SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-12-007-00)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

NASA’S PLANS TO MODIFY THE ARES I

MOBILE LAUNCHER IN SUPPORT OF THE 

SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

 
REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

Final report released by:

Paul K. Martin

Inspector General

Acronyms 

GSDO Ground Systems Development and Operations 

MPCV Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle

OMB Office of Management and Budget

RS&H Reynolds, Smith, and Hill 

SLS Space Launch System
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

OVERVIEW

NASA’S PLANS TO MODIFY THE ARES I MOBILE LAUNCHER IN 

SUPPORT OF THE SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM

The Issue

NASA’s newest Mobile Launcher was designed and built at Kennedy Space Center to 

support assembly, testing, transportation, and launch of the Constellation Program’s 

Ares I launch vehicle.1

In February 2010 – before the Mobile Launcher could be 

used – the President proposed cancellation of the 

Constellation Program and unveiled a new direction for 

NASA’s space program.

 The Mobile Launcher, completed in August 2010 at a cost of 

$234 million, consists of a two-story base, a 355-foot-tall launch umbilical tower, and 

facility ground support systems that include power, communications, and water. 

2

 The subsequently enacted NASA 

Authorization Act of 2010 (the Act) directed NASA to 

design the Space Launch System (SLS), a new heavy-lift 

rocket capable of deep space exploration. The Act required 

NASA to design the SLS with an initial capability of lifting 

payloads weighing between 70 and 100 tons and a fully 

evolved capability of lifting 130 tons or more.3

By August 2011, two NASA-sponsored trade studies 

concluded that the Agency could strengthen and modify the 

 As a result, 

NASA is designing a family of SLS launch vehicles that 

will be heavier, larger, and more powerful than the Ares I. 

The Act also directed NASA to use, to the extent 

practicable, existing investments and infrastructure in 

developing and operating the SLS. 

 

1 NASA established the Constellation Program in response to the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Public Law 109-155, December 30, 2005, which called for 

development of a crew launch vehicle, heavy launch vehicle, and crew exploration vehicle to return to the 

Moon and serve as a stepping-stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations.

2 In place of Constellation, the President’s budget proposed a program that focused on leveraging advanced 

technology, international partnerships, and commercial capabilities to set the stage for a revitalized 

human space flight program.

3 As a comparison, the Satern V rockets used to launch the Apollo missions to the Moon were capable of 

launching 130 tons into low Earth orbit while the Space Shuttle was capable of launching 30 tons into low 

Earth orbit. 

Figure 1. The Ares I Mobile 

Launcher at Kennedy Space 

Center on November 30, 2011. 

(Source: Mr. Neil Berger, Mobile 

Launcher Deputy Project Manager)
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

Mobile Launcher to support the heavier weight and additional thrust of the SLS. 

According to NASA, not only are the necessary modifications technically feasible, but 

using the Mobile Launcher to support the SLS Program is the most cost-effective 

approach to launching the SLS when compared to modifying one of the three existing 

Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platforms or building a new launch platform.4

The SLS Program is in the early stages of design during which NASA officials are 

identifying how the Program will accomplish its goals.

 

Specifically, preliminary cost estimates found that modifying the Mobile Launcher would 

cost $54 million, modifying the Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platforms would cost 

$93 million, and constructing a new mobile launch platform would cost $122 million. 

5

In designing the Mobile Launcher, NASA used $25 million from the American Recovery 

and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act).

 Technical details about the 

vehicle’s design are still under development; therefore, the configuration of the launch 

vehicle will evolve as the Program progresses. 

6

The Office of Inspector General initiated this audit to determine whether NASA 

sufficiently evaluated all possible alternatives to ensure that modifying the Mobile 

Launcher in support of the SLS is in the best interest of the Government. We also 

reviewed NASA’s use of and accounting for the $25 million in Recovery Act funds. 

Results

The OIG found that NASA’s decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher is 

technically feasible and the most cost-effective option for launching at least the initial 

versions of the SLS vehicles. However, further assessment of planned modifications to 

the Mobile Launcher will be needed as the SLS continues to evolve and its design 

solidifies. While NASA performed two trade studies that supported its decision to 

modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher, both studies were based on preliminary assumptions 

and limited information about the configuration of the SLS. Because SLS vehicles will 

increase in size as they evolve, these early studies may not have addressed all the 

challenges or costs associated with launching the larger vehicles. Additionally, the 

SLS, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), and the Ground Systems 

 

4 The three Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platforms were originally designed and used for the Apollo 

Program and were later modified for the Space Shuttle.

5 The SLS Program is in the formulation phase as outlined by NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, 

“NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,” August 14, 2012. Project 

formulation consists of developing and defining the project requirements and cost/schedule basis, and 

designing a plan for implementation including an acquisition strategy, contractor selection, and long-lead 

procurement.

6 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, February 17, 2009. The Act provided funds for job 

preservation and creation, infrastructure investment, energy efficiency and science, assistance to the 

unemployed, and State and local fiscal stabilization.
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 iii

Development and Operations (GSDO) programs – the three components of NASA’s 

planned deep space exploration missions – are in relatively early stages of development. 

Successful integration of the three elements will require an interdependent management 

structure (known as an Exploration Systems Integration Strategy) to ensure the programs 

are effectively communicating their individual and collective requirements. Lastly, we 

determined that NASA properly tracked and accounted for its use of Recovery Act funds 

in designing the Mobile Launcher. 

Two Trade Studies Support Decision to Modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher. Two 

NASA-sponsored trade studies compared three mobile launcher options to support the 

SLS: modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher, modify one of the Agency’s three Mobile 

Launcher Platforms previously used by the Space Shuttle Program, or build a new mobile 

launcher. Based on the studies, the Agency concluded that modifying the Ares I Mobile 

Launcher was the most cost-effective alternative. The two studies’ cost estimates for 

modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher – $54 million and $74 million – are not directly 

comparable due in part to differences in assumptions about the launch vehicles that 

would use the Mobile Launcher and whether the Mobile Launcher would include a tower 

to support the launch vehicles. 

NASA’s Decision to Modify the Mobile Launcher Was Based on Limited 

Information and Preliminary Assumptions. The two trade studies that NASA relied 

on to support its decision to modify the Mobile Launcher were based on limited 

information and preliminary assumptions that may not address all challenges or costs 

associated with launching the larger evolved version of the SLS.7

In addition to the unknown cost and schedule impact of tower modifications that may be 

needed to launch the fully evolved 130-ton SLS, NASA plans to use new, advanced

booster technology currently under development for the 130-ton vehicle. Neither study 

included the possible impacts to the Mobile Launcher that such new technology might 

pose. As such, the potential exists that the requirements to support the new booster may

exceed the capabilities of the Mobile Launcher and require NASA to construct an entirely 

new launch platform. 

 Both studies relied on 

information available at the time and, because the SLS vehicle configurations are still 

being formulated, some technical details have changed since the studies were performed 

while other details have not yet been decided. The scope of the two studies also varied in 

that one study did not evaluate modifications that may need to be made to the tower, 

while the other included tower modifications that it concluded will be necessary for the 

Mobile Launcher to launch the SLS. 

Because additional modifications to the Mobile Launcher may be required as the SLS 

Program matures and the vehicle’s design changes, it is imperative that NASA routinely 

update the planned modifications and corresponding cost estimates throughout the life 

 

7 The studies found that all three options are equally technically feasible. As a result, cost and schedule 

were the primary determining factors.
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

cycle of the SLS Program. Such an ongoing review will help identify technical risks and 

enable the Agency to better understand the full life-cycle costs of necessary modifications 

to the Mobile Launcher. 

Continued Development of an Exploration Systems Integration Strategy Is Needed 

to Ensure the Mobile Launcher’s Success. The evolving configuration requirements 

for the SLS require ongoing coordination among three programs – SLS, Orion MPCV, 

and GSDO.8

In our judgment, development of an effective Exploration Systems Integration structure 

that includes baseline technical agreements is essential to ensure that requirements are 

effectively communicated among the SLS, MPCV, and GSDO programs. Additionally, a 

well-coordinated management structure will help ensure that each program reassesses the 

budget and cost implications of changing assumptions and configurations as the SLS 

Program evolves. 

 The three programs are in different stages of development and the necessity 

of an interdependent management structure is a significant change for most NASA 

employees assigned to the programs, many of whom previously worked for the Space 

Shuttle Program while it was in operations mode for the past 30 years. Moreover, the 

three programs are managed from three different NASA Centers, further complicating 

integration efforts. History has shown that failing to establish firm project requirements 

early in a project’s life cycle often results in cost overruns and can delay the completion 

of a project. To address these challenges, NASA is developing an Exploration Systems 

Integration structure to assist the three programs in effectively communicating their 

requirements. As of September 2012, NASA was finalizing the key documents that will 

define the Exploration Systems Integration structure and govern how it will operate. 

Recovery Act Funds Appropriately Used for Mobile Launcher. In 2009, NASA 

allocated $25 million in Recovery Act funds to advance design work for the Mobile 

Launcher. We found that NASA properly tracked and accounted for use of those funds. 

Conclusion 

NASA’s decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher is technically feasible and the 

most cost-effective option for launching the initial SLS vehicles. However, NASA’s 

ability to identify additional technical risks of modifying the Mobile Launcher and 

accurately estimate future operating costs throughout the SLS Program’s life cycle is 

diminished by the relative immaturity of the SLS Program and evolvable nature of the 

SLS vehicles. NASA must develop a well-functioning Exploration Systems Integration 

structure to monitor the planned modifications and corresponding cost estimates 

 

8 The Orion MPCV Program at Johnson Space Center is building the exploration vehicle that will carry the 

crew to space. The GSDO Program at Kennedy Space Center manages the ground systems and 

infrastructure, including the Ares I Mobile Launcher, to process and launch the next generation of rockets 

and spacecraft in support of NASA’s exploration objectives. The SLS Program is based at Marshall 

Space Flight Center.
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 v 

throughout the programs’ life cycles. Failure of the SLS, GSDO, and MPCV programs to 

effectively communicate their requirements will compromise the accuracy of the Mobile 

Launcher’s budget and schedule estimates and ultimately the utility of the Mobile 

Launcher as the SLS Program evolves.

Management Action 

We are not making specific recommendations for corrective action, but believe NASA 

should assess and update the planned Mobile Launcher modifications throughout its life 

and the life of the SLS Program to ensure that all technical risks are identified and 

addressed and the true life-cycle costs of the modifications are understood. In discussing 

a draft of this report, the Deputy Associate Administrator for NASA’s Exploration 

Systems Development Division stated that his office is developing the Exploration 

Systems Integration structure to ensure that the SLS, MPCV, and GSDO programs are 

effectively communicating requirements as the SLS Program evolves. 

SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background _________________________________________ 1 

Objectives __________________________________________ 4 

RESULTS

Modifying Ares I Launcher Most Cost-Effective Option, but 

Additional Assessment Needed as the Space Launch System 

Program Evolves ___________________________________ 5 

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology_______________________________ 13

Review of Internal Controls ____________________________ 16

APPENDIX B 

Management Comments ______________________________ 17

APPENDIX C 

Report Distribution___________________________________ 18

SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background

NASA built the Mobile Launcher specifically for the Constellation Program’s crew 

launch vehicle known as Ares I and the platform would not have been used to launch the 

Constellation Program’s heavy lift vehicle, Ares V. The Mobile Launcher structure took

2 years to construct and was completed in August 2010 at a cost of $234 million.9

 In 

October 2010, before NASA could use the Mobile Launcher, Congress cancelled the 

Constellation Program, including the Ares I launch vehicle, and directed NASA to 

develop a heavy-lift rocket called the Space Launch System (SLS) that will carry 

astronauts beyond low Earth orbit and provide the cornerstone for America’s future 

human space exploration efforts.

10

Because the Mobile Launcher was originally designed for the Ares I rocket, it will 

require significant modifications to support the much heavier SLS. In order to evaluate 

its options for platforms to launch the SLS, officials at Kennedy Space Center (Kennedy) 

initiated two trade studies in 2010, one conducted by NASA staff, the other by a 

contractor. 

 Congress also directed NASA to use, to the extent 

practicable, existing investments and infrastructure in developing and operating the SLS. 

Based on the results of the studies, the Agency concluded that modifying the Ares I

Mobile Launcher was the best, most cost-effective option to both meet the initial needs of 

the SLS and salvage at least some of the $234 million spent to build the Ares I Mobile 

Launcher. In May 2011, Kennedy officially decided to use the Ares I Mobile Launcher

to support the SLS, and the NASA Administrator concurred with the decision in 

June 2011. As previously discussed, re-engineering the Ares I Mobile Launcher for the 

SLS complied with Congress’ direction to use existing infrastructure for the SLS to the 

extent practicable. 

The launcher will support the assembly, testing, check out, and servicing of the rocket, as 

well as enable its transfer to the launch pad and provide the platform from which it will 

launch. The launch of the initial SLS rocket is scheduled for December 2017. The 

specific processes and criteria the Agency used for selecting the Ares I Mobile Launcher

to support the SLS are discussed in the Results section of this report. 

 

9 The $234 million is the combined value of all the contracts for the Ares I Mobile Launcher’s design, 

construction, and operational readiness from inception through completion of construction in August 

2010. 

10 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, Public Law 111-267, 

October 11, 2010.
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

Design modifications to retrofit the Mobile Launcher for use by the SLS began in 

February 2012. The primary work that the Ground Systems Development and Operations 

(GSDO) Program at Kennedy must undertake includes strengthening the supports in the 

base and widening the exhaust port.11 The GSDO Program plans to complete these

modifications in February 2015 at an estimated cost of $62 million. The installation of 

ground support equipment (propellants, gases, power, and communications) is scheduled 

for completion in September 2016 at an estimated cost of $105 million.12

The modifications to the Ares I Mobile Launcher are necessary because planned versions 

of the SLS rockets are larger, heavier, and a different configuration than the Ares I rocket

that the Mobile Launcher was initially designed to support. The NASA Authorization 

Act of 2010 required NASA to design the SLS with an initial capability of lifting 

payloads weighing between 70 and 100 tons and a fully evolved capability of 130 tons or 

more. As a result, NASA is designing a family of SLS rockets that will evolve over time. 

The initial 70-ton rocket is planned for cargo missions in 2017 and crewed missions in 

2021. The next version will be capable of lifting 105 tons and will be used for missions 

in 2023 and 2025. The fully evolved version will be capable of lifting 130 tons for 

launches in the 2030 timeframe. Although the 105-ton and 130-ton vehicles are being 

designed to meet a variety of crew and cargo missions, the specific configurations of 

these vehicles is currently under discussion. 

 Finally, the 

GSDO Program plans to complete validation and activation of the Mobile Launcher in 

March 2017 (approximately 9 months before the initial launch of an SLS vehicle) at an 

estimated cost of $7 million. The total estimated cost for the three actions is 

$174 million.

As the SLS Program evolves, the vehicle will increase in height and weight. As shown in 

Figure 2, NASA estimates that the initial 70-ton rocket will be about 320 feet tall with a 

gross liftoff weight of 5.8 million pounds. The 105-ton version will be slightly larger at 

336 feet tall with a gross liftoff weight of 5.9 million pounds. Finally, the fully evolved 

130-ton rocket will be about 389 feet tall with a gross liftoff weight of 6.9 million 

pounds. When compared to the Ares I rocket, the initial SLS rocket will be about the 

same height, but weigh more than twice as much, and the fully evolved SLS will be 

nearly 75 feet taller and three times heavier. The heavier weight of the SLS rockets 

necessitates strengthening the supports in the Mobile Launcher base.

 

11 The GSDO Program manages ground systems and infrastructure at Kennedy to support the launch of 

rockets and spacecraft in support of NASA’s exploration objectives.

12 The installation cost does not include the cost of the ground support equipment because the Agency is 

still determining which specific equipment to install.
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 3 

Figure 2. Comparison of Ares I launch vehicle and planned versions of the SLS.

In addition to being bigger and heavier, the SLS rockets are of a different configuration 

than the Ares I rocket. The SLS rockets will have two boosters attached to a core stage, 

while the Ares I rocket was an in-line, two-stage rocket configuration. The addition of 

the two rocket boosters on the SLS design necessitates expansion of the exhaust port on 

the Mobile Launcher base from a 22-foot square to a 60-foot-by-30-foot rectangle.

The SLS Program is in what NASA calls the formulation phase during which officials 

assess the program’s risk, feasibility, and technology; develop operations concepts and 

acquisition strategies; establish high-level requirements and success criteria; and prepare 

plans, budgets, and schedules.13

 

13 NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 

Requirements,” August 14, 2012.

 Additionally, as previously described, the launch vehicle 

will evolve as the Program progresses. Therefore, key technical details about the 

vehicle’s design and configuration and how it will interface with the Mobile Launcher

and ground support equipment are under discussion. For example, due to the planned 

varying heights of the SLS as it evolves, changes are expected in the vertical position of 

different stages of the rocket and, therefore, the placement of vehicle umbilicals on the 
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

Mobile Launcher tower.

14 Additionally, the height of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew 

Vehicle (MPCV), which will sit atop the SLS for crewed missions, may change and that 

would affect the location of the Mobile Launcher tower’s crew access arm and the crew 

emergency egress system.

15

In 2009, NASA received $1 billion from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

(Recovery Act) and allocated $25 million to support design of the Mobile Launcher. The 

Recovery Act was signed into law on February 17, 2009, to help jumpstart the U.S. 

economy, preserve or create jobs, and spur technological advances in science and health. 

 

Objectives

We evaluated NASA’s plans for the Ares I Mobile Launcher to determine whether the 

Agency sufficiently evaluated all options before deciding that modifying it in support of 

the SLS was in the best interest of the Government. We also examined whether NASA 

properly tracked and accounted for Recovery Act funds associated with the Mobile 

Launcher and reviewed internal controls as they relate to the overall objective. See 

Appendix A for details of the audit’s scope and methodology and our review of internal

controls. 

 

14 Launch stand umbilicals interface with the spacecraft and provide the electrical, gas, and fluids support 

necessary for launch.

15 The crew access arm will allow personnel to enter the MPCV from the Mobile Launcher tower. The 

emergency egress system is the means by which crew would evacuate the tower in the event of a launch 

emergency. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 5 

MODIFYING ARES I LAUNCHER MOST 

COST-EFFECTIVE OPTION, BUT ADDITIONAL 

ASSESSMENT NEEDED AS THE SPACE LAUNCH 

SYSTEM PROGRAM EVOLVES

NASA’s decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher is technically feasible and 

the most cost-effective option for launching at least the initial versions of the SLS 

vehicles. However, the two studies and corresponding cost estimates that NASA 

used to support its decision were based on preliminary assumptions and limited 

information. As a result, the studies may not have addressed all challenges or costs 

associated with launching the planned larger versions of the SLS rockets. Because 

additional modifications to the Mobile Launcher may be required as the SLS 

Program matures, it is imperative that NASA update the planned modifications and 

corresponding cost estimates throughout the life of the SLS Program. In addition, 

given the relative immaturity of the SLS Program and NASA’s ongoing SLS 

development efforts, it is essential that SLS, Orion MPCV, and GSDO program 

officials effectively communicate launch vehicle, spacecraft, and ground systems 

requirements to ensure the success of each program. Lastly, we found that NASA 

properly tracked and accounted for Recovery Act funds used to design the Mobile 

Launcher. 

Two Trade Studies Support Decision to Modify the Ares I Mobile 

Launcher

Two NASA-sponsored trade studies compared three mobile launcher options to support 

the SLS: modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher, modify one of the Agency’s three Mobile 

Launcher Platforms used in the Space Shuttle Program, or build a new mobile launcher. 

Based on the studies, the Agency concluded that modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher

proved the best and most cost-effective option. 

The first trade study was an internal study conducted by Kennedy and contractor 

personnel initiated in October 2010 to evaluate options, selection criteria, and 

requirements for development of a mobile launcher for a heavy lift launch vehicle. The 

team reported their initial findings in March 2011 and concluded that each of the three 

options under examination were technically feasible.16 The study’s cost estimates 

indicated that modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher would be the lowest cost option 

($54 million) followed by modifying the Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platform

($93 million) and finally building a new mobile launcher ($122 million).17

 

16 “2011 Mobile Launcher Structure Trade Study – Initial Findings,” KSC-NE 11477, March 2011.

 The cost 

17 “2011 Mobile Launcher Structure Trade Study – Initial Findings, Volume 2, Cost Annex,” KSC-NE 

11477 Volume 2, April 2011. 
RESULTS

6 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

evaluations for the Ares I Mobile Launcher and Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platform

were limited to modifying the base; none of the three cost evaluations included estimates 

for installation of ground support equipment.

The second study, conducted by Reynolds, Smith, and Hill (RS&H), a facilities, 

infrastructure, and aviation consulting firm with more than 40 years’ experience in 

designing NASA launch platforms, examined mobile launcher and launch pad concepts 

to support a variety of launch vehicle concepts developed under the SLS architecture. 

RS&H reported the results of its study in August 2011 and estimated that the cost of 

modifying the base and tower of the Ares I Mobile Launcher to launch the 70-ton version 

of the SLS vehicle would be $74 million.18

The two studies’ cost estimates for modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher ($54 million 

and $74 million) are not directly comparable due to differences in assumptions about the 

launch vehicles that would use the Mobile Launcher and whether the Mobile Launcher

would include a tower or merely a base. 

 The estimate did not include the cost of 

installing ground support equipment. 

Trade Studies Were Based on Limited Information and 

Preliminary Assumptions

The two trade studies relied on preliminary assumptions about the launch vehicles and 

Mobile Launcher tower because they were initiated before NASA had decided on the 

launch vehicles that would use the Mobile Launcher and whether the Mobile Launcher

would include a tower. GSDO estimated that it would take 6 years to modify, outfit, and 

activate the Ares I Mobile Launcher or a Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platform and 

7 years to build a new mobile launcher for the SLS Program. Delaying initiation of the 

studies until June 2011, when the NASA Administrator approved the SLS launch vehicle 

architecture, would have jeopardized GSDO’s ability to support a 2017 launch. Figure 3 

shows significant dates affecting the development of the Mobile Launcher and its 

projected life-cycle timeline.

 

18 “Study: Space Launch System Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle Mobile Launcher and Launch Pad,” KSC-NE11533, August 22, 2011.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 7 

Figure 3. Projected Mobile Launcher life-cycle timeline.

Internal Trade Study. NASA’s internal study examined only required modifications to 

the Ares I Mobile Launcher’s base and did not review needed modifications to the tower. 

Kennedy officials describe the internal trade study as “a snapshot in time” and the study 

itself states that “Because the initial phase of the effort was to be small in scope and short 

in duration, basic assumptions about the Mobile Launcher were identified to make the 

task manageable.” 

According to GSDO officials, the study was limited to modifications to the base because 

one option being considered at the time was to operate the SLS launch platform without a 

tower. In fact, the team’s trade study included the cost of removing the Ares I Mobile 

Launcher’s tower because they assumed it would not be needed.19

In addition, Kennedy based its study cost estimates on a version of SLS capable of 

launching payloads of 110 tons even though NASA does not now plan to launch a 110-

ton version of the SLS vehicle. Members of the study team told us that the assumptions 

they made for the 110-ton vehicle provided the most reasonable assurance that the 

required launch platform modifications would accommodate all evolutions of the SLS. 

However, the fully evolved 130-ton version of the SLS will be 53 feet taller than the 

110-ton version the team assessed, and the assessment team did not evaluate the impact 

this height difference might have on the launch platform or the Mobile Launcher tower.

 NASA has since 

decided to retain the Mobile Launcher’s tower to assist with launching the SLS. 

 

19 The estimated costs to remove the tower did not play a role in NASA’s final decision to modify the 

Ares I Mobile Launcher. 
RESULTS

8 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

External Trade Study. The initial purpose of the external trade study was to evaluate 

the feasibility and compare the costs of modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher, 

modifying a Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platform, or constructing a new launch 

platform to support several heavy lift launch vehicle concepts being considered for the 

SLS Program. These concepts included four reference vehicle “teams”:

• Team 1 was a Shuttle-derived heavy lift launch vehicle; 

• Team 2 was a liquid-only heavy lift launch vehicle; 

• Team 3 was a clustered Atlas V and Delta IV configuration; 

• Team 4 was a combination of a Shuttle-derived heavy lift launch vehicle and a 

clustered Atlas V configuration. 

However, before RS&H could complete their study of launch platform requirements for 

all SLS architectures under consideration, the NASA Administrator decided in June 2011 

to use a Shuttle-derived configuration for the SLS.20

Following the Administrator’s decision, NASA requested RS&H to develop a cost 

estimate for the modifications needed on the Ares I Mobile Launcher to launch the 70-ton 

and 130-ton versions of the SLS. NASA limited the company’s analysis and cost 

estimates only to the modified Ares I Mobile Launcher and did not ask RS&H to 

compare the cost of modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher with the cost of modifying an 

existing Space Shuttle Mobile Launcher Platform or constructing a new launch platform. 

However, company officials told us that based on their knowledge of the options, they 

“very likely” would have concluded that modifying the Ares I Mobile Launcher was the 

most cost-effective option, at least for the 70-ton version of the SLS. 

 In making this decision, the 

Administrator also approved plans to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher to support 

SLS launches based on the internal trade study. 

In their August 2011 report, RS&H estimated it would cost approximately $74 million to 

modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher for the initial version of the SLS. Unlike the trade 

study performed by NASA engineers, this estimate included the cost to modify the 

launcher’s tower. According to the company’s report, tower modifications for the initial 

SLS vehicle should include adaptations for a crew access arm and the emergency egress 

system. 

The RS&H study also noted that crewed missions using the larger SLS vehicle would 

require “an additional level on top of the tower with accommodations for a crew access 

arm at the higher level including a repositioned porch for the [emergency egress 

system].” NASA officials told us that they have not yet estimated the costs to modify the 

Mobile Launcher tower modifications to launch the fully evolved 130-ton SLS vehicle

 

20 “MPCV, SLS, 21st [Century Ground Systems] Pre-Formulation Decision Memorandum,” signed by the 

NASA Administrator on June 20, 2011. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 9 

because the exact vehicle configuration has not yet been decided. Additionally, SLS 

managers have not yet decided whether the 130-ton SLS vehicle will be used for crewed 

missions. That decision will have a significant impact on the tower modifications that 

will be needed to launch the fully evolved 130-ton version of the SLS. 

Trade Studies Did Not Evaluate Impact of New Booster Technology. Given that the 

fully evolved 130-ton rocket is not scheduled for its first launch until 2030, we 

acknowledge that it is premature to build a launch platform for a rocket that is not 

scheduled to launch for another 18 years. However, NASA is moving forward to 

maximize its use of the $234 million spent on the Ares I Mobile Launcher by repurposing 

it for use with at least the initial versions of the SLS. Whether the fully evolved 130-ton 

version of the SLS will be able to be launched from this same modified platform or 

whether it will require a different launch platform is an open question that will be driven 

by the final design of the 130-ton rocket. 

For example, NASA plans to use advanced booster technology for the 130-ton vehicle to 

provide a significant increase in thrust compared to currently available liquid or solid 

boosters. Neither the internal or external trade study included the possible impact of 

using advanced rocket boosters on the costs or feasibility of modifying the Ares I Mobile 

Launcher. Therefore, it is possible that the requirements to support the 130-ton booster 

rocket could exceed the capabilities of the redesigned Mobile Launcher, which would 

require NASA to either construct an entirely new launch platform or further modify the 

former Ares I Mobile Launcher. 

Because additional modifications to the Mobile Launcher may be required as the SLS 

Program matures, it is imperative that NASA continue to assess and update its planned 

modifications and corresponding cost estimates. Without such continual assessments, it 

will be difficult for the Agency to identify and address all technical risks and understand 

the true life-cycle costs of any required modifications to the Mobile Launcher, including 

the potential expense of building an entirely new launch platform for the 130-ton SLS 

vehicle. 

Continued Development of an Exploration Systems Integration 

Strategy Needed to Ensure the Mobile Launcher’s Success

According to the Deputy Associate Administrator for NASA’s Exploration Systems 

Development Division, the management structure created for the development and launch 

of NASA’s heavy lift vehicle is a significant departure from how the Agency managed 

the Space Shuttle Program. He explained that the Space Shuttle Program had been in 

operations mode for almost 30 years and consequently most current NASA employees 

were not working for the Program during its development phase. Under the Space 

Shuttle Program, the authority to make key program decisions was generally limited to 

senior-level managers. The Deputy Associate Administrator stated that requiring highlevel decision making when a space program is in operations mode is appropriate. He 
RESULTS

10 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

explained that the consequences to the decisions that were made when the Space Shuttle 

was operational frequently involved crew safety, and were more significant than the 

decisions that are commonly made when a program is in the development phase. 

Although this process helped Space Shuttle managers ensure that they made informed 

and accurate decisions based on program-wide information, a common complaint was 

that it was not relatively efficient and not well suited for a program in the development 

phase. 

The Agency’s heavy lift program requires close coordination among three primary 

entities – the SLS, MPCV, and GSDO programs. To enhance efficiency, senior 

managers have delegated authority to program-level managers to make decisions that, at 

least in the Space Shuttle Program, were only allowed to be made by senior-level 

managers. Although “pushing down” the decision-making authority could increase the 

programs’ efficiency, it increases the risk that one program makes decisions without fully 

evaluating their impact on the other two programs. Additionally, the three programs are 

at different stages in development and are managed from three different NASA Centers, 

further complicating coordination efforts. 

During our audit, SLS officials shared a significant amount of potential launch vehicle 

requirements for GSDO personnel to evaluate. Some of these initial requirements were 

close to exceeding ground system capabilities, such as a proposed vehicle too tall to fit 

through the doors of the Vehicle Assembly Building or too heavy for Kennedy’s 

Crawler-Transporters.21

NASA’s ability to effectively communicate launch vehicle, spacecraft, and ground 

systems requirements between the SLS, MPCV, and GSDO programs will be challenging

given the change in management structure, the relative immaturity of the SLS Program, 

and NASA’s ongoing SLS development efforts. NASA has recognized these challenges

and is establishing an Exploration Systems Integration structure to assist the three 

programs in effectively communicating their requirements. As of September 2012, the 

Agency was in the process of formalizing the key documents that will define the 

Exploration Systems structure and govern how it will operate. The Deputy Associate 

Administrator for NASA’s Exploration Systems Development Division estimates that 

NASA will complete the Exploration Systems Integration Structure in time to support the 

 Although it appears that program personnel have resolved these 

issues for the initial versions of the vehicle, the SLS will continue to evolve and 

requirements will change. As this evolution occurs, MPCV requirements will also affect

the Mobile Launcher, adding an additional layer of complexity with integration efforts 

among the SLS, MPCV, and GSDO programs. 

 

21 A Crawler-Transporter is a tracked vehicle used to transport a rocket and its Mobile Launcher from the 

Vehicle Assembly Building to launch pads at Kennedy.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 11

Cross-Program System Definition Review scheduled for the first quarter of fiscal 

year 2013.22

The development of an effective Exploration Systems Integration structure is essential to 

ensure that requirements and decisions are communicated between the SLS, MPCV, and 

GSDO programs. Additionally, if properly functioning this structure can help ensure that 

each program reassesses the budget and cost implications of changing assumptions and 

configurations as the SLS Program evolves. 

 

Recovery Act Funds Were Appropriately Used for Mobile Launcher

The Recovery Act was signed into law on February 17, 2009, as a way to jumpstart the 

U.S. economy, preserve or create jobs, and spur technological advances in science and 

health. In 2009, NASA received $1 billion from the Recovery Act and officials allocated 

$25 million to the Mobile Launcher to support its engineering design. 

Our review of the use of these funds found that NASA generally met cost, schedule, and 

performance milestones for the Mobile Launcher project. In addition, the project 

adequately addressed the reporting requirements of the Recovery Act and related Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. Consequently, we determined that 

NASA’s use and reporting of Recovery Act funds for the Mobile Launcher was 

appropriate. 

Conclusion

NASA’s decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher to launch the SLS, the Agency’s 

heavy-lift rocket for deep space exploration, is technically feasible and the most costeffective option for launching the initial SLS vehicles. However, NASA’s ability to 

identify additional technical risks of modifying the Mobile Launcher and accurately 

estimate future operating costs throughout the SLS Program’s life cycle is diminished by 

the relative immaturity of the SLS Program and the evolvable nature of the SLS vehicles. 

NASA must develop a well-functioning Exploration Systems Integration Strategy to 

monitor the planned modifications and corresponding cost estimates throughout all three 

programs’ life cycles. Failure of the SLS, GSDO, and MPCV programs to effectively 

communicate their requirements will compromise the accuracy of the Mobile Launcher’s 

budget and schedule estimates and ultimately the utility of the Mobile Launcher as the 

SLS Program evolves. 

 

22 According to NASA’s Space Flight Program and Project Management requirements, the System 

Definition Review determines whether the maturity of the program’s definition and associated plans are 

sufficient to begin implementation. At the time of the System Definition Review, programs should be in 

place and stable; have adequately completed formulation phase activities; and have an acceptable plan 

for the implementation phase.
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

Management Action

We are not making specific recommendations for corrective action, but believe NASA 

should assess and update the planned Mobile Launcher modifications throughout its life 

and the life of the SLS Program to ensure that all technical risks are identified and 

addressed and the true life-cycle costs of the modifications are understood. In discussing 

a draft of this report, the Deputy Associate Administrator for NASA’s Exploration 

Systems Development Division stated that his office is developing the Exploration 

Systems Integration structure to ensure that the SLS, MPCV, and GSDO programs are 

effectively communicating requirements as the SLS Program evolves. 
APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 13

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology

We performed this audit from November 2011 through September 2012 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The audit included reviews of two distinct areas: NASA’s plans for the Mobile Launcher

and its accounting for use of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) 

funds on the Mobile Launcher project. We separated our audit work along these two 

areas, with separate scopes and methodologies for each.

NASA’s Plans for the Mobile Launcher. The scope for this review was NASA’s 

decision to modify the Ares I Mobile Launcher for use with the SLS. The scope included 

the processes NASA used to select the Ares I Mobile Launcher as the launch platform for 

the SLS, the technical feasibility of the planned modifications to the Mobile Launcher, 

challenges that might hinder the planned modifications, and alternative uses for the 

Mobile Launcher. For this review, we conducted audit work at Kennedy, NASA 

Headquarters, and Marshall Space Flight Center.

To accomplish our reviews of the processes that NASA used to select the Mobile 

Launcher and the technical feasibility of the planned modifications, we interviewed 

appropriate NASA and RS&H officials and reviewed records related to the selection 

process. We also interviewed NASA officials with the Human Exploration and 

Operations Mission Directorate, the GSDO Program, and various Kennedy offices. 

Mission Directorate and GSDO Program officials interviewed included the Mission 

Directorate’s Deputy Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Development 

Division, the Manager for GSDO’s Vehicle Integration and Launch Integration Product 

Team, and the Manager for the Mobile Launcher Project. Kennedy officials interviewed 

included the Center’s Vehicle Integration and Launch Chief Engineer and the Cost 

Analyst who developed the Agency’s cost estimate for modifying the Mobile Launcher. 

RS&H officials interviewed included a Senior Vice President and a Vice President with 

the company’s Aerospace Services Group.
APPENDIX A 

14 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

The records we reviewed included NASA-sponsored trade studies and Kennedy 

architecture refinement cycle reviews: 

• Trade Study KSC-NE-11477, “2011 Mobile Launcher Structure Trade Study - 

Initial Findings,” March 2011, and “2011 Mobile Launcher Structure Trade 

Study - Initial Findings, Volume 2: Cost Annex,” April 2011; 

• Trade Study KSC-NE-11533, “Study: Space Launch System Heavy Lift Launch 

Vehicle Mobile Launcher and Launch Pad,” August 22, 2011; 

• “21st Century Space Launch Complex Architecture Refinement Cycle 4.0 Final,” 

February 15-17, 2011; 

• “21st Century Space Launch Complex Architecture Refinement Cycle 5.0, 

Closing the Ground Operations Architecture, Final PoD [Point of Departure] 

Architecture Review,” May 26, 2011. 

To accomplish our review of challenges that might hinder the planned modifications, we 

interviewed appropriate NASA officials and reviewed records related to potential risks to 

successful completion of the planned modifications. In addition to interviewing the 

aforementioned Mission Directorate and GSDO Program officials, we interviewed the 

Chief Engineer and the Lead Systems Engineer for the SLS Program. The records we 

reviewed included the GSDO Program’s list of Mobile Launcher associated risks and a 

Booz Allen Hamilton assessment of cost and schedule estimates that the GSDO Program 

used to evaluate candidates for NASA’s post-Space Shuttle manned space flight 

architecture.23

To accomplish our review of alternative uses for the Mobile Launcher, we interviewed 

appropriate NASA officials and reviewed records identifying commercial companies 

interested in using the Mobile Launcher for their respective launch vehicles. NASA 

officials interviewed included the Program Manager for the Agency’s Commercial Crew 

Program and the Manager of Kennedy’s Partnerships Development Office. The records 

we reviewed included a statement of interest in Kennedy assets submitted by ATK Space 

Launch Systems and Kennedy’s response to ATK’s statement of interest.24,25

Recovery Act Funds Associated with the Mobile Launcher. The review examined the 

$25 million in Recovery Act funds NASA used toward the engineering design of the 

Mobile Launcher’s mechanical, fluid, and electrical subsystems. The scope included 

NASA’s management, distribution, use, reporting, and closeout of these Recovery Act 

 

23 “Independent Cost Assessment of the Space Launch System, Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and 21st 

Century Ground Systems Programs, Final Report,” August 19, 2011. Booz Allen Hamilton is a 

consulting firm that provides management and technology consulting services.

24 “ATK Space Launch Systems’ Statement of Interest for KSC Assets,” February 21, 2011. ATK is an 

aerospace firm interested in providing a launch system under NASA’s Commercial Crew Program.

25 “KSC Comprehensive Response to ATK’s Request for Use of Government Assets,” August 12, 2011. 
APPENDIX A 

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 15

funds. For this review, we conducted audit work at Kennedy, the NASA Shared Services 

Center, and NASA Headquarters.

To accomplish our review we interviewed appropriate NASA officials, reviewed 

applicable records, and verified compliance with Recovery Act requirements. NASA 

officials interviewed included the Agency’s Recovery Act Implementation Executive, the 

Mobile Launcher Program Manager, and the Kennedy Supervisory Accountant 

responsible for tracking Recovery Act funds. We also interviewed the NASA Shared 

Services Center Accounts Payable Lead responsible for the SAP accounting internal 

control processes that NASA put into place for Recovery Act compliance.

The records we reviewed included the Agency’s Recovery Act guidance, fund-related 

plans, contractual documents, status reports, and billing documents: 

• Procurement Information Circular (PIC) 09-06H, “Contracting with Recovery Act 

Funds including deviation to FAR and NFS Quick Closeout Procedures,” 

November 23, 2010; 

• “Recovery Act Plan for Constellation Ground Operations - Mobile Launcher 

Design,” August 21, 2009; 

• Task orders under which the Recovery Act-related work was performed;26

• Monthly technical and financial status reports, as well as quarterly status reports, 

submitted by the contractor performing the Recovery Act-related work; and

• Contractor invoices billed to NASA for the Recovery Act work performed.

To assess compliance with Recovery Act requirements we verified:

• Agency payments and accounting entries matched amounts on contractor invoices 

for the Recovery Act work;

• Quarterly reports were submitted on time using a central government-wide data 

collection system for Federal Agencies and Recipients of Federal awards per the 

Recovery Act;

• Key milestones and deliverables were met; 

• Recovery Act funds were expended and final invoices received; and

• Mobile Launcher Project status was marked “Fully Complete” in 

FederalReporting.gov. 

 

26 Task Order Numbers 625, 626, and 627 under NASA Contract Number NAS10-03006 with ASRC 

Aerospace Corporation.
APPENDIX A 

16 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not use computer-processed data to perform 

the review of NASA Plans for the Mobile Launcher, but did use data from SAP (NASA’s 

financial system) for the review of Recovery Act funds associated with the Mobile 

Launcher. As part of the review, we compared data from source documents against the 

data in the financial system. Based on the results of those comparisons, we concluded 

that the data was valid and reliable for the purposes of the review.

Review of Internal Controls 

For the review of NASA’s Plans for the Mobile Launcher, we reviewed internal controls 

that Kennedy used to provide reasonable assurance that the selection of the Mobile 

Launcher for the SLS was in the best interest of the Government. The controls included 

the process (Architecture Refinement Cycle Reviews) and tools (trade studies and cost 

estimates) the Center used in selecting the Mobile Launcher for the SLS. Except for the 

trade studies being based on preliminary assumptions as described in this report, we 

considered the reviewed internal controls to be adequate.

For the review of Recovery Act funds used on the Mobile Launcher, our review of 

internal controls included reviews of policies, procedures, and practices that the Agency 

implemented to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with Recovery Act 

requirements as identified in Office of Management and Budget guidance.27

Prior Coverage

 Based on 

the results of our review, we considered the internal controls over the Recovery Act funds 

associated with the Mobile Launcher to be adequate.

During the past 5 years, neither the NASA Office of Inspector General nor the 

Government Accountability Office issued reports of relevance to the subject of this 

report. 

 

27 OMB M-09-15, “Updated Implementing Guidance for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 

2009,” April 3, 2009; OMB M-09-10, “Initial Implementing Guidance for the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009,” February 18, 2009; OMB M-10-34, “Updated Implementing Guidance for 

the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,” September 24, 2010.
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-12-022 17

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX C 

18 REPORT NO. IG-12-022 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Administrator

Deputy Administrator

Chief of Staff

Chief Financial Officer/Recovery Act Senior Accountable Official 

Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 

Deputy Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems Development Division

Recovery Act Implementation Executive

NASA Advisory Council’s Audit, Finance, and Analysis Committee 

Director, Kennedy Space Center

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch

Government Accountability Office 

Director, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and 

Ranking Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
REPORT NO. IG-12-022 19

Major Contributors to the Report: 

Rebecca Sharek, Former Director, Space Operations Directorate

Ridge Bowman, Director, Space Operations Directorate 

Paul Johnson, Project Manager

Doug Orton, Team Leader

Linda Hargrove, Management Analyst

Barbara Moody, Auditor

Michael Palinkas, Management Analyst

Dimitra Tsamis, Management Analyst
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012

REPORT No. IG-12-022 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

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