United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED December 27, 2006 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

_______________


### m 06-10664 Summary Calendar

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### C AT HERINE 

### J. M ILLER 

### ,

Plaintiff-Appellant 

### , VERSUS


### J O 

### ANNE 

### B. B ARNHART 

### , C OMMISSIONER OF S OCIAL S ECURITY , 

### Defendant-Appellee

_________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Texas 

### m 4:04-CV-789

______________________________

Before S MITH , WIENER , and O WEN , Circuit Judges.
P ER C URIAM : *
Catherine Miller applied fo r disabilit y insurance and supplemental se curity inco me benefit s, but the Com

missio ner of Soci al Security determ ined th at Miller was not disabled wit hin the meaning of the Soci al Security Act. Because the Com

missio ner’s decision is in accordance with law, we affirm.

I. Miller filed applications fo r disabilit y insurance and supplemental security inco me b enefit s in 2000, alleging pain in her neck, shoul

- * Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.2

ders, and left hip; carpal tunnel syndrome; majo r depression; panic disorder; and anxiety. The Commissioner denied her applications.
A hearing was held before an administ rative law j udge (“ALJ”) at which Miller, her husband, a medical expert witness, and a vocational expert wit ness tes ti fied. The ALJ reviewed the Com

missio ner’s d eci sio n and determ ined Miller was not disabled, and the district court af

fir med.
As part of his determination, the ALJ gave lit tle weight to the opinio n of Miller’s treating physician, Charles Marable, that Miller was disabled and could not work. The ALJ stated:
In reaching my conclusions, I have considered the opinio ns of Ms. Miller’s treating physicians, including Dr. Marable, that the claimant is disabled. I am familiar wit h Dr. Marable in particular, and I know him to be a constant advocate fo r his patients. Accordingly, I therefore carefully examine his opinio ns and the remaining evidence in each case. While I decide each case based on the evidence before me, I am mindful th at I need to lo ok clo sely at any opinio n rendered b y Dr. Marable. In this case, I did not find his opinio ns convincing or supported, to the degree he has fo und th at the claimant is unab le t o e ngage in any work activit y. Hence, I gave his opinions little weight.
II. We review the Com

missio ner’s decision to deny soci al security benefit s only to determ ine whether the final decision is supported by substanti al evidence and whether the proper legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence. Brow n v. Apfe l , 192 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 1999); Gr

eenspan v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). Miller argues the ALJ e rred b y according little weight to Marable’s opinio n, claiming it should have been given great weight because it was supported by substanti al evidence. Additionally, she urges that the ALJ erred by using info rmation outside the record in determ

ining the weight to accord Mar able’s opinion. Miller does not contend th at substantial evidence does not support the Com missio ner’s decision, so we review the decisio n to determ

ine whether it is in accordance wit h law.
The ALJ did not err by according lit tle weight to Marab le’s opinio n; t he ALJ’s decision was in accordance with law. Miller is correct th at treating physician’s opin io ns should be given great weight. M artinez v. Chater , 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Greenspan v. Shalala , 38 F.3d 232, 237 ( 5th Cir. 1994)). Also , “[a] treating physician’s opinio n on the nature and severity of a patient’s impairment will be given controlling weight if it is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and labo ratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence.’” I

d. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).
We have disting uished, however, between the weight given to a treating physician’s medical opinio n on th e nature and severity of an impairment and his opinio n on whether the patient is disabled and cannot work. We do not require th at an ALJ jus ti fy a decision to give lit tle weight to a physician’s opinio n th at a patient is disabled or unable to work, because such decis io ns are reserved for the Commissio ner. Frank v. Barnhart , 326 F.3d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 2003). An ALJ need not give special weight to treating physicians’ opinions if they have no special significance. “Among the opinio ns by treating doctors th at have no3

special significance are determ inat io ns th at an applicant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work.’ 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). These determinations are legal conclusions th at the regulation describes as ‘reserved to the Com missio ner.’” Id.
The ALJ gave l

it tle weight to Marable’s opinio ns th at Miller was disabled and unable to work 

### SS the two opini ons th at Frank states have no speci al significance and need not be given any weight. The ALJ specifically explained th at he gave lit tle weight to Marable’s opinio n “t hat the claimant is disabled” and th at “t he claimant is unable to engage in any work activit y. ” Because Frank makes plain that an ALJ need not give special weight to conclusio ns about disabilit y or abilit y to work, th e ALJ did not err. Even if Marable’s opinio ns were supported by substantial evidence, as Miller stresses, the ALJ was not requi red to give them special weight.
Miller’s argument th at she was preju diced becau se the ALJ looked to evidence outside the record to reject Marable’s opinion on disabilit y also fails. Even if the ALJ considered an extrajudicial source, the con sideration did
n ot result in a decision on the merit s on th at basis, because the ALJ was not required to give Marable’s opinion about Miller’s disabilit y any special weight and because disabilit y is an issue reserved fo r the Com missio ner to decide. 1 Whether Miller was disabled was never Marable’s question to answer. 2
AFFIRMED.

1 United States v. Grinnell Corp. , 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (“The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial
source and result in an opinion on the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”). 2 Miller cites Oshkeshequoam v. Barnhart , 274 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (C.D. Ill. 2003), to support her contention that she was improperly prejudiced
as a re sult of the ALJ’s bias. That court, however, did not hold that an ALJ’s bias improperly prejudices an applicant. The court rejected the ALJ’s finding that a treating physician was biased SS it did
no t even involve an ALJ’s being biased. S ee id. (“ALJ Welsch reiterates ALJ Lipe’s statement that Dr. Mack should not be found to be credible because he ‘tries to give his patients a break.’ However, there is no evidence in the record that Dr

. Mack is biased in favor of Plaintiff, other than the fact that Dr. Mack has concluded upon his extensive, long-care treatment of Plaintiff that she is disabled.”).