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i 

58–294 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–153] 

REPORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW AND THE FISCAL YEAR 

2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE 

DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 15, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page HEARING: 

Thursday, April 15, 2010, Report on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

and the Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Request 

for Missile Defense Programs ............................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 15, 2010 ........................................................................................ 31 

THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2010 

REPORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW AND THE 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense .................................................................................. 9 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. 

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 7 

Roberts, Dr. Bradley H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 

and Missile Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense ....................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael ................................................................................. 76 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 35 

O’Reilly, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. ............................................................................ 57 

Roberts, Dr. Bradley H. ................................................................................... 43 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from the Hon. Michael R. Turner to Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly, 

dated April 15, 2010 ..................................................................................... 89 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 107 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 93 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 106 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 101 

(1) 

REPORT ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 

AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 15, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:14 p.m., in room 

HVC–210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. James R. Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee will come to order. Today we will take testimony on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and the fiscal year 2011 budget request for missile defense programs. 

Let me begin the hearing today by welcoming our three distinguished witnesses. First we have Dr. Bradley Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. Dr. Roberts was responsible for coordinating the Department’s 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Prior to his current duties, Dr. 

Roberts helped former Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger write the 

report on the Bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. Dr. Roberts holds a bachelor’s 

degree from Stanford University, a master’s degree from the London School of Economics, and a doctorate from Erasmus University 

in Rotterdam, Holland. 

Next, Lieutenant General O’Reilly, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), has agreed to appear before the subcommittee 

to discuss his agency’s programs and budget. General O’Reilly is a 

graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has three master’s degrees: one in physics, one in national security and strategic studies, 

and one in business. As a scientist, and through his skills as the 

program manager of highly technical projects, he has been instrumental in the success of many of MDA’s most important programs, 

including its directed energy work, Patriot, Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD), and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

System. 

Finally, we will hear from Dr. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, about the operational status of our 

ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. Prior to his confirmation, 

Dr. Gilmore served as the Assistant Director for National Security 
2 

at the Congressional Budget Office. Dr. Gilmore has worked at the 

Pentagon before, having served for 11 years in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation. Early in his career, Dr. Gilmore 

worked for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on magnetic fusion energy. He is a graduate of MIT, where he earned a 

B.S. in physics, and he earned his master’s and Ph.D. in nuclear 

engineering from the University of Wisconsin. 

Gentlemen, I want to thank each of you for being with us here 

today, and we certainly look forward to your testimony. 

As ballistic missile technology proliferates across the globe and 

increases in capability, the potential threat to our Nation and our 

allies grows as well. Continued developments in both Iran and 

North Korea are our most urgent concerns. While recent intelligence estimates have highlighted the growing number of shortand medium-range missiles developed by these nations, both of 

these rogue states continue, as we know, to work on intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology that could lead to missiles which directly threaten our homeland. 

This past September, President Obama announced his plan for 

strengthening missile defenses in Europe through a Phased, Adaptive Approach to deploying defenses against the threat of Iranian 

ballistic missiles. On February 1, with the release of the budget, 

the Department submitted its first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review. The Administration’s review established six clear objectives to guide ballistic missile programs. 

First, the U.S. will continue to defend the homeland against the 

threat of limited ballistic missile attack. 

Second, the U.S. will defend against regional missile threats to 

U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them 

to defend themselves. 

Third, before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo 

testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions. 

Fourth, the commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. 

Fifth, BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as 

threats change. 

And, finally, the U.S. will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense. 

The BMDR also endorsed applying the new Phased, Adaptive Approach across the board, including for the defense of South Korea, 

Japan, and our allies in the Middle East. This new approach links 

missile defense deployments more directly to the current threat; 

provides for flexible responses to future threats; and signals to the 

Russians, the Chinese, and the world that we are serious about 

maintaining strategic stability. 

As we all know, ballistic missile defense is sometimes a controversial subject, but I believe that there is much greater consensus on this matter than meets the eye. In 1999, an overwhelming bipartisan majority of the House of Representatives 

voted to deploy a national missile defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic 

missile attack. Since that time Congress has appropriated over $90 

billion for missile defense, and the Pentagon has delivered 30 
3 

ground-based interceptors (GBIs) effective against long-range missiles that might be launched by Iran or North Korea; 52 batteries 

of Patriot short-range missiles, 44 of which are capable of launching the advanced Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) missile; 

2 Terminal High-Altitude Air Defenses, or THAAD, batteries and 

16 interceptors; and 55 medium-range Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) 

interceptors. The program has also converted 28 Aegis ships to use 

the SM–3 interceptors. 

And this year the President’s budget provides another $9.9 billion for missile defense programs, an increase of $670 million over 

the fiscal year 2010 appropriated level. 

The consensus that paved the way for these developments is 

rooted in the basic principles that missile defenses should discourage rogue nations from developing threatening systems and that 

deployment of U.S. defenses protect us against those threats, but 

should not create strategic instability or increase the risk of nuclear war. 

Yet a new strategy alone will not be enough. The Administration 

must convince Congress that it has an effective plan for ensuring 

that our defense systems are thoroughly tested, and that sufficient 

resources will be allocated to make sure that our missile defense 

systems are available when we need them. 

That said, we are eager to hear from each of you this afternoon. 

Dr. Roberts, I am especially interested in your thoughts on how we 

should balance our efforts to defend the homeland with the challenges of building regional defenses against short- and mediumrange missile threats. 

General O’Reilly, I had asked if you would focus on how the 

BMDR and the Phased, Adaptive Approach have modified the 

MDA’s plans for testing and deployment over the past year. 

And, finally, Dr. Gilmore, we look forward to hearing your assessment of the operational capabilities of each of the components 

of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. 

With that, again, gentlemen, I want to welcome you here today 

and I look forward to your testimony. 

Before I turn the floor over to you, though, I want to turn to the 

ranking member for any comments he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to welcome Dr. Roberts, General O’Reilly and Dr. 

Gilmore. I appreciate you being here today, and I appreciate your 

attention to these important issues. 

I also think it might be appropriate if, in the opening of this 

hearing, that we recognize the tragedy with Polish President 

Kaczynski. The Polish Government was so accommodating and welcoming of what are our important missile defense assets, and we 

certainly are all saddened by the tragedy of his military and civilian leaders who perished in the weekend’s airplane accident. 
4 

Well, we have a lot of ground to cover today, so let us dive into 

some of the issues that are of concern to me. 

First, I am very concerned by recent comments from Administration officials that, essentially, Congress has everything it needs to 

know about the Phased, Adaptive Approach, PAA. As Under Secretary Tauscher said at our hearing yesterday in reference to PAA 

details, ‘‘It’s on the Internet.’’ Well, unfortunately, the Internet 

does not provide sufficient details on the four phases of the PAA, 

nor does it provide a description of the options considered by the 

Administration in addition to the PAA and the analysis to support 

why it was chosen as the preferred approach. 

Now, let me share a few examples of information that the committee does not have. 

Phase 1 of the PAA calls for the deployment of a forward-based 

radar in Europe by the end of 2011. Now, we are considering the 

fiscal year 2011 budget request, yet we don’t have where this radar 

will be located or how long host nation negotiations might take. 

Right now this would appear to be a high schedule risk item. 

We do not know the number of ships, interceptors, and sensors 

that will be required for each phase, nor do we know the estimated 

costs or acquisition strategies for each phase. 

We have minimal information on the technical feasibility, expected performance, and cost of the SM–3 Block IIA and IIB interceptors, which Senator Lieberman called ‘‘paper systems’’ just last 

year. So far, I am a little concerned as to why the Administration 

would be so slow in providing the information. 

And, lastly, while we have positive statements from the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General, we have 

yet to see details of a ‘‘NATO-ization’’ of the PAA, its integration 

with NATO’s missile defense architecture, and any allied contributions. 

Now, today, General O’Reilly, you provided a great deal of detail 

to us that we are going to be digesting from that. You have indicated that we can take, in a review of the information, the types 

of information to provide us milestones to be able to look at. We 

greatly appreciate your providing that to us. 

Also today, I provided the General with a letter requesting his 

assistance in focusing on the issue of Phase 4 of PAA being the 

phase where mainland United States really becomes engaged with 

the assistance of missile defense. And I have a copy of that letter, 

if we can add that into the record, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 89.] 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate all of your expertise and all of your 

dedication. I know that you guys have worked diligently to ensure 

that we have a quality system, and I look forward to the exchange 

and the additional information you can provide so that we can 

work even more closely together. 

I want to note that this committee had asked similar information 

of the prior administration on its prior proposed configuration of 

missile defense. And I think that this is an opportunity to gain bipartisan support for the current PAA plan, but the committee must 

have confidence that the PAA is the best approach for protecting 
5 

the United States and our European allies, and then, of course, 

mainland United States. 

Second, my second concern is the 30 percent increase to the 

Ground-Based Midcourse Defense program is welcome—after last 

year’s reductions—as in the Department’s decision to finish Missile 

Field 2 in Alaska. However, it is unclear whether MDA has 

planned and budgeted for a sufficient number of ground-based 

interceptors, GBIs, to support reliability flight testing through 2030 

and to accommodate test failures or surge scenarios. The health of 

the industrial base supporting the GMD program remains a concern, and the last thing any of us want to see are GMD options 

precluded because suppliers went cold. 

In addition, the BMDR states that the U.S. ‘‘will continue development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor’’ as 

a hedging strategy for defense of the homeland. We are interested 

to see how does MDA plan to make it a viable hedging strategy, 

particularly when the budget request removes some two-stage GBI 

flight tests and delays others? I am concerned that such delays 

may preclude the two-stage GBI from being considered as a viable 

hedge. 

Third, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach will be tailored to other regions. And 

we know qualitatively that these new regional missile defense architectures will have significant force structure and inventory implications. However, without any tailored understanding of these 

plans, basing locations, inventory requirements and costs, it is difficult to assess whether MDA’s budget is sufficient. 

One thing is clear: Demand exceeds supply. Despite plans for 

Aegis and THAAD inventory growth, the bulk of the funding is 

planned for out-years. This creates near-term production gaps and 

inefficiencies for industry. An example shortfall is Aegis SM–3 

interceptors. The Administration wants an inventory of 436 interceptors by 2015, yet is only buying eight new interceptors in this 

year’s budget. Industry is sized to build 48 interceptors a year. 

Why were such decisions made? 

Fourth, we need to see a long-term commitment towards a robust 

research and development program. I worry that we are giving up 

on some promised technologies while rushing to pursue others. The 

Airborne Infrared, ABIR; Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS); 

and SM–3 Block IIB are interesting concepts, but still unproven 

technologies. 

Meanwhile, the Airborne Laser (ABL)—I appreciate the briefing 

that we just had with the General—recently demonstrated a successful missile shoot-down, yet the budget request appears insufficient to maintain the aircraft, conduct flight experiments, and fund 

further development of innovative directed energy technologies. 

Fifth, I remain concerned that Russian linkage between U.S. 

missile defense activities and their adherence to the New START 

Treaty may have the potential to self-constrain U.S. missile defense 

activities. After all, the U.S. scrapped plans to deploy GBIs in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, and there are those who 

believe that was to ‘‘remove an irritant’’ in U.S.-Russian relations. 

It is important for the Administration to clarify its missile defense 

plans not only for Congress, but also for the Russians. 
6 

Lastly, we know that the threat is changing, and our missile defense plans must be flexible to those changes. A year ago, the Administration concluded that the long-range threat was not materializing as rapidly as once thought. However, since then, new details are emerging on both North Korean and Iran’s long-range 

missile programs that should be grounds for the Administration to 

revisit the assumptions behind its policy changes. 

I am pleased with the restoration of some funds in the budget 

request after last year’s $1.2 billion cut. It is a welcome indication 

that the Administration took note of concerns expressed by many 

of us that a top-line increase was necessary to accomplish all that 

was being asked of MDA: homeland missile defense, PAA, regional 

missile defense architectures, expanded inventory, increased testing, and continued investments in science and technology. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for their leadership and dedication and for being here today, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I thank the ranking member. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We received prepared testimony statements for 

each of our witnesses, and these will be entered into the record, 

without objection. So at this point if you could please summarize 

your key points so that we have plenty of time to ask questions and 

answers. 

With that, we will turn the floor over to Dr. Roberts. 

STATEMENT OF DR. BRADLEY H. ROBERTS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE 

DEFENSE POLICY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. ROBERTS. Thank you, Chairman Langevin. Thank you, Ranking Member Turner. Thank you, members of the committee. I am 

pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to share our 

thinking and address your questions. 

My statement for the record touches on two main topics. The 

first is the contents of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, just to 

review the main elements there, to make the point that that review 

proceeded in parallel with the Quadrennial Defense Review and 

the Nuclear Posture Review. These were intended to be integrated 

looks at the strategic landscape in front of us. You have reviewed 

the elements of the policy and strategy framework elaborated 

there; I will not do so. 

A key question you pose to us in the assignment for the first-ever 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review was this question about balance 

on future investments between defense of the homeland and defense of the region, and it was posed a bit as an either/or question. 

And, of course, as you know, the conclusion of the review is it is 

not an either/or question. We need a sound pathway forward for 

both the protection of the homeland and protection against regional 

threats and, because of the inherently unpredictable nature of the 

threat, the need to be well-hedged, to be able to accelerate capability deployment, and to be flexible with the capabilities we do deploy to meet unexpected requirements. 
7 

The second main part of the prepared statement addresses your 

questions about implementation of the conclusions of the review. I 

think we are likely to have three areas of focus. One is on aligning 

programmatic requests with the policy objectives. And, as noted in 

General O’Reilly’s testimony, we have requested increases for 

homeland defense, for regional defense, and for testing consistent 

with the results of the review. 

A second likely area of focus is the implementation of the missile 

defense in Europe and the Phased, Adaptive Approach. I perfectly 

agree with the proposition the committee must have confidence in 

the choices made and the logic behind them. It needs information 

in order to have that confidence. It does not have all of the information it needs to have that confidence, and part of my purpose 

in being here today is to better understand the pieces of the puzzle 

that are missing in order to help fill them in. I would give a more 

detailed answer to your question, but I will save that for the question and answer portion. 

I think the third focus in my remarks on implementation is 

about cooperation with Russia. General O’Reilly, Under Secretary 

Tauscher and others have engaged Russia to further explore areas 

of cooperation on the basis of shared interest and mutual benefit. 

We have an ambitious agenda there. 

And, with that, I will wrap up and look forward to your questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Roberts. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Roberts can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General O’Reilly, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

General O’REILLY. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Congressman Turner, and other distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on the Missile Defense Agency’s support to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and 

our $8.4 billion fiscal year 2011 budget request to continue our mission to develop and field an integrated, layered Ballistic Missile Defense System to defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all 

phases of flight. 

This budget request reflects strategy and policies stated in the 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review report and the prioritized missile 

defense needs of our combatant commanders and services as stated 

in the latest U.S. Strategic Command’s missile defense prioritized 

capabilities list. 

Under the oversight and direction of the Missile Defense Executive Board, chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the Missile Defense Agency proposes a fiscal year 2011 program that is balanced to achieve the 

six strategy and policy goals documented in the Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review report. 

First, defense of the homeland against limited attack. We continue to upgrade the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System to 
8 

increase reliability, survivability, and expand the ability to leverage new ballistic missile defense sensors, as well as test the GMD 

system to accredit our models and simulations. The purchase of 

five additional ground-based interceptors and limited life components for refurbishment—and our program is very extensive—will 

sustain our production capability until 2016 and critical component 

manufacturing beyond 2020. 

Second, the defense against regional threats. We have increased 

our investment in regional assets and, by 2015, will procure 436 

SM–3 IA and IB interceptors and 431 THAAD missiles, and have 

available 38 ballistic missile defense-capable ships. 

We are developing regional missile defense elements that can be 

adapted to unique circumstances of each combatant command region. For example, we determined, based on intelligence estimates, 

that our previous plan for the defense of Europe could simply be 

overwhelmed by the large number of Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) today and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the near future. Therefore, we plan to deploy a 

larger number of interceptors in Europe in four phases as missile 

defense threats from the Middle East evolve. 

Third, prove that the missile defense system works. We have 

submitted a comprehensive, Integrated Master Test Plan signed by 

the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Dr. Gilmore, the 

services, the Operational Test Agencies, the Commander of the 

U.S. Strategic Command’s Joint Functional Component Command 

for Integrated Missile Defense subcommand to ensure we extensively fly our missiles and test them before we buy them. 

The two largest challenges to executing the U.S. missile defense 

program is acquiring a cost-effective set of reliable targets and improving quality control. Over the past year, we have initiated steps 

to acquire a new set of targets of all ranges. Our new target acquisition strategy initiated in 2009 procures targets and production 

lots to increase competition, quality control, reduce costs, and ensures the availability of backup targets starting in 2012. 

We have had many successes in improving our prime contractor 

and supplier quality assurance to meet the precise manufacturing 

standards required for missile defense components; however, not 

all companies have sufficiently improved. Until we complete 

planned competitions, including the greater use of firm, fixed-price 

contracts, we will have to motivate greater attention by senior industry management through intensive government inspections, low 

award fees, the issuance of cure notices, stopping the funding of 

new contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control 

performance to influence future contract awards. 

Fourth, we are hedging against threat uncertainty. In accordance 

with warfighter priorities, we are focusing our future technologies 

in four areas: one, developing more accurate and faster tracking 

sensors on platforms to enable fire control solutions and intercepts 

earlier; two, developing enhanced command-and-control networks 

to link and rapidly fuse sensor data to handle large raid sizes of 

missile threats; three, developing a faster, more agile version of our 

SM–3 interceptor to destroy long-range missiles early in flight; and, 

four, developing discrimination techniques to rapidly resolve re-
9 

entry vehicles from other nearby objects. And we will continue to 

develop high-energy laser technologies. 

Fifth, develop new, fiscally sustainable capabilities over the long 

term. The Missile Defense Agency is complying with the Weapons 

Systems Acquisition Reform Act by establishing six baselines—cost, 

schedule, technical, test, contract, and operational—to plan, manage, and increase service and warfighter participation, and increasing emphasis on competition in all phases of programs’ acquisition 

life cycle. 

Six, expand international missile defense cooperation. We are 

currently engaged in missile defense projects, studies, and analysis 

with over 20 countries, including Japan, Poland, the Czech Republic, Israel, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea, 

NATO, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. 

Additionally, Poland and Romania have agreed to host our Aegis 

Ashore sites, and we continue cooperative development of the SM– 

3 IIA interceptor with Japan. 

We also continue to support expert dialogue with the Russian 

Federation on missile defense cooperative efforts. Relative to the 

recently expired START Treaty, the New START Treaty actually 

reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program. Our targets will no longer be subject to START constraints, 

which limited our use of air-to-surface and waterborne launches of 

targets which are essential for the cost-effective testing of missile 

defense interceptors against medium-range and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles in the Pacific region. 

In conclusion, MDA is working with the combatant commanders, 

services and other Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, academia, industry, and international partners to address the challenges and difficulties of managing, developing, testing, fielding 

new military capabilities to deter the use of ballistic missiles and 

effectively destroy them once launched. 

Our 2011 budget funds the warfighters’ near-term priorities 

while building the foundation of a layered defense system with our 

partners and friends that can provide an adaptive, cost-effective 

strategy to protect our homelands and counter ballistic missile proliferation in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I request my written statement be 

submitted for the record, and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Turner, Members of 

Congress, I will, as you requested, very briefly summarize my written statement. 

First of all, my characterization of demonstrated BMD performance is contained in the report submitted to Congress this past 

February. I characterized capability of ballistic missile defense sys-
10 

tems using six levels of capability, with one being the lowest demonstrated level and six being the highest. 

Generally speaking, Aegis, THAAD, Patriot performance against 

short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), or capability against 

SRBMs, is rated at the highest level. There has been fairly extensive testing against those kinds of threats, and generally I characterize their performance at levels from four to six. 

With regard to Aegis Ground-Based Missile Defense and THAAD 

against medium-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental-range missiles, I generally characterize 

their performance at levels one to three or four because there has 

been lesser testing against those threats, and the capability levels 

that have actually been demonstrated tend to decrease pretty much 

in step with the increase in range of the potential threats. 

With regard to major events on testing, of course there was the 

demonstration of the Airborne Laser, which was a significant technical achievement. But also, there was a significant achievement in 

planning for tests, and General O’Reilly has already discussed the 

Integrated Master Test Plan which was developed and then revised. It is a rigorous plan for conducting tests and collecting the 

data needed to rigorously and independently verify, validate, and 

accredit the models that are going to be critical to assessing the 

operational effectiveness of missile defense, because we will never 

be able to do enough live flight tests to span the entire battle space 

that we are concerned about in demonstrating operational performance of the system. 

And then, finally, with regard to challenges moving forward, 

there are many challenges. These are some of the most complex 

tests that the Department of Defense attempts. There have been 

failures, particularly with regard to targets. And so, as General 

O’Reilly has already mentioned, target reliability and realism are 

particular challenges that the Agency is going to have to address 

in the future. 

Thank you. And I will be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore can be found in the Appendix on page 76.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. After 

myself and the ranking member ask questions, we will recognize 

members for five minutes in the order in which they arrived. 

Dr. Roberts, let me start with you, if I could. I understand that 

the Department thoroughly assessed the previous Administration’s 

plan for missile defenses in Europe, the so-called third-site plan, 

during the BMDR. Would you, for the subcommittee, summarize 

the key shortfalls of the previous Administration’s European missile defense plan and the reasons for rejecting that approach? And 

could you also describe the key reasons that the President adopted 

the new Phased, Adaptive Approach to defending our allies and deployed forces in Europe? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I would be happy to have the opportunity to do so. 

Thank you. 

To begin at the beginning, we did not come, first and foremost, 

to the question of what to do about the third site. We came first 

and foremost to the questions, as scripted in the legislation, for the 

missile review, which was to begin with an assessment of the 
11 

threat, how the threat had evolved, expectations about how it 

might yet evolve, and then to assess current capability vis-a`-vis 

that threat globally. 

And so before we came to the question of what to do about the 

third site in Europe, we came to a view of the following landscape: 

That our posture—after a decade of investment and active capability development, our posture and protection of the homeland, relatively strong vis-a`-vis the threat. If we had been seeking limited 

protection from the ICBM capabilities of North Korea and Iran, we 

have that today. We have 30 interceptors on the ground that are 

operational, and that threat from their ICBMs does not exist today. 

We are in a strong posture. 

But inherent to our understanding or assessment of the threat 

was that it was unpredictable and, indeed, that we need to be more 

strongly hedged than we were for possible accelerated developments in the ICBM threat. So you saw, as a result of the review, 

a number of actions to strengthen our hedge for protection of the 

homeland. 

In the case of our regional defense posture, we were not so wellpositioned vis-a`-vis the threat. The threat had clearly been exploding. We had many capabilities reaching the end of the development 

pipeline but not yet reaching the field, and the clear need here is 

to increase—accelerate the deployment of capabilities to the 

warfighter in the regions while also being well-hedged against possible unexpected developments in the threat. 

That pointed to a particular set of capabilities; in other words, 

to seek capabilities that could be surgeable, adaptive, flexible to go 

where crisis required in time. That is the construct in which we 

came to our question then, the fourth, I think it was, on your list, 

of what to do about missile defense in Europe. And you have read 

our thinking about this. We have explained it in great length. I 

have tried to boil it down for myself into a few very short points. 

I think there are six criteria that guided our thinking on this 

topic. The first is for prompt protection. The pathway we were on 

with third site would have put initial capabilities on the ground in 

2017 or 2018. We have a threat that exists today; we have capabilities we can put on the ground in 2011. Why wait? 

Second criterion: complete protection. Under the former approach 

we had not complete protect on of our allies. We have the means 

to protect all of our allies. There had been talk of protecting all of 

our allies, but no plans in place to do so. Why not protect all of our 

allies when we have the means to do so? 

Third criterion: effective protection. Why deploy a system that is 

capable against a salvo launch of only five missiles when we need 

to, and can, scale it up to deal with the expected increases in missile threats from the Middle East? We have the means to do that. 

Why shouldn’t we do that? 

The fourth criterion: cost effectiveness. If we expect to have to 

scale up to meet the demands of a growing threat, why rely on 

ground-based interceptors at roughly $70 million apiece when we 

can acquire roughly comparable capabilities in the SM–3s, but acquiring six or seven for the same price of one? 

Fifth criterion: cooperation with allies. We have the opportunity 

to work within the NATO framework. NATO’s views of missile de-
12 

fense have evolved in recent years. They are eager to join us. We 

are trying to persuade them of the virtue of declaring this territorial defense as a NATO mission. We see positive indicators that 

they are interested in so doing. Why not work with allies to share 

these benefits and burdens? 

And, lastly, flexibility. Why rely on a system that involves fixed 

assets that can’t be moved when we know we are not going to have 

enough to deal with the threat globally, and we should have some 

ability to relocate and surge capabilities while they remain scarce 

in our arsenal? 

So beginning with our view of the threat environment, beginning, 

then, with our view of how to balance our future investments 

across this homeland defense and regional problem space, we 

looked at the third-site approach to missile defense in Europe and 

found it wanting on these criteria. So the President chose an approach that is more flexible, more adaptive, more cost-effective, enables more international cooperation, more sharing of burden. 

That would be the five-minute answer, I think, to the question. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Roberts. 

General O’Reilly, yesterday the subcommittee received a briefing 

on MDA’s Integrated Master Test Plan conducted with the Office 

of Testing and Evaluation. 

First of all, I really want to commend you for the excellent job 

that MDA and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) have 

done, and especially General O’Reilly for bringing high quality 

oversight and a serious testing regime to our missile defense programs. Well done on that front. 

Unfortunately, MDA’s testing progress has been hindered by target missile failures such as with the THAAD intercept test in December. And I am sure that even with that failure, though, we 

have learned a great deal. You can certainly touch on some of those 

things that we have learned. But in particular, what was the additional cost incurred from the target failures, and what measures is 

MDA taking with its contractors to ensure high quality testing is 

accomplished on schedule? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, unfortunately the THAAD test in December we did not learn very much. The target itself was about $15 

million. It was a first-time use of that particular configuration, so 

another 15 was invested. We spent around $12 million for the 

range and the test preparations. And then there is the impact on 

the program that wasn’t able to be tested, the THAAD program, 

where we had the delay in restructure activities. Sir, it was in excess of $50 million, perhaps even $60 million, because of the quality control errors we found in the installation of the target into the 

aircraft. So that was a significant setback to the program. 

Because of that, I then made—we had a failure review board, 

and that failure team was very experienced from both industry and 

government, and came back and found that there was a systemic 

problem with the quality control in the areas of that target. And, 

therefore, I made the decision not to use air-launched targets until 

we have reset with our contractors, either expanded the number of 

contractors which we use so we can induce competition, which I believe is part of the solution to quality control issues. 
13 

It is not that these were poorly-built systems. The precision required of missile defense systems is very high, and it is achievable, 

but it requires a specific discipline and experience base and investment in testing that—in-plant testing that is required. And so to 

motivate that, I have delayed any new scope to that particular 

company so that—until they satisfy that they have made corrective 

actions in management structure and in approaches to targets and 

so forth. And also, at the same time, I have taken the planned 

work that I was going to use with that company in 2012 and put 

that scope on another contract that I have with another company 

and asked that second company to develop an air launch capability 

so that we have true competition, to emphasize the fact that it is 

an absolute requirement in the missile defense business that you 

have the highest repeatable quality. It is a condition on which our 

contracts should be set. 

Also, we have—as I said in my statement, we have other competitions now that we have instituted so that we buy targets in lots 

which allow themselves to have quality control issues applied or 

techniques and procedures on a lot of a buy, rather than buying 

them individually, which we were in the past, which was much 

more expensive. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, General. Thank you very much. 

And finally, Dr. Gilmore, can you describe the key tests and criteria that you believe would have to be met before the Department 

can make an informed deployment decision for the first phase of 

the European PAA Missile Defense System? 

Dr. GILMORE. The testing that is going to be possible between 

now and the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2011 is driven, in large 

part, by the availability of targets. But the revised IMTP incorporates four flight tests, two THAAD tests, and then also an operational test involving both THAAD and Aegis. 

The Aegis test, which is called Flight Test Mission (FTM) 15, I 

think it is in the third quarter of fiscal year 2011, will be key because it will be the first test of an Aegis SM–3 Block IA missile 

and the Aegis fire control system and radar, as well as testing out 

the launch capability that might be necessary to engage an MRBMor IRBM-class threat fired from Iran. So that test, that operational 

test, will be key. Then, of course, there will be additional tests that 

take place after the end of fiscal year 2011, leading up to another 

large operational test event in fiscal year 2012, which will have a 

number of missiles simultaneously in flight that will have to be 

intercepted and that will be crossing multiple sensors and will 

challenge the battle management command-and-control system to 

sort all of that information out, provide firing solutions to the various platforms. 

So those are the tests that are scheduled. To some extent the 

number of tests is limited by the number of targets, but conducting 

those tests will be key, and the results will be key to informing us 

on the performance of PAA Phase 1. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Gilmore. 

I want to thank you, gentlemen. 

And now turning to—the ranking member is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, one of the problems that we have in 

this whole missile defense discussion and in trying to get bipar-
14 

tisan support is really an issue of credibility. And I am very, very 

concerned by the question that our chair asked and your response. 

And I want to go through the elements of what you gave us as your 

response because there is an essential, fundamental misrepresentation that is made within your answer, and that is assuming that 

the third site, Poland and Czech Republic sites, had to be scrapped 

so that the PAA could be adapted. 

When you compare a system of Aegis ships and SM–3s to a system of ground-based interceptors and present it as a false choice, 

that one had to be scrapped in order for the pursuit of others, 

when, I mean, everyone in this room who has put any effort into 

this issue understands that that is not a necessity, we start a problem of having a difference of being able to evaluate the information 

that you are providing us. 

Now, it may be that, when we are finally done with the PAA and 

it is provided to us, we might have enough information to see that 

it has benefits, too. But there are a number of things in comparing 

them that are just not very accurate. You said, first, we wanted to 

do something prompt. We can do it by 2011. Why wait? But you 

know you are not doing the same thing and I know you are not 

doing the same thing, so why don’t we just—you know, just say 

that? 

When you said the ground-based interceptors are not going to be 

available until 2017 or 2018, we all know, of course, that the original schedule was they would have been completed by 2013. But I 

will give you—I will give you the 2017 and the 2018. Even if I give 

it to you, the PAA doesn’t provide the same level of protection to 

the United States until 2020 by your plan, not 2011. So when you 

say ‘‘prompt’’ and ‘‘why wait,’’ mainland United States is not protected by that system, which the ground-based system would have 

provided in Poland and Czech Republic. 

If you are going to do a comparison, apples to apples, that system 

versus the other system, you are comparing 2017 and 2018, not 

2011. Now, I know you say, ‘‘Oh, well, we have the 30 other interceptors that provide us our complete coverage.’’ Of course, there 

were going to be 44 until the Administration cut them. And I don’t 

think that the threat itself represents something that we all believe 

is diminishing, but yet the interceptors that were planned by the 

Administration are diminishing. 

Then you go on to say that it is not going to provide—it will not 

have provided complete protection to our allies. Well, neither are 

you by 2011. I mean, if you look at the coverage in the plan and 

how it has unfolded and what has happened with London and 

Paris, I don’t think you can provide information saying by 2011 we 

have done it promptly, we now protect our allies. 

And the false choice issue is the one that really falls in your 

other points of effectiveness, five launchers versus the shift that we 

are having in the number of missiles there. It is not necessary that 

one be scrapped in order to pursue another, which was all part, before—part of the smorgasbord of the availability of technology and 

assets that we were all pursuing. And the same issue with the cost 

effective. 

And then cooperation with the allies. The one that I really find 

amazing there is that—and mind you, I am not a big fan of how 
15 

the Poland and Czech Republic sites were handled with respect to 

our allies. But you are aware that, of course, NATO did endorse 

that plan at Bucharest, and we are all aware that Romania was 

an announcement that occurred without NATO participation. It is 

one of those ones where, after the fact, this Administration, almost 

in the same vein as we have Poland and the Czech Republic, made 

an announcement that then we all have to fall back on trying to 

clean up how that announcement was handled. 

And the flexibility of fixed or moved. Again, this was supposed 

to be a smorgasbord. This was not supposed to be a one-off exclusive, that once we do Poland and Czech Republic, we are stuck. 

That is why MDA had so many things that we were developing so, 

in fact, we could have this multiple use. 

But the thing that concerns me, which I would really appreciate 

your thoughts on, considering your position, is that the concern— 

especially when we get to the issue of the credibility and the dialogue of—you know, many people were concerned that the Polish 

and Czech Republic sites were compromised by this Administration 

as a result of their concession to Russia. No secret to anybody that 

Russia didn’t like this. The President announces his intention to 

reset. Even the letter went off, I believe, if I am correct, that said 

to Russia: We would consider our view of missile defense based 

upon your participation and assistance with Iran. I think the Poles 

and the Czechs were very taken by surprise with how the rug was 

pulled underneath them and the manner in which that was done. 

They were walked out onto the world stage and then not really 

given the appropriate attention as this was diminished. 

But the START agreement. The START agreement includes the 

preamble language that recognizes the relationship between the 

strategic and the defensive, and Russia has made statements that 

they might consider withdrawing from START if the United States 

vigorously pursues missile defense. 

The Phased, Adaptive Approach is something this Administration 

has announced. We don’t have all the details, but it is something, 

certainly, that even Secretary Tauscher says that its effect is on 

the Web. You can look on the Internet and see what the effect is. 

Is the Administration confident that the Phased, Adaptive Approach doesn’t already violate what the Russians’ intent is in saying they will withdraw from START if we vigorously pursue missile 

defense? And this new restart relationship, has the Administration 

received assurances that the Phased, Adaptive Approach is not a 

violation of the concept of the preamble of START? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Well, it is clear we are going to disagree on the dichotomy of choices. I didn’t misrepresent to you the choice made by 

the Secretary, which was: Go forward with third site, or go forward 

with phased, adaptive. This is the unanimous recommendation of 

the Secretary, the Chairman, and the military leadership to the 

President, was on the basis of this choice. It wasn’t a false dichotomy. 

The constraints in New START: our position is very clear that 

we see no development in our missile defense posture that is 

threatening to the viability of Russia’s strategic deterrent. Russia 

is not—Russian experts are not particularly happy with Phase 4 of 

PAA because they don’t fully understand what Phase 4 entails and 
16 

what it might imply in the way of capability against Russia. Our 

view is that, from a technical perspective, there is no capability in 

Phase 4 that could be jeopardizing to their deterrent. It is a simple 

matter of physics and geography. 

So they have made it clear throughout the negotiating process 

that they are unhappy about developments in the U.S. strategic 

posture of multiple kinds—the development of ballistic missile defenses, the development of non-nuclear strike capabilities. But 

their bottom line has been that they will support and implement 

New START, so long as we don’t do something we have no intention of doing, which is jeopardizing—this is a limited defense of the 

homeland, and there is nothing in the PAA and Europe that can 

be effective against their strategic deterrent. 

Mr. TURNER. And thank you for that clarification. And I need to 

ask you the question again with the additional way that you 

framed it. 

The concern is—you just said that there are some things in 

Phase 4 that they may have objection with. The concern is, is that, 

has the Administration, when it began the discussion—the Phased, 

Adaptive Approach was a policy the Administration was already 

pursuing. START was something that the Administration was already pursuing. The Administration concedes to language being in 

START that includes missile defense. 

Has the Administration received assurances from Russia that 

Phase 4 of the Phased, Adaptive Approach doesn’t violate the now, 

as Secretary Tauscher points out, unilateral statements that Russia is making with respect to their interpretation of the language 

in START? Because—and the concern is this, is that because we 

know that Russia objected to the Poland and Czech Republic sites, 

and now this Administration are not pursuing those, the concern 

is, is if the Administration is faced with Russia objecting, pursuant 

to START, to Phase 4, will it weaken the Administration’s support 

for Phase 4 as it did the Administration’s commitment to the Poland and Czech site? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The inference of your question was that Russian 

objections to the third site were a driving factor in the decision. 

They were not. I have made the case—— 

Mr. TURNER. And then the question? The question being, is there 

that assurance? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Is there an Administration assurance to Russia? 

Mr. TURNER. From Russia. Has Russia communicated with the 

Administration that Phase 4 is not that violation that Russia believes would occur to its strategic deterrent by the—— 

Dr. ROBERTS. I have no basis. 

Mr. TURNER. The Administration has not addressed that with 

Russia, then? 

Dr. ROBERTS. To my knowledge, no. 

Mr. TURNER. Okay. Thanks. 

General O’Reilly, two-stage ground-based interceptor. The Ballistic Missile Defense Review states that it will continue to be developed, and we assessed as a hedge strategy. I believe that is correct; is it not? Could you please describe to me what that hedge 

strategy is? I mean, a hedge against what? A hedge for what? What 
17 

would the expectation be in looking at the ground-based interceptor 

as a hedge? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we are going to continue to develop the 

two-stage ground-based interceptor. In fact, we will be flight testing it in June for the first time. That capability, what it gives us 

if we deploy, it would be additional time and additional opportunities to defend the United States from locations such as Iran or 

North Korea. 

So, specifically, when you have a three-stage missile, it burns for 

over four minutes, and there is a set amount of time it takes before 

it is ready for an intercept. A two-stage is ready much earlier; and, 

therefore, if you had a failed intercept from a three-stage, you have 

another opportunity with a two-stage. 

Mr. TURNER. I mean, currently there is no plans for its deployment; is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we currently have no request from the 

combatant commanders for that capability to deploy it in that manner. 

Mr. TURNER. So the word ‘‘hedge’’ is the one I keep stumbling 

over. What scenario—since that is in the Missile Defense Review, 

it is a policy statement. What are the circumstances under which 

that it would satisfy as a hedge? I am assuming that means in 

some form of deployment. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We can actually—with the utilization 

of a two-stage, in some geometries, we have the ability to better 

utilize our inventory of GBIs. In other words, one shoot doctrine is 

to fire multiple GBIs at one target. With the capability of having 

a later intercept opportunity, then you can actually launch one, determine whether it is successful, launch a second. And in this case, 

you would have an additional shot opportunity. 

So if what we thought was a larger number of ICBMs than what 

we see today, another option would be to add additional twostage—or to in-place two-stage GBIs so that, in fact, you have a 

larger number of missiles you can engage with the 30 that we are 

deploying. 

Mr. TURNER. Airborne Laser Test Bed. People are very concerned 

about the amount of cuts that has occurred as it goes from two to 

the test bed: 2009, $384 million; $182 million in 2010; $98.7 million 

for this upcoming year. Could you please describe to us—and you 

just gave us a classified briefing previously. Can you describe to us 

now, in an open setting, how those budgetary dollars will support 

the Airborne Laser as a test bed and as a research project? 

And one of the things that would be really helpful, I think, because I don’t think there has been enough horn blowing, is if you 

could do a commercial right now for how great the test was and 

how accomplished—what an accomplishment it is that the Airborne 

Laser accomplished what it did in its test. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, twice this year now we have engaged, for 

the first time, the destruction of a ballistic missile defense early in 

its flight using a laser onboard an aircraft. This is—the technology 

of just producing a laser and the fire control system is a watershed 

event for military capability. But the details of how this system 

worked, there was a litany of scientific achievements which were 

accomplished, and they have been accomplished over the last two 
18 

years in a repeated fashion with the ABL to give us confidence that 

we certainly understand how to generate this type of laser energy 

and how to impart it on a target in a very, very quick fashion. We 

destroyed the missile in the second launch at half the time that we 

had calculated. So this also indicates we have a lot to learn from 

this in the area of beam propagation and in the lethality mechanisms. It is a very, very promising way to destroy a large number 

of ballistic missiles launched in a short period of time. 

However, we do recognize that there is additional engineering 

and additional research involved, number one, to validate our models. And, number two, this aircraft, with the fantastic performance 

it had, was actually based on designs that were over a decade old. 

And we have technologies today where we have made progress in 

our laboratories over the last 10 years that indicate that there is 

even a greater capability with future airborne systems. And the 

747-based Airborne Laser is a very good platform we have already 

invested in. It has multiple—it has the capacity to carry more than 

one laser system, so that it is a very good research platform, and 

that is what we have intended it to do. 

The budget last year was larger than this year’s, the fiscal year 

2010 request, because we were still completing the construction of 

the optical beam line. We have completed that work. And now, 

when you are focusing on the research, we believe we have an adequate budget in which to operate the aircraft and to complete the 

large amount of unknown scientific exploration that is necessary to 

occur for us to have a very effective military system. 

Mr. TURNER. One more question, General. The Aegis SM–3. The 

bulk of the funding comes in out-years. It creates a near-term production gap and inefficiencies, perhaps, for industries. An example 

shortfall is the Aegis SM–3 interceptor. The Administration wants 

an inventory of 436 interceptors by 2015, yet it is only buying 8 

interceptors this year and, looking in the forward years, MDA 

plans to buy 66 in fiscal year 2012; 72, I guess, in fiscal year 2013. 

Is there a better way to manage this ramp-up, and do you have 

concerns as to how you are going to get to the inventory of 436? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, first of all, the SM–3 IB, the newest 

version, has the same ordnance stack that the current version has. 

It has a new seeker, a much more capable seeker that is the particular distinguishing characteristic of this missile. So the production gap which we have is part of a large family of missiles. So we 

will continue to produce the ordnance stack that we have to propel 

the SM–3 IB just like we do the IA. 

In the case of the IB, though, again, it goes back to the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review, the tenet that we will fly first before we 

go into production. Therefore, we have a series—working with the 

operational test communities and the other test agencies—a series 

of agreed-upon tests that must occur before I will go to the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology and 

request a production decision. 

I have procured 30 missiles for research and development at this 

time, and so those 30 will more than adequately demonstrate the 

capability and validate the new production lines for the new kill vehicle. But to go beyond that, we will need to complete the testing 
19 

which we have planned for the next year and a half, and that does 

delay the start of a full-rate production. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. 

Before I go to Mr. Larsen, on the third site, since we are talking 

about some of the specifics in your analysis of alternatives, could 

you just for the committee talk about the cost involved of the fiscal 

structure for erecting the sites in both Poland and the Czech Republic? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I cannot. I am happy to take the question for the 

record. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

General O’REILLY. On the order of—this is preliminary work, sir, 

as we are working through our cost estimates and the design of the 

first Aegis Ashore site. Was that the question? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The third site. 

General O’REILLY. The budget request that we had made last 

year was based on a $4.2 billion cost for the third site. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. For a third site. And that did not include the cost 

of the interceptors, right? 

General O’REILLY. It did include the cost of the interceptors of 

the missile field in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic, the 

battle command and control, and the initial startup. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So how many of the GBIs? 

General O’REILLY. Ten were in there, sir, at a cost of about $70 

million apiece. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. It is my understanding if there is an incoming 

target, you would fire not just one at the target, you would fire 

multiple. 

General O’REILLY. To achieve our probabilities of protection we 

try to achieve, our typical shot doctrine, and in a very constrained 

environment like in Europe, the region, we would need to salvo two 

for every one. Our preferred approach is to launch one missile, determine if there is an intercept, and, if you have enough time, 

launch a second missile. But in the case of Europe, because of the 

closing velocities in which we are flying it and the size of the theatre, we would need to salvo two, as a minimum, for every missile 

coming in. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So $140 million for the two missiles being fired 

versus $10 million to $15 million a shot for the SM–3. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, how do those numbers compare to 

Alaska? Because that would be the comparable. It is not really the 

SM; it is really GBI to GBI, because as you were not disputing in 

the testimony, they really aren’t shot at comparable targets. It 

really would be Alaska; would it not? I think that is what Dr. Roberts was indicating, that would have the ability to protect the 

mainland. 

Are the costs significantly different between Poland and Alaska? 

General O’REILLY. The interceptors would be the same cost. It is 

the same design of the intercept. The operation is a little more expensive because it is a remote site. We have missile assembly 
20 

buildings and other infrastructure in Alaska that we wouldn’t have 

there. The missile field itself would be slightly less than what we 

spent in Alaska, because the first time you do a construction, you 

develop it, it is more expensive, and we have a learning curve. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, General O’Reilly. 

The chair now recognizes Mr. Larsen for five minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

General O’Reilly, the PAA has been presented as a missile defense architecture, and it is focused mainly on our allies in Europe. 

I think in your testimony you discussed how this approach might 

be applied to other regions. Can you get into a little more detail 

for us on that? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. There is very attractive attributes of 

the Phased, Adaptive Approach. First of all, with our investments 

and our growth of capability of the Aegis system, you have a mobile 

system that you can surge into certain regions. But what it distinguishes in the Phased, Adaptive Approach as we looked at the different potential weapons systems that could provide defense 

against missiles, the idea of taking the Aegis system and putting 

it on the land, which we already test parts of the Aegis system at 

White Sands, New Mexico, and at other sites on the east coast. So 

this is not an infeasible capability. We would make it to have a 

military capability of hardening it and so forth, but that capability 

would allow us to place in remote sites, high-value areas of the 

world where we have forward bases and so forth, you effectively 

have a permanent defense equivalent to what Aegis has. 

We already have the Aegis Logistic System and Training Base 

that has already been established. It allows us to manage a larger 

pool of interceptors for both land-based and sea-based use. So the 

operational commanders have more flexibility. 

And again, for remote sites around the world, it does give you defense. The defense of the first generation is on the order of 1,000 

kilometers protected area. So it is a significant capability, and it 

can be removed in the future if it needed to, and what would remain behind would just be the concrete. We have said in the past 

that to relocate it would be on the order of about four months. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you very much for getting into that. I think, 

again, getting to the PAA approach, the Phased, Adaptive Approach, does provide a little bit more flexibility for us not just in 

the European theatre, but in other areas that you have noted. 

Dr. Gilmore, a few more questions about testing. First, with regard to the Airborne Laser Test Bed and the recent successful 

tests, in your testimony—I think it is your testimony—you have 

outlined some of the issues, though, with the test. For instance, the 

detection and tracking system wasn’t available for the test; therefore, the aircrew utilized the aircraft’s Wide Area Surveillance System for knowledge of the threat missile launch location, timing, 

and aim point. 

I guess, in the end, you said, ‘‘If the Department should determine at a future time that it is appropriate to develop and field an 

Airborne Laser system, an extensive program of additional developmental testing culminating in realistic operational testing would be 

needed.’’ It is a short way of saying it is not ready. But are there 
21 

things in the testing regimen that would get us closer to that or 

not? 

Dr. GILMORE. Well, you would have to do additional tests, but 

also, as pointed out in my testimony, and I also in January submitted a report on the Airborne Laser to the Congress. I was required by law to assess the operational effectiveness of the Airborne Laser, and the thrust of the report was I can’t do that at this 

point because there has been insufficient testing. But also, the aircraft, as it exists, is a test bed; it is not an operational—doesn’t 

compose an operational combat capability for some of the reasons 

that you just mentioned that were in my testimony. 

You would also, in addition to additional capabilities on the aircraft, the additional sensors that would enable you to detect in real 

time and track large numbers of threat missiles that you might encounter. One of the principal things you would also need is, in all 

likelihood, a higher-powered laser to stand off against modern air 

defenses, because you can’t assume the aircraft can penetrate in 

the airspace and would be able to survive if it did that. So you 

would have to demonstrate the capability to engage missiles at substantially larger ranges than we have done at this point. 

As General O’Reilly mentioned, this was a real technical achievement, but it was necessary—but not sufficient—to the demonstration of a combat capability. You would also have to demonstrate 

that the system had high reliability. There were some problems 

during the tests. You have to have a system with high reliability 

because you don’t know when the threat will launch. You can’t 

have the system go down. You would have to have at least two aircraft per orbit, because when the aircraft are turning, sometimes 

they can be in a position where they couldn’t engage a threat. So 

the analysis that I have seen done would indicate you would need 

at least two aircraft per orbit in order to assure you could intercept 

launches from a particular area you were interested in intercepting 

launches. 

To have those two aircraft on orbit continuously, which you 

would need to do because you don’t want to give the enemy a choice 

of when to fire their missiles, because they might well see when an 

aircraft had to leave an orbit, you would need another three to five 

aircraft per orbit. You might need only one or two orbits in the case 

of North Korea, but in the case of a larger country like Iran, there 

would be certain areas in Iran from which launches could occur 

that probably couldn’t be intercepted by any number of orbits of 

Airborne Lasers if they have to stand off outside the border of the 

country. 

So there are all those kind of issues that would have to be addressed in adding capability to the aircraft, perhaps, for example, 

as General O’Reilly notes, taking advantage of modern technology 

to incorporate a higher-power laser that, in fact, would have effectiveness at larger ranges, as well as all these other things I have 

mentioned that would have to be done before you had an operational combat capability. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Franks is now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here. 
22 

Mr. Chairman, I have several questions, very limited time here, 

so I can’t help but express some perspective on some comments by 

our ranking member Mr. Turner related to your testimony, Dr. 

Roberts. I think that I just want to be on record as suggesting 

there was indeed a false choice between two cases here. The notion 

that we could not have continued forth with the third site and that 

that foreclosed anything else we were doing is not something that 

reasonable people can embrace. And to suggest that our allies were 

well served by that, given the reaction by the Polish representatives that came after that announcement, and some of the people 

from the Czech Republic, they felt simply betrayed. So I don’t know 

how we have served those allies’ interests. 

I suppose my biggest concern is the discussion related to the timing. I am fully aware that we have some raid issues related to only 

10 interceptors. But whatever capability they represented will be 

nonexistent, perhaps in a critical time in Iran’s calculus as they 

move forward with not only their missile systems but, potentially, 

their nuclear system. I think that that issue is, potentially, going 

to saturate the discussion of this committee in the future because 

of the seriousness of it. Any time or opportunities or additional 

margin that we could have purchased with the third site in Europe 

could prove to be something that we would regret not having in the 

near future. 

So, with that, I just wanted to be on record with that, and I want 

to try to direct some questions to General O’Reilly in the short time 

that I have. 

General, thank you for your service to this country. People like 

you carry freedom on your backs, and the rest of us just talk about 

it. 

Recent news from the Middle East region has been troubling. I 

have already mentioned that the Iranian situation, I believe, continues to be a great concern to us, given their enrichment of uranium and their active space and missile development and testing 

program. There are varying estimates on when Iran will develop a 

nuclear weapon. I am told by the Secretary of Defense that is probably not anything to worry about. It could be one to three years, 

at least. I am not sure that that is something I would celebrate, 

that it is only two or three years away. In any case, I know that 

the Secretary of Defense is focused on that as much as he can be, 

and I think all of us should be. 

Just yesterday there were news items describing that Syria provided Scud missiles to Hezbollah. These Scud missiles would be 

able to range much, if not all of Israel, with better accuracy than 

the Katyusha rockets and the Qassam rockets that have been almost a ubiquitous part of Israel’s life. 

Potential adversaries continue to develop and deploy larger numbers of increasingly advanced ballistic missiles, and they are also 

exercising concepts of operations involving larger raid sizes and 

multiple launch platforms. I guess my question to you, sir, is: How 

is the Missile Defense Agency’s technology development program 

aligned to meet the ballistic missile threat 5 years from now, or 

even 10 years from now, given these concerns? 

General O’REILLY. Thank you, sir. First of all, we need to have 

a greater effectivity of each one of the missiles we launch. So our 
23 

investment program in advanced technologies is designed to have 

better use of our sensors so we can track missiles early in their 

flight and pass that information to an interceptor and intercept 

missiles earlier. When we have large raids of missiles that, as you 

describe, sir, the threat is growing, I don’t know of a technical reason why we won’t be facing large raid sizes in the future of increasingly longer-range threats. We need to defeat those missiles early 

in flight, and key to that is having sensor systems and using all 

of our possible sensors—including unattended air vehicles—and, 

from space, have the ability to track and launch interceptors sooner. 

So we have a significant investment in that area. Associated with 

that is a very rapid command-and-control system which could then 

pass that information so we could, in fact, have intercepts earlier, 

as soon as immediately after a boost. So that is one investment 

area we are making, and we are working on that very quickly. 

In 2012, we have several demonstrations of intercepting missiles 

early in flight from an Aegis ship by using one unattended air vehicle and a second test which we will be tracking from space. So that 

capability will be available based on the success of the work we are 

doing right now, and that test to prove we have that, so that by 

the middle of this decade we will have an ability to start destroying 

missiles early in flight. 

I have asked for the Defense Science Board to do an independent 

assessment of what I just said, and they have agreed to that, the 

Secretary of Defense has agreed to that, and they will be studying 

that this year for an independent report out in the late summer on, 

in fact, the capability and when we will have this early intercept 

capability, as I just stated. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Heinrich is now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman. 

General O’Reilly, I wanted to ask you that if North Korea or Iran 

were to develop intercontinental-range ballistic missiles capable of 

delivering a nuclear weapon to our homeland more quickly than 

what we currently anticipate, what options does MDA have for responding to this kind of threat? 

General O’REILLY. First of all, sir, today, as we stated, we have 

30 in-place—or will by the end of this year—we will have 30 inplace GBI interceptors. In the case of North Korea, looking at the 

geometries of the tests we have already conducted and the geometries of a launch coming out of North Korea and interceptors coming out of Alaska, we have demonstrated that capability to intercept that. 

I believe the question, though, would be what we could do to enhance our Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System is, again, 

structuring our sensor system and linking it together in a way— 

and we are doing this, and we proved it in our flight tests in 

2008—the ability to have very, very accurate sensor data that we 

could launch and improve the performance of each GBI that we 

launch so that we could do intercepts as far out and as early as 

possible. And if we miss, then we would launch second interceptors. 
24 

That, in effect, would give us greater capability with the 30 that 

we will have currently in place this year. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Okay. I am going to shift gears real quick to the 

Airborne Laser Test Bed. And, once again, congratulations for the 

very successful test that we saw recently. Certainly, I am looking 

forward to the result of some of the upcoming activities. 

Given what we have learned from the Airborne Laser program, 

I wanted to ask if you foresee any near- or medium-term applications for directed energy weapons in the ballistic missile defense 

architecture. 

General O’REILLY. First of all, sir, I appreciate your recognition. 

I would like to recognize the work of the folks from industry and 

government—in this case, for many years—of what they have accomplished. There were a lot of experts that said couldn’t be, and 

they had the persistence. I am very interested in maintaining that 

knowledge base and those experts that this country has that are 

unique to us so that we can, in fact, continue on directed energy 

research. I think that is extremely important. 

For near-term applications, the concern as we have in missile defense is that we need to be—with the current powers, we believe 

we need to be close enough in order to have an effective range that, 

in fact, puts us at a disadvantage with what we see as surface-toair missiles. And so, therefore, we are actively involved in this next 

generation of lasers and looking forward and funding work so that 

we can, in fact, significantly increase the power that that aircraft 

has in an actual smaller package. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Speaking of maintaining that knowledge, how 

many—if you look at the Administration’s current budget, how 

many experiments would that fund over the course of the fiscal 

year? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, there is a study ongoing under the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense that is looking at all of our directed energy programs. 

Mr. HEINRICH. This is the one that will be due out in June? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. In that study it is a broad view of all 

of our work that is going on. And part of that is looking at the testing aspect; what needs to be tested. In the area of ABL, I would 

say first is beam propagation; second would be lethality mechanisms; and third would be other ways to make it more difficult for 

us to use a laser to destroy a missile. 

In that regard, if we go down this path of testing that I expect 

to, to answer your question, would be 10 tests over the next year 

with smaller sounding rockets, because we don’t have to do the 

more expensive, larger tests in order to gain valuable data into the 

areas that I just discussed. 

Mr. HEINRICH. The current numbers would support 10 tests over 

the course of the next year? 

General O’REILLY. Against the type of target that I just talked 

about. Against the larger target sets, which we have been doing in 

the past and will do next month, no, it wouldn’t. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Okay. I will yield back the rest of my time, Mr. 

Chair. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Spratt is now recognized for five minutes. 
25 

Mr. SPRATT. Sorry to be late, but I had the benefit of a briefing 

a few days ago. Having followed this program a long time, I have 

the feeling it has come to fruition. I commend you all for making 

this happen. As we scrape up scarce resources to apply them to the 

best outcome, there are some systems we have supported for a long 

time in alliance with our allies—the Arrow and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). What can those systems do 

that we couldn’t otherwise accomplish using the SM–3 or Aegis 

Ashore, the THAAD, the PAC–3, the Patriot; our existing systems? 

Couldn’t they perform the mission more or less as well as the two 

systems we are developing—the MEADS system? And I know 

MEADS mobility is an issue. Is it necessary to push forward with 

those systems at the cost of these other systems? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the MEADS system is a low-altitude interceptor, and its purpose is to intercept cruise missiles, air breathers, unattended air vehicles, aircraft, and low-altitude missile defenses similar to what a Patriot would do. That capability is what 

we call a lower-tier capability. I developed the upper-tier, and what 

we focused on for defense of Europe and the discussion we have 

had are upper-tier systems. 

Mr. SPRATT. The Patriot can’t take on that mission, then, because of the altitude? 

General O’REILLY. It is a very similar mission to the MEADS, 

sir. The THAAD program is much higher altitude of intercept. 

MEADS has—in its objectives has much greater mobility than 

what a Patriot system would have, as you pointed out, sir. That is 

the most significant difference between the two. And for the Arrow 

system, sir, it is a fixed system, but it actually intercepts higher 

than the altitude of a Patriot and literally intercepts up into outer 

space. So it operates in a different regime than what a Patriot system would be. And Arrow would have an opportunity for at least 

one intercept, maybe more, before Patriot would then engage it. 

Mr. SPRATT. So they are worth the buy. 

General O’REILLY. They both have attributes, sir. Whether or not 

they are worth the buy, I am not in a position—I don’t manage either one of those programs. 

Mr. SPRATT. One of the programs you do manage, I think, still 

is the Satellite Tracking Surveillance System (STSS), now to be 

called the PTSS. Before that it was the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRs) Low, SBIRs High. Number one, what does PTSS do 

that STSS—how do you distinguish those two programs? Number 

two, what do they add to the quality and capability of the missile 

defense that we have for national defense? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the Space Tracking Surveillance System, 

the STSS, which was an outcome of the old SBIRs Low, we 

launched it this year, or actually September of last year, both satellites are on orbit. They are the first satellites that have the ability to track a missile over its entire flight. So they are doing 

groundbreaking work. 

Actually, the PTSS is a smaller satellite. It is focused on certain 

parts of the Earth, and it will stare at certain parts of the Earth 

at a much simpler system than what the STSS had because we 

have found there are regions of the world where we are most worried about in missile defense. 
26 

And so one of the problems we have found in building satellites 

in the past is their complexity. So the PTSS system is actually significantly less complex than the STSS satellites we are flying 

today. We believe, again, it would be more affordable, and it is 

more—once you put a constellation up, you can quickly reconstitute 

it if you ever had a problem with a satellite on orbit. And it is an 

entire system. STSS is a satellite. The Precision Tracking Space 

System, PTSS, also incorporates the command and control system 

and the communications system all the way through a fire control 

system, such as Aegis or THAAD. 

Mr. SPRATT. Do you still propose to go forward with deployment 

of the STSS? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. The STSS is a fantastic capability we 

have today that is providing us design information. But we believe 

the PTSS, which is a smaller satellite, can, in fact, perform the 

mission that we need in missile defense. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

We are going to go for a brief second round of questions. 

If I could, General, let me ask you, since the START Treaty was 

just signed recently. Obviously, there has been a lot of talk about 

this and its effect on MDA’s work. Can you describe how implementing the treaty would affect MDA’s testing? 

General O’REILLY. It will allow us to test—let me start again, sir. 

In the Pacific, the greatest concern we have for testing missile defense is our hazard areas, the debris that it causes, and to conduct 

that safely. So we do a lot of testing in the Pacific. The issue we 

run into is where to launch the targets from. In the previous treaty, we were restricted by launching targets from airborne targets, 

from aircraft, or from waterborne targets. So under the new treaty, 

we do not have those restrictions, and that gives us much greater 

flexibility in conducting long-range testing in the Pacific. In the 

past we have tested 1,000 kilometers. Now we will be testing 2-, 

3-, 4,000-kilometer threats against our systems. And the New 

START Treaty allows that without any constraints. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you. 

I would like to turn, if I could, to the issue of radar. MDA has 

been an excellent innovator at driving advanced technology, especially in the sensor arena. I have two issues of concern, however, 

related to MDA’s radar technology plans. Maybe you can clarify it 

for me. 

The first issue was the Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY–2) radars. These radars are slated to play an important role in the President’s Phased, Adaptive Approach plan for 

European missile defense and other regional defense plans for the 

Middle East and East Asia. They are also the radar system for the 

THAAD fire control units. With such high demand for these radars, 

I am concerned about potential production schedule shortfalls. How 

does your fiscal year 2011 request address the growing need for 

AN/TPY–2 radars, and does MDA have a plan for addressing any 

production shortfalls? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the plan that we were on when we submitted the budget for the TPY–2 would allow us to have two radars 

available in their forward-based mode and match the delivery 
27 

schedule for our THAAD units. So we will deliver one THAAD unit 

this year and be able to deliver a THAAD unit per year until we 

have nine total THAAD units. So we had synchronized the delivery 

and the purchases of our TPY–2s in order to achieve that. 

We have several radars that are in testing today that we were 

going to refurbish so they can, in fact, be used for THAAD radars 

or forward-based radars. We took that refurbishment into account. 

We have found an opportunity we have right now because we actually accomplished the testing sooner of the radars, and they performed very well. So we are now putting them in refurbishment 

earlier so that, in fact, we will have an additional radar in the 

near-term available that we hadn’t planned on. But we were taking 

advantage, managing very carefully, the success we have had with 

that radar. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Secondly, I wanted to address the issue of investment in optical 

sensors versus radar sensors. I am concerned about the lack of 

funding for next-generation advanced radar technology. I know we 

spoke a little bit about this recently, but maybe you can clarify 

this. 

I realize that MDA’s Sensors Directorate funds existing radars 

such as the previously discussed AN/TPY–2 radar, but there are 

new radar technologies that could significantly increase radar coverage at the same cost as existing systems. How will MDA continue 

to encourage development of these new radar technologies? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, in our innovative technology area, we have invested about $110 million a year in Small Business Innovation Research and university programs. There is a lot of work going 

on at that level in the area of substrates and electronics for radars. 

We also have several other programs that are looking at advancing 

the use of the algorithms on the radar. So there are two areas of 

radar development; one is in the area of the software and the algorithms so we can improve the discrimination capability in particular; and then, also, in the areas of having much more robust, 

more powerful radars in the size of a current radar. In fact, we recently signed an agreement working between our universities and 

in the Czech Republic on how to develop greater, more efficient 

performing substrates for our radar technology. So we are very interested in continuing on radar development work, but at the same 

time, we are finding that there is significant contribution, also, in 

the infrared. We need them both. The reason is because if you are 

relying on one type of sensor, you are vulnerable for that sensor to 

be countered in some way. And the more sensors we have, and the 

more different phenomenology we use, the much more difficult it 

is for an adversary in order to interfere with our sensor system. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you, General. 

The ranking member is now recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Last year when we received the Obama Administration’s defense budget from which we could learn of its missile defense policies, $1.2 billion was recommended cut in the budget, 

which this Congress implemented. One of the things that was done 

in that budget was to cut completion, construction of Missile Field 

Number 2 in Alaska. When our National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) came forward, I offered an amendment which I offered 
28 

that would have restored the funding for Missile Field 2. Unfortunately, we did not have the support of the Democrat members on 

the committee, and the amendment did not pass. Not one member 

of the Democrat side voted for it. 

Oddly, the Administration then reversed its position, after the 

NDAA and after Congress did not put the money back, and decided 

to complete Missile Field 2. So we are going to go ahead and spend 

the money that this committee voted not to spend in completing 

that. 

However, we are also learning, though—again, I want to digress 

for just a moment that this is the missile field that Dr. Roberts indicates is our primary response for North Korea and Iran, and will 

be continuing our primary response, I believe, until 2020 by the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach, because that is when the Administration’s announced Phased, Adaptive Approach plan in 2020 provides 

alternative, or additional, coverage to the United States for our 

mainland United States. 

I am concerned, though, of course, that what we learn is that 

Missile Field 1 is now considered to be decommissioned. And considering whether or not this Congress may also want to reconsider 

that and then wondering whether or not the Administration might 

subsequently reverse its decision on that, it would probably be 

helpful for us to have information on it. 

General O’Reilly, rather than decommissioning Missile Field 1 at 

Fort Greely, Alaska, what would it take to upgrade it, including 

necessary hardening and technology, to further leverage it as a 

hedge capacity, which would take us back to the original plan of 

44 interceptors instead of the—I believe we are going down to 30? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, first of all, again, through the assessments that were done through the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, that is when it was determined that, in fact, it would be beneficial to have a hedge. That was part of the results of the review. 

We did not have that at the time last year when we submitted the 

budget. Working closely with combatant commanders, the determination was, for the foreseeable future, we saw that 30 missiles 

would be sufficient, and that is why the decision was made. It was 

made in consultation with the combatant commanders. 

However, as part of the result of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, one of the tenets is that we must be flexible against future 

intelligence estimates, and because of that, the most straightforward way to gain that flexibility would be to have the potential—or to reconstruct or complete the construction of the missile 

field. Due to the number of GBIs that we have, in fact, you would 

have a capability you could reconstitute for the next decade in that 

missile field. 

You asked me about Missile Field Number 1. The reason it was 

decommissioned or it is planned to be decommissioned is that it 

was designed to be a test bed, and it did not have the hardening, 

as you say, sir. But not only that, it has environmental issues and 

things that occur when you have a construction—underground construction like we have in Missile Field 1. So we would need to remediate that. We would need to actually remove almost all of the 

active components of that missile field and replace them with 

newer ones. The timeframe with that would be on the order of two 
29 

years. The costs that we have looked at in the past when we looked 

at different options would be on the order of—and this has been 

done several years ago, sir, so the costs are somewhat approximate—would be on the order of $200 million. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

Dr. Roberts, when you were doing your comparison of the GBI 

proposal for the two-stage at the third site in Poland and Czech Republic, including the radar in the Czech Republic, you indicated 

2011, we need to get everything done faster. One of the things that 

I understand about the previous proposal is that it would have provided—and this was well-known figures that were established and 

discussed—75 percent coverage for Europe, and then also the coverage for mainland United States. Seventy-five was the number 

that was discussed openly with even our European allies. So there 

were discussions about what are we going to do with the gap and 

then discussions with NATO-ization. 

Do you have the figures for Phase 1 of the Phased, Adaptive Approach of the percentage of Europe that will be covered? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I do not. 

Mr. TURNER. I assume if you don’t have it for Phase 1, you don’t 

have it for Phase 2, Phase 3, or Phase 4 either. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Phase 4 and 3 are 100 percent. 

Mr. TURNER. One hundred percent? And what is the year that 

you hit that? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Phase 3 is roughly 2015. 

Mr. TURNER. And Phase 3, you are projecting 100 percent. 

Dr. ROBERTS. I believe so. 

Mr. TURNER. And for the United States mainland? 

Dr. ROBERTS. With our current position—I mean, that is not 

changing materially as a result of Phases 1, 2, or 3 in Europe. 

Mr. TURNER. Meaning that there isn’t coverage. That coverage 

arrives in 2020 with Phase 4. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. But Phase 1 and Phase 2, you don’t have the figures as to what the percentage of coverage for Europe, because obviously that is important for NATO-ization. It is important for us, 

an evaluation. Can you provide those to us for another time? 

Dr. ROBERTS. I am happy to do that. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Dr. ROBERTS. I would like to address a concern of yours, I think, 

and sparked by a comment from Mr. Larsen about phased, adaptive being an architecture. Phased, adaptive is a policy. What we 

have been doing since the announcement of the policy is turning 

it into the elements of each of the four steps. We knew in the analytical work conducted in July and August that we were headed towards an adaptive capability that required two locations for shooters—interceptors—in Southeastern Europe and somewhere in 

Northern Europe, and to a forward-based radar capability. 

We did not do detailed architectural work. We looked in detail 

at alternative architectures with the support of the Missile Defense 

Agency, but we did not choose an architecture in September. We 

chose a policy approach that would be phased and adaptive involving improving technology as we could acquire it, tested and proven, 
30 

and into Europe as quickly as possible. We heard immediately from 

vulnerable allies in the 70 percent equation, 75 percent equation— 

those left out—that they were looking for protection early because 

they were the ones who were the most vulnerable early. We wanted 

to meet their demands for protection and scale the capability as the 

threat develops and as our capabilities improve. 

So the architecture—we did not have an architecture in September that we did not brief you on. We briefed you on the elements of the policy. We provided materials on notional coverage 

that would go with the different phases, based on assumptions 

about where things might be deployed. And what we have been 

doing subsequently is working with our partners to determine— 

both within the multilateral context within NATO and separately 

to determine how to bring the pieces together. So we have been 

bringing forward the details as they have turned into details, but 

we did not choose an architecture in September that we have been 

privately working out. 

Mr. TURNER. As you look at the Phased, Adaptive Approach and 

the different phases, are there Aegis and THAAD that are dedicated assets to United States European Command? And then the 

reason why I am asking this question is because, as part of the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach, is it that the assets are dedicated, or 

do they flow in and out? How is that going to work with respect 

to Aegis and THAAD? Are they dedicated, or do they at times leave 

and go do other tasks? 

Dr. ROBERTS. This is a question for the Joint Staff to determine 

through its Global Force Management Project. When there are too 

few assets available for the combatant commanders, the Joint Staff 

is responsible for having a plan for adjudicating competing demands. 

Mr. TURNER. So when we ask the questions about coverage, I 

guess part of the information that we need in coverage is depending upon what assets are there and what assets are not. 

Dr. ROBERTS. Correct. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. 

With that, I just want to thank our panel for their outstanding 

testimony today and for being here. We look forward to, obviously, 

continued vigorous oversight in this area, obviously, as we go forward with ballistic missile defense. It is going to be vitally important to the Nation. We look forward to being active partners with 

you in that effort. 

With that, some of the members may have additional questions 

that they will submit for the record, and I would ask the panel to 

respond expeditiously in writing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, this subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 15, 2010 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

APRIL 15, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 15, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The BMDR notes that defense of the homeland may be aided by 

the development of new technologies and concepts. These include intercepting longrange missiles early in their flight, launching interceptors based on remote sensor 

information, and strengthening ballistic missile sensors. Specifically, this might include launching SM–3 Block IIB missiles ‘‘which should provide some capability to 

intercept long-range missiles’’ by 2020. MDA will continue development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, including a flight test planned for June 2010, and research 

on the potential of directed energy systems for missile defense. With the exception 

of continued development and testing of the two-stage GBI, new technologies for 

homeland defense are at the concept development stage. Continued development of 

the 2-stage GBI is meant as a hedge in case the SM–3 Block II missile, intended 

for Europe, encounters significant developmental delays. 

Secretary Roberts, can you describe how the Ballistic Missile Defense Review was 

shaped by, and provides guidance for, the contingency that either North Korea or 

Iran, or both, more rapidly develop ICBM-type systems? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The United States is currently protected against the attacks that 

North Korea or Iran would be able to launch if they were to develop an ICBM capability. This protection is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD). Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of ground-based interceptors now 

deployed, compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected 

threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

Preserving this capability as these threats continue to develop is essential. Toward that end, the Administration is continuing to sustain and improve the GMD 

system through a variety of means, including a rigorous flight-testing program. The 

United States is also pursuing several other hedging strategies to maintain the currently favorable position over the long term. For example, the United States will 

continue development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor. We 

will also pursue multiple paths to develop and deploy ballistic missile sensors, including both airborne and space-based detection and tracking systems. Although the 

Airborne Laser (ABL) program has been restructured, the Department will continue 

to research the potential of directed energy systems for missile defenses, including 

the establishment of a directed energy research program inside MDA. 

The Department also plans to complete the construction of Missile Field 2 in Fort 

Greely, Alaska to a 14 silo configuration and to decommission Missile Field 1. (Missile Field 1 was designed as a test bed only and was not built to current operational 

specifications and is not sufficiently reliable for long-term operational deployment.) 

These improvements will provide a reserve capability to deploy rapidly up to 8 additional GBIs from the pool of interceptors currently designated for testing. Although 

the Department does not currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, 

eight extra operational silos will provide an additional hedge against future uncertainty. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Roberts, can you explain why the Department decided 

to complete all 14 GMD silos in Missile Field 2 at Ft. Greeley, Alaska when the 

original plan announced with the budget last year was to stop construction on the 

missile field? Is there a specific development which motivated the Department to 

adopt this hedge strategy? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The completion of all 14 silos in Missile Field 2 provides a reserve 

capability to deploy up to eight additional GBIs from the pool of interceptors currently designated for testing. Although the Department does not currently foresee 

a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these extra operational silos provide an additional hedge against future threat uncertainty. 

Missile Field 2, currently under construction at Fort Greely, is planned for a 14 

silo configuration and will be available for GBI emplacements by the end of FY 

2012. Once Missile Field 2 is completed and fully available for emplacing GBIs, we 

plan to transfer six GBIs currently deployed in Missile Field 1 to Missile Field 2 

and to decommission Missile Field 1. Missile Field 1 was designed as a test bed only 
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and was not built to current operational specifications and is not sufficiently reliable 

for long-term operational deployment. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. According to the BMDR, the Administration plans to tailor its 

Phased, Adaptive Approach to other regions such as East Asia and the Middle East. 

These ‘‘regional missile defense architecture’’ plans are still in development, so the 

inventory and resources requirements for Aegis BMD ships, SM–3 interceptors, 

THAAD, Patriot and further host nation/basing support are not certain. Recognizing 

the ‘‘regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for some years 

to come,’’ the Joint Staff and STRATCOM are developing ‘‘a comprehensive force 

management process.’’ 

Secretary Roberts, the new Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense 

is likely to have significant force structure implications—have these requirements 

been quantified yet? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Department will rely on the Global Force Management process 

to assist in decisions on the allocation of missile defense forces among the geographic combatant commands. 

This process adjudicates competing requirements for missile defense assets from 

the various combatant commands. The requirement to allocate scarce resources underscores the value of developing capabilities that are flexible, adaptive, and 

relocatable, so that they can be surged into troubled regions in times of politicalmilitary crisis. 

It is important to note that the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) is an approach 

to regional missile defense that will be adjusted continuously as risks and threats 

evolve, and as such, there is no final architecture or a specific set of force structure 

requirements for each region. The guidance from the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) will help to inform combatant command requests for missile defense 

assets and guide the Global Force Management adjudication process for addressing 

competing requests. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In 2007, the Joint Capabilities Mix Study II, approved by DOD’s 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, concluded that combatant commanders required at least twice as many SM–3 and THAAD interceptors as were planned at 

the time. General O’Reilly, are you confident that the President’s Budget contains 

sufficient resources to procure new SM–3 and THAAD interceptors to meet predicted inventory needs of the PAA? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Joint Staff is leading a review which includes an examination 

of how the Global Force Management process will incorporate the updated missile 

defense policy and planning guidance contained in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The review will be completed in the summer of 2010. Additionally, the Joint 

Capability Mix–3 study will determine inventory levels of BMD assets by spring 

2011. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How might the regional plans for the Middle East and East Asia 

affect requirements for BMD ships, batteries, and interceptors? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Department will rely on the Global Force Management process 

to assist in decisions on the allocation of missile defense forces among the geographic combatant commands. 

This process adjudicates competing requirements for missile defense assets from 

the various combatant commands. The requirement to allocate scarce resources underscores the value of developing capabilities that are flexible, adaptive, and 

relocatable, so that they can be surged into troubled regions in times of politicalmilitary crisis. 

It is important to note that the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) is an approach 

to regional missile defense that will be adjusted continuously as risks and threats 

evolve, and as such, there is no final architecture or a specific set of force structure 

requirements for each region. The guidance from the BMDR will help to inform combatant command requests for missile defense assets and guide the Global Force 

Management adjudication process for addressing competing requests. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Roberts, given the fact that regional demand for U.S. 

BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for some years to come,’’ when do you think 

that the comprehensive force management process be completed to allocate these 

scarce resources? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Joint Staff is leading a review of the current Global Force Management process to incorporate updated missile defense policy and planning guidance contained in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The review will be complete 

in the summer of 2010. Additionally, the Joint Capability Mix–3 study will determine inventory levels of BMD assets by spring 2011. 

There is no final configuration for the system. It is clear that an effort to match 

one-for-one the potential deployments of short-range missiles within the regions 

would be prohibitively expensive. Accordingly, the United States must pursue a 
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comprehensive approach to risk management. Missile defenses are an essential element of the U.S. commitment to strengthen regional deterrence architectures 

against states acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 

contravention of international norms and in defiance of the international community. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. According to current plans, in ten years the United States is expected to have many sea-based interceptors capable in principle of intercepting longrange missiles. 

Secretary Roberts, what steps will be taken to make sure that this system does 

not lead China to increase its number of long-range nuclear missiles as a way of 

preserving its retaliatory capability in the face of such defenses? And what steps 

are being taken currently to reassure Russia that U.S. missile defense plans do not 

result in a destabilizing capability that could be used to intercept Russian ICBMs 

(launched from Russian missile sites west of the Urals)? 

Dr. ROBERTS. As the President has made clear, both Russia and China are important partners for the future, and the United States seeks to continue building collaborative and cooperative relationships with them. 

The United States will continue to seek to discuss missile defense and strategic 

stability matters with China. The Administration is committed to substantive and 

sustained dialogue with China, with the goals of enhancing confidence, improving 

transparency, and reducing mistrust on strategic security issues. At the same time, 

it is important that China understand that the United States will work to ensure 

protection of our forces, allies, and partners in East Asia against all regional ballistic missile threats. 

With Russia, the Administration is pursuing an agenda aimed at bringing the 

strategic military postures of our two countries into alignment with our post-Cold 

War relationship—no longer enemies, no significant prospect of war between them, 

and cooperating when mutually advantageous. 

To address stated Russian concerns over our future BMD capabilities, we plan to 

continue to engage Russia on a broad range of cooperative initiatives as well as 

transparency and confidence building measures. As part of this effort, we provided 

Russia with a briefing demonstrating that the interceptors we are planning as part 

of the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) will not have the capability necessary to intercept Russian ICBMs heading to the United States. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In previous years, Congress had established limitations on funding 

for and deployment of the Bush Administration’s European missile defense plans 

pending the satisfaction of certain criteria, including: signed and ratified host nation 

agreements, independent analysis of alternatives, and Secretary of Defense certification that the system has undergone operationally realistic testing. 

Secretary Roberts, would you agree that the deployment of missile defenses in Europe should be held to the same standards that the Congress established for the previous plan? 

Dr. ROBERTS. It is essential that systems be deployed following operationally realistic testing. This is a key theme of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review and is reflected in the budget for FY2011. The Administration is committed to deploying capabilities that have been proven under extensive testing and assessment and are 

affordable over the long term. To strengthen the testing program, a number of steps 

are being taken. Working in close partnership with the Director of Operational Test 

and Evaluation, as requested by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency announced 

a new approach to testing in June 2009. This program sets forth test activities over 

the full course of each system’s development, not just two years into the future as 

under the former program. These activities include a comprehensive set of ground 

and flight tests designed to demonstrate operational performance and validate models used to support an evaluation of system effectiveness. The new master plan is 

to be reviewed and updated semiannually. This new approach will be evaluated 

after one year of experience (June 2010), and any necessary adjustments will be 

made at that time. We do not, however, see a need for supplemental certification 

from the Secretary of Defense. 

In addition, we need to have agreements with our allies to allow us to proceed 

to deployment. In fact, many of those agreements are in place already. U.S. efforts 

to implement the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) have proceeded at a 

rapid pace and we have made significant progress since the September 2009 announcement of the new approach. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. According to press reports, the tri-national Medium Extended Air 

Defense System (MEADS) co-development program may not meet the requirements 

of the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture and joint 

operational concept. The Army’s IAMD architecture relies on the IAMD Battle Command System (IBCS) to provide battle management and command and control (C2) 
96 

across all Army air and missile defense sensors and shooters. IBCS also provides 

the interface to other air and missile defense battle management and C2 systems 

such as the Missile Defense Agency’s Command and Control, Battle Management, 

and Communications (C2BMC) and the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability 

(CEC), which enables access to their sensors and interceptor systems. However, the 

MEADS program, as currently planned, does not include the IBCS. Staff understands that the United States requested a restructure of the MEADS program in 

the fall of 2008 and has proposed substituting IBCS as the MEADS battle manager. 

While the Army will not be represented in the hearing, staff understands that the 

Army has considered asking MDA to take responsibility for the MEADS program. 

Secretary Roberts, can you describe OSD’s views about the role of the MEADS 

program in our efforts to establish greater international cooperation on missile defense? And what course should the United States pursue to ensure that the resulting system will meet Army requirements as well as the international objectives? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The MEADS program, under co-development in a partnership 

among the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only active missile defense development program the United States currently has with NATO partners. We believe that honoring U.S. commitments to our cooperative program partners is critical. 

Although there have been numerous schedule delays and cost growth in the 

MEADS program, the program is being restructured so that it can better meet its 

cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

When ready, MEADS will offer a replacement for the Patriot system that is more 

capable, more easily sustained, and more mobile. It could be an important part of 

a NATO missile defense effort. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Roberts, given the cost and schedule problems the Army 

has encountered in the MEADS program, is the Department considering revamping 

this international cooperation program? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Discussions regarding a possible transfer to the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) have occurred; however, no decision has been made to date. 

Although there have been numerous schedule delays and cost growth in the 

MEADS program, the program is being restructured so that it can better meet its 

cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

The Department of the Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS programs. The Army and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics can better discuss our specific efforts to ensure the affordability of the program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The BMDR notes that defense of the homeland may be aided by 

the development of new technologies and concepts. ‘‘These include intercepting longrange missiles early in their flight, launching interceptors based on remote sensor 

information, and strengthening ballistic missile sensors. Specifically, this might include launching SM–3 Block IIB missiles ‘‘which should provide some capability to 

intercept long-range missiles’’ by 2020. MDA will continue development and assessment of a two-stage GBI, including a flight test planned for June 2010, and research 

on the potential of directed energy systems for missile defense. With the exception 

of continued development and testing of the two-stage GBI, new technologies for 

homeland defense are at the concept development stage. Continued development of 

the 2-stage GBI is meant as a hedge in case the SM–3 Block II missile, intended 

for Europe, encounters significant developmental delays. 

General O’Reilly, what are MDA’s plans for the 2-stage GBI? Has MDA identified 

a key milestone or date upon which a decision would be made to continue with the 

SM–3 Block II missile or switch to the 2-stage GBI ‘‘hedge’’? 

General O’REILLY. The Department of Defense is investing in new missile defense 

capacity and capabilities to hedge against future uncertainties in both the ballistic 

missile threat and the technical risk inherent to our own development plans. One 

such hedge effort is the development and testing of a 2–Stage Ground Based Interceptor (GBI). While there are no plans to field this interceptor at this time, maintaining a 2-Stage GBI development and testing program preserves national policy 

options to field missile defenses in a timely and effective manner. 

The availability of the demonstrated 2-stage GBI will also serve to reduce the risk 

and required development time to incorporate this alternative asset in the BMD architecture if deemed advantageous in the future. We will be flight testing the 2- 

stage GBI for the first time in June 2010. During Booster Vehicle Test (BVT)–01. 

By conducting the first test event in FY10, early critical data will be available to 

support future technical trades. In FY12 we will test a 2-stage GBI on Flight Test 

Ground (FTG)–08. Twelve of the thirteen planned Critical Engagement Conditions 

(CEC) and Empirical Measurement Events (EME) for 2-stage development are col-
97 

lected with BVT–01 and FTG–08 flight tests. The remaining CEC/EME is collected 

in FY 2016 with FTG–17. 

There are two planned versions of the SM–3 Block II, the SM–3 Block IIA and 

the SM–3 Block IIB. The SM–3 Block IIA is planned for use aboard ships first, and 

then used ashore until the Block IIB is developed and available. The Aegis BMD 

ship-based SM–3 Block IIA remains an operational need independent of decisions 

related to developing and producing two-stage GBIs or Block IIB’s. 

At this point in time MDA is engineering the systems and maturing the technologies for the SM–3 Block IIB. The technical maturity will be determined through 

a series of knowledge points (KPs) that ties achievement of critical information to 

reducing developmental risk and increasing confidence in meeting the desired capabilities. These knowledge points will build confidence in the SM–3 Block IIB. 

It is important to note that the Department does not view the SM–3 Block II and 

the 2-Stage GBI as either/or programs. The Department plans to invest in SM–3 

Block II interceptors for operational use and the 2-Stage GBI solely for development 

and testing at this time. Any future decision to pursue an operational 2-Stage GBI 

would not preclude the option to continue efforts for the SM–3 Block IIB interceptors, and vice-versa. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. According to the BMDR, the Administration plans to tailor its 

Phased, Adaptive Approach to other regions such as East Asia and the Middle East. 

These ‘‘regional missile defense architecture’’ plans are still in development, so the 

inventory and resources requirements for Aegis BMD ships, SM–3 interceptors, 

THAAD, Patriot and further host nation/basing support are not certain. Recognizing 

the ‘‘regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for some years 

to come,’’ the Joint Staff and STRATCOM are developing ‘‘a comprehensive force 

management process.’’ 

General O’Reilly, given the fact that regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for some years to come,’’ when do you think that the comprehensive force management process be completed to allocate these scarce resources? 

General O’REILLY. The Joint Staff is leading a review of the current Global Force 

Management process to incorporate updated missile defense policy and planning 

guidance brought on by the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The review will complete in the summer of 2010. Additionally, the Joint Capability Mix–3 study will determine inventory levels of BMD assets by spring 2011. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. To enhance the effectiveness of all missile defense systems, and 

to reduce reliance on land and sea-based sensors, MDA has created a new program 

this year, Precision Tracking Space System or PTSS. 

General O’Reilly, given the ongoing challenges in space acquisition, can you assure the committee that the PTSS program can be delivered in a timely way at a 

reasonable cost? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. Challenges and problems associated with past satellite development programs indicate that a stable baseline and risk reduction is necessary 

to improving development timelines. Developing prototypes prior to making production decisions will ensure that proper Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) are 

achieved, thereby improving our development timelines. The PTSS acquisition strategy is to develop a prototype system with Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory before awarding production development contracts to industry. Additionally, we will award contracts to several industry participants during concept development and exploration to insure the prototype can be readily produced by industry. Industry engagement during the prototyping phase will greatly improve the 

level of understanding by the contractors and reduce risk for PTSS production. This 

partnership between industry and the scientific community will ensure our understanding of requirements before we award production development contracts. 

The MDA also intends to leverage heritage, high TRL space system components 

for the PTSS. This approach focuses on component reuse and integration and minimizes the need for new technology development and custom design which will drive 

costs up and increase development timelines. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What actions is MDA pursing to ensure the program establishes 

a realistic baseline and only uses mature technology? What technology and other 

lessons learned is the PTSS program taking from the STSS demonstration satellites? Finally, can you explain why MDA is planning to acquire a satellite capability when the Air Force has the primary expertise for space systems? 

General O’REILLY. Challenges associated with past satellite development programs indicate that a stable baseline is necessary to improve development timelines. 

To that end, MDA will establish the requirements baseline upfront and early and 

discourage future growth without operational necessity. MDA also intends to leverage heritage, high Technology Readiness Level components and subsystems for the 

PTSS. This approach focuses on component reuse and integration and minimizes the 
98 

need for new technology development that may drive costs up and increase development timelines. 

MDA is further incorporating lessons learned from the STSS demonstration satellites to inform our decisions on the development of PTSS, specifically in the areas 

of phenomenology and fire control. STSS phenomenology data (i.e., infrared scene 

collections such as atmospheric backgrounds, clouds, earth limb observations, etc.) 

will be used to anchor models essential to the missile tracking mission. In the case 

of PTSS, this category of collections is planned to be used in payload design, and 

validate the selection of optics, focal planes, wavebands of interest and data processing. STSS uses on-board processing to autonomously generate missile target 

tracks and pass that data to the ground control system. The PTSS program will 

analyze STSS processing performance to determine the level of on-board processing 

required, from a system-wide perspective for PTSS. 

The development of PTSS is in line with MDA’s charter to develop, integrate and 

test all missile defense capabilities, including and not limited to missiles and sensors. PTSS is more than a satellite development program—it is an integral part of 

the extended Aegis fire-control system. The development of space-based remote 

sensing and the integration of the data into Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) firecontrol architectures are integral to early intercept capability (a key focus of MDA). 

The objective of the PTSS program is to address the ascent-phase, midcourse tracking challenge facing the joint warfighter. 

MDA is collaborating with key Air Force stakeholders including Air Force Space 

Command, the Space and Missile Systems Center and the appropriate members of 

the Air Staff on specific roles and responsibilities. MDA is collaborating with the 

Air Force to establish a Service Cell within the PTSS Hybrid Program Office which 

will ensure the PTSS operations and data management systems are consistent with 

Air Force initiatives. MDA is also teaming with critical technical expertise within 

the Navy and its Aegis cadre for integration of the PTSS into Aegis Combat System 

fire control design and development. Acting as a pathfinder, STSS will characterize 

the challenges of closing the fire control loop with Aegis BMD, addressing problems 

such as latencies, interfaces, accuracies, and biases. Using the same Navy expertise, 

PTSS will build upon the STSS launch-on knowledge, to continue with an engageon campaign, expanding the battlespace for operational ships along with larger defended areas. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. According to press reports, the tri-national Medium Extended Air 

Defense System (MEADS) co-development program may not meet the requirements 

of the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture and joint 

operational concept. The Army’s IAMD architecture relies on the IAMD Battle Command System (IBCS) to provide battle management and command and control (C2) 

across all Army air and missile defense sensors and shooters. IBCS also provides 

the interface to other air and missile defense battle management and C2 systems 

such as the Missile Defense Agency’s Command and Control, Battle Management, 

and Communications (C2BMC) and the Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability 

(CEC), which enables access to their sensors and interceptor systems. However, the 

MEADS program, as currently planned, does not include the IBCS. Staff understands that the United States requested a restructure of the MEADS program in 

the fall of 2008 and has proposed substituting IBCS as the MEADS battle manager. 

While the Army will not be represented in the hearing, staff understands that the 

Army has considered asking MDA to take responsibility for the MEADS program. 

General O’Reilly, we understand that the Army is concerned about the direction 

of the MEADS program, and the possibility that it will not work well with the 

broader Integrated Air and Missile Defense command and control system. Can you 

share with us your views on the status of the MEADS program, and any thoughts 

about whether it might more appropriately be situated in the Missile Defense Agency? 

General O’REILLY. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is currently focused on developing and fielding upper tier capabilities such as the Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense and Aegis BMD systems. The integrated deployment of the lower tier 

MEADS and PAC–3 with MDA upper tier systems adds effective layered and regional missile defenses to the BMDS. Program support and budgetary responsibility 

for MEADS resides with the U.S. Army. I defer to the Army about the current status of the program. Discussions regarding a possible transfer to MDA have occurred; 

however, no decision has been made to date. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General O’Reilly, could you provide an update on remedying past 

problems observed with the capability of the Patriot to differentiate between incoming missiles and the Identification Friend or Foe systems? 
99 

General O’REILLY. The U.S. Army has programmatic and budgetary responsibility 

for the Patriot program. I defer to the U.S. Army’s senior leadership on questions 

pertaining to the system’s technical and operational performance. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Director Gilmore, can you describe the process of developing and 

approving the Integrated Master Test Plan? How has this process differed from the 

way that the MDA and DOT&E have worked together in the past? 

Dr. GILMORE. My staff, along with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the Combatant Commands, and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Operational 

Test Agency participated in the development of the Integrated Master Test Plan 

(IMTP). DOT&E has been involved in the evaluation-based strategy underpinning 

the IMTP since General O’Reilly initiated its development in December 2008. In addition to detailed and day-to-day staff involvement in the formulation of the IMTP, 

I personally participated in a number of executive-level reviews and provided comments and guidance to the MDA. I approved the IMTP, which includes plans for 

operational testing. I expect that as the IMTP is executed, I will continue to review 

and approve the detailed test plans that support all significant BMDS testing, and 

that the realism of the testing conducted will increase over time. 

A significant difference between the current IMTP planning process and previous 

efforts is that the IMTP is now a requirements-driven process, while previous efforts 

were not. In the IMTP, each test is now designed to collect Verification, Validation, 

and Accreditation (VV&A) data for the models and simulations and the IMTP is reviewed and updated every six months. If successfully executed, the IMTP should 

lead to validated and accredited models and simulations, which may be used to support evaluations of the BMDS. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Director Gilmore, you mention in your 2009 report that DOT&E 

has begun an evaluation of the President’s new Phased, Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe. Would you describe to the committee your plans for evaluating the PAA and any finding you can share from the review to date? 

Dr. GILMORE. The IMTP includes plans for dedicated operational testing. Operational testing, both ground and flight testing is planned for each phase of the 

Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA). In FY12 (post Phase 1), the MDA intends to conduct a system-level operational test, FTO–1, featuring three ballistic missile targets 

to be intercepted by Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) (version 3.6.1), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot. FTO–2 is planned for FY– 

15 (Phase 2) and is a BMDS operational system-level flight test against five ballistic 

missile targets to be intercepted by Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), Aegis 

BMD, THAAD, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot. FTO–3 is planned for FY18 (Phase 3) and 

is a BMDS operational system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets 

employing the same elements as FTO–2 but in their upgraded configurations. The 

IMTP does not currently address Phase 4 testing that would be conducted in FY20. 

Additionally, Aegis BMD will conduct flight test FTM–15 in 3QFY11 and THAAD 

will conduct flight test FTT–13 in 2QFY11. Both of these are operationally realistic 

flight tests planned to demonstrate capability against intermediate and medium 

range ballistic missiles, respectively, and to support my assessment of the PAA 

Phase 1 capability prior to the planned FY11 deployments of these systems to the 

European theater. The MDA also plans to conduct ground testing of the command, 

control, battle management, and communications system in FY11 to support the 

Phase 1 implementation. 

To assess performance of the Phased, Adaptive Approach, as well as the BMD system as a whole, I have begun to apply proven statistical techniques that generate 

quantitative results from the integration of many different sources of information. 

The use of these techniques is necessary because BMD test results will be drawn 

from a variety of sources, including live flight tests as well as modeling and simulation. These techniques are similar to those currently used to certify the effectiveness 

and safety of our nuclear stockpile. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Director Gilmore, your 2009 report says that, to date, ‘‘GMD has 

demonstrated a limited capability against a simple threat.’’ Can you explain to the 

committee what level of confidence DOT&E currently has in the effectiveness of our 

homeland defense system? How do you see this level of confidence changing in the 

future? 

Dr. GILMORE. I will evaluate confidence as much as possible on a statistical, quantitative basis, not on a subjective basis. Because the majority of the testing providing the data needed for quantitative assessment will be due during the next five 

to seven years, I cannot provide a quantitative estimate of confidence in the performance of the missile defense system now. The estimate I provide in the future 

will depend on the outcome of all the events that can provide information. As there 

are insufficient end-to-end live tests that by themselves could conclusively characterize Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) effectiveness, my evaluation will 
100 

embrace additional pertinent information sources—including smaller-scoped developmental and operational testing observations, engineering and system-level knowledge, data on related systems and processes, and modeling and simulation. We will 

conduct detailed and fully documented integrated analyses for the individual constituent systems and performance functions (e.g., detect threat launch, tracking and 

discriminating, engagement planning and authorization, weapon launch, fire control, fly out, end game) that comprise BMDS architectures under varying threats 

and environments. Extensive sets of preeminent subject matter experts (SMEs), internal and external to DOT&E, will be integral to these analyses. Formal elicitation 

techniques and synthesis methodologies will be utilized to construct quantitative 

representations of test results to translate these to overall estimates of BMDS performance capabilities and associated uncertainties. The calculus of probability and 

the use of likelihood functions and likelihood ratios will be used to fuse information 

in much the same manner as target tracking and sensor fusion. This approach is 

comparable to that used to certify our national nuclear stockpile and to variants 

that have been applied in industry and in various risk assessment settings—including counter-terrorism and homeland security studies. Additional assurance for and 

calibration of the specific application of these methods to the evaluation of BMDS 

will be obtained by systematically comparing recorded SME portrayals to new test 

results and related information that will emerge as the BMDS program schedule advances and additional testing is conducted. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Director Gilmore, your 2009 report says: ‘‘the Aegis BMD provides 

a moderately well characterized capability against a majority of its theater-level 

missile threat set and its operational battlespace.’’ Is this level of confidence sufficient to ensure that the first phase of the PAA will be operationally effective? If not, 

what steps will be required to achieve such effectiveness? 

Dr. GILMORE. Aegis BMD capability versus Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) 

threats (that is, those that fly less than 1000 km) is well characterized. Against 

these threats, the Aegis BMD has had numerous flight test successes, which resulted in the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force declaring the system in October 2008, to be operationally effective and suitable. However, the Aegis 

BMD system has not yet conducted a flight test against a Medium Range Ballistic 

Missile (MRBM) target (a missile that flies greater than 1000 km). The Aegis BMD 

system has also not demonstrated a queued engagement during a live flight test 

using track data from a forward-based sensor such as the AN/TPY–2 radar. Therefore, while I assess the Aegis BMD to be effective against SRBM threats, performance against longer range threats has not yet been demonstrated. 

The required steps to demonstrate this effectiveness are documented in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). For Phase 1, Aegis BMD will conduct flight test 

FTM–15 in 3QFY11. This operationally realistic flight test is planned to demonstrate capability against an intermediate range ballistic missile. It will exercise 

a launch on remote engagement using a forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar. In FY12, 

following the Phase 1 deployment, the MDA intends to conduct a system-level operational test, FTO–1, featuring Aegis BMD, as well as THAAD and Patriot in a multiple simultaneous engagement. The MDA also plans to conduct ground testing of 

the command, control, battle management, and communications system in FY11 to 

support the Phase 1 implementation. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Director Gilmore, can you detail the track record and any future 

plans for testing the system for deployment in Europe and the system to defense 

the Homeland in terms of including: 

• Warheads and similarly-sized balloon decoys that will challenge the system’s 

ability to discriminate? 

• Tumbling warheads? 

• Testing at night? 

• Including multiple targets? 

Dr. GILMORE. My office’s Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) annual reports 

over the past few years discuss the testing the MDA has completed for the various 

elements of the BMDS. These reports describe the varying maturities of the different elements that make up the BMDS. The current IMTP includes testing of the 

President’s phased, adaptive approach for the defense of Europe as well as continued testing of the GMD for the defense of the Homeland. As systems mature, testing 

in the IMTP evolves to include complex target scenes, testing under varying environmental conditions, testing against multiple targets, and testing in a layered and 

integrated ballistic missile defense architecture. Each test has been designed to collect the data needed to verify, validate, and accredit the BMDS models and simulations that will be used to evaluate BMDS capability. 
101 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, in the hearing on April 15, you stated that, to your 

knowledge, the Administration has not received assurances from Russia that phase 

four of the Phased, Adaptive Approach doesn’t violate the new START. Please describe Administration’s intent in seeking such assurance from Russia. 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Administration is not seeking assurance from Russia that the 

European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) does not violate the New START Treaty. The New START Treaty does not constrain the PAA, nor does it constrain the 

United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible; therefore, 

our missile defense plans for Europe pose no issue of compliance with the New 

START Treaty. We have, however, explained that the missile defense capabilities 

associated with the European Phased, Adaptive Approach will not affect the U.S.- 

Russian strategic balance. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, please provide the figures for phases one through four 

of the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA), and the corresponding percentage of the 

U.S. homeland as well as Europe that PAA would provide? Furthermore, what asset 

allocations would be needed to provide the coverage? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The coverage of Europe in each phase of the European Phased, 

Adaptive Approach (PAA) was briefed to the HASC in a classified setting on April 

8, 2010. The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks 

using the ground-based midcourse system deployed in the United States. The EPAA 

will enhance that coverage from a potential Iranian ICBM threat beginning in 

Phase 1 (2011 timeframe). 

The coverage in Europe is designed to cover the areas closest to and within range 

of existing and developing near-term threats first, with improved coverage in each 

phase. By Phase 3 (2018 timesframe), coverage will be extended to all NATO Allies 

in Europe. For more detailed information about asset locations and coverage, we can 

provide a briefing to you or your staff in a classified setting. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts and General O’Reilly, at what point do you believe the 

Department needs to reevaluate its reductions to homeland defense (e.g., reducing 

the number of GBIs from 44 to 30) because the threat has changed? What policy 

and planning assumptions would have to change? 

Dr. ROBERTS. Given the continuing improvement in the Ground-Based Missile Defense (GMD) system and the number of ground-based interceptors currently deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian capabilities, the United 

States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats from North Korea 

and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

Because of uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate at which 

it will mature, it is important that the United States maintain this advantageous 

position. But doing so does not require that the United States continue to develop 

these capabilities at the same accelerated rate as it has in recent years and accept 

the same level of risk in the developmental program. Rather, the United States will 

refocus its homeland missile defense plans to maintain our current advantage, while 

developing future, proven capabilities that will enhance homeland defense should a 

new threat emerge. This refocused approach was introduced in the FY 2010 budget 

submission, in which the Department of Defense proposed to hold the number of 

operationally deployed GBIs at 30, instead of the 44 originally planned. The completion of eight additional empty silos at Fort Greely, Alaska and the storage of test 

and spare GBIs will provide a hedge against unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We 

are also developing stronger sensor networks with additional land-based sensors 

and new airborne and space-based platforms, and investing in advanced capabilities 

such as the ability to intercept ballistic missile threats earlier in their flight. The 

missile defense assets needed to protect the homeland will be constantly evaluated 

as we continue to defend the homeland from missile defense attack, consistent with 

the first policy priority established by the BMDR. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, Phase 1 of the PAA calls for the deployment of a forward-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011. We are considering the Fiscal Year 

2011 budget request yet we don’t know where this radar will be located or how long 

host nation negotiations might take. Does the Department have a plan and schedule 

for deploying this radar and will the 2011 timeframe be met? 

Dr. ROBERTS. We are still in discussions with a potential host nation for the AN/ 

TPY–2 radar at this time. However, the Department does have a plan for deploying 

this radar, and we expect the 2011 timeframe to be met. We will consult closely 

with Congress as we proceed. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Roberts, the BMDR states that the Phased, Adaptive Approach 

will be tailored to other regions. When will the committee see the regional missile 
102 

defense architectures that are being developed? What force structure, inventory, and 

resource implications will these new regional missile defense architectures have? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The United States will pursue missile defense regional approaches 

that are tailored to the deterrence and defense requirements of each region. These 

approaches will evolve over time in accordance with the threats and circumstances 

unique to each region. They could vary considerably and may not resemble the fourphased European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA). In some regions, our regional 

missile defense efforts are already underway. In these regions, the architecture will 

change as the threat evolves and as new capabilities become available. Each of the 

major regions outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) differ in 

their geography, history, existing military relationships, and threat environment. 

Although the approaches will vary, they will be guided by common principles. We 

will pursue efforts to strengthen regional deterrence architectures, field capabilities 

that are tailored to the threat, and focus on flexible and mobile capabilities that can 

adapt as needed. 

The Department will rely on the Global Force Management process to assist in 

decisions on the allocation of missile defense forces among the geographic combatant 

commands. This comprehensive force management process will adjudicate competing 

requirements of scarce missile defense assets from the various combatant commands. This approach underscores the value of developing capabilities that are 

flexible and adaptive and also relocatable, so that they can be surged into troubled 

regions in times of political-military crisis. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, last year, we asked several questions about the 

state of the GBI manufacturing line—was it hot or cold—and we were particularly 

concerned about 2nd and 3rd tier suppliers. Can you please update us on the status 

of the industrial base? And, more broadly, what impact does the recent NASA decision to terminate the Constellation program have on the missile defense industrial 

base? What do you believe needs to be done to stabilize the industrial base, particularly in the area of solid rocket motors and liquid rocket engines? 

General O’REILLY. MDA’s most recent purchase of GBIs was December 2006. 

Lower-tier GBI supplies began ‘‘production breaks’’ in 2007. The GBI 2nd tier supplier (Raytheon and Orbital) manufacturing lines are warm, and are expected to remain warm beyond 2016 through continued deliveries of on-contract GBIs, ongoing 

GBI refurbishments for operational and test GBIs, and the planned purchase of five 

(5) additional GBIs. As for the 3rd and 4th tier supplier manufacturing lines, all 

are expected to complete their deliveries in FY10 for on-contract GBIs with the exceptions of Aerojet and Rockwell Collins. Additionally, MDA utilized the $50M FY10 Congressional Add to keep manufacturing lines warm for critical warm suppliers through the fiscal year. The following 

summarizes the content authorized to Boeing in January and April 2010: • Booster Orion Motor Sets (ATK)—FY10 increment for eight (8) motor sets (completion and delivery of the motor sets will be continued under a separate future 

contract action) 

• Booster Shrouds (Astech)—5 units 

• EKV Communication Link Subsystem (Rockwell Collins)—FY10 increment for 

3 units (completion and delivery will be continued under a separate future contract action) 

• EKV Inertial Measurement Units (Northrop Grumman)—2 units 

• EKV Laser Firing Units (L–3)—3 units 

• EKV Electronics Units (Raytheon)—3 units 

• EKV Electrical Conversion Units (Raytheon)—3 units 

• EKV Structures (General Dynamics)—2 units. 

These purchases along with the five (5) additional GBIs and planned refurbishment component purchases are expected to sustain GBI 3rd and 4th tier suppliers 

until FY13 and final GBI deliveries in 2016. 

MDA Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base (IB) impacts (THAAD and GBI) 

from the termination of the Constellation Program could include the following: 

• Increased cost 

• Suppliers exiting the business causing requalification expenses 

• Schedules could lengthen as new suppliers need to qualify lines to replace those 

that may exit the business 

• Prime contractor (ATK) decisions to ‘‘right-size’’ to match demand and restructure 

The impact to THAAD will be less than the impact to GBI since THAADs are 

being procured from Aerojet and Aerojet has already right-sized. 

MDA’s long-term plan to stabilize the high-tech SRM IB includes supporting the 

SRM IB Interagency Task Force development of a DoD Sustainment Plan. This plan 

would be inclusive of: 
103 

• Work with industry to ‘‘right size’’ and align capacity to reality 

• Ensure long term viability of small and large SRMs (missile defense and tactical systems), and 

• Closely monitor the already fragile critical sub-tier supplier base 

This task force will provide solid rocket motor industrial base sustainment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for a subsequent report to Congress in 

approximately September, 2010. 

MDA also procures a small number of Divert Attitude and Control Systems 

(DACS) for the THAAD and EKV. These engines use a very small quantity of liquid 

propellant. The Industrial Base for both of these systems is healthy. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, please discuss the status of the SM–3 Block 2A 

and 2B interceptor development efforts. What are the highest risk areas that could 

affect the availability of the SM–3 Block 2A and 2B interceptors to meet Phase 3 

and Phase 4 of the PAA, respectively? 

General O’REILLY. The Joint U.S.–Japan Standard Missile-3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) Project is will conduct its Preliminary Design Review (PDR) 

in January 2011. The SCD Project has successfully completed the first four steps 

for the PDR as planned, including reviews of Japan’s Second Stage and Third Stage 

Rocket Motors. The SCD Project is on track to accomplish flight testing in November 2014 and March 2015, to support deployment in 2018 as part of Phased, Adaptive Approach Phase III. 

The SCD Project’s highest development risk area is the Kinetic Warhead (KW). 

Particular areas of focus include the focal plane array production yield, the divert 

thruster survivability, and the KW dynamic body motion impact to image processing. The Project Team is actively engaged in defining and executing mitigation 

efforts to retire these risks prior to flight testing. 

The SM–3 Block IIB, is in the initial phase of technology assessment and development. The technical challenges in developing the Block IIB are dependent on the 

missile architecture and associated technologies selected for incorporation on the 

Block IIB. In general, technical challenges will be related to our goal of developing 

a faster, more flexible missile, which requires propulsion upgrades, controllability 

enhancements, and lighter weight components. Investments will be made to raise 

the maturity of key component technologies, with the goal of achieving Technology 

Readiness Level (TRL) 6 by 2013, to support the SM–3 Block IIB development program for Phase IV of the Phased, Adaptive Approach in 2020. 

To reduce risk on relevant technologies we will complete design trades, assess 

technology readiness and conduct technology demonstrations through 2010. Key activities will include technology assessments and missile architecture studies to define feasible missile concepts for the SM–3 Block IIB mission; investments in technologies that have the potential to provide higher velocity and energy management; 

mission analysis to determine the appropriate balance and trades between missile 

weapon systems and sensor capabilities leading to a definition of the Block IIB operations concept; and definition of the Block IIB acquisition strategy. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, at what point do you believe the Department needs 

to reevaluate its reductions to homeland defense (e.g., reducing the number of GBIs 

from 44 to 30) because the threat has changed? What policy and planning assumptions would have to change? 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, Phase 1 of the PAA calls for the deployment of a 

forward-based radar in Europe by the end of 2011. We are considering the Fiscal 

Year 2011 budget request yet we don’t know where this radar will be located or how 

long host nation negotiations might take. Does the Department have a plan and 

schedule for deploying this radar and will the 2011 timeframe be met? 

General O’REILLY. The Department of Defense is considering locations in Southeast Europe for the forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar. It is difficult to predict exactly 

how long it will take to conclude the necessary host nation agreements once a country agrees in principle to host the radar. However, the Department is confident that 

agreements will be in place in time to support the 2011 deployment timeframe. 

Concurrent to negotiations with potential host nations, the Missile Defense Agency will work with the Joint Staff and the European Combatant Commander to deploy the radar in Phase I of the European PAA. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, the BMDR states that the Phased, Adaptive Approach will be tailored to other regions. When will the committee see the regional 

missile defense architectures that are being developed? What force structure, inventory, and resource implications will these new regional missile defense architectures 

have? 
104 

General O’REILLY. Flexible and adaptable capabilities with global application to 

meet evolving threats are key attributes of the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA). 

As such, we are developing regional missile defense elements that can be adapted 

to address threats and the unique circumstances of each Combatant Command region. 

Missile defense architectures are determined by the Combatant Commanders. 

System and inventory requirements are determined by the Joint Staff in collaboration with the Combatant Commanders. They also develop the assignment of missions, tasks and forces. As a material developer, MDA will be responsible for developing the systems for the services to fulfill their Title X responsibilities to train and 

equip the military to support a Combatant Commander’s request for forces and 

equipment. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, please describe the current developmental status 

and technical maturity of the 2-stage GBI and the SM–3 Block 2A and SM–3 Block 

2B interceptors. What are the expected performance differences? 

General O’REILLY. The 2-stage Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) is a development 

and test program only. There are no plans at this time to produce or deploy operational 2-stage GBIs. Conversely, the Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) Block IIA and IIB 

missiles will be developed, tested and produced as operational interceptors. 

Should the decision be made in the future to pursue an operational 2-stage GBI 

capability, its performance would vary from that of the SM–3 interceptors. The 2- 

stage GBI is a land-based, fixed-site interceptor whose performance is similar to the 

currently deployed 3-stage GBI. 

The 2-stage GBI has completed System Requirement Review (SRR). The SRR examines the functional, technical, performance and security requirements for the system and the preliminary project plan. The project plan ensures the requirements 

and the selected concept will satisfy the system objectives. Currently, there are 

three 2-stage GBI flight tests planned (one 2-stage Booster Verification Test (BVT) 

and two 2-stage GBI flight tests). The first 2-stage GBI vehicle was delivered/emplaced in May 2010 in supported the fully successful initial flight test (BVT–01) on 

June 6, 2010. The remaining two 2-stage flight tests are scheduled for Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2012 and 2016. • In a fully successful flight test, BVT–01 delivered a Capability EnhancementI (CE–I) Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) to a predetermined aim point using 

a First Generation configuration 2-stage booster (test conducted on June 6, 

2010). After separating from the second-stage booster, the kill vehicle executed 

a variety of maneuvers to collect data to further prove the performance of the 

kill vehicle in space. • Flight Test GBI (FTG)-08 is an intercept flight test event of the 2-stage First 

Generation configuration avionics GBI with a CE–I EKV payload. • FTG–17 is an intercept flight test event of the 2-stage Fleet Avionic Upgrade/ 

Obsolescence Program configuration avionics GBI with a CE–I EKV payload. 

The Aegis BMD/SM–3 Block IIA is a sea- and land-based rapidly mobile, deployed 

and logistically supported system. It defends against Medium Range Ballistic Missiles and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. 

The SM–3 Block IIA Cooperative Development (SCD) Project is executing section 

level Preliminary Design Reviews (PDRs) in 2010 in preparation for the missile system PDR in January 2011. The SCD Project has successfully completed the first 

four section PDRs as planned. The SM–3 Block IIA has completed System Concept 

Review (SCR). The SCR evaluates the scope, performance, cost, and risk, and determines a missile concept(s) and the employed technology. The program’s SRR is 

scheduled for April 2011. The SCD Project is on track to accomplish flight testing 

in November 2014 and March 2015 and is scheduled to deploy by the end of FY18. 

The performance of the SM–3 Block IIB is dependent on the missile concept selected. The SM–3 Block IIB will use many of the technologies and the manufacturing base of the SM–3 family of interceptors enabling reductions in both technical 

risk and cost. The SM–3 Block IIB is in the concept planning stage with several 

missile configurations being considered. It has not completed a SCR. The SM–3 

Block IIB missile concept and employed technology are in the early stages of evaluation. 

Initial results from system architecture studies and technology assessments show 

that a next generation SM–3 Block IIB missile using well understood technology can 

achieve the increases in burnout velocity and divert capability necessary to defeat 

ICBMs from forward based Aegis Ashore sites. MDA will leverage the SM–3 Block 

IA, IB, and IIA designs as well as propulsion investments made under the Kinetic 

Energy Interceptor and Multiple Kill Vehicle programs to develop the SM–3 Block 

IIB interceptor. The SM–3 Block IIB will also leverage the SM–3 Block IB kill vehicle to the maximum extent possible to reduce costs, schedule and risks for devel-
105 

oping a new kill vehicle. We have planned eight years for technology development, 

system design, and integration and test prior to making a production decision in 

late FY18. 

Mr. TURNER. General O’Reilly, why has MDA removed two planned flight tests 

of the 2-stage GBI from the budget request and delayed the first intercept test until 

3 years after flight tests and delays. What is the rationale for this? Will such a 

delay preclude the 2-stage GBI from being considered as a viable hedge? 

General O’REILLY. Two 2-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) flight tests were 

not removed from our current test plan. The current test plan contains three 2-stage 

configured flight tests (one 2-stage booster verification test and two 2-stage GBI 

flight tests). These flights will yield data for both demonstrating 2-stage capability 

and anchor development models and simulations for both 2-stage and 3-stage designs. 

The 2-stage GBI builds upon the success of the 3-stage GBI and has 95% commonality of existing flight-qualified 3-stage GBI components, except the third stage 

is removed. 

We tested the 2-stage GBI for the first time in June 2010 to verify differences 

between the performance of 2-stage and the 3-stage GBIs. After this test and evaluation of the results dealing with the subsequent intercept events, we will have 

characterized differences between the two and will be able to evaluate the performance of a 2-stage GBI using data collected from 3-stage testing as well. 

The remainder of the test program is Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle focused (i.e., 

booster components are interchangeable). The 2-stage reuses existing flight-qualified 

components from its 3-stage counterpart. The most important component in a 

Ground-Based Interceptor is the kill vehicle. The kill vehicle for both the 2- and 3- 

stage interceptors are identical. 

The 3-stage GBI is the operationally deployed configuration; therefore most testing is with the 3-stage interceptor, but could be 2-stage if required. As such, the 

2-stage interceptor remains a potential hedge as defined in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Gilmore, please describe the current developmental status and 

technical maturity of the 2-stage GBI and the SM–3 Block 2A and SM–3 Block 2B 

interceptors. What are the expected performance differences? 

Dr. GILMORE. The two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) is a variation of the 

deployed three-stage GBIs; a variation that does not include a final third stage. The 

first two-stage GBI has been built and is scheduled to undergo the first-ever flight 

test in June 2010. This first flight test is a non-intercept test with no target and 

is intended to demonstrate two-stage GBI silo launch and flyout. The two-stage GBI, 

having never been flight tested, is less technically mature than the three-stage GBI. 

The Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) Block IIA interceptor has been in cooperative development with Japan since June 2006. The Block IIA interceptor completed a system design review in June 2009 and under current plans will participate in a booster performance test in 1QFY14, which will be followed by three other interceptoronly (no target) tests before its first intercept test in 2QFY15. The Block IIA interceptor includes a number of technology enhancements over currently fielded SM– 

3 interceptors. These enhancements have not yet been fully developed or flight tested. Thus, the technical maturity of the Block IIA interceptor is likely low-to-moderate, as would be expected for a program roughly half-way through its development. 

The SM–3 Block IIB interceptor is intended to have a smaller weight than that 

of the Block IIA interceptor, thereby increasing the flyout range and burnout speed. 

Although some of the Block IIB interceptor components from previous versions of 

the SM–3 may be applicable, many components will likely require completely new 

development. The SM–3 Block IIB interceptor is currently in the later stages of conceptual development. Thus, the SM–3 Block IIB has a lower technical maturity than 

that of the Block IIA interceptor. The current Integrated Master Test Plan does not 

provide a flight test schedule for the Block IIB interceptor. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Gilmore, why has MDA removed two planned flight tests of the 

2-stage GBI from the budget request and delayed the first intercept test until 3 

years after flight tests and delays. What is the rationale for this? Will such a delay 

preclude the 2-stage GBI from being considered as a viable hedge? 

Dr. GILMORE. The current Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) includes three 

flight tests of the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI): a non-intercept first 

flight (BVT–01) in June of this year, an intercept flight test (FTG–08) in 4QFY12, 

and an intercept flight test (FTG–17) in 3QFY16. These tests are part of the overall 

IMTP objective to collect the data needed to anchor the GMD and BMDS models 

and simulation. These flight tests will characterize differences between the two- and 

three-stage GBIs and allow evaluation of the performance of a two-stage GBI using 
106 

data collected from three-stage testing. This approach is possible because the twostage GBI uses many of the same components as the three-stage GBI. The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill vehicle, which is the same for 

both interceptors. Successful completion of these three flight tests, in conjunction 

with other ground tests, will provide information that could be used to evaluate the 

potential performance of the two-stage GBI if it were used to defend Europe against 

ballistic missile attacks. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. Dr. Gilmore’s testimony reads: ‘‘I am concerned that it [the Integrated Master Test Plan] is success-oriented with limited schedule flexibility and no 

incorporation of repeat, or backup, tests to compensate for test failures.’’ He goes 

on to note that even one test failure in the Aegis system could jeopardize the deployment schedule for Phase 1. Do you believe the development and testing schedule for 

the SM–3 Blocks IA, IB and IIA is realistic and adequately accounts for the possibility of test failures? What steps do you believe should be taken to mitigate the 

possibility of test failures for the various blocks of the SM–3 missile system? Are 

additional steps needed to account for the possibility of target failures as well? 

General O’REILLY. The Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) is used to evaluate 

research and development milestones, technology maturity levels, and coverage and 

performance analysis. The Missile Defense Agency remains committed to successfully executing and completing the IMTP. The development and testing schedule 

within the IMTP is realistic and accounts for the possibility of testing anomalies. 

Within the IMTP, the test regime for the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) variants follows the proven disciplines and procedures used during the Aegis BMD 3.6/SM–3 

Block I/IA and Aegis LEAP Intercept Programs. 

The IMTP establishes and documents test requirements for the variants of SM– 

3 with specific focus on collecting data needed for the Verification, Validation, and 

Accreditation (VV&A) of missile and threat models and simulations. Models and 

simulations permit repeated assessments of performance and provide a statistical 

determination of effectiveness of SM–3 capabilities. Ground tests using these high 

fidelity models and simulations test SM–3 capabilities across a range of threats and 

environments that cannot be affordably replicated in flight tests. 

Testing of the SM–3 Block IA is complete after FTM–15. In order to obtain the 

necessary data to anchor SM–3 Block IB models, we plan to test as quickly as is 

technically and reasonably possible. While the SM–3 Block IIA is currently in the 

‘‘planning’’ stages within the context of the existing IMTP, testing will be conducted 

to collect data whenever possible. 

We will follow the same rigorous, practical and methodical approach to missile 

tests with each version of the SM–3 as we did with the earlier SM–3 variants. We 

will augment testing as necessary to overcome setbacks with remedial responses, including conducting additional tests to accelerate deliveries and enhancing instrumentation where required. 

Mr. LARSEN. Dr. Gilmore, in your testimony you note: ‘‘I am concerned that it [the 

Integrated Master Test Plan] is success-oriented with limited schedule flexibility 

and no incorporation of repeat, or backup, tests to compensate for test failures.’’ You 

go on to note that even one test failure in the Aegis system could jeopardize the 

deployment schedule for Phase 1. Do you believe the development and testing schedule for the SM–3 Blocks IA, IB and IIA is realistic and adequately accounts for the 

possibility of test failures? What steps do you believe should be taken to mitigate 

the possibility of test failures for the various blocks of the SM–3 missile system? 

Are additional steps needed to account for the possibility of target failures as well? 

Dr. GILMORE. The currently-fielded SM–3 Block IA interceptor has flown in nine 

intercept flight tests (including three Japanese tests) against Short Range Ballistic 

Missiles (SRBMs) and a satellite shoot-down in February 2008. Prior to the PAA 

Phase 1 deployment, one Block IA interceptor test (FTM–15) against an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) target is planned for 3QFY11. Given a flight 

test failure, there would be little time to repeat the test in FY11 and the loss of 

information could potentially affect the plans for deploying Phase 1. 

SM–3 Block IB development is currently on-schedule for a 2QFY11 intercept flight 

test. Once started, the Aegis BMD intercept flight test program with the Block IB 

includes tests occurring about every three to nine months. That frequency of testing 

could provide some margin for recovery if failures occur. However, it is difficult to 

make definitive claims regarding the sufficiency of that margin given that the Block 

IB interceptor includes technology enhancements that have not yet been flight tested. 
107 

The developmental test schedule for the SM–3 Block IIA interceptor, as laid out 

in the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), allows for about one year between an 

early booster performance test (1QFY14) and the first intercept test with the Block 

IIA (2QFY15). The current IMTP does not provide a test program beyond CY 2015; 

thus, it is not possible now to assess whether test plans beyond 2015 will provide 

margin for failures that could occur during developmental (or subsequent) testing. 

Concerning steps that should be taken to mitigate potential SM–3 test failures, 

one approach is to ensure that quality assurance mechanisms remain in place. Interceptor failures during flight tests have often been related to reliability issues, 

some of which could have been mitigated by more robust quality assurance. The 

MDA has recently increased emphasis on its quality assurance program, which 

should decrease the number of interceptor failures. For targets, a way to mitigate 

test failures would be to include a backup target for each flight test. Many previous 

MDA flight tests have not included backup targets. The initial cost of testing would 

increase with the inclusion of backup targets, but many of the backup targets could 

be used in subsequent tests if they are not needed as backups. Provision of backup 

targets for future tests should become feasible as the MDA executes its revised approach for procuring targets. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Dr. Roberts, what concerns you most about the industrial base? 

What actions have been taken and need to be taken to ensure an industrial base 

capable of producing the quality and quantity of product to meet current and longterm threats? 

Dr. ROBERTS. What concerns me the most about the industrial base is its ability 

to produce effective and affordable systems to meet the policy and strategy priorities 

of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 

For specific questions related to the industrial base, I would defer to LTG O’Reilly 

and to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Has the Administration completed a thorough analysis of worldwide missile defense architectures to support each phase of PAA? Please be specific 

with exactly what has been done in analyzing possible architectures and alternatives for these architectures for each phase of PAA. If the analysis has been done 

when will it be complete? 

Dr. ROBERTS. The Department of Defense conducted the first-ever Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review from March 2009 through January 2010. Required by statute, and 

guided by a Presidential directive, the review comprehensively considered U.S. BMD 

policies, strategies, plans, and programs. The initial study focused on missile defense in Europe. During the course of that review, numerous potential architectures 

were evaluated, and the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) was chosen 

based on the unanimous recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the ‘‘Third Site’’ plan be revised. 

In terms of how this applies to other regions, we will pursue a Phased, Adaptive 

Approach within each region that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, 

including their scale, the scope and pace of their development, and the capabilities 

available and most suited for deployment. 

The Department will rely on the Global Force Management process to assist in 

decisions on the allocation of missile defense forces among the geographic combatant 

commands. This process will adjudicate competing requirements of scarce missile 

defense assets. This approach underscores the value of developing capabilities that 

are flexible and adaptive and also relocatable, so that they can be surged into troubled regions in times of political-military crisis. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is expected to have a lifetime of 20 years. How many flight tests per year do 

you believe are necessary to ensure the long-term reliability of the GMD system 

over its 20-year lifetime? 

General O’REILLY. By the end of 2020, MDA will have tested 20 GBIs, including 

previous GBI flight tests, and there are SRP flight tests planned beyond 2020. MDA 

plans one flight test per year from FY11 to FY20, with the exception of FY18 when 

two are scheduled, for a total of 11 flights based on the current Integrated Master 

Test Plan (IMTP) dated 18 February 2010 and provided to Congress in March. This 

testing supports data collection for Critical Engagement Condition (CEC) and Empirical Measurement Event (EME) Model and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation and Accreditation (VV&A), and the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) Stockpile 

Reliability Program (SRP). 
108 

Beyond 2020, six GBIs are allocated for both operational spares and SRP flight 

testing. However, flight testing is only one part of the SRP. The GMD sustainment 

program will maintain and support an effective defensive system meeting 

Warfighter requirements over the expected 20-year life cycle and support a decision 

on potential Service Life Extension in 2027. Maintaining readiness of the GBI fleet 

will be accomplished through emphasis on key operational availability metrics, a 

comprehensive SRP that monitors the health and status of the fielded interceptors. 

For example, over a 20-year period MDA will conduct 4.3 million maintenance builtin tests, which monitor the health and status of fielded interceptors and verify and 

determine GBI fleet readiness. 

The in-place Aging and Surveillance test program will improve estimates for interceptor reliability by testing aged hardware to determine natural degradation 

characteristics and to understand performance changes in the deployed fleet. By the 

end of 20 years, all known limited life items will be replaced in the GBI fleet. Refurbishments of operational and flight test interceptors also provide critical data points 

for the Aging and Surveillance Program. During the refurbishment process approximately 20 key samples (parts) are removed resulting in over 900 total samples 

taken. Another key activity of the Aging and Surveillance program is the static firing of eight motor stages (two 1st stages, three 2nd stages and three 3rd stages) 

and the dissection of two motor stages (one 1st stage and one 3rd stage) over the 

next 22 years. 

A GBI rotation program will also be used which removes older assets from the 

operational fleet and replaces them with newer GBIs off the production line. This 

reduces the average age of the fleet and uses the older, refurbished GBIs for test 

or operational spare requirements. The surveillance flight testing provides the most 

operationally realistic method of evaluating interceptor reliability performance assessment by using older removed GBIs from the operational fleet during IMTP test 

events, which are designed to accomplish performance and surveillance test objectives concurrently. 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s Budget request lays out a plan that funds production start-up costs for cold GBI suppliers, and begins the acquisition of five additional GBIs. This planned acquisition will bring the GBI total to 52, and is consistent with the IMTP and stockpile reliability testing requirements to support the 

service life of the GMD element. A total of 52 GBIs completes the fielding of 30 

operational GBIs and delivery of 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability 

and operational spare requirements. Of the 22 GBIs, 16 GBIs are allocated to testing defined in the IMTP (two will be consumed in FY10) and by the end of 2020, 

six GBIs will remain for operational spares and SRP testing. 

Mr. LAMBORN. According to MDA’s budget documents, 14 GBIs will be available 

for flight testing. Do you believe MDA has programmed and budgeted for enough 

GBIs to support developmental and operational testing, as well as annual reliability 

flight testing? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. The fiscal year 2011 President’s Budget request lays out 

a plan that pays production start-up costs for cold Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) 

suppliers, and begins the acquisition of five additional GBIs beginning in fiscal year 

2011. This planned acquisition will bring the GBI total to 52. This quantity satisfies 

the Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) and stockpile reliability testing requirements to support the service life of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The total provides for completing the 

fielding of 30 operational GBIs and delivering 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability and operational spare requirements. 

Of the 22 GBIs, 16 (not 14) are allocated to testing defined in the IMTP. The current IMTP v10.1, dated 18 February 2010 and provided to Congress in March, defines tests considered both Developmental Test/Operational Test (DT/OT) flight tests 

and Stockpile Reliability Program (SRP) flight tests given that critical data is collected in each test for both DT/OT and SRP purposes. The six remaining GBIs are 

allocated for both operational spares and stockpile reliability tests beyond 2020. 

MDA worked with the test community and together we determined that by 2019, 

if the tests are successful, we will have the data necessary to confirm the performance of the GMD system and all anticipated flight regimes. In addition, we have 

designed a missile with a capability of maintaining its health and status. As part 

of system operations and maintenance we constantly maintain the health and status 

of these missiles, we also run periodic checks thoroughly to verify its performance 

and the proper functioning of all of the systems. We will conduct 4.3 million checks 

through Built-In Tests (BIT) of these 30 missiles over a 20-year period, plus 600 

other tests where we remove the missiles, remove components from it, test those 

components and refurbish the missiles with brand new components. 
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Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, what concerns you most about the industrial 

base? What actions have been taken and need to be taken to ensure an industrial 

base capable of producing the quality and quantity of product to meet current and 

long-term threats? 

General O’REILLY. With the exception of solid rocket motors and propulsion systems, the Missile Defense Agency‘s (MDA) industrial base is healthy. The Agency 

has taken several steps to ensure key industrial base suppliers remain viable, particularly with the Ground-Based Interceptor industrial base. 

The most recent purchase of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) by the MDA was 

in December 2006. Some third and fourth tier GBI suppliers began ‘‘production 

breaks’’ in 2007. All third and fourth tier supplier manufacturing lines are expected 

to complete deliveries in FY10 for GBIs currently on contract, with the exception 

of Aerojet and Rockwell Collins. 

Congress provided an additional $50M in FY10 to assist in keeping manufacturing lines warm for critical suppliers through FY 2010 due to the fact that key 

suppliers are expected to complete deliveries in FY10 for GBIs currently on contract. 

Accordingly, MDA authorized Boeing in January and April 2010 to purchase: 

• Booster Orion Motor Sets (ATK)—FY10 increment for eight motor sets (completion and delivery of the motor sets will be continued under a separate future 

contract action) 

• Booster Shrouds (Astech)—5 units 

• EKV Communication Link Subsystem (Rockwell Collins)—FY10 increment for 

3 units (completion and delivery will be continued under a separate future contract action) 

• EKV Inertial Measurement Units (Northrop Grumman)—2 units 

• EKV Laser Firing Units (L–3)—3 units 

• EKV Electronics Units (Raytheon)—3 units 

• EKV Electrical Conversion Units (Raytheon)—3 units 

• EKV Structures (General Dynamics)—2 units. 

The new purchases above combined with the purchase of five additional GBIs and 

the purchase of planned refurbishment components are expected to sustain GBI 3rd 

and 4th tier suppliers until FY13. 

GBI second tier supplier (Raytheon and Orbital) manufacturing lines are warm 

and are expected to remain warm beyond 2016 with continued deliveries of on-contract GBIs, ongoing refurbishments of operational and test GBIs, and the planned 

purchase of five additional GBIs. 

Despite the general health of the industrial base, one area of general concern for 

MDA is the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base. Concerns include the potential for: 

• Increased cost 

• Suppliers exiting the business causing costly requalification expenses 

• Delivery schedules lengthen as new suppliers need to qualify lines to replace 

those that may exit the business 

Much of THAAD and SM–3 SRMs are produced at Aerojet, which is right-sized. 

ATK, which produces GBI SRMs, has not ‘‘right-sized’’ to match demand. 

MDA’s long-term plan to sustain the high-tech SRM industrial base includes supporting the SRM Industrial Base InterAgency Task Force (IATF) development of a 

SRM Sustainment Plan. This plan includes: 

• Working with industry to ‘‘right size’’ and align capacity to reality 

• Ensuring long-term viability of small and large SRMs (missile defense and tactical systems), and 

• Monitoring the fragile critical sub-tier supplier base 

MDA also procures a small number of Divert Attitude and Control Systems 

(DACS) for THAAD and GBI Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles (EKVs). These engines 

use a small quantity of liquid propellant. The industrial base for both of these systems is healthy. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, do you believe we should continue to develop and 

test the 2-stage ground-based interceptor (for example, as a hedge against a possible 

Iranian break-out)? 

General O’REILLY. The Department of Defense is investing in new missile defense 

capacity and capabilities to hedge against future uncertainties in both the ballistic 

missile threat and the technical risk inherent to development plans. One such hedge 

effort is the development and testing of a 2-stage Ground Based Interceptor (GBI). 

A 2-stage interceptor has less burn time than the 3-stage version, enabling operation within a shorter engagement timeline. As such, 2-stage GBIs provide time for 

greater launch windows and additional shot opportunities to engage threat missiles 

in some scenarios. 
110 

While there are no plans to field this interceptor at present, maintaining a 2-stage 

GBI development and testing program preserves the option to field missile defenses 

for defense of the homeland in a timely and effective manner. Accordingly, we will 

be flight testing the 2-stage GBI for the first time in June 2010. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, Do you believe there should be a competition or 

clear criteria established for a down-select between the 2-stage GBI and the SM– 

3 Block 2A and Block 2B interceptors which are planned to provide defense of Europe and the U.S. in the new Phased, Adaptive Approach? Right now, it would appear that the Department has put all its proverbial ‘‘eggs’’ in the SM–3 Block 2A 

and Block 2B ‘‘basket.’’ 

General O’REILLY. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the 

subcommittee files.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, Many aspects of a truly joint and integrated 

training program for missile defense hinge upon the release of an Operations Concept for Ballistic Missile Defense. What is the current status of an Operations Concept for Ballistic Missile Defense? Who are the key players in writing the concept 

and what is MDA’s role, if any? Is there a deadline for the Operations Concept? 

General O’REILLY. The Commander, U.S. Strategic Command signed the Global 

Missile Defense Concept of Operations on February, 28, 2010. U.S. Strategic Command was assisted by the Joint Staff, Geographic Combatant Commanders, Joint 

Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, Services, and the 

Missile Defense Agency in writing the concept. Within the Concept of Operations, 

the MDA has been assigned several tasks that contribute to setting the conditions 

for missile defense operations by the Combatant Commands. 

Mr. LAMBORN. General O’Reilly, I understand that MDA has a seat on the Integrated Missile Defense Training Working Group along with STRATCOM and Joint 

Forces Command. General Chilton testified in March that each Service is responsible for training their component of the Missile Defense System with the training 

for C2BMC yet to be assigned. How does the Integrated Missile Defense Training 

Working Group inject training recommendations into Service channels to address 

any shortcomings that arise during tests? How are training shortfalls in command 

and control at the Service and COCOM staff level resolved? 

General O’REILLY. In accordance with a U.S. Strategic Command Instruction, Missile Defense Training Qualification and Certification Program, the Integrated Training Working Group (ITWG) serves as an inter-agency/inter-Service and international partner advisory group to provide oversight for training initiatives, ensure 

Service and component representation in decision-making, and arbitrate training 

issues. The ITWG serves as an advisory forum for all Integrated Missile Defense 

training matters and facilitates the training efforts of the entire Missile Defense 

community. 

The ITWG does not inject training recommendations into Service channels. Training shortcomings that are identified during missile defense tests are injected into 

the Warfighter Involvement Process (WIP). The WIP is a multi-phased collaborative 

process linking combatant commands, international partners, Services, Defense 

Agencies, and the Joint Staff. Through this process stakeholders define desired 

(training) capabilities and evaluate enhancements to missile defense systems. Based 

on funding provided from Congress, the ITWG is conducting an independent training and education assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense training and education needs across the Department of Defense. This study is being sponsored by 

the Joint Staff and overseen by a ITWG senior review panel. 

Ballistic Missile Defense command and control, specifically C2BMC initial and 

spiral update training are scheduled and completed no later than 30 days prior to 

the MDA Program Control Board-approved software spiral release date. When refresher, crew rotation, or specific event training is needed, training is provided ‘‘on 

demand’’ by mobile training teams. The requesting organization contacts the 

C2BMC Program Office training manager to convey training requirements and 

schedule a mobile training team visit. All training (initial, refresher, spiral update, 

crew rotation, and specific event) is conducted at the requestor’s location. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Dr. Gilmore, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system 

is expected to have a lifetime of 20 years. How many flight tests per year do you 

believe are necessary to ensure the long-term reliability of the GMD system over 

its 20-year lifetime? 

Dr. GILMORE. Continued flight testing will be necessary to assess GMD reliability 

over the lifetime of the system. The Air Force and Navy both conduct three to four 

flight tests per year for their Minuteman and Trident fleets respectively. These 

flight tests support large inventories of 350–450 missiles each. The number of flight 

tests conducted is based on a combination of statistical calculations, reliability experience to-date, and available funding. 
111 

It is the system sponsor’s responsibility to establish a life-cycle reliability program 

designed to demonstrate to the user that what has been delivered continues to be 

a viable weapon system. Typically, the developing command, the MDA, would recommend to the operating command, U.S. Northern Command, a flight testing program for the ground-based interceptor to verify missile reliability throughout its 

projected life time. The recommendation could include both ground and flight testing. This recommendation would be based on a number of factors including: demonstrated reliability in the developmental and operational test programs leading up 

to fielding; estimated or demonstrated reliability of the various missile components; 

complexity of the missile system; experience with other similar missile systems; ongoing developmental testing that could substitute for or supplement reliability testing; availability of operational assets for testing or for replacement on operational 

status if missiles are expended during reliability testing; funding available to execute a reliability test program; and the risk the operating command is willing to assume. These are the same kinds of considerations that have been part of the development of the flight test program for Trident and Minuteman. 

The GMD program will be in continual testing through 2020, the results of which 

will provide data on the system’s reliability. I expect flight testing will continue beyond that time. The number of tests conducted will depend on the considerations 

described above. 

Mr. LAMBORN. According to MDA’s budget documents, 14 GBIs will be available 

for flight testing. Do you believe MDA has programmed and budgeted for enough 

GBIs to support developmental and operational testing, as well as annual reliability 

flight testing? 

Dr. GILMORE. The GMD flight test program is based on the requirements defined 

by the three-phased process that the MDA used to create the new, five-year Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) that I approved last July. This approach emphasizes testing under Critical Engagement Conditions (CECs) and during Empirical 

Measurement Events (EMEs) to collect the data on system performance necessary 

to verify, validate, and accredit, the GMD and Ballistic Missile Defense System 

(BMDS) models and simulations to be used to assess overall capability. The IMTP 

is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test information needed to assess GMD and 

BMDS performance quantitatively. If the MDA can execute the IMTP, the data 

needed to validate models and perform quantitative assessments of GMD and 

BMDS performance will become available. 

The MDA has programmed and budgeted for the GBIs needed to conduct the developmental and operational testing defined in the IMTP. Additional interceptors 

will be needed to conduct flight testing beyond 2020 to verify GMD performance, 

including reliability. The number of tests conducted will depend upon a number of 

considerations including: demonstrated reliability in the developmental and operational test programs leading up to fielding; estimated or demonstrated reliability 

of the various missile components; complexity of the missile system; experience with 

other similar missile systems; ongoing developmental testing that could substitute 

for or supplement reliability testing; availability of operational assets for testing or 

for replacement on operational status if missiles are expended during reliability 

testing; funding available to execute a reliability test program; and the risk the operating command is willing to assume. 

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