*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-30536

Summary Calendar

_____________________

WALTER BLOODSAW,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

HELMERICH & PAYNE, INC., ET AL.,

Defendants,

VASTAR RESOURCES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

_______________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(97-CV-1586)

_______________________________________________________

March 18, 1999

Before REAVLEY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Walter Bloodsaw appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of appellee Vastar

Resources, Inc. (Vastar) on prescription grounds. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The summary judgment record shows the following. Bloodsaw was employed by

Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (H & P). He was assigned to an offshore rig
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skidded atop a fixed platform operated by Vastar. The platform is located on the Outer

Continental Shelf off the coast of Louisiana. 

On January 10, 1995, while employed on the rig, Bloodsaw slipped on stairs and hurt his

back. Bloodsaw made a visit to a clinic on January 25, 1995 as a result of his injury. H & P paid

for this doctor’s visit on February 8, 1995. Bloodsaw continued to work until November 19,

1996, when he claimed that his injury had rendered him disabled. On September 16, 1996, H & P

paid for medical services rendered on behalf of Bloodsaw between April 18, 1996, and May 17,

1996. Therefore, during the period from February 8, 1995 to September 16, 1996, H & P made

no workers’ compensation payments or payments for Bloodsaw’s medical care. After November

19, 1996, H & P began making voluntary disability payments to Bloodsaw. The payments

continued until June of 1997, at which time H & P received a doctor’s report reporting that

Bloodsaw could return to work. 

Bloodsaw filed suit in state court against H & P and Vastar on or about July 17, 1997,

alleging status as a Jones Act seaman and claiming negligence on the part of both defendants. 

Defendants removed the case to federal court. H & P won a summary judgment on grounds that

Bloodsaw lacked seaman status because the rig on which he was working was not a vessel. The

district court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of Vastar on prescription grounds. 

Bloodsaw appeals the latter summary judgment.
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 DISCUSSION

Bloodsaw’s injury occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf off the coast of Louisiana, and

under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., his claim against Vastar is

governed by Louisiana’s tort law. Cormier v. Clemco Servs. Corp., 48 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.

1995). Under La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492, this claim is subject to a one year prescriptive

period. Cormier, 48 F.3d at 181. 

In Cormier, we held that under Louisiana law, if the prescriptive period as to one solidary

obligor is interrupted, it is interrupted as to all solidary obligors. Id. We further held that the

voluntary payment of workers’ compensation benefits by an employer under the Longshore and

Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., operated to interrupt

the prescriptive period. Id. at 182-83.

Our understanding of Louisiana law, however, compels us to conclude that if the one year

prescriptive period ran on the claim against Vastar, it cannot be “revived” by acts of another

obligor that serve to interrupt prescription as to that other obligor. As one court has explained:

Civilian prescriptive periods act to extinguish the civil obligation to which they

apply. Once a cause of action is extinguished by prescription, a subsequent timely

suit against alleged solidary obligors will not revive the prescribed action. “Once

prescription occurs it cannot be interrupted. Timely suit against one solidary

obligor does not interrupt prescription that has run against another solidary

obligor.” 

Nordgren v. Trojan Contractors, Inc., 648 So.2d 980, 981 (La. App. 1994) (citations omitted). 

In the pending case, the one payment for medical care by H & P on February 8, 1995

might be viewed as a voluntary payment of LHWCA benefits under Cormier, which would serve

to interrupt prescription as to all obligors. However, no such further benefits were paid by H & P

until more than one year later. Under art. 3492, prescription runs from “the day injury or damage

is sustained.” Therefore, prescription began running on January 10, 1995, or February 8, 1995 at

the latest. The one year period expired months before any other event that might serve to

interrupt prescription, and under Nordgren, Bloodsaw’s claim against Vastar is therefore timebarred.
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Bloodsaw argues on appeal that the claim is not prescribed because the one-year period

did not begin to run until November of 1996, when he came to “know the full nature and extent of

his damages and claim against Vastar.” He cites Cameron Parish Sch. Bd. v. Acands, Inc., 687

So.2d 84 (La. 1997), an asbestos removal case, which explained:

Though prescription under La. C.C. art. 3492 begins to run from the day injury or

damage is sustained, damage is considered to have been sustained only when it has

manifested itself with sufficient certainty to support accrual of a cause of action. . .

. “Prescription will not begin to run at the earliest possible indication that a

plaintiff may have suffered some wrong. Prescription should not be used to force a

person who believes he may have been damaged in some way to rush to file suit

against all parties who might have caused that damage. On the other hand, a

plaintiff will be responsible to seek out those whom he believes may be responsible

for a specific injury. . . . When prescription begins to run depends on the

reasonableness of a plaintiff's action or inaction.” The question, therefore, is

whether, in light of the information known, a plaintiff was reasonable to delay in

filing suit. 

Id. at 88 (citations omitted).

We are persuaded that the Louisiana courts would find the claim against Vastar prescribed

under the facts presented. At the outset, “[o]nce it is established that more than a year has

elapsed between the time the tort occurred and the filing of suit, the burden on proof shifts to the

plaintiff to show an interruption or suspension of prescription.” Additon v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,

526 So.2d 465, 467 (La. App. 1988). The burden therefore fell to Bloodsaw to offer summary

judgment proof that his injury had not sufficiently manifested itself to make his delay in filing suit

reasonable.

Further, we cannot agree that prescription was tolled until Bloodsaw knew the “full nature

and extent” of his damages. Louisiana law is clear that prescription is not interrupted until the full

extent of injuries are known. “If it is immediately apparent to the victim that he has sustained

damages, prescription runs from the date the tort is committed, even if the extent of the victim’s

injuries are not known.” Id. at 467. See also Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So.2d 351, 354

(La. 1992) (noting that “there is no requirement that the quantum of damages be certain or that

they be fully incurred,” and “prescription runs from the day on which [plaintiff] first suffered

actual and appreciable damage”); Doe v. Doe, 671 So.2d 466, 471 (La. App. 1995) (“Prescription
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runs from the date a plaintiff suffers some appreciable damages, even though he may only later

come to a more precise realization of the full damages he has suffered.”); Hampton v. Kroger Co.,

658 So.2d 209, 211 (La. App. 1995) (“Prescription begins to run from the date the plaintiff first

suffers actual or appreciable damage, even though he may thereafter come to a more precise

realization of the damages or may incur further damages as a result of a completed tortious act.”).

Additon raised similar facts. The plaintiff testified that on the date of his accident he

strained his back and that his back hurt immediately, but claimed that he discovered the extent of

his injury – a ruptured disc – only after seeking medical attention on a later date. The court held

that the prescriptive period ran from the date of the injury, since the plaintiff experienced pain and

knew he had hurt his back immediately after his accident. Additon, 526 So.2d at 467. 

Under these authorities, Bloodsaw did not carry his burden of showing that he did not

suffer actual or appreciable damage until some date after January 10, 1995, the date of his

accident. On the contrary, he testified that after he slipped he felt pain in his back, reported the

accident to his toolpusher and to the rig medic, and received medication for his injured back. He

further testified that after the accident, he took seven days off under his normal rotation, and came

back to work with his “back still bothering me.” He told a coworker upon this return to work

that “my back is still eating me up.” The coworker told him to visit a doctor during his next

period off. He visited a doctor for his back pain on January 25. An employer accident report in

the record indicated that Bloodsaw had injured his lower back when he slipped on stairs on

January 10, and that he reported the accident that day to H & P. Bloodsaw’s summary judgment

response argues that “one co-employee testified that Bloodsaw continued to complain of pain in

his lower back from the date of his accident until he eventually left the rig.” 

While there may be evidence that Bloodsaw did not become disabled, and thus entitled to

LHWCA workers’ compensation benefits, until long after his accident, Bloodsaw offered no

evidence that he did not suffer actual and appreciable damage on January 10.

AFFIRMED.