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### MAfTOX ttorney General

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# TheAttorney, General ofTexas

Dectrber 21, 1984

Ronorable JimMapel Crlmiual District Axorney Brasoria CountyCowthouse Angleton, Texas 7’7Ii15 Opinion NO.m-257

Re: Whether ahospital district mayacquire by lease or purchase real property outside its boundaries

Dear Mr. Mapel:

You aak whether the Sweeny Hospital District may acquire, by lease or purchase in fee simple. real property located outside its boundaries when swb property is deemednecessary for the efficient operation of the hospital district. We conclude that the Sweeny Hospital District :Lacks the authority to purchase real property located outside itr boundaries to fulfill the district’s purpose of providing regular aedical andhospital care for its inhabitants.

Grants of powr to hospital district8 and limitations on the exercise of that ;?ower depend upon the constitution and upon each hospital distrlct’li enabling statute. Attorney General Opinion M-171 (1967); see MooreYLEdnaRosultal District, 449S.W.Zd 508 (Tax. Civ. APP* - %iii:iSti 1969. writ ref ’d n.r.e.). Special purpose district8 have on3.ythe authority which is clearly granted by the legislature. Tri-Xty Fresh Water Supply District No. 2 of Harris County V. Hannn? S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1940); Lower Nueces River Water Supply District v. Cartwright. 274 S.W.Zd 199. 207 (Tex. Civ. APP

. - San Anton:;) 1954, writ ref ’d n.r.e.); see Moore v. Edna HOEPita District, >n. -

The Fifty-eighth Legislature authorized creation of the Sweeny Hospital District ..n accordance with article IX Texas Constitution.’ Act8 1963, 58th Leg.. ch. &.‘??l yVP,‘C? art. 4494q-13). Theenabling statute provides. in part, as follow:

Sec. 2. The hospital district herein authorized to be created, shall provide for the establishment of a hospital system to furnish medical and hosl~.tsl care to person8 residing in said hospital-district by the purchase, construction, acquisit Tona.repair, or renovation of buildings and impxcvements; and the equipping of same and the adml&tration thereof for hospital purposes. Suchdistrict shall assumefull responsibility for

p. 1143Honorable JimMapel - Page 2 (m-257)

providing medical andhospital 

### care for its needy inhabitants.

. . . .
Sec. 9. A hospital district organized in
nursuance of this Act shall have the right and power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring by condem%ion any and all property of anykind or charact&. resl, personal ormixed, or any interest therei,-, including outright ownership of such property in fee simple absolute, within the boundaries of tE8 said district, necessary or convenient to the clxercise of the rights, power, privileges and funcc::lonsconferred upon it by this Act, in the manner provided by General Lawwith respect to condemnal::.on

. . . . (Emphssis added).

Acts 1963, 58th Leg., ch. 131iat 361. The only express reference to acquiring real property limitli the district’s power of condemnation to property “within the boundaries of the said district.” Nevertheless, the purpose for the restriction also logically applies to non-condemnation acquisitions of properl:y.
Thus, neither the enabl:lng statute nor the constitutional provision uponwhich it is based expressly prohibit8 acquisitions of real property located outside the district. However, because special purpose district8 have only the authority clearly granted by the legislature, the determinative? question is whether the legislature has clearly granted the SweenyHospital District the authority to acquire real property outside of ~I:II boundaries, 

### not merely whether the legislature has not prohibil:c!d such action. See Attorney General Opinion WW-914 (1960). In c:he Sweeny Hospital-strict’s enabling statute, the legislature gra~,ted authority to acquire real property but did not clearly indicate l:hescope of the power.

Because the constitution does not require that the boundaries of
a special purpose political subdivision include all area8 in which the subdivision has operations, c:helegislature mayauthorize operations outside a district’8 boundaries. San Jacinto River Conservation and Reclamation District V. Sellf:rs, 184S.W.2d 920. 923-24 (Tex. 1945); State ex rel Grimes County IzFpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency, 565 S.W.2d 258-(Tex. Civ. App. - Houston [lst Dist.] 1978. nowrit); Harris County Water Control and Improvement Dj~strict No. 58 v. City of Houston. 357S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1962, writ ref

’d n.r.e.); Lover NUaCe8 River Water Supply District v. Cartwright, supra. However- the cases allowing acquisitions of real property outside the houndarles of ‘a special district usually deal with a specific legislative Srant of authority to acquire property vithin or without the district. See, e.g., San Jacinto River

?* 1144Honorable JimMapel - Page 11 (311-257)

Conservation and Reclamntio~ District v. Sellers, rupra; Lower Nueces River Water Supply District~r. Cartwright, B.

The court in State ex Eel Grimes **County** Taxpayers Association v. Texas Municipal Power Agency. supra, upheld inclusion of a portion of Grimes County within the TlUta8Municipal Power Agsncy’s [hereinafter TMPA1operating area **that** was not within its boundaries although the enabling statute did not expressly authorize acquisitions of property outside of the TMPA’s boundaries. See V.T.C.S. srt. 1435a. 14(2). However, the court emphasized that rwss undisputed that from the inception of planning **to** establish the TMPA,it was contemplated that certain areas outside its boundaries were to be acquired as sources of lignite coal **to** carry out the purpose of the TMPA of producing electricity. Further, evenwhena statute does authorize acquisitions outside district boundaries, the acquisitions mustfurther the purpose for creation of the district. Harris County Water Control and **Improvement** DiStriCt No. **28 V.**  City of Houston. supra; Attorney General oninion WW-914 (1960). Therefore, determination of the legislative intent for c&&n of the Sweeny Hospital District is necessary.
The legislature is not required to set forth in detail all the provisions governing the e.uthority of a political subdivision in carrying out its legislative purpose, State ex rel Grimes County Taxpayers Association v. T~?:tasMunicipal Power Agency, supra at 273, and the courts vi11 occa&nally add words or phrase8 to a statute whennecessary to give effect to-legislative intent whenthe intent is clearly disclosed by the ::t!mainder of the statute. SweenyHospital District v. Carr, 378S.W.ld 40, 47 (Tex. 1964). Eowever, weconclude that the lack of an express grant to the SweenyHospital District **of** authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, and the express limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to vithin its boundaries indicate that the legislature did not intend **the** district to have the implied power to acquire property located outside of its boundaries.
Further, the fundsmcztal purpose for the hospital di8triCt militates against implied authoritation for the acquisition of facilities outside the boundaries **of the**  district. The sole purpose of the SweenyHospital District is **to** provide medical ar.d hospital
care to persons residing ,111 the hospital district. Acts 1963. 58th Len.. ch. 135. 52. ConceStably, a medical facility locat.ed outside th; district’s boundaries ‘&nydc~near enough to the district to serve its inhabitants efficientl:r.~ Although purchasing anexisting facility outside the district could be less expensive than purchasing one inside the district and less expensive than constructing a new facility, the inhabitants of a hospital district will usually best be served through medical fa~::Llities located within their district. A hospital district’s difficulty in serving its inhabitants within its boundaries mayindicate a need for a change in district boundaries rather than a need for acquisitions of facilities outside its

p. 1145Honorable JimMapel - Page 4 

### UM-257)

boundarier. Thelegislature uay provide a solution to this problem by authorizing expansion of the boundaries of a hospital district even when it is alreadv in creat!.oo and subiect to bonded indebtedness. See Stamford Hospital District. v. Vinsoi. 517 S.W.Zd 358 (Tex. Civ. App. - Rastland 1974, wit r;f’d n.r.e.1; see also Carter V. Aamlin Hospital District. 538 S.W.211671 (Tex. Civ. App. - Eastland 1976. writ ref

’d n.r.e.

. Rowever, we note that ill fulfilling its constitutional duty to
assumefull responsibility for providing medical andhospital care for its needy inhabitants. the hospital district has the authority to pay for the medical expense of cwndlng a needy inhabitant to a medical facility outside the district because of a temporary or emergency lack of sufficient medical or hospital facilities. Attorney General Opinion M-171 (1967); see also Attorney General Opinion h-870 (1971). We conclude only that the S&eny Hospital District maynot acquire real property located outside the district to fulfill its purpose of providing **regular** medical and hospital care for inhabitants of the district.

The Sweeny Hos+tal District has only the

authority which :La clearly granted by the legislature. Thelack of an express grant to the district of authority to acquire property outside its boundaries, the express limit on the exercise of its eminent domain power to within its boundaries. and th,e fundamental purpose for the hospital district of providing medical and hospital care to its inhabitants indicate 

### that the legislature did not intend the district to have the authority to ac,quire property located outside of its boundaries.



### Very truly yo , 

# J k

iv JIH MATTOX Attorney General of TLxas

TOMGREEN First Assistant Attorney General

DAVIDR. RICHARDS Executive Assistant Attorney General

RICKGILPIN Chairman. Opinion Committee

p. 1146Ronorable Jim&lapel- Page 5 (JM-257)

Prepared byJennifer Riggs Assistant Attorney General

APPROVED: OPINIONCOMMITTEE

Rick Cllpin, Chairman Co1111 Carl SusanGarrison JimMoellinger Jennifer Riggs NancySutton

pi 1147