21

TCE, an industrial degreaser, and technetium-99, a

radionuclide fission product from nuclear fuel, were

discovered in the wells. This discovery prompted the

government to provide municipal water free of charge

to all residences and businesses in an area bounded by

the Ohio River to the north, by the DOE property to

the south, by Metropolis Lake Road to the east, and by

Bethel Church Road to the west. Under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), DOE and

the EPA developed an Administrative Consent Order,

effective November 23, 1988, that established a

schedule to investigate and remediate offsite

groundwater contamination. Phase I of the CERCLA

review, conducted in 1989 and 1990, identified

contaminants of concern and solid waste management

units (SWMUs) that could have contributed to offsite

contamination, outlined the physical characteristics of

the SWMUs, and described the risk of offsite

contamination. Phase II of the CERCLA review,

conducted in 1990 and 1991, further assessed the risk

of offsite contamination, characterized SWMUs that

could have contributed to offsite contamination, and

identified migration pathways for contaminants.

2.8 Key External Assessments

In April 1985, a DOE task force evaluated the

adequacy of practices to support handling of radioactive

contaminants in uranium recycle materials at the Oak

Ridge Y-12 Plant, the Feed Materials Production Center

(in Fernald, Ohio), and the RMI Company (in Ashtabula,

Ohio), and examined past operations at the PGDP and

the Portsmouth Oxide Conversion Facility. The task

force concluded that an in-depth examination of PGDP

handling and processing practices was warranted, that

quantities of recycle materials with undetermined levels

of contaminants were present at PGDP, and that PGDP

was periodically receiving commercially-produced UF6

containing trace levels of transuranic elements. This

study recommended that PGDP line management assess

worker exposures to transuranic elements and fission

products from processing of recycled materials and

recommend a feasible method for disposing of uranium

recycle material.

An overall concern regarding ES&H conditions at

all DOE sites led then-Secretary of Energy Watkins to

establish the Tiger Team program and to conduct a

Tiger Team assessment of PGDP in June and July 1990.

The assessment concluded that ceasing PGDP

operations was not warranted, that compliance issues

were known by those Federal and State agencies that

issue permits, and that the following ES&H and

management issues required prompt attention: (1)

environmental monitoring and evaluation programs were

not being effectively implemented due to a lack of

technical direction, formal procedures, and a

coordinated quality assurance program; (2) formal

procedures for implementing environmental protection

activities were lacking, and quality assurance programs

had not been implemented for many environmental

activities; (3) compliance with DOE orders and

mandatory standards for worker safety and health was

deficient, as was the system for managing administrative

control documents; (4) training and certification

programs did not meet site needs; (5) instrument

calibration practices did not always meet minimum

standards; (6) there was no long-range plan for safe

storage of UF6

 cylinders; (7) no integrated sitewide

management system was available to track and correct

identified deficiencies; (8) DOE was not effectively

performing oversight to ensure that ES&H initiatives

were being implemented; and (9) the site contractor did

not have a corporate strategic plan to accomplish DOEís

ES&H objectives.

These issues became the framework for the siteís

ES&H activities for much of the decade of the 1990s.

The siteís effectiveness in addressing these concerns,

the current ES&H posture of the site, and the transition

of the siteís uranium enrichment operations to a

privatized enterprise (USEC) are documented in the

Office of Oversightís report from the first phase of this

investigation (Phase I Independent Investigation of the

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant: Environment,

Safety, and Health Issues, October 1999). A detailed

discussion of historic hazards at PGDP; operational,

maintenance, and environmental activities and practices;

and the effectiveness of these practices in addressing

historic hazards is provided in Sections 3 and 4 of this

report.
22

SIGNIFICANT PADUCAH PLANT MILESTONES AND EVENTS ñ 1950 TO 1999

October 1950 Paducah selected as site for new gaseous diffusion plant

January 1951 Construction begins

July 1952 First uranium received at Paducah

September 1952 Cascade Buildings C-331 and C-333 begin operation

November 1952 First product withdrawn

April 1953 C-400 cleaning building activated

July 1953 Use of reactor tails feed materials begins

April/July 1954 C-335 and C-337 cascades begin operation

August 1954 First Cascade Improvement Program/Cascade Uprating Program (CIP/CUP)

August 1956 C-420 expansion to feed plant completed

November 1956 Major fire in C-310 product withdrawal area

December 1956 C-340 UF6 to UF4 conversion process on stream

January 1957 C-340 uranium derby production started

1957 Presence of neptunium in reactor tails feed at PGDP known

November 1958 Neptunium recovery program begins

April 1960 Technetium recovery program begins

June 1961 First CIP/CUP completed

September 1961 Magnesium fluoride traps installed for neptunium and technetium

March 1962 Explosion and fire in C-340; one fatality

December 1962 Explosion and fire in C-337

January 1963 Technetium traps installed

June 1963 Technetium recovery ends

April 1968 Radiation overexposure to 2 maintenance workers

March 1973 Second CIP/CUP started

October 1973 C-340 uranium derby production discontinued

January 1975 NRC and ERDA assume regulatory responsibilities for AEC activities

mid-1975 Scrap Handling Committee formed

February 1977 Maintenance worker electrocuted in C-331

May 1977 Feed plants cease operation

October 1977 DOE assumes regulatory responsibilities from ERDA

January 1978 Explosion and fire in C-315

1978 Material Terminal Management function established

September 1981 Second CIP/CUP completed

April 1984 Martin Marietta replaces Union Carbide as site operating contractor

February 1985 DOE submits RCRA Part A permit

June 1986 Discovery of major leak of TCE to ground from C-400

November 1988 DOE and EPA sign Administrative Consent Order

June/July 1990 DOE conducts Tiger Team Assessment of Paducah

August 1991 DOE RCRA Part B Permit effective

1992 USEC established

February 1992 Toxicity Characteristic Characterization Procedure Federal Facility Compliance

Agreement effective

July 1993 USEC leases enrichment production facilities from DOE, and Lockheed Martin Energy

Systems becomes USEC operations and maintenance contractor

July 1993 Lockheed Martin Energy Systems becomes DOE management and operations contractor

for environmental management

May 1994 PGDP placed on National Priorities List

June 1995 Martin Marietta becomes Lockheed Martin

October 1995 Site Treatment Plan effective

November 1996 NRC grants certificate of compliance for enrichment operations

March 1997 Regulatory oversight of enrichment transferred from DOE to NRC

February 1998 PGDP Federal Facility Agreement signed by EPA, Commonwealth, and DOE

April 1998 Bechtel-Jacobs awarded DOE management and integration contract

May 1999 USEC takes over direct operation of all enrichment activities