NUMBER 13-18-00165-CV 

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

WILLIAM J. NORBERG JR., 

M.D., ET AL., Appellants,

v.

ALEXIS AMEEL, PIETER AMEEL,

AND ACACIA AMEEL, Appellees.

On appeal from the 206th District Court 

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Hinojosa, and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Appellants Vangala J. Reddy, M.D., William J. Norberg, Jr., M.D., Krishna M. 

Turlapati, M.D., Ana Hernandez Almeda, M.D., Frank W. Sabatelli, M.D., and Irene V. 

Perez Young, M.D. appeal the trial court’s order denying their motions to dismiss a
2

healthcare liability claim brought by appellees Alexis Ameel, Pieter Ameel,1 and Acacia 

Ameel. In a single issue, appellants assert the trial court erred in denying their motions

to dismiss because the Ameels’ expert reports failed to comply with § 74.351 of the Texas 

Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351. We 

reverse and remand in part and affirm in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 9, 2015, sixteen-year-old Alexis was admitted to the emergency 

department at Doctor’s Hospital at Renaissance (DHR) after being diagnosed with deepvein thrombosis (DVT) at Valley Baptist Medical Center.2 After a thirteen-day stay at 

DHR, during which she was treated by appellants, Alexis was flown from DHR to Texas 

Children’s Hospital (TCH) in Houston. At TCH, physicians performed a pulmonary 

angiogram, and she was diagnosed with Catastrophic Antiphospholipid Syndrome (CAS) 

and pulmonary emboli (PE).

3 After three weeks of undergoing multiple surgical 

procedures, Alexis was discharged. 

On May 8, 2017, the Ameels filed their original petition and request for disclosure, 

alleging appellants were negligent in failing to detect and diagnose Alexis with PE, and

as a result of appellants’ negligence, Alexis suffered catastrophic injuries. On September 

15, 2017, the Ameels filed two expert reports by Michael Tsifansky, M.D. and S. Robert 

Hurwitz, M.D. in accordance with § 74.351. See id. § 74.351(a) (“In a health care liability 

claim . . . a claimant shall . . . serve on [a defendant physician] one or more expert reports, 

 1 Since the filing of this appeal, Pieter Ameel has passed away. However, appellees filed a 

suggestion of death and do not believe any substitution of parties is necessary. We agree. 

2 DVT is a deep-vein blood clot in the leg. 

3 DVT in the lower extremities often spreads to the chest creating PE, according to Dr. Tsifansky’s 

expert report. 
3

with a curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report.”). The experts opined, among 

other things, that appellants “failed to order, recommend, or perform a single pulmonary 

CT angiogram (or invasive pulmonary angiogram) throughout [Alexis’s] stay at DHR” and 

that Alexis’s pain, impairment, and multiple surgical procedures were a result of 

appellants’ failures. 

Appellants filed their objections to the expert reports and motions to dismiss, 

contending that the expert reports did not represent a “good faith” effort to comply with 

the statute. Id. § 74.351(l) (“A court shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an 

expert report only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not represent 

an objective good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report . . . .”). After 

a hearing, the trial court overruled appellants’ objections and denied the motions to 

dismiss. This interlocutory appeal followed. See id. § 51.014(a)(9) (authorizing an appeal 

of an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for failure to file a medical expert 

report under the Texas Medical Liability Act).

II. DISCUSSION

Appellants assert the trial court erred in denying their motions to dismiss because 

the expert reports: (1) “fail to set out the specific standards of care”; (2) fail to set out 

“deviations from that nonspecific standard of care”; and (3) inadequately explain “the 

causal relationship between appellants alleged breaches” and Alexis’s injuries.4

Appellants also allege that the opinions in the expert reports are conclusory. Drs. 

Norberg, Turlapati and Almeda additionally challenge Dr. Hurwitz’s qualifications, but we 

first address whether Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report meets the statutory requirements. 

 4 We note that Drs. Sabatelli, Young, and Reddy only challenge this element. 
4

A. Chapter 74 Expert Report

In a suit against a physician, a plaintiff is required to serve on defendants one or 

more expert reports within 120 days of a defendant physician’s answer that fairly 

summarizes: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) how the defendant physician failed 

to meet that standard; (3) and the causal relationship between the defendant physician’s 

breach and the plaintiff’s injury. Id. § 74.351(a), (r)(6); Certified EMS, Inc. v. Potts, 392 

S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2013). A report that satisfies these requirements, even if as to 

one theory only, entitles the plaintiff to proceed with a suit against the defendant 

physician. Potts, 392 S.W.3d at 630. “The expert report requirement is a threshold 

mechanism” for the trial court to conclude that the plaintiff’s claims have merit. Id. at 631. 

First, the report must inform the defendant of the specific conduct the plaintiff has 

called into question and must provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims 

have merit. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879

(Tex. 2001). “It need not cover every alleged liability theory to make the defendant 

physician aware of the conduct at issue, but it must sufficiently describe the defendant 

physician’s alleged conduct.” Potts, 392 S.W.3d at 631. If the trial court determines that 

a liability theory is supported, then the claim is not frivolous, and the plaintiff’s suit may 

proceed. Id. 

B. Standard of Review 

We review a trial court’s decision with respect to chapter 74 expert reports for an 

abuse of discretion. Omaha Healthcare Ctr., LLC v. Johnson, 344 S.W.3d 392, 398 (Tex. 

2011); Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 304–05 (Tex. 2006); Jernigan v. Langley, 

195 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. 2006); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 877. The trial court abuses its 
5

discretion if it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or 

principles. Van Ness v. ETMC First Physicians, 461 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 2015). In our 

review of an expert report, we are limited to the contents contained within the four corners 

of the report in determining whether the report manifests a good faith effort to comply with 

the statutory definition of an expert report. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. 

C. Analysis 

1. Applicable Standard of Care.

Dr. Tsifansky provided the following in his expert report:

Defendants Frank Sabatelli, M.D., Irene Perez-Young, M.D., and Vangala 

Reddy, M.D. were [Alexis’s] treating interventional radiologists during her 

stay at DHR. Defendants William Norberg, Jr., M.D., Krishna M. Turlapati, 

M.D., and Ana Hernandez Almeda M.D. were [Alexis’s] treating attending 

physicians at DHR.

As outlined above, [Alexis] presented to DHR with a diagnosis of DVT in the

right leg. As outlined above, multiple DVT, both occlusive and nonocclusive, were noted throughout [Alexis’s] stay at DHR. As outlined above, 

[Alexis] also presented to DHR with symptoms consistent with Crohn’s 

Disease, which is a clot-forming condition, and later developed [CAS] also 

a clot-forming condition. Also, as noted above, [Alexis] manifested 

symptoms, which the Defendants noted, of tachycardia, high thrombus 

load, blood in urine and vomit, and a generally and gravely deteriorating 

condition before being life-flighted to [TCH] in Houston.

The standard of care for attending physicians and interventional radiologists 

like the individually-named Defendants in this case is to consider whether 

PE may be present in the unwell (and especially gravely deteriorating) 

patient, like [Alexis], with known DVT and to order, perform, or recommend 

the performance of a pulmonary CT angiogram (or an invasive pulmonary 

angiogram). These simple tests (that is, a pulmonary CT angiogram or an 

invasive pulmonary angiogram) would have detected and therefore allowed 

for the removal of PE present in [Alexis’s] chest, either emboli that had 

spread from her DVT or emboli created in her chest by nature of her Crohn’s

Disease or otherwise. All of the above-named Defendants (who were 

[Alexis’s] treating attending physicians and interventional radiologists at 

DHR) failed to order, recommend, or perform a single indicated pulmonary 

CT angiogram following Dr. Norberg’s ordered chest x-ray on May 9, 2015 

(the initial date of admission).
6

Defendants Sabatelli, Perez-Young, Reddy, Norberg, Turlapati, and 

Almeda each therefore breached this applicable standard of care by failing 

to order, recommend, or perform a single pulmonary CT angiogram (or 

invasive pulmonary angiogram) throughout [Alexis’s] stay at DHR, in spite 

of her diagnosed right leg DVT, symptoms consistent with Crohn’s Disease, 

tachycardia, and gravely deteriorating overall clinical condition.

. . . 

As noted above, the standard of care applicable to Defendants required 

them to regularly (that is, daily) consider the presence of PE in a criticallyill patient with DVT, and to [sic] a pulmonary CT angiogram or an invasive 

angiogram whenever PE is suggested by clinical findings or suspicion, so 

as to be able to timely detect, and therefore remove, life-threatening PE. 

Had the identified Defendants ordered, recommended, or performed the 

aforementioned imaging studies (after Dr. Norberg’s sole chest x-ray 

ordered on May 9, 2015), [Alexis’s] multiple PE and related injuries would 

have been diagnosed far sooner than they were, which would have negated 

the necessity for her life-flight to [TCH], her multiple surgical procedures

performed at [TCH], and the pain and impairment she suffered from the time 

of the creation of the emboli up to and following her ultimate discharge from

[TCH].

The report goes on to describe what occurred during Alexis’s stay at DHR and what

appellants performed or failed to perform. 

Drs. Norberg, Turlapati, and Almeda argue that the expert report “do[es] not 

distinguish, or even attempt to distinguish, between the different categories of health care 

providers, nor do[es] [it] distinguish between the various physicians themselves” in 

reference to the applicable standard of care.5 However, in his report, Dr. Tsifansky 

opined that “[t]he standard of care for attending physicians and interventional radiologists 

like the individually-named [appellants] is to consider whether PE may be present . .. .” 

and “to order, perform, or recommend the performance of a pulmonary CT angiogram or 

invasive pulmonary angiogram.” Additionally, Dr. Tsifansky named all appellants as

 5 We note that the remaining appellants do not make this argument on appeal. 
7

having failed to meet this standard of medical care: “Sabatelli, Perez-Young, Reddy, 

Norberg, Turlapati, and Almeda each therefore breached this applicable standard of 

care . . . .” Dr. Tsifansky was not required to set out a different standard of care as to 

each physician because he opined that all appellants—attending physicians and 

interventional radiologists—owed Alexis the same standard of care. See Bailey v. Amaya 

Clinic, Inc., 402 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); see 

also Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Qi, 370 S.W.3d 406, 413 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (stating that the expert report, which addressed the 

actions of a doctor and a nurse, needed to either describe the respective standards of 

care for the doctor and the nurse or state that the same standard of care applied to both 

the doctor and the nurse). 

Although Dr. Tsifansky referred to appellants collectively throughout his report, we 

do not agree that in doing so Dr. Tsifansky failed “to present the standards of care relevant 

to each [appellant].” Grouping different types of healthcare providers together in 

discussing relevant standards of care does not render an expert report inadequate when 

the healthcare providers owed the same duties to the plaintiff. Harvey v. Kindred 

Healthcare Operating, Inc., 578 S.W.3d 638, 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019 

no pet.) (holding that “grouping different types of healthcare providers together in 

discussing relevant standards of care does not render an expert report inadequate when 

the healthcare providers owed the same duties to the plaintiff”); Bailey, 402 S.W.3d at 

366–67 (same); Livingston v. Montgomery, 279 S.W.3d 868, 871–73 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

2009, no pet.) (rejecting arguments that expert reports were inadequate because they 

“‘lumped together’ all of the doctors and all of the nurses” and that the “trial court should 
8

not have permitted [the expert] to identify one standard of care for more than one 

defendant”); Methodist Hosp. v. Shepherd-Sherman, 296 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (“There is nothing inherently impermissible about 

concluding that different health care providers owed the same standard of care . . . and 

breached that duty in the same way.”). We therefore reject Drs. Norberg, Turlapati, and

Almeda’s argument. 

2. Breach of the Standard of Care. 

Next, appellants assert that the expert report fails to set out deviations from the 

applicable standard of care. Dr. Tsifansky states that Drs. Sabatelli, Perez-Young, and 

Reddy performed doppler ultrasounds on Alexis’s right leg, and all their findings showed 

multiple DVT present in the right leg. Moreover, appellants noted her condition was 

worsening while she experienced a high suspicion of heparin-induced thrombocytopenia, 

nausea and vomiting, and tachycardia; her leg was more swollen and contained more 

fluid. Additionally, Alexis now had blood in her urine and was vomiting blood with an 

abnormally high heart rate. Despite Alexis manifesting symptoms consistent with PE, 

according to Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report, appellants failed to perform the required 

angiograms while she gravely deteriorated before being flown to TCH. Dr. Tsifansky also 

explained in detail why appellants’ failure was a breach of the applicable standard of care: 

an angiogram would have detected and therefore allowed for the removal of the PE 

present in Alexis’s chest. Thus, Dr. Tsifansky’s report put each appellant on notice of 

how he believed appellants breached the applicable standard of care. Because the 

expert report sufficiently put appellants on notice of what care was allegedly required but 

not given, it sufficiently sets out a standard of care and a breach of that standard. See 
9

Columbia N. Hills Hosp. Subsidiary, L.P. v. Alvarez, 382 S.W.3d 619, 629 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).

Dr. Norberg however, treated Alexis the day she arrived at DHR, May 9, 2015. In 

his report, Dr. Tsifansky states:

Defendant William J. Norberg, Jr., M.D. admitted [Alexis] to DHR on May 9, 

2015, began a heparin drip, diagnosed her with DVT with undetermined 

etiology, and recommended an ultrasound for evaluation with consideration 

of intervention and a continued heparin drip . . . Dr. Norberg ordered a single 

chest x-ray on the date of admission, which did not reveal anything out of 

the ordinary. 

(Emphasis added). According to Dr. Tsifansky’s report, it appears Dr. Norberg did 

not evaluate or treat Alexis on any other day. 

All of the above-named Defendants (who were [Alexis’s] treating attending 

physicians and interventional radiologists at DHR) failed to order, 

recommend, or perform a single indicated pulmonary CT angiogram 

following Dr. Norberg’s ordered chest x-ray on May 9, 2015 (the initial date 

of admission) 

. . . 

The chest x-ray ordered by Dr. Norberg on the date of admission (May 9, 

2015) did not reveal any PE present at that point.

. . . 

Had the identified Defendants ordered, recommended, or performed the 

aforementioned imaging studies (after Dr. Norberg’s sole chest x-ray 

ordered on May 9, 2015) . . . . 

(Emphasis added). Dr. Tsifansky’s report does not explain how Dr. Norberg, who was 

not present when Alexis manifested the various symptoms referenced above, breached 

the standard of care. Specifically, Dr. Tsifansky does not explain why Dr. Norberg should 

have ordered the required angiograms when the chest x-ray did not reveal anything out 

of the ordinary and Dr. Norberg only treated Alexis the day of her admission. Therefore,
10

we conclude that Dr. Tsifansky’s report is deficient in this regard.

6 We sustain Dr. 

Norberg’s sole issue. 

3. Causation and Injury. 

Lastly, appellants argue that Dr. Tsifansky’s report “grossly fails to establish the 

required causal link between [appellants’] alleged breaches.” As to causation, an “expert 

must explain, based on facts set out in the report, how and why” a health care provider’s 

breach proximately caused the injury. Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., LP v. Zamarripa, 

526 S.W.3d 453, 459–60 (Tex. 2017). A report should explain how the defendant

physician’s action or inaction caused injury. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 

53 (Tex. 2002). A court may not fill in gaps in a report by drawing inferences or guessing 

what the expert meant or intended. Austin Heart, P.A. v. Webb, 228 S.W.3d 276, 279 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.). Furthermore, causation may not be inferred. Castillo 

v. August, 248 S.W.3d 874, 883 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.).

Dr. Tsifansky’s report addressed the issue of causation. First, Dr. Tsifansky 

addressed the standard of care applicable to appellants:

the standard of care applicable to Defendants required them to regularly 

(that is, daily) consider the presence of PE in a critically-ill patient with DVT, 

and to a pulmonary CT angiogram or an invasive angiogram whenever PE 

is suggested by clinical findings or suspicion, so as to be able to timely 

detect, and therefore remove, life-threatening PE.

In a section titled “CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN BREACHES OF THE 

STANDARDS OF CARE AND ALEXIS AMMEL’S INJURIES,” Dr. Tsifansky opines: 

 6 In his expert report, Dr. Hurwitz states that Dr. Norberg, as Alexis’s admitting attending physician,

“ordered a single chest x-ray on May 9, 2015, which did not reveal any abnormalities.” Like Dr. Tsifansky, 

Dr. Hurwitz does not address whether Dr. Norberg treated Alexis after this date. Specifically, Dr. Hurwitz 

does not explain why Dr. Norberg should have ordered the required angiograms when the chest x-ray did 

not reveal any abnormalities. Accordingly, we conclude Dr. Hurwitz’s report fails to address how Dr. 

Norberg breached the applicable standard of care.
11

These simple tests (that is, a pulmonary CT angiogram or an invasive 

pulmonary angiogram) would have detected and therefore allowed for the 

removal of pulmonary emboli present in [Alexis’s] chest, either emboli that 

had spread from her DVT or emboli created in her chest by nature of her 

Crohn’s Disease or otherwise.

. . . 

Had the identified [appellants] ordered, recommended, or performed the 

aforementioned imaging studies (after Dr. Norberg’s sole chest x-ray 

ordered on May 9, 2015), [Alexis’s] multiple PE and related injuries would 

have been diagnosed far sooner than they were, which would have negated 

the necessity for her life-flight to TCH, her multiple surgical procedures

performed at TCH, and the pain and impairment she suffered from the time 

of the creation of the emboli up to and following her ultimate discharge from 

TCH.

In our view, Dr. Tsifansky’s explanation provides a straightforward link between 

appellants’ alleged breach of the standard of care and Alexis’s injury. Dr. Tsifansky

asserted that the DVT in the lower extremities, in this case in Alexis’s leg, often spreads 

to the chest, creating PE. Dr. Tsifansky explained how appellants’ breach—failing to 

order, perform, or recommend performance of angiograms, particularly considering her 

worsening condition—caused a delay in diagnosis and proper treatment and why that 

delay caused the issues that led to her life-flight and medical procedures at TCH. See 

Abshire v. Christus Health Southeast Texas, 563 S.W.3d 219, 226 (Tex. 2018) (holding 

that with respect to causation, our “role is to determine whether the expert has explained 

how the negligent conduct caused the injury”); Miller v. JSC Lake Highlands Operations

536 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. 2017) (holding that that there was a “more-than-adequate 

summary” of causation where the expert explained how the physician’s breach—failing 

to identify the illness—delayed timely removal, which in turn caused the patient to 

aspirate). 
12

Appellants argue that because Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report does not provide a 

date on which Alexis’s PE was detected, it is not a good faith effort to establish causation. 

We disagree. An expert report “does not have to meet the same requirements as the 

evidence offered in a summary-judgment proceeding or at trial.” Miller, 536 S.W.3d at 

517. Although Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report does not give an exact date Alexis’s PE 

developed, he clearly opines that she manifested symptoms while under appellants’

care—diagnosis DVT; iron-deficient anemia; chronic gastritis; weight loss of over twenty 

pounds in two months; high suspicion of heparin-induced thrombocytopenia, nausea and 

vomiting, significant tachycardia, edematous, hematuria, and hematemesis—which 

should have prompted appellants to perform or order the required angiograms. See 

Fagadau v. Wenkstern, 311 S.W.3d 132, 139 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (rejecting 

the contention that the expert report was conjectural with respect to causation because 

there was no indication of the exact date the patient’s retinal detachment occurred;

although the expert’s report did not give an exact date, the expert opined that an 

examination would have prevented the detachment). Thus, according to Dr. Tsifansky,

performing the required angiograms would have, in all medical probability, detected the 

presence of PE and therefore allowed for the removal of it, negating the necessity of her 

life-flight to TCH and preventing the subsequent invasive procedures. See Patterson v. 

Ortiz, 412 S.W.3d 833, 839–40 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (concluding that the

expert report sufficiently showed that performing the required tests would have led to the 

diagnosis of pneumonia, and early treatment would have more likely than not saved his 

life); Gelman v. Cuellar, 268 S.W.3d, 123, 130 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, 

pet. denied) (holding an expert report adequate regarding the breach of standard of care 
13

and causation because it explained that if patient had “been properly monitored and timely 

treated post-operatively with aggressive respiratory care, she would not have developed 

respiratory insufficiency,” which caused her “anoxic brain damage”); In re Barker, 110 

S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding) (concluding an expert 

report sufficient because it explained negligent failure to recognize medical condition and 

delay in treatment increased severity of plaintiff’s injuries). Therefore, we conclude the 

report adequately links Dr. Tsifansky’s conclusion with the underlying facts: the failure to 

perform angiograms was a substantial factor in Alexis’s delayed treatment and 

subsequent injury.

D. Summary 

As to whether the report is conclusory, we conclude that it is sufficiently detailed 

as to (1) inform appellants of the conduct called into question and (2) allow the trial court 

to conclude the Ameels’ claims have merit. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873 at 879. Dr. 

Tsifansky clearly articulated that appellants were required to perform or order an 

angiogram and how the failure to do so in all medical probability allowed the progression 

of Alexis’s PE, causing her to undergo multiple surgical procedures—with the exception 

of Dr. Norberg. See Zamarripa, 526 S.W.3d at 460 (holding that the expert need not 

prove the entire case or account for every known fact; the report is sufficient if it makes 

“a good-faith effort to explain, factually, how proximate cause is going to be proven”). 

Because expert reports are simply a preliminary method to show that a plaintiff has a 

viable cause of action that is not frivolous, we hold that Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report 

represents an objective good faith effort to inform appellants of the causal relationship

between the failure to adhere to the pertinent standard of care and the injury, harm, or 
14

damages claimed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 74.351(l). Therefore, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Drs. Reddy, 

Turlapati, Almeda, Sabatelli, and Young’s motions to dismiss based on their complaints 

that Dr. Tsifansky’s report was deficient. We overrule appellants’ issue. However, 

because we have concluded that Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report does not address how Dr. 

Norberg breached the standard of care, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion 

by denying his motion to dismiss. See Van Ness, 461 S.W.3d at 142. 

E. Dr. Hurwitz

Drs. Turlapati and Almeda challenged Dr. Hurwitz’s expert report by arguing that 

he is not qualified. Because we determined that Dr. Tsifansky’s expert report complies 

with § 74.351, we do not need to address appellants’ complaints regarding Dr. Hurwitz as 

those complaints are not dispositive. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE ANN. § 74.351 (providing that an expert report “is not admissible in evidence by any 

party; shall not be in used in a deposition, trial, or other proceeding; and shall not be 

referred to by any party during the course of the action for any purpose”).

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s order denying Dr. Norberg’s motion to dismiss and 

remand the case to the trial court to decide whether to grant the Ameels a thirty-day 

extension to cure the deficiency. See Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 

2008). We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment. 

JAIME TIJERINA,

Justice

Delivered and filed the

19th day of December, 2019.