AEROSPACE POWER IN URBAN 

WARFARE: BEWARE THE 

HORNET’S NEST 

Peter C. Hunt 

INSS Occasional Paper 39 

Aerospace Issues and Planning Series 

May 2001 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by SAF/PA; distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

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 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

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ISBN: 0-9710900-2-5 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Acknowledgements x 

Introduction 1 

Why Should We Care? 3 

Aerospace Power and the Levels of War 7 

The Relationship Between Offense and Defense 15 

A Concept for Aerial Isolation 28 

Conclusion 35 

Notes 39 

Sources Consulted 48 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth-ninth volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). Aerospace power has emerged as a primary 

military instrument of choice in pursuing national objectives within the 

complex international security environment entering the 21st century. 

Changes in the security landscape, the dynamics of sub-theater conflicts, 

and coalition imperatives combine to place new requirements on 

aerospace operational planning and the conduct of aerospace operations 

themselves. Occasional Papers 38 and 39 address, in turn, both political 

and operational dimensions of aerospace power application today. They 

are presented both for informational and educational purposes to offer 

informed perspectives on important aspects of contemporary aerospace 

operations, to generate informed discussion and to bound productive 

debate on aerospace power in both supported and supporting roles. In 

Occasional Paper 38, Constraints, Restraints, and the Role of Aerospace 

Power in the 21st Century, Jeffrey Beene presents a comprehensive 

examination of the use of aerospace power within tightly restrained 

conflicts and suggests improvements in doctrine, training, and tools to 

more effectively employ such power within that environment. Then in 

Occasional Paper 39, Aerospace Power in Urban Warfare: Beware the 

Hornet’s Nest, Peter Hunt examines the employment of aerospace power 

in the increasingly important urban operational environment. Aerospace 

technologies and systems offer alternatives and important adjuncts to 

surface forces in the urban arena, but significant obstacles and critical 

considerations must be brought into planning for such operations. Each 

of these aspects of aerospace power demands greater thought and 

analysis, and these two occasional papers are presented to help focus that 

attention. 
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About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

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Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to 

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focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: 

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 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

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JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Interservice debates concerning urban warfare diverge along 

two paths. One approach emphasizes the role of infantry, whereas the 

second approach seeks ways to achieve operational and strategic 

objectives without large numbers of ground forces. This alternative 

approach relies on aerospace power to provide commanders with better 

intelligence, which they can use to analyze and target entities valued by 

the enemy. 

Aerospace power should emphasize those tasks that best support 

the joint force. The urban area provides aerospace power with 

advantages over surface-based counterparts, yet it introduces variables 

affecting the offense-defense relationship that should not be overlooked. 

The compression of time, space and levels of war in an urban 

environment threatens to reduce aerospace power effectiveness, much as 

it degrades the fire and maneuver of surface forces. 

Little evidence or doctrine exists concerning offensive 

aerospace power against modern, well-equipped urban defenders. An 

operational-level strategy that isolates the enemy optimizes aerospace 

power with minimum risk, but requires accurate intelligence and 

specialized munitions. The strength of urban aerospace defenses and the 

time required to achieve objectives should not be underestimated. 

Enemies defending the terrain on which they live and work tend to 

devise workarounds to defeat the most militarily capable attackers. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
x

This paper could not have been accomplished without the support and 

encouragement of my colleagues and family. I would like to thank the 

leadership of the 23rd Fighter Group “Flying Tigers,” Colonel Joe Wood 

and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Brown, for their encouragement and 

understanding as I devoted time to this project. The rare opportunity to 

conduct research while assigned to an operational flying unit enabled me 

to reach out and build bridges with a dedicated group of active duty, 

retired and contractor personnel who are addressing the difficult 

challenges of urban operations. Thanks also to another Flying Tiger, 

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Fisher, with whom I debated many of the 

issues in this paper. Finally, I thank my wife, Debbie and my children, 

Rachel, Kristen, Abby and Ryan, for their love and patience as I 

completed this paper. 
Aerospace Power in Urban Warfare: Beware the Hornet’s Nest 

INTRODUCTION

As the U.S. Armed Forces continue to debate post-Cold War roles and 

missions, a significant intellectual divide has developed concerning the 

approach to operations in urban environments. The bulk of professional 

literature on this subject deals with methods to improve the capabilities of the 

infantryman, around whom an urban force would best be structured. New 

technologies and experiments seek to provide the foot soldier with better 

communications, improved ability to fire and maneuver through the urban 

jungle, and protection from a variety of threats. 

An alternative approach to the challenge of urban environments 

emphasizes joint operational concepts that achieve operational and strategic 

objectives with minimum risk to friendly forces. This perspective "steps 

back" from a pure infantry fight and seeks the best means to influence the 

urban environment from the pre-crisis phase through conflict termination and 

transition.1

 New technologies and procedures provide friendly commanders 

with improved intelligence, enabling him to understand and shape the crisis in 

consonance with strategic goals. Based on the improved situational 

awareness, commanders can orchestrate precision strikes that use a wide 

variety of lethal and non-lethal munitions appropriate for the situation. 

This paper acknowledges the merits of both approaches, but offers no 

new ideas for infantry tactics in urban areas. Instead, it analyzes alternative 

approaches that rely heavily on aerospace power. In general, the paper focuses 

on the challenges to operational-level aerospace power planners charged with 

developing strategies appropriate for an urban environment. Specifically, the 

paper highlights enemy countermeasures that could increase risk and reduce 

aerospace power effectiveness in urban warfare. Although an urban 

environment could be the locus of a range of scenarios from peacekeeping to 

full-scale war, this examination concentrates on small-scale contingencies that 
2

pose a viable threat to U.S. military personnel, but involve less-than-vital 

national interests. Such activities referred to here as "urban warfare," 

encompass only a subset of possible urban operations. 

Several assumptions limit the scope of this paper. First, the paper 

assumes the projection of U.S. military power to an urban area outside the 

United States. The defense of U.S. cities against foreign powers, terrorists or 

other non-state actors remains a concern of defense planners, but is not 

addressed here. Second, the U.S. mission will be to attack an urban defender 

in an unfriendly nation, not to defend an ally's city against an outside force. If 

trying to defeat an enemy who has occupied a friendly city, the mission 

changes little, though the following assumption would warrant increased 

attention. Third, the scenario assumes the establishment of rules of 

engagement that are significantly more complex than those expected in other 

types of terrain, primarily due to the presence of noncombatants and a desire to 

minimize collateral damage. Finally, the paper assumes the U.S. will achieve 

air and space superiority before conducting urban warfare.2

 

The following section explores the fundamental question of why we 

should plan for urban warfare. Before committing or reprioritizing assets 

toward this mission area, one should understand the nature of the subject area 

and the implications for aerospace power. The paper then discusses the levels 

of war and the unique characteristics of the urban environment that influence 

aerospace power strategies. It next analyzes the relationship between offense 

and defense in the urban setting, to reveal salient points of note for campaign 

planners. It then presents a concept for using aerospace power to isolate the 

urban defender, and describes challenges in applying aerospace power in 

urban areas. Finally, the paper draws conclusions from the theory and 

evidence presented that can guide aerospace power planners faced with similar 

challenges. 
3

WHY SHOULD WE CARE? 

U.S. Unprepared for Urban Warfare, Analysts Caution. 

- Steven Willingham, National Defense 

Bottom Line: It's Infantry. 

- Scott E. Packard, Proceedings 

Defense periodicals published during the past five years are replete with 

articles critical of the U.S. military capability to conduct urban warfare. 

Government boards and panels have identified deficiencies in several areas, 

including training, doctrine and technology.3

 Why has this issue generated so 

much attention and how have the services responded? If the “bottom line” is 

infantry, then what role should aerospace power have in the urban 

environment? 

Several core arguments attempt to justify why this issue should be of 

interest to military planners. First, demographic shifts toward urbanization 

lead to governmental failures to provide for the needs of the expanded urban 

populace. Dissatisfaction with the status quo, potentially fueled by ethnic or 

religious tensions, leads to massive unrest and instability. Second, since urban 

areas contain key political, economic and social institutions, the U.S. and its 

allies naturally seek to defend such important interests. Third, the U.S. 

involvement in urban peace operations in the 1990's, from Somalia to Haiti to 

Bosnia, demonstrates a trend that may likely continue. A final argument 

points to the post-Cold War strategic environment dominated by the U.S. role 

in world politics, bolstered by a military without peer. Challengers to the U.S. 

military will seek to deny our technology-dependent force by "luring us into 

the cities in an attempt to mitigate our capabilities and make us fight where we 

are the least effective." 4 Such "asymmetric conflicts" challenge U.S. planners 

to avoid fighting the last war—commonly identified as Operation Desert 

Storm in 1991. 

Skeptics argue that the number of urban warfare incidents in the past 

500 years of Western warfare has actually decreased, not increased.5

 Since 

cities are valuable to someone, they prefer to avoid death and destruction in 
4

the urban area. Only when a city became a political symbol like Stalingrad, 

Manila, Seoul or Grozny was urban warfare deemed necessary by both sides.6

 

A second contrary view attributes U.S. military intervention in peace 

operations (often with urban components) to "promiscuous" foreign policy 

commitments of U.S. forces to regions of marginal interest.7

 This view holds 

that U.S. involvement in urban operations depends not just on the strategic 

environment, but on the willingness of political parties to employ the military 

instrument of power as a foreign policy tool. 

Overall, however, policymakers have downplayed the skeptic’s 

viewpoints and directed the unified commands and services to develop 

capabilities to conduct urban warfare.8

 Since military leaders normally cannot 

choose the environment in which they are ordered to operate, prudence 

dictates establishing strategies to achieve objectives in a variety of situations. 

While the joint community has made considerable progress in coordinating 

service urban warfare efforts, the lack of a single focal point within the 

Department of Defense has resulted in fragmented service programs that vary 

widely in scope.9

 Service initiatives reflect their beliefs on the urgency of the 

impending threat as well as perceptions about how the environment changes 

their roles and missions. Efforts devoted to three areas—training, doctrine, 

and technology—demonstrate how the services are addressing this challenge. 

The following section describes some of these areas, with emphasis on 

aerospace power efforts. 

Training 

If measured by the proportion of resources expended, the Marine Corps leads 

U.S. military efforts to experiment and train for urban warfare. Since the mid1990's, a series of Advanced Warfighting Experiments directed by the Marine 

Corps Warfighting Laboratory—HUNTER WARRIOR, URBAN WARRIOR 

and PROJECT METROPOLIS—have sought to understand the urban 

environment and to determine requirements to improve warfighting capability. 

Guiding their programs is the notion of a "three block war," where ground 

forces conduct humanitarian assistance on one block, peacekeeping on a 
5

second block and combat operations on a third block. Recognizing that 

overcoming small-unit deficiencies takes time, training and equipment, the 

Corps focus is admittedly tactical: "It doesn't do you any good to make the 

grand strategy of the Roman Empire if your legions can't fight, and we can't 

fight."10 

The Marines have coordinated their experiments with Navy Fleet 

Battle Experiments and the U.S. Army's Military Operations in Urban Terrain 

(MOUT) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs). Under 

the umbrella of the Army After Next project, the Army's Dismounted 

Battlespace Battle Lab has led the service's MOUT efforts to identify mission 

needs and establish MOUT training facilities at several Army posts. 

Recent U. S. Air Force experimentation with urban warfare has 

concentrated on the role of Close Air Support (CAS), as have Marine Corps 

aviation initiatives.11 The USAF special operations community has conducted 

experiments applicable to urban CAS, but most USAF programs seek to raise 

the activity above the tactical level. For example, the recent USAF-hosted 

Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment (JEFX) 2000 focused on operationallevel issues but included urban scenarios and MOUT ACTD activities as part 

of the overall environment.12 

Doctrine 

Army and Marine Corps doctrines stress that urban areas are to be bypassed 

when possible, to avoid risking long, costly battles.13 The previously 

discussed imperatives to improve urban warfare capability have resulted in 

updated Marine Corps MOUT doctrine and calls for similar Army revisions. 

Some claim that emerging technological advances and threat capabilities 

outpace the ability of doctrine to adequately guide military operations.14 A 

proposal to develop operational-level joint doctrine for urban operations 

initially encountered resistance, but should be available in the near future as 

Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations.15 

Air Force doctrine regards force application more from a "functional 

than geographic standpoint and classifies targets by the effect that destruction 
6

has on the enemy rather than where the targets are physically located."16 For 

the Air Force, urban warfare is not a new phenomenon, nor is the use of 

aerospace power in such twentieth-century conflicts. As a result, basic and 

operational-level Air Force doctrine do not address unique considerations for 

urban environments. At the tactical level, some aircraft-specific employment 

doctrine includes urban operations techniques. Additionally, emerging 

multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures for aviation in urban 

operations will provide officially sanctioned guidance for operators.17 

To the Air Force's credit, it recently initiated two projects, which, 

though not published as official doctrine, indicate a desire to understand the 

characteristics of aerospace power in urban operations. First, the USAFfunded, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) J8-sponsored Handbook for Joint Urban 

Operations represents a fast-track effort to provide a planning tool that 

describes the operational-level urban environment pending the publication of 

JP 3-06. 18 Second, a year-long RAND Corporation study culminated in the 

publication of Aerospace Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New 

Concepts,19 a comprehensive, well-balanced report on the capabilities and 

limitations of aerospace power in urban areas and possible tasks and concepts 

that can optimize aerospace power effectiveness. 

Technology 

Proposed technological solutions to the urban warfare dilemma abound. The 

JCS J8 Land and Littoral Warfare Assessment Division identified and 

prioritized mission needs unique to urban operations, leading to a 

comprehensive list of requirements. Suggested technological equipment 

includes through-wall sensors, non-LOS communications, sensor fusion 

devices, advanced vision equipment, human sensory enhancements, remote 

reconnaissance, non-lethal munitions and personal protection kits.20 Tying 

some of these capabilities together, one Army computer and communications 

program, the Situational Awareness System, attempts to "link together teams 

of 8-12 soldiers, an ideal size for the type of widely dispersed small unit 

operations that will define urban operations."21
7

By their very nature, air and space-based platforms rely upon hightechnology systems to perform functions such as Intelligence, Surveillance and 

Reconnaissance (ISR), attack and lift. Generally, aerospace technologies 

oriented toward urban warfare attempt to perform the same functions by 

extracting more information and attempting more precise strikes. The RAND 

study grouped enabling aerospace technologies into six areas: threedimensional modeling, communications and navigation systems, sensor 

technologies, sensor fusion, air-launched sensors and limited-effects 

munitions.22 Examples of such technologies include through-wall 

communications, seismic and acoustic sensors, laser-guided hand grenades and 

non-lethal weapons. Many of the proposed concepts of operations incorporate 

these technologies using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) of various sizes 

and networks of ground sensors.23

The training, doctrine and technology initiatives discussed above 

represent only some of the current efforts to address urban warfare challenges. 

One problem noted in many studies, conferences and discussions about urban 

warfare concerns the difficulty in distinguishing between the operational and 

tactical levels of war.24 The following section defines these terms and 

analyzes the characteristics of urban environments that contribute to this 

difficulty. 

AEROSPACE POWER AND THE LEVELS OF WAR 

Operational level of war: The level of war at which 

campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and 

sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters 

or areas of operations....

- Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms 

Joint doctrine defines three levels of war—strategic, operational and tactical—

which are differentiated by the level of responsibility for planning, decision 

making and execution. The operational level links strategy to tactics, so that 

resource application and phasing achieves both operational and strategic 
8

objectives. Classical military theorist Carl von Clausewitz wrote that political 

policy “permeates all military operations and, in so far as their violent nature 

will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.”25 In short, a coherent 

operational-level campaign plan requires continuous coordination with 

echelons above and below the operational level. 

Does the nature of an urban environment affect the levels of war? 

Certainly, tactical actions can have operational and strategic effects, 

particularly in urban operations. One recalls the U.S. soldier in Port Au 

Prince, Haiti in 1995, whose decision to withhold force against a threatening 

mob prevented the ignition of an already tense situation. The deaths of 

eighteen servicemembers on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993 

marked a turning point for U.S. policy in the area, leading to a rapid 

withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region. A single air-delivered bomb can 

have strategic implications, as demonstrated by the interruption of the Iraqi 

power grid during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and by the political fallout 

following the mistaken strike on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, 

Yugoslavia during NATO Operation Allied Force in 1999. 

The level of war at which effects are felt, however, must be 

distinguished from the level at which activities are planned and conducted.26 

Urban warfare creates a tension between the operational and the tactical levels 

due to the differences in air, space, and ground power capabilities introduced 

by this unique environment. In USAF doctrine, the first tenet of air and space 

power calls for centralized control and decentralized execution of air and space 

forces.27 Furthermore, command of aerospace assets should be exercised by 

an airman at the theater level, normally the Joint Force Air Component 

Commander (JFACC). For airmen, whose operational doctrine is essentially 

unaffected by terrain, the capability to control aerospace power at the theater 

level (including strategy development, targeting recommendations and tasking 

order promulgation) is primarily a function of communications. The urban 

environment creates an imbalance between control of air and ground forces: 

the JFACC's capabilities are only marginally affected by terrain, but the 
9

ground commander encounters obstacles to fire, maneuver and 

communications that degrade his ability to command large units. 

To understand operational-level challenges for both aerospace power 

and ground power, the following section examines the characteristics that 

differentiate the urban environment from other areas. The paper then analyzes 

the unique attributes of aerospace power to see how the urban environment 

affects both aerospace and ground power. 

Characteristics of the Urban Environment 

Essentially, only two characteristics of urban areas differentiate them from 

other environments: (1) complex terrain dominated by three-dimensional 

manmade structures, and (2) the presence of large numbers of non-combatants. 

Both elements vary considerably as one spans the globe: the urban core of a 

developed state often contains tall skyscrapers of concrete and glass, while a 

sprawling urban area in a lesser-developed state may consist of wood-framed 

houses in irregular patterns. Additionally, the number of civilians in urban 

areas varies by several orders of magnitude, as does their intent and capability 

to resist an enemy force. The effects of these two characteristics, however, are 

far-reaching. 

Three-dimensional terrain that includes subways, sewers, buildings 

and towers presents several challenges for opponents attempting to project 

force. First, the number and type of obstructions reduce the LOS distances in 

many situations. Small changes in location can drastically increase or 

decrease LOS ranges, since even a single structure affects the relationship. 

Beyond the impediments to visual sight, LOS restricts weapons and sensors 

that use other portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as radio 

communications, lasers, data links and infrared devices. Second, the presence 

of vertical terrain restricts vehicle and personnel movement. Streets and 

buildings that channellize surface movement form additional obstacles when 

damaged or rubbled by combat operations. Third, the complexity of the 

terrain offers numerous places to conceal personnel and equipment. 

Combined with reduced LOS ranges, this characteristic offers advantages to 
10

defenders and renders ineffective the use of some weapons designed for longrange engagements. 

The presence of large numbers of noncombatants also constrains 

military operations. To maintain domestic, international, and even target-state 

popular support for a small-scale contingency operation, U.S. planners must 

demonstrate extraordinary efforts to avoid civilian casualties. A city whose 

citizens evacuate becomes merely a new type of terrain, but in virtually all 

cases, "the people are the center of gravity."28 Although the law of armed 

conflict regards noncombatants in a city no differently from those in other 

areas, the requirement for attacking forces to observe the principles of 

proportionality and discrimination dictates restraints on acceptable collateral 

damage. The rules of engagement (ROE) may specify additional criteria that 

attackers must observe prior to expending ordnance, which delays the delivery 

of force at many levels. Finally, the desired endstate may include a restoration 

of public facilities and services, which could limit short-term desires to apply 

overwhelming firepower. 

Although an urban operation may comprise only part of a larger 

campaign, its political importance (perhaps a major reason it was not avoided), 

inherent complexity and the proportionally large amount of resources required 

to achieve theater objectives could lead commanders to designate the urban 

area itself a Joint Operations Area (JOA). As one example, the Russian 

victory over the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad took six months and cost 

over one million casualties. More recently, when combat erupted in 

Mogadishu, Somalia on 3 October 1993, the task force commander 

appropriately focused all efforts on the city fighting. The subsequent Joint 

Task Force (JTF) Commander devised a four-phased campaign plan that 

clearly defined offensive and defensive orientations with respect to tactical 

(Mogadishu) and operational (the hinterlands) areas.29 

Figures 1 and 2 compare a current JOA comprised of mostly open 

area, Operation Southern Watch in Iraq, with a notional urban area and its 
11

Figure 1: Operation Southern Watch JOA30 

Figure 2: Urban Operations JOA31
12

overlaid ground unit control measures. As discussed above, the complex 

terrain and presence of noncombatants tend to slow ground force advances. If 

the overall objective is to capture terrain, then phase lines (PL) and ground 

objectives (OBJ) in urban areas become compressed because of the time 

required to consolidate gains. The increased target density affects aerospace 

power capabilities as well; the following discussion analyzes why and how 

this affects campaign-level planning. 

Aerospace Power Attributes in Urban Warfare 

Aerospace power derives many of its capabilities from three essential 

attributes that differ greatly from surface-based power: speed, range and 

perspective. The resulting capabilities include strategic airlift, precision strike 

and multispectral ISR. How does the urban environment affect the three 

essential attributes? From a tactical viewpoint, the urban environment appears 

to blunt aerospace power. The first attribute, speed, enables aerospace 

platforms to span an entire theater in just a few hours, but it provides a less 

obvious advantage in a small urban "theater" only ten or twenty miles across. 

The difference between 100-knot, 300-knot or 500-knot platforms seems 

largely irrelevant if each can traverse a city in a few minutes. The second 

attribute, aerospace power's global range, offers seemingly fewer advantages 

when the entire area is within range of organic artillery. From a ground 

commander's perspective, artillery provides reliable fires without additional 

coordination required to deliver bomb or missile strikes. Moreover, even a 

"precision" guided 2000-pound bomb may create unacceptable collateral 

damage. Finally, aerospace power's three-dimensional perspective cannot be 

fully realized due to tall buildings and hidden defenders. Reduced LOS and 

ability to detect enemy forces renders ISR products less valuable. Viewing 

these three aerospace power attributes—speed, range and perspective—from a 

tactical perspective, however, ignores this component's role in an operational 

campaign and fails to consider the relative characteristics of aerospace and 

ground power in the urban environment. 
13

Although aerospace power capabilities may be degraded in the urban 

environment, such degradations need to be compared with those encountered 

by ground forces. First, aerospace power's speed in crossing an urban area 

dwarfs the rate of advance for ground units involved in house-to-house 

fighting. Oversimplified, an open-terrain ratio of air advance (500 miles per 

hour) to ground advance (50 mph) yields a 10:1 speed differential. Since 

aerospace power is unhindered by terrain, this ratio increases whenever a 

ground offense slows for any reason. Assuming that ground forces advance 

through a city in a day and that slow-moving aircraft cover this distance in less 

than an hour, this increases the ratio of airspeed to groundspeed to 24:1. 

While this analysis does not consider the potential objectives achieved by the 

advance ("controlling a sector" versus placing aerospace power overhead to 

"do something"), it clarifies the relative time advantage of aerospace power 

whenever surface obstacles impede movement. 

Second, the capability of a ground commander to direct fire across 

the bounds of an urban "theater" is appealing, but it ignores the impact of 

urban terrain on weapons ranges. Vertical structures limit both the azimuth 

and elevation of surface fires. In fact, both Army and Marine Corps doctrine 

acknowledge the limitations of artillery in MOUT.32 Aerospace power can 

attack urban targets from long ranges and from nearly any azimuth. As with 

ground-fired weapons, of course, the urban environment demands threedimensional delivery accuracy. To dismiss airpower in general as too "blunt" 

is premature, since desired effects and minimal collateral damage may be 

achieved with a wide range of currently available guns, bombs, and rockets. 

Third, the urban environment hinders aerospace power's perspective 

to some degree, but only for short periods of time. Space forces have the 

ability to provide continuous surveillance from above, while the movement of 

aircraft creates constantly changing angles and perspectives between the 

aircraft and the area of interest. Maneuvering "around" terrain is certainly 

easier at altitude than in urban canyons or alleyways. Among other things, an 

elevated perspective can provide ISR by solving the LOS problem, deliver 
14

fires that would otherwise be blocked by obstacles, and serve as a relay for 

data, voice and other forms of communication between air-, ground-, sea- and 

space-based platforms. 

Aside from understanding these three attributes that distinguish 

aerospace power from ground power, operational commanders must assess the 

risk of committing various types of forces to an operation. When less-thanvital interests are at stake, domestic support in the face of U.S. casualties 

remains tenuous at best. The Marine Corps recognizes both the lessons of 

history and the results of current experiments that confirm the high-risk nature 

of urban warfare. The URBAN WARRIOR series of experiments gradually 

reduced the rate of casualties to the urban attackers from about 46 percent to 

38 percent; the follow-on PROJECT METROPOLIS seeks to apply the lessons 

learned and reduce casualty rates below 20 percent.33 By defining the range of 

problems encountered by attackers, the Corps is focusing initially on doctrinal 

and tactical solutions, from which technological enhancements will follow.34

Commanders must also assess the risk posed by the urban 

environment to modern aerospace power. Absent a broad series of tactical 

experiments comparable to ground-based MOUT efforts, aerospace strategists 

must evaluate the body of knowledge resident in aerospace power theory, 

history and contemporary threat assessments. U.S. aerospace power's 

capability to locate and destroy targets has increased by orders of magnitude 

with the advent of space-based navigation systems and precision-guided 

munitions. The improvement in individual platform quality and the 

downsizing of the post-Cold War military results in a quantity of attackcapable aircraft only a fraction of that available in the last half of the twentieth 

century. Survivability of aerospace platforms becomes a critical concern, 

because sustained attrition would likely outpace the replenishment capability 

of the aerospace industry. Thus, a commander's risk-assessment concerning 

aerospace forces must define acceptable loss rates. The next section examines 

the relationship between offense and defense where aerospace forces are 
15

engaged, and presents potential countermeasures that enemies could use to 

degrade U.S. aerospace power. 

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 

The discussion of offense and defense in airpower cannot be 

divorced from an analysis of the circumstances postulated to 

exist during the employment of airpower forces. 

- John R. Carter, Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive 

According to most contemporary urban warfare scholars, the defender of 

urban terrain maintains a distinct advantage over the attacker. In a purely 

surface-based campaign without reference to terrain characteristics, 

Clausewitz provided an explanation for the defender's advantages of position

and time.35 He maintained that defense is a stronger form of war, yet it seeks a 

weaker objective—often the status quo as measured by control of terrain. 

Over the course of a campaign, Clausewitz’s proposition that "time which is 

allowed to pass unused accumulates to the credit of the defender" assumes, of 

course, that the defender is using his time wisely.36 If an enemy is defending a 

city and the elements within are of value to him, one can logically assume that 

his time will be well spent executing a tenacious defense. However, 

Clausewitz's theories failed to account for either the role of revolutionary 

military technologies such as aerospace power or for the drastically changed 

strategic landscape since the eighteenth century. The inquiry into how 

aerospace power impacts urban warfare requires a reexamination of the nature 

of offense and defense with respect to aerospace power. 

Defining aerospace power as defensive or offensive can be based on 

factors such as relative air platform position, intent to project power, or even 

the orientation of ground forces. For simplicity, this paper defines postures of 

aerospace power as follows: defensive aerospace operations are those 

conducted to deny an enemy's aerospace operations in a defined airspace. The 

defense may be active (e.g. surface-to-air missiles [SAM], antiaircraft artillery 

[AAA], or electronic countermeasures [ECM]), or passive (e.g. camouflage, 

concealment and deception [CCD], burying facilities underground, hardening 
16

shelters). Offensive aerospace operations are those conducted to exploit air 

and space (such as ISR, lift and attack) as well as counterair missions such as 

airfield attacks. Additionally, offensive operations include measures to 

counter enemy defenses, which can be categorized as active (air intercepts, 

lethal or non-lethal suppression of enemy air defenses [SEAD], ECM) or 

passive (low-visibility designs that reduce radar, visual, infrared, acoustic or 

other signatures). Note that some measures (e.g. ECM) can be defensive or 

offensive, depending on whether the intent is to deny an enemy's operation or 

to exploit the use of the environment.37

Early airpower theorists like Giulio Douhet believed that aerospace 

power is inherently offensive because the attacker can choose the time, avenue 

of approach and point of attack, while the defender, "not knowing the direction 

of attack, is compelled to spread his forces thinly to cover all possible points 

of attack along his line of defense."38 Written before the invention of radar, 

Douhet's assumption that defenders could not know the direction of attack 

downplayed the role of air defense in general and the value of cueing 

information in particular. The devastating effect of fighter aircraft and 

German flak in World War II forced airmen to reevaluate aerospace power's 

offense-defense relationship. While aerospace power could still mass effects 

from widely dispersed locations, the threat earned respect during operational 

and tactical planning. In the last several decades of the twentieth century, for 

example, fighter escort and SEAD gained prominence with the introduction of 

radar-guided SAMs and AAA. 

The projection of (and the surface-based defense against) aerospace 

power differs at the tactical and operational levels. At the tactical level, 

attackers and defenders must detect, engage and employ assets against the 

enemy. Detection includes things like radar spikes, visual pickups, or moving 

target indications on a surveillance platform. Engagement involves the target 

tracking and system manipulation required to achieve weapons and sensor 

parameters. Employment requires the delivery of an asset—deadly weapons, 

non-lethal munitions, electronic jamming, paratroopers, surveillance photos, 
17

etc—to achieve the tactical objective. At the operational level, strategists must 

observe the enemy, develop a campaign plan to achieve operational objectives, 

issue orders, and incorporate the effects of tactical actions to adjust future 

plans. Whereas tactical engagements take place over minutes or hours, 

operational planning requires both long and short-range views. The observeorient-decide-act (OODA) model of decision making and execution applies to 

both tactical and operational levels, where the speed and quality of the 

"OODA Loop" affect success as much as the ability to "act" with superior 

power projection. Of the four phases, orientation is the most important but 

also the most complex.39 

Many concepts for aerospace power in urban environments focus on 

ways to conduct offensive operations. The survivability of stealth aircraft in 

Operation Desert Storm seemed to swing the offense-defense pendulum back 

to the offense. In a sense, Iraq’s inability to detect (observe) and target 

(orient) stealth aircraft harkened back to the pre-radar era during which Douhet 

authored his theories. Experience since 1991 warns us that the pendulum 

remains situation-dependent and should be continuously evaluated during each 

campaign; the downing of an F-117 stealth fighter during NATO Operation 

Allied Force in March 1999 confirmed that ground-based defenses have the 

potential to defeat even the most sophisticated aerospace assets.40 The 

remainder of this section describe ways the urban warrior seeks to defend 

against aerospace power. 

Actively Defending the Urban Airspace 

Differences between defense of urban airspace and defense of open areas can 

be explained by the nature of the threat and illustrated by lessons of the past. 

Historically, states threatened by air attack established active air defense 

“belts” or “zones” around areas of value. The rear-area defense of military 

command posts requires forward observers to report surface and air threats, 

while a carrier battle group’s defense-in-depth involves complex and 

redundant layers of defense against surface, subsurface and air threats. 

Commanders defending cities from Berlin to Baghdad established the most 
18

effective air defenses available to them at the time. The following discussion 

examines active air defenses prior to and during actual force engagement. 

Preengagement Relationships: The ability to observe impending air 

attacks aids the defense in preparing and executing the best possible response. 

Since World War II, early warning (EW) radar has provided defenders with 

the primary means to anticipate impending air attacks. However, the use of 

EW radar is not unique to urban air defense. An important advantage, distinct 

to the urban defender who knows that aerospace power is focused on his area, 

concerns the predictability of aerospace platform routes and destinations. By 

reducing the advantage of aerospace power’s speed and range over a large 

theater, the urban defender can challenge not only air strikes, but also other 

missions such as aerial resupply. The German air bridge to resupply the Sixth 

Army at Stalingrad encountered a Russian defense that emplaced “hundreds of 

antiaircraft batteries...along the flight path, in direct line to the German radio 

beacon to Pitomnik [airfield].... In just five weeks, nearly three hundred of 

them [transports] were shot down.”41 

Enemies lacking EW radar to identify attackers can fuse available 

radar information with other indicators to provide warning. During Operation 

Desert Storm, F-117 stealth fighters attacked targets in Baghdad without 

sustaining any damage from enemy defenses. Iraqi AAA gunners anticipated 

the nightly attacks, but opened fire for only a few minutes after each bomb 

exploded. Not until several weeks into the campaign did pilots observe AAA 

prior to the aircraft reaching Baghdad. They attributed the preemptive AAA 

not to a newfound ability to observe the aircraft, but rather to Iraqi EW radar 

detection of air refueling aircraft. By correlating the location of the air 

refueling tracks with previous attacks, the Iraqis may have used timing to 

anticipate the F-117 strikes.42 On a broad scale, detection includes not simply 

the immediate tactical engagement, but also pre-strike, enroute and even 

ground sortie preparation activities. If desiring to achieve surprise, 

operational-level considerations such as package timing and composition 

should avoid predictability over the course of a campaign. 
19

When EW radar is unavailable, urban air defenders must resort to 

other means for defeating attacks. One system used by the Chechens during 

the defense of Grozny (1995-2000) demonstrates how to construct a 

rudimentary integrated air defense system (IADS). Though not oriented solely 

against air attack, the Chechens use of cellular phones and commercial 

scanners allowed them “to communicate easily with one another, ensured the 

coordination of combat operation, and allowed Chechens to listen in on 

Russian conversations.”43 In the first three years of the on-again, off-again 

battles for Grozny, the Chechens shot down three fighter aircraft and ten 

helicopters while damaging twenty-six aircraft. The Chechen air defenses, 

assessed by the Russian Air Force Chief of Staff as "very effective," operated 

without the support of a single surveillance radar.44

Force Engagement: As aerospace assets approach the urban area, the 

increased density of threats affects tactical and operational considerations. 

Even a single type of enemy countermeasure represents a potential showstopper to aerospace power employment: "the detection and neutralization of 

adversary manportable surface-to-air missiles will become increasingly 

important ...[because] these weapons could seriously impede all urban air 

operations, both rotary and fixed wing."45 

The lethality of active aerospace defense increases in proportion to 

the time attackers spend within range of threat systems. Not only is the threat 

potentially more dense (if measured by the number of systems per square mile 

or the number of possible bullets per cubic meter), but the compression of 

friendly aerospace platforms into the same urban JOA further improves the 

defense to offense ratio. The defender’s mathematical advantage increases as 

attackers approach the urban core, if overlapping threat rings defend key sites 

near the heart of a city. Particularly in this "most dangerous" urban 

environment, operational planners must determine the degree to which threat 

systems must be suppressed before tasking friendly aerospace platforms.46 

The proximity of urban targets to threat systems may force 

operational planners to increase the priority of SEAD in urban campaigns. In 
20

open terrain, targets and threats are not necessarily collocated. Fixed targets, 

such as electrical power stations or weapons storage sites, often lack point 

defenses due to the sheer number that would be required. Moving targets, 

such as the lead elements of a tank column, sometimes outpace their unit’s air 

defense umbrella. To mass effects on the target, planners and attack aircrews 

seek to avoid known threats, suppress threats when possible and kill threats 

when necessary. The compressed nature of an urban environment means that 

targets and threats often coincide, or that targets are more likely to be located 

within a threat’s lethal range. When threat ranges of ground defenses 

consistently exceed the standoff ranges of attack platforms, the importance of 

SEAD increases correspondingly. 

Active aerospace power defenses that can be used in urban areas 

include conventional systems such as AAA and SAMs as well as several 

nontraditional means. The RAND study concluded that “the primary threats 

facing U.S. air assets operating over urban terrain are likely to be shoulderlaunched SAMs, heavy machine guns, small arms and other infantry 

weapons.”47 Such threats challenged U.S. aerospace power in Panama City 

and Mogadishu. During Operation Just Cause in Panama (1991), small arms 

presented the primary threat to airpower. Thirteen fixed-wing transports 

received minor damage from small arms, while eighteen of twenty transport 

helicopters took hits.48 Four helicopters were shot down by small arms, the 

largest of which were Soviet-built 14.5 millimeter AAA guns. In Mogadishu, 

Somalia (1993), the antiaircraft weapon of choice was the rocket-propelled 

grenade (RPG), which shot down two helicopters and downed two others. The 

downings took place during periods of prolonged overflight, during which 

time the increasing density of RPG fire proved too much for the vulnerable 

aircraft.49 In Chechnya, Russian helicopters also proved vulnerable to RPGs; 

the Chechens favored RPGs because they could be used against both air and 

ground targets.50

Urban terrain limits the effectiveness of large AAA and SAM 

systems, but their presence drastically changes attackers' tactical 
21

considerations. Large-caliber AAA and radar-guided SAMs suffer from urban 

LOS difficulties, cumbersome equipment and large crews.51 However, the 

introduction of such systems, even if along the outskirts of the urban area, 

demands attention. During the 1982 Lebanon War, Israel employed an intense 

SEAD campaign against SAMs and radar-guided AAA in the Beka’a Valley, 

over which they flew enroute to targets around Beirut.52 In Grozny, the 

Chechens placed radar-guided ZSU 23-4 AAA guns in the city, and one of the 

guns shot down a Su-25 fighter aircraft attacking a nearby bridge.53 

Aside from SAMs and AAA, urban defenders may use nontraditional 

means to deny the attackers' use of air and space. Such countermeasures rely 

on low-, medium-, or high-technology devices. Low-technology items such as 

balloons have been employed across a wide range of urban areas. The Soviets 

used barrage balloons in Leningrad to interfere with attacking aircraft flight 

paths, while the threat of tethered balloons over Baghdad caused F-117 pilots 

nearly as much anxiety as the dense AAA.54 While impractical to deploy 

balloons across an entire theater at all times, the enemy can anticipate the 

attacker's requirement to overfly the urban area to achieve his objectives. An 

even simpler countermeasure than balloons was the Somali use of kites to 

counter low-flying helicopters over Mogadishu.55 

Intermediate technical applications include the use of lights and 

ECM. The sheer amount of light in urban areas may ease the general target 

area acquisition problem, but may also highlight aircraft that would otherwise 

be difficult to acquire. In World War II, defenders used searchlights to 

illuminate aircraft and provide cueing to air defense assets; similar techniques 

may be effective against platforms that are not visible on radar. Active groundbased ECM systems suffer from urban clutter and limited field of regard, but 

can nevertheless deny portions of the airspace, if only for limited times and 

sectors. False radar-threat emissions complicate a campaign-level threat 

analysis, and signals that reflect off urban structures could actually help the 

defender by obscuring the source's location. Friendly ISR capabilities have 

significant limitations against an enemy capable of jamming electronic links. 
22

The RQ-1 Predator UAV, for example, relies on a single UHF radio that is not 

equipped with frequency-hopping or secure communications.56 Commercial 

radio scanners and electronic jammers can degrade attackers' ability to 

coordinate attacks. Chechen rebels used some of these techniques,57 and the 

capability to deny data links or any portion of the electromagnetic spectrum 

could reveal the Achilles heel of high-tech attackers 

High technology countermeasures include systems like Global 

Positioning System (GPS) jammers and lasers, which are not necessarily more 

effective in urban areas than in open areas. While no current threat to spacebased GPS satellites seems imminent, the opportunity exists for interruptions 

to other components of the GPS: ground stations and data links. A competent 

enemy may be able to reduce the satellite reception capability in a certain area, 

degrading platform navigation and weapon guidance for certain systems. 

Aside from requiring a technologically sophisticated enemy, such a strategy 

would likely be implemented outside the immediate urban area. The use of 

lasers represents another high-technology countermeasure, one designed to 

defeat both manned systems and weapons sensors. Aircrews attacking an 

urban area necessarily focus their sensors on the target area and potential 

threat locations. High-powered lasers, particularly if oriented toward known 

aircraft locations, could potentially blind or incapacitate aircrew. If located 

atop buildings and fired upward, lasers present minimal risk to defenders on 

the ground. These high-tech countermeasures, along with "traditional" urban 

threats of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and AAA represent 

some of the active means to deny attacks. 

The ways that defenders employ countermeasures are as important as 

the systems themselves. For example, defensive conditioning of attackers 

through predictable firing patterns offers the potential to lure attackers into 

areas of lethal fires. Two recent enemies with Soviet-style IADS implemented 

their defenses in different manners. Though their IADS were degraded to 

different degrees, the Iraqi technique discussed above against F-117s was 
23

primarily reactive, whereas the Serbs conserved air defense assets for 

employment in unexpected ways.58 

Finally, the exploitation of the attackers' communications network 

offers ample opportunity to direct either active or passive defenses. The 

strength of U.S. ISR systems is also a vulnerability if enemy information 

warfare efforts yield useful information. Whether using captured U.S. 

equipment, organic assets or other means, the vast amount of U.S. military 

communications can seem like a sieve of information to a qualified 

interceptor. Code-breaking or monitoring nonsecure communications enables 

air defense cueing or passive defense preparations. The following discussion 

examines the often-neglected, but potentially effective passive defenses of 

urban airspace. 

Passively Defending the Urban Airspace 

While active aerospace defense projects power against attackers, passive 

defenses use other strategies to deny the offense. AAA and SAM 

effectiveness rely on the speed and quality of the defender's “OODA Loop,” 

but passive defenses interfere with the attacker’s decision cycle. If friendly 

assets can observe any point on the globe and deliver munitions precisely on 

those coordinates, need we consider enemy efforts to disrupt our capability? 

The following discussion shows that opportunities abound for passive 

aerospace defense of urban areas, by denying the attacker’s ability to properly 

observe, orient, decide and act upon available information. 

To deny theater-level observation altogether, enemies can exploit 

gaps in aerospace surveillance and reconnaissance. In the face of intense 

aerial interdiction efforts, the North Vietnamese used the cover of thick 

vegetation, night and weather to move supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.59 

Similarly, during Operation Allied Force the Serbs moved most combat 

equipment at night or under the cover of bad weather, which denied aerospace 

sensors usable information in the electro-optical (visual) and infrared 

regions.60 An enemy who determines the overflight window of nongeosynchronous satellites can plan activities during periods of minimum 
24

surveillance. In short, even the most advanced ISR systems have limits that 

determined and capable enemies can exploit. 

Another strategy to deny observation is to simply hide behind or 

beneath urban terrain, which offers numerous concealment opportunities. 

Sewers, subways and other subterranean structures present difficulties for 

aerospace sensors that cannot detect underground activity. To neutralize 

Israeli aerospace power in the Lebanon War, Palestinians maneuvered through 

the buildings of Beirut and also developed an extensive network of 

underground tunnels and trenches.61 Burying facilities underground offers the 

potential to deny detection, but defenders must take care to avoid related 

indications of activity. In Operation Desert Storm, an F-117 strike against an 

underground Iraqi command post nearly failed because the pilot could not 

identify the target. However, a large group of vehicles near the entrance to the 

facility gave away its position, and the bunker was destroyed.62 On the other 

hand, urban terrain may cover up such carelessness in an environment filled 

with vehicles, airshafts, manhole covers and the like. 

When the denial of overhead observation is not possible, passive 

defenses can degrade observation and orientation at both the operational and 

tactical levels. Classic CCD techniques have proven effective in urban 

warfare. In World War II, Germany and Britain devised elaborate schemes to 

defend cities from air attack. The famous German camouflage of Hamburg 

Harbor used painted rafts in the harbor to replicate nearby buildings, bridges 

and canals. Meanwhile, the British camouflaged factories using paint, 

landscaping and other devices. Both sides blacked out city lights at night to 

complicate target acquisition. British denial of both operational-level 

reconnaissance and tactical-level target acquisition proved generally more 

effective than the German focus on denying target acquisition alone. In fact, 

the Hamburg Harbor effort failed partly due to German “disregard for 

concealing the camouflage effort from aerial reconnaissance.”63 Poor 

camouflage offered little protection, so the Germans also distributed war 

production industries throughout numerous buildings. When the allies knew 
25

the target location, German efforts to disperse activities worked better than 

camouflage.64 

Contemporary measures to degrade aerial observation and orientation 

must account for both visual sensors and sensors that use other portions of the 

electromagnetic spectrum. Visual target identification may well be required in 

urban environments, if ROE are designed to minimize the probability of 

attacking the incorrect target. Traditional battlefield smoke generators will 

obscure activity on streets and alleyways, but vertical terrain protruding 

through the smoke prevents total target area obscuration. Even primitive 

enemies have degraded advanced U.S. electronic intelligence (ELINT) efforts. 

In Mogadishu, Somalis practiced electronic emission control and used drums, 

written orders and messengers for communication.65 Strategies used in nonurban settings have denied U.S. ELINT, infrared (IR) detection, and ground 

sensor networks. The North Vietnamese used aluminum foil to suppress 

electromagnetic emanations from engine ignition systems, shielded vehicle hot 

spots with banana leaves and bamboo and may have neutralized air-delivered 

ground sensors.66 The resources available in urban areas multiply 

opportunities for similar tactics. 

The above strategies seek to minimize observability, but an 

alternative strategy could add to large amounts of emissions inherent in urban 

areas. By overwhelming the data available to collection platforms, enemies 

can essentially “hide in the open.” Simple defensive measures to increase 

visibility require corresponding friendly efforts to observe and analyze the 

behavior. Sorting the real from the false requires significant (and not 

necessarily foolproof) resources that tend to expand rather than contract 

decision cycles.67

We Own the Night? High technology devices expand the human 

capability to observe and target enemy forces during periods of darkness. The 

most widely used system uses helmet-mounted goggles that amplify light. 

Aircrew, infantrymen and other specialists wear these Night Vision Goggles 

(NVGs) to improve night warfighting capability. In conjunction with laser 
26

designators, IR sensors and laser-guided munitions, NVG-equipped attackers 

can perform precision attack without artificial illumination. Operation Desert 

Storm demonstrated the effects of night-vision exploitation, but urban terrain 

offers defenders unique countermeasures against NVGs, laser and IR 

capabilities. 

Target-area lighting highlights enemy positions, yet it can hinder 

night weapons delivery accuracy. NVGs are designed to amplify low light, so 

a single bright light can wash out a large portion of the field of view. Even the 

most advanced aviation NVGs cannot “gain down” sufficiently to distinguish 

targets in the vicinity of city lights.68 Ironically, the World War II blackouts 

sought to deny visual acquisition, whereas illuminating city lights to full 

intensity might better deny NVG-equipped aircrews. Aircrews could opt to 

attack without NVGs, accepting reduced visual cues as the best alternative to 

unusable night-vision devices. The overall lighting situation—target area, 

moon illumination, cloud cover and ambient urban lights—could eventually 

work to the advantage of the defender, not the attacker. 

Lasers enable precision weapons delivery by providing target 

identification, ballistic ranging and warhead guidance. Attackers generally 

minimize lase time, in part to avoid detection from laser receivers. Should a 

sophisticated enemy ascertain attackers' laser codes, the potential for decoy 

laser spots and reflections off urban structures could confuse friendly sensors 

and weapons. At the operational level, laser planning must be deconflicted in 

time and space, which is particularly challenging in limited airspace with large 

numbers of laser-capable platforms. 

Finally, IR sensors and weapons rely on thermal contrast to 

distinguish targets. Just as NVGs gain down when sensing bright lights, IR 

sensors gain down when oriented towards structures that retain heat, such as 

concrete and asphalt. Depending on their locations, false heat sources can 

degrade IR sensors; more likely, however, is the potential to decoy IR 

weapons that have smaller fields of regard. Other potential countermeasures 

involve efforts to mask IR signatures through direct shielding or through 
27

indirect methods such as increasing moisture in the target area, since high 

absolute humidity reduces IR sensor range. Clever use of thermal contrast 

inherent in urban structures offers natural deception with minimum effort. In a 

worst-case scenario, a defender equipped with NVGs or IR scanners enjoys 

distinct contrasts between his target (hot aircraft with some ambient lighting) 

and cool, dark backgrounds. 

Perfect Observation and Orientation: Passive defenses against 

aerospace power may assume that attackers will observe activity and orient 

forces accordingly. In these cases, complicating attackers' decisions and 

actions can achieve defensive success. Somali warriors used noncombatants 

as shields, while infantry “hugging” tactics have denied Close Air Support in 

places like Stalingrad and Chechnya.69 These techniques capitalized on 

attackers' desires to limit collateral damage and fratricide, respectively. To 

complicate decisions to strike fixed targets, relocating noncombatants or 

cultural items to the vicinity of potential targets forces attackers to evaluate the 

legal, moral and political effects of potential collateral damage. 

In cases where attackers correctly observe, orient and decide to 

execute a plan, defenders can prevent the actions from achieving the desired 

effect. As discussed above, burying targets may deny observation altogether, 

but it has a dual purpose of protecting against most conventional aerial 

munitions. While collateral damage concerns of urban warfare strategists tend 

to dictate lower-yield weapons, buried (or hardened) targets require high-yield 

weapons to achieve the desired probability of kill. This inherent contradiction 

places aerospace planners in a dilemma not normally encountered when 

planning against targets in the open. 

In light of the potential defensive measures available in urban areas, 

what concepts should aerospace strategists consider to optimize the use of 

aerospace power? Battlespace analysis includes a threat assessment, which 

commanders use to judge the risks to friendly forces. Unless the strategic 

urgency demands immediate intervention, an indirect approach that avoids 

enemy strengths offers an alternative method to achieve objectives. 
28

A CONCEPT FOR AERIAL ISOLATION 

No single factor is more important to the attacker's success 

than isolation of the urban area.

- MCWP 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain

Several operational concepts guide the conduct of urban warfare. The 

Handbook for Joint Urban Operations describes five potential operational 

effects: Isolating (to isolate or cut off an enemy force inside an urban area 

from other enemy forces or allies), Containing (to prevent enemy forces from 

breaking out of urban areas), Reducing (to eliminate an enemy’s hold over an 

urban area), Retaining (to prevent urban areas from falling under the political 

and/or military control of an adversary), and Denying (to prevent approaching 

enemy forces from gaining control of the urban area).70 The first three effects 

are essentially offensive, while the last two are defensive. The last section 

examined ways defenders seek to retain and deny aerospace power in urban 

environments. This section considers using aerospace power for isolation, 

which for these purposes includes the containing of enemy forces. Finally, the 

paper briefly discusses concepts that use aerospace power for reducing an 

enemy in urban warfare. 

Isolation encompasses more than simply cutting off military forces, 

and the concept below should be integrated with strategies that isolate an 

enemy both physically and psychologically using all instruments of national 

power. Multinational political and economic support for an isolation strategy 

increases its likelihood of success. Furthermore, aerospace power in a 

notional urban environment represents only one component of the joint force. 

An Indirect Approach 

When direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength, Joint Force 

Commanders (JFCs) should seek an indirect approach.71 An enemy force in an 

urban area likely constitutes a source of strength that for some reason cannot 

be bypassed. Indirect attacks include “isolating (the force) from its C2, 

severing its LOCs (including resupply) and defeating or degrading its air 
29

defense and indirect fire capability.”72 Relevant aerospace power missions and 

target sets include: 1) strategic attacks on command posts and communications 

functions, 2) interdiction of roads, rails and bridges, 3) counterair strikes, and 

4) destruction of artillery and weapons storage sites. A senior U.S. Army 

officer described an alternative to direct urban assault that would “establish a 

loose cordon around the city and control the surrounding countryside. The 

cordon would eventually result in complete isolation of the enemy from the 

outside world. All avenues, including air, sea and land arteries, would be 

blocked.”73 Complete isolation might be unnecessary and counterproductive, 

however, if the resulting civilian hardships exceed the coercive value of the 

strategy on enemy decisionmakers. An advantage of the isolation concept 

over direct attack is the increased ability to control LOCs and discriminate 

between items of value to military forces or to the population at large. 

The City as an Island: 74 To help visualize the isolation concept, 

consider the similarity of a city to a defended island. Each has distinct 

physical contrasts with it surroundings and acts as a fortress that derives its 

importance from its inherent characteristics and its ability to project power. 

During the South Pacific “island-hopping” campaign in World War II, 

Generals MacArthur and Kenney bypassed islands of little strategic or military 

importance. Like cities, important islands were well defended, and challenged 

attackers who transitioned the surface boundaries. Most islands and cities 

depend on outside sources of food, fuel, raw materials, psychological security 

and other essentials that are extremely vulnerable to attack by forces 

possessing freedom of maneuver outside their boundaries.75 General 

MacArthur controlled sea LOCs and weakened islands by using air, surface 

and subsurface craft to interdict shipping. Similarly, aerospace power’s role in 

isolating a city requires air interdiction and air mobility to achieve the desired 

level of control. Unlike the World War II strategic objective of unconditional 

surrender, limited objectives of urban warfare in small-scale contingencies 

normally constrain attackers' weapons and strategies. 
30

Learning From the Russians: Recent urban warfare in Chechnya 

offers an example of an attempt at isolation. The Russian strategy in Grozny 

shifted over the course of the war, incorporating lessons from earlier mistakes. 

In the 1995 campaign, a three-pronged Russian advance into the city failed to 

encircle and secure the area, allowing Chechen fighters to escape to the 

southern mountains.76

Among other errors that trapped Russian armor in the city and led to 

their destruction, they attacked directly into the Chechen strength. In the 

January 2000 campaign, however, the Russians executed an entirely different 

approach that “surrounded the city and used an “indirect approach” that 

offered success at varying levels.”77 Avoiding frontal assaults, Russian 

reconnaissance located resistance pockets, against which artillery or airpower 

was directed. The magnitude of the Russian encirclement should not be 

underestimated: some 50,000 soldiers eventually surrounded the city.78 

In some ways, the Russian operation was more like a modern-day 

siege, which largely disregarded concerns for the lives and property of 

noncombatants. Collateral damage was widespread and firepower less than 

precise. Additionally, Russian impatience (militarily and politically) with the 

Chechen War reduced the time available for isolation to take effect. Such 

conditions of minimum ROE are unlikely to exist for US planners in smallscale contingencies. 

Fundamentals of Operational Art 

Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) employ operational art in developing 

campaigns and operations.79 Examination of the operational art elements 

reveals several considerations for planners using aerospace power to isolate 

the enemy. First, the arrangement of operations—phases, branches and 

sequels—determines aerospace power’s role over time. Figure 3 shows a 

hypothetical concept of urban operations, in which isolation plays a key role. 

Battle-space analysis enables isolation activities to shape enemy perception 

and behavior in all phases. Prior to hostilities, airborne information operations 

such as communications jamming, media broadcasting, leaflet drops and 
31 

Figure 3. Hypothetical Concept of Operations80
32

nonlethal weapons help achieve psychological isolation.81 Isolation continues 

its importance in follow-on phases such as decisive engagement, sustainment 

and transition to peace, as military and political pressures are brought to bear. 

Second, aerospace power’s operational reach—basing and lines of 

operation—affects the ability to isolate an enemy. The size and scope of an 

urban cordon determines the resources required for its enforcement. Carrier 

battle groups may establish effective cordons around coastal cities, particularly 

when combined with disembarked Marines. Expeditionary air and ground 

forces could utilize an airfield in a friendly neighboring state, but operating 

from an airfield closer to the city offers two advantages. First, the shorter 

LOCs between the airfield and the city increase on-station times for aerospace 

power. Unlike strategic attack missions against fixed targets, isolation 

missions such as reconnaissance, interdiction, information operations and air 

mobility require persistence and near-continuous presence in time-critical 

situations. While the urban defender operates on interior lines, maintenance of 

the attacker’s exterior lines requires time and logistical resupply. Second, an 

airfield takedown establishes a friendly LOC while denying the enemy the 

same, furthering the isolation effort. 

Third, JFCs use leverage—exploitation of combat power—through 

support relationships, force interactions and force protection. If ground forces 

are not committed to urban combat, aerospace power may comprise the 

preponderance of the isolation effort. The JFACC may be the supported 

commander for interdiction, while the special operations commander may 

become supported during missions such as infiltration, exfiltration or direct 

attack in the city. Force interactions seek the asymmetrical application of 

strength against weakness; the overall isolation concept minimizes the entry of 

friendly forces into the city, while luring the enemy into the open countryside. 

Finally, a key force protection issue for aerospace assets involves the 

vulnerability of aerospace power while on the ground. Mortar attacks and 

satchel charges against friendly airfields in South Vietnam destroyed a 

significant number of aircraft, and the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi 
33

Arabia reinforced this vulnerability while on the ground. The advantage of 

using airfields in close proximity to urban areas must be balanced with the risk 

of ground attack, particularly if little geographical buffer exists to give time 

for attack warning. 

Fourth, the offense’s culminating point—the point in time and space 

where the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender—

should be viewed more from a political view than from that of pure military 

strength. Militarily, isolation should allow unhindered friendly force buildup 

and gradual diminishing of enemy strength as he depletes resources. 

Politically, the domestic and international will to sustain an isolation strategy 

remains circumspect. Some argue that urban warfare creates a “time 

advantage reversal” which places the defender at a disadvantage because he 

cannot provide for his populace. This “will eventually lead to the 

displacement of the government leadership or hostile action on the part of the 

populace.”82 The mechanism by which objectives are achieved, however, 

depends on numerous factors unique to the target state. Saddam Hussein’s 

grip on Iraq a full decade after the Persian Gulf War, despite wide-ranging 

economic sanctions, military exclusion zones and political isolation, defies the 

simple logic that suffering of the citizens leads to regime replacement. 

Reducing the Enemy 

For the aerospace power advocate who views urban warfare much as 

operations on any other terrain, the central elements of strategy remain 

unchanged. With stealth technology and precision-guided munitions, the 

strategist’s challenge is largely in identifying and analyzing targets: “In 

essence, Air power is targeting, targeting is intelligence, and intelligence is 

analyzing the effects of air operations.”83 The difficulties of ground-based 

urban warfare, such as small unit operations, close-range weaponry, presence 

of noncombatants, defensive bias and absorption of manpower led one airman 

to summarize: 

Airpower, the integrated application of C4ISR and precision 

strike supported by other surface forces that impact the 
34

aerospace medium, is the only instrument of military force 

that can effectively prosecute urban warfare by shaping and 

controlling the battlespace through precise applications of 

lethal and nonlethal force that affect the tactical, operational 

and strategic levels near simultaneously. This theory 

encompasses every major aspect of this study and drives 

home the premise that airpower is the key to success in urban 

combat.84 

Thus, aerospace power's two components for reducing the enemy are 

intelligence (essentially "observe-orient-decide" or "C4ISR") and targeting 

(the "act" or "precision strike"). This paper earlier described some 

technological efforts to enable urban warfare, and it also showed how urban 

defenders can intentionally disrupt these elements. How can we stay ahead of 

this thinking enemy? To improve urban intelligence, the Handbook for Joint 

Urban Operations recommends JFCs consider five essential characteristics of 

urban areas—physical, infrastructure, commercial, residential, and socioeconomic. The handbook also describes eleven air considerations and 

planning factors, and devotes a large section to the importance of human 

intelligence.85 To ensure intelligence for urban operations is properly oriented, 

the intelligence community recently formed the Defense Intelligence Support 

to Urban Operations Working Group. Such efforts portend great benefits for 

airman reliant more than most on intelligence.86 

Targeting and munitions capabilities require adaptation for urban 

applications, primarily because of collateral damage concerns and the need for 

three-dimensional precision. Predicted Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual 

(JMEM) weapons effects apply to open terrain, but urban structures introduce 

complicating variables. To minimize collateral damage, munitions smaller 

than 500-pound bombs, such as guns available on the AC-130, A-10 and AH64 may be suitable. Additionally, the USAF is furthering development of 

selectable yield warheads, miniature munitions and non-lethal weapons.87 

Three-dimensional precision requires improvements to both munitions and 

their fuzes. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) features "selectable 

impact azimuth and direction, allowing it to transit an "urban canyon" and 
35

engage with great precision."88 Additionally, the hard-target smart fuze allows 

bombs to "penetrate a structure and detonate after passing through a 

predetermined number of open spaces, enabling precision vertical targeting by 

floor."89 In many urban situations, both of these related capabilities (smaller 

warheads and three-dimensional precision) may be required on a single 

munition. 

The concept of aerial isolation may comprise only part of a strategy 

that includes aerial attacks to "reduce" the enemy. Doctrinal guidance to 

rapidly mass aerospace power provides a psychological advantage greater than 

that obtained against dispersed forces, due to the presence of noncombatants. 

Striking at the heart of the enemy shocks not only military forces, but also the 

population on whom they depend for support. Blending the notions of 

isolation, reduction and other concepts into a joint urban campaign requires an 

indepth understanding of the enemy and an appreciation for the limitations of 

military power in achieving friendly objectives. 

CONCLUSIONS 

Finally, it must be recognized that the adversary is a 

thinking, adapting, often highly motivated independent actor 

who will do creative and surprising things to counter U.S. 

sensors, weapons, and concepts of operation. Concepts of 

operation will have to be flexible and evolve to stay one step 

ahead of such a thinking adversary. 

- Alan Vick, et al., Aerospace Operations in Urban 

Environments: Exploring New Concepts 

Until the U.S. conducts a sustained campaign against a modern urban 

defender, we must rely on theory, doctrine and fragmented historical evidence 

to draw appropriate conclusions. This paper began by examining the 

relevance of urban warfare and current efforts to address U.S. preparation for 

its conduct. At the operational level, urban environments present more 

challenges for ground commanders than for aerospace commanders, and 

service initiatives to date reflect this belief. JFCs may elect to implement an 

urban isolation strategy that minimizes risk to both ground and air forces. A 
36

review of this paper's propositions reveals the following conclusions to guide 

operational aerospace planners tasked to develop urban warfare strategies. 

Don't Underestimate the Defense 

Urban environments introduce numerous variables that complicate strategy 

development. Operational plans, wargames and campaign planning principles 

tend to focus on friendly courses of action, particularly in complex situations. 

This paper proposed that a well-equipped, intelligent defender enjoys 

increased threat system density in urban areas, along with increased 

opportunities for other active and passive defenses. Aerospace power faced 

minimal threats in Panama and Somalia, yet a single RPG triggered events that 

altered U.S. strategic policy. 

Stronger air threats over Baghdad and Belgrade failed to deter U.S. 

power, which relied upon tactical surprise achieved through undetected stealth 

aircraft. However, Operation Allied Force offers evidence that challenges the 

invincibility of modern aerospace offensives: the downing of an F-117 Stealth 

Fighter confirmed the capability of active air defense, while the Serbian use of 

passive defense measures effectively avoided detection and deceived U.S. 

forces. A balanced strategy requires detailed planning and critical evaluation 

to prevent being trapped in the "cult of the offensive."90 Attack-minded 

Americans ignore these recent incidents at their own peril. 

Assume Imperfect Intelligence 

Clausewitz's distrust of intelligence applies to aerospace power, whose 

capability to strike targets exceeds the ability to identify them. Referring to 

vast amounts of data on urban infrastructure such as streets, subways, alleys, 

structures and electrical power, some strategists claim that "more is known 

about urban areas than any other environment—and more is knowable."91 Just 

as important is that which is unknown about an urban area. If static targets like 

the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade get lost in volumes of data available for 

analysis, then dynamic, moving, time-sensitive targets present a challenge of 

tremendous proportion. 
37

Divining the capability or value of a target to enemy decisionmakers 

is one matter; divining enemy intent is quite another, though one toward which 

strategists must orient to achieve the ultimate objective, a political resolution. 

One turning point in U.S. operations in Somalia occurred well before the 

deaths of eighteen soldiers on 3-4 October 1993: 

This is the lesson of the US helicopter gunship attacks on a 

compound in Mogadishu on the twelfth of July 1993. The 

attack coincided with a meeting of some 200 leaders of the 

clan that was debating whether or not they could get him 

[Aideed] out of the country and call off the war. The 

political side of the UN operation understood what the 

meeting was about. The military side, including the United 

States, took the approach that said “we’ve got them all in 

one place at one time, and our mission is to get rid of the 

enemy. Let’s see if we can do it.” So, we had helicopter 

gunships firing missiles into this compound. Well, the result 

was that all those who came out alive were enemies, the 

moderates had disappeared, and the rest of the population 

that didn’t like Aideed suddenly rallied to his cause. It was 

now Aideed and Somalia against the Americans, the 

outsiders. The internal divisions at that point disappeared. 

We became the enemy, just as we had earlier in Lebanon, 

without even understanding how it happened.92 

Failure to understand the intent of influential leaders in this 

anarchical society backfired, and the increasing clan violence against 

Americans fundamentally changed Somali perceptions. Efforts to achieve 

“dominant battlespace knowledge” are to be applauded, but military leaders 

should highlight its inherent difficulty and prepare for consequences when the 

goal falls short. 

Isolate the Enemy 

Physically and psychologically separating the enemy from his sources of 

strength offers an indirect strategy that can precede, complement or serve as an 

alternative to a direct attack strategy. Complete political and economic 

isolation from the world community is unlikely, but a military strategy reliant 

upon aerospace power to enforce a "loose cordon" exploits the attackers 

strengths. Instead of immediately risking aerospace and ground force 
38

engagements on urban terrain, isolation seeks to draw out the enemy where 

U.S. forces can employ superior firepower and maneuver. While this battle 

offered may not be accepted, strategists should view the target state as a whole 

and pressure key nodes in other areas. 

A stand-alone strategy of isolation, even if well executed, competes 

against time. Internal workarounds, substitutes and allied support reduce 

reliance upon severed LOCs. True isolation requires worldwide support 

across all instruments of national power. As a precursor or complement to 

other urban strategies, however, isolation allows the attacker to shape the 

environment and initiate operations on his own terms. 

Train For Urban CAS 

This paper avoided detailed discussions of urban CAS, a mission for which the 

Marines train regularly and about which the USAF recently experimented in 

depth. The USAF study, based strictly on A/OA-10 capability to conduct CAS, 

concluded that current technology, weapons and tactics for urban CAS are 

generally sufficient, but gaps in training require attention.93 As this paper 

showed, planners require an analysis of urban threats to all platforms. The 

balance of survivability and effectiveness determines the size and scope of 

SEAD efforts. Furthermore, an isolation strategy may buy time for urban CAS 

training in the form of mission rehearsals and terrain study. Until multiservice 

tactics, techniques and procedures are published and internalized, urban CAS 

training will be largely performed ad hoc. Even with published guidance, the 

capability for effective urban CAS requires a higher level of training 

proficiency. 

Aerospace Power: The Force of Choice 

Despite the challenges facing aerospace power in urban warfare, U.S. political 

and military leaders are likely to view the “aerospace option” as the initial 

force of choice, primarily to minimize risk to U.S. forces. Two militarily 

organizations, the U.S. Marine Corps and the Russian military, have gradually 

recognized the relative advantage of aerospace power in urban warfare. After 

extensive study and field exercises, updated Marine Corps doctrine maintains: 
39

“In future urban warfare, aviation will be even more effective due to advances 

in fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, precision guided 

munitions, improved munitions, communications, sensors and targeting 

systems. Our battle study already indicates a trend towards more extensive 

aviation participation in MOUT.”94 After suffering high casualties from 

ground combat in Grozny, the third Russian battle for Grozny involved 

encircling the city and fewer frontal assaults. Additionally, “helicopter use 

and aviation assets of the air force were deployed much more widely in the 

2000 battle for Grozny than earlier.”95

As in any environment, national objectives and strategies in urban 

areas will drive the specific military objectives. In most cases, a strategy of 

aerial isolation offers JFCs a flexible, low risk option that can help the joint 

force achieve these military objectives. Though we may be forced to fight the 

battle we don’t want, we should attempt to tip the playing field to our 

advantage. 

NOTES 

 

1

 Norton A. Schwartz and Robert B. Stephan, “Don’t Go Downtown without 

Us: The Role of Aerospace Power in Joint Urban Operations,” Aerospace 

Power Journal 14 (Spring 2000): 3-11. Additionally, the author wishes to 

thank Colonel Rob Owen for his challenge to examine urban operations at all 

levels of war, in Robert C. Owen, “Urban Warfare in the Future: The Need for 

Balanced Inquiry,” [unpublished paper dated 15 November 1999, provided to 

author on 25 February 2000]. 

2

 The definitions from Air Force Doctrine Document 1, (Washington, DC: 

Department of the Air Force, September 1997), apply to this paper. Air 

Superiority: That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over 

another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related 

land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive 

interference by the opposing force. Space Superiority: Degree of control 

necessary to employ, maneuver, and engage space forces while denying the 

same capability to an adversary. See AFDD 1, 79, 85. Note that air superiority 

refers to the “air battle,” whereas space superiority does not limit itself to a 

“space battle.” This paper assumes that air superiority (against aircraft) has 

been achieved and maintained through missions such as air-to-air 

engagements, airfield attacks and strikes on command centers . The remaining 

threat to air superiority in the urban environment consists of surface-based air 
40

 

defenses. This paper presents considerations for operational-level 

commanders who must determine when urban air defenses create “prohibitive 

interference.” 

3

 Notable government critiques include Report of the Defense Science Board 

Task Force on Military Operations in Built-Up Areas (MOBA)," (Washington, 

DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 

1994), National Defense Panel: Transforming Defense: National Security in 

the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), and 

William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, n.p. 

available from http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/; Internet; accessed 

February 2000. 

4

 Charles C. Krulak, quoted in John G. Roos, "Changing the Heading: USMC 

Commandant Puts Training, Modernization Efforts on 21st Century Course," 

Armed Forces Journal International 135 (January 1998): 33. At the time, 

General Krulak was Commandant of the Marine Corps. Others argue that 

decisions not to capture cities (Hanoi, Baghdad, Belgrade) in recent wars have 

committed U.S forces to drawn out periods of occupation that may lead to 

growing public fatigue with peacekeeping. To bring about final resolution and 

remove a belligerent regime, the Army must prepare for urban combat in 

megacities. See William R. Hawkins, Putting Urban Warfare in Strategic 

Context, available from 

http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/99/mil_c4I_122899f_j.shtml; Internet; 

accessed 24 August 2000. 

5

 Russell W. Glenn, ed., The City's Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND 

Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference April 13-14, 1999 

(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), 159. 

6

 Scales, 160. 

7 2000 Republican Party Platform, available from 

http://www.rnc.org/2000/2000platform8; Internet; accessed July 2000. 

8

 Defense Planning Guidance: FY 2000-2005, cited in The Joint Staff, 

Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, 17 May 2000, I-1. 

9

 Peter J. Skibitski, “Draft GAO Study Criticizes Pentagon Urban Warfare 

Capability,” Inside The Navy, 7 February 2000, 2. Despite the apparent lack 

of a focal point, the defense community has established several groups tasked 

to coordinate urban operations efforts. Since May 1998, the JCS J-8 Land and 

Littoral Warfare Assessment Division’s Joint Urban Working Group (JUWG) 

has led the DOD effort. In January 2000, the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy 

and the OSD Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) formed an Urban 

Operations (UO) Cell responsible for development of an Urban Operations 

Roadmap by May 2001. In February 2000, the Joint Forces Command Joint 
41

 

Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) established an Urban Operations Branch in 

their J31 Current Operations Division. Within the Air Force, few senior-level 

“advocates” consistently represent the service position on urban warfare. Air 

Staff efforts to energize major command proponency for urban warfare have 

been largely unsuccessful. Background concerning JUWG, JAWP and JWAC 

efforts described in memorandum dated 29 February 2000 detailing minutes of 

the 17 February 2000 JAWP-UO meeting, provided to author by Chris 

Nerney, JWAC J31. Background on Air Staff efforts provided by Colonel 

Robert B. Stephan, interview by author, 24 February 2000, Arlington, VA. 

10 Gary Anderson, quoted in Skibitski, 2. Colonel Anderson is Chief of Staff 

at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. 

11 Brooks Wright, "Urban Close Air Support: The Dilemma," USAF Weapons 

Review 46 (Summer 1998): 15-19, Jon M. Davis, Urban Offensive Air 

Support: Is the United States Military Prepared and Equipped? (Quantico, 

VA: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, 

April 1995), and Floyd J. Usry, Jr. and Matthew T. Sampson, "MAWTS 1 

Urban CAS Initiatives," Marine Corps Gazette 83 (May 1999): 33-36. 

12 Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment 2000 Bullet Background Paper, 

available from https://jefxlink.langley.af.mil/mil/jefx2000/about.htm; Internet; 

accessed 28 August 2000. 

13 Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), 

(Washington, DC: Department of the Army), 15 August 1979, 1-1. Marine 

Corps doctrine is less specific on this point, but it includes a wide range of 

considerations (including risk analysis) to help commanders decide if 

attacking an urban area is warranted. See Marine Corps Warfighting 

Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 

(MOUT), (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy), April 1998, 2-1 through 

2-2. 

14 Robert B. McFarland, Jr., MOUT Doctrine and the Third World Threat in 

2005-2010: Will it Work?, (Monograph, School of Advanced Military 

Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, 

KS: First Term AY 98-99). For additional arguments for updated urban 

doctrine, see Russell W. Glenn, We Band of Brothers: The Call for Joint 

Urban Operations Doctrine (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999). 

15 At the October 1998 Joint Doctrine Working Party (JDWP) hosted by the 

U.S. Atlantic Command Joint Warfighting Center (USACOM JWFC), the U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command proposed the development of Joint 

Doctrine for MOUT. A Front End Analysis conducted by the USACOM 

JWFC Doctrine Division recommended against the development of a new 

publication, primarily because the Universal Joint Task List categorizes 

MOUT as an environment, not an operation. Instead, they recommended 

including operational-level considerations into existing JP 3-0 series doctrine. 
42

 

The Air Force representative noted that no previous urban campaigns have 

failed due to inadequate MOUT doctrine. Representatives from the nine 

unified commands, four services and the Joint Staff voted on the proposal, and 

the JDWP decided 12-2 in favor of developing MOUT doctrine. The USAF 

and USSPACECOM dissented. See A Common Perspective: USACOM Joint 

Warfighting Center Newsletter 7 (April 1999): 18. Front End Analysis and 

further background provided by Steve Senkovich, interview by author, 23 

February 2000, Suffolk, VA. Lieutenant Colonel Senkovich was the 

USACOM JWFC Doctrine Division representative responsible for the Front 

End Analysis of the MOUT doctrine proposal. 

16 Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 1. 

17 Air Land Sea Applications Center, Multiservice Procedures for Aviation 

Urban Operation (Signature Draft), March 2000. The final publication is 

expected to be released in Fall 2000. 

18 The Joint Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations (Washington, DC: 

The Joint Staff, 17 May 2000). For background on the genesis of the 

handbook, see Glenn, ed., The City's Many Faces, 404-413. 

19 Alan Vick et al., Aerospace Power in Urban Environments: Exploring New 

Concepts (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). 

20 Joint Chiefs of Staff J8, J8 Land and Littoral Warfare Division Phase I 

Urban Operations Study, Phase I Final Report, 14 January 1999, Annex A. 

21 George I. Seffers, "Power on the Front Line," Defense News, 27 July - 3 

August 1998, 19. Another experimental system, Land Warrior, equips infantry 

soldiers with personal computers, Global Positioning Satellite receivers, digital 

maps, headset radios and helmet-mounted eyepiece displays. In September 

2000, paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division tested Land Warrior 

prototypes during the Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting 

Experiment at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. See Tanya 

S. Blank, “Soldiers Testing Computers in Combat,” Fayetteville (NC) 

Observer, 17 September 2000, 1A. 

22 Vick, et al., 149. 

23 Vick, et al., 119-148. For more detail on a recently demonstrated airdeliverable ground sensor system, see David Castellon, "New Toys: Lawn 

Dart Sensor Among Wares on Display at High-Tech Demo," Air Force Times, 

21 August 2000, 28. 

24 Joint Chiefs of Staff J8, ii-iii. Additional evidence found in A Common 

Perspective, 18, and author's notes from JUWG-JAWP meeting, Institute for 

Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA, 25 May 00. 

25 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87. 
43

 

26 The Joint Staff’s Handbook for Joint Urban Operations confuses the issue. 

For example, in describing the effects of actions as strategic, operational or 

tactical, it states that “levels of command...are not associated with a particular 

level [of war].” In defining the strategic level of war, however, it notes that 

“the combatant commander is usually associated with this level of war.” See 

The Joint Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, II-7. 

27 Air Force Doctrine Document 1, 23. 

28 Robert B. Oakley, remarks to combined JUWG-JAWP meeting, Institute for 

Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA, 25 May 2000. 

29 Carl Ernst, "Mogadishu: The Operational Level," presentation at the 2000 

RAND Urban Operations Conference, Santa Monica, CA, 22-23 March 2000. 

Major General Ernst commanded Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia, established 

by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) after the tragedy in Mogadishu. 

USCENTCOM tasked JTF Somalia to provide force protection for U.S. 

troops, continue U.S. support of United Nations operations, and maintain open 

lines of communications. 

30 A. Timothy Warnock, ed., Short of War: Major USAF Contingency 

Operations (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program in 

association with Air University Press, 2000), 190. 

31 Air Land Sea Applications Center, III-6. 

32 Field Manual 90-10, 4-1 and MCWP 3-35.1, 4-4.

33 Gary Anderson, “Applying the Lessons Learned, Take 1: Project 

Metropolis,” (presentation at the 2000 RAND Urban Operations Conference, 

Santa Monica, CA, 22-23 March 2000). 

34 Ibid. Anderson outlined the following five problem areas for attackers in 

urban warfare: 1) bunching up, or "stacking" of troops, 2) mistaking speed for 

momentum, 3) failing to ensure 360 degree security, 4) incorrect actions while 

crossing danger areas, and 5) improper use of combined arms. 

35 Clausewitz, 357-392. 

36 Ibid, 357. 

37 With minor changes, these definitions use the framework established by 

John R. Carter, Airpower and the Cult of the Offensive, (Maxwell AFB, AL: 

Air University Press, 1998), 9-10. 

38 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrare (1942; new 

imprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 16. 

39 Colonel John Boyd developed but never published this OODA theory. For a 

fuller description of Boyd’s theory, see David S. Fadok, John Warden and 
44

 

John Boyd: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis, (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993). 

40 Gregory Vistica, "Seeing Through Stealth," Newsweek, 5 July 1999, 30-31. 

41 William Craig, Enemy at the Gates (New York: Readers Digest Press, 

1973), 303. 

42 F-117 pilot who flew in Operation Desert Storm, interview by author, 

Fayetteville, NC, 5 September 2000. The pilot requests anonymity. 

43 Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban 

Combat,” Parameters 29 (Summer 1999): 94. See also Theodore Karasik, 

Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare, available from 

http://www.casianalyst.org/headline1.htm; Internet; accessed 22 March 2000. 

44 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Russia's Air Power in Crisis, (Washington: 

Smithsonian Institute Press, 1999), 130. 

45 Vick, et al., 120. 

46 Rebecca A. Grant, "The Radar Game," Air Force Magazine, February 1999, 

52-60. Grant used simulations of three radar-threat environments to evaluate 

aircraft survivability and air campaign planning. The Direct Attack scenario 

was posited against a capital city in 2010 that has a modern Integrated Air 

Defense System (IADS) with overlapping SAM coverage. She concluded that 

"in this most dangerous environment, a conventional aircraft signature suffers 

from both sustained, early detection and from a gigantic spike in detections 

over the target area." Additionally, high attrition rates would force the JFACC 

to "devise an air campaign plan that focused on rolling back air defenses prior 

to launching Direct Attacks of this sort." 

47 Vick, et al., 81. 

48 Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, eds., Operation Just Cause: The 

U.S. Intervention in Panama (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 117-118. 

49 Kent DeLong and Steven Tucker, Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy. 

(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), 13. 

50 Timothy L. Thomas and Lester W. Grau, “Russian Lessons Learned From 

the Battles For Grozny,” Marine Corps Gazette 84 (April 2000): 45. 

51 Vick, et al., 80-81. 

52 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Arab-Israeli Military Balance and the Art of 

Operations, (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1987), 68-69, 

cited in J. Marcus Hicks, Fire in the City: Airpower in Urban, Smaller-Scale 

Contingencies, (Master’s thesis, Air University, School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL: June 1999), 23. 

53 Lambeth, 126. 
45

 

54 Soviet balloon countermeasures found in Leon Goure, The Siege of 

Leningrad (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962): 99. Information 

on threat of Iraqi balloons over Baghdad obtained from F-117 pilot, interview 

by author, Fayetteville, NC, 5 September 2000. 

55 The Joint Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, IV-34. 

56 Kaz Purdy, interview by author, Indian Springs Air Force Base, Nevada, 17 

May 00. Major Purdy is the 15th Reconnaissance Squadron Director of 

Operations. 

57 Thomas, Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat, 94. 

58 Department of Defense, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied 

Force After-Action Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 31 

January 2000), 65-66, available from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf; Internet; accessed July 

2000. One of the four lessons learned about countering the Yugoslavian IADS 

was the increasing importance of the enemy's air defense strategy, not just his 

available systems. See Department of Defense, 71. 

59 Eduard Mark, Aerial Interdiction in Three Wars (Washington, DC: Center 

for Air Force History, 1994), 330-371. 

60 Department of Defense, Operation Allied Force After Action Report, 62. 

61 R.D. McLaurin and Paul A. Jureidini, The Battle of Beirut, 1982 (Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, MD: U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, January 

1986): 33, cited in Vick, et al., 262. 

62 F-117 pilot, interview by author, Fayetteville, NC, 5 September 2000. 

63 Thomas Steck, Camouflage and Deception Techniques for Urban Warfare 

(Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Research and 

Development Command, October, 1980), 5-7. 

64 Ibid., 7. 

65 The Joint Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, IV-34 and Davis, 

54. 

66 Mark, 349-350. 

67 For an interesting proposition that a city’s “background noise” provides an 

excellent framework for deception, see Scott Gewehr and Russell W. Glenn, 

The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2000), 44. Gewehr and Glenn offer five other reasons why urban 

terrain amplifies the ease and effectiveness of deception: 1) Scope of 

deception is increased (more men, material and opportunities for CCD), 2) 

City is rich source of materiel resources for deception, 3) Decision making is 

hastier and generally less informed, making it more vulnerable to deception, 4) 
46

 

Enemy can use noncombatants to camouflage their presence or as “living 

decoys, and 5) Urban clutter blunts sensors and communications required for 

gathering ELINT, and difficulties corroborating it with uncertain HUMINT 

increases vulnerability to deception. See Gewehr and Glenn, 43-48. 

68 The most advanced NVG equipment used by U.S. Air Force Air Combat 

Command aircrews is the Image Intensification Set, Night Vision, AN/AVS9(V), Model F4949G. Even these advanced goggles create a “halo” around 

point sources of light, which grows in proportion to the light’s intensity. 

Personal observation of author while flying night sorties with NVGs, 13 July 

2000 and 16 August 2000, 75th Fighter Squadron, Pope AFB, NC. 

69 Numerous incidents of Somali shielding tactics are described in Mark 

Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic 

Monthly Press, 1999). For an account of Soviet hugging tactics to deny 

German CAS in Stalingrad, see Vasil I. Chuikov, The Battle for Stalingrad 

(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), 72. For Chechen hugging 

tactics to deny Russian artillery and aerial firepower, see Thomas and Grau, 

46. 

70 The Joint Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, II-10 through II-11. 

71 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint 

Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995), III21. 

72 Ibid. 

73 Robert H. Scales, Jr., “The Indirect Approach: How U.S. Military forces 

Can Avoid the Pitfalls of Future Urban Warfare,” Armed Forces Journal 

International 136 (October 1998): 74. 

74 The concept described in this paragraph is paraphrased from Robert C. 

Owen, “What a JFACC Should Know About Urban Operations,” presentation 

at the Role of Aerospace Power in Joint Urban Operations Conference, 

Hurlburt Field, FL, 24 March 1999. 

75 Owen, “Urban Warfare in the Future,” 8. 

76 Anatoly Sergeevich Kulikov, “The Chechen Operation From the Viewpoint 

of the Military Command,” presentation at the 2000 RAND Urban Operations 

Conference, Santa Monica, CA, 22-23 March 2000. General Kulikov assumed 

command of Russian forces in Grozny on 19 January 1995, shortly after the 

Chechens destroyed nearly an entire Russian mechanized brigade that reached 

the center of Grozny. He emphasized how blockading the city enabled 

enabling control, which became the heart of their strategy five years later. 

77 Thomas and Grau, 47. 

78 Ibid, 48. 
47

 

79 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations, III-9. 

80 Ibid., 6. 

81 Schwartz and Stephan, 7. 

82 Scales, 72. 

83 Philip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington, 

DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995): 20. Meilinger 

emphasizes the difficulty of selecting targets and the complexities in assessing 

strategic effects. Unlike quantifiable tactical strikes on military forces, 

strategic effects are more difficult to measure. As a source of political, 

economic, social and military power, a defended urban area offers fertile 

ground for attackers seeking strategic effects. 

84 Timothy L. Saffold, The Role of Airpower in Urban Warfare (Maxwell 

AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 1998), 25. 

85 The Joint Staff, Handbook for Joint Urban Operations, III-2 through III-11. 

The air considerations and planning factors, many of which are addressed in 

this paper, are as follows: 1) challenges of CAS and interdiction, 2) air 

navigation, 3) flight hazards such as wires, 4) ease of detecting aircraft, 5) 

reduced inflight visibility, 6) effect of lighting on NVGs, 7) comm/nav 

interference, 8) air defense threat, 9) ground security, 10) personnel recovery, 

and 11) landing zones. 

86 The formation of the intelligence working group was discussed at the 21 

June 2000 JAWP-JUWG meeting attended by the author and confirmed by the 

director of the JUWG. Vick, et al. present a comprehensive survey of enabling 

technologies and new concepts that attempt to extract better intelligence from 

the urban area through a wide range of sensors and systems. For a method to 

select urban targets, see Edward R. McCleskey, Urban Warfare at the 

Operational Level: Identifying Centers of Gravity and Key Nodes (Research 

Report, Air University, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL, 

April 1999). 

87 Robert Wall, "USAF Tackles Urban Combat," Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, 22 March 1999, 83. For a full description of limited effect 

munitions, see Vick, et al., 187-197. 

88 Schwartz and Stephan, 8. 

89 Ibid. 

90 Carter, 91. 

91 James R. Callard, "Aerospace Power Essential in Urban Warfare," Aviation 

Week and Space Technology, 6 September 1999, 110. 
48

 

92 Robert B. Oakley, Remarks to combined JUWG-JAWP meeting, Institute 

for Defense Analysis, Alexandria, VA, 25 May 2000, 10. 

93 For USAF Urban CAS, see Wright, 18. For Marine Corps initiatives, see 

Usry and Simpson, 33-36. 

94 MCWP 3-35,1, 1-16. 

95 Thomas and Grau, 47-48. Emphasis mine. 

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