Draft Report 

 

 

 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION 

Office of Inspector General 

Transportation Security Administration’s 

Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, 

and Identification Cards
 

(Redacted) 

Notice: The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General has redacted 

this report for public release. A review under the Freedom of Information Act will be 

conducted upon request. 

OIG-08-92 September 2008 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 September 12, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, was established by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 

1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

controls over Security Identification Display Area badges, Transportation Security Officer uniforms, 

and identification cards. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of the Transportation 

Security Administration, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General
 
 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................1 

Background............................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Audit .....................................................................................................................................3 

 TSA Needs to Improve Accountability over SIDA Badges, TSO Uniforms, and TSA ID Cards....3 

 TSA Needs to Improve Policy and Oversight.................................................................................10 

 Secured and Sterile Airport Areas Are at Risk ...............................................................................12 

Recommendations...........................................................................................................................13 

 Management Comments and OIG Analysis ...................................................................................15 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology............................................................................19 

Appendix B: Inspector General’s Management Advisory Memorandum ......................................21 

Appendix C: Assistant Secretary’s Response to Inspector General’s Memorandum.....................26 

Appendix D: Management Comments to the Draft Report ...........................................................28 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to this Report .............................................................................34 

Appendix F: Report Distribution ....................................................................................................35 

Abbreviations 

FSD Federal Security Director 

ID Identification 

PSD Personnel Security Division 

SIDA Security Identification Display Area 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

TSO Transportation Security Officer 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 
 

 

 

OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

In early 2007, the media widely reported that thousands of Transportation 

Security Administration uniforms and badges were missing from various 

airport locations throughout the United States. Security experts and some 

Members of the Congress expressed concern that these missing items could 

allow unauthorized persons access to secured areas of an airport. Our audit 

objective was to determine whether the Transportation Security 

Administration has policies, procedures, and internal controls to manage and 

safeguard airport security identification display area badges, uniforms, and 

identification cards provided to its employees. 

Transportation Security Administration does not have adequate controls in 

place to manage and account for airport security identification display area 

badges, uniforms, and identification cards provided to its employees. 

Unauthorized individuals’ access to those items increases an airport’s level of 

risk to a wide variety of terrorist and criminal acts. Specifically, the 

Transportation Security Administration did not: 

•	 Ensure that airport badge offices were notified when employees 

separated from the agency, and that airport security identification 

display area badges were retrieved and returned to the badge offices. 

•	 Record and track issuance of uniforms, collect uniforms upon an 

employee’s separation, and safeguard and account for reserve stock. 

•	 Maintain accurate records on identification cards or ensure that 

identification cards were returned and destroyed upon an employee’s 

separation from the agency. 

We are making three recommendations that the Assistant Secretary, 

Transportation Security Administration, strengthen management controls over 

airport security identification display area badges, uniforms, and identification 

cards. The agency concurred with our recommendations and their response 

provided details on how they made or plan to make improvements in securing 

these controlled items provided to its employees. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards
 

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Background 

In early 2007, it was widely reported in the media that thousands of 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uniforms and badges were 

missing from various airport locations throughout the United States. The CBS 

news affiliate in Los Angeles, California, for example, reported that more than 

3,600 identification badges and uniform articles had been reported lost or 

stolen from TSA employees, from its inception to May 2006. TSA officials 

said that missing uniforms and badges alone do not represent a significant 

threat because airports also require TSA employees to have airport security 

identification display area (SIDA) badges that can be deactivated when 

reported missing. However, security experts and some Members of the 

Congress expressed concern that these missing items could allow an 

unauthorized person access to secured areas of an airport. 

TSA is responsible for screening all air travelers to ensure that certain items 

and persons prohibited from flying do not board commercial airlines. TSA 

accomplishes this mission through its workforce of approximately 

43,000 Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) stationed at over 450 airports 

across the country. TSOs conduct their screening operations in both secured 

and sterile areas of an airport. Secured areas of an airport are not to be 

accessed by passengers and typically are located near terminal buildings, 

parked aircraft and airport facilities, and baggage loading areas where TSOs 

screen checked baggage. Airport operators issue TSOs and other airport 

employees SIDA badges to work in such secured areas. Sterile areas of an 

airport are located in the terminal where passengers wait to board aircraft after 

passing through security screening. TSOs control access to these areas at 

checkpoints where they physically screen passengers and their carry-on 

baggage for weapons and explosives. 

TSOs are required to wear a standard uniform as a readily identifiable symbol 

of TSA’s security mission, intended to instill trust and confidence in the 

traveling public. A TSA employee is also issued a TSA identification (ID) 

card, which is used to identify TSOs as TSA employees, and may be used to 

access sterile areas of some airports. TSOs are responsible for returning all 

government-issued property, uniforms, badges, and credentials upon 

separation from TSA. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards
 

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Results of Audit 

TSA Needs to Improve Accountability over SIDA Badges, TSO 

Uniforms, and TSA ID Cards 

TSA does not ensure that airport SIDA badge offices were notified when TSA 

employees separated from the agency, and that SIDA badges were retrieved 

and returned to the badge offices. TSA does not adequately record and track 

issuance of TSO uniforms, collect uniforms upon TSO separations, and 

safeguard and account for reserve stock. Further, TSA does not maintain 

accurate records on TSA identification cards or ensure that the cards are 

returned and destroyed upon a TSO’s separation from TSA. 

SIDA Badges 

The Code of Federal Regulations, Title 49, Part 1542 requires airport 

operators to submit an airport security program to TSA for approval. Included 

in the airport security programs are security badge control procedures that 

provide specific timeframes for tenants, including TSA, to promptly notify 

badge offices when employees separate and to return their SIDA badges to the 

badge office. 

We reviewed files at five Category X airports

from TSA between October 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007, to determine 

1

 for TSOs who separated 

whether TSA notified the badge offices of the separations in a timely manner 

so that the airports could promptly deactivate the badges. We also evaluated 

whether the badges were retrieved and returned to the badge offices in a 

timely manner. Of the sampled TSOs, were issued airport SIDA 

badges. 

Airport Badge Offices Are Not Receiving Adequate Notification for SIDA 

Badge Deactivation 

TSA does not notify, or is late in notifying, airport SIDA badge offices when 

TSA employees separate from the agency. As shown in Table 1, TSA did not 

notify at all, or did not notify the badge offices timely2

, for of the TSOs 

 who had separated from TSA. 

1

 TSA classifies commercial airports in the United States in five categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, 

such as the total number of takeoffs and landings annually, and other security risk considerations. In general, Category 

X airports have the highest number of passenger boardings, while Category IV have the lowest. 

2

 For the five airports we reviewed, the airport security programs generally require immediate notification. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards
 

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TABLE 1. TSA SIDA Badge Office Notification for Separated TSOs 

TSA Notification Results 

Range of Time for Untimely Notification 

to Badge Offices (63) 

2-7 days 

8-30 days 

31-60 days 

61-129 days 

Notification No. of TSOs 

Timely 

Untimely 63 

No Notification 10 

Total 

For the ten instances where TSA did not notify the badge office that TSOs had 

separated: 

•	 Four separated TSOs had active SIDA badges. After we notified 

personnel in the badge offices, they immediately deactivated the SIDA 

badges. These TSOs, who were terminated by TSA, had active SIDA 

badges in their possession for up to 212 days after their separation dates. 

•	 Six TSOs’ badges were automatically deactivated by the badge offices’ 

security system at their expiration dates. However, five of the six TSOs 

had active badges in their possession from 97 to 827 days after the 

employee no longer had an operational need for the badge. 

TSA did not notify the badge offices timely to deactivate the SIDA badges for 

63 separated TSOs. of the 63 TSOs retained possession of their 

SIDA badges, which remained active for an average of days. One 

separated TSO had an active SIDA badge in his possession for 129 days after 

separation. For the remaining separated TSOs, TSA collected the SIDA 

badges from the TSOs, but did not notify the badge offices timely that the 

TSO had separated. 

We also asked the five airport badge offices to identify the number of SIDA 

badges that were issued to TSOs and were automatically deactivated upon 

expiration during the period March 2003 to September 2007. The badge 

offices identified 279 SIDA badges. For these 279 SIDA badges, TSA had 

not notified the badge offices that the TSOs had separated or no longer had 

operational need for the badges. The SIDA badges could have remained 

active for up to 3 years. 

TSA Return of SIDA Badges to Airport Badge Offices 

TSA did not return or was not timely in returning SIDA badges to badge 

offices when TSOs separated from the agency. Four airport security programs 

required badges to be returned within 3 days of an employee separating, while 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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the fifth airport security program allowed 10 days to return badges. As 

displayed in Table 2, TSA returned badges timely, returned 53 badges 

untimely, and did not return 14 badges to the badge offices. Additionally, 

13 of the 14 badges not returned were issued to TSOs who had been 

terminated by the agency. 

TABLE 2. SIDA Badge Returns For Separated TSOs 

TSA SIDA Badge 

Return Results 

Badge Returns No. of TSOs 

Timely 

Untimely 53 

Not Returned 14 

Total 

Range of Time for Untimely Return to 

Badge Offices (53) 

2-7 days 

8-30 days 

31-60 days 

61-129 days 

For the 53 instances where SIDA badges were untimely returned to the badge 

offices, TSA collected 22 badges, yet did not return them to the badge offices 

in a timely manner. The remaining 31 separated employees retained 

possession of their badges. 

We also asked the five airport badge offices to identify the number of SIDA 

badges that were issued to TSOs and were deactivated, but not returned to the 

badge offices. The badge offices identified 1,188 missing badges for the 

period August 2002 to September 2007. Although these badges had been 

deactivated, the badges were not in the possession of the badge offices and 

may not have been in the possession of TSA. 

Uniforms and Insignia 

TSA Management Directive 1100.73-2, TSO Dress and Appearance 

Responsibilities, requires TSOs to return for disposal all uniform articles 

purchased and issued by TSA that contain TSA patches, badges, and other 

insignia: 

• When they leave TSA employment, 

• Are reassigned to a non-TSO position, or 

• When the uniform articles are no longer suitable for continued use. 

According to TSA Management Directive 1100.30-10, Employee Exit 

Clearance Procedures, when TSA property (e.g., uniforms or badges) in the 

possession of a TSO is not returned immediately upon separation, local 

management should attempt to contact the employee via certified mail and 

request that the TSO return the TSA property. If the TSO does not respond 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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within a 30-day period, management may arrange to have a TSA law 

enforcement officer pick up the TSA property. 

Additionally, TSA revised Management Directive 200.57, Personal Property 

Management, effective July 27, 2007, requires an airport’s property custodian 

or uniform coordinator to maintain local accountable property records and 

handle and secure serviceable uniforms with patches, or the patches 

themselves, until disposal. However, the directive still does not provide 

airports specific guidance on how to manage and control uniform articles. 

TSA does not have adequate controls in place for recording and tracking 

issuance of TSO uniforms, collecting uniforms upon TSO separation, and 

safeguarding and accounting for reserve stock. We reviewed airport files at 

five Category X airports for separated TSOs to determine whether the 

TSOs returned the proper number of uniform articles bearing TSA patches, 

badges, and other insignia (referred to as “required articles”) when they left 

TSA employment. 

Uniform Issuance Controls Need Additional Improvements 

Although all five airports reviewed had improved issuance controls over TSO 

uniforms since 2004 when new uniforms were last distributed, more 

improvements are still needed. For example, one airport did not maintain 

records to document when new uniform articles were issued or when reserve 

stock uniform articles were reissued to TSOs to replace damaged uniform 

articles. Therefore, the airport was unable to determine the actual number of 

uniform articles issued to a TSO and subject to collection upon the TSO’s 

separation. In August 2006, this airport began recording initial uniform 

issuance data, yet the airport did not record subsequent uniform orders placed 

by TSOs. 

Airports Visited Do Not Have Adequate Controls for Collecting Uniforms 

upon the TSOs’ Separation 

As shown in Table 3, 82 TSOs had uniform articles that were unaccounted for 

upon the TSOs’ separation. Specifically, our review disclosed that 50% of the 

841 uniform articles issued to those 82 TSOs were not returned. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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Description TSOs Total 

TSOs returned all required uniform articles 

TSOs transferred to another airport and were not required to turn 

in their uniforms 

TSO Uniforms Accounted For 

TSOs did not return any uniform articles 20 

TSOs returned some uniform articles, but other articles were 

unaccounted for 

52 

TSOs returned some uniform articles and claimed remaining 

articles were lost, stolen, or destroyed 

5 

TSA records were inadequate to determine whether TSOs returned 

all uniform articles 

5 

TSO Uniforms Not Properly Accounted For 

Total Number of TSOs Reviewed 

82 

 

TABLE 3: Airport Accountability Over TSO Uniforms Upon Separation 

The five airports visited do not have adequate controls for collecting uniforms 

upon the TSOs’ separation. Specifically: 

•	 Three of five airports did not properly complete the exit clearance process. 

Exit clearance officers, the airport contacts responsible for assisting 

separating TSOs, were unaware of the number of uniform articles that 

should be collected, or if applicable, had already been collected. This 

occurred because some TSOs returned uniforms to their checkpoint 

supervisors or uniform coordinator. Accordingly, the airports did not 

identify on their out-processing forms all uniform articles that were 

required to be returned. 

•	 Three of the five airports visited had not developed adequate 

reconciliation processes to verify that separating TSOs returned all 

uniform articles upon separation. Two of the three airports had not 

performed any reconciliation. These two airports relied on the honesty of 

the separating TSOs to return the correct number of uniform articles. 

Additionally, one uniform coordinator destroyed TSO uniform issuance 

records once the exit clearance officer notified her of a TSO’s separation, 

making reconciliation impossible. The third airport began performing 

reconciliations in April 2007. 

•	 Airports did not actively pursue collection of uniform articles that TSOs 

did not return upon separation. Airports sent certified letters warning of 

monetary penalties to 6 of the 20 separated TSOs who had not returned 

any uniform articles. None of the five airports visited pursued civil or 

criminal penalties. Additionally, four airports did not use TSA law 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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enforcement officers to attempt to collect outstanding uniforms. TSA airport 

management acknowledged that obtaining uniforms and other property from 

separated TSOs is difficult, especially from terminated TSOs. Many 

terminated TSOs do not complete their exit interviews, at which time TSA 

usually collects outstanding badges and uniforms. 

Airports Do Not Have Safeguards and Accountability Controls in Place for 

Reserve Stock 

The five airports we visited do not have adequate controls in place to 

safeguard or account for their reserve stock. One of the five airports did not 

safeguard its reserve stock, which was located in an unsecured area of the 

airport’s training center. Additionally, the airport did not maintain records 

documenting when serviceable uniform articles from the reserve stock were 

issued to TSOs to replace damaged uniform articles. 

Two of the five airports did not conduct inventories of reserve stock. The 

remaining three airports conducted periodic inventory counts of uniform 

articles in their reserve stock; however, the counts could not be reconciled 

because the airports did not have a system that maintained a running inventory 

balance. Such a system would show when uniform articles were issued to 

TSOs or when uniform articles were returned to reserve stock. 

TSA Rollout of New Uniforms 

Despite the problems identified above, TSA planned to issue new TSO 

uniforms beginning in October 2007. In July 2007, the TSA Assistant 

Administrator, Office of Security Operations, approved changes to the TSO 

uniform, including the addition of a metal badge. On August 21, 2007, the 

Inspector General issued a management advisory memorandum 

recommending that TSA postpone the planned rollout of new TSO uniforms 

until TSA implemented adequate accountability controls. A copy of the 

Inspector General’s memorandum is included in its entirety in Appendix B. 

On September 20, 2007, the Assistant Secretary for TSA responded that TSA 

planned to provide airports with supplemental guidance on handling uniform 

articles and actions to recover unreturned articles. The Assistant Secretary 

believed the additional guidance would mitigate the Inspector General’s 

concerns sufficiently to permit the distribution of new uniforms beginning the 

following month. A copy of TSA’s response to our memorandum is included 

in its entirety in Appendix C. 

TSA Identification Cards 

Identification (ID) cards are issued to TSA employees for their official 

identification only. TSA ID Card Policy, dated February 1, 2005, states that 

each airport is responsible for the accountability and control of ID cards and is 
Airport Total 

TSOs returned ID cards upon separation 70 

TSOs did not return ID cards upon separation 6 

TSOs reported ID cards lost upon separation 2 

TSOs were not issued ID cards 

TSOs transferred to another airport and took ID cards to that 

airport 

Insufficient documentation to determine whether ID cards 

were issued 

Total 

 

required to maintain a current ID card inventory. Federal Security Directors 

(FSDs) at the airports are required to ensure that ID cards are returned, or 

otherwise accounted for, prior to a TSO’s separation from federal service or 

transfer to another TSA airport or TSA agency. Within TSA, the Office of 

Security, Personnel Security Division (PSD), maintains a database of all 

current and past ID cardholders and written reports on lost, stolen, or damaged 

ID cards. TSA ID Card Policy requires that PSD ensure that all organizations 

within TSA conduct an annual inventory of ID cards and reconcile it against 

their data. TSA IDs are also subject to TSA Management Directive 1100.30-

10, Employee Exit Clearance Procedures, as discussed on page 6 of this 

report. 

PSD and the airports have incomplete and unreliable records on the issuance, 

management, collection, and disposition of ID cards. TSA guidance and 

controls do not ensure proper accountability over ID cards, although TSA 

suggests the cards be treated with the same level of care that an employee 

would assign to a firearm or other dangerous weapon. We identified internal 

control problems with ID cards at PSD and the five selected airports, as shown 

in Table 4. 

TABLE 4: TSA Accountability over ID Cards for Sampled TSOs 

ID Card Records at PSD 

PSD does not maintain complete and reliable records for when ID cards are 

issued to TSOs, returned by airports to PSD for disposal, and physically 

destroyed. Although our review of airport records disclosed that 70 of the 

separated TSOs in our sample returned their ID cards upon separation, we 

could not determine whether the ID cards had been physically returned to PSD 

and destroyed. PSD personnel generally void ID cards in their database upon 

physical receipt and destruction of the ID cards. However, PSD will 

occasionally void an employee’s ID card when airport personnel notify them 

that an employee has separated, even if the ID card has not been recovered. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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As a result, PSD does not know the quantity of ID cards that have not been 

physically recovered and destroyed. Since an ID card is used only for visual 

inspection (e.g., the cards do not have magnetic swipe capabilities), voiding a 

card in TSA’s database system does not prohibit a person from using the card. 

Additionally, PSD’s reports of lost and stolen ID cards do not accurately 

account for the number of outstanding ID cards. For example, the PSD 

reports of lost or stolen ID cards did not identify any of the six separated 

TSOs who did not return their ID cards. PSD and airport records of lost and 

stolen ID cards also were in conflict. Airports identified instances where ID 

cards were reported lost or stolen, yet they were not listed on PSD’s reports of 

lost or stolen ID cards. PSD also identified lost or stolen ID cards where 

airports had no records of the lost or stolen ID cards. 

ID Card Records at Airports 

Airports also do not maintain complete files of when ID cards are issued to 

TSOs, returned by separated TSOs to the airports, and returned by the airport 

to PSD for destruction. We were unable to determine whether separated 

TSOs had been issued ID cards and, therefore, were required to return the 

cards upon separation. Three of the airports we visited did not have complete 

ID card issuance records to show whether the TSOs were issued ID cards. We 

attempted to compare airport data to that maintained by PSD to determine 

whether the TSOs had been issued ID cards; however, the data maintained by 

PSD was also insufficient or unreliable. 

Four of the five airports visited had not performed any type of audit or 

reconciliation to ensure that their records of issued ID cards were consistent 

with PSD’s records. One airport conducted a review of ID cards issued to 

TSOs during the airport’s semiannual shift bid in September 2006 to verify 

whether TSOs had current ID cards. The airport also identified TSOs who 

had been employed more than a few months and still did not have ID cards; 

however, the airport acknowledged that it was not a full reconciliation. 

TSA Needs to Improve Policy and Oversight 

We attribute the issues above to the need for TSA to improve its policies and 

procedures on the management of SIDA badges, TSO uniforms, and TSA ID 

cards. Additionally, TSA could provide better oversight to ensure that 

airports have adequate controls in place to manage and safeguard these items. 

Inadequate Policies and Procedures 

TSA Headquarters has issued management directives and other guidance to 

the airports partially addressing FSDs’ responsibility for the management and 

control of SIDA badges issued to TSA employees, TSO uniforms, and TSA 
 

 

ID cards. However, the guidance is not sufficient. For example, the guidance 

does not describe 

•	 When TSA should notify the badge offices to deactivate the separated 

TSOs’ SIDA badges, 

•	 In what manner TSA’s notification should take place, 

•	 When TSA should return the collected badges to the badge offices, or 

•	 How TSA should pursue collection of unreturned SIDA badges from 

separated TSOs. 

TSA has issued three management directives that address the acquisition, 

wearing, maintenance, retrieval, and disposal of TSO uniforms. However, 

TSA has not provided sufficient guidance and procedures for establishing 

consistent recordkeeping systems to track issuance, recovery, and disposal of 

TSO uniforms. Consequently, the effectiveness of each airport’s uniform 

control system appears to be directly related to the priority each FSD places 

upon it. 

Additionally, TSA policies on pursuing collection of unaccounted for uniform 

articles are deficient. TSA management directives on the collection of 

unaccounted for uniform articles require that airport FSDs issue letters 

notifying separated TSOs that they may be subject to civil or criminal 

penalties if they fail to return the uniform articles within 10 days. FSDs also 

may arrange to have TSA law enforcement officers pick up the property. 

However, the directives do not provide guidance on how to, or in what 

instances, FSDs may pursue the penalties. Additionally, the directives do not 

provide guidance on the circumstances where law enforcement officers should 

pursue uncollected articles or what authority they have to collect those 

articles. 

Lastly, TSA has not implemented an adequate agency-wide policy on ID 

cards. In February 2005, PSD prepared a TSA ID card policy that described 

the responsibilities and procedures for issuance and control of ID cards. 

Although PSD management personnel said that the TSA ID Card Policy had 

been distributed to the FSD and Administrative Officer at each airport, the 

policy was not signed by the approving official and has not been implemented 

at the airports. The current ID card Program Manager commented that the 

February 2005 guidance is insufficient in terms of specifying responsibilities 

and systems to adequately control ID cards. 

Lack of Management Oversight 

TSA Headquarters does not provide oversight to ensure the accuracy, 

completeness, and effectiveness of an airport’s records and control systems 

for SIDA badges, TSO uniforms, or TSA ID cards. For example, TSA does 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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not regularly review active SIDA badge listings to ensure that separated 

employees do not have active SIDA badges. Airport badge offices 

periodically provide tenants, including TSA, with active badge lists and 

request the tenants to validate that the employees on the lists should have 

active badges. TSA did not consistently perform these validations at the five 

airports visited. A comparison of the badge office’s active badge list to a list 

of recently separated TSA employees at the five airports showed that 

32 separated employees had active SIDA badges. 

Two airports we visited had reported no lost or stolen uniform articles from 

TSA’s inception through May 2006, in response to a data call by TSA 

Headquarters. However, our review of uniform files for a sample of 

38 separated TSOs at the two airports showed that together they had 

494 unaccounted for uniform articles. Additionally, TSA Headquarters relied 

on TSA airport personnel to maintain local records on the issuance, recovery, 

and disposal of TSO uniforms. TSA Headquarters has not developed a 

standardized, nationwide system to control and track uniforms, which would 

provide TSA Headquarters with information to evaluate individual airport 

performance. 

TSA has not ensured that annual ID card inventories are completed by the 

airports and reconciled against PSD’s data. Periodically reviewing and 

reconciling PSD records against airport records could reduce the time that 

airport personnel spend determining whether ID cards were properly issued to 

airport TSOs, issued ID cards have expired, and ID cards of separated TSOs 

have been physically returned to PSD. Recreating the documentation at a 

later date can be very time consuming and may not yield accurate results. 

Secured and Sterile Airport Areas Are at Risk 

The Nation’s airports face potentially increased risk because TSA is not 

adequately controlling airport SIDA badges, uniforms, and ID cards issued to 

TSA employees. 

Former TSA employees or other unauthorized personnel in possession of 

SIDA badges could have access to secured and sterile areas of commercial 

airports. TSOs in particular have widespread access to airport doors, 

elevators, and stairwells throughout their airports. Therefore, a former TSO’s 

SIDA badge, if left active, could grant access to most secured areas of an 

airport for an extended time, as SIDA badges at some airports do not expire 

for up to 3 years. Deactivated but uncollected SIDA badges also pose a 

security risk for other unauthorized persons to gain access to an airport’s 

secured or sterile areas. Although a badge may be deactivated (not allowing 

access to doors and elevators), it could still be presented at checkpoints, 

allowing a person to avoid screening at many airports. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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Unaccounted for SIDA badges, TSO uniforms, or TSA ID cards alone may or 

may not allow unauthorized individuals access to secured airport areas. 

Office of the Inspector General Report, Audit of Access to Airport Secured 

Areas, OIG-07-35, March 2007, disclosed that unauthorized personnel that did 

not even possess badges, uniforms, and ID cards could gain access to secured 

and sterile areas of an airport. However, unauthorized individuals using these 

items, especially in combination, could significantly increase an airport’s 

vulnerability to unauthorized access and, potentially, a wide variety of 

terrorist and criminal acts. TSO turnover and the large number of TSOs at 

Category X airports, together with failures to notify TSA airport staff of TSO 

separations and the need to recover their badges, uniforms, and ID cards, can 

only serve to raise the security risk to airports’ secured or sterile areas even 

further. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of the Transportation 

Security Administration: 

Recommendation #1: 

Reexamine, revise, and develop, as necessary, agency policies, procedures, 

and guidance for managers and staff involved on the use, issuance, 

management, collection, and disposition of SIDA badges, TSA uniforms, and 

TSA ID cards. At a minimum guidance should ensure, that TSA Headquarters 

and airport personnel have detailed procedures for: 

•	 Notifying airport SIDA badge offices when TSA employees separate 

from the agency, retrieving badges from separated employees, and 

returning the SIDA badges to the badge offices; 

•	 Recording and tracking issuance of TSO uniforms, collecting uniforms 

upon TSO separations, and safeguarding and accounting for reserve 

stock; and 

•	 Maintaining accurate records on TSA identification cards and ensuring 

that identification cards are returned and destroyed upon a TSO’s 

separation from TSA. 

Recommendation #2: 

Initiate collection actions against TSOs who do not return the required items 

after separating from TSA. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards
 

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Recommendation #3: 

Routinely evaluate and take actions, as appropriate, to enhance Federal 

Security Directors’ performance in managing and controlling TSO uniforms, 

SIDA badges, and TSA ID cards. 

Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards
 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

TSA concurred with the recommendations in the report and reported that the 

agency is addressing, or has already addressed, each recommendation. TSA’s 

response provided details on how the agency has made or is planning to make 

improvements in its security controls over SIDA badges, uniforms, and ID 

cards provided to TSA employees. While TSA believes this report overstates 

deficiencies in the practices reviewed during the audit, as well as any potential 

associated security risk, the agency shares the OIG’s interest in improving 

TSA processes and procedures. TSA asserted that officials, both at 

Headquarters and in the field, will continue to pay increased attention to 

creating and managing efficient internal security systems for SIDA badges, 

uniforms and TSA employee ID cards. As a result, TSA believes that any risk 

of unauthorized use of SIDA badges, uniforms, and ID cards will be reduced 

to a negligible concern. 

TSA also attempted to clarify two issues raised in the draft report. The first 

issue addressed a draft TSA ID Card Policy, dated February 1, 2005, stating 

that TSA ID cards be treated with the same level of care that an employee 

would assign a firearm. Although TSA provided this policy to the OIG, TSA 

believes that the misuse or loss of a TSA ID card would have minimal impact 

because the card by itself neither affords the bearer any special authority, nor 

provides access to restricted areas of an airport without screening or escort. 

We disagree with TSA’s statement that the ID card does not provide the 

bearer access to restricted areas of an airport without screening or escort, 

especially if used in combination with SIDA badges and uniforms. 

TSA also believes the results of this audit are not necessarily indicative of 

TSA operations nationwide since the OIG team only visited 5 out of 450 

airports. To provide timely and effective results, we performed audit work at 

5 Category X Airports, which represent the largest airports. As discussed in 

Appendix A, we selected Category X airports that reported both a high and a 

low number of lost and stolen uniforms and ID cards. We focused the review 

on Category X airports because the large number of TSOs and TSO turnover 

at these airports provide more opportunities where unauthorized individuals 

could gain access to secured and sterile areas of an airport. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 1: 

TSA concurs and has already begun implementing the recommendation. TSA 

issued Operations Directive (OD) 400-25-4, Guidance and Procedures for 

Control of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Uniforms and Badges, on 

April 9, 2008, which contains detailed procedures for recording and tracking 

issuance of TSO uniforms, collecting uniforms upon TSO separations, and 

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Transportation Security Administration’s Controls over SIDA Badges, Uniforms, and Identification Cards 

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safeguarding and accounting for returned uniform items. Additionally, TSA 

is evaluating current policy on TSA ID cards and plans to rescind policy that 

is outdated and issue revised instructions by September 1, 2008. TSA is 

developing a broadcast message on SIDA badges that will be issued to all 

FSD staff. The message will provide detailed instructions for establishing and 

maintaining a system to verify the retrieval and deactivation of the SIDA 

badges, including the need to comply with airport security timeframes for the 

notification and return of SIDA badges. Finally, TSA plans to add the 

collection of SIDA badges to the employee exit clearance process and assess 

civil penalties against employees who do not comply with TSA procedures. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s recently issued and proposed policies and procedures 

will help the agency improve controls over SIDA badges, uniforms, and ID 

cards. While we believe that a broadcast message to all FSD staff containing 

detailed instructions for controlling SIDA badges will help to reduce the 

weaknesses addressed in the report, we question whether a one-time broadcast 

message will be sufficient unless it is incorporated into a more formal TSA 

policy or procedure. This recommendation is resolved, but will remain open 

until we have the opportunity to review the issued policies and procedures for 

TSA uniforms and ID cards. We would also like further information on 

TSA’s planned broadcast message on SIDA badges and how the agency will 

determine its effectiveness. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 2: 

TSA concurs and has already begun implementing this recommendation. 

TSA will initiate collection actions against TSOs who do not return the 

accountable property after separating from the agency. FSDs have been 

delegated the authority to issue orders to former TSOs, which can result in 

civil penalties (i.e., fines) if the property is not returned. Additionally, TSA’s 

recently issued OD-400-25-4, issued April 9, 2008, requires FSDs to 

designate a responsible person to pursue and monitor the status of the 

recovery of accountable property until the case is resolved. An FSD’s ability 

to issue binding orders, and to impose civil penalties, should significantly 

improve TSA’s ability to recover accountable items that are not returned at 

separation. 

OIG Analysis: TSA’s planned collection actions along with the additional 

requirements of OD-400-25-4 will help to ensure TSOs separating from TSA 

return the required items. This recommendation is resolved and closed. 

Management Comments to Recommendation 3: 

TSA concurs and has already begun implementing this recommendation 

through coordination among three separate offices within TSA. First, the 

Office of Security Operations, through the FSDs, is responsible for carrying 
 

 

out the policies and procedures which govern the control of accountable TSA 

property, including SIDA badges, TSO uniforms, and TSA ID cards. While 

senior officials review FSD performance involving these responsibilities, TSA 

is implementing new oversight measures to enhance FSD performance. 

Specifically, TSA is developing a uniform tracking system, called the Asset 

Tracking Module, where FSDs will be required to track the issuance, 

recovery, and disposal of TSO uniforms. The system also provides a 

reporting mechanism, which allows both the FSD and Headquarters officials 

to routinely evaluate individual efforts to manage and control property. This 

system is currently being tested at 141 airports and should be operational 

nationwide by November 2008. 

Second, the Office of Finance and Administration/Chief Financial Officer, 

through the Office of Property Management, has added a 14-item uniform 

management performance assessment to its annual inventory protocol 

conducted at TSA airport operations throughout the country. In calendar 

year 2008, uniform management performance assessments will be conducted 

at 40 airports. As of May 2008, 20 of the 40 audits have been completed. The 

Office of Property Management plans to increase the number of uniform 

performance assessments it will conduct in fiscal year 2009. 

Third, the Personnel Security Division within the Office of Law 

Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of Security, has initiated 

development of the Integrated Security Information Management System, a 

new database, to improve record keeping on employees and contractors. 

Designated TSA Headquarters and field personnel will have the ability to 

access the database to generate reports, update information, and reconcile data 

against Office of Security records with respect to TSA ID cards. This system 

will enhance the FSD’s ability to manage and control TSA ID cards. The new 

database is expected to be operational by late summer 2008. 

Finally, the Office of Security Operations, Compliance Branch, has initiated 

rolling SIDA badge audits at all Category X and I airports. TSA 

Transportation Security Inspectors are inspecting the airports’ annual audit 

requirements under their Airport Security Programs and reconciling the 

current tenant employee lists with the airport’s active SIDA badge records. 

This regulatory inspection activity will continue throughout fiscal year 2008 

and will provide useful feedback to FSDs and airport officials with regard to 

accurate and expedient SIDA badge control. 

OIG Analysis: TSA has already taken actions or has actions planned that 

will enhance FSD’s performance in managing and controlling TSO uniforms, 

SIDA badges, and TSA ID cards. This recommendation is resolved but will 

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remain open until TSA provides evidence that the Asset Tracking Model and 

Integrated Security Information Management System are operational. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of our audit was to determine whether TSA has policies, 

procedures, and internal controls to manage and safeguard airport SIDA 

badges provided to TSA employees, TSO uniforms, and TSA ID cards. 

Specifically, we determined whether: 

•	 TSA accounts for the quantity of airport SIDA badges, TSO uniforms, and 

TSA ID cards issued to TSA employees; 

•	 Separated employees are returning their airport SIDA badges, TSO 

uniforms, and TSA ID cards to the agency, and the agency is ensuring 

those items are either secured and destroyed or deactivated; and, 

•	 Potential exists for unauthorized persons to use lost, stolen, missing, or 

unrecovered airport SIDA badges, TSO uniforms, and TSA ID cards to 

gain access to secured areas of airports. 

We visited five Category X airports, interviewed TSA and airport operator 

personnel, and observed airport operations. We obtained and reviewed 

applicable federal laws, directives, and regulations; TSA’s Standard Operating 

Procedures related to screening; TSA’s airport security program guidance; and 

the airport security programs in place at the five airports visited. We selected 

a judgmental sample of TSOs at each airport who had separated from the 

agency between October 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007. 

We reviewed TSA and uniform contractor records for each separated TSO. 

We also reviewed TSA Human Resources and other administrative files. We 

confirmed with airport badge offices that the SIDA badges had been 

deactivated and returned to the badge offices. For instances where the 

separated TSO did not return all uniform articles with TSA insignia, their 

SIDA badges, or TSA ID cards, we looked for evidence to determine whether 

the agency had taken additional actions to collect the unreturned items. 

Additionally, we reviewed badge offices’ active SIDA badge reports for TSA 

employees and compared those reports against each airport’s list of TSOs who 

had separated from the agency between October 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007. 

We also requested a list of missing badges for TSA employees from March 

2003 to September 2007, from each of the five badge offices. 

We interviewed airport FSDs, Assistant FSDs, TSA staff, and ten TSOs at 

each airport. Additionally, we interviewed airport operator personnel 

responsible for the SIDA badge program at each of the five airports. We 

toured airport facilities, with a focus on entry and exit points that TSOs use to 

access an airport’s secured and sterile areas. We also observed many of those 

access points. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We selected the airports to visit from a May 2006 TSA report of lost uniforms 

and TSA ID cards. In May 2006, TSA reported 1,806 lost or stolen TSA ID 

cards and 1,868 lost or stolen uniforms from inception until May 30, 2006, 

with Category X airports having more than 70% of the lost and stolen items. 

We selected a judgmental sample using the Category X airports as our 

universe. We selected the two airports that reported the highest numbers of 

lost and stolen uniforms and ID cards, the two airports that reported the lowest 

numbers of lost and stolen uniforms and ID cards, and one airport that was in 

the middle. We could not verify the accuracy of TSA’s report of lost 

uniforms and TSA ID cards; however, we noted the limitations of the 

agency’s tracking system in the audit results section of our report. We visited 

We conducted fieldwork between July 9 and September 21, 2007, under the 

authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to 

generally accepted government auditing standards. We appreciate the 

cooperation and courtesies extended to our audit team by TSA. 

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Appendix B 

Inspector General’s Management Advisory Memorandum 

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Appendix B 

Inspector General’s Management Advisory Memorandum 

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Appendix B 

Inspector General’s Management Advisory Memorandum 

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Appendix B 

Inspector General’s Management Advisory Memorandum 

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Appendix B 

Inspector General’s Management Advisory Memorandum 

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Appendix C 

Assistant Secretary’s Response to Inspector General’s Memorandum 

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Appendix C 

Assistant Secretary’s Response to Inspector General’s Memorandum 

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Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix D 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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 Transportation Security Division

Timothy Crowe, Director 

Dennis Deely, Audit Manager 

Christine Haynes, Auditor-in-Charge

Kevin Donahue, Auditor 

Katherine McPherson, Auditor

Mark Phillips, Auditor 

Tia Jackson, Program Analyst 

Barry Bruner, Referencer 

 

 

 

Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

TSA Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web 

site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of 

criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

•	 Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528, 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.