. 

 Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant L.T. 

 Darlene Azevedo Kelly, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Real Party 

in Interest, C.M. 
2

 John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and 

Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent 

Department of Children and Family Services. 

___________________________________ 

Mother, L.T., appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order granting 

custody of minor E.T. to his biological father, C.M. Father admits he never achieved 

presumed father status, but nonetheless contends the appeal is moot because the court 

subsequently removed E.T. from his custody upon the filing of a supplemental petition 

alleging neglect by father. Mother also contends the court’s visitation order, providing 

that “[t]he Department is to create a detailed visitation order for mother[,]” is 

prejudicially vague. The Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed 

a letter brief “taking no position” on mother’s challenge to the custody order, and “not 

oppos[ing] a remand for a proper visitation order.” We find this appeal is not rendered 

moot by the court’s later order removing E.T. from his placement with C.M. Because 

C.M. was a mere biological father, and was not entitled to presumed father status, the 

order granting him custody was in error. We also agree that the visitation order failed to 

adequately specify the frequency and duration of mother’s visits, and reverse and remand 

for further proceedings. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 27, 2012, the Department received a referral alleging that 21-monthold E.T. was neglected by mother. Mother and E.T. shared a home with maternal 

grandmother and an older sibling (over whom maternal grandmother had a guardianship 

due to mother’s drug use), and maternal great grandparents. E.T. had lived in this home 

for his entire life. Mother would often leave E.T. with maternal relatives without making 

plans for his care, and without specifying when she would return. She would leave E.T. 

for days without calling to check on him. Mother admitted leaving E.T. with maternal 

relatives for days at a time while she stayed with friends, and that she does not always 
3

return when she says she will. She also admitted that she does not contact maternal 

relatives to let them know when she is not going to return as planned. 

 Mother has a history of illegal drug abuse. She started using marijuana when she 

was 14 (in 1995), and graduated to methamphetamine when she was 16 (in 1997). 

Mother completed a drug program in September 2006, and claims she has not used illegal 

drugs since then. 

Mother also has a history of mental health problems. She was diagnosed as 

bipolar in 2007, and was prescribed medication. She stopped taking her medication once 

she became pregnant with E.T. She was hospitalized several times in the last seven years 

because she attempted suicide. Her last hospitalization was in 2010. 

At the request of the Department, mother drug tested on February 8, 2012. The 

test was positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. When the social worker went 

to the family home, maternal great grandfather reported that mother left the home over 

the weekend, and had not returned or contacted them. E.T. was ill over the weekend, and 

mother did not return the family’s calls. 

Maternal grandmother reported that E.T. had a fever and was vomiting. She did 

not know where mother was, and left voicemail messages for mother that E.T. was sick. 

Mother did not return any of her calls. Maternal grandmother took E.T. to the emergency 

room, and had difficulty obtaining treatment for E.T. because she did not have an 

authorization to receive medical care for E.T. Eventually, she was able to get him 

treated. Maternal grandmother was concerned that mother was currently using drugs; she 

was exhibiting many of the same behaviors that led grandmother to seek guardianship 

over mother’s older child. 

Mother eventually called the Department social worker. She said E.T. was not 

sick when she left him, and that she did not receive any phone calls concerning his illness 

because she had turned off her phone over the weekend. When confronted with the 

positive drug test, mother explained that perhaps she was around someone who was using 

drugs, causing her to test positive. She did admit to using drugs on Sunday (over the 
4

weekend that E.T. became ill) because maternal great grandmother had been diagnosed 

with cancer, and this was difficult for mother to deal with. 

A team decision-making meeting was held on February 17, 2012. Mother, 

maternal grandmother, maternal great grandparents, and maternal aunt attended. At the 

meeting, mother claimed her recent positive drug test must have been a mistake. She 

only used drugs over the weekend that E.T. became ill. Nevertheless, all parties agreed 

the Department’s supervision was necessary to protect E.T. Mother agreed to leave the 

family home so that E.T. could stay there under the care of maternal grandmother. 

Mother refused to disclose to the Department the identity of E.T.’s father, who had 

not provided for E.T.’s support. 

At the February 29, 2012 detention hearing, the trial court ordered E.T. removed 

from mother and placed with maternal grandmother. The court ordered monitored 

visitation for mother, and allowed maternal grandmother to monitor the visits. Mother 

also submitted a signed declaration of paternity indicating that father’s identity was 

“unknown.” 

The Department’s April 11, 2012 jurisdiction/disposition report reflected that the 

family home was clean and safe, and that none of the occupants had any criminal or child 

abuse histories. Mother had only one visit with E.T. since his detention and called 

maternal grandmother only for money rather than to arrange visits. Mother did not return 

calls from the Department. Because mother refused to identify father, the Department 

completed a due diligence search. The due diligence did not identify or locate E.T.’s 

father. No father was identified on E.T.’s birth certificate. 

At the April 11, 2012 adjudication hearing, mother pled no contest to the petition, 

and the following allegations were sustained: 

“[Under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300, subdivision (b)1] . . . 

[M]other . . . has a history of illicit drug abuse, including marijuana, and is 

a recent abuser of amphetamine and methamphetamine, which periodically 

 

1 All further undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
5

renders the mother incapable of providing regular care and supervision of 

the child. On 02/08/2012, the mother had a positive toxicology screen for 

amphetamine and methamphetamine. On 02/08/2012 and on prior 

occasions, the mother was under the influent of illicit drugs, while the child 

was in mother’s care and supervision. The mother’s illicit drug abuse 

endangers the child[’s] physical health and safety and places the child at 

risk of physical harm and damage. 

“[Under section 300, subdivision (b)] . . . On 02/18/2012 and on prior 

occasions, . . . mother . . . left the child in the care of maternal grandmother 

. . . and maternal relatives without making an appropriate plan for the 

child’s ongoing care and supervision. The mother’s whereabouts were 

unknown to the maternal grandmother and maternal relatives. On 

02/18/2012, the child suffered from a fever and vomiting and required 

medical treatment. The mother failed to provide the maternal grandmother 

with medical authorization to obtain medical care for the child. The 

mother’s failure to make an appropriate plan for the child’s care and 

supervision endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the 

child at risk of physical harm and damage.” 

Mother finally identified father at the hearing, and informed the court that he had 

filed a paternity action at the Norwalk courthouse. The court continued the matter to 

May 14 for a further disposition hearing, and for further due diligence now that father’s 

name had been disclosed. 

In a May 14, 2012 last minute information for the court, the Department informed 

the court that it had obtained information regarding father’s paternity action from the 

Norwalk courthouse. The Department also reported that father had a child welfare 

history, consisting of substantiated referrals for physical abuse in November of 2000, and 

emotional abuse in April of 2001. Father used “excessive and inappropriate physical 

discipline” on his stepchildren. He completed a 26-week domestic violence program and 

a parenting class, and jurisdiction was terminated in February 2002. 

The Department interviewed father. He had no contact with mother since 

December 2010. Mother refused to allow him to see E.T., and so he filed for shared 

custody and visitation. Father admitted to domestic violence problems with an ex-wife 

with whom he has two children. He also admitted to being sentenced to prison for three 
6

years for domestic violence in 2003. He denied any other criminal history. Father ended 

his relationship with mother while she was pregnant with E.T. He ensured she received 

prenatal care before their relationship ended. Father only saw E.T. three or four times 

after he was born. 

Father filed an order to show cause re: child custody and visitation in family court 

in October 2010. In her responsive declaration, mother did not consent to custody, and 

wanted only monitored visitation for father. She declared that father “may or may not be 

the father” of E.T. as she had “multiple sexual partners . . . around the approximate time 

of conception.” She further declared she was concerned about E.T.’s safety because of 

father’s methamphetamine use. Moreover, father did not have a stable and permanent 

residence of his own, and was involved in a police chase while his sons from another 

relationship were with him in the car. At the January 8, 2011 order to show cause 

hearing, the family court ordered paternity testing, and ordered each party to pay for half 

the cost. Father failed to appear at the continued order to show cause hearing, and failed 

to pay for his share of the paternity testing. Accordingly, the order to show cause was 

placed off calendar. 

Father appeared at the May 14, 2012 disposition hearing. The court ordered 

paternity testing. The court also gave the Department discretion to release E.T. to father 

if paternity was established. Father was also to receive unmonitored visits upon positive 

paternity results. The June 5, 2012 paternity results established that father was E.T.’s 

biological father. On June 22, 2012, the trial court found that father was E.T.’s biological 

father. The court ordered unmonitored visitation for father. 

On June 28, 2012, the Department filed a supplemental petition under section 342, 

which included new allegations about father. The petition alleged father “has a history of 

illicit drug abuse and is a frequent user of methamphetamine which renders the child’s 

father incapable of providing regular care and supervision for the child. The father’s 

illicit drug abuse endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at 

risk of physical harm and damage.” 
7

In a June 28, 2012 supplemental report, the Department described father’s child 

welfare history. The Department received a referral in November 2000, alleging that 

father hit his stepdaughters in the face with a baseball bat, his fists, and a hanger, causing 

bruising. The allegations were substantiated, and the family was under court supervision 

between November 2000 and April 2002. The Department also received a substantiated 

referral in April 2001 for emotional abuse of father’s biological child. Father pulled the 

child across the yard with enough force to nearly pull his arm out of the socket. Father 

also threatened to put a “hit” on the child’s stepfather. 

Father also has an extensive criminal history. He has a 1991 conviction for assault 

with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); two 2002 arrests for inflicting 

corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subds. (a), (e)(1)); a 2003 conviction for 

evading a police officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), willful cruelty to a child (Pen. Code, 

§ 273a, subd. (b)), and corporal injury on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (e)(1)), for 

which he was sentenced to three years in prison; a 2005 conviction for possession of a 

controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); as well as two warrants for 

parole violations in 2006 and 2007 (Pen. Code, § 3056). 

Moreover, father was living with people with criminal histories. His fiancé, V.A., 

was arrested in 2008 for possession of a controlled substance. (Pen. Code, § 4573.6). 

His future father-in-law had a driving-under-the-influence conviction from 2009. 

In late June 2012, father had a visit with E.T. in maternal grandmother’s home. 

Maternal grandmother reported the visit went well, but she was concerned E.T. would be 

traumatized by unmonitored visits with father, because he did not know father and the 

two did not have a relationship. 

Father denied any current drug use to the Department social worker, and denied 

ever being caught with drugs in his possession. He did admit to completing a Proposition 

36 drug program, but claimed he did so simply to reduce his prison sentence. However, 

he was ordered to participate in a Proposition 36 program for his 2005 drug conviction. 

When confronted with his drug conviction, father said that it must be a mistake, and must 

be for someone else with his same name. Father claimed to have had no trouble with 
8

drugs or the law since his release from prison. Based on his history, the Department 

recommended that father’s contact with E.T. be monitored. 

Mother and father testified at the June 28, 2012 combined disposition hearing for 

the original section 300 petition, and the detention hearing for the section 342 

supplemental petition. As to the section 342 petition, mother testified that she had used 

methamphetamine with father “[a] lot of times” and had last used methamphetamine with 

father in June of 2009. Their relationship had lasted 10 months, and they used drugs 

together nearly the entire time. The last time father saw E.T. was when he was one 

month old, and then father stopped visiting. Mother never hid E.T. from father. 

Father testified that he completed a Proposition 36 program, and completed a 

“substance abuse foundation” while in prison in 2003. He admitted to being arrested in 

2005 on drug charges, and that he completed the Proposition 36 program because of that 

arrest. Father denied telling the Department social worker he completed the Proposition 

36 program to get less prison time, and denied that he told her the arrest for drugs was a 

“mistake.” When asked when was the last time he used drugs, father claimed, “I never 

used. I was selling in 2005.” 

The trial court observed that its ruling on the section 342 petition turned on 

whether mother or father was a more credible witness regarding father’s drug use. The 

court found father to be more credible. “[I]f you . . . go back to the detention report 

where [mother] even refused to name who the father was or say anything . . . it’s one 

more indication of her lack of being forthcoming and having some motive to keep the 

father out of the case or the child’s life.” The court dismissed the section 342 petition. 

As to the disposition on the original section 300 petition, mother testified that 

because she was not sure who was E.T.’s biological father, mother wanted paternity 

testing in the family law proceeding. But, father “never showed up” to complete the 

testing. Mother did not identify father in the dependency proceeding because “if he 

wants to be the father let him do it on his own volition. I didn’t feel like court should be 

the way to make him want to be a father.” Father testified that E.T. should be released to 

him. Father did not complete the paternity testing in the family law proceeding because 
9

he did not have the money to pay for his share of the test. He never followed up to 

establish his paternity because “I was kind of hurt because [mother] said I wasn’t the 

father.” He just “figured” he was not wanted at mother’s family’s house because he had 

not established his paternity. 

The court concluded that removal from mother was necessary, and placed E.T. 

with father under a family maintenance plan. The court ordered father to submit to six 

random drug tests. The court ordered family reunification services for mother, and 

ordered that “the Department is to create a detailed visitation schedule for the mother.” 

Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

Mother appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order granting custody of E.T. to 

father, contending that only presumed fathers are entitled to custody, and that father 

never achieved presumed father status. Father admits he never achieved presumed father 

status, but contends that issue is moot because the court subsequently removed E.T. from 

his custody. Mother also contends the court’s visitation order, providing that “[t]he 

Department is to create a detailed visitation order for mother[,]” is too vague. We find 

that mother’s appeal is not moot, because allowing the order to stand may have 

consequences in later proceedings. We also agree that the visitation order fails to 

sufficiently establish the frequency and duration of mother’s visits. Accordingly, we 

reverse. 

1. Custody Order 

Mother challenges the order granting father custody, contending the court did not 

find that father was E.T.’s presumed father, and that any implied finding is not supported 

by substantial evidence. Father admits the court never found him to be a presumed 

father, and that he did not qualify for presumed father status, but nonetheless contends the 

court properly exercised its discretion to place E.T. with him as E.T.’s biological relative

under section 361.3. 

An appeal may become moot where subsequent events, including orders by the 

juvenile court, render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief. (In re 
10

Albert G. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 132, 134-135; In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 

1313, 1315-1317; In re Katherine R. (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 354, 357; In re Pablo D.

(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 761; In re Dylan T. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769.) “‘An 

issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’” 

(In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.) 

Mother urges that the appeal is not moot because the custody order has “collateral 

consequences which will continue to adversely affect mother in the underlying 

dependency proceedings, and potentially in future proceedings as well.” Specifically, she 

contends the court’s order resulted in neglect or abuse of E.T. while he was in father’s 

care. Also, mother contends that father’s paternity status is still at issue, and that he 

would automatically benefit from presumed father status if the order is allowed to stand. 

We agree that allowing the court’s order to stand may have collateral consequences, such 

as the implied finding that father qualifies for presumed father status, and that mother 

may be unfairly prejudiced in her efforts to reunify with E.T. due to the abuse and neglect 

E.T. suffered while in his father’s care. Therefore, we will reach the merits of the appeal. 

“In dependency proceedings, ‘fathers’ are divided into four categories—natural [or 

biological], presumed, alleged, and de facto.” (In re A.A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, 

779.) The distinction is important because only a presumed father is entitled to custody 

and reunification services. (In re Kobe A. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120; In re 

Paul H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 753, 760; In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1406-

1407.) Specifically, section 361.2 provides that “[w]hen a court orders removal of a child 

pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the 

child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose 

that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume 

custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with 

the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the 

safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) 

Only a presumed father is entitled to custody under section 361.2. (In re Zacharia D.

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451.) 
11

 The statutory methods for establishing a presumption of paternity are contained in 

the Family Code. The provision applicable here, Family Code section 7611, subdivision 

(d), provides that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if “[h]e receives 

the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” Moreover, 

there are some circumstances when a man who has not received the child into his home 

may be declared a presumed father, under principles of due process and equal protection, 

when he has been prevented by the mother from physically receiving the child into his 

home. (See Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849-850.) 

A man who claims entitlement to presumed father status has the burden of 

establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting his entitlement. (In 

re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210.) In carrying that burden, a biological father 

must establish that he “‘promptly [came] forward and demonstrate[d] a full commitment 

to his parental responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise . . . .’” (In re 

Zacharia, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 450.) “In determining whether a biological father has 

demonstrated such a commitment, ‘[t]he father’s conduct both before and after the child’s 

birth must be considered. Once the father knows or reasonably should know of the 

pregnancy, he must promptly attempt to assume his parental responsibilities as fully as 

the mother will allow and his circumstances permit. In particular, the father must 

demonstrate “a willingness himself to assume full custody of the child . . . .”’” [Citation.] 

‘A court should also consider the father’s public acknowledgement of paternity, payment 

of pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so, and prompt legal 

action to seek custody of the child.’” (Id., at p. 450, fn. 19, italics omitted.) 

 Here, the only paternity finding appearing in the record is that father is a 

biological father. Father never endeavored to establish his status as a presumed father, 

and never asked the court to make such a finding. Father does not dispute that the court 

did not find him to be a presumed father, and on appeal, he agrees that such a finding 

would not have been supported by the evidence. The facts discussed above plainly 

establish that father is not a presumed father. 
12

Father contends, however, that as E.T.’s biological relative, he was entitled to 

placement of E.T. under section 361.3. Section 361.3, subdivision (a) provides, “In any 

case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant 

to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the 

child for placement of the child with the relative.” “Preferential consideration” means 

that “the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and 

investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) For purposes of section 361.3, “‘[r]elative’ means 

an adult who is related to the child by blood, adoption, or affinity within the fifth degree 

of kinship, including stepparents, stepsiblings, and all relatives whose status is preceded 

by the words ‘great,’ ‘great-great,’ or ‘grand,’ or the spouse of any of these persons even 

if the marriage was terminated by death or dissolution. However, only the following 

relatives shall be given preferential consideration for the placement of the child: an adult 

who is a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(2).) 

Although a biological father is technically an “adult who is related to the child by 

blood, adoption, or affinity within the fifth degree of kinship” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(2)), 

section 361.3 contemplates the placement of a child with a relative after removal from his 

“parents.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a), italics added.) Moreover, “parents” are not listed as 

relatives entitled to preferential placement under section 361.3, and it is clear that any 

preference for placement with a relative is subordinate to placement with a nonoffending 

parent under section 361.2. Section 361.2 requires a child to be placed with a 

nonoffending parent unless such a placement would be detrimental, whereas section 

361.3 only requires preferential consideration of a relative for placement. (See § 361.2, 

subd. (a) [“If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent 

unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, 

protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (Italics added.)]; § 361.3, 

subds. (a), (c).) Furthermore, section 361.2 specifically addresses placement with a 

parent, and therefore makes clear that section 361.3 was not intended to address parents. 

Had the Legislature intended section 361.3 to apply to parents, it would have said so. 

(See In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 451.) 
13

Even if section 361.3 applies, it was a clear abuse of discretion to place E.T. with 

father rather than maternal grandmother. Father and E.T. had no relationship, whereas 

E.T. had grown up in maternal grandmother’s home, along with his sibling, E.L. 

Moreover, maternal grandmother had no criminal or child welfare history, whereas father 

had a long history of child abuse and criminal behavior. (See Alicia B. v. Superior Court

(2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 856, 863-864; § 361.3, subd. (a).) 

Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred in placing E.T. with father, and 

reverse the court’s dispositional order. 

2. Visitation Order 

Mother contends the trial court’s June 28, 2012 visitation order failed to ensure 

that she would receive reasonable visitation, when the court ordered that the “Department 

is to create detailed written visitation schedule for mother.” The Department agrees the 

court’s visitation order fails to establish a “minimal framework” for visitation, and 

therefore “does not oppose remand for a proper visitation order to be fashioned by the 

juvenile court.” Father takes no position as to mother’s challenge to the visitation order. 

The court has the sole power to determine whether visitation will occur. (In re 

M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274; In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 319; In re 

Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 48-49.) Once visitation is ordered, the court may 

delegate responsibility for managing details such as the time, place and manner of visits, 

none of which affect a parent’s defined right to see his or her child. (In re Chantal S.

(1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213; In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374; In re 

T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123.) However, the visitation order must give some 

indication of how often visitation should occur. (See In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 

Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008-1009; In re Moriah T., at pp. 1375-1376.) A court may not 

abdicate its discretion to determine whether visitation will occur to a third party. (In re 

S.H., at pp. 317-318; see also In re Rebecca S. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314 [“The 

time, place, and manner of visitation may be left to the legal guardian, but leaving the 

frequency and duration of visits within the legal guardian’s discretion allows the guardian 

to decide whether visitation actually will occur.”].) 
14

Here, the court’s visitation order failed to give any indication about the frequency 

of the visits, effectively giving the Department discretion to decide whether visitation 

would actually occur. Accordingly, we remand the matter with directions “to specify the 

frequency and duration” of mother’s visits. (In re Rebecca S., supra, 181 CalApp.4th at 

p. 1315.) 

DISPOSITION

 The June 28, 2012 dispositional order placing E.T. in the home of father is 

reversed. The visitation order is reversed, and the case remanded with directions to 

specify the frequency and duration of mother’s visits. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 GRIMES, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

 BIGELOW, P. J. 

 RUBIN, J.