MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 20 ME 122 Docket: Cum

- 19

- 48 Argued : March 2,	2020 Decided: October	22,	2020 Panel: MEAD, GORMAN,	 JABAR , HUMPHREY, and HORTON , JJ. ,	 and	 HJELM	 and	 CLIFFORD, A.R.JJ. * Majority: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	and	HORTON , JJ.,	and	CLIFFORD,	A.R.J. Dissent: HJELM,	A.R.J.

THE	BANK	OF	NEW	YORK	MELLON

v. DANIELLE	SHONE et	al.

HORTON ,	J. [¶1] In	 this	 appeal	 from	 a	 residential	 foreclosure	 judgment	 of	 the Superior	Court	(Cumberland	County, Warren,	J. ),	we	are	called	upon	to	clarify the	 criteria	 under	 the	 business	 record	 exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 for admitting	in	evidence	records	that	a	business	has	obtained	from	another	entity and	integrated	into	its	own records	or operations. See M.R.	Evid.	803( 6) .		Our decisions	 since	 1984	 have	 endorsed	 two	 conflicting	 interpretations	 of Rule 803(6)	as	it	relates	to	integrated	business	records,	and	this	case	affords	an

* Although	 not	 present	 at	 oral	 argument,	 Active	 Retired	 Justice Clifford	 participated	 in	 the development	 of	 this	 opinion. See M.R.	 App.	 P.	 12(a)(2)	 (“A	 qualified J ustice	may	 participate	in	 a decision	even	though	not	present	at	oral	argument.”).2 opportunity	to	resolve	the	conflict.		We	hereby	reaffirm	the	interpretation	first set	 forth	 in	 our	 1984	 decision in Northeast	 Bank	 &	 Trust	 Co.	 v.	 Soley,
481 A.2d 1123,	1127	(Me. 1984),	which	is	consistent	with	the	widely	accepted interpretation	 of	 the	 iden tical	 federal	 rule, see U.S.	 Bank	 Tr

. ,	 N.A.	 v.	 Jones , 925 F.3d	534 ,	537 (1st Cir. 2019)

. We	conclude	that	a	record	that	one	business has	received	from	another	is	admissible	under	Rule	803(6)	without	testimony about	the	practices	of	the	business	that created	the	record,	provided,	first,	that the	 proponent	 of the	 evidence establishes that	 the	 receiving	 business	 has integrated	 the	 record	 into	 its	 own	 records,	 has	 verified	 or	 otherwise established	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	contents	 of	 the	 record,	and has relie d on	 the record	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 its	 operations,	 and , second,	 that	 the	 opponent	 of admission	 has	 not	 shown	 that	 the	 record	 is	 nonetheless	 not	 sufficiently trustworthy	to	be	admitted.
I.		BACKGROUND	AND	PROCEDURAL	HISTORY [¶ 2 ]		We	draw	the	following	brief	a ccount	of	this	case	from	the	procedural record	and	the	evidence	offered	or	referenced	at	trial. [¶ 3 ]		In	2015, The Bank	of	New	York	Mellon	commenced	this	foreclosure action	against Danielle Shone	and Michael Buck.		The	Bank’s	complaint	alleged that	in	2005 ,	Buck	had	taken	out	a	loan	from	America’s	Wholesale	Lende r and3 that,	 to	 secure	 Buck’s	 performance	pursuant	 to	 the	 promissory	 note	 for	 that loan,	 Shone	 and	 Buck	 had	 executed	 a	 mortgage	 on a	 Portland property	 they owned.		Although	the	original	lender	and	mortgagee	were	third

- party	entities, the	Bank alleged	that	it	ultimately	acquired	the	note	and	mortgage.		The	Bank also	alleged	that	Buck	had	stopped	making	payments	on	the	loan	in 2008. [¶ 4 ]	 	 The	 cour t	 held	 a	 bench	 trial	 on	 the	 complaint	 in	 October	 2018. There,	 the	Bank	offered	an	exhibit	containing a notice	of	default	and	right	 to cure	purportedly	sent	to	Shone	and	Buck	by	the	law	firm	retained	by	Bayview Loan	Servicing,	which	serviced	the	note	and	m ortgage	for	the	Bank,	along	with a	purported	U.S.	Postal	Service	certificate	of	mailing.		The	Bank	first	attempted to	qualify	the	exhibit	for	admission	in	evidence	by	calling	an	employee	of	the law	 firm	 to	 testify	 about	 that	 office’s	 procedures	 for	 creatin g	 and	 mailing notices	 of	 default,	 but	 the	 court	 barred	 that	 testimony	 because	 the	 Bank ’s witness	 list had	 not	 properly	 identified	 the	 prospective	 witness	 by	 name	 or capacity.	 	 The	 Bank	 next	 attempted	 to	 submit	 an	 affidavit	 from	 a	 law	 firm employee	as	a	mec hanism	for	admitting	the	notice	itself	pursuant	to	M.R.	Evid. 902(11).		The	court	did	not	allow	the	Bank	to	use	that	procedure	because	it	had4 not,	as	required	by	the r ule,	provided	Shone	and	Buck	with	reasonable	advance notice	that	it	would	seek	to	do	so. 1 [¶ 5 ]		The	Bank	 then	attempted	 to	present	a	 testimonial	 foundation	 for the	 exhibit	 through	 James	 D’Orlando,	 a	 litigation	 manager	 employed	 by Bayview.		After	D’Orlando	testified,	the	court	excluded	the	notice	from	evidence because	 the	 Bank	 failed	 to	 present evidence	 that	 D’Orlando	 had	 personal knowledge	about	the	law	firm’s	practices	relating	to	the	creation	and	mailing	of notices	of	default	and	right	to	cure.		Because	the	Bank	was	therefore	unable	to prove	that	it	had	satisfied	the	notice	requirements	impos ed	by	14	M.R.S.	§	6111 (2018), 2 the	 court	 entered	 judgment	 for	 Shone	 and	 Buck. 3 After	 the	 court

1 Neither of	those	rulings	is	at	issue	on	this	appeal.

2 This	 statute	 was	 recently	 amended	 to	 change	 the	 procedure	 for	 providing	 the	 notice. See P.L. 2019,	ch.	361 §§	1

- 2 (effective	Sept.	19,	2019)	(codified	at 14	M.R.S.	§	6111(2

- A)	(2020) ).

3 Although,	in	the	e nd,	the	trial	in	this	case	was	limited	to	the	Bank’s	attempt	to	enter	in	evidence the	 notice	 of	 default	 and	 right	 to	 cure,	 the	 Bank	 does	 not	 suffer	 the	 same	 fate	 as	 the plaintiff

- mortgagee	in Wilmington	Savings	Fund	Society,	FSB	v.	Abildgaard ,	2020	ME	48, 229 A.3d 789

. There,	 after	 the	 court	 excluded	 a	 similar	 notice	 from	 evidence	 but	 before	 the	 plaintiff	 presented evidence	or	an	offer	of	proof	that	covered	the	remaining	elements	of	a	foreclosure	case,	the	plaintiff voluntarily	rested	its	case

- in

- chief,	an d	the	court	entered	judgment	for	the	defendant. Id. ¶	4.		On appeal,	we	held	that	as	the	result	of	the	plaintiff’s	choice	to	rest	without	presenting	evidence	that could	satisfy	all	elements	of	its	case,	we	were	required	to	affirm	the	adverse	judgment	irre spective of	whether	the	court’s	evidentiary	ruling	was	erroneous. Id. ¶	5. Here,	in	contrast,	at	Shone	and	Buck’s	own	suggestion,	the	parties	and	the	court	agreed	that,	as the	first	step	in	the	trial,	because	of	the	potentially	dispositive	nature	of	that issue,	the	Bank	would present	 evidence	 to	 try	 to	 establish	 that	 the	 notice	 was	 an	 admissible	 business	 record.	 	 After excluding	the	document	following	D’Orlando’s	testimony	but	without	the	Bank	having	rested	its	case, the	court	proceeded	to	enter	judgment	a gainst	the	Bank.		Even	though	the	Bank	did	not	make	any offer	of	proof	as	to	the	remaining	elements	of	its	claim,	it	is	clear	that	the	Bank	did	not	proceed	in	a way	that	forfeited	its	argument	on	appeal	as	the	mortgagee	did	in Abildgaard .		Thus,	if	on	rema nd	the5 denied	the	Bank’s	motion	to	alter	or	amend	the	judgment	or	for	a	new	trial,	the Bank	appealed	to	us. See 14	M.R.S.	§	1851	(2020) ; M.R.	App.	P.	2A

. [¶ 6 ]		After this	case	was	initially	briefed	on	appeal,	we	invited	the	parties and	 any	amici	 to	 file	additional	briefs	 on	 the	question	 of	whether	we	 should “consider	adjusting	application	of	.	.	.	[Maine	Rule	of	Evidence]	803(6),	to	track application	 of	 [Federal	 Rule of	 Evidence]	 803(6)	 as	 addressed	 in U.S.	 Bank Trust,	N.A.	v.	Jones ,	925	F.3d	534	(1st	Cir.	2019)

. ”		In addition	to	briefs	filed	by the	parties,	we	received	amici	curiae	briefs	filed	by	the	Federal	Housing	Finance Agency;	Full	Disclosure,	LLC;	Gerald	F. Pet ruccelli, Esq.;	Maine	Attorneys	Saving Homes;	the	Maine	Bankers	Association;	the	Maine	Credit	Union	League;	Maine Equal	 Justice;	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Consumer	 Advocates	 et	 al.;	 the National	 Consumer	 Law	 Center;	 PHH	 Mortgage	 Corporation;	 and	 Pine	 Tre e Legal	Assistance,	Inc.
II.		DISCUSSION [¶ 7 ]	 	 The	 pivotal	 issue	 here	 centers	 on	 the	 foundational	 showing	 that must	be	made to	admit	an integrated	business	record

— that	is,	a	record	created by	one	entity	and	later	integrated	into	the	records	of	a	second,	se parate	entity.

trial	court	decides	to	admit	the	exhibit	at	issue,	the	court	likely	would	need	to	reopen	the	record	for a	full	trial	on	all	issues.6 [¶ 8 ]		The	traditional	method of	admitting	business	records	in	evidence pursuant	 to	Rule	803(6) is	 through	 the	 testimony	of	a	witness	with	personal knowledge	 of	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 business	 or	 other	 entity	 that	 created	 the record.		The	integrated	records method is	a	different	method	that applies	when the	record	has,	in	effect,	become	a	business	reco rd	of	a	business	other	than	the business	 that	 created	 the	 record. 4 See MRT	 Const r .	 v.	 Hardrives,	 Inc. , 158 F.3d 478,	483	(9th	Cir.	1998) (“ [R] ecords a	business	receives	from	others

4 Under	both	 the	 traditional	approach	and	the	integrated	 records	approach,	 the	proponent	of admitting	a	business	rec ord	must	establish	the	following: (A) The	record	was	made	at	or	near	the	time	by

— or	from	information transmitted by

— someone	with	knowledge; (B) The	record	was	kept	in	the	course	of	a	regularly	conducted	activity	of	a	business, organization,	occupation,	o r	calling,	whether	or	not	for	profit; (C) Making	the	record	was	a	regular	practice	of	that	activity. M.R.	Evid.	803(6)(A)

- (C). Under	 both	 approaches,	 the	 proponent	 of	 an	 exhibit	 may	 satisfy	 these	 criteria	 through	 direct evidence	of	the	regular	practices of	either	the	business	that	created	the	record	or	a	business	that	has integrated,	verified,	and	relied	upon	a	record	received	from	another	business.		In	each	instance,	proof of	 the	 business’s	 regular	 practices	 can	 constitute	 circumstantial	 evidence	 of	 tru stworthiness sufficient	 to	 justify	 the	 inference	 that	 the	 record	 was	 created	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 satisfies	 the Rule 803(6)	criteria. See	Boca	Investerings	P’ship	v.	United	States , 128	F.	Supp.	2d	16,	18	(D.D.C. 2000) (“ The	 theory	 [underlying Federal Rule	 803(6)]	 is	 that	 if	 a	 statement	 is	 recorded	 in	 the	 ordinary course	of	a	regularly	conducted	activity,	and	if	it	is	the	regular	practice	of	the	business	to	record	such a	statement,	there	is	a	sufficiently	high	degree	of	trustworthiness	inherent	in	the	d ocument	to	ensure its	 truthfulness,	 making	 cross

- examination	 of	 the	 person	 who	 prepared	 the	 document	 less necessary.”); U.S.	Bank,	N.A.	v.	Christmas ,	No.	26695, 2016	Ohio	App.	LEXIS	205,	at	*10	(Ohio	Ct.	App. Jan.	 22,	 2016), vacated	 on	 other	 grounds , 54	 N. E.	 3d	 1267	 (Ohio	 2016) ( “ [A] court	 may	 admit	 a document	as	a	business	record	even	when	the	proffering	party	is	not	the	maker	of	the	document,	if the	other	requirements	of	[Rule	803(6)]	are	met	and	the	circumstances	suggest	 that	 the	record	is trustworthy. Trustworthiness	of	a	record	is	suggested	by	the	profferer ’ s	incorporation	into	its	own records	and	reliance	on	it.”)	(citations	omitted)

.7 are	admissible	under Federal	Rule	of	Evidence 803(6 ) when	those records are kept	in	 the	regular	course	of	 that	business,	relied	upon	by	 that	business,	and where	that	business	has	a	substantial	interest	in	the	accuracy	of	the records .”). Thus,	the	integrated	records	approach	eliminates	the	need	for	testimony	about the	practic es	 of	 the	entity	 that	created	 the	 record	and	 shifts	 the	 focus	 to	 the record’s	status	within	the	receiving	entity. [¶ 9 ] Evidence	 of	 the	 receiving	 entity’s	 reliance	 on	 the	 record	 in	 the regular	 course	 of	 its	 business	 is	 important	 because	 a	 business’s	 relian ce	 on information	in a record	it	did	not	create	helps	demonstrate	the	trustworthiness of	 the	 record. Compare	 MRT ,	 158	 F.3d	 at	 483 ( holding	 that invoices incorporated	into	a	company’s records were admissible	under	Rule 803(6)	to establish	amounts	paid because the company	relied	upon	the	amounts	shown
in the invoices) , with N

. L

. R

. B

. v.	First	Termite	Control	Co. ,	646	F.2d	424,	42 9

- 30 (9th	Cir.	1981) ( concluding	that third

- party	records were not	admissible	under Rule 803(6)	to	prove the origin	of	lumber because the recipient	business	did not	rely	on the records	to	determine that origin). [¶1 0 ]		On	 the	 other	hand,	 “mere	possession	 or	‘custody’	 of	 records

.	 .	 . does	 not	 qualify	 employees	 of	 the	 possessing	 party	 to	 lay	 the	 requisite foundation,	 and	 reliance by	 the	 organization	 on	 records	 created	 by	 others,8 although	an	important	part	of	establishing	trustworthiness,	without	more	is	not sufficient.”		2	Kenneth	S.	Broun	et	al., McCormick	on	Evidence §	292,	at 476

- 77 ( Robert	P.	Mosteller	ed.,	8 th	ed.	20 20 ) (footnote	omitted) .		When	“the	business offering	the	records	of	another	has	made	an	independent	check	of	the	records, has	integrated	them	into	their	own	business	operation	in	a	way	that	establishes trustworthiness	 or	 contains	 other	 assurances	 of	 trustwort hiness,	 or	 can establish	 accuracy	 by	 other	 means,	 the	 necessary	 foundation	 may	 be established.” Id. at 477

- 48	 (footnotes	 omitted) ; s ee	 also	 United	 States	 v. Sokolow , 91	 F.3d	 396,	 403	 (3d	 Cir.	 1996)	 ( stating	 that	 the business	 records exception may	apply	to records	obtained	from	others	if	the	receiving	business obtains	 “adequate	 verification	 or	 other	 assurance	 of	 accuracy” (quotation marks	omitted) ). [¶1 1 ] The	 verification	 element	 of	 the	 integrated	 records	 approach requires	simply	 that	 the	business	receiving	a	record establish	or	confirm	 the accuracy	 of the	 record	 in	 some	 way. See	 McCormick	 on	 Evidence §	 292,	 at
477

- 78 .		For	example,	the	recipient	business may	check	the	record	for	accuracy before	integrating	and	relying	upon	it in	its	own	operations. See	U.S.	Bank	Trust, N.A.	v.	Jones, 330	F.	Supp. 3d 5 30 ,	543	(D.	Me.	2018), aff’d 925	F.3d	534	( 1st Cir. 2019)	 ( noting	 that	 the loan	 servicer	 “ took	 steps	 to	 re view	 the	 previous9 servicer ’ s	 records	in	 a	way	 that	 assured	itself	 of	 the	 accuracy	 of	 the	 records during	the	boarding	process	before	placing	its	own	financial	interest	at	stake by	relying	on	those	records”).		Another	means	of	verification could	be for	the

r eceiving	 business	 to integrate	 and us e the	 record	 in	 the	 course	 of	 its	 own operations	in	a	manner	 that	confirms	 the	accuracy	of	 the	record. See	United States	v.	Ullrich, 580	F.2d	765,	771

- 72 ( 5th Cir.	1978)	( holding	that	the	v ehicle inventory	schedule	prepared	by the manufacturer	and	received	by the dealer was	 integrated	 and	 used	 in the dealer’s	 daily	 operations	 in	 a	 manner	 that confirmed the	accuracy	of	the	schedule). [¶1 2 ] Regardless	of	how	verification	occurs,	“[t]he	custod ian	company ’ s independent	check	of	the	documents	acts	as	a	proxy	for	the	requirement	that the	records	have	been	prepared	by	someone	with	personal	knowledge	of	the recorded	 events. By	 verifying	 the	 documents,	 the	 custodian	 company	 is	 in essence	 acquiring	 p ersonal	 knowledge	 of	 the	 recorded	 events,	 and	 thereby effectively	 adopting	 the	 entries	 in	 the	 documents	 as	 his	 own.” Air	 Land Forwarders,	Inc.	v.	United	States, 172	F.3d	1338,	1348	(Fed.	Cir.	1999) (Bryson, J.,	dissenting)

. [¶1 3 ] Multiple	 federal	 circuit	 courts	 and	 numerous	 other	 states	 have upheld	 the	 admission	 of	 integrated	 business	 records	 upon	 a	 showing	 of10 verification	and	reliance	on	the	part	of	the	receiving	business,	without	the	need for	testimony	from	the	originating	busine ss. See,	e.g. , United	States	v.	Adefehinti , 510	 F.3d	319,	325

- 26	 (D.C.	Cir.	2007) ; Air	 Land	 Forwarders,	 Inc. ,	172	 F.3d at 1341

- 42 ; United	States	v.	Childs ,	5	F.3d	1328,	1334

- 36 (9th	Cir.	1993) ; United
States	 v.	 Doe ,	 960	 F.2d	 221,	 223	 (1st	 Cir.	 1992) ; United	 States	 v.	 Jakobetz , 955 F.2d 786,	 801	 (2d	 Cir.	 1992) ; United	 States	 v.	 Parker ,	 749	 F.2d	 628,	 633 (11th	 Cir.	 1984) ; Ullrich ,	 580 F.2d at 772 ; United	 States	 v.	 Carranco , 551 F.2d 1197,	1200	(10th	Cir.	1977) ; see	also State	v.	Fitzwater ,	227 P.3d	520 , 531

- 36 ( Haw. 2010) ; Pizza	Corner,	 Inc.	v.	C.F.L.	Transp.,	 Inc. ,	792 N.W.2d	911,
913

- 14 (N.D. 2010)

. [¶1 4 ]	 	 We	 adopted	 the federal	 courts’	 integrated records approach to Rule	 803(6)	 in Northeast	 Bank	 &	 Trust	 Co.	 v.	 Soley, 481	 A.2d	 1123,	 1127 (Me. 1984),	a decision	that	has	never	been	overruled	or	questioned	and	that	is still	good	law. [¶1 5 ]		In Soley, we	decided	that the	plaintiff	bank’s	practice	of	obtaining prime	rate	information	from	another	bank,	integrating	the	information	into	its own	records,	and	rel ying	on	the	information	in	its	operations	was	sufficient	to support	 the	 admissibility	 of	 that	 information	 for	 its	 truth,	 without	 any11 testimony	 by	 a	 witness	 with	 personal	 knowledge	 of	 the	 sending	 bank’s practices	in	developing	the	information: Here,	 the	 inf ormation	 was	 transmitted	 by	 an	 employee	 of	 the banking	 institution	 which	 was	 the	 source	 of	 that	 information, which	information	was	then	integrated	into	the	plaintiff’s	records and	relied	upon	by	the	plaintiff	in	its	own	business	operations.		We hold	 that	 u nder	 these	 circumstances	 the	 schedule	 satisfied	 the requirements	of	M.R.	Evid.	803(6)	and	was	properly	admitted. 481	A.2d	at	1127

. [¶1 6 ] The Soley court	emphasized	the	fact	that	the	receiving	entity	had relied	upon	the	integrated	records	in	its	own	business	operations. See	id. In extending	the	business	records	exception	to	include	business	records	created by	someone	“not	within	the	[proponent’s]	or ganization,” id ,	we	explained	that the	regular	indicia	of	reliability	had	been	demonstrated	because	the	bank	had an	 “obvious	 business	 incentive	 in	 assuring	 that	 this	 employee	 [ of	 the transmitting	bank who	reported	 the	prime	rate to	 the	receiving	bank ]	woul d have	personal	knowledge	of	changes	in	the	prime	rate	and	would	report	those changes	accurately.” Id. [¶1 7 ] Our	 endorsement	 of	 the	 integrated	 records	 approach	 in Soley rested	 solidly	 on	 federal	 precedent. See i d. (citing In	 re Ollag	 Constr.	 Equip. Corp

. , 665	 F.2d	 43,	 46	 (2d	 Cir.	 1981) (emphasizing	 the	 receiving	 business’s regular	 use	 of	 and	 reliance	 on	 integrated	 records); U l lrich, 580	 F.2d	 at	 77212 (upholding the admission	of “records	transmitted	by	persons	with	knowledge and	 then	 confirmed	 and	 used	 in	 the	 regular	 course	 of	 the	 dealership’s business”)).	 	 Our	 holding	 in Soley also	 relied	 upon	 the	 factors	 confirming trustworthiness	 enumerated	in	 the	Notes	 of	 the	 Advisory	 Committe e for	 the Federal Rules	of	Evidence ) .		481	A.2d	at	1127	n.3. [¶1 8 ]		Eight	years	after	our Soley decision , we confirmed	that	holding	by noting	that	“ we	have	recognized	that	in	certain	circumstances	business	records may	include	information	prepared	outside the	business

. ” Leen	Co.	v.	Web	Elec

. , Inc. , 611	 A.2d	 83,	 83

- 84	 (Me.	 1992).	 	 However,	 in Leen we	 upheld	 the	 trial court’s exclusion of	 outside	 records , pointing	 out that such	 documents	 “are admissible only	if	 they	contain	 the	indicia	of	reliability	 that	 form	 the	basis	of the	 business	 record	 exception.” Id. at	 84 ( quotation marks omitted).	 	 We specifically	 discussed	 how	 the	 proponent	 of	 the	 records	 had	 failed	 to demonstrate	that	reliability: Here,	Web sought	 to	introduce	 through	 the	 testimony	 of	its	 own agent	 records	 of	 business	 correspondence	 prepared	 by	 others, without	providing	any	foundation	to	suggest	that	the	records	were prepared	by	a	person	with	knowledge	of	the	cause	of	the	delays	or were	creat ed	in	 the	 ordinary	course	 of	 business.		The	 fact	 that	 a document	is	received	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business	does	not alone	satisfy	the	foundational	requirements	of	rule	803(6).
Id. at	84.13 [¶1 9 ]		However,	we	adopted	a	different	view	of	 the	integrated	records approach	in	a	more	recent	line	of	cases,	beginning	with Beneficial	Maine Inc. v. Carter ,	decided	twenty

- seven	years	after Soley ,	and	nineteen	years	after Leen

. 5 2011	ME	77, ¶ 13,	25	A.3d	96 .		Our	decision	in Carter endors ed the	integrated records	approach,	citing Soley : The	 affiant	 whose	 statements	 are	 offered	 to	 establish	 the admissibility	of	a	business	record	on	summary	judgment	need	not be	an	employee	of	the	record’s	creator. See,	e.g. , Ne.	Bank	&	Trust Co.	v.	Soley ,	481	A.2d	1123,	1127	(Me.	1984).		For	instance,	if	the records	 were	 received	 and	 integrated	 into	 another	 business’s records	 and	 were	 relied	 upon	 in	 that	 business’s	 day

- to
- day operations,	 an	 employee	 of	 the	 receiving	 business	 m ay	 be	 a qualified	witness. Id. (citations	omitted). [¶ 20 ]		Despite	its	reliance	on Soley, our	decision	in Carter departed	from Soley by	requiring	 that	 the	qualified	witness	have	personal	 knowledge	of	 the practices	 of both the	 business	 that	 created	 the	 record and the	 business	 that received	 it,	 a	 requirement	 that	 negates	 the	 entire	 point	 of	 the	 integrated

5 The	dissent	suggests ,	Dissenting	Opinion ¶	3 8 n.14 , that	we	arguably	began	to	depart	from	our holding	in Soley in State	v.	Radley ,	in	which	we	decided	that	the	trial	court	erred	in	admitting	business records	of	one	organization	“through	the	testimony	of	a	witness	employed	by	an	entirely	different organization,	simply	because	her	employer	relied	on	that	organization’s records	in	its	own	business dealings

. ”		2002	ME	150,	¶	16,	804	A.2d	1127.		We	distinguished	the	situation	in Radley from	that	in Soley ,	without	overruling	or	questioning Soley. Id. ¶	17	n.2 .		What Radley stands	for,	in	keeping	with Soley and	our	decision today,	is	that	reliance by	one	business	upon	the	records	of	another ,	without verification	or	corroboration	of	the	accuracy	of	the	records, is	insufficient	to	support	admission	under the	integrated	records	approach.14 records	 approach	we	 adopted	in Soley

. See	id. Even	 so,	 our Carter decision contains	 no	indication	 that	we	intended	 to	de part	 from	 our	holding	in Soley

. Also,	the	underlying	facts	of Carter did	not	even	involve	an	integrated	records issue	because	there	was	no	evidence	that	the	entity	that	created	the	records	in question	 had	 sent	 them	 to	 another	 entity. Carter ,	 2011	 ME	 77, ¶¶	 2

- 8, 25 A.3d 96. Instead, Carter stands	for	the	proposition	that	an	entity’s	business records	cannot	be	admitted	based	on	 the	 testimony	of	a	witness	who	has	no personal	knowledge	of	the	practices	of	the	entity. 6 [¶ 21 ]		In	three	decisions	since Carter ,	we	continued	to	depart	from	our holding	in Soley, still	without	saying	so	or	explaining	why,	by	maintaining	the requirement	 that	 the	 proponent	 of	 admitting	 an	 integrated	 business	 record present	foundational	testimony	about	the	practices	of	the	business	t hat	created the	record. See	M & T	Bank	v.	Plaisted ,	2018	ME	121,	¶¶	24,	31,	192	A.3d	601; Deutsche	Bank	Nat’l	Tr.	Co.	v.	Eddins ,	2018	ME	47,	¶	14,	182	A.3d	1241; KeyBank Nat’l	Ass’n	v.	Est.	of	Quint ,	2017	ME	237,	¶	13,	176	A.3d	717.

6 In Beneficial	Maine	 Inc.	v. Carter, Be neficial	was	the	plaintiff	in	a	mortgage	 foreclosure	case. 2011 ME 77, ¶	2, 25	A.3d	96.		The	qualifying	witness,	who	was	the	affiant	in	the	motion	for	summary judgment,	was	an	employee	of	HSBC,	an	entity	that	serviced	the	loan. Id. ¶	3.		The	witness	atte mpted to	 lay	 the	 proper	 foundation	 for	 the	 introduction	 of	 Beneficial’s	 records,	 not	 HSBC	 records	 that contained	integrated	records	from	Beneficial. Id. ¶	4.		The Carter court	held	that	the	affiant	did	not have	 first

- hand	information	 regarding	 Beneficial’ s	 records	 and	 therefore	 was	 not	 able	 to	lay	 the proper	foundation	pursuant	to	Rule	803(6). Id. ¶¶	15

- 17.15 [¶ 22 ]		Although	 these decisions	postdate Soley and Leen , none	of	 them overrules	or	distinguishes Soley or Leen ,	or	even	acknowledges	any	substantive departure	from Soley’s holding.		Indeed,	two	of	the	four	decisions	nominally	rely

on Soley

— the	most	recent	of	the	four	decisions	cites	to Soley , as	did Carter

. See Plaisted , 2018	ME	121,	¶ 31	n.10. [¶ 23 ] In	other	words, Soley and Leen remain	good	law

. T hus,	although the doctrine of stare	decisis supports	following Carter , 7 the	case	for	reaffirming our	holding	in Soley also rests	upon stare	decisis .		 In	 that	sense,	 the	question before	us	is	less	a	matter	of	honoring stare	decisis than	a	matter	of	resolving	the sharp	 and	 hitherto	 unexplained	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	 interpreta tions	 of Rule	803(6)	that	we	have	endorsed	at	various	times	since 1984. [¶ 24 ] Rule	803(6)	was	restyled	in	2014	and	 then	amended	in	2018	 to align	 with	 its	 federal	 counterpart. See M.R.	 Evid.	 803 Advisory	 Committee

7 The	dissent	advances	several	objections	to	our	endorsement	of	the	integrated	records	approach , including	an	objection	based	on stare	decisis

. Diss ent ing	Opinion ¶¶ 5 4

- 6 1

. G iven	that Soley predates Carter and	has	never	been	questioned	or	overruled,	 the	integrated	 records	approach	has its	own foundation	in stare	decisis

. The	dissent	also	contends	that	the	integrated	records	approach	rewrites Rule	803(6)

. Dissent ing	Opinion ¶¶ 3 2 , 6 5

. But	the	traditional	approach	and	the	integrated	records approach	 are	 two	 similar	 evidentiary	 paths	 to	 proving	 the	 same	 Rule	 803(6)	 criter ia.	 	 Both approaches	call	for	first

- hand	testimony	about	the	practices	of	a	business

— either	the	business	that created	the	record	or	the	business	that	received	the	record

— based	upon	which	it	can	be	inferred,	as a	matter	of	circumstantial	evidence,	that	the record	in	question	meets	the Rule	803(6) criteria. Based on	its	view	that	we	are	rewriting	the r ule,	the dissent	also	contends	that	we	should	be	engag ing in rulemaking	as	the	Supreme	Judicial	Court	rather	than	opining	as	the	Law	Court. Dissent ing	Opinion ¶¶ 6 5

- 6 7

. The	contention	would	be	well

- taken	if	we	were	adopting	a	new	interpretation	of	the r ule, but we	are	simply	reaffirming	an	interpretation	of	the r ule	that	we	first	endorsed thirty

- six years	ago.16 Note

— August	 2018 ;	 M.R.	 Evid 803	 Maine	 Restyling	 Note

— November	 2014

. The	 Advisory	 Committee	 Notes	 accompanying	 both	 the	 2014	 restyling	 of Rule 803(6)	and	the	2018	amendment	indicate	that	the changes	in	the	language of	the	rule we re	not	intended	to	make	any	substantive	change	in	the rule, and therefore neither	 of	 these	changes	 to	 Rule 803(6)	 addressed	 or	 resolved	 the conflict	between	the Soley and Carter lines	of	cases. [¶ 25 ] As	 our	 reliance	 in Soley on	 federal	 authority illustrates , we regularly	look	to	federal	analysis	when interpreting	our	own	identical	or	nearly identical	rules. See,	e.g. , State	v.	Gorman ,	2004	ME	90,	¶¶	30

- 31,	854	A.2d	1164 (comparing	M.R.	Evid.	Rule	803(5)	with	Fed.	R.	Evid.	803(5)); State	v.	Discher , 597	 A.2d	 1336,	 1342	 (Me.	 1991)	 (same).	 	 Reaffirming S oley aligns	 our interpretation	 of	 Maine	 Rule	 of	 Evidence	 803(6)	 with	 the	 widely	 accepted interpretation	 that	 federal	 courts	 apply	 to	 the	 identical	 federal	 rule.	 	 It promotes	 a	 uniformity	 of	 application	 of	 the	 business	 records	 exception	 in Maine’s	 federal	 a nd	 state	 courts,	 and

— in	 that	 sense

— discourages forum

- shopping. [¶ 26 ]		The	opposition	of	the	appellees	and	some	of	the	amici	to	the Jones and Soley integrated	 records	 approach	 appears	 grounded	 primarily	 in	 their view	 that	 the	 recordkeeping	 practices	 of	 mortgage	 loan	 servicers	 such	 as17 Bayview	are	too	unreliable	to	justify	the	admission	of	a	record	that	one	servicer has	received	from	a	prior	servicer	or other	entity	without	testimony	based	on personal	 knowledge	 regarding	 the	 practices	 and	 procedures	 of	 the	 business that	 created	 the	 record.	 	 The	 lack	 of	 reliability	 of	 records	 submitted	 in foreclosure	cases	by	some	residential	mortgage	lenders	or	loan	serv icers	has been	 amply	 documented. See,	 e.g. , HSBC	 Mortg.	 Servs. , Inc.	 v.	 Murphy , 2011 ME 59,	¶	15	n.8,	19	A.3d	815	(noting	“the	recurring	problem	of	lenders submitting	 unreliable	 affidavits	 and	 documents	 in	 residential	 foreclosure proceedings”). [¶ 27 ]	 	 Sti ll,	 the	 recordkeeping	 shortcomings	 of	 some	 members	 of	 a particular	 business	 sector	 should	 not	 drive	 our	 interpretation	 of	 a	 rule	 of evidence	 that	 applies	 to	 the	 records	 of	 all	 businesses	 and, more	 broadly,	 as Rule 803(6)(B)	indicates,	 to	 the	 records	 of	 any “ organization,	 occupation,	 or calling.” If	the	records	kept	by	mortgage	lenders	or	loan	servicers	in	particular are	 categorically	 unreliable,	 more	 stringent	 proof	 requirements	 might	 be appropriate. 8 But	there	is	no	good	reason	to	require	in	every	case	testimony based	 on	 personal	 knowledge	 of	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 business	 that	 created	 a

8 For	 example,	 the	 Maine	 Legislature	 has	 enacted	 special	 requirements	 for	 collection	 actions brought	by	consumer	debt	buyers. See 32	M.R.S. § 11019	(2020) ; see	 also P.L.	2017,	ch.	216,	 §	6 (effective	Nov.	1,	2017)

.18 record	when	 the	business	 that	 received	 the	 record	can	meet	 the	integration, verification,	and	reliance	criteria	of the	integrated	records	approach. [¶ 28 ]		Moreover,	 the	 federal	and	Maine	 versions	 of	Rule	803(6)	guard against	 the	 admission	 of	 untrustworthy	 integrated	 business	 records	 by precluding	admission,	even	when	 the	proponent	makes	an	initial	 showing	 of integratio n,	verification,	and	reliance,	if	 the	opposing	party	“ show[s]	 that	 the source	of	information	or	the	method	or	circumstances	of	preparation	indicate a	lack	of	trustworthiness.”		Fed.	R.	Evid.	803(6)(E);	M.R.	Evid.	803(6)(E).		Lastly, the	integrated	records approach	is	only	a	means	of laying	a	foundation	for	the admission	in	evidence	of a	record;	it	does	not	purport	to	define	or	establish	the weight	to	be	given	to	the	record. [¶ 2 9 ]		In	this	case,	the	trial	court’s	exclusion	of	the	exhibit	at	issue	was
consist ent	with	the Carter line	of	cases,	because	the	Bank	did	not	present	any first

- hand	 testimony	 about	 the	 practices	 of	 the	 law	 firm	 that	 purportedly created	and	mailed	the	notices	of	default. [¶ 30 ]		Because	we	today	reaffirm	the	integrated	records	approach	th at we	adopted	in Soley , under	which	such	foundational	evidence	is	unnecessary,

we	 must vacate the	 judgment and	 remand the	 matter	 for the	 trial	 court	 to determine,	 based	 on	 the	 current	 record,	 whether	 the	 Bank’s	 exhibit,	 which19 includes	 the	 two	 purported notices	 of	 default	 and	 a	 separate	 purported	U.S. Postal	 Service	 certificate	 of	 mailing,	 meets	 the	 integration,	 verification,	 and reliance	criteria	for	admission	in	evidence	as	an	integrated	record. 9 The	entry	is: Judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 for	 further pro ceedings	consistent	with	this	opinion.

HJELM,	A.R.J.,	dissenting. [¶ 31 ]		The	Court	today	remands	this case for	the	trial	court	to	reconsider its	ruling	that	excluded	from	evidence	an	integrated	business	record	critical	to the	Bank	of	New	York	Mellon’s	foreclosure	claim,	with	the	new	determination to	 be	 based	 not	 on	 Maine	 law	 but	 on	 a	 materially	 different	 stand ard	 for admissibility	 that	is	 used	 in	 other	jurisdictions,	 notably	 a	 number	 of	 federal

courts.

9 When	 admission	 of	 evidence	 under	 the business	 records exception	 to	 the	 hearsay	 rule	 is challenged, “ ‘ we review a	trial	court ’ s	foundational	findings	to	support admissibility for clear	error and	its	ultimate	determination	of admissibility for	an abuse	of	discretion

. ’ ” Am

. Express	Bank, FSB	v. Deering, 2016	ME	117,	¶ 12,	145	A.3d	551	( quoting State	v.	Abdi , 2015	ME	23,	¶	16,	112 A.3d 360). Thus, the	determination	of	whether	some	or	all	of	the	materials	contained	in the	exhibit	at	issue is admissible	based	on	the	current	record	should,	at	least	initially,	be	made	by	the	trial	court.		Nothing in	this	opinion	should	be	taken	to	imply	a	view	regarding	whether	the	exhibit	should	be	admitted	as an	integrated	record.		In	light	of	our	adoption of	a	different	evidentiary	standard	than	was	argued	at trial,	the	court	may	reopen	the	record	to	allow	further	argument	by	the	parties.		If	the	court	decides to	admit	the	exhibit,	the	trial	may	resume	on	all	issues	in	contention.20 [¶3 2 ]		To	arrive	at	its	conclusion,	the	Court	errs	in	two	fundamental	ways. The	 first	 is	 analytical. As	 the	 Court	 acknowledges, the	 trial	 court	 correctly applied	Maine	law	that	governs	the	admissibility	of	business	records

. See M.R. Evid. 803(6) .	 	 By	 nonetheless	 vacating	 the	 judgment,	 however,	 t he	 Court derogates	from	principles	of stare decisis and improperly dispenses	with	that well

- established	Maine	jurisprudence

— jurisprudence	that	we	have	developed over	nearly	 the	past	decade	and	 that	is	entirely	consonant	with	Rule	803(6). The	second	error	is	structural.		Because	the	Court’s	reasoning	is	not	supported by	 a	 sound	 jurisprudent ial	 rationale,	 the	 Court	 must	 be	 seen	 as	 rewriting Rule 803(6),	 thereby	 improperly	 blending	 its	 nonadjudicatory	 authority	 to promulgate	rules	in	its	capacity	as	 the	Maine	Supreme	 Judicial	Court	with	its adjudicatory	authority , when	sitting	as	the	Law	Court , to	consider	appeals.		For these	reasons,	I	respectfully	dissent. [¶3 3 ]		In	this	opinion,	I	will	first	review Maine’s governing	law	that	the Court	 now	 abandons	 and	 discuss	 the	 reasons	 why that	 law should	 remain controlling	authority	in	Maine	courts.		Sec ond,	 I	will	explain	 the	basis	 for	my conclusion	that	the	remaining	rationale	for	the	Court’s	decision	wrongly	strays into	its	discrete	regulatory	rulemaking	function.21 A. Maine ’s	Law on	Integrated	Business	Records
1. Maine’s	Case L aw [¶3 4 ]		The	essential	issue	pr esented	in	this	case	focuses	on	the	showing that,	 pursuant	 to	 Maine	 Rule	 of	 Evidence	 803(6), 10 must	 be	 made	 by	 the proponent	of	an	integrated	business	record

— a	document	created,	maintained, and	handled	by	one	entity	and	then	transferred	to	and	held	by	a	sec ond	entity

— for	the	record	to	be	admitted	in	evidence.		The	particular	record	at	issue	here
is a notice	 of	 default	 and	 right	 to	 cure	 purportedly	 mailed	 by	 the	 law	 firm engaged	 by	 the	 mortgage	 servicer	 to	 the	 mortgagors,	 Danielle	 Shone	 and Michael	Buck.

10 In	its	current	formulat ion,	Maine	Rule	of	Evidence	803(6)	creates	an	exception	to	the	general exclusion	of	hearsay	evidence	and	allows	the	court	to	admit	a	business	record,	i.e.,	a	“[r]ecord[]	of	a regularly	conducted	activity,”	if	the	following	criteria	are	satisfied: (A) The record	was	made	at	or	near	the	time	by

— or	from	information	transmitted by

— someone	with	knowledge; (B) The	record	was	kept	in	the	course	of	a	regularly	conducted	activity	of	a	business, organization,	occupation,	or	calling,	whether	or	not	for	profit; (C) Making	the	record	was	a	regular	practice	of	that	activity; (D) All	 these	 conditions	are	 shown	 by	 the	 testimony	 of	 the	 custodian	 or	 another qualified	witness,	or	by	a	certification	that	complies	with	Rule	902(11),	Rule	902(12) or	with	a	statute	permitti ng	certification;	and (E) The	opponent	does	not	show	 that	 the	source	of	information	or	 the	method	or circumstances	of	preparation	indicate	a	lack	of	trustworthiness.22 [¶ 3 5 ]		In	its o pinion,	the	Court	states	that	an	integrated	business	record is	 admissible	 pursuant	 to	 Rule	 803(6)	 if	 the	 proponent	 presents,	 as	 a foundational	predicate,	testimony	from	a	witness,	who	need	not	have	personal knowledge	 of	 the	 originating	 entity’ s	 record

- related	 practices,	 that	 the receiving	 entity	 merely	 integrated,	 verified,	 and	 relied	 on	 the	 document. Court’s	Opinion	¶ 30 .		Over	the	course	of	nearly	the	past	decade,	however,	we have	 consistently	 and	 explicitly	 articulated two	 categorical foundational elements	for	an	integrated	business	record ,	which, as	I	will	discuss	below , are very	different from	the	elements	that	the	Court	prescribes	today .		First,	our	case law	 establishes	 that	 the	 proponent	 of	 an	 integrated	 business	 record	 must demonst rate	 that	 the	 record

- related	 protocols	 of both the	 originating	 and receiving	 entities	 meet	 the	 requirements	 of	 Rule	 803(6)(A)

- (C),	 which	 set specific	evidentiary	standards	for	when	the	document	must	have	been	created, how	 it	 was	 maintained,	 and	 whether	 tho se	 business	 practices	 were	 routine. And	second,	to	be	a	“qualified	witness”	within	the	meaning	of	Rule	803(6)(D), the	foundational	witness	must	have	personal	knowledge	about	those	protocols maintained	by	each	entity. [¶3 6 ]	 	 It	 is	 manifest	 that	 the	 standar d	 that	 the	 Court	 now	 adopts	 is materially	different	from	the	criteria	prescribed	in	controlling	Maine	case	law.23 A	review	of	those	cases	demonstrates	that	our	articulation	of	the	evidentiary standards	was	not,	as	the	Court	seems	to	suggest,	unintentional	o r	inadvertent. Indeed,	 the	clear	and	explicit	language	we	used	 to	 frame	 those	requirements demonstrates	that,	in	those	cases,	we	meant	what	we	said. [¶3 7 ]		The	line	of	cases	defining	our	current	jurisprudence	began	no	later than	our	2011	opinion	in Benefi cial	Maine	Inc.	v.	Carter ,	2011	ME	77,	25	A.3d 96, 11 which	addressed	Rule	803(6)	in	its	then

- existing	formulation. 12 There , we stated	that	for	an	integrated	business	record	to	be	admissible,	the	proponent

11 The	articulation	of	our	current	standard	arguably	had	its	genesis	even	earlier,	in St ate	v.	Radley , where	we	stated,	“To	permit	the	State	to	proffer	the	[integrated	business]	records	.	.	.	through	the testimony	of	a	witness	employed	by	an	entirely	different	organization,	simply	because	her	employer relied	on	that	organization’s	records	in its	own	business	dealings,	is	wholly	unsupported	by	rule	or law.”	 	 2002	ME	 150,	 ¶	 16,	 804	 A.2d	 1127.	 	We	 further	 stated	 that,	 instead,	 the	 proponent	 must demonstrate	 through	a	 knowledgeable	witness	that	 the	upstream	entity	created,	maintained,	and transmit ted	the	record	in	a	way	 that	satisfied	the	requirements	now	 found	in	Rule	803(6)(A)

- (C). Radley , 2002	ME	150, ¶ 16,	804	A.2d	1127. These are	the	criteria	for	the	admissibility	of	an	integrated business	record	that	we	again	articulated	beginning	nine	years	later	in Beneficial	Maine	Inc.	v.	Carter , 2011	ME	77,	25	A.3d	96.		Despite	the	analysis	contained	in Radley ,	however,	for	the	reasons	I	d iscuss below, see	 infra n.14, that	 opinion	 may	 not	 constitute	 a	 full	 and	 clear	 demarcation	 from	 the evidentiary	 standard	 described	 in Northeast	 Bank	 & Trust	 Co.	 v.	 Soley ,	 481	 A.2d	 1123,	 1127 (Me. 1984)

— the	standard	to	which	the	Court	now	returns.		Rather, that	change	in	our	law	was	more definitively	established	in Carter

.
12 The	Rule	then	stated	in	pertinent	part	that	a	business	record	was	admissible	if	the	record	was “made	 at	 or	 near	 the	 time	 by,	 or	 from	 information	 transmitted	 by,	 a	 person	 with knowledge, if	kept	in	the	course	of	a	regularly	conducted	business,	and	if	it	was	the regular	 practice	 of	 that	 business	 to	make	 the	 .	 .	 .	 record	 .	 .	 .	 ,	 all	 as	 shown	 by	 the testimony	 of	 the	 custodian	 or	 other	 qualified	 witness,	 .	 .	 .	 unless	 the	 source	 of information or	 the	 method	 or	 circumstances	 of	 preparation	 indicate	 lack	 of trustworthiness.” Carter ,	2011	ME	77,	¶	12	n.5,	25	A.3d	96	(quoting	M.R.	Evid.	803(6)	(Tower	2010)).		As	I	discuss	in the	 text, infra ¶¶	 39,	 48

- 51 ,	 the	 current	 version	 of	 the	 Rule	 is	 substanti vely	 the	 same	 as	 the formulation	of	the	Rule	discussed	in Carter

.24 must	demonstrate	that	the	originating	entity	routine ly	used	specified	protocols

to	create the	business	record ,	maintain it ,	and	transmit it to	the	receiving	entity , all in	a	way	that,	in	the	end,	is	sufficient	to	allow	the	receiving	entity	to	rely	on
it. Id. ¶¶	13

- 14.		Thus,	although,	as	the	Court	states	t oday,	Court’s	Opinion	¶	9, reliability	generally	is	germane	to	the	evidentiary	framework,	there	is	more	to it	 than	 that	 because ,	 as	 we	 stated	in Carter and	 subsequent	 cases	 described below, the r ule	still	requires	foundational	evidence	of	certain	specific historical circumstances,	 which	 could	 then	 form	 the	 basis	 to	 allow	 some resulting assurance	that	the	information	in	the	record	is	reliable.		We	also	stated	in Carter that	 although	 the	 foundational	 witness	 need	 not	 be	 an	 employee	 of	 the originating	 entity, that	 witness	 must

— as the r ule explicitly	 requires

— be “qualified,”	which	means	that	the	witness	must	“demonstrate	knowledge”	of	the originating	 entity’s	 specific	 record

- related	 practices	 now	 described	 in Rule 803(6)(A)

- (C). 13 2011	ME	77,	¶¶	13

- 14,	25	A.3d	9 6.

13 The	Court	asserts	that,	because Carter stated	that	the	witness	need	not	be	an	employee	of	the originating	entity, our	opinion	in	that	case “endorsed	the	integrated	records	approach”	that had	been set	out	in Soley ,	481	A.2d at 1127.		Court’s	Opinion	¶ 19 .		For	the	reasons	I	explain	in	the	text,	however, Carter superseded Soley by	articulating	materially	different	criteria	for	an	integrated	business	record to	 be	 admissible. Additionally,	w e	 have	 never	 held	 that,	 to	 be	 “qualified”	within	 the	meaning	 of Rule 803(6)(D),	 the	 foundational	witness	must	be	an	employee	of	 the	entity	whose	record

- related practices	 are	 being	 described	 in	 that	 witness’s	 testimony.	 	 The	 test	 for	 whether	 a	 witness	 is “q ualified” rests	on the	nature	and	source	of	the	witness’s	knowledge,	not	the	witness’s	employment or	capacity. See	M	&	T	Bank	v.	Plaisted ,	2018	ME	121,	¶¶ 7

- 12,	24,	192	A.3d	601; Deutsche	Bank	Nat’l Tr.	Co.	v.	Eddins ,	2018	ME	47,	¶	12,	182	A.3d	1241; KeyBank	Nat’l	Ass’n	v.	Est

. of	Quint ,	2017	ME	237,25 [¶3 8 ]		As	the	Court	correctly	notes,	Court’s	Opinion	¶ 20 ,	those	standards heightened	 the	 requirements	 for	 the	 admissibility	 of	 integrated	 business records	as	set	out	in	our	previous	case	law,	which	had	allowed	the trial court	to admit	 such	 evidence	 whe n	 there	 were	 merely “ indicia	 of	 [the	 record’s] reliability”

— something	that	could	be	demonstrated	by	as	little	as	foundational evidence	 that	 the	 receiving	 entity	 had	 integrated	 the	 record	 into	 its	 own records	 and	 relied	 on	 it. Ne.	 Bank	 &	 Tr.	 Co.	 v.	 Soley , 481	 A.2d	 1123,	 1127 (Me

. 1984). 14 Carter ’s	clear	and	explicit	articulation	of	more	exacting	criteria

¶	15,	176	A.3d	717; Carter ,	2011	ME	77,	¶¶ 13

- 14,	25	A.3d	96.		Thus,	the	Court’s	attempt	to	equate the	analyses	in Carter and Soley is	a	curious	one.

14 As	I	state	above, see supra n.11 ,	in Radley we	at	l east	began	our	move	away	from	the	approach described	in Soley a	full	nine	years	before Carter. At	issue	in Radley was	the	admissibility	of	a	report of	a	funds	transfer	offered	by	the	State.		2002	ME	150,	¶	5,	804	A.2d	1127.		The	foundational	witness, who was	an	employee	of	the	receiving	entity,	testified	that	her	office had received	the	report	from another	entity	and	 relied	on	it

— a	 foundation	that	was	sufficient	pursuant	 to Soley

. Id. We	held, however,	that	the	witness	was	not	“qualified”	within	the	mean ing	of	Rule	803(6)	because	she	had	no knowledge	of	the	manner	by	which	the	sending	entity	created,	maintained,	or	transmitted	the	report to	the	receiving	entity. Id. ¶	15.		Additionally,	at	trial	the	proponent

— the	State

— had	failed	to	present any	evidence of	whether	the	record	was	created	at	or	near	the	time	of	the	event	it	described,	whether the	 record	 was	 created	 by	 someone	 with	 knowledge	 of	 the	 event,	 and	whether	 the	 entity	 had	 a regular	practice	of	creating	such	a	record. Id. ¶	16.		These	are	the	crite ria	for	the	admissibility	of	an integrated	business	record	that	we	articulated	nine	years	later	in Carter .		Because	in Radley the	State had	 failed	to	develop	a	 foundation , based	 on	 the	 testimony	 of	a	witness	with	 knowledge,	 that	 the sending	 entity’s	 record

- related	 practices	 met	 the	 requirements	 that	 are	 now	 found	 in Rule 803(6)(A)

- (C),	we	concluded	that	the	trial	court	erred	by	admitting	the	record	in	evidence. Id. In	a	footnote in Radley ,	however,	we	did	bring	into	question	the	scope	of	the	holding	and	it s	effect on Soley

. Id. ¶	17	n.2,	804	A.2d	1127.		We	addressed	 the	State’s	contention	 that	admission	of	 the integrated	business	record	was	a	“natural	extension”	of Soley because	the	foundational	witness	had testified	that	the	receiving	entity	received	and relied	on	it. Id. We	rejected	that	entreaty	because	the report	provided	information	that	had	been	reported	from	yet	another	underlying	source	and	because it	described	the	defendant’s	conduct	rather	than	“objective	and	verifiable”	information	such	as	was involved	in Soley (information	about	interest	rates). Id

.26 for	admissibility,	however,	can	leave	no	doubt	that	we	intended	to	implement those	 more	 refined	 and	 disciplined	 standards,	 which	 also,	 unlike	 those describ ed	in Soley ,	 track	 the	 requirements	as	 they	were	 plainly	 stated	in	 the

r ule. [¶3 9 ]	 	 The	 entire	 body	 of	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Evidence	 was	 restyled effective	at	the	beginning	of	2015,	more	than	three	years	after	we	issued	our decision	in Carter

. See 2014	Me. Rules	 15	 (effective	 Jan.	1,	 2015).		 The	 only change	to	Rule	803(6)	created	by	the	restyling	was the	helpful separat ion	of the

r ule’s	 foundational	 elements	 into	 discrete	 subparts. Cf. M.R.	 Evid.	 803(6) (Tower	2010).		When	the	Advisory	Committee	on	the Maine	Rules	of	Evidence presented	 the	 proposed	 restyled	 rules	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court,	 the Committee	made	explicit	that	the	purpose	of	the	restyling	effort	was	to	make the	 language	 contained	 in	 the	 rules	 clearer	 while	 still	 “preserv[ing]	 the substanc e	of	the	respective	rules	without	change.” Advisory	Committee	on	the Maine	 Rules	 of	 Evidence	Note:	 Proposed	 Restyled	 Rules	 of	 Evidence [2014]

.

Therefore,	at	the	very	least,	nine	years	before Carter ,	our	decision	in Radley signaled	a	limitation on	 the	 holding	 in Soley by	 requiring	 the	 proponent	 to	 present	 testimony	 from	 a	 knowledgeable foundational	witness	that	the	practices	of	the	originating	entity	met	the	requirements	now	set	out	in subparts	A	through	C	of	Rule	803(6).		But Radley did	not	make	a	clean	break	from Sole y because	of the	discussion	in	the	footnote	that	appears	to	have	distinguished Soley in	part	based	on	differences in	the	facts. Radley ,	2002	ME	150,	¶	17	n.2,	804	A.2d	1127.		I	therefore	treat Carter as	the	analytical divide	even	though Radley certainly	p resaged	that	development	by	bringing Soley into	considerable question	that	much	earlier.27 This	means	that,	although	having	occasion	to	do	so	through	its	comprehensive review	of	the	rules,	the	Advisory Committee	did	not	recommend	a	change	from the	way	we	had	construed	Rule	803(6)	several	years	earlier	in Carter .		Further, our	consideration	of	the	proposed	restyled	body	of	rules	also	presented us with the	opportunity	to	rewrite	or	otherwise	clarify	Rule	8 03(6)	in	a	way	that	would alter Carter ’s	standards	for	the	admissibility	of	integrated	business	records	and

restore Soley ’s.	 	 If	 our	 analysis	 in Carter had	 been	 mistaken,	 as	 the	 Court concludes	today,	we	could	and	presumably	would	have	done	so.		But	we	did not, and	so	the	substance	of	Rule	803(6)	remained	the	same,	and Carter remained good	law. [¶ 40 ]	 	When	 we	 first	 considered	 and	 applied	 restyled	 Rule	 803(6),	 in KeyBank	National	Ass ’n v.	Estate	of	Quint ,	we	quoted	directly	from Carter and reiterated	the	req uirement	for	the	admissibility	of	integrated	business	records that	the	foundational	witness,	if	an	employee	of	only	the	receiving	entity,	must have	 the	 requisite	 knowledge	 of	 the	 regular	practices	 of both the	 originating and	receiving	entities:	“[a]	qualif ied	witness	is	one	who	was	intimately	involved in	 the	 daily	 operation	 of	 the	 business	 and	 whose	 testimony	 showed	 the firsthand	 nature	 of	 his	 knowledge.”	 	 2017	 ME	 237,	 ¶	 15,	 176	 A.3d	 717 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). But	 the	 foundational	 witness	 need	 not	 be	 a n28 employee	 of	 the	 originating	 entity,	 in	 which	 case	 the witness must	 have “sufficient	knowledge	of both	 businesses’ regular	practices”	in	a	measure	 that demonstrates	the	reliability	and	trustworthiness	of	the	information	contained in	 the document. Id. (qu otation	marks	 omitted). We	 affirmed	 the	judgment entered	for	the	mortgagor	because	the	trial	court	had	correctly	concluded	that the	mortgagee	did	not	develop	foundational	evidence	that	the	originating	entity had	engaged	in	the	regular	business	practices	m eeting	the	requirements	of	the

r ule	as	explained	in Carter

. Id. ¶	19.		Further,	true	to	the	provisions	of	the	rule and	the	Advisory	Committee’s	explanation	of	the	proposed	restyled	rules,	we viewed	restyled	Rule	803(6)	as	containing	the	same	substantive	requirements as	the	previous	version. See	id. ¶¶	14

- 15.		In	other words,	we	reaffirmed	the
Carter analysis,	and	that	case	therefore	again	remained	good	law. [¶ 41 ]		Similarly,	in Deutsche	Bank	National	Trust	Co

. v.	Eddins ,	another foreclosure	 case	involving	 an	integrated	 business	 record	 where	 the	 restyled version	of	Rule 803(6)	was	applicable,	we	again	stated	that,	for	the	document to	be	admissible,	the	foundational	witness	must	have	“adequate	knowledge	of the	 processes	 used	 by	 the	 entity	 that	 created	 and	 preserved	 the	 document.” 2018	 ME	 47,	 ¶	 12,	 182	 A.3d	 1241.	 	 We	 also stated	 explicitly	 that	 “[t]he incorporation	of	one	entity’s	record	into	the	records	of	the	receiving	entity	is29
not a	 sufficient	 basis,	 by	 itself,	 for	 the	 admissibility	 of	 that	 record.” Id. (emphasis	added). [¶4 2 ]		The	most	recent	case	in	which	we	conside red	the	admissibility	of integrated	business	records	is M	&	T	Bank	v.	Plaisted ,	2018	ME	121,	192	A.3d 601.		There,	the	foundational	witness	was	an	employee	of	the	originating	entity and	 was	 familiar	 with	 that	 business’s	 record

- related	 practices,	 but we

con cluded	 that ,	 because	 he	 had	 no	 “personal	 knowledge”	 of	 the	 receiving entity’s	business	practices,	the	integrated	business	record	in	the	possession	of the	 receiving	 entity	 was	 not	 admissible. Id. ¶¶	 7

- 12,	 24.	 	 This	 again demonstrates	that	the	proponent’s	f oundation	must	include	testimony	from	a witness	 with	 firsthand	 knowledge	 that	 the	 record

- related	 practices	 of	 each entity	satisfy	the	requirements	of	Rule 803(6)(A)

- (C). [¶4 3 ]	 	 These	 cases

— decided	 over	 the	 course	 of	 nearly	 a	 decade and perhaps	longer , see supra nn.11,	14 ,	and	all	decided	unanimously	and	without doctrinal	interruption

— establish	 the	 standards	 that	govern	 the	admissibility of	integrated	business	records	pursuant	to	Rule	803(6)

. The	cases	confirm	that the	proponent	must	present	evidence	that	t he	practices	of	both	the	originating and	receiving	entities	meet	the	specific	criteria	set	out	in	subparts	A	through	C; an	 attempt	 to	 show	 reliability	in	 some	 other	way	 falls	 short.	 	The	cases	 also30 require	 that	 the	 foundation	emanate	 from	one	or	more	witne sses	who,	 to	be “qualified”	within	the	meaning	of	Rule	803(6)(D),	must	have	actual	familiarity with	 the	 processes	 used	 by	 both	 the	 originating	 and	 receiving	 entities	 for creating,	handling,	and	retaining	the	business	record	at	issue. [¶4 4 ]	 	 In	 contrast, the	 standard	 announced	 today	 by	 the	 Court	 allows admission	of	an	integrated	business	record	on	foundational	evidence	that	the receiving	 entity	 integrated,	 verified,	 and	 relied	 on	 the	 document	 it	 received from	the	originating	entity. Further,	as	 the	Court describes	the	standard,	the receiving	 entity	 can	 “verify”	 the	 record	 when	 that	 entity	 “simply

. . . establish[es]	or	confirm[s]	the	accuracy	of	the	record in	some way .”		Court’s Opinion	 ¶	 11	 (emphasis	 added). That standard

— particularly	 the	 highly nonspeci fic	 criterion	 for	 how	 the	 receiving	 entity	 may	 verify	 a	 record’s
accuracy — is	 entirely	 at	 odds	 with,	 and	 is	 insufficient	 to	 satisfy,	 the	 plain language	 of	 Rule	 803(6)	 and	 our	 interpretive	 case	 law	 since	 at	 least	 2011. Despite	that	legal	authority and the	clear	requirements	of	Rule 803(6)(A)

- (D), based	on the	Court’s	decision	today,	no	longer	will	the	proponent	be	required to	present	evidence,	based	on	the	testimony	of	a	“qualified	witness”	as	we	have construed	 that	 term, see	 Carter ,	 2011	ME	 77,	 ¶¶	 13

- 1 4,	 25	 A.3d	 96,	 that	 the record	was	made	at	the	time	or	near	the	time of	the	recorded	event by	someone31 with	knowledge	of	the	event,	that	the	document	was	kept	in	the	course	of	the originating	business’s	regularly	conducted	activity,	and	that	creating	the	re cord was	among	the	originating	business’s	regular	practices. [¶4 5 ]		Notwithstanding	 the	interpretation	 of	Rule	803(6)	it	announces today ,	 the	Court	states	 that	 the	requirements	of	Rule	803(6)	will	continue	 to govern	the	admissibility	of	integrated	business records	and	that	the	proponent will	 still	be	 required	 to	 present	 foundational	 evidence	 from	which	it	may	be “inferred”	that	the	originating	entity’s	practices	satisfy	the	predicate	elements in	 the	 Rule.	 	 Court’s	 Opinion	 ¶ 23 n. 7 .	 	 This	 assertion	 is	 belied by	 the	 very evidentiary	standard	the	Court	adopts	here.		For	an	integrated	business	record to	be	admissible	from	now	on,	the	proponent	will	need	only	present	evidence that	 the	 downstream	 entity	 received,	 verified,	 and	 relied	 on	 the	 document created	 by	 the upstream	 entity.	 	 As	 I	 have	 discussed	 above,	 however, Rule 803(6)	 prescribes	 standards	 that	 are	 different	 and	more	 exacting.	 	 The three	 steps	 to	 be	 taken	 by	 the	 receiving	 entity	 that	 the	 Court	 finds	 to	 be cumulatively	 sufficient

— receipt,	 verification,	 and reliance

— do	 not	 bear	 any meaningful	 or	 predictable	 relationship	 to	 the	 particularized	 requirements	 of the	Rule,	which	center	on	a	showing	of	specific	practices	used	by	the	originating entity	 in	 creating,	 maintaining,	 and	 transmitting	 the	 document. See M. R.32 Evid. 803(6)(A)

- (C).		Despite	 the	Court’s	attempts	 to	minimize	 or	even	 erase the	 differences,	 the	 requirements	 prescribed	 by	 the	 Rule	 in	 fact	 are qualitatively	distinct	from	the	more	tolerant	criteria	the	Court	adopts	today. [¶4 6 ]	 	 The	 Court	 also	 asse rts	 several	 times	 that	 within	 our	 current jurisprudence	 there	 is	 a	 “conflict”	 regarding	 the	 admissibility	 of	 integrated business	records.		Court’s	Opinion	¶¶	1, 23 , 24 .		I	submit,	with	respect,	that	the Court	is	wrong.		Our	decisions	beginning	no	later	tha n	with	the	2011	opinion	in
Carter establish	a consistent	and clear	set	of	standards	for	the	admissibility	of integrated	business	records.		That	the	evidentiary	criteria	articulated	in	those cases	may	differ	from	those	set	out	in	older	cases , such	as Soley , does not	create an	 ongoing	 conflict.	 	 Rather, Carter and	 the	 cases	 that	 follow	 represent	 a succession	 by	 which	 previous law	 has	 been	 superseded.	 	 Further,	 the	 Court describes Soley as	“good	law”	and	states	that	there	was	no	indication	in Carter of	an	inte ntion	to	depart	from Soley. Court’s	Opinion	¶¶ 20 , 23 .		That	is	plainly not	the	case , as	is	made	clear	by	our	analysis	and	discussion	of	the	issue	in	our opinions	 beginning	 with Carter

— cases	 that	 the	 Court	 now	 effectively	 must overrule	to	reinstate	pre

- Ca rter jurisprudence. 15

15 Not	 once	in	its o pinion	does	 the	Court	directly	state	 that	it	is	 overturning	 the	line	 of	cases beginning	with Carter ,	although	that is clearly	what	the	Court	is	doi ng.33 [¶4 7 ]		In	doing	so,	the	Court	writes	off	a	decade’s	or	more	worth	of	our decisions,	beginning	with Carter (if	not State	v. Radley , 2002	ME	150,	804	A.2d 1127, see	infra nn.11,	14 ) and	continuing	through Plaisted ,	because,	the	Court suggests,	 we	 did	 not	 pay	 enough	 attention	 to	 the	 admissibility	 standards contained	 in	 earlier	 decisions	 and	 therefore	 decided	 those	 cases	 based	 on oversight	and	inadvertence. See Court’s	Opinion	¶¶ 20

- 22 .		That	view,	however,

cannot	a ccount	for	our	explicit	articulation	of	pertinent	evidentiary	standards in	the	cases	beginning	with Carter, and,	regrettably,	it	reflects	a	diminution	of the	weight	and	significance	 that	should	be	attributed	 to	our	decision

- making process,	which,	although certainly	not	infallible,	is	exercised	with	care,	and	with sensitivity	to	and	appreciation	for	our	role	as	the	court	of	last	resort.
2. 2018	Amendment	to	Rule	803(6) [¶4 8 ]		The	Bank	and	several	of	its	supporting	amici	place	significance	on a	2018	amendment	to Rule 803(6)(E),	2018	Me.	Rules	09	§	2	(effective	Aug.	1, 2018),	to	support	the	conclusion	that	we	should	now	interpret	the	rule	as	do other	jurisdictions,	including	 specifically	 the	 federal	courts	as	 exemplified	in U.S.	Bank	Trust,	N.A.	v.	Jones ,	925	F.3d 534	(1st	Cir.	2019). 16 I	disagree.

16 In	that	case,	the	First	Circuit	stated	that	there	is	no	material	difference	between	the	Maine	and federal	approaches	to	the	admissibility	of	integrated	business	records. U.S.	Bank	Tr.,	N.A.	v.	Jones ,	925 F.3d	534,	539	&	n.1	(1st	Cir.	2019).		 I	 resp ectfully	submit	 that	this	is	not	so	because	 the	analysis described	 in Jones tolerates	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 personal	 knowledge	 by	 the	 witness	 about	 the34 [¶4 9 ]		The	modest	change	implemented	by	 the	2018	amendment	does not	have	such	a	radical	effect.		The	amendment	did	nothing	more	than	fill	a	gap
in the	 allocation	 of	 the	 burden	 of	 proof	 on	 a	 limited	 aspect	 of	 the r ule, by providing	that	the	burden	to	demonstrate	a	lack	of	trustworthiness	sufficient to	defeat	admission	of	the	proffered	document	rests	with	the	opponent,	thereby clarifying	 that	 the	 proponent	 is	 not	 required	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 absence	 of indicia	of	untrustwo rthiness. 17 See M.R.	Evid.	803(6)(E).		The	amendment	did not	 introduce	 the	 general	 consideration	 of	 a	 business	 record’s untrustworthiness.		That	factor	was	already	present	in	the	prior	formulation	of the r ule. See M.R.	Evid.	803(6)(E)	(Tower	2017).		The	a mendment	also	did	not touch	 the	 specific	 predicate	 criteria	 for	 admission	 of	 a	 business	 record contained	in	subparts	A	through	C:	whether	the	document	was	made	at	or	near the	 time	 of	 the	 recorded	 event	 by,	 or	 with	 information	 from,	 someone	 with

originating	entity’s	 records	practices	and	does	not	require	 the	proponent	 to	present	 foundational evidence that	 the	 record

- related	 practices	 of	 the	 originating	 entity	 meet	 the	 requirements	 of Rule 803(6)(A)

- (C). Jones ,	925	F.3d	at	538.		These	principles	run	contrary	to	Maine	law,	as	is	shown by	my	review	of	our	case	law.		Indeed,	in	now	abandoning	Maine’s	curr ent	case	law	and	adopting	the framework	described	in Jones ,	the	Court	confirms	the	existence	of	the	differences	between	the	two approaches.

17 As	 the	 result	 of the	2018	amendment,	Rule	803(6)(E)	now	provides	 that	a	business	 record meeting	the	standards	set	out	in	the	remaining	aspects	of	the	Rule	is	admissible	if	“[t]he	opponent does	not	show	that	the	source	of	information	or	the	method	or	circumstances	of	prepa ration	indicate a	lack	of	trustworthiness.” See 2018	Me.	Rules	09	§	2	(amending	M.R.	Evid.	803(6)(E)); see	also	supra n.1 0 (setting	out	the	current	Rule	in	its	entirety).35 knowledge; whether	the	record	was	created	in	the	normal	course;	etc.		Further, the	 amendment	 did	 not	 alter	 the basis	 or measure	 of	 knowledge	 that	 the foundational	witness	must	have:	the	witness	still	must	be	“qualified”	pursuant to	Rule	803(6)(D),	a	concept	that	we	h ad	addressed and	explained in	our	case law	outlined	above. [¶ 50 ]	 	 The	limited	 nature	 of	 the	 2018	 amendment	is	made	 even	more apparent	by	 the	 statement	 of	 the	Advisory	Committee	 on	 the	Maine	Rules	 of Evidence,	accompanying	 the	 submission	 of	 the	proposed	 r ule	 amendment	 to the	Supreme	Judicial	Court,	that	the rule change	was	not	substantive

— it	would not	 change	 the	 factors	 that	 bear	 on	 the	 determination	 of	 admissibility.	 	M.R. Evid. 803 Advisory	Committee	Note

– August	2018. As	the	Advisory	Committee explain ed,	the	amendment	merely	codified	the	practice	that	was	already	being followed	 by	 Maine	 courts	 and	 litigants. Id. Both	 this	 description	 of	 the amendment	and	the	nature	of	the	amendment	itself	confirm	its	nonsubstantive content,	further	undermining	use	of the	amendment	as	a	springboard	to	justify substantial	 substantive	 changes	 to	 separate	 components	 of	 the	 evidentiary standard	 governing	 the	 admissibility	 of	 integrated	 business	 records.	 	 To conclude	 that	 this	limited	amendment	contributes	 to	a	wholesale	 re vision	 of36 the	entire analysis	governing integrated	record s reads	far	too	much	into	such	a narrow	rule	change. [¶5 1 ]		In	my	view,	Maine	law	is	clear,	and	the	Court’s	efforts	to	tease	out vestiges	of	pre

- Carter jurisprudence	from	current	case	law, see Court’s	Opinion ¶¶ 19 , 22 ,	do	not	change	 that	 fact.		The	proponent	 of	an	integrated	business record	must	demonstrate,	through	testimony	of	a	witness	with	knowledge,	that the	originating	and	receiving	entities	each	engaged	in	record

- related	practices that	 s atisfy	 the	 requirements	 of	 Rule 803(6)(A)

- (C). Contrary	 to	 the	 Court’s conclusion,	t he	receiving	entity’s	mere	integration, verification, and	reliance	on the	originating	entity’s	record	is	not	sufficient	to	render	the	record	admissible

. See	supra ¶¶	44

- 4 5

. [¶5 2 ]	 	 At	 the	 trial	 in	 this	 action,	 the	 dispositive	 issue	 became	 the admissibility	 of	 a	 notice	 of	 default	 and	 right	 to	 cure	 ostensibly	 created	 and issued	by	the	law	firm	engaged	by	the	servicer	of	the	mortgage. See	Bank	of	Am., N.A.	v.	Greenleaf ,	2014 ME	89,	¶	18,	96	A.3d	700	(stating	that	proof	of	mailing or	other	authorized	method	of	service	is	one	of	the	elements	of	a	foreclosure case);	14	M.R.S.	§	6111(3)	(2018), repealed	and	replaced	by P.L.	2019,	ch.	361 §§	1,	2	(effective	Sept.	19,	2019)	(codifie d	at	14 M.R.S.	§	6111(2

- A)	(2020)).		The Bank	 developed	 no	 evidence	 that	 the	 foundational	 witness,	 who	 was	 an37 employee	 of	 the	 servicer,	 oversaw,	 reviewed,	 or	had	any	 familiarity	with	 the law	firm’s	internal	processes	for	creating	and	mailing	default	notice s,	and	the witness	did	not	describe	any	such	processes	themselves,	including	the	mailing
process. As	the	Court	itself	recognizes,	Court’s	Opinion	¶	29,	and	c ontrary	to the	Bank’s	contention	on	appeal,	the trial court	correctly	determined , based	on that	 re cord	 and the	 current, controlling	 Maine	 law , that	 the	 Bank	 had	 not qualified	the	notice	as	an	admissible	integrated	business	record. [¶5 3 ]		Because	the	court	committed	no	error	when	it	excluded	the	notice, the	 judgment	 should	 be	 affirmed,	 unless	 our	 case s,	 beginning	 with Carter , establishing	the	standards	for	the	admissibility	of	integrated	business	records should	 be	 overturned. This	 question	 directly implicates	 principles	 of stare decisis

. 3. Stare	Decisis 18 [¶5 4 ]		An	analytical	cornerstone	of	jurisprud ence,	 the	doctrine	of stare decisis calls	 upon	 the	 courts	 to	 respect	 legal	 precedent	 in	 order	 to provide

18 It	bears	note	that	the	Bank	itself	has	not	explicitly	asserted	that	current	Maine case	law	should be	overturned.		In	fact, while	this	appeal	was	pending we raised	the	issue	and	invited	the	parties	and amici	to	submit	briefs	on	the	question	of	whether,	in	light	of	the	First	Circuit’s	decision	in Jones ,	we should	change	 the	way	we	apply	Rule	803(6)	 to	integrated	business	records.		 In	its	supplemental brief,	the	Bank	then	asserted	that	adoption	of Jones would	actually	clarify	rather	than	change	Maine’s current	law	on	integrated	business	records.		Nonethe less,	the	Bank	also	argued	that	the	trial	court incorrectly	 applied	Maine’s	 current	 law	 to	 the	 evidence,	 thereby	 making	 it	 unduly	 difficult	 for	 a proponent	to	achieve	admission	of	integrated	business	records

— a	particular	challenge,	presumably, for	mortgage es	 given	 that	 sequential	 ownership	 and	management	 of	mortgages	is	 common. See38 “stability	 to	 the	 law	 and	 enable[]	 the	 public	 to	 place	 reasonable	 reliance	 on judicial	decisions	affecting	important	matters.		Even	when	we	have	a	certain unease	with	 the	analysis	of	a	prior	decision,	we	do	not	overrule	 the	decision without	a	compelling	an d	sound	justification.” McGarvey	v.	Whittredge ,	2011 ME	97,	¶	63,	28	A.3d	620	 (Levy,	 J.) (quotation	marks	 omitted).		As	 the	Chief Justice	of	the	United	States	has	recently	stated,	the	principle	of stare	decisis “is grounded	in	a	basic	humility	that	recogn izes	today’s	legal	issues	are	often	not so	different	from	the	questions	of	yesterday	and	that	we	are	not	the	first	ones to	try	to	answer	them.		Because	the	private	stock	of	reason	.	.	.	in	each	[person] is	small,	.	.	.	individuals	would	do	better	to	avail themselves	of	the	general	bank and	capital	of	nations	and	of	ages.” June	Med.	Servs.,	L.L.C.	v.	Russo , --- U.S.

--- , - - - , 140	 S.	 Ct.	 2103,	 2134	 (2020) (Roberts,	 C.J.,	 concurring)	 (quotation	 marks omitted). [¶5 5 ] To	be	sure,	respect	for	precedent	is	not	a n	absolute	bar	that	ossifies obsolete	judicial	reasoning	and	conclusions. Dyer	v.	Me.	Drilling	&	Blasting,	Inc. , 2009	ME	126,	¶	28,	984	A.2d	210; MacDonald	v.	MacDonald ,	412	A.2d	71,	74

Homeward	Residential,	 Inc.	v.	Gregor ,	2015	ME	108,	¶	13,	122	A.3d	947.		To	 the	contrary,	 the	 trial court’s	analysis	was	entirely	 faithful	 to	Maine’s	current	evidentiary	standard s.		Consequently,	 the Bank’s	complaint	about	the	effect	of	the	court’s	ruling	can	be	seen,	at	most,	as	a	de	facto	challenge	to our	present	case	law	governing	Rule	803(6),	even	though	the	Court	has	now	proceeded	as	if	the	Bank had	asked	us	more	directly	to overrule	our	precedent.39 (Me.	1980)	(stating	that	stare	decisis	does	not	require	“judges	of	th e	present, who	like	their	predecessors	cannot	avoid	acting	when	called	upon,	.	.	.	to	act	as captives	of	the	judges	of	the	past,	restrained	without	power	to	break	even	those bonds	so	withered	by	the	changes	of	time	that	at	the	slightest	touch	they	would

cr umble”). Nonetheless,	in	order	to	promote	predictability	and	stability	in	the law	and	to	avoid	arbitrariness,	“ a ppellate	courts	proceed	with	great	care	before overruling	a	prior	decision,	and	do	so	only	after	careful	analysis	and	based	on	a compelling	 rea son. We	 do	 not	 disturb	 a	 settled	 point	 of	 law	 unless	 the prevailing	 precedent	 lacks	 vitality	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 serve	 the	 interests	 of justice.” State	v.	Bromiley ,	2009	ME	110,	¶	6,	983	A.2d	1068 (citation	omitted) (quotation	marks	omitted). [¶5 6 ] Considerations	relevant	to	whether	precedent	should	be	cast	aside include	 whether	 the	 existing	 approach	 has	 “fa llen	 into	 jurisprudential disrepute	 and	 is	 disapproved	 in	 better

- considered	 recent	 cases	 and	 in	 the authoritative	 scholarly	 writings,” Dyer ,	 2009 ME	 126,	 ¶	 28,	 984	 A.2d	 210 (quotation	 marks	 omitted);	 whether	 “the	 passage	 of	 time	 and	 changes	 in conditions”	call	 for	a	reassessment	of	existing	law	 to	 the	point	of	“reaching	a different	result,” Est

. of	Galipeau	v.	State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co. ,	2016	M E	28, ¶ 15,	132	A.3d	1190	(quotation	marks	omitted);	and	the	administrability	of	the40 law	 at	 issue, June	 Med.	 Servs. , --- U.S.	 at

--- , 140	 S.	 Ct.	 at	 2134	 (Roberts,	 C.J., concurring)	 (citing Janus	 v.	 AFSCME,	 Council	 31 , --- U.S.

--- ,	 138	 S.	 Ct.	 2448,
2478

- 79 (2018)). [¶5 7 ]		This	case	does	not	present	a	justification	for	abandoning	current Maine	 law	 governing	 the	 admissibility	 of	 integrated	 business	 records.	 	 We suggested	those evidentiary standards	as	early	as	2009	in State	v.	Radley ,	2002 ME	 150,	 804	 A.2d	 1127, see	 supra nn.11,	 14 ,	 and	 we	 have	 articulated	 them clearly	 and	 consistently	 since	 2011	 and	 as	 recently	 as	 2018

— hardly	 an antiquated	body	of	law.		Our	case	law	has	not	become	obsolete	or	 fallen	into disrepute	over	 time	because	o f	advances	in	legal	 thought. Cf. Dyer ,	2009	ME 126,	 ¶	 18,	 984	 A.2d	 210	 (concluding	 that	 developments	in	 the	law	 over	 the previous	half

- century	warranted	changes	in	applicable	Maine	law).		This	is	also not	 a	 situation	 where	 our	 current	 law	 creates	 such	 unf airness	 as	 to	 justify rejection	of	recent	precedent. Cf. Myrick	v.	James ,	444	A.2d	987,	999	(Me.	1982), superseded	by	statute	on	other	grounds	as	stated	in Sears,	Roebuck	&	Co.	v.	State
Tax	Assessor ,	2012	ME	110,	¶	1,	52	A.3d	941	(overturning	Maine	preced ent	that we	 determined	 was	 “harsh	 and	 unjust”	 and	 “ counterproductive	 to	 the achievement	 of	 any	 principled	 conception	 of	 fair	 and	 even

- handed	 justice”). Further,	there	is	no	significant	difficulty	in	administering

— i.e.,	applying

— the41

r ule ( although,	 as	 is	 e vident	 from	 the	 cases	 I	 review	 above,	 mortgagees sometimes	 have	 difficulty	 at	 trial	 meeting	 the	 standards	 prescribed	 in Rule 803(6) )

. [¶5 8 ] The	 divergence	 between	 Maine	 law	 and	 the	 law	 of	 other jurisdictions,	exemplified	by Jones ,	is	not	a	new	circumstan ce	that	would	justify departing	from	our	precedents. Jones relies	on	several	federal	cases	going	as far	back	as	1992.		925	F.3d	at	537	( citing	United	States	v.	Doe ,	960	F.2d	221,	223 (1st	Cir.	1992)).		And	here	the	Court	itself	cites	to federal	and	state appellate court	 opinions	 that	were	issued	decades	ago. See Court’s	Opinion	¶	1 3 .		We developed	 our	 modern

- day	 standards	 for	 the	 admissibility	 of	 integrated business	records	in	our	decisions	beginning	no	later	than Carter in	2011,	well after some other	cou rts	had	put	their	less	stringent	model	in	place.		This	means that	 the	 approach	 described	 in Jones and	 elsewhere	 was	 available	 for	 us	 to consider	 and	 possibly	 adopt	 throughout	 the	 entire	 time	 that	 we	 have	 been articulating	 our	 different	 standard	 for	 the	 adm ission	 of	 integrated	 business records.		Nonetheless,	we	took	a	different	route. [¶5 9 ]		Finally,	the	Court	states	that	there	is	benefit	to	interpreting	Maine’s rule	 uniformly	 with	 the	 construction	 found	 in	 other	 jurisdictions,	 in	 part	 to discourage	forum

- shopping. See Court’s Opinion	¶ 25 .		When	the	Maine	Rules42 of	Evidence	were	restyled effective in	2015,	however,	the	Advisory	Committee on	 the	Maine	 Rules	 of	 Evidence	 presented	 the	 proposed	 amendments	 to	 the Supreme	Judicial	Court	with	the	explicit	explana tion	that	“[r]estyled	Rule	803 preserves	 the	 substantive	 differences	 between	 the	 Maine	 and	 the	 Federal Rules.”	 	M.R.	 Evid.	 803	Maine	 Restyling	Note	 [November	 2014].	 	 This	makes clear	 that	 the	 restyled	 rules	were	not	proposed	 to	us	in	 order	 to	create	 that

u niformity

— and	in	 fact	 they	were	intended	 to	preserve	 the	independence	of our	 own	 jurisprudence.	 	 Since	 then,	 we	 have	 done	 nothing	 to	 call	 that framework	into	question.		Based	on	this	history,	homogeneity	between	Maine law	and	the	law	of	other	jurisdictions ,	while	not	without	some	ancillary	value, is	nonetheless	not	an	objective	to	be	pursued	for	its	own	sake. 19 [¶ 60 ] The	 question	 here	 is	 not	 whether	 the	 approach	 to	 integrated business	records	embodied	in Jones is	reasonable.		Rather,	the	issue	now	before th e	Court	is	whether Maine ’s	current	case	law	governing	Rule	803(6)	is	wrong. It	is	not.		As	I	have	discussed,	our	case	law	going	back	at	least	as	far	as	2011 could	not	be	clearer	in	requiring	a	greater	foundational	showing	than Jones and

19 Another	example	of	the	lack	of	symmetry	between	Maine’s	rules	of	evidence	and	the	federal rules	is	that	the	latter	include	a	residual	hearsay	exception. See Fed.	R.	Evid.	807.		Maine’s	rules	do not. See M.R.	Evid.	803	Maine	Res tyling	Note	 [November	2014];	M.R.	Evid.	803	Advisers’	Note	 to former	M.R.	Evid.	803	(February	2,	1976).43 the	courts	of	othe r	jurisdictions	insist	on,	but	that	divergence	does	not	prove Maine’s	criteria	to	be	incorrect;	the	existence	of	one	approach	does	not	prove the	 other	 wrong.	 	 Rather,	 the	 difference	 in	 approaches	 simply	 represents different	levels	of	sensitivity	to	the	mea sure	of	reliability	that	must	characterize an	integrated	business	record	to	allow	its	admission	in	evidence .		Additionally, Maine’s	 current	 approach	 has	 the	 benefit	 of	 faithfulness	 to	 the	 language	 of Rule 803(6)	itself.		What	the	Court	does	today	is	simply to	adopt	one	approach, which	is	 described	in Jones and	 has	 existed	all	 along,	 as	 the	 replacement	 for another,	which	is	described	in Carter and	is	different	but	in	no	way	incorrect. In	 my	 view,	 to	 jettison	 a	 well

- established	 and	 perfectly	 appropriate	 and defensible	 legal	 standard	 established	 in	 Maine’s	 authoritative	 case	 law	 does damage	 to	 the	 safeguard	 and	 stability	 of	 legal	 precedent	 achieved	 through adherence	to	the	basic	principle	of stare	decisis

. [¶6 1 ]	 	 Given	 the	 fundamental	 importance	 of	 respecting	 and	 following precedent,	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 rationale	 that	 constitutes	 a	 “compelling” justification	 necessary	 for	 departing	 from	 settled	 and	 well

- established	 law, Bromiley , 2009	ME	110,	¶	6,	983	A.2d	10 68,	we	should	not	overrule	the	case44 law	establishing	our	current	jurisprudence	on	 the	admissibility	of	integrated business	records. 20
B. The	Court’s	Rulemaking	Authority [¶6 2 ]	 	 For	 the	 reasons	 I	 have	 explained,	 there	 does	 not	 exist	 a	 sound jurisprudential basis	 for	 the	 Court’s	 decision to	 change	 its	 construction	 of Rule 803(6)	as	applicable	to	integrated	business	records.		As	a	result,	today’s decision	must	be	viewed	as	a	de	facto	change	to	the	meaning	and	content	of	the

r ule	 itself

— something	 the	 Court	 may do	 pursuant	 only	 to	 its statutory authority	 to	 promulgate	 the	 rules	 that	 govern	 judicial	 proceedings ,	 not	 in exercise	of	its	appellate	authority

. See 4	M.R.S.	§§	1, 8, 9

- A,	51	(2020). [¶6 3 ]		By	concluding	that	the	proponent	need	present	evidence	only	th at the	receiving	entity	received,	verified,	and	relied	on	a	record	generated	by	the originating	entity, see Court’s	Opinion	¶ 30 ,	the	Court	effectively	eliminates	the specific	 requirements	 imposed	 by	 Rule 803(6)(A)

- (C)	 as they appl y to

20 To	the	extent	that	the	Court	concludes

— without	the	benefit	of	any	advocacy	on	the	point, see supra n.18 ,	and	while	simultaneously	stating	 that Cart er is	entitled	 to	 respect	as	precedent

— that Carter and	the	cases	that	followed	were	themselves	decided	in	contravention	of	principles	of stare decisis ,	Court’s	Opinion	¶ 23 &	n. 7, the	Court	collaterally	attacks	those	decisions.		This	leaves	one	to wonder	a bout	 the consequences	of	 the	application	of	Rule	803(6)	 to the	judgments	addressed	in those	cases, and the	many	additional	judgments	that	have	been	issued	in	the	trial	courts	based	on our	current	law	governing	the	admissibility	of	integrated	business	recor ds,	not	only	in	foreclosure cases	but	in	all	other	types	of	cases	where	such	records	were	material.		Additionally,	the	fact	remains that	our	current	jurisprudence is the	law,	so	the	question	presented	here	is	whether	we	should	now reject that authority.45 integrated	 business records,	 namely,	 that	 the	 proponent	 must	 present foundational	evidence	 that	 the	 record	 “was	made	at	 or	near	 the	 time	by

— or from	information	transmitted	by

— someone	with	knowledge , ”	that	it	“was	kept in	the	course	of	a	regularly	conducted	activity	of	a	busin ess , ”	and	that	“[m]aking the	record	was	a	regular	practice	of	that	activity.”		As	I	have	discussed	above,
supra ¶¶	44

- 45 ,	the r ule,	as	the	Court	now	interprets	it,	therefore	will	now	allow a	materially	lesser	foundational	showing	than	is	required	by	the	pl ain	terms	of the r ule	for	a	proffered	integrated	business	document	to	become	admissible	in evidence. [¶64]		T he	Court	describes	this	as	an	integrated	records	“ method ,”	which it	bases	on	a	generalized	notion	of	reliability.		Court’s	Opinion	¶¶	8

- 10 .		No such

“ method ”	 exists	 within	 Rule	 803(6),	 however.	 	 As	 written,	 the	 specific requirements	of	the r ule,	including	those	set	out	in	subparts	A	through	C,	apply irrespective	of	whether	the	record	is	that	of	a	single	entity	or	is	an	integrated record.	 	 By	 const ruing	 the r ule	 as	 it	 does,	 the	 Court	 effectively	 exempts integrated	business	records	from	the	particularized	foundational	predicate	set out	in	subparts	A	through	C	and	thereby	rewrites	the r ule	by	eliminating	those requirements	for	such	records	to	be	admit ted	in	evidence. 21 See	Radley ,	2002

21 Although	the	Court	denies	that	it	is	rewriting	Rule	803(6)	because	it	is	simply	returning	to	our interpretation	of	the	Rule	from	the Soley era,	Court’s	Opinion	¶ 23 & n. 7 ,	the	fact	remains	that	the46 ME	 150,	 ¶	 17,	 804	 A.2d	 1127	 (stating	 that	 the	 erroneous	 admission	 of	 an integrated	 business	 record,	 where	 it	 is	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 foundational requirements	 of	 Rule	 803(6),	 cannot	 be	 transformed	 into	 a	 correct	 ruling b ecause,	 unlike	 the	 federal	 rules, see Fed.	 R.	 Evid.	 807,	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of Evidence	do	not	include	a	residual	or	“catch

- all”	exception	to	the	hearsay	rule, which	might	allow	the	record	to	be	admissible). [¶6 5 ]		When	promulgating	or	amending	rules	of	cour t,	the	Court	invokes and	 exercises	 authority	 in	 its	 capacity	 as	 the	 Supreme	 Judicial	 Court. See
4 M.R.S.	§§	1, 8, 9

- A,	51

. That	authority	is	separate	and	mutually	exclusive	from the	 authority	we	 exercise	when	 sitting	 as	 the	 Law	 Court,	 an	 appellate	 body

. Compare 4	M.R.S.	 §	8	 (rulemaking	authority), with 4	M.R.S.	 §§	51,	57 (2020) (appellate	 authority); see	 also	 State	 v.	 Doucette ,	 544	 A.2d	 1290,	 1294 (Me. 1988).	 	 Here,	 by	 effectively	 rewriting	 the	 way	 Rule	 803(6)	 applies	 to integrated	business	records,	the Court	is	improperly	exercising	its	regulatory rulemaking powers	in	an	adjudicatory	context. See	Conservatorship	of	Emma , 2017	ME	1,	¶¶	1,	10,	153	A.3d	102	(declining	to	answer	a	question	reported	by the	Kennebec	County	Probate	Court	in	part	because	questi ons	“of	policy,	with

construction	of	the	Rule	now	embraced	by	the	Court	changes	the	substance	and	structure	of	the	Rule as	established	by	our	current	controlling	jurisprudence.		This	amounts	to	an	amendment	of	the	Rule itself.47 long

- ranging	 and	 far

- reaching	 implications”	 are	 properly	 answered	 not through	adjudication	but	through	the	rulemaking	process	in	which	the	related issues	“can	be	addressed	together	in	an	open	forum”). [¶6 6 ]		I	have	no	quarrel	with	the suggestion that	it	may	be	beneficial	to reexamine	 the	 way	 Rule	 803(6)	 should be	 applied to	 integrated	 business records,	at	least	in	foreclosure	cases.		The	Bank	and	its	allied	amici	assert	that Rule 803(6),	 as	 we	 have	 construed	 it	 since	 2011,	 imposes	 an	 un fair	 and unnecessary	obstacle	to	admitting	those	records,	which	can	contain	necessary aspects	 of	 proof in	 foreclosure	 cases where	 mortgages	 are	 often	 transferred from	 one	 entity	 to	 the	 next	 and	 the	 servicing	 of	 a	 single	 mortgage	 can	 also change	 hands. See Plaisted , 2018	 ME	 121, ¶	 1,	 192	 A.3d	 601	 (noting	 the challenges	 faced	by	mortgagees	in	 proving	a	 foreclosure	case	because	 of	 the industry’s	 “practice	 of	 securitization,	 spawning	 a	 byzantine	 mass	 of assignments,	 transfers,	and	documentation” (quotation	mar ks	 omitted) ).		On the	other	side,	several	amici	in	support	of	Shone	and	Buck’s	position	point	to	a checkered	 track	record	in	 the	efforts	of	mortgagees	 to	present	sufficient	and reliable	information	about	the	history	of	mortgages	on	which	they	have	sought

t o	foreclose,	and	th ose	amici point	to	the	incentive	that	mortgagees,	servicers, and	 others	 involved	 in	 administering	 mortgages	 may	 have	 to	 simply	 adopt ,48 verify, and	 rely	 on	 one	another’s	 records. See	id. ¶ 2 (“ The	law,	 the	 rules	 of evidence,	 and	 court processes	 have	 not	 become	 more	 complicated	 in	 these matters.		Applying	established	law,	however,	has	become	more	problematic	as courts	 address	 the	 problems	 the	 financial	 services	 industry	 has	 created	 for itself.” (quotation	marks	omitted) ); see	also	HSBC	M ortg.	Servs.,	Inc.	v.	Murphy , 2011	ME	59,	¶ 15	&	n.8,	19	A.3d	815. [¶6 7 ]		Although	this	is	a	discussion	that	may	be	well	worth	having,	it	must occur	in	a	forum	other	than	this	appeal,	where	we	are	called	upon	to	interpret and	apply	Rule	803(6)	as	it	exists .		The	proper	vehicle	to	address	the	efficacy	of the	 current	 Rule	 to	 serve	 its	 purposes	 effectively	 in	 some	 or	 all	 contexts	 is through	 the	 Advisory	 Committee	 on	 the	 Maine	 Rules	 of	 Evidence	 or	 other interested	 persons	 or	 entities,	 and	 ultimately	 within	 the Supreme	 Judicial Court,	exercising	its	 rulemaking	authority

— a	deliberative	process	 that	likely would	require	consideration	of	broad	empirical	industry

- wide	practices	based on	 information	 that	 goes	 well	 beyond	 the	 present	 record.	 	 For	 the	 Court	 to de facto rewrite	the r ule	in	the	context	of	this	appeal	is	an	improper	exercise	of its	rulemaking	authority	in	an	adjudicatory	proceeding.49 C. Conclusion [¶6 8 ]		The	 trial	court	correctly	applied	 Rule	803(6)	and	committed	no error	when	it	excluded	the	notice	of	default and	right	to	cure, directly resulting in	 the	 entry	 of	 judgment	 for	 mortgagors	 Danielle	 Shone	 and	 Michael	 Buck. Further,	 there	 is	 no proper persuasive	 basis	 for	 casting	 aside	 our	 clear	 and well

- established	 jurisprudence	 governing	 the	 admissibility	 of	 inte grated business	records.		The	judgment	should	be	affirmed.

Santo	Longo,	Esq., Bendett	&	McHugh,	P.C.,	Portland,	and	William	A.	Fogel,	Esq. (orally) ,	San	Diego,	California,	for	appellant t he	Bank	of	New	York	Mellon Mark	A.	Kearns,	Esq. (orally) ,	and Mark	L.	Randall,	Esq.,	Portland,	for	appellees Michael	Buck	and	Danielle	Shone Jeremy	 Kamras,	 Esq.,	 Arnold	 &	 Porter	 Kay	 Scholer	 LLP,	 San	 Francisco, California,	for	amicus	curiae	Federal	Housing	Finance	Agency Andrea	 Bopp	 Stark,	 Esq., National	 Consumer	 La w	 Center,	 Boston, Massachusetts,	for	amicus	curiae	National	Consumer	Law	Center Daniel	 L.	 Cummings,	 Esq.,	 and	 Michael	 T.	 Devine,	 Esq.,	 Norman,	 Hanson	 & Detroy,	LLC,	Portland,	for	amicus	curie	Maine	Credit	Union	League Diane	 Cipollone ,	 Esq.,	 Yarmouth,	 for	 amici	 curiae	 National	 Association	 of Consumer	Advocates,	Marc	Dann,	 the	Dann	 Law	 Firm,	 James	Sturdevant,	 the Sturdevant	Law	Firm,	Phillip	Robinson,	and	the	Consumer	Law	Center	LLC Frank	D’Alessandro,	Esq.,	Augusta,	for	amicus	curiae Maine	Equal	Justice50 Jonathan	 E.	 Selkowitz,	 Esq.,	 Pine	 Tree	 Legal	 Assistance,	 Inc.,	 Portland,	 for amicus	curiae	Pine	Tree	Legal	Assistance ,	Inc. Catherine	R.	Connors,	Esq.,	 John	 J.	Aromando,	Esq.,	and	Sara	A.	Murphy,	Esq., Pierce	Atwood	LLP, Portland,	for amicus	curiae	The	Maine	Bankers	Association Brett	L.	Messinger,	Esq., and Elizabeth	M.	Lacombe, Esq., Portland,	for	amicus curiae	PHH	Mortgage	Corporation Kelly	W.	McDonald,	Esq.,	Murray,	Plumb	&	Murray,	Portland,	for	amicus	curiae Full	Disclosure,	LLC Thomas	A.	Cox, Esq.,	Portland,	for amicus	curiae Maine	Attorneys	Saving	Homes Gerald	F.	Petruccelli,	amicus	curiae	pro	se

Cumberland	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	RE

- 2015

- 116 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY