* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 14 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. GLENIS LANORE WILSON,

Defendant-Appellant. No. 98-6163 (D.C. CR-97-191-R) (Western District of Oklahoma)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Glenis Lanore Wilson pleaded guilty to bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2), but appeals her fifteen month sen tence, contending only that2

the district court erred in denying her a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 . We affirm. On October 29, 1997, Ms. Wilson was arrested for he r participation in a bank fraud scheme. She immediately confessed to he r involvement and provided information on other criminal participants, but min imized her own role. At her plea hearing and subsequent debriefing, in order to protect a relative, she falsely identified a co-participant. Later at the same deb riefing, she renounced her earlier statements and correctly identified the co- participant. At sentencing, the district court imposed a two-level upward adjustmen t for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because of Ms. Wilson’ s earlier false statements. Ms. Wilson argues that the district court erred in failing to grant her a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Acceptance of responsibility is a factual determination reviewed for clear error.
See United States v. Hawley , 93 F.3d 682, 689 (10th Cir. 1996). “The sentenci ng judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defenda nt’s acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 5. Ordinarily, a defendant who has been assessed an up ward adjustment for obstruction of justice may not simultaneously recei ve a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 4. Ms. Wilson3

nevertheless contends that her situation qualifies as an “extraordinary case” exception to the ordinary rule, in which the distri ct court might grant simultaneous adjustments. See id. (“There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1. and 3E1.1 may apply.”). She argues that her immediate confession, her cooperation rega rding her co-participants, and her ultimate correct identification of all co-parti cipants demonstrate her acceptance of responsibility. Under the deferential standard, however, we do not believe the district court erred in refusing to find that Ms. Wilson’s s ituation presented an “extraordinary” case. The district court’s determi nation of whether a defendant has accepted responsibility should not be disturbed “unless it is without foundation.” United States v. Amos , 984 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1993). In determining whether a case is extraordinary, the court may consider whether the defendant’s obstructive conduct is “inconsisten t” with her acceptance of responsibility. See United States v. Hopper , 27 F.3d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court, in denying the downward adjustm ent, expressly considered that Ms. Wilson initially minimized her involvementand that she continued to provide false information to the court and the pros ecutor even after pleading guilty. See Rec. vol. IV, at 6-7 (Transcript of Sentencing Hr’ g held March 26, 1998). This behavior, inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, presents a4

sufficient foundation for the court’s denial of Ms. Wilson’s request for downward adjustment. See, e.g. , United States v. Tovar , 27 F.3d 497, 499 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[D]istrict court did not clearly err i n refusing to reduce [defendant’s] offense level for acceptance of responsibility” whe n defendant “obstructed justice by misrepresenting his age in his motion to dismiss ” the indictment, although he later pleaded guilty). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district c ourt’s refusal to grant a downward adjustment was clearly erroneous. We therefore AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the dis trict court. Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge