Filed 10/20/22; Certified for Publication 11/16/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

NATASHA THOMPSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B307969 & B311569

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC687511

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.

The Law Office of Cliff Dean Schneider and Cliff Dean 

Schneider for Plaintiff and Appellant.

David Weiss Law, David J. Weiss, Nicholas A. Weiss, and 

Skyla L. Gordon for Defendants and Respondents.

____________________
2

Natasha Thompson sued the County of Los Angeles and 

other county defendants (the County) for removing her son, J.G., 

from her care.

The County demurred. The trial court sustained the 

demurrer without leave to amend. It found the County was 

immune from suit and Thompson failed to allege a mandatory 

duty sufficient to overcome immunity. Thompson appealed 

(appellate case No. B307969). She says she alleged a mandatory 

duty and, in the alternative, the court should have allowed her to 

amend her complaint.

The court later denied Thompson’s motion to tax expert 

witness fees. Thompson appealed this ruling (appellate case No. 

B311569).

We consolidated the two appeals for oral argument and 

opinion. We affirm.

I

J.G. is the son of Natasha Thompson and Delmas Griffin. 

On August 31, 2016, when he was four years old, J.G. fell at his 

school’s playground. The fall fractured his arm. J.G. has a 

developmental delay and was nonverbal.

Two days after the fall, J.G.’s parents took him to a doctor. 

The doctor did not diagnose the fracture as abuse by J.G.’s 

parents.

The principal at J.G.’s school called the Los Angeles Police 

Department and reported physical abuse of J.G. by an unknown 

party.

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and 

Family Services investigated J.G.’s injury. A Department social 

worker spoke to police officers, J.G.’s school principal, Thompson, 

Griffin, and J.G. The social worker reported that when she asked 
3

J.G. who injured him, J.G. pointed to Griffin, J.G.’s father. The 

social worker concluded J.G. was at risk of harm and took him 

into protective custody on September 15, 2016. The Department 

filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition.

A juvenile court found there was prima facie evidence J.G. 

was a child described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 

300 and detention was appropriate.

On December 24, 2016, a forensic child abuse expert 

reported J.G.’s injury could have been an accident.

On January 5, 2017, the juvenile court dismissed the 

petition and released J.G. to his parents.

On December 19, 2017, Thompson and Griffin sued the 

County in Los Angeles Superior Court. Only Thompson has 

appealed. For readability, we refer to the trial court plaintiffs as 

“Thompson.” 

On February 16, 2018, Thompson filed a first amended 

complaint. This complaint is not in our record. It apparently 

contained state and federal claims.

The County removed the case to federal court, where 

Thompson filed a second amended complaint. On March 11, 

2019, the federal court granted motions for summary judgment in 

the County’s favor for Thompson’s federal claims and remanded 

the remaining claims to state court.

On October 8, 2019, Thompson filed another second 

amended complaint in state court alleging two causes of action: 

negligence per se and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The County demurred.

The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed 

Thompson’s claims with prejudice. The court concluded 

Thompson did not allege a mandatory duty.
4

After the court sustained the demurrer, the County filed a 

memorandum of costs seeking $51,997.52. This figure included 

$37,315 in expert fees. The form the County used specified the 

expert fees were “per Code of Civil Procedure section 998.” That 

section permits a defendant who makes a settlement offer that 

the plaintiff does not accept to recover costs for expert witnesses 

in certain circumstances. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)

Thompson moved to tax costs. As to the expert fees, her 

motion said the fees should not be taxed for several reasons. 

Thompson did not mention Code of Civil Procedure section 998 in 

the motion.

The County opposed the motion and argued it was entitled

to fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 because it had 

made a settlement offer in federal court. In reply, Thompson 

argued for the first time that this section did not apply.

The trial court denied the motion to tax expert fees. The 

court gave two grounds for its decision. First, Thompson gave no 

legal authority to support her argument about why Code of Civil 

Procedure section 998 did not apply. Second, Thompson waived 

the argument by failing to raise it in her initial motion.

Thompson appealed the court’s rulings on the demurrer 

and the motion to tax costs.

II

A

The trial court correctly sustained the demurrer. Because 

Thompson attacks the trial court’s finding about the mandatory 

duty exception to immunity, only, we limit our discussion to this 

issue. The trial court properly found Thompson did not allege a 

breach of a mandatory duty sufficient to overcome immunity.
5

Although Thompson does not cite this provision in her 

appellate briefing, her mandatory duty argument seems to be 

about Government Code section 815.6, which says, “Where a 

public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an 

enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a 

particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury 

of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the 

duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised 

reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.”

Liability under Government Code section 815.6 may only 

be based on an enactment that creates an obligatory duty and 

may not be based on a discretionary or permissive duty. (Haggis 

v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498.) It is not 

enough that an enactment requires a public entity or officer to 

perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of 

discretion. (Ibid.)

Thompson cites a provision that does not create a 

mandatory duty. The provision comes from the state’s Child 

Welfare Services Manual of Policies and Procedure. The 

provision requires social workers to make “necessary collateral 

contacts” with people “having knowledge of the condition” of 

children subject to allegations. (Cal. Dept. of Social Services, 

Child Welfare Services Manual of Policies and Procedures (eff. 

April 8, 1994) p. 62, Div. 31, former Ch. 31-125.222 [eff. Oct. 1, 

2016, amended Ch. 31-125.22 substantially includes the same 

language].) Thompson says the County violated its duty to make 

necessary collateral contacts by not speaking to J.G.’s doctor.

We assume without deciding that the collateral contacts 

provision Thompson cites is a regulation with legal force. The 

court in Scott v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 125 
6

(Scott) found that provisions in the Manual adopted pursuant to 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 16501 and the 

Administrative Procedures Act have the force of law. (Scott, at p. 

145.) Thompson cites Scott without explaining whether the

provision at issue in her case was adopted pursuant to these 

laws. Because Thompson’s argument fails for other reasons, we 

assume the provision she cites has legal force. 

Thompson’s argument about the provision fails, however, 

because the provision is discretionary. The County must exercise 

discretion to determine what constitutes a “necessary” collateral 

contact. In other words, the County must make contacts, 

generally, but the decision to make contact with a particular 

person is discretionary. This is logical because the universe of 

people with “knowledge” of a child’s “condition” is vast. It could 

include a child’s parents, siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles, 

cousins, school bus drivers, teachers, principals, school nurses, 

classmates, friends, friends’ parents, neighbors, police officers, 

doctors, and dentists, to name a few. When the County decides 

whom to deem a necessary contact, it balances various interests: 

child safety, family preservation, and limited time and resources. 

This balancing requires the County to exercise discretion. The 

provision does not create a mandatory duty to contact particular 

individuals.

Thompson refers to a second provision, but she does not tell 

us what that regulation says, nor does she say how it creates a 

mandatory duty. She has therefore waived contentions about it. 

(See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 

852.)

Thompson cites Scott, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 125, but that 

case does not support her position. The rule at issue in Scott
7

required social workers to make monthly face-to-face contact with 

children and foster parents. (Id. at p. 138.) A social worker could 

make less frequent visits under certain circumstances, but only if 

a supervisor approved this in writing. Despite reports of abuse 

while the child was placed with the foster parent in Scott, the 

social worker did not make monthly visits, and a supervisor had 

not approved less frequent visits. The court held that monthly 

visitation was a mandatory requirement. (Id. at pp. 139, 142.) 

Scott therefore involved a specific obligation with no room to 

exercise discretion. In contrast, as we explained, the provision 

Thompson cites does not impose a clear and unequivocal 

mandatory duty because determining who is a necessary contact 

is inherently subjective and requires the exercise of discretion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

Thompson leave to amend. Thompson has the burden to 

establish a reasonable possibility she could amend the complaint 

to state a claim. (See Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 

Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) She says the determination of whether the 

collateral contacts provision created a mandatory duty is a 

factual issue and she “can likely identify more” collateral 

contacts. As we explained, the collateral contacts provision gives 

social workers discretion to determine which contacts are 

necessary. As a matter of law, it does not create a mandatory 

duty. Thompson’s assertion that she can identify other collateral 

contacts is vague and does not establish a reasonable possibility 

she can amend the complaint to state a claim. Furthermore, the 

collateral contact provision would remain discretionary even if 

Thompson were to name other contacts. The trial court properly 

exercised its discretion.
8

B

Turning to costs, Thompson waived her argument by failing 

to raise it in her motion to tax costs. On appeal, she challenges 

the expert witness fees, only. The trial court relied on waiver as 

one ground for its ruling denying Thompson’s motion to tax these 

fees. The court’s ruling was proper because the County requested 

expert witness fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

998 and Thompson did not address this section in her motion. On 

appeal, Thompson ignored the waiver ground in her opening brief 

and she filed no reply brief. We affirm on the ground of waiver. 

Because Thompson offers no challenge to this ground, we need 

not and do not address her other arguments about expert witness 

fees.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the 

Respondents.

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

GRIMES, Acting P. J. 

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 11/16/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

NATASHA THOMPSON, 

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et 

al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 B307969 & B311569

 Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC687511

ORDER CERTIFYING

 OPINION

FOR PUBLICATION

[No change in judgment]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October 

20, 2022, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. 

For good cause, it now appears that the opinion should be 

published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.

There is no change in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

GRIMES, Acting P. J. WILEY, J. HARUTUNIAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.