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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-2302

K E VI N R. C AR

MODY , Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

B OAR DOF T R US T E E SOF TH E U N I V E R

S I T Y OF I L L I N O I S

, et al. , Defen dants-Appellees.
Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the

Central Distri ct o f Il l i noi s. No. 12 -CV- 22 49 — Micha el P. McCus key, Judg e.
A RGU E D D E C E MB E R 3, 2013

— D E C I D E D M ARC H 28, 2014

Before P O S N E R

, M AN I O N

, and H AMI L TO N

, Circ uit Judges. H AMI L TO N , Cir cui t Judge. Plainti ff Kev in Carmody w or ked for the Uni v ersi ty of Illi noi s for 25 y ears u nti l he w as fi red for
reasons involvi ng a secu rity breach of the uni v ersi ty’ s emai l system. After uns ucc essf ully appealin g hi s di sch arg e, Carmody fi led thi s sui t again st the uni v ersi ty’ s board of tr ustees and sev eral univ ersi ty o ffic i als clai ming that they violated hi s rights under the Due Process Clause of the2 No. 13-2302
Four teenth Amendment and under an Illi noi s statute desi gned to prot ect whi stle-blow ers. The di stric t co urt di smi ssed Carmody ’ s co mplaint wi th prej udi ce under Feder al Rule of Ci vil Procedure 12(b) (6) for fai lure to state a clai m upon whi ch relief c an be granted. Car mody has appealed. W e rev i ew de novo a di stric t court’s gr ant o f a mo tion to di smi ss, construing the complaint in the plainti ff’s fav or

. Sun g P ar k v
. Indiana Univ

. School of Dentistry, 692 F .3d 828, 830 (7t h Ci r
. 2012). While w e take the facts alleged in t he complaint to be tr ue, w e also consi der attached exhib i ts and take into
accoun t any contradic tions

. Phillips v
. Pruden tial Ins. Co. of America , 714 F .3d 1017, 1019–20 (7th Ci r
. 2013). For a case at the pleading stage, w e hav e here an unusuall y detailed recor d of
ev ents becau se the complaint inclu des numero us exhib i ts reg ardin g Car mody’s ter minati on. W e conclu de that the di stric t court’s di smi ssal w as premature wi th respect to on e aspect of Carmody ’s due process clai m: that he w as not giv en an adequate pre- t e rmi nati on hearin g. Car mody has plaus ibly alleged thathi s pre-termination oppor tuni ty to be heard w as meaningless becau se he could not answer the uni v ersi ty’ s cruci al questi ons or respond to i ts accu sat ions wi thout violating a state court or der that required hi m not to di scu ss the key su bj ect. The univ ersi ty acted to fi re Carmody on the same day the state court modi fi ed i ts or der to allow hi m to respond to the charges, so the modi fi

cati on came too late to he l p hi m. Also, Carmody has alleged that he w as actuall y fi red based in par t on a charge for whi ch he had no prior notic e and oppor tuni ty to be heard. W e there fo r e r e verse thi s one port i on of the di stric t court’sNo. 13-2302 3 judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. W e affi rm the j udgment in all other r espects. I. Suf fici ency of the Pre-T

ermin atio n Process A. Factual Allegations For the last 22 y ears of Carmod y’s employment wi th the Uni v ersi ty of Illi noi s, he w as manager of systems servic e s in the De p a rtm e n t of In d u s tr i al and Enterpr i se Sy stems Engi neer
ing. Accordi ng to Carmody ’s complaint a nd numero us attached exhib i ts, the uni v ersi ty’ s offi ci al reasons for fi ring hi m inv olv ed a secu rity breach of the uni v ersi ty’ s emai l system, a breach connected to a st a t e court laws ui t Carmody w as then pursuing agains t a uni v ersi ty pr ofessor , Davi d Goldberg. C a r mody says that whi le hi s laws ui t again st Professo r Goldberg w a s p e nding, he di scov ered sev eral prin ted emai ls in the news paper box outsi de hi s home. The emai ls cont r a
di cted an affi davit that Professor Goldberg’s defense atto rney had fi led in the case, an affi davit by a no ther professor , Deborah Thurston. Carmody gav e th e emai ls to hi s lawy er , who then fi led a motion of some kin d to whi ch he attached the emai ls, desi gnating them “Group Exhibi t A.” Carmody deni es knowi ng how the emai ls came to be in hi s news paper box. (Carmody’ s cl ai m in hi s law sui t agains t Goldberg w as appar
ently that the professor h ad assau lted h i m, though the nature of the clai m i s i rr elev ant to Carm o dy’s fi ring and the case before us. Carmody ’s sui t a g a inst Goldberg has since been di smi ssed.) The emails Carmody found w ere betw een univ ersi ty employ ees, inclu ding Pro fe ss o r Thurston, and all of them4 No. 13-2302
concerned Professor Goldberg. Accordi ng to Carmody ’ s federal compl a int, the state court judge or dered as follows reg ardin g the emails : [T]h e Court i s going to or der that Group Exhi bi t A [the Thurston emai ls] be placed under seal pending li tigati on of any further clai ms of privi lege or relev ance, and the Court i s further go ing t o enter a prot ecti v e or der o n the parties that there is to be no secondary dissem ination of any of the contents o f Group Exhibit A as the court has described them, beyond the
respective li tigatio n fil es of the three lawyers here

. (Emph asi s added.) The three lawyers w ere Carmody ’s lawy er , Goldberg’s lawy er

, a n d a l a wye r for Thurston. Both professors’ lawy ers w ere pr ov i ded by the uni v ersi ty

. Carmody then receiv ed a pre-ter minati on lette r dated July 19, 2010. It explain ed t ha t he w as being inv esti gate d for mi scondu ct, that he w as sus pended wi th pay i mmedi ately , and that i f the charges spelled out in the letter w ere sub stanti ated, they could resu lt in di sci pline up to and i nclu ding i mmedi ate ter minati on of employment. As far as the sub st a nce of the charges w ent, the let ter sai d: It i s alleged that y ou atte mpted to use the sub stance of the emai l mess ages fo r no n-Univ ersi ty relat ed purposes and wi thout permi ssi on. Furthe r more, there are open questi ons reg ardin g how y ou came to be in p o ssessi on of these documents, speci fi cally whether you obtained them thro ugh i mproper acces s.No. 13-2302 5
The July 19 lette r w ent on to say that Carmody w ould hav e an oppor tuni ty to respond to the charges at a me e t ing later that month. On Ju l y 28th, uni v ersi ty offi ci als held a pre-ter minati on meetin g wi th C a r mody, who brought hi s lawy er , Rober t Kirchn e r
. At that meetin g, Carmody alleges, the univ ersi ty offi ci als sai d they intended to questi on hi m about the contents of the emai ls in Group Exhibi t A. Keeping in mind that w e are rev i ewing a R ule 12(b) (6) di smi ssal, w e mus t giv e Carmody the bene fit of confli cting information and allegations about what happened in the meetin g. W e there fore assu me that uni v ersi ty offi ci als intended to questi on Car mo dy about the contents of the emai ls, as w ell as how he receiv e d t he m, and that both subjects w ere i mport ant to the pending deci sio n about what acti on to take again st Carmody

. Carmody ’s lawyer sum mari zed hi s v ersi on of the meetin g in an August 3 letter to counsel for t he uni v ersi ty: Thi s lette r w i ll sum mari ze the meetin g of July 28th, in whi ch y ou w e r e a partici pant. [T w o univ ersi ty offi ci als] had advis ed, and y ou then confi rmed that they were in possess i on of a copy of a document
or dered sealed by Judge Leonard and that y ou, and they , intended to questi on Kevin Carmody about the contents of, and sub stance contai ned in, that document. I a d v ised that I w ould not permi t Mr

. Carmody to v i olate Judge Leonard’s or der by di scu ssing or di scl osing the cont e nt s of the sealed materials and that by insi sting that he do so, Uni v er
si ty personnel w ould be acting in violati on of the6 No. 13-2302

or der as w ell. Y

ou di sagreed and a dvis ed that the “Uni v ersi ty i s not a party to that case.” W e adjo urned the meetin g wi th an agr eement that I w ould send thi s lett e r t o y ou, aw ai t y our reply , and then seek di rection from the Court

. I wi ll aw ai t y our reply

. The un i v ersi ty’ s coun sel wrote in response: Y ou are corr ect in that the Uni v ersi ty has co pi es of “Exhibi t A,” whi ch consi st of Uni v ersi ty documents. The Uni v ersi ty i s now inv esti gating whether or n ot any U nive rsi ty poli ci es hav e been violated and/or
secu rity measu res breached in the acqui si tion or use of those documents. [Uni v ersi ty offi ci als] atte mpted to ask y our cli ent questi ons about the documents in hi s possess i on, whi ch he declined to answer becau se of y our interpret ation of the Judge’s ruling. I advis e d t hat I di d not interpr et the Judge’s r uling as y ou di d. I t i s my understanding that the Judge sealed the documents

... becau se of the concerns wi th how the documents w ere obtained

... . I do not beli ev e i t w as the intent o f the Judge t o prev ent the Uni v ersi ty from using i ts documents as necess ary in or der to deter mine i f t he r e ha s been a breach of Uni v ersi ty sec ur ity and/or a breach of tr ust and responsibi li ty o f any Uni v ersi ty e mploy ees ... . I w ould be happy to jo in y ou in a motion for clari fi

cati on of the judge’ s or der if you feel that i s necessary

. In the meanti me, the Uni v ersi ty wi ll pr o ce ed wi th i ts inv esti gation. If y o ur cli ent reconsi dersNo. 13-2302 7 partici patin g in thi s proc ess, please let me know

. Other wi se, hi s refusal to partici pate may be consi dered in the inv esti gation. Att o r ne y K i rchner began efforts to modi fy the state court
or der to allow Carmody to respond to the univ ersi ty’ s accu sations and t hr e a t of ter minati on. The recor d does not reflect whether he too k the uni v ersi ty’ s lawy er up on her offer to jo in hi m in a motion for clari fi cati on, though the court modi fi ed i ts
or der about tw o months later , on the same day that Carmody

w as fi red. The inv e st ig ation w as conduc ted by the uni v ersi ty’ s Academi c Human Resources department and w as compl eted in early Sept ember 2010. The inv esti gato rs sub mi tte d a repo rt
on Sept ember 7 to uni v ersi ty offi ci als. They recommended that Carmody ’s e mployment be t ermin ated. The repor t ex plained that, r egar dless of how Carmody had obtained the emai ls in Group Exhibi t A, “he di d not i mmedi ately repo rt the breach of
secu rity” that mus t hav e been perpet rat ed. Carmody also had “atte mpted to use the sub stance of the emai l mess ages

... for non-Uni v ersi ty purposes and wi thout permi ssi on,” and i t w as “more probable than not t ha t M r
. Carmody obtained the documents in ‘Group Exhib i t A’ t hrough imp ro per access .” On Sept ember 9 , a t tor ney Kirchn er sent a lette r to tw o un i v ersi ty lawy ers reg ardin g the Sept ember 7 repo rt

. He
con tended that the recommendati on to fi re hi s cli ent w as based in part on a new charge: that C a r mo d y had fai led to repo rt a secu rity b reach upon receiving the emai ls. Kirchn er asked for
an oppor tuni ty for Carmody to respo nd t o thi s new charge. Carmody alleges that no o pport uni ty w as prov i ded.8 No. 13-2302
Notice w as sent to Carmody on Sept ember 23, 2010 that hi s employment w as ter minated. The lette r also sa id he could appeal that deci si on to the associ ate provost for human
resources. Accordi ng to Carmody’ s complaint, the state c ourt li fted i ts restr i cti ons o n d isc ussing Group Exhibi t A the v ery day he w as fi red. In hi s complaint i n thi s federal cas e, Carmody alleges that he w as not giv en suffi ci ent notic e and oppor tuni ty to respond to the charges again st hi m before he w as fi red. The d ist r ict court conclu ded that Carmody had not stated a due process clai m becau se he had been giv en an oppor tuni ty to respond to the charges at the July 28 meetin g but decline d t o take i t. Carmody v
. Boa rd of T

rustees of the Univ

. of Illinois , No. 12-CV

2249, 2013 WL 2145878, at *8 (C.D. Ill. May 15, 2013). Mor eov er , the court explain ed, Carmody had adequate notic e before that meetin g of the charge that he fai led to repo rt a secu rity breach. Although the charge w as not explic i tly lev eled unti l after the meetin g, Carmody w as aw are that hi s possess i on of the emai ls

w as being inv esti gate d. Accordi ng to the court, that w as suffi ci ent notic e of the la t e r charge of fai lure to repo rt a secu rity breach. Id. at *9. B. Analysis A publi c emplo yee wh o can be fi red only for goo d caus e has a proper ty intere st in his o r he r jo b and may be depr i v ed of that proper ty intere st only wi th due process of law

. Se e Gilbert v
. Homar

, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997); Clevel and Boa rd of Educ. v
. Loudermi ll , 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985); Boa rd of Regen ts of State Colleges v
. Roth , 408 U.S 564, 576–78 (1972); Harbaugh v
. Boa rd of Educ. of City of Chicago , 716 F .3d 983, 986 (7th Ci r
. 2013).No. 13-2302 9
For purposes of the motion to di smi ss and t his a ppeal, the parties agree t hat Carmo dy had a proper ty interest in h i s job. The uni v ersi ty there fore could not depr iv e hi m of that propert y wi thout due pro cess of law

. “The fund amental requirement of due p ro cess i s the oppor tuni ty to be heard ‘at a meaningful tim e and in a meaningful manner .’” Mathews v
. Eldridge, 42 4 U

. S

. 319, 333 (1976), quoting Armstrong v
. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (196 5 ); see Baird v
. Boa rd of Educ. for W arren Cmty. Unit School Dist. No. 205, 389 F .3d 685, 690 (7th Ci r
. 2004); Schu ltz v
. Baumgart, 738 F .2d 231, 235 (7th Ci r
. 1984). The nature and ext ent of the process a publi c employ ee i s due before ter minati on depend on the adequacy o f any post-ter minati on hearing t hat w as av ai lable. Loud e rmill , 470 U.S. at 545–46; Bodenstab v
. County of Cook , 569 F .3d 651, 663 (7th Ci r
. 2009). Becaus e w e conclud e in P art II below that Carmody w as giv en a full oppor tuni ty to contest hi s fi ring in a post-ter minati on hearin g, before he w as fi red he

w as entitled under Loudermi ll to only “or al or wri tte n notic e of the charges again st hi m, an explanation o f t he employ er’s evidenc e, and an oppor tuni ty to present hi s si de of the stor y .” Loudermi ll , 470 U.S. at546. Ev en where there i s a ro bus t post-ter minati on procedure, though, a meaningful oppor tuni ty to be heard before the employ er deci des on ter minati on i s a cr it ical prot ecti on. The purpose of a pre -t e r minati on hearin g i s t o prov i de “an ini tial che c k a gainst mi staken deci si ons—ess ential ly , a deter minati on of whether there are reasonable gr ounds t o be li ev e that the charges again st the employ ee are tr ue and supp or t t he proposed acti on.” Loudermi ll , 470 U.S. at 545–46. Addi tionally , “[e]v en where the facts ar e cl e a r , the appropr i ateness or10 No. 13-2302

necess i ty of the di sch arg e may not be; in such ca ses, the only meaningful oppor tuni ty to inv ok e the di screti on of the deci si onmaker i s lik e l y to be before the ter minati on take s effect.” Id. at 543; accord, Hudson v
. City of Chicago , 374 F .3d 554, 560 (7th Ci r
. 2004); D u c h e s ne v
. W illiams , 849 F .2d 1004, 1008 (6th Ci r . 1988) (en b anc)

. The Sup re m e C ou rt’s vi e w th a t a p os t- ter minati on oppor tuni ty to tr y to change an employ er’s mind wi ll be less meaningfu l is supp or ted by common sens e. It wi ll be harder to co nvinc e an employ er to rev erse a deci si on to fi re someone than to make sure t he ini tial deci si on i s fair and thought ful. Whether that reluctance t o change one’s mind i s based on concerns a bo ut appearin g indeci si v e or admi tting a mi stake, or o n logisti cal reasons or ot her factor s, the reluctance i s real. The Court ’s obser v ation i s also consi stent wi th what has been shown by decades of behavi or al research: once an indi vidu al or gr oup has made a decisio n to take a particu lar
course of acti on, i t becomes harder and harde r to change course, ev en in the face of pow erful co nf l i cting evidenc e and
reasons. See gener ally

, e.g. , Dani el Kahneman, Thinki ng Fast and Slow 80–85, 245–54 (2011) (d e scribing confi rmation bi as, bi ased assi mi lation, a n d s u nk- cost effects on deci si on-making); Gei r Kirkebøen, Erik V

asaasen & Kar l Halv or T ei gen, Revisi ons and Regret: T

h e Cost of Changin g Y

our Mind, 26 J. Behavioral Deci si on M a kin g 1, 1 ( Jan. 2013) (su mmari zing large body of
re s e a rch th a t d e m on s tr a tes “people’s reluctance to ch a n ge the i r minds”) ; Craig A. Anderson, Belief Perseverance , in Encyclopedi a of So ci al Psych olog y 109, 109–10 (Roy F

. B a umeis ter & Kathleen D. V

ohs e ds. 2 0 0 7 ), and many sources ci ted in t heseNo. 13-2302 11

w or ks

. That ’s why a meaningful oppor tuni ty to be heard before t ermin ation i s so i mport ant. Carmody makes tw o arg uments that the uni v ersi ty di d not comply wi th the mini mal r e q uirements of Loudermi ll before fi ring hi m. He fi rst arg ue s that at the July 28 meetin g, he di d not hav e a meaningful opport uni ty to respond to the charges he w as aw are of becau se the state court or der in the Goldberg
case forbade hi m from di scu ssing the contents of the emai ls in Group Exhibi t A. Second, he arg ues that the uni v ersi ty added t he charge that he fai led to repo rt a secu rity breach after the July 28 meetin g and di d not giv e hi m an oppor t unity to respond to thi s new charge before he w as fi red, ev en though he requested suchan oppor tuni ty

. Both of these are at least plaus ible theo r ie s suffi ci ent to surviv e the defendants’ motion to di smi ss. W e consi der fi rst the effect of the state court or der

. A t t o rney Kirchn er’s lette r sum mari zing the July 28 meetin g, whi ch i s part of the complaint’s allegations, s ays that Carmody faced questi ons about the “sub stance contai ned in” t he emai ls in Group Exhibi t A. The state court judge’ s or der prohibi ted any secondary d isseminati on of the contents of those emai ls bey ond th e l it i gation fi les of the atto rneys di rectly inv olv ed in the st a t e court acti on. W

e mus t tr eat as at leas t plau si ble the possi

bi li ty that Carmody w ould hav e violated the state court or der i f he had answered at least some of the uni v ersi ty offi cia l s’ questions

. If indeed Carmody w ould hav e needed to violate the state court or der to giv e hi s si de of the stor y , he ha s plaus ibly
a lleged that he had no meaningful oppor tuni ty before the12 No. 13-2302

ter minati on deci si on to respond to the mo st ser i ous charge again st hi m. C o urts hav e recog ni zed that a publi c employ er may be required to accomm odate certain tempor ary obstacles, such as a seri ous i llness, that prev ent an employ ee from respondi ng to pending charges. See Calderón-Garnier v
. Rodríguez , 578 F .3d 33, 38 (1st Ci r
. 2009) (“W

e do not doubt that at some point a health condi tion could prev ent an indi vidu al from meaningfully presentin g her si de of the stor y .”); Buckner v
. City of Highland Park , 901 F .2d 491, 495 (6th Cir

. 1990) (“Buc kner w as not sufferin g from any mental or p hy si cal di sabi li ty whi ch prevented hi m from offerin g hi s response to the complaint.”) ; Galloway v
. Louisi ana, 817 F .2d 1154, 1158 (5th Ci r
. 1987) (p l ainti ff who clai med he could not respond to employ e r ’ s charges pre-ter mina t i on becau se he w as hospi talized mi ght hav e been corr ect, except that he abandoned an oppor tuni ty to respond after hi s release). That recog ni tion i s sound. The gener al consti tutional standard i s that an employ ee wi th a proper ty intere st i s entitled to notic e of the employ er’s reasons and a m eaningf ul oppor tuni ty to respond bef or e the employ er deci des to ter minate the employment. Domiano v
. V illage of River Grove, 904 F .2d 1142, 1 148–49 (7th Ci r
. 1990) (rev ersing gr ant of
sum mary judgment to employ er becau s e bri ef pre-ter minati on telephone c all di d not constitute a meaningful oppor tuni ty to respond to charges); see gener ally Loudermi ll , 470 U. S

. a t 543; Mathews , 424 U.S. at 333. An employ ee who i s si lenced temporar i ly by an i llness or injury has no meaningful oppor tuni ty to respond. Carmody has al l e g e d here that he w as si lenced tempor arily not by an i llness or injury but by a co urt or der ,No. 13-2302 13
enforceable wi th co ntempt sanc tions and other penalti es, intended to pr ote ct the priv acy intere sts of non-parti es. 1 Adding further suppor t to Carmody ’s theor y are the indi cati ons t hat hi s law y er w as w or kin g wi th the uni v ersi ty’ s lawy er to modi fy the state court or der so that Carmody could respond freely t o the uni v ersi ty’ s allegations. The or der w as not a permanent or long-ter m prohibi tion. It w as a tempor ary obstacle that could be modi fi ed, especi ally wi th the uni v er
si ty’ s cooper ation. Also, the tim etable seems both unus ual and relev ant. The univ ersi ty fi red Carmody the same day the state
co urt met wi th couns el for Carmody and the uni v ersit y a nd modi fi ed i ts or der to all ow hi m to respond to the accu sati ons. There i s no indi cati on here of any speci al urgency that required the uni v ersi ty to fi re Carmody (remember that he had be e n sus pended wi th pay) before he could prov ide a meaningful response to t he accusati ons. W e cannot deci de at thi s poin t, of course, whe t he r Carmody can pr e se nt suffi ci ent evidenc e to surviv e a motion for sum mary judgment and to prev a il a t tr i al. Perhaps hi s answering the uni v ersi ty’ s questi ons w ould not hav e required him t o v i olate the state court or der

. Perhaps he w as no t reasonably di l ig e nt in at tempting t o remove the obstacle t hat

Carmody’s case i s sub stantial l y di ffe rent fro m cases i nv ol v i ng empl oyee s 1 who decl i ne to respo nd to an emplo yer’s charges because their respo nses coul d b e i ncri minating. Such em p l o y e es, rather than b ei ng sil enced b y a tempor ary cour t or der, mak e a v ol unta ry and sel f-i nterested choi ce to stay sil ent. Cases hol di ng tha t such empl oyee s hav e b een given a su f f i ci ent opp or tunity to respo nd, see, e.g. , Gniotek v. City of Philad elphia , 80 8 F.2d 24 1, 24 5 ( 3d Ci r. 1 98 6) , do not appl y here.14 No. 13-2302
the or der presented. Perhaps ev en a bri ef further delay w ould hav e i mposed an undu e burden o n t he univ ersi ty

. Such questi ons cannot be r e so l ved on a motion to di smi ss on the basi s of the complaint and the attached exhib i ts. See Chaney v

. Subu rban Bus Div

. of Regional T ransp. Auth. , 52 F .3d 623, 630 (7th Ci r
. 1995) (reve r sing gr ant of motion to di smi ss clai m of inadequate pre-ter minati on hearing). T urning t o C a rmody ’s second theor y on the pre-ter mination process, the later -added charge for fai lure to r e p o r t a secu rity breach, we also agr ee wi th Carmody at the pleadings stage that thi s charge may hav e been suffi ci ently di stinct from the or i gin al char g e s t hat he di d not receiv e fai r notic e before the July 28 meetin g that he faced thi s charge. Relying on a new charge wi thout prov i ding a meaningful oppor tuni ty to respond violates due process. See Staples v
. City of Milwaukee, 142 F .3d 383, 3 8 4 , 387 (7th Ci r
. 1998) (rev ersi ng gr ant of
sum mary judgment for employ er becau se employ e e w as informed of one gr i ev ance before a pre-ter minati o n meetin g but not another and arg uably had no meaningful oppor tuni ty to respond to new charge); Peery v
. Brakke, 826 F .2d 740, 743–44 (8th Ci r
. 1987) (rev ersi ng judgment notwi thsta nding the

v erdic t for employ er becau se e mp l oy ee had notic e of only
some charges again st hi m and w as not “giv en any oppor tuni ty to respond to the new ch a r g e s before being fi red”); see also Stone v
. FDIC, 179 F .3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Ci r
. 1999) (“Procedural due process guarante es are not met i f the employ ee has notic e only of certain charges or port i ons of the evidenc e and the deci ding offi ci al consi ders new and m ater i al information.”). The uni v ersi ty

, rely ing on Head v
. Chicago School Reform Bd. of T rustees , 225 F .3d 794 (7th Ci r
. 2000), contends that CarmodyNo. 13-2302 15
should hav e realized a charg e of fai lure to repo rt a secu rity breach w as at least i mpli ci t in i ts July 19 lette r
. In He ad w e affi rmed the di stric t court’s gr ant of sum mary judgment to the employ er

. W

e conclu ded that the r a t he r broadly w or ded charges l ev eled again st the employ ee before hi s pre-ter mination hearin g consti tuted suffi ci ent notic e, particu larly becau se the employ ee w as giv en an addi tional oppor tuni ty to respond to th e ch a r g e s after the hearin g but befor e he w as fired. Id. at 799 n.3, 804. Thi s case i s di fferent becau se w e face a si mi lar i ssu e o n t he pleadings rat her than sum mary judgment. W e cannot resolv e the factual is sues on the pleadings, and in any ev ent there i s no indi cati on that Carmody receiv ed a second pre-ter minati on oppor tunit y to respond to the arg uably new charge, as the plai nti ff di d in Head

. The uni v ersi ty’ s response r e g ardin g Carmody ’s preter minati on clai m i s focus ed prim arily on poin tin g out,
corr ectly , that Carmody ’s relianc e on Baird v
. Boa rd of Educ. for W arren Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 205, 389 F .3d 685 (7th Ci r
. 2004)—a ca se holding that a breach of contract sui t cannot sub sti tute for a post- t e rmi nati on hearin g—is mi splac ed. Regar ding the adequacy of C a rmody ’s pre-ter minati on hearin g, the uni v ersi ty merely states that Carmody could hav e responded to the charges at the July meetin g despi te the court
or der becau se “[i ]t w as the use of the e-mai ls th a t w as being inv esti gate d, not the information cont ained there in.” In addi tion, t he univ ersi ty remark s that the “di stric t court
corr ectly ruled that the stat e ment of charges prov i ded to Carmody w as certainly suffi ci ent to allow hi m to defend hi mself .” These co nclu sory asserti ons merely contradic t Carmody ’s factual allegations. They are not suffi ci ent to allow16 No. 13-2302

us to affi rm di smi ssal on the pleadings. Carmody should hav e been allo w ed to proceed on the theor y that he w as denied an adequate pre-te rmi nati on hearing. II. Suf fici ency of the Post-T

ermin atio n Hearin g A. Factual Allegations After Carmody w as fi red, he notifi ed the uni v ersi ty that he

w ould appeal. He receiv ed a document sum mari zing the hearin g procedures, and hi s atto rney Kirchn er responded wi th
a lette r objecting to a numb er o f percei v ed defi ci enci es. The objections relev ant to thi s appeal w ere that the procedures di d
no t prov i de for acces s to exami ne the univ ersi ty’ s ema il system, or for a court repo rt er or other means of recor ding the hearin g, or for sub poenas to wi tnesses. The uni v ersi ty refused Carmody ’ s r e q uests to alter these aspects of the hearin g procedures. The he a ring offi cer’s repo rt, attached as an exhib i t to Carmody ’s complaint, shows that Carmody ’s lawy er w as permi tte d to cross-examine the uni v ersi ty’ s wi tnesses ext ensi v ely

. The univ ersi ty rested i ts case in mid -D ecember 2010,
a nd t he hearin g w as t o resume at the end o f January 2011 fo r Carmody to pr esent hi s evi dence. Schedul in g c onfl i c ts b e twe e n a tt orn e y Ki rchn e r a n d couns el for the univ ersi ty delay ed resumpti on, whi ch w as rescheduled for May 2011. On Apri l 17, how ev er , Kirchn er di ed. Carmody

w as left unrepresented. Carmody then asked to see the hearin g offi cer’s notes, whi ch he felt w oul d he lp hi m find a new a t t or ney

. The hearin g offi cer deni ed that request, but he g r a nt ed Carmody ’s request for a few months to replaceNo. 13-2302 17
Kirchn er. Although the uni v e rsi ty sought a speci fi c deadlin e, the h earing offi cer explained that he w ould not “set fi rm ti me li mi ts on Mr

. Carmody ’s efforts to secu re new repr esentation.” At t he end o f June 2011, Carmody sent the hearin g offi cer an emai l declining to partici pate in further proceedings. He sai d the hearing offi cer should c onclude the post-termin ation hearin g wi th the uni v ersit y ’ s co uns el. The hearin g w as not resumed, a nd instead the uni v ersi ty sub mi tte d a wri tte n sum mary o f i ts posi tion. The hearin g offi cer i ssu ed hi s findings in July 2011. He
conc l ud e d that the uni v ersi ty had not shown that Carmody hi mself breached the computer system to obtain the em ai ls in Group Exhibi t A. (The uni v ersi ty’ s evidenc e show ed t ha t t he emai ls w ere all accessed fr o m Deborah Thurston’s computer , and no d i rect evi dence show ed that Carmody was the person who a cc e ss ed them.) But the hearin g offi cer found that the other tw o charges—Carmody used the emai ls for non-uni v er
si ty purposes wi thout pe r mis sio n and fai led to repo rt a secu rity breach—w ere support ed “clearly and conv incingly .” Based on hi s findings, the offi cer recommended that univ ersi ty offi ci als consi der whether Carmody w ould hav e been fi red on those gr ounds alone, wi thout assu ming that Carmody hi mself had breached th e sy st em’s priv acy

. The uni v ersi ty informed C a r mo d y the following month that the tw o “clearly support ed” charges w ere “suffi ci ently egr egious to w arr ant i mmedi ate d ismi ssal .” Follo wing the rej ecti on of hi s postter minati on appeal, Carmody fi led thi s federal laws ui t. In hi s compl aint, Carmo dy alleges thatone or more of the i ssue s a t tor ney Kirchn er i denti fi ed when he objecte d to the18 No. 13-2302
hearin g procedures consti tuted a deni al o f d ue process. He focus es on hi s inabi li ty to recor d the hearin g, to inspect the uni v ersi ty’ s emai l system, and to sub poena wi tnesses. He also poin ts to the he a r ing offi cer’s refusal to supp ly hi m wi th the offi cer’s notes and the o ffic er’s refusal to exclude wi tnesses from the hear ing whi le other wi tnesses were t esti fyi ng. The di stric t court explain ed that, under Mathews v
. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976), Carmody ’s r ig ht to hi s employment and the probable v alue of hi s desi red procedures mus t be bal a n c e d a ga in st the cost of the procedures and the uni v ersi ty’ s intere st in ter minating problem employ ees. The cour t conclud ed in short that Carmody ’s abi l i ty to defend hi mself w as not unduly hindered by the hearin g’s purpor ted defi ci enci es, meaning that he had no t st a ted a clai m based on a deni al of due process. Carmody, 2013 WL 2145878 at *10–11. B. Analysis The requirements of due process are “flexible” and depend
o n t he si tuation at hand, Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334, but a t t he
same tim e the rules that apply to a giv en type of si tuation “are shaped by the ris k of err or inherent in the tr uthfinding process as appli ed to the gen erality of cases,” id. at 344. The rules are not shaped by “rar e exceptions.” Id. On appeal C a r mody again li sts addi tional procedures he beli ev es should hav e been prov i ded, but he dev e l o p s no arg ument that the potent i al v alue of these procedures in postte rm in a ti on h e a ri

ngs, when w ei ghed again st their cost, render s them consti tutionally required. He ci tes a few cases inv olving post-ter minati on hearin gs in which a more ext ensi v e recor d

w as produced, e.g. , W

iller v
. Las V

egas V alley W ater D i s t. , No.No. 13-2302 19
98-156 8 6 , 1999 WL 274472, at *2 (9th Ci r
. Apr

. 19, 1999) (postter minati on hearin g recor d w a s o v er 3700 pages long); English v
. T

alladega Cnty. Boa rd of Edu c
. , 938 F

. Supp. 775, 777 n.2 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (transcri pt w as produced), or uns peci fi ed di scov ery w as conduc ted, e.g. , Powers v
. Richards , 549 F .3d 505, 509 (7th Ci r
. 200 8 ) (fi red employ ee “had the oppor tuni ty to conduc t di scov ery ”). Carmody ci tes no case, how ev er , holding that a ny o f hi s desi red procedures w ere consti tutionally required, and w e ha ve fo und none. The abi li ty to sub poena wi tnesses, for example, i s not alw ays guarante ed in an admini strat i v e hearin g. See Am u n d sen v
. Chicago Park Dist. , 218 F .3d 712, 717 (7th Ci r . 2000). In a ny ev ent, the speci fi c procedures Carmody requested do not require indi vidu al analysi s. Carmody ’s deci si on to bow out of the post-ter minati on hearin g—a deci si on he made freely—for ecloses hi s due process clai m to the ext e nt it i s premi sed on that hearin g. See Swank v
. Smart, 999 F .2d 263, 264–65 (7th Ci r
. 1993) (employ ee w ai v ed right to post-ter mination hearin g by declining i t); Farhat v
. Jopke, 370 F .3d 580, 596 (6th Ci r
. 2004) (“[W] here the employ ee refuses to partici pate or chooses not to partici pate in the post-ter minati on proceedings, then the employee has w ai v ed hi s procedural due process clai m.”). W e are not suggesti ng that no ci rcums tances could ev er justif y forg oin g a p os t- ter minati on hearin g. (W e allow ed abov e for ju s t s u ch a p os s i

b i l i ty reg ardin g Carmody ’s pre-te rm in a ti on hearin g: a co ur t or der prohibi tin g meaningful partici pation.) But the c omplaint and exhib i ts show that the uni v ersi ty offered Carmody a n adv ersarial post-ter minati on hearin g before a neutral hearin g offi cer

. He w as permi tte d to hav e legal couns el20 No. 13-2302

a nd to present evidenc e and cross-examine wi tnesses. Carmody parti c i p a te d thro u gh the c l os e of the uni v ersi ty’ s case but declined to complete the hearin g. Hi s explanation on appeal for bowing out—that he di d not w ant “to partici pate in hi s own lynching”—i s hyperbole that i s completely out of step wi th hi s exhib i ts and allegations. The di strict court corr ectly rej ected Carmody ’s due process claim t o the ext ent i t w as premi sed on the post-ter minati on hearing. Carmody also appea l s t he di stric t court’s deni al of hi s motion to amend hi s complaint, but he ha s g iven us no indi cati on what allegations he w ould li ke to add. In gener al, a di stric t court should freely giv e leav e to amend to cure curable defects, at least where there i s no undu e delay or undue prej udi ce t o the opposi ng party , but t he court can r e a so nably expect a party asking for an oppor tuni ty to amend to i denti fy how he propo ses to cure the defe ct s. E.g. , Independen t T rust Corp. v
. Stewart Information Servic es Co rp ., 665 F .3d 930, 943–44 (7th Ci r
. 2012). W

e see no reason to di sturb the di stric t c ourt ’s deci si on on this poin t. III

. Illinois S tat e Offi cials and Employees Ethics Ac t Claim Carmody also clai ms that hi s fi ring vi olated the prov i si on of t he Illi noi s St ate Offi ci als and Employ ees Ethi cs Act that prohibi ts ret ali ation again st employ ees who repo rt i llegal acti vity

. See 5 Ill. Comp. St at. 430/15-10. Thi s clai m i s based on Carmody ’s beli ef that hi s fi ring actually had nothin g to do wi th t he emai ls he found in hi s news paper box. He w as fi r e d in 2010, he contends, in ret ali ation for a repo r t he made three y ears earlier

, in May 2007, about i mpro p e r acti vity at the uni v ersi ty

. Accordi ng to hi s complaint, he had learned that tw oNo. 13-2302 21
p r o fe ssors w ere using a popcorn mach ine on univ ersi ty proper ty as part of “a priv ate consu ltin g deal” of some sort

. He repo rt ed thi s so-call e d “ p op c orn a c tivi ty ” to P ro fe s s or Deborah Thurston (of the later Goldberg case) , but she too k no acti on, in Carmody ’s vie w becau se her husband w as one of the perpet rat or s. C a r mo d y’s only reason for beli eving that hi s repo rt about the popcorn led to hi s fi ring seem s to be that the popcorn inc i dent occurred and then later he w as fi red. If the allegations in a compla int d o no t “‘state a clai m to relief that is plausi

ble o n its fac e,’” the clai m cannot surv i v e a motion to d ism iss

. Ashcroft v
. Iqb al , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v
. T wombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The di stric t court conclu ded that C a r mo d y di d not state a plau sib l e clai m under the Ethi cs Act becau se the three y ears separating the popc or n inci dent an d hi s fi ring made hi s clai m i mplaus i ble. C ar m ody, 2013 WL 2145878, at *12–13. W e agr ee wi th that asses sment, at least where Carmody has giv en us no pot e nti al explanation for the long delay betw een hi s repo rt and the alleged ret ali ation. Under these ci rcums tances, three y ears i s “well bey ond the tim e that w ould allow a reasonable jury to conclu de that hi s ter minati on w as caus ally re l ated” to the repo rt . See Lalvani v

. Cook Cnty., Illin ois , 269 F .3d 785, 790 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 0 1 ) (c oncluding that a y ear and a half betw een employ ee’s acti on and supp osed ret ali ation made clai m i mplaus i

ble). Again Carmody seeks leav e to amend hi s complaint, b ut nothin g in hi s appellate fi lings i dent i fi es new allegations or suggests that an amendmen t w ould make hi s clai m plaus ible. For these reasons, w e R E VE R S E the di stric t court’s judgment di smi ssing Carmody ’s due process clai m and REMAND the case for further proc e e d ing s li mi ted to whether he w as22 No. 13-2302
deni ed a consti tutionally adequate pre-ter minati on hear ing. W e AFF IRM the di smi ssal of Carmody ’ s clai m under 5 Ill. Comp. St at. 430/15-10.