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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FILED WITH THE 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

MASHOUR 

ALSABRI et 

ABDULLAH 

al., 

MUQBEL ~;:~

Petitioners, Civil Action No.: 06-1767 (RMU) 

v. Re Document No.: 1 

BARACK OBAMA et al., 

Respondents. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This matter comes before the court on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by 

Mashour Abdullah Muqbel Alsabri (lSN 324) ("the petitioner"), a Yemeni national detained at 

the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("GTMO"). The government 

maintains that the petitioner was part of and provided material support to the Taliban, al-Qaida or 

associated enemy forces and is therefore lawfully detained. The petitioner asserts that he was 

neither part of nor supported those forces and that the court should therefore direct the 

government to release him from custody immediately. 

In November 2010, the court held a merits hearing addressing the legality ofthe 

petitioner's detention. During the course ofthat hearing, which spanned four days, the parties 

introduced dozens of exhibits concerning the petitioner's alleged role in the Taliban and alQaida, including interrogation reports reflecting statements made by the petitioner and other 

GTMO detainees, declarations of intelligence officials and translations ofdocuments purportedly 

seized from al-Qaida and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan. 

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As discussed below, the government has established by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the petitioner traveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2000 to fight with the Taliban, alQaida or associated forces, stayed in Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouses, sought out and received 

military-style training from the Taliban or al-Qaida, traveled to the battle lines in Afghanistan as 

part ofthe Taliban or al-Qaida and remained part ofthose forces at the time of his capture in 

early 2002. Thus, based on the totality of the evidence, the court is compelled to conclude that 

the petitioner was part of the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces and is therefore lawfully 

detained. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Overview 

The petitioner is a thirty-four year old Yemeni national who was born in Mecca, Saudi 

Arabia to Yemeni parents. GE 1 at 1 GE 3 at 1. I He attended school in Saudi Arabia until 

approximately the ninth grade, when he dropped out and began working odd jobs, including 

driving a taxi. GE 1 at 2; GE 3 at 1; GE 10 at 1. During this period, the petitioner became 

acquainted with a Yemeni man named GE 10 at l~ GE 43 at 1, a fonner 

mujahaddin in Bosnia, PE 115 at 2, who would later introduce the petitioner to variousjihadists 

and members of al-Qaida, see infra Part IV.B.l.a. 

In late 1998, Saudi authorities arrested the petitioner for allegedly harboring an individual 

wanted for passport forgery. GE 1 at 2~ GE 3 at 1~ GE 9 at 1. After a month-long stay in a Saudi 

jail, the petitioner was deported to Yemen, his country of citizenship. GE 1 at 2~ GE 3 at 2. The 

Citations to "GE _" refer to the exhibits introduced by the government during the merits 

hearing, while citations to "PE __" refer to the exhibits introduced by the petitioner during the 

merits hearing. 

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petitioner was barred from returning to Saudi Arabia for a period of five years. GE 1 at 2; GE 2 

at 2. 

After arriving in Sana'a, Yemen from Saudi Arabia, the petitioner contacted and met with 

_ GE 3 at 2-3; GE 10 at 1; GE 43 at 1. The petitioner spent a few days in Sana'a 

before traveling to the city of Ta'iz, GE 3 at 2-3; GE 10 at 1, where he remained for several 

weeks, living with extended family and working in the honey trade, GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3; GE 10 

at 1. While in Ta'iz, the petitioner's uncle taught him how to use an AK-47 and a pistol. GE 3 

at 5. 

During this period in Ta'iz, the petitioner became acquainted with a twenty-five year old 

Saudi man named GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2.•had received military 

training from the Taliban and had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan two years earlier. GE 

1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. The petitioner and. discussed various topics, including the local honey 

trade and the conflict in Afghanistan. GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. 

In the summer of 1999, the petitioner returned to Sana'a, purportedly in the hopes of 

obtaining a visa to return to Saudi Arabia. GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3. While his visa application was 

pending,_ arranged for the petitioner to stay at a boardinghouse operated by. 

_ brother-in-law, ("the_boardinghouse"). GE 3 at 3-4; GE 43 at 1. 

The petitioner shared the.oardinghouse with at least eight other men. GE 1 at 3-4; GE 3 

at 3-5. At the time, th.boardinghouse served as the hub of a car theft ring whose aim was 

to violently free a Yemeni terrorist from a Sana'a prison. GE 1 at 5; GE 2 at 2. Many of the 

individuals who lived at or were associated with th.oardinghOUSe were veteranjihadists 

and several would later travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaida. See infra 

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Part IV.B.1.a. One of these men would later be a suicide bomber during al-Qaida's October 

2000 attack on the Us.s. Cole? See id. 

Approximately two weeks after arriving at th.oardinghouse, the petitioner was 

arrested by Yemeni authorities, along with other individuals associated with the boardinghouse, 

on suspicion of involvement in the car theft conspiracy. GE 1 at 4; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 1. The 

petitioner was released from prison in December 1999 and, after briefly visiting his uncle in 

Ta'iz, returned to the.oardinghouse. GE I at 5-6; GE 9 at 2. The petitioner was reincarcerated for a few days by Yemeni authorities for allegedly providing a cell phone to one of 

his imprisoned housemates from the.oardinghOuse. GE 1 at 5. During this period, the 

petitioner socialized wit'-, who had also been recently released from prison, and 

became acquainted with individuals whom the petitioner has admitted were members of alQaida. See infra Part IV.B.l.a. 

Around this time, the petitioner decided to leave Yemen and travel to Afghanistan. GE 1 

at 6; GE 3 at 5. The petitioner has stated that his decision to go to Afghanistan was influenced 

by a fatwa (religious decree) issued by nationally recognized religious scholars encouraging men 

to travel to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. GE 3 at 5. The petitioner also stated that he was 

influenced by the former Taliban fighter he had met in Ta'iz, who 

purportedly told the petitioner that he could find work and a better life in Afghanistan. GE 1 at 

6; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 3. The petitioner did not tell anyone, including his family, that he was 

planning to go to Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6. 

On October 12,2000, al-Qaida operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked the 

u.s.s. Cole, a Navy destroyer docked in the port of Aden in Yemen. PE 33 ("9/11 COMM'N 

REpORT") at 190. The blast killed seventeen members of the ship's crew and wounded at least 

forty other crewmembers. [d. 

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In August 2000, following travel instructions provided to him by.the petitioner flew 

from Sana'a, Yemen through Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan and then on to Quetta, Pakistan, a city 

near the Afghan border. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5; GE 6 at 2. In Quetta, the petitioner stayed for 

three days at the Daftar al-Taliban, a Taliban-run facility which arranged for him and three other 

men to be transported across the border to Kandahar, Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 

1; GE 6 at 2. The three men who crossed the border with the petitioner admitted that they were 

traveling to Afghanistan to become martyrs. GE 10 at 2. 

In Kandahar, the petitioner and his companions were taken to a guesthouse known as the 

Haji Habash guesthouse, which was run by an individual named_. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 

at I; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 3. The petitioner stayed at this guesthouse for approximately two weeks. 

GE 4 at 1; GE 9 at 3. From there, the petitioner traveled to Kabul, where he stayed for a few 

days at a guesthouse operated by an individual named Hamza al-Ghamdi. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; 

GE 9 at 4. The petitioner requested permission from al-Ghamdi to travel to the front lines, but 

al-Ghamdi denied the request because the petitioner lacked weapons training. GE 9 at 4. 

The petitioner then traveled on to lalalabad, where he allegedly stayed at the home of 

, an individual whom. had advised the petitioner to contact once in 

Afghanistan. GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4; GE 10 at 2. After several months, the petitioner returned to 

the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul. GE 9 at 5-6. With al-Ghamdi's authorization, the petitioner 

then traveled to the battle lines manned by Taliban fighters in combat with the Northern 

Alliance. GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 6. 

After leaving the Taliban battle lines, the petitioner allegedly returned to_ 

house in Jalalabad. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 6. As coalition forces approached the city in late 2001, 

the petitioner fled Jalalabad for Pakistan. GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 3. The petitioner was arrested by 

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Pakistani authorities in early 2002 and transferred to the custody of the United States military. 

GE 6 at 3. He was subsequently transferred to GTMO, where he is currently detained. Pet. at 1. 

B. Procedural History 

The petitioner commenced this action in October 2006 by filing a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus.3 See generally Pet. In December 2006, the court stayed the case while the 

Circuit and the Supreme Court considered whether the federal district courts have jurisdiction 

over habeas petitions filed by individuals detained at GTMO. See Mem. Order (Dec. 4, 2006) at 

2. The Supreme Court resolved this question in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), in 

which the Court held that individuals detained at GTMO were "entitled to the privilege of habeas 

corpus to challenge the legality oftheir detention," id at 2262, and that the federal district courts 

have jurisdiction over such challenges, id at 2274. 

Although the Supreme Court did not specify what procedures the district courts were to 

employ in resolving these habeas petitions, it did emphasize that the "detainees in these cases are 

entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hearing." Id at 2275. Toward that end, this court and other 

judges in this district agreed to consolidate their cases before Judge Hogan for the purpose of 

adopting common procedures for the GTMO detainee litigation. On November 6, 2008, Judge 

Hogan issued a Case Management Order ("CMO") to govern these proceedings, which he 

amended on December 16,2008. See generally Am. CMO (Dec. 16,2008). This court adopted 

the provisions ofthe amended CMO, subject to modifications set forth in an Omnibus Order 

issued on April 23, 2009. See generally Omnibus Order (Apr. 23,2009). 

Meanwhile, having filed its initial Factual Return for the petitioner in April 2007, the 

government filed a motion to amend its Factual Return, which Judge Hogan granted in 

The petitioner filed his petition together with another Yemeni detained at Guantanamo Bay, 

Mohammad AI-Zamouqi (ISN 691). A merits hearing on AI-Zarnouqi's petition is scheduled to 

begin May 2, 20 II. 

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November 2008. See Order (Nov. 7,2008). Following an extensive period of discovery, the 

court issued an order in February 2010 establishing dates to bring this litigation to completion. 

Order (Feb. 16,2010). 

On April 29, 2010, the government filed a second motion for leave to amend the factual 

return, see generally Govt's 2d Mot. for Leave to Amend Factual Return, which the court 

ultimately granted,4 see generally Mem. Order (June 9, 2010). The petitioner filed his traverse 

on April 30, 2010, see generally Traverse, and on June 4,2010, the government filed its motion 

for judgment on the record, see generally Govt's Mot. for J. on R. The petitioner filed his crossmotion for judgment on the record on June 18,2010. See generally Petr's Cross-Mot. for J. on 

R. In late August and early September 2010, the parties filed supplements to their cross-motions 

for judgment on the record addressing recent Circuit rulings concerning the scope ofthe 

government's detention authority. See generally Govt's Supplemental Mot. for 1. on R.; Petr's 

Supplemental Mot. for 1. on R. 

On September 16,2010, the court denied the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the 

record and scheduled a merits hearing to begin November 8, 2010. Order (Sept. 16,2010). On 

October 25,2010, two weeks before the merits hearing was scheduled to begin, the government 

filed a motion to supplement the record with additional evidence. See generally Govt's Mot. to 

Supplement Evidence. Following expedited briefing, the court denied the motion and ordered 

the government to limit its presentation to evidence previously disclosed to the petitioner as part 

ofthe factual return. See generally Mem. Op. (Nov. 4, 2010). 

In granting the government's second motion for leave to amend the factual return, the court 

offered the parties an opportunity to propose adjustments to the litigation schedule. See Mem. 

Order (June 9, 2010) at 4. The parties elected to retain the deadlines previously imposed by the 

court. Joint Status Report (June 16,2010). 

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The merits hearing began on November 8,2010 and spanned four days. 5 At the outset of 

the hearing, the court ruled on the government's motion to admit hearsay evidence with a 

presumption of accuracy and authenticity. See generally Govt's Hearsay Mot. The court held 

that although the government's evidence would, in appropriate circumstances, be afforded a 

presumption of authenticity, it was not entitled to a presumption of accuracy.

6 See infra Part 

lILA. 

During the course of the merits hearing, the parties presented the court with extensive 

argument and nearly two hundred exhibits. 7 At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties' 

submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. With the record now complete, the 

court turns to the applicable legal standards and the evidence and argument presented by the 

parties. 

III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS 

A. Admissibility and Reliability of Hearsay Evidence 

As alluded to above, prior to the merits hearing, the government submitted a motion in 

which it argued that the court should afford a presumption of accuracy and authenticity to its 

hearsay evidence. See generally Govt's Hearsay Mot. That motion was granted in part and 

The merits hearing occurred on November 8, 10, 15 and 16, 2010. Citations to the hearing 

transcript shall be made by designating the date ofthe proceedings and, when appropriate, 

whether the proceedings occurred in the morning or evening. 

At the outset ofthe hearing, the court also ruled that the government would be permitted to rely 

on certain exhibits that had been made part ofthe record as attachments to the government's 

hearsay motion. Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at S. 

The court greatly appreciates the efforts undertaken by counsel for both the government and the 

petitioner to present information during the merits hearing in a clear, systematic and easily 

digestible manner. 

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denied in part at the outset of the merits hearing. Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at 3-4. The reasoning 

underlying the court's ruling is set forth in greater detail below. 

This court has previously held, in another GTMO habeas case, that although hearsay 

evidence is always admissible in these habeas proceedings, the court must make individualized 

determinations about the reliability and accuracy of that evidence and the weight it is to be 

afforded. Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d I, 10 (D.D.C. 2009). The court further stated that 

based on the principles underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), which sets forth the hearsay 

exception for reports of regularly conducted activity, the government's interrogation reports and 

intelligence reports were entitled to a presumption of authenticity. Id The court declined, 

however, to presume the accuracy of the government's exhibits, noting that there was ample 

reason not to afford such a presumption to those exhibits, many of which contained two or three 

levels of hearsay. Id 

This Circuit has since issued a number of decisions consistent with this approach to 

hearsay evidence. The Circuit has made clear that although "hearsay evidence is always 

admissible in Guantanamo habeas proceedings, such evidence must be accorded weight only in 

proportion to its reliability." Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2010); accord 

Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing that "the question a habeas 

court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible - it is always 

admissible - but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits"). 

Nothing in these Circuit decisions suggests that the court should presume the accuracy or 

reliability of the government's exhibits; to the contrary, the Circuit has stated that before relying 

on any piece of evidence, the district court must make a threshold determination that it is 

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sufficiently reliable and probative.8 Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 

(citing Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834,847 (D.C. Cir. 2008»; cf Ai Odah v. Obama, 611 F.3d 8, 

14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court did not err in relying on hearsay evidence 

where "[t]he government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indicia of reliability, and 

the court considered the reliability ofthe evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay 

evidence"). 

Accordingly, at the outset of the merits hearing in this case, the court ruled that hearsay 

evidence would be admissible and that the court would presume the authenticity but not the 

accuracy ofthe government's intelligence reports and interrogation reports.9 Nov. 8 Unclassified 

Tr. at 3-4. The court further ruled that it would make individualized determinations regarding 

the reliability of any hearsay evidence presented by the parties. Id. 

B. Assessment of the Evidence 

As noted, before the court may consider whether the government has shown by a 

preponderance ofthe evidence that the petitioner is lawfully detained, the court "must evaluate 

the raw evidence, finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate 

the truth of the asserted proposition with the requisite degree of certainty." Parhat, 532 F.3d at 

847 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 

8	 The approach to hearsay articulated by this court in Hatim is also consistent with positions taken 

by otherjudges in this district since the Circuit's ruling in Ai Bihani. See. e.g., Aimerfedi v. 

Obama, 2010 WL 691944, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 1,2010) (concluding that all ofthe government's 

hearsay evidence was admissible and that any evidence created and maintained by the 

government in the ordinary course of business was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 

authenticity but rejecting the government's argument that its evidence should be afforded a 

presumption of accuracy); see aisoA/ Kandari v. Obama, 2010 WL 3927309, at *5-6 (D.D.C. 

Sept. 15,2010) (declining to afford a presumption of authenticity or accuracy to the 

government's evidence). 

9	 During the merits hearing, the petitioner did not challenge the authenticity of any of the 

intelligence reports or interrogation reports relied on by the government. 

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(1993». Thus, before relying on any piece of evidence in these GTMO habeas proceedings, the 

court must examine that evidence to "determine whether the evidence is in fact sufficiently 

reliable to be used as a justification for detention." Khan v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 6, 12 

(D.D.C. 2009); see also Naji al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2010) 

(observing that "[i]n Guantanamo habeas proceedings, the Court must assess the accuracy, 

reliability, and credibility of each piece of evidence presented by the parties in the context of the 

evidence as a whole" (internal quotation marks omitted». 

The reliability of hearsay evidence may be established by the intrinsic characteristics of 

the evidence, such as the nature and consistency of the details contained in the hearsay, 

Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 428-29, as well as through corroboration by other evidence in the record, 

id at 429 (noting that "an intelligence report's reliability can be assessed by comparison to 

'exogenous information'''); Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725-26 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 849). Two 

pieces of evidence, "each unreliable when viewed alone," can corroborate each other and 

mutually establish their reliability. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 726 (citing United States v. Laws, 808 

F.2d 92,100-03 (D.C. Cir. 1986». 

In this case, the government has based its case principally on interrogation reports 

reflecting statements allegedly made by the petitioner. See generally GE 1·6,8·10,24,27,36, 

40-41,43. These statements, which the government relies on to establish the petitioner's actions 

and intentions before his apprehension, plainly constitute hearsay. See FED. R. EVlD. SOl (c). 

The court has carefully reviewed each report to ensure that the statements contained therein are 

sufficiently reliable for use in assessing the lawfulness ofthe petitioner's detention. 

At the outset, the court notes that the petitioner's statements to interrogators are recorded 

in standard reporting forms, such as FD-302s, Summary Interrogation Reports ("SIRs") and 

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Intelligence Infonnation Reports ("IIRs"). See generally, e.g., GE 1,2,24. These reports are 

prepared by intelligence and law enforcement agents in the nonnal course oftheir duties to 

memorialize intelligence gathered from various sources, including interviews of detainees. See 

GE 30 (Decl. 0 Decl. 11,,))10 at 6-7. The 

fact that these reports were prepared by government agents in the course of their nonnal 

intelligence gathering duties provides a degree of support for their reliability. 

Moreover, the court finds ample evidence in the content of these interrogation reports to 

support their reliability. With few exceptions (on which the court does not rely), the statements 

reflected in these interrogation reports concern infonnation about which the petitioner had 

personal knowledge. Furthennore, these statements are replete with specific details, lending 

further support to their reliability. The court has been presented with no evidence that any ofthe 

statements were elicited through undue coercion. Moreover, although the details sometimes 

differ, the accounts of the petitioner's actions in these different interrogation reports are 

remarkably consistent. Indeed, as evidenced in the following sections, many ofthe statements 

that the court relies on in its analysis are repeated by the petitioner in multiple interrogations and 

corroborated by the statements ofthird-party detainees. See infra Part IV.B.l-5. 

Although the petitioner challenges the accuracy of the translation and transcription of 

certain statements that the reports attribute to him, nothing about these purported errors calls into 

question the inherent reliability of the reports. See Al-Waraji, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 39 ("[T]hat the 

[petitioner's] statements were translated does not render them unreliable or incredible. 

Id The court considers his declaration, which is based on his personal knowledge and 

experience, to be reliable. 

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Petitioner's reservations about the accuracy ofthe translations ofthe statements goes to the 

weight ... the Court should afford the statements, not their reliability."). Thus, although the 

court must, in the course of its analysis, address the parties' disagreements regarding the 

probative value of various portions ofthese interrogations reports, the court concludes that the 

reports are sufficiently reliable to be considered in its assessment ofthe lawfulness of the 

petitioner's detention. 

The government also relies on other types of evidence, such as interrogation reports 

containing statements made by third-party detainees, see, e.g., GE 7, 8, 12, 13, declarations of 

intelligence officers and subject-matter experts, see, e.g., GE 14, 19, and intelligence reports 

regarding materials captured from al-Qaida and Taliban forces, see, e.g., GE 25, 29. The 

reliability of each ofthese exhibits is assessed individually in the course ofthe analysis. See 

infra Part IV.B.1-5. 

IV. ANALYSIS 

A. The Scope of the Government's Detention Authority 

The government's authority to detain individuals at GTMO derives from the 

Authorization for the Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), which provides that 

the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 

those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 

committed, or aided the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11,2001, or 

harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 

international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, 

or persons. 

Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 

This Circuit has stated that the AUMF authorizes the government to detain two categories 

ofpersons: (1) individuals "part of' forces associated with al-Qaida or the Taliban and (2) 

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individuals who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against the United 

States. Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872. To justify its detention of an individual, the government 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual falls within one ofthese 

categories of detainable persons. 11 See Awadv. Ohama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating 

that "a preponderance ofthe evidence standard satisfies constitutional requirements in 

considering a habeas petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF"); accord Al Bihani, 

590 F.3d at 878. 

In this case, the government's principal contention is that the petitioner is lawfully 

detained because he was "part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces. 12 The Circuit has 

observed that because al-Qaida's organizational structure is amorphous, "it is impossible to 

provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether an individual is 'part of al Qaeda." 

Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. Accordingly, the district courts must determine whether an 

individual is "part of' al-Qaida or associated forces on a "case-by-case basis" employing a 

"functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual in 

relation to the organization." Id. 

II	 The Circuit has expressly left open the question of whether a lower evidentiary standard would 

be constitutionally permissible. See AI-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

12	 Although the government also asserted during the merits hearing that the petitioner "purposefully 

and materially supported" al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces, Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at 8, 

it offered scant evidence or argument on this issue. At any rate, because the government 

demonstrated that the petitioner was "part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces, the 

court need not address whether the government satisfied the second prong of the detention 

standard. See AI-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing that "both 

prongs (of the detention standard] are valid criteria that are independently sufficient to satisfY the 

standard"). 

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"That an individual operates within al Qaeda's fonnal command structure is surely 

sufficient but is not necessary to show that he is 'part of the organization.")) Id.; see also Awad, 

608 F.3d at 11 ("If the government can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a 

detainee was part of the 'command structure' of al Qaeda, this satisfies the requirement to show 

that he was 'part of al Qaeda. But there are ways other than making a 'command structure' 

showing to prove that a detainee is 'part of al Qaeda."). On the other hand, "the purely 

independent conduct of a freelancer is not enough" to show that an individual is detainable as 

"part of' ofthose enemy forces. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725; see also Salahi v. Ohama, 625 F.3d 

745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that "the government's failure to prove that an individual was 

acting under orders from al-Qaida may be relevant to the question ofwhether the individual was 

'part of' the organization when captured"). 

The government's "authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent on whether 

an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if released." Awad, 608 F.3d at 

11. The government must prove, however, that the petitioner was "part of" the Taliban, alQaida or associated forces at the time of his capture to demonstrate that his detention is lawful 

under the first prong of the standard. See Salahi, 625 FJd at 751 (observing that "the relevant 

inquiry is whether [the petitioner] was 'part of aI-Qaida when captured"); Gherebi v. Obama, 

609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009). 

In assessing whether the government has met its burden, the court may not view each 

piece of evidence in isolation, but must consider the totality of the evidence. See Al-Adahi v. 

Ohama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Even ifno individual piece of evidence 

Prior to these Circuit decisions, many district court judges had held that an individual was a "part 

of' al-Qaida or associated forces only ifhe operated within the organization's fonnal command 

structure. See. e.g., Hatim v. Ohama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010); Gherehi v. Ohama, 

609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009); Ham/i/y v. Ohama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009). 

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would, by itself, justify the petitioner's detention, the evidence may, when considered as a whole 

and in context, nonetheless demand the conclusion that the petitioner was more likely than not 

"part of' the Taliban or al-Qaida or purposefully and materially supported such forces. Id. 

(concluding that the district court erred in "requir[ing] each piece of the government's evidence 

to bear weight without regard to all (or indeed any) other evidence in the case"); cf Bourjaily v. 

United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987) (observing that "individual pieces of evidence, 

insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it" because the "sum of an 

evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts"). 

B. The Petitioner Is Lawfully Detained 

During the course of the merits hearing, the parties presented evidence and argument on 

the following five disputed material issues: 14 

1.	 The government's allegation that the petitioner went to Afghanistan to 

receive military-style training from and fight for al-Qaida, the Taliban or 

other associated forces. 

2.	 The government's allegation that the petitioner stayed at guesthouses in 

Pakistan and Afghanistan associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban or other 

associated forces. 

3.	 The government's allegation that the petitioner attended a training camp 

or training camps operated by or associated with al-Qaeda, the Taliban or 

other associated forces. 

4.	 The government's allegation that the petitioner traveled to the battle lines 

in Afghanistan as part of al-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces. 

5.	 The government's allegation that the petitioner was part of al-Qaida, the 

Taliban or other associated forces at the time of his capture. 

Over the government's objection, the petitioner requested that the court address a sixth contested 

issue during the merits hearing: the government's assertion that its evidence is generally reliable. 

Petr's Supplement to List of Contested Issues. Although the court granted the petitioner's 

request, during the merits hearing, the petitioner incorporated the elements of his presentation on 

this issue into his presentations on the five jointly identified issues and elected not to give a 

separate presentation on his proposed sixth issue. 

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Joint List of Contested Issues (Oct. 15,2010). The court considers these disputed issues in turn. 

1.	 The Petitioner Traveled to Afghanistan to Fight for the Taliban, 

al-Qaida or Associated Enemy Forces 

During the merits hearing, the parties devoted substantial time and effort addressing the 

first material disputed issue: whether the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the 

Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. Nov. 8 Tr. at 32 - 154; Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 4­

100. Their attentiveness to this issue was well warranted. The Circuit has observed that 

although an "intention to fight is inadequate by itselfto make someone 'part of al Qaeda ... it is 

nonetheless compelling evidence when ... it accompanies additional evidence of conduct 

consistent with the effectuation ofthat intent." Awad, 608 F.3d at 9. 

The government bases its contention that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight 

with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces on: (1) the petitioner's association with the. 

boardinghouse; (2) the influence and assistance 0_(including the 

implausibility ofthe petitioner's account ofhow. convinced him to go to Afghanistan); (3) the 

influence ofthe religious fatwa that the petitioner encountered in Yemen; and (4) the petitioner's 

travel route and travel companions. The court considers these matters below. 

a. The Petitioner's Association With th.oardinghOuSe 

The government contends that the petitioner's association with individuals at the. 

boardinghouse supports the inference that he went to Afghanistan to engage in jihad and, in fact, 

shows that he was a "part of' al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces even before he left 

Yemen for Afghanistan in the summer of 2000. Nov. 8 Tr. at 61-143. The petitioner responds 

that his fleeting association with these individuals establishes nothing and does not support the 

government's contention that he traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, al-Qaida or 

associated forces. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 41-54. 

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As noted in the factual overview, in the summer of 1999, the petitioner traveled from 

Ta'iz to Sana'a and stayed at the _boardinghOuSe while purportedly attempting to obtain a 

visa to return to Yemen. GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3. Approximately two weeks after his arrival, 

Yemeni authorities arrested the petitioner and several other individuals associated with the 

boardinghouse on suspicion of belonging to a car theft ring. GE I at 5; GE 2 at 2. According to 

the petitioner, the car theft conspiracy centered on a plot to steal cars in order to purchase arms, 

which they would then use to violently free an individual named who was held 

in a Sana'a prison. GE I at 5; GE 9 at 3. ~ad been convicted of kidnapping and 

murdering four western tourists as part of a plot to free an imprisoned sheikh associated with a 

South Yemen Islarnist group. GE 1 at 5; GE 9 at 3. According to the petitioner, the conspirators 

also considered using the stolen vehicles to kidnap tourists, whom they would use to negotiate 

thereleaseo~ GE 1 at 5. 

Many ofthe individuals associated with th.oardinghouse during this period were 

experienced jihadists. According to Abdu Ali al Hajj Sharqawi, a veteran jihadist whom the 

petitioner asserts is a reliable source,I5 see Petr's Proposed Findings of Fact 16,_ 

_ the individual who introduced the petitioner to th.oardinghOuse, "was a 

mujahaddin in Bosnia and ... was a well-known person." PE 115 at 1. Likewise, Sharqawi 

states that Issam al-Maklahfi, the leader ofthe car theft ring, and Ahmed al Khadr al-Bidani, 

another member ofthe conspiracy, were also veterans of Bosnian jihad. Id. at 2. Sharqawi also 

IS 

PE 8 at 8; PE 11 at 2. 

Furthennore, Sharqawi's statements about the boardinghouse are based on his personal 

knowledge. PE 115 at 1. There is no evidence at Sharqawi's statements were the result of 

torture and, in fact, the petitioner himself relies on Sharqawi's interrogation report in support of 

his case. Petr's Proposed Findings ofFact~~ 13-22. Accordingly, Sharqawi's interrogation 

report is sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 

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states that Fawaz al-Rabia'i lived at the .0ardinghouSe and was an al-Qaida operative at 

the time he was imprisoned by Yemeni authorities. PE 115 at 3; see also GE 8 at 1 (GTMO 

intelligence report indicating that al-Rabia'i was a known al-Qaida associate). 

The petitioner himself admits that housemates and 

had received jihadist training in Afghanistan. GE 3 at 5. Another housemate 

_ had, according to the petitioner, trained at the Khalden camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, 

GE 3 at 4, ajihadist training camp affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban, GE 19 (Decl. of 

6 at 7-8. Likewise, the petitioner admits that 

an individual who resided at the boardinghouse during the petitioner's stay, had fought and 

trained with the Taliban in Afghanistan. GE 1 at 4; GE 3 at 4; GE 43 at 2. _ would 

later be one ofthe suicide bombers in the October 2000 attack on the Us.s. Cole. GE 2 at 3; GE 

4 at 3; GE 5 at 2; GE 6 a 3; GE 9 at 5; GE 43 at 2. 

During the period that the petitioner lived there, th.oardinghOUSe served as a hub 

for the individuals involved in a car theft ring whose aim was to free~om prison. 

GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 3; see also PE 115 at 1 (interrogation report in which Sharqawi stated to 

interrogators that residents ofthe boardinghouse were involved in a plot to steal cars and that this 

group "wanted to get rid of the Yemeni Government because the Yemeni Government killed 

Abu Hassain al Miktar, a famous mujahaddin"). The petitioner has acknowledged that. 

_ the leader ofthe plot, and_visited th-"oardinghouse while the 

16 1, 3 

1, 3, • •• • ... 

his personal knowledge and analysis, to be credible. 

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petitioner was there. I? GE 1 at 4-5; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 2. The petitioner also admitted that 

his roommate and closest friend at the boardinghouse, GE 3 at 4, served as a 

driver in the car theft plot, GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 1, and that bin Attash, his housemate and a 

veteranjihadist, was arrested with the petitioner and formally charged in the conspiracy, GE 8 at 

2. In total, the petitioner identified more than half a dozen individuals who resided at or visited 

the_boardinghouse while he first lived there who were involved in the car theft plot 

designed to free_ 

The petitioner claims that he had no real association with these individuals, noting that he 

stayed at th.boardinghouse for less than two weeks before he was arrested. Nov. 10 

(a.m.) Tr. at 41. As described above, however, the petitioner revealed to interrogators detailed 

knowledge about the biographies ofthese men, suggesting that his relationships with these 

individuals were more than fleeting. See AI-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1109 (observing that the 

petitioner's detailed knowledge of personal information about a group of al-Qaida operatives, 

including where they had fought and what languages they could speak, tended to show that the 

petitioner had close relationships with these individuals and strengthened the probability that that 

he was part of al-Qaida). 

Moreover, it is the timing, rather than the duration, ofthe petitioner's initial stay at the 

.oardinghouse that is particularly telling. The fact that a group of veteran jihadists 

permitted the petitioner to live at th.boardinghouse while the location was used as a hub 

for an active terrorist conspiracy suggests that they considered the petitioner an individual they 

could trust. It is highly unlikely that these men would allow an individual into their living and 

meeting space, even if only for two weeks, during such a sensitive period without some 

The petitioner states that he believes tha_had been surveilled to thtl 

boardinghouse, which led to the arrest ofthe boardinghouse residents. GE 1 at; 9 at 1-2. 

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assurance that the individual shared some allegiance with them and would not undermine their 

p10t. 18 Although this evidence hardly establishes that the petitioner was "part of' al-Qaida at this 

time, it does support the government's contention that the petitioner had associations with known 

terrorists and had gained their confidence prior to his departure for Afghanistan. 

The petitioner has also stated that when he first went to live at the.oardinghouse, 

he had no idea that anyone associated with the boardinghouse was involved in any criminal 

activity. GE I at 5; GE 2 at 2; GE 9 at 2. According to the petitioner, he first learned about the 

details of the plot during his period of incarceration when _,the head of the 

conspiracy, was released from solitary confinement. 19 GE 9 at 2. 

Even ifthe court were to credit the petitioner's version of events, it would not 

dramatically alter the court's assessment ofhis associations with members ofthe. 

boardinghouse conspiracy. It seems unlikely that a veteran jihadist like _ would have 

revealed the details ofthe plot to the petitioner, while they were still in custody and the 

information could plainly be used against them, unless he had reason to believe that the 

petitioner would not reveal this information to Yemeni authorities. Moreover, rather than 

distancing himself from the conspirators following his arrest, the petitioner continued to 

associate with members of the terrorist conspiracy during his months of incarceration and 

18 The petitio_that at his invitation, an acquaintance from Saudi Arabia, 

stayed at th oardinghouse the night before Yemeni authorities raided the boardinghouse. 

GE 3 at 4. Because the government has not supplied any evidence that_had any 

terrorist or criminal involvement, the petitioner argues, the fact that he was permitted to stay at 

th~oardinghouse undermines the government's theory that only trusted individuals were 

pe~to stay at the boardinghouse. It is, however, far from clear that~

terrorist affiliations; as discussed below, _ attended the wedding~. a 

veteran Afghan mujahaddin, to the da~family with known terrorist connections. GE 9 

at 2-3. Furthermore, it is unclear that~ was "permitted" to stay at the boardinghouse, as 

he stayed there only one night and there is no evidence that leaders ofthe car theft conspiracy 

were aware of his presence. 

19	 The petitioner stated that~as held in solitary confinement for approximately twenty 

days after their arrest. GE 9 at 2. 

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became lasting friends with several members ofthe group. GE 1 at 5-6; GE 3 at 3-5; GE 9 at 1­

2. Thus, the evidence indicates that even if the petitioner was not considered an ally at the time 

he first went to the.boardinghouse, he became one during his months in prison.2° 

Indeed, even after he was released from prison in late 1999, the petitioner maintained his 

associations with members ofth_boardinghouse. According to the petitioner, Yemeni 

authorities released him from prison at the same time as two ofhis former housemates, _ 

_ and GE 9 at 2. The petitioner has admitted that upon his release, 

he chose to return to the _boardinghouse with these men, both of whom were veteran 

jihadists.21 GE 1 at 5-6; GE 9 at 2. Shortly after their return to the.oardinghOUSe, the 

petitionerand_attended al-Ansari's wedding to a daughter of an individual named 

GE 9 at 2. Another o~sons-in-law was 9/11 hijacker Khalid alMihdhar. ld at 3. 

20	 The petitioner points out that Sharqawi stated to interrogators that th~boardinghouse "was 

a place only for sleeping" and that the petitioner was not associated with the individuals who 

resided there. PE 1:'5t 1-2. Sharqawi did, however, acknowledge in the same interrogation that 

the individuals at th oardinghouse were involved in a car theft ring, that residents of the 

house desired to overt row the Yemeni government because it had killed a famous Yemeni 

mujahaddin and that numerous individuals who resided at or were associated with the 

boardinghouse were veteran mujahaddin. rd. at 1-3. Moreover, Sharqawi's assertion that the 

petitioner had no associations with these individuals is belied by the petitioner's own admissions 

that he maintained his associations with individuals he had met in prison and through th. 

boardinghouse after he was released and even into Afghanistan. 

21	 The petitioner contends that his decision to return to th~boardinghouse following his 

release from prison does not indicate any continuing rel~ip with members ofthe 

boardinghouse, as the other members ofthe car theft ring were still imprisoned. This contention, 

however, is undennined by the petitioner's own admissions that he returned to the boardinghouse 

with other individuals who had been imprisoned based on their relationship with the 

boardinghouse, GE 9 at 2, and that he maintained a close relationship with 

whom the petitioner has acknowledged was a member of the car theft plot, GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 

1. 

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Although the petitioner states in one interrogation that he only stayed at the. 

boardinghouse for a week after his return from prison, GE 1 at 5_6,22 the fact that the petitioner 

chose to return to the boardinghouse at all following his release from prison, at which point he 

clearly knew about the car theft conspiracy, supports the notion that the petitioner's associations 

with the individuals at the_boardinghouse were meaningful. The petitioner'S attendance at 

_ wedding further indicates that the petitioner had become accepted in the jihadist 

circle that he encountered at the~oardinghouse.

Following his release from prison, the petitioner also maintained a relationship with 

one ofthe drivers in the car theft plot. GE I at 4-5; GE 9 at 1. The petitioner 

attended _ court appearances and smuggled a cell phone t~in prison, an act 

which resulted in the petitioner's brief re-imprisonment. GE 1 at 5. The fact that the petitioner 

would take such a risk for_undermines the petitioner's contention that his associations 

with all the members ofthe car theft ring were fleeting and insignificant. 

In fact, the petitioner's associations with individuals at th.oardinghouse survived 

his journey to Afghanistan. For instance, one ofthe individuals the petitioner met at the" 

boardinghouse was also known as GE 5 at 1. 

According to the petitioner, after was released from prison, he went to the front 

lines in Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Id While staying at 

an al-Qaida guesthouse in Kabul, see infra Part IV.B.2.c, the petitioner inquired as to the 

whereabouts and was told that was at the frontlines and would 

According 

several.'

to another 

week after 

interrogation 

his arrest," 

report, 

GE 3 

the 

at 

petitioner 

5, indicating 

stated 

a longer 

that he 

affiliation 

"socialized 

with 

a"

and the oardinghouse following the petitioner's release from prison. 

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come to visit him at a later time.23 GE 6 at 2-3. The incident demonstrates not only that the 

petitioner had a continuing association with in Afghanistan, but also that the 

petitioner was sufficiently integrated into the al-QaidaITaliban structure such that he was able to 

send and receive messages through its military apparatus.24 

While in Afghanistan, the petitioner also maintained his relationship with 

The petitioner had met_ 

after his release from prison while socializing at_home in Sana'a. GE 3 at 5. The 

petitioner has acknowledged that _ was a member ofal-Qaida, who trained at the alFarouq training camp and possibly the Abu Obeida training camp, both of which are al-Qaida 

training camps in Afghanistan. GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2. The petitioner states tha_ 

visited him while he was in Jalalabad and that_and were the only people 

in Afghanistan who knew him by his real name rather than his kunya. GE 9 at 4-5. In fact, once 

in Afghanistan, the petitioner listed_as his reference on an application to attend a 

terrorist training camp. GE 25 at 4; infra Part IV.B.3.b. 

The purpose of this discussion is not to condemn the petitioner on the basis of his 

associations. Indeed, the petitioner's relationships with individuals associated with th. 

23 According to Salim Hamdan, a former driver for Usama bin Ladin, _ later acted as a 

bodyguard for bin Ladin. PE 27 at 7. 14. 

24 The court does not, however, credit the government's contention that_an individual 

who accompanied the petitioner on.'mey from Yemen to Afghanistan, see infra Part 

IV.B.l.d, was an associate from the oardinghouse. The government bases this contention 

on the fact_ name is included in one interrogation report in which the petitioner lists the 

individuals associated with the~oardinghouse. GE 3 at 4. That report, however, includes 

no information abou_other than his name, whereas it contains detailed information 

regarding other individuals associated with the boardinghouse. See id. Furthermore___ 

not mentioned in any ofthe other interrogation reports in which the petitioner discusses tlie" 

boardinghouse. GE 1 at 3-5; GE 5 at 1-2; GE 9 at 2-3. In fact, another interrogation report 

indicates that the petitioner stated that he "had no previous contact with .prior to meeting him 

one week before they left for Afghanistan and the only thing he knew about him was that he was 

from Ta~en." GE 9 at 3. Accordingly, the court concludes that_was not associated 

with the _boardinghouse. 

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boardinghouse, standing alone, likely would not demonstrate that the petitioner was "part of' alQaida during his time in Yemen. The evidence does establish, however, that by the time the 

petitioner chose to travel to Afghanistan, he had developed significant and lasting relationships 

with veteranjihadists, who accepted him into their midst while they were involved in an active 

terrorist conspiracy. Many of the individuals associated with the boardinghouse would go on to 

become active al-Qaida associates and fight on the front lines in Afghanistan, and the petitioner 

maintained his relationships with these individuals as well. The fact that the petitioner had 

enduring relationships with knownjihadists prior to his decision to go to Afghanistan supports 

the contention that he traveled to Afghanistan to train and fight with al-Qaida, the Taliban or 

associated forces. 

b. Influence and Assistance 

The petitioner has stated that one of the principal influences on his decision to go to 

Afghanistan was an individual he met in Ta'iz named GE9at3. The 

government contends that. was a Taliban facilitator and that his influence on the petitioner's 

decision to travel to Afghanistan supports its allegation that the petitioner went there to receive 

training and fight for the Taliban and al-Qaida. Nov. 8 Tr. at 142, 150; Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 17­

20. The petitioner contends that there is no evidence that. was a Taliban facilitator and that 

• merely encouraged the petitioner to travel to Afghanistan to seek out a better life. Nov. 10 

(a.m.) Tr. at 57-62. 

There is no dispute that. had a significant influence on the petitioner's decision to 

travel to Afghanistan. The petitioner has stated that. "was the person who had the most 

influence on [him] going to Afghanistan, although he admitted that he was also influenced by a 

fatwa issued by the sheikhs in Yemen." GE 9 at 3. Nor is there any dispute that two years 

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before they met,. had received military training in Afghanistan and had fought for the 

Taliban. GE 1 at 3; GE 10 at 2. 

There is, however, no evidence that at the time. encouraged the petitioner to go to 

Afghanistan, he was acting as a Taliban recruiter or facilitator, at least in any formal capacity. 

The govenunent has provided no evidence that. influenced any other individuals to travel to 

Afghanistan or that he had any formal relationship with the Taliban or al-Qaida. See Bensayah, 

610 FJd at 726 (concluding that the govenunent failed to establish that the petitioner was an a1­

Qaida facilitator in the absence of reliable evidence that the petitioner had links to al-Qaida or 

facilitated the travel of al-Qaida members). Indeed, the petitioner has stated that when they first 

met,. encouraged him to enter into the honey trading business in Ta'iz, GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3, 

and the government has offered nothing to discredit that account. Furthermore, the petitioner 

paid his own way to Afghanistan, GE 3 at 6, a fact inconsistent with Taliban recruitment. 

Accordingly, the government has not established that. was a Taliban facilitator. 

Nonetheless, the evidence does not support the petitioner's contention that" influence 

was entirely benign. The petitioner has admitted that he and. discussed" military training 

in Afghanistan and his experience fighting for the Taliban: 

AI-Sabri met a Yemeni named age 25 in Taiz.• 

had previously traveled to Afghanistan for military training and to fight for the 

Taliban. AI-Sabri became interested in this discussion and inquired about 

receiving military training. 

GE 1 at 3. Whether, as the government suggests, the petitioner was expressing an interest in 

obtaining military training or, as the petitioner has argued, expressing an interest in hearing about 

the military training that. had received in Afghanistan, it is clear that. and the petitioner 

discussed the military training available in Afghanistan and fighting with the Taliban. See id 

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Indeed, the petitioner states that it was during this period in Ta'iz, when he met. that the 

petitioner first began thinking about going to Afghanistan.25 GE 9 at 3. 

Moreover, the travel route that the petitioner took into Afghanistan, which was furnished 

by. GE 3 at 5-6; GE 9 at 3; GE 10 at 2, suggests that. was assisting the petitioner join with 

Taliban and al-Qaida fighting forces in Afghanistan. As discussed below, the route that. 

instructed the petitioner to take from Sana'a through Bahrain and eventually to Quetta, Pakistan, 

is the same path used by foreign mujahaddin traveling to Afghanistan to engage in jihad. See 

infra Part IV.B.l.d. Indeed,. specifically instructed the petitioner to visit the TaIiban offices 

in Quetta, Pakistan, GE 3 at 6, which, as discussed below, facilitated the travel of fighters to alQaida and Taliban guesthouses and camps in Afghanistan, see infra Part IV.B.2.a; see also GE 3 

at 5 ('_told [the petitioner] that the Taliban would assist him in getting from Pakistan into 

Afghanistan because he was Arabic."). 

Finally, the petitioner's account ofhow. lured him to Afghanistan is not plausible. 

According to the petitioner,. told him "that there was security and peace in Afghanistan," GE 

9 at 3, and that "he should move to Afghanistan as work was easier to find there," GE 3 at 5. 

The petitioner stated that. "convinced him to travel to Afghanistan for a better life and find a 

wife." GE I at 6. 

Vet before the petitioner left for Afghanistan, he had spent months with veteranjihadists 

associated with the.oardinghouse, some of whom had trained and fought in Afghanistan. 

See supra Part IV.B.I.a. The petitioner had also had conversations with. about his own 

experiences fighting in Afghanistan just two years earlier. GE I at 3. Furthermore, as discussed 

The petitioner's admission that he began thinking of going to Afghanistan soon after his 

deportation to Yemen, see GE 6 at 1, casts doubt on his assertion that he went to Afghanistan 

only as a last resort, after his efforts to obtain entry to other Arab countries failed, see Nov. 10 

(a.m.) Tr. at 58-59. 

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below, the petitioner admits that he encountered at least one fatwa that encouraged men to go to 

Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. See infra Part IV.B.l.c. As the petitioner must have been 

aware that there was ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, it is difficult to believe that he truly would 

have believed that Afghanistan offered security and peace. 

The petitioner's conduct once in Afghanistan also undermines his account ofhow. 

convinced him to travel there. Although the petitioner contends that. lured him to 

Afghanistan with promises ofwork opportunities, there is no evidence that the petitioner made 

any effort to secure employment once he was in Afghanistan.26 See Sulayman v. Obama, 2010 

WL 3069568, at *13-14 (D.D.C. July 20,2010) (declining to credit the petitioner's claim that he 

traveled to Afghanistan to find a job, a wife and a home because he admitted to interrogators that 

he "never really looked" for ajob or a wife and that "he wasn't really that interested in trying to 

find a job"). Indeed, as the petitioner must have known, any efforts to secure employment would 

have been complicated by the fact that he spoke only Arabic.27 GE 3 at 1. 

Although the petitioner told interrogators that he had marriage prospects while in 

Afghanistan, these accounts are contradictory and not credible. For instance, the petitioner stated 

in one interrogation that the sister-in-law of an individual he met in Jalalabad, 

had introduced him to a young Moroccan woman for the purposes of marriage but that the plans 

26	 To bolster his claim that he went to Afghanistan for benign purposes, the petitioner offers a 

declaration from Professor Sheila Carapico, who states that the poverty and lack of opportunities 

in Yemen in the late 1990s and early 2000s led many young Yemeni men to travel to Pakistan 

and Afghanistan for economic reasons. See generally PE 30 (Decl. of Dr. Sheila Carapico, 

("Carapico Decl."»; see a/so Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 59-60. There is, however, no evidence that 

this petitioner made any efforts whatsoever to obtain employment while he was in Afghanistan, 

suggesting that economic factors were not a major consideration underlying his decision to go to 

Afghanistan. 

27	 Although the petitioner has offered evidence that Yemeni Arabic speakers might be able to find 

work in Afghanistan teaching Quran, as the Yemeni dialect is closest to the classical language of 

the Quran, Carapico Dec!. 16(t), there is no evidence that the petitioner, who had limited formal 

education, had any training in the Quran or was motivated by such opportunities. 

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had fallen through due to the chaos following September 11. GE 3 at 6. In another interview, 

the petitioner stated that the man with whom he lived in Jalalabad, had 

arranged for the petitioner to marry his wife's sister who lived in Morocco. GE 9 at 4. In yet a 

third interrogation, the petitioner stated that he was arranged to marry_sister. GE 6 at 

3. The inconsistencies of these accounts cast doubt on the petitioner's claim that finding a wife 

was one ofthe principal reasons he went to Afghanistan. 

Finally, if the petitioner went to Afghanistan merely for the benign purposes that. had 

purportedly discussed with him, it is difficult to understand why the petitioner chose not to 

infonn anyone, including his family in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, of his decision to relocate. GE 1 

at 6. The fact that the petitioner hid his plans from his family further undermines the contention 

that. persuaded him to go to Afghanistan with promises of work, a wife and a better, more 

secure life. The petitioner also admitted to interrogators that he assumed a kunya while he was in 

Afghanistan, GE 10 at 2; see infra Part IV.B.3, and that only two or three individuals (all with 

ties to al-Qaida or the Taliban) knew his real name, GE 9 at 4. That the petitioner concealed his 

true identity in Afghanistan is also not consistent with his stated intention oftraveling to 

Afghanistan for benign reasons. 

In sum, although the government has not established that. had any formal relationship 

with the Taliban, the evidence, viewed as a whole, indicates that. discussed with the petitioner 

his experiences training and fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan and provided the petitioner 

a route to Afghanistan designed to funnel him into Taliban and al-Qaida fighting forces. Thus, 

the evidence concerning. bolsters the contention that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to 

train and fight with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. 

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c. Influence of the Fatwa Issued by Religious Clerics 

In addition to his discussions with. the petitioner has stated that he was influenced to 

go to Afghanistan by a fatwa issued by two Saudi religious scholars, Hammoud al-Aqla and 

Abdulla al-Jibreen. GE 3 at 2, 5; GE 9 at 3. According to the petitioner, the fatwa "was 

encouraging men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban." GE 3 at 5. The government 

contends that the influence of the fatwa indicates that the petitioner went to Afghanistan to 

engage in jihad. Nov. 8 Tr. at 148-52. The petitioner responds that there is no evidence that the 

fatwa advocated taking up arms on behalf ofthe Taliban. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 62-65. 

Although the exact fatwa that influenced the petitioner is unknown, another fatwa 

authored by al-Aqla in 2000 included the following language: 

At this time, the Taliban Regime remains in a state of warfare against its 

opposition, the Northern Alliance, so Jihad with it is ordained by the Shariah 

because Jihad with the Taliban is against the Northern Alliance which is being 

funded by the forces of Disbelief like America, Britain, and Russia and others 

who are calling for a broad-based government in Afghanistan established upon a 

Western legislative system. Since the situation is like this, then indeed it is 

obligatory to assist the Taliban Regime and to make Jihad with it in order to 

bring victory to Islam. 

Govt's Mot. for 1. on the R. at 12-13; see also Nov. 8 Tr. at 152-53. 

Indeed, one detainee described al-Aqla as "a well known religious leader [who] claimed 

to have sent 11,000 Saudis to various training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya and the 

Philippines." GE 12 at 1. The detainee stated that in his fatwas, al-Aqla "preach[ed] ... that it 

was the duty of all Muslim men to prepare themselves for jihad." Id Another detainee has 

stated that al-Aqla "encouraged young men to travel to [Afghanistan] and fight against Massoud, 

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who was killing a lot of Muslims. Al Aqla, who issued the fatwa, told his audience that if they 

did not follow this fatwa they would go to hell." GE 13 at 1.28 

Likewise, at least one GTMO detainee has admitted that his decision to go to Afghanistan 

and fight for the Taliban was influenced by a fatwa issued by al-Jibreen, the other author ofthe 

fatwa that influenced the petitioner in this case. See GE 11 at 2. The detainee stated that 

he listened to 2 Fatwas that were issued, one by Sheikh Mohammed al Imam and 

another by Sheikh Bin Gibrin. The Fatwas were read at the Jamal Al Din 

Mosque and were about going to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban against the 

Northern Alliance. The Fatwas had vers[es] from the Koran and talked about the 

Taliban and its victories. One of the Fatwas further explained how to travel to 

Quetta and get to a large Taliban center where the Taliban would take people to 

Afghanistan. [The detainee] decided, on his own, to go to Afghanistan and assist 

the Taliban based on the Fatwas. 

Id (emphasis added).29 

In light ofal-Aqla's and al-Jibreen's documented history of issuing fatwas encouraging 

men to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban, it is more likely than not that the fatwa 

28	 Government's Exhibit 12 is an interrogation report reflecting statements made by GTMO 

detainee Mukhtar Yahya Naji al-Warafi, while Government's Exhibit 13 is an interrogation 

report reflecting statements made by GTMO detainee Hamud Dakhil al-Jadani. See generally 

GE 12; GE 13. Their descriptions of the fatwas issued by al-Aqla are based on their personal 

knowledge, highly detailed and corroborated by one another. Furthermore, there is no evidence 

that these statements were elicited through undue coercion. Although the petitioner has pointed 

out that al-Jadani was offered inducements to cooperate with interrogators and that his statements 

regarding the U.S.S. Cole bombing are not credible, Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 67-91 (indeed, the court 

declines to rely on those statements), the court shall assess the reliability ofeach piece of 

information provided by al-Jadani rather than making generalized conclusions about his 

credibility, see Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Rather than draw a 

general conclusion as to the credibility of [al-Jadani], the Court has examined in detail each of 

the six reports relied upon by the government to determine whether the particular information in 

each should be credited."). In this case, the court concludes that his statements regarding the 

fatwas issued by al-Aqla, like the statements ofal-Warafi, are sufficiently reliable for the court's 

consideration. 

29	 Government's Exhibit 11 is an interrogation report reflecting statements made by detainee alWarafi. See generally GE 11. There is no evidence that his statements were elicited through 

inducements or undue coercion. Moreover, the petitioner provides a detailed account of both the 

circumstances under which he heard the fatwas as well as the actual content of the fatwas. See 

GE 11 at 2. Accordingly, these statements are sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 

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that influenced the petitioner to go to Afghanistan called for Muslim men to "assist the Taliban" 

by taking up arms against the Northern Alliance.3o Furthermore, given the petitioner's 

documented awareness ofthe conflict in Afghanistan, it is not plausible that the petitioner could 

have understood the fatwa's call to "assist the Taliban" as anything other than a call to take up 

arms. This evidence therefore provides additional support for the government's contention that 

the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to engage in jihad. 

d. The Petitioner's Travel Route and Travel Companions 

The government asserts that the route the petitioner followed to Afghanistan is the same 

route used by other foreign mujahaddin entering Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. Nov. 10 

(a.m.) Tr. at 12-29. The government also notes that the petitioner has admitted that his traveling 

companions professed to him that they were going to Afghanistan to become martyrs. Id at 19. 

These facts, the government argues, strongly indicate that the petitioner too traveled to 

Afghanistan to engage in jihad. Id at 12-29. According to the petitioner, there is no evidence 

that the route he followed is different from the route any Arab man of limited means would have 

taken into Afghanistan. Id. at 65. Furthermore, the petitioner argues, the fact that he traveled to 

Afghanistan with self-professedjihadists does not mean that he was ajihadist. Id. at 64-65. 

The petitioner left Yemen for Afghanistan in the late summer or early fall of2000. GE 1 

at 6. During the initial leg of his journey, he was joined by an individual named 

whom he had met approximately one week before. GE 9 at 3. The petitioner and_flew 

from Sana'a through the United Arab Emirates and on to Karachi, Pakistan before eventually 

The petitioner contends that the fatwas cited by the government are distinguishable because they 

were issued at different times or in a different form than the fatwa that influenced the petitioner. 

Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 63-64. These differences, however, do not significantly undermine the 

probative value ofthe fatwas cited by the government, which were written by the same clerics 

about the same conflict during roughly the same time period. Furthermore, the petitioner has not 

presented the court with evidence of any other fatwa issued around this period that called for 

Muslim men to go to Afghanistan but did not advocate taking up arms. 

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arriving in Quetta, Pakistan, a city near the Afghanistan border. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 6. Once in 

Quetta, the two took a taxi to the Daftar al-Taliban, a Taliban-run office and guesthouse, as 

instructed by. GE 1 at 6; GE 6 at 2. After spending two or three days at the Daftar alTaliban, the petitioner left for the border along with_and two other men, whom he knew as_and_ GE 1 a6;GE3at5-6;GE 10at2. _told the petitioner that 

he was going to Afghanistan for jihad, and all told the petitioner 

that they wanted to be martyrs. GE 9 at 3; GE 10 at 2. 

The four men were driven by taxi from the Daftar al-Taliban to the border town of Spin 

Boldak. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 4 at 1. When they reached the border, the men exited the 

taxi and crossed the border on motorcycles. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1. According to the petitioner, 

motorcycles were not required to stop at the border. GE 4 at 1. After crossing the border, the 

men were picked up by the same taxi and carried on to Kandahar, GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1, where, as 

discussed below, they were taken to an a1-Qaida guesthouse, see infra Part IV.B.2.b. 

The petitioner's travel route - flying from a Persian Gulf state through the United Arab 

Emirates to Karachi and then to the Taliban offices in Quetta, Pakistan - was common among 

jihadists traveling to Afghanistan to train and fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida. See, e.g., Ai 

Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that the petitioner's 

travel route from Dubai to Karachi and then Quetta before crossing the border into Afghanistan 

supported the inference that he traveled to Afghanistan to engage in jihad), aff'd, 611 FJd 8 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). The petitioner contends that the government has not demonstrated that this 

route differed from the route taken by any other individuals with limited means traveling to 

Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 64-65. Indeed, viewed in isolation, evidence that the 

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petitioner utilized a travel route frequented by foreignjihadists may not be particularly probative 

of the petitioner's intentions. 

In this case, however, there are additional facts that color the court's assessment of the 

significance of the petitioner's travel route. First of all, the elaborate arrangements made by the 

Taliban office in Quetta to ferry the petitioner across the border without detection by border 

patrol calls into question the legitimacy ofthe petitioner's motives.31 The fact that the petitioner 

traveled along this route with individuals whom he knew to be jihadists also casts doubt on his 

motivations for going to Afghanistan. Finally, there is the fact, discussed below, that the end 

point of the petitioner's travel route was an al-Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. See 

infra Part IV.B.2.b. 

Thus, the evidence that the petitioner followed travel routes frequented by the foreign 

jihadists entering Afghanistan and traveled with individuals who admitted to the petitioner that 

they intended to become martyrs provides additional support for the government's allegation that 

the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida. 

e. Conclusion 

In summary, the evidence indicates that before the petitioner left for Afghanistan, he 

developed significant and meaningful relationships with both veteran and future jihadists in 

Yemen. The evidence also indicates that the petitioner was influenced to travel to Afghanistan 

by. a veteran Taliban fighter who told the petitioner about training and fighting with the 

The petitioner has suggested that these border-crossing measures may have been motivated by 

concerns about efficiency. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 71-72; see also Petr's Proposed Findings of Fact 

131. Yet the petitioner stated that after he and his fellow companions were taken across the 

border on motorcycles, they rejoined the taxi that had brought them to the border. GE 3 at 6; GE 

4 at 1. Given that the taxi too crossed the border, it is unclear why logic or efficiency would 

dictate leaving the taxi for the border crossing and then rejoining it after the crossing was 

completed. Instead, the more reasonable inference is that the petitioner and his companions 

exited the taxi at the border to escape detection by border patrol guards, who, according to the 

petitioner, did not stop motorcycles crossing the border. GE 4 at 1. 

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Taliban and who provided the petitioner a route to Afghanistan that funneled him into the alQaida/Taliban military apparatus. Furthennore, the petitioner admits that he was influenced to 

go to Afghanistan by a religious fatwa that likely called for him to go to Afghanistan to fight 

with the Taliban. Finally, the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan along a route used by jihadists 

and traveled with individuals who admitted that they were going to engage in jihad and become 

martyrs. Based on this evidence, the court concludes that it is more likely than not that the 

petitioner traveled to Afghanistan in order to fight with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated 

enemy forces. 

2. The Petitioner Stayed at aJ-Qaida and Taliban Guesthouses 

The government contends that the petitioner stayed at numerous al-Qaida and Taliban 

guesthouses during his time in Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 2-68. The government asserts 

that this fact strongly supports its contention that the petitioner was "part of' Taliban or al-Qaida 

forces. Id; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 30-62. Although the petitioner does not dispute that he stayed 

at guesthouses in Afghanistan, he denies that these guesthouses were necessarily affiliated with 

al-Qaida or the Taliban and contends that the fact that he stayed at these guesthouses provides no 

support for the government's allegation that he was part of al-Qaida or the Taliban. Nov. 10 

(p.m.) Tr. at 69-74; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 3-27 

This Circuit has stated that evidence supporting a reasonable belief that an individual 

attended al-Qaida training camps or stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan is powerful 

evidence that the detainee was "part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces. Al-Bihani, 

590 F.3d at 873 n.2 (observing that "evidence supporting the military's reasonable belief of 

either of those two facts with respect to a non-citizen seized abroad during the ongoing war on 

terror would seem to overwhelmingly, if not definitively, justify the government's detention of 

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such a non-citizen"); see also AI-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108 (observing that the petitioner's 

"voluntary decision to move to an al-Qaida guesthouse ... makes it more likely - indeed, very 

likely - that [the petitioner] was himself a recruit."); Sulayman, 2010 WL 3069568, at *14-15 

(observing that the petitioner's presence at Taliban-affiliated guesthouses supported the legality 

of his detention). 

The government contends that the petitioner stayed at the following al-Qaida or Talibanaffiliated guesthouses prior to his capture: (1) the Daftar al-Taliban in Quetta in Quetta, Pakistan; 

(2) the Haji Habash guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan; (3) the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in 

Kabul, Afghanistan; (4) the home 0 in lalalabad, Afghanistan; and (5) 

guesthouses near the Taliban battle lines. The court considers the evidence supporting these 

contentions below. 

a. Daftar al-Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan 

As previously noted, the launching point for the petitioner's journey into Afghanistan 

was the Daftar al-Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan, which arranged for his entry into Afghanistan and 

where the petitioner stayed for two to three days before his border crossing. See supra Part 

IV.B.l.d. The petitioner acknowledged to interrogators that he understood that the Daftar alTaliban operated as a Taliban-run guesthouse, GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5-6, a characterization 

consistent with the account of at least one other GTMO detainee, see, e.g., GE 13 at 2 

(interrogation report in which the detainee describes a fatwa that "explained how to travel to 

Quetta and get to a large Taliban center where the Taliban would take people to Afghanistan,,).32 

Indeed, according to the petitioner, the three other individuals whose journey into Afghanistan 

As previously noted, Government's Exhibit 13 is an interrogation report reflecting statements 

made by GTMO detainee al-Jadani. See generally GE 13. AI-Jadani's description ofthe Taliban 

office in Quetta, Pakistan corresponds closely with the petitioner's account, and this 

corroboration supports the reliability of both accounts. 

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was also facilitated by the Daftar al-Taliban admitted that they intended to become martyrs. GE 

10 at 2. 

The petitioner has suggested that the Daftar al-Taliban simply acted as a travel agency for 

individuals seeking to enter Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 70-71; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 12­

13. His only support for this assertion, however, is the fact that most taxi drivers in Quetta knew 

the location of the facility and that the Daftar al-Taliban sometimes charged a fee. Nov. 10 

(p.m.) Tr. at 70-71; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 13; see also GE 15 at 1. This evidence, however, is not 

necessarily inconsistent with, and hardly overcomes the weight of, the evidence that the Daftar 

al-Taliban served as a Taliban-run waystation for foreign fighters seeking entry to Afghanistan. 

See GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 13 at 2. Thus, the court concludes that the Daftar al-Taliban 

functioned as a Taliban guesthouse and facilitation hub and that the petitioner knew that these 

were the functions ofthe Daftar al-Taliban at the time he stayed there. 

b. Haji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan 

After arriving in Kandahar, the petitioner stayed for two weeks at the Haji Habash 

guesthouse. GE 3 at 6; GE 6 at 2. As described in the declaration 0_ 

the Arab House, also known as the Haji Habash House, functioned as a Talibansponsored guesthouse for Arab mujahedeen in Kandahar. . .. [T]he Arab House 

was used as a transition point and in-processing location for individuals going to 

train at various training camps, including al-Farouq. Additionally, all personnel 

staying at the Arab House were required to turn over their luggage, passports, 

and any money they possessed. 

_Decl.at3. 

Although the petitioner likens the Haji Habash guesthouse to a youth hostel, Nov. 10 

(p.m.) Tr. at 72-74, the petitioner's own statements belie this characterization. The petitioner 

acknowledged to interrogators that the Haji Habash guesthouse was a Taliban guesthouse, GE 6 

at 2, operated by an individual named_ id.; GE 2 at 3; GE 3 at 6. The petitioner also 

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acknowledged that he knew_was a member of al-Qaida. GE 2 at 3 ("When he was 

asked about al-Qaida members he knows, al Sabri said that he only knew one al-Qa'ida member, 

a man named_.... He said he met him in Kandahar, at the al-Ansar guesthouse."). 

Indeed, well-documented affiliation with al-Qaida has been noted by other 

members ofthis court. See, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 2010 WL 3270761, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 

2010) (describing ole as an al-Qaida facilitator); Abdah v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 

2d 25, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that_was a member of al-Qaida and that the Haji 

Habash guesthouse he ran was affiliated with al-Qaida). 

The petitioner also stated to interrogators that "[t]here were many people from different 

nations at the [Haji Habash] guesthouse, and they were there waiting to go on training missions 

at either Al Farouq or Abu Baida.',33 GE 6 at 2. The petitioner stated that when he arrived at the 

Haji Habash guesthouse, he turned over his passport to Abu Khloud. GE 6 at 2; see als~

Decl. at 3 (noting that collecting passports gave training camp and guesthouse administrators 

greater control over trainees and prevented them from easily leaving without approval). Another 

detainee has stated that the Haji Habash guesthouse was surrounded by 

walls that were approximately four meters high and that the front entrance was guarded by a 

Taliban guard armed with a Kalashnikov rifle who searched persons entering the house.34 GE 13 

at 2. These descriptions ofthe facility simply do not correspond with the type of guesthouses 

33	 Indeed, the petitioner acknowledged that during the two weeks he stayed at the Haji Habash 

guesthouse, he was approached by an individual who tried to convince him to train at the alFarouq camp. GE 9 at 3. 

34	 The level of detail contained in al-Jadani's description ofthe Haji Habash guesthouse (he 

describes the guesthouse's precise location, the surrounding buildings and the layout of the 

facility, and gives a detailed physical description of the guard who provided security to the 

guesthouse), see GE 13 at 2, coupled with the absence of any evidence of undue coercion, 

persuades the court to rely on the detainee's account. 

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that the petitioner's expert has stated are "most closely comparable to the old-fashioned Western 

concept ofa non-profit youth hostel or YMCA." Carapico Decl. 18(c). 

The petitioner maintains that even ifthe Haji Habash guesthouse was affiliated with the 

Taliban or aI-Qaida, not everyone who stayed there was necessarily affiliated with those forces. 

Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 72-74; see also PE 32 6.0; PE 35 at 1; PE 115 at 2. The evidence, 

however, does not support the notion that the petitioner was one ofthese unaffiliated wayward 

travelers. For instance, the petitioner stated to interrogators that during the two weeks he stayed 

at the Haji Habash guesthouse, he visited the Islamic Institute across the street daily. GE 3 at 6; 

GE 4 at 1. According to other GTMO detainees, this Institute was headed by Abu Hafs alMauritania, a senior al-Qaida leader who associated with high-ranking Taliban and al-Qaida 

leaders. GE 7 at 1; GE 48 at 1_2.35 One detainee reported that "the mission of the Institute was 

to issue religious fatwa[s], teach the Koran and the Hadith, and to indoctrinate the young 

students about going to paradise if they give their lives for the Muslim cause." GE 48 at 1-2. 

This account has been found credible by another judge in this district, who has remarked that 

"the Institute was sponsored and led by key Al Qaeda figures" and that "students there were 

taught Islamic doctrine in a manner twisted to serve the purposes of Al Qaeda" and that 

"attendance at the Institute is certainly consistent with becoming a part of Al Qaeda." Abdah, 

709 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 

Government's Exhibit 7 is an interrogation report containing statements made by GTMO 

detainee Ahmed Abdel Aziz. See generally GE 7. Aziz admitted to working for Abu Hafs alMauritania at the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, id. at 1, and provided detailed information about 

numerous suspected j ihadists, id. at 1-4. His account of ai-Mauritania's affiliation with the 

Islamic Institute is corroborated by al-Jadani, who provides detailed information about Abu Hafs, 

his family and the physical layout of the institute. GE 48 at 1-2. The court has been presented 

with no evidence that these descriptions were elicited through undue coercion. The court 

therefore considers both accounts sufficiently reliable for this analysis. 

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At any rate, the government need not establish that every person who stayed at the Haji 

Habash guesthouse (or any other guesthouse) was a member of al-Qaida. Rather, the 

government's burden is to prove that it is more likely than not that the petitioner was "part of' alQaida, and evidence that the petitioner knowingly stayed at a guesthouse affiliated with al-Qaida 

or the Taliban, even if not dispositive, is undoubtedly probative in this regard. See Al-Bihani, 

590 F.3d at 873 n.2; AI-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108. 

Based on the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the court concludes that the Haji 

Habash guesthouse was a Taliban or al-Qaida affiliated guesthouse. The court further concludes 

that the petitioner knew the guesthouse was affiliated with the Taliban and al-Qaida at the time 

he stayed there. This evidence strongly supports the government's assertion that the petitioner 

was "part of' al-Qaida at the time. 

c. Hamza aJ-Ghamdi's Guesthouse in KabuJ, Afghanistan 

After spending two weeks at the Haji Habash guesthouse, the petitioner received 

permission from _ to journey to lalalabad. GE 3 at 6. The petitioner traveled with 

another guesthouse resident, a Moroccan named_ GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. En 

route to lalalabad, the petitioner spent two nights at a guesthouse in Kabul operated by an 

individual named Hamza al-Ghamdi. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. 

Other detainees have acknowledged that al-Ghamdi was a member of al-Qaida. One 

detainee described al-Ghamdi as "one ofUsama bin Laden's main [lieutenants]." GE 20 at 2. 

The detainee stated that al-Ghamdi "[was] one ofthe planners for al-Qaida special operations in 

Afghanistan and maybe for other countries." Id. Another detainee stated that "AI-Ghamdi 

decided what training a person received and where they went for training" and that "if anyone 

wanted to go somewhere such as Kandahar ... or the front line, al-Ghamdi would arrange to get 

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them there." GE 22 at 1. 36 Indeed, when asked by interrogators, the petitioner did not deny that 

al-Ghamdi was a member ofal-Qaida. GE 24 at 1. 

The petitioner told interrogators that during this stay at the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, he 

asked al-Ghamdi for permission to go to the front lines. GE 9 at 4. According to the petitioner, 

al-Ghamdi denied the request "since. he did not have any weapons training." Jd. This account is 

consistent with that of another detainee, who stated that he too requested pennission from alGhamdi to travel to the front, but that this request was denied because "AI-Ghamdi told him that 

he needed refresher training." GE 22 at 2. 

The petitioner spent two days at the al-Ghamdi guesthouse before traveling on to 

Jalalabad. GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. After several months, the petitioner "decided to return to Al 

Ghamdi's Arab house in Kabul to try and get to the fighting at the front line." GE 9 at 5. During 

this second stay, which lasted approximately one week, GE 24 at I, AI-Ghamdi granted the 

petitioner's request and "finally authorized [the petitioner] to go to the 2nd line of defense near 

Bagram," GE 9 at 6. The petitioner told interrogators that he "receive[ed] instructions from [alGhamdi] on training sites and front lines." GE 24 at 1. 

Before the petitioner departed the al-Ghamdi guesthouse for the front, he observed an 

individual named visit the guesthouse. GE 9 at 5. _ was a 

coordinator for the September 11 terrorist attacks. 9111 COMMISSION REpORT at 434. According 

Government's Exhibit 20 is an interrogation report containing statements made by GTMO 

detainee Ghaleb Nassar al-Bihani, who provides detailed information regarding al-Ghamdi's 

history of affiliation with al-Qaida, as well as his role within the organization. GE 20 at 1-2. 

There is no evidence that these statements were elicited through undue coercion. Moreover, al· 

Bihani's account is consistent with the account provided by al-Jadani, who described alGhamdi's role in facilitating the movement offighters to and from the front lines. GE 22 at 1. 

AI-Jadani's description of al-Ghamdi's responsibilities is corroborated by the petitioner, who also 

acknowledges al-Ghamdi's authorization was necessary to get to the front lines. GE 9 at 6; GE 

24 at 1. 

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to the petitioner, _ would come to the house and greet people before going upstairs to the 

private offices. GE 9 at 5-6. 

In light ofthe above, there is overwhelming evidence that the al-Ghamdi guesthouse was 

a Taliban or al-Qaida affiliated guesthouse. Furthermore, the petitioner plainly knew that the 

guesthouse had these affiliations, as he understood that al-Ghamdi was a member of al-Qaida, 

knew that al-Ghamdi associated with senior members of al-Qaida, asked al-Ghamdi twice for 

permission to travel to the front and returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse for the express 

purpose ofreaching the front. 

d. _ House in Jalalabad, Afghanistan 

The petitioner stated to interrogators that after spending two days at the al-Ghamdi 

guesthouse, he traveled to lalalabad with_, who had accompanied him on his journey 

from the Haji Habash guesthouse to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul. GE 4 at 2; GE 10 at 2. 

In lalalabad, the petitioner contacted~ friend, GE 4 at 2; GE 10 at 2. 

According to the petitioner,.and_had fought together with the Taliban and remained 

very close. GE 9 at 4; GE 10 at 2. The petitioner stated to interrogators that he lived withlll 

_ for several months before returning to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in an effort to get to the 

front. GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4.; GE 10 at 2. 

Although the government contends tha_house was "just another al-Qaeda and 

Taliban guesthouse," Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 43-50, they have offered little to support that 

assertion. The government has provided no evidence that other Taliban or al-Qaida fighters 

stayed at_house during the time that the petitioner was there. See~ecl. at 1 

(noting that most guesthouses "functioned as bed-down locations" for jihadist fighters). Nor is 

there any evidence that_house served as a training camp facilitation hub, meeting 

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place for al-Qaida leaders or waystation for fighters on their way to the frontlines. See id 

(describing other functions served by al-Qaida guesthouses). Accordingly, the government has 

not established that_house was a Taliban or al-Qaida guesthouse. 

The significance of this finding, however, is tempered by two additional findings. First, 

as discussed below, the evidence indicates that during at least part of the period that the 

petitioner claims to have been living with_the petitioner was, in fact, receiving military 

training at an al-Qaida training camp. See infra Part IV.B.3. Indeed, despite his demonstrated 

ability to recall minute details about other aspects of his time in Yemen and Afghanistan,37 the 

petitioner appears to have provided little information about the many months he allegedly spent 

with_. See, e.g., GE 4 at 2 (the petitioner stated that he "did not work or receive any 

training while living with_ 

Furthermore, for whatever time he did spend at _ house, the petitioner remained 

intimately associated with jihadist forces. ~ashimself a former Taliban fighter, GE 

10 at 2, whose principal activity was, according to the petitioner, disbursing funds that he 

received from Saudi Arabia, GE 9 at 5; GE 41 at 2. Although the petitioner stated that these 

funds were distributed to orphanages and the parents of children studying Quran, GE 6 at 2; GE 

41 at 2, he stated that those funds may have gone to other sources as well, GE 41 at 2. Indeed, 

while describing~istributionof funds during one interrogation, the petitioner 

acknowledged, "I do not know i~isa member ofal Qa'ida." GE 41 at 2. 

See, e.g., GE I at 2-3 (petitioner recalled the name ofthe two individuals who flew with him 

from Saudi Arabia to Sana'a, the name ofthe hotel where he stayed in Sana'a and the amount of 

money he paid the taxi to drive him to Ta'iz); GE 3 at 4-5 (petitioner recalled detailed 

biographical information about numerous members ofthe Jamil boardinghouse); GE 9 at 4-5 

(petitioner provided a detailed description ofthe physical layout ofthe al-Ghamdi guesthouse and 

surrounding grounds, including its location, the placement of vehicles and guards, despite the fact 

that he stayed there less than two weeks). 

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Regardless ofwhether_ was a member ofthe Taliban or al-Qaida, there is 

evidence tha_had ongoing relationships with jihadists. The petitioner recalled that on 

one occasion while he was living there, ~as visited by four Tunisians who "were in 

Jalalabad for Jihad." GE 6 at 2. One of these Tunisians was a small anns dealer named _ 

_ Id; GE 4 at 2. According to the petitioner, he purchased a pistol from al-Tunisi and 

he,~d_'would travel to an area called Negim ai-Jihad located between eight 

(8) and ten (10) kilometers from Jalalabad" where there was a public shooting range. GE 4 at 2­

3. 

During this period, the petitioner was also visited by an associate from Sana'a,. 

who was accompanied by an individual name GE 3 at 7; GE 9 at 5.• 

_ whom the petitioner had met once in Sana'a through_ collected funds for the 

jihad in Chechnya. GE 3 at 7; GE 9 at 5. As previously noted, the petitioner has acknowledged 

that_was a member of al-Qaida. GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2. _ informed the 

petitioner that his fonner housemate, al-Khamri, had been one of the suicide bombers during the 

Cole attack. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5. 

Lastly, the court notes that after allegedly spending several months with_the 

petitioner returned to al-Ghamdi's guesthouse in Kabul, at which time he received authorization 

to travel to the front. GE 9 at 5-6. Had the petitioner truly dissociated himself from the Taliban 

and al-Qaida during the months when he was allegedly living with_and failed to 

address the lack of training that had previously prevented him from going to the front, it seems 

unlikely that al-Ghamdi would have immediately welcomed him back to the guesthouse and 

authorized him to go to the Taliban battle lines. 

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Accordingly, even i~house was not a formal al-Qaida or Taliban guesthouse, 

the time the petitioner spent there does not constitute time when he was dissociated from alQaida or the Taliban. To the contrary, it appears that during this time, he remained very much a 

part of the al-Qaida and Taliban apparatus, continuing his interactions with establishedjihadists 

before eventually returning to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in an effort to get to the front. 

e. ~uesthouse Near the Frontlines 

As noted, the petitioner has stated that after spending several months in Jalalabad, he 

returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, at which time he received authorization to the Taliban 

battle lines. GE 9 at 2. The details ofthe petitioner's accounts of his time at the front are not 

entirely consistent. See GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 6. These accounts do, however, suggest 

that after he returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, he stayed in at least one other Taliban and alQaida guesthouse near the front. See GE 6 at 2 ("[The petitioner] traveled to Kabul via taxi and 

stayed at a guesthouse for seven (7) days. Afterwards, [the petitioner] ventured to another 

guesthouse located near the thirdlines for ten (10) days."); GE 4 at 2 (interrogation report in 

which the petitioner states that on his way to the front, he stayed at a guesthouse operated by an 

individual named_ a Taliban fighter who had been in charge ofa defense fighting line 

outside Bagram). Accordingly, the evidence indicates that even after his extended stay in 

Jalalabad, the petitioner stayed at additional Taliban and al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses in his 

effort to get to the frontline. 

f. Conclusion 

In sum, the evidence indicates that throughout his time in Afghanistan, the petitioner 

stayed at multiple guesthouses that he knew were affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban. The 

fact that one of the houses he stayed at may not have been a formal al-Qaida guesthouse hardly 

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indicates that he had dissociated himself from the Taliban or al-Qaida. This evidence strongly 

indicates that the petitioner was "part of' al-Qaida during this period. 

3. The Petitioner Sought Out and Received Military-Style Training in Afghanistan 

The government contends that the petitioner applied for and received military-style 

training from the Taliban or al-Qaida during his time in Afghanistan. Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 63­

79; Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 3-20, 36-51. This evidence, the government contends, provides further 

support for the government's allegation that the petitioner was "part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or 

associated enemy forces. Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 63-79; Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 3-20,36-51. The 

petitioner responds that the government has not proven that he received any military training. 

Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 20-35. The petitioner further contends that even ifhe did receive such 

training, that fact would not establish that he was part ofthe Taliban or al-Qaida. Id 

a. The Petitioner's Kunyas 

The government has offered evidence that terrorists and insurgents commonly use 

kunyas, which are assumed names or pseudonyms used to conceal the individual's true identity. 

GE 1 ecl. I") at 2.38 In Muslim culture, the kunya is traditionally an 

honorific indicating that the person is either a mother or father and is constructed using the name 

ofthe first-born son or eldest daughter ifthe person has no sons. Id. The kunya for a man is 

"Abu," meaning "father of," plus the name ofthe first born. Id Terrorists, on the other hand, 

use kunyas without regard to children's names or whether the individual has children. Id 

Kunyas are often used by terrorists "as a security, denial and deception measure." Id 

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In this case, the petitioner, who has no children, GE 27 at 1, has acknowledged that while 

in Afghanistan, he used the kunya "Abu Abdullah." GE 9 at 4; see also GE 27 at 1 (noting that 

the petitioner admitted using the kunya "Abu Abdullah" even before leaving for Afghanistan). 

Furthermore, it is undisputed that the petitioner also used the kunya 

during the time he was in Afghanistan. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. 21-22, 34, 37. 

b. The Petitioner's Application to Attend an al-Qaida Training Camp 

In support of its contention that the petitioner received military training, the government 

has submitted an FBI memorandum, dated March 27, 2002, which states that in December 2001, 

coalition forces "recovered numerous documents from an 'Arab' office in Kandahar, 

Afghanistan." GE 25 at 1. According to the memorandum, the documents recovered included 

"applications for training at Al Qaeda camps." [d. The FBI memorandum then provides an 

English-language translation ofthese applications. See generally id. 

The FBI memorandum indicates that one of the individuals who applied to attend an aIQaida training camp was GE 25 at 4. The applicant 

indicates that he was born in 1977, hails from Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and has a ninth grade 

education. [d. The applicant also indicates that he was referred to the camp by two individuals, 

_ and_. [d. As previously noted_is an individual whom the 

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petitioner met in Sana'a through~dwhom the petitioner has acknowledged was a 

member of al-Qaida. GE 3 at 5; GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2. The applicant also lists the names and 

telephone numbers oftwo brothers,_ and_ GE 25 at 4. This information too is 

consistent with biographical information provided by the petitioner. GE 1 at 1-3; GE 3 at 3. The 

application concludes by asking for "Plans after training," to which this applicant responded, 

"Jihad." GE 25 at 4. 

It is clear that the who submitted this training 

camp application is the petitioner. Each piece of biographical information contained in the 

application, including the names of his brothers, his city of origin and his level of education, 

corresponds with information that the petitioner has provided to interrogators. Indeed, the 

petitioner does not dispute that he is the individual referred to in the application. Nov. 15 (p.m.) 

Tr. at 21-22,34. Accordingly, the government has established that the petitioner submitted an 

application to attend an al-Qaida training camp. 39 

The petitioner offers two arguments to diminish the significance ofthis evidence. First, 

he contends that even though the application states that the petitioner's intention was to engage 

in "jihad" after the completion of his training, "jihad" does not necessarily mean armed conflict. 

See Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 22-23; see also PE 95 18; PE 138 at 1. Although the court does not 

doubt that the term "jihad" can encompass different meanings in different contexts, insofar as 

this particular training camp application is concerned, the petitioner's argument is implausible. 

As the FBI memorandum clearly indicates, each training camp application asked the applicant 

The FBI memorandum specifies when and where the training camp applications were recovered 

and who recovered the materials. GE 25 at I. Furthermore, the petitioner does not dispute that 

the application 0 described in the FBI memorandum 

reflects accurate, detailed biographical information regarding the petitioner. Id. at 4. Moreover, 

the information contained in other applications translated in the FBI memorandum corresponds 

with information recorded in other al-Qaida training documents. See infra Part IV.BJ.c. 

Accordingly, the FBI memorandum is sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 

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not only to provide background infonnation, but also specifically directed each applicant to 

describe his "Previous military service." GE 25 at 1-4. Moreover, it is well established that alQaida training camps were designed "to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists." 9/11 

COMMISSION REpORT at 66. Accordingly, the court concludes that by indicating on his training 

camp application that he intended to engage in 'Jihad" following his training, the petitioner was 

expressing a desire to take up anns with al-Qaida or the Taliban. 

The petitioner also contends that even ifhe filled out an application to attend an al-Qaida 

training camp, it does not necessarily follow that he actually attended the camp. Nov. 15 (p.m.) 

Tr. at 21-22. Noting that the date of the application corresponds with the time that he was at the 

Haji Habash guesthouse, the petitioner claims that the application must have been completed 

when he was approached at that guesthouse by a training camp recruiter. [d. Because the 

petitioner ultimately declined the offer to attend the training camp, he argues, the application 

submitted as part of this unsuccessful recruitment effort does not show that he attended an alQaida training camp. [d. 

The petitioner, however, has offered no evidence to substantiate his theory that the 

training camp application was submitted as part of this recruitment effort. Furthennore, even if 

the petitioner's training camp application does not conclusively prove that he received training 

from al-Qaida, it certainly offers significant support for that allegation, particularly in light ofthe 

detailed personal infonnation contained therein. Indeed, ifthe petitioner had no intention of 

attending an al-Qaida training camp, it is not clear why he would provide such detailed 

biographical infonnation about himself, including,the names and telephone numbers ofhis 

brothers in Saudi Arabia and the name ofhis associate from th~oardinghouse,_

See GE 25 at 4. Accordingly, the fact that the petitioner filled out an application to attend an al49 

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Qaida training camp strongly supports the government's allegation that he sought out militarystyle training in Afghanistan. 

c. Records of the Petitioner's Training 

The government contends that the petitioner's receipt of military-style training is also 

documented in a ninety-two page collection of documents, which, the government asserts, are 

English-language translations of internal Taliban or al-Qaida records ("the AFGP Documents"). 

See generally GE 29. A corresponding DIA record, which the government submitted as a 

supplemental exhibit,40 indicates that the AFGP Documents consist of English-language 

translations ofArabic-language documents captured by coalition forces during Operation 

Enduring Freedom.41 GE 70 at 1. The record seems to reflect that these documents were 

recovered from the "Director ofAI-Qa'ida Security Training Office" and that they are similar to 

other materials recovered from enemy forces. Id. at 2. The DIA, which prepared the translation, 

notes that the AFGP Documents "contain[] [t]he names ofthe students admitted to the training in 

the tactics of [a]rtillery, communication, infantry and their distribution. The training starting 

times, programs, instructions about the subject matters are discussed too." Id. at 2. 

The AFGP Documents contain multiple records concerning the petitioner. For example, 

the exhibit contains several rosters of "arriving brothers," organized by their date of arrival. GE 

29 at 48-53. One ofthese arriving brothers is 

In its post-merits hearing submission, the petitioner complains that GE 70 was not admitted into 

the record. The hearing transcript, however, plainly documents that the court pennitted the 

introduction of this exhibit as rebuttal evidence over the objection ofthe petitioner's counsel. 

Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 39-41. 

4\	 Operation Enduring Freedom is the military operation commenced b the United States and 

coalition forces a ainst Taliban and al-Qaida forces in 

ofthe operation is set forth in the 

declaration of Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Brooks, a veteran Anny historian with twenty-three years 

of active and reserve Anny service. See generally id. 

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who, according to the roster, has a high school education, no profession and was referred by an 

individual named Id at 52. The infonnation contained in this entry is consistent 

with the infonnation recorded in the petitioner's training camp application, GE 25 at 4, and with 

infonnation provided by the petitioner to interrogators, GE I at I; GE 3 at I. That the petitioner 

is listed as an "arriving brother" on an al-Qaida roster captured with dozens of other documents 

concerning al-Qaida trainees suggests that the petitioner sought out and received training from 

al-Qaida or the Taliban. 

The AFGP Documents also contain records reflecting the petitioner's attendance and 

completion of various training courses. See generally GE 29. One such record is a training 

roster issued by the "Office ofMujahadeen Affairs." Id at 34. The roster indicates tha_ 

~asscheduled to attend "Communication Class #2" beginning in February 2001. ld 

The AFGP Documents also include a memorandum issued by the "Ansar Allah Base" on August 

24,200 I, listing a group of individuals, including who had "graduated from 

Anti Air Missiles" and who would therefore "have priorit[y] in joining the Artillery Sessions" 

which was to start shortly. ld. at 84. These internal al-Qaida records indicate that after applying 

to attend an al-Qaida training camp, the petitioner did, in fact, receive such training. 

The petitioner contends that the goyernment has not established the reliability of the 

AFGP Documents. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 23-24. The court disagrees. As previously noted, the 

government has submitted an internal DIA record indicating that the exhibit represents a DIA 

translation of training records captured during Operation Enduring freedom. GE 70 at 1-2. 

Although the petitioner points out that the DIA record indicates that the ninety-two page exhibit 

represents intelligence that has not been evaluated, the Circuit has made clear that "raw" 

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intelligence is not inherently unreliable. Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 429 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 

836). 

The petitioner also notes that the DIA record does not specify when and where the AFGP 

Documents were recovered. See GE 70 at 1. Yet the absence of this information, while 

significant, does not necessarily undermine the reliability of the AFGP Documents, particularly 

in light of the fact that the information contained in the document is corroborated by other 

materials in the record. See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 429 (observing that "an intelligence report's 

reliability can be assessed by comparison to 'exogenous information'" (quoting Parhat, 532 F.3d 

at 848)). As previously noted, the petitioner's biographical information recorded in the AFGP 

Documents' roster of "arriving brothers," GE 29 at 52, is consistent with that provided in the 

petitioner's training camp application, GE 25 at 4. Likewise, the other rosters of "arriving 

brothers" in the AFGP Documents contain information about trainees that also matches up with 

information recorded in the training camp applications translated in the FBI memorandum. 

Compare GE 29 at 48,52 

The overlap in the information set forth in the AFGP Documents and 

the FBI memorandum provides substantial evidence oftheir authenticity and reliability. 

The information in the AFGP Documents (and the FBI memorandum) is also 

corroborated by the petitioner's own statements. For instance, according to the petitioner, one of 

the individuals who traveled with him from the Daftar al-Taliban to the Haji Habash guesthouse 

was a twenty-three year old Yemeni man he knew as~E 1 at 6-7. The _ 

_ listed on the FBI memorandum is described as a twenty-three year old Yemeni man 

with an occupation in computers referred bY~hoarrived in Afghanistan in 

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September 2000, the same time as the petitioner. GE 25 at 2. listed 

on the AFGP Documents training roster is described as a 

GE 29 at 48. These 

corroborating details strongly suggest that the_ who traveled with the petitioner is the 

same man listed on the al-Qaida training roster and the training camp applications, and provide 

further support for the reliability of the AFGP Documents and the FBI memorandum. 

The petitioner also contends that there is no proof that the who was 

scheduled to attend a communications class, GE 29 at 34, and the who had 

completed a course in anti-aircraft missiles and was scheduled to begin artillery training, id at 

84, refer to the petitioner. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 24-28. The petitioner points out that the names 

are both 

common names that are used in the kunyas of many individuals listed in the AFGP Documents. 

The petitioner, however, has not identified any instance in which an individual listed as 

an "arriving brother" or training camp attendee in the AFGP Documents used the kunya _ 

_ Moreover, the petitioner does not dispute that the entry for 

on the al-Qaida training roster found in the AFGP Documents refers to the petitioner. GE 29 at 

52. Indeed, given the overlap between the information in that entry, the training camp 

application, see GE 25 at 4, and the petitioner's statements to interrogators, see GE 1 at 1-3, the 

evidence strongly indicates that the individual listed on the training roster is the petitioner. 

Having established that at least one of the references t in the AFGP 

The closest the petitioner comes to such evidence is an entry on an "arrivin brothers" list in 

which one individual lists as a reference an individual named GE 29 at 55. 

While this evidence supports the uncontroversial proposition t at t ere were 0 er mdividuals 

using the kunyas similar to that ofthe petitioner, it provides little support for the proposition that 

there were other individuals being processed for training at al-Qaida training camps around the 

same period using that kunya. 

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Documents refers to the petitioner, the court concludes that it is more likely than not that the 

other references to that kunya contained in the same collection of materials also refer to the 

petitioner, rather than some unidentified individual also using the same kunya. 

d. Authorization to Travel to the Front 

Finally, the fact that al-Ghamdi subsequently authorized the petitioner to go to the 

Taliban battle lines also supports the government's contention that he received military-style 

training from al-Qaida. As previously noted, the petitioner has stated that when he first stayed at 

al-Ghamdi's guesthouse in Kabul, he requested permission to go to the front. GE 9 at 4. AIGhamdi denied that request "since he did not have any weapons training." Id. This account is, 

as previously noted, consistent with that of another detainee, who stated that al-Ghamdi similarly 

denied his request to go to the front because he needed "refresher training." GE 22 at 2. 

According to that detainee, al-Ghamdi sent him to the Malik training camp near Kabul. Id. 

In this case, the petitioner stated that several months after al-Ghamdi denied his request, 

he returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse and again requested permission to go to the front. GE 9 

at 4. During this second visit, al-Ghamdi authorized the petitioner to go to the battle lines. Id. 

The reasonable inference from the petitioner's own account is that between his first and second 

stays at al-Ghamdi's guesthouse, he remedied the deficiency identified by al-Ghamdi by 

obtaining weapons training. 

The fact that the petitioner reached the Taliban battle lines also undermines the 

petitioner's argument that not everyone who received training from al-Qaida or the Taliban went 

on to become a member of those forces. See Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 31-35. The petitioner has 

presented substantial evidence that not every individual who attended an al-Qaida training camp 

would go on to become part of those forces. See, e.g., PE 19 at 2, 7; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 

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at 67. In the petitioner's case, however, the petitioner, after receiving training, did not distance 

himselffrom the Taliban or al-Qaida; to the contrary, he "decided to return to Al Ghamdi's Arab 

house in Kabul to try and get to the fighting at the front line." GE 9 at 5. 

e. Conclusion 

Based on the evidence presented by the parties, it is more likely than not that the 

petitioner applied for and received military-style training from the Taliban or al-Qaida during his 

time in Afghanistan. This fact strongly indicates that the petitioner was "part of' al-Qaida, the 

Taliban or associated enemy forces. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. 

4. The Petitioner Traveled to Taliban Battle Lines 

The government contends that the petitioner spent time at Taliban battle lines and that 

this fact further demonstrates that he was "part of' al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated enemy 

forces. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 51-61; 71-74. Although the petitioner does not dispute that he went 

to the front, he contends that he traveled there essentially as a tourist and that this evidence does 

not demonstrate that he was affiliated with the Taliban or al-Qaida. Id. at 62-71. 

The petitioner repeatedly admitted to interrogators that in or around May 2001, he 

traveled to the Taliban battle lines. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5-6. In one interrogation, the 

petitioner stated that after returning to al-Ghamdi's guesthouse "to try and get to the fighting at 

the front line," GE 9 at 5, he received permission to "to go to the 2nd line ofdefense near 

Bagram. [The petitioner] went there to support the Taliban who were positioned to fight 

Masood's Northern Alliance troops," id. at 6. In another interrogation, the petitioner stated that 

he "began traveling to Bagram to assist Taliban fighters in their efforts against the Northern 

Alliance fighters." GE 4 at 3. The petitioner stated that he spent a week at the fighting line, 

although he did not see any exchange of gunfire. [d. In yet another interrogation, the petitioner 

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stated that during the time he was in lalalabad, he "traveled to the frontline near Kabul. [The 

petitioner] acknowledged that there was fighting going on there." GE 3 at 6. 

The petitioner's admissions establish not only that he went to the front, but that he went 

there to support Taliban forces. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5. Furthermore, the evidence that the 

petitioner requested authorization to go to the front, GE 9 at 5-6, received instruction from alGhamdi regarding battle lines, GE 24 at 1, followed al-Ghamdi's directives about when he could 

and could not go to the front, GE 9 at 4-6, and exchanged communications with his compatriot 

Abu Ghanem at the front, GE 6 at 2-3, strongly suggests that the petitioner was not acting as a 

"freelancer," but was instead operating within the Taliban or al-Qaida command structure as 

"part of" those forces, see Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725; Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. 

To blunt the significance ofthis evidence, the petitioner has suggested at various times 

that he went to the Taliban battle lines out of curiosity, or to find his former acquaintance, Abu 

Ghanem, or as a "Gucci jihadist" tourist.43 These contentions are not plausible. As one judge in 

this district has remarked, "[i]t is inconceivable that the Taliban would allow an outsider to stay 

at their front line camp just to see what the fighting was like. An outsider, whose trustworthiness 

and loyalty are unknown, poses a threat to a military camp." Al-Waraji, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 42; 

see also Sulayman, 2010 WL 3069568, at *18 ("[T]he Court cannot fathom a situation whereby 

Taliban fighters would allow an individual to infiltrate their posts near a battle zone unless that 

person was understood to be a 'part of the Taliban."). The court concurs with this assessment. 

In fact, this petitioner admitted in two separate interrogations that he went to the front to assist 

The petitioner has submitted a declaration from an expert in Islamic cultures, who states that in 

the 1980s, foreign volunteers, known as "Guccijihadists," traveled to Afghanistan on "jihad 

tours" to fulfill their religious obligation to engage in jihad. PE 42 at 4. Although the petitioner 

suggests that he may have been such a tourist, there is no evidence that these ''jihad tours" 

continued into the 1990s and 2000s, nor is there any evidence that "Guccijihadists" ofthe 1980s 

stayed in Taliban guesthouses or received military training like the petitioner. 

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Taliban fighters. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5. The court therefore concludes that evidence that the 

petitioner spent time at Taliban battle lines strongly indicates that he was "part of' the Taliban, 

al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. 

S. The Petitioner Remained "Part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or Associated 

Enemy Forces at the Time of His Capture 

The government contends that the petitioner remained "part of' those forces at the time 

he was apprehended. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 74-86; Nov. 16 Ir. at 10-12. Indeed, the government 

asserts that the petitioner was captured after fleeing the battle of Tora Bora, where he had fought 

alongside the Taliban and al-Qaida against coalition forces. Id. The petitioner maintains that 

there is no evidence that he was "part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces at the time 

he was captured and that the government's contention that the petitioner fought at Tora Bora is 

based on pure speculation. Nov. 16 Tr. at 3-10. 

As noted, it is not enough for the government to show simply that the petitioner was, at 

one time, a member of the Taliban, al-Qaida of associated forces; to be lawfully detained, the 

petitioner must have been "part of' those forces at the time of his capture. See Salahi, 625 F.3d 

at 751; Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71. "A petitioner who may once have been part ofal-Qaida 

or the Taliban can show that he was no longer part of such an entity at the time of capture by 

showing that he took affinnative actions to abandon his membership." Khalifv. Obama,2010 

WL 2382925, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) (citing AI Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 

128-30 (D.D.C. 2009)). 

The petitioner stated to interrogators that after spending time at the front in the summer 

of2001, he returned to_house in Afghanistan. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 6. 

According to the petitioner, around the time that coalition forces approached lalalabad in the fall 

of2001_instructed the petitioner to travel with an Afghan guide to a village near the 

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Pakistan border. GE 6 at 3; GE 9 at 6. The petitioner claims that he waited in that village for 

almost a month for_ to arrive with the petitioner's passport. GE 6 at 3; GE 9 at 6. The 

petitioner then traveled into Pakistan, where he was arrested by Pakistani authorities. GE 6 at 3; 

GE 9 at 6. 

The petitioner's account is not credible. Although the petitioner claims to have stayed in 

the border village for nearly a full month, he asserted to interrogators that he could not recall the 

name ofthe village. GE 3 at 6.44 This assertion is difficult to square with the petitioner's 

demonstrated ability to recall specific details about names and locations. See infra Part IV.B.2.d. 

Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner would have waited a month in a hostile 

war zone simply to retrieve his passport, given that he had entered the country surreptitiously in 

the first place. See supra Part IV.B.I.d. 

Nonetheless, the government has offered no persuasive evidence that the petitioner was, 

in actuality, fleeing after fighting in the battle ofTora Bora. Although the government points out 

that the timing ofthe petitioner's retreat to Pakistan is consistent with having fought in the battle 

ofTora Bora, Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 85-86, it is undisputed that around that time, coalition forces 

were advancing on Jalalabad. Accordingly, the timing of the petitioner's decision to flee to 

Pakistan is equally consistent with an individual fleeing from oncoming conflict. The 

government therefore has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner 

fought in the battle of Tora Bora. 

It is, however, not necessary for the government to prove that the petitioner fought at 

Tora Bora to demonstrate that he was "part of' al-Qaida or the Taliban at the time of his capture. 

The government has already offered compelling evidence that the petitioner traveled to 

Afghanistan specifically to fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida, pointing out that the petitioner had 

This interrogation occurred in May 2002, less than six months after his capture. See GE 3 at 1. 

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extensive and lasting associations with al-Qaida associates prior to his departure and traveled 

with individuals who acknowledged that they were going to Afghanistan to become martyrs. See 

supra Part IV.B.l. The government also demonstrated that the petitioner stayed at multiple 

Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouses and received military-style training during his time in 

Afghanistan. See supra Part IV.B.2-3. Furthermore, the petitioner repeatedly admitted that just 

months before his capture, he had been at the Taliban battle lines where he had gone to assist 

Taliban forces fighting against the Northern Alliance. See supra Part IV.B.4. Viewed as a 

whole, the evidence plainly establishes that at least by the summer of 2001, the petitioner was 

"part of' al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated enemy forces. 

There is no evidence that the petitioner took any steps to dissociate himself from these 

forces in the intervening months before his capture. See Ai Ginco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 128-30. 

Even if the petitioner did stay with _ during those months, that fact alone is hardly 

inconsistent with remaining "part of' the Taliban or al-Qaida; as previously discussed, after 

allegedly living wit~or several months on a prior occasion, the petitioner was 

permitted to stay at the al-Ghamdi guesthouse again and received authorization to travel to the 

front. See supra Part IV.B.2.d. The petitioner, whose descriptions of his time with_are 

strikingly vague when compared to his accounts of other periods in Yemen and Afghanistan, has 

provided no evidence that he established contacts with anyone in Afghanistan outside the 

Talibanlal-Qaida network, that he took any steps to obtain employment or that he took any other 

affirmative actions inconsistent with being "part of' al-Qaida. 

In sum, the court concludes that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the 

Taliban or al-Qaida, stayed at Taliban or al-Qaida guesthouses, received military training at alQaida facility, traveled to the battle lines and was captured during the same armed conflict. Even 

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if none of these findings would independently justify his detention, viewed as a whole, they 

plainly establish that the petitioner was "part of" the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy 

during his time in Afghanistan. Moreover, there is no evidence that the petitioner dissociated 

with these enemy forces at any point prior to his capture. The weight ofthe evidence therefore 

supports the conclusion that the petitioner remained "part of' al-Qaida or the Taliban at the time 

of his capture and that he is therefore lawfully detained. 

V. CONCLUSION 

The government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner 

was "part of' the Taliban, al·Qaida or associated enemy forces and is therefore lawfully 

detained. The court therefore denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. An Order 

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately and contemporaneously this 3rd 

day of February, 2011. 

RICARDO M. URBINA 

United States District Judge 

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UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE