J-S43045-14

2014 PA Super 252

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

IAN THOMAS SEAGRAVES,

Appellant No. 2758 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered September 20, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000298-2009

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J, ALLEN and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

OPINION BY ALLEN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2014

In this appeal, we address a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence imposed following a re-sentencing hearing in accordance with 

Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed. 407 (2012), 

and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. 

Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013).1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant filed his appeal from the order denying his post-sentence motion. 

In a criminal case, “when timely post-sentence motions are filed, an appeal 

properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of the 

post-sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 69 A.2d 253, 254 

(Pa. Super. 2013).

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Ian Thomas Seagraves (“Appellant”), then seventeen, and his adult 

co-defendant, Shawn Nicholas Freemore (“Freemore”), then nineteen, 

planned to lure the victim to an obscure location under a bridge. Although 

the victim believed he was meeting Freemore for a sexual encounter, 

according to Freemore, “The plan was to meet him. Scare him. Kill him.” 

See N.T., 9/16/11, at 79. As planned, once the victim was present, 

Appellant jumped the victim, stabbing him in his throat. While the victim 

ran and pled for mercy, Appellant and Freemore caught up to him and forced 

him into the woods. Appellant and Freemore then stabbed the victim 

approximately forty-five times, and slashed him with a meat cleaver. They 

then attempted to hide the victim’s body under the snow. After leaving the 

scene, Freemore returned and rifled through the victim’s pockets, taking the 

victim’s car keys, as well as a digital recorder on which the victim had 

recorded choir music he performed for a local church.

After the victim was reported missing, the local authorities found his 

car, and their investigation led them to Freemore. At first Freemore denied 

recently meeting with the victim. He then informed them he killed the 

victim and acted alone. In his final version of events, Freemore told the 

authorities that he planned and committed the murder with Appellant, and 

that Appellant still possessed a DVD that he and Freemore had taken from 

the victim’s car. Following a search of Appellant’s home, the police 

recovered the stolen DVD. Authorities ultimately charged Appellant and 

Freemore with criminal homicide and related crimes.
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A joint jury trial began on September 13, 2011. As part of the 

evidence, the Commonwealth introduced notebooks and digital recordings 

made by each defendant. The Commonwealth first introduced notebooks 

found in Freemore’s car in which each defendant “set his crime to verse.” 

N.T., 9/13/11, at 38. The two later used the victim’s digital recorder to set 

their words to music, and sing them as a rap song.2 The Commonwealth 

____________________________________________

2 A Pennsylvania State trooper read the following “lyrics” of Appellant’s rap 

song at the resentencing hearing:

It was cold, but I wasn’t alone trippin, waiting for the 

kid to commence with throat rippin. My heart skipping as 

I’m waiting under the dark bridge, my friend luring him 

down here, we gonna kill this kid. When they come under, 

I was sitting in the dark cover. He sat next to me, and I 

went and stabbed this mothafucka. Right into his neck, 

and I stabbed him in the head. He choked, but started 

running. His bitch ass wasn’t dead. My homie chased him 

down the street and ran towards the light, but nobody saw 

him. It was in the middle of the night. His fright was 

showing. The mothafucka started pleading. He was all 

light-headed because his throat was all bleeding. I’m 

seeing so much blood as we led him into the woods. We 

were killing some faggot in my own neighborhood. He 

wanted to fuck my friend, but instead we fucked him. I 

stuck him in the fuckin throat, so that said something. 

From all the running my lungs were starting to hurt. We 

stabbed him again, and we watched the blood squirt. 

Through his shirt, and I stabbed him in the face. He was 

still alive but dying at good pace. He was begging and 

begging. Please, man, let me go. I’ll never say nothing, 

and nobody will ever know. But Skippy said no, and so I 

left the blade in his neck, destroyed his radio, and the 

fucka had no respect. Trippin him out at something at first 

thought, scaring his dying ass with some reverse talk. I 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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played these recordings for the jury. Finally, the Commonwealth introduced 

evidence to demonstrate that, following the murder, Appellant changed his 

name on a social media site to “Throwt Stabba.”

On September 21, 2011, the jury convicted Appellant and Freemore of 

first-degree murder, conspiracy, and tampering with evidence. On 

December 12, 2011, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the mandatory 

term of life without the possibility of parole for his murder conviction, and a 

consecutive term of eight and one-half to twenty years of incarceration for 

the remaining convictions.3

Following the denial of his post-sentence motions, Appellant filed a 

timely appeal to this Court. In an unpublished memorandum filed on July 

16, 2013, this Court, although rejecting Appellant’s substantive claims, 

vacated Appellant’s mandatory life imprisonment sentence and remanded for 

resentencing in accordance with the Miller and Batts decisions.

On remand, the trial court appointed new counsel for Appellant, and 

conducted a re-sentencing hearing on September 20, 2013. At the 

conclusion of this hearing, the trial court re-imposed a sentence of life 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

was kicking him in the skull to make sure he was gone, 

stabbed him in the side and spine and in his throng [sic].

N.T., 9/20/13, at 20-21.

3 The trial court imposed the same sentence upon Freemore.
J-S43045-14

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imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, and 

the same consecutive term for the remaining convictions. This appeal 

followed. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

I. Whether the [trial] court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced Appellant, who was a juvenile at the time of 

the crime, to life without parole without properly taking 

into consideration mitigating factors listed in Miller v. 

Alabama.

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

As noted above, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. This Court has summarized:

Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of sentencing 

for which there is no automatic right to appeal. This appeal 

is, therefore, more appropriately considered a petition for 

allowance of appeal. Two requirements must be met before 

a challenge to the judgment of sentence will be heard on 

the merits. First, the appellant must set forth in his [or her] 

brief a concise statement of matters relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary 

aspects of his [or her] sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). 

Second, he or she must show that there is a substantial 

question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under 

the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b)[.]

The determination of whether a particular case raises a 

substantial question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case 

basis. Generally, however, in order to establish that there 

is a substantial question, the appellant must show actions 

by the sentencing court inconsistent with the Sentencing 

Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the 

sentencing process.
J-S43045-14

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Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d 608, 611-12 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(footnote and citations omitted).

Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement reads, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

In the instant case, the [trial] court abused its discretion 

by re-sentencing Appellant without properly considering 

mitigating factors due to Appellant’s status as a juvenile at 

the time of the commission of the offense. The U.S. 

Supreme Court outlined a number of factors that a 

sentencing court must consider prior to imposing a life 

sentence without the possibility of parole on a juvenile. 

The [trial] court improperly relied solely on factors derived 

from a decertification hearing, rather than conducting a 

searching inquiry into the factors it had to consider. As a 

result, the sentence imposed constituted a manifest abuse 

of discretion.

Appellant’s Brief at 11. 

As recognized by this Court in Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 

1263 (Pa. Super. 2013), prior decisions from this Court involving whether a 

substantial question has been raised by claims that the sentencing court 

“failed to consider” or “failed to adequately consider” sentencing factors “has 

been less than a model of clarity and consistency.” Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1272 

n.8. Nevertheless, we hold that Appellant’s claim that the trial court 

improperly relied on factors derived from a prior decertification hearing, 

when resentencing in accordance with the Miller and Batts decisions, raises 

a substantial question. We will therefore proceed to address the merits of 

Appellant’s claim.
J-S43045-14

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“In reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, 

we evaluate the court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard.” 

Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1274. When, as here, the trial court has the benefit of a 

pre-sentence report, we presume that the court was aware of relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with any mitigating factors. Commonwealth v. 

Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 937 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In support of his claim on appeal, Appellant asserts that, while the trial 

court “indicated that it had considered mitigating factors prior to re-imposing 

[a life sentence without possibility of parole] on Appellant, . . . the factors 

the court said it considered all came from the decertification hearing held 

earlier in this matter.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. According to Appellant, the 

trial court’s “relying solely on the factors derived from the decertification 

hearing falls short of the mandate outlined in Miller v. Alabama, [supra], 

and thus violates Appellant’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment.” Id. Our review of the resentencing transcript refutes 

Appellant’s claim.

At the beginning of the re-sentencing hearing, the trial court 

recognized that it had to consider more than just evidence from the 

decertification hearing. The following exchange occurred between the trial 

court and defense counsel:

THE COURT: Well, we have two things. One of them 

was a decertification - -
J-S43045-14

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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.

THE COURT: - - hearing that was held before Judge 

Vican together with his findings that he made at that time, 

and that touches upon a lot of the same areas that you 

would look at under the new standard and under what [our 

Supreme Court] told us to look at essentially in Batts.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.

THE COURT: And so I’ve reviewed that. But I would 

like from your point of view rather than - - since this is a 

resentencing, I would like to hear from your point of view 

whether you have any testimony, any additional 

information for me that touches upon those very specific 

areas.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, your Honor. All I have is 

the arguments that were given in the past. I don’t think 

anything else has changed. We discussed possibly having 

another evaluation done, but I’m not sure if that would be 

relevant at this point because things haven’t changed that 

much since the last time [Appellant] was sentenced.

I do believe that you should take into consideration all 

of the things that were brought up at that hearing. 

Whether it was remanded to juvenile court or not, the 

issues that were presented at that hearing are still 

relevant, and I think you should take those into 

consideration for sentencing.

I should point out that Miller also talks about the ability 

to deal with outside pressures, and I think that [Freemore] 

in this matter should be taken into consideration as well as 

his maturity and whether he led [Appellant] to do these 

sort of situations. [sic] And I think you should take into 

consideration the environment and the lack - - the ability 

of [Appellant] to get himself out of that sort of situation.

There are other issues involved, or course. We’ll deal 

with those as the appeal process continues. Right now the 

main issue is whether [Appellant] is going to be the same 

50 years from now when we’re long gone and the world is 

much, much different. And I think that’s one of the

reasons that the Supreme Court made that decision as 

well.
J-S43045-14

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You know, someone who was sentenced in 1960 who is 

now in his 70s and still sitting in jail is not necessarily the 

same person he was when he was 17, and 50 years from 

now who knows what [Appellant] is going to be like.

All we’re asking is for the possibility of parole. A future 

parole board might deny it, but then they might have 

much more information at their hand [sic]. I think that’s 

why Miller is such an important case because by then they

will have the background information of how [Appellant’s] 

life has progressed in the next who knows how many years 

before they look at that.

To block that off at this stage is to prevent future courts 

and future judges from looking at this with an eye on how 

[Appellant’s] life has changed, and I think that’s important, 

and I think that’s why Miller is such an important case. 

And I’m asking you to do that more than anything else, to 

leave the option open for the future.

[Appellant] may never get parole. He may constantly 

spend the rest of his life in jail, and they may deny it over 

and over again. But to close that door on him I think is 

against what the constitution stands for based on what 

Miller said.

And that’s pretty much my main argument. I’m just 

saying let’s leave the door open, Judge. This is a horrible 

incident. I’m not going to deny that. And the district 

attorney and all the witnesses are going to try to make it 

sound absolutely terrible, and I’m not going to deny it’s 

absolutely terrible.

But he was a juvenile at the time. The standards are 

different, and I am asking you to look at [Appellant’s] 

background based on what’s already in the file, what’s 

already in the record, and use that to decide to keep the 

door open for him sometime in the future just in case.

N.T., 9/20/13, 4-8.

Defense counsel then asked Appellant if he would like to address the 

trial court, and Appellant did so:
J-S43045-14

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[APPELLANT]: I mean, you can believe what you want. 

But the years that I’ve been in prison, even since juvenile 

since being a juvenile, you know, I’ve been through a lot 

of things in my life. You know, I’ve always had kind of the 

same thought process, but I’ve learned a lot of things. 

You know, I got my GED upstate. You know what I’m 

saying? I had basically a lot of downtime to really 

evaluate my life and think it over a lot of, you know, bonds 

I made with people I probably shouldn’t have.

And, you know, I pretty much guarantee that if I would 

be released right now I would never be in a situation like 

this, which I know is never going to happen. But, you 

know, it’s just for you to decide.

Id. at 8.

Next, the trial court heard from several of the victim’s family 

members. The Commonwealth then presented its argument to the trial 

court:

Miller v. Alabama, as summarized in [the] Batts 

decision clearly indicates that you have the authority to 

sentence [Appellant] to life without parole. It says clearly 

in the Batts decision, “Miller neither barred imposition of 

a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile categorically 

nor indicated that a life sentence with[out] the possibility 

of parole could never be . . . imposed on a juvenile.” 

“Rather, Miller requires only that there be judicial 

consideration of the appropriate age-related factors set 

forth in that decision prior to the imposition of sentence.” 

And then in Batts there’s actually 14 separate factors 

that are laid out. The [d]efendant’s age [at the time he or 

she committed the crime] is the first one. [In Miller and 

its companion case], you’re talking about kids on the lower 

end. You’re talking 14-year-olds, that sort of thing.

[Appellant] was 17 years and some odd months with a 

birth date of January 22nd, 1992, so he was 17 years plus I 

think two or three months, if I remember correctly. His 
J-S43045-14

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co-Defendant had just turned 19, so they were close in 

age, [Freemore], so they were close in age.

So when you look at those cases that talk about how 

children are different and all that, the focus on those - -

what made those cases maybe more compelling factually 

was the younger age [of the defendant]. And then you got 

to look at the involvement of those juveniles. Many of 

them were more like murders in the second degree, felony 

murders that went awry, so there was a mandatory life 

sentence for that. 

[Appellant’s] conduct was totally out of the ballpark in 

terms of active participation, which is another factor that 

we’ll get to, so I don’t believe the age should be a factor 

that would militate in [Appellant’s case] of any kind of 

parole at 17 plus years.

The capacity for change, this is time to establish that. 

This is the time - - that’s another factor in Batts, in 

Miller. What’s [Appellant’s] capacity for change? I 

haven’t heard any evidence that he had demonstrated a 

capacity for change.

In fact, the argument of the Commonwealth would be 

[to] warehouse [Appellant] as long as you can because 

you’re going to [save] lives along the way by doing that as 

opposed to letting him see the light of day again, and we’ll 

get to that.

The circumstances of his crime, the extent of his 

participation, and whether he was the subject of any peer 

pressure are all kind of related to the facts of the case.

The facts of the case were summarized by Judge Vican 

when he did the original sentence on December 12th, 2011. 

On page 9 of that transcript, he said, “The horrendousness 

of this, the lack of compassion, the lack of human 

sympathy for another person I think is justified in allowing 

the [sentencing] recommendation to be imposed as it is 

given. We will issue the following Order.” It was a life 

plus sentence.

He was struck, [Judge Vican] was, as the jury was, as 

anyone who has looked at the facts of this case was, by 

the fact that there was such a long period of planning that 
J-S43045-14

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went into this. This wasn’t a conglomeration of factors 

that brought [the victim] in his circle, in [Appellant’s] 

circle, and then something went awry, and it resulted in 

the death of [the victim].

This was the plan, the plan that [Freemore] told 

Trooper Sebastianelli and Trooper Vanlouvender was to go 

ahead and get [the victim], scare him and kill him. I 

mean, that was part of it, and they wanted to do that. 

They were equal partners, and they wanted to write about 

it, and they wanted to sing a song to it.

N.T., 9/20/13, at 12-15.

The Commonwealth then recounted the facts surrounding Appellant’s 

and Freemore’s plan, and its execution, ultimately resulting in the victim’s 

death. Next, the Commonwealth referenced how, after the murder, 

Appellant “composes a song commemorating what he did, his role in it[,]” 

and how the “Commonwealth used each line of [Appellant’s] song and 

[Freemore’s] song to match it up with the physical evidence at the scene. It 

was flawless.” Id. at 17. A Pennsylvania state trooper then read the “lyrics” 

of Appellant’s rap song into the record,4and the recording was played for 

the trial court.

The Commonwealth concluded its argument as follows:

But I think the Court has received the clear intent of 

[Appellant], his level of participation, the fact that he 

wasn’t subject to peer pressure. This was something that 

he strived for, and he accomplished his designs.

____________________________________________

4 See n.2, supra.
J-S43045-14

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And in light of the fact that there’s a paucity of any of

the other factors such as capacity for change and his 

amenability for rehabilitation, I haven’t heard any of that 

established today. This was the chance for the Court to 

consider such things if they, in fact, happened.

In fact, [Appellant’s] own statements [at sentencing] 

were all about him and not a shred of remorse expressed 

for what he did to [the victim], so to talk about change. I 

ask that you impose the sentence you can, which is life 

without the possibility of parole, and those other ancillary 

charges should also run consecutive. Thank you.

N.T., 9/20/13, at 22.

In response, defense counsel stated:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Only that to address the 

capacity for change, Your Honor, [Appellant] has talked 

about how he has done at the jail. He hasn’t had any 

problems at this time. He’s still young. There’s a lot of 

room for capacity for change, and to ask that we speculate 

over what might happen over the next 30, 40, 50 years is 

asking for a bit too much.

He has not had any problems since his time in jail, and 

he talked about how he got his GED. He’s working to 

make his life better. Those to me show some signs of 

capacity to change. We won’t know for certain for a long 

time which is why I’m asking that you do not close the 

door.

Id., at 23.

After considering the arguments of counsel, the trial court stated the 

following:

THE COURT: This is probably one of the most - - well, 

we have a lot of troubling cases. But whenever you have 

someone who is a juvenile who commits this kind of an 

offense, it becomes even more troubling because you have 

to look and think what the heck happened during those 

formative years that caused this to happen.
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And I think that’s why we have decertification 

proceedings in part because it gives the Court and the 

[defendant] and the prosecution an opportunity to look at 

all those factors.

And I looked through what had been heard by Judge 

Vican, and I thought it was interesting. I looked at an 

independent psychiatric evaluation that was done and 

admitted back then, and it struck me when I was looking 

at the Batts factors that the summary in the conclusions 

of this evaluation found [Appellant] to be relatively mature 

for someone his age and intelligent. It found him to not 

have a diminished mental capacity at the time of the 

evaluation. It found him to have a moderate degree of 

sophistication. It found that he would not be rehabilitable 

- - that’s a difficult word to say - - rehabilitable in a 

juvenile court jurisdiction at that point. And all of those 

are part and parcel of what I believe Batts wants you to 

look at when you are making these decisions under the 

Miller case.

It’s clear from - - to me at least from a review of the 

file, and I had not seen the autopsy report, but I looked at 

it and saw actually the force of each of these wounds and 

what they would require and how it essentially pierced 

various organs of the [victim]. And I can only begin to 

imagine the horrific experience that [the victim] had on 

that evening and as illustrated in that song, the fear that 

he must have been feeling and the distress. It’s a crime 

that shows no compassion for life, none whatsoever, just a 

coldness and a calculation that is just beyond what you 

usually see.

I do not believe, [Appellant], that you fall into these 

categories that I’m looking at under the Miller and Batts 

decisions that I need to consider and have considered by 

reviewing this file and listening to what was said today, 

that your age at the time of the commission of this 

horrible, horrible murder was almost adulthood. You were 

very close.

And I agree with [the Commonwealth] because I looked 

at that, and I wondered what are the ages of these people 

in the other cases, and they were at the other end of the 

juvenile spectrum, not at the [sic] close to [the] adult end.
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When I look at some of the other factors they talk 

about, emotional maturity and development, peer 

pressure, you know, ability to deal with police, capacity to 

assist attorney, by the evaluation, you’re very intelligent 

and more mature than your age level would have 

indicated. I see no reason based on all of these factors to 

sentence you to anything other than what you were 

sentenced to by Judge Vican.

And although at this point in time I have the option of 

life with parole or life without parole, in my estimation, and 

after reviewing all of these factors and in addition the 

aggravating circumstance that was provided for in the PSI 

that at the time of this you were actually on juvenile 

probation when these offenses were committed, I see no 

reason to sentence you to anything other than life without 

the possibility of parole.

N.T., 9/20/13, at 23-26.

The above comments at sentencing unequivocally establish that the 

trial court did not base its decision to re-impose a life without the possibility 

of parole sentence solely on information culled from the prior decertification 

proceeding. Moreover, the trial court gave Appellant the opportunity to 

present any additional information regarding his “capacity to change,” his 

amenability to treatment, and/or his potential for rehabilitation. Other than 

informing the trial court that he obtained his GED, Appellant failed to do so. 

Finally, because the trial court had the benefit of a presentence report, we 

presume that the court was aware of relevant information regarding the 

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with any 

mitigating factors. Commonwealth v. Griffin, supra.

Citing the pre-sentence report it possessed at resentencing, the trial 

court further explained its reasoning in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:
J-S43045-14

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Because Appellant was seventeen [when he murdered 

the victim], we find that the “penological justifications for 

imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders” 

[Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2465,] were not as diminished in the 

case at bar as they are in cases where the minor 

defendant is younger.

Relatedly, we consider Appellant’s prior criminal history 

as it relates to his potential for rehabilitation. Appellant 

has a lengthy juvenile record. His involvement in the 

juvenile system dates back to a residential structure fire 

occurring on July 12, 2005. On March 23, 2006, Appellant 

admitted guilt to one count of burglary and one count of 

arson in connection with this incident, both of which would 

have been graded as felonies of the second degree if 

Appellant were an adult at the time of their commission. 

One month prior, in February of 2006, Appellant admitted 

to possessing drug paraphernalia on school property in 

August of 2005, which would have been an ungraded 

misdemeanor if Appellant had been an adult. In 

connection with these infractions, Appellant was placed at 

the Abraxas Youth Center, a residential treatment facility. 

Prior to this placement, Appellant had accumulated forty[-] 

five disciplinary infractions during the 2004-2005 school 

year. After his placement, Appellant violated the 

conditions of a subsequent term of probation by returning 

positive urine screens on three tests and receiving a 

citation for disorderly conduct. At the time of the murder 

of [the victim], Appellant was facing prosecution for 

providing false urine, a charge which was dropped in light 

of the latter, more serious charges brought against 

Appellant in the case at bar. Based on Appellant’s status 

as a repeat juvenile offender, we find he possesses a 

limited, if any, capacity for change.

The brutal circumstances of [the victim’s] death, the 

extent of Appellant’s participation therein, and the 

apparent lack of familial or peer pressure to participate 

also inform our Judgment of Sentence. The case against

Appellant contained overwhelming evidence of planning 

and lying in wait for the victim. The victim died as a result 

of a willful, premeditated plan devised by Appellant and 

[Freemore]. As articulated by Freemore to Trooper Craig 

VanLouvender, the plan, in its entirety, was “to meet him, 

scare him, kill him.” This plan was brutally executed to the
J-S43045-14

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point that the victim was savagely tortured to death by the 

two men. And although both men participated in 

delivering the numerous and fatal knife wounds, Appellant 

was the individual who laid in wait for the victim and 

delivered the initial blow, stabbing the victim in his throat. 

In Miller, Justice Breyer authored a concurrence, opining 

that the only juveniles who may constitutionally be 

sentence[d] to life without parole are those convicted of 

homicide offenses who kill or intend to kill, differentiating 

such offenders from those who were convicted of murder 

as a result of participation in a felony. In the case at bar, 

there is no indication that Appellant was anything other 

than a knowing and willing participant in the senseless, 

premeditated and horrendous slaughter of [the victim]. 

Accordingly, we find further support in ordering Appellant 

to serve a sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole.

Additionally, there is no indication that Appellant’s 

family, home or neighborhood life was so dysfunctional as 

to create an environment out of which Appellant could not 

extricate himself. Although Appellant’s attorneys [sic] 

have made several allusions to Appellant’s less than ideal 

upbringing, no demonstrative facts were ever placed on 

the record. Further, these generalized assertions were 

largely negated by Appellant’s own statement in his [presentence] report regarding his home life. “When asked to 

describe his childhood, [Appellant] responded ‘It definitely 

wasn’t bad,’ adding that ‘My parents went through their 

trials and tribulations but they got through it.” [Appellant] 

denied suffering any instances of abuse and indicated that 

all of his material and emotional needs were fulfilled.

Relatedly, there is no evidence demonstrating that 

Appellant had any past exposure to violence, other than to 

the Jugalo subculture in which he voluntarily immersed 

himself. Appellant and Freemore were both self-described 

Jugalos. At trial, Appellant described a Jugalo as an 

individual who is a fan of Psychopathic Records, a horror 

core or horror rap music label where the lyrics are based 

on murder, violence and sex. In connection with his 

identity as a Jugalo, Appellant would hang out with other 

Jugalos, listen to this music, emulate the music through 

writings of his own, and carry a butcher’s knife around in 

his back pocket. Due to the voluntary nature of these 
J-S43045-14

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activities, we do not find Appellant’s past exposure to 

violence to be a mitigating factor.

Finally, there is no indication that Appellant was unable 

to deal with police or assist his attorneys. Under Miller, a 

sentencing court must consider these factors in order to 

determine whether Appellant “might have been charged 

and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 

associated with youth . . .” At trial, Trooper James 

Wheeler testified regarding the initial police interview of 

Appellant. According to Trooper Wheeler, Appellant 

seemed calm, friendly and interested in speaking with the 

police. Trooper Wheeler assured that both Appellant and 

Appellant’s mother understood Appellant’s rights in 

speaking with him. As a further assurance, Trooper 

Wheeler allowed Appellant to consult privately with his 

mother before he endeavored to question Appellant about 

[the victim]. At some point, the line of questioning 

became “a little more in depth than first originally 

intended” and Appellant and his mother indicated their 

desire to terminate the interview. Based on Trooper 

Wheeler’s testimony regarding this exchange, and the lack 

of any other evidence demonstrating that Appellant’s youth

may have rendered him vulnerable to the police or 

prosecutors or incapable of assisting his attorneys, we do

not find these factors present mitigating circumstances.

Not all of the Batts factors militate in favor of imposing 

a sentence [of] life without the possibility of parole. Under 

Miller this Court must “consider mitigating circumstances 

before imposing the harshest penalty.” Appellant’s mental 

health and drug and alcohol history are such 

circumstances. As to his mental health history, Appellant 

[claims to have been] diagnosed bipolar and at the time of 

trial was prescribed Seroquel and lithium in connection 

with this condition. Appellant is additionally diagnosed 

with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and has been 

prescribed amphetamines since he was four years old. At 

trial, Appellant testified to crushing and snorting the 

amphetamines as opposed to ingesting the medicine 

according to the prescribed manner. The other illegal drug 

activity to which Appellant testified included the daily 

smoking of marijuana and the near daily use of 

hallucinogenic drugs such as lysergic acid diethylamide, 

psilocybin mushrooms, and dextromethorphan, an active 
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ingredient in cough suppressants. Appellant’s mother 

testified to her concern over Appellant’s drug use. Due to 

this concern, Appellant’s mother enrolled Appellant in an 

impatient drug treatment program at the Lehigh Hospital 

in January of 2009. Upon discharge from this program, 

Appellant resumed his drug use. Although this Court is 

sympathetic to Appellant’s unfortunate history, it does 

very little in the way of persuading us to impose a 

sentence anything other than life without the possibility of 

parole. These mitigating circumstances do not outweigh 

the other Batts factors analyzed above.

Because this Court gave adequate consideration to the 

relevant factors listed in Miller and thereafter in Batts, we

disagree with Appellant’s contention that we abused our 

discretion in sentencing him to life without the possibility 

of parole.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/13, at 4-8 (footnotes and citations omitted). 

After carefully reviewing the record, we concur with the trial court’s 

assessment of Appellant’s claim on appeal.

Neither the decision in Miller nor Batts categorically prohibits the reimposition of a life without the possibility of parole sentence. In Batts, our 

Supreme Court explained:

[The United States Supreme Court in Miller] did not 

entirely foreclose the imposition of a life-without-parole 

sentence on a juvenile offender; rather the majority stated 

the occasion for such a punishment would be “uncommon,” 

and, in any event, must first “take into account how 

children are different, and how those differences counsel 

against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in 

prison.” [Miller], at ___, 132 S.Ct. 2469.

***

Thus, the majority explained that its decision “mandates 

only that a sentence follow a certain process-considering 

an offender’s youth and attended characteristics–before 
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imposing a particular penalty. [Miller], at ___. 132 S.Ct. 

at 247. 

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a 

joining concurrence, opining that “[t]he only juveniles who 

may constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole are 

those convicted of homicide offenses who kill or intend to 

kill,” differentiating such offenders from those who were 

convicted of murder as a result of participation in a felony. 

Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2476. 

Batts, 66 A.3d at 291 (footnote omitted).5 

Finally, when considering “appropriate age-related factors” upon resentencing, our Supreme Court quoted with approval our discussion of 

Miller in Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 745 (Pa. Super. 2012):

[A]t a minimum [the trial court] should consider a 

juvenile’s age at the time of the offense, his diminished 

culpability and capacity for change, the circumstances of 

the crime, the extent of his participation in the crime, his 

family, home and neighborhood environment, his 

emotional maturity and development, the extent that 

familial and/or peer pressure may have affected him, his 

past exposure to violence, his drug and alcohol history, his 

ability to deal with the police, his capacity to assist his 

attorney, his mental health history, and his potential for 

rehabilitation.

Batts, 66 A.3d at 297.

____________________________________________

5 Our Supreme Court further noted that a newly enacted statute, 18 

Pa.C.S.A. section 1102.1, “applies only to minors convicted of murder on or 

after the date Miller was issued (June 25, 2012).” Batts, 66 A.3d at 293. 

Because Appellant was convicted of murder in 2011, the new statute is 

inapplicable.
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Because our review of the record readily reveals that the trial court 

considered these factors before re-imposing the sentence, we affirm

Appellant’s life sentence without the possibility of parole.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

President Judge Gantman joins the opinion.

Justice Fitzgerald files a dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/2014