IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52416-3-II

Respondent,

v.

ISIDRO LYNN APODACA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

LEE, A.C.J. — Isidro L. Apodaca appeals his unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle 

conviction. He challenges the trial court’s refusal to give his abandoned property jury instruction 

and its imposition of interest on nonrestitution legal financial obligations (LFOs). The State 

concedes that the interest accrual provision on nonrestitution LFOs should be stricken. We affirm 

Apodaca’s conviction, but we remand to the sentencing court to strike the interest provision on 

nonrestitution LFOs.

FACTS

On February 1, 2018, William Marks discovered his green Honda Civic was missing. He 

had parked his locked vehicle at his apartment complex the night before. Marks reported to the 

police that his vehicle had been stolen.

The next day, Keola Ceridon, an asset protection team leader for a department store, 

observed a man and a woman in the parking lot with a stick object poking through the window of 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

March 3, 2020
No. 52416-3-II

2

a green Honda Civic. The man appeared to be trying to open the window of the car. The two 

individuals eventually got into the vehicle and drove across the street to another parking lot. 

Ceridon called the police.

Officer Brian VanSickle responded and found the Honda in the parking lot. VanSickle ran 

the license plate through dispatch and discovered the vehicle was stolen. As he drove around to 

the front of the car, VanSickle saw a man, later identified as Apodaca, walking away from the back 

of the car. VanSickle stopped Apodaca. As VanSickle patted Apodaca down for weapons, 

Apodaca said, “‘Just let her go. She didn’t know the vehicle was stolen,’” referring to the woman 

with him. 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (August 20, 2018) at 213.

Officer Vansickle then arrested Apodaca and he again stated, “‘Let her go. She did not 

know.’” 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 214. Apodaca told the officer he got the car in Kent, that he 

knew he should not have taken it, but he was cold. Apodaca then stated that someone else had 

already taken the car and he had gotten it off the side of the road. VanSickle found shaved keys 

and a file in Apodaca’s pockets.1

The State charged Apodaca with unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. During trial, 

Marks testified that his locked vehicle was taken from where he had parked it the night before and 

that he did not give anyone permission to use his vehicle. He also testified that when he retrieved 

his vehicle after Apodaca’s arrest, the ignition was “punched in” and the plastic between the dash 

and steering wheel was removed. 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 177-78. Officer VanSickle testified 

 

1

 Shaved keys have the edges filed down so you “can use them to jiggle to start vehicles.” 2 VRP 

(August 20, 2018) at 216.
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to Apodaca’s statements that the woman did not know the car was stolen, he took the vehicle 

because he was cold, and he got it off the side of the road.

Apodaca requested the following jury instruction: “Abandoned property is not the property 

of another. Property is abandoned when the owner intentionally gives up possession of the 

property.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 18. The trial court declined to give the proposed instruction, 

concluding, “In this particular case, I do not believe [the instruction] factually or legally fits the 

facts within this case.” 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 247. The trial court clarified that assuming 

Apodaca’s statement was true, “[t]he fact that [the vehicle] was left by the side of the road would 

also imply that a person had left to go get a tow truck, or some other such thing” and would not 

support that the vehicle was abandoned. 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 249. Thus, “there is not, to 

this Court’s mind, sufficient facts before the trier of fact in order to make that particular argument.” 

2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 249.

The trial court also stated that Apodaca could still argue to the jury that he did not have 

knowledge the vehicle was stolen. Defense repeatedly argued to the jury that Apodaca did not 

know the vehicle was stolen. Specifically, defense counsel argued to the jury that if someone else 

stole the car and abandoned it on the side of the road, then it was “not a crime” for Apodaca to 

take possession of the vehicle. 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 273. Defense counsel also argued to 

the jury that the evidence suggested that Apodaca did not know the car was stolen “until he was 

arrested.” 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 274.

The jury found Apodaca guilty as charged. The sentencing court found Apodaca indigent. 

Apodaca’s judgment and sentence includes a boilerplate interest provision, stating, “The financial 
No. 52416-3-II

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obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the judgment until 

payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments.” CP at 79. Apodaca appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. JURY INSTRUCTION 

Apodaca argues that the trial court erred by refusing to provide his proposed jury 

instruction regarding abandoned property. He further argues the trial court’s refusal to provide his 

proposed jury instruction denied Apodaca his constitutional right to present a defense. We 

disagree.

1. Legal Principles

We review a trial court’s refusal to give a proposed jury instruction based on lack of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ehrhardt, 167 Wn. App. 934, 939, 276 P.3d 332 

(2012). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly unreasonable or based on 

untenable grounds. State v. Salgado-Mendoza, 189 Wn.2d 420, 427, 403 P.3d 45 (2017). A party 

is entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of the case when evidence exists in the record to support 

the party’s theory. State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 191, 721 P.2d 902 (1986).

Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. CONST. amends. 

V, VI, XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 22; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S. Ct. 

1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973). However, “[t]his right is not absolute.” State v. Arredondo, 188 

Wn.2d 244, 265, 394 P.3d 348 (2017). The defendant’s right to present a defense is subject to 

“established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the 

ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; State v. Cayetano-Jaimes, 190 

Wn. App. 286, 296, 359 P.3d 919 (2015).
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When reviewing trial court discretionary rulings that potentially implicate constitutional 

rights, we engage in a “two-step review process.” See State v. Arndt, ___ Wn.2d ___, 453 P.3d 

696, 703 (2019) (concerning discretionary evidentiary rulings) (citing State v. Clark, 187 Wn.2d 

641, 648-56, 389 P.3d 462 (2017)). We first review whether there has been an abuse of discretion 

and then consider de novo the constitutional question of whether the ruling deprived the defendant 

of his or her Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Id.

2. No Abuse of Discretion

Apodaca requested that the jury be instructed that “[a]bandoned property is not the property 

of another. Property is abandoned when the owner intentionally gives up possession of the 

property.” CP at 18. Apodaca argues this jury instruction was necessary to show he did not have 

knowledge that the vehicle was stolen.2 But there must be evidence in the record to support 

Apodaca’s theory that the vehicle was abandoned. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d at 191. There is not.

Here, there is no evidence that Marks, the owner of the vehicle, intentionally gave up 

possession of the vehicle. Rather, the overwhelming evidence showed that the vehicle was not 

abandoned. The vehicle’s owner testified he parked his locked vehicle outside his apartment in 

Kent and did not give permission for anyone to drive it. The next day after the vehicle was reported 

stolen, Apodaca was seen with the vehicle. The vehicle’s ignition was “punched in” and the plastic 

between the dash and steering wheel was removed. 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 177. Apodaca 

 

2

 Under RCW 9A.56.068(1), a “person is guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle if he or she 

possess [possesses] a stolen motor vehicle.” “Possessing stolen property” is defined as “knowingly 

to receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen 

and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true owner.” RCW 

9A.56.140(1).
No. 52416-3-II

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twice told the officer that the woman he was with did not know the vehicle was stolen, but did not 

reference his own knowledge. Instead, Apodaca told VanSickle he got the car in Kent and that he 

knew he should not have taken it, but he was cold. He later told VanSickle that someone else had 

already taken the vehicle and he just got it off the side of the road. VanSickle found shaved keys 

and a file in Apodaca’s pockets.

The trial court declined to give Apodaca’s proposed instruction, concluding, “In this 

particular case, I do not believe [the instruction] factually or legally fits the facts within this case.” 

2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 247. The trial court clarified that assuming Apodaca’s statement 

about finding the vehicle on the side of the road was true, “that . . . would . . . imply that a person 

had left to go get a tow truck, or some other such thing” and would not support that the vehicle 

was abandoned. 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 249. The trial court also stated that Apodaca could 

still argue to the jury that he did not have knowledge the vehicle was stolen, which he did.

Because the evidence in the record did not support Apodaca’s proposed jury instruction, 

the trial court’s ruling was not manifestly unreasonable. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion.

3. Right To Present a Defense 

Turning to Apodaca’s argument that he was denied his constitutional right to present a 

defense, the State was required to prove that Apodaca knew that the vehicle was stolen. RCW 

9A.56.068(1); RCW 9A.56.140(1). Defense counsel argued during closing arguments that 

Apodaca did not know the vehicle was stolen. Specifically, defense counsel argued that if someone 

else stole the car and abandoned it on the side of the road, then it was “not a crime” for Apodaca 

to take possession of the vehicle. 2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 273. Defense counsel also argued 
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that the evidence suggested that Apodaca did not know the car was stolen “until he was arrested.” 

2 VRP (August 20, 2018) at 274. 

Accordingly, Apodaca’s proposed jury instruction was not necessary in order for him to 

argue that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. He, therefore, fails to show that omission of 

his proposed jury instruction limited his right to present a defense.3

B. LFOS

Apodaca challenges the provision of his judgment and sentence imposing interest on 

nonrestitution LFOs in light of State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). The State 

concedes that the interest accrual provision on nonrestitution LFOs should be stricken. We accept 

the State’s concession.

Currently, the LFO statutes prohibit sentencing courts from imposing interest accrual on 

the nonrestitution portions of LFOs. RCW 10.82.090(2)(a); Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d at 746-47 (2018 

legislative amendments apply prospectively to all cases pending on direct review and not final 

when the amendment was enacted). Therefore, we accept the State’s concession that the interest 

accrual provision on nonrestitution LFOs should be stricken, and we remand to the sentencing 

court to strike the interest accrual provision on nonrestitution LFOs from Apodaca’s judgment and 

sentence.

We affirm Apodaca’s conviction, but we remand to the sentencing court to strike the 

interest provision on nonrestitution LFOs.

 

3

 Based on our disposition of this case, we need not reach the State’s harmless error argument.
No. 52416-3-II

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A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Lee, A.C.J.

We concur:

Worswick, J.

Cruser, J.