* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60503

Summary Calendar

TERRY LEE TAYLOR

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

COOPER TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi, Aberdeen

USDC No. 1:05-CV-250

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Terry Lee Taylor worked at Cooper Tire and Rubber Company (“the

company”) from September 28, 1988 through April 6, 2005, when the company

fired him for hitting another employee with a tire. After the tire incident,

foremen questioned Taylor about the skirmish and managers later met with

Taylor to formally discuss it. On April 6, the company informed him by letter

that he had been fired and allowed him to request a peer review hearing, which

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

November 15, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
1 EEOC v. Jefferson Dental Clinics, PA, 478 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2007)

(quotations omitted). 

2 Jones v. Robinson Prop. Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 995 (5th Cir. 2005)

(citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

2

the company held on April 21. Taylor did not indicate during any of these

discussions or meetings that the other employee involved in the skirmish had

first hit him with a tire. He later testified that he did not reveal this information

because he was afraid of being fired. 

In 2004, the company transferred Taylor from his position in the rubber

mixing department and from his brief service as a second stage tire builder to

a “green tire handler job” after issuing multiple oral and written warnings to

Taylor. He did not ever receive any bonuses in his tire sorter position. 

Taylor alleges that the company fired him because of his union activity

and in retaliation for his hitting a Caucasian employee with a tire. He filed a

claim with the National Labor Relations Board, similarly arguing that the

termination resulted from his union activity, and the NLRB concluded that the

company validly fired Taylor on the basis of the tire incident. Taylor did not

appeal this decision with the NLRB. He then brought claims of race

discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in

district court. The district court granted the company’s motion for summary

judgment. 

We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary

judgment de novo and find summary judgment “appropriate if the record shows

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 To establish a retaliation claim under

Title VII, Taylor had to show “(1) that he engaged in activity protected by Title

VII; (2) [defendant] took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a

causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action.”2 To establish employment discrimination under Title VII,

the district court properly recognized that, absent evidence of direct
3 See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003). 

4 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). 

5 Evans v. Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2001). 

3

discrimination, the plaintiff may present circumstantial evidence3 but must

under the McConnell Douglas scheme4“first prove a prima facie case of

discrimination,”5 after which the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that

defendant had a non-discriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff. 

The district court determined that the company did not dispute Taylor’s

prima facie case for discrimination but that the reasons that it provided for

Taylor’s transfer and termination were not a pretextual cover for discriminatory

motive. We agree with the unchallenged findings that the company’s refusal to

give Taylor a bonus resulted from his failure to take a proficiency test required

for that bonus; that its transfer of Taylor resulted from numerous warnings

unrelated to race; and that it terminated Taylor because actions such as

throwing tires create a dangerous workplace. Taylor admitted in his deposition

thatthe company transferred him from his job of second stage tire builder to tire

sorter because he was “disqualified” and did not meet the minimum

requirements for that job. He also indicated that he “kinda caught wind” of the

fact that he had to take a proficiency test in order to receive a bonus, and agreed

that the termination letter indicated that the company discharged Taylor for

throwing another tire at another employee in an “intentional and dangerous

act.” We agree with the district court’s finding that Taylor’s response to the

company’s motion for summary judgment failed to show that the company’s

reasons were pretextual or involved mixed discriminatory and legitimate

motives. Finally, we find no disputed material fact in the case below indicating

the causal connection between Taylor’s transfer and termination and his union

activity or race. 

AFFIRMED.