IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-60275

JOSE SANTOS NATAREN ESCOBAR,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

consolidated with

No. 09-60276

EVIN ONEL NATAREN LOPEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

consolidated with

No. 09-60277

JOSE ANTONIO NATAREN ESCOBAR,

Petitioner,

v.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 13, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk
No. 09-60275

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

2

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S. Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review from an Order of the 

United States Board of Immigration Appeals

A088 745 173

A088 745 174 

A088 745 175 

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The United States Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the

finding of the immigration judge that the three petitioners—Jose Santos

Nataren Escobar (Santos), Evin Onel Nataren Lopez (Lopez), and Jose Antonio

Nataren Escobar (Antonio) (together, Natarens)—are Honduran citizens who

entered the United States without inspection, and are subject to removal. The

Natarens now appealto this court, contending reversible error exists in a failure

to suppress evidence in the removal proceedings or purported violations of due

process and of the Department of Homeland Security's internal regulations. In

the alternative, they assert that they should be subject to withholding of

removal. Lacking such violations or sufficient grounds for withholding of

removal, we affirm the decision of the BIA.
No. 09-60275

3

I

The Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE) agency detained the Natarens during an early morning

immigration raid in Maryland. This raid was the culmination of an eighteenmonth investigation, though the Natarens were not actually targets of the raid.

Though ICE obtained warrants in connection with the raid, it did not have a

warrant for the house in which the Natarens were discovered. Upon finding a

van driven by one ofthe raid’s targets parked by his neighbor’s home, armed law

enforcement obtained entrance to that home from its owner and occupant

Alfonso Madrid Acosta (Acosta). Other agents may or may not have already

entered through another door. ICE agents then spoke to the various individuals

present in the home. Included in that group were the Natarens, who paid rent

to Acosta and shared the home with him. The Natarens were interviewed by

ICE agents and revealed themselves to have entered the United States without

inspection. They subsequently provided sworn written statements admitting

that they entered the United States illegally. 

ICE then transported the Natarens to Texas, where they were brought

before an immigration judge. The immigration judge found no reason to

suppress evidence collected as a result of the ICE raid, pursuant either to the

exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment or to due process under the Fifth

Amendment and internal ICE regulations. 

The immigration judge also rejected the Natarens’ argument that they

should be subject to withholding of removal. In support of their request for

withholding, the Natarens noted that they are members of the National Party,

one of two major parties in Honduras. Though Lopez is not a member of the

party, the Natarens argue that their family as a whole is associated with the

party. They contend that as a result they were subjected to violence when living

in Honduras. 
No. 09-60275

1 8 U.S.C. § 1252.

2 Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing Soadjede v.

Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam)).

3 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

4

As evidence of this violence, they submitted the following: taxis owned by

Antonio were violently robbed three times in Honduras during which the drivers

were told to find other routes, and party paraphernalia on the cabs was removed;

Antonio’s father-in-law was killed in Honduras by Jeremiah Fuentes, whom

Antonio asserts is a member of the rival Liberal Party; Antonio’s wife received

death threats in Honduras; and a relative of Jeremiah Fuentes, Alton Fuentes,

later shotLopez in the leg. The Fuentes family then contributed towards Lopez’s

medical bills in exchange for Lopez not assisting the Honduran police in their

investigation. Though Santos stated at trial that he had never personally had

any problems as a result of his family’s politics, he testified that he now feared

that he would. By contrast, the government contended that Alton Fuentes is a

member of a violent gang, and that the Natarens were victims of gang and

economic violence, rather than political intimidation. 

The immigration judge found withholding of removal unwarranted. The

BIA found no reason to disturb the conclusions of the immigration judge. As a

result, it affirmed. The Natarens now appeal to this court, and their cases have

been consolidated. 

II

We have statutory jurisdiction to review the decision of the BIA under the

Immigration and Nationality Act.1 We review constitutional claims in

immigration proceedings de novo.2 Per the statute, findings of fact are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would have to find otherwise.3

Therefore, this court will not reverse a finding of fact “so long as it is not

capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or
No. 09-60275

4 Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d

80, 83 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).

5 Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

6 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).

7 Ali, 440 F.3d at 681. 

8 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).

5

otherwise so aberrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any

perceptible rational approach.”4 Our authority is to review the decision of the

BIA, and we have previously held that where the immigration judge’s decision

has an “impact” on the BIA’s determination we may review it as well.5 Where,

as here, the BIA largely relies on the immigration judge’s findings, it is

appropriate to review them.

A

We will address the Natarens’ suppression and due process claims first.

The Natarens assert that they are entitled to have the evidence forming the

basis of this removal action suppressed in accordance with the Fourth

Amendment. The Supreme Court held in Wong Sun v. United States that both

products of unconstitutional searches and the fruits thereof are subject to

exclusion in criminal proceedings under the Fourth Amendment unless

sufficiently attenuated.6

The Natarens bring this challenge in an immigration proceeding, which

is a civil, not criminal, proceeding.7 As a result, the potency of the exclusionary

rule is not clear. In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, with Justice O’CONNOR writing for

the majority, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be

applied in civil deportation hearings.8 The Natarens rely, instead, on negative

inferences drawn from a later section of Justice O’CONNOR’s opinion joined only

by a plurality, suggesting that the Court had not reached the issue of “egregious
No. 09-60275

9

Id. at 1050-51 (plurality).

10 Matter of Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503, 505 (BIA 1980).

11 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).

12 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

13 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184 (1990).

6

violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that mighttransgress notions

of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence

obtained.”9In the instant case, we need not reach the question of whether an

egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment would warrant suppression.

Indeed, the Natarens have not demonstrated any violation of the Fourth

Amendment, egregious or not, and the burden of proof is on the Natarens to

show that exclusion is warranted.10

The Natarens argue thattheir home was searched without a warrant, and

that Acosta’s consent was defective. This argument is unavailing. Here, a cooccupant of the home consented to the entrance of law enforcement agents. The

Supreme Court has long held that a co-occupant may consent to a search of

shared premises for one not present.11 Thus, Acosta, an individual who lived in

the home, had authority to allow the agents into the home while the Natarens

slept. Once in the home, the agents needed no further consent to speak to the

Natarens. As a result, Acosta’s consent was effective. 

The Natarens contend that because Acosta was their landlord, his consent

was invalid under Chapman v. United States. In that case, the Supreme Court

held that a landlord who owned but did notlive in a property, and who possessed

limited rights of access, could not consent to a police search of the home.12 As in

the instant case, however, the Court has made clear that an individual also

living at a property can consent to a search on behalf of a cotenant not currently

objecting.13 There is no reason that a financial relationship between roommates
No. 09-60275

14 See id. at 186.

15 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).

16 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984) (plurality).

7

should limit this power to consent. Indeed, this exception is sufficiently broad

to allow Acosta to provide consent even if he had not actually lived in the home,

but merely reasonably appeared to the officers to be an occupant.14 Since a

reasonable appearance of cotenancy is sufficient for consent, there is no reason

that receiving rent from an actual cotenant should render Acosta’s consent

defective.

The Natarens also argue thatthe purported entrance of other agents prior

to Acosta’s consent requires suppression of all evidence from the raid. The

immigration judge and the BIA found that there was insufficient evidence of

such an entrance, and the record does not compel a contrary view. Moreover, we

note that Acosta’s effective consent cures any defect through the inevitable

discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Where evidence would be

discovered through an alternative process, unrelated to a purported violation,

the Supreme Court has held that the evidence may be admitted.15 Here, even

accepting the Natarens’ factual account, the agents entering with consent were

only moments behind the agents entering without consent and Acosta, unaware

of their presence, would have admitted the others regardless. Thus, there are

no grounds for application of the exclusionary rule. 

In the alternative, presupposing both that a violation did occur and that

an egregious violation would warrant exclusion, exclusion still is not justified.

The I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza plurality offered the egregious example of Rochin

v. California.

16 In Rochin, police officers watched a criminal narcotics suspect

swallow two capsules, and when they could not manually extract the capsules

themselves, handcuffed the suspect and took him against his will to a hospital
No. 09-60275

17 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).

18 Id.

19 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b).

8

where his stomach was pumped to recover the capsules.17 The chief evidence in

that case was the capsules recovered through the induced vomiting.18 Using

Rochin as an example of “egregious” violations of the Fourth Amendment, it is

clear that the facts of this case do not rise to the requisite level. Thus, even

supposing such a rule and violation, there would nonetheless be no cause for

exclusion. 

B

The Natarens’ theory that two purported violations of ICE regulations

require suppression of evidence is similarly unavailing. The Natarens direct this

court to an operating manual for the Immigration and Naturalization Service

directing agents to give apprehended aliens a notice of rights. The Natarens fail,

however, to indicate the rights of which they were not given notice. Moreover,

we review the factual determination of whether a reasonable immigration judge

and the BIA could have found notice was given, and there is support for their

finding that no violation occurred.

Similarly, there is support for the immigration judge’s finding that there

was no violation of applicable provisions ofthe Code of Federal Regulations with

respect to reasonable suspicion for interrogation and the BIA’s affirmance

thereof. To that end, the Natarens rely on a provision permitting only a brief

detention for interrogation based upon reasonable suspicion.19 Below, the

immigration judge found that ICE agents gained Acosta’s consent believing that

the raid’s original target—the van owner—was inside the home, and that this

provided reasonable suspicion to speak to the other adults in the house. Those

adults then revealed their undocumented status. The conclusion that this
No. 09-60275

20 8 C.F.R. § 287.12.

21 499 U.S. 621, 623-24 (1991).

22 Id. at 624.

23 Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Bridges v. Wixon,

326 U.S. 135 (1945)).

9

regulation was not violated is not unreasonable, and therefore we uphold the

BIA’s affirmance thereof. We also note in the alternative that the section of

Code of Federal Regulations the Natarens rely upon does not create an

enforceable right: “These regulations do not, are not intended to, shall not be

construed to, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or

procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal.”20

Thus, there is no reason to believe the drastic remedy of suppression would be

warranted even if the regulations had been violated.

These same facts dispose of the Natarens’ contention that they were

unreasonably “seized.” They cite to California v. Hodari D., arguing that they

were “seized” at some point prior to revealing their undocumented status,21 and

that their statements must be suppressed as a result. If applicable here, that

case requires only an agent’s reasonable suspicion prior to seizure.22 We have

not disturbed the immigration judge’s findings of facts regarding the van, and

those findings provide grounds for such a reasonable suspicion for the ICE.

C

Lastly, the Natarens allege that their Fifth Amendment rights were

violated by a BIA review that they insist failed to address their evidence or

arguments. This court has held that individuals in removal hearings have a

rightto fundamental fairness under due process.23 The Natarens allege that the

BIA violated that right to fundamental fairness by ignoring their purported

evidence of an ICE pattern of bad behavior tantamountto an egregious violation

of the Fourth Amendment and by failing to address ICE’s lack of a warrant. In
No. 09-60275

24 L & A Contracting Co. v. S. Concrete Servs., Inc., 17 F.3d 106, 113 (5th Cir. 1994).

25 Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).

26 Id. at 681-82.

27 Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d

80, 83 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).

28 Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).

10

light of the factual finding of consent that we have not disturbed on appeal,

neither issue is legally relevant. Thus, this issue is not a due process violation.

Further, the Natarens have provided two sentences in different paragraphs

asserting without citation that the BIA erred in its review of the immigration

judge’s requirement that the Natarens make a prima facie case for suppression

before entertaining testimony on that subject. This court has previously held

that failure to cite any authority in a brief constitutes abandonment of an

issue.24 Secondarily, it is notable that the Natarens have not offered any details

regarding the testimony they wish to offer. The burden lies on the Natarens to

show prejudice,25 and there is no such showing. As a result, a hypothetical

violation in the hearing below would be harmless.26

III

We now address the Natarens’ alternative theory that they are eligible for

withholding of removal. As with the factual determinations above, we will

disturb the conclusions of the immigration judge and the BIA only if they were

inconsistent with the findings of any reasonable adjudicator.27 We also will

again consider the findings of the immigration judge, as those findings had a

significant impact on the BIA’s determination.28

For withholding of removal, an applicant must show that“‘itis more likely

than not’ that his life or freedom would be threatened by persecution on account

of one of the five categories mentioned under asylum: race, religion, nationality,
No. 09-60275

29 Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)).

30 Shaikh v. Holder, 588 F.3d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)).

31 See Adebisi v. INS, 952 F.2d 910, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1992).

11

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”29 As a result of

recent statutory changes, an applicant must now show that the protected

classification will be at least one central reason for persecution.30 The

persecution must come at the hands of the government, or with its consent or

acquiescence.31 The Natarens theorize that withholding is justified by their

family’s longstanding membership in the National Party in concert with the acts

of violence they describe. As the findings below were not unreasonable on this

point, we uphold the BIA’s affirmance of the immigration judge.

The BIA found no reason to disturb the immigration judge’s determination

that the Nataren family was not a social group entitled to protection on account

of their political views. Though the Natarens advance one theory for the

lamentable difficulties they have faced, there are other reasonable views. The

immigration judge found that Lopez’s shooting was linked to the shooter’s gang

membership, rather than any political affiliation. Similarly, the immigration

judge found that since Santos left Honduras before the relevant incidents, he

could not have done so on the basis of political oppression. Lastly, the

immigration judge concluded that, in light of the taxi robbers’ warning to find

a different route, Antonio was the victim of economic, not political, violence.

While the Natarens contend that the BIA should have reversed this finding on

the basis of their “consistently” maintaining that these crimes had political

motives, there is evidence in the record to the contrary. For instance, Antonio’s

wife described her father’s shooting as the result of the shooter’s drunkenness.

Moreover,the Natarens repeatedly reference police involvement. Indeed, Lopez

claimed to be fearful because his shooter might think that he reneged on his
No. 09-60275

12

promise not to speak to the police. This information makes it difficult for the

Natarens to demonstrate government acquiescence. As a result, it cannot be

said that no reasonable adjudicator would have denied withholding of removal.

* * *

Finding no reversible error in the BIA’s affirmance of the immigration

judge’s order, we AFFIRM.