United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Appellant

v.

SAMAH BENSALEM,

Appellee

______________________ 

2022-1872

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No. 

92074494.

______________________ 

Decided: February 15, 2024 

______________________ 

JORGE MIGUEL HERNANDEZ, Carstens, Allen, & Gourley, LLP, Plano, TX, argued for appellant. Also represented by DAVID W. CARSTENS. 

 JEFFREY STURMAN, Sturman Law LLC, Denver, CO, argued for appellee. 

 ______________________ 

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, STOLL and CUNNINGHAM,

Circuit Judges.

CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge. 

Case: 22-1872 Document: 35 Page: 1 Filed: 02/15/2024
2 NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM

Naterra International, Inc. (“Naterra”) appeals from a 

decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

(“Board”) denying Naterra’s petition for cancellation of Samah Bensalem’s BABIES’ MAGIC TEA standard character 

mark registration. Naterra Int’l, Inc. v. Samah Bensalem, 

No. 92074494, 2022 WL 1237887, at *1, *21 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 

4, 2022) (“Decision”). Naterra challenges the Board’s conclusion that there was no likelihood of confusion between 

Naterra’s BABY MAGIC mark and Bensalem’s BABIES’ 

MAGIC TEA mark. For the reasons below, we vacate the 

Board’s denial of Naterra’s cancellation petition and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND

Bensalem owns the registration for the standard character mark BABIES’ MAGIC TEA for “medicated tea for 

babies that treats colic and gas and helps babies sleep better.” Decision at *1; J.A. 48 (Trademark Reg. No. 

4,771,300). Naterra owns four registrations for the standard character mark BABY MAGIC covering numerous toiletry goods.1 See Decision at *1. In June 2020, Naterra 

filed a Petition for Cancellation alleging that the use of

Bensalem’s BABIES’ MAGIC TEA mark in connection with 

Bensalem’s goods would likely “cause confusion, mistake, 

1 See J.A. 50 (Trademark Reg. No. 1,228,079) (body 

powder, body oil, and skin cleanser); J.A. 51 (Trademark 

Reg. No. 1,055,375) (hair shampoo); J.A. 52–54 (Trademark Reg. No. 580,657) (skin lotion); J.A. 55 (Trademark 

Reg. No. 3,890,083) (baby hair conditioner; baby lotion; 

baby oil; baby powder; baby shampoo; baby wipes; bath 

soaps in liquid, solid, or gel form; bubble bath; cologne;

laundry detergent; non-medicated bath preparations; nonmedicated diaper rash cream; non-medicated diaper rash 

ointments and lotions; skin cleansers; skin conditioners; 

and sunscreen); see also Decision at *4 (finding Naterra’s

“pleaded registrations are valid and owned by [Naterra]”). 

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NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM 3

or deception,” and is therefore in violation of Section 2(d) of 

the Lanham Act. J.A. 65 ¶ 31; see also Decision at *1; J.A. 

56–58, 63–65. 

The Board denied Naterra’s petition because Naterra

failed to prove a likelihood of confusion. Decision at *21. 

The Board conducted its likelihood of confusion analysis

under the factors set forth in In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours 

& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (CCPA 1973) (“the DuPont factors”).2 Decision at *6. First, the Board found Naterra 

“fail[ed] to carry [its] burden to clearly show [ ]that its 

BABY MAGIC mark is commercially strong, let alone famous” and the mark therefore “f[ell] somewhere in the middle of the fame spectrum” for DuPont factor five. Id. at *12; 

see also id. at *7–11. The Board found DuPont factor six to 

be neutral, and thus concluded that the BABY MAGIC 

mark is entitled to “the normal scope of protection to which 

inherently distinctive marks are entitled.” Id. at *12 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board also concluded that DuPont factor one favored finding likelihood of 

confusion because the marks were “more similar than 

2 “The thirteen factors are as follows: (1) similarity 

of the marks; (2) similarity and nature of goods described 

in the marks’ registrations; (3) similarity of established 

trade channels; (4) conditions of purchasing; (5) fame of the 

prior mark; (6) number and nature of similar marks in use 

on similar goods; (7) nature and extent of actual confusion; 

(8) length of time and conditions of concurrent use without 

evidence of actual confusion; (9) variety of goods on which 

mark is used; (10) market interface between applicant and 

owner of a prior mark; (11) extent to which applicant has a 

right to exclude others from use of its mark; (12) extent of 

potential confusion; and (13) any other established probative fact on effect of use.” Zheng Cai v. Diamond Hong, 

Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1371 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing 

DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). 

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4 NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM

dissimilar as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Id. at *15; see also id. at *12–14. The 

Board also found that DuPont factors two (similarity and 

nature of goods) and three (similarity of established trade 

channels) weighed against a finding of likelihood of confusion, concluding that Naterra had “failed to demonstrate 

that the parties’ respective goods are related in any manner, or that they travel within the same trade channels to 

the same class of purchasers.” Id. at *19; see also id. at

*15–18. Lastly, the Board found that DuPont factors four, 

eight, ten, and twelve were neutral. Id. at *19–20. 

In weighing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board

gave “particular weight” to the lack of “probative evidence 

showing the relatedness of the parties’ respective 

goods, . . . coupled with the somewhat weak inherent nature of [Naterra’s] BABY MAGIC mark, [and] the lack of 

demonstrated commercial strength (let alone fame) and 

similar trade channels.” Id. at *21. After weighing the 

pertinent DuPont factors, the Board found Naterra failed 

to prove a likelihood of confusion. See id.

Naterra appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(4)(B). 

II. Standard of Review

Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act provides the registration of a mark may be refused if it is “likely, when used on 

or in connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause 

confusion” with another registered mark. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1052(d); see QuikTrip W., Inc. v. Weigel Stores, Inc., 984 

F.3d 1031, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2021). “Likelihood of confusion 

is a question of law based on underlying factual findings 

regarding the DuPont factors.” Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 

71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). “We review 

the Board’s factual findings on each relevant DuPont factor 

for substantial evidence, but we review the Board’s weighing of the DuPont factors de novo.” QuikTrip, 984 F.3d at 

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NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM 5

1034. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Zheng Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Not all of the DuPont factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight in a given case, and any 

one of the factors may control a particular case.” Tiger Lily 

Ventures Ltd. v. Barclays Cap. Inc., 35 F.4th 1352, 1362 

(Fed. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only 

the DuPont factors of significance to the particular mark 

need be considered in the likelihood of confusion analysis.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

Naterra raises two issues on appeal. First, Naterra 

contends that substantial evidence does not support the 

Board’s finding that the similarity and nature of the goods

(DuPont factor two) and trade channels (DuPont factor 

three) disfavor a likelihood of confusion. Appellant’s Br.

13, 17; see also id. at 14–16, 18. Second, Naterra argues

that the Board erred by failing to give greater weight to the 

similarity of the marks (DuPont factor one) and the fame 

of the BABY MAGIC mark (DuPont factor five) in its overall likelihood of confusion analysis. Id. at 10–13. We address each issue in turn.

A. 

We first turn to Naterra’s arguments regarding

DuPont factors two and three. See id. at 13, 17. 

i.

The second DuPont factor “considers whether the consuming public may perceive the respective goods and services of the parties as related enough to cause confusion 

about the source or origin of the goods and services.” In re 

St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 752 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

(cleaned up) (citation omitted). Naterra argues that the 

Board failed to consider pertinent evidence indicating that 

several companies sell baby ingestible products and baby 

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6 NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM

skin care products under the same mark in concluding that

the parties’ goods were not related. Appellant’s Br. 13–15. 

In reaching the conclusion that the goods are not related, the Board rejected Naterra’s theory of relatedness

known as “umbrella branding” and “natural zones of expansion.” Decision at *16–18. In the context of discussing 

the issue of natural expansion, the Board stated that Naterra’s expert “provided several examples of other umbrella

baby brand companies that purportedly provide certain 

products in both the baby skincare product category and 

the baby ingestible product category.” Id. at *17 (cleaned 

up). The Board rejected this expert testimony as “unsupported by underlying evidence.” Id. 

However, testimony that third-party companies sell 

both types of goods is pertinent to the relatedness of the 

goods. See Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1328–29 

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding the Board erred in declining to 

consider lay evidence that several companies sell both pet 

and human food products). Furthermore, Bensalem’s counsel admitted at oral argument that the third-party evidence is “absolutely very relevant.” Oral Arg. at 15:55–

16:16, https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-1872_06062023.mp3. We cannot discern

if the Board also considered and rejected this testimony 

outside its discussion of the issue of natural expansion. 

See, e.g., Packard Press, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 227 

F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (vacating and remanding 

because the court could not “discern from the Board’s brief 

discussion” whether the Board applied the wrong test); Decision at *18 (noting an “absence of evidence showing that 

other companies in [Naterra’s] industry also sell medicated 

teas”); J.A. 134 ¶¶ 13–17. Because we cannot discern 

whether the relevant evidence was properly evaluated, we 

remand to the Board for further consideration and explanation of its analysis under this factor. 

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NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM 7

At oral argument, Bensalem’s counsel also argued that 

the Board’s conclusion on this factor at most constitutes 

harmless error. See Oral Arg. at 10:12–50. This argument

was raised for the first time at oral argument and is thus

forfeited. See SEKRI, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.4th 1063, 

1071 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Additionally, even if we were to 

consider the merits of Bensalem’s argument, we find the 

argument unpersuasive. The Board relied on the rejection 

of the third-party evidence in finding no relatedness. See 

Decision at *16, *18. Among other things, the Board further found the fact that “this case is devoid of probative evidence showing the relatedness of the parties’ respective 

goods” “carrie[d] particular weight” in arriving at the conclusion that Naterra failed to prove a likelihood of confusion. Id. at *21. Because the Board might reach “an 

answer to the overall likelihood-of-confusion question different from the answer the Board gave in the decision on 

review,” the error is not harmless. See Juice Generation

Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 

2015). 

ii.

The third DuPont factor considers “[t]he similarity or 

dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels.” In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. 

Cir. 2018) (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). Naterra argues that the Board’s finding on the third factor is not supported by substantial evidence because it ignored 

Bensalem’s admission that the parties’ goods are sold in 

similar trade channels. Appellant’s Br. 17–18; J.A. 109 ¶ 7. 

We agree.

The Board addressed some but not all of the evidence 

relevant to the third DuPont factor. For example, the 

Board found there to be “no dispute that the classes of customers for both parties’ areas of business are the same or 

overlapping (i.e., parents and caregivers).” Decision at *18. 

The Board also considered evidence that the parties’ goods 

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8 NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM

were offered together online by Walmart and Amazon, J.A. 

119–21 ¶¶ 15–16, but ultimately found the third factor to 

weigh against a finding of likelihood of confusion, indicating that “[w]ithout more persuasive evidence, we cannot 

conclude that the trade channels are the same in this case.” 

Decision at *18–19. 

However, the Board failed to address Bensalem’s response to the request for admission, admitting that both 

parties “utilize similar channels of trade in connection with 

the trademarks.” J.A. 109 ¶ 7. This request for admission

is relevant to the inquiry under the third factor. Moreover, 

the Board did not identify in its decision any evidence 

showing a lack of similarity in trade channels. Decision at 

*18–19; Appellee’s Br. 30–31; Oral Arg. at 12:27–53. Accordingly, a reasonable mind could not accept the available 

evidence as adequate to support the Board’s finding that 

the third DuPont factor weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion. See Zheng Cai, 901 F.3d at 1371. 

For the first time at oral argument, Bensalem’s counsel

similarly contends that the Board’s finding with respect to 

the third DuPont factor is at most harmless error. See Oral 

Arg. at 12:56–13:33. We again find this argument forfeited. Even if we consider this argument on the merits, it 

fails. The Board relied on the lack of similar trade channels in finding Naterra failed to prove a likelihood of confusion. Decision at *21. Because the Board might reach 

“an answer to the overall likelihood-of-confusion question 

different from the answer the Board gave” if it considered 

the admission regarding the trade channels, the error is 

not harmless. See Juice Generation, 794 F.3d at 1341. 

Accordingly, we vacate the Board’s decision and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the Board 

should consider all the relevant evidence related to the second and third DuPont factors.

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NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM 9

B. 

Naterra additionally argues that the Board incorrectly

weighed DuPont factors one and five in its likelihood of confusion analysis. See Appellant’s Br. 10–13. We address 

each factor in turn. 

i.

Regarding the first DuPont factor, Naterra does not 

dispute the Board’s finding that the BABY MAGIC and 

BABIES’ MAGIC TEA marks were “more similar than dissimilar as to appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.” Decision at *15; see Oral Arg. at 5:43–51

(Naterra conceding to “hav[ing] no issue with the Board’s 

factfinding”). Rather, Naterra contends that the Board 

erred in its weighing of this factor, arguing that it

“should—at a minimum—weigh heavily in favor of finding 

a likelihood of confusion if not be dispositive in the analysis.” Appellant’s Br. 12; see also id. at 10–11. We find Naterra’s argument to be persuasive. 

The Board erred in failing to weigh the first DuPont 

factor heavily in favor of a likelihood of confusion finding. 

Decision at *21. This court’s holding in Detroit Athletic is 

instructive, where we found that similarity of the marks

“weighs heavily in the confusion analysis” because the 

Board found that the marks’ “lead words are their dominant portion and are likely to make the greatest impression 

on consumers.” 903 F.3d at 1303–04. While the words 

“Co.” and “Club” technically differentiated the marks, the 

court found those words were merely descriptive and “unlikely to change the overall commercial impression engendered by the marks.” Id. at 1304. Similarly, here, the 

Board found that “the first two words of [the] BABIES’ 

MAGIC mark and the entirety of [the] BABY MAGIC mark 

look and sound almost the same and have the same connotation and commercial impression.” Decision at *13. Moreover, just like in Detroit Athletic, the Board here found that 

TEA is “a generic term” having “no source-identifying 

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10 NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM

significance” and “is the ultimate in descriptiveness.” Id.

at *14 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the first DuPont factor should “weigh[] heavily in the confusion analysis.” Detroit Athletic, 903 F.3d at 1303–04. The Board here erred 

in concluding otherwise. 

We decline to address Naterra’s additional argument 

that this first factor is dispositive. Because we also vacate

the Board’s decision in light of the errors with respect to

the analysis of the second and third DuPont factors, we remand to the Board to address this argument after considering all the relevant DuPont factors. See Hewlett-Packard 

Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 

2002) (explaining the likelihood of confusion analysis “considers all DuPont factors for which there is evidence of record” but may focus on dispositive factors); In re Guild 

Mortgage Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (vacating the Board’s decision and remanding for the Board to 

reconsider one of the DuPont factors and “to reconsider its 

likelihood of confusion determination in the first instance 

in light of all the evidence”). 

ii. 

Lastly, we address Naterra’s argument relating to the 

fifth DuPont factor, fame. See Appellant’s Br. 12–13. On 

this factor, the Board found there to be no evidence regarding “sales or advertising expenditures in connection with 

[Naterra’s] trademark;” no evidence regarding “critical assessments or notice by independent sources of the products 

identified by the mark;” and no evidence regarding “general reputation of [Naterra’s] BABY MAGIC mark.” Decision at *10. The Board also rejected Naterra’s Executive 

President’s testimony as self-serving and “unsupported by 

any corroborating evidence.” Id. at *10–11. Lastly, the 

Board found Naterra’s foreign registrations “d[id] not aid 

[the] determination” on fame in the United States. Id. at 

*12. Therefore, the Board did not find the BABY MAGIC 

mark “commercially strong, let alone famous,” and instead 

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NATERRA INTERNATIONAL, INC. v. BENSALEM 11

found the mark “somewhat conceptually weak” and that it 

“falls somewhere in the middle of the fame spectrum.” Id.

at *9, *12 (emphasis added). 

On appeal, Naterra does not challenge the Board’s factfinding on this factor. See Oral Arg. at 5:43–51. Instead, 

Naterra argues that the Board erred as a matter of law in

failing to give greater weight to fame in its likelihood of 

confusion analysis. Appellant’s Br. 12–13. We disagree. 

Naterra relies on Recot to argue that when present, fame 

“plays a dominant role” in the likelihood of confusion analysis. See id. But Recot is inapposite because in that case

the mark’s fame was “unquestionably established.” 214 

F.3d at 1327. Here, fame was not unquestionably established. See Decision at *12. Therefore, the Board did not 

err in failing to give fame a dominant role in the overall 

likelihood of confusion analysis. Recot, 214 F.3d at 1327. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We have considered Naterra’s remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. We conclude the Board erred 

in weighing the first DuPont factor and failed to address 

relevant evidence concerning the third DuPont factor. We 

also cannot discern whether the Board properly addressed 

relevant evidence concerning the second DuPont factor. 

Accordingly, we vacate the Board’s decision and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs awarded to appellant. 

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