Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

TIMOTHY E. STUCKY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Blume, Connelly, Jordan, Attorney General of Indiana

Stucky & Lauer, LLP

Fort Wayne, Indiana ROBERT J. HENKE

Deputy Attorney General

DAVID E. COREY

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY )

TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD )

RELATIONSHIP OF G.G., MINOR CHILD, )

AND HER MOTHER, S.V., )

)

S.V., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A04-1403-JT-105

)

INDIANA DEPARTMENT )

OF CHILD SERVICES, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, Judge

Cause No. 02D08-1306-JT-56

September 5, 2014
2

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BRADFORD, Judge

CASE SUMMARY

Appellant-Respondent S.V. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her 

parental rights to G.G. (“the Child”). Mother argues that Appellee-Petitioner the Indiana 

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

(1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child’s removal 

from Mother’s care will not be remedied, and that (2) termination of Mother’s parental rights 

is in the Child’s best interests. Because the undisputed findings of the juvenile court indicate 

that Mother has neither engaged in nor completed her court-ordered domestic violence 

counseling programs, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

determination that there is a reasonable probability that the recurring episodes of domestic 

violence, for which the Child was removed from Mother’s care, will not be remedied. 

Additionally, because the Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) for the Child 

testified that the Child needs a safe, stable, and permanent home, which Mother has been 

unable to provide, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s

determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests. We 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Child was born on November 12, 2005, to Mother and R.G. (“Father”).1 Prior to 

 

1 Father’s parental rights to the Child were also terminated by the juvenile court but are not at issue in 
3

October 2, 2012, the Child resided with Mother and Mother’s boyfriend, C.S. (“Boyfriend”).2

On March 28, 2012, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Child was a Child in Need of 

Services (“CHINS”). Specifically, DCS alleged that Mother and Boyfriend had a history of 

domestic violence and had engaged in acts of domestic violence while the Child was present 

in the home. DCS further alleged that Boyfriend had been convicted of domestic battery for 

which he was then-serving his sentence on home detention.

At a hearing on March 29, 2012, Mother admitted to the allegations set forth in the 

CHINS petition, and the juvenile court adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS. The juvenile 

court issued its dispositional decree that same day, ordering the Child to remain in Mother’s 

care and establishing a parental participation plan for Mother. Mother’s parental 

participation plan required her, inter alia, to enroll in both family and individual counseling 

on domestic violence, attend all sessions, and successfully complete the programs. Mother 

was also required to refrain from any and all domestic violence.

At a review hearing on August 16, 2012, the juvenile court found that Mother had 

enrolled and was participating in the counseling programs required by her parental 

participation plan. The juvenile court further found that Mother had demonstrated an ability 

to benefit from those services. The juvenile court continued the Child’s placement with

Mother, finding that the Child was progressing well.

In early October 2012, DCS received a report that Mother and Boyfriend had engaged 

 

this appeal.

2 Mother has two other children, born to Boyfriend, who were subject to the underlying CHINS 

proceedings. Mother’s parental rights to these other children are not at issue in this appeal.
4

in a new episode of domestic violence. As a result, on October 2, 2012, the Child was 

removed from Mother’s care and placed with her paternal grandparents. At a hearing on 

October 9, 2012, the juvenile court found that a new episode of domestic violence had indeed 

occurred between Mother and Boyfriend. The juvenile court ordered the Child to remain in

the care of her paternal grandparents.

On February 5, 2013, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing and found that 

Mother had failed to satisfactorily participate in the counseling programs required by her 

parental participation plan and that she no longer demonstrated an ability to benefit from 

those services. The court maintained its permanency plan for the Child of reunification with 

Mother but ordered a concurrent plan for paternal grandparents to establish custody. 

On May 1, 2013, the juvenile court held another permanency hearing and again found 

that Mother had failed to satisfactorily participate in the counseling programs required by her 

parental participation plan and that she had not demonstrated an ability to benefit from those 

services. As a result the juvenile court modified the permanency plan to termination of 

Mother’s parental rights and adoption for the Child.

On June 24, 2013, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. On 

November 6, 2013, the juvenile court ordered Mother and paternal grandparents to undergo 

mediation concerning the Child’s care. A two-hour mediation conducted on November 12, 

2012, proved unsuccessful. On November 19 and 20, 2013, the juvenile court held an 

evidentiary hearing on DCS’s termination petition, during which the court heard testimony 

from, inter alia, Mother’s domestic violence counselors, Patricia Stonestreet and Maralee 
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Martin; the Child’s case worker, Amanda Ray; and CASA Suzanna Lange. On February 14, 

2014, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child. 

Where necessary, additional facts will be provided below.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional 

right of a parent to establish a home and raise her children. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further, we acknowledge that the 

parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships of our culture.” Id. 

However, although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the 

termination of those rights when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his responsibility as a

parent. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore, 

parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in 

determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. Id.

The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parent but to protect the 

child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s emotional and physical 

development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child isirreversibly 

harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired 

before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

In order to involuntarily terminate a parent’s parental rights, DCS must establish by 

clear and convincing evidence that: 

(A) one (1) of the following exists:
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(i) the child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree;

(ii) a court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable 

efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, 

including a description of the court’s finding, the date of the finding, 

and the manner in which the finding was made; or

(iii) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the 

supervision of a county office of family and children or probation 

department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twentytwo (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the

home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of 

services or a delinquent child;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2011). 

Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

termination of her parental rights. Specifically, Mother argues that DCS failed to prove by 

clear and convincing evidence that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the Child’s removal from Mother’s care will not be remedied, and that (2) 

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests. In reviewing 

termination proceedings, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of 

the witnesses. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the 
7

evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom. Id. 

Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in 

its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must 

determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings 

support the legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to 

assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment terminating a 

parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly 

erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. Id. A 

judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not 

supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

I. Whether There Was a Reasonable Probability that the Conditions Resulting in 

the Removal of the Child Would Not Be Remedied

Mother argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there 

was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Child’sremoval would not be 

remedied. In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal will not 

be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 

Dearborn Cnty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013).

First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we 

“determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied.” Id. (quoting [In re] I.A., 934 N.E.2d [1127,] 1134 [(Ind. 

2010)] (internal quotation marks omitted). In the second step, the trial court 

must judge a parent’s fitness “as of the time of the termination proceeding, 

taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions,” [Bester, 839 

N.E.2d at 152]—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “habitual 
8

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of 

future neglect or deprivation.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231 (quoting Bester,

839 N.E.2d at 152) (internal quotation marks omitted). We entrust that 

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s 

prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.

See K.T.K., [989 N.E.2d] at 1234. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to 

changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past 

behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.

In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) (footnote omitted).

The record reveals that DCS removed the Child from Mother’s care due to recurring 

episodes of domestic violence between Mother and Boyfriend. The juvenile court 

determined there to be a reasonable probability that the recurrence of these episodes would 

not be remedied because “Mother ha[d] not been meaningfully engaged in her therapy” and 

“ha[d] not completed services designed to correct the issue of domestic violence.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 72. In support of this determination, the trial court found as follows:

15. In August, 2012, the Department referred the Mother for counseling 

services at Family and Children’s Services. From the testimony of 

therapist Joel Harris the Court finds that he met with the Mother and 

[Boyfriend] on about September 2012. However, in February 2013, 

[Boyfriend] expressed an interest to pursue a life path separate from 

Respondent Mother.[3] As a result, the Mother was referred to therapist 

Rebecca Stonestreet for individual therapy. Therapist Harris testified 

and the Court finds that the Mother and [Boyfriend] did not make 

sufficient progress in family therapy to achieve their goals. From 

therapist Stonestreet’s testimony the Court finds that therapy was 

provided to the [M]other from February 25, 2013 until October, 2013. 

Only seven sessions were held owning to the [M]other’s lapse in 

attendance between May and August 2013. As a result, her progress 

suffered. The therapist reported that the Mother was in denial as to her 

issues and was not engaged. The Mother did not meet the therapeutic 

goals.

 

3

In April of 2013, Boyfriend terminated his relationship with Mother and ordered her out of his home. 

Mother vacated Boyfriend’s home the following month.
9

16. The Mother was referred to the Center for Nonviolence in August, 

2012. She was enrolled in a special program designed for mothers with 

children who have been exposed to violence in the home. From the 

testimony of Maralee Martin of the Center, the Court finds that the 

Mother attended 21 of 26 session[s]. She was expelled from the 

program because she was not engaged in the group discussions and was 

not demonstrating an ability to benefit from the therapy. The Mother 

made comments during the group sessions that demonstrated a lack of 

attention to the discussion. She did not successfully complete the 

program.

Appellant’s App. p. 71.

Mother does not challenge the above-stated findings of the juvenile court. Rather, she 

claimsthe findings do not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that there was a reasonable 

probability that the conditions resulting in the Child’s removal would not be remedied. We 

disagree. As the juvenile court accurately summarized, “Three separate therapists testified 

that the Mother did not meet her therapeutic goals,” and “Two confirmed that the Mother was 

not engaged” in her counseling programs. Appellant’s App. p. 72. “[S]imply going through 

the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the 

needed change....” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Moreover, “A 

pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those 

providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, will support a finding 

that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change.” In re A.H., 832 

N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

II. Whether Termination Is in the Best Interests of the Child

Mother also argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
10

termination is in the Child’s best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a 

child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to 

the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 

N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the 

interests of the parent to those of the child involved. Id. Furthermore, this court has 

previously determined that the testimony of a child’s case worker, Guardian Ad Litem, or 

CASA regarding the child’s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is in the 

child’s best interests. Id.; see also In re M.B., 666 N.E.2d 73, 79 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. 

denied.

In determining that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best 

interests, the juvenile court found as follows:

In this case [CASA Lange] has concluded that termination of parental rights is 

in the child’s best interests. The child loves her grandparents and they have 

provided her with a stable, safe, and nurturing environment. The child is doing 

well in their care. In contrast, the Mother and Father have not made a 

commitment to the provision of services that demonstrate[s] a level of 

sacrificial care that a child needs. ... The Mother has only recently secured a 

home; having lived in two separate hotels for most of the summer and fall, 

2013. She has not completed therapeutic services primarily because she has 

not been engaged in the sessions. When called upon in group therapy she 

acknowledged that she was not paying attention. She has not met her 

obligations to her other children. Through the termination of parental rights, 

the child is freed to be adopted by relatives who have demonstrated the 

willingness and ability to make the necessary sacrifices and commitment to 

provide the child with a safe, stable, and permanent home.

Appellant’s App. pp. 72-73.

Mother does not challenge the above-stated findings of the juvenile court. Rather, she

claims that terminating her parental rights would unnecessarily sever the close bond and 
11

loving relationship she and the Child share. Mother likens her case to In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 

144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), where a divided panel of this court reversed a juvenile court’s order 

terminating a father’s parental rights, concluding that “no relationship need be severed and 

no permanent and irreversible decision need be made to protect [the child’s] best interests.” 

Id. at 151. The father in In re R.H. resided in Alaska and had no relationship with his child, 

and the child was strongly bonded with his grandparents, with whom he had been placed.

The father, however, “did everything that was asked of him,” including completing and 

benefiting from all court-ordered services. Id. at 150. 

Here, the juvenile court’s undisputed findings reveal that Mother has neither engaged 

in nor completed her court-ordered domestic violence counseling programs. In light of 

CASA Lange’s testimony regarding the Child’s need for permanency, considered with the 

reasonable probability that Mother’s recurring episodes of domestic violence will not be 

remedied, we conclude that DCS presented sufficient evidence to prove that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION

Having concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Child, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile 

court.

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.