In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-23-00236-CV 

 

BRADLEY GENE LLOYD, APPELLANT 

V. 

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

Bexar County, Texas1 

Trial Court No. 2022CV04198, Honorable Cesar Garcia, Presiding 

November 30, 2023 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Bradley Gene Lloyd appeals from the trial court’s judgment affirming an 

administrative order that revoked his driver’s license. In a single issue, Lloyd challenges 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the revocation of his driver’s license. We 

reverse the trial court’s judgment. 

1 Pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization order, this case was transferred to 

this Court from the Fourth Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any 

conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 
2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 9, 2021, Lloyd was involved in a motor vehicle accident in San 

Antonio, Bexar County, Texas. During the investigation of the accident, San Antonio 

Police Officer Zachary Krok determined that Lloyd rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a 

traffic light while traveling at a high rate of speed. The impact of the collision knocked the 

vehicle Lloyd struck into the back of another vehicle, which was also stopped at the traffic 

light. Officer Krok noted in his Texas peace officer’s crash report that “[Lloyd] was having 

a mental health episode and was believed to have tried to commit suicide by crashing 

into the vehicle while not wearing a seat belt.” 

In December of 2021, the Texas Department of Public Safety issued a letter to 

Lloyd concerning a report of “a possible medical condition which might affect” his safe 

operation of a motor vehicle and requested Lloyd complete and return a medical packet 

within ninety days. (Emphasis in original.) On April 12, 2022, the Department sent Lloyd 

a notice of revocation of his driver’s license with instructions to request a hearing or the 

indefinite revocation would begin on May 25, 2022. Lloyd requested an administrative 

hearing before the Bexar County municipal court. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. 

§ 521.300.2 After a hearing, the Bexar County municipal judge made an affirmative 

finding that, for medical reasons, Lloyd is incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle

and issued an order of revocation. Lloyd timely appealed the judgment of the municipal 

court by filing a petition in the county court at law for a trial de novo. See § 521.308. After 

2 Further references to provisions of the Texas Transportation Code will be by reference to “section 

__” or “§ __.” 
3

a bench trial, the county court at law sustained the revocation of Lloyd’s driver’s license,

prompting this appeal. At Lloyd’s request, the court filed findings of fact and conclusions 

of law. 

By his sole issue, Lloyd contends the order of revocation is not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The parties argue that the applicable standard of review on appeal is under the 

substantial evidence standard. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174. However, Texas 

Government Code section 2001.221 specifically exempts from substantial evidence 

review the revocation of a driver’s license brought under Subchapter N, Chapter 521 of 

the Texas Transportation Code. See id. § 2001.221(1) (“This chapter does not apply to 

a . . . revocation . . . of a driver’s license . . . as authorized by: ‘Subchapter N, Chapter

521, Transportation Code’ . . .”); § 521.294(1) (authorizing revocation of driver’s license 

of person who is “incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.”). 

In his brief, Lloyd contends “there is not a scintilla of reliable evidence in the record 

to support the revocation of [his] driver’s license.” We construe his issue as a challenge 

to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. 

When, as here, the trial court has made findings of fact and a reporter’s record has 

been filed, we review the findings for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence using 

the same standards we apply to jury findings. See Hanford-Southport, LLC v. City of San 

Antonio, 387 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied). A legal 

sufficiency challenge to the evidence supporting an adverse finding of fact on an issue 
4

for which the appellant did not have the burden of proof requires the appellant to show 

that no evidence supports the adverse finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Peña, 442 

S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). When reviewing the record, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, considering only the evidence and 

inferences that support the finding and disregarding all evidence and inferences to the 

contrary. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). If more than a scintilla 

of evidence exists to support the finding of fact, the legal sufficiency challenge will not 

prevail. Graham Cent. Station, Inc., 442 S.W.3d at 263.

ANALYSIS

At a license revocation hearing brought under Subchapter N, Chapter 521 of the 

Texas Transportation Code, the Department must prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence, and the presiding officer must affirmatively find, “the grounds for suspension or 

revocation stated in the notice are true.” § 521.301. Here, the Department’s April 12 

notice alleged as grounds for revocation that Lloyd is incapable of safely operating a 

motor vehicle. See § 521.294(1).

At the de novo hearing before the trial court, the Department’s evidence consisted 

of a certified record of the documents introduced at the hearing before the municipal 

judge, including the following: Officer Krok’s peace officer’s crash report; a December 31, 

2021 notice from the Department requesting Lloyd return a medical packet within ninety 

days to avoid revocation; the April 2022 minutes of the Medical Advisory Board for Driver 

Licensing; an undated document referring to the minutes of the Medical Advisory Board 

and noting that “[s]pecific limitation(s) to driving is a listed suspicion of possible underlying 
5

psychiatric components of paranoia and delusional thoughts”; a notice of revocation dated 

April 12, 2022; and an August 16, 2022 evaluation from Lloyd’s psychiatrist. No witnesses 

testified at the hearing. In its findings of fact, the trial court found that Lloyd was involved 

in an automobile collision; the investigating officer stated that it appeared Lloyd had a 

mental health episode and tried to commit suicide by crashing into a vehicle without 

wearing a seat belt; the Medical Advisory Board for Driver Licensing determined Lloyd 

was unable to safely operate a motor vehicle due to psychiatric medical limitations and 

experienced two events (hospitalization and motor vehicle accident) in a short period of 

time related to paranoid/delusional thoughts and “there is no reason to believe that 

whatever caused this is under control”; Lloyd’s medical history indicates two instances of 

hospitalization due to his anxiety disorder; and Dr. Rosalia Carrasco’s evaluation of Lloyd 

on August 16, 2022 did not recommend any prescription medication or determine a 

reason for Lloyd’s continued license suspension.3

Lloyd characterizes Officer Krok’s report that he was “having a mental health 

episode and was believed to have tried to commit suicide by crashing into the vehicle 

while not wearing a seat belt” as conclusory, explaining that the officer gave no 

justification or explanation for his conclusion. We agree with Lloyd. A conclusory 

statement makes an assertion without any basis or explanation. See San Antonio v.

Pollock, 284 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. 2009); see also Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 

447, 462 (Tex. 2017) (explaining that “[a]n expert’s testimony is conclusory if the witness 

3 Notably, there are no findings related to a revocation of Lloyd’s driver’s license, only a suspension. 

This is not a suspension case. The Department sought an indefinite revocation of Lloyd’s driver’s license, 

not a suspension. Revocation and suspension are not synonymous. 
6

simply states a conclusion without an explanation or factual substantiation.”) Bare or 

baseless opinions cannot support a judgment, even if there was no objection over their 

admission into evidence. See Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 816. An “expert must explain the 

basis of his statements to link his conclusions to the facts.” Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 

882, 890 (Tex. 1999). When the evidence presented to the factfinder is conclusory, it is 

considered no evidence. See Kindred v. Con/Chem. Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983) 

(“When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than create 

a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, 

in legal effect, is no evidence.”). Moreover, there is no evidence that Officer Krok was 

qualified to make a mental health determination.

Additionally, the findings of fact make reference to the minutes of the Medical 

Advisory Board. The minutes relied on the possible attempted suicide referenced in 

Officer Krok’s crash report and mention Lloyd experiencing a hospitalization and 

automobile accident in a short period of time purportedly related to paranoid/delusional 

thoughts. There are no facts in this record to support the conclusion that Lloyd suffered 

from paranoid or delusional thoughts. It is unclear what medical records were before the 

Medical Advisory Board in April. Consequently, we find the Medical Advisory Board’s 

minutes to be conclusory and, therefore, no evidence. 

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings, 

considering only the evidence and inferences that support the findings and disregarding

all evidence and inferences to the contrary, we hold there was no legally sufficient 

evidence to support the revocation of Lloyd’s driver’s license. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at

297. We sustain Lloyd’s sole issue.
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CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand to the trial court with instructions 

to vacate the judgment.

Judy C. Parker

 Justice