# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 229/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0987
  doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2013.229.mlt |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 568 ta' Awwissu 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0987

doi:10.3000/19770987.C_2013.229.mlt

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 568 ta' Awwissu 2013

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| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 229/01 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti dwar l-abbozz tar-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea għal għajnuna de minimis | 1 |
| 2013/C 229/02 | Abbozz Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru .../... tas-17 ta’ Lulju 2013 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea dwar l-għajnuna de minimis
   (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 229/01

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti dwar l-abbozz tar-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea għal għajnuna de minimis

de minimis

1

2013/C 229/02

Abbozz Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru .../... tas-17 ta’ Lulju 2013 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea dwar l-għajnuna de minimis
   (
  1
  )

de minimis

1

1

| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 229/03 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 10 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI |
| 2013/C 229/04 | Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati Membri dwar l-għeluq tas-sajd | 11 |
| 2013/C 229/05 | Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati Membri dwar l-għeluq tas-sajd | 11 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA |
| 2013/C 229/06 | Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati tal-EFTA dwar għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija skont l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1 j tal-Anness XV tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni (Regolament għal Eżenzjoni Ġenerali Sħiħa) skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat) | 12 |
| 2013/C 229/07 | L-ebda għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE | 16 |
| 2013/C 229/08 | L-ebda għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE | 17 |
| 2013/C 229/09 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat rigward il-finanzjament tas-Sala tal-Kunċerti u Ċentru tal-Konferenzi ta' Harpa | 18 |
| 2013/C 229/10 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lin-Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA) | 31 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 229/03

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

10

INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI

2013/C 229/04

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati Membri dwar l-għeluq tas-sajd

11

2013/C 229/05

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati Membri dwar l-għeluq tas-sajd

11

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

2013/C 229/06

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati tal-EFTA dwar għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija skont l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1 j tal-Anness XV tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni (Regolament għal Eżenzjoni Ġenerali Sħiħa) skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat)

12

2013/C 229/07

L-ebda għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE

16

2013/C 229/08

L-ebda għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE

17

2013/C 229/09

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat rigward il-finanzjament tas-Sala tal-Kunċerti u Ċentru tal-Konferenzi ta' Harpa

18

2013/C 229/10

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lin-Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA)

31

| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | ATTI OĦRAJN |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2013/C 229/11 | Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel | 43 |

V   Avviżi

ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2013/C 229/11

Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel

43

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| | (1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE |

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(1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
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MT

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II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/1

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Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti dwar l-abbozz tar-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea għal għajnuna de minimis

2013/C 229/01

Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-abbozz ta’ Regolament lil:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Posta elettronika: stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Posta elettronika: stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

Numru ta’ referenza: HT.3572 — SAM — de minimis review

It-test jinsab ukoll fuq il-websajt:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_second_de_minimis/index_en.html

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| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/1 |
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8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/1

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ABBOZZ REGOLAMENT TAL-KUMMISSJONI (UE) Nru .../...

tas-17 ta’ Lulju 2013

dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea dwar l-għajnuna de minimis

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2013/C 229/02

IL-KUMMISSJONI EWROPEA

Wara li kkunsidrat it-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u b'mod partikolari l-Artikolu 108(4) tiegħu,

Wara li kkunsidrat ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 994/98 tas-7 ta' Mejju 1998 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 92 u 93 tat-Trattat li jistabbilixxi l-Komunità Ewropea għal ċertu kategoriji ta' għajnuna Statali orizzontali (1),

Wara li ppubblikat abbozz ta’ dan ir-Regolament (2),

Wara li kkonsultat il-Kumitat Konsultattiv dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat,

Billi:

| (1) | Il-finanzjament mill-Istat li jissodisfa l-kriterji tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea (“it-Trattat”) jikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-Istat u jeħtieġ jiġi nnotifikat lill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 108(3) tat-Trattat. Madankollu, skont l-Artikolu 109 tat-Trattat, il-Kunsill jista’ jiddetermina x’inhuma l-kategoriji tal-għajnuna li huma eżentati minn dan ir-rekwiżit ta’ notifika. Skont l-Artikolu 108(4) tat-Trattat il-Kummissjoni tista’ tadotta regolamenti dwar dawn il-kategoriji ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat. Bis-saħħa tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 994/98 il-Kunsill iddeċieda, f’konformità mal-Artikolu 109 tat-Trattat, li għajnuna de minimis tista’ tikkostitwixxi kategorija bħal din. Fuq dik il-bażi, għajnuna de minimis, għajnuna mogħtija għall-istess impriża matul perjodu partikolari ta’ żmien li ma taqbiżx ċertu ammont fiss, hija meqjusa li ma tkunx tissodisfa l-kriterji kollha stipulati fl-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat u għalhekk mhix soġġetta għall-proċedura ta’ notifika. |
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(1)

Il-finanzjament mill-Istat li jissodisfa l-kriterji tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea (“it-Trattat”) jikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-Istat u jeħtieġ jiġi nnotifikat lill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 108(3) tat-Trattat. Madankollu, skont l-Artikolu 109 tat-Trattat, il-Kunsill jista’ jiddetermina x’inhuma l-kategoriji tal-għajnuna li huma eżentati minn dan ir-rekwiżit ta’ notifika. Skont l-Artikolu 108(4) tat-Trattat il-Kummissjoni tista’ tadotta regolamenti dwar dawn il-kategoriji ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat. Bis-saħħa tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 994/98 il-Kunsill iddeċieda, f’konformità mal-Artikolu 109 tat-Trattat, li għajnuna de minimis tista’ tikkostitwixxi kategorija bħal din. Fuq dik il-bażi, għajnuna de minimis, għajnuna mogħtija għall-istess impriża matul perjodu partikolari ta’ żmien li ma taqbiżx ċertu ammont fiss, hija meqjusa li ma tkunx tissodisfa l-kriterji kollha stipulati fl-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat u għalhekk mhix soġġetta għall-proċedura ta’ notifika.

| (2) | Il-Kummissjoni, f’għadd kbir ta’ deċiżjonijiet, ikkjarifikat il-kunċett ta’ għajnuna skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat. Il-Kummissjoni stqarret il-politika tagħha dwar limitu massimu de minimis, li skont l-Artikolu 107(1) tista’ titqies li ma tapplikax, għall-ewwel fl-avviż tagħha dwar ir-regola de minimis għall-għajnuna mill-Istat (3) u sussegwentement fir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 69/2001 (4) u r-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1998/2006 (5). Fid-dawl tal-esperjenza miksuba bl-applikazzjoni tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1998/2006, jidher li jkun xieraq li jiġu riveduti xi wħud mill-kundizzjonijiet stipulati f'dak ir-Regolament u li dan jinbidel. |
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(2)

Il-Kummissjoni, f’għadd kbir ta’ deċiżjonijiet, ikkjarifikat il-kunċett ta’ għajnuna skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat. Il-Kummissjoni stqarret il-politika tagħha dwar limitu massimu de minimis, li skont l-Artikolu 107(1) tista’ titqies li ma tapplikax, għall-ewwel fl-avviż tagħha dwar ir-regola de minimis għall-għajnuna mill-Istat (3) u sussegwentement fir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 69/2001 (4) u r-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1998/2006 (5). Fid-dawl tal-esperjenza miksuba bl-applikazzjoni tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1998/2006, jidher li jkun xieraq li jiġu riveduti xi wħud mill-kundizzjonijiet stipulati f'dak ir-Regolament u li dan jinbidel.

| (3) | Huwa xieraq li jinżamm il-limitu massimu ta’ EUR 200 000 għall-ammont ta’ għajnuna de minimis li kull impriża tista’ tirċievi għal kull Stat Membru matul kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ tliet snin. Dak il-limitu jibqa’ meħtieġ sabiex jiżgura li kwalunkwe miżura li taqa' skont dan ir-Regolament ma jkollha l-ebda effett fuq il-kummerċ bejn l-Istati Membri u/jew ma tfixkilx jew ma tkunx ta' theddida li tfixkel il-kompetizzjoni. |
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(3)

Huwa xieraq li jinżamm il-limitu massimu ta’ EUR 200 000 għall-ammont ta’ għajnuna de minimis li kull impriża tista’ tirċievi għal kull Stat Membru matul kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ tliet snin. Dak il-limitu jibqa’ meħtieġ sabiex jiżgura li kwalunkwe miżura li taqa' skont dan ir-Regolament ma jkollha l-ebda effett fuq il-kummerċ bejn l-Istati Membri u/jew ma tfixkilx jew ma tkunx ta' theddida li tfixkel il-kompetizzjoni.

| (4) | Għall-finijiet tar-regoli dwar il-kompetizzjoni stabbiliti fit-Trattat u għall-iskopijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament impriża hi entità involuta f’attività ekonomika, irrispettivament mill-istatus legali u mill-mod ta’ kif hija ffinanzjata (6). Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ddeċidiet li entitajiet li huma kkontrollati (fuq bażi legali jew fuq bażi de facto) mill-istess entità għandhom jitqiesu bħala impriża waħda (7). Għal raġunijiet ta’ ċertezza legali u sabiex jitnaqqas il-piż amministrattiv, dan ir-Regolament għandu jipprovdi lista eżawrjenti ta’ kriterji ċari biex jiġi ddeterminat meta żewġ entitajiet jew aktar għandhom jitqiesu bħala impriża waħda. Il-Kummissjoni għażlet minn kriterji stabbiliti sew li jiddefinixxu “impriżi relatati” fid-definizzjoni ta’ SME fl-Anness I tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 800/2008) (8) dawk il-kriterji li huma xierqa għall-iskop ta’ dan ir-Regolament. Dawk il-kriterji huma diġà familjari għal awtoritajiet pubbliċi u għandhom ikunu applikabbli, minħabba l-kamp ta' applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament, lill-SMEs kif ukoll lill-impriżi l-kbar. |
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(4)

Għall-finijiet tar-regoli dwar il-kompetizzjoni stabbiliti fit-Trattat u għall-iskopijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament impriża hi entità involuta f’attività ekonomika, irrispettivament mill-istatus legali u mill-mod ta’ kif hija ffinanzjata (6). Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ddeċidiet li entitajiet li huma kkontrollati (fuq bażi legali jew fuq bażi de facto) mill-istess entità għandhom jitqiesu bħala impriża waħda (7). Għal raġunijiet ta’ ċertezza legali u sabiex jitnaqqas il-piż amministrattiv, dan ir-Regolament għandu jipprovdi lista eżawrjenti ta’ kriterji ċari biex jiġi ddeterminat meta żewġ entitajiet jew aktar għandhom jitqiesu bħala impriża waħda. Il-Kummissjoni għażlet minn kriterji stabbiliti sew li jiddefinixxu “impriżi relatati” fid-definizzjoni ta’ SME fl-Anness I tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 800/2008) (8) dawk il-kriterji li huma xierqa għall-iskop ta’ dan ir-Regolament. Dawk il-kriterji huma diġà familjari għal awtoritajiet pubbliċi u għandhom ikunu applikabbli, minħabba l-kamp ta' applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament, lill-SMEs kif ukoll lill-impriżi l-kbar.

| (5) | Sabiex jittieħed kont tad-daqs medju tal-impriżi ta’ daqs żgħir attivi fis-settur tat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq, huwa xieraq li jiġu stabbiliti l-limiti massimi għal EUR 100 000 għal impriżi li jwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq għall-kiri u l-ħlas. Il-forniment ta’ servizz integrat fejn it-trasport attwali huwa biss element wieħed, bħal servizzi ta' rilokazzjoni, dawk postali jew servizzi ta' kurrier jew ġbir ta' skart u servizzi tal-ipproċessar, ma għandux jiġi kkunsidrat bħala servizz ta' trasport. Minħabba l-produzzjoni żejda fis-settur tat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq u l-għanijiet tal-politika tat-trasport rigward il-konġestjoni tat-toroq u t-trasport tal-merkanzija, għajnuna għall-akkwist ta’ vetturi għat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq minn impriżi li jwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq għal kiri u bi ħlas għandhom ikunu esklużi mill-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament. Fid-dawl tal-iżvilupp fis-settur tat-trasport bit-triq tal-passiġġieri, ma għadux xieraq li japplika limitu massimu aktar baxx għal dan is-settur. |
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(5)

Sabiex jittieħed kont tad-daqs medju tal-impriżi ta’ daqs żgħir attivi fis-settur tat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq, huwa xieraq li jiġu stabbiliti l-limiti massimi għal EUR 100 000 għal impriżi li jwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq għall-kiri u l-ħlas. Il-forniment ta’ servizz integrat fejn it-trasport attwali huwa biss element wieħed, bħal servizzi ta' rilokazzjoni, dawk postali jew servizzi ta' kurrier jew ġbir ta' skart u servizzi tal-ipproċessar, ma għandux jiġi kkunsidrat bħala servizz ta' trasport. Minħabba l-produzzjoni żejda fis-settur tat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq u l-għanijiet tal-politika tat-trasport rigward il-konġestjoni tat-toroq u t-trasport tal-merkanzija, għajnuna għall-akkwist ta’ vetturi għat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq minn impriżi li jwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq għal kiri u bi ħlas għandhom ikunu esklużi mill-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament. Fid-dawl tal-iżvilupp fis-settur tat-trasport bit-triq tal-passiġġieri, ma għadux xieraq li japplika limitu massimu aktar baxx għal dan is-settur.

| (6) | Minħabba r-regoli speċjali li japplikaw fis-setturi tal-produzzjoni primarja tal-prodotti agrikoli, is-sajd u l-akwakultura u r-riskju li ammonti iżgħar ta’ għajnuna minn dawk stipulati f’dan ir-Regolament jistgħu jissodisfaw il-kriterji tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat f’dawk is-setturi, dan ir-Regolament ma għandux japplika għal dawk is-setturi. |
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(6)

Minħabba r-regoli speċjali li japplikaw fis-setturi tal-produzzjoni primarja tal-prodotti agrikoli, is-sajd u l-akwakultura u r-riskju li ammonti iżgħar ta’ għajnuna minn dawk stipulati f’dan ir-Regolament jistgħu jissodisfaw il-kriterji tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat f’dawk is-setturi, dan ir-Regolament ma għandux japplika għal dawk is-setturi.

| (7) | Meta jitqies ix-xebh bejn l-ipproċessar u l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta’ prodotti agrikoli, fuq naħa waħda, u ta’ prodotti mhux agrikoli fuq in-naħa l-oħra, dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika għall-ipproċessar u l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta’ prodotti agrikoli, sakemm jiġu ssodisfati ċerti kundizzjonijiet. F’dan ir-rigward, la l-attivitajiet meħtieġa li jsiru fl-irziezet biex il-prodott jitħejja biex jinbiegħ għall-ewwel darba, bħall-ħsad, il-qtugħ u d-dris taċ-ċereali, jew l-ippakkjar tal-bajd, u lanqas l-ewwel bejgħ lill-pitkali jew lil min jipproċessa l-prodott ma għandhom jitqiesu bħala pproċessar jew kummerċjalizzazzjoni. Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja stabbilixxiet (9) li, ladarba l-Unjoni lleġiżlat favur it-twaqqif ta’ organizzazzjoni komuni tas-suq f’settur partikolari tal-agrikoltura, l-Istati Membri huma obbligati li ma jieħdu ebda miżura li tista’ ddgħajjifha jew toħloq eċċezzjonijiet għaliha. Għal din ir-raġuni, dan ir-Regolament ma għandux japplika għal għajnuna li l-ammont tagħha huwa stabbilit fuq il-bażi tal-prezz jew tal-kwantità tal-prodotti mixtrija jew imqiegħda fis-suq. Lanqas ma għandu japplika għal sostenn marbut ma' obbligu li l-għajnuna tinqasam mal-produtturi primarji. |
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(7)

Meta jitqies ix-xebh bejn l-ipproċessar u l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta’ prodotti agrikoli, fuq naħa waħda, u ta’ prodotti mhux agrikoli fuq in-naħa l-oħra, dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika għall-ipproċessar u l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta’ prodotti agrikoli, sakemm jiġu ssodisfati ċerti kundizzjonijiet. F’dan ir-rigward, la l-attivitajiet meħtieġa li jsiru fl-irziezet biex il-prodott jitħejja biex jinbiegħ għall-ewwel darba, bħall-ħsad, il-qtugħ u d-dris taċ-ċereali, jew l-ippakkjar tal-bajd, u lanqas l-ewwel bejgħ lill-pitkali jew lil min jipproċessa l-prodott ma għandhom jitqiesu bħala pproċessar jew kummerċjalizzazzjoni. Il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja stabbilixxiet (9) li, ladarba l-Unjoni lleġiżlat favur it-twaqqif ta’ organizzazzjoni komuni tas-suq f’settur partikolari tal-agrikoltura, l-Istati Membri huma obbligati li ma jieħdu ebda miżura li tista’ ddgħajjifha jew toħloq eċċezzjonijiet għaliha. Għal din ir-raġuni, dan ir-Regolament ma għandux japplika għal għajnuna li l-ammont tagħha huwa stabbilit fuq il-bażi tal-prezz jew tal-kwantità tal-prodotti mixtrija jew imqiegħda fis-suq. Lanqas ma għandu japplika għal sostenn marbut ma' obbligu li l-għajnuna tinqasam mal-produtturi primarji.

| (8) | Dan ir-Regolament m’għandux japplika għal għajnuna għall-esportazzjoni jew għajnuna li tiffavorixxi prodotti domestiċi fuq prodotti importati. B’mod partikolari, ma għandux japplika għal għajnuna li tiffinanzja t-twaqqif u t-tħaddim ta’ netwerk ta’ distribuzzjoni fi Stati Membri oħra jew pajjiżi terzi. Għajnuna għal spejjeż ta’ parteċipazzjoni f’fieri kummerċjali, jew ta’ studji jew servizzi ta’ konsulenza meħtieġa għat-tnedija ta’ prodott ġdid jew eżistenti f’suq ġdid normalment ma titqiesx li hija għajnuna għall-esportazzjoni. |
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(8)

Dan ir-Regolament m’għandux japplika għal għajnuna għall-esportazzjoni jew għajnuna li tiffavorixxi prodotti domestiċi fuq prodotti importati. B’mod partikolari, ma għandux japplika għal għajnuna li tiffinanzja t-twaqqif u t-tħaddim ta’ netwerk ta’ distribuzzjoni fi Stati Membri oħra jew pajjiżi terzi. Għajnuna għal spejjeż ta’ parteċipazzjoni f’fieri kummerċjali, jew ta’ studji jew servizzi ta’ konsulenza meħtieġa għat-tnedija ta’ prodott ġdid jew eżistenti f’suq ġdid normalment ma titqiesx li hija għajnuna għall-esportazzjoni.

| (9) | Dan ir-Regolament ma għandux japplika għal intrapriżi li jkunu f’diffikultà billi mhuwiex xieraq li jingħata appoġġ finanzjarju lil impriżi f’diffikultà 'l barra minn pjan ta’ ristrutturazzjoni. Barra minn hekk, hemm diffikultajiet marbuta mad-determinazzjoni tal-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għall-għajnuna mogħtija lil dawn it-tip ta' impriżi. Sabiex tkun provduta ċertezza legali, huwa xieraq li jiġu stabbiliti kriterji ċari li ma jkunux jeħtieġu valutazzjoni tal-partikolaritajiet kollha tas-sitwazzjoni ta’ impriża biex ikun stabbilit jekk impriża titqiesx li tinsab f’diffikultà għall-finijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament. |
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(9)

Dan ir-Regolament ma għandux japplika għal intrapriżi li jkunu f’diffikultà billi mhuwiex xieraq li jingħata appoġġ finanzjarju lil impriżi f’diffikultà 'l barra minn pjan ta’ ristrutturazzjoni. Barra minn hekk, hemm diffikultajiet marbuta mad-determinazzjoni tal-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għall-għajnuna mogħtija lil dawn it-tip ta' impriżi. Sabiex tkun provduta ċertezza legali, huwa xieraq li jiġu stabbiliti kriterji ċari li ma jkunux jeħtieġu valutazzjoni tal-partikolaritajiet kollha tas-sitwazzjoni ta’ impriża biex ikun stabbilit jekk impriża titqiesx li tinsab f’diffikultà għall-finijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament.

| (10) | Il-perjodu rilevanti ta’ tliet snin li għandu jiġi kkunsidrat għar-raġunijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament għandu jkun ivvalutat fuq bażi rotanti sabiex, għal kull għotja ġdida ta’ għajnuna de minimis, l-ammont totali ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija fis-sena fiskali kkonċernata kif ukoll matul is-sentejn fiskali ta’ qabel ikun irid jiġi determinat. |
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(10)

Il-perjodu rilevanti ta’ tliet snin li għandu jiġi kkunsidrat għar-raġunijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament għandu jkun ivvalutat fuq bażi rotanti sabiex, għal kull għotja ġdida ta’ għajnuna de minimis, l-ammont totali ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija fis-sena fiskali kkonċernata kif ukoll matul is-sentejn fiskali ta’ qabel ikun irid jiġi determinat.

| (11) | Fejn impriżi huma attivi f’setturi esklużi mill-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament, kif ukoll f’setturi jew attivitajiet oħra, dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika għal dawk is-setturi jew l-attivitajiet oħra sakemm l-Istati Membri jiżguraw, permezz ta' mezzi adegwati bħas-separazzjoni tal-attivitajiet jew id-distinzjoni tal-ispejjeż, li l-attivitajiet f'setturi esklużi ma jibbenefikawx mill-għajnuna de minimis. L-istess prinċipju għandu japplika fejn impriżi huma attivi f’setturi li għalihom japplikaw il-limiti de minimis aktar baxxi. Jekk ma jistax ikun żgurat li l-attivitajiet f'setturi li għalihom japplikaw il-limiti de minimis aktar baxxi ma jibbenefikawx minn għajnuna de minimis biss sa dawn il-limiti aktar baxxi, l-inqas limitu għandu japplika għall-attivitajiet kollha tal-impriża. |
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(11)

Fejn impriżi huma attivi f’setturi esklużi mill-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament, kif ukoll f’setturi jew attivitajiet oħra, dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika għal dawk is-setturi jew l-attivitajiet oħra sakemm l-Istati Membri jiżguraw, permezz ta' mezzi adegwati bħas-separazzjoni tal-attivitajiet jew id-distinzjoni tal-ispejjeż, li l-attivitajiet f'setturi esklużi ma jibbenefikawx mill-għajnuna de minimis. L-istess prinċipju għandu japplika fejn impriżi huma attivi f’setturi li għalihom japplikaw il-limiti de minimis aktar baxxi. Jekk ma jistax ikun żgurat li l-attivitajiet f'setturi li għalihom japplikaw il-limiti de minimis aktar baxxi ma jibbenefikawx minn għajnuna de minimis biss sa dawn il-limiti aktar baxxi, l-inqas limitu għandu japplika għall-attivitajiet kollha tal-impriża.

| (12) | Dan ir-Regolament għandu jistabbilixxi regoli li jassiguraw li ma jkunx possibbli li jiġu evitati l-intensitajiet massimi tal-għajnuna stabbiliti f’Regolamenti speċifiċi jew deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni. Għandu jistipula wkoll regoli ċari dwar il-kumulazzjoni li huma faċli biex jiġu applikati. |
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(12)

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jistabbilixxi regoli li jassiguraw li ma jkunx possibbli li jiġu evitati l-intensitajiet massimi tal-għajnuna stabbiliti f’Regolamenti speċifiċi jew deċiżjonijiet tal-Kummissjoni. Għandu jistipula wkoll regoli ċari dwar il-kumulazzjoni li huma faċli biex jiġu applikati.

| (13) | Dan ir-Regolament ma jeskludix il-possibbiltà li miżura tista' ma titqiesx bħala għajnuna mill-Istat fi ħdan it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat abbażi ta' raġunijiet oħra minn dawk stabbiliti f’dan ir-Regolament, pereżempju minħabba li l-miżura tikkonforma mal-prinċipju tal-operatur tal-ekonomija tas-suq jew minħabba li l-miżura ma tinvolvix trasferiment ta’ riżorsi tal-Istat. |
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(13)

Dan ir-Regolament ma jeskludix il-possibbiltà li miżura tista' ma titqiesx bħala għajnuna mill-Istat fi ħdan it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat abbażi ta' raġunijiet oħra minn dawk stabbiliti f’dan ir-Regolament, pereżempju minħabba li l-miżura tikkonforma mal-prinċipju tal-operatur tal-ekonomija tas-suq jew minħabba li l-miżura ma tinvolvix trasferiment ta’ riżorsi tal-Istat.

| (14) | Għall-finijiet ta’ trasparenza, trattament ugwali u monitoraġġ effettiv, dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika biss għall-għajnuna de minimis li għaliha jkun possibbli li tiġi kkalkulata bi preċiżjoni l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ex ante mingħajr il-ħtieġa li ssir valutazzjoni tar-riskju (“għajnuna trasparenti”). Kalkolu preċiż bħal dan jista', pereżempju, isir għal għotjiet, sussidji fuq ir-rata tal-imgħax, eżenzjonijiet limitati tat-taxxa jew strumenti oħra li jistipulaw limitu li jista' jassigura li l-ogħla livell applikabbli ma jinqabiżx. Il-provvediment għall-iffissar ta' limitu jimplika li sakemm l-ammont preċiż tal-għajnuna mhuwiex magħruf jew għadu mhux magħruf, l-Istat Membru jkollu jassumi li l-ammont huwa daqs il-limitu sabiex ikun assigurat li bosta miżuri ta' għajnuna flimkien ma jeċċedux il-limitu stabbilit f’dan ir-Regolament u japplika r-regoli dwar il-kumulazzjoni. |
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(14)

Għall-finijiet ta’ trasparenza, trattament ugwali u monitoraġġ effettiv, dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika biss għall-għajnuna de minimis li għaliha jkun possibbli li tiġi kkalkulata bi preċiżjoni l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ex ante mingħajr il-ħtieġa li ssir valutazzjoni tar-riskju (“għajnuna trasparenti”). Kalkolu preċiż bħal dan jista', pereżempju, isir għal għotjiet, sussidji fuq ir-rata tal-imgħax, eżenzjonijiet limitati tat-taxxa jew strumenti oħra li jistipulaw limitu li jista' jassigura li l-ogħla livell applikabbli ma jinqabiżx. Il-provvediment għall-iffissar ta' limitu jimplika li sakemm l-ammont preċiż tal-għajnuna mhuwiex magħruf jew għadu mhux magħruf, l-Istat Membru jkollu jassumi li l-ammont huwa daqs il-limitu sabiex ikun assigurat li bosta miżuri ta' għajnuna flimkien ma jeċċedux il-limitu stabbilit f’dan ir-Regolament u japplika r-regoli dwar il-kumulazzjoni.

| (15) | L-Istati Membri kollha għandhom japplikaw l-istess metodu ta’ kalkolu, sabiex ikun hemm it-trasparenza, it-trattament indaqs u l-applikazzjoni korretta tal-limitu de minimis. Biex jiġi ffaċilitat il-kalkolu, jeħtieġ li l-ammont tal-għajnuniet mogħtija mod ieħor milli taħt il-forma ta’ għotja fi ħlas kontanti jkunu konvertiti fl-ekwivalenti ta' għotja grossa ekwivalenti. Il-kalkolu tal-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għal tipi trasparenti ta’ għajnuna barra minn għotjiet jew għajnuna li jkunu pagabbli f'bosta pagamenti jeħtieġ l-użu ta’ rati ta’ imgħax tas-suq li jkunu qed jintużaw fil-mument li tkun ingħatat tali għajnuna. Bl-għan li jkun hemm applikazzjoni uniformi, trasparenti u sempliċi tar-regoli dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat, għall-iskopijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament ir-rati tas-suq għandhom jitqiesu li huma r-rati ta' referenza, kif stipulat fil-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni tal-metodu li jistabbilixxi r-rati ta' referenza u ta' skont (10). |
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(15)

L-Istati Membri kollha għandhom japplikaw l-istess metodu ta’ kalkolu, sabiex ikun hemm it-trasparenza, it-trattament indaqs u l-applikazzjoni korretta tal-limitu de minimis. Biex jiġi ffaċilitat il-kalkolu, jeħtieġ li l-ammont tal-għajnuniet mogħtija mod ieħor milli taħt il-forma ta’ għotja fi ħlas kontanti jkunu konvertiti fl-ekwivalenti ta' għotja grossa ekwivalenti. Il-kalkolu tal-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għal tipi trasparenti ta’ għajnuna barra minn għotjiet jew għajnuna li jkunu pagabbli f'bosta pagamenti jeħtieġ l-użu ta’ rati ta’ imgħax tas-suq li jkunu qed jintużaw fil-mument li tkun ingħatat tali għajnuna. Bl-għan li jkun hemm applikazzjoni uniformi, trasparenti u sempliċi tar-regoli dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat, għall-iskopijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament ir-rati tas-suq għandhom jitqiesu li huma r-rati ta' referenza, kif stipulat fil-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar ir-reviżjoni tal-metodu li jistabbilixxi r-rati ta' referenza u ta' skont (10).

| (16) | L-għajnuna fil-forma ta' self għandha titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti jekk l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tkun ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi ta' rati attwali ta' imgħax tas-suq fil-mument tal-għotja. Sabiex jiġi ssimplifikat it-trattament ta' self żgħir ta' tul qasir ta' żmien, dan ir-Regolament għandu jipprovdi għal dispożizzjoni ċara li tkun faċli biex tiġi applikata u li tqis kemm l-ammont tas-self kif ukoll it-tul tiegħu. Ibbażat fuq l-esperjenza tal-Kummissjoni, self li huwa assigurat b'kopertura kollaterali li tkopri mill-inqas 50 % tas-self u li ma jkunx iktar minn EUR 1 000 000 u tul ta' ħames snin jew EUR 500 000 u tul ta' għaxar snin jista' jkun ikkunsidrat li għandu għotja grossa ekwivalenti daqs il-limitu de minimis. |
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(16)

L-għajnuna fil-forma ta' self għandha titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti jekk l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tkun ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi ta' rati attwali ta' imgħax tas-suq fil-mument tal-għotja. Sabiex jiġi ssimplifikat it-trattament ta' self żgħir ta' tul qasir ta' żmien, dan ir-Regolament għandu jipprovdi għal dispożizzjoni ċara li tkun faċli biex tiġi applikata u li tqis kemm l-ammont tas-self kif ukoll it-tul tiegħu. Ibbażat fuq l-esperjenza tal-Kummissjoni, self li huwa assigurat b'kopertura kollaterali li tkopri mill-inqas 50 % tas-self u li ma jkunx iktar minn EUR 1 000 000 u tul ta' ħames snin jew EUR 500 000 u tul ta' għaxar snin jista' jkun ikkunsidrat li għandu għotja grossa ekwivalenti daqs il-limitu de minimis.

| (17) | L-għajnuna inkluża f’injezzjonijiet ta’ kapital ma għandhiex tkun ikkunsidrata għajnuna de minimis trasparenti, sakemm l-ammont totali ta' injezzjoni mill-pubbliku ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis. Għajnuna inkluża f’miżuri ta' finanzjament tar-riskju li tieħu l-forma ta' investimenti ta' ekwità jew kważi ekwità, kif imsemmi f'(il-linji gwida l-ġodda dwar finanzjament tar-riskju), ma għandhiex titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti, sakemm il-miżura kkonċernata ma tipprovdix kapital li ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis għal kull impriża fil-mira. |
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(17)

L-għajnuna inkluża f’injezzjonijiet ta’ kapital ma għandhiex tkun ikkunsidrata għajnuna de minimis trasparenti, sakemm l-ammont totali ta' injezzjoni mill-pubbliku ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis. Għajnuna inkluża f’miżuri ta' finanzjament tar-riskju li tieħu l-forma ta' investimenti ta' ekwità jew kważi ekwità, kif imsemmi f'(il-linji gwida l-ġodda dwar finanzjament tar-riskju), ma għandhiex titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti, sakemm il-miżura kkonċernata ma tipprovdix kapital li ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis għal kull impriża fil-mira.

| (18) | Għajnuna li tikkonsisti f’garanziji għandha titqies bħala trasparenti fejn l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tkun ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi ta' primjums eżentati stabbiliti f’avviż tal-Kummissjoni għat-tip ta' impriża kkonċernata. Pereżempju, għall-impriżi żgħar u ta' daqs medju, l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat tal-KE għall-għajnuna mill-Istat fil-forma ta’ garanziji (11) jindika livelli ta' primjum annwali li 'l fuq minnu garanzija mill-Istat titqies bħala li ma tikkostitwixxix għajnuna. Sabiex jiġi ssimplifikat it-trattament ta' garanziji ta' żmien qasir li jassiguraw sa 80 % ta' self relattivament żgħir, dan ir-Regolament għandu jipprovdi għal dispożizzjoni ċara li tkun faċilment applikata li tqis kemm l-ammont tas-self sottostanti kif ukoll it-tul tal-garanzija. Dan il-limitu ma japplikax għal garanziji dwar tranżazzjonijiet sottostanti li ma jikkostitwixxux self, bħal pereżempju garanziji fuq tranżazzjonijiet ta' ishma. Fejn il-garanzija ma tkunx qabżet it-80 % tas-self sottostanti, l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx il-EUR 1 500 000 u t-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx ħames snin, il-garanzija tista’ titqies bħala għotja grossa ekwivalenti daqs il-limitu de minimis. L-istess japplika fejn il-garanzija ma tkunx qabżet it-80 % tas-self sottostanti, l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx l-EUR 750 000 u t-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx l-għaxar snin. |
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(18)

Għajnuna li tikkonsisti f’garanziji għandha titqies bħala trasparenti fejn l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tkun ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi ta' primjums eżentati stabbiliti f’avviż tal-Kummissjoni għat-tip ta' impriża kkonċernata. Pereżempju, għall-impriżi żgħar u ta' daqs medju, l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat tal-KE għall-għajnuna mill-Istat fil-forma ta’ garanziji (11) jindika livelli ta' primjum annwali li 'l fuq minnu garanzija mill-Istat titqies bħala li ma tikkostitwixxix għajnuna. Sabiex jiġi ssimplifikat it-trattament ta' garanziji ta' żmien qasir li jassiguraw sa 80 % ta' self relattivament żgħir, dan ir-Regolament għandu jipprovdi għal dispożizzjoni ċara li tkun faċilment applikata li tqis kemm l-ammont tas-self sottostanti kif ukoll it-tul tal-garanzija. Dan il-limitu ma japplikax għal garanziji dwar tranżazzjonijiet sottostanti li ma jikkostitwixxux self, bħal pereżempju garanziji fuq tranżazzjonijiet ta' ishma. Fejn il-garanzija ma tkunx qabżet it-80 % tas-self sottostanti, l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx il-EUR 1 500 000 u t-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx ħames snin, il-garanzija tista’ titqies bħala għotja grossa ekwivalenti daqs il-limitu de minimis. L-istess japplika fejn il-garanzija ma tkunx qabżet it-80 % tas-self sottostanti, l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx l-EUR 750 000 u t-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx l-għaxar snin.

| (19) | Meta self jew garanzija hija għal ammont iżgħar jew tul taż-żmien iqsar minn dawk speċifikati fil-premessi 16 u 18, l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għandha tiġi kkalkulata billi jiġi multiplikat il-proporzjon bejn l-ammont attwali u l-ammont massimu indikat fil-premessi 16 u 18 permezz tal-proporzjon bejn it-tul attwali u ħames snin b’EUR 200 000. Għalhekk, pereżempju, self ta’ EUR 500 000 għal 2.5 snin għandu jitqies li jkollu ċertifikat ekwivalenti tal-għotja grossa ta’ EUR 50 000. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Meta self jew garanzija hija għal ammont iżgħar jew tul taż-żmien iqsar minn dawk speċifikati fil-premessi 16 u 18, l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għandha tiġi kkalkulata billi jiġi multiplikat il-proporzjon bejn l-ammont attwali u l-ammont massimu indikat fil-premessi 16 u 18 permezz tal-proporzjon bejn it-tul attwali u ħames snin b’EUR 200 000. Għalhekk, pereżempju, self ta’ EUR 500 000 għal 2.5 snin għandu jitqies li jkollu ċertifikat ekwivalenti tal-għotja grossa ta’ EUR 50 000.

| (20) | Wara li ssir notifika minn Stat Membru, il-Kummissjoni tista’ teżamina jekk miżura li ma tikkonsistix f’għotja, self, garanzija, injezzjoni ta’ kapital jew miżuri ta’ finanzjament ta' riskju twassalx għal forma ta' investiment ta' ekwità jew kważi ekwità li ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis u tista’ għalhekk tkun koperta fi ħdan il-kamp ta' applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Wara li ssir notifika minn Stat Membru, il-Kummissjoni tista’ teżamina jekk miżura li ma tikkonsistix f’għotja, self, garanzija, injezzjoni ta’ kapital jew miżuri ta’ finanzjament ta' riskju twassalx għal forma ta' investiment ta' ekwità jew kważi ekwità li ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis u tista’ għalhekk tkun koperta fi ħdan il-kamp ta' applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament.

| (21) | Il-Kummissjoni għandha d-dover li tiżgura li regoli ta' għajnuna mill-Istat huma konformi u skont il-prinċipju ta’ kooperazzjoni li jinsab fl-Artikolu 4(3) tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea, l-Istati Membri għandhom jiffaċilitaw it-twettiq ta’ dan il-kompitu billi jistabbilixxu l-għodod meħtieġa sabiex jassiguraw li l-ammont totali tal-għajnuna de minimis mogħtija lill-istess impriża taħt ir-regola de minimis ma jaqbiżx il-limitu kumplessiv permissibbli. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Il-Kummissjoni għandha d-dover li tiżgura li regoli ta' għajnuna mill-Istat huma konformi u skont il-prinċipju ta’ kooperazzjoni li jinsab fl-Artikolu 4(3) tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea, l-Istati Membri għandhom jiffaċilitaw it-twettiq ta’ dan il-kompitu billi jistabbilixxu l-għodod meħtieġa sabiex jassiguraw li l-ammont totali tal-għajnuna de minimis mogħtija lill-istess impriża taħt ir-regola de minimis ma jaqbiżx il-limitu kumplessiv permissibbli.

| (22) | Qabel ma jagħtu għajnuna de minimis l-Istati Membri għandhom jivverifikaw li l-limitu de minimis ma jinqabiżx mill-għajnuna de minimis ġdida u li l-kundizzjonijiet l-oħrajn ta' dan ir-Regolament jiġu mħarsa. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Qabel ma jagħtu għajnuna de minimis l-Istati Membri għandhom jivverifikaw li l-limitu de minimis ma jinqabiżx mill-għajnuna de minimis ġdida u li l-kundizzjonijiet l-oħrajn ta' dan ir-Regolament jiġu mħarsa.

| (23) | Sabiex jiġi żgurat li l-Istati Membri jkollhom dejta preċiża, affidabbli u kompluta biex ikun żgurat li bl-għoti de minimis ġdida massima ma jkunx qed jinqabeż il-limitu rispettiv tal-impriża, huwa meħtieġ li l-Istati Membri jkunu obbligati li jwaqqfu reġistru ċentrali ta’ għajnuna de minimis li jkun fih informazzjoni sħiħa dwar l-għajnuna kollha de minimis mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament minn kwalunkwe awtorità fi ħdan dak l-Istat Membru. L-Istati Membri huma ħielsa li jfasslu r-reġistru tagħhom u jiddeċiedu dwar il-mekkaniżmu adatt biex jistabbilixxuh skont l-istruttura kostituzzjonali u amministrattiva tagħhom basta li jkun assigurat li r-reġistru jippermetti l-awtoritajiet pubbliċi kollha fl-Istat Membru li jivverifikaw l-ammont ta' għajnuna de minimis mogħtija lil kull impriża. L-Istati Membri għandu jkollhom biżżejjed żmien biex jistabbilixxu reġistru bħal dan. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Sabiex jiġi żgurat li l-Istati Membri jkollhom dejta preċiża, affidabbli u kompluta biex ikun żgurat li bl-għoti de minimis ġdida massima ma jkunx qed jinqabeż il-limitu rispettiv tal-impriża, huwa meħtieġ li l-Istati Membri jkunu obbligati li jwaqqfu reġistru ċentrali ta’ għajnuna de minimis li jkun fih informazzjoni sħiħa dwar l-għajnuna kollha de minimis mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament minn kwalunkwe awtorità fi ħdan dak l-Istat Membru. L-Istati Membri huma ħielsa li jfasslu r-reġistru tagħhom u jiddeċiedu dwar il-mekkaniżmu adatt biex jistabbilixxuh skont l-istruttura kostituzzjonali u amministrattiva tagħhom basta li jkun assigurat li r-reġistru jippermetti l-awtoritajiet pubbliċi kollha fl-Istat Membru li jivverifikaw l-ammont ta' għajnuna de minimis mogħtija lil kull impriża. L-Istati Membri għandu jkollhom biżżejjed żmien biex jistabbilixxu reġistru bħal dan.

| (24) | Sakemm Stat Membru ma jkunx għadu stabbilixxa reġistru ċentrali u r-reġistru li jkopri perjodu ta’ tliet snin, l-Istat Membru għandu jinforma lill-impriża kkonċernata bl-ammont ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija u l-karattru de minimis tagħha, billi jirreferi għal dan ir-Regolament. Barra minn hekk, qabel l-għoti ta’ għajnuna bħal din, l-Istat Membru kkonċernat għandu jirċievi dikjarazzjoni mingħand l-impriża dwar għajnuna oħra de minimis koperta minn dan ir-Regolament jew minn regolamenti de minimis oħra li waslu matul is-sena fiskali kkonċernata jew is-sentejn fiskali ta’ qabel. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Sakemm Stat Membru ma jkunx għadu stabbilixxa reġistru ċentrali u r-reġistru li jkopri perjodu ta’ tliet snin, l-Istat Membru għandu jinforma lill-impriża kkonċernata bl-ammont ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija u l-karattru de minimis tagħha, billi jirreferi għal dan ir-Regolament. Barra minn hekk, qabel l-għoti ta’ għajnuna bħal din, l-Istat Membru kkonċernat għandu jirċievi dikjarazzjoni mingħand l-impriża dwar għajnuna oħra de minimis koperta minn dan ir-Regolament jew minn regolamenti de minimis oħra li waslu matul is-sena fiskali kkonċernata jew is-sentejn fiskali ta’ qabel.

| (25) | Sabiex jippermettu lill-Kummissjoni biex tissorvelja l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament u biex jiġi identifikat it-tfixkil potenzjali tal-kompetizzjoni, l-Istati Membri għandhom ikunu meħtieġa li jipprovdu informazzjoni bażika dwar l-ammonti mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament fuq bażi annwali. Jekk Stat Membru informa lill-Kummissjoni meta d-dejta kollha mitluba fir-rapporti hija disponibbli pubblikament, l-Istat Membru ma għandux ikun mistenni minnhom li jipprovdi rapport lill-Kummissjoni. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Sabiex jippermettu lill-Kummissjoni biex tissorvelja l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament u biex jiġi identifikat it-tfixkil potenzjali tal-kompetizzjoni, l-Istati Membri għandhom ikunu meħtieġa li jipprovdu informazzjoni bażika dwar l-ammonti mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament fuq bażi annwali. Jekk Stat Membru informa lill-Kummissjoni meta d-dejta kollha mitluba fir-rapporti hija disponibbli pubblikament, l-Istat Membru ma għandux ikun mistenni minnhom li jipprovdi rapport lill-Kummissjoni.

| (26) | Wara li tiġi kkunsidrata l-esperjenza tal-Kummissjoni, u b'mod partikolari l-frekwenza li biha huwa ġeneralment meħtieġ li tiġi riveduta l-politika tal-għajnuna Statali, ikun xieraq li jiġi limitat il-perjodu ta' applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament. Jekk dan ir-Regolament jiskadi mingħajr ma jkun estiż, l-Istati Membri għandu jkollhom perjodu ta’ aġġustament ta’ sitt xhur f’dak li għandu x’jaqsam ma’ għajnuna de minimis koperta minn dan ir-Regolament, |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Wara li tiġi kkunsidrata l-esperjenza tal-Kummissjoni, u b'mod partikolari l-frekwenza li biha huwa ġeneralment meħtieġ li tiġi riveduta l-politika tal-għajnuna Statali, ikun xieraq li jiġi limitat il-perjodu ta' applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament. Jekk dan ir-Regolament jiskadi mingħajr ma jkun estiż, l-Istati Membri għandu jkollhom perjodu ta’ aġġustament ta’ sitt xhur f’dak li għandu x’jaqsam ma’ għajnuna de minimis koperta minn dan ir-Regolament,

ADOTTAT DAN IR-REGOLAMENT:

Artikolu 1

Il-kamp ta' applikazzjoni

1.   Dan ir-Regolament japplika għal għajnuna mogħtija lill-intrapriżi fis-setturi kollha, ħlief għal:

| (a) | għajnuna mogħtija lil impriżi għal attivitajiet fis-setturi tas-sajd u tal-akwakultura, kif koperti mir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 104/2000 (12); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

għajnuna mogħtija lil impriżi għal attivitajiet fis-setturi tas-sajd u tal-akwakultura, kif koperti mir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 104/2000 (12);

| (b) | għajnuna mogħtija lil impriżi attivi fil-produzzjoni primarja ta' prodotti agrikoli; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

għajnuna mogħtija lil impriżi attivi fil-produzzjoni primarja ta' prodotti agrikoli;

| (c) | għajnuna mogħtija lil impriżi attivi fl-ipproċessar u t-tqegħid fis-suq ta’ prodotti agrikoli, fil-każi segwenti:






  (i) | meta l-ammont tal-għajnuna jkun ffissat fuq il-bażi tal-prezz jew kwantità ta' prodotti bħal dawn mixtrija minn produtturi primarji jew imqiegħda fis-suq mill-impriżi kkonċernati, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(c)

għajnuna mogħtija lil impriżi attivi fl-ipproċessar u t-tqegħid fis-suq ta’ prodotti agrikoli, fil-każi segwenti:

(i)

meta l-ammont tal-għajnuna jkun ffissat fuq il-bażi tal-prezz jew kwantità ta' prodotti bħal dawn mixtrija minn produtturi primarji jew imqiegħda fis-suq mill-impriżi kkonċernati,

| (ii) | meta l-għajnuna tingħata bil-kundizzjoni li tingħata parzjalment jew kollha lill-produtturi primarji; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

meta l-għajnuna tingħata bil-kundizzjoni li tingħata parzjalment jew kollha lill-produtturi primarji;

| (d) | għajnuna lill-attivitajiet relatati mal-esportazzjoni lejn pajjiżi terzi jew Stati Membri, l-aktar għajnuna marbuta direttament ma' kwantitajiet esportati, it-twaqqif u l-operazzjoni ta' netwerk ta' distribuzzjoni jew nefqa oħra kurrenti marbuta mal-attività tal-esportazzjoni; |
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(d)

għajnuna lill-attivitajiet relatati mal-esportazzjoni lejn pajjiżi terzi jew Stati Membri, l-aktar għajnuna marbuta direttament ma' kwantitajiet esportati, it-twaqqif u l-operazzjoni ta' netwerk ta' distribuzzjoni jew nefqa oħra kurrenti marbuta mal-attività tal-esportazzjoni;

| (e) | għajnuna li tiddependi mill-użu ta’ prodotti domestiċi fuq prodotti importati; |
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(e)

għajnuna li tiddependi mill-użu ta’ prodotti domestiċi fuq prodotti importati;

| (f) | għajnuna mogħtija lill-impriżi f’diffikultà kif definit fl-Artikolu 2(e). |
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(f)

għajnuna mogħtija lill-impriżi f’diffikultà kif definit fl-Artikolu 2(e).

2.   Jekk impriża hija attiva fis-setturi msemmija fil-punti (a), (b) jew (c) tal-ewwel paragrafu, kif ukoll f’setturi li jaqgħu taħt il-kamp ta' applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament, dan ir-Regolament japplika għal għajnuna mogħtija fir-rigward dawk is-setturi jew attivitajiet tal-aħħar, bil-kundizzjoni li l-Istati Membri jiżguraw b'mezzi adatti bħalma huma s-separazzjoni tal-attivita' jew id-distinzjoni fl-ispejjeż li l-attivitjiet fis-setturi esklużi ma jibbenefikawx mill-għajnuna de minimis mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament.

Artikolu 2

Definizzjonijiet

Għall-finijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament:

| (a) | “prodotti agrikoli” tfisser prodotti elenkati fl-Anness I tat-Trattat, bl-eċċezzjoni tal-prodotti tas-sajd u l-akkwakultura elenkati fl-Anness I tar-Regolament (UE) Nru (għadu ma ġiex adottat; ara l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni COM(2011) 416) dwar l-organizzazzjoni komuni tas-swieq fil-prodotti tas-sajd u l-akkwakultura; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

“prodotti agrikoli” tfisser prodotti elenkati fl-Anness I tat-Trattat, bl-eċċezzjoni tal-prodotti tas-sajd u l-akkwakultura elenkati fl-Anness I tar-Regolament (UE) Nru (għadu ma ġiex adottat; ara l-proposta tal-Kummissjoni COM(2011) 416) dwar l-organizzazzjoni komuni tas-swieq fil-prodotti tas-sajd u l-akkwakultura;

| (b) | “ipproċessar ta’ prodotti agrikoli” tfisser kwalunkwe operazzjoni fuq prodott agrikolu li tirriżulta fi prodott li huwa wkoll prodott agrikolu, ħlief fuq attivitajiet li jsiru f'razzett li huma neċessarji għall-preparazzjoni ta’ prodott minn annimal jew pjanta għall-ewwel bejgħ; |
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(b)

“ipproċessar ta’ prodotti agrikoli” tfisser kwalunkwe operazzjoni fuq prodott agrikolu li tirriżulta fi prodott li huwa wkoll prodott agrikolu, ħlief fuq attivitajiet li jsiru f'razzett li huma neċessarji għall-preparazzjoni ta’ prodott minn annimal jew pjanta għall-ewwel bejgħ;

| (c) | “il-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta' prodotti agrikoli” tfisser iż-żamma jew il-wiri bl-iskop ta' bejgħ, ta' offerta għal bejgħ, ta' kunsinna jew ta' kwalunkwe mod ieħor ta' tqegħid fis-suq, minbarra l-ewwel bejgħ minn produttur primarju lil bejjiegħa sekondarji jew proċessuri u kwalunkwe attività li tħejji prodott għal dan l-ewwel bejgħ; bejgħ minn produttur primarju lill-konsumaturi aħħarin għandu jitqies bħala tqegħid fuq is-suq jekk isir f’post separat riservat għal dak il-għan; |
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(c)

“il-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta' prodotti agrikoli” tfisser iż-żamma jew il-wiri bl-iskop ta' bejgħ, ta' offerta għal bejgħ, ta' kunsinna jew ta' kwalunkwe mod ieħor ta' tqegħid fis-suq, minbarra l-ewwel bejgħ minn produttur primarju lil bejjiegħa sekondarji jew proċessuri u kwalunkwe attività li tħejji prodott għal dan l-ewwel bejgħ; bejgħ minn produttur primarju lill-konsumaturi aħħarin għandu jitqies bħala tqegħid fuq is-suq jekk isir f’post separat riservat għal dak il-għan;

| (d) | “impriża waħda” għall-fini ta’ dan ir-Regolament tfisser l-entitajiet kollha li jkollhom mill-inqas waħda mir-relazzjonijiet li ġejjin ma’ xulxin:






  (i) | entita waħda li jkollha l-maġġoranza tad-drittijiet tal-vot tal-azzjonisti jew tal-membri f’entità oħra; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(d)

“impriża waħda” għall-fini ta’ dan ir-Regolament tfisser l-entitajiet kollha li jkollhom mill-inqas waħda mir-relazzjonijiet li ġejjin ma’ xulxin:

(i)

entita waħda li jkollha l-maġġoranza tad-drittijiet tal-vot tal-azzjonisti jew tal-membri f’entità oħra;

| (ii) | entità waħda li jkollha d-dritt taħtar jew tneħħi maġġoranza mill-membri tal-korp amministrattiv, tal-ġestjoni jew dak sorveljanti ta’ entità oħra; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

entità waħda li jkollha d-dritt taħtar jew tneħħi maġġoranza mill-membri tal-korp amministrattiv, tal-ġestjoni jew dak sorveljanti ta’ entità oħra;

| (iii) | entità waħda għandha d-dritt teżerċita influwenza dominanti fuq entità oħra skont kuntratt illi tkun daħlet fih ma’ dik l-entità jew skont dispożizzjoni tal-memorandum jew tal-artikoli ta’ assoċjazzjoni tagħha; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

entità waħda għandha d-dritt teżerċita influwenza dominanti fuq entità oħra skont kuntratt illi tkun daħlet fih ma’ dik l-entità jew skont dispożizzjoni tal-memorandum jew tal-artikoli ta’ assoċjazzjoni tagħha;

| (iv) | entità waħda, illi tkun azzjonista fi jew membru ta’ entità oħra, tikkontrolla waħedha, skont ftehim ma’ azzjonisti oħra fi jew membri ta’ dik l-entità, maġġoranza tad-drittijiet tal-voti tal-azzjonisti jew tal-membri f’dik l-entità. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

entità waħda, illi tkun azzjonista fi jew membru ta’ entità oħra, tikkontrolla waħedha, skont ftehim ma’ azzjonisti oħra fi jew membri ta’ dik l-entità, maġġoranza tad-drittijiet tal-voti tal-azzjonisti jew tal-membri f’dik l-entità.

Entitajiet li jkollhom waħda mir-relazzjonijiet imsemmija hawn fuq permezz ta’ waħda jew aktar entitajiet oħra jitqiesu wkoll bħala impriża waħda;

| (e) | “impriża f’diffikultà” tfisser impriża li tissodisfa mill-inqas waħda minn dawn il-kundizzjonijiet li ġejjin:






  (i) | fil-każ ta’ kumpanija b’responsabbiltà limitata, aktar minn nofs il-kapital azzjonarju sottoskritt tagħha jkun sparixxa minħabba telf akkumulat; dan huwa l-każ meta jitnaqqas telf akkumulat minn riżervi (u l-elementi l-oħra kollha ġeneralment meqjusa bħala parti mill-fondi proprji tal-kumpanija) iwassal għal riżultat negattiv li jeċċedi nofs il-kapital azzjonarju sottoskritt; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(e)

“impriża f’diffikultà” tfisser impriża li tissodisfa mill-inqas waħda minn dawn il-kundizzjonijiet li ġejjin:

(i)

fil-każ ta’ kumpanija b’responsabbiltà limitata, aktar minn nofs il-kapital azzjonarju sottoskritt tagħha jkun sparixxa minħabba telf akkumulat; dan huwa l-każ meta jitnaqqas telf akkumulat minn riżervi (u l-elementi l-oħra kollha ġeneralment meqjusa bħala parti mill-fondi proprji tal-kumpanija) iwassal għal riżultat negattiv li jeċċedi nofs il-kapital azzjonarju sottoskritt;

| (ii) | fil-każ ta’ kumpanija li fiha għallinqas xi membri li għandhom responsabbiltà limitata għad-dejn tal-kumpanija, aktar minn nofs il-kapital kif imniżżel fil-kontijiet tal-kumpanija, ikunu sparixxew minħabba telf akkumulat; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

fil-każ ta’ kumpanija li fiha għallinqas xi membri li għandhom responsabbiltà limitata għad-dejn tal-kumpanija, aktar minn nofs il-kapital kif imniżżel fil-kontijiet tal-kumpanija, ikunu sparixxew minħabba telf akkumulat;

| (iii) | l-impriża hija f’proċedimenti kollettivi ta’ insolvenza jew tissodisfa l-kriterji skont il-liġi domestika tagħha minħabba li tqiegħdet fi proċedimenti kollettivi għall-insolvenza fuq talba tal-kredituri tagħha; |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

l-impriża hija f’proċedimenti kollettivi ta’ insolvenza jew tissodisfa l-kriterji skont il-liġi domestika tagħha minħabba li tqiegħdet fi proċedimenti kollettivi għall-insolvenza fuq talba tal-kredituri tagħha;

| (iv) | il-proporzjon tad-dejn bil-ktieb mal-ekwità hu ikbar minn 7,5; |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

il-proporzjon tad-dejn bil-ktieb mal-ekwità hu ikbar minn 7,5;

| (v) | il-proporzjon tal-qligħ tal-impriża qabel l-interessi u t-taxxi (EBIT) meta mqabbla mal-kopertura tal-imgħax kien anqas minn 1,0 għal dawn l-aħħar sentejn; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

il-proporzjon tal-qligħ tal-impriża qabel l-interessi u t-taxxi (EBIT) meta mqabbla mal-kopertura tal-imgħax kien anqas minn 1,0 għal dawn l-aħħar sentejn;

| (vi) | l-impriża għandha rata ekwivalenti għal CCC+ (“kapaċità ta’ ħlas dipendenti fuq kundizzjonijiet favorevoli kontinwi”) jew inqas b’mill-inqas aġenzija waħda tal-klassifikazzjoni tal-kreditu rreġistrata skont ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1060/2009 (13). |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

l-impriża għandha rata ekwivalenti għal CCC+ (“kapaċità ta’ ħlas dipendenti fuq kundizzjonijiet favorevoli kontinwi”) jew inqas b’mill-inqas aġenzija waħda tal-klassifikazzjoni tal-kreditu rreġistrata skont ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1060/2009 (13).

Għall-finijiet tal-punt (e) tal-ewwel subparagrafu, jista’ jagħti l-każ li SME li tkun ilha teżisti għal anqas minn tliet snin ma għandhiex titqies li hi f’diffikultà sakemm ma tirrispettax il-kondizzjoni stabbilita fil-punt (iii) ta’ dak il-punt.

Artikolu 3

Għajnuna de minimis

1.   Il-miżuri ta' għajnuna se jitqiesu li ma jissodisfawx il-kriterji tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat u għaldaqstant ikunu eżentati mill-ħtieġa tan-notifika fl-Artikolu 108(3) tat-Trattat, jekk jissodisfaw il-kundizzjonijiet stabbiliti fil-paragrafi 2 sa 8 ta' dan l-Artikolu u fl-Artikoli 4 u 5.

2.   L-għajnuna totali de minimis mogħtija lil kull Stat Membru lil xi impriża waħda kif definit fl-Artikolu 2(d) ma għandhiex taqbeż il-EUR 200 000 fuq kwalunkwe perjodu ta' tliet snin fiskali.

L-għajnuna totali de minimis mogħtija lil kull Stat Membru lil xi impriża waħda kif definit fl-Artikolu 2(d) li teżegwixxi trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq għal kiri u ħlas ma għandhiex taqbeż il-EUR 100 000 fuq kwalunkwe perjodu ta' tliet snin fiskali. L-għajnuna de minimis ma għandhiex tintuża għall-akkwist ta’ vetturi għat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq.

3.   Jekk impriża twettaq trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq għal kiri jew bi ħlas u attivitajiet oħra li għalih japplika l-massimu ta’ EUR 200 000, il-limitu ta’ EUR 200 000 għandu japplika għall-impriża, sakemm l-Istati Membri jiżguraw b’mezzi xierqa bħas-separazzjoni tal-attivitajiet jew id-distinzjoni tal-ispejjeż li l-benefiċċju għall-attività tat-trasport bit-triq tal-merkanzija ma jaqbiżx il-EUR 100 000 u li l-ebda għajnuna de minimis ma tintuża għall-akkwist ta’ vetturi għat-trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq.

4.   L-għajnuna de minimis tingħata fil-mument li d-dritt legali biex tinkiseb l-għajnuna jkun mogħti lill-impriża taħt ir-reġim nazzjonali legali applikabbli.

5.   Il-limiti stabbiliti fil-paragrafu 2 għandhom japplikaw irrispettivament mit-tip ta' għajnuna de minimis jew l-għan ta' tali għajnuna u rrispettivament minn jekk l-għajnuna mogħtija mill-Istat Membru hijiex finanzjata totalment jew parzjalment minn riżorsi ta' oriġini tal-Unjoni. Il-perjodu ta' tliet snin fiskali għandu jiġi ddeterminat b'referenza għas-snin fiskali użati mill-impriża fl-Istat Membru kkonċernat.

6.   Il-limiti stipulati fil-paragrafu 2 għandhom ikun espressi bħala għotja ta’ flus. Iċ-ċifri kollha użati għandhom ikunu grossi, jiġifieri, qabel kwalunkwe tnaqqis ta’ taxxa jew ta’ xi dritt ieħor. Meta tingħata l-għajnuna f'forma għajr għotja, l-ammont tal-għajnuna għandu jkun l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti għall-għajnuna.

Għajnuna pagabbli f’diversi pagamenti għandha tiġi skontata għall-valur tagħha fil-mument li tingħata. Ir-rata tal-interessi li għandha tintuża għal skopijiet ta’ skont għandha tkun ir-rata ta’ referenza applikabbli fil-mument tal-għotja.

7.   Fejn il-limitu de minimis stabbilit fil-paragrafu 2 jinqabeż permezz tal-għotja ta’ għajnuna ġdida de minimis, l-ebda waħda mill-għajnuna l-ġdida ma tista’ tibbenefika minn dan ir-Regolament.

8.   Fil-każ ta' fużjonijiet jew akkwiżizzjoniijiet, l-għajnuna kollha de minimis mogħtija lil kwalunkwe mill-impriżi li għadejjin minn fużjoni se tiġi kkunsidrata biex tiddetermina jekk xi għajnuna ġdida de minimis lill-impriża l-ġdida jew lill-impriża ta' akkwiżizzjoni taqbiżx il-limitu massimu, mingħajr ma jinxeħet dubju fuq l-għajnuna de minimis mogħtija legalment lill-fużjoni jew lill-akkwiżizzjoni.

Jekk impriża waħda tinqasam fi tnejn jew aktar minn żewġ impriżi separati, l-għajnuna de minimis mogħtija qabel il-qsim għandha tkun allokata lill-impriża li bbenefikat minnha, li fil-prinċipju hija l-impriża li tieħu ħsieb l-attivitajiet li għalihom l-għajnuna de minimis kienet użata. Jekk dik l-allokazzjoni ma tkunx possibbli, l-għajnuna de minimis għandha tiġi allokata proporzjonatament fuq il-bażi tal-valur skont il-kotba fil-kapital ta’ ekwità tal-impriżi l-ġodda.

Artikolu 4

Kalkolu tal-għotja grossa ekwivalenti

1.   Dan ir-Regolament għandu japplika biss għall-għajnuna li għaliha huwa possibbli li tista' tiġi kkalkulata b'mod preċiż l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tal-għajnuna ex ante mingħajr il-ħtieġa ta' valutazzjoni tar-riskju (“għajnuna trasparenti”). B'mod partikolari l-miżuri ta' għajnuna msemmija fil-paragrafi 2 sa 6 għandhom jitqiesu bħala għajnuna trasparenti.

2.   L-għajnuna inkluża f’self għandha titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti jekk:

| (a) | is-self hu assigurat minn kopertura kollaterali ta' mill-inqas 50 % tas-self u s-self ma jaqbiżx la EUR 1 000 000 (u lanqas EUR 500 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u wkoll tul ta' ħames snin jew EUR 500 000 (jew EUR 250 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u tul ta' għaxar snin. Jekk xi self jammonta għal inqas minn dawk l-ammonti u/jew huwa mogħti għal perjodu ta' inqas minn ħames jew għaxar snin rispettivament, l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ta' dak is-self għandu jkun ikkalkolat bħala proporzjon tal-limitu applikabbli stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2); jew |
| --- | --- |

(a)

is-self hu assigurat minn kopertura kollaterali ta' mill-inqas 50 % tas-self u s-self ma jaqbiżx la EUR 1 000 000 (u lanqas EUR 500 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u wkoll tul ta' ħames snin jew EUR 500 000 (jew EUR 250 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u tul ta' għaxar snin. Jekk xi self jammonta għal inqas minn dawk l-ammonti u/jew huwa mogħti għal perjodu ta' inqas minn ħames jew għaxar snin rispettivament, l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ta' dak is-self għandu jkun ikkalkolat bħala proporzjon tal-limitu applikabbli stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2); jew

| (b) | l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tkun ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi tar-rata ta’ referenza applikabbli fil-mument tal-għotja. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tkun ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi tar-rata ta’ referenza applikabbli fil-mument tal-għotja.

3.   Għajnuna fil-forma ta' injezzjonijiet ta’ kapital ma għandhiex tkun ikkunsidrata għajnuna de minimis trasparenti, sakemm l-ammont totali ta' injezzjoni mill-pubbliku ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis.

4.   Għajnuna inkluża f’miżuri ta' finanzjament tar-riskju li tieħu l-forma ta' investimenti ta' ekwità jew kważi ekwità, ma għandhiex titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti, sakemm il-miżura kkonċernata ma tipprovdix kapital li ma jaqbiżx il-limitu de minimis għal kull impriża fil-mira.

5.   L-għajnuna inkluża f’self għandha titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti jekk:

| (a) | il-garanzija ma taqbiżx it-80 % tas-self sottostanti u jew l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx l-EUR 1 500 000 (jew l-EUR 750 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u wkoll it-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx ħames snin jew l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx l-EUR 750 000 (jew l-EUR 375 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u t-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx għaxar snin. Jekk xi self jammonta għal inqas minn dawk l-ammonti u/jew huwa mogħti għal perjodu ta' inqas minn ħames jew għaxar snin rispettivament, l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ta' dak is-self għandha tkun ikkalkolata bħala proporzjon tal-limitu applikabbli stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2); jew |
| --- | --- |

(a)

il-garanzija ma taqbiżx it-80 % tas-self sottostanti u jew l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx l-EUR 1 500 000 (jew l-EUR 750 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u wkoll it-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx ħames snin jew l-ammont garantit ma jaqbiżx l-EUR 750 000 (jew l-EUR 375 000 għal impriżi li qed iwettqu trasport tal-merkanzija bit-triq) u t-tul tal-garanzija ma jaqbiżx għaxar snin. Jekk xi self jammonta għal inqas minn dawk l-ammonti u/jew huwa mogħti għal perjodu ta' inqas minn ħames jew għaxar snin rispettivament, l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ta' dak is-self għandha tkun ikkalkolata bħala proporzjon tal-limitu applikabbli stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2); jew

| (b) | l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi ta’ primjums eżentati stipulati f’avviż tal-Kummissjoni (14); jew |
| --- | --- |

(b)

l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ġiet ikkalkulata abbażi ta’ primjums eżentati stipulati f’avviż tal-Kummissjoni (14); jew

| (c) | qabel ma tiġi implimentata, il-metodoloġija biex tiġi kkalkulata l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tal-garanzija tkun ġiet aċċettata wara li ġiet notifikata din il-metodoloġija lill-Kummissjoni skont kwalunkwe regolament adottat mill-Kummissjoni fil-qasam tal-għajnuna mill-Istat, u l-metodoloġija approvata tindirizza espliċitament it-tip ta' garanziji u t-tip ta' tranżazzjoni sottostanti involuta fil-kuntest tal-applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

qabel ma tiġi implimentata, il-metodoloġija biex tiġi kkalkulata l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti tal-garanzija tkun ġiet aċċettata wara li ġiet notifikata din il-metodoloġija lill-Kummissjoni skont kwalunkwe regolament adottat mill-Kummissjoni fil-qasam tal-għajnuna mill-Istat, u l-metodoloġija approvata tindirizza espliċitament it-tip ta' garanziji u t-tip ta' tranżazzjoni sottostanti involuta fil-kuntest tal-applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament.

6.   L-għajnuna inkluża fi strumenti oħra għandha titqies bħala għajnuna de minimis trasparenti sakemm l-istrument jipprovdi għall-iffissar li jassigura li l-limitu applikabbli ma jinqabiżx.

Artikolu 5

Kumulazzjoni

1.   Għajnuna de minimis skont dan ir-Regolament tista’ tiġi akkumulata ma' għajnuna de minimis skont ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 360/2012 (15) sa limiti stipulati f'dak ir-Regolament. Din tista’ tiġi akkumulata ma' għajnuna de minimis skont ir-regolamenti de minimis oħrajn sal-limitu stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2).

2.   L-għajnuna de minimis ma għandhiex tiġi akkumulata mal-għajnuna tal-Istat fir-rigward tal-istess spejjeż jew finanzi eliġibbli jew mal-għajnuna tal-Istat għall-istess miżura ta' finanzjament tar-riskju, jekk din l-akkumulazzjoni tirriżulta f'intensità ta' għajnuna li taqbeż dak fissat fiċ-ċirkostanzi speċifiċi ta' kull każ f'regolament għall-eżenzjoni ġenerali jew deċiżjoni adottata mill-Kummissjoni.

Artikolu 6

Monitoraġġ u rappurtar

1.   L-Istati Membri għandhom jistabbilixxu reġistru ċentrali ta' għajnuna de minimis sal-31 ta' Diċembru 2015. Ir-reġistru ċentrali għandu jkun fih informazzjoni dwar kull benefiċjarju (inkluż huwiex intrapriża żgħira, medja jew kbira u s-settur ekonomiku (kodiċi NACE fil-Livell ta’ Diviżjoni (16)) tal-attività ewlenija tiegħu), id-data tal-għoti u l-għotja grossa ekwivalenti ta’ kull miżura ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament minn kwalunkwe awtorità f'dak l-Istat Membru. Ir-reġistru għandu jinkludi l-miżuri kollha de minimis mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament mill-1 ta’ Jannar 2016 ’il quddiem.

2.   Il-paragrafu 3 għandu japplika sakemm Stat Membru jkun stabbilixxa reġistru ċentrali u r-reġistru jkun ikopri perjodu ta’ tliet snin.

3.   Meta Stat Membru jkollu l-intenzjoni li jagħti għajnuna de minimis skont dan ir-Regolament lil impriża, għandu jinforma lil dik l-impriża bil-miktub dwar l-ammont tal-għajnuna espressa bħala għotja grossa ekwivalenti u dwar in-natura de minimis tagħha, billi ssir referenza diretta għal dan ir-Regolament, u billi jiġi kkwotat it-titolu tiegħu u r-referenza ta' pubblikazzjoni f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea. Fejn l-għajnuna de minimis hi mogħtija skont dan ir-Regolament lil impriżi differenti fuq il-bażi ta' skema u ammonti differenti ta' għajnuna individwali jingħataw lil dawk l-impriżi taħt dik l-iskema, l-Istat Membru kkonċernat jista’ jagħżel li jissodisfa dak l-obbligu billi jinforma lill-impriżi dwar is-somma fissa li tikkorrispondi mal-ammont massimu ta’ għajnuna li tkun se tingħata taħt dik l-iskema. F’tali każ, is-somma fissa għandha tintuża biex tiddetermina jekk il-limitu stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2) ġiex issodisfat. Qabel jagħti l-għajnuna, l-Istat Membru għandu wkoll jikseb dikjarazzjoni mingħand l-impriża kkonċernata, bil-miktub jew f’forma elettronika, dwar kwalunkwe għajnuna de minimis oħra li tkun ingħatatilha skont dan ir-Regolament jew skont regolamenti de minimis oħrajn matul is-sentejn fiskali ta’ qabel u fis-sena fiskali attwali.

4.   Stat Membru għandu jagħti l-għajnuna de minimis ġdida skont dan ir-Regolament biss wara li jkun ivverifika li dan ma jżidx l-ammont totali tal-għajnuna de minimis mogħtija lil impriża li tipprovdi servizzi ta' interess ekonomiku ġenerali skont dan ir-Regolament għal livelli ogħla mil-limitu stipulat fl-Artikolu 3(2) u li l-kundizzjonijiet kollha fl-Artikoli 1 sa 5 ikunu rispettati.

5.   L-Istati Membri għandhom iżommu rekord u jiġbru l-informazzjoni kollha dwar l-applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament. Dawn ir-rekords għandhom jinkludu l-informazzjoni kollha meħtieġa biex jintwera li l-kundizzjonijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament ikunu ġew osservati. Ir-rekords li jkollhom x’jaqsmu ma’ għajnuna de minimis individwali għandhom jinżammu għal perjodu ta’ 10 snin fiskali mid-data li fiha tkun ingħatat l-għajnuna. Ir-rekords li jkollhom x'jaqsmu ma' skema ta' għajnuna de minimis għandhom jinżammu għal perjodu ta' 10 snin mid-data li fiha tkun ingħatat l-aħħar għajnuna individwali bit-tali iskema. B'talba bil-miktub, l-Istat Membru kkonċernat għandu jipprovdi lill-Kummissjoni, f'perjodu ta' 20 jum ta’ xogħol, jew tali perjodu itwal hekk kif jista' jiġi ffissat fit-talba, l-informazzjoni kollha li l-Kummissjoni tqis meħtieġa biex tanalizza jekk il-kundizzjonijiet ta' dan ir-Regolament ikunux ġew imħarsa, u b’mod partikolari l-ammont totali tal-għajnuna de minimis skont dan ir-Regolament jew taħt regolamenti de minimis oħra li tkun irċeviet xi impriża.

6.   L-Istati Membri għandhom jirrappurtaw lill-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament fuq bażi annwali. Ir-rapporti għandhom jinkludu:

| (a) | l-ammont totali ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija fl-Istat Membru kkonċernat skont dan ir-Regolament matul is-sena kalendarja ta’ qabel, skont is-settur ekonomiku u skont id-daqs (intrapriżi żgħar, ta’ daqs medju jew intrapriża kbira) tal-benefiċjarji; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

l-ammont totali ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija fl-Istat Membru kkonċernat skont dan ir-Regolament matul is-sena kalendarja ta’ qabel, skont is-settur ekonomiku u skont id-daqs (intrapriżi żgħar, ta’ daqs medju jew intrapriża kbira) tal-benefiċjarji;

| (b) | l-għadd totali ta' benefiċjarji ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija fl-Istat Membru kkonċernat skont dan ir-Regolament matul is-sena kalendarja ta’ qabel, skont is-settur ekonomiku u skont id-daqs (intrapriżi żgħar, ta’ daqs medju jew intrapriża kbira) tal-benefiċjarji; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

l-għadd totali ta' benefiċjarji ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija fl-Istat Membru kkonċernat skont dan ir-Regolament matul is-sena kalendarja ta’ qabel, skont is-settur ekonomiku u skont id-daqs (intrapriżi żgħar, ta’ daqs medju jew intrapriża kbira) tal-benefiċjarji;

| (c) | kwalunkwe informazzjoni oħra mitluba mill-Kummissjoni rigward l-applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament u li trid tiġi speċifikata fil-ħin qabel jiġi ppreżentat ir-rapport. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

kwalunkwe informazzjoni oħra mitluba mill-Kummissjoni rigward l-applikazzjoni ta' dan ir-Regolament u li trid tiġi speċifikata fil-ħin qabel jiġi ppreżentat ir-rapport.

L-ewwel rapport għandu jiġi ppreżentat sat-30 ta' Ġunju 2017 u għandu jkopri s-sena kalendarja 2016. Jekk id-dejta kollha meħtieġa fir-rapporti ssir disponibbli pubblikament mill-Istat Membru, l-Istat Membru ma jkunx obbligat li jipprovdi rapport lill-Kummissjoni. Kull sena, il-Kummissjoni għandha tippubblika sinteżi tal-informazzjoni li tinsab fir-rapporti annwali, inkluż l-ammont totali ta’ għajnuna de minimis mogħtija minn kull Stat Membru skont dan ir-Regolament.

Artikolu 7

Dispożizzjonijiet tranżitorji

1.   Kull għajnuna de minimis mogħtija bejn it-2 ta’ Frar 2001 u t-30 ta’ Ġunju 2007 u li tissodisfa l-kundizzjonijiet tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 69/2001, għandha titqies li ma tilħaqx il-kriterji kollha tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat u għandha għalhekk tkun eżentata mir-rekwiżit ta’ notifika kif stipulat fl-Artikolu 108(3) tat-Trattat.

2.   Kull għajnuna de minimis mogħtija bejn l-1 ta’ Jannar 2007 u t-30 ta’ Ġunju 2014, li tkun tissodisfa l-kundizzjonijiet tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1998/2006, għandha titqies li ma tilħaqx il-kriterji kollha tal-Artikolu 107(1) tat-Trattat u għandha għalhekk tkun eżentata mir-rekwiżit ta’ notifika kif stipulat fl-Artikolu 108(3) tat-Trattat.

3.   Fl-aħħar tal-perjodu ta’ validità ta’ dan ir-Regolament, kwalunkwe għajnuna de minimis li tissodisfa l-kundizzjonijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament tista’ tkun implimentata b’mod validu għal perjodu ulterjuri ta’ sitt xhur.

Artikolu 8

Dħul fis-seħħ u perjodu ta’ validità

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jidħol fis-seħħ nhar l-1 ta’ Jannar 2014 u għandu japplika mill-1 ta’ Jannar 2014 sal-31 ta’ Diċembru 2020.

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jorbot fl-intier tiegħu u japplika direttament fl-Istati Membri kollha.

Magħmul fi Brussell, is-17 ta’ Lulju 2013.

Għall-Kummissjoni

Il-President

[...] [...]

---

(1)  ĠU L 142, 14.5.1998, p. 1.

1

(2)  ĠU C 229, 8.8.2013, p. 1.

2

(3)  ĠU C 68, 6.3.1996, p. 9.

3

(4)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 69/2001 tat-12 ta' Jannar 2001 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat tal-KE għal għajnuna de minimis (ĠU L 10, 13.1.2001, p. 30).

4

de minimis

(5)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1998/2006 tal-15 ta’ Diċembru 2006 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat dwar l-għajnuna de minimis (ĠU L 379, 28.12.2006, p. 5).

5

de minimis

(6)  Il-Kawża C-222/04 Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA et al. [2006] Ġabra I-289.

6

Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA et al.

(7)  Il-Kawża C-382/99, Netherlands v Commission [2002] Ġabra I-5163.

7

Netherlands

Commission

(8)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 tas-6 ta’ Awwissu 2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat (ĠU L 214, 9.8.2008, p. 3).

8

(9)  Il-Kawża C-456/00 France v Commission [2002] ECR I-11949.

9

France

Commission

(10)  ĠU C 14, 19.1.2008, p. 6.

10

(11)  ĠU C 155, 20.6.2008, p. 10.

11

(12)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 104/2000 tas-17 ta' Diċembru 1999 dwar l-organizzazzjoni komuni tas-swieq fil-prodotti tas-sajd u l-akkwakultura (ĠU L 17, 21.1.2000, p. 22).

12

(13)  Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1060/2009 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Settembru 2009 dwar aġenziji li jiggradaw il-kreditu (ĠU L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 1).

13

(14)  Bħalissa l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat tal-KE għall-għajnuna mill-Istat fil-forma ta’ garanzija (ĠU C 155, 20.6.2008, p. 10).

14

(15)  Ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (UE) Nru 360/2012 tal-25 ta’ April 2012 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikoli 107 u 108 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea għal għajnuna de minimis mogħtija lil impriżi li jipprovdu servizzi ta’ interess ekonomiku ġenerali (ĠU L 114, 26.4.2012, p. 8).

15

de minimis

(16)  Skont l-Artikolu 2(1)(b) u l-Anness I tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1893/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-20 ta’ Diċembru 2006 li jistabbilixxi l-klassifikazzjoni tal-istatistika ta’ attivitajiet ekonomiċi tan-NACE Reviżjoni 2 u li jemenda r-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KEE) Nru 3037/90 kif ukoll ċerti Regolamenti tal-KE dwar setturi speċifiċi tal-istatistika. Test b’rilevanza għaż-ŻEE, (ĠU L 393, 30.12.2006, p. 1),

16

---

IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/10

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

Is-7 ta’ Awwissu 2013

2013/C 229/03

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,3305 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 129,21 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4571 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,85955 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 8,7261 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,2321 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 7,8995 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 25,978 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 299,52 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lats Latvjan | 0,7025 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,2170 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,4330 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,5713 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,4878 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,3868 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 10,3197 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,6826 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,6868 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 486,17 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 13,2109 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 8,1416 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,4975 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 13 683,68 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,3301 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 58,258 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 43,9480 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 41,831 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 3,0641 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 16,8685 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 81,4960 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,3305

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

129,21

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4571

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,85955

SEK

Krona Żvediża

8,7261

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,2321

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

7,8995

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

25,978

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

299,52

LTL

Litas Litwan

3,4528

LVL

Lats Latvjan

0,7025

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,2170

RON

Leu Rumen

4,4330

TRY

Lira Turka

2,5713

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,4878

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,3868

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

10,3197

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,6826

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,6868

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 486,17

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

13,2109

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

8,1416

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,4975

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

13 683,68

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,3301

PHP

Peso Filippin

58,258

RUB

Rouble Russu

43,9480

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

41,831

BRL

Real Brażiljan

3,0641

MXN

Peso Messikan

16,8685

INR

Rupi Indjan

81,4960

---

(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

---

INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI

| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/11

---

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati Membri dwar l-għeluq tas-sajd

2013/C 229/04

F'konformità mal-Artikolu 35(3) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1224/2009 tal-20 ta' Novembru 2009 li jistabbilixxi sistema Komunitarja ta’ kontroll għall-iżgurar tal-konformità mar-regoli tal-Politika Komuni tas-Sajd (1), ittieħdet deċiżjoni li s-sajd jingħalaq kif deskritt fit-tabella hawn taħt:

| Data u ħin tal-għeluq | 4.7.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Tul ta’ Żmien | 4.7.2013-31.12.2013 |
| Stat Membru | Il-Portugall |
| Stokk jew Grupp ta’ stokkijiet | BFT/AE45WM |
| Speċi | Tonn (Thunnus thynnus) |
| Żona | L-Oċean Atlantiku, fil-Lvant ta’ 45° W, u l-Mediterran |
| Tip(i) ta’ bastimenti tas-sajd | — |
| Numru ta' referenza | 16/TQ40 |

Data u ħin tal-għeluq

4.7.2013

Tul ta’ Żmien

4.7.2013-31.12.2013

Stat Membru

Il-Portugall

Stokk jew Grupp ta’ stokkijiet

BFT/AE45WM

Speċi

Tonn (Thunnus thynnus)

Żona

L-Oċean Atlantiku, fil-Lvant ta’ 45° W, u l-Mediterran

Tip(i) ta’ bastimenti tas-sajd

—

Numru ta' referenza

16/TQ40

---

(1)  ĠU L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/11

---

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati Membri dwar l-għeluq tas-sajd

2013/C 229/05

F'konformità mal-Artikolu 35(3) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1224/2009 tal-20 ta' Novembru 2009 li jistabbilixxi sistema Komunitarja ta’ kontroll għall-iżgurar tal-konformità mar-regoli tal-Politika Komuni tas-Sajd (1), ittieħdet deċiżjoni li s-sajd jingħalaq kif deskritt fit-tabella hawn taħt:

| Data u ħin tal-għeluq | 4.7.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Tul ta’ żmien | 4.7.2013-31.12.2013 |
| Stat Membru | Ir-Renju Unit |
| Stokk jew Grupp ta’ stokkijiet | SAN/2A3A4. u ż-żoni ta’ ġestjoni
  SAN/123_1, _2, _3, _4, _6 |
| Speċi | Iċ-ċiċċirell u l-qabdiet inċidentali assoċjati (Ammodytes spp.) |
| Żona | L-ilmijiet tal-UE taż-żoni IIa, IIIa u IV u ż-żoni ta’ ġestjoni taċ-ċiċċirell fl-ilmijiet tal-UE taż-żoni 1, 2, 3, 4 u 6 (esklużi l-ilmijiet sa sitt mili nawtiċi mil-linji bażi tar-Renju Unit f’Shetland, Fair Isle u Foula) |
| Tip(i) ta’ bastimenti tas-sajd | — |
| Numru ta' referenza | 17/TQ40 |

Data u ħin tal-għeluq

4.7.2013

Tul ta’ żmien

4.7.2013-31.12.2013

Stat Membru

Ir-Renju Unit

Stokk jew Grupp ta’ stokkijiet

SAN/2A3A4. u ż-żoni ta’ ġestjoni

SAN/123_1, _2, _3, _4, _6

Speċi

Iċ-ċiċċirell u l-qabdiet inċidentali assoċjati (Ammodytes spp.)

Żona

L-ilmijiet tal-UE taż-żoni IIa, IIIa u IV u ż-żoni ta’ ġestjoni taċ-ċiċċirell fl-ilmijiet tal-UE taż-żoni 1, 2, 3, 4 u 6 (esklużi l-ilmijiet sa sitt mili nawtiċi mil-linji bażi tar-Renju Unit f’Shetland, Fair Isle u Foula)

Tip(i) ta’ bastimenti tas-sajd

—

Numru ta' referenza

17/TQ40

---

(1)  ĠU L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 1.

---

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/12

---

Informazzjoni kkomunikata mill-Istati tal-EFTA dwar għajnuna mill-Istat mogħtija skont l-Att imsemmi fil-punt 1 j tal-Anness XV tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE (ir-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 800/2008 li jiddikjara ċerti kategoriji ta’ għajnuna bħala kompatibbli mas-suq komuni (Regolament għal Eżenzjoni Ġenerali Sħiħa) skont l-Artikoli 87 u 88 tat-Trattat)

2013/C 229/06

PARTI I

| Għajnuna Nru | GBER 8/13/REG |
| --- | --- |
| L-Istat tal-EFTA | In-Norveġja |
| Ir-reġjun | Ir-reġjuni kollha fir-Rumanija | Stejtus tal-għajnuna reġjonali |
| L-awtorità awtorizzanti | Isem | Innovation Norway |
| Indirizz | PO Box 448 Sentrum |
| 0104 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Għajnuna Nru

GBER 8/13/REG

L-Istat tal-EFTA

In-Norveġja

Ir-reġjun

Ir-reġjuni kollha fir-Rumanija

Stejtus tal-għajnuna reġjonali

L-awtorità awtorizzanti

Isem

Innovation Norway

Indirizz

PO Box 448 Sentrum

0104 Oslo

NORWAY

Il-paġna tal-internet

http://www.innovationnorway.no

It-titolu tal-miżura ta’ għajnuna

Mekkaniżmu Finanzjarju Norveġiż 2009-2014

Programm ta' Innovazzjoni tal-Industrija Ekoloġika ROMANIA

Il-bażi ġuridika nazzjonali (Referenza għall-pubblikazzjoni nazzjonali uffiċjali rilevanti)

Prop. 1 S (2012-2013) “Il-Ministeru tal-Affarijiet Barranin” paġni 85-95

http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/prop/2012-2013/prop-1-s-20122013.html?id=703276

Il-link tal-internet għat-test sħiħ tal-miżura ta' għajnuna

http://www.norwaygrants-greeninnovation.no

It-tip ta’ miżura

Skema

Iva

Għajnuna ad hoc

Mhux applikabbli

Tul ta’ żmien

Skema

12.3.2013 sa 30.4.2016

Is-settur(i) ekonomiku/ekonomiċi kkonċernat(i)

Is-setturi ekonomiċi kollha eliġibbli biex jirċievu l-għajnuna

Iva, is-setturi ekonomiċi kollha

It-tip ta' benefiċjarju

SME

Iva

Impriżi kbar

Iva

Impriżi mikro

Iva

NGOs

Iva

Baġit

L-ammont totali annwali tal-baġit ppjanat skont l-iskema

L-ammont totali (2013-2016) EUR 21 768 200

L-istrument tal-għajnuna (Art. 5)

Għotja

Iva

PARTI II

| L-Għanijiet Ġenerali (lista) | L-Għanijiet (lista) | L-intensità massima ta’ għajnuna f'% jew l-Ammont massimu ta' għajnuna f'NOK | SME bonusijiet f'% |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Għajnuna reġjonali għall-investiment u l-impjieg
  (Art. 13) | Skema | L-intensità tal-għajnuna fl-ekwivalenti preżenti tal-għotja gross m’għandhiex taqbeż il-limitu tal-għajnuna reġjonali li tkun fis-seħħ fiż-żmien li tingħata tal-għajnuna fir-reġjun assistit kkonċernat fir-Rumanija. | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għall-intrapriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| Għajnuna tal-SMEs għall-investiment u l-impjieg
  (Art. 15) | | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju | |
| Għajnuna għall-ħarsien tal-Ambjent
  (Art. 17-25) | Għajnuna għall-investiment li tgħin lill-impriżi biex imorru lil hinn mill-istandards Komunitarji għall-protezzjoni ambjentali jew biex jgħollu l-livell tal-protezzjoni ambjentali fin-nuqqas tal-istandards Komunitarji
  (l-Art. 18)
  Jekk jogħġbok ipprovdi referenza speċifika għall-istandard rilevanti | 35 % | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| | Għajnuna għall-akkwist ta’ vetturi ta’ trasport ġodda li jmorru lil hinn mill-istandards Komunitarji jew li jgħollu l-livell tal-ħarsien ambjentali fin-nuqqas ta’ standards Komunitarji
  (Art. 19) | 35 % | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| | Għajnuna għall-adattament bikri għall-istandards Komunitarji futuri għall-SMEs
  (Art. 20) | 15 % għal impriżi żgħar u 10 % għall-impriżi ta’ daqs medju, jekk l-implimentazzjoni u l-finalizzazzjoni iseħħu mhux aktar minn tliet snin qabel id-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-istandard (10 % għal impriżi żgħar jekk inqas minn tliet snin) | |
| | Għajnuna għal investiment ambjentali f’miżuri tal-iffrankar tal-enerġija
  (Art. 21) | 60 % | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| | Għajnuna għall-investiment ambjentali f’koġenerazzjoni ta’ effiċjenza għolja
  (Art. 22) | 45 % | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| | Għajnuna għall-investiment ambjentali għall-promozzjoni tal-enerġija minn sorsi ta’ enerġija rinnovabbli
  (Art. 23) | 45 % | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| | Għajnuna għal studji ambjentali
  (Art. 24) | 50 % | 20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju |
| Għajnuna għal konsulenza u l-parteċipazzjoni tal-SMEs ġo fieri
  (Art. 26-27) | Għajnuna għal konsulenza favur SMEs
  (Art. 26) | 50 % | |
| | Għajnuna għall-parteċipazzjoni ta’ SMEs f’fieri
  (Art. 27) | 50 % | |
| Għajnuna għar-riċerka, l-iżvilupp u l-innovazzjoni
  (Art. 30-37) | Għajnuna għal proġetti ta' riċerka u ta' żvilupp
  (l-Art. 31) | Riċerka fundamentali
  (l-Art. 31(2)(a)) | 100 % | |
| | | Riċerka industrijali
  (Art. 31(2)(b)) | 50 % | 10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju
  20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  Bonus ta’ 15 % jista’ jiġi miżjud sa intensità massima ta’ għajnuna ta’ 80 % jekk il-kundizzjonijiet fl-Artikolu 31(4)(b) huma sodisfatti. |
| | | Żvilupp sperimentali:
  (Art. 31(2)(c)) | 25 % | 10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju
  20 % għal impriżi żgħar
  Bonus ta’ 15 % jista’ jiġi miżjud sa intensità massima ta’ għajnuna ta’ 80 % jekk il-kundizzjonijiet fl-Artikolu 31(4)(b) huma sodisfatti. |
| | Għajnuna għal studji tekniċi ta' vijabilità
  (Art. 32) | 75 % (riċerka industrijali) u 50 % (żvilupp esperimentali) għall-SMEs
  65 % (riċerka industrijali) u 40 % (żvilupp esperimentali) għall-impriżi kbar | |
| | Għajnuna għall-ispejjeż ta’ drittijiet ta’ proprjetà industrijali għall-SMEs
  (Art. 33) | L-intensità tal-għajnuna m’għandhiex teċċedi l-intensità għal għajnuna għal proġett ta’ riċerka u żvilupp
  (Art 31(3-4)) | |
| | Għajnuna lill-impriżi innovattivi żgħar
  (Art. 35) | EUR 1 miljun | |
| | Għajnuna għal servizzi ta' konsulenza tal-innovazzjoni u għal servizzi ta' appoġġ għall-innovazzjoni
  (Art. 36) | EUR 200 000 għal kull benefiċjarju f’kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 3 snin | |
| | Għajnuna għat-tislif ta’ persunal bi kwalifiki għoljin
  (Art. 37) | | |
| Għajnuna għat-taħriġ
  (Art. 38-39) | Taħriġ speċifiku
  (Art. 38(1)) | 25 % | 10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju
  20 % għal impriżi żgħar |
| | Taħriġ ġenerali
  (Art. 38(2)) | 60 % | 10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju
  20 % għal impriżi żgħar |

L-Għanijiet Ġenerali (lista)

L-Għanijiet (lista)

L-intensità massima ta’ għajnuna f'% jew l-Ammont massimu ta' għajnuna f'NOK

SME bonusijiet f'%

Għajnuna reġjonali għall-investiment u l-impjieg

(Art. 13)

Skema

L-intensità tal-għajnuna fl-ekwivalenti preżenti tal-għotja gross m’għandhiex taqbeż il-limitu tal-għajnuna reġjonali li tkun fis-seħħ fiż-żmien li tingħata tal-għajnuna fir-reġjun assistit kkonċernat fir-Rumanija.

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għall-intrapriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna tal-SMEs għall-investiment u l-impjieg

(Art. 15)

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għall-ħarsien tal-Ambjent

(Art. 17-25)

Għajnuna għall-investiment li tgħin lill-impriżi biex imorru lil hinn mill-istandards Komunitarji għall-protezzjoni ambjentali jew biex jgħollu l-livell tal-protezzjoni ambjentali fin-nuqqas tal-istandards Komunitarji

(l-Art. 18)

Jekk jogħġbok ipprovdi referenza speċifika għall-istandard rilevanti

35 %

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għall-akkwist ta’ vetturi ta’ trasport ġodda li jmorru lil hinn mill-istandards Komunitarji jew li jgħollu l-livell tal-ħarsien ambjentali fin-nuqqas ta’ standards Komunitarji

(Art. 19)

35 %

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għall-adattament bikri għall-istandards Komunitarji futuri għall-SMEs

(Art. 20)

15 % għal impriżi żgħar u 10 % għall-impriżi ta’ daqs medju, jekk l-implimentazzjoni u l-finalizzazzjoni iseħħu mhux aktar minn tliet snin qabel id-data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-istandard (10 % għal impriżi żgħar jekk inqas minn tliet snin)

Għajnuna għal investiment ambjentali f’miżuri tal-iffrankar tal-enerġija

(Art. 21)

60 %

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għall-investiment ambjentali f’koġenerazzjoni ta’ effiċjenza għolja

(Art. 22)

45 %

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għall-investiment ambjentali għall-promozzjoni tal-enerġija minn sorsi ta’ enerġija rinnovabbli

(Art. 23)

45 %

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għal studji ambjentali

(Art. 24)

50 %

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

Għajnuna għal konsulenza u l-parteċipazzjoni tal-SMEs ġo fieri

(Art. 26-27)

Għajnuna għal konsulenza favur SMEs

(Art. 26)

50 %

Għajnuna għall-parteċipazzjoni ta’ SMEs f’fieri

(Art. 27)

50 %

Għajnuna għar-riċerka, l-iżvilupp u l-innovazzjoni

(Art. 30-37)

Għajnuna għal proġetti ta' riċerka u ta' żvilupp

(l-Art. 31)

Riċerka fundamentali

(l-Art. 31(2)(a))

100 %

Riċerka industrijali

(Art. 31(2)(b))

50 %

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

Bonus ta’ 15 % jista’ jiġi miżjud sa intensità massima ta’ għajnuna ta’ 80 % jekk il-kundizzjonijiet fl-Artikolu 31(4)(b) huma sodisfatti.

Żvilupp sperimentali:

(Art. 31(2)(c))

25 %

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

Bonus ta’ 15 % jista’ jiġi miżjud sa intensità massima ta’ għajnuna ta’ 80 % jekk il-kundizzjonijiet fl-Artikolu 31(4)(b) huma sodisfatti.

Għajnuna għal studji tekniċi ta' vijabilità

(Art. 32)

75 % (riċerka industrijali) u 50 % (żvilupp esperimentali) għall-SMEs

65 % (riċerka industrijali) u 40 % (żvilupp esperimentali) għall-impriżi kbar

Għajnuna għall-ispejjeż ta’ drittijiet ta’ proprjetà industrijali għall-SMEs

(Art. 33)

L-intensità tal-għajnuna m’għandhiex teċċedi l-intensità għal għajnuna għal proġett ta’ riċerka u żvilupp

(Art 31(3-4))

Għajnuna lill-impriżi innovattivi żgħar

(Art. 35)

EUR 1 miljun

Għajnuna għal servizzi ta' konsulenza tal-innovazzjoni u għal servizzi ta' appoġġ għall-innovazzjoni

(Art. 36)

EUR 200 000 għal kull benefiċjarju f’kwalunkwe perjodu ta’ 3 snin

Għajnuna għat-tislif ta’ persunal bi kwalifiki għoljin

(Art. 37)

Għajnuna għat-taħriġ

(Art. 38-39)

Taħriġ speċifiku

(Art. 38(1))

25 %

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

Taħriġ ġenerali

(Art. 38(2))

60 %

10 % għal impriżi ta’ daqs medju

20 % għal impriżi żgħar

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C 229/16

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L-ebda għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE

2013/C 229/07

L-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA hija tal-fehma li l-miżura li ġejja ma tikkostitwixxix għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE:

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni | : | l-10 ta' April 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numru tal-każ | : | 69933 |
| Numru tad-Deċiżjoni | : | 144/13/COL |
| Stat tal-EFTA | : | In-Norveġja |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | : | Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd |
| Tip ta’ miżura | : | L-ebda għajnuna |
| Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità li qed tagħti l-għajnuna | : | Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd |
| Bjørns gate 1 |
| 5008 Bergen |
| NORWAY |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni

:

l-10 ta' April 2013

Numru tal-każ

:

69933

Numru tad-Deċiżjoni

:

144/13/COL

Stat tal-EFTA

:

In-Norveġja

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

:

Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd

Tip ta’ miżura

:

L-ebda għajnuna

Isem u indirizz tal-awtorità li qed tagħti l-għajnuna

:

Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd

Bjørns gate 1

5008 Bergen

NORWAY

It-test awtentiku tad-deċiżjoni, li minnu tneħħiet l-informazzjoni kunfidenzjali kollha, qiegħed fuq il-websajt tal-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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C 229/17

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L-ebda għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE

2013/C 229/08

L-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA hija tal-fehma li l-miżura li ġejja ma tikkostitwixxix għajnuna mill-Istat skont l-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim dwar iż-ŻEE:

| Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni | : | l-10 ta' April 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Numru tal-każ | : | 70521 |
| Numru tad-Deċiżjoni | : | 145/13/COL |
| Stat tal-EFTA | : | L-Islanda |
| Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju) | : | Allegata għajnuna mill-Istat lil Landsbankinn permezz tar-rinunzja ta’ redditu mistenni fuq il-fondi pubbliċi |
| Bażi legali | : | L-Artikolu 61(1) ŻEE |
| Tip ta’ miżura | : | L-ebda għajnuna |
| Setturi ekonomiċi | : | Servizzi finanzjarji |

Data tal-adozzjoni tad-deċiżjoni

:

l-10 ta' April 2013

Numru tal-każ

:

70521

Numru tad-Deċiżjoni

:

145/13/COL

Stat tal-EFTA

:

L-Islanda

Titolu (u/jew isem tal-benefiċjarju)

:

Allegata għajnuna mill-Istat lil Landsbankinn permezz tar-rinunzja ta’ redditu mistenni fuq il-fondi pubbliċi

Bażi legali

:

L-Artikolu 61(1) ŻEE

Tip ta’ miżura

:

L-ebda għajnuna

Setturi ekonomiċi

:

Servizzi finanzjarji

It-test awtentiku tad-deċiżjoni, li minnu tneħħiet l-informazzjoni kunfidenzjali kollha, qiegħed fuq il-websajt tal-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat rigward il-finanzjament tas-Sala tal-Kunċerti u Ċentru tal-Konferenzi ta' Harpa

2013/C 229/09

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 128/13/COL tal-20 ta' Marzu 2013, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni ta' wara dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Islandiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-Deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tistieden lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura kkonċernata fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussell |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussell

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jiġu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista’ tinżamm mistura wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

Proċedura

F’Settembru 2011 l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA (l-Awtorità) irċeviet ilment dwar is-sussidjar allegat mill-Istat tal-Iżlanda u l-belt ta' Rejkjavik ta’ servizzi tal-konferenzi u servizzi ta' ristorant/catering fis-Sala tal-Kunċerti u Ċentru għall-Konferenzi ta' Harpa (Harpa). Sussegwentement, l-Awtorità bagħtet żewġ talbiet għall-informazzjoni li l-awtoritajiet Islandiżi rrispondew.

Deskrizzjoni tal-miżura

Fl-2004 l-Istat Islandiż u l-Belt ta’ Rejkjavik inizjalaw sejħa għal Sħubija Pubblika Privata dwar il-kostruzzjoni, id-disinn u t-tħaddim ta’ sala tal-kunċerti u ċentru tal-konferenzi ta' 28 000 metru kwadru. Fit-12 ta’ Jannar 2007, wara li ġiet aġġudikata l-offerta l-aktar favorevoli, bdiet il-kostruzzjoni tas-sala tal-kunċerti u ċ-ċentru għall-konferenzi ta' Harpa. Minħabba l-kollass finanzjarju fl-Islanda l-kostruzzjoni ta’ Harpa ġiet sospiża fl-2008. Ftit wara, is-Sindku ta’ Rejkjavik u l-Ministru tal-Edukazzjoni laħqu ftehim li fisser li l-Istat u l-belt kellhom ikomplu bil-kostruzzjoni tal-proġett mingħajr l-imsieħeb privat. Il-bini nfetaħ formalment fl-20 ta’ Awwissu 2011.

Harpa huwa maħsub biex jakkomoda servizzi u operazzjonijiet varji. Kemm l-Orkestra Sinfonika tal-Islanda kif ukoll l-Opera Islandiża daħlu f’kuntratti fit-tul għall-użu ta’ ċerti faċilitajiet fi ħdan Harpa. Barra minn hekk, Harpa takkomoda konferenzi u hemm erba’ swali tal-konferenzi ta’ daqsijiet differenti. Harpa tilqa' fiha wkoll diversi avvenimenti oħra tal-arti bħal kunċerti pop u ta’ mużika rock kemm minn artisti Islandiżi kif ukoll barranin. Attivitajiet oħra f'Harpa, bħalma hu l-catering, ristoranti, ħanut tal-mużika u ħanut tal-għamara huma operati minn kumpaniji privati li jikru l-faċilitajiet f'Harpa. Dawn il-faċilitajiet jinkrew lil operaturi privati b'kunsidzzjonijiet tas-suq u kienu suġġetti għal sejħiet għall-offerti pubbliċi fejn ġew aċċettati l-aktar offerti favorevoli.

Harpa tappartjeni kompletament lill-Istat tal-Islanda (54 %) u l-Belt ta’ Rejkjavik (46 %) li jipprovdu kontribuzzjonijiet annwali sostanzjali skont il-parteċipazzjoni fil-proġett. Minn mindu fetħet, Harpa operat b’defiċit annwali konsiderevoli li ġie kopert permezz tal-baġits tal-Istat tal-Islanda u tal-Belt ta’ Rejkjavik.

Kummenti mill-awtoritajiet Islandiżi

Skont l-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda, il-finanzjament ta’ Harpa ma jinvolvix għajnuna mill-Istat peress li huma raw li, kif jixraq, ikun hemm kontijiet separati għall-attivitajiet differenti ġewwa s-sala tal-kunċerti u ċ-ċentru għall-konferenzi. Sabiex jappoġġjaw din l-allegazzjoni l-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda ppreżentaw rapporti minn żewġ ditti tal-kontabilità dwar is-separazzjoni tal-kontijiet tal-kumpaniji involuti fl-operazzjoni ta’ Harpa. L-awtoritajiet Islandiżi ressqu wkoll analiżi tal-prezzijiet fejn dawn ipparagunaw il-prezzijiet ta' faċilitajiet għall-konferenzi komparabbli f'Rejkjavik, abbażi ta' daqs u kapaċità. Barra minn hekk, l-awtoritajiet tal-Iżlanda jsostnu li n-negozju tal-konferenzi jikkontribwixxi b’mod pożittiv għall-attivitajiet l-oħra f’Harpa u mingħajr in-negozju tal-konferenzi, il-kosti li kien ikollhom iġorru attivitajiet oħra kienu jkunu konsiderevolment ogħla.

Il-preżenza ta' għajnuna mill-Istat

Vantaġġi li jinvolvu riżorsi mill-Istat li jingħataw lil impriża

Peress li l-Istat Islandiż u l-Belt ta’ Rejkjavik flimkien ikopru d-defiċit annwali tal-operazzjoni ta' Harpa billi kull sena jikkontribwixxu ċertu ammont mill-baġits tagħhom, huma involuti riżorsi tal-Istat fis-sens tal-Artikolu 61 tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

L-Awtorità hija tal-opinjoni li kemm il-kostruzzjoni kif ukoll it-tħaddim ta’ infrastruttura jikkostitwixxu attività ekonomika fiha nnifsha jekk dik l-infrastruttura tintuża, jew tkun se tintuża, biex jiġu pprovduti oġġetti jew servizzi fis-suq (1). Xi attivitajiet li jseħħu f’Harpa, notevolment il-konferenzi, l-ispettakli teatrali, il-kunċerti ta' mużika popolari, eċċ., jistgħu jattiraw numru sinifikanti ta’ klijenti waqt li jkunu f’kompetizzjoni ma’ ċentri tal-konferenzi, teatri jew postijiet oħra tal-mużika li jappartjenu lill-privat. Għalhekk, l-Awtorità hija tal-fehma preliminari li l-kumpaniji involuti fl-operazzjoni ta’ Harpa, sakemm ikunu qed jieħdu sehem f’attivitajiet kummerċjali, jikkwalifikaw bħala impriżi.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità tikkunsidra li l-finanzjament pubbliku tal-kostruzzjoni ta' Harpa jikkostitwixxi vantaġġ ekonomiku u għalhekk għajnuna, peress li l-proġett x'aktarx li ma kienx iseħħ fin-nuqqas ta' tali finanzjament. Barra minn hekk, jingħata vantaġġ lill-kumpaniji involuti fl-operazzjoni ta’ Harpa fil-forma ta’ profitti garantiti meta l-Istat u l-Belt ma jkunux jeħtieġu qligħ fuq l-investiment tagħhom fis-sala tal-kunċerti u ċ-ċentru tal-konferenzi, sakemm dawk il-kumpaniji jieħdu sehem f’attivitajiet kummerċjali, bħalma huma l-ospitar ta’ konferenzi jew avvenimenti oħra tal-arti. L-evalwazzjoni preliminari tal-Awtorità għaldaqstant tindika li fl-ebda livell (ta' kostruzzjoni, tal-operazzjoni u tal-użu) ma jista jiġi eskluż li qed jingħata vantaġġ ekonomiku selettiv.

Id-distorsjoni tal-kompetizzjoni u l-effett fuq il-kummerċ bejn partijiet kontrattanti

Billi s-suq tal-organizzazzjoni ta' avvenimenti internazzjonali bħalma huma konferenzi u avvenimenti huwa miftuħ għall-kompetizzjoni bejn dawk li jipprovdu l-postijiet għall-attivitajiet u l-organizzaturi tal-avvenimenti, li ġeneralment ikunu involuti f'attivitajiet li huma soġġetti għall-kummerċ bejn l-Istati taż-ŻEE, wieħed jista' jassumi li se jkun hemm impatt fuq il-kummerċ. F’dan il-każ, l-effett fuq il-kummerċ bejn ċerti Stati taż-ŻEE ġirien huwa saħansitra aktar probabbli minħabba n-natura tal-industrija tal-konferenzi (2). Għalhekk, fil-fehma preliminari tal-Awtorità, il-miżura thedded li toħloq distorsjoni tal-kompetizzjoni u taffettwa l-kummerċ fi ħdan iż-ŻEE.

Il-kompatibbiltà tal-għajnuna

Skont l-Artikolu 61(3)(c) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE, kif interpretat mill-Awtorità u żviluppati mill-Kummissjoni Ewropea taħt ex Artikolu 87(3)(d) tat-Trattat tal-KE li issa hu l-Artikolu 107(3)(d) TFUE, l-għajnuna biex tiġi promossa l-kultura u l-preservazzjoni tal-patrimonju tista’ titqies kompatibbli mal-funzjonament tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE, fejn tali għajnuna ma tolqotx il-kundizzjonijiet tal-kummerċ u tal-kompetizzjoni fiż-ŻEE sal-punt li jkun kuntrarju għall-interess komuni. L-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda ddikjaraw li l-għan ewlieni tal-miżura inkwistjoni kien li tiġi promossa l-kultura permezz tal-kostruzzjoni ta' sala tal-kunċerti li tkun tista' tilqa' kemm lill-Orkestra Sinfonika tal-Islanda kif ukoll lill-Opra Islandiża. L-Awtorità aċċettat li, minħabba l-iskop kulturali tagħha, il-kostruzzjoni u l-operat ta’ faċilità sinfonika u tal-Opera, tista’ tikkwalifika bħala għajnuna għall-promozzjoni tal-kultura.

L-Awtorità taċċetta li infrastruttura bħalma hi dik ta' Harpa tista' wkoll tintuża biex jinżammu diversi attivitajiet kummerċjali bħal ristoranti, ħwienet tal-kafè, imħażen, konferenzi u kunċerti popolari. Madankollu, sabiex ma jkunx hemm distorsjoni tal-kompetizzjoni, għandhom jiġu stabbiliti salvagwardji li jiżguraw li ma jkunx hemm sussidji trażversali bejn l-attivitajiet kummerċjali u l-attivitajiet kulturali sussidjati. L-Awtorità ma tistax tara li l-awtoritajiet tal-Islanda daħħlu s-salvagwardji meħtieġa fis-seħħ sabiex jiġi żgurat li tali sussidju trażversali ma jseħħx. Konsegwentement, wara l-valutazzjoni preliminarja tagħha, l-Awtorità għandha d-dubji jekk il-kostruzzjoni u l-operazzjoni ta' Harpa tistax titqies kompatibbli taħt l-Artikolu 61(3)(c) tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet li saru, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ proċedura ta' investigazzjoni formali f'konformità mal-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 għall-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta' Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza u ta' Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir-rigward tal-iffinanzjar tas-Sala tal-Kunċert u Ċentru tal-Konferenzi ta' Harpa. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

Skont l-Artikolu 14 tal-Protokoll 3, kull għajnuna illegali tista’ tkun soġġetta għal irkupru mingħand il-benefiċjarji.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 128/13/COL

of 20 March 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential State aid involved in the financing of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to:

The Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

The Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Article 4(4) and Articles 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 19 September 2011, the Authority received a complaint, dated 13 September 2011 (Event No 608967), concerning the alleged subsidising by the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík (‘the City’) of conference services and restaurant/catering services in the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre (‘Harpa’) (3). |
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(1)

On 19 September 2011, the Authority received a complaint, dated 13 September 2011 (Event No 608967), concerning the alleged subsidising by the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík (‘the City’) of conference services and restaurant/catering services in the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre (‘Harpa’) (3).

| (2) | By letter dated 14 October 2011, the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities (Event No 609736). By a letter dated 30 November 2011 (Event No 617042), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information. |
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(2)

By letter dated 14 October 2011, the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities (Event No 609736). By a letter dated 30 November 2011 (Event No 617042), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information.

| (3) | The case was the subject of discussions between the Authority and the Icelandic authorities as well as the lawyer representing the holding company responsible for Harpa’s operations, at the package meeting in Reykjavík on 5 June 2012. Shortly after the meeting, the Authority sent a follow up letter, dated 9 July 2012 (Event No 637627), to the Icelandic authorities inviting them to provide information on certain outstanding issues. |
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(3)

The case was the subject of discussions between the Authority and the Icelandic authorities as well as the lawyer representing the holding company responsible for Harpa’s operations, at the package meeting in Reykjavík on 5 June 2012. Shortly after the meeting, the Authority sent a follow up letter, dated 9 July 2012 (Event No 637627), to the Icelandic authorities inviting them to provide information on certain outstanding issues.

| (4) | By letter dated 21 August 2012 (Event No 644771), the Icelandic authorities submitted additional information. By letter dated 27 September 2012 (Event No 648320), the Icelandic authorities submitted a memorandum concerning the separation of accounts as well as a statement from the accounting firm PWC. |
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(4)

By letter dated 21 August 2012 (Event No 644771), the Icelandic authorities submitted additional information. By letter dated 27 September 2012 (Event No 648320), the Icelandic authorities submitted a memorandum concerning the separation of accounts as well as a statement from the accounting firm PWC.

| (5) | Finally, the Icelandic authorities submitted information by e-mail dated 11 February 2013 (Event No 662444) and by letter dated 7 March 2013 (Event No 665434). |
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(5)

Finally, the Icelandic authorities submitted information by e-mail dated 11 February 2013 (Event No 662444) and by letter dated 7 March 2013 (Event No 665434).

2.   The complaint

| (6) | The complainant has alleged that unlawful State aid is being provided by the Icelandic State and the City to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The complainant referred to the State budget for the year 2011 where the Ministry of Finance allocated ISK 419 400 000 to the operation of Harpa and additional ISK 44 200 000 for building costs and maintenance. The Municipality’s budget foresaw a substantial allocation of funds to the Harpa project for the year 2011 amounting to a total of ISK 391 526 000. Furthermore, the Municipality contributed a substantial amount to the project in the years 2009-2010. |
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(6)

The complainant has alleged that unlawful State aid is being provided by the Icelandic State and the City to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The complainant referred to the State budget for the year 2011 where the Ministry of Finance allocated ISK 419 400 000 to the operation of Harpa and additional ISK 44 200 000 for building costs and maintenance. The Municipality’s budget foresaw a substantial allocation of funds to the Harpa project for the year 2011 amounting to a total of ISK 391 526 000. Furthermore, the Municipality contributed a substantial amount to the project in the years 2009-2010.

| (7) | The complainant claims that the contribution from both the Icelandic Government and the City is partly being used to subsidise the conference service and the restaurant/catering services in the music hall and conference centre. The contributions in question are fairly high and according to the complainant, there is no transparency in how they are being used. The complainant maintains that this State aid affects the market for the conference business in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) as a whole and is not limited to competitors on the Icelandic market. It therefore constitutes an infringement of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. |
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(7)

The complainant claims that the contribution from both the Icelandic Government and the City is partly being used to subsidise the conference service and the restaurant/catering services in the music hall and conference centre. The contributions in question are fairly high and according to the complainant, there is no transparency in how they are being used. The complainant maintains that this State aid affects the market for the conference business in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) as a whole and is not limited to competitors on the Icelandic market. It therefore constitutes an infringement of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

| (8) | The complainant provided the Authority with extracts from the Icelandic State budget for the year 2011 as well as an extract from the City’s budget for the same year. Furthermore, the complainant provided a purchase agreement for Harpa and general information on the conference market in Iceland. However, the complainant noted that due to the lack of transparency it was difficult to gather detailed information on the obligations of the Icelandic State and the City to contribute funds to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa as well as information on Harpa’s business model and on the separation of accounts. |
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(8)

The complainant provided the Authority with extracts from the Icelandic State budget for the year 2011 as well as an extract from the City’s budget for the same year. Furthermore, the complainant provided a purchase agreement for Harpa and general information on the conference market in Iceland. However, the complainant noted that due to the lack of transparency it was difficult to gather detailed information on the obligations of the Icelandic State and the City to contribute funds to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa as well as information on Harpa’s business model and on the separation of accounts.

3.   Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre

3.1.   Background

| (9) | In 1999, the Mayor of Reykjavík along with representatives of the Icelandic Government announced that a concert and conference centre would be constructed in the centre of Reykjavík. In late 2002, the Icelandic State and the City signed an agreement regarding the project and the following year the company Austurhöfn-TR ehf. was founded with the purpose of overseeing the project. |
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(9)

In 1999, the Mayor of Reykjavík along with representatives of the Icelandic Government announced that a concert and conference centre would be constructed in the centre of Reykjavík. In late 2002, the Icelandic State and the City signed an agreement regarding the project and the following year the company Austurhöfn-TR ehf. was founded with the purpose of overseeing the project.

| (10) | In 2004, the Icelandic State and the City initiated a public-private partnership (‘PPP’) bid concerning the construction, design and operation of the concert hall and conference centre. There were four companies that bid for the contract. In 2005, the evaluation committee of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. concluded that the offer from Portus ehf. was the most favourable one and subsequently the Icelandic State and the City entered into a contract with Portus ehf. for the construction and operation of a concert and conference centre (4). The construction of Harpa began on 12 January 2007. |
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(10)

In 2004, the Icelandic State and the City initiated a public-private partnership (‘PPP’) bid concerning the construction, design and operation of the concert hall and conference centre. There were four companies that bid for the contract. In 2005, the evaluation committee of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. concluded that the offer from Portus ehf. was the most favourable one and subsequently the Icelandic State and the City entered into a contract with Portus ehf. for the construction and operation of a concert and conference centre (4). The construction of Harpa began on 12 January 2007.

| (11) | Due to the financial collapse in Iceland in October 2008, the construction of Harpa was put on hold. However, shortly after the collapse, the Mayor of Reykjavík and the Minister for Education reached an agreement which entailed that the State and the City would continue with the construction of Harpa without the private partner. After an amended and restated project agreement was concluded, the construction project continued (hereinafter referred to as ‘the project agreement’) (5). On 20 August 2011, Harpa was formally opened. The building is 28 000 square meters and is located at Austurbakki 2, 101 Reykjavík. |
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(11)

Due to the financial collapse in Iceland in October 2008, the construction of Harpa was put on hold. However, shortly after the collapse, the Mayor of Reykjavík and the Minister for Education reached an agreement which entailed that the State and the City would continue with the construction of Harpa without the private partner. After an amended and restated project agreement was concluded, the construction project continued (hereinafter referred to as ‘the project agreement’) (5). On 20 August 2011, Harpa was formally opened. The building is 28 000 square meters and is located at Austurbakki 2, 101 Reykjavík.

| (12) | Harpa is meant to accommodate various services and operations. Both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera have entered into long-term contracts for the use of certain facilities within Harpa. Moreover, Harpa accommodates conferences and there are four conference halls of different sizes. Harpa also houses various other events such as pop and rock concerts with both Icelandic and foreign artists. |
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(12)

Harpa is meant to accommodate various services and operations. Both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera have entered into long-term contracts for the use of certain facilities within Harpa. Moreover, Harpa accommodates conferences and there are four conference halls of different sizes. Harpa also houses various other events such as pop and rock concerts with both Icelandic and foreign artists.

| (13) | Other activities in Harpa such as catering, restaurants, a music shop and a furniture shop are operated by private companies who rent the facilities. According to the Icelandic authorities, these facilities are leased on market terms and were subject to public tenders, where the most favourable offers were accepted. |
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(13)

Other activities in Harpa such as catering, restaurants, a music shop and a furniture shop are operated by private companies who rent the facilities. According to the Icelandic authorities, these facilities are leased on market terms and were subject to public tenders, where the most favourable offers were accepted.

3.2.   The ownership and corporate structure of Harpa

| (14) | Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre is owned by the Icelandic State (54 %) and Reykjavík City (46 %) and therefore constitutes a public undertaking. The entire Harpa project has been overseen by Austurhöfn-TR ehf. which is a limited liability company, established by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Icelandic State and the City in order to take over the construction and running of the Harpa project (6). |
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(14)

Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre is owned by the Icelandic State (54 %) and Reykjavík City (46 %) and therefore constitutes a public undertaking. The entire Harpa project has been overseen by Austurhöfn-TR ehf. which is a limited liability company, established by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Icelandic State and the City in order to take over the construction and running of the Harpa project (6).

| (15) | Until recently there were several limited liability companies involved in Harpa's operations, namely: Portus ehf., which was responsible for Harpa real estate and operations, and Situs ehf., which was responsible for other buildings planned in the same area. Portus had two subsidiaries: Totus ehf., which owned the real estate itself, and Ago ehf., which was responsible for all operations in Harpa and leased the property from Totus. Situs also had two subsidies: Hospes ehf., which would have owned and operated a hotel which is to be constructed in the area, and Custos ehf., which was to own and operate any other buildings in the area. |
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(15)

Until recently there were several limited liability companies involved in Harpa's operations, namely: Portus ehf., which was responsible for Harpa real estate and operations, and Situs ehf., which was responsible for other buildings planned in the same area. Portus had two subsidiaries: Totus ehf., which owned the real estate itself, and Ago ehf., which was responsible for all operations in Harpa and leased the property from Totus. Situs also had two subsidies: Hospes ehf., which would have owned and operated a hotel which is to be constructed in the area, and Custos ehf., which was to own and operate any other buildings in the area.

| (16) | However, in order to minimise operational costs and increase efficiency, the board of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. decided in December 2012 to simplify the operational structure of Harpa by merging most of the limited liability companies involved in its operations into one company. The State and the City therefore founded the company Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. which is to oversee all of Harpa's operations. Simplifying the infrastructure of Harpa is a part of a long-term plan to make Harpa’s operations sustainable. |
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(16)

However, in order to minimise operational costs and increase efficiency, the board of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. decided in December 2012 to simplify the operational structure of Harpa by merging most of the limited liability companies involved in its operations into one company. The State and the City therefore founded the company Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. which is to oversee all of Harpa's operations. Simplifying the infrastructure of Harpa is a part of a long-term plan to make Harpa’s operations sustainable.

| (17) | The following chart explains in broad terms the organisational structure of Harpa after the changes to its corporate structure entered into effect (7): |
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(17)

The following chart explains in broad terms the organisational structure of Harpa after the changes to its corporate structure entered into effect (7):

Image

3.3.   The financing of Harpa’s operations

| (18) | As previously noted, Harpa is fully owned by the Icelandic State and the City through Austurhöfn-TR ehf. The obligations of the State and the City are regulated by Article 13 of the project agreement from 2006 (8). The annual payments of the State and the City are covered by their respective budgets. According to the State budget for 2011, the annual State contribution was expected to amount to ISK 424,4 million. For the year 2012, the expected amount to be contributed by the State was ISK 553,6 million. In the year 2013, there is expected to be an increase in the public funding of Harpa as the City and the State have approved an additional ISK 160 million contribution. All public contributions to Harpa are borne in accordance with the participation in the project, i.e. the State pays 54 % and the City 46 %. The contributions are also indexed with the consumer price index. |
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(18)

As previously noted, Harpa is fully owned by the Icelandic State and the City through Austurhöfn-TR ehf. The obligations of the State and the City are regulated by Article 13 of the project agreement from 2006 (8). The annual payments of the State and the City are covered by their respective budgets. According to the State budget for 2011, the annual State contribution was expected to amount to ISK 424,4 million. For the year 2012, the expected amount to be contributed by the State was ISK 553,6 million. In the year 2013, there is expected to be an increase in the public funding of Harpa as the City and the State have approved an additional ISK 160 million contribution. All public contributions to Harpa are borne in accordance with the participation in the project, i.e. the State pays 54 % and the City 46 %. The contributions are also indexed with the consumer price index.

| (19) | In addition to the contribution provided for in the State and the City’s budgets, the Government and the City have undertaken an obligation to grant a short-term loan for the operation of Harpa until long-term financing necessary to fully cover the cost of the project is completed. As from 2013, the total amount of the loan was ISK 794 million with an interest rate of 5 % and a 200 bp premium. The Icelandic authorities have however announced their intention to convert the loan into share capital in the companies operating Harpa (9). |
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(19)

In addition to the contribution provided for in the State and the City’s budgets, the Government and the City have undertaken an obligation to grant a short-term loan for the operation of Harpa until long-term financing necessary to fully cover the cost of the project is completed. As from 2013, the total amount of the loan was ISK 794 million with an interest rate of 5 % and a 200 bp premium. The Icelandic authorities have however announced their intention to convert the loan into share capital in the companies operating Harpa (9).

| (20) | The State and the City allocate funds on a monthly basis in order pay off loan obligations in connection with Harpa. Since the project is meant to be self-sustainable, the profits must cover all operational costs. The funds from the owners are therefore, according to the Icelandic authorities, only meant to cover outstanding loans (10). |
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(20)

The State and the City allocate funds on a monthly basis in order pay off loan obligations in connection with Harpa. Since the project is meant to be self-sustainable, the profits must cover all operational costs. The funds from the owners are therefore, according to the Icelandic authorities, only meant to cover outstanding loans (10).

| (21) | According to the project agreement, there is to be a financial separation between the different companies involved in the operation of Harpa and between the different operations and activities: |
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(21)

According to the project agreement, there is to be a financial separation between the different companies involved in the operation of Harpa and between the different operations and activities:

| (22) | 13.11.1 | The private partner will at all times ensure that there is financial separation between the real estate company, the operation company, Hringur and the private partner. Each entity shall be managed and operated separately with regards to finances. |
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(22)

13.11.1

The private partner will at all times ensure that there is financial separation between the real estate company, the operation company, Hringur and the private partner. Each entity shall be managed and operated separately with regards to finances.

| (23) | 13.11.2 | The private partner will at all times ensure that there is sufficient financial separation, i.e. separation in book-keeping, between the paid for work and other operations and activities within the CC. The private partner shall at all times during the term be able to demonstrate, upon request from the client, that such financial separation exists. |
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(23)

13.11.2

The private partner will at all times ensure that there is sufficient financial separation, i.e. separation in book-keeping, between the paid for work and other operations and activities within the CC. The private partner shall at all times during the term be able to demonstrate, upon request from the client, that such financial separation exists.

| (24) | The operations of Harpa are divided into several categories: 1. the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra; 2. the Icelandic Opera; 3. other art events; 4. conference department; 5. operations; 6. ticket sales; 7. operating of facilities; 8. management cost. All these cost categories now fall under Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. and the revenue and costs attributed to each of these categories are included in the budget under the relevant category. Common operational costs such as salary, housing (heating and electricity) and administrative costs are divided among the categories according to a cost allocation model (11). |
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(24)

The operations of Harpa are divided into several categories: 1. the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra; 2. the Icelandic Opera; 3. other art events; 4. conference department; 5. operations; 6. ticket sales; 7. operating of facilities; 8. management cost. All these cost categories now fall under Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. and the revenue and costs attributed to each of these categories are included in the budget under the relevant category. Common operational costs such as salary, housing (heating and electricity) and administrative costs are divided among the categories according to a cost allocation model (11).

| (25) | According to the projected annual account of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. for the year 2012, the company was expected to sustain a significant operating loss corresponding to a total negative EBITDA of ISK 406,5 million. The conference part of Harpa's operation was run at a negative EBITDA of ISK 120 million in 2012 and the same goes for ‘other art events’ (negative EBITDA of ISK 131 million). The projected annual accounts and earning analysis for the year 2013 also foresee a considerable operating loss, a total negative EBITDA of around ISK 348 million, with both the conference activities and ‘other art events’ operating at a loss (12). |
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(25)

According to the projected annual account of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. for the year 2012, the company was expected to sustain a significant operating loss corresponding to a total negative EBITDA of ISK 406,5 million. The conference part of Harpa's operation was run at a negative EBITDA of ISK 120 million in 2012 and the same goes for ‘other art events’ (negative EBITDA of ISK 131 million). The projected annual accounts and earning analysis for the year 2013 also foresee a considerable operating loss, a total negative EBITDA of around ISK 348 million, with both the conference activities and ‘other art events’ operating at a loss (12).

| (26) | As previously noted, the operation in Harpa is now overseen by a single company, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., which is devoted to making the Harpa project as profitable as possible. According to the Icelandic authorities, the overall aim is to make the operations gradually sustainable. Nevertheless, Harpa has since its opening been operated with an annual deficit that has been covered over the budgets of the Icelandic State and Reykjavík City (13). According to projections submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the conference activities in Harpa are expected to become gradually sustainable and by the year 2016 the authorities project that Harpa’s conference operations will run at a positive EBITDA of ISK 3,5 million (14). However, by the year 2016 the ‘other art events’ are still expected to run at a negative EBITDA of around ISK 93 million. |
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(26)

As previously noted, the operation in Harpa is now overseen by a single company, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., which is devoted to making the Harpa project as profitable as possible. According to the Icelandic authorities, the overall aim is to make the operations gradually sustainable. Nevertheless, Harpa has since its opening been operated with an annual deficit that has been covered over the budgets of the Icelandic State and Reykjavík City (13). According to projections submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the conference activities in Harpa are expected to become gradually sustainable and by the year 2016 the authorities project that Harpa’s conference operations will run at a positive EBITDA of ISK 3,5 million (14). However, by the year 2016 the ‘other art events’ are still expected to run at a negative EBITDA of around ISK 93 million.

4.   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

| (27) | The Icelandic authorities argue that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa does not involve State aid since they have properly ensured that the companies keep separate accounts for the different activities within the concert hall and the conference centre. |
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(27)

The Icelandic authorities argue that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa does not involve State aid since they have properly ensured that the companies keep separate accounts for the different activities within the concert hall and the conference centre.

| (28) | The Icelandic authorities have claimed that revenues from conference and concert activities have been accounted for separately from other activities, while costs had not been accounted for separately up until now. The Icelandic authorities have acknowledged the need for accounting for conference activities separately from concert activities, as well as costs associated with these activities, and they aimed at having such a separation functional in January 2012. |
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(28)

The Icelandic authorities have claimed that revenues from conference and concert activities have been accounted for separately from other activities, while costs had not been accounted for separately up until now. The Icelandic authorities have acknowledged the need for accounting for conference activities separately from concert activities, as well as costs associated with these activities, and they aimed at having such a separation functional in January 2012.

| (29) | Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities claim that there is now a sufficient separation of accounts. In order to validate this claim, they have put forward statements from two accounting firms, PWC and KPMG. According to PWC, the separation of accounts for the companies involved in the operation of Harpa is sufficient. The profits are attributed to the relevant operational category and the common operational costs are divided between all operational categories. According to the report from KPMG, the property management team of Harpa has divided the building’s square meters based on function and usage and the related costs are allocated accordingly. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities claim that there is now a sufficient separation of accounts. In order to validate this claim, they have put forward statements from two accounting firms, PWC and KPMG. According to PWC, the separation of accounts for the companies involved in the operation of Harpa is sufficient. The profits are attributed to the relevant operational category and the common operational costs are divided between all operational categories. According to the report from KPMG, the property management team of Harpa has divided the building’s square meters based on function and usage and the related costs are allocated accordingly.

| (30) | With regard to the conference operations, according to the Icelandic authorities, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. is not itself active on the conference market. The company however leases conference rooms either to one-off conference organisers or to specialised conference businesses. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have noted that that there are no competing conference centres in Iceland capable of hosting large-scale conferences like Harpa. According to the Icelandic authorities, the conference business positively contributes to other activities in Harpa. If Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. would not operate the conference business, the costs other activities would have to carry would be considerably higher. In order to show that the conference aspect of Harpa is not being subsidised, the Icelandic authorities submitted a pricing analysis from KPMG where they compared the prices of comparable conference facilities, based on size and capacity. According to KPMG’s analysis, the price for a full day, the price per guest and the price per square meter are on average much higher for the facilities in Harpa than for comparable facilities offered in competing conference facilities. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

With regard to the conference operations, according to the Icelandic authorities, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. is not itself active on the conference market. The company however leases conference rooms either to one-off conference organisers or to specialised conference businesses. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have noted that that there are no competing conference centres in Iceland capable of hosting large-scale conferences like Harpa. According to the Icelandic authorities, the conference business positively contributes to other activities in Harpa. If Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. would not operate the conference business, the costs other activities would have to carry would be considerably higher. In order to show that the conference aspect of Harpa is not being subsidised, the Icelandic authorities submitted a pricing analysis from KPMG where they compared the prices of comparable conference facilities, based on size and capacity. According to KPMG’s analysis, the price for a full day, the price per guest and the price per square meter are on average much higher for the facilities in Harpa than for comparable facilities offered in competing conference facilities.

| (31) | Lastly, the Icelandic authorities maintain that the financial contributions from the State and the City are fully allocated for payment of outstanding loans and are not used in order to subsidise the conference hosting aspect. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Lastly, the Icelandic authorities maintain that the financial contributions from the State and the City are fully allocated for payment of outstanding loans and are not used in order to subsidise the conference hosting aspect.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (32) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

| (33) | ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(33)

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (34) | In the following chapters the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre will be assessed with respect to these criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In the following chapters the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre will be assessed with respect to these criteria.

1.1.   State resources

State resources

| (35) | According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid.

| (36) | At the outset, the Authority notes that both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (15). Consequently, the state for the purpose of Article 61(1) covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the City level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies. Furthermore, municipal resources are considered to be State resources within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement (16). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

At the outset, the Authority notes that both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (15). Consequently, the state for the purpose of Article 61(1) covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the City level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies. Furthermore, municipal resources are considered to be State resources within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement (16).

15

16

| (37) | Since the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík cover jointly the annual deficit of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa by annually contributing a certain amount from their budgets, State resources are involved. Furthermore, the converting of loans into share capital also entails a transfer of State resources since the State and the City would forgo their entitlement to receive a full repayment of the outstanding loans. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Since the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík cover jointly the annual deficit of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa by annually contributing a certain amount from their budgets, State resources are involved. Furthermore, the converting of loans into share capital also entails a transfer of State resources since the State and the City would forgo their entitlement to receive a full repayment of the outstanding loans. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled.

1.2.   Undertaking

Undertaking

| (38) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (17). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (18). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods and services on a given market do not constitute undertakings. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (17). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (18). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods and services on a given market do not constitute undertakings.

17

18

| (39) | The Authority is of the opinion that both the construction and operation of an infrastructure constitute an economic activity in itself (and are thus subject to State aid rules) if that infrastructure is, or will be used, to provide goods or services on the market (19). In this case, the conference hall and concert centre is intended for e.g. hosting conferences as well as music, culture and ‘other art events’ on a commercial basis, i.e. for the provision of services on the market. This view has been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Leipzig/Halle case (20). Consequently, in infrastructure cases, aid may be granted at several levels: construction, operation and use of the facilities (21). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority is of the opinion that both the construction and operation of an infrastructure constitute an economic activity in itself (and are thus subject to State aid rules) if that infrastructure is, or will be used, to provide goods or services on the market (19). In this case, the conference hall and concert centre is intended for e.g. hosting conferences as well as music, culture and ‘other art events’ on a commercial basis, i.e. for the provision of services on the market. This view has been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Leipzig/Halle case (20). Consequently, in infrastructure cases, aid may be granted at several levels: construction, operation and use of the facilities (21).

19

Leipzig/Halle

20

21

| (40) | As previously noted, Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre hosts concerts by the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra, the Icelandic Opera, various other art events as well as conferences. In the view of the Icelandic authorities, only the conference aspect of Harpa’s operation constitutes an economic activity. All other activities should therefore be classified as non-economic. However, the Authority has certain doubts in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

As previously noted, Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre hosts concerts by the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra, the Icelandic Opera, various other art events as well as conferences. In the view of the Icelandic authorities, only the conference aspect of Harpa’s operation constitutes an economic activity. All other activities should therefore be classified as non-economic. However, the Authority has certain doubts in this regard.

| (41) | Some of the activities taking place in Harpa, notably conferences, theatre performances, popular music concerts etc., can attract significant numbers of customers while they are in competition with private conference centres, theatres or other music venues. Therefore, the Authority takes the view that the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre and the companies involved in its operation, in so far as they engage in commercial activities, qualify as an undertaking (22). The companies involved in the operation of Harpa must be regarded as vehicles for pursuing the common interest of its owners, that is to support cultural activities in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Some of the activities taking place in Harpa, notably conferences, theatre performances, popular music concerts etc., can attract significant numbers of customers while they are in competition with private conference centres, theatres or other music venues. Therefore, the Authority takes the view that the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre and the companies involved in its operation, in so far as they engage in commercial activities, qualify as an undertaking (22). The companies involved in the operation of Harpa must be regarded as vehicles for pursuing the common interest of its owners, that is to support cultural activities in Iceland.

22

1.3.   Advantage

Advantage

| (42) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on the recipient.

| (43) | Regarding the financing of the construction of Harpa, State aid can only be excluded if it is in conformity with the market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’) (23). According to the Icelandic authorities, the State and the City had initially hoped that a private investor would finance the realisation of the project. However, due to the financial crisis, it became impossible to carry out the project without public funding. The direct grant by the State and the City is thus claimed to be necessary, as without it there were not enough funds to finance the project. The Authority therefore considers, at this stage, that the public financing of the construction of Harpa would constitute an economic advantage and thus aid, since the project would admittedly not have been realised in the absence of public funding and the participation by the State and the City was essential to the Harpa project as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Regarding the financing of the construction of Harpa, State aid can only be excluded if it is in conformity with the market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’) (23). According to the Icelandic authorities, the State and the City had initially hoped that a private investor would finance the realisation of the project. However, due to the financial crisis, it became impossible to carry out the project without public funding. The direct grant by the State and the City is thus claimed to be necessary, as without it there were not enough funds to finance the project. The Authority therefore considers, at this stage, that the public financing of the construction of Harpa would constitute an economic advantage and thus aid, since the project would admittedly not have been realised in the absence of public funding and the participation by the State and the City was essential to the Harpa project as a whole.

23

| (44) | It follows from the Authority’s decisional practice that when an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system that ensures that the commercial activities are not financed through State resources allocated to the non-profit making activities must be in place (24). This principle is also laid down in the Transparency Directive (25). The Directive does not apply directly to the case at hand. However, the Authority is of the opinion that the principles of operating economic activities on commercial terms with separate accounts, and a clear establishment of the cost accounting principles according to which separate accounts are maintained, still apply. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

It follows from the Authority’s decisional practice that when an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system that ensures that the commercial activities are not financed through State resources allocated to the non-profit making activities must be in place (24). This principle is also laid down in the Transparency Directive (25). The Directive does not apply directly to the case at hand. However, the Authority is of the opinion that the principles of operating economic activities on commercial terms with separate accounts, and a clear establishment of the cost accounting principles according to which separate accounts are maintained, still apply.

24

25

| (45) | As described in Section I.3 above, the operations of Harpa are divided into several categories, e.g. hosting the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera as well as other art events and conferences, which can be divided into economic and non-economic activities (i.e. cultural activities). The Icelandic authorities have however not properly ensured, through either amending the organisational structure of Harpa or by other administrative action, that there is a clear and consistent separation of the accounts for the different activities of the concert hall and conference centre. Simply dividing the losses associated with the operation of the building and common administrative costs between the different activities of Harpa, both the economic and non-economic, based on estimated usage and other criteria cannot be seen as a clear separation of accounts under EEA law. This situation therefore may lead to cross-subsidisation between non-economic and economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As described in Section I.3 above, the operations of Harpa are divided into several categories, e.g. hosting the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera as well as other art events and conferences, which can be divided into economic and non-economic activities (i.e. cultural activities). The Icelandic authorities have however not properly ensured, through either amending the organisational structure of Harpa or by other administrative action, that there is a clear and consistent separation of the accounts for the different activities of the concert hall and conference centre. Simply dividing the losses associated with the operation of the building and common administrative costs between the different activities of Harpa, both the economic and non-economic, based on estimated usage and other criteria cannot be seen as a clear separation of accounts under EEA law. This situation therefore may lead to cross-subsidisation between non-economic and economic activities.

| (46) | Additionally, an advantage is conferred on the companies involved in the operation of Harpa in the form of foregone profits when the State and the City do not require a return on their investment in the concert hall and conference centre, in so far as those companies engage in commercial activities, such as the hosting of conferences or ‘other art events’. Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement effectively represents an expense for the undertaking. If a State- and municipally-owned undertaking is not required to generate a normal rate of return for its owner this effectively means that the undertaking benefits from an advantage whenever the owner foregoes that profit (26). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Additionally, an advantage is conferred on the companies involved in the operation of Harpa in the form of foregone profits when the State and the City do not require a return on their investment in the concert hall and conference centre, in so far as those companies engage in commercial activities, such as the hosting of conferences or ‘other art events’. Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement effectively represents an expense for the undertaking. If a State- and municipally-owned undertaking is not required to generate a normal rate of return for its owner this effectively means that the undertaking benefits from an advantage whenever the owner foregoes that profit (26).

26

| (47) | The Authority considers that the announced conversion of loans, in the amount of ISK 904 million, could also constitute an advantage, should the conversion not be concluded on market terms. However, since the Authority has not received a detailed description of the loan conversion agreement it is not in the position to assess whether an advantage is present or not. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority considers that the announced conversion of loans, in the amount of ISK 904 million, could also constitute an advantage, should the conversion not be concluded on market terms. However, since the Authority has not received a detailed description of the loan conversion agreement it is not in the position to assess whether an advantage is present or not.

| (48) | The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded at any level (construction, operation and use). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded at any level (construction, operation and use).

1.4.   Selectivity

Selectivity

| (49) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must be selective. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must be selective.

| (50) | The Icelandic authorities provide funding to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The funding is used to cover the losses stemming from the different activities within Harpa, including economic activities such as the hosting of conferences. This system of compensation, under which cross-subsidisation may occur, is not available to other companies that are active on the conference market in Iceland or elsewhere. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Icelandic authorities provide funding to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The funding is used to cover the losses stemming from the different activities within Harpa, including economic activities such as the hosting of conferences. This system of compensation, under which cross-subsidisation may occur, is not available to other companies that are active on the conference market in Iceland or elsewhere.

| (51) | In light of the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the companies involved in the operation of Harpa receive a selective economic advantage compared to their competitors on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In light of the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the companies involved in the operation of Harpa receive a selective economic advantage compared to their competitors on the market.

1.5.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

| (52) | The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (53) | According to settled case law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (27). The State resources allocated to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa, in order to cover their losses, constitute an advantage that strengthens Harpa’s position compared to that of other undertakings competing in the same market. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to settled case law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (27). The State resources allocated to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa, in order to cover their losses, constitute an advantage that strengthens Harpa’s position compared to that of other undertakings competing in the same market.

27

| (54) | As the market for organising international events is open to competition between venue providers and event organisers, which generally engage in activities which are subject to trade between EEA States, the effect on trade can be assumed. In this case, the effect on trade between certain neighbouring EEA States is even more likely due to the nature of the conference industry. Moreover, the General Court has recently, in its Order concerning the Ahoy complex in the Netherlands, held that there was no reason to limit the market to the territory of that Member State (28). |
| --- | --- |

(54)

As the market for organising international events is open to competition between venue providers and event organisers, which generally engage in activities which are subject to trade between EEA States, the effect on trade can be assumed. In this case, the effect on trade between certain neighbouring EEA States is even more likely due to the nature of the conference industry. Moreover, the General Court has recently, in its Order concerning the Ahoy complex in the Netherlands, held that there was no reason to limit the market to the territory of that Member State (28).

28

| (55) | Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA.

1.6.   Conclusion with regard to the presence of State aid

Conclusion with regard to the presence of State aid

| (56) | With reference to the above considerations the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

With reference to the above considerations the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market.

2.   Compatibility assessment

Compatibility assessment

| (57) | The Icelandic authorities have not put forward any arguments demonstrating that the State aid involved in the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa could be considered as compatible State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Icelandic authorities have not put forward any arguments demonstrating that the State aid involved in the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa could be considered as compatible State aid.

| (58) | Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition.

| (59) | The derogation in Article 61(2) is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Further, the aid under assessment in this case cannot be considered to qualify as public service compensation within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The derogation in Article 61(2) is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Further, the aid under assessment in this case cannot be considered to qualify as public service compensation within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | The EEA Agreement does not include a provision corresponding to Article 107(3)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Authority nevertheless acknowledges that State aid measures may be approved on cultural grounds on the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement (29). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The EEA Agreement does not include a provision corresponding to Article 107(3)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Authority nevertheless acknowledges that State aid measures may be approved on cultural grounds on the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement (29).

29

| (61) | On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest. The Authority must therefore assess whether granting aid to the various activities in Harpa can be justified as aid to promote culture on the grounds of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest. The Authority must therefore assess whether granting aid to the various activities in Harpa can be justified as aid to promote culture on the grounds of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (62) | It should be noted that the principles laid down in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement have been applied to cases somewhat similar to the case at stake (30). The Icelandic authorities have stated that the primary objective of the measure in question was to promote culture through the construction of a concert hall that could house both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Similar multipurpose cultural centres already exist in most other European cities. Harpa is to be Iceland’s national concert hall, providing a necessary cultural infrastructure that was missing in Iceland and it will act as the focal point for the development and advancement of those performance arts in Iceland. The concert centre will therefore contribute to the development of cultural knowledge and bring access to cultural educational and recreational values to the public (31). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It should be noted that the principles laid down in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement have been applied to cases somewhat similar to the case at stake (30). The Icelandic authorities have stated that the primary objective of the measure in question was to promote culture through the construction of a concert hall that could house both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Similar multipurpose cultural centres already exist in most other European cities. Harpa is to be Iceland’s national concert hall, providing a necessary cultural infrastructure that was missing in Iceland and it will act as the focal point for the development and advancement of those performance arts in Iceland. The concert centre will therefore contribute to the development of cultural knowledge and bring access to cultural educational and recreational values to the public (31).

30

31

| (63) | In view of the above, the Authority considers that, given its cultural purpose, the construction and operation of a Symphony and Opera facility would qualify as aid to promote culture within the meaning of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. However, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted to subsidise conference and other art events, on a commercial basis, can be justified under Article 61(3)(c) and this aid must therefore be assessed separately. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In view of the above, the Authority considers that, given its cultural purpose, the construction and operation of a Symphony and Opera facility would qualify as aid to promote culture within the meaning of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. However, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted to subsidise conference and other art events, on a commercial basis, can be justified under Article 61(3)(c) and this aid must therefore be assessed separately.

| (64) | Concerning necessity, proportionality and whether the measure is likely to distort competition, the Authority has the following observations. As previously noted the main reason for constructing Harpa was the apparent need for a suitable concert hall to accommodate both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Given the scale of the project it is understandable that an infrastructure such as Harpa would also be used to house various commercial activities such as restaurants, coffee shops, stores, conferences and popular concerts. However, in order not to distort competition, safeguards must be put in place to ensure that there is no cross subsidisation between the commercial activities and the heavily subsidised cultural activities. This can be achieved by either tendering out facilities for the commercial activities, thereby ensuring that the economic operator pays market price for the facilities and does not benefit from cross subsidisation, or by sufficiently separating the economic activities from the non-commercial activities by establishing a separate legal entity or a sufficient system of cost allocation and separate accounts that ensures a reasonable return on investment. The Icelandic authorities have already taken the former approach with regard to the restaurants, catering services and shops within Harpa. The same approach has however not been taken with regard to the hosting of conference and ‘other art events’ which are currently overseen by a company owned by the State and the City, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., and run at a considerable negative EBITDA. The Authority therefore cannot see that the Icelandic authorities have put the necessary safeguards in place to ensure that cross subsidisation does not occur between the cultural and the purely commercial activities within Harpa. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Concerning necessity, proportionality and whether the measure is likely to distort competition, the Authority has the following observations. As previously noted the main reason for constructing Harpa was the apparent need for a suitable concert hall to accommodate both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Given the scale of the project it is understandable that an infrastructure such as Harpa would also be used to house various commercial activities such as restaurants, coffee shops, stores, conferences and popular concerts. However, in order not to distort competition, safeguards must be put in place to ensure that there is no cross subsidisation between the commercial activities and the heavily subsidised cultural activities. This can be achieved by either tendering out facilities for the commercial activities, thereby ensuring that the economic operator pays market price for the facilities and does not benefit from cross subsidisation, or by sufficiently separating the economic activities from the non-commercial activities by establishing a separate legal entity or a sufficient system of cost allocation and separate accounts that ensures a reasonable return on investment. The Icelandic authorities have already taken the former approach with regard to the restaurants, catering services and shops within Harpa. The same approach has however not been taken with regard to the hosting of conference and ‘other art events’ which are currently overseen by a company owned by the State and the City, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., and run at a considerable negative EBITDA. The Authority therefore cannot see that the Icelandic authorities have put the necessary safeguards in place to ensure that cross subsidisation does not occur between the cultural and the purely commercial activities within Harpa.

| (65) | Consequently, following its preliminary assessment, the Authority has doubts whether the proposed project could be deemed compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, at this stage at all three levels of possible aid (construction, operation and use) in accordance with the above. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Consequently, following its preliminary assessment, the Authority has doubts whether the proposed project could be deemed compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, at this stage at all three levels of possible aid (construction, operation and use) in accordance with the above.

| (66) | At this stage, the Authority has not carried out an assessment with respect to other possible derogations, under which the measure could be found compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In this respect, the Icelandic authorities have not brought forward any further specific arguments. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

At this stage, the Authority has not carried out an assessment with respect to other possible derogations, under which the measure could be found compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In this respect, the Icelandic authorities have not brought forward any further specific arguments.

3.   Procedural requirements

Procedural requirements

| (67) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by constructing and operating Harpa, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by constructing and operating Harpa, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved is therefore unlawful.

4.   Opening of the formal investigation procedure

Opening of the formal investigation procedure

| (69) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, is of the opinion that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre — within the context of the project as outlined above — might constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, as outlined above, the Authority has doubts as regards the compatibility of the potential State aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, is of the opinion that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre — within the context of the project as outlined above — might constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, as outlined above, the Authority has doubts as regards the compatibility of the potential State aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (70) | Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure.

| (71) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid.

| (72) | The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the Harpa project on relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the Harpa project on relevant markets.

| (73) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision.

all documents, information and data

| (74) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

| (75) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication, |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication,

Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The financing and operation of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has doubts as regards the compatibility of the State aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is initiated regarding the aid referred to in Article 1.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide, within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the measures under the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 20 March 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Ara d-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni fil-Kawża SA. 33618 (l-Isvezja) L-iffinanzjar tal-arena ta' Uppsala (ĠU C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 18), il-paragrafu 19.

1

L-iffinanzjar tal-arena ta' Uppsala

(2)  Ara l-Kawża T-90/09 Mojo Concerts BV u Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie BV v. Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea, Ordni tal-Qorti Ġenerali tas-26 ta’ Jannar 2012, paragrafu 45, ippubblikat fil-ĠU C 89, 24.3.2012, p. 22.

2

Mojo Concerts BV u Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie BV

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

(3)  For the purposes of this Decision, ‘Harpa’ will refer to the building itself and its facilities.

3

(4)  Project agreement between Austurhofn-TR ehf. and Eignarhaldsfelagid Portus ehf, signed on 9 March 2006.

4

(5)  Amended and restated project agreement between Austurhofn-TR ehf. and Eignarhaldsfelagid Portus ehf, signed on 19 January 2010.

5

(6)  Further information on Austurhöfn-TR ehf. can be found on their website: http://www.austurhofn.is/

6

(7)  Information available online at: http://en.harpa.is/media/english/skipur-1.jpg

7

(8)  As amended and restated in 2010.

8

(9)  The Icelandic authorities have not yet outlined the particulars of this arrangement.

9

(10)  See memorandum issued by the Director of Harpa, dated 24 September 2012 (Event No 648320).

10

(11)  See report by KPMG, dated 7 February 2013 (Event No 662444).

11

(12)  Ibid.

12

(13)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Harpa’s losses mostly stem from high real estate taxes.

13

(14)  The key factor in this revenue growth is the expected increase in the conference business.

14

(15)  See Article 2 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings (OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17), incorporated at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

15

(16)  See the Authority’s Decision No 55/05/COL, Section II.3, p. 19 with further references, published in OJ L 324, 23.11.2006, p. 11 and EEA Supplement No 56, 23.11.2006, p. 1.

16

(17)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraphs 21-23 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] Ct. Rep. 61, paragraph 78.

17

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(18)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 108.

18

Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(19)  See the Commission Decision in Case SA.33618 (Sweden) Financing of the Uppsala arena (OJ C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 18), paragraph 19.

19

Financing of the Uppsala arena

(20)  Case C-288/11 P Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v The European Commission, 19 December 2012, paragraphs 40-43, not yet published.

20

Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle

The European Commission

(21)  See the Commission Decision in Case SA.33728 (Denmark) Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen (OJ C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 6), paragraph 24.

21

Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen

(22)  See the Commission Decision in Case N 293/08 (Hungary) Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries (OJ C 66, 20.3.2009, p. 22), paragraph 19.

22

Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries

(23)  See the Commission Decision in Case SA.33728 (Denmark) Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen (OJ C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 6), paragraph 25.

23

Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen

(24)  ESA Decision No 142/03/COL regarding reorganisation and transfer of public funds to the Work Research Institute (OJ C 248, 16.10.2003, p. 6, EEA Supplement No 52, 16.10.2003, p. 3), ESA Decision No 343/09/COL on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32 (OJ L 123, 12.5.2011, p. 72, EEA Supplement No 27, 12.5.2011, p. 1).

24

(25)  Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings (OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17), incorporated at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

25

(26)  Case C-234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR I-2263, paragraph 14.

26

Belgium

Commission

(27)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] Report of the EFTA Court p. 76, paragraph 59; Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 11.

27

The Government of Norway

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris

Commission

(28)  Case T-90/09 Mojo Concerts BV and Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie BV v The European Commission, Order of the General Court of 26 January 2012, paragraph 45, published in OJ C 89, 24.3.2012, p. 36.

28

Mojo Concerts BV and Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie BV

The European Commission

(29)  See for example paragraph 7 (with further references) of the Authority’s Guidelines on State aid to cinematographic and other audiovisual work, available at the Authority’s webpage at: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

29

(30)  See Commission Decision in Case N 122/10 (Hungary) State aid to Danube Cultural Palace (OJ C 147, 18.5.2011, p. 3) and Commission Decision in Case N 293/08 (Hungary) Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries (OJ C 66, 20.3.2009, p. 22).

30

State aid to Danube Cultural Palace

Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries

(31)  See Commission Decision in Case SA.33241 (Cyprus) State support to the Cyprus Cultural Centre (OJ C 377, 23.12.2011, p. 11), paragraphs 36-39.

31

State support to the Cyprus Cultural Centre

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| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/31

---

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta’ Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta' għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lin-Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA)

2013/C 229/10

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 136/13/COL tas-27 ta’ Marzu 2013, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni ta' wara dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità tas-Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta' Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ din in-notifika l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex iressqu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tissottometti l-kummenti tista’ tinżamm milli tkun żvelata wara talba bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

SOMMARJU

Kuntest

L-edukazzjoni fin-Norveġja hija obbligatorja għat-tfal kollha minn meta jkollhom sitt snin sa 16-il sena, u hija pprovduta permezz ta’ sistema ta’ skejjel pubbliċi bla ħlas. Fl-2006 l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ddeċidew matul l-“Inizjattiva għall-Promozzjoni tal-Għarfien” (Kunnskapsløftet) li l-iskejjel kollha Norveġiżi jridu jenfasizzaw l-abbiltà li wieħed jitgħallem suġġett partikolari bl-użu tat-teknoloġija tal-informazzjoni u l-komunikazzjoni. F’dan il-kuntest, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi emendaw l-Att dwar 1-Edukazzjoni u obbligaw lill-muniċipalitajiet tal-kontea biex jipprovdu lill-istudenti l-materjali tat-tagħlim stampati u diġitali meħtieġa mingħajr ħlas.

F’Mejju 2006 l-Gvern Norveġiż għamel NOK 50 miljun disponibbli għall-iżvilupp u l-użu ta’ tali riżorsi ta’ tagħlim diġitali. F’Ġunju 2006 l-Ministeru tal-Edukazzjoni ssottometta stedina lill-muniċipalitajiet tal-kontea biex flimkien japplikaw għall-fondi disponibbli. F’Awwissu 2006 il-kapijiet tal-edukazzjoni ta’ 18 mid-19-il muniċipalità tal-kontea ddeċidew li jidħlu fil-kooperazzjoni intermuniċipali u li jwaqqfu l-NDLA bħala korp għall-kooperazzjoni bejn il-kontej skont il-paragrafu 27 tal-Att dwar il-Gvern Lokali.

Il-muniċipalitajiet tal-kontea parteċipanti mbagħad issottomettew applikazzjoni għall-fondi lill-Ministeru tal-Edukazzjoni, li ta NOK 30,5 miljun għall-proġett bil-kundizzjoni li l-entità ġuridika responsabbli tieħu ħsieb l-obbligu tal-kontej taħt l-inizjattiva, li l-entità ma tiħux sehem f’attività ekonomika u li x-xiri ta’ materjali tat-tagħlim diġitali u s-servizzi ta' żvilupp jitwettqu skont ir-regolamenti dwar l-akkwist pubbliku

Sussegwentement, l-muniċipalitajiet tal-kontea allokaw NOK 21,1 miljun (2008), NOK 34,7 miljun (2009), NOK 58,8 miljun (2010) u NOK 57,7 miljun (2011) għall-proġett. Dawn il-fondi kienu parzjalment iffinanzjati mill-finanzjament muniċipali regolari tal-attivitajiet ta' taħriġ u parzjalment permezz tal-fondi addizzjonali msemmija hawn fuq, li l-Ministeru tal-Edukazzjoni kien għamel disponibbli lill-muniċipalitajiet tal-kontea għal dan il-proġett speċifiku.

Deċiżjoni u Sentenza tal-Qorti

Fit-12 ta' Ottubru 2011 l-Awtorità adottat id-Deċiżjoni Nru 311/11/COL li biha ddeċidiet li l-miżura ma kinitx tikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-Istat skont it-tifsira tal-Artikolu 61(1) ŻEE (minn hawn’ il quddiem: id-Deċiżjoni). Fid-9 ta' Jannar 2012 l-applikant ressaq azzjoni kontra d-deċiżjoni u bis-sentenza tagħha ddatata l-11 ta' Diċembru 2012, il-Qorti tal-EFTA annullat id-Deċiżjoni (1).

Valutazzjoni tal-miżura

Il-preżenza ta' għajnuna mill-Istat

Wara s-sentenza l-Awtorità għandha dubji jekk l-NDLA hijiex involuta f’attività ekonomika. B’mod partikolari, l-Awtorità teħtieġ aktar dettalji fir-rigward tat-tranżizzjoni tal-inizjattiva mill-fażi tal-proġett sal-istabbiliment formali tal-NDLA bħala korp għall-kooperazzjoni bejn il-kontej skont il-paragrafu 27 tal-Att dwar il-Gvern Lokali.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità teħtieġ aktar informazzjoni dwar sa liema punt il-bidla fl-istatus legali affettwat l-proċess tat-teħid tad-deċiżjoni. B’mod partikolari, l-Awtorità teħtieġ li jiġi stabbilit sa fejn l-NDLA jista' jespandi l-ambitu tal-attivitajiet tiegħu mingħajr il-kunsens tal-muniċipalitajiet parteċipanti jew saħansitra kontra l-volontà tagħhom, u jekk din is-sitwazzjoni hijiex differenti mis-sitwazzjoni qabel l-istabbiliment formali.

Barra minn hekk, l-Awtorità se tinvestiga f’aktar dettall l-finanzjament tal-NDLA, kemm fil-fażi tal-proġett u wara d-dħul fis-seħħ formali.

Ukoll, jeħtieġ li l-Awtorità tistabbilixxi f’aktar dettall kif huma stabbiliti l-parametri għall-proċeduri tal-akkwist pubbliku li permezz tagħhom l-NDLA jixtri l-prodotti u jimpjega l-persunal.

Fl-aħħar nett, l-Awtorità teħtieġ aktar informazzjoni dwar l-effetti tal-miżura dwar il-kompetizzjoni u l-kummerċ.

Il-kompatibbiltà tal-għajnuna

Abbażi tal-informazzjoni disponibbli l-Awtorità ma tistax, f’dan l-istadju, tikkonkludi dwar il-kompatibbiltà tal-miżura. Għalhekk l-Awtorità teħtieġ informazzjoni addizzjonali f’dak ir-rigward.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta' hawn fuq, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ proċedura ta' investigazzjoni formali skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar l-Istabbiliment ta' Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jressqu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 136/13/COL

of 27 March 2013

opening the formal investigation procedure into potential aid to the Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA)

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’)

HAVING REGARD to:

The Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

The Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘SCA’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the SCA (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 15 April 2010 Den Norske Forleggerforening, the Norwegian Publishers Association (‘NPA’), sent a complaint alleging that illegal State aid has been granted to the Nasjonal digital læringsarena (‘NDLA’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 16 April 2010 (Event No 553723). Following a telephone conference on 15 July 2011 the complainant provided additional information by email on the same day (Event No 608593). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 15 April 2010 Den Norske Forleggerforening, the Norwegian Publishers Association (‘NPA’), sent a complaint alleging that illegal State aid has been granted to the Nasjonal digital læringsarena (‘NDLA’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 16 April 2010 (Event No 553723). Following a telephone conference on 15 July 2011 the complainant provided additional information by email on the same day (Event No 608593).

| (2) | By letter dated 2 July 2010 (Event No 558201), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 9 August 2010 (Event No 566179), the Norwegian authorities requested an extension of the time limit for sending a response. The request for an extension was granted by the Authority by letter dated 12 August 2010 (Event No 566397). By letter dated 9 September 2010 (Event No 568942), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. In addition, discussions between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities regarding the case took place at a meeting in Norway on 13-14 October 2010. Additional information from the Norwegian authorities was sent to the Authority by letter dated 1 December 2010 (Event No 579405). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 2 July 2010 (Event No 558201), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 9 August 2010 (Event No 566179), the Norwegian authorities requested an extension of the time limit for sending a response. The request for an extension was granted by the Authority by letter dated 12 August 2010 (Event No 566397). By letter dated 9 September 2010 (Event No 568942), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. In addition, discussions between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities regarding the case took place at a meeting in Norway on 13-14 October 2010. Additional information from the Norwegian authorities was sent to the Authority by letter dated 1 December 2010 (Event No 579405).

| (3) | The Authority considered that further information was necessary and sent another request for information by letter dated 4 February 2011 (Event No 574762). The Norwegian authorities replied to the information request by letter dated 7 March 2011 (Event No 589528). Upon request the Norwegian authorities provided further clarifications by emails 2 May 2011 (Event No 596402) and 12 August 2011 (Event No 608596). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Authority considered that further information was necessary and sent another request for information by letter dated 4 February 2011 (Event No 574762). The Norwegian authorities replied to the information request by letter dated 7 March 2011 (Event No 589528). Upon request the Norwegian authorities provided further clarifications by emails 2 May 2011 (Event No 596402) and 12 August 2011 (Event No 608596).

| (4) | On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL deciding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA (hereafter: the Decision). On 9 January 2012 the applicant brought an action against the decision and by its judgment dated 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled the decision (hereafter: the Judgment) (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL deciding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA (hereafter: the Decision). On 9 January 2012 the applicant brought an action against the decision and by its judgment dated 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled the decision (hereafter: the Judgment) (2).

2.   The complaint

| (5) | The complainant is the Norwegian Publishers Association, which represents i.a. companies which are or could be active in the development and distribution of digital learning material. The complaint concerns the Norwegian government’s and the county municipalities granting of funds as well as the transfer of a content management system to the NDLA. The NDLA is an entity which has been founded as an inter-county cooperation body by 18 Norwegian municipalities (3) in order to develop or purchase digital learning material with a view to publishing the material on the internet free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The complainant is the Norwegian Publishers Association, which represents i.a. companies which are or could be active in the development and distribution of digital learning material. The complaint concerns the Norwegian government’s and the county municipalities granting of funds as well as the transfer of a content management system to the NDLA. The NDLA is an entity which has been founded as an inter-county cooperation body by 18 Norwegian municipalities (3) in order to develop or purchase digital learning material with a view to publishing the material on the internet free of charge.

| (6) | The complainant submits that the NDLA has four main areas of activity: firstly, the NDLA develops and supplies learning resources for the upper secondary school; secondly, the NDLA procures learning resources from third party suppliers; thirdly, the NDLA ensures the quality of learning resources; and fourthly, the NDLA develops and manages the content management system which operates the website through which the digital learning material is published (these activities are hereafter also referred to as ‘purchase, development and supply of digital learning materials’). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The complainant submits that the NDLA has four main areas of activity: firstly, the NDLA develops and supplies learning resources for the upper secondary school; secondly, the NDLA procures learning resources from third party suppliers; thirdly, the NDLA ensures the quality of learning resources; and fourthly, the NDLA develops and manages the content management system which operates the website through which the digital learning material is published (these activities are hereafter also referred to as ‘purchase, development and supply of digital learning materials’).

| (7) | The complainant submits that the granting of funds to the NDLA for the purchase, development and supply of digital learning material constitutes illegal State aid to the NDLA. In that regard the complainant emphasises that — in his view — the NDLA is not an integrated part of the public administration but rather an undertaking within the meaning of State aid rules. The complainant recalls that according to established case law an undertaking is an entity which is engaged in economic activities. The complainant suggests that according to the ECJ case law an economic activity is an activity, which could, at least in principle, be carried out by a private undertaking in order to make profits. Then, the complainant argues that any entity, which carries out an activity which could be carried out to make profits, is engaged in an economic activity. The complainant further submits that there was a market for digital learning material prior to the activities of the NDLA and that the NDLA competes at present with private undertakings offering digital learning resources. The complainant claims that on this basis the development and supply of digital learning resources constitutes an economic activity. The complainant further suggests that the other activities of the NDLA are closely linked to the development and supply of digital learning resources and are therefore also to be considered as economic in nature. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The complainant submits that the granting of funds to the NDLA for the purchase, development and supply of digital learning material constitutes illegal State aid to the NDLA. In that regard the complainant emphasises that — in his view — the NDLA is not an integrated part of the public administration but rather an undertaking within the meaning of State aid rules. The complainant recalls that according to established case law an undertaking is an entity which is engaged in economic activities. The complainant suggests that according to the ECJ case law an economic activity is an activity, which could, at least in principle, be carried out by a private undertaking in order to make profits. Then, the complainant argues that any entity, which carries out an activity which could be carried out to make profits, is engaged in an economic activity. The complainant further submits that there was a market for digital learning material prior to the activities of the NDLA and that the NDLA competes at present with private undertakings offering digital learning resources. The complainant claims that on this basis the development and supply of digital learning resources constitutes an economic activity. The complainant further suggests that the other activities of the NDLA are closely linked to the development and supply of digital learning resources and are therefore also to be considered as economic in nature.

| (8) | Furthermore, the complainant argues that the funds offered by the Ministry of Education and from the county municipalities to the NDLA for the purchase of digital learning material from third party suppliers also constitute State aid. Finally, the complainant submits that the fact that the State also made its content management system available to the NDLA free of charge — according to the complainant — also amounts to State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Furthermore, the complainant argues that the funds offered by the Ministry of Education and from the county municipalities to the NDLA for the purchase of digital learning material from third party suppliers also constitute State aid. Finally, the complainant submits that the fact that the State also made its content management system available to the NDLA free of charge — according to the complainant — also amounts to State aid.

| (9) | The complainant notes that the measure has not been notified. He continues to argue that Article 59(2) EEA is not applicable and concludes that — in the absence of a notification — the Norwegian State has granted State aid contrary to State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The complainant notes that the measure has not been notified. He continues to argue that Article 59(2) EEA is not applicable and concludes that — in the absence of a notification — the Norwegian State has granted State aid contrary to State aid rules.

3.   Background

3.1.   
  The educational system in Norway

| (10) | Education in Norway is mandatory for all children aged from 6 to 16 and is provided through a system of free public schools. This system is divided into a compulsory elementary school (age 6 to 13), a compulsory lower secondary school (age 13 to 16), and the upper secondary school (age 16 to 19). |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Education in Norway is mandatory for all children aged from 6 to 16 and is provided through a system of free public schools. This system is divided into a compulsory elementary school (age 6 to 13), a compulsory lower secondary school (age 13 to 16), and the upper secondary school (age 16 to 19).

| (11) | In 2006 the Norwegian authorities decided in the course of the ‘Knowledge Promotion Initiative’ (Kunnskapsløftet) that all Norwegian schools were to emphasise certain basic skills in all subjects. One of these skills is the ability to learn a given subject by using information and communication technology. This requirement was introduced in the national curricula for pupils in the 10-year compulsory school (i.e. school for grades 1 to 9) and for pupils in the first year of upper secondary education (i.e. school for grades 10 to 12) and apprenticeships. Under the Norwegian Education Act (4) the county municipalities are responsible for meeting these requirements. Furthermore, in 2007 the Norwegian authorities amended the Education Act and obliged the county municipalities to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In 2006 the Norwegian authorities decided in the course of the ‘Knowledge Promotion Initiative’ (Kunnskapsløftet) that all Norwegian schools were to emphasise certain basic skills in all subjects. One of these skills is the ability to learn a given subject by using information and communication technology. This requirement was introduced in the national curricula for pupils in the 10-year compulsory school (i.e. school for grades 1 to 9) and for pupils in the first year of upper secondary education (i.e. school for grades 10 to 12) and apprenticeships. Under the Norwegian Education Act (4) the county municipalities are responsible for meeting these requirements. Furthermore, in 2007 the Norwegian authorities amended the Education Act and obliged the county municipalities to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge.

| (12) | It should be noted that until that time, pupils in Norwegian upper secondary school (grades 10 to 12) had to purchase their learning material themselves based on the choice of learning material designated by the schools in compliance with the national curricula (5). Under the new Education Act, county municipalities are obliged to provide all learning material, i.e. digital learning material as well as physical learning material such as books, to pupils free of charge (6). |
| --- | --- |

(12)

It should be noted that until that time, pupils in Norwegian upper secondary school (grades 10 to 12) had to purchase their learning material themselves based on the choice of learning material designated by the schools in compliance with the national curricula (5). Under the new Education Act, county municipalities are obliged to provide all learning material, i.e. digital learning material as well as physical learning material such as books, to pupils free of charge (6).

| (13) | The obligation of providing digital and physical learning material for free constitutes a considerable financial burden for the Norwegian county municipalities. In view of these additional costs, the Norwegian government decided already in 2006 to provide additional funds. The provision of these funds is laid down in a revised State budget which was adopted in May 2006:
  ‘The Government aims to introduce free teaching material for secondary education. At the same time, it is desirable to encourage the use of digital learning materials in secondary education. As part of the efforts to bring down the cost for each student through increased access to and use of digital teaching aids, the Government proposes to allocate NOK 50 million as a commitment to the development and use of digital learning resources.
  Counties are invited to apply for funding for the development and use of digital learning resources. Applications from counties may include one, several, or all secondary schools in the county, and may include one or more subjects. The objective of the grant is to encourage the development and use of digital learning resources, and to help reduce students' expenses for teaching aids.
  The funds can be used for the provision or for local development of digital learning resources. The funds shall not be used for the preparation of digital infrastructure for learning. The intention is to give priority to applications that involve inter-county cooperation.’ (7) |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The obligation of providing digital and physical learning material for free constitutes a considerable financial burden for the Norwegian county municipalities. In view of these additional costs, the Norwegian government decided already in 2006 to provide additional funds. The provision of these funds is laid down in a revised State budget which was adopted in May 2006:

‘The Government aims to introduce free teaching material for secondary education. At the same time, it is desirable to encourage the use of digital learning materials in secondary education. As part of the efforts to bring down the cost for each student through increased access to and use of digital teaching aids, the Government proposes to allocate NOK 50 million as a commitment to the development and use of digital learning resources.

Counties are invited to apply for funding for the development and use of digital learning resources. Applications from counties may include one, several, or all secondary schools in the county, and may include one or more subjects. The objective of the grant is to encourage the development and use of digital learning resources, and to help reduce students' expenses for teaching aids.

The funds can be used for the provision or for local development of digital learning resources. The funds shall not be used for the preparation of digital infrastructure for learning. The intention is to give priority to applications that involve inter-county cooperation.’ (7)

| (14) | In June 2006 the Ministry of Education submitted an invitation to the county municipalities to jointly apply for the available funds of NOK 50 million. The letter describes the objectives and the concept of the initiative as follows:
  ‘The Ministry of Education has the following objectives for the initiative:






  — | To increase access to and use of digital learning materials in secondary education. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

In June 2006 the Ministry of Education submitted an invitation to the county municipalities to jointly apply for the available funds of NOK 50 million. The letter describes the objectives and the concept of the initiative as follows:

‘The Ministry of Education has the following objectives for the initiative:

—

To increase access to and use of digital learning materials in secondary education.

| — | To develop secondary schools and school owners’ competence as developers and/or purchasers of digital learning materials. |
| --- | --- |

—

To develop secondary schools and school owners’ competence as developers and/or purchasers of digital learning materials.

| — | To Increase the volume and diversity of digital teaching materials aimed at secondary schools. |
| --- | --- |

—

To Increase the volume and diversity of digital teaching materials aimed at secondary schools.

| — | Over time to reduce students' expenses for teaching aids. |
| --- | --- |

—

Over time to reduce students' expenses for teaching aids.

[...]

The funds can be used to purchase digital learning resources and to locally develop digital learning resources.’ (8)

| (15) | In August 2006 the heads of education of the 19 Norwegian county municipalities met to discuss the possibility of a joint application for the funds in question based on the requested inter-county cooperation. While the municipality of Oslo decided not to participate in a cooperative project, the other 18 municipalities decided to enter into the inter-county cooperation and to set up the NDLA to manage the process. Each of these municipalities subsequently adopted the following resolution:
  ‘The County Council passes a resolution for the following counties, Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, Nordland, Nord-Trondelag, More og Romsdal, Oppland, Rogaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Sor-Trondelag, Telemark, Troms, Vest-College, Vesold and Østfold, to establish an inter-county cooperation body, the NDLA, with its own Board in accordance with §27 of the Local Government Act. The purpose of this collaboration is to facilitate the purchase, development, deployment and organisation of digital learning resources for all subjects in upper secondary education. The result shall be free digital learning material that facilitates active learning and sharing...’ (9) |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In August 2006 the heads of education of the 19 Norwegian county municipalities met to discuss the possibility of a joint application for the funds in question based on the requested inter-county cooperation. While the municipality of Oslo decided not to participate in a cooperative project, the other 18 municipalities decided to enter into the inter-county cooperation and to set up the NDLA to manage the process. Each of these municipalities subsequently adopted the following resolution:

‘The County Council passes a resolution for the following counties, Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, Nordland, Nord-Trondelag, More og Romsdal, Oppland, Rogaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Sor-Trondelag, Telemark, Troms, Vest-College, Vesold and Østfold, to establish an inter-county cooperation body, the NDLA, with its own Board in accordance with §27 of the Local Government Act. The purpose of this collaboration is to facilitate the purchase, development, deployment and organisation of digital learning resources for all subjects in upper secondary education. The result shall be free digital learning material that facilitates active learning and sharing...’ (9)

| (16) | Subsequently, an application for the State funds was submitted to the Ministry of Education, which in April 2007 granted the funds under a number of conditions:
  ‘The Ministry requests further that the counties jointly identify a responsible legal entity that will take care of the counties’ responsibility for digital learning resources under this initiative. Such an entity can be e.g. a corporation, an inter (county) municipal corporation or a host (county) municipality but it cannot itself engage in economic activity.
  [...]
  The Ministry expects that the purchase of digital learning materials and development services are performed in accordance with the regulations for public procurement. The development of digital learning resources by county employees is to be regarded as an activity for its own account, provided that the counties do not gain any profits from this activity. The development by people who are not county employees must be regarded as the purchase of services and should be evaluated based on the rules and regulations for public procurement in the usual way.’ (10) |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Subsequently, an application for the State funds was submitted to the Ministry of Education, which in April 2007 granted the funds under a number of conditions:

‘The Ministry requests further that the counties jointly identify a responsible legal entity that will take care of the counties’ responsibility for digital learning resources under this initiative. Such an entity can be e.g. a corporation, an inter (county) municipal corporation or a host (county) municipality but it cannot itself engage in economic activity.

[...]

The Ministry expects that the purchase of digital learning materials and development services are performed in accordance with the regulations for public procurement. The development of digital learning resources by county employees is to be regarded as an activity for its own account, provided that the counties do not gain any profits from this activity. The development by people who are not county employees must be regarded as the purchase of services and should be evaluated based on the rules and regulations for public procurement in the usual way.’ (10)

| (17) | Following the approval of the funds the Ministry of Education transferred over a period of three years NOK 30,5 million (NOK 17 million in 2007, NOK 9 million in 2008 and NOK 4,5 million in 2009) to the participating municipalities for the NDLA project. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Following the approval of the funds the Ministry of Education transferred over a period of three years NOK 30,5 million (NOK 17 million in 2007, NOK 9 million in 2008 and NOK 4,5 million in 2009) to the participating municipalities for the NDLA project.

| (18) | Besides, following the amendment of the Education Act in 2007, the county municipalities were compensated for the obligations to provide (physical and digital) learning material through an increase in the county municipal grant scheme. This compensation was based on the estimated costs of providing learning materials in all subjects. The compensation amounted to NOK 287 million in 2007, NOK 211 million in 2008, NOK 347 million in 2009 and NOK 308 million in 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Besides, following the amendment of the Education Act in 2007, the county municipalities were compensated for the obligations to provide (physical and digital) learning material through an increase in the county municipal grant scheme. This compensation was based on the estimated costs of providing learning materials in all subjects. The compensation amounted to NOK 287 million in 2007, NOK 211 million in 2008, NOK 347 million in 2009 and NOK 308 million in 2010.

| (19) | The participating municipalities decided to use part of these funds for the NDLA project. The county municipalities allocated NOK 21,1 million (2008), NOK 34,7 million (2009), NOK 58,8 million (2010) and NOK 57,7 million (2011) to the project. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The participating municipalities decided to use part of these funds for the NDLA project. The county municipalities allocated NOK 21,1 million (2008), NOK 34,7 million (2009), NOK 58,8 million (2010) and NOK 57,7 million (2011) to the project.

| (20) | The EFTA Court emphasised that it is apparent from the case file that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act (11). |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The EFTA Court emphasised that it is apparent from the case file that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act (11).

| (21) | There are currently two other projects concerning digital learning in Norway. Firstly, the municipality of Oslo has applied for a similar grant for its own project (Real Digital). Secondly, the Ministry of Education itself is working on a similar project (Utdanning). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

There are currently two other projects concerning digital learning in Norway. Firstly, the municipality of Oslo has applied for a similar grant for its own project (Real Digital). Secondly, the Ministry of Education itself is working on a similar project (Utdanning).

| (22) | The municipality of Oslo does not participate in the NDLA project and has submitted an application for funding for its own project called Real Digital. The Norwegian government accepted the application from Oslo and granted NOK 13,5 million to the municipality of Oslo over a period of two years (NOK 8 million in 2007 and NOK 5,5 million in 2008). It should be noted that the funds provided to the municipality of Oslo are not subject to the complaint at hand. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The municipality of Oslo does not participate in the NDLA project and has submitted an application for funding for its own project called Real Digital. The Norwegian government accepted the application from Oslo and granted NOK 13,5 million to the municipality of Oslo over a period of two years (NOK 8 million in 2007 and NOK 5,5 million in 2008). It should be noted that the funds provided to the municipality of Oslo are not subject to the complaint at hand.

| (23) | The Ministry of Education has decided to provide its own system for access to digital learning material. In that regard the Ministry can both develop digital learning material and/or acquire such learning material from third party suppliers. The Ministry acknowledges that there might be areas where the activities of the Ministry of Education might overlap with the activities of the NDLA. In its letter stating the conditions of the grant the Ministry of Education reserved itself the right to reallocate funds originally earmarked for the NDLA to the Ministry’s own project. The relevant funds provided to the Ministry of Education are not subject to the complaint at hand. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

The Ministry of Education has decided to provide its own system for access to digital learning material. In that regard the Ministry can both develop digital learning material and/or acquire such learning material from third party suppliers. The Ministry acknowledges that there might be areas where the activities of the Ministry of Education might overlap with the activities of the NDLA. In its letter stating the conditions of the grant the Ministry of Education reserved itself the right to reallocate funds originally earmarked for the NDLA to the Ministry’s own project. The relevant funds provided to the Ministry of Education are not subject to the complaint at hand.

3.2.   
  National legal basis for the measure

| (24) | The legal basis for the funds paid by the Ministry of Education to the NDLA is the State budget resolution of the Stortinget in combination with the delegation of competence to the Ministry of Education to approve applications for grants. The legal basis for the grants from the county municipalities to the NDLA is budget resolution of the participating county municipalities. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The legal basis for the funds paid by the Ministry of Education to the NDLA is the State budget resolution of the Stortinget in combination with the delegation of competence to the Ministry of Education to approve applications for grants. The legal basis for the grants from the county municipalities to the NDLA is budget resolution of the participating county municipalities.

3.3.   
  Recipient

| (25) | The NDLA is organised as an inter-county cooperation body under Article 27 of the Local Government Act. This provision stipulates that municipalities or county municipalities may join forces to solve mutual tasks. The cooperation should take place through a board appointed by the relevant municipal or county municipal boards. The board may be empowered to adopt decisions concerning the operation and organisation of the inter municipal cooperation. Moreover, the provision stipulates that the articles of association of such cooperation shall determine the appointment and representation in the board, the area of activities, whether the participating municipalities shall make financial contributions, whether the board may enter into loan agreements or in other ways make the participating municipalities liable for financial obligations and, finally, how such cooperation shall be abolished. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The NDLA is organised as an inter-county cooperation body under Article 27 of the Local Government Act. This provision stipulates that municipalities or county municipalities may join forces to solve mutual tasks. The cooperation should take place through a board appointed by the relevant municipal or county municipal boards. The board may be empowered to adopt decisions concerning the operation and organisation of the inter municipal cooperation. Moreover, the provision stipulates that the articles of association of such cooperation shall determine the appointment and representation in the board, the area of activities, whether the participating municipalities shall make financial contributions, whether the board may enter into loan agreements or in other ways make the participating municipalities liable for financial obligations and, finally, how such cooperation shall be abolished.

| (26) | Participation in such cooperation is only open for municipalities and county municipalities. Neither the State nor other State entities or private parties can participate. The cooperation must be sincere in the sense that the law prohibits that the competence to govern the cooperation is delegated to one municipality. This is so since municipal tasks and obligations shall remain the responsibility of each municipality (12). |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Participation in such cooperation is only open for municipalities and county municipalities. Neither the State nor other State entities or private parties can participate. The cooperation must be sincere in the sense that the law prohibits that the competence to govern the cooperation is delegated to one municipality. This is so since municipal tasks and obligations shall remain the responsibility of each municipality (12).

3.4.   
  Amount

| (27) | As indicated above, so far the county municipalities have transferred NOK 21,1 million in 2008, NOK 34,7 million in 2009 and NOK 61,6 million in 2010 to the NDLA project. In 2010 the county municipalities allocated NOK 58,8 million to the project and in 2011 this amount was NOK 56,9 million. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

As indicated above, so far the county municipalities have transferred NOK 21,1 million in 2008, NOK 34,7 million in 2009 and NOK 61,6 million in 2010 to the NDLA project. In 2010 the county municipalities allocated NOK 58,8 million to the project and in 2011 this amount was NOK 56,9 million.

3.5.   
  Duration

| (28) | The NDLA project is not subject to a limited duration. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The NDLA project is not subject to a limited duration.

4.   The Decision

| (29) | On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL holding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. The Authority found that the NDLA was not to be considered as an undertaking because it did not carry out an economic activity. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL holding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. The Authority found that the NDLA was not to be considered as an undertaking because it did not carry out an economic activity.

| (30) | In that regard the Authority, firstly, noted that, according to established case law and decision practice, in setting up and maintaining the national education system the State fulfils its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields (13). The Authority observed that the purchase, development and supply of learning material is inextricably linked to the provision of teaching content and is thus an inherent part of the actual teaching itself. In that regard it noted that the learning material forms both the basis and the framework for teaching and that the development of learning material is closely linked to the curriculum which is also established by the public authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

In that regard the Authority, firstly, noted that, according to established case law and decision practice, in setting up and maintaining the national education system the State fulfils its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields (13). The Authority observed that the purchase, development and supply of learning material is inextricably linked to the provision of teaching content and is thus an inherent part of the actual teaching itself. In that regard it noted that the learning material forms both the basis and the framework for teaching and that the development of learning material is closely linked to the curriculum which is also established by the public authorities.

| (31) | Secondly, the Authority pointed out that, for a service to be considered as non-economic, it must be provided based on the principle of national solidarity, which means that the activity must be funded by the public purse and not through remuneration. In other words, there should be no connection between the actual costs of the service provided and the fee paid by those benefiting from the activity (14). In that regard the Authority concluded that this requirement was fulfilled because the NDLA is entirely funded by the State and distributes the developed or purchased learning material free of any charge. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Secondly, the Authority pointed out that, for a service to be considered as non-economic, it must be provided based on the principle of national solidarity, which means that the activity must be funded by the public purse and not through remuneration. In other words, there should be no connection between the actual costs of the service provided and the fee paid by those benefiting from the activity (14). In that regard the Authority concluded that this requirement was fulfilled because the NDLA is entirely funded by the State and distributes the developed or purchased learning material free of any charge.

| (32) | Thirdly, the Authority noted that in cases in which the activity in question is carried out by entities other than the State itself, the recipient of the funds (public or private) must be subject to the control of the State to the extent that the recipient merely applies the law and cannot influence the statutory conditions of the service (i.e. the amount of the contributions, the use of assets and the fixing of the level of benefits) (15). In that regard the Authority noted that the participating municipalities have established the NDLA as an inter-county cooperation body in accordance with Article 27 of the local government act, referred to above. In view of the above, the Authority concluded in its Decision that the NDLA did not carry out an economic activity. Consequently, the NDLA did not act as an undertaking and the funds which the county municipalities transferred to it did not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Thirdly, the Authority noted that in cases in which the activity in question is carried out by entities other than the State itself, the recipient of the funds (public or private) must be subject to the control of the State to the extent that the recipient merely applies the law and cannot influence the statutory conditions of the service (i.e. the amount of the contributions, the use of assets and the fixing of the level of benefits) (15). In that regard the Authority noted that the participating municipalities have established the NDLA as an inter-county cooperation body in accordance with Article 27 of the local government act, referred to above. In view of the above, the Authority concluded in its Decision that the NDLA did not carry out an economic activity. Consequently, the NDLA did not act as an undertaking and the funds which the county municipalities transferred to it did not constitute State aid.

5.   Judgment in Case E-1/12

| (33) | On 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled Decision No 311/11/COL. The EFTA Court concluded that the Authority did not carry out a sufficient examination into several issues and should have opened the formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

On 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled Decision No 311/11/COL. The EFTA Court concluded that the Authority did not carry out a sufficient examination into several issues and should have opened the formal investigation procedure.

| (34) | Firstly, the EFTA Court noted that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant to Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act. According to the EFTA Court it remains unclear how this change in the legal and organisational status may have changed the decision-making process and the source of funding (16). |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Firstly, the EFTA Court noted that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant to Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act. According to the EFTA Court it remains unclear how this change in the legal and organisational status may have changed the decision-making process and the source of funding (16).

| (35) | Secondly, the EFTA Court stated that it remains unclear whether the legislation imposes the obligation to provide the services free of charge on the counties or on the NDLA (17). According to the EFTA Court this circumstance raises serious difficulties with regard to the application of the principle of solidarity. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Secondly, the EFTA Court stated that it remains unclear whether the legislation imposes the obligation to provide the services free of charge on the counties or on the NDLA (17). According to the EFTA Court this circumstance raises serious difficulties with regard to the application of the principle of solidarity.

| (36) | Thirdly, the EFTA Court stated that there are aspects related to the autonomy of the NDLA which remain unclear. First, the EFTA Court noted that it is unclear, how the decisions to expand the NDLA’s activities were taken and by whom (18). Furthermore, the EFTA Court pointed out that Article 8 of the Articles of Association of the NDLA states that ‘the board (of the NDLA) has the competence to impose financial obligations on the participants (19).’ Moreover, it follows from the judgment that the annulled decision lacked information as regards the autonomy of the the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedure through which it purchases goods on the market and hires staff (20). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Thirdly, the EFTA Court stated that there are aspects related to the autonomy of the NDLA which remain unclear. First, the EFTA Court noted that it is unclear, how the decisions to expand the NDLA’s activities were taken and by whom (18). Furthermore, the EFTA Court pointed out that Article 8 of the Articles of Association of the NDLA states that ‘the board (of the NDLA) has the competence to impose financial obligations on the participants (19).’ Moreover, it follows from the judgment that the annulled decision lacked information as regards the autonomy of the the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedure through which it purchases goods on the market and hires staff (20).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (37) | According to Article 61(1) EEA ‘[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(37)

According to Article 61(1) EEA ‘[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

1.1.   
  State resources

| (38) | A measure is financed by the State or through State resources, if it results in a burden on the budget of a public authority or on a public or private undertaking provided that the measure is imputable to the State (21). In the case at hand the financing of the project results in a burden on the budget of the counties and of the Ministry of Education and Research. Consequently, the measure is financed by the State within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

A measure is financed by the State or through State resources, if it results in a burden on the budget of a public authority or on a public or private undertaking provided that the measure is imputable to the State (21). In the case at hand the financing of the project results in a burden on the budget of the counties and of the Ministry of Education and Research. Consequently, the measure is financed by the State within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA.

1.2.   
  Advantage to an undertaking

| (39) | As mentioned above, the Authority concluded in its previous decision that the county municipalities’ provision of free, and in this case digital learning material for pupils in the national elementary and secondary school system to be a part of the State's fulfilment of its duty in the educational field and hence a non-economic activity provided under the principle of solidarity as such material is fully funded by the State. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

As mentioned above, the Authority concluded in its previous decision that the county municipalities’ provision of free, and in this case digital learning material for pupils in the national elementary and secondary school system to be a part of the State's fulfilment of its duty in the educational field and hence a non-economic activity provided under the principle of solidarity as such material is fully funded by the State.

| (40) | However, in its judgment the EFTA Court addressed several aspects relating not to the nature of the activity as such but rather to organisational aspects of the NDLA, its financing and autonomy, which should have led the Authority to open a formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

However, in its judgment the EFTA Court addressed several aspects relating not to the nature of the activity as such but rather to organisational aspects of the NDLA, its financing and autonomy, which should have led the Authority to open a formal investigation procedure.

| (41) | The EFTA Court noted that the Articles of Association of the NDLA foresaw that the formalised cooperation would enter into force on 1 July 2009 (22). At the same time, the EFTA Court noted that the county municipalities resolutions of August 2006 foresaw that the inter-county cooperation would enter into force on 1 January 2010 (23). In view of the above and taking into account that the NDLA was already active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established, the EFTA Court found that the Authority should have investigated the effects of the organisational changes and legal status of the NDLA may have affected its decision making process and the sources of its funding and how it may have changed over time (24). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The EFTA Court noted that the Articles of Association of the NDLA foresaw that the formalised cooperation would enter into force on 1 July 2009 (22). At the same time, the EFTA Court noted that the county municipalities resolutions of August 2006 foresaw that the inter-county cooperation would enter into force on 1 January 2010 (23). In view of the above and taking into account that the NDLA was already active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established, the EFTA Court found that the Authority should have investigated the effects of the organisational changes and legal status of the NDLA may have affected its decision making process and the sources of its funding and how it may have changed over time (24).

| (42) | The Authority’s Decision described the project phase of the NDLA; the Authority thus acknowledges that the information in the case file does indeed suggest that the NDLA entered into force on 1 July 2009 and thus six months earlier than originally foreseen in the resolutions which the county-municipalities had adopted several years earlier. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority’s Decision described the project phase of the NDLA; the Authority thus acknowledges that the information in the case file does indeed suggest that the NDLA entered into force on 1 July 2009 and thus six months earlier than originally foreseen in the resolutions which the county-municipalities had adopted several years earlier.

| (43) | The complainant has not alleged that the NDLA in its project phase, i.e. before its entry into force as a inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, did engage in any other activities than what it has done after its formal establishment Nevertheless, the EFTA Court points out that the lack of information about how the county municipalities organised their cooperation to comply with their obligations to provide learning material in the NDLA project phase may have an impact on the classification of the activities as non-economic. For that reason the Court emphasised that the Authority should have carried out an investigation on the effects of the change in legal status on the decision making process in the NDLA (25). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The complainant has not alleged that the NDLA in its project phase, i.e. before its entry into force as a inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, did engage in any other activities than what it has done after its formal establishment Nevertheless, the EFTA Court points out that the lack of information about how the county municipalities organised their cooperation to comply with their obligations to provide learning material in the NDLA project phase may have an impact on the classification of the activities as non-economic. For that reason the Court emphasised that the Authority should have carried out an investigation on the effects of the change in legal status on the decision making process in the NDLA (25).

| (44) | In that regard it is the Authority’s understanding that prior to the formal establishment the project was managed by the ‘forum for the county municipalities Heads of Education’ (hereafter: FFU) (26), which appointed board members to carry out delegated tasks in the project phase. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

In that regard it is the Authority’s understanding that prior to the formal establishment the project was managed by the ‘forum for the county municipalities Heads of Education’ (hereafter: FFU) (26), which appointed board members to carry out delegated tasks in the project phase.

| (45) | After the NDLA had been formally established and according to §7(2) of the Articles of Association the forum of the counties’ Heads of Education became the Supervisory Board which remains responsible for the overall management. The forum of the counties’ Heads of Education appoints the Management Board management board. According to §7(1) of the Articles of Association the Management Board is composed of five members with one member of the FFU and at least one representative of the training regions (i.e. Northern Region, South Western Region and Eastern Region. According to §8 of the Articles of Association, the task of the Management Board is to ensure that the NDLA is able to perform its duties under §2 of the Articles of Association, namely to ensure that (1) that digital educational materials are available to users free of charge, (2) that secondary school is characterised by collaboration and sharing (3) that students and teacher actively participate in teaching and learning, (4) that academic institutions and networks across the country are a driving force in the development of excellent digital learning material and (5) that the market provides content and services for students and teachers needs. Furthermore, the Management Board has the authority to incur financial obligations on the participants in that regard. However, §7(2) of the Articles of Association explicitly states that the Management Board only exercises its authority on the basis of delegation decisions of the Supervisory Board and that the Supervisory Board may instruct the Management Board and overrule its decisions. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

After the NDLA had been formally established and according to §7(2) of the Articles of Association the forum of the counties’ Heads of Education became the Supervisory Board which remains responsible for the overall management. The forum of the counties’ Heads of Education appoints the Management Board management board. According to §7(1) of the Articles of Association the Management Board is composed of five members with one member of the FFU and at least one representative of the training regions (i.e. Northern Region, South Western Region and Eastern Region. According to §8 of the Articles of Association, the task of the Management Board is to ensure that the NDLA is able to perform its duties under §2 of the Articles of Association, namely to ensure that (1) that digital educational materials are available to users free of charge, (2) that secondary school is characterised by collaboration and sharing (3) that students and teacher actively participate in teaching and learning, (4) that academic institutions and networks across the country are a driving force in the development of excellent digital learning material and (5) that the market provides content and services for students and teachers needs. Furthermore, the Management Board has the authority to incur financial obligations on the participants in that regard. However, §7(2) of the Articles of Association explicitly states that the Management Board only exercises its authority on the basis of delegation decisions of the Supervisory Board and that the Supervisory Board may instruct the Management Board and overrule its decisions.

| (46) | The Authority requests the Norwegian government and any interested third parties to explain whether they consider the NDLA to be an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. In particular they are asked to explain in more detail how the counties cooperated in the NDLA project phase and, in particular, to clarify at what time the NDLA entered into force and whether this entry into force of the municipal cooperation affected the decision making process and the sources of the NDLA’s funding. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities are invited to elaborate on the nature, practice and use of inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, including whether such cooperation is considered separate legal entities or not under Norwegian law. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority requests the Norwegian government and any interested third parties to explain whether they consider the NDLA to be an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. In particular they are asked to explain in more detail how the counties cooperated in the NDLA project phase and, in particular, to clarify at what time the NDLA entered into force and whether this entry into force of the municipal cooperation affected the decision making process and the sources of the NDLA’s funding. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities are invited to elaborate on the nature, practice and use of inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, including whether such cooperation is considered separate legal entities or not under Norwegian law.

| (47) | The Authority moreover requests the Norwegian authorities to explain to what extent the change in legal status effected the decision making process, in particular, to what extent the NDLA can expand the scope of its activities without the consent of the participating municipalities or even against their will, and if the present situation differs from the situation prior to the formal establishment of the NDLA on 1 July 2009 (27). The Authority also invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more detail the funding of the NDLA, both in its project phase and after the formal entry into force up to and including 2012 (28). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover requests the Norwegian authorities to explain to what extent the change in legal status effected the decision making process, in particular, to what extent the NDLA can expand the scope of its activities without the consent of the participating municipalities or even against their will, and if the present situation differs from the situation prior to the formal establishment of the NDLA on 1 July 2009 (27). The Authority also invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more detail the funding of the NDLA, both in its project phase and after the formal entry into force up to and including 2012 (28).

| (48) | The EFTA Court also found that it was unclear from the Decision whether the obligation to provide digital learning material free of charge falls upon the county municipalities or upon the NDLA (29). The EFTA Court noted that in the annulled Decision, the Authority ‘refers to the Norwegian legislation and states that it obliged the counties to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge’ (emphasis added) (30). The EFTA Court further noted that in the assessment on the autonomy of the NDLA, the annulled decision states that the NDLA cannot decide on charging fees to the end consumer ‘... since the legal framework obliges the NDLA to provide its services free of charge’ (emphasis added) (31). The judgment also refers to that the Authority at the oral hearing explained that it is the counties which bear the statutory obligation to offer this service free of charge and that they had decided to offer this service jointly through the NDLA (32). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The EFTA Court also found that it was unclear from the Decision whether the obligation to provide digital learning material free of charge falls upon the county municipalities or upon the NDLA (29). The EFTA Court noted that in the annulled Decision, the Authority ‘refers to the Norwegian legislation and states that it obliged the counties to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge’ (emphasis added) (30). The EFTA Court further noted that in the assessment on the autonomy of the NDLA, the annulled decision states that the NDLA cannot decide on charging fees to the end consumer ‘... since the legal framework obliges the NDLA to provide its services free of charge’ (emphasis added) (31). The judgment also refers to that the Authority at the oral hearing explained that it is the counties which bear the statutory obligation to offer this service free of charge and that they had decided to offer this service jointly through the NDLA (32).

| (49) | In the view of that the EFTA Court considered the above mentioned statements in the decision to represent an implicit contradiction (as it was not clear who was the client of the NDLA), the Authority notes that the notion of ‘legal framework’ is wider than that of ‘legislation’. The reference to the legal framework encompasses not only the statutory obligation in national law (such as the Education Act), but also resolutions (such as the resolutions passed by the county municipalities in August 2006), as well as administrative acts (such as the April 2007 award of funding by the Ministry of Education) and the Articles of Association of the NDLA. The Authority does therefore not consider the above mentioned statements to contain any implicit contradiction. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In the view of that the EFTA Court considered the above mentioned statements in the decision to represent an implicit contradiction (as it was not clear who was the client of the NDLA), the Authority notes that the notion of ‘legal framework’ is wider than that of ‘legislation’. The reference to the legal framework encompasses not only the statutory obligation in national law (such as the Education Act), but also resolutions (such as the resolutions passed by the county municipalities in August 2006), as well as administrative acts (such as the April 2007 award of funding by the Ministry of Education) and the Articles of Association of the NDLA. The Authority does therefore not consider the above mentioned statements to contain any implicit contradiction.

| (50) | However, based on the EFTA Court’s judgment the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more details how the obligation to provide free learning material has been imposed on the county municipalities in the Public Education Act, and how the county municipalities involved in the NDLA have fulfilled this obligation through the NDLA cooperation as set out in the Articles of Association. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

However, based on the EFTA Court’s judgment the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more details how the obligation to provide free learning material has been imposed on the county municipalities in the Public Education Act, and how the county municipalities involved in the NDLA have fulfilled this obligation through the NDLA cooperation as set out in the Articles of Association.

| (51) | Finally, the Court found that the decision did not contain sufficient information on the possibility of the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which it purchases goods and hires staff (33). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Finally, the Court found that the decision did not contain sufficient information on the possibility of the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which it purchases goods and hires staff (33).

| (52) | The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more detail on how the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which the NDLA purchases goods and hires staff are set. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more detail on how the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which the NDLA purchases goods and hires staff are set.

| (53) | Consequently the Authority expresses doubts as to whether the NDLA, wholly or partly, before or after its formal entry into force, may be considered as an undertaking under the EEA State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Consequently the Authority expresses doubts as to whether the NDLA, wholly or partly, before or after its formal entry into force, may be considered as an undertaking under the EEA State aid rules.

1.3.   
  Selectivity

| (54) | It is established case law that a measure is selective if it derogates from the common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who are otherwise in the same legal and factual situation (34). In that regard the Authority notes that if the NDLA were to be considered as an undertaking, the funding of it would be selective since other operators would not benefit from a similar funding. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

It is established case law that a measure is selective if it derogates from the common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who are otherwise in the same legal and factual situation (34). In that regard the Authority notes that if the NDLA were to be considered as an undertaking, the funding of it would be selective since other operators would not benefit from a similar funding.

1.4.   
  Effect on competition and trade

| (55) | It is established case law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared with other companies (35) and if the recipient is active in a sector, in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (36). In that regard the Norwegian authorities noted that the relevant geographic market for provision of learning materials made to fit the national Norwegian curricula should to a great extent be limited to Norway, so that the effects on cross-border trade are not significant. The Authority cannot at this stage and based on the information at hand conclude on the effects of the measure on competition and trade. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

It is established case law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared with other companies (35) and if the recipient is active in a sector, in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (36). In that regard the Norwegian authorities noted that the relevant geographic market for provision of learning materials made to fit the national Norwegian curricula should to a great extent be limited to Norway, so that the effects on cross-border trade are not significant. The Authority cannot at this stage and based on the information at hand conclude on the effects of the measure on competition and trade. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard.

2.   Compatibility

| (56) | The Norwegian authorities submitted that if one were to view the funding of the NDLA as State aid, then it would qualify as a compensation for a service of general economic interest under Article 59(2) EEA. However, based on the information at hand the Authority cannot at this stage conclude on the compatibility of the measure. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The Norwegian authorities submitted that if one were to view the funding of the NDLA as State aid, then it would qualify as a compensation for a service of general economic interest under Article 59(2) EEA. However, based on the information at hand the Authority cannot at this stage conclude on the compatibility of the measure. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard.

3.   Conclusion

| (57) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and by the Norwegian authorities, and taking into account the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority has doubts as to whether the grants to the NDLA constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts regarding the compatibility of the measure with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and by the Norwegian authorities, and taking into account the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority has doubts as to whether the grants to the NDLA constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts regarding the compatibility of the measure with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (58) | Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (59) | The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute State aid.

| (60) | The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the measure on the relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the measure on the relevant markets.

| (61) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (62) | Further, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Further, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (63) | The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. Moreover, according to Article 15 Part II of Protocol 3, the powers of the Authority to order the recovery of aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. This period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded. Any action taken by the Authority with regard to this unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. Moreover, according to Article 15 Part II of Protocol 3, the powers of the Authority to order the recovery of aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. This period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded. Any action taken by the Authority with regard to this unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period.

| (64) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the EEA Supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication, |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the EEA Supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of part I of Protocol 3 is initiated regarding the potential State aid to the NDLA.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the nature and compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 27 March 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Il-Kawża E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening (għadha mhux ippubblikata).

1

Den norske Forleggerforening

(2)  See footnote 1.

2

(3)  Norway is divided into 19 municipalities, all of which participate in the NDLA project with the exception of the county municipality of Oslo. Participants are therefore the municipalities of Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, Nordland, Nord-Trøndelag, Møre og Romsdal, Oppland, Rogaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Sør-Trøndelag, Telemark, Troms, Vest-Agder, Vestfold and Østfold.

3

(4)  Act of 17 July 1998 No 61 relating to Primary and Secondary Education and Training (The Education Act).

4

(5)  As the national curricula set out the objectives for the learning outcome of all classes, the content of the learning material must respect the objectives of the national curricula.

5

(6)  Sections 3-l and 4A-3 of the Education Act states that the county municipality is responsible for providing pupils with the necessary printed and digital teaching material as well as digital equipment free of charge.

6

(7)  Translation made by the Authority.

7

(8)  See footnote 7.

8

(9)  See footnote 7.

9

(10)  See footnote 7.

10

(11)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 117 (not yet published).

11

Den norske Forleggerforening

(12)  NOU 1996:5 pkt. 8.1.2.

12

(13)  Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5383, para. 18; Case E-05/7 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 64, para. 82; Commission decision No 118/2000 France — Aide aux clubs sportifs professionels, OJ C 333, 28.11.2001, p. 6.

13

Humbel

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

France — Aide aux clubs sportifs professionels

(14)  Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-2493, para. 47; Case C-160/91 Poucet [1993] ECR I-637, paras. 11 and 12.

14

AOK Bundesverband and Others

(15)  Case C-160/91 Poucet [1993] ECR I-637, para. 15 and 18; Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-2493, paras. 46-57; Case C-218/00 Cisal die Battistello Venanzi [2002] ECR I-691, para. 31-46. These cases concern health and social insurances. However, the fact that the Commission explicitly refers to these cases in the context of professional services indicates that the assessment can be generally applied (see Commission Communication ‘Report on Competition in Professional Services’ of 9.2.2004 (COM(2004) 83 final, Fn. 22).

15

Poucet

AOK Bundesverband and Others

Cisal die Battistello Venanzi

(16)  See footnote 11.

16

(17)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 123 (not yet published).

17

Den norske Forleggerforening

(18)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 127 (not yet published).

18

Den norske Forleggerforening

(19)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, paras. 128-130 (not yet published).

19

Den norske Forleggerforening

(20)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 131 (not yet published).

20

Den norske Forleggerforening

(21)  Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust) [2002] ECR I-4397, para. 52.

21

France

Commission (Stardust)

(22)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 115 (not yet published).

22

Den norske Forleggerforening

(23)  The EFTA Court refers to the submission from Norway dated 9 September 2010, p. 3.

23

(24)  See footnote 11.

24

(25)  See footnote 11.

25

(26)  The Norwegian wording is: ‘Forum for fylkesutdanningssjefer’.

26

(27)  See footnote 11.

27

(28)  See footnote 11.

28

(29)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, paras. 121-123 (not yet published).

29

Den norske Forleggerforening

(30)  The EFTA Court seems to refer to para. 12 and footnote 4 of the annulled decision according to which ‘Section 3-1 and 4A-3 of the Education Act states that the county municipality is responsible for providing pupils with the necessary printed and digital teaching material as well as digital equipment free of charge.’

30

(31)  The EFTA Court refers to para. 45 of the annulled decision in para. 121 of the Judgment.

31

(32)  See footnote 17.

32

(33)  See footnote 20.

33

(34)  Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365, para. 41; Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Gibraltar and UK (Gibraltar corporate tax) [2011] not yet published, para. 36.

34

Adria-Wien Pipeline

Commission and Spain

Gibraltar and UK (Gibraltar corporate tax)

(35)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, [2005] ECR, 2671, para. 11.

35

Holland

(36)  Case 102/87, France v Commission (SEB), [1988], 4067, Case C-310/99, Italian Republic v Commission, [2002] EC R I-289, para. 85, Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), [2003] ECR, I-7747, para. 77; Case T-55/99, Confederación Espanola de Tranporte de Mercancias (CETM) v Commission, [2000] ECR II-3207, para. 86.

36

France

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

Confederación Espanola de Tranporte de Mercancias (CETM)

Commission

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V Avviżi

ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 8.8.2013 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 229/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 229/43

---

Pubblikazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 50(2)(a) tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar skemi tal-kwalità għal prodotti agrikoli u oġġetti tal-ikel

2013/C 229/11

Din il-pubblikazzjoni tikkonferixxi d-dritt ta’ oġġezzjoni għall-applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 51 tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill (1).

DOKUMENT UNIKU

IR-REGOLAMENT TAL-KUNSILL (KE) Nru 510/2006

dwar il-protezzjoni tal-indikazzjonijiet ġeografiċi u d-denominazzjonijiet tal-oriġini għall-prodotti agrikoli u l-oġġetti tal-ikel
   (2)

“ANTEP BAKLAVASI”/“GAZİANTEP BAKLAVASI”

Nru tal-KE: TR-PGI-0005-0781-10.07.2009

IĠP ( X ) DPO ( )

1.   Isem

“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”

2.   Stat membru jew pajjiż terz

It-Turkija

3.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel

3.1.   Tip ta’ prodott

| Klassi 2.4. | Prodotti ta’ ħobż, għaġina, kejkijiet, ħlewwiet, gallettini u prodotti oħra tal-furnara |
| --- | --- |

Klassi 2.4.

Prodotti ta’ ħobż, għaġina, kejkijiet, ħlewwiet, gallettini u prodotti oħra tal-furnara

3.2.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott li għalih japplika l-isem fil-punt 1

“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” hija għaġina ħelwa magħmula minn saffi ta’ għaġina filo mimlija bil-krema tas-smid u pistaċċi ta' Antep u mogħtijin il-ħlewwa bil-ġulepp.

Skont it-tip kummerċjali (niexef jew frisk), il-perċentwali medju ta’ materja prima bażika għandha tkun kif ġej (b’tolleranza ta’ ± 3 %):

| | Normali (frisk) | Xotti |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Għaġina | 25 % | 30 % |
| Pistaċċita' Antep (Antep fıstığı) | 10-11 % | 10-11 % |
| Krema tas-smid | 12-13 % | — |
| Butir sempliċi | 15-20 % | 20-25 % |
| Ġulepp | 35-36 % | 35-36 % |

Normali (frisk)

Xotti

Għaġina

25 %

30 %

Pistaċċita' Antep (Antep fıstığı)

10-11 %

10-11 %

Krema tas-smid

12-13 %

—

Butir sempliċi

15-20 %

20-25 %

Ġulepp

35-36 %

35-36 %

Id-differenza bejn “baklava” xotta u friska hija li dik li tal-ewwel ma tinkludix il-krema tas-smid.

Karatteristiċi tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”

| | Riħa: din ġejja mill-pistaċċi ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı) u l-butir sempliċi; |
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Riħa: din ġejja mill-pistaċċi ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı) u l-butir sempliċi;

| | Kulur: Il-wiċċ tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” huwa isfar dehbi u l-parti t’isfel hija ħadra skura minħabba l-pistaċċi ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı); |
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Kulur: Il-wiċċ tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” huwa isfar dehbi u l-parti t’isfel hija ħadra skura minħabba l-pistaċċi ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı);

| | Konsistenza: il-parti ta’ fuq tqarmeċ ftit minħabba s-safef tal-għaġina. Il-parti t’isfel għandha konsistenza għaslija. |
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Konsistenza: il-parti ta’ fuq tqarmeċ ftit minħabba s-safef tal-għaġina. Il-parti t’isfel għandha konsistenza għaslija.

| | Forma: il-prodott għandu jitqatta' qabel il-ħami. Il-biċċiet jistgħu jiġu f’diversi forom, imma fil-biċċa l-kbira għandhom forma rettangolari ugwali u qasira, forma ta' mekkuk (djamant), ta' amulett (trijangolari) jew forma kwadra, jew forma li tixbaħ zunnarija (flieli trijangolari twal miċ-ċentru għat-truf ta' tilat ċirkolari). |
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Forma: il-prodott għandu jitqatta' qabel il-ħami. Il-biċċiet jistgħu jiġu f’diversi forom, imma fil-biċċa l-kbira għandhom forma rettangolari ugwali u qasira, forma ta' mekkuk (djamant), ta' amulett (trijangolari) jew forma kwadra, jew forma li tixbaħ zunnarija (flieli trijangolari twal miċ-ċentru għat-truf ta' tilat ċirkolari).

3.3.   Materja prima (għall-prodotti pproċessati biss)

Ingredjenti tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”

| — | Pistaċċi ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı): l-użu tal-pistaċċi ta' Antep huwa obbligatorju għall-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”. Indiġeni għal provinċja ta' Gaziantep, il-pistaċċi ta' Antep huma prodott agrikolu rreġistrat fit-Turkija. Huma ħodor skuri b’aroma densa. Skont l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet tal-prodott, hemm ħames tipi u l-pistaċċa għandha forma twila, ovali jew ċirkolari u ta' lewn aħdar skur. Għandha rata ta' proteini ta' bejn l-21,77 % u t-23,77 % u rata tax-xaħam ta' bejn is-56,27 % u d-59,89 %. Il-pistaċċi ta' Antep istgħu jitqattgħu ħoxnin jew irqaq; |
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Pistaċċi ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı): l-użu tal-pistaċċi ta' Antep huwa obbligatorju għall-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”. Indiġeni għal provinċja ta' Gaziantep, il-pistaċċi ta' Antep huma prodott agrikolu rreġistrat fit-Turkija. Huma ħodor skuri b’aroma densa. Skont l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet tal-prodott, hemm ħames tipi u l-pistaċċa għandha forma twila, ovali jew ċirkolari u ta' lewn aħdar skur. Għandha rata ta' proteini ta' bejn l-21,77 % u t-23,77 % u rata tax-xaħam ta' bejn is-56,27 % u d-59,89 %. Il-pistaċċi ta' Antep istgħu jitqattgħu ħoxnin jew irqaq;

| — | Butir sempliċi: 99,9 % tal-butir sempliċi huwa magħmul mill-ħalib u m'għandux melħ jew additivi oħra; |
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Butir sempliċi: 99,9 % tal-butir sempliċi huwa magħmul mill-ħalib u m'għandux melħ jew additivi oħra;

| — | Krema tas-smid (użati biss għal prodotti “normali” (frisk)): il-ħalib huwa mgħolli għal 105-108 °C u s-smid huwa miżjud (100 g tas-smid għal 1 kg ta' ħalib). It-taħlita tissaħħan sa 100 °C sakemm issir solida u mbagħad titħalla għat-tkessiħ; |
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Krema tas-smid (użati biss għal prodotti “normali” (frisk)): il-ħalib huwa mgħolli għal 105-108 °C u s-smid huwa miżjud (100 g tas-smid għal 1 kg ta' ħalib). It-taħlita tissaħħan sa 100 °C sakemm issir solida u mbagħad titħalla għat-tkessiħ;

| — | Dqiq: magħmul minn qamħ durum; |
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Dqiq: magħmul minn qamħ durum;

| — | Lamtu: Lamtu tal-qamħ; |
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Lamtu: Lamtu tal-qamħ;

| — | Ġulepp: Magħmul biz-zokkor jew bid-dolċifikant (għad-dijabetiċi). Kważi 350-360 g ġulepp huwa miżjud ma’ kull kilogramma ta’ taħlita tal-baklava. L-għasel m’għandux jintuża; |
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Ġulepp: Magħmul biz-zokkor jew bid-dolċifikant (għad-dijabetiċi). Kważi 350-360 g ġulepp huwa miżjud ma’ kull kilogramma ta’ taħlita tal-baklava. L-għasel m’għandux jintuża;

| — | Bajd: Tliet bajdiet għal kilogramm dqiq (għaġina għall-preparazzjoni); |
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Bajd: Tliet bajdiet għal kilogramm dqiq (għaġina għall-preparazzjoni);

| — | Melħ: 10 g melħ tal-blat għal kilogramm dqiq (għaġina għall-preparazzjoni); |
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Melħ: 10 g melħ tal-blat għal kilogramm dqiq (għaġina għall-preparazzjoni);

3.4.   Għalf (għall-prodotti li ġejjin mill-annimali biss)

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3.5.   Stadji speċifiċi tal-produzzjoni li jridu jsiru fiż-żona ġeografika ddefinita

It-tħejjija tal-għaġina, it-teħid tal-baklava u l-ħami.

3.6.   Regoli speċifiċi dwar it-tqattigħ, it-tħakkik, l-ippakkjar, eċċ.

L-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” tista’ tiġi kkummerċjalizzata bil-piż jew bħala porzjon f'tilari jew pakketti. Jekk tiġi ppakkjata, jistgħu jintużaw il-kaxex tal-kartun, imma dawn għandhom ikunu miksija b’saff fojl jew b'materjal similari li ma jgħaddix l-ilma minnu. Tista’ titqiegħed nota fil-kaxxa bis-suġġeriment tas-servizz, “Isıtarak servis yapınız” (“saħħan qabel ma sservi”).

3.7.   Regoli speċifiċi dwar it-tikkettar

Jekk l-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” tinbiegħ fil-forma niexfa, it-terminu kuru (“niexef”) għandu jidher fuq il-pakkett.

It-tikketti li jkun fihom it-termini “IĠP” u “Antep Baklavası” jew “Gaziantep Baklavası” jridu jiġi mwaħħla mal-faċċata viżibbli tal-ippakkjar, kif ukoll il-logo li ġej:

Image

4.   Definizzjoni fil-qosor taż-żona ġeografika

Iż-żona tal-produzzjoni tkopri l-Provinċja kollha ta’ Gaziantep., fix-Xlokk tal-Anatolja. Il-Provinċja tmiss mas-Sirja lejn in-Nofsinhar, Birecik u Halfeti lejn il-Lvant, Adiyaman lejn il-Grigal, Kahramanmaras lejn it-Tramuntana, Osmaniye lejn il-Punent u Hatay lejn il-Lbiċ.

5.   Rabta maż-żona ġeografika

5.1.   Speċifiċità taż-żona ġeografika

Il-Provinċja ta' Gaziantep hija ċ-ċentru tal-kultivazzjoni tal-pistaċċa fit-Turkija. Il-pistaċċi jissejħu antep fıstığı (“pistaċċa ta' Antep”) fit-Turkija, hekk kif il-belt ta’ Gaziantep ħadhet isimha mill-kelma Torka għal “pistaċċa”.

Il-prodotti magħmula mill-prodotti tal-pistaċċa ta' Antep ilhom jitħejjew u jittieklu għal sekli sħaħ f'Gaziantep.

L-esperjenza tal-ħaddiema tas-sengħa:

It-tħejjija tal-għaġina tal-baklava, l-irrumblar u l-ftuħ tagħha, it-tbexxix tal-lamtu bejn is-saffi, it-tqegħid tas-saffi fuq it-tilar, it-tixrid tal-krema u l-pistaċċi ta' Antep, it-tqattigħ tal-baklava f’biċċiet indaqs, id-dlik tagħha bil-butir sempliċi, il-ħami u ż-żieda tal-ġulepp – dan kollu jeħtieġ ħila kbira. L-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” għandha tkun ippreparata u moħmija minn nies tas-sengħa li jkunu kisbu dawn il-ħiliet fiż-żona ta' Gaziantep.

5.2.   Speċifiċità tal-prodott

L-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” tista' tingħaraf minn baklava oħra mill-kulur isfar dehbi ileqq, il-konsistenza, l-istruttura tagħha u l-aħdar skur fil-parti t'isfel. Madankollu, id-differenza ewlenija hija t-togħma u l-aroma tal-pistaċċa ta' Antep u tal-butir sempliċi.

Għat-tħejjija tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” jeħtieġ ħila kbira.

Il-fama tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” tiġi mit-tagħqida għar-rikkezza ta' ingredjenti, u l-metodu ta’ esperjenza tal-ħami manwali użat mill-ħaddiema tas-sengħa. Qabel ma jittiekel, ir-riħa tal-butir pur tippredomina. Baklava ppreparata sew tinħall fil-ħalq immedjatament. Dawn huma l-aktar karatteristiċi speċifiċi importanti tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”.

5.3.   Rabta kawżali bejn iż-żona ġeografika u l-kwalità jew il-karatteristiċi tal-prodott (għad-DPO) jew il-kwalità speċifika, ir-reputazzjoni jew karatteristiċi oħrajn tal-prodott (għall-IĠP)

L-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” minn Gaziantep ilha tiġi apprezzata ħafna mis-seklu 19 għall-istil tal-produzzjoni distint tagħha, il-karatteristiċi speċjali tal-ingredjenti u l-metodu manwali tal-ħami tal-ħaddiema tas-sengħa esperjenzati. Bosta familji famużi ilhom, għal diversi ġenerazzjonijiet sa minn madwar l-1870, jipproduċu l-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” bil-mod tradizzjonali.

L-aktar materja prima importanti hija l-pistaċċa ta' Antep (Antep fıstığı), prodott agrikolu rreġistrat fit-Turkija. It-togħma u l-aroma densa tagħha hija ppreservata fil-prodott finali u dawn jagħtuha l-kulur ħadrani skur tagħha mal-parti t'isfel tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”.

L-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” tissemma f’kotba dwar Gaziantep u l-kċina Torka, u fil-fuljetti tat-turiżmu tal-Ministeru tal-Kultura u tat-Turiżmu dwar Gaziantep.

Il-ktieb Gaziantep Folklorundan Notlar (Noti mill-folklor ta' Gaziantep), miktub fl-1959 minn Cemil Cahit Güzelbey, speċjalista tar-riċerka minn Gaziantep, isemmi (P. 86) li “l-pistaċċi huma użati mill-manifatturi tal-baklava”. Il-ktieb ukoll jirrakkonta l-istorja (p. 87) ta’ vjaġġ lejn Gaziantep tal-Ministru tas-Saħħa Tork. Fl-ikla ta' filgħaxija, wara li ġie servut soppa bil-pistaċċa, ross bil-pistaċċa, baklava bil-pistaċċa u finalment ġelat bil-pistaċċa, huwa ċċajta, “Jekk jogħġbok, nista’ nitolbok tazza ilma mingħajr pistaċċa?”.

L-edizjoni tal-2001 tal-gwida tal-ivvjaġġar Frommer’s Turkey (Lynn A. Levine, 2001 John Wiley & Sons) tgħid li hija famuża l-aktar għall-baklava straordinarja tagħha. B’aktar minn 500 furnar tal-baklava fil-belt, il-“mixja tal-baklava” hija ħaġa li għandek tagħmel bilfors, speċjalment matul iż-żmien tal-ħsad tal-pistaċċa f’Settembru.

Ukoll, Cooking the Turkish Way (Kari Cornell, 2004) isemmi (P. 14) li “l-belt ta' Gaziantep, fil-Lvant tal-Anatolja, hija magħrufa għal pistaċċi tagħha u għal baklava ħelwa għaslija”.

Referenza għall-pubblikazzjoni tal-ispeċifikazzjoni

(L-Artikolu 5(7) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 510/2006 (3))

Il-Gvern Tork nieda l-proċedura nazzjonali ta’ oġġezzjoni bil-pubblikazzjoni tar-reġistrazzjoni għar-rikonoxximent tal-“Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası” bħala IĠP fil-Gazzetta Uffiċjali tar-Repubblika Torka Nru 26505 tas-27 ta’ April 2007.

It-test sħiħ tal-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott huwa disponibbli fuq is-sit elettroniku tal-Istitut Tork dwar il-Privattivi:

http://www.turkpatent.gov.tr/portal/default_en.jsp?sayfa=172 (għafas fuq “Antep Baklavası”/“Gaziantep Baklavası”).

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(1)  ĠU L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Mibdul permezz tar-Regolament (UE) Nru 1151/2012.

(3)  Ara n-nota f’qiegħ il-paġna Nru 2.

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