RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 18a0014p.06 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

L IBERTY C OINS , LLC; J OHN M ICHAEL T OMASO ; W ORTHINGTON J EWELERS , LTD.; R OBERT C APACE , Plaintiffs-Appellees ,

v

.
D AVID G OODMAN , et al., Defendants , J ACQUELINE T. W ILLIAMS , in her official capacity as Director, Ohio Department of Commerce; A MANDA M C C ARTNEY , in her official capacity as Consumer Finance Attorney of Division of Financial Institutions, Ohio Department of Commerce, Defendants-Appellants

. ┐ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ │ ┘ No. 16-3735

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus. No. 2:12-cv-00998—Michael H. Watson, District Judge. Argued: June 22, 2017 Decided and Filed: January 22, 2018
Before: SILER, McKEAGUE, WHITE, Circuit Judges.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jennifer S. M. Croskey, OFFICE OF THE OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Maurice A. Thompson, 1851 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jennifer S. M. Croskey, Keith O’Korn, OFFICE OF THE OH IO ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants. Maurice A. Thompson, 1851 CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Columbus, Ohio, Curt C. Hartman, THE LAW FIRM OF CURT C. HA RTMAN, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees. 

### >No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 2

_________________ OPINION

_________________ McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Libe rty Coins, LLC, and Worthington Jewelers, Ltd., bring facial and as-applie d Fourth Amendment challenges to four warrantless search provisions in Ohio’s Precious Metals Dealer s Act and the accompanying regulations: O.R.C. §§ 4728.05(A), 4728.06, 4728.07, and Ohio Admin. Code § 1301:8-6-03(D). These laws equip state agents and local law enforcem ent with the authority to inspec t certain records, articles, and information kept by precious metals dealers without first obtaining a warrant. The district court held that these warrantless search provisions we re unreasonable and unconstitutional on their face, and therefore did not address plaintiffs’ as-applied claims.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part . We agree with the
district court that the warrantle ss searches authorized by O.R.C. § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Admin. Code § 1301:8-6-03(D) are facially unconstitutional. These search provisions are not necessary to furthering the state’s interest in recovering stolen jewelry and coins nor do they serve as adequate warrant substitut es because they are overly broad in scope. However, we reverse the district court’s ruling as to §§ 4728.06 and 472 8.07 because we conclude that the warrantless searches provided for in these subsections are facially constitutional. Further, we dismiss plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07 as not ripe.

I
We first provide a brief overview of the Precious Metals Dealers Act before turning to the facts of this appeal.

A. Precious Metals Dealers Act
For over a century, Ohio indire ctly regulated precious meta ls dealers through statutes governing pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers. See generally R. 14-1 (compiling the legislative history of these various laws). As prices for gold and silver increased, the state found that such dealers provided easy av enues for thieves to re-sell and profit from stolen jewelry andNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 3

coins. See Appellant Br. at 31; R. 23-3, Exh. DXD at 4, PID 369. Therefore, in 1987, the Ohio General Assembly sought to impose stricter standards on them through the passage of the Precious Metals Dealers Act (PMDA). The Act defi nes a “precious metals dealer” as any person who “holds himself, herself, or itself out to the public” as being “engaged in the business of purchasing articles made of or containing gold, silver, platinum, or other precious metals or jewels . . . .” O.R.C. § 4728.01(A). The Act task s the Division of Financial Institutions within Ohio’s Department of Commerce with ge neral enforcement responsibility. § 4728.10.
The PMDA requires every dealer in preciou s metals to first apply for and obtain a license. § 4728.02(A). The state co nducts investigations of all applicants and ha s the power to issue licenses “to any person of good character, having experience and f itness in the capacity involved, who demonstrates a net worth of at least ten thousand dollars and the ability to maintain that net worth during the licensure period.” § 4728.03(B )(1). Prospective licensees must pay a $200 investigation fee and, upon being licensed, an annual renewal fee as well. § 4728.03(C)–(D). Licensees are re quired to post, in a “conspic uous place” at their business location, (1) their license and (2) a statement that they have no right to retain stolen goods. § 4728.04(A)–(B). Certain businesses are exempt fr om licensure, for example, jewelry stores whose monthly precious metals purchases repres ent less than 25% of their total inventory and shops that buy coins as “numismatic objects, and not for their content as precious metals.” See,

e.g. , § 4728.11(E)–(F). However, even these ex empt businesses are subject to certain requirements under the Act. See § 4728.12.
Beyond licensure, the PMDA also imposes r ecordkeeping requirements and provides state agents and local police with power to search the records and businesses of dealers without a
warrant. The four sections of the PMDA that au thorize warrantless searches form the heart of this appeal. The first challenge d provision, § 4728.05(A), provides th e state with the authority to “investigate the business” of both licensees and non-licensees who d eal in precious metals “and for that purpose” provides it with “free access to the books and papers thereof and other sources of information with regard to the[ir] business[es]. ” Even though it allows officials to look at this information without a warrant, § 4728.05 also arms the state w ith administra tive powers toNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 4

effectuate compliance, including the power to compel, issue subpoe nas, and apply to the court for an order, injunction, or te mporary restraining order. See, e.g. , § 4728.05(B)(5).
Section 4728.06—the second provision at issu e—requires licensees to maintain books and records in a form approved by the state. The records must include a detailed description of all precious metals purchased as well as iden tifying information about the seller. This information must be kept at the licensed location “open to the inspection of the superintendent or
chief of or head of the local police department . . . .” Sect ion 4728.06 also requires licensees, “upon demand,” to show authorities any precious me tal within their possession that is listed in
these records. Id.
Similarly, § 4728.07—the third provis ion at issue in this case—r equires licensees to keep separate records for the benefit of local police departments. Specifically , this section mandates that licensees keep “on forms furnished by the police department, a desc ription of all articles
received” and make these forms availa ble to the police “every business day.”
The fourth and final challeng ed provision is a regulation promulgated pursuant to the PMDA, which elaborates on licensees’ recordkeep ing duties and advises them how to comply with state inspections. This regulation, Ohio Administrative Code § 1301:8-6-03(D), contemplates that the state shal l have the authority to inspect “at all times” the “books, forms, and records, and all other sources of information with regard to the business of the licensee” in
order to ensure “that the business of the license e is being transacted inaccordance with law.” This regulation also requires licensees to main tain their records and i nventory at the licensed
location.

In addition to these four sections authorizi ng warrantless searches, several other sections of the PMDA are pertinent to th is appeal. Section 4728.09(A) prohi bits licensees from either reselling or altering the form of any article purchased for at leas t five days. This holding period can be extended to thirty days if the police have “probable cause” to believe that an article within a licensee’s possession is stolen property. § 4728.09(B). The PMDA also provides for a
criminal enforcement scheme. Section 4728.10 re quires state agents to “make all reasonableNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 5

efforts to discover alleged violators” of the Ac t and to “notify the proper prosecuting officer.” Section 4728.99, in turn, imposes crimin al penalties for violations.
B. Factual Background
Liberty Coins, LLC, is a coin shop, located in Delaware County, Ohio, that buys and sells various forms of gold and silver. R. 72, Amen ded Compl. ¶¶ 5–6, PID 826. It is owned by John
Michael Tomaso. Id. ¶ 6, PID 826. Although it admits that it “holds itself out to the public” as a precious metals dealer, Liberty Coins does not have a PMDA license. R. 26, TRO Tr. at 91, 110, PID 564, 583. In August 2010, the state got wind of that fact and sent out an inspector to investigate. R. 26, TRO Tr. at 54–55, PID 526–27. The inspector spoke with Tomaso and left forms for him to complete so that the state co uld determine whether Liberty Coins was eligible for an exemption from licensure. Id. at 71–72, PID 543–45. The inspecto r did not request to see any business records during his visit to Liberty Coins. Id. at 74, PID 547. After Tomaso failed to complete the necessary forms, the state sent a letter requiring him to “produce business records to demonstrate the amount of precious meta ls [it had] purchased from the public over the last twelve (12) months.” R. 23-1, Exh. JXI at 1, PID 339.
Tomaso never responded to the state’s inquiries, and Liberty Coins never applied for a PMDA license. Instead, they filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various Ohio Department
of Commerce officials. R. 1, Verified Compl. ¶¶ 11–12, PID 4–5. They sought de claratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the PMDA was facially invalid under the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶ 1, PID 2. The district court granted a preliminary injunction to Tomaso and Liberty Coins on their First Amendmen t claim, prohibiting the state from enforcing the PMDA because it placed an impermissible bur den on commercial speech, i.e., the ability to advertise one’s willingne ss to buy precious metals. Liberty Coins, LLC v. Goodman , 977 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792 (S.D. Ohio 2012). A panel of this court reversed. 748 F.3d 682 (6th Cir. 2014).
On remand, Liberty Coins and To maso added Worthington Jewe lers, an “upscale jewelry store and bridal boutique” located in Worthington, Ohio, and its owner, Robert Capace, as plaintiffs. R. 72, Amended Compl. ¶¶ 8–11, PID 826; Appellee Br. at 7. Unlike Liberty Coins,No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 6

Worthington Jewelers was licensed under the PM DA at the time this amended complaint was filed. R. 72, Amended Compl. ¶ 54, PID 833. That license has since lapsed, and Worthington Jewelers spent several years ope rating without a license before obtaining another one on October 26, 2015. R. 98-1, Capace Decl. ¶ 2, PID 1141. Under the Act, that license expired on June 30, 2017, see § 4728.03(D), and it is unclear whether Worthington Je welers sought renewal.
In their amended complaint, Tomaso, Libe rty Coin, Worthington Jewelers, and Capace again sought various forms of constitutional relief, but their Fourth Amendment claim is the only one pertinent to this appeal. Specifically, they alleged that four secti ons of the PMDA—O.R.C. §§ 4728.05(A), 4728.06, and 4728.07 and Ohio Administra tive Code § 1301:8-6-03—authorized
warrantless searches that were unconstitutional unde r the Fourth Amendment “[e]ither facial[ly] or as-applied.” R. 72, Ame nded Compl. ¶ 160, PID 846; see generally id. ¶¶ 139–60, PID 844– 46. Several dispositive motions we re then filed with re gards to this claim: The state filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, R. 77, Mot. to Dismiss at 1, PID 859, and both the plaintiffs and the state filed motions for summary judgment, see R. 98, Plaintiff Mot. for SJ at 22, PID 1124; R. 103, State Mot. for SJ at 3, PID 1151.
The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and denied both of the state’s motions. It agreed that the warrantless sear ches authorized by the PMDA were facially unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement. R. 113, Op. and Order at 35, PID 1433. The district court based its ruling primarily on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in City of Los Angeles v. Patel , 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015). See id. at 1, 21–32, PID 1399, 1419–30. First, it concluded that the PMDA search provisions “suffer[ed] from the same constitutional deficiencies as” the Los Angeles ordinan ce that the Supreme Court struck down in Patel : they offered no opportunity for dealers to seek “neu tral, precompliance review” before being faced with either refusing to submit to a sear ch or being charged with a crime. Id. at 26, PID 1424. Moreover, the district court held that even if these businesses were entitled to a reduced expectation of privacy b ecause they were “closely regulated,” the statutory pr ovisions were still unconstitutional under the three-part test governi ng warrantless searches of those industries. Id. at 28–32, PID 1426–30. The district court did not explicitly discuss plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges. This appeal followed. After oral ar gument, the parties submitted a joint brief, at theNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 7

panel’s request, which explicitly delineated the stat utory language that plaintiffs have challenged
as unconstitutional.

II
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreas onable searches and seizures.” U.S. C ONST . amend. IV. A search is generally unrea sonable if it is no t conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause. Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of San Francisco , 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967). This general rule “applies to co mmercial premises as well as homes,” Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978), and protects busin ess owners’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their commercial property, New York v. Burger , 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987) (citing Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Har lan, J., concurring)).
There are, however, exceptions to this warrant requirement. When a search is conducted for a “special need” other than to investigate criminal wrongdoi ng, the probable-cause standard is modified. For example, when a search is conducted pursuant to an administrative regime, the government need only make a lesser showing th at a search is in accord with “reasonable legislative or administrative standards.” Camara , 387 U.S. at 538. For an administrative-search scheme to be constitutional, it generally must o ffer the subject of the s earch an opportunity to seek precompliance review of the request by a ne utral decisionmaker prior to the imposition of criminal penalties. See Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2452–53.
The tempered reasonableness standard governing administrative searches is relaxed even further for searches of businesses in “closely regulated” industries. Id. at 2454

. No warrant or opportunity for precompliance re view may be required at a ll for searches conducted of
businesses in these industries si nce they are already subject to extensive government oversight and accordingly possess reduced privacy interests. See Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. at 313 (recognizing that “[c]ertain industries have su ch a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise”) (internal citation omitted).No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 8

Nevertheless, even warrantless searches of bus inesses in closely regul ated industries must meet three criteria, as delineated by the Supreme Court in New York v. Burger , in order to be deemed reasonable, and thus constitutional, under the Fourth Amendment: (1) “there must be a ‘substantial’ government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made”; (2) “the warrantless inspecti ons must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme”; and (3) “the statute’s in spection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.” Burger , 482 U.S. at 702–03 (internal quotations omitted; brackets removed) (the “ Burger test”). When the government seeks to impose a penalty for failure to comply with a warra ntless inspection, it is the government’s burden to establ ish that the warrantless search fits within this exception. McLaughlin v. Kings Island , 849 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1998).
Lastly, plaintiffs lodging Fourth Amendment challenges to statutes may bring either facial or as-applied challenges. Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2449. “A facial challenge is anattack on the statute itself,” and while more difficult to “mo unt successfully” than challenges to particular applications of a statute, the S upreme Court recently clarified that these types of challenges “are not categorically barred or especially disfavored.” Id.
A. The PMDA does not provide dealers the opportunity to seek precompliance review. The warrantless searches in question are authorized by the PMDA for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the Act, which the state be lieves will allow it to retrieve stolen jewelry and coins and both deter criminals from selling th ese items to licensed dealers and prevent their resale back into the marketplace. Given this “special need,” the question is whether the PMDA warrantless search provisions are constitutiona l under the administrative search doctrine. Answering this ultimate question involves answ ering two sub-questions: (1) Does the PMDA give dealers the chance to seek precompliance revi ew, that is, to challenge a warrantless search request prior to being criminally sanctioned?; and (2) if not, is precious metals dealing a closely regulated industry, and, if so, is Burger ’s three-part test satisfied?

The answer to the first of these sub-questions is no. City of Los Angeles v. Patel governs our analysis. Patelinvolved a Los Angeles c ity ordinance that required hotel operators to makeNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 9

their guest registries open to warrantless inspections by local police. Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2447. A failure to do so was punishable by up to six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. Id. at 2448. A group of hotel operators argued that this ordinance was faci ally invalid under the Fourth Amendment, and five Justices of the Supreme Court agreed. Id. Since hotels were not a closely regulated industry, the ordinance was unconstituti onal because it “penali ze[d] [operators] for declining to turn over their records without af fording them any opportunity for precompliance
review.” Id. at 2247.
The PMDA is indistinguishable from Patelwith regards to its lack of precompliance review. Like the Los Angeles city ordina nce, the challenged PMDA provisions authorize warrantless searches of the books, records, articl es, and other items pertaining to the businesses of precious metals dealers. And while the PMDA does provide in spectors with process-based, civil remedies to secure compliance with a warrantless search request, see, e.g. , § 4728.05(B)– (E), the statute simultaneously allows for the po ssibility of criminal pe nalties. Section 4728.99 provides that dealers who oppose a search could be “guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree on a first offense,” and in Ohio, a first-degree mi sdemeanor carries up to 180 days in jail, O.R.C. § 2929.24(A)(1). As the Supreme Court said in Patel , business owners cannot be forced to choose between being “arrested on the spot” an d standing on their Fourth Amendment rights.
Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2452.
The state argues that division of finance offici als do not have the power to bring criminal actions, and thus the threat of criminal penalties is illusory. But the statute requires these regulators to “notify the proper pr osecuting officer whenever [the y] ha[ve] reasonable grounds to believe that a violation has occurred.” § 4728.10. Moreover, police may accompany officials on any search, and in some cases, they have the authority to conduct the searches themselves. See,

e.g. , § 4728.06–07. Therefore, despite th e state’s assurance that “[t] here is no ev idence in the record of anyone having been arre sted or threatened with arrest,” Appellant Br. at 42, the statute clearly contemplates this possi bility, making it no different than the ordinance at issue in Patel

. Thus, we turn to the second sub-question. In order for the PMDA warrantless search provisions to withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny, precious metals dealing must be considered a “closely regulated industry” and the search es the PMDA calls for must meet Burger ’s three-part test.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 10

B. Precious metals dealing is a closely regulated industry.
In determining whether an industry is closely regulated, we consider (1) “the pervasiveness and regularity” of regulations governing an industry; (2) “the duration of a particular regulatory scheme”; and (3) whether other states have imposed similarly extensive regulatory requirements. Burger , 482 U.S. at 701, 705. Most recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated that closely regulated industries are the “exception,” and suggested that businesses operating within these industries al l “pose[] a clear and significant risk to the public welfare.”
Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2454–55. The Court has identified four closely regulated industries: (1) liquor sales ( Colonnade Corp. v. United States , 397 U.S. 72 (1970)); (2) gun sales ( United
States v. Biswell , 406 U.S. 311 (1972)); (3) mining ( Donovan v. Dewey , 452 U.S. 594 (1981)); and (4) automobile junkyards ( Burger , 482 U.S. 691). It has conc luded that hotels are not closely regulated ( Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2443) and also reject ed giving “all businesses involved in interstate commerce” this label ( Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. 307).
The Sixth Circuit has categorized pharmacies ( United States v. Acklen , 690 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1982)) and the sand and gravel industry (Mashall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co. , 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979)) as closely re gulated, but not bee apiaries ( Allinder v. Ohio , 808 F.2d 1180 (6th Cir. 1987). The Fourth Circuit and the MichiganCourt of Appeals have found precious metals dealing to fit within this category of businesses. See Gallaher v. City of Huntington , 759 F.2d 1155 (4th Cir. 1985); see also People v. Pashigian , 388 N.W.2d 259 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam).
The state argues that precious metals deali ng is analogous to running an automobile junkyard, so it qualifies as a closely regulated industry under Burger and its progeny. Plaintiffs refute this association, arguing that Patel significantly narrowed the test for closely regulated industries and that, just as hotels are not closely regulat ed, neither are precious metals dealers. We agree with the state. Because we find no meaningful difference between the regulatory
scheme at issue in Burger and the one here, notwithstanding the Court’s recent decision in Patel , we conclude that precious metals dea ling is a closely re gulated industry.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 11

First, the regulations governing precious meta ls dealers are sufficiently pervasive. In fact, they are nearly id entical to those the Supreme Court deemed “extensive” in Burger

. 482 U.S. at 703–04. There, the Court recognized the numerous obligations placed on junkyard owners: to obtain a license, wh ich meant meeting certain requi rements and paying a fee; to maintain a “police book” containing a record of each car or part bought and sold; to make this book available for inspection “by the police or any agent of the Department of Motor Vehicles”; and to display their registration numbers at their businesses and on all vehicle parts. See id. at 704–05. Automobile junkyard owners were also subj ect to civil and criminal penalties and loss of licensure for failing to comply with the state statute. Id.
Indistinguishably, the PMDA requires busine ss owners to obtain a license by meeting delineated criteria and paying a fee (§ 4728.02–03); to “keep and us e books and forms” detailing information about the precious metals they purchase (§ 4728.06–.07); to make their records—as well as their businesses more generally—open to inspection by the superintendent of financial
institutions or the lo cal police department ( id. ; see also § 4728.05(A); Ohio Admin. Code § 1301:8-6-03(D)); and to display their license “in a conspicuous place in the office where business is transacted” (§ 4728.04(A)). Precious metals dealers also face comparable penalties for violating the PMDA (§§ 4728.05(B)–(E); 4728.99).
These requirements are more comprehensive than those applicable to the hotel industry in
Patel . For example, while the licensing requiremen t there carried little weight since “[a]ll businesses in Los Angeles need a license to operate,” Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2455, the PMDA’s licensing requirements are carefu lly tailored to precious metals dealers specifically. See, e.g. , § 4728.03(A) and (B) (requiring dealer s to have “sufficient . . . e xperience in the business of precious metals” and to demonstrate “a net worth of at least ten thousand dollars”). Additionally, in Patel , many of the hotel regulations relied upon by the state were applicable to a
broader subset of businesses—su ch as all rental properties—while the PMDA is a self-contained statute applying solely to businesse s dealing in precious metals. See id. at 2455. This makes precious metals dealers accountable to a whole host of laws above and beyond those applicable to all businesses, such as the minimum wage and maximum hour laws that the Court foundNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 12

insufficient to render an i ndustry “closely regulated” in Patel

. Cf. id. (citing Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. at 314).
Second, the history of regulation governing precious metals dealers and automobile junkyards stems from a common origin. In Burger , while the Court noted that “automobile junkyards and vehicle dismantlers ha[d] not been in existence very long” at that time, these businesses were “simply [] new branch[es] of anindustry that ha[d] ex isted, and ha[d] been closely regulated, for many years”—the secondhand shop or general junkyard. Id. at 706 (recognizing that “[b]oth share the purpose of recycling salvageable articles and components of items no longer usable in their original form”). Since automobile junkyards were simply a subset of an industry historically subject to close re gulation, these business owners were thus on notice that they were subject to careful government oversight. See id. at 706–07 (noting that junk shop
laws had been on the books “f or at least 140 years”); see also Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2455 (emphasizing that closely regulat ed industries are those that put business owners “on notice that their ‘property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes’” (quoting Burger , 482 U.S. at 705 n.16)).
Ohio has regulated precious metals even l onger than New York had regulated automobile junkyards at the time Burger was decided. The New York law ha d only been in effect for seven years at the time Burger was decided, yet the first iteration of the PMDA went into effect in 1987, more than thirty years ago. Moreover, just like automob ile junkyard owners had been governed by more universal laws pertai ning to general junkyards and secondhand goods, Burger , 482 U.S. at 706, precious metals d ealers, too, were previouslysubject to regulation under pawnbroker and secondhand d ealing statutes since 1863. See, e.g. , R. 14-1, Appendix to Leg. Hist. at 3–4, PID 196–97. These old laws subjecte d dealers to periodic searches as well. Id. at 3, PID 197 (requiring pawnbrokers to “keep a correct list and description in a book” of all items bought and sold which “shall at al l times be open to the inspection of the chief of police”); cf.
Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2455–56 (d iscounting historical laws requiri ng hotels to provide suitable lodging because they did little to inform owners that they could one day be subject to warrantless search). Like automobile junkyards analogized to the general junk shop, precious metals dealing is “simply a new branch” of the age-old pawnbroker tree. Burger , 482 U.S. at 706.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 13

Third, and relevant to the que stion of close regulation, Ohio has provided evidence that many other states also regulate precious metals dealers. Id. at 698 n.11, 705 (noting that “other States besides New York [that] have imposed similarly extensive regulations on automobile junkyards,” which “further support[ed] the ‘closely regulated’ status of [that] industry”). As Ohio points out, more than thirty other st ates have laws on their books governing either pawnbrokers and secondhand dealers more genera lly, or precious metals dealers specifically. See, e.g. , A LA

. C ODE 1975 § 8-34-3; G A

. C ODE A NN . § 43-37-1 et seq. ; M ICH

. C OMP

. L AWS § 445.481 et seq. In sum, Burger fully supports the conc lusion that precious metals dealing is a closely regulated industry.
Plaintiffs argue that Patel forecloses this result by limiting the businesses that may qualify as closely regulated to only those that are “ultra-hazar dous.” Appellee Br. at 13. We disagree. While Patel undoubtedly clarified the application of Burger , we do not read Patelas narrowly as plaintiffs suggest. Patel simply recognized that the industries the Court had deemed closely regulated in the past —liquor, firearms, mining, and automobile junkyards—all involved “a clear and significant risk to the public welfare” and were “intrinsically dangerous.” Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2444–45 & n.5. For example, the Court acknowledged that, unlike hotels, automobile junkyards met these standards because they “provide [d] the major market for stolen vehicles and vehicle parts.” Id. (quoting Burger , 482 U.S. at 709). Precious meta ls dealing, too, presents an analogous danger because it provides thieves with a marketplace by which to sell stolen articles made of precious metals. See, e.g. , R. 23-3, Exh. DXD at 4, PID 369. A finding that precious metals dealing is closely regulated is therefore in line with Patel. The pervasiveness of the PMDA’s regulatory scheme, the history of laws governing precious metals dealers specifically and pawnbrokers more generally, and the analogous laws in other st ates, all suggest that precious metals dealing, like running anautomobile junkyard, is a closely regulated industry.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 14

C. Under Burger’s 3-part test governing warrantless searches of closely regulated industries, the searches contemplated by O.R.C. § 4728.05(A) 1 and Ohio Administrative Code § 1301:8-6- 03(D) are unconstitutional on their face, but those in O.R.C. §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07 withstand plaintiffs’ facial challenge.

Both parties concede that the state has a substantial interest in regulating precious metals.
See Appellant Br. at 31; Appellee Br. at 26. Th erefore, only the latter two parts of the Burger test—whether the warrantless searches are necessary to further the state’s proffered interests and whether the statutory provisions serve as adequate warrant substitutes—are at issue. First, warrantless searches are necessary if “a warrant requirement could si gnificantly frustrate
effective enforcement of the Act.” Dewey , 452 U.S. at 603. This may be the case when the objects of a search lend themselves to easy concealment or alteration, making “unannounced, even frequent, inspections [] essential.” Biswell , 406 U.S. at 316. For example, in Dewey , the
Court determined that warrantless searches of mi nes were necessary due to the “notorious ease with which many safety or healthhazards may be concealed if a dvance warning of inspection is obtained.” 452 U.S. at 603 (quoting S. R EP . 95-181 at 27 (1977)).
Warrantless searches might also be necessaryif the search objects are likely to change hands quickly or if unannounced inspections will otherwise constrain the market in illicit goods. For example, in Burger , state officials professe d the need to conduct impromptu inspections of automobile junkyards in order to identify st olen items before they were resold. Burger , 482 U.S. at 710. The Burger Court sanctioned warrantless searches for this purpose because “stolen cars and parts often pass quickly through an autom obile junkyard,” so “frequent” and “unannounced” inspections were necessary to detect them. Id. The Court also credited the state’s belief that, by “controlling the receiver” of stol en property, i.e., the junkyard owners, thieves would be less
inclined to unload their stolen merchandise wi th these individuals, thereby deterring theft. Id. at 709. Lastly, the Supreme Court has cautioned that simply seeking to prevent falsification of records or looking to avoid administrative burden s will not be sufficient to conduct a warrantless
search. Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2456.

1 To the extent the district court’s order enjoin ed the state from enforc ing all of § 4728.05, see R. 113, Opinion and Order at 35, PID 1433, both parties acknowledge that this was a scrivener’s error and that the warrantless search language contained in part (A) is the only portion of that subsection being challenged.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 15

Beyond the necessity requirement, a statute’s in spection program must also, “in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application,” serve as a “constitutionally adequate substitute for
a warrant.” Burger , 482 U.S. at 702 (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). This means a statute must do two things. It must be “suffi ciently comprehensive” so that businesses are on notice that they will be subject to periodi c searches of a properly defined scope. Id

. Additionally, it must constrain the discretion of an inspecting officer by being “carefully limited in time, place, and scope.” Id. Searches that are “so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real e xpectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials” will not be permitted. Dewey , 452 U.S. at 599.

In Dewey , the Supreme Court upheld an inspection regime that required searches of all
surface mines “at least twice an nually” and of all underground mines “at least four times annually,” and also mandated routine follow- up searches when violations were found. Id. at 604. And in Burger , New York’s law passed muster because it provided for inspections on a “regular basis,” and only “during [] regul ar and usual business hours.” Burger , 482 U.S. at 694 n.1, 711. But in Patel , the City of Los Angeles st atute was more open-ended, si mply requiring that hotel guest records “shall be made available,” with the only cav eat that “[w]hene ver possible, the inspection shall be conducted at a time and in a manner that minimizes interference with the operation of the business.” Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2448. The Supreme Court found this to be
deficient. Id. at 2456.

1. Sections 4728.06 and 4728.07
Given this precedent, we think that th e warrantless searches authorized by §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07 satisfy the latter two parts of the Burger test. We address these two provisions first because we believe that, unlike the others, they are narrowly tailored to address the state’s proffered need to curb the market in stolen precious metals.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 16

a. Necessity
Section 4728.07 requires licensees to detail, on police-approved forms, a description of all precious metals purchased, and to make these forms available to the police each business day. That section, being challenged in it s entirety, is reproduced below:
Each person licensed under Chapter 4728. of the Revised Code, shall, every business day, make available to the ch ief or the head of the local police department, on forms furnished by the police department, a description of all articles received by the licensee on the business day immediately preceding, together with the number of the receipt issued. Providing the police access to this informa tion without having to obtain a warrant
furthers the state’s interest in tracking down stolen items containing precious metals and returning them to their lawful owners. 2 See Appellant Br. at 16, 34. Police will be able to crossreference the lists of items purchased by dealers w ith reports of stolen coins, rings, or other precious metals. It is important for police to have access to these forms quickly in order to
recover stolen items before a d ealer melts the precious metal into another form, thus making it unidentifiable, or resells it back into th e marketplace, making it difficult to trace. See Burger , 482 U.S. at 710; Dewey , 452 U.S. at 602–03.
Should the report of a missing ring, for example, match the description of a ring recently purchased by a precious meta ls dealer in the area, § 4728.06 works in tandem with § 4728.07 to allow the state or local police to quickly view th e object as well as information about the seller:
Every person licensed under this chapter shall keep and use books and forms approved by the superintendent of financia l institutions, which shall disclose, at the time of each purchase, a full and accurate description including identifying letters or marks thereon of the articles purchased, with the na me, age, place of residence, driver’s or commercial dr iver’s license number or other personal identification, and a short physical descrip tion of the person of the seller. The licensee also shall write in the book the name of the maker. The licensee shall keep the books in numerical order at all times at the licensed location, open to the inspection of the superintendent or ch ief of or head of the local police department, a police officer deputed by the chief or head of police, or the

2 In the Joint Submission of the parties filed after oral argument, the state asked us to uphold this provision as a mere reporting requirement, rath er than as authorizing warrantless s earches. We need not address this argument, however, because we find that § 4728.07 is co nstitutional even if construe d as a search provision.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 17

chief executive officer of the political subdivision thereof. Upon demand of any of these officials, the licensee sh all produce and show an article thus listed and described which is in the licensee’s possession

. 3
If the ring bought by the dealer indeed appears to be the stolen item, th e dealer will then be required under the PMDA to return it to its rightful owner, see § 4728.04(B), and law enforcement will have a lead on the thief, th ereby furthering the state’s interests.

Like in Burger , warrantless searches of the articles themselves, as provided for in § 4728.06, are necessary given the fluid and trans itory nature of articl es made of precious
metals. Burger , 482 U.S. at 710. Although § 4728.09(A)–( B) of the PMDA require precious metals dealers to retain all purchased articles fo r five days, increased to thirty if police have probable cause to suspect an item is stolen, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where these moratoriums would be insufficient to compensate for the police’s need to obtain a warrant. For example, if the police do not beco me aware of a stolen item or match it with a dealer’s records until more than thirty days from the time it was initially sold, the Act’s holding periods do no work. In these situations, in order for the police to identify and recover a st olen item before it is altered or resold, the flexib ility to conduct “unannounced” inspections may very well be
“essential.” Biswell , 406 U.S. at 316.
Moreover, it is rational for the state to belie ve that warrantless searches of a licensee’s purchasing records are necessary to (1) deter thieves from stealing precious metals in the first place because their chances of cashing out w ithout suspicion would be diminished; and (2) prompt dealers themselves to be more vi gilant in the purchases that they make. See Burger , 482 U.S. at 709. And these interests are suff iciently weighty to pass Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g. , Biswell , 406 U.S. at 315–16 (finding warra ntless inspection of weapons dealers “crucial” to the regulatory scheme sin ce it ensured “weapons [wer e] distributed through regular channels and in a traceable manner and ma[de] possible the prev ention of sales to
undesirable customers and the detection of the origin of particular firearms”); see also Exotic

3 Only the bolded language in § 4728.06 is being challenged by plaintiffs as facially unconstitutional. Similarly, the plaintiffs only lodge challenges to portions of § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code § 1301:8- 6-03(D). These two sections are reproduced later in the opinion, and once again, the bolded language denotes the parts of those provisions that are in dispute.No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 18

Coins, Inc. v. Beacom , 699 P.2d 930, 940–42 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (upholding parts of
Colorado’s Purchasers of Valuable Articles Act and noting that im posing record-keeping requirements on the purchasers of precious metals w ould curb “illicit traffic in stolen valuable articles”).
The state’s professed needs in this case are distinguishable from the one the Supreme Court deemed inadequate in Patel . There, Los Angeles claimed that warrantless searches of hotel registries were necessary to prevent operators from falsifying their records. Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2456. The Court explained that the city could prevent th is risk without resorting to warrantless searches by, for example, obtaining an ex parte warrant or by “guarding the registry” while an administrative warrant is challenged. Id. Here, in contrast, th e state’s underlying needs as to §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07 relate not to ensuring th e correctness of records, but to deterring both sellers and purchasers alike from engaging in suspect transactions involving precious metals. We conclude that these provisions are more akin to those at issue in Burger and its progeny in this respect and therefore sa tisfy the necessity requirement.
b. Constitutionally Adequate Substitute
Additionally, § 4728.06 and § 4728.07 serve as constitutio nally adequate warrant substitutes. First, they apply only to licensed precious metals dealers who have chosen to enter this closely regulated industry. Second, they carefully limit the sc ope of the warrantless searches to only a narrow subset of information—purchasing records and the precious metals themselves. The statutes upheld in Burger and Biswell were analogous in this respect. Burger , 482 U.S. at 711 (permitting warrantless searches of the re cords and car parts of automobile junkyards);
Biswell , 406 U.S. at 312 n.1 (same as to the reco rds and inventory of gun dealers). This delineated scope notifies inspectors of the parameters of the permitted search, Burger , 482 U.S. at 711, and ensures that “[t]he deal er is not left to wonder about th e purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task,” Biswell , 406 U.S. at 316. Third, § 4728.07 sp ecifies that licensees may be required to provide a descriptio n of all precious metals purchas ed each business day. Fourth, § 4728.06 ensures that searches pr ovided for in that provision will take place only “at the
licensed location.”No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 19

Furthermore, we do not think that the abse nce of a specific temporal limitation on searches in § 4728.06 is fatal to that subsection’s constitutional ity. While express limits on the number of searches are “a factor in an analysis of the adequacy of a particular statute,” their absence is not determinative “so long as the statute, as a whole, places adequate limits upon the discretion of the inspecting officers.” Burger , 482 U.S. at 711 n.21. In both Dewey and Biswell , the Supreme Court upheld statutes that, like here, neither expressly fixed the number of inspections within a particular time period, nor were expressl y cabined to business hours. Dewey , 452 U.S. at 596–97 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 813); Burger , 482 U.S. at 691 n. 21 (citing
Biswell , 406 U.S. at 312 n.1).
When § 4728.06 is read in conjunction with § 4728.07 and other PMDA provisions, we believe the statute “establishes a predictabl e and guided . . . regul atory presence.” Dewey , 452 U.S. at 604. Section 4728.07’s requirement that licensees make their purchasing records available daily puts licensees on notice that they may be subject to frequent related searches, such as those in § 4728.06, which provide in spectors with access to only minimally more
information. See Exotic Coins, Inc. , 699 P.2d at 942 (noting that warr antless searches of records, “[w]hen viewed as an adjunct to the weekly reporting requirement . . . [were] unlikely to be so random, infrequent, or unpredictabl e that a legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents will arise” (citing Dewey , 452 U.S. at 598–99)). Moreover, under § 4728.06, licensees are aware that they must keep records in the first place, and under § 4728.09, that they must hold precious metals for certain periods of time. Since licensees know they must comply with these subsections, they are likewise on notice that such information may be subject to periodic search. This is part of the cost of doing bu siness in a closely regulated industry. Biswell , 406 U.S. at 316; cf. Hall v. Sweet , 666 F. App’x 469, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2016).

In the absence of ev idence that the state or the pol ice are conducting searches of licensees’ records and inventory under § 4728.06 in an unreasonabl e manner, we cannot say that this subsection is unconstitutional simply because it fails to use the magic words that searches may be conducted, for example, only at “reasonable times,” Biswell , 406 U.S. at 319 n.1, or on “a regular basis,” Burger , 482 U.S. at 711. These phrases offer little true notice as to when a business owner might be subject to search. To th e contrary, the narrow scope of the searches, theNo. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 20

temporal language in § 4728.07, and the limitation on the place where searches may take place, coupled with the PMDA’s other detailed requirements, on ba lance offset the warrantless intrusions provided for by §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07.

2. Section 4728.05(A) and Ohio Admi nistrative Code § 1301:8-6-03(D)

Unlike the narrow warrantless searches contemplated by §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07, we agree with the district court that those authorized by § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code 1301:8-6-03(D) are both unnecessary to furtheri ng Ohio’s stated interests and too broad in scope to withstand facial Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
a. Necessity
While the former search provisions allow access to only discrete information, the latter are not so cabined, providing the state with abi lity to investigate the entire businesses of both
licensees and non-li censees alike:
The superintendent of financial instituti ons may, either personally or by a person whom the superintendent appoints for that purpose, if the superintendent considers it advisable, investigate the business of every person licensed as a precious metals dealer under this chapte r, and of every person, partnership, and corporation by whom or for which any purchase is made, whether the person, partnership, or corporation acts, or claims to act, as principal, agent, or broker, or under, or without the authority of this chapter, and for that purpose shall have free access to the books and papers th ereof and other sources of information with regard to the business of the licensee or person and whether the business has been or is being transact ed in accordance with this chapter . The superintendent and every examiner may examine, under oath or affirmation, any person whose testimony may relate to any business coming withinthis chapter. O.R.C. § 4728.05(A).
Inspection of books and records: All books, forms, and records, and all other sources of information with regard to the business of the licensee, shall at all times be available for inspection by the division for the purpose of assuring that the business of the licen see is being transacted in accordance with law. All purchased items shall be keptat the licensed location for seventytwo hours from the time of purchase. All books, forms, records, etc., shall be kept at the licensed location. Ohio Admin. Code § 1301:8-6-03(D).No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 21

The state’s specified reason for needing access to this additional information is merely so that it can ensure compliance with the Act. As an example, it explains that it may need access to
all of a dealer’s records in order to ascertai n whether he may qualify for exemption from licensure. But it is unclear why warrantless searches would be requir ed to effectuate this compliance-based purpose. The need for quic k action is gone, and in that sense, these
subsections are more akin to the statute struck down in Patel , where Los Angeles was simply
concerned that hotels were maintaini ng records in accordance with law. Patel , 135 S. Ct. at
2456.

As the Court found in Patel , most precious metals dealers will likely acquiesce to routine investigations. Id. at 2453 (recognizing that “the great majority of busin essmen can be expected
in normal course to consent to in spection without a warrant” (quoting Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. at 316)). In fact, the state’s chief examiner re sponsible for PMDA compliance testified that is exactly what typically happens. See R. 26, TRO Tr. at 85, PID 558 (expla ining that it is “a very rare thing” for a dealer to refuse an inspector’s request to look at records and stating that it had only happened “one time” in three years).
Furthermore, §§ 4728.05(B)–(E) expressly c ontemplate process-based remedies for inspectors, giving them authority, for example, to “[c]ompel by order or subpoena duces tecum the production of all relevant books, records, accounts, and other documents.” See § 4728.05(B).
These remedies undercut the notion that th e Ohio General Assembly thought warrantless
searches would be “crucial” to eff ectuate compliance with the Act. Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. at 317–18. And, in fact, the state confirmed that it does resort to these process-based remedies when conducting inspections. R. 26, TRO Tr. at 85, PID 558 (state official explaining that if a dealer refuses to submit to a search, the inspecto r will merely “write that on the report” and then “just go back to the office”). One state official testified that the department only attempts to conduct routine inspections once “w ithin the first sixth months” of a dealer becoming licensed and then “usually every 18 months” after that. R. 26, TRO Tr. at 79, PID 552. Being required to obtain a subpoena this infre quently—and only when a dealer does not consent—would impose very minimal burdens on the state. See Allinder , 808 F.3d at 1188 (citing Barlow’s, Inc. , 436 U.S. at 316–19) (rejecting th e “administrative burden” ar gument for necessity).No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 22

b. Constitutionally Adequate Substitute
Because we find that § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code § 1301:8-6-03(D) are unnecessary, they are therefore facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, we note that these two provisions also fail the “certa inty and regularity” part of the Burger test. Most notably, they are too broad in scope. Section 4728.05(A) applies to both
licensees and non-licensees. While the former choose to enter th e business of precious metals dealing, thereby subjecting them to the possibility of some govern ment intrusion, the same is not true for non-licensees. Additionally, both statutes effectively allow searches of dealers’ entire
businesses. See § 4728.05(A) (allowing access to “books, papers [] and other sources of information with regard to the business of the licen see”) (emphasis added); Ohio Admin. Code § 1301:8-6-03(D) (same). They therefore “do[] not provide any standards to guide inspectors . . . in the exercise of their authority to search.” Dewey , 452 U.S. at 601. This is particularly concerning because some dealers, like Worthi ngton Jewelers, may only buy and sell precious metals as a subset of their overall business. The provisions’ seemingly unlimited scope, along with the grant of “free access” to such information “at all times,” does not sufficiently constrain the discretion of the inspectors. See Patel , 135 S. Ct. at 2453. For this additional reason, § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administra tive Code § 1301:8-6-03(D) ar e facially unconstitutional.
D. We need not address plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code 1301:8-6-03(D) a nd find the challenges to §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07 not ripe.

Because we agree with the district court th at the warrantless-search language found in § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code § 1301: 8-6-03(D) renders the provisions facially unconstitutional, we need not address plainti ffs’ as-applied challenges to these sections. See Heffner v. Murphy , 745 F.3d 56, 67 n.7 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). We do, however, conclude that plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge to §§ 4728.06 and 4728.07 are not ripe. Both of these sections apply only to licensees. Liberty Coins admits that it does not hold a license. R. 98-1, Tomaso Decl. ¶ 3, PID 1140. Accordingly, it cannot be sanctioned for failing to comply with warrantless searches authorized by these provisions. And the record reveals that the state merely requeste d that Liberty Coins pro duce business records to determine whether it qualified for an exemption from licensure. R. 26, TRO Tr. at 74, PID 547;No. 16-3735 Liberty Coins, et al. v. Goodman, et al. Page 23

R. 23-1, Exh. JXI at 1, PID 339. But the state’s only redress for Liberty Coins’ failure to comply with this request was to issue a show cause order or impose fi nes, § 4728.05(E), and there is no evidence it did either, let alone execute a warrantless search.

While it is unclear whether Worthington Jewelers still maintains a license, there is likewise no evidence that the state or police ever requested or subjected it to either of the warrantless searches authorized by §§ 4728.06 or 4728.07. Because we hold that these provisions are constitutional on their face, plainti ffs were required to provide some evidence that officials sought to apply them in an unconstituti onal manner. Without such evidence, plaintiffs’ as-applied claims remain far too speculative for us to address. See Warshak v. United States , 532 F.3d 521, 525–29 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).

III
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs on their facial Fourth Amendment cha llenges to O.R.C. §§ 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code § 1301: 8-6-03. To be clear, we hold unconstitutional only the bolded language in these sections that purport to authorize warrantless searches—the same language that appears stricken in the parties’ joint brief. See App. R. 27 at 1–2. The remaining language in § 4728.05(A) and Ohio Administrative Code § 1301: 8-6-03(D), which, for example, imposes certain recordkeeping requirements on precious metals dealers, remains in effect. In the absence of exigent circumstances, the state is simply required to obtain consent, issue a subpoena, or obtain a probable cause warrant in order to effectuate searches of this information.
We REVERSE the district court as to §§ 4728.06 a nd 4728.07, finding these pr ovisions facially constitutional and dismiss plainti ffs’ analogous as-applied challenges.