". UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

### FILED WITH THE FORTHE DISTRICT OFCOLUMBIA

# ~;:~ MASHOUR ABDULLAH MUQBEL ALSABRI 

### et al., Petitioners, Civil Action No.: 06-1767 (RMU)
v. Re Document No.: 1 BARACK OBAMA 

### etal., Respondents. MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING THE PETITION FORAWRIT OFHABEAS CORPUS I. INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the court on the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus filed by MashourAbdullah Muqbel Alsabri (lSN 324) ("the petitioner"), a Yemeni national detained at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ("GTMO"). The government maintains that the petitioner was part ofand provided material support to the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces and is therefore lawfully detained. The petitioner asserts that he was neitherpart ofnor supported those forces andthat the court should therefore directthe governmentto release him from custody immediately. In November2010, the courtheld a merits hearing addressing the legality ofthe petitioner's detention. During the course ofthat hearing, which spanned four days, the parties introduced dozens ofexhibits concerning the petitioner's allegedrole in the Taliban and alQaida, including interrogationreports reflecting statements made by the petitioner and other GTMO detainees, declarations ofintelligence officials and translations ofdocuments purportedly seized from al-Qaida and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan.

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### S@@M'f As discussed below, the government has established by a preponderance ofthe evidence thatthe petitionertraveled from Yemen to Afghanistan in 2000 to fight withthe Taliban, alQaida or associated forces, stayed inTaliban and al-Qaida guesthouses, sought out and received military-style training from the Taliban oral-Qaida, traveled to the battle lines in Afghanistan as part ofthe Taliban or al-Qaida and remained part ofthose forces at the time ofhis capture in early 2002. Thus, based onthetotality ofthe evidence, the court is compelledto conclude that the petitioner was part ofthe Taliban, al-Qaidaorassociated forces and is therefore lawfully detained. Accordingly, the petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus mustbe denied.


### II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Overview Thepetitioner is a thirty-fouryearold Yemeni national who was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabiato Yemeni parents. GE 1 at 1 GE 3 at 1. I He attended school in Saudi Arabia until approximately the ninth grade, whenhe dropped out and began working oddjobs, including driving ataxi. GE 1 at 2; GE 3 at 1; GE 10 at 1. During this period, the petitioner became acquainted with a Yemeni man named GE 10 at**l~** GE 43 at 1, a fonner mujahaddin in Bosnia, PE 115 at 2, who would later introduce the petitioner to variousjihadists and members ofal-Qaida, 

### see infra Part IV.B.l.a. In late 1998, Saudi authorities arrestedthe petitioner for allegedly harboring an individual wanted for passport forgery. GE 1 at**2~** GE 3 at**1~** GE 9 at 1. After a month-long stay in a Saudi jail, the petitioner was deported to Yemen, his country ofcitizenship. GE 1at**2~** GE 3 at 2. The

Citations to "GE_"refer to the exhibits introduced by the governmentduring the merits hearing, while citations to "PE

__"referto the exhibits introduced by the petitionerduring the merits hearing. 

### 2 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**SECJU~'f** 

### petitioner was barred from returning to Saudi Arabia for a period offive years. GE 1at 2; GE 2 at 

### 2. After arriving in Sana'a, Yemen from Saudi Arabia, the petitioner contacted and met with

_ GE 3 at 2-3; GE 

### 10 at 

### 1; GE 43 at 

### 1. The petitioner spent a few days in Sana'a before traveling to the city ofTa'iz, GE 3 at 2-3; GE 10 at 1, where he remained for several weeks, living with extended family and working in the honey trade, GE 1

### at 3; GE 3 at 3; GE 

### 10 at 1. 

### While in Ta'iz, the petitioner's uncletaught him howto use an AK-47 and a pistol. GE 3 at 5. During this period in Ta'iz,the petitioner became acquainted with a twenty-five year old Saudi man named GE 

### 1at 3; GE 

### 10 at 2.• had received military training from the Taliban and had fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan two years earlier. GE 1at 3; GE 10 at 2. Thepetitioner 

### and. discussed various topics, includingthe local honey trade and the conflict in Afghanistan. GE 1at 3; GE 10 at 2. In the summer of 1999, thepetitionerreturned to Sana'a, purportedly in the hopes of obtaining a visa to return to Saudi Arabia. GE 1at 3; GE 3 at 3. While his visa application was pending,_arranged for the petitioner to stay at a boardinghouse operated

### by.

_ brother-in-law, ("the_boardinghouse"). GE 3 at 3-4; GE 43 at 1. 

### The petitioner shared the.oardinghouse with at least eight other men. GE 1at 3-4; GE 3 at 3-5. At the time, th.boardinghouse served as the hub ofa cartheft ring whose aim was to violently free a Yemeni terrorist from a Sana'aprison. GE 1 at 5; GE 2 at 2. Many ofthe individuals who lived at orwere associated with th.oardinghOUSe were veteranjihadists and several would later travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban and al-Qaida. See infra



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### SJ!3CItE't' Part IV.B.1.a. One ofthese men would later be a suicide bomber during al-Qaida's October 2000 attack onthe Us.s. Cole? See id. 

### Approximately two weeks after arriving at th.oardinghouse, the petitioner was arrested by Yemeni authorities, along with other individuals associated with the boardinghouse,
on suspicion ofinvolvement in the cartheft conspiracy. GE 1 at 4; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 1. The petitioner was released fromprison in December 1999 and, after briefly visiting his uncle in Ta'iz, returned to the.oardinghouse. GE I at 5-6; GE 9 at 2. The petitioner was reincarcerated for a few days by Yemeni authorities for allegedly providing a cell phone to one of his imprisoned housemates from the.oardinghOuse. GE 1 at 5. During this period, the petitioner socialized wit'-, who had also been recently released from prison, and became acquainted with individuals whom the petitioner has admitted were members ofalQaida. See infra 

### Part IV.B.l.a. Around this time, the petitioner decided to leave Yemen and travel to Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5. The petitionerhas stated that his decision to go to Afghanistan was influenced by a fatwa (religious decree) issued by nationally recognized religious scholars encouraging men to travel to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. GE 3 at 5. The petitioner also stated that he was influenced by the former Taliban fighter he had met in Ta'iz, who purportedly told the petitionerthat he could find work and a better life in Afghanistan. GE 1at 6; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 3. The petitionerdid not tell anyone, including his family, that he was planning to go to Afghanistan. GE 1at 6.

On October 12,2000, al-Qaida operatives in a small boat laden with explosives attacked the 

# u.s.s. Cole, a Navy destroyer docked in the port ofAden in Yemen. PE 33 ("9/11 COMM'N REpORT") at 190. Theblast killed seventeen members ofthe ship's crew and wounded at least forty othercrewmembers. [d. 4 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### SEeM'f
In August 2000, following travel instructions provided to him by. the petitioner flew from Sana'a, Yemen through Bahrain to Karachi, Pakistan and then onto Quetta, Pakistan, a city
near the Afghan border. GE 1at 6; GE 3 at 5; GE 6 at 2. In Quetta, the petitioner stayed for three days at the Daftar al-Taliban, a Taliban-run facility which arranged for him and three other
mento be transported across the border to Kandahar, Afghanistan. GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1; GE 6 at 2. The three menwho crossed the border with the petitioner admitted that they were traveling to Afghanistan to become martyrs. GE 10 at 2. In Kandahar, the petitioner and his companions were takento a guesthouse known as the Haji Habash guesthouse, which was run by an individual named_. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at I; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 3. The petitioner stayed at this guesthouse for approximately two weeks. GE 4 at 1; GE 9 at 3. From there, the petitionertraveled to Kabul, where he stayed for a few days at a guesthouse operated by an individual named Hamza al-Ghamdi. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. Thepetitioner requested permission from al-Ghamdi to travel to the front lines, but al-Ghamdi denied the request becausethe petitioner lacked weapons training. GE 9 at 4. The petitioner then traveled onto lalalabad, where he allegedly stayed at the home of

, an individual whom.had advised the petitionerto contact once in Afghanistan. GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4; GE 10 at 2. After several months, the petitionerreturned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul. GE 9 at 5-6. With al-Ghamdi's authorization, the petitioner then traveled to the battle lines manned by Taliban fighters in combat with the Northern Alliance. GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 6. After leaving the Taliban battle lines, the petitioner allegedly returned to_ house 

### in Jalalabad. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 6. As coalition forces approached the city in late 2001, the petitioner fled Jalalabad for Pakistan. GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 3. The petitioner was arrested by

5 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8B(JM~** Pakistani authorities in early 2002 and transferred to the custody ofthe United States military. GE 6 at 3. He was subsequently transferred to GTMO, where heis currently detained. Pet. at 1. 

### B. Procedural 

### History The petitioner commencedthis action in October2006 by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 3 See generally Pet. In December2006, the court stayed the case while the Circuit and the Supreme Court considered whether the federal district courts havejurisdiction
overhabeas petitions filed by individuals detained at GTMO. See Mem. Order (Dec. 4, 2006) at 2. The Supreme Court resolved this question inBoumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), in which the Court held that individuals detained at GTMO were "entitledto the privilege ofhabeas corpusto challenge the legality oftheir detention," 

### id at 2262, and that the federal district courts havejurisdiction over such challenges, 

### id at 2274. Although the Supreme Courtdid not specify what proceduresthe district courts were to employ in resolving these habeas petitions, it did emphasizethat the "detainees in these cases are entitled to a prompthabeas corpus hearing." 

### Id at 2275. Toward that end, this court and other judgesin this district agreed to consolidatetheir cases before Judge Hogan for the purpose of adopting common procedures for the GTMO detainee litigation. OnNovember 6, 2008, Judge Hogan issued a Case Management Order ("CMO") to govern these proceedings, which he amended onDecember 16,2008. See generally Am. CMO (Dec. 16,2008). This court adopted the provisions ofthe amended CMO, subjectto modifications set forth in an Omnibus Order issued on April 23, 2009. See generally Omnibus Order (Apr. 23,2009). Meanwhile, having filed its initial Factual Return for the petitioner in April 2007, the government filed a motionto amend its Factual Return, whichJudge Hogan granted in The petitionerfiled his petition together with another Yemeni detained at Guantanamo Bay, Mohammad AI-Zamouqi (ISN 691). Amerits hearing on AI-Zarnouqi's petition is scheduled to begin May 2, 20II. 

### 6 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 3UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~I!lenif** November 2008. 

### See Order (Nov. 7,2008). Following an extensive period ofdiscovery, the court issued an order in February 2010 establishing dates to bring this litigationto completion. Order (Feb. 16,2010). OnApril 29, 2010, the government filed a second motion for leave to amend the factual return, 

### see generally Govt's 2d Mot. for Leave to Amend Factual Return, which the court ultimately granted,4 

### see generally Mem. Order (June 9, 2010). Thepetitioner filed his traverse
onApril 30, 2010, 

### seegenerally Traverse, and onJune4,2010, the government filed its motion forjudgmenton the record, 

### see generally Govt's Mot. for J. on R. Thepetitioner filed his crossmotion forjudgmentonthe record onJune 18,2010. 

### See generally Petr's Cross-Mot. for J. on R. In late August and early September2010, the parties filed supplements to their cross-motions forjudgment on the record addressing recent Circuitrulings concerningthe scope ofthe government's detention authority. 

### See generally Govt's Supplemental Mot. for 1. on R.; Petr's Supplemental Mot. for 1. on R. On September 16,2010,the court denied the parties' cross-motions forjudgment onthe record and scheduled a merits hearing to begin November 8, 2010. Order (Sept. 16,2010). On October 25,2010, two weeks before the merits hearing was scheduled to begin, the government filed a motion to supplement the record with additional evidence. 

### See generally Govt'sMot. to Supplement Evidence. Following expedited briefing, the court denied the motion and ordered the government to limit its presentation to evidence previously disclosed to the petitioner as part ofthe factual return. 

### See generally Mem. Op. (Nov. 4, 2010).

In granting the government's second motion for leave to amend the factual return, the court offered the parties an opportunity to propose adjustments to the litigation schedule. See Mem. Order (June 9, 2010) at 4. The parties elected to retain the deadlines previously imposed by the court. Joint Status Report (June 16,2010). 

### 7 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 4UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SI!!@M9 Themerits hearing began onNovember 8,2010 and spanned four days. 5 Atthe outset of thehearing, the court ruled onthe government'smotion to admit hearsay evidence with a presumption ofaccuracy and authenticity. See generally Govt's Hearsay Mot. The courtheld that although the government's evidencewould, inappropriate circumstances, be afforded a presumption ofauthenticity, it was not entitled to a presumption ofaccuracy.6 See infra Part lILA. During the course ofthe merits hearing, the parties presented the courtwith extensive argument and nearlytwo hundred exhibits. 7 At the conclusion ofthehearing, theparties' submitted proposed findings offact and conclusions oflaw. Withthe record nowcomplete, the courtturns to the applicable legal standards and the evidence and argument presented bythe parties.



### III. EVIDENTIARY MATTERS A. Admissibility and Reliability ofHearsay Evidence As alluded to above, priorto the merits hearing, the government submitted a motion in which it argued that the court should afford a presumption ofaccuracy and authenticityto its hearsay evidence. See generally Govt's Hearsay Mot. That motion was granted inpart and

The merits hearing occurred on November 8, 10, 15 and 16, 2010. Citations to the hearing transcript shall be made by designating the date ofthe proceedings and, when appropriate, whether the proceedings occurred in the morning or evening. At the outset ofthe hearing, the court also ruled that the government would be permitted to rely on certain exhibits that had been made part ofthe record as attachments to the government's hearsay motion. Nov. 8Unclassified Tr. at S. The court greatly appreciates the efforts undertaken by counsel for both the government and the petitioner to present information during the merits hearing in a clear, systematic and easily digestible manner. 

### 8 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 6UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### 8)g@M. denied in part at the outset ofthe merits hearing. Nov. 8Unclassified Tr. at 3-4. The reasoning underlying the court's ruling is set forth in greater detail below. This courthas previouslyheld, in another GTMO habeas case, that although hearsay evidence is always admissible inthese habeas proceedings, the court must make individualized determinations about the reliability and accuracy ofthat evidence and the weight it is to be afforded. Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d I, 10 (D.D.C. 2009). The court further statedthat based onthe principles underlying Federal Rule ofEvidence 803(6), which sets forth the hearsay exception for reports ofregularly conducted activity, the government's interrogation reports and intelligence reports were entitledto a presumption ofauthenticity. Id The court declined, however, to presume the accuracy ofthe government's exhibits, noting that there was ample
reason not to afford such a presumptionto those exhibits, many ofwhich containedtwo orthree levels ofhearsay. Id This Circuit has since issued a number ofdecisions consistent withthis approachto hearsay evidence. The Circuit has made clearthat although "hearsay evidence is always admissible in Guantanamo habeas proceedings, such evidence must be accorded weight only in proportion to its reliability." Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2010); accord AlBihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observing that "the question ahabeas courtmust ask whenpresented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible

- it is always admissible

- but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia ofreliability it exhibits"). Nothing in these Circuit decisions suggests that the court should presume the accuracy or reliability ofthe government's exhibits; to the contrary, the Circuit has stated that beforerelying
onanypiece ofevidence, the district court must make a threshold determinationthat it is



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### SECftl3'f sufficiently reliable andprobative. 8 

### Bensayah v. 

### Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing

### Parhat v. 

### Gates, 532 F.3d 834,847 (D.C. Cir. 2008»; 

### cfAi 

### Odah v. 

### Obama, 611 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the district court did not errin relying onhearsay evidence where "[t]he government offered reasons why its hearsay evidence had indiciaofreliability, and the court considered the reliability ofthe evidence in deciding the weight to give the hearsay evidence"). Accordingly, at the outset ofthe merits hearing in this case, the court ruled that hearsay evidence would be admissible and that the court would presumethe authenticity but notthe accuracy ofthe government's intelligence reports and interrogation reports.9 Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at 3-4. The court further ruled that it would make individualized determinations regarding the reliability ofany hearsay evidencepresentedby the parties. 

### Id. B. Assessment oftheEvidence As noted, before the court may consider whether the government has shown by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the petitioner is lawfully detained, the court "mustevaluate the rawevidence, finding it to be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently probative to demonstrate the truth ofthe asserted propositionwiththerequisite degree ofcertainty." 

### Parhat, 532 F.3d at 847 (quoting 

### Concrete Pipe & 

### Prods., Inc. v. 

### Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622

8 The approach to hearsay articulated by this court in Hatim is also consistent with positions taken by otherjudges in this district sincethe Circuit's ruling inAiBihani. See. e.g.,Aimerfediv. Obama, 2010 WL 691944, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 1,2010) (concluding that all ofthe government's hearsay evidence was admissible and that any evidence created and maintained by the government in the ordinarycourse ofbusiness was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of authenticity but rejecting the government's argument that its evidence should be afforded a presumption ofaccuracy); see aisoA/Kandari v. Obama, 2010 WL 3927309, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Sept. 15,2010)(decliningto afford a presumption ofauthenticity or accuracy to the government's evidence).
9 During the merits hearing, the petitionerdid not challenge the authenticity ofany ofthe intelligence reports or interrogation reports relied on by the government. 10 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE S"8CIU3'f (1993». Thus, before relying on anypiece ofevidence in these GTMO habeas proceedings, the court must examine that evidence to "determinewhetherthe evidence is in fact sufficiently reliable to be used as ajustification for detention." Khan v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 6, 12 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Naji al Warafi v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2010) (observing that "[i]n Guantanamo habeas proceedings, the Courtmust assess the accuracy, reliability, and credibility ofeach piece ofevidence presented by theparties inthe context ofthe evidence as a whole" (internal quotation marks omitted». The reliability ofhearsay evidence may be establishedby the intrinsic characteristics of the evidence, such asthe nature and consistency ofthe details contained in the hearsay, Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 428-29, as well as through corroborationby otherevidence in the record, id at 429 (noting that "anintelligence report's reliability can be assessed by comparisonto 'exogenous information'''); Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725-26 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 849). Two pieces ofevidence, "each unreliable when viewed alone," can corroborate each other and mutually establish their reliability. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 726 (citing UnitedStates v. Laws, 808 F.2d 92,100-03 (D.C. Cir. 1986». In this case, the government has based its case principally oninterrogation reports reflecting statements allegedly made by the petitioner. See generally GE 1·6,8·10,24,27,36, 40-41,43. These statements, which the government relies onto establish the petitioner's actions and intentions before his apprehension, plainly constitute hearsay. See FED. R. EVlD. SOl(c). The court has carefully reviewed each report to ensure that the statements contained therein are sufficiently reliable for use in assessing the lawfulness ofthe petitioner's detention. At the outset, the courtnotes that the petitioner's statements to interrogators are recorded in standard reporting forms, such as FD-302s, Summary Interrogation Reports ("SIRs") and



### 11 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~~e:M3T** Intelligence Infonnation Reports ("IIRs"). See generally, e.g., GE 1,2,24. These reports are prepared by intelligence and law enforcement agents in the nonnal course oftheir duties to memorialize intelligence gathered from various sources, including interviews ofdetainees. See GE 30 (Decl. 0 Decl. 11,,))10 at 6-7. The fact thatthese reports were prepared by government agents in the course oftheir nonnal intelligence gathering duties provides a degree ofsupport for theirreliability. Moreover, the court finds ample evidence in the content ofthese interrogationreports to support their reliability. With few exceptions (on which the court does not rely), the statements reflected inthese interrogationreports concern infonnation about which the petitionerhad personal knowledge. Furthennore, these statements are replete with specific details, lending further support to their reliability. The courthas been presented with no evidence that any ofthe statements were elicited through undue coercion. Moreover, although the details sometimes differ, the accounts ofthe petitioner's actions inthese different interrogation reports are remarkably consistent. Indeed, as evidenced in the following sections, many ofthe statements that the courtrelies on in its analysis are repeated by the petitioner in multiple interrogations and corroboratedby the statements ofthird-party detainees. See infra Part IV.B.l-5. Although the petitioner challenges the accuracy ofthe translation and transcription of certain statements that the reports attribute to him, nothing about these purported errors calls into question the inherent reliability ofthe reports. SeeAl-Waraji, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 39 ("[T]hatthe [petitioner's] statements were translated does not render them unreliable or incredible.

Id The court considers his declaration, which is based on his personal knowledge and experience, to be reliable. 12 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 10UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**s~enT** Petitioner's reservations about the accuracy ofthe translations ofthe statements goes to the weight
... the Court should afford the statements, not their reliability."). Thus, although the court must, inthe course ofits analysis, address the parties' disagreements regarding the probative value ofvariousportions ofthese interrogations reports, the court concludes that the reports are sufficiently reliable to be considered in its assessment ofthe lawfulness ofthe petitioner's detention. The government also relies on othertypes ofevidence, such as interrogation reports containing statements made bythird-party detainees, see, e.g., GE 7, 8, 12, 13, declarations of intelligence officers and subject-matterexperts, see, e.g., GE 14, 19, and intelligence reports regarding materials captured from al-Qaida and Taliban forces, see, e.g., GE 25, 29. The reliability ofeach ofthese exhibits is assessed individually in the course ofthe analysis. See infra Part IV.B.1-5.


### IV. ANALYSIS A. The Scope ofthe Government's Detention Authority The government's authority to detain individuals at GTMO derives from the Authorization for the Use ofMilitary Force ("AUMF"), which provides that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack that occurred on September 11,2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, orpersons. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) This Circuit has statedthat the AUMF authorizes the government to detain two categories ofpersons: (1) individuals "part of' forces associated with al-Qaida orthe Taliban and (2)



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### SEEM!' individuals who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against the United States. AlBihani, 590 F.3d at 872. Tojustify its detention ofan individual, the government mustprove by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the individual falls within one ofthese categories ofdetainable persons. 11 SeeAwadv. Ohama, 608 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that "apreponderance ofthe evidence standard satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a habeas petition from a detainee held pursuant to the AUMF"); accordAlBihani, 590 F.3d at 878. In this case, the government'sprincipal contention is thatthe petitioner is lawfully detained because he was "part of' the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces. 12 The Circuit has observed thatbecause al-Qaida's organizational structure is amorphous, "it is impossible to provide anexhaustive list ofcriteriafor determining whether an individual is 'part of al Qaeda." Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725. Accordingly, the district courts must determine whether an individual is "part of' al-Qaida or associated forces on a "case-by-case basis" employing a "functional ratherthan a formal approach andbyfocusing upon the actions ofthe individual in relationto the organization." Id.

II The Circuit has expressly left open the question ofwhether a lower evidentiary standard would be constitutionally permissible. SeeAI-Adahiv. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

12 Although the government also asserted during the merits hearing thatthe petitioner "purposefully and materially supported" al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces, Nov. 8 Unclassified Tr. at 8, it offered scantevidence orargument onthis issue. At any rate, because the government demonstrated thatthe petitioner was "partof'the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces, the court need not address whetherthe government satisfied the second prong ofthe detention standard. SeeAI-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (observingthat "both prongs (ofthe detention standard] are valid criteriathat are independently sufficientto satisfY the standard").

14 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### Sli3eMT "That an individual operates within al Qaeda'sfonnal command structure is surely sufficient but is notnecessary to showthat he is 'part of the organization.")) Id.; see alsoAwad, 608 F.3d at 11 ("Ifthe governmentcan establishby a preponderance ofthe evidence that a detainee was part ofthe 'command structure' ofal Qaeda, this satisfies the requirement to show that he was 'part of al Qaeda. Butthere are ways otherthan making a 'command structure' showing to prove that a detainee is 'partof al Qaeda."). Onthe other hand, "the purely independent conduct ofa freelancer is not enough" to showthat an individual is detainable as "partof' ofthose enemy forces. Bensayah, 610 F.3d at725; see also Salahi v. Ohama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that "the government's failure to prove that an individual was acting under orders from al-Qaida may be relevantto the question ofwhetherthe individual was 'partof' the organization when captured"). The government's "authority to detain an enemy combatant is not dependent onwhether
an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies ifreleased." Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. The government must prove, however, that the petitioner was "part of" the Taliban, alQaidaor associated forces at the time ofhis capture to demonstrate that his detention is lawful under the first prong ofthe standard. See Salahi, 625 FJd at 751 (observingthat "therelevant inquiry is whether [the petitioner] was 'part of aI-Qaida when captured"); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 71 (D.D.C. 2009). In assessing whetherthe government has met its burden, the court may not view each piece ofevidence in isolation, but must consider the totality ofthe evidence. SeeAl-Adahi v. Ohama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105-06 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Even ifno individual piece ofevidence
Priorto these Circuit decisions, many district courtjudges had held that an individual was a "part of'al-Qaida or associated forces only ifheoperated within the organization's fonnal command structure. See. e.g., Hatim v. Ohama, 677 

### F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2010); Gherehi v. Ohama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 69 (D.D.C. 2009); Ham/i/y v. Ohama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009). 15 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 13UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~t:M"** would, by itself,justifythe petitioner's detention, the evidence may, when considered as a whole and in context, nonetheless demand the conclusion that the petitionerwas more likely than not "part of'the Taliban oral-Qaida orpurposefully and materially supported such forces. 

### Id. (concluding that the district court erred in "requir[ing] each piece ofthe government's evidence to bearweight without regard to all (or indeed any) other evidence in the case"); 

### cfBourjaily v. UnitedStates, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987) (observing that "individual pieces ofevidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may incumulationprove it" becausethe "sum ofan evidentiary presentation may well be greaterthan its constituentparts"). 

### B. ThePetitionerIs Lawfully Detained During the course ofthe merits hearing, the parties presented evidence and argument on the following five disputed material issues: 14 1. The government's allegation that the petitionerwentto Afghanistan to receive military-style training from and fight for al-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces. 2. The government's allegation thatthe petitioner stayed at guesthouses in Pakistan and Afghanistan associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban orother associated forces. 3. The government's allegationthat the petitioner attended a training camp ortraining campsoperated by or associated with al-Qaeda, the Taliban or other associated forces. 4. The government's allegationthat the petitionertraveled to the battle lines in Afghanistan as part ofal-Qaida, the Taliban or other associated forces. 5. The government's allegation that the petitioner was part ofal-Qaida, the Taliban orother associated forces at the time ofhis capture.

Over the government's objection, the petitioner requested that the court address a sixth contested issue during the merits hearing: the government's assertion that its evidence is generally reliable. Petr's Supplement to List ofContested Issues. Although the court granted the petitioner's request, duringthe merits hearing, the petitioner incorporated the elements ofhis presentation on this issue into his presentations on the fivejointly identified issues and elected not to give a separate presentation on his proposed sixth issue. 16 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 14UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~t:enT** JointList ofContested Issues (Oct. 15,2010). The court considers these disputed issues in turn. 

### 1. The PetitionerTraveled to Afghanistan to Fightfor theTaliban, al-Qaida orAssociated Enemy Forces During the merits hearing, the parties devoted substantial time and effort addressing the first material disputed issue: whether the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. Nov. 8 Tr. at 32

- 154; Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 4­ 100. Their attentiveness to this issue was well warranted. The Circuithas observedthat although an "intention to fight is inadequate by itselfto make someone 'part of al Qaeda
... it is nonetheless compelling evidence when
... it accompanies additional evidence ofconduct consistent with the effectuation ofthat intent." Awad, 608 F.3d at 9. The government bases its contentionthat the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight withthe Taliban, al-Qaida or associated forces on: (1) the petitioner's association with the. boardinghouse; (2) the influence and assistance

# 0_(includingthe implausibility ofthe petitioner's account ofhow. convinced him to go to Afghanistan); (3) the influence ofthe religious fatwa that the petitioner encountered in Yemen; and (4) the petitioner's travel route and travel companions. The court considers these matters below.


### a. The Petitioner'sAssociation With th.oardinghOuSe The government contends that the petitioner's association with individuals at the. boardinghouse supportsthe inferencethat he went to Afghanistan to engage injihad and, in fact, shows that he was a "part of' al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces even beforehe left Yemen for Afghanistan in the summer of2000. Nov. 8 Tr. at 61-143. The petitionerresponds thathis fleeting association with these individuals establishes nothing and does not supportthe government's contention that he traveled to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, al-Qaidaor associated forces. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 41-54.

17 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### Sl!!@n'f As noted in the factual overview, in the summer of 1999, the petitionertraveled from Ta'izto Sana'aand stayed atthe_boardinghOuSe while purportedly attempting to obtain a visato return to Yemen. GE 1 at 3; GE 3 at 3. Approximately two weeks after his arrival, Yemeni authorities arrested the petitioner and several other individuals associated withthe boardinghouse on suspicion ofbelonging to a car theft ring. GE I at 5; GE 2 at 2. Accordingto the petitioner, the cartheft conspiracy centered on a plotto steal cars in orderto purchase arms, which they would then use to violently free an individual named who was held in a Sana'aprison. GE I at 5; GE 9 at 3.**~ad** been convicted ofkidnapping and murdering four western tourists aspart ofa plotto free an imprisoned sheikh associated with a South Yemen Islarnist group. GE 1 at 5; GE 9 at 3. According to the petitioner, the conspirators also considered using the stolen vehicles to kidnap tourists, whom they would use to negotiate**thereleaseo~** GE 1 at 5. Many ofthe individuals associatedwithth.oardinghouse during this period were experiencedjihadists. According to Abdu Ali al Hajj Sharqawi, a veteranjihadistwhom the petitioner asserts is a reliable source,I5 see Petr's ProposedFindings ofFact 16,
_

_ the individual who introduced the petitionerto th.oardinghOuse, "was a mujahaddin in Bosniaand
... was a well-known person." PE 115 at 1. Likewise, Sharqawi states that Issam al-Maklahfi, the leader ofthe cartheft ring, and Ahmed al Khadr al-Bidani, another member ofthe conspiracy, were also veterans ofBosnianjihad. Id. at 2. Sharqawi also

IS
PE 8 at 8; PE 11 at 2. Furthennore, Sharqawi's statements aboutthe boardinghouse are based on his personal knowledge. PE 115 at 1. There is no evidence at Sharqawi's statements were the result of torture and, in fact, the petitionerhimselfrelies on Sharqawi's interrogation report in support of his case. Petr's Proposed Findings**ofFact~~** 13-22. Accordingly, Sharqawi's interrogation report is sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 18 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### SECItE't'
states that Fawaz al-Rabia'i lived at the .0ardinghouSeand was an al-Qaida operative at thetime he was imprisoned by Yemeni authorities. PE 115 at 3; 

### see also GE 8 at 1 (GTMO intelligence report indicatingthat al-Rabia'i was a known al-Qaida associate). The petitioner himselfadmits that housemates and had receivedjihadisttraining in Afghanistan. GE 3 at 5. Anotherhousemate

_ had, according to the petitioner, trained at the Khalden camp nearJalalabad, Afghanistan, GE 3 at4, ajihadisttraining camp affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban, GE 19 (Decl. of
6 at 7-8. Likewise, the petitioner admits that
an individual who resided at the boardinghouse during the petitioner's stay, had fought and trained with the Taliban inAfghanistan. GE 1at4; GE 3 at 4; GE 43 at 2.
_ would later be one ofthe suicide bombers inthe October 2000 attack onthe 

### Us.s. Cole. GE 2 at 3; GE 4 at 3; GE 5 at 2; GE 6 a 3; GE 9 at 5; GE43 at 2. During the period thatthe petitionerlived there, th.oardinghOUSe served as a hub for the individuals involved in a cartheft ring whose aim was to**free~om** prison. GE 1 at 4-5; GE 9 at 3; 

### see also PE 115 at 1 (interrogation report in which Sharqawi statedto interrogators that residents ofthe boardinghouse were involved in a plot to steal cars and that this group "wanted to getrid ofthe Yemeni Government because the Yemeni Governmentkilled Abu Hassain al Miktar, a famous mujahaddin"). The petitioner has acknowledged that.

_ the leader ofthe plot, and_ visited th-"oardinghouse while the

16 1, 3
1, 3, • •• • ... his personal knowledge and analysis, to be credible. 19 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### St3t:Ulf petitionerwas there.I? GE 1 at 4-5; GE 3 at 5; GE 9 at 2. The petitioner also admitted that his roommate and closest friend at the boardinghouse, GE 3 at4, served as a driver in the cartheftplot, GE 1at4-5; GE 9 at 1, and that bin Attash, his housemate and a veteranjihadist, was arrested withthe petitioner and formally charged in the conspiracy, GE 8 at 2. In total, the petitioner identifiedmorethan halfa dozen individuals who resided at orvisited the_boardinghouse while he first lived there who were involved in the cartheftplot designed to free_ The petitioner claims thathe had no real association with these individuals, noting thathe stayed at th.boardinghouse for less than two weeks before he was arrested. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 41. As described above, however, the petitionerrevealed to interrogators detailed knowledge aboutthe biographies ofthese men, suggesting that his relationships with these individuals were more than fleeting. SeeAI-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1109 (observing that the petitioner's detailed knowledge ofpersonal information about a group ofal-Qaidaoperatives, including where they had fought and what languages they could speak, tended to showthat the petitionerhad close relationships with these individuals and strengthened the probability that that he was part ofal-Qaida). Moreover, it is the timing, ratherthanthe duration, ofthe petitioner's initial stay at the .oardinghousethat is particularly telling. The fact that a group ofveteranjihadists

permitted the petitionerto live at th.boardinghousewhile the location was used as a hub for an active terroristconspiracy suggests that they considered the petitioner an individual they could trust. It is highly unlikelythat these men would allow an individual into their living and meeting space, even ifonly for two weeks, during such a sensitive period without some
The petitioner states that he believes tha_ had been surveilled to thtl boardinghouse, which led to thearrest ofthe boardinghouse residents. GE 1at; 9 at 1-2. 20 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 17UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### SI!@M"f

assurance thatthe individual shared some allegiance with them and would notundermine their p10t. 18 Although this evidence hardly establishes thatthe petitioner was "part of'al-Qaida at this time, it does support the government's contention that the petitionerhad associations with known terrorists and had gained their confidence priorto his departure for Afghanistan. The petitioner has also stated that when he first went to live at the.oardinghouse, he had no idea that anyone associated with the boardinghouse was involved in any criminal activity. GE I at 5; GE 2 at 2; GE 9 at 2. According to the petitioner, he first learned about the details ofthe plotduring his period ofincarceration when_, the head ofthe conspiracy, wasreleased from solitary confinement. 19 GE 9 at 2. Even ifthe court were to credit the petitioner's version ofevents, it would not dramatically alter the court's assessment ofhis associations with members ofthe. boardinghouse conspiracy. It seemsunlikely that a veteranjihadistlike
_ would have revealed the details ofthe plotto thepetitioner, while they were still in custody and the information could plainly be used againstthem, unless he had reason to believe that the petitioner would not reveal this information to Yemeni authorities. Moreover, ratherthan distancing himselffrom the conspirators following his arrest, the petitioner continued to associate with members ofthe terrorist conspiracy during his months ofincarceration and
18 The petitio_thatat his invitation, an acquaintance from Saudi Arabia, stayed at th oardinghouse the night before Yemeni authorities raided the boardinghouse. GE 3at 4. Becausethe government has not supplied any evidence that_had any terrorist or criminal involvement, the petitioner argues, the fact that he was permitted to stay at**th~oardinghouse** undermines the government's theory that only trusted individuals were

### pe~ to stay at the boardinghouse. Itis, however, far from clear

### that~ terrorist affiliations; as discussed below,
_ attended the**wedding~.** a veteran Afghan mujahaddin, to the**da~** family with known terrorist connections. GE 9 at 2-3. Furthermore, it is unclear**that~** was "permitted" to stay at the boardinghouse, as he stayed there only one night and there is no evidence that leaders ofthe cartheft conspiracy were aware ofhis presence. 19 The petitioner stated**that~as** held in solitary confinement for approximately twenty days aftertheir arrest. GE 9at 2. 21 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**S~E!lJiW!'f** became lasting friends with several members ofthe group. GE 1 at 5-6; GE 3 at 3-5; GE 9 at 1­ 2. Thus, the evidence indicates that even ifthe petitioner was not considered an ally at the time he first went to the. boardinghouse, he became one during his months inprison.2° Indeed, even after he wasreleased from prison in late 1999, the petitionermaintained his associations with members ofth_boardinghouse. According to the petitioner, Yemeni authorities released him from prison at the same time as two ofhis former housemates,
_

_ and GE 9 at 2. The petitionerhas admitted that upon his release, he choseto return to the_boardinghouse with these men, both ofwhom were veteran jihadists.21 GE 1 at 5-6; GE 9 at 2. Shortly after their return to the.oardinghOUSe,the petitioner and_ attended al-Ansari's wedding to a daughterofan individual named GE 9 at 2. Another**o~** sons-in-law was 9/11 hijacker Khalid alMihdhar. ld at 3.

20 The petitioner points out that Sharqawi stated to interrogators that

### th~boardinghouse "was a place only for sleeping" and thatthe petitioner was not associated with the individuals who resided there. PE 

# 1:'5 t 

# 1-2. Sharqawi did, however, acknowledge in the same interrogation that the individuals atth oardinghouse were involved in acartheft ring, that residents ofthe house desired to overt row the Yemeni government because it had killed a famous Yemeni mujahaddin and that numerous individuals who resided at or were associated with the boardinghouse were veteran mujahaddin. 

### rd. at 1-3. Moreover, Sharqawi's assertion that the petitionerhad no associations with these individuals is belied by the petitioner's own admissions that he maintained his associations with individuals he had met in prison and through th. boardinghouse after he was released and even into Afghanistan.
21 The petitioner contends that his decision to return to**th~boardinghouse** following his release from prison does not indicate any continuing**rel~ip** with members ofthe boardinghouse, as the other members ofthe cartheft ring were still imprisoned. This contention, however, is undennined by the petitioner's own admissions that he returned to the boardinghouse with other individuals who had been imprisoned based on their relationship with the boardinghouse, GE 9 at2, and that he maintained aclose relationship with whom the petitioner has acknowledged was a member ofthe car theft plot, GE 1at 4-5; GE 9 at 1.
22 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~eeMT** Although the petitioner states in one interrogation that he only stayed at the. boardinghouse for a week afterhisreturn from prison, GE 1 at 

### 5_6,22 the fact that the petitioner chose toreturn to the boardinghouse at all following his release from prison, at which point he clearlyknewabout the cartheft conspiracy, supportsthe notion that the petitioner's associations with the individuals at the_boardinghouse were meaningful. The petitioner'S attendance at

_ wedding further indicates that the petitionerhad become accepted in thejihadist circle that he encountered at

### the~oardinghouse. Following his release from prison, the petitioner also maintained a relationship with
one ofthe drivers in the cartheft plot. GE I at 4-5; GE 9 at 

### 1. The petitioner attended
_ courtappearances and smuggled a cell phone**t~** inprison, an act which resulted in the petitioner'sbriefre-imprisonment. GE 1 at 5. The fact that the petitioner wouldtake such a risk for_ undermines the petitioner's contention that his associations with allthe members ofthecartheftring were fleeting and insignificant. In fact, the petitioner's associations with individuals atth.oardinghouse survived hisjourney to Afghanistan. For instance, one ofthe individuals the petitioner met at the" boardinghouse was also known 

### as GE 5 at 1. Accordingto the petitioner, after was released from prison, he went to the front lines in Afghanistan to fight withtheTalibanagainst the Northern Alliance. 

### Id While staying at
an al-Qaida guesthouse in Kabul, see infra Part IV.B.2.c, the petitionerinquired as to the whereabouts and wastold that was at thefrontlines and would

According to another interrogation report, the petitioner stated that he "socialized

# a"

several.'week after his arrest," GE 3 at 5, indicating a longer affiliation with and the oardinghouse following the petitioner's release from prison. 

### 23 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 22UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**S~en'f**
come to visit him at a later time.23 GE 6 at 2-3. The incident demonstrates not only that the petitionerhad a continuing association with in Afghanistan, but also that the petitionerwas sufficiently integrated into the al-QaidaITaliban structure such that he was able to send and receive messagesthrough its military apparatus.24 While in Afghanistan, the petitioner also maintained his relationship with Thepetitioner had met_ after his release from prison while socializing at_home in Sana'a. GE 3 at 5. The petitioner has acknowledged that
_ was a member ofal-Qaida, who trained at the alFarouq training camp and possibly the Abu Obeida training camp, both ofwhich are al-Qaida training campsin Afghanistan. GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2. The petitioner states tha_ visited him while he was in Jalalabad and that_ and were the only people in Afghanistan whoknewhim by his real name ratherthan his kunya. GE 9 at 4-5. In fact, once in Afghanistan, the petitioner listed_as his reference on an application to attend a terrorist training camp. GE 25 at 4; infra Part IV.B.3.b. Thepurpose ofthis discussion is notto condemn the petitioner onthe basis ofhis associations. Indeed, the petitioner'srelationships with individuals associated with

# th.

23 According to Salim Hamdan, a former driver for Usama bin Ladin,
_ later acted as a bodyguard for bin Ladin. 

### PE 27 at 7. 14.
24 The court does not, however, creditthe government's contention that_ an individual who accompanied the petitioner on.' mey from Yemen to Afghanistan, see infra Part IV.B.l.d, was an associate from the oardinghouse. The government bases this contention on the fact_name is included in one interrogation report in which the petitioner lists the individuals associated with**the~oardinghouse.** GE 3 at 4. Thatreport, however, includes no information abou_otherthan his name, whereas it contains detailed information regarding other individuals associated with the boardinghouse. See id. Furthermore
___ not mentioned in any ofthe other interrogation reports in which the petitioner discusses tlie" boardinghouse. GE 1at 3-5; GE 5at 1-2; GE 9at 2-3. In fact, another interrogation report indicates that the petitioner stated that he "had no previous contact with .priorto meeting him one week before they left for Afghanistan and the only thing he knew about him was that he was from**Ta~en."** GE 9 at 3. Accordingly, the courtconcludes that_wasnot associated with the_boardinghouse. 

### 24 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~@M'f** boardinghouse, standing alone, likely would not demonstrate that thepetitioner was "part of'alQaida during his time in Yemen. The evidence does establish, however, that by the time the petitioner chose to travel to Afghanistan, he had developed significant and lasting relationships with veteranjihadists, who accepted him intotheir midst while they were involved in an active terrorist conspiracy. Many ofthe individuals associated with theboardinghouse would go onto become active al-Qaida associates and fight on the front lines in Afghanistan, and the petitioner maintained his relationships with these individuals as well. The fact that thepetitioner had enduring relationships with knownjihadists priorto his decision to go to Afghanistan supports thecontention that he traveled to Afghanistan to train and fight with al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated forces. 

### b. Influence andAssistance Thepetitionerhas statedthat one ofthe principal influences onhis decision to go to Afghanistan was an individual he met in Ta'iznamed GE9at3. The government contends that.was a Taliban facilitator and that his influence onthe petitioner's decision to travel to Afghanistan supports its allegation that the petitioner went there to receive training and fight for the Taliban and al-Qaida. Nov. 8 Tr. at 142, 150; Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 17­ 20. Thepetitioner contendsthatthere is no evidence that.was a Talibanfacilitator and that
• merely encouraged the petitionerto travel to Afghanistan to seek out a better life. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 57-62. There is no dispute that.had a significantinfluence on the petitioner's decision to travel to Afghanistan. The petitionerhas statedthat."wasthe person who had the most influence on [him] going to Afghanistan, although he admitted that he was also influenced by a fatwa issued by the sheikhs in Yemen." GE 9 at 3. Noris there any dispute that two years

25 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~@M't'** 

### before they met,.had received military training in Afghanistan and had fought for the Taliban. GE 1at 3; GE 10 at 2. There is, however, no evidence that atthetime.encouraged the petitioner to go to Afghanistan, he was acting as a Taliban recruiter or facilitator, at least in any formal capacity. The govenunent has provided no evidence that.influenced any other individuals to travel to Afghanistan orthat he had any formal relationship with the Taliban oral-Qaida. 

### See Bensayah, 610 FJdat726 (concludingthat the govenunent failed to establish that the petitionerwas an a1­ Qaida facilitator in the absence ofreliable evidence thatthe petitioner had links to al-Qaida or facilitated the travel ofal-Qaidamembers). Indeed, the petitioner has stated thatwhenthey first met,.encouraged himto enter into the honey trading business in Ta'iz, GE 1at 3; GE 3 at 3, and the government has offered nothing to discredit that account. Furthermore, the petitioner paidhis own way to Afghanistan, GE 3 at 6, a fact inconsistent with Taliban recruitment. Accordingly, the government has not established that.was a Taliban facilitator. Nonetheless, the evidence does not supportthe petitioner's contention that" influence
was entirely benign. The petitionerhas admitted that he

# and. discussed"military training in Afghanistan and his experience fighting for the Taliban: AI-Sabri met a Yemeni named age 25 in Taiz.• had previously traveled to Afghanistan for military training and to fight for the Taliban. AI-Sabri became interested in this discussion and inquired about receiving military training. GE 1at 3. Whether, as the government suggests, the petitioner was expressing an interest in obtaining military training or, asthe petitioner has argued, expressing an interest inhearing about the military training that.had received in Afghanistan, it is clearthat.and thepetitioner discussed the military training available in Afghanistan and fighting with the Taliban. 

### See id



### 26 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### 815@M'f Indeed, the petitioner states that it was during this period in Ta'iz, when he met.thatthe petitioner first began thinking about going to Afghanistan.25 GE 9 at 3. Moreover, the travel route thatthe petitionertook into Afghanistan, which was furnished by. GE 3 at 5-6; GE 9 at 3; GE 10 at 2, suggests that.was assisting the petitionerjoinwith Taliban and al-Qaida fighting forces in Afghanistan. As discussed below, theroute that. instructedthe petitionerto take from Sana'athrough Bahrain and eventually to Quetta, Pakistan, is the same path used by foreign mujahaddin traveling to Afghanistan to engage injihad. See infra Part IV.B.l.d. Indeed,.specifically instructed the petitionerto visitthe TaIiban offices in Quetta, Pakistan, GE 3 at 6, which, as discussed below, facilitated the travel offighters to alQaida and Taliban guesthouses and camps in Afghanistan, see infra Part IV.B.2.a; see also GE 3 at 5 ('_told [the petitioner] that the Taliban would assist himin getting from Pakistaninto Afghanistan because hewas Arabic."). Finally, the petitioner's account ofhow.lured him to Afghanistan is not plausible. According to the petitioner,.told him "thatthere was security andpeace in Afghanistan," GE 9 at 3, and that "he should move to Afghanistan as work was easierto find there," GE 3 at 5. The petitioner stated that."convincedhimtotravel to Afghanistan for a better life and find a wife." GE I at 6. Vet before the petitioner left for Afghanistan, hehad spent months with veteranjihadists associated withthe.oardinghouse, some ofwhom had trained and fought in Afghanistan. See supra PartIV.B.I.a. Thepetitionerhad also hadconversations with.abouthis own experiences fighting in Afghanistanjusttwo years earlier. GE I at 3. Furthermore, as discussed
The petitioner's admission that he began thinking ofgoing to Afghanistan soon after his deportation to Yemen, 

### see GE 6 at 1, casts doubt on his assertion that he wentto Afghanistan only as a last resort, after his efforts to obtain entry to otherArab countries failed, 

### see Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 58-59. 27 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 25UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~@IlE't'** below, the petitioner admits thathe encountered at least one fatwa that encouraged men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. 

### See infra Part IV.B.l.c. Asthe petitionermust have been
aware that there was ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, it is difficult to believe thathetrulywould have believed thatAfghanistan offered security and peace. Thepetitioner's conduct once in Afghanistan also undermines his account ofhow. convinced himto travel there. Althoughthepetitionercontends that. lured him to Afghanistan withpromises ofwork opportunities, there is no evidence that the petitionermade any effort to secure employment once he was in Afghanistan.26 

### See Sulayman v. Obama, 2010 WL 3069568, at *13-14 (D.D.C. July 20,2010) (declining to credit the petitioner's claim thathe traveled to Afghanistanto find ajob, a wife and a home because he admitted to interrogatorsthat he "neverreally looked" for ajob or a wife and that "he wasn't really that interested intrying to find ajob"). Indeed, as the petitioner must have known, any efforts to secure employmentwould have been complicated by the fact that he spoke only Arabic.27 GE 3 at 1. Althoughthe petitionertold interrogators that he had marriage prospects while in Afghanistan, these accounts are contradictory and not credible. Forinstance, the petitioner stated in one interrogation thatthe sister-in-law of an individual hemet in Jalalabad, had introduced him to a young Moroccan woman for the purposes ofmarriage butthat the plans

26 To bolster his claim that he wentto Afghanistan for benign purposes, the petitioner offers a declaration from Professor Sheila Carapico, who states that the poverty and lack ofopportunities in Yemen in the late 1990s and early 2000s led many young Yemeni men to travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan for economic reasons. See generally PE 30 (Decl. ofDr. Sheila Carapico, ("Carapico Decl."»; see a/so Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 59-60. There is, however, no evidence that this petitioner made any efforts whatsoeverto obtain employmentwhile he was in Afghanistan, suggesting that economic factors were not amajor consideration underlying his decision to go to Afghanistan.
27 Although the petitioner has offered evidence that Yemeni Arabic speakers might be able to find work in Afghanistan teaching Quran, as the Yemeni dialect is closest to the classical language of the Quran, Carapico Dec!. 16(t), there is no evidence that the petitioner, who had limited formal education, had any training in the Quran orwas motivated by such opportunities. 28 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SI3CRI3r£ had fallen through due to the chaos following September 11. GE 3 at 6. In another interview, the petitioner stated that the man with whom he lived in Jalalabad, had arranged for the petitionerto marryhis wife's sisterwho lived in Morocco. GE 9 at 4. In yet a third interrogation, the petitioner stated that he was arranged to marry_ sister. GE 6 at 3. The inconsistencies ofthese accounts cast doubt onthe petitioner's claim that finding a wife
was one ofthe principal reasons he wentto Afghanistan. Finally, ifthe petitioner wentto Afghanistan merely for the benignpurposes that.had purportedly discussed with him, it is difficultto understand why the petitioner chose not to infonn anyone, including his family in Saudi Arabia or Yemen, ofhis decision to relocate. GE 1 at 6. The fact thatthe petitionerhid his plans from his family further undermines the contention that.persuaded him to go to Afghanistan with promises ofwork, a wife and a better, more
secure life. Thepetitioner also admitted to interrogators that he assumed a kunya while he was in Afghanistan, GE 10 at 2; 

### see infra Part IV.B.3, and that only two orthree individuals (all with ties to al-Qaida or the Taliban) knew his real name, GE 9 at4. Thatthe petitionerconcealed his true identity in Afghanistan is also not consistent with his stated intention oftraveling to Afghanistan for benignreasons. In sum, although the government has not established that.had any formal relationship withthe Taliban, the evidence, viewed as a whole, indicates that.discussed with the petitioner his experiences training and fighting with the Taliban in Afghanistan andprovidedthepetitioner
aroute to Afghanistan designedto funnel him into Taliban and al-Qaida fighting forces. Thus, the evidence concerning.bolsters the contention that the petitionertraveled to Afghanistanto train and fight withthe Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces.

29 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 88@ft@"f

c. Influence oftheFatwa Issued by Religious Clerics 

### In addition to his discussions with.the petitioner has stated that he was influencedto go to Afghanistan by a fatwa issued by two Saudi religious scholars, Hammoud al-Aqla and Abdulla al-Jibreen. GE 3 at 2, 5; GE 9 at 3. According to the petitioner, the fatwa "was encouraging men to go to Afghanistan to assistthe Taliban." GE 3 at 5. The government contends that the influence ofthe fatwa indicates that the petitioner went to Afghanistan to engage injihad. Nov. 8 Tr. at 148-52. Thepetitioner responds that there is no evidence that the fatwa advocated taking up arms onbehalfofthe Taliban. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 62-65. Although the exact fatwa that influenced the petitioner is unknown, another fatwa authored by al-Aqla in 2000 included the following language: At this time, the Taliban Regime remains in a state of warfare against its opposition, the Northern Alliance, so Jihad with it is ordained by the Shariah because Jihad with the Taliban is against the Northern Alliance which is being funded by the forces of Disbelief like America, Britain, and Russia and others who are calling for a broad-based government in Afghanistan established upon a Western legislative system. Since the situation is like this, then indeed it is obligatory to assist the Taliban Regime and to make Jihad with it in order to bring victory to Islam. Govt's Mot. for 1. 

### on the R. at 12-13; 

### see also Nov. 8 Tr. 

### at 152-53. Indeed, one detainee described al-Aqla as "awell known religious leader [who] claimed to have sent 11,000 Saudis to various training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya and the Philippines." GE 12 at 1. 

### The detainee stated that in his fatwas, al-Aqla "preach[ed]
...that it
was the duty ofall Muslim men to prepare themselves forjihad." 

### Id Anotherdetainee has stated that al-Aqla "encouraged young mento travel to [Afghanistan] and fight against Massoud,

30 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~~eM"** who was killing a lot ofMuslims. Al Aqla, who issued the fatwa, told his audience that ifthey did not follow this fatwa they would go to hell." GE 13 at 1.28 Likewise, at least one GTMO detainee has admitted that his decision to go to Afghanistan and fight for the Taliban was influenced by a fatwa issued by al-Jibreen, the other author ofthe fatwa that influenced the petitioner inthis case. 

### See GE 11 at 2. The detainee stated that he listened to 

### 2 Fatwas that were issued, one by Sheikh Mohammed al Imam and another by 

### Sheikh Bin Gibrin. The Fatwas were read at the Jamal Al Din Mosque and were about going to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. The Fatwas had vers[es] from the Koran and talked about the Taliban and its victories. One ofthe Fatwas further explained how to travel to Quetta and get to a large Taliban center where the Taliban would take people to Afghanistan. [The detainee] decided, onhis own, to go to Afghanistan and assist the Talibanbased onthe Fatwas. Id (emphasis added).29 In light ofal-Aqla's and al-Jibreen's documented history ofissuing fatwas encouraging
men to travel to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban, it is more likely than notthat the fatwa

28 Government's Exhibit 12 is an interrogation report reflecting statements made by GTMO detainee Mukhtar YahyaNaji al-Warafi, while Government's Exhibit 13 is an interrogation report reflecting statements made by GTMO detainee Hamud Dakhil al-Jadani. See generally GE 12; GE 13. Theirdescriptions ofthe fatwas issued by al-Aqla are based on their personal knowledge, highly detailed and corroborated by one another. Furthermore, there is no evidence thatthese statements were elicited through undue coercion. Although the petitionerhas pointed out that al-Jadani was offered inducements to cooperate with interrogators and that his statements regardingthe U.S.S. Cole bombing are not credible, Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 67-91 (indeed, the court declines to rely onthose statements), the court shall assess the reliability ofeach piece of information provided by al-Jadani ratherthan making generalized conclusions about his credibility, seeAlmerfediv. Obama, 725 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2010) ("Ratherthan draw a general conclusion as to the credibilityof[al-Jadani], the Courthas examined in detail each of the sixreports relied upon by the government to determine whether the particular information in each should be credited."). In this case, the court concludes that his statementsregardingthe fatwas issued by al-Aqla, like the statements ofal-Warafi, are sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 29 Government's Exhibit 11 is an interrogation report reflecting statements made by detainee alWarafi. SeegenerallyGE 11. There is no evidence that his statements were elicited through inducements orundue coercion. Moreover, the petitioner provides a detailed account ofboth the circumstances under which he heard the fatwas as well as the actual content ofthe fatwas. See GE 11 at 2. Accordingly, these statements are sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 31 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~t3eMT** that influenced thepetitionerto go to Afghanistan called for Muslim men to "assist the Taliban" bytaking up arms against the Northern Alliance.3o Furthermore, giventhepetitioner's documented awareness ofthe conflict in Afghanistan, it is notplausible thatthepetitioner could have understood the fatwa's call to "assistthe Taliban" as anythingotherthan a callto take up
arms. This evidence therefore provides additional support for the government's contention that thepetitionertraveled to Afghanistanto engage injihad. 

### d. ThePetitioner's Travel Route and Travel Companions The government asserts that the route the petitioner followed to Afghanistan isthe same route used byother foreign mujahaddin entering Afghanistan to fight withthe Taliban. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 12-29. The government also notes thatthe petitionerhas admittedthathis traveling companions professedto him thatthey were going to Afghanistanto become martyrs. Id at 19. These facts, the government argues, strongly indicate that the petitionertoo traveled to Afghanistanto engage injihad. Id at 12-29. According to the petitioner, there is no evidence that the route he followed is different from theroute any Arab man oflimited means wouldhave taken into Afghanistan. 

### Id. at 65. Furthermore, the petitioner argues, the fact that he traveled to Afghanistan with self-professedjihadists does not meanthat hewas ajihadist. Id. at 64-65. The petitionerleft Yemen for Afghanistan in the late summerorearly fall of2000. GE 1 at 6. Duringthe initial legofhisjourney, he wasjoinedby an individual named whom hehadmet approximately one week before. GE 9 at 3. The petitioner and_flew from Sana'athrough the United Arab Emirates and on to Karachi, Pakistanbefore eventually The petitioner contends that the fatwas cited by the government are distinguishable because they were issued at differenttimes or in a different form than the fatwa that influenced the petitioner. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 63-64. These differences, however, do not significantly undermine the probative value ofthe fatwas cited by the government, which were written by the same clerics aboutthe same conflict during roughly the same time period. Furthermore, the petitionerhas not presented the court with evidence ofany otherfatwa issued around this period that called for Muslim men to go to Afghanistan but did not advocate taking up arms. 32 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 30UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**SJ3@M~** arriving in Quetta, Pakistan, a city nearthe Afghanistan border. GE 1at 6; GE 3 at 6. Once in Quetta, the two took a taxi to the Daftar al-Taliban, a Taliban-run office and guesthouse, as instructed 

### by. GE 1 at 6; GE 6 at 2. After spending two orthree days at the DaftaralTaliban, the petitioner left for the border along with_andtwo other men, whom he knew 

# as_and_
GE 1a6;GE3at5-6;GE 10at2. _toldthe petitionerthat he was going to Afghanistan forjihad, and all told the petitioner that they wanted to be martyrs. GE 9 at 3; GE 10 at 2. The four men were drivenby taxi from the Daftar al-Taliban to the border town ofSpin Boldak. GE 1at 6; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 4 at 1. When they reached the border, the men exited the taxi and crossed the border on motorcycles. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1. Accordingto the petitioner, motorcycles were not required to stop at the border. GE4 at 1. After crossingthe border, the
men were picked up by the sametaxi and carried onto Kandahar, GE 3 at 

### 6; GE

### 4 at 1, where, as discussed below, they were taken to an a1-Qaida guesthouse, see infraPart IV.B.2.b. The petitioner's travel route
- flying from a Persian Gulfstate through the United Arab Emirates to Karachi and then to the Taliban offices in Quetta, Pakistan

- was common among jihadiststraveling to Afghanistan to train and fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida. See, e.g.,Ai Odah 

### v. UnitedStates, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding thatthe petitioner's travel route from Dubai to Karachi and then Quettabefore crossing the border into Afghanistan supported the inference that he traveled to Afghanistan to engage injihad), aff'd, 611 FJd 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The petitionercontends that the government has not demonstrated that this route differed from the route taken by any other individuals with limited means traveling to Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (a.m.) Tr. at 64-65. Indeed, viewed in isolation, evidence thatthe

33 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE31 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### RIU,MJ'f petitioner utilized a travel route frequented by foreignjihadists may not be particularlyprobative ofthe petitioner's intentions. In this case, however, there are additional facts that colorthe court's assessment ofthe significance ofthe petitioner's travel route. First ofall, the elaborate arrangements made by the Taliban office in Quettato ferry the petitioner across the border without detectionbyborder patrol calls into question the legitimacy ofthe petitioner's motives.31 The fact that the petitioner traveled along this route with individuals whom he knewto bejihadists also casts doubt on his motivations for going to Afghanistan. Finally, there is the fact, discussed below, that the end point ofthe petitioner's travel route was an al-Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan. See infraPart IV.B.2.b. Thus, the evidence that the petitioner followed travel routes frequented by the foreign jihadists entering Afghanistan and traveled with individuals who admitted to the petitionerthat they intended to become martyrs provides additional support for the government's allegationthat the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban oral-Qaida.


### e. Conclusion In summary, the evidence indicates that before the petitioner left for Afghanistan, he developed significant and meaningful relationships with both veteran and futurejihadists in Yemen. The evidence also indicates that the petitioner was influenced to travel to Afghanistan by.a veteran Taliban fighter who told the petitioner about training and fighting with the
The petitioner has suggested that these border-crossing measures may have been motivated by concerns about efficiency. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 71-72; see also Petr'sProposed Findings ofFact

131. Yetthe petitioner stated that after he and his fellow companions were taken across the border on motorcycles, they rejoined thetaxi that had brought them to the border. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 1. Given that the taxi too crossed the border, it is unclear why logic or efficiency would dictate leaving the taxi for the border crossing and then rejoining it after the crossing was completed. Instead, the more reasonable inference is thatthe petitioner and his companions exited the taxi at the borderto escape detection by border patrol guards, who, according to the petitioner, did not stop motorcycles crossingthe border. GE 4 at 1. 34 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 8f3tlM3'f Taliban and who provided thepetitioner a route to Afghanistan that funneled him into the alQaida/Taliban military apparatus. Furthennore,the petitioner admits that he was influenced to go to Afghanistan by a religious fatwa that likely called for him to go to Afghanistan to fight withthe Taliban. Finally, the petitionertraveledto Afghanistan along a route used byjihadists and traveled with individuals who admittedthat they were goingto engage injihad and become martyrs. Based onthis evidence, the court concludes that it is more likely than notthat the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan in orderto fight with the Taliban, al-Qaida or associated enemy forces. 

### 2. The PetitionerStayed at aJ-Qaida and Taliban Guesthouses The government contends that the petitioner stayed at numerous al-Qaida and Taliban guesthouses during his time in Afghanistan. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 2-68. The government asserts that this fact strongly supports its contention that the petitioner was "part of'Talibanoral-Qaida forces. Id; Nov. 15 (a.m.)Tr. at 30-62. Although the petitioner does not dispute thathe stayed at guesthouses inAfghanistan, he denies that these guesthouses were necessarily affiliated with al-Qaida orthe Taliban and contends that the fact that he stayed at these guesthouses provides no support for the government's allegation that he was part ofal-Qaida orthe Taliban. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 69-74; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 3-27 This Circuithas stated that evidence supporting a reasonable beliefthat an individual attended al-Qaida training camps or stayed at al-Qaida guesthouses in Afghanistan is powerful evidence thatthe detainee was "partof'the Taliban, al-Qaida orassociated forces. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2 (observing that "evidence supporting the military's reasonable beliefof either ofthose two facts with respect to a non-citizen seized abroad during the ongoing war on terror would seem to overwhelmingly, ifnot definitively,justify the government's detention of



### 35 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SI!(!JM'f such a non-citizen"); 

### see alsoAI-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108 (observing thatthe petitioner's "voluntary decision to move to an al-Qaida guesthouse
...makes it more likely

- indeed, very likely

- that [the petitioner] was himselfa recruit."); 

### Sulayman, 2010 WL 3069568, at *14-15 (observing that the petitioner's presence at Taliban-affiliated guesthouses supported the legality ofhis detention). The government contends that the petitioner stayed at the following al-QaidaorTalibanaffiliated guesthouses priorto his capture: (1) the Daftar al-Taliban in Quetta in Quetta, Pakistan; (2) the Haji Habash guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan; (3) the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul, Afghanistan; (4) the home 0 in lalalabad, Afghanistan; and (5) guesthouses near the Taliban battle lines. The court considers the evidence supporting these contentions below.


### a. Daftaral-Taliban in 

### Quetta, Pakistan As previously noted, the launchingpoint for the petitioner'sjourney into Afghanistan
was the Daftar al-Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan, which arranged for his entry into Afghanistan and where the petitioner stayed for two to three days before his border crossing. 

### See supra Part IV.B.l.d. The petitioner acknowledged to interrogators that he understood that the DaftaralTaliban operated as a Taliban-run guesthouse, GE 1 at 6; GE 3 at 5-6, a characterization consistent with the account ofat least one other GTMO detainee, 

### see, e.g., GE 13 at 2 (interrogation report in which the detainee describes a fatwa that "explained howto travel to Quetta and getto a large Talibancenterwhere the Taliban would take people to Afghanistan,,).32 Indeed, according to the petitioner, the three other individuals whosejourney into Afghanistan

As previously noted, Government's Exhibit 13 is an interrogation reportreflecting statements made by GTMO detainee al-Jadani. See generally GE 13. AI-Jadani's description ofthe Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan corresponds closely with the petitioner's account, and this corroboration supports the reliability ofboth accounts. 36 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 32UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 8I!18M'I'

was also facilitated by the Daftar al-Taliban admitted that they intended to become martyrs. GE 10 at 2.The petitionerhas suggested thatthe Daftaral-Taliban simply acted as a travel agency for individuals seeking to enterAfghanistan. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at70-71; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 12­ 13. His only support for this assertion, however, is the fact that most taxi drivers in Quetta knew the location ofthe facility and that the Daftar al-Taliban sometimes charged a fee. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 70-71; Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 13; see also GE 15 at 1. This evidence, however, is not necessarily inconsistent with, and hardly overcomes the weight of, the evidence that the Daftar al-Taliban served as a Taliban-run waystation for foreign fighters seeking entry to Afghanistan. See GE 1at 6; GE 3 at 5-6; GE 13 at 2. Thus, the court concludes that the Daftar al-Taliban functioned as a Taliban guesthouse and facilitation hub and that the petitioner knew that these
were the functions ofthe Daftar al-Taliban at the time he stayed there. 

### b. Haji Habash Guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan After arriving in Kandahar, the petitioner stayed for two weeks at the Haji Habash guesthouse. GE 3 at 6; GE 6 at 2. As described in the declaration

# 0_

the Arab House, also known as the Haji Habash House, functioned as a Talibansponsored guesthouse for Arab mujahedeen in Kandahar.
. .. [T]he Arab House was used as a transition point and in-processing location for individuals going to train at various training camps, including al-Farouq. Additionally, all personnel staying at the Arab House were required to turn over their luggage, passports, and any money they possessed. _Decl.at3. Although the petitioner likens the Haji Habash guesthouse to a youth hostel, Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 72-74, the petitioner's own statements belie this characterization. The petitioner acknowledged to interrogators that the Haji Habash guesthouse was a Taliban guesthouse, GE 6 at 2, operated by an individual named_

### id.; GE 2 at 3; GE 3 at 6. The petitioner also

37 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE S@t!ftIi3't' acknowledged that he knew_ was a memberofal-Qaida. GE 2 at 3 ("When he was asked about al-Qaida members he knows, al Sabri said that he only knewone al-Qa'idamember,
a man named_
.... He said he met him in Kandahar, atthe al-Ansar guesthouse."). Indeed, well-documented affiliation with al-Qaidahas been noted by other members ofthis court. 

### See, e.g.,Abdah v. Obama, 2010 WL 3270761, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2010) (describing ole as an al-Qaida facilitator);

### Abdah 

### v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that_ was a memberofal-Qaida and that the Haji Habash guesthouse he ran was affiliated with al-Qaida). The petitioner also stated to interrogators that "[t]here were many people from different nations at the [Haji Habash] guesthouse, and they were there waiting to go ontraining missions at either Al Farouq orAbu Baida.',33 GE 6 at 2. The petitioner stated that when he arrived at the Haji Habash guesthouse, he turned overhis passportto Abu Khloud. GE 6 at 2; 

### see

### als~ Decl. at 3 (noting that collecting passports gave training camp and guesthouse administrators greater control overtrainees and prevented them from easily leaving without approval). Another detainee has stated that the Haji Habash guesthouse was surrounded by walls that were approximately four meters high and that the front entrance was guarded by a Taliban guard armed with a Kalashnikov rifle who searched persons entering the house.34 GE 13 at 2. These descriptions ofthe facility simplydo not correspond with the type ofguesthouses

33 Indeed, the petitioner acknowledged that during the two weeks he stayed at the Haji Habash guesthouse, he was approached by an individual who tried to convince him to train at the alFarouq camp. GE 9 at 3. 34 The level ofdetail contained in al-Jadani's description ofthe Haji Habash guesthouse (he describes the guesthouse's precise location, the surrounding buildings and the layout ofthe facility, and gives a detailed physical description ofthe guard who provided security to the guesthouse), 

### see GE 13 at 2, coupled with the absence ofany evidence ofundue coercion, persuades the courtto rely on the detainee's account. 38 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE S@@It@'f that the petitioner's expert has stated are "mostclosely comparableto the old-fashioned Western concept ofanon-profit youth hostel or YMCA." Carapico Decl. 18(c). The petitionermaintains that even ifthe Haji Habash guesthouse was affiliated with the Taliban oraI-Qaida, not everyone who stayed there was necessarily affiliated withthose forces. Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 72-74; see also PE 32 6.0; PE 35 at 1; PE 115 at 2. The evidence, however, does not supportthe notion that the petitioner was one ofthese unaffiliated wayward travelers. Forinstance, thepetitioner stated to interrogators that during the two weeks he stayed atthe Haji Habash guesthouse, he visited the Islamic Institute across the street daily. GE 3 at 6; GE4 at 1. According to other GTMO detainees, this Institute was headed by Abu Hafs alMauritania, a senior al-Qaida leaderwho associated withhigh-ranking Taliban and al-Qaida leaders. GE 7 at 1; GE 48 at 1_2.35 One detainee reported that "the mission ofthe Institute was to issue religious fatwa[s], teachthe Koran and the Hadith, and to indoctrinatethe young students about going to paradise ifthey give their lives for the Muslim cause." GE 48 at 1-2. This account has been found credible by anotherjudge in this district, who has remarked that "the Institute was sponsored and led by keyAl Qaedafigures" and that "students there were taught Islamic doctrine in a mannertwisted to serve the purposes ofAl Qaeda" and that "attendance at the Institute is certainly consistent with becoming a part ofAl Qaeda." Abdah, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 44.

Government's Exhibit 7 is an interrogation reportcontaining statements made by GTMO detainee Ahmed Abdel Aziz. See generallyGE 7. Aziz admitted to working for Abu Hafs alMauritania atthe Islamic Institute in Kandahar, id. at 1, and provided detailed information about numerous suspectedj ihadists, id. at 1-4. His account ofai-Mauritania's affiliation with the Islamic Institute is corroborated by al-Jadani, who provides detailed information about Abu Hafs, his family and the physical layout ofthe institute. GE48 at 1-2. The court has been presented with no evidence thatthese descriptions were elicited through undue coercion. The court therefore considers both accounts sufficientlyreliable for this analysis. 39 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### 8E@ItEIf' At any rate, the government need not establish that every person who stayed at the Haji Habash guesthouse (or any other guesthouse) was a member ofal-Qaida. Rather, the government's burden is to prove that it is more likely than not that the petitionerwas "part of' alQaida, and evidence that the petitioner knowingly stayed at a guesthouse affiliated with al-Qaida
orthe Taliban, even ifnot dispositive, is undoubtedly probative inthis regard. SeeAl-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2;AI-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1108. Based on the overwhelming weight ofthe evidence, the court concludes that the Haji Habash guesthouse was a Taliban oral-Qaida affiliated guesthouse. The court further concludes thatthe petitionerknew the guesthouse was affiliated withthe Taliban and al-Qaida atthe time he stayed there. This evidence strongly supports the government's assertion that the petitioner
was "part of'al-Qaida at the time.


### c. Hamza aJ-Ghamdi's Guesthouse in KabuJ, Afghanistan After spending two weeks at the Haji Habash guesthouse, the petitionerreceived permission from
_ tojourneyto lalalabad. GE 3 at 6. The petitionertraveled with another guesthouse resident, a Moroccan named_ GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. En route to lalalabad, the petitioner spent two nights at a guesthouse in Kabul operated by an individual named Hamza al-Ghamdi. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. Otherdetainees have acknowledged that al-Ghamdi was a member ofal-Qaida. One detainee described al-Ghamdi as "one ofUsamabin Laden's main [lieutenants]." GE 20 at 2. The detainee stated that al-Ghamdi "[was] one ofthe planners for al-Qaida special operations in Afghanistan and maybe for other countries." 

### Id. Another detainee stated that "AI-Ghamdi decided what training a person received and where they went for training" and that "ifanyone wanted to go somewhere such as Kandahar
... orthe front line, al-Ghamdi would arrange to get



### 40 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE'36 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 8H@M'f them there." GE 22 at 1. 36 Indeed, whenasked by interrogators, the petitionerdid not deny that al-Ghamdi was a member ofal-Qaida. GE24 at 1. The petitionertold interrogators that during this stay at the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, he asked al-Ghamdi for permission to go to the front lines. GE 9 at4. Accordingto thepetitioner, al-Ghamdi deniedthe request "since.he did not have any weaponstraining." Jd. This account is consistent with that ofanother detainee, who stated that hetoo requested pennission from alGhamdi to travel to the front, butthat this request was denied because "AI-Ghamdi told him that he needed refresher training." GE 22 at 2. Thepetitioner spenttwo days atthe al-Ghamdi guesthouse before traveling onto Jalalabad. GE4 at 2; GE 9 at 4. After several months, thepetitioner "decided to return to Al Ghamdi's Arab house in Kabul to try and get to the fighting at the front line." GE9 at 5. During this second stay, which lasted approximately one week, GE 24 at I, AI-Ghamdi granted the petitioner's request and "finally authorized [the petitioner] to go to the 2nd line ofdefensenear Bagram," GE 9 at 6. The petitioner told interrogators thathe "receive[ed] instructions from [alGhamdi] on training sites and front lines." GE 24 at 1. Before the petitionerdeparted the al-Ghamdi guesthouse for the front, he observed an individual named visit the guesthouse. GE 9 at 5.
_ was a coordinator for the September 11 terrorist attacks. 9111 COMMISSION REpORT at 434. According

Government's Exhibit 20 is an interrogation report containing statements made by GTMO detainee Ghaleb Nassar al-Bihani, who provides detailed information regarding al-Ghamdi's history ofaffiliation with al-Qaida, as well as his role within the organization. GE 20 at 1-2. There is no evidence that these statements were elicited through undue coercion. Moreover, al· Bihani's account is consistent with the account provided by al-Jadani, who described alGhamdi's role in facilitating the movement offighters to and from the front lines. GE 22 at 1. AI-Jadani's description ofal-Ghamdi's responsibilities is corroborated by the petitioner, who also acknowledges al-Ghamdi's authorization was necessary to get to the front lines. GE 9 at 6; GE 24 at 1. 41 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~ii"fliI§'f** to the petitioner,
_ would come to the house and greet people before going upstairs to the private offices. GE 9 at 5-6. In light ofthe above, there is overwhelming evidence that the al-Ghamdi guesthouse was
a Taliban or al-Qaida affiliated guesthouse. Furthermore, the petitionerplainly knewthat the guesthouse had these affiliations, as he understood that al-Ghamdi was a member ofal-Qaida, knewthat al-Ghamdi associated with seniormembers ofal-Qaida, asked al-Ghamdi twice for permission to travel to the front and returnedto the al-Ghamdi guesthouse for the express purpose ofreaching the front. d.
_ House in Jalalabad,Afghanistan The petitioner stated to interrogators that after spending two days at the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, he traveled to lalalabad with_,who had accompanied him onhisjourney from the Haji Habash guesthouse to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in Kabul. GE4 at 2; GE 10 at 2. In lalalabad, the petitioner**contacted~** friend, GE 4 at 2; GE 10 at 2. According to the petitioner,. and_ had fought together with the Taliban and remained very close. GE 9 at 4; GE 10 at 2. The petitioner stated to interrogators that he lived withlll

_ for several months before returning to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in an effort to getto the front. GE 4 at 2; GE 9 at 4.; GE 10 at 2. Although the government contends tha_ house was "just another al-Qaeda and Taliban guesthouse," Nov. 10 (p.m.) Tr. at 43-50, they have offered little to supportthat assertion. The governmenthas provided no evidence that otherTalibanor al-Qaida fighters stayed at_ house during the time that the petitioner was there.

### See~ecl. at 1 (notingthat most guesthouses "functioned as bed-down locations" forjihadist fighters). Nor is there any evidence that_house served as a training camp facilitation hub, meeting

42 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 8H@MIf place for al-Qaida leaders or waystation for fighters on their way to the frontlines. See id (describing other functions served by al-Qaida guesthouses). Accordingly, the government has not established that_ house was a Taliban or al-Qaida guesthouse. The significance ofthis finding, however, is tempered by two additional findings. First,
as discussed below, the evidence indicates that during at leastpart ofthe period that the petitioner claims tohave been living with_ the petitioner was, in fact, receiving military training at an al-Qaida training camp. See infra Part IV.B.3. Indeed, despite his demonstrated ability to recall minute details about other aspects ofhis time in Yemen and Afghanistan,37 the petitioner appears to have provided little information about the many months he allegedly spent with_. 

### See, e.g., GE 4 at 2 (the petitioner stated that he "didnot work orreceive any training while living with_ Furthermore, for whatevertime he did spend at_ house, the petitionerremained intimately associated withjihadistforces.**~as** himselfa former Taliban fighter, GE 10 at 2, whose principal activity was, accordingto the petitioner, disbursing funds that he received from Saudi Arabia, GE 9 at 5; GE 41 at 2. Although the petitioner statedthat these funds were distributed to orphanages and the parents ofchildren studying Quran, GE 6 at 2; GE 41 at 2, he stated that those funds may have gone to other sources as well, GE41 at 2. Indeed, while**describing~istribution** offunds during one interrogation, the petitioner acknowledged, "Ido not know**i~is** a member ofal Qa'ida." GE 41 at 2.

See, e.g., GE I at 2-3 (petitionerrecalled the name ofthe two individuals who flew with him from Saudi Arabiato Sana'a, the name ofthe hotel where he stayed in Sana'aand the amountof money he paid the taxi to drive him to Ta'iz); GE 3 at4-5 (petitionerrecalled detailed biographical information about numerous members ofthe Jamil boardinghouse); GE 9 at 4-5 (petitionerprovided a detailed description ofthe physical layout ofthe al-Ghamdi guesthouse and surrounding grounds, including its location, the placement ofvehicles and guards, despite the fact that he stayed there less than two weeks). 43 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 37UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE iliilaliiT 

### Regardless ofwhether_was a member ofthe Taliban or al-Qaida, there is evidence tha_had ongoing relationships withjihadists. The petitionerrecalledthat on
one occasion while he was living there,**~as** 

### visited by four Tunisians who "were in Jalalabad for Jihad." GE 6 at 2. One ofthese Tunisians was a small anns dealer named
_

_ Id; 

### GE 4 at 2. According to the petitioner, he purchased apistol from al-Tunisi and**he,~d_'would** 

### travel to an area called Negim ai-Jihad located between eight (8) and ten (10) kilometers from Jalalabad" where there was a public shooting range. GE 4 at 2­ 

### 3. During this period, the petitionerwas also visited by an associate from Sana'a,. who was accompanied by an individual name GE 3 at 7; GE 9 at 5 .•

_ whom the petitionerhad met once in Sana'athrough_collected funds for the jihadin Chechnya. GE 3 at 7; GE 9 at 5. As previously noted, the petitionerhas acknowledged that_was a member ofal-Qaida. GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2.
_ informed the petitionerthat his fonner housemate, al-Khamri, had been one ofthe suicide bombers during the Cole 

### attack. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5. Lastly, the court notes that after allegedly spending several months with_ the petitionerreturned to al-Ghamdi's guesthouse in Kabul, at which time he received authorization to travel to the front. GE 9 at 5-6. Had the petitioner truly dissociated himselffrom the Taliban and al-Qaida during the months when he was allegedly living with_ and failed to address the lack oftraining that had previouslyprevented him from going to the front, it seems unlikely that al-Ghamdi would have immediately welcomed him back to the guesthouse and authorized him to go to the Taliban battle lines.

44 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**"~~M!Y** Accordingly, even**i~** house was not a formal al-Qaida orTaliban guesthouse, the time the petitioner spentthere does not constitute time when he was dissociated from alQaida or the Taliban. To the contrary, it appears that during this time, he remained very much a part ofthe al-Qaida and Taliban apparatus, continuing his interactions with establishedjihadists before eventually returning to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse in an effortto get to the front.


### e.

## ~uesthouse Near the Frontlines As noted, the petitioner has statedthat after spending several months in Jalalabad, he returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, at whichtime he received authorization to the Taliban battle lines. GE 9 at 2. The details ofthe petitioner's accounts ofhis time at the front are not entirely consistent. See GE 4 at 2; GE 6 at 2; GE 9 at 6. These accounts do, however, suggest that after he returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse, he stayed in at least one otherTaliban and alQaida guesthouse nearthe front. See GE 6 at 2 ("[The petitioner] traveled to Kabul viataxi and stayed at a guesthouse for seven (7) days. Afterwards, [the petitioner] ventured to another guesthouse located near the thirdlines for ten (10) days."); GE 4 at 2 (interrogation report in which the petitioner states that onhis way to the front, he stayed at a guesthouse operatedby an individual named_a Taliban fighter who hadbeen in charge ofadefense fighting line outside Bagram). Accordingly, the evidenceindicates that even afterhis extended stay in Jalalabad, the petitioner stayed at additional Taliban and al-Qaida affiliated guesthouses inhis effort to get to the frontline. f. 

### Conclusion In sum, the evidence indicates that throughout his time inAfghanistan, the petitioner stayed at multiple guesthouses that he knew were affiliated with al-Qaida and theTaliban. The fact that one ofthe houses he stayed at may not have been a formal al-Qaida guesthouse hardly



### 45 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE Sl'3t:ftt3'f indicates that he had dissociated himselffrom the Taliban or al-Qaida. This evidence strongly indicates thatthe petitioner was "part of' al-Qaida during this period. 

### 3. The PetitionerSoughtOut and Received Military-Style Training in Afghanistan The government contends that the petitioner applied for and received military-style training from the Taliban or al-Qaidaduring his time in Afghanistan. Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 63­ 79; Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 3-20, 36-51. This evidence, the government contends, provides further support for the government's allegation thatthe petitioner was "part of'the Taliban, al-Qaidaor associated enemy forces. Nov. 15 (a.m.) Tr. at 63-79; Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 3-20,36-51. The petitionerresponds that the governmenthas not proventhat he received any military training. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 20-35. The petitioner further contends that even ifhe did receive such training, that fact would notestablish that he was part ofthe Taliban oral-Qaida. Id


### a. ThePetitioner's

### Kunyas The government has offered evidencethat terrorists and insurgents commonly use kunyas, which are assumed names orpseudonyms used to conceal the individual's true identity. GE 1 ecl. I") at 2.38 In Muslimculture, the kunya is traditionally an honorific indicating that the person is either a mother or father and is constructed using the name ofthe first-born son or eldest daughter iftheperson has no sons. Id. The kunya for a man is "Abu," meaning "father of," plus the name ofthe first born. Id Terrorists, onthe otherhand,
use kunyas without regard to children's names or whetherthe individual has children. Id Kunyas are often used by terrorists "as a security, denial and deception measure." Id



### 46 UNCLASSIFIE;DIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 38UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### S!:t!Mif In this case, the petitioner, who has no children, GE 27 at 1, has acknowledged that while in Afghanistan, he used the kunya "Abu Abdullah." GE 9 at 4; see also GE 27 at 1 (noting that the petitioner admitted using the kunya "AbuAbdullah" even before leaving for Afghanistan). Furthermore, it is undisputed that the petitioner also used the kunya during the time he was in Afghanistan. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. 21-22, 34, 37.

b. The Petitioner'sApplication to Attend an al-Qaida Training Camp In support ofits contentionthat the petitionerreceived military training, the government has submitted an FBI memorandum, dated March 27, 2002, which states that in December 2001, coalition forces "recovered numerous documents from an 'Arab' office in Kandahar, Afghanistan." GE 25 at 1. According to the memorandum, the documents recovered included "applications for training at Al Qaedacamps." 

### [d. The FBI memorandum thenprovides an English-language translation ofthese applications. See generally id. The FBI memorandum indicates that one ofthe individuals who applied to attend an aIQaida training camp was GE 25 at 4. The applicant indicates that he was born in 1977, hails from Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and has a ninth grade education. [d. The applicant also indicates that he was referred to the camp by two individuals,

_ and_. [d. As previously noted_is an individual whom the

47 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~@M.** petitioner met in Sana'a**through~d** whomthe petitioner has acknowledged was a member ofal-Qaida. GE 3 at 5; GE 36 at 3; GE 41 at 2. The applicant also lists the names and telephone numbers oftwo brothers,_

### and_ GE 25 at 4. This informationtoo is consistent with biographical informationprovided by the petitioner. GE 1 at 1-3; GE 3 at 3. The application concludes by asking for "Plans after training," to which this applicant responded, "Jihad." GE 25 at 4. Itis clearthatthe who submitted this training camp application is the petitioner. Eachpiece ofbiographical information contained inthe application, including the names ofhis brothers, his city oforigin and his level ofeducation, corresponds with information that the petitionerhas provided to interrogators. Indeed, the petitioner does not dispute that he is the individual referred to in the application. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at21-22,34. Accordingly, the governmenthas establishedthatthe petitioner submitted an application to attend an al-Qaidatraining camp. 39 The petitioner offers two arguments to diminish the significance ofthis evidence. First, he contends that even though the application states that the petitioner's intention was to engage in "jihad" after the completion ofhis training, "jihad"does not necessarily mean armed conflict. See Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 22-23; see also PE 95 18; PE 138 at 1. Although the courtdoes not doubt that the term "jihad" can encompass different meanings in different contexts, insofar as this particulartraining camp application is concerned, the petitioner's argument is implausible. As the FBI memorandum clearly indicates, each training camp application asked the applicant The FBI memorandum specifies when and where the training camp applications were recovered and who recovered the materials. GE 25 at I. Furthermore, the petitioner does not dispute that the application 0 described in the FBI memorandum reflects accurate, detailed biographical information regarding the petitioner. Id. at 4. Moreover, the information contained in other applications translated in the FBI memorandum corresponds with information recorded in other al-Qaida training documents. See infra Part IV.BJ.c. Accordingly, the FBI memorandum is sufficiently reliable for the court's consideration. 48 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 39UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### 8@@M.,
not onlyto provide background infonnation, but also specifically directed each applicantto describe his "Previous military service." GE 25 at 1-4. Moreover, it is well established that alQaidatraining camps were designed "totrain and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists." 9/11 COMMISSION REpORT at 66. Accordingly, the court concludes that by indicating on his training camp application that he intended to engage in 'Jihad" following his training, the petitionerwas expressing a desire to take up anns with al-Qaida orthe Taliban. The petitioner also contends that even ifhe filled out an application to attend an al-Qaida training camp, it does not necessarily follow that he actually attended the camp. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 21-22. Noting that the date ofthe application corresponds with the time that he was atthe Haji Habash guesthouse, the petitioner claims thatthe application musthave been completed when he was approached at that guesthouse by a training camp recruiter. [d. Because the petitioner ultimately declined the offer to attend the training camp, he argues, the application submitted as part ofthis unsuccessful recruitment effort does not showthat he attended an alQaidatraining camp. 

### [d. The petitioner, however, has offered no evidence to substantiate his theory thatthe training camp application was submitted as part ofthis recruitment effort. Furthennore, even if the petitioner's training camp application does not conclusively prove that he received training from al-Qaida, it certainly offers significant support for that allegation, particularly in light ofthe detailed personal infonnation contained therein. Indeed, ifthepetitioner had no intention of attending an al-Qaida training camp, it is not clear why he would provide such detailed biographical infonnation about himself, including,the names and telephone numbers ofhis brothers in Saudi Arabia and the name ofhis associate from

### th~oardinghouse,_ See GE 25 at4. Accordingly, the fact that the petitionerfilled out an application to attend an al49 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE40 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### SF3CH'f Qaidatraining camp strongly supports the government's allegation that he sought out militarystyle training in Afghanistan.


### c. Records ofthe Petitioner's Training The government contends that the petitioner'sreceipt ofmilitary-style training is also documented in a ninety-two page collection ofdocuments, which, the government asserts, are English-language translations ofinternal Taliban oral-Qaida records ("the AFGP Documents"). 

### See generally GE 29. A corresponding DIA record, which the government submitted as a supplemental exhibit,40 indicates thatthe AFGP Documentsconsist ofEnglish-language translations ofArabic-language documents captured by coalition forces during Operation Enduring Freedom.41 GE 70 at 1. Therecord seems to reflect that these documents were recovered from the "Director ofAI-Qa'ida Security Training Office" and that they are similarto other materials recovered from enemy forces. Id. at 2. The DIA, whichprepared the translation, notes that the AFGP Documents "contain[] [t]he names ofthe students admitted to the training in the tactics of[a]rtillery, communication, infantry and their distribution. The training starting times, programs, instructions about the subject matters are discussed too." Id. at 2. The AFGP Documentscontain multiple records concerning the petitioner. Forexample, the exhibit contains several rosters of"arriving brothers," organized by their date ofarrival. GE 29 at48-53. One ofthese arriving brothers is

In its post-merits hearing submission, the petitioner complains that GE70 was not admitted into the record. The hearing transcript, however, plainly documents thatthe court pennitted the introduction ofthis exhibit as rebuttal evidence overthe objection ofthe petitioner's counsel. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 39-41.
4\ Operation Enduring Freedom is the military operation commenced b the United States and coalition forces a ainst Taliban and al-Qaida forces in ofthe operation is set forth in the declaration ofLieutenant Colonel Jerry Brooks, a veteran Anny historian with twenty-three years ofactive and reserve Anny service. 

### See generally id. 50 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**S~t:M"** who, according to the roster, has a high school education, no profession and was referred by an individual named 

### Id at 52. The infonnation contained in this entry is consistent withthe infonnation recorded in the petitioner's training camp application, GE 25 at 4, and with infonnationprovided by the petitionerto interrogators, GE I at I; GE 3 at I. That the petitioner is listed as an "arriving brother" on an al-Qaidaroster captured with dozens ofother documents concerning al-Qaida trainees suggests that the petitioner sought out and received training from al-Qaida orthe Taliban. The AFGP Documents also containrecords reflecting the petitioner's attendance and completion ofvarious training courses. 

### See generally GE 29. One such record is a training roster issued by the "Office ofMujahadeen Affairs." 

### Id at 34. The roster indicates tha_

### ~as scheduledto attend "Communication Class #2" beginning in February 2001. 

### ld The AFGP Documents also include a memorandum issued bythe "AnsarAllah Base" onAugust 24,200I, listing a group ofindividuals, including who had "graduated from Anti AirMissiles" and who would therefore "have priorit[y] injoiningthe Artillery Sessions" which was to start shortly. 

### ld. at 84. These internal al-Qaida records indicate that after applying to attend an al-Qaida training camp, the petitioner did, in fact, receive such training. The petitioner contends that the goyernment has not established the reliability ofthe AFGP Documents. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 23-24. The court disagrees. As previously noted, the government has submitted an internal DIA record indicating that the exhibit represents a DIA translation oftraining records captured during Operation Enduring freedom. GE 70 at 1-2. Although the petitionerpoints out that the DIA record indicates that the ninety-two page exhibit represents intelligence that has not beenevaluated, the Circuit has made clearthat "raw"



### 51 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

### S@@M'f intelligence is not inherently unreliable. Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 429 (citing Parhat, 532 F.3d at 836). The petitioner also notes that the DIA record does not specify when and where the AFGP Documents were recovered. See GE 70 at 1. Yet the absence ofthis information, while significant, does not necessarily undermine the reliability ofthe AFGP Documents, particularly in light ofthe fact that the information contained in the document is corroborated by other materials in the record. See Barhoumi, 609 F.3d at 429 (observing that "an intelligence report's reliability canbe assessed by comparison to 'exogenous information'" (quoting Parhat, 532 F.3d at 848)). Aspreviously noted, the petitioner's biographical informationrecorded inthe AFGP Documents' roster of"arrivingbrothers," GE 29 at 52, is consistent with that provided in the petitioner's training camp application, GE 25 at 4. Likewise, the other rosters of"arriving brothers" in the AFGP Documents contain information about trainees that also matches up with information recorded in the training camp applications translated in the FBI memorandum. Compare GE 29 at48,52

The overlap in the information set forth in the AFGP Documents and the FBI memorandum provides substantial evidence oftheir authenticity and reliability. The information in the AFGP Documents (and the FBI memorandum) is also corroborated bythe petitioner's own statements. For instance, according to thepetitioner, one of the individuals who traveled with him from the Daftar al-Taliban to the Haji Habash guesthouse
was a twenty-three year old Yemeni man he knew**as~E** 

### 1at 6-7. 

### The
_

_ listed onthe FBI memorandum is described as a twenty-three year old Yemeni man with an occupation in computers referred

### bY~ho arrived inAfghanistan in

52 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~~eM3T** September 2000, the same time as the petitioner. GE 25 at 2. listed
onthe AFGP Documents training roster is described as a GE 29 at 48. These corroborating details strongly suggest that

# the_who traveled with the petitioner is the
same man listed onthe al-Qaida training roster and the training camp applications, and provide further support for the reliability ofthe AFGP Documents and the FBI memorandum. The petitioner also contends that there is no proofthat the who was scheduled to attend a communications class, GE 29 at 34, and the who had completed a course in anti-aircraft missiles and was scheduled to begin artillery training, 

### id at 84, refer to the petitioner. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 24-28. The petitionerpoints outthatthe names
are both
common names that are used in the kunyas ofmany individuals listed in the AFGP Documents. The petitioner, however, has not identified any instance in which an individual listed as
an "arriving brother" ortraining camp attendee inthe AFGP Documents used the kunya
_

_ Moreover, the petitionerdoes not dispute that the entry for

onthe al-Qaida training roster found inthe AFGP Documents refers to the petitioner. GE 29 at 52. Indeed, given the overlap between the information in that entry, the training camp application, see GE 25 at 4, andthe petitioner's statements to interrogators, see GE 1 at 1-3, the evidence strongly indicates that the individual listed on the training roster is the petitioner. Having established that at least one ofthe references t inthe AFGP

The closestthe petitionercomes to such evidence is an entry on an "arrivin brothers" list in which one individual lists as a reference an individual named GE 29 at 55. While this evidence supports the uncontroversial proposition t att ere were 0 er mdividuals using the kunyas similarto that ofthepetitioner, it provides little support for the propositionthat there were other individuals being processed for training at al-Qaida training camps around the same period using that kunya. 

### 53 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 42UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~@M'f** Documents refers to the petitioner, the court concludes that it is more likely than not thatthe otherreferences to that 

### kunya contained in the same collection ofmaterials also refer to the petitioner, rather than some unidentified individual also using the same 

### kunya. 

### d. Authorization to Travel to theFront Finally, the fact that al-Ghamdi subsequently authorized the petitionerto go to the Taliban battle lines also supportsthe government's contention that he received military-style trainingfrom al-Qaida. Aspreviously noted, the petitionerhas stated that whenhe first stayed at al-Ghamdi's guesthouse in Kabul, he requested permission to go to the front. GE 9 at 4. AIGhamdi denied that request "sincehe did not have any weapons training." 

### Id. This account is,
as previously noted, consistent with that ofanother detainee, who stated that al-Ghamdi similarly denied his request to go to the front becausehe needed "refresher training." GE 22 at 2. According to that detainee, al-Ghamdi sent him to the Malik training camp near Kabul. 

### Id. In this case, the petitioner stated that several months after al-Ghamdi denied his request, he returned to the al-Ghamdi guesthouse and again requested permission to go to the front. GE 9 at 4. During this second visit, al-Ghamdi authorized the petitionerto go to the battle lines. 

### Id. The reasonable inference from the petitioner's own account is that between his first and second stays at al-Ghamdi's guesthouse, he remedied the deficiency identified by al-Ghamdi by obtaining weapons training. The fact that thepetitioner reached the Taliban battle lines also undermines the petitioner's argument that not everyone who received training from al-Qaida orthe Taliban went
onto become a member ofthose forces. See Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 31-35. The petitionerhas presented substantial evidence that not every individual who attended an al-Qaidatraining camp would go on to become partofthose forces. See, e.g., PE 19 at 2, 7; 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT

54 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SJ!len'f
at 67. In thepetitioner's case, however, the petitioner, after receiving training, did not distance himselffrom the Taliban or al-Qaida; to the contrary, he "decided to return to Al Ghamdi's Arab house in Kabul to try and get to the fighting at the front line." GE 9 at 5.


### e. Conclusion Based onthe evidence presented by the parties, it is more likely than not that the petitioner applied for and received military-style training from the Taliban or al-Qaida during his time inAfghanistan. This fact strongly indicates that the petitioner was "part of'al-Qaida, the Taliban orassociated enemy forces. SeeAl-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873 n.2. 

### 4. The PetitionerTraveled to Taliban Battle Lines The government contends that the petitioner spent time at Talibanbattle lines and that this fact further demonstrates thathewas "part of'al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated enemy forces. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 51-61; 71-74. Although the petitioner does not dispute that he went to the front, he contends that he traveled there essentially as a tourist and that this evidence does not demonstrate that he was affiliated with the Taliban or al-Qaida. 

### Id. at 62-71. The petitionerrepeatedly admitted to interrogators that in or around May 2001, he traveled to the Taliban battle lines. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5-6. In one interrogation, the petitioner stated that after returning to al-Ghamdi's guesthouse "to try and get to the fighting at the front line," GE 9 at 5, he received permission to "to go to the 2nd line ofdefense near Bagram. [The petitioner] wentthere to support the Taliban who werepositioned to fight Masood's Northern Alliance troops," 

### id. at 6. In another interrogation, the petitioner stated that he "began traveling to Bagram to assist Taliban fighters in their efforts against the Northern Alliance fighters." GE 4 at 3. The petitionerstated that he spent a week at the fighting line, althoughhe did not see any exchange ofgunfire. 

### [d. In yet another interrogation, the petitioner

55 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE SIe@MIf stated that during thetime he was in lalalabad, he "traveled to the frontline near Kabul. [The petitioner] acknowledged thatthere was fighting going on there." GE 3 at 6. Thepetitioner's admissions establish not only that he wentto the front, butthat he went there to support Taliban forces. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5. Furthermore, the evidencethat the petitionerrequested authorization to go to the front, GE 9 at 5-6, received instruction from alGhamdi regarding battle lines, GE 24 at 1, followed al-Ghamdi's directives about when he could and could not go to the front, GE 9 at 4-6, and exchanged communications with his compatriot Abu Ghanem atthe front, GE 6 at 2-3, strongly suggests that the petitioner was not acting as a "freelancer," but was instead operating within the Taliban oral-Qaida command structure as "partof"those forces, 

### see Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725;

### Awad, 608 F.3d at 11. Toblunt the significance ofthis evidence, thepetitionerhas suggested at various times that he went to the Taliban battle lines out ofcuriosity, orto find his former acquaintance, Abu Ghanem, or as a "Guccijihadist"tourist.43 These contentions are notplausible. As onejudgein this district has remarked, "[i]tis inconceivablethatthe Taliban would allow an outsiderto stay attheir front line campjustto see what the fighting was like. An outsider, whose trustworthiness and loyalty are unknown, poses a threatto a military camp." 

### Al-Waraji, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 42;


### see also Sulayman, 2010 WL 3069568, at *18 ("[T]he Court cannot fathom a situation whereby Taliban fighters would allowan individual to infiltrate theirposts near a battle zone unless that person was understood to be a 'part of the Taliban."). The court concurs withthis assessment. In fact, this petitioner admitted in two separate interrogations that he went to the front to assist

The petitionerhas submitted a declaration from an expert in Islamic cultures, who states that in the 1980s, foreign volunteers, known as "Guccijihadists,"traveled to Afghanistan on "jihad tours" to fulfill their religious obligation to engage injihad. PE 42 at 4. Although the petitioner suggests that hemay have been such a tourist, there is no evidencethat these ''jihad tours" continued into the 1990s and 2000s, nor is there any evidence that "Guccijihadists"ofthe 1980s stayed in Taliban guesthouses orreceived military training like the petitioner. 56 UNCLASSIFIEOIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 43UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**~:eeM"t'** Taliban fighters. GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 5. The court therefore concludes that evidence thatthe petitioner spent time at Talibanbattle lines strongly indicates that he was "partof'the Taliban, al-Qaida orassociated enemy forces. 

### S. ThePetitionerRemained "Partof' the Taliban, al-Qaida orAssociated Enemy Forces at theTime ofHis Capture The government contends that the petitioner remained "part of'those forces atthe time he was apprehended. Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 74-86; Nov. 16 Ir. at 10-12. Indeed, the government asserts that the petitioner was captured after fleeing the battle ofTora Bora, where he had fought alongside the Taliban and al-Qaida against coalition forces. 

### Id. Thepetitionermaintains that there is no evidence that he was "partof'the Taliban, al-Qaida orassociated forces at the time he was captured and that the government's contentionthat the petitioner fought at ToraBora is based on pure speculation. Nov. 16 Tr. at 3-10. As noted, it is not enough for the governmentto show simplythat the petitionerwas, at
one time, a member ofthe Taliban, al-Qaidaofassociated forces; to be lawfully detained, the petitionermusthave been "part of'those forces at the time ofhis capture. 

### See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 751; 

### Gherebi, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 71. "Apetitioner who may once have been part ofal-Qaida
orthe Taliban can show thathe was no longerpart ofsuch an entity atthetime ofcapture by showing that he took affinnative actions to abandon his membership." 

### Khalifv. Obama,2010 

### WL 2382925, at *2 

### (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) (citing

### AIGinco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128-30 

### (D.D.C. 2009)). The petitioner stated to interrogators that after spending time atthe front in the summer of2001, he returned to_ house in Afghanistan. GE 3 at 6; GE 4 at 3; GE 9 at 6. Accordingto the petitioner, around the timethat coalition forces approached lalalabad inthe fall of200

# 1_
instructed the petitionerto travel with an Afghan guide to a village nearthe

57 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 

## steen"
Pakistan border. GE 6 at 3; GE 9 at 6. The petitioner claims that he waited in that village for almost a month for_to arrive with the petitioner's passport. GE 

### 6 at 

### 3; GE 

### 9 at 

### 6. The petitionerthen traveled into Pakistan, where he was arrested by Pakistani authorities. GE 6 at 3; GE 

### 9 at 6. The petitioner's account is not credible. Although thepetitioner claims to have stayed in the border village for nearly a full month, he asserted to interrogators that he could notrecall the
name ofthe village. GE 3 at 6.44 This assertion is difficult to square with the petitioner's demonstrated ability to recall specific details about names and locations. 

### See infra Part IV.B.2.d. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the petitionerwould have waited a month in a hostile
war zone simply to retrieve his passport, given thathe had entered the country surreptitiouslyin the first place. 

### See supra Part IV.B.I.d. Nonetheless, the government has offered no persuasive evidence that the petitionerwas, in actuality, fleeing after fighting in the battle ofTora Bora. Althoughthe governmentpoints out that the timing ofthe petitioner's retreat to Pakistan is consistent withhaving fought in the battle ofTora Bora, Nov. 15 (p.m.) Tr. at 85-86, it is undisputed that around that time, coalition forces
were advancing on Jalalabad. Accordingly, the timing ofthe petitioner's decision to flee to Pakistan is equally consistent with an individual fleeing from oncoming conflict. The governmenttherefore has not establishedby a preponderance ofthe evidence thatthe petitioner fought in the battle ofTora Bora. It is, however, not necessary for the government to prove that the petitioner fought at Tora Borato demonstrate that he was "part of' al-Qaida or the Taliban at the time ofhis capture. The government has already offered compelling evidence that the petitionertraveled to Afghanistan specifically to fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida, pointing outthat the petitioner had This interrogation occurred in May 2002, less than six months after his capture. See GE 3 at 1. 58 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE 44UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**8~@M.** extensive and lasting associations with al-Qaida associates prior to his departure and traveled with individuals who acknowledged thatthey were going to Afghanistan to become martyrs. See supra Part IV.B.l. The government also demonstrated that the petitioner stayed at multiple Taliban and al-Qaida guesthouses and received military-style training during his time in Afghanistan. See supra Part IV.B.2-3. Furthermore, the petitionerrepeatedly admitted thatjust months before his capture, he had been at the Taliban battle lines where he had gone to assist Taliban forces fighting against the Northern Alliance. See supra Part IV.B.4. Viewed as a whole, the evidence plainly establishesthat at least by the summer of2001, the petitionerwas "partof' al-Qaida, the Taliban or associated enemy forces. There is no evidence that the petitionertook any steps to dissociate himselffrom these forces in the intervening months before his capture. SeeAiGinco, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 128-30. Even ifthe petitioner did stay with
_ during those months, that fact alone is hardly inconsistent with remaining "partof' the Taliban oral-Qaida; as previously discussed, after allegedly living

## wit~or several months on a prior occasion, the petitioner was permitted to stay at the al-Ghamdi guesthouse again and received authorization to travel to the front. See supra Part IV.B.2.d. The petitioner, whose descriptions ofhis time with_ are strikingly vague when compared to his accounts ofother periods in Yemen and Afghanistan, has provided no evidence thathe established contacts with anyone inAfghanistan outside the Talibanlal-Qaida network, that he took any steps to obtain employment orthathe took any other affirmative actions inconsistent with being "part of' al-Qaida. In sum, the court concludes that the petitioner traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban or al-Qaida, stayed at Taliban or al-Qaida guesthouses, received military training at alQaida facility, traveled to the battle lines and was captured during the same armed conflict. Even

59 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASEUNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE**SB@RfB~** ifnone ofthese findings would independentlyjustify his detention, viewed as a whole, they plainly establishthat the petitioner was "part of"the Taliban, al-Qaida orassociatedenemy during his time in Afghanistan. Moreover, there is no evidence thatthe petitioner dissociated with these enemy forces at any point prior to his capture. The weight ofthe evidence therefore supports the conclusion that the petitionerremained "partof' al-Qaida orthe Taliban at the time ofhis capture and thathe istherefore lawfully detained.



### V. CONCLUSION The government has establishedby apreponderance ofthe evidence that the petitioner
was "partof'the Taliban, al·Qaida or associated enemy forces and is therefore lawfully detained. The courttherefore denies the petition for a writofhabeas corpus. An Order consistent withthis Memorandum Opinion is issued separately and contemporaneouslythis 3rd day ofFebruary, 2011.

RICARDO M. URBINA United States District Judge



### 60 UNCLASSIFIEDIIFOR PUBLIC RELEASE