* Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by

designation.

1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-8424.

Patricia BURGOS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO., Defendant-Appellee.

May 11, 1994.

Appeal from t he United States District Court for the Western

District of Texas.

Before ALDISERT * , REYNALDO G. GARZA and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Burgos family appeals the dis trict court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. on the

basis that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187, preempts their intentional

inflictio n of emotional distress claim. Finding no error, we

AFFIRM.

I. FACTS

Oscar Burgos was employed by Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.

("Southwestern Bell") for over nineteen years. In 1989, Burgos was

a non-management employee with the title Communications Technician.

He was a member of the labor organization Communications Workers of

America, wh ich was a party to a collective bargaining agreement

wit h Southwestern Bell. The agreement covered the conditions of

employment of Burgos and other employee s similarly situated. In2

August, 1989, Burgos was found to be suffering from a heart

condition known as idiopathic, congestive cardiomyopathy. After a

period of hospitalization, he recovered sufficiently to return to

work in October, 1989, on a restricted basis, the restriction being

that he was forbidden to lift anything heavier than twenty-five

pounds. With this restriction, Burgos was apparently able to

perform the duties of a Communications Technician, at least for a

few months. He was assigned to a group known as the Special

Services Group.

In March, 1990, Southwestern Bell made a management decision

to transfer the work being done by the Special Services Group in El

Paso to the Dallas office. Under the collective bargaining

agreement then in effect, Burgos had thre e options: (1) move to

Dallas with the Special Services Group; (2) seek and obtain

another position with the company in El Paso, or (3) take

termination, which entit led the employee to a termination

allowance. Burgos advised the company that his doctor advised him

not to move to Dallas with the Special Services Group. Rather than

taking termination, he decided to apply for another position with

the company in El Paso. Pursuant to the Job Vacancy Article of the

collective bargaining agreement, Burgos took four tests to

determine his qualifications for alternative positions within

Southwestern Bell. He failed all four tests, which the appellants

specifically attribute to his worsening medical condition.

On July 7, 1990, a position became available in network

switching and Burgos was placed in this position. Although his3

title of Communications Technician continued, his duties were

changed significantly. He was sent to Dallas to attend a course in

electronic switching known as the "511A Training Course." Burgos

proceeded to fail a segment of this c ourse, and he was deemed by

Southwestern Bell to have failed the entire course. As a result,

h e was "retreated" back to El Paso to his former posi tion in

Special Services. His continued efforts to obtain a new position

with Southwestern Bell in El Paso were unsuccessful. Finally, on

August 17, 1990, Burgos n otified Southwestern Bell that he would

take termination. Accordingly, his employment was terminated and

he received termination pay of about $30,000.00. After this, his

heart condition worsened, and he was hospitalized. On October 3,

1990, Burgos died while awaiting a heart transplant.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The widow and children of the deceased, Oscar Burgos, brought

a civil action in the El Paso County Court, alleging negligence,

breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Southwestern Bell filed a notice of removal to the

Western District of Texas on the basis of diversity of citizenship

and federal question. The Burgos family abandoned all claims

except for their intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Southwestern Bell on the basis that section 301 of the LMRA

preempted the Burgos family's tort claim. The Burgos timely

appealed to this court.

III. DISCUSSION4

The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court

properly granted summary judg ment on the basis that federal law,

via the LMRA, preempts the Burgos' intentional inflic tion of

emotional distress claim.

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews the district court's rulings on motions

for summary judgment de novo. FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231,

1236 (5th Cir.1991). A motion for summary judgment should be

granted only where competent evidence establishes the absence of a

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. S ee, Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d

265 (1986 ). A defendant moving for summary judgment must

affirmatively demonstrate that there is no ge nuine issue of

material fact concerning each element of the plaintiff's claims for

relief. S ee, Id. at 323 , 106 S.Ct. at 2552. An issue is

"material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law. S ee, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed .2d 202

(1986). This court is required to resolve all reasonable doubts

and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and

then determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 169

(5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 1959, 109

L.Ed.2d 321 (1990).

B. LMRA Preemption5

The Burgos family argues that the district court erred in

holding that their claim of intentional infliction of emotional

d istress is preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. They argue

that their claim is based on the conduct of the agents and

employees of Southwestern Bell who, with knowledge of Mr. Burgos'

serious heart condition, placed Mr. Burgos under such extreme

emotional distress that his physical condition deteriorated to the

point where he was forced to take voluntary termination and

succumbed to an untimely death soon thereafter. The Burgos family

argues that they do n ot complain of the particular Southwestern

Bell policies which set this course of harassment and stress into

effect. They further argue that their claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress does not require any analysis of

the collective bargaining agreement. They conclude, therefore,

that their state-law claim is not preempted by section 301(a) of

the LMRA.

Southwestern Bell, in contrast, argues that the Burgos' tort

claim is nothing more than an attack on their procedures in

declaring force adjustments, filling job vacancies, and

effectuating terminations. Southwestern Bell claims that the

entire process through which Oscar Burgos passed in the spring and

summer of 1990 was the effectuation of their forc e adjustment

decision pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. As the

Burgos' tort claim is only another way of complaining about that

process a nd Oscar Burgos' ultimate termination from employment,

their claim is substantially dependent upon an analysis of the6

collective bargaining agreement. Southwestern Bell concludes,

therefore, that the Burgos' tort claim is preempted by section

301(a) of the LMRA.

Section 301(a) of the LMRA states:

Suits for violation of contracts between an emp loyer and a

labor organization representing employees in an industry

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any

such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court

of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,

without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard

to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,

405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), the U.S.

Supreme Court held:

if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the

meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application

of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since

there could be as many state-law principles as there are

States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law

principles—necessarily uniform throughout the Nation—must be

employed to resolve the dispute.

Prior to Lingle, the U.S. Sup reme Court, in A llis-Chalmers

Corporation v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1916, 85

L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), held that "when resolution of a state-law claim

is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an

agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim

must be either treated as a § 301 claim, [aut hority omitted], or

dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law."

In Brown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co

., 901 F.2d 1250,

1253 (5th Cir.1990), an employee was told by his personal physician

that he was completely disabled and should not return to work.7

Southwestern Bell, however, informed the employee that if he did

not return to work by a certain date, he would be terminated. I d.

The employee brought a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress based on the fact that Southwestern Bell forced

him to ch ose between his job and his doctor's advice. I d. This

court held that the employee's clai m was essentially that his

absence from work pursuant to doctor's orders did not constitute a

just cause for discharge under the collective bargaining agreement.

Id. at 1255. Thus, the court reasoned, his claim required an

interpre t ation of the collective bargaining agreement and was

preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 1255-56.

The Fourth Circuit, in McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.,

934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir.1991) ( en banc ), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----,

112 S.Ct. 912, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992), dealt with a similar

sit uation. In M cCormick, the plaintiff brought claims for

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well

as other claims based on AT & T's removal and dis card of

plaintiff's personal belongings from his locker. I d. at 533. The

Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff had the burden of proving

wrongful conduct and that he must demonstrate not that the conduct

was wrongful in some abstract sense, but wrongful under the

circumstances. I d. at 535-36. The court went on to state that the

circumstances that must be considered in examining management's

conduct are not merely factual, but contractual, and the collective

bargaining agreement is a crucial component of these circumstances.

Therefore, plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress8

claim was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 536.

We agree with the reasoning in Brown and McCormick. In order

to determine whether Southwestern Bell acted wrongfully in the way

it transferred Mr. Burgos from one section to another, required him

to take different tests, and ultimately eff ectuated his

termination, an analysis of Southwestern Bell's obligations under

the collective bargaining agreement is necessary. Since an

analysis of the collective bargaining agreement is necessary, the

Burgos' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is

preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.

Therefore, we find that the district cou rt properly granted

summary judgment in favor of Southwestern Bell.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of

summary judgment is AFFIRMED.