Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 29A02-1603-JC-680 | November 15, 2016 Page 1 of 8

OPINION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Carolyn J. Nichols

Noblesville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of Tr.S. and N.S.

(Minor Children) and To.S. 

(Mother);

To.S. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

November 15, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

29A02-1603-JC-680

Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Paul A. Felix, 

Judge

The Honorable Todd L. Ruetz, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause Nos.

29C01-1412-JC-1444

29C01-1412-JC-1445

29C01-1412-JC-1446

29C01-1412-JC-1447

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 29A02-1603-JC-680 | November 15, 2016 Page 2 of 8

[1] To.S. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s Order Approving Permanency Plan 

and On Review Hearing,

1 which suspended parent-child visitation and other 

reunification services, modified the previous dispositional order, and changed

the permanency plan for Mother’s two youngest children, Tr.S. and N.S.

(“Children”). She raises two issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive: 

whether the trial court’s order modifying the permanency plan is an appealable 

final order. Because we conclude the order is not an appealable final judgment, 

we dismiss. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Z.S. (“Father”)2 are the parents of Tr.S. and N.S., born March 4, 

2012, and June 5, 2013, respectively.3 In November 2014, Mother and Father 

were arrested for heroin possession and drug use. The Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) became involved and removed Children from the home on 

December 1, 2014. On December 4, 2014, DCS filed petitions alleging 

Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). After a fact-finding 

 

1 The trial court issued, and Mother appeals, two separate, but identical Orders, each issued with regard to 

one of Children. For purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the Orders as one order. 

2 Father does not participate in this appeal. 

3 Mother has two other children, M.H. and B.S., from fathers different than Z.S. At the time of this appeal, 

M.H. was in her maternal grandmother’s custody and B.S. was in his biological father’s custody. On 

February 11, 2016, the trial court ordered M.H. to remain in her grandmother’s custody and B.S. to remain 

in his father’s custody, with concurrent plans of reunification with Mother for both M.H. and B.S. Mother 

does not challenge, in this appeal, the trial court’s orders with respect to M.H. and B.S. (Appellant’s Br. at 

10.)
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hearing at which Mother admitted routine illegal drug use, the court 

adjudicated Children as CHINS. On August 10, 2015, the court entered a

Dispositional Order requiring Mother and Father to participate in reunification 

services. Mother was required to participate in individual therapy, substance 

abuse assessments, random urinalysis, and home based case management 

services. Additionally, Mother was permitted weekly supervised visitation with 

Children. 

[3] On November 18, 2015, DCS filed a Motion to Suspend Visitation between 

Mother and Children, alleging Children were having negative reactions to 

visitation with Mother. On December 28, 2015, the court held a fact-finding 

hearing regarding DCS’s request to suspend visitation. DCS’s family case 

manager and Children’s therapist testified at the hearing. Children’s therapist 

testified N.S. was not eating and Tr.S. was “expressing fear” after a visit with 

Mother. (Tr. at 46.) Children’s therapist recommended visitation be 

suspended. The court suspended visitation. 

[4] On February 11, 2016, the trial court held a Permanency Hearing. It found

Mother had not complied with the Dispositional Order. It further found 

visitation between Mother and Children should remain suspended and, in the 

best interests of Children, DCS should initiate proceedings for termination of 

the parent-child relationship. Additionally, the court ordered DCS was no 

longer required to provide reunification services to Mother, with the exception 

of random drug screens. The court then ordered the permanency plan for 

Children changed from reunification to termination of the parent-child 
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relationship and subsequent adoption. The order stated, “[t]he projected date 

for finalization of [Children’s] permanency plan is July 31, 2016.” (App. Vol. II 

at 33.) The court set the case for a Permanency and Review Hearing on August 

11, 2016. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Mother appeals the trial court’s February 11, 2016, order. She contends we 

should characterize the order as a final, appealable order. In response, DCS 

argues we should dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

[6] Our authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals 

from final judgments, certain interlocutory orders, and agency decisions. In re 

D.W., 52 N.E.3d 839, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied; see also Ind. 

Appellate Rule 5 (defining cases over which Court of Appeals has jurisdiction). 

Here, Mother argues we should consider her appeal “on the merits as a direct 

appeal from a final judgment.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.)

[7] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H), a judgment is final if: 

(1) it disposes of all claims as to all parties; 

(2) the trial court in writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) 

or Trial Rule 56(C) that there is no just reason for delay and in writing 

expressly directs the entry of judgment (i) under Trial Rule 54(B) as to 

fewer than all the claims or parties, or (ii) under Trial Rule 56(C) as to 

fewer than all the issues, claims or parties;

(3) it is deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C);
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(4) it is a ruling on either a mandatory or permissive Motion to Correct 

Error which was timely filed under Trial Rule 59 or Criminal Rule 16; or 

(5) it is otherwise deemed final by law. 

[8] The trial court’s February 11, 2016, order meets none of the above 

requirements. We have repeatedly held such orders are not final appealable 

orders. See In re D.W., 52 N.E.3d at 841 (holding an order denying a mother’s 

motion for modification of a permanency plan is not a final appealable 

judgment);4 In re K.F., 797 N.E.2d 310, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a 

permanency plan ordering case to proceed with termination of parental rights 

was not a final judgment).5

[9] Mother is essentially appealing the denial of reunification services. She states

she “believes she is required to request needed reunification services at the 

earliest opportunity during the CHINS proceeding, or risk permanent waiver of 

her request for continuing and additional services.” (Appellant’s Br. at 16.) 

She contends the issue “will not be available for review in a subsequent appeal 

from the involuntary termination of her parental rights.” (Id. at 24.) Mother is 

correct that failure to provide services cannot serve as a basis for later attacking 

a termination order. See In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 

 

4 At the outset of this argument, Mother claims D.W. should not be given precedential value in her appeal 

because her “appellate process was already underway before the decision in In re D.W. was issued.” 

(Appellant’s Br. at 25.) This argument is without merit because D.W. did not create new law; it simply 

applied the long-standing rule of In re K.F., 797 N.E.2d 310, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

5 Mother urges us to rely on In re E.W., 26 N.E.3d 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), but it is distinguishable for 

reasons explained in D.W., 52 N.E.3d at 841, and we decline to revisit that analysis. 
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2015) (noting requirement for DCS to provide reasonable services was not a 

requisite element of parental rights termination statute and DCS’s failure to 

provide services could not serve as basis to attack termination order), trans. 

denied. However, Mother could challenge the trial court’s decision to terminate 

reunification services by filing an interlocutory appeal.6

 

[10] Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B) outlines the certification procedure for parties 

pursuing an appeal from an interlocutory order. It describes the time for filing a 

motion requesting certification of an interlocutory order, content of the motion, 

and grounds for granting interlocutory appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule 

14(B)(1)(a)-(c). Indeed, Rule 14(B)(1)(c)(iii) contemplates the very situation

Mother describes: that “the remedy by appeal is otherwise inadequate.”

Because Rule 14(B) provides Mother an opportunity to bring her case before us

properly, we decline to adopt her reasoning to consider this order a final 

judgment. (See Appellant’s Br. at 15 (“Mother repeats her concern that if she is 

not afforded the opportunity to appeal the court’s decision to withhold 

requested services, that this important right may forever be lost and may not be 

available for later review.”).)

 

6 Mother claims the trial court ordered her to file a Notice of Appeal and “counsel was not ordered to ‘pursue 

a discretionary interlocutory appeal.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 25.) Appellate Rule 9 outlines the different 

procedures for initiating appeals. Listed within Rule 9 are both appeals from final judgments and 

interlocutory appeals. It is counsel’s role, not the trial court’s, to assess and determine the appropriate course 

of action for pursuing an appeal under Rule 9.
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[11] Nor do we find any merit in Mother’s assertion that filing an interlocutory 

appeal is unreasonable to expect of parties because it requires counsel to make a 

“difficult decision.” (Id. at 21.) Mother argues appellants need more than 

thirty days to examine the record and “make informed, sound decisions 

regarding the issues to be raised on appeal, and on the propriety of pursuing 

interlocutory certification over a blind, hasty filing of a Notice of Appeal.” (Id.

at 29.) We disagree that an appellant would need to undergo such an analysis

to file a notice of appeal. An appellant merely needs to determine what kind of 

order he or she is appealing – a final judgment or an interlocutory order – and 

proceed accordingly under Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A). If an appellant is 

unsure, he or she could err on the side of caution and request certification. We

therefore are not persuaded by Mother’s claim that determining what type of 

appeal to file is a difficult decision requiring more than thirty days.7

 

7 Mother also argues for a change in the law. Mother contends “the decisions in In re K.F. and In re D.W. 

should not be permitted to conflict with the parents’ right to receive and request appropriate reunification 

services” and therefore K.F. and D.W. “should be modified or overruled.” (Appellant’s Br. at 31-32.) She 

reasons “[i]f parents are required to seek out and request reunification services, parents must also have the 

right to immediate appellate review, in the event such requests are denied.” (Id. at 32.) Furthermore, she 

contends in light of DCS’s right to certain expedited interlocutory appeals under Indiana Appellate Rule 

14.1, “there must be a corresponding right of a parent” to file similar appeals. (Id. at 32-33). To the extent 

Mother wants a change of the controlling statutes or appellate rule, that is not our function. See Moore v. 

State, 949 N.E.2d 343, 345 (Ind. 2011) (“The judicial function is to apply the laws as enacted by the 

legislature.”); T.B. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is not the 

proper function of this court to ignore the clear language of a statute and, in effect, rewrite the statute in order 

to render it consistent with a particular view of sound public policy.”), trans. denied. Mother’s argument she 

“must also have access to immediate appellate review,” (Appellant’s Br. at 32), should have been made in a 

motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal. This argument is not grounds for characterizing the trial 

court’s order as a final, appealable order. 
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[12] We agree with DCS that Mother is essentially “pre-appealing” a possible 

judgment terminating her parental rights. (Appellee’s Br. at 9.) As DCS 

correctly points out, at the time of this appeal, Mother still had the full 

opportunity to seek services and demonstrate to the trial court at her next 

hearing that she was making progress.

[13] Because Mother has not followed the proper procedure to seek a discretionary 

interlocutory appeal, we lack subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we 

dismiss. See K.F., 797 N.E.2d at 315 (finding Court of Appeals lacked 

jurisdiction where parents appealed from permanency plan order without 

proceeding under Indiana Appellate Rule 14). 

[14] Dismissed. 

Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.