Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

DHS' Role in 
 

State and Local Fusion Centers 
 

Is Evolving 
 

OIG-09-12 December 2008 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

 December 10, 2008 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

In response to a congressional request from U.S. Representative Bennie G. Thompson, 

Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, our report addresses whether 

DHS is providing adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what problems 

and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. It is based on interviews 

with employees and officials of relevant federal and state agencies and departments, 

direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

hope that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. 

We express our appreciation to all who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 
 

Inspector General 
 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 
 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 


Background..........................................................................................................................3
 


Results of Review ................................................................................................................8
 


Fusion Center Coordination Is Improving and Evolving, But Some Challenges 
 

Remain ...........................................................................................................................8
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................15 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................16 
 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ Coordination Within the 
 

Department of Homeland Security Is Progressing, But 
 

Major Challenges Still Exist ........................................................................................17 
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................25 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................25 
 

Additional Work Is Necessary to Align Fusion Center Funding
 

and Activities With the Department of Homeland Security’s Mission .......................27 
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................32 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................32 
 

Fusion Centers Are Concerned With Sustainability and Funding...............................34 
 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ Intelligence Officers 
 

Are Adding Value to Fusion Centers...........................................................................37 
 

Deploying Intelligence Officers to Fusion Centers Has Been a Challenge
 

for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis ................................................................39 
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................45 
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................46 
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology........................................................47 
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ........................................48 
 

Appendix C: DHS-Managed Systems Available to Fusion Centers...........................54 
 

Appendix D: Office of Inspections’ Fusion Center Sample, March 2008..................55 
 

Appendix E: Major Contributors to This Report ........................................................56 
 

Appendix F: Report Distribution ................................................................................57 
 
Abbreviations 

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USCG United States Coast Guard 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Services 
OIG
 


Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Improving intelligence gathering and information sharing at all levels of 

government has been a major concern and priority since the terrorist attacks 

of September 11, 2001. To promote greater information sharing and 

collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence and law 

enforcement entities, state and local authorities established fusion centers 

throughout the country. These centers are a collaborative effort of two or 

more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the 

center with the goal of maximizing its ability to detect, prevent, investigate, 

and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 

In June 2006, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 

signed an implementation plan to support state and local fusion centers 

and designated the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as the executive 

agent for managing the department’s role in the nationwide Fusion Center 

Initiative. The department’s fusion center program is intended to provide 

information, people, technology, and other resources to fusion centers to 

create a web of interconnected information nodes across the country. 

At the request of Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security, we assessed whether the 

Department of Homeland Security is providing adequate oversight and 

guidance for fusion centers, and what problems and challenges are being 

encountered as fusion centers develop. Specifically, we determined: 

(1) the extent to which the department’s Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis has been working to coordinate and develop its relationship and 

role with fusion centers; (2) whether fusion center funding and activities 

are aligned to further the department’s mission; (3) the merits of detailing 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis staff to fusion centers; and (4) whether 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is successful in backfilling 

positions used to staff fusion centers. 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis coordination efforts with fusion 

centers are improving and evolving, and its intelligence officers assigned 

to fusion centers have added value. However, challenges remain with 

internal Department of Homeland Security coordination, aligning fusion 

center activities and funding with the department’s mission, and deploying 

personnel to state and local fusion centers in a timely manner. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 1 
We are making seven recommendations to assist the Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis in improving the overall effectiveness of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s fusion center program. In response to 

our report, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has proposed plans and 

taken action that, once fully implemented, will reduce a number of the 

deficiencies we identified. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

concurred with all seven recommendations. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 2 

Background 

Improving intelligence gathering and information sharing at all levels of 

government has been a major concern and priority since the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 

established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and charged it 

with coordinating activities and improving information sharing efforts 

among federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies and the private 

sector. Furthermore, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 

the United States, the 9/11 Commission, concluded that a lack of 

information sharing contributed to the inability to prevent the attacks. 

Moreover, in its 2004 final report, the 9/11 Commission promoted the 

value of state and local agencies in the information sharing process and 

recommended that DHS have the responsibility of coordinating these 

efforts.1 

Establishing Fusion Centers 

Information sharing has become the primary means to detect, identify, and 

assess terrorist threats to and vulnerabilities of the homeland. To promote 

greater information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, and 

local intelligence and law enforcement entities, state and local authorities 

established fusion centers throughout the country. 

Fusion centers are “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that 

provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of 

maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to 

criminal and terrorist activity.”2

 They are joint multi-jurisdictional 

information centers that combine data from various sources and 

disciplines. The term fusion refers to the process of managing the flow of 

information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government 

and private industry, and through analysis, provides meaningful 

intelligence. 

Legislation and Initiatives To Facilitate Information Sharing 

To aid information sharing efforts further, Congress enacted the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This Act 

established the Information Sharing Environment within the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence.3

 The Information Sharing Environment 

1 The 9/11 Commission Report, July 2004. http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
 
 2

 DHS and the Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006.
 3

 Public Law 108-458 § 1016. 
 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 3 

is “an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information.”4 The 

Implementation Plan for the Information Sharing Environment envisions 

that the federal government will promote the establishment of a 

nationwide and integrated network of state and major urban area fusion 

centers to facilitate effective terrorism information sharing. This network 

of fusion centers would house federal, state, and local law enforcement 

and intelligence resources to provide useful sources of law enforcement 

and threat information, facilitate information sharing across jurisdictions 

and functions, and establish a conduit among federal, state, and local 

agencies. 

Recognizing that state and local governments are vital partners in 

information sharing, federal agencies such as DHS, the Department of 

Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have 

collaborated to assist in establishing and sustaining fusion centers. 

Creating Fusion Center Guidance and Information Sharing 

Requirements 

On December 16, 2005, the President issued a memorandum prescribing 

the guidelines and requirements supporting the creation and 

implementation of the Information Sharing Environment.5

 The President 

directed the heads of executive departments and agencies to work actively 

to create a culture of information sharing within their respective 

departments or agencies by assigning personnel and dedicating resources 

to terrorism-related information sharing. The President’s guidelines 

recognized that state, local, and tribal authorities are critical to the 

nationwide efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks and are the first to 

respond when an attack occurs. 

In August 2006, DHS and the Department of Justice published the Fusion 

Center Guidelines to help direct and provide assistance to developing 

fusion centers. These guidelines delineate 18 recommended elements for 

establishing and operating fusion centers. The guidelines are intended to 

improve consistency among the many different state and local fusion 

centers, enhance coordination, strengthen regional and national 

partnerships, and improve fusion center capabilities. 

4

 Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, accessed March 28, 2008. 
 

http://www.ise.gov/pages/organization.html.
 
 5

 “Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Guidelines and Requirements in 
 

Support of the Information Sharing Environment,” Office of the Press Secretary, December 16, 2005.
 


http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051216-10.html.
 


DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 4 
Developing a Strategy for Information Sharing With Fusion Centers 

In October 2007, the President issued the first National Strategy for 

Information Sharing6

 to prioritize and unify the Nation’s efforts to 

advance terrorism-related information sharing. The strategy integrates 

Information Sharing Environment-related initiatives and sets forth a 

national plan to build on progress made in improving information sharing 

and establishing an integrated national information sharing capability. 

The National Strategy emphasizes that information on homeland security, 

terrorism, and law enforcement related to terrorism can come from 

multiple sources and all levels of government. 

The National Strategy designates fusion centers as vital assets critical to 

information sharing and antiterrorism efforts, and as the primary state and 

local focal points for receiving and sharing of terrorism-related 

information. As a part of the National Strategy, the federal government 

recommends that fusion centers achieve a baseline capability level and 

become interconnected with the federal government and each other. This 

collaboration is intended to create a nationwide, integrated network of 

fusion centers to enable the effective sharing of terrorism-related 

information. 

As of April 2008, state and local authorities have created 58 fusion centers 

nationwide. The centers’ goals are to blend law enforcement and 

intelligence information, and coordinate security measures to reduce 

threats in local communities. Fusion centers vary in size, scope, 

jurisdiction, capability, and maturity. The missions of these centers also 

vary. For example, some fusion centers are focused specifically on 

terrorism-related threats, others deal with information sharing related to all 

crimes, while other centers focus on addressing all hazards. 

DHS’ Implementation of the Fusion Center Program 

DHS uses the national intelligence and law enforcement communities to 

support state and local government requirements through its fusion center 

program. In June 2006, the Secretary signed the DHS Support 

Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers and designated 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) as its executive agent for 

managing the department’s role in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. 

The implementation plan identified state and local governments among 

DHS’ primary partners. It also explained DHS’ role in supporting and 

developing state and local partnerships and highlighted domestic 

6 National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related 

Information Sharing, October 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 5 

�

�

�
 

information gathering and analysis as DHS’ “unique contribution to the 

national-level mission” to protect the Nation. Further, the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 codified the 

nationwide Fusion Center Initiative and DHS’ role in it.7 

DHS’ fusion center program is intended to provide information, people, 

technology, and other resources to fusion centers to create a nationwide 

web of interconnected information nodes. DHS views fusion centers as 

entities that provide critical sources of unique law enforcement and threat 

information, and facilitate sharing information across federal, state, and 

local jurisdictions and functions. DHS envisions creating partnerships 

with all state and local fusion centers to improve information flow 

between DHS and the fusion centers, and to improve the effectiveness of 

the centers in general. The goal is to enable DHS and the fusion center 

network to produce accurate, timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence 

products and services in support of securing the homeland. 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ Role in DHS’ Fusion Center 

Program 

As the executive agent for managing DHS’ fusion center program, I&A is 

responsible for coordinating among its federal, state, local, tribal, and 

private sector partners to ensure the program’s success. Each I&A 

division has a specific mission that in some way relates to the program. 

I&A is headed by an Under Secretary, who also serves as the department’s 

Chief Intelligence Officer. The State and Local Program Office, which 

coordinates the fusion center program, is directed by a program manager. 

The State and Local Program Office contains three divisions: 

State and Local Fusion Center Program Management Office; 


Information Sharing Fellows Program; and 


Law Enforcement Liaison Team. 


The Program Management Office directs the day-to-day operations of 

DHS’ fusion center program, including the management and coordination 

of deployed officers and Homeland Secure Data Network8

 access. 

Through the Information Sharing Fellows Program, state or local 

representatives are detailed temporarily to I&A to familiarize state and 

local entities with DHS missions, capabilities, roles, and programs, and to 

promote information sharing among federal, state, and local entities. Law 

Enforcement Liaison Team representatives liaise with state and local law 

7 Public Law 110-53 § 511. 
 

8

 The Homeland Secure Data Network is DHS’ classified communications network system to which 
 

federal, state, and local users can post and manage information. 
 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 6 
enforcement entities to advise them about DHS’ role in the nationwide 

Fusion Center Initiative, promote state and local use of DHS systems and 

databases such as the Homeland Security Information Network,9

 and 

improve information sharing. Figure 1 depicts I&A’s current 

organizational chart. 

Figure 1: Office of Intelligence and Analysis Organizational Chart, as of March 2008 

Source: I&A 

DHS Support to Fusion Centers 

As part of its support to fusion centers, DHS has provided more than $254 

million, from FY 2004 to FY 2007, to state and local governments.10 DHS 

is also deploying personnel to fusion centers to facilitate state and local 

access to information, technology, and training. The Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 specifies that DHS 

9

 The Homeland Security Information Network is DHS’ primary, nationwide information-sharing 

application for sharing sensitive but unclassified information. The network is composed of more than 35 

community-of-interest topic-portals, such as Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Emergency Management. 10 DHS State and Local Fusion Center Initiative Web site, accessed May 21, 2008. 

http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156877184684.shtm. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 7 
intelligence officers may be assigned from I&A, the Office of 

Infrastructure Protection, the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigrations 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other 

DHS components as determined by the Secretary. I&A has deployed 

intelligence officers to work side by side with state and local authorities at 

fusion centers and to facilitate the two-way flow of timely, accurate, and 

actionable information on all types of threats. As of April 2008, I&A has 

deployed 22 intelligence officers, and the Under Secretary anticipates 

having 35 officers in major fusion centers nationwide by the end of FY 

2008. 

At the request of Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security, we assessed whether DHS is 

providing adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what 

problems and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. 

Specifically, we examined the following: 

�	 The extent to which I&A has been working to coordinate and 

develop its relationship and role with fusion centers; 

�	 Whether fusion center funding and activities are aligned to further 

the department’s mission; 

�	 The merits of detailing I&A staff to fusion centers; and 

�	 Whether I&A is successful in backfilling positions used to staff 

fusion centers. 

Results of Review 

Fusion Center Coordination Is Improving and Evolving, But 

Some Challenges Remain 

Coordination efforts with fusion centers continue to improve through the 

combined efforts of I&A and other federal, state, and local information 

sharing partners. Many state and local fusion center officials praised 

I&A’s efforts on the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. However, fusion 

center officials remain concerned that I&A has not developed an action 

plan to ensure that it understands and can meet the centers’ evolving and 

unique needs. Such needs include receiving adequate and timely 

information from DHS, assistance in navigating DHS’ complex 

organization, and obtaining initial and ongoing training for state and local 

analysts. I&A is working to address fusion center coordination needs by 

improving access to information, responding to Requests for Information, 

assisting fusion centers in coordinating communications with DHS 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 8 
components, and developing and offering training opportunities to state 

and local officials. 

Adequate and Timely Information Dissemination Needs Improvement 

Fusion centers have experienced difficulty receiving adequate and timely 

information from DHS. Many fusion center officials we interviewed said 

that they received irrelevant or outdated information in the past. In 

addition, center officials could not determine whether the information was 

adequately processed through all relevant systems or coordinated with 

other intelligence or law enforcement entities. However, according to 

I&A officials, I&A is striving to meet the needs of fusion centers. In an 

April 2008 speech, the Under Secretary for I&A recognized that state and 

local authorities have been analyzing and acting on information for years 

and the federal government must aggressively support these endeavors. 

As a result, I&A plans to increase its support to state and local partners in 

three main areas: standing information needs, Requests for Information, 

and use of open source information. 

Although much work remains, fusion center officials note many 

improvements in obtaining timely and relevant information from DHS. 

For example, a sample of fusion centers are benefiting from a pilot 

program to improve Request for Information processing and from access 

to deployed intelligence representatives. 

The Request for Information Process Increases Information Support to 

State and Local Partners 

Fusion center officials identified information needs as a primary concern. 

I&A has taken steps to improve DHS’ Request for Information process 

and implemented a pilot program to refine the department’s response to 

fusion center information requests. Such requests express a need for 

information that can be satisfied through the exploitation of existing 

databases or analyses not normally available to the requestor. The 

requestor may be a person, component, agency, or a group of 

organizations or stakeholders. 

The Request for Information pilot program examined information flows 

and processes regarding requests, standing information needs, and open 

source information. The pilot program identified several areas needing 

improvement, including establishing a single point of entry to submit 

Requests for Information, improving response time, and training fusion 

center personnel on how to access information through the Request for 

Information process. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 9 
DHS has established policies, procedures, and responsibilities for 

departmental processing of Requests for Information. Through the 

Request for Information pilot process and deployed officers, fusion centers 

gain assistance in obtaining information from DHS. However, DHS needs 

to improve the quality and timeliness of DHS information support to 

fusion centers and establish a single point of service. 

Creation of Fusion Cell Within the National Operations Center 

I&A accepts, processes, and responds to Requests for Information through 

the National Operations Center. I&A coordinates with the Office of 

Operations Coordination, which oversees the National Operations Center. 

The center collects and processes information from more than 35 federal, 

state, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector agencies; it is the primary 

national-level hub for domestic situational awareness, information 

processing and sharing, communications, and coordination pertaining to 

terrorist attack prevention and domestic incident management. 

Within the National Operations Center, the Fusion Cell serves as the initial 

entry point for inquiries and requests from deployed I&A officers or 

fusion center personnel for intelligence and operations information. The 

Fusion Cell, established in 2007, tasks requests that are deemed 

“immediate action” within the center. More in-depth requests are 

forwarded to I&A’s Collection Requirements division for further analysis 

and delegated to the appropriate responder, such as an analyst in one of 

I&A analytical divisions, DHS components, or other intelligence 

community agencies. 

The Fusion Cell comprises personnel from the National Operations 

Center’s Fusion Desk and I&A’s Watch and Warning division. There are 

two branches within the Watch and Warning division. One branch is the 

Watch Section, which operates 24 hours per day, 7 days per week to 

maintain situational awareness. The second branch is the Warning 

Section, which deals primarily with intelligence threats and notifications 

to state and local entities, fusion centers, and other homeland security 

personnel as appropriate. The Warning Section coordinates with the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on intelligence products. The 

products are approved by the Under Secretary for I&A, and disseminated 

by the Watch and Warning division. The Watch Section distributes daily 

intelligence updates and provides information to DHS representatives in 

the fusion centers. Both sections focus primarily on domestic threats to fit 

the state and local fusion center needs. Classified products are distributed 

through the secure Homeland Secure Data Network. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 10 
 

Request for Information Pilot Project Implemented 

Beginning in July 2007, I&A conducted a six-month pilot project to 

evaluate and improve its Request for Information process. The pilot 

examined information flows and processes regarding requests, routine 

information needs, and open source information. It was intended to 

upgrade the quality and timeliness of DHS information support to fusion 

centers, and establish a single point of service for fusion centers to submit 

requests. DHS’ State and Local Fusion Center Support Oversight Group, 

an integrated product team of the Information Sharing and Collaboration 

Council, was established to provide oversight. The group, composed of 

I&A division chief managers; senior I&A analysts assigned to the pilot 

project; and representatives from the National Operations Center, Fusion 

Desk, ICE, and CBP, monitored the pilot. The group assessed the pilot’s 

operation and acted as necessary to resolve requests, meet fusion center 

standing information needs, and other issues of significance. 

The pilot was conducted at six fusion centers—two in California and one 

each in Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York. National 

Operations Center officials said that all requests were treated with equal 

importance, whether the request originated from a pilot site or nonpilot 

site, but pilot-site Requests for Information were tracked separately for 

statistical purposes and analysis. A senior I&A official said that although 

the initial pilot officially concluded in December 2007, I&A decided to 

extend it to conduct a complete review of I&A’s efforts with all fusion 

centers. 

Pilot Project Results 

The results described improvements made since the pilot’s inception and 

included recommendations for increasing performance, efficiency, quality 

and timeliness of responses, and overall program effectiveness. For 

example, I&A should assist states in developing priority information needs 

to reflect each fusion center’s top priorities and focus areas for the 

upcoming year. Some of the top priorities for the pilot fusion centers 

include threats to critical infrastructure and prison radicalization. These 

information needs give I&A an “accurate picture of each fusion center’s 

mission-critical intelligence support needs.”11 Identifying needs may 

encourage dialogue between DHS and fusion centers, as well as direct 

analyst-to-analyst exchanges. I&A also may use the priority needs to 

inform its production planning. 

11 Enhancing DHS Information Support to State and Local Fusion Centers: Results of the Chief Intelligence 

Officer’s Pilot Project and Next Steps, Centra Technology, February 20, 2008. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

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I&A is working to improve its response time and critical needs 

assessments for fusion centers through the pilot project. One I&A 

representative said that it reflects poorly on DHS when information 

requests from state and local officials do not receive timely or sufficient 

attention. Another DHS official reported that, prior to the pilot, the 

interaction between the Offices of Operations Coordination and I&A was 

not streamlined. As a result, there was some friction over who had what 

information and who was responsible for tasking the requests. The pilot 

project attempted to formalize the process to determine information flow 

and needs. 

Operating Outside the Established Request for Information Process 

Several fusion center officials and I&A representatives reported that the 

information flow to and from DHS is inconsistent and the Request for 

Information process still needs improvement. For example, many I&A 

officers assigned to fusion centers rely on prior informal relationships with 

the National Operations Center or I&A personnel to obtain information, 

rather than using the established Fusion Cell request process. In addition, 

some fusion center personnel rely on their I&A officers, or on previously 

developed DHS contacts, to obtain information rather than navigate DHS’ 

information system or the National Operations Center Fusion Cell. 

Additional Needs for Law Enforcement and Immigration Information 

Some of the information that interests fusion center personnel is 

incomplete, classified intelligence from the intelligence community, which 

could be provided by I&A. However, many state and local personnel 

desire access to law enforcement information that is more readily available 

from DHS’ law enforcement components, such as ICE and CBP, or 

immigration information managed by U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations 

Services (USCIS). A State and Local Program Office official said that 

DHS has a great deal of information at its disposal that could be useful to 

state and local authorities, such as immigration and law enforcement 

information in databases managed by CBP, ICE, and USCIS. As I&A 

employees, the deployed officers may not be best suited to provide fusion 

center personnel with information from those databases, which are largely 

under the control of other DHS components. 

Navigating DHS’ Complex Organization Is More Efficient When I&A 

Representatives Are Deployed 

The majority of fusion center officials whom we spoke with reported 

frustrations when navigating DHS’ complex organization, and are 

confused by the department’s structure. As a result, state and local 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 12 
officials rely on their assigned I&A officer for fast, efficient, and adequate 

responses to their information needs. In response, I&A officials said that 

I&A continues to identify ways to improve the Request for Information 

process. For example, one I&A representative said that when there is an 

administrative request, such as a Request for Information about security 

clearances, the representative refers the request to I&A’s State and Local 

Program Office, who could be immediately and appropriately tasked. 

In another example, should a request involve an analytical product, the 

representative refers the request to one of I&A’s analytical branches for 

resolution. To discourage the practice of several fusion center officials 

contacting multiple DHS components directly for information, another 

I&A representative suggested creating a single email address to receive 

requests from fusion center officials and provide one “DHS answer.” 

DHS is taking steps to facilitate efficient and coordinated communications 

between it and the fusion centers by enhancing I&A’s Request for 

Information process and by requesting that each state that has multiple 

fusion centers designate one of its centers as the primary point of contact 

with DHS. 

Analytical Training, Working Groups, and Conferences That Target 

Fusion Centers Are Viewed As Beneficial 

Fusion center officials reported benefits from DHS communications, 

training, and outreach efforts, as these efforts enhance state and local 

officials’ understanding of the federal intelligence community and their 

role within the community. However, fusion center officials expressed a 

need to obtain more structured and formalized analytical training to 

improve their ability to generate products for the intelligence community, 

and to facilitate coordination and communication between DHS and the 

fusion centers. Fusion center officials also reported that budget 

constraints limit their ability to send personnel to out-of-state training. 

One fusion center director said funds are not routinely available to send 

personnel to off-site training or conferences, and it can be difficult 

convincing state governments to fund such travel. A number of fusion 

center officials suggested that DHS conduct training outside of the 

Washington, DC, metropolitan area and explore the feasibility of online 

training modules to provide low- or no-cost training to state and local field 

personnel. 

I&A Is Developing Training for State and Local Governments 

The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

mandates that I&A develop training opportunities for state and local 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 13 
government officials.12 According to the Deputy Under Secretary for 

Operations, I&A is developing specific training plans to support the needs 

of state and local analysts and deployed I&A officers. Specifically, I&A 

divisions have developed targeted training opportunities for state and local 

government officials. These I&A divisions participate in, coordinate, and 

host analytical exchanges, working groups, workshops, training sessions, 

and conferences to develop I&A’s relationship with fusion centers. 

Although subject matter varies, focus areas include maritime and border 

security, extremism and radicalization, programmatic and planning 

elements, and state intelligence requirements. 

I&A issues information related to analytical training in its weekly training 

newsletter. The newsletter provides descriptions of intelligence-related 

courses, such as Best Practices in Community Collaboration, Intelligence 

Oversight and Information Handling, and Analytical Thinking and 

Presentation. I&A has conducted Reports Officers training and 

intelligence writing courses, and is working with DHS’ Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties and Office of the Chief Privacy Officer to 

develop privacy and civil liberties training, as required by the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

Working Groups and Conferences Have Been Established To Enhance 

Coordination 

To ensure that DHS is working toward coordinating with fusion centers, 

I&A personnel are also involved in various working groups and 

committees. For example, the National Fusion Center Coordination 

Group, co-chaired by I&A’s State and Local Program Office program 

manager and the FBI’s Deputy Assistant Director for the Directorate of 

Intelligence, was established as part of the Information Sharing 

Environment to oversee progress and encourage collaboration on the 

nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. The National Fusion Center 

Coordination Group operates with the full participation of state and local 

officials to help ensure that the federal government’s efforts to work with 

fusion centers are coordinated and carried out efficiently. Additionally, 

I&A’s State and Local Program Office helps coordinate the annual, jointly 

planned DHS and Department of Justice National Fusion Center 

Conferences, which were held in Destin, Florida, in March 2007, and in 

San Francisco, California, in March 2008. 

12 Public Law 110-53 § 511. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 14 
Deployed I&A Officers Participate in Various Forums To Facilitate 

Communication and Coordination 

Deployed I&A officers said that they participate in or lead working 

groups, briefings, planning meetings, and governance committees 

designed to improve information sharing and coordinate state, local, 

regional, and national efforts. I&A officers serve as advisors on fusion 

center governing boards and planning committees, such as the Maryland 

Coordination and Analysis Center’s Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council, the 

Alabama Fusion Center Advisory Board, the Mississippi Fusion Center 

Steering Committee, and the National Capital Region Fusion Center 

Regional Programmatic Working Group. 

In addition, I&A officers may attend or lead sessions at regional forums, 

outreach groups, and homeland security task forces whose members 

include federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement 

representatives. I&A officers also participate in regional consortiums such 

as Southern Shield, which unites law enforcement and fusion center 

personnel in the Southeast region. I&A officials said they have hosted 

many fusion center officials in Washington, DC. One fusion center 

director reported that a classified intelligence briefing given in 

Washington in June 2007 was a valuable experience. The State and Local 

Program Office has also given briefings in the field to fusion center 

personnel and state and local government officials, such as governors and 

state Homeland Security Advisors. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis, in coordination with relevant DHS components: 

Recommendation #1: Develop a plan to improve the adequacy, 

quality, and timeliness of responses to Requests for Information, 

and identify designated points-of-contact between I&A and fusion 

centers to receive, task, and respond to information needs. 

Recommendation #2: Develop a plan to expand analytical 

training courses, provide additional course locations, and explore 

the feasibility of online training modules to provide low- or no-cost 

training to state and local fusion center personnel. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 15 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated I&A’s written comments and have made changes to 

the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of I&A’s 

written response to the report’s recommendations and our analysis 

of the response follows each recommendation. A copy of I&A’s 

response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B. 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 1. In its 

response, I&A said that it has created a single point of service to 

increase the ease of use, efficiency, and quality of support for its 

state and local fusion center partners. This single point of service 

provides fusion centers with a one-stop shop for DHS information 

and intelligence support. It employs a streamlined Request for 

Information process to ensure that I&A’s partners’ needs are 

addressed quickly and effectively. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending receipt of 

documentation that describes the current single point of service 

and the streamlined Request for Information processes, as well as 

the way in which I&A will measure and document improvements 

in its ability to respond quickly and effectively to the information 

needs of fusion centers. 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 2. In its 

response, I&A said that Section 503 of the 9/11 Commission Act 

mandates that DHS develop training curricula on the intelligence 

cycle for state and local officials, using existing training programs 

as appropriate and assessing needs of the target audience. The 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise Training Working Group was formed 

to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence training-related 

requirements in the 9/11 Commission Act. As a result, this 

working group has developed and delivered the DHS Analytic and 

Critical Thinking Skills Workshop, which is mobile training that 

combines elements of critical thinking, analytic tools, techniques, 

and writing. I&A said that it has delivered 4 workshop classes to 

more than 80 state and local students; and has plans to offer 

training to another 140 state and local analysts over the next year. 

This training is delivered regionally at sites readily accessible to 

fusion center personnel. 

Additionally, I&A said that it is pursuing a more flexible delivery 

system for DHS’ Basic Intelligence and Threat Assessment 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 16 
Course, which is currently only offered at facilities in the 

Washington, DC, metropolitan area. I&A also plans to develop the 

Homeland Security Intelligence Specialist Certificate program and 

offer modules through mobile training teams at regional facilities 

nationwide. Further, I&A is working with federal partners to 

develop and provide critical training to state and local officials at 

fusion centers nationwide. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

Office of Intelligence &Analysis’ Coordination Within the 

Department of Homeland Security Is Progressing, But Major 

Challenges Still Exist 

To develop its role and relationship with fusion centers, I&A is working to 

coordinate internally among its divisions and externally among other DHS 

components. I&A has experienced some successes in this effort. Most 

notably, I&A is shifting its analytical focus and reporting to meet the 

needs of state and local officials more effectively. However, I&A’s 

coordination and support among some DHS components appears 

inconsistent, and several communication and management difficulties 

challenge I&A’s ability to fulfill its mandate as the executive agent for 

DHS’ fusion center program. 

Fusion Center Program Coordination and Support Within I&A 

Divisions Is Evolving 

State and Local Program Office officials said that they interact with all 

I&A divisions on DHS’ fusion center program. These divisions must 

work together to ensure that the program meets its objectives. The extent 

to which the State and Local Program Office interacts with each I&A 

division varies according to programmatic or operational needs. For 

example, the program office works with the Production Management 

division to coordinate and generate intelligence products for federal, state, 

and local use. The State and Local Program Office assists in the 

development of DHS’ Interaction with State and Local Fusion Center 

Concept of Operations plan, which is led by I&A’s Information Sharing 

and Knowledge Management division. Also, the program office 

coordinates with the Collection Requirements division to aid in the 

identification of federal, state, and local intelligence needs, and with the 

Homeland Environment Threat Analysis division to provide analytic and 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 17 
oversight support to the State and Local Fusion Center’s pilot project 

concerning the processing of Requests for Information. 

Some Internal Coordination Challenges Exist Within I&A 

Despite the importance of all I&A divisions participating in the fusion 

center program, coordination and support among some I&A divisions 

remains inconsistent. Although fusion center officials, I&A deployed 

officers, and I&A divisions have reported successes, additional challenges 

exist. For example, one I&A official said, “I&A divisions are playing in 

the same sandbox but building their own castles.” Another I&A officer 

suggested that coordination and communication among I&A divisions is 

confusing and varies widely. Some divisions are more helpful than others 

in obtaining information requested by fusion centers. 

I&A personnel also noted that some divisions may not have a clear 

understanding of the State and Local Program Office’s mission, 

responsibilities, and activities. This ambiguity leads to confusion over 

roles and responsibilities of the office, slows coordination, and hampers 

communications among the divisions. Some I&A officials said that 

internal coordination is further challenged by personality-driven tensions 

and confusion about meeting state and local needs. 

Efforts To Address Coordination Challenges 

As a result, I&A has begun taking measures to ensure that its divisions 

understand the overall mission and goal of DHS’ fusion center program. 

I&A is devising an internal plan to meet the needs of state and local 

partners. More important, I&A officials said that I&A is directing its 

attention to state and local entities and the divisions have been instructed 

to tailor analytical products to meet state and local customer needs. 

Greater internal coordination of the fusion center program’s mission is 

essential for DHS to succeed in its involvement in the nationwide Fusion 

Center Initiative. Executing a successful program and coordinating with 

external partners relies on I&A’s ability to coordinate more effectively 

within its internal divisions. 

I&A Coordination With and Support From Other DHS Components 

Requires Additional Attention 

To fulfill its role as the department’s executive agent for the nationwide 

Fusion Center Initiative, I&A coordinates with and needs support from 

other DHS components. However, coordination and support among a 

number of DHS components appears inconsistent, with some successes 

and several challenges reported by fusion center officials, I&A officials, 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 18 
I&A deployed officers, and DHS component representatives. 

Communications among I&A, fusion centers, and DHS components are 

sometimes conducted informally or on an ad hoc basis, which may 

exclude relevant parties with equities in information sharing on a local or 

national level. 

Some DHS Fusion Center Support Roles Are Not Clearly Understood 

Many DHS components already coordinate with state and local 

government authorities. However, as stated in DHS’ State and Local 

Fusion Center Support Implementation Plan, there is a need to work with 

fusion centers “as a Department, not as a group of separate entities.” As 

an Operations Coordination official noted, greater transparency and an 

enhanced understanding of respective roles in DHS’ fusion center 

program is important. In addition, I&A representatives reported that more 

transparency and increased communication are essential to ensure that all 

relevant components are consulted on decisions that may affect their roles 

in the fusion center program. 

Fusion Centers Request DHS Component Representatives 

A majority of state and local officials we spoke with expressed a desire 

that representatives from DHS components be assigned to their fusion 

centers. Some fusion center officials said that although they requested that 

DHS components such as ICE, CBP, or USCG assign a representative to 

their fusion center, some requests have not been fulfilled. Budget 

constraints were the reason most often cited for DHS components’ 

inability to assign personnel to fusion centers. One fusion center official 

requested a USCG representative but was told that resource constraints 

made it difficult to assign an officer to the center. Another center official 

reported that he requested a CBP officer but has not yet received 

confirmation that one would be deployed. 

Although we encountered ICE, CBP, and TSA personnel as well as DHS 

National Protection and Programs Directorate Protective Security 

Advisors working at fusion centers, we did not seek to determine the 

extent to which representatives from DHS operational components are 

assigned to fusion centers. However, few DHS components have assigned 

personnel to fusion centers, partly because the newer fusion centers are 

developing needs and resource requirements and DHS components have 

limited resources to fulfill competing priorities. The few DHS component 

representatives assigned to fusion centers is apparent when comparing 

DHS participation at fusion centers with that of other federal agencies 

such as the FBI or National Guard Bureau. Most of the fusion centers that 

we visited were co-located with FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces or 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

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received other support from FBI resources and personnel. One fusion 

center had five National Guard counter-drug analysts, while another center 

had three intelligence analysts from the FBI. 

According to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act of 2007, it is a priority for DHS to assign representatives from CBP, 

ICE, and USCG to border-state fusion centers.13 DHS’ State and Local 

Fusion Center Support Implementation Plan also recommends assigning 

personnel from DHS components other than I&A. One State and Local 

Program Office official suggested that a fusion center near a large seaport 

might prefer to have a representative from USCG, rather than a 

representative from one of I&A’s analytical divisions. Conversely, 

officials from a fusion center in a land border state might prefer a Border 

Patrol agent instead of a USCG officer. However, few fusion center 

officials we spoke with seemed inclined to refuse any personnel from any 

DHS component. 

Efforts To Address More Effective Coordination and Communication 

Formal working groups, such as the Information Sharing Governance 

Board, have formed to address some of these concerns and barriers that 

affect communication and coordination. This board is a DHS-wide forum 

that provides strategic oversight to the department’s information sharing 

activities. It is responsible for ensuring consistency in information sharing 

and collaboration on policies across the department, and assists in 

decision-making policies related to DHS’ support and interaction with 

fusion centers. The board provides a forum for senior DHS intelligence, 

operational, and management leaders to ensure consistent governance, 

both internally and externally, when interacting with the fusion centers. 

Under the auspices of the Information Sharing Governance Board, the 

Information Sharing and Collaboration Council is the coordination body 

that addresses information sharing issues, including those that support 

fusion center activities. The council drafted DHS’ Interaction with State 

and Local Fusion Centers Concept of Operations plan. 

Among the various members of the council, the Office of Operations 

Coordination has many connections with DHS’ fusion center program. 

I&A collaborates with Operations Coordination on initiatives such as the 

Fusion Center Concept of Operations plan, the Homeland Security 

Information Network, the Request for Information pilot project, and 

National Operations Center activities. According to Operations 

Coordination officials, the relationship with I&A is improving. However, 

13 Public Law 110-53, § 511. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

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Operation Coordination officials expressed a desire for better 

communication to ensure that their office receives proper visibility on and 

awareness of interagency working groups and activities related to its role 

in DHS’ fusion center program. 

Coordination Progressing Well With the Offices of the Chief Privacy 

Officer and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

The Offices of the Chief Privacy Officer and Civil Rights and Civil 

Liberties have critical roles in ensuring that DHS’ fusion center program is 

carried out in accordance with all applicable privacy and civil rights 

regulations, laws, and constitutional protections. Officials from both 

offices said that coordination with I&A is progressing well. According to 

I&A officials, these offices are essential partners in DHS’ fusion center 

program. 

Each office has participated in privacy guidelines committees and working 

groups related to fusion centers and information sharing. Also, the offices 

have been involved in drafting DHS’ State and Local Fusion Center 

Concept of Operations plan, pursuant to guidelines set forth in the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.

14 

At the conclusion of our fieldwork, the concept of operations plan was in 

the final stages of review, as the Privacy Office worked to finalize its 

Privacy Impact Assessment. 

As information sharing efforts expand, it will be even more critical for 

DHS and fusion centers to work on developing privacy, civil rights, and 

civil liberties procedures to protect information and systems. Both the 

Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties offices provide relevant 

training and guidance to fusion centers to support these efforts. Both 

offices work with I&A to ensure that fusion centers are operating in 

accordance with current statutes and guidelines. In addition, these offices 

assess systems, information flows, and information use to ensure that 

processes and procedures are in compliance with applicable privacy laws. 

Fusion center personnel also receive training to assist in complying with 

Title 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23. This regulation governs 

criminal intelligence systems that are operated by, or on behalf of, state 

and local law enforcement agencies and use certain federal funds. The 

regulations are intended to ensure that criminal intelligence systems 

operate in compliance with an individual’s privacy and constitutional 

rights. Fusion centers receive assistance from the Offices of Privacy and 

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in developing policies to comply with 

14 Public Law 110-53, § 511. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 21 
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these regulations. The Mississippi Analysis Information Center and the 

West Virginia Joint Intelligence Fusion Center, for example, are two 

fusion centers that have received privacy training. 

Further, I&A’s State and Local Program Office is working with the 

Offices of Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to complete its 

Privacy and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Impact Assessments. These 

offices are also working to develop privacy and civil rights and liberties 

training. 

I&A Coordination With FEMA Is Effective and Encourages External 

Collaboration by Providing Technical Assistance 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Grants Programs 

is responsible for providing training, funding for equipment purchases, 

support for planning and executing exercises, and technical assistance and 

other support to assist state and local jurisdictions to prevent, respond to, 

and recover from acts of terrorism. I&A has experienced many successes 

coordinating with FEMA on the Technical Assistance Program. I&A’s 

training and outreach efforts with FEMA’s Technical Assistance Branch 

have also encouraged greater federal, state, and local collaboration. 

The Technical Assistance Program, a joint endeavor between DHS and the 

Department of Justice, offers training-related activities and subject matter 

expertise to state and local entities, including fusion centers. It is designed 

to enhance interoperable communications among federal, state, and local 

emergency responders and public safety officials. 

The Technical Assistance Program receives service requests from new, 

developing, and established fusion centers. The program’s services 

include: 

Fusion center governance structure and authority guidance; 

Fusion process orientation; 

Training; 

Concept of operations development; 

Privacy and civil rights and liberty policies development; and 

Administrative and management assistance. 

The program’s services support the implementation of the Fusion Center 

Guidelines and the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan 

to develop and enhance the fusion process nationwide. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 22 

Fusion Center Experiences With the Technical Assistance Program 

The majority of fusion center officials we spoke with said their 

experiences with the Technical Assistance Program have been positive. 

Fusion center officials said that program personnel delivered timely and 

satisfactory services. However, some fusion center officials suggested 

that the program’s services could be enhanced to fit the needs of more 

advanced fusion centers better. New and developing centers primarily 

request basic services such as concept of operations development, while 

more established centers would benefit from services such as grants 

writing, analytical training, and how to integrate better with federal, state, 

local, and private sector partners. In addition, an online request process 

could increase request submission efficiency and facilitate more timely 

responses. 

Although coordination continues to evolve, some fusion center officials 

and I&A personnel reported that coordination between I&A and FEMA 

Grants Programs could be improved. For example, one fusion center 

representative said that coordination between the two entities is 

inconsistent, as FEMA Grants Programs handle funding, while I&A 

develops the intelligence expertise of fusion centers. According to this 

official, inconsistent coordination between the two DHS components 

resulted in redundant state efforts to align their activities and policies 

concerning training requests and grant writing. As another example, an 

I&A officer assigned to a fusion center reported that FEMA grant 

managers are not well-integrated into DHS’ fusion center program. This 

has resulted in confusion delivering adequate Technical Assistance 

Program services to the officer’s fusion center. 

DHS Component Roles, Support, and Coordination in the Nationwide 

Fusion Center Initiative 

I&A’s State and Local Program Office is responsible for determining the 

current level of support provided by DHS components to the fusion 

centers and coordinating the effort to integrate components into the 

nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. DHS components’ information and 

expertise have great value if they are tailored to the fusion centers’ 

specific needs. Through their fusion center representatives, DHS 

components may also gain useful, first-hand jurisdictional knowledge on 

issues such as local threats and vulnerabilities. However, an I&A State 

and Local Program Office official said that some fusion centers may not 

need a full-time DHS component representative. A part-time 

representative may be sufficient to fulfill a fusion center’s needs. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 23 

DHS components operate in multiple locations throughout the country, 

sometimes in close proximity to a fusion center. Component officials may 

determine that assigning a representative to a fusion center is not 

necessary if the representative can be made available to the fusion center 

on an as-needed basis. Often, fusion center personnel said that DHS 

component representatives make themselves available to the fusion 

centers, even if they are not directly assigned to a fusion center. Some 

fusion centers have workstations for DHS component personnel to use on 

an as-needed basis. 

In addition, there is a larger issue concerning which DHS component 

would have operational control over assigned personnel: I&A or another 

DHS component. These concerns could be mitigated by making 

assignments part-time or temporary, and clearly defining reporting 

structures and requirements while on assignment. Tracking performance 

metrics might also ensure that DHS and fusion centers are realizing both 

qualitative and quantifiable benefits from the assignments. 

Despite these concerns, DHS should leverage its component presence and 

local knowledge to support its fusion center program. Calling fusion 

centers potential “force multipliers” for DHS, a State and Local Program 

Office official said that DHS component field offices are encouraged to 

identify what fusion centers need from DHS, and what fusion centers can 

offer DHS. Information sharing can be a force multiplier for DHS by 

making state-level information more readily available to DHS intelligence 

specialists. However, I&A has yet to establish a systematic approach to 

identifying specific instances where these benefits could be realized across 

the department. 

Defining DHS Operational Component Roles and Support Is Ongoing 

I&A coordinates with DHS operational components on information 

sharing and intelligence-related elements of DHS’ fusion center program. 

In particular, I&A interacts with ICE, CBP, USCG, and TSA on activities 

such as individual name checks, immigration and law enforcement 

database searches, and other activities related to each component’s 

mission and scope. Some DHS components are already interacting with 

fusion centers to help support operations and garner jurisdictional 

information from state and local communities. 

ICE, the largest investigative arm of DHS, is responsible for identifying 

and eliminating vulnerabilities along the Nation’s border in economic, 

transportation, and infrastructure security. CBP is responsible for 

protecting U.S. borders by preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from 

entering the country, while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 24 
travel. The USCG protects the public, the environment, and U.S. 

economic interests in the Nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, 

on international waters, and in any maritime region as required to support 

national security. TSA protects the Nation’s transportation systems to 

ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. 

To emphasize the importance of DHS component roles and needed 

support, I&A’s Deputy Under Secretary for Operations testified before 

Congress on April 17, 2008, that DHS components such as ICE, CBP, 

TSA, and USCG “routinely work with state and local officers.” Further, 

DHS components are “reach[ing] out to embrace fusion centers, with 

many planning on expanding their participation in future DHS budgets.” 

This collaboration helps to improve state and local officials’ 

understanding of DHS operations within their geographic areas and to 

establish common methods and practices of keeping their areas of 

responsibility secure. Assigning officials from DHS components to fusion 

centers would provide an effective method to connect fusion center 

officials to information that components have and the centers need. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis: 

Recommendation #3: Evaluate the extent to which each I&A 

division is involved in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative, and 

develop and execute a strategy to properly integrate all relevant 

I&A division roles and responsibilities into DHS’ fusion center 

program. 

Recommendation #4: Develop a strategy and execute a plan to 

increase support to state and local fusion centers, with law 

enforcement and intelligence personnel, by determining the extent 

to which representatives from DHS components should be 

assigned to fusion centers, and clearly define reporting structures 

and requirements while on assignment. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 3. In its 

response, I&A said that the State and Local Program Office has 

made intra- and interagency coordination with fusion centers a 

major priority, and has conducted a series of internal coordination 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 25 
sessions with DHS components and divisions to better integrate 

their participation. 

I&A said that its Analysis and Production divisions have increased 

the level of support to fusion centers and their partners through its 

Reports Officer Program. This program has deployed several 

reports officers to the field and has enhanced the sharing of state 

and local raw information throughout the state and local 

community, and with the federal government. 

Additionally, I&A’s Homeland Environment Threat Analysis 

Division; the Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis Division; and 

Borders, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Health Threat 

Analysis Division regularly contact state and local customers to 

ensure that production is geared to state and local requirements. 

The Analysis and Production divisions are also working 

collaboratively to identify state and local fusion center priority 

information needs. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and closed. No further 

reporting is necessary. 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 4. In its 

response, I&A said that it is working with departmental leadership 

to more fully integrate DHS law enforcement and operational 

components with fusion centers. The discussions include the 

possible deployment or reassignment of component field personnel 

to state and local fusion centers, the development of further 

Technical Assistance Programs, and strengthened relationships 

between fusion centers and emergency operations centers. 

Further, I&A stated it will establish a working group, chaired by a 

Deputy Under Secretary, to produce an organized and logical 

strategy that ensures maximum use of existing DHS resources to 

meet both fusion center and DHS requirements. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending receipt of 

documentation that a working group is established and a plan 

created that describes the extent to which representatives from 

DHS components should be assigned to fusion centers, and also 

clearly defines the reporting structures and requirements while on 

assignment. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 26 
Additional Work Is Necessary To Align Fusion Center Funding 

and Activities With the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Mission 

As DHS’ fusion center program is in its second operational year, 

evaluating its overall successes and challenges may be premature. 

However, for DHS to achieve the fusion center program’s intended goals, 

additional program planning is necessary. Although I&A continues to 

collaborate with fusion centers on joint products, information sharing 

remains inconsistent. Further, funding shortfalls are a major concern as 

federal, state, and local officials determine how to sustain the fusion center 

program. 

Despite these challenges, I&A can take near- and long-term steps to 

establish and ensure that program goals are appropriate, measurable, 

realistic, and achievable. I&A should develop effective strategies for 

achieving its goals and communicate program needs and intended 

outcomes more effectively. 

National Strategy Supports Network of Integrated Fusion Centers 

As a part of the President’s 2007 National Strategy for Information 

Sharing, the federal government has a goal of creating a national, 

integrated network of fusion centers to enable the effective sharing of 

terrorism-related information. This network would promote state and 

major urban area fusion centers’ achievement of baseline capabilities. It 

would also enhance fusion centers’ ability to become interconnected with 

the federal government and with one another. Comments made by the 

DHS Secretary reflect the department’s vision for the nationwide Fusion 

Center Initiative: “One of the department’s top priorities is to work with 

state and local authorities and share information that helps to connect the 

dots on emerging threats.”15 The Secretary emphasized that “[DHS is] 

working towards an era of increasing collaboration, and fusion centers are 

a great example of how partnerships can achieve great success.”16 

Priorities of I&A’s Under Secretary include sharing information with state 

and local partners and reviewing I&A-generated products with a focus on 

state and local authorities. During his February 14, 2007, congressional 

testimony, I&A’s Under Secretary said that he envisions a seamless, 

15 DHS Office of the Secretary Press Release, July 27, 2006. 
 

16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence Public Affairs Office News Release, March 8, 2007. 
 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 27 

nationwide community of intelligence professionals working to ensure that 

nonfederal partners have timely and actionable information. Also, at an 

April 8, 2008, conference, the Under Secretary said he envisions a 

network of federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement 

professionals working together—supported by appropriate tools—to 

achieve a common goal of protecting the Nation. 

However, despite the initiative’s high-level visibility, I&A faces 

significant challenges in obtaining adequate support and necessary 

resources to plan and meet operational needs, goals, and expectations of 

its fusion center program. 

Additional Program Planning Is Necessary To Achieve Intended 

Goals 

When DHS’ fusion center program was established in June 2006, I&A 

developed three primary standards to measure program performance: 

�	 The number of fusion centers staffed with DHS personnel; 

�	 The ability to share information among federal, state, and local 

analysts; and 

�	 The number of joint intelligence products published with fusion 

centers. 

Functional requirements and expectations have grown more rapidly than 

I&A’s ability to plan for necessary administrative functions, operational 

needs, and support resources to meet those expectations. For example, the 

fusion center program has no written standard operating procedures to 

govern issues such as I&A officer roles and responsibilities, equipment 

use, information handling, clearance procedures, training requirements, 

and coordination protocols. Although I&A has contracted to develop its 

procedures and an officer desk reference guide, DHS’ fusion center 

program remains challenged by not having operational policies and 

procedures. 

Also, I&A officers are being placed in fusion centers without consistent 

tasking orders and written instructions. Consequently, the officers 

encounter problems with information technology needs, administrative 

and personnel matters, and programmatic and functional issues. I&A 

fusion center officers do not have clear guidance on how to get issues 

resolved. In addition, position descriptions were not initially created for 

the officers, nor were there adequate position classifications for regional 

coordinators. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 28 
Regional coordinators are responsible for overseeing fusion center 

coordination efforts in their assigned jurisdictions, and are intended to also 

supervise I&A deployed officers in their regions. Because reclassification 

has not taken place, and staffing levels in the field are inadequate to justify 

a supervisory position, regional coordinators were placed in fusion centers 

with no one to supervise. As a result, I&A’s State and Local Program 

Office program manager has supervisory authority over all deployed 

officers. In bypassing essential steps in its business process, the program 

office has had difficulty meeting program staffing goals and expectations 

of the fusion center program. 

Fewer Databases and Access Controls Could Improve Information 

Sharing 

I&A measures its ability to share information with its federal, state, and 

local partners, in part, through the installation and use of unclassified and 

classified information sharing resources. 

In its State and Local Fusion Center Support Implementation Plan, DHS 

identified information technology as one of the requirements for program 

success. In October 2007, the Government Accountability Office reported 

that DHS and the Department of Justice had 17 major network and 4 

system applications to support homeland security efforts.17 To conserve 

time and limited resources, fusion center personnel said they want fewer 

databases and limits to the number of separate login accounts. This would 

reduce duplication of efforts, such as entering the same document into 

several different sites, and improve information access and centralize 

information sharing better. Appendix C lists the four main DHS-managed 

systems available to fusion centers. 

In his February 26, 2008, testimony before Congress, I&A’s Under 

Secretary said I&A is working to streamline and merge disparate classified 

networks into a single, integrated network—the Homeland Secure Data 

Network—to help increase the secure sharing of intelligence and other 

information. As of March 2008, I&A had installed 18 Homeland Secure 

Data Network terminals in fusion centers such as the New York State 

Intelligence Center, the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 

and the Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Center. These 

centers have I&A officers and appropriate facilities to house secure 

information and systems. However, connectivity and information sharing 

is inconsistent at fusion centers without I&A officers or secure facilities. 

For example, a fusion center that does not have an I&A officer reported 

difficulty sending and receiving secure information to and from DHS. 

17 Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information 

Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35, October 2007. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 29 
I&A also has placed a priority on establishing a strong capability at the 

controlled unclassified information level. The majority of the fusion 

center officials we spoke with said that they most frequently use the 

Homeland Security Information Network and the Lessons Learned 

Information Sharing online resource.18 Other fusion center officials were 

not aware of all of the databases available to them at the controlled 

unclassified information level. 

I&A Actions To Reduce Use of Multiple Databases 

To provide fusion centers with a common method to share best practices, 

lessons learned, case studies, and other relevant intelligence information, 

I&A is developing the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence 

Community network. This network is being established to consolidate and 

house relevant information for fusion centers, to provide guidance to DHS 

leadership on intelligence information sharing, and to provide a common 

forum for sharing intelligence information among federal, state, and local 

entities. By using an unclassified but restricted access portion of the 

Homeland Security Information Network portal and weekly 

teleconferences, the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence 

Community provides a means for fusion centers and federal partners to 

collaborate on threat analysis. As of March 2008, there were more than 

1,000 participating members from 42 states, the District of Columbia, and 

6 other federal departments. 

I&A’s commitment to improving interconnectivity among the multiple 

classified and unclassified information systems is essential to the 

program’s success. I&A needs to be committed to identifying and 

designating a system that can be easily accessed and navigated by its state 

and local partners, and properly maintained with current and relevant 

information. 

I&A Divisions and Fusion Centers Are Collaborating on Joint 

Intelligence Products 

I&A divisions such as Homeland Environment Threat Analysis and 

Production Management work with fusion centers to generate products 

such as threat assessments, bulletins, and alerts. As of March 2008, I&A’s 

Production Management division disseminated five finished intelligence 

products that were produced jointly with fusion centers. The Arizona 

Counterterrorism Information Center, for example, produced a joint threat 

18 The Lessons Learned Information Sharing online resource is a secure-but-unclassified restricted-access 

database used to share fusion center-related documents, such as best practices and standard operating 

procedures. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 30 
assessment for the February 2008 Super Bowl with DHS, the FBI, the 

National Counterterrorism Center, and other federal agencies. I&A 

officials said that they have initiated a Reports Officer program, which had 

written and disseminated 79 Homeland Intelligence Reports to the 

Intelligence Community as of March 2008. I&A’s Reports Officer Branch 

is concentrating on the southwest border in coordinating with and training 

appropriate fusion center and state personnel. The branch is working with 

the deployed I&A field officers as well as local law enforcement, 

intelligence, and security entities in the public and private sectors to report 

information of value and to ensure that the local perspective is accurately 

represented to the intelligence community. 

However, while the number of joint products may indicate a degree of 

collaboration among agencies and fusion centers, not all fusion centers 

have the training or resources to produce such products. Thus it is 

difficult to use this standard as a general measure of coordination among 

all fusion centers. 

Funding Shortfalls Could Affect Sustaining I&A’s Role As DHS’ 

Executive Agent for the Nationwide Fusion Center Initiative 

When DHS’ fusion center program was established, there were no funds 

set aside in I&A’s or in DHS’ overall budgets to support the program. In 

its first year of operation, FY 2006 funds were reprogrammed to start the 

program. Congress has since authorized $10 million per year, for FY 

2008 through FY 2012, for DHS’ fusion center program.19 I&A’s entire 

budget is part of the National Intelligence Program, which incorporates all 

national-level intelligence, counterintelligence, and reconnaissance 

activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, 

and all civilian agencies and departments. The amount of funding that 

I&A and the Fusion Center Program received is classified, although the 

program received an unclassified $8 million from the Iraq Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 2007.

20 

I&A received additional funding in FY 2007 and FY 2008, allowing it to 

deploy officers to fusion centers. For FY 2009, the President’s 

unclassified combined budget request for I&A and the Office of 

Operations Coordination proposes a 9% increase from the FY 2008 

enacted level. 

According to State and Local Program Office officials and based on 

program staffing expectations, current funding levels are inadequate to 

19 Public Law 110-53 § 511. 20 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 

2007, Public Law 110-28 §3401. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 31 
allow the program to operate effectively and efficiently, to meet current 

program goals, or perhaps even to sustain itself in future years. The need 

for increased funding jeopardizes the ability of the State and Local 

Program Office to deploy additional officers or adequately equip its 

current officers with the tools necessary to be effective. 

Senior federal officials cited the benefits of creating a national fusion 

center network and mandated I&A’s involvement as the executive agent. 

However, budgetary constraints, hiring, and other administrative issues 

limit I&A’s ability to develop adequate performance measures to evaluate 

success. These processes should be used to demonstrate and justify the 

value of DHS’ fusion center program and to capture the capabilities, 

accomplishments, and worth of the program. Solid business process 

strategies would help ensure a uniform approach to I&A’s interactions 

with fusion centers and streamline how I&A manages its executive agent 

responsibilities. Such strategies would further I&A’s efforts to request, 

justify, and secure additional resources for the program. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis: 

Recommendation #5: Develop a comprehensive performance 

plan that includes measurable performance standards to properly 

reflect successes and challenges in DHS’ fusion center program, 

and establish clear justification for continued resource allocations. 

Recommendation #6: In coordination with relevant DHS 

components, develop a plan to analyze connectivity among the 

department’s unclassified and classified systems, streamline 

communications, and reduce redundancy across databases to 

improve interconnectivity among the multiple information systems 

used to share and obtain information from fusion centers. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 5. In its 

response, I&A said that the Office of Management and Budget 

examiner required that I&A supplement its current performance 

measures to include the State and Local Program Office to ensure 

that sufficient planning, accountability, and resources were applied 

to the program. Additionally, the DHS Chief Financial Officer’s 

Performance Analysis and Evaluation Office, which monitors 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 32 
programmatic performance for planning and budgeting purposes, 

required information for a similar purpose. As a result, the 

program’s performance measures meet the reporting requirements 

for both the Office of Management and Budget and DHS, and took 

into account the State and Local Program Office’s goals and 

objectives. The programmatic efforts were coordinated with the 

Plans and Integration’s Performance Management Branch and 

approved by the Chief Intelligence Officer. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending receipt of 

documentation verifying that the Office of Management and 

Budget and DHS’ Chief Financial Officer examined I&A’s 

performance measures for the State and Local Fusion Center 

Program and determined the measures met the reporting 

requirements for both offices. In addition, documentation is 

needed that reflects the results of the complete assessment of the 

State and Local Program Office’s programmatic efforts, which was 

coordinated with the Plans and Integration’s Performance 

Management Branch and approved by the Chief Intelligence 

Officer. 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with recommendation 6. In its 

response, however, I&A said that while this recommendation 

addresses a need far beyond the scope of the State and Local 

Program Office’s authorities, DHS recognizes its role in state 

frustration over the multiple systems required to search for federal 

information. I&A said these coordination efforts are centered in 

DHS’ headquarters and DHS component Offices of the Chief 

Information Officer. 

I&A said that it works with other DHS elements in a number of 

joint efforts to improve interconnectivity with state and local 

partners. For example, the DHS Intelligence Systems Board and 

the Information Sharing Coordinating Council jointly established 

the Data Access, Sharing, and Intelligence Integration Integrated 

Project Team in April 2008. The team’s primary purpose is to 

address issues arising from the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

requirement to “establish ... a comprehensive information 

technology network architecture for [I&A] that connects the 

various databases and related information technology assets of 

[I&A] and the intelligence components of the Department in order 

to promote internal information sharing among the intelligence and 

other personnel of the Department.” 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 33 
I&A is also a participant in a number of federal efforts, including 

those of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 

Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment and its 

various working groups, to streamline DHS and other national 

systems and improve the access of state, local, and other partners. 

DHS policy continues to encourage the use of its Homeland 

Security Data Network and associated secure video 

teleconferencing systems as the primary conduit for intelligence 

and information exchange between the federal government and 

states. I&A further responded that the department encourages 

states to put as much information as possible on the Homeland 

Security Data Network in order to make relevant information 

accessible to the intelligence community at large. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending receipt of 

documentation that: 

�	 Lists all Homeland Security Data Network installations to 

date, as well as a plan that describes the projected dates and 

locations of future installations; 

�	 Identifies I&A’s plan to establish a strong capability to 

share information with fusion centers at the controlled 

unclassified information level; and 

�	 Describes the role and capabilities of the Homeland 

Security State and Local Intelligence Community network. 

Fusion Centers Are Concerned With Sustainability and Funding 

Some fusion centers cannot operate without federal funding, and other 

centers may be forced to cease operations should federal funding be 

significantly reduced or eliminated. The fusion center officials we 

interviewed emphasized that sustainment planning and funding from the 

federal government is essential for the success of fusion centers. 

However, despite the existence of several grant programs from which 

fusion centers may receive funding, DHS does not have a dedicated grant 

program to fund fusion centers. State and local officials said it is crucial 

that state governments are notified about the federal government’s plan for 

future fusion center funding and resource allocations so that they may 

properly plan for current and future fusion center operations. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 34 
Further, the Homeland Security Advisory Council—which provides 

advice and recommendations to DHS’ Secretary on matters related to 

homeland security—identified the need to continue to improve 

intelligence and information sharing as one of the top ten challenges 

facing DHS’ next Secretary. In its September 11, 2008, report, the council 

emphasized that several initiatives should be considered and supported in 

building information sharing.21 One initiative is to continue to improve 

intelligence and information sharing by expanding and sustaining fusion 

centers. According to the report: 

“[i]ntelligence fusion centers at the state level are becoming an 

essential place for information sharing. [DHS should] expand and 

sustain existing fusion centers by completing the assignment of DHS 

intelligence officers in every fusion center, continue to build common 

standards and common platforms for information-sharing in the fusion 

centers, and seek mechanisms to provide sustained funding to fusion 

center efforts, especially those efforts that include technology and 

people.”22 

DHS’ Primary Funding Source for Fusion Center Capabilities and 

Resources 

The Homeland Security Grant Program is DHS’ primary funding source 

for building and sustaining national preparedness capabilities. This grant 

program funds a range of preparedness activities that include planning, 

organizing, equipment purchase, training, exercises, program 

management, and administrative costs. 

The Homeland Security Grant Program guidance incorporates restrictions 

and limitations related to how grant funds can be used. Generally, states 

can use FY 2008 program funds to establish and enhance their fusion 

centers. Funded activities must support the development of a statewide 

fusion process that corresponds with the Fusion Center Guidelines and the 

National Strategy for Information Sharing. Fusion centers must also strive 

to achieve baseline capability levels as defined by the Fusion Center 

Capability Planning Tool, included as a supplemental resource in the FY 

2008 Homeland Security Grant Program guidance. 

The Fusion Center Capability Planning Tool provides a framework of 

fusion center process capabilities to help identify areas of improvement, 

develop strategies to overcome shortfalls, and prioritize the expenditure of 

funds. To accelerate implementation of baseline capabilities at all fusion 

21 Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory
 


Council, September 11, 2008, page 8. 


22 Ibid.
 


DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 35 
 

centers, DHS and the Department of Justice developed 11 targeted Fusion 

Process Technical Assistance Services.23 Each service supports the 

implementation of the Fusion Center Guidelines and the Information 

Sharing Environment implementation plan to facilitate the nationwide 

development or enhancement of fusion centers. 

Fusion Centers Do Not Have Specifically Dedicated DHS Funds 

DHS does not have a dedicated grant program to fund fusion centers. 

Therefore, DHS does not solicit, score, or fund state grant applications 

strictly for fusion center or intelligence and information sharing activities. 

These activities are included in the broad scope of allowable preparednessrelated activities—prevention, protection, response, and recovery—as 

requested by state and urban area jurisdictions via the grant application 

process for each respective Homeland Security Grant Program. 

In addition, when Homeland Security Grant Program funds are disbursed, 

awards go directly to the state governments, which then set priorities and 

allocate funds within that state. Currently, DHS does not have the ability 

to track grant funds to each specific fusion center as, in most cases, the 

State Administrative Agency is the recipient. Within most states, the State 

Administrative Agency is responsible for providing subgrants to specific 

agencies or organizations for projects in accordance with respective 

investment justifications and homeland security strategies. 

Many fusion center officials acknowledge that there are some funding 

difficulties at the state level; however, their primary concern is the amount 

and consistency of federal financial support and resources. Most fusion 

center officials we interviewed said that there is a need to dedicate funds 

specifically for activities and operations. Center officials emphasized that 

developing a national fusion center network and enhancing information 

sharing capabilities is a priority, but said federal support is critical to these 

efforts. 

Other centers that are partly or fully supplemented with state funds are 

equally concerned about the federal and state governments’ abilities to 

sustain centers in the future. As one fusion center director said, “it is hard, 

from an operational standpoint, to build a strategic plan for the future with 

an unclear financial outlook.” 

23 DHS-Department of Justice Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program and Services: Activities 

Overview, September 2007 (Inaugural Issue). 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 36 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ Intelligence Officers Are 

Adding Value to Fusion Centers 

We spoke to fusion center officials with and without deployed I&A 

officers. The majority of fusion centers with a deployed I&A officer 

reported major improvements in their interactions with DHS since an 

officer arrived. One fusion center director referred to the I&A officer as a 

“great asset.” Another fusion center official said that center staff were 

“extremely impressed” with the I&A officer’s performance. Many center 

officials said that their relationships with DHS are progressing well. I&A 

officers act as trusted liaisons or “go-betweens” to receive and disseminate 

information quickly to and from DHS and the fusion centers. Appendix D 

lists the fusion centers that we contacted during our review. 

Intended Role for Deployed I&A Officers Versus Actual Role 

Deployed I&A officers are tasked with assisting state and local law 

enforcement and emergency response providers in using homeland 

security information to develop threat assessments. Officers also review 

homeland security information from law enforcement agencies and other 

state and local entities to share with federal partners. Deployed I&A 

officers create intelligence products and help disseminate products to the 

appropriate personnel in the federal, state, and local law enforcement and 

intelligence communities. Further, DHS’ State and Local Fusion Center 

Support Implementation Plan states that these officers facilitate 

coordination, synchronization, and information flow between the fusion 

centers and DHS. The officers provide analytical and reporting expertise, 

coordinate with local DHS and FBI components, and provide DHS with 

local situational awareness and access. 

Fusion center staff said that placing I&A officers in the centers 

personalized its relationship with DHS, referring to DHS as a previously 

faceless entity. Although some center officials view the deployed officers 

as jacks-of-all-trades, others are concerned that DHS is not marketing I&A 

officers as well as it could. Fusion center officials suggested that DHS 

provide more information to states regarding what DHS can offer to 

eliminate confusion as to the role and responsibilities of deployed I&A 

officers. 

Interaction With DHS Is More Difficult for Fusion Centers Without 

Deployed I&A Officers 

At centers without a deployed I&A officer, fusion center personnel 

reported difficulty interacting with DHS, particularly given the 

department’s size and complexity. These officials reported not knowing 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 37 
which DHS component to contact regarding specific topics of interest. 

They suggested that I&A develop alternative means to share information 

with officials in jurisdictions without a deployed I&A officer. For 

example, an official from one fusion center without a deployed I&A 

officer said that communication with DHS could sometimes be confusing. 

The official described an incident involving a dirty bomb threat that the 

fusion center staff knew to be innocuous. However, the media reported 

the information as an actual threat. During the incident, the fusion center 

official received a telephone call from a DHS official who wanted to be 

briefed on the situation. Not knowing who the person was or why this 

individual was calling, the fusion center official referred the individual to 

DHS’ National Operations Center. 

The fusion center official emphasized that the situation could have been 

handed more efficiently if an I&A officer had been present at the center. 

Also, this official suggested that state representatives need better guidance 

on where to go within DHS to ask questions. When states are not sure 

where to request or send information, they err on the side of wide 

distribution, which may not be the best way to operate and could lead to 

information overload for federal, state, and local personnel. 

Deployed Officers Often Assume Additional Responsibilities 

To help alleviate similar issues, some I&A deployed officers do more than 

just support their assigned center. Officers sometimes assist neighboring 

fusion centers that do not have a deployed officer. DHS’ Secretary 

emphasized this sentiment when he said: 

“[t]here is no more effective way to connect the dots than by having 

our personnel sitting in a chair next to their local counterparts, 

providing them with information they need to make timely and 

informed decisions on how best to protect their community.”24 

However, when officers assist other centers, demands on their time 

increase and the support the officers can provide to the assigned fusion 

center decreases. 

Although considerable work still needs to be done, deployed I&A officers 

are demonstrating added value to both DHS and fusion centers by serving 

as liaisons, improving information flows, and identifying communication 

entry points into DHS. As I&A officers rotate positions, presumably back 

to DHS I&A headquarters, they may bring with them valuable state and 

local expertise, awareness, and perspective. To meet fusion center needs 

24 “DHS Strengthens Intelligence Sharing at State and Local Fusion Centers.” DHS Office of the Secretary 

Press Release, July 27, 2006. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 38 
more precisely, I&A should identify its internal capabilities and the skills 

of its deployed officers. Additionally, deployed I&A officers should be 

provided with well-defined and written descriptions of their roles, 

responsibilities, standing orders, expectations, and procedures to guide 

their duties at the fusion center. 

Deploying Intelligence Officers to Fusion Centers Has Been a 

Challenge for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

DHS’ fusion center program was designed to ensure that state and local 

officials are involved in DHS’ information sharing efforts. According to 

the initiative’s Strategic Plan, a major program goal was to establish DHS’ 

presence in fusion centers by deploying DHS personnel. Initially, it was 

envisioned that DHS deployed personnel would link the federal 

government to state and local customers by embedding Fusion Center 

Teams with access to information, technology, and training to facilitate a 

two-way flow of information. 

DHS envisioned staffing fusion centers with teams of three people: a team 

chief, an intelligence professional, and an operational professional. I&A 

assumed that each fusion center’s greatest need would be for intelligence 

professionals. For operational professionals, the department hoped to 

engage DHS law enforcement personnel already working at a field office 

in the vicinity of the fusion center. As I&A implemented the program, it 

hired intelligence officers to staff fusion centers and regional coordinators 

to supervise the officers. However, budget and management constraints 

challenge I&A’s ability to fulfill the deployment levels as initially 

envisioned. 

Efforts To Meet Deployment Expectations Have Fallen Short 

I&A has endeavored to meet expectations of deploying 35 officers to 

fusion centers by the end of FY 2008. DHS officials have emphasized the 

importance of supporting fusion centers. However, budget constraints and 

insufficient allocation of billeted positions to support I&A officer 

recruitment and deployments challenge I&A’s ability to fulfill those 

expectations. As a result, in February 2008, DHS reduced the number of 

I&A personnel it expects to deploy to fusion centers by the end of FY 

2008 to 26 officers.25 However, in April 2008, I&A’s Under Secretary 

25 Statement of Charles E. Allen, Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Before the Subcommittee 

on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment Committee on Homeland Security, 

U.S. House of Representatives, February 14, 2008. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 39 
said that I&A is committed to deploying 35 officers by the end of 

FY 2008. 

Early Efforts To Staff Fusion Centers Used Internal I&A Resources 

Most I&A officers were internally rotated from I&A divisions to staff 

DHS’ fusion center program. Initially, I&A distributed internal email 

solicitations to its staff regarding fusion center openings. I&A fusion 

center officers were selected from a pool of qualified intelligence 

specialists who were already employed in various I&A divisions. 

Candidates who responded to the internal solicitation underwent a hiring 

process that included a written application package and interviews with 

senior I&A officials. As a condition of employment, the deployed officers 

signed a mobility agreement and agreed to serve for three years at their 

assigned fusion center. 

As of March 2008, there were 19 I&A officers and 3 regional 

coordinators, of which 18 were internal I&A personnel, deployed to fusion 

centers. Of the 18 internal hires, 13 were recruited from I&A’s analytical 

divisions. Because one of the regional coordinators is assigned to a fusion 

center that also has an I&A officer assigned, as of March 2008, 21 fusion 

centers have an I&A presence. However, it is unclear where the deployed 

I&A officers will be assigned once their current assignment is completed. 

State and Local Program Office personnel said that the officers could be 

assigned to a different fusion center or the officers may return to I&A 

headquarters in Washington, DC. 

As of March 2008, one officer on a temporary duty assignment to a fusion 

center is technically still working for one of I&A’s analytical divisions. 

An additional officer is employed under the Intergovernmental Personnel 

Act.

26 The authority to temporarily assign this officer is derived from the 

Intergovernmental Personnel Act Mobility Program. The Program allows 

temporary assignments of personnel to and from the federal, state, local, 

and tribal governments, and other eligible organizations, such as colleges, 

universities, or federally funded research centers. 

Although the regional coordinators were intended to serve as supervisors 

of the I&A officers, as of March 2008, regional coordinators were not 

assigned supervisory duties because a supervisor is required to have at 

least three subordinates. 

26 Intergovernmental Personnel Act, 5 United States Code § 3371 et. seq. See also 

http://www.opm.gov/PROGRAMS/IPA/. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 40 
Additional Billeted Positions Have Been Allocated for I&A Officers, But 

More Will Be Needed 

Seven billets were allocated to the DHS fusion center program when it 

was established in FY 2006. The program received 10 additional billets 

from other I&A divisions in FY 2007. For FY 2008, the program received 

another 6 billets from other I&A divisions, totaling 23 billet allocations. 

Each I&A division has a specific number of billets that represent an 

authorized full-time equivalent federal position. The billet describes the 

title, occupational series, pay grade, duties, skills, and responsibilities of 

either an occupied position or a vacant position within each I&A division. 

Billets can then be moved from one I&A division to another, with the 

Under Secretary’s approval. 

I&A uses both internal rotations and external vacancy announcements to 

hire intelligence professionals to staff fusion centers. According to I&A 

documents, I&A has recruited four I&A officers to deploy through the 

external hiring process. Of the additional billets received in FY 2008, 

three were used to staff fusion centers during the first quarter of FY 2008. 

According to I&A staff and supporting documents, I&A plans to recruit 

intelligence specialists to fill the remaining billets during FY 2008. 

In November 2007, DHS’ Secretary and the U.S. Attorney General 

requested that each state designate one primary fusion center with which 

DHS will coordinate. Eventually I&A will be expected to staff each statedesignated fusion center with an I&A officer, fill the six envisioned 

regional coordinator positions, and staff some major urban area fusion 

centers with I&A officers. To address expanding needs, one I&A official 

said that ten more billets for FY 2009 are required. Through FY 2009 and 

beyond, I&A may be expected to provide as many as 60 or more 

intelligence professionals to staff fusion centers. Additional budgetary 

resources will be needed to meet this projected requirement. 

Alternatively, I&A may decide to move more billets from other I&A 

divisions to the staff fusion centers. Figure 2 depicts the locations of the 

deployed I&A officers. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 41 

 

 

 

 

Figure 2: I&A Resources at Fusion Centers as of March 2008 

Washington Joint Analytical Center 

Sacramento Regional Terrorism 

Threat Analysis Center 

Los Angeles Joint Regional 

Intelligence Center 

Arizona Counterterrorism 

Information Center 

Colorado Information Analysis Center 

North Central Texas 

Fusion System Louisiana State Analytic &

Fusion Exchange 

Georgia Information Sharing &

Analysis Center 

South Carolina Information 

Exchange 

Virginia Fusion Center 

Illinois State Terrorism & Intelligence Center 

Ohio Strategic Analysis & 

Information Center 

Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center 

Maryland Coordination

& Analysis Center 

New Jersey Regional Operations 

Intelligence Center 

New York Police Department

(2 HSDN Terminals) 

Connecticut Intelligence 

Center 

Commonwealth Fusion Center 

New York State 

Intelligence Center 

National Capitol Region 

Florida Fusion Center 

Michigan Intelligence 

Operations Center 

I&A Resources at Fusion Centers 

3 Regional Coordinators, 19 Intelligence Officers, and 18 HSDN Terminals are installed in 22 locations. 

Information is current as of March 2008. 

Regional Coordinator, Intelligence Officer, HSDN Terminal Installed 

Regional Coordinator, HSDN Terminal Installed, No Intelligence Officer 

Regional Coordinator, No Intelligence Officer, No HSDN Terminal Installed 

Intelligence Officer, HSDN Terminal Installed 

Intelligence Officer, No HSDN Terminal Installed 

HSDN Terminal Installed, No Regional Coordinator, No Intelligence Officer 

Source: OIG 

Deployed Officers Are Assigned by Using Risk Factor Assessments 

Before an officer is assigned to a fusion center, I&A conducts an 

assessment to gauge the center’s capabilities and maturity level, and then 

tailors DHS support to meet each center’s specific needs. I&A employs a 

risk-based methodology to assess the centers and then determines when an 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 42 

I&A officer will be assigned. Initially, DHS prioritized New York and 

Los Angeles as “immediate” need cities for I&A officers. 

Personnel assigned to the fusion centers are chosen after a comprehensive 

hiring process, according to DHS officials. I&A selects from a pool of 

suitable candidates who have demonstrated prior law enforcement or 

intelligence experience and are subject matter experts. Once selected, 

candidates undergo training and orientation, which includes an overview 

of DHS components’ missions and functions, component briefings, and 

elements of intelligence, analytical, and law enforcement processes. 

As staff is identified and hired, some fusion centers may need to wait 

several years before I&A can assign an officer. For example, one I&A 

regional coordinator said that a fusion center official recently asked when 

the center could expect an I&A officer. The regional coordinator said 

I&A did not have a billet for an officer to serve at that fusion center in FY 

2008 or FY 2009, and that it might not be until FY 2010 or FY 2011 

before a billet is available to hire an I&A officer for the center. 

I&A Explored Additional Hiring Processes To Deploy More Officers 

To expedite the recruiting and hiring of officers, I&A explored the 

possibility of using direct hire authority for its staffing shortfalls. Direct 

hire is a less restrictive process that allows an agency to hire from a larger 

pool of candidates for a vacancy than can be hired under normal federal 

hiring procedures. I&A has direct hire authority within the National 

Capital Region for employees on the 0132 intelligence specialist 

occupational series. In the summer of 2007, I&A and DHS’ Office of the 

Chief Human Capital Officer sought permission from the Office of 

Personnel Management to exercise this authority nationwide, specifically 

for the purpose of hiring fusion center officers. I&A formally made this 

request in a June 2007 letter. As of February 2008, the Office of 

Personnel Management had not responded. However, I&A officials said 

that they do not expect the request to be approved. 

We examined classified documents related to the number of occupied and 

available billets within I&A and discussed the information with senior 

I&A officials. The officials said that individuals have been identified for 

many of the vacant positions and the positions are in the process of being 

filled. However, I&A officials also said that the hiring process has been 

delayed because a new contractor assumed human resources 

responsibilities for I&A’s Office of Chief Human Capital Officer. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


Page 43 

Backfilling Vacated I&A Headquarters Positions Was Not Necessary 

Backfilling is the personnel practice of temporarily replacing a person in 

his or her usual position with another person. However, backfilling the 

vacated internal I&A positions was unnecessary because the employees’ 

billet transferred with them when they were deployed. Some I&A 

officials said that staffing fusion centers with I&A division professionals 

was “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Technically, no vacancies were created 

when these I&A officers were assigned to fusion centers. However, if 

additional I&A personnel from I&A’s analytical division are deployed to 

fusion centers, the vacancies created in those divisions will need to be 

backfilled. 

Initial Officer Deployment Has Resource Implications for I&A 

I&A’s difficulty in staffing fusion centers is exacerbated as existing 

officers finish their assignments and need to be replaced, even though I&A 

continues to hire and deploy officers to additional fusion centers. As 

billets are shifted and other I&A divisions’ staff are reduced, internal 

recruitments may increase the workload of I&A divisions that lose 

intelligence professionals to fusion center assignments. The divisions may 

also experience a decrease in the amount or quality of their analytical 

products. 

One senior I&A official suggested that assigning I&A intelligence 

professionals to fusion centers has negatively affected I&A’s analytical 

divisions. Specifically, the intended benefit may actually reduce I&A’s 

overall ability to build its core capabilities, receive and analyze 

information, and deliver quality and timely intelligence products to its 

state and local customers. As one I&A official explained, if there are 

fewer staff or positions at headquarters to conduct analytical tasks, there 

may be increases in delayed, untimely, and insufficient responses to 

Requests for Information. However, the official suggested that I&A was 

aware of this risk, but serving state and local intelligence needs is DHS’ 

niche within the intelligence community. Hence, I&A has deployed some 

of its highest-quality performers to fusion centers to represent DHS and 

support the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative. 

The experience of the deployed I&A officers could prove valuable to I&A 

headquarters. Returning officers will be more aware of the intelligence 

and information-sharing needs of state and local officials and may 

improve I&A’s focus and attention on specific needs. This benefit is 

predicated on the assumption that I&A officers will return to I&A 

headquarters after finishing their assignments. Comments from some 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 44 
deployed I&A officers support the assumption that some are amenable to 

returning to I&A headquarters. 

Reliance on Contract Support Could Create Program Sustainability 

Issues 

DHS’ State and Local Program Office, as well as other I&A divisions, rely 

heavily on contractor staff to handle personnel management and budget 

development and execution. Contractors coordinate and prioritize the 

delivery of information systems and secure communications, training, and 

field requests. Contractors said that they also assist with the preparation 

of talking points, presentations, publications, and program overview 

documents for department officials. In addition, contractors help 

coordinate and conduct fusion center program assessments to determine 

where I&A officers will be deployed. 

Collectively, these duties afford contractors extensive knowledge of 

operations, processes, and procedures necessary to run the program 

effectively. Given current federal government employee staffing levels in 

the State and Local Program Office, it is unlikely that the State and Local 

Program Office would be able to manage the fusion center program 

successfully if contractor resources are significantly reduced. Although 

contractor support and expertise are often necessary to initiate programs and 

operations, valuable institutional knowledge would be lost if current 

contractors are no longer engaged in the fusion center program. To 

minimize vulnerabilities resulting from long-term reliance on contractors, 

I&A should work to build additional capabilities and bolster federal staff 

resources to manage, plan, and implement the program. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis: 

Recommendation #7: Develop a plan to explore funding options 

and identify sufficient resources for DHS’ fusion center program. 

Attention should be given to examining billeted positions and 

related funds. The State and Local Program Office should also be 

provided with the necessary staff to oversee and manage program 

implementation, and to continue their efforts to recruit, hire, and 

train additional qualified personnel to staff fusion centers. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

I&A Response: I&A concurred with Recommendation 7. In its 

response, I&A said that DHS leadership is committed to the support 

and growth of the state and local fusion center network. The 

original program plan envisioned deploying up to 70 officers at a 

pace of 10 per year; however, current funding for the State and 

Local Program Office limits that anticipated growth rate. Given the 

necessary funds, billets, and administrative support, the Program 

Office could dramatically accelerate the pace of deploying officers 

and communications hardware and meet the needs of fusion centers 

well beyond the 70 field officers initially envisioned. 

As of October 2008, I&A states that it deployed 25 Intelligence 

Operations Specialists and is on schedule to have 35 officers in the 

field by December 31, 2008. 

I&A said that it has already reprioritized and reprogrammed funds 

into the State and Local Program Office, and will continue to make 

such efforts a priority in FY 2009 and beyond. I&A intends to 

program the required resources within its base budget, and will 

continue to work with the Office of Management and Budget and 

Congress to ensure that necessary resources are available to realize 

this plan and ensure the future success of the program. 

OIG Analysis: We consider I&A’s proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending receipt of 

documentation that: 

�	 Describes its progress in deploying 35 Intelligence 

Operations Specialists by December 31, 2008, and 

�	 Reflects budgetary adjustments for State and Local Fusion 

Center Program resources that are programmed into I&A’s 

base budget figures for FY 2009–FY 2012. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 


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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the House Committee 

on Homeland Security, requested that we assess whether DHS is providing 

adequate oversight and guidance for fusion centers, and what problems 

and challenges are being encountered as fusion centers develop. 

Specifically, we determined: 

�	 The extent to which I&A has been working to coordinate and 

develop its relationship and role with fusion centers; 

�	 Whether fusion center funding and activities are aligned to further 

the department’s mission; 

�	 The merits of detailing I&A staff to fusion centers; and, 

�	 Whether I&A is successful in backfilling positions used to staff 

fusion centers. 

Our scope was limited to examining the roles of federal, state, and local 

fusion center participants and representatives. We did not include private 

sector or international fusion center partners. We examined geographical 

areas of interest, which included a sample of select fusion centers that 

illustrated the challenges faced by northern and southern border, coastal, 

and heartland states, as well as urban and rural communities, in information 

sharing efforts. During our fieldwork, we visited fusion centers in Arizona, 

California, the District of Columbia, New York, Georgia, Illinois, 

Michigan, Missouri, and Texas. We also conducted teleconferences with 

fusion center officials in Alabama, Mississippi, and Washington. 

We conducted the majority of our DHS component interviews in the 

Washington, DC, metropolitan area. We interviewed officials from DHS’ 

Offices of Policy, Chief Privacy Officer, Operations Coordination, National 

Programs and Protection Directorate, FEMA, TSA, CBP, ICE, and Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties. We also interviewed officials from various I&A 

divisions, including the State and Local Program Office, Collections 

Requirements, Production Management, Information Sharing and 

Knowledge Management, Intelligence Watch and Warning, and Plans and 

Integration. In addition, we reviewed I&A policies, memoranda, and 

organization charts. These included DHS’ State and Local Fusion Center 

Support Implementation Plan, capability and program guidance, grant 

programs, policy directives, concept of operations, training materials, and 

documentation on I&A budget and staffing. 

Our fieldwork was performed between October 2007 and February 2008. 

This review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General 

Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for 

Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 

Page 47 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 48 
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 49 
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 50 
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 51 
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 52 
 
Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 53 
 
 

Appendix C 

DHS-Managed Systems Available to Fusion Centers 

System or 

Database 

Functions Sensitivity 

Level 

DHS 

Component 

Manager 

Information 

Shared 

Homeland DHS’ primary Sensitive but Office of Suspicious incident 

Security nationwide unclassified Operation and pre-incident 

Information information-sharing Coordination information, 24/7 

Network application for 

sharing sensitive but 

unclassified 

information, 

composed of more 

than 35 community 

of interest topicportals such as 

Intelligence, Law 

Enforcement, and 

Emergency 

Management 

situational 

awareness, 

unclassified 

bulletins, alerts, 

and analysis 

reports 

Lessons Learned Secure but Sensitive but Federal Best practices, 

Information unclassified, unclassified Emergency lessons learned, 

Sharing Fusion restricted access Management case studies, 

Center Resource database for sharing 

fusion center–related 

documents 

Agency operating manuals, 

and document 

templates 

Homeland Unclassified but Sensitive but Office of Collaborative 

Security State and restricted access unclassified Intelligence and analysis and 

Local Intelligence forum for fusion Analysis, Office discussion among 

Community* centers and federal 

partners to 

collaborate on threat 

analysis 

of Operations 

Coordination 

federal, state, and 

local intelligence 

partners via 

analytic 

conferences, 

conference calls, 

and briefings 

Homeland Secure DHS classified Secret Office of Collateral-level 

Data Network communications 

network system to 

which federal, state, 

and local users can 

post and manage 

information 

Intelligence and 

Analysis 

homeland security 

data, reports, 

communications, 

intelligence 

summaries, email 

correspondence, 

and alerts 

* Formerly a secure portal on Homeland Security Information Network Intelligence community of 

interest; still under development 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

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Appendix D 

Office of Inspections’ Fusion Center Sample, March 2008 

Location Fusion Center 

OIG Site 

Visit or 

Conference 

Call 

I&A 

Officer 

Deployed 

Equipment 

Installed* 

Alabama Criminal Justice Information Center Call No No 

Arizona Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center Visit Yes No 

California 

Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis 

Center Visit Yes Yes 

California Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center Visit Yes Yes 

District of 

Columbia 

Washington Regional Terrorism Analysis 

Center Visit No No 

Georgia Georgia Information Sharing & Analysis Center Visit Yes Yes 

Illinois Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center Visit Yes No 

Michigan Detroit Fusion Center Visit No No 

Michigan Michigan Intelligence Operations Center Visit No No 

Mississippi Mississippi Fusion Center Call No No 

Missouri Missouri Information Analysis Center Visit No Yes 

New York New York State Intelligence Center Visit Yes Yes 

Texas Texas Fusion Center Visit No No 

Texas North Central Texas Regional Fusion System Visit Yes Yes 

Washington Washington Joint Analytical Center Call Yes Yes 

*Homeland Secure Data Network is installed in 18 fusion centers around the country, including the centers 

listed above and the following additional centers that we did not contact during our review: Maryland 

Coordination & Analysis Center, Virginia Fusion Center, Louisiana State Analytic and Fusion Exchange, 

Florida Fusion Center, Ohio Strategic Analysis & Information Center, Connecticut Intelligence Center, 

Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center, New York Police Department Counterterrorism & Intelligence 

Divisions, Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, South Carolina Information Exchange. 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

Page 55 
 
Appendix E 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Nikole Smith, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Michael Zeitler, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Lisa Berardi, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office 

of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

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Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

I&A Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

DHS’ Role in State and Local Fusion Centers Is Evolving 
 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4199, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.