J-S61040-14 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee 

v. 

PATRICK REED MORAN, 

 Appellant 

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 809 WDA 2014 

 

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 23, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County, 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-53-CR-0000148-2012 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 16, 2014 

 Patrick Reed Moran (Appellant) appeals from the order entered on 

April 1, 2014, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

 The background underlying this matter can be summarized in the 

following manner. 

On December 10, 2012, a jury convicted Appellant of possession 

of a firearm prohibited. The conviction stemmed from 

Appellant’s possession of a shotgun while on parole. On 

February 8, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to fortyeight (48) to one-hundred-twenty (120) months’ imprisonment. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on February 25, 2013. ... 

Commonwealth v. Moran, 93 A.3d 496 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished 

memorandum at 1). “[On direct appeal,] Appellant argue[d] the 

Commonwealth improperly elicited prejudicial testimony concerning 
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Appellant’s possession of a firearm, his threats to injure and/or kill his 

estranged wife, and his drug use. ...” Id. at 2. 

 In its memorandum opinion affirming Appellant’s judgment of 

sentence, this Court reproduced the complained-of testimony. The Court 

then initially stated, “After a thorough examination of these exchanges, we 

conclude the testimony regarding Appellant’s drug use and threats to his 

estranged wife established context for Appellant’s possession of the 

shotgun.” Id. at 7. The Court, however, ultimately determined that 

Appellant waived his issue because he did not object to the testimony at 

trial. Id.

 Appellant did not petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal. 

However, he did file timely a pro se PCRA petition. His counsel subsequently 

filed a supplemental PCRA petition. The crux of Appellant’s claim was that 

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony about which 

he complained on direct appeal. 

 The PCRA court held a hearing regarding Appellant’s petition. On April 

23, 2014, the court denied the petition, concluding that Appellant failed to 

establish the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 

standard.1 Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The PCRA court 

 

1

 In the PCRA court’s opinion in support of its order, the court, at least to 

some extent, conflated the prejudice prong of the ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel standard with a prejudice analysis under Pennsylvania Rule of 

Evidence 403. 
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directed Appellant to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant then filed 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

In his brief to this Court, Appellant asks us to consider one question, 

namely, “Must trial counsel object to prejudicial statements by the 

prosecutor during a jury trial concerning threats to injure and/or kill 

[Appellant’s] separated wife and [Appellant’s] drug usage, when [Appellant] 

was never charged with these crimes?” Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

 In support of his issue, Appellant notes that, just prior to his trial, a 

murder occurred in Potter County and that the murder “involved a firearm, 

threats, and an ex-wife (the victim).” Id. at 7. Appellant argues, 

[Trial counsel] did not object, nor request a mistrial, when 

testimony was presented by the Commonwealth that referred to 

[Appellant’s] usage of a firearm and threats to injure/or kill his 

separated wife. This was particularly prejudicial as [Appellant] 

was not charged with these alleged threats, but also the facts 

were similar in the Potter County murder case[.] 

Id. Appellant also complains that counsel failed to object to testimony 

regarding his use of drugs. Appellant does not seem to challenge the 

relevancy of the testimony regarding his drug use or threats to his estranged 

wife; rather, he seems to suggest that the testimony was unfairly 

prejudicial. 

 Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the court’s rulings are supported by the evidence of 

record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 

1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010). 
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Appellant’s issue involves a claim that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel. “To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, a 

PCRA petitioner must show the underlying claim has arguable merit, 

counsel’s actions lacked any reasonable basis, and counsel’s actions 

prejudiced the petitioner. Prejudice means that, absent counsel’s conduct, 

there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceedings would have 

been different.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 71 A.3d 1061, 1063 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citations omitted). 

At Appellant’s trial, the jury was charged with determining whether the 

Commonwealth proved that Appellant violated 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), 

which provides: 

A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in 

subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless 

of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in 

subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or 

manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, 

transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth. 

Appellant stipulated that he had been convicted of an offense enumerated in 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(b). Thus, in order to convict Appellant, the 

Commonwealth simply had to prove that Appellant possessed, used, 

controlled, sold, transferred, or manufactured a firearm. 

 The Commonwealth’s first witness at trial was Joshua Blass. According 

to Blass, he purchased a shotgun from a store on May 14, 2012, and then 

sold that gun to Appellant approximately two weeks later. 
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 The second witness to testify was Stacey Imler. Imler testified that 

Appellant was a neighbor and friend. Imler’s family owns a camp in Tioga 

County. Imler stated that Appellant and others were at that camp in late 

May or early June of 2012. 

Appellant highlights the following exchange between the prosecutor 

and Imler: 

Q. If you can recall what was [Appellant] doing [at the camp] at 

that time? 

A. We were up having a good time, had a [bonfire], we were 

drinking, partying that was about it. 

Q. And was [Appellant] drinking and partying with you guys? 

A. He’s not a big drinker I believe he partook in the party. 

Q. Any drugs? 

A. Yes. 

N.T., 12/10/2012, at 30-31. 

 Imler went on to testify that he observed Appellant holding a shotgun 

at the camp. While Imler stated that Blass owned the gun, he also testified 

that he asked Appellant why he purchased the gun. According to Imler, at 

some point, Appellant said that “he takes his marriage vows very seriously 

and to death do us part.” Id. at 33. Imler then stated that Appellant and 

Appellant’s wife, Rebecca Carr, had broken up; so, Imler “warned [Carr] that 

[Appellant] had a gun and [] also warned her about the vows to death do us 

part.” Id. at 34. Imler further testified that, after he informed Carr of the 
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gun at his camp, she and Matt Yoder retrieved it in order to keep Appellant 

from getting the gun again. 

 On cross-examination, Imler admitted to using “alcohol, weed, [and] 

bath salt” during the time Appellant was at his camp. Id. at 37. He also 

believed Blass, who also was at the camp, may have used bath salt as well. 

On redirect examination, Imler stated that he did not see Appellant use any 

bath salt. Imler also stated, 

Everybody knows [Appellant], knows that his marriage vows 

were sacred and anyone that’s married that’s part of your vows 

too to death do us part for anyone that’s married part of you 

vows is to death do us part. He meant one thing or another it’s 

still death do us part. 

Id. at 40. 

 Ryan Rachiele testified next for the Commonwealth. The focus of his 

testimony was that, in late May or early June of 2012, Appellant offered to 

give him a shotgun. Rachiele asserted that he declined Appellant’s offer. 

 The Commonwealth then elicited testimony from Carr. Carr stated 

that she and Appellant separated in May of 2012 due to Appellant’s anger 

and abusiveness. She reported that, after she moved out of the couple’s 

apartment, Imler informed her that Appellant had a shotgun. According to 

Carr, at some point after speaking to Imler, she asked Appellant why he got 

the gun; he stated, “You know why.” Id. at 58. The prosecutor asked Carr 

if she knew what Appellant meant by that statement, and she responded, 

“From conversations from before I left him, yeah, he said that I would get a 
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bullet in the head before I would leave him and death, until death do us 

part.” Id. 

 Carr further testified that, after her conversation with Appellant, she 

and Matt Yoder went to Imler’s camp and retrieved the gun. The 

Commonwealth also presented Yoder as a witness, and for the most part, he 

corroborated Carr’s testimony. 

 Roger Probel, Carr’s step-father, testified for the Commonwealth. He 

reported that Yoder gave him the shotgun and that he then gave the gun to 

the chief of police in Galeton. The remainder of the testimony came from 

the Galeton chief of police, a forensic evidence technician, and a firearm and 

tool mark examiner. 

 We first will address Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object to Imler’s testimony regarding Appellant’s drug use. The 

only testimony that arguably suggests that Appellant used any drugs was 

Imler’s positive response to the prosecutor’s question, “Any drugs?” Id. at 

31. The prosecutor did not specifically ask Imler if Appellant used drugs. 

Furthermore, before he answered this ambiguous question, Imler stated that 

Appellant was not a big drinker, and after he answered the question, Imler 

testified that he did not see Appellant take any bath salt. 

Thus, even if we assume arguendo that trial counsel should have 

objected to this passing reference to drug use, we nonetheless conclude that 

Appellant has not established the prejudice prong of the ineffective-
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assistance-of-counsel standard. Appellant has failed to convince us that, 

had counsel successfully objected to the prosecutor’s question and Imler’s 

answer, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would 

have been different. 

We now will address Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object to testimony regarding his devotion to his marriage 

vows, which could be construed as threats to Carr. Appellant seems to 

suggest that trial counsel should have objected to this testimony on the 

ground that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of causing 

him unfair prejudice. We disagree. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a “court may exclude 

relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or 

more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 

evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. “‘Unfair prejudice’ means a tendency to suggest 

decision on an improper basis or divert the jury's attention away from its 

duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 

961 A.2d 119, 151 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has 

explained that 

[e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because it is harmful to 

the defendant. Th[e Supreme] Court has stated that it is not 

required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts 

from the jury’s consideration where those facts are relevant to 

the issues at hand and form part of the history and natural 
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development of the events and offenses for which the defendant 

is charged. 

Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 141 (Pa. 2007) (citation 

omitted). 

 As we noted above, Appellant does not challenge the relevancy of the 

evidence regarding the threats he made toward Carr. Furthermore, 

evidence of those threats helped form the history and natural development 

of the events and offenses for with Appellant was charged. Testimony 

regarding those threats explained why Appellant purchased the gun, how 

Carr knew about the gun, why she retrieved the gun, and why Probel turned 

over the gun to the police. Given the nature and context of the testimony 

regarding Appellant’s threats toward Carr, we are not persuaded that this 

evidence had a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis or 

diverted the jury’s attention away from its duty of weighing the evidence 

impartially. We thus conclude that Appellant’s claim that counsel should 

have objected to this testimony on the basis that it was unfairly prejudicial 

lacks arguable merit. 

 For these reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court properly denied 

Appellant’s PCRA petition. We, therefore, affirm the court’s order. 

 Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/16/2014