UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Dillon R. SAPP

Lieutenant (O-3), U.S. Coast Guard

CGCMG 0392

Docket No. 001-69-23

23 August 2023

General court-martial sentence adjudged on 27 March 2021.

Military Judges: CDR Paul R. Casey, USCG

Appellate Defense Counsel: LT Schuyler B. Millham, USCG

Appellate Government Counsel: LCDR Daniel P. Halsig, USCG

LT Elizabeth M. Ulan, USCG

BEFORE

MCCLELLAND, HERMAN & MANNION

Appellate Military Judges

MCCLELLAND, Chief Judge:

Appellant was tried by general court-martial composed of officers. Contrary to his pleas,

Appellant was convicted of one specification of assault consummated by a battery, in violation 

of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); and one specification of conduct 

unbecoming an officer by providing false information on an application for a concealed handgun 

permit, in violation of Article 133, UCMJ. The court sentenced Appellant to forfeiture of $3,920 

per month for three months, 60 days restriction, and a punitive letter of reprimand. Judgment was 

entered accordingly.

Before this Court, Appellant has assigned the following errors:

I. The evidence is legally insufficient to prove that Appellant knowingly provided false 

information when his incomplete concealed handgun permit application was improperly 

filed by the Arlington County Circuit Court before he had signed it or attested that the 

information in the application was correct and complete under the penalty of perjury.
United States v. Dillon R. SAPP, No. 001-69-23 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

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II. The military judge abused his discretion when he permitted Ms. JB to provide an 

unsworn victim impact statement during presentencing proceedings in violation of 

R.C.M. 1001(c) when she was not the victim of an offense of which appellant was found 

guilty.

Legal Sufficiency of Article 133 Evidence

Appellant argues that because his application for a concealed handgun permit was 

incomplete, lacking his signature, it should not have been accepted for filing, and therefore he 

cannot be held liable for submitting it. He also claims that because the military protective order 

he had received did not fit a particular statutory definition of “protective order,” his answer to a 

question denying that he was the subject of a protective order was not false.

According to JB’s testimony, Appellant received a Military Protective Order on 

5 September 2019, effective until 4 December 2019, restraining him from initiating contact or 

communication with Ms. JB and directing him to remain at least 500 feet away from her. (R. at 

538-539.) Testimony of a deputy clerk at the Circuit Court Clerk’s Office in Arlington, Virginia, 

provided the following information. On 10 September 2019, Appellant presented an application 

for a concealed handgun permit at the Arlington Circuit Court Clerk’s Office, along with the 

filing fee and his military identification card or a copy of it. (R. at 651-655.) Question 8.F. on the 

application form, “Are you the subject of, or named as a respondent in a restraining order or a 

protective order?” was answered “NO.” (Pros. Ex. 11.) The application was unsigned, but it was 

received and filed. Two days later, he returned and sought to retract the application and receive a 

refund. Ultimately, an order was issued dismissing his application, but in the meantime, the 

police department had begun a background check. Ultimately, the Commonwealth Attorney’s 

office filed a recommendation that the application be denied on grounds of a protective order. (R. 

at 656-660.)

We review questions of legal sufficiency de novo. “Evidence is legally sufficient if, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing every reasonable 

inference from the evidence of record in favor of the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. 
United States v. Dillon R. SAPP, No. 001-69-23 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

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Flores, 82 M.J. 737, 742 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. 

King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)).

The specification of which Appellant was found guilty alleges that he “knowingly 

provide[d] false information on an application for a concealed handgun permit . . . .” Whether or 

not the office to which he provided the application should have accepted it without a signature, 

under their rules and procedures, has no bearing on the matter. There is evidence that he

submitted the application, which was accepted, resulting in commencement of other processes

that evidently revealed the existence of his military protective order. The submission of the 

application provided the false information, as alleged.

As to the definition of “protective order,” there is no reason to assume the definition 

Appellant identifies must be used in interpreting the question on the application form. The form 

notes that certain orders “may be an automatic disqualifier” (emphasis added), citing a particular 

statute. That statute makes it unlawful for a person to purchase a firearm if that person is subject 

to a protective order issued under any of a number of specified legal regimes. However, this does 

not mean that a protective order of a different provenance is of no relevance for the purposes of a 

concealed handgun permit. Further, it does not alter the plain meaning of the question, and of 

Appellant’s answer, which was false within that plain meaning.

The evidence was legally sufficient to support the court-martial’s finding of guilty.

Victim Impact Statement

The following is based on the testimony of witnesses Ms. JB and Dr. FR. (R. at 467-472; 

R. at 674-678.) Appellant and Ms. JB took a trip to the area of St. Petersburg, Florida, in 

September 2017. In a bar there, they encountered a college friend of hers, Dr. FR, whom she had 

not seen or talked with since college, nine years earlier. Excited, she introduced Appellant and 

Dr. FR, and then engaged in conversation with Dr. FR. She showed him something on her phone 

relating to her employment, and while he was looking at it, Appellant grabbed him by the neck 

and pushed him against the wall. Appellant was escorted from the bar, and Ms. JB followed him 

after apologizing to Dr. FR. Shocked at what had occurred, she asked Appellant why he had 
United States v. Dillon R. SAPP, No. 001-69-23 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

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done what he did, and he answered that he didn’t like the way Dr. FR was looking at her. On the 

basis of this incident, Appellant was found guilty of assault consummated by a battery.

Appellant argues, consistent with his contention at trial, that the military judge abused his 

discretion by allowing consideration of the unsworn victim impact statement of Ms. JB, when 

she was not the victim of any offense of which Appellant was found guilty.

A crime victim of an offense of which the accused has been found guilty has the right to 

be reasonably heard at the presentencing proceeding relating to that offense. Article 6b(a)(4)(B), 

UCMJ; Rule for Courts-Martial, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) (R.C.M.) 

1001(c)(1). A crime victim is defined as an individual who has suffered direct physical, 

emotional, or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of an offense of which the accused 

was found guilty. Article 6b(b), UCMJ; R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(A). R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(B) defines 

victim impact as “any financial, social, psychological, or medical impact on the crime victim 

directly relating to or arising from the offense of which the accused has been found guilty.”

A significant portion of Ms. JB’s unsworn statement describes her friendship with Dr. 

FR: that she knew him “very well during college;” that they “spent quality time together, 

working out, going on hikes, and discussing our future plans regarding what we both were 

striving for in our careers;” and that running into him after so many years was “a joyous moment 

for us” until Appellant attacked him, “altering our friendship forever.” The statement goes on to 

set forth the emotional impact on her of the offense: “To say I was shocked, humiliated and 

appalled is an understatement. There are no words to articulate the whirlwind of emotions I was 

trying to navigate at that time. I can’t imagine what Frank was thinking or feeling. I am still 

remorseful for what happened to him that night.”

Caselaw has not set limits on who can be a crime victim or the level of connection 

necessary between a purported victim and the offense, nor has there been significant legal 

development concerning the harm required. Appellant insinuates that the military judge’s 

acceptance of the harm to Ms. JB as sufficient to qualify for consideration “neglects the 

requirement that the harm be ‘direct.’ ” We disagree. We find that the harm Ms. JB described 
United States v. Dillon R. SAPP, No. 001-69-23 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. 2023)

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directly resulted from Appellant’s assault on Dr. FR, and qualifies for consideration. The military 

judge did not abuse his discretion.

Even if it were error to allow consideration of Ms. JB’s unsworn statement, it would be 

harmless error. “When the Court finds error in the admission of sentencing evidence (or 

sentencing matters), the test for prejudice is whether the error substantially influenced the 

adjudged sentence.” United States v. Edwards, 82 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (cleaned up) 

(quoting United States v. Barker, 77 M.J. 377, 384 (C.A.A.F. 2018)). “The Court considers four 

factors when deciding whether an error substantially influenced an appellant's sentence: (1) the 

strength of the Government's case; (2) the strength of the defense case; (3) the materiality of the 

evidence in question; and (4) the quality of the evidence in question.” Id. at 247 (cleaned up) 

(quoting Barker, 77 M.J. at 384). In this case, the Government argued for a sentence of six 

months confinement and dismissal, while the defense argued for a sentence of restriction and a 

reprimand. The sentence adjudged was restriction, a reprimand, and forfeitures of half pay for 

three months. We find that consideration of Ms. JB’s statement did not substantially influence 

the sentence.

Decision

We determine that the findings and sentence are correct in law and, on the basis of the 

entire record, should be approved. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence, as 

approved below, are affirmed.

Judges HERMAN and MANNION concur.

For the Court,

Sarah P. Valdes

Clerk of the Court