VIUNAM STUDIES 

The Development and 

Training of the 

South Vietna mese Army 

1950- 1972 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 74-34409 

First Printed 1975 - CMH Pub 90-10-1 

For salc hy th,' Supl"rinlCndl"1I1 of D<X'lIll1cllts. II.S. Go"~rnnwn l Printing Offk,' 

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Foreword 

The United States Army has mel an unusually complex challenge in Southeast Asia. In conjunction with the other services, the 

Army has fought in support of it nalional policy of assisting an 

emerging nation to develop governmclllal processes of its own 

choosing, free of outside coercion. In addition to the usual problems of wagin g armed connic!' the assignment in Southeast Asia 

has required superimposing the immense ly sophisticated tasks of 

a modern army upon an underdeveloped environment and adapting them to dema nds covering it wide spectrum. These in volved 

helping to fulfi ll lhe basic needs of an agTari an population, dea ling 

with the frustrat ions of antiguerrilla operations, and conducting 

conventional campaigns against well-trained and determined 

regular units. 

It is still necessa ry for the Army to continue to prepare for 

other challenges th:lt may li e ahead. While cogniz;mt that history 

never repeats itsel[ exactly and that no army e,'er profited [rom 

trying to meet a new challenge in terms o[ the old one, the Army 

nevertheless stands to benefit immensely from a study of its experience, its Shortcomings no less than its achievements. 

Aware that sollle years must elapse before the offic ial histories 

will provide a detailed and objeni\'e analysis of the experience in 

Southeast A,ia, we have so ught a (orum whereby some of the more 

$.1.l ient aspects of that experience can be made available now, At 

the request of the Chief of Staff, a representative group of senior 

officers who served in important posts in Vietnam and who still 

carry a heavy burden of day-to-day responsibiliti es has prepared a 

series of monogra phs. These studies should be of great val ue in 

helping the Army develop future operational concepts while at 

the same time contributing to the historical record and providing 

the American public with an interim report on the performance 

of men and officers who have responded, as others have through 

our history. to exacting and trying demands. 

The reader should be reminded that most of the writing was 

accomplished while the war in Vietnam was at its peak, and the 

monographs frequently refer to cvems of the past as if they were 

taking place in the present. 

All monographs in the series are based primarily on offic ial 
records, with additional material from published and unpublished 

secondary works, from debriefing reports and interviews with key 

participants, and from the personal experience of the author. To 

facilitate security clearance, annotation and detailed bibliography 

have been omitted from the published version; a full y documented 

account with bibliography is filed with the U. S. Army Center of 

j\'lilitary History. 

Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr., presently the 

Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, has the wealth of experience 

required to tell the story of all ied participation in the Vietnam 

War. After having served in Korea as the Assistant Commander, I 

Corps (Group) Artillery, General Collins had twO tours of duty 

in Vietnam that involved close liaison with all nations participating 

in the allied effort. In 1964 he was assigned as the senior U.S. 

adviser to lhe Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces, 

and in May 1965 was named Special Assistant to the Commander, 

U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. In the latter capacity 

General Collins was the personal representative of General West· 

moreland to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff on all matters 

pertaining to the co-ordination of U.S., Vietnamese, and allied 

forces operations. For his outstanding service in Vietnam, the Re· 

public of Vietnam awarded him the Nalional Order and the Army 

Distinguished Service Medal, two of its mOSt cove ted awards. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 April 1974 

VERNE L. BOWERS 

Major General, USA 

The Adjutant General 
Preface 

In 1954 the Army of South Vietnam was a collection of former 

French coloni al tToaps with littl e command experience and no 

support forces worthy of mention. Gradually and despite a con· 

sidcrable degree of political and soc ial instability, the Army, with 

strong American assistance, was molded into an effective fighti ng 

force by the efforts of Vietnamese leaders. After 1960 the South 

Vietnamese Army also acquired a counterinsurgency capability, 

but by 1965 increased political turmoil had undermined its effectiveness and necessitated the intervention of strong U.S. combat 

forces. 

From 1965 to 1968, while U.S. forces bore the brunt of the 

fighting, the SOllth Vietnamese slowly regrouped and, with increasing American advisory assistance and materiel support, once aga in 

became an effective fighting force. During this period the military 

provided security for the civilian population and administration 

and, in schools and training centers, laid the basis for a larger and 

more responsive military force. 

The battles of the Tel offensive of 1968 were followed by the 

general mobilization of South Vietnam and, one year later, by the 

decision of the United States to begi n troop redeployments. These 

moves set the stage for the third phase in the Army's development, 

Vietnami zation. The years from 1968 to 1972 saw a great ex pansion 

of South Vi etnam's terrilOrial security forces and militia, and the 

continual improveme nt and modernization of the regu lar Army 

as it once again assumed complete responsibility for the war effort. 

This monograph, covering the three stages in the growth and 

development of the South Vietnamese Army, highlights the role 

of the U,S. Army, especially the MACV advisory system, Most of 

the material presented is based on offic ial historical summaries 

prepared on a regular basis by the major U,S. military commands 

in South Vietnam. Special attention is given to the expansion of 

Somh Vietnam'S training base and her increasingly soph istica ted 

military school system. \Vhil e such a study can do no more than 

survey these activities, it docs rdlet.:t the deep and continuous 

comm itment by thousands of American soldiers to make the South 

Vietnamese Army a self-sufficient force capable of defending itself 

with minimum outside assistance. 

Washington, D.C. 

15 April 1974 

JAMES LAWTON COLLINS, JR. 

Brigadier General, U.S'. Army 

• 

Contents 

Chapter 

L THE FORMATIVE YEARS. 1950-1959 ... 

Backgrou lid. . . . 

Military AssistallCt! Advisory Croup, VietlUlm 

Organiwtioll and Force Strllcllire 

T rai1lillg . . . . . . . . . 

1 

2 

8 

12 

II. THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1960-1964 17 

The Problem, 1959- / 960 17 

Til e Imm ediat e R esp01I$t!, /960-/96/ J 8 

COIUllcrinsurgellCY Pia II, 1961 . 20 

Presitltmlial Support. 21 

U.S, Buildup. /96 1- /962. . 25 

e stablishment 0/ lite Milita ry Assistance Commal,d, 

Victnam .' . . . 27 

Years of Progress, /962-/96) . ....... 29 

Year.s 0/ Crisis, /96J-/964.. .. ..... 30 

Trainin g 0/ th e SOlllh Vietnamese Army, /960-1964 M 

A ir Support. . . . . . . . !6 

R ofe of the U.S. Army S/Jccia/ Forces. . . . 38 

The Civiliall IrregultlT De/twsc Crollp Program 40 

T erritorial Forces: Civil Guard and Self·De/ellSt! Corps 4 1 

Civil ADairs. . . . . . . . 43 

III. THE BUILDUP YEARS, 1965-1967. 47 

BackgrOlwtl . ' . . . . . . . 47 

M ilitary Assistanct: Commallrl Advisory E.'(P(l1l5ioll 48 

U.S. Army Special Forct:s Advisory Programs. 53 

Fillallcial Support. . . 55 

Mallpower R esources . . 56 

The Desertion Problem . 60 

ECOllOmic and Socia llm/Jrovemell/ . 63 

Fora Structure Expansion. 65 

Limits 0/ £XP(IIIS;O'I . . 67 

T erri/orial Forces. . . . 71 

T he Civilian Irregular Dt/ellse Grollp . 74 
Clla/lur Pagr 

Training alld L(;(Idership 75 

OUshore Train illg . 79 

South Vietnam Schools. 80 

IV. ETNA~IIZATION. 1968-1972 85 

BlIckgrorOld . 85 

IHobifization . 85 

Force Structure, 86 

DesertiOIlS 91 

Pay and A llowlI7lC1:s . 93 

Vet era" AUairs , 9·1 

Letldership 97 

MMbiel . 100 

Trai"j"g Ouerview 103 

School alld Training Cel/ler Improveml'llts ' 105 

Combined Arms Trainin g. 109 

Middle lI'1anagelllCllt Trllinin g 110 

Advanced T echnical Training 111 

Pilot Trail/illg Jar Ihe Soulh Vi clllMn Air Force. 112 

Oll.lhe·Job Training. . 114 

COlllbillCl/ Operatiolls I I7 

Mobile AdvisOr'Y T eams. 119 

V. OVERVIEW 123 

General 123 

Trainillg Cell/(;rs 123 

Unil Trail/jllg . 126 

M ilitary Schools 126 

SIIIIIIII(lry ami COllclusiolls', 127 

Appelldi" 

A. l\fajol' RVNA F Schools and T rai ning Centers Existing at the 

End of 1958 ' 131 

B. R VNAF Academies. Colleges. and Schools, 132 

C. RVNAF Training Schoo! Enrollments for 1970 150 

D. Republic of Vielllam Armed Forces 151 

GLOSSARY 153 

INDEX. . 155 

Maps 

No_ 

I. Location of R VNAF Academics. Colleges. and Schools, J %9 . 81 

2. Location of RVNAF Training Centers. December 197J 107 

viii 
Illustrations 

U.S. Military Advisory Group Headquarters. Saigon. 

Civil Guard Basic Training Class . 

Officer Candidates Train at Tim Duc . 

U.S. Army Adviser Trains at Battalion Level. 

U.S. Army Aviation Supports Soulh Vietnamese Units. 

Lonely Outpost of Self· Defense Corps. 

CIDG Unit Training. 

Ne",' Territorial Recruiu 

Training at Phu Cat 

Range Practice With New M16 Rifle. 

Cadets at Dalal. 

Rangers Defend Saigon, Ttl 

Instruction at Da Nang Vocational School 

Main LCnance Classes for New Equipment . 

Bridge Construction Training. Engineer School 

StudentS at Vung Tau Signal School . 

Vietnamese Student Pilots, Ft. Stewart. Ga .. 

Signal Training for Viet namese . 

l\,IAT Adviser Examines Homemade PF Mortar 

Soulh Vietnamese Armor in Cambodia 

South Vietnamese field Operation. 

AU iIIu5lratiOlli arc from Department of Ocfensc filel. 

5 

11 

15 

25 

26 

51 

41 

57 

77 

78 

82 

87 

96 

IO! 

112 

II! 

11 4 

115 

121 

129 

I!O 

THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY 

1950-1972 

CHAPTER I 

The Formative Years, 1950-1959 

Backgroutld 

The history of formal U.S. aid to Vietnam began on 1 May 

1950, when President Harry S. Truman approved a $ 10 million 

grant for urgently needed military assistance items for Indochina. 

Later. in December. the United States signed a Pentalateral Agreement with France and the associated states of Laos. Cambodia, and 

Vietnam tcnned the MUlUal Defense Assistance Program. Under 

this program the U.S. government committed itself to furnish 

military supplies, material, and equipment to Indochina for the 

purpose of halting the expansion of communism, and an American 

Military Assistance Advisory Croup (MAAG), Indochina, was 

formed to administer the support program. From 1950 to 1954 the 

United States contributed about $1.1 billion to France for the 

prosecution of the war including some $746 million \vorth of Army 

materiel delivered directly to the French Expeditionary Corps in 

Indochina. However, despite the magnitude of this aid, U.S. advisers exercised littl e if any supervisory authority. U.S. supplies 

and equipment were generall y turned over to the French, and, 

until 1955. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Indochina, functioned only as a small logistical accollnting group. 

Following the Indochina cease-fire agreement (Geneva Accords) 

of 20 Jul y 1954, the United States became directl y involved with 

advising and assisting the government o~ Vietnam (south), headed 

by President Ngo Dinh Diem. The Geneva Accords, a joint agreement between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

(north). divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel, provided 'for the 

withdrawal of all Communist forces from the south, and established 

strict limitations and prohibitions on the introduction of fore ign 

military personnel and materiel. Its provisions would be supervised by an International Control Commission (ICC) consisting 

of representatives from Canada, India, and Poland. The Eisenhower administration regarded the provisions as potentially disastrous and the United States did not sign or endorse the Accords. 

On 15 June 1954 Lieutenant General John W. " Iron Mike" 

O'Daniel. chief of Military Assistance Advisory Grollp, Indochina, 

had obtai ned agreement from the French commander in chief for 
2 DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

U.S. participa tion in training ViClIlamcse units and requested that 

more men be sent immediately. After the cease-fire General 

O'Daniel drew up plans for a comprehensive assistance program 

for the Army of the Republic of (Sou th) Vietnam, but the U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff were more cautiolls and declared it "hopeless 

to expect a U.S. military training mission to achieve success unless 

the nation considered is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential to the successful raising and maintenance 

of arllled forces." In opposition to this view, Secretary of Stale 

john Foster Dulles underlined the need "lO bolster that government by strengthening the army which supports it." Dulles was 

backed up by the National Security Council, and in the end 

political considerations overrode military objections; shortly thereafter Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, assumed a new 

training mission in suppOrt of the Diem regime. On 22 OClOber 

1954 U.S. Ambassador Donald R. Heath and O'Daniel were 

authorized to "collaborate in setting in motion a crash program 

designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese Forces," and General J. Lawton 

Collins was sent as a special envoy to Saigon to co-ordinate the 

endeavor. The result was a formal agreement in December between 

representatives of France, the Republic of Vietnam, and the 

United States to supply direct aid through the Military Assistance 

Program (MAP). 

Military Assistance Advisory Croup, Vietnam 

Shortly after the Geneva Accords the Military Assistance Ad· 

visory Group, Indochina, was split into separate components for 

Vietnam and Cambodia. The former, Military Assistance Advisory 

Group, Vietnam (MAAGV) (officially designated as such only in 

October 1955), was limited by the Accords to !H2 individuals. With 

these [ew the advisory group had the immense task of raising the 

military ca pabilities of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces 

through planning, developing, and administering military assistance. All plans to be co·ordinated with the remaining French 

forces, and in February 1955 a joint Franco·American Training 

Relations and Instructions li ssion (TRIM) was established with 

thirty-three U.S. and twemy·eight French officers and enlisted men. 

Headed by O'Daniel, the Training Relations and Instructions 

Mission was charged with developing a training program that 

would deill with Vietnamese command and staff organization and 

procedures, all planning and logistical activities, and both unit 

and individual training. To accomplish this mission, the team was 
THE fORMATIVE YEARS, 1950-1959 , 

THE U,S. MILITARY ADVISORY CROUP H EADQUARTERS, SAICON 

enlarged and orga nized in two echelons: " staff that advised and 

assisted the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense, the Vietnamese Gen· 

eral Staff, and the Vi etnamese Arms and Service Directorates, and 

a group of advisers who assisted and advised subordinate headquarters, units, schools, training celllers, agencies, and installations. Key staff positions were held by both French and U.S. 

officers. In the case of the advisory teams, if the senior were French, 

his immedi ate assistant was American, and vice vefsa. These ad· 

visory teams wefe placed within the military geographical subdivisions (regions), the fi eld divisions, light divisions, training cenlers, 

and schools. Members of the headquarters staff doubled in duty by 

:lCting as advisers to Iheir Vi etnamese counterparts in higher head· 

quarters and wit h the chi efs of the technica l services. Since the 

French still retai ned a portion of their army in South Vietnam, 

its chief. General Paul El y, was tcchnica ll y both head of the Training Relations and Instructions Mission and O'Daniers opera tional 

superior. However, Ely never interfered with TRIM operations, 

and in the following yca rs the French elements were slowly reo 

duced. 

Within this fTam ework the Training Relations and Instruc-
• DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

tions Mission had two chief objectives: first, to create a conventional army of divisional units and supporting forces by 1 January 

1956 and. second, to establish follow-through programs to increase 

and maintain the effic iency of this force. Furthermore. the combat 

infantry divisions were to have a dual capability of providing internal security and serving as a blocking or counterattacking (orce 

against an external atlack. The Training Relations and Instructions Mission set about accomplishing its training objectives 

through direct relations with the South Vietnamese high command 

and by the use of mobile train ing learns consisting of MAAGV 

personnel and technical service teams which were sent to Vietnam 

on a temporary duty (TOY) or "loan" status. The use of TOY 

personnel made it possible to provide increased training support 

since they were not included in the 342-man MAAGV ceiling 

imposed by the Accords. Later, on 25 August 1955, the International Control Commission requested that the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group include all temporary duty personnel in the 

!J42·man ceiling. Instead, the ad visory group organized substitute 

training teams composed of civilian specialists and technicians 

from the United States and cominued its efforts undisturbed. For 

example, the U.s. Operations Mission (a precursor of the U.S. 

Agency for International Development) contracted with Michigan 

State University to prov ide advisory personnel to the South Viet· 

nam government along with assistance in developing the territorial 

militia and an effective police organization. 

Although the Training Rela tions and Instructions Mission 

made some progress in beginning training programs and identify· 

ing problem areas, its work was severely limited by the internal 

military and political situation in South Vietnam. The South 

Vietnamese Army was still organized into small units and lacked 

trai ned leaders, equipment, and adequate logistica l capabilities at 

all levels. These units were scattered throughout the country, and 

a large proportion of them were still fighting remnants of the 

religious sects and other factions. The TRIM learn continued its 

existence until the French withdrew their advisers on 28 April 

1956. The French continued to maintain a small naval and air 

advisory mission until the £ollowing year. 

Throughout the early period a chronic problem of the ad· 

visory effort was its lack of personne l. The establishment of a 

separate Military Assistance Advisory Group for Cambodia in June 

1955 and a simil ar institution, the Programs Evaluation Office, for 

Laos in December eased the situation somewhat; so also did the 

transferral of forty.three spaces for administrative support person-
THE FORMATI VE YEARS, 195G-1959 , 

nel from the U.S. Embassy in Saigon to the Mil itary Assistance 

Advisory Group in Vietnam in 1957. 

These measures could not begin to remed y the basic probl em. 

The background of the siwation is fairl y cl ear, but deserves a 

detailed presentation, At the close of the Indochina War the 

French Expeditionary Corps had a strength of approxima tely 

140,000. It was agreed at the time of the signing of the de£ense 

agreement in December 1954 that the United States would su pport 

a reduced Vietnamese armed forces of approximately 100,000. By 

mid· 1955 the French Expeditionary Corps had been reduced to 

roughly 35,000, and other factors, such as the failure of special 

representatives of the French and Vietnamese to open negotiations 

on the fuwre status of the French forces in Vietnam, plus the (act 

that the French mil it.'1ry budget for ca lendar year 1956 made no 

provisions for Indochina , indicated a questionable future for the 

French in Vietnam at best. 

A second problem grew Ollt of the dominance of the French 

in the field of logistics up to 1956. Until that time both Vietnamese 

and Americans h •• d been excluded from this area, despite the fact 

that logistica l autonomy had been plr. nned for the Vietnamese 

forces by January 1956. U.S. influence on the logistics system was 

thus confined to the combined staff efforts of the Training Relations and Instructions Mission and, in r.ctuality. American influence on logistica l matters wa s practicalJy nil. As a result, the 

Vietnamese in late 1955 were unprepared to assume logistical 

responsibility Cor their army, and the limited number of U.S. 

logistical advisers could do little to offset the lack of Vietnamese 

experi ence. 

After January 1956 the accelerated withdrawa l of the French 

forces rurth er aggravated an already compl ex situation. The French 

literally dumped mountains of equipment upon the Vietnamese. 

Most of this materiel was improperly packed, indiscriminately 

piled, often placed in outside storage, and control1ed by inadcqucue 

or meaningless inventory records. T o add to this confusion, the 

Vietnamese were prone to open all packages to ascertain their 

contents. It is questionable whether the Vietnamese could have 

handled this situation properl y even if they had been better 

trained. 

With regard to the quality of the equipment, consideration 

must aga in be given to the circumstances of the French with· 

drawal. The French were confronted with a ra pidl y deteriorating 

situation in North Arrica, which required increasing qualHities of 

personnel and equipment. Therefore, they were primarily con· 

cerned with salvaging the best equipmelH for their O\\ln use. With 
• DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

this end in mind. the French were able to exploit the agreement 

which authorized their removal of i\'IAP-typc equipment based on 

a proponionate input. In the face of French reluctance to allow 

U.S. personnel to inventory this materiel, there was no way to 

determine the quality OT quantity of equipment. 

French refusal to allow U.S. personnel into their installations 

and dumps covered their natural effort to obtain the best of everything in the quantities desired for their future needs. As a matter 

of fact, the equipment turned over to the Vietnamese was in both 

respects inadequate. In mOSt instances, it had been used prior to 

Indochina and had subsequently seen hard service under wartime 

conditions. jVlaintenance requirements could not be met since 

critical sp.tre parts and tools were nonexistent. 

Provisions of the Geneva Accords relating to the introduction 

of war materiel was also a matter of concern. The French- North 

Vietnamese protocol specifically defined the nature of "arms, 

munitions, and war materiel" and also Olltlined the procedures 

{or the control of the importation and exportation of these items 

under the supen'ision and auspices of the International Control 

Commission. The Accords also established the procedures for 

notifying the commission in order that credi t could be obtained 

for items exported. However, these provisions were never strictly 

adhered to. Upon withdrawal, the French took vast quantities of 

materiel with them. Despite their responsibilities with respect to 

the Accords, it was assumed that onl y a small portion of these 

supplies was reported to the commission in such a way as to obtain 

credit aga inst future imports. Moreover, because the protocol was 

-:oncluded between the French and the North Vietnamese, the 

Saigon government consistently refuse4 to recognize its validity 

or to comply openly with its provisions. The French were expected 

to support this position in a showdown since it could be shown 

that they were remiss in complying with the provisions concerning 

exportation. 

Finally, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was never reo 

duced to a force goal of 100,000. In light of the rapid withdrawa l 

of most of the French forces, continued Viet Cong buildup, and 

the civil war agai nst the dissident sect forces, j\'lilitary Assistance 

Advisory Croup, Vietnam, took the position that such a (orce 

goal was inadequate. 'Vith the concurrence of the U.S. Embassy 

in May 1955, the adv isory group proposed a ISO,OOO·man force 

goal to be reached by I July 19S6, and this proposa l was subse· 

quently approved. However, all these developments together with 

the departure of the French Expeditionary Corps in April 19S6 

and the dissolution of the Training Relations and Instructions 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1950-1959 7 

Mission made it mandatory that U.S. advisory forces be increased. 

In order to satisfy this need, the manpower ceilings were bypassed with the establishment of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) on I June 1956. With an authorized 

strength of 350, the recovery mission raised the total size of Military Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam, to 692. Ovenly the 

recovery mission was to assist the advisory group in recovering 

excess war materiel being turned in. tn performing this function, 

the group supervised the removal of large qua ntities of materiel 

through exportation, destruction, and scrapping; additional items 

were sent out of the country for rep..lir and rebuilding and then 

returned to Vietnam. However, the Temporary Equipment Recovery ~rission's real assignment was to aid in developing an 

adequate and effective Smuh Vietnamese logistical system. TERM 

personnel were assigned to all major SOllth Vietnamese armt:d 

forces logistical organizations. Under their guidance, training 

courses were developed, selected logislicaJ officers were sent to U.S. 

service schools, and U.S. supply and maintenance procedures were 

adopted. Marked progress was realized in the reorganization of 

the medical, quartermaster. ordnance, and engineer services. Transportation and signal services did not show the same degree of 

advancement owing to reluctance of certain South Vietnamese 

Army officers to accept advice and to the lack of trained personnel. 

But by 1957 the transformation of the logistical facilities had 

largely been completed, and all the technical services were using 

U.S. supply procedures. The Temporary Equipment Recovery 

Mission had been introduced into South Vietnam without official 

ICC sanction, and in December 1958 the International Control 

Commission adopted a resolution urging the recovery mission to 

complete its activities by 30 June 1959. Consultations at the diplomatic level with the Indian ICC representatives extended the 

completion date to the end of 1960. But the major goal of the 

United States was to have the size of the Military Assistance 

Advisory Grollp in Vietnam legally increased to 888, the total o[ 

U.S. and French advisers in South Vietnam at the time of the 

Geneva Accords. The Canadians were enthusiastic and the U.S. 

Ambassador requested that the State Department begin immediate 

negotiations with Ottawa to increase the MAAGV strength ceiling. 

The dissolution o[ the Temporary Recovery l\'fission in 1960 only 

emphasized the need for more people. 

In December 1959 the Ollice of the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to prepare a new 

MAAGV joint table of distribution to reAeet the phase-out of the 

recovery mission. and in April 1960 the chief of the advisory group 
8 DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

indicated that the Internationa l Control Commission had favorably considered a request to increase MAACV strength to 685. On 

5 May 1960 the U.S. government offic ially announced that at the 

request of the government of South Vietnam the U.S. MAAGV 

strength would be increased from 327 to 685 members. Imple· 

mentation of this increase involved the conversion of TERM 

personnel to MAAGV stalUs during the remainder of 1960. 

OrganiUltion and Force Structure 

Organization and training of the Army of the Republic of 

Vietnam was the primary task of the Military Assistance Advisory 

Group, Vietnam, during 1956- 59. The South Vietnamese Army 

had been created in 1949 Ollt of units that had been native auxiliaries to the French Union Forces; these units were commanded by 

French officers and fouglll alongside regular French Army units. 

A series of decrees by the government of Bao Dai, recognized by 

the French as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the 

new State of Vietnam, provided a judicial basis for the evolving 

armed forces. A Ministry of National Defense headed by a Secretary 

o( State for National Defense was established on 19 September 

1049. A Vietnamese Air Force was authorized on 25 June 1951, 

a Vietnamese Navy on 6 March 1952, and a Marine Corps by decree 

of 13 October 1954. 

The earliest l\'IAP support levels provided for a force of 150,000 

starting on 1 July 1956. This level had been recommended after 

determination by the Country Team that the security of the Republic of Vietnam was threatened by both internal su bversion and 

external aggression. 1 However, despite the threat of subversion, 

initially no provisions were made to provide MAP funding for 

the paramilitary territorial forces, the Civil Guard, and the Self· 

Defense Corps militia. Realizing the importance of these paramilitary forces in assluning internal security duties, in November 

1956 Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. recommended 

that MAP support be provided for a Civil Guard force of 59,000 

and a Self-Defense Corps force of 60.000. But it was not until 1961 

that any appreciable financial support was available for the para· 

military forces. 

At the time of the 1954 armistice, the Vietnamese armed forces 

numbered about 205,000 men and consisted primarily of infantry 

• The Country T eam consisted of the U.S. AmbaMador in Saigon. the chief of 

Mil;ury Assistance Ad\';sory Group. and other senior officials who drew up a planning 

document that dealt with the political. military. c:<onomic. and psychological reqUire. 

menlS for fighting the Communist insurgency. 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS. 1950-1959 , 

units under French offi cer and noncommissioned officer cadres. 

This force included 152 infantry baualions, 2 airborne battalions, 

2 imperial guard battalions, 2 highlander infantry battalions, 2 

armored cava lry squadrons. 6 artillery battalions. and 5 engineer 

battalions. Under TRIM g-uidelines these units were reorganized 

into (our standard fi eld divisions of 8,100 men each and six light 

divisions of 5,800 men each and a number of territoria l regiments. 

The air and sea elements were smaller, ill-equipped, and poorly 

trained. 

Following the June 1954 cease-fire, and the subsequent division 

of the country. Army strength dccre .. sed rapidly. The primary 

ca lise was .. high desertion r .. te during the redeployment of troops 

(Tom North to South Vietnam. During the reorganization period, 

French officers "!ld noncommissioned oflicers were withdrawn, and 

a lightl y armed auxili .. ry force was inactivated. Army strength decreased even more Sharply .. fter 1954, while navy and air force 

strength grad uall y increased. The arllled forces as a whole, however, remained be low the 150,000 level supported by the United 

States. 

From 1957 to 1959 the Somh Vietnamese Army was further 

restructured under MAAGV guidance to meet the threat of extern .. ! attack. In October 1957 the advisory group began tests to 

determine the mOSl effocti ve and pr .. ctical organiza ti on for a 

standard di vision. The next two years saw more than two hundred 

tables o[ organization and equipment and t .. blcs of distribution 

developed in the search for the propcr organization. By September 

1959 the South Vietnamesc Army had been organized into seven 

standard divisions of 10,450 men e .. ch and threc Army corps he .. d· 

quartcrs. Each di\!ision consisted of th ree infantry regimellls, an 

artillery, a mort .. r, .. nd an enginecr battalion, and company-size 

support clements. The airborne troops were organi zed into a fivebattalion group and thc armor branch into four .. rmored cavalry 

"regiments" (approximatcly the equiva lent of a U.S. Army cavalry 

squadron), cach containing one squadron (U.S. troop) of M24 

light tanks and t\vo squadrons of ~I S self-propelled 75-mm. 

howitzers. The eight independent artillery battalions were 

equ ipped with U.S. to-mill. and IS-mill. pieces. Tactica l control 

was divided bctween I Corps at Da N<IIlg for lhe northcrn and 

central areas, II Corps at Pleiku for the Central Highl ands provinces, and I II Corps at Saigon for the so uthern part of thc country. 

Saigon city remained a special military district. 

Throughout this pcriod the paramilitary Civil Guard and SelfDefense Corps remained poor cousins of the regular Army. The 

Civil Guard had been created by presidential decree in April 1955 
10 OE\'ELOPME:-IT AN Il TRAI~I:\'G 

from members of inactivated wartime paramilita ry agencies and 

numbered some 68,000 at th e end of 19j6. Its primary fun ction 

was to rel ieve th e reg ul ar fORes of internal security duties, with 

additional missions of local ilHclligence colle('lion and C(J(lIlt crsubversion. The Ci"ii Guard was iniLially under lhe direct comral of 

the President, bill in ~c pl mb r 1958 it \\las placed under the 

control of the ?'·linisll'Y of the Interior. Orga nilcd illlo companies 

and platoons, th e Civil Guard was represented by two 10 eigh t 

,:olllp..lIl ics Iii e,ldl p lOl li Ke. In add ition, eight mobile b;lU,d ions 

of 500 mel! each were controll ed from a cel1lnd hcadq uarters in 

Saigon and employed in general support mission. 

The Self· Defense Corps had existed locally sincc 1955. lL was 

officia ll y established in April 1956 with some 48,000 non uniformed 

troops armed with Frent h weapons. The Selr-Defense Corps, like 

the Civil Guard, was estahlished to free regular forces from ill, 

tcrn~l security duties by provid ing ,I polke orga ni7.:ll ion at village 

level to protect th e population from sull\crsion and intimidation. 

Units of four to ten men each were orga nized in villages of 1,000 

or more inhabitanu. T he ch:lin of comnund extended from th e 

Iini try of the Interior to the pro\ ince chiefs. district chi efs. and 

village councils. The Civil CU;lrd and the Sclf-Dciense Corps were 

poorly trained and ill·equipped to perform their missions, and by 

1959 their numbers had declined to about 46,000 and 40,000, 

respectively. 

Command and cOll tl ol of the South Vietnamese defclI ~e forces 

was less than sa tisfactory. President Diem appointed Lhe Secretary 

of Stale for Na tional Defense who in turn su pervised th e activities 

of the General Sta ff chi ef and several spec ial subdepartments. The 

General staff chief, in turn , supervised th e Army staff and. through 

it. the military regions and th e field cOlllmands. In practice the 

system was beset by conflicting. dupli ca ting l hannels of cOlllmand 

and communications and by duplica te offi ces or agencies with 

overl apping interest.s. To further compliGlLe matt ers. variOlls major 

agencies o f the Department of National Defense wCle ill al1ed in 

widely separated areas, so a~ [0 hampe r ro-ord imllioll , rapid staff 

action. and decision'lIla\"'ing. 

Problems resulting from th is command structure \\'el e frequent. Often a division commander would receive ord ers from 

both the corps commander (who should ha\'e been his undisputed 

boss) and the region COnUlI,IIlUer ill whose regiun his di vision was 

stationed. III another caM!. brandl (inralllry, armor. :lIld so forlh) 

chiefs would give orders to unit'i of th eir br;mdles ,"hile the units 

in question were i1~sig ed to rleld commauds. l)eriMps the most 

llagTant c<lse in volver! the President himself, who. using his radi o 
THE FOR MATIVE YEARS, 1950-1959 II 

C IVIL GUARD BASIC TRAININC CLASS 

net from a van in the ga rden of the presidential palace, sometimes 

sent out operational orders directl y to combat regiments. bypassing 

the Depanment of N:ltional Defense, the Genera l Staff. and the 

fi eld commands. An example of duplicate agencies of primary 

interest was the presence of a Director of Air Technica l Service 

(who was nominally directly under the Chief of the Armed Forces 

General Staff but actuall y subordinate to the Director General of 

Administration. Budget, and Comptroller for fiscal matters) and 

a Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Mal( ri l. 

T he physic..1l location o[ various agencies also caused problems. 

The Depanment of Na tiona l Defense and most of the central 

organizations and the ministerial services were loca ted in downtown 

Saigon, while the General Staff (less air and navy elements) was 

inefficiently located in a series of company-size troop barracks on 

the edge of the CilY. The chief of the General Staff was thus removed several mil es from the Depanment of Na tiona l Defense. 

The na vy and air staffs were also se para tely loca ted in downtown 

Saigon. With such a physical layout, staff action and dec ision-making unduly delayed on even the simplest of mallers. 

The over-all ministerial struc ture described above was originally 

set lip by the French and slightly modified by presidential decree 

on 3 October 1957. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. 

had proposed a different command structure which would have 

placed the ministry and the "general staff" in closer proximity both 
" DEVELOPMENT AND TR..AIi\'ING 

physically and in command relationship. BUl the proposal was not 

accepted by President Diem, perhaps because he wished to can· 

tinue to maintain a division of power and prevcm anyone indio 

vidual--other than himself- from having too much authority. 

Thus, during the period in question, the existing system was accepted by the advisory group which. in turn, served as lubrication 

for its more delicate components. 

Tra;"illg 

In organlzmg and training the South Vietnamese Army, the 

United Slales relied heavily on its recent experience in South 

Korea. The similarity between the Vietnamese situation of 1954 

and (he Korean situation of 1950 prompted the Military Assistance 

Advisory Group in Vietnam to concentrate on developing a South 

Vietnamese force capable of meeting an overt invasion from North 

Vietnam. \Vhile the threat of an external aggression was real, it 

was not until 1959 that the imernal subversion and insurgency 

openly supported by the north was recognized as the major threat 

and that a strong cffort to ghe South Vietnam a counterinsurgency 

capability began. 

Troops for the anned forces were obtained through voluntary 

enlistmentS and conscription. The military service law enacted 29 

june 1953 prescribed a continuing active and reserve obligation 

(or all male citizens between the ages of eighteen and fony-five. 

Under the conscription pro&,-a1l1, initialed on I August 1957 and 

amended in january 1959, male citizens aged twcnty and twenty· 

one were called up for an eightcen-momh sen;ice period. In addi· 

tion, preinduction tr:lining was given in high schools to physically 

fit males fifteen years of age or older. Graduates of this two-year 

compulsory training program received no military rank, but if 

they were later inducted they were often sem to officer candidate 

school. 

During this period, South Vietnamese trainees underwent a 

31-week training program that had bcen devcloped by modifying 

appropriate U.S. Army training programs to conform to Vietnamese 

requirements. As in the United States, the training cycle consisted 

of four phases: basic individual, advanced individua l, basic unit, 

and advanced unit training. To assist in the massivc training process U.S. Army field manuals were translated, and both mobile 

training and contract civilian teams were active, despite ICC objections. One such team, consisting of personnel from the 1st U.S. 

Army Special Forces Group (Airborne), conducted a sixteen-week 

course at the Commando Training Center at Nil a Trang. For the 
THE FOR MATIVE YEARS. 19.50-1959 " 

most part the South Vietnamese Army fully utilized these teams, 

although at times U.S. methods were adopted onl y with reluctance. 

The i\fil itary Assistance Advisory Croup in Viet nam had hoped 

to have all tactica l units com pl ete a £ull cycle of trai ning by the end 

of 1957, but progress was slow. Initial plans had called for the 

Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps to take over the internal 

security mission while the South Vietnamese Army was undergoi ng training. But, since the poorly trained and ill-equipped 

paramilitary forces were unable to fulfill this task, it was continually necessary to divert regular forces away from their training program for operational requirements. I-loping to correct this 

defic iency, the advisory group establ ished provincial training centers to provide at least (our weeks of instruction to Civil Guard 

and Self-Defense Corps personnel. Although this step helped the 

situation somewhat, by mid-1958 three divisions, the airborne 

group, a majority of the combat engineers, and all of the territorial 

regiments had had either major interruptions or no training at all 

because of operational demands. 

Despite delays, lhe advisory group began an expanded training 

program in 1958. The new progr am was to proceed in twO cycles: 

I) a six-phase cycle of thirty-two weeks leading to advanced unit 

training and concluding with field maneuvers at regimental level 

and 2) followed by an an nual training cycle of fifty-two weeks within 

each corps area. The 32- and 52-week training programs extended 

to all arms and services and were based on modified U.S. Army 

training programs. The goal continued to be the construction of a 

conventional milit.1Ty force, and by September 1959 the training 

picture had brightened. Two of the seven infantry d ivisions were 

in the advanced unit training phase, as were the airborne group 

and the fi ve general reserve artillery battalions. The engineer 

groups were in on-t he-job training and building roads and bridges 

stage, and considerable progress had been made in train ing combat 

and service support elemems. In order to emphasize realistic tactical 

field training, two divisions were schedul ed to participate in maneuvers in January 1960, and night combat training was increased 

throughout all phases of instruction. 

Concurrent with the expansion and improvement in the tactical training programs, the Military Assistance Advisory Group devoted considerable effort to the development of a South Vietnamese 

Army service school and training system. The French military 

school system in Indochina reflected its own metropolitan system, but was modified sign ific3mly by the practice of never 

promoting native personnel into positions higher than junior 

officer. As a result, Vietnamese officers were usually untrai ned for 
" Df:VELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

command and sta ff positions higher than company level. As early 

as October 1956, MAAGV personnel participated with key Viet· 

namese officers on a master school planning board. The board 

ga thered factual information on all schools as a basis for developing a master plan and directed key changes in organizations and 

localion. An Army school system was started to provide technical 

and spec ialist schools, arm and service basic and adva nced courses, 

a military academy to train select young men for commissions in 

the Anny, and a replacement tra ining centcr to provide basic 

training for conscripts and new enlistees. The system was built 

around six key centers: 

I. a genera l school center at Thu Duc wit h a capacity for 1,000 

studen ts and comprising most of the arm and service technical and 

specialist schools; 

2. a separate infantry school, to be located initially also at Thu 

Duc, which would include a 400-student officer candidate school and 

later basic branch officer and noncommissioned officer courses; 

3. medical, intelligence, and psychological warfare schools to 

be located in the Saigon area owing to the availabil ity of facilities 

and other resources; 

4. the Military Academy at Dalat, with a two-year curriculum 

combining academic and military subjects to train new officers, to 

be transformed later into a four-year institution; 

5. a higher military school or college, located in Saigon with a 

capacity of 250 students: and 

6. a centralized replacement camp for training conscripts located at Quang Trung near Sa igon and with an annual capacity of 

approximate ly 24,000 (or about 8,000 at anyone time). 

In practice, the principal training establishment during this 

period was the Quang Trung Training Center, near Saigon, which 

gave eight weeks of basic training to all recruits and which gave 

advanced courses to infantry soldiers. Training in other branches 

of service was given at the special ized training centers, especiall y 

those at the Thu Duc Military Schools Center. Regular officers 

were trained at the Military Academy at Dalat and received further ca reer schooling at the TllU Duc Military Schools complex, at 

the Command and General Staff College in Saigon, and in schools 

abroad. Many reserve officers, obl iga ted to serve two years, passed 

through the Officer Candidate School at Thu Duc. The continued 

development of the school system made it possible to reduce the 

number of personnel which had to be sent every year for specialized and advanced training, or at least it made this type of training 

more selective. 

By the end of 1958 a total of eighteen schools and training cen· 
THE FORMATIVE YEARS. 1950- 95~ " 

OFFICER CANDIDATES TRAIN AT THU Due 

ters had been established and were training about 20,000 a year. 

(See Appendixes A atld n.) Another important addition w:ts an ex· 

panded English Language School. Finally, unit schools conducted 

training in such subjects as leadership, communications, and automotive operations. 

Another vital link in the American training effort was the Off· 

Shore School Program. Begun in 1955 under MAP sponsorship, it 

provided formal training for both officer and enlisted men in all 

branches of the Army at CONUS (continental United States) and 

overseas U.S. Army schools and included orientation tours for 

senior officers at various U.S. installations. The importance of this 

program soon became evident. During the French era in Vietnam 

all key command and staff positions had been occupied by French 

officers. After 1954 many Vietnamese officers had to occupy positions for which Ihey had insufficient training experience. This 

situation was particularly critical in the technical and logistical 

areas. By fisca l year 1954 a total of 3,644 Vielilamese officers and 

enlisted men were trained under the Off-Shore School Program in 

CONUS installati ons and schools, and 726 were trained at overseas 

Army installations. This program was highly successful in training 

key Vietnamese officers and specialislS, but needed to be expanded. 

The fiscal year 1960 j\'lilitary Assistance Program therefore pro· 

vided ror the training of 1,375 Vietnamese soldiers in the United 

States and 226 in allied countries. Probably the most valid criti· 

cism was U.S. development of the South Vietnamese Army into a 

conventional military force not properly organized. equipped. and 

trained to contest the guerrilla in the jungles and mountains where 
16 DEVELOPMENT AND TRAININC 

he lurks. The realization came in 1959 and massive efforts were 

finally begun to train Vietnamese units and personnel in counterinsurgency warfare. But owing in part to the nrength of the South 

Vietnamese Army, there was no conventional attack from North 

Vietnam similar to the invasion of South Korea. 

The obstacles Americans faced in training the Vietnamese dUTing this early period were many. Some were overcome. MAACV advisers noted critical training deficiencies. with incompl ete unit 

trai ning heading the list. Rising operational requirements made it 

impossible to institute effective training exercises fOT units already 

constituted-a shortcoming for wh ich harder or longer training 

for the individual recruit could not compensate. One result was the 

distinct lack of knowledge or techniques in combined arms opera· 

tions and amphibious and other joint operations. Officers at all 

levels lacked the experience and military schooling needed to 

qualify them for their positions. Another serious probl em was the 

shortage of officers and enlisted special ists for the technica l services. Units and schools both suffered from a shortage o( trained 

instructors. Finally. despite all efforts, the output of Vietnamese 

proficient in the English language never met the increasing demand for th is most difficult skill. 

Although progress had been made in years past in training and 

orga nizing the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. the internal 

situation in South Vietnam had deteriorated to lhe point that the 

Viet Cong were gradually gaining the initiative. By 1959 the enemy 

had greatly increased the tempo of his activities. ambushing and 

attacking large milit.,ry insta ll ations. Despite these developments. 

both the MAAGV chief. Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams. 

and the U.S. Ambass.,dor remai ned optimistic. As late as the spring 

of 1960 Williams was convinced that Saigon was in no danger and 

that a phased withdrawal of the Military Assistance Ad visory Group 

in Vietnam could begin soon. In retrospect. his judgments were to 

appear premature. 
CHAPTER II 

The Crucial Years, 1960-1964 

The Problem, 1959-1960 

By 1960 it was apparent that the armed forces of the Republic 

of Vietnam were incapable of dealing with the growing insurgency. 

Since 1956 the Viet Cong had been slowly turning the sollth il1lo 

a battlefield of unconventional \varfare and eroding the limited 

authority of Saigon in the countryside. Assassinations and other 

aeu of terrorism bega n to rise rapidly <l nd [or the first time battalion-size "nacks occurred against isola ted posts and small lOwns. 

When, on 26 January 1960, the Viet Cong overran a South Vietnamese Army regimental headquarters in Tay N inh Province and 

captured large amounts of arllls and ammunition, U.S. planners 

rea lized that n(\ ... and forceful actions and programs were needed 

if the government of Vietnam was to surv ive. The coming years 

would be crucial. 

The Un ited States had already begun responding to this new 

threat. The previous year, in May 1959, the Commander in Chief, 

Pacifi c (CINCPAC), directed that MAAGV advisers be provided 

down to infantry regiment and to artill ery, armored. and separate 

Marine baualion level. This move wou:d enable advisers to give 

on.the-spot advice and effectively assess the end result of the advisory effort. The Pacifi c commander in chief's orders forbade the 

advisers to participa te directly in com bat operations or to accompany units on antiguerrilla operations immediately adjacent to 

national boundaries. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, also took 

steps to obta in U.S. Army Special Forces mobile training teams to 

assist in training indigenolls "Ranger·' companies for countergu errilla warfare. The Ranger units had been created by President 

Di em, aga inst U,S. adv ice, simply by laking the fourt h company 

out of each infantry ballalion and redesigna ting it. These Ranger 

units thus constituted a special branch of the Army- in addition 

to the Vietnamese Special Forces-bUl as yet had received no special training which \\'ould justify their new mission. 

The major elements of the Republ ic of Vietnam armed forces 

at this time were three corps headquarters, seven infalllry divisions, 

one airborne brigade, the Ranger force of <lbout 9,000 men, three 

Marine battalions, a token Air Force and Navy, and a small nUI11-
18 nF.VFIOI'!on:'\'T '''ll fRAI':'"'' 

ber of logistical SliPPOI'I units. In 1960 the t'olililCll) J\~sis al1lt. ,\d· 

visory Group reported that the Republic of Vielllam amlcd forces 

were about 13.000 below its aUlhorifcd 150,000 level and that both 

the Civil Cuard and the Self-Defense Corps were below strength 

and still l'ITgely untrained. The Civil Guard and the Self-Defense 

Corps were not considered part of the Republic of Vietnam Army 

or armed forces until 1964. MAl) support was available for about 

25,000 Civil Guardsmen, bUl the Self·Defense Corps \\'<lS still not 

receiving any financial aid. In vicw of the growing insurgency these 

force levels had to be raised and both the tr:tining program and 

the organization of the Army modifi ed to provide the armed forces 

wilh a greatly strengt hened counterinsurgency cap.lbility. 

At the Pacific commanders conference in April 1959 General 

Williams, the chid of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, reviewed the situati on in Victnam and cited what he felt 

were the most serious problems: absence of a nati onal plan for 

control of the situation, no rotation of military units in the field, 

the need for a central surveillance plan, the proliferation of Ranger·type counterinsurgency units, the lack of intelligence conccrn· 

ing enemy activiti es. an inadequate miliwry communications 

system. and the neecl for a single commander to dire<.:t the war 

effort. Williams <l Isa underlined the inability of the Civil Guard 

to maintain internal security and the ensuing commitment of 

South Vietnam Army units to stability operations in lieu of training. The Civil Guard was still undcr the government of Vietnam's 

Department of Interior and controlled locally by the province and 

district chiefs. While this arrangement madc it possible for the U.S. 

Operations ~Iission to support the Civil Guard financially, it also 

made it extremely difficult to implement any significant illlFrove· 

menU for these scattered troops. 

The Immediate Respo'lSe, 1960-1961 

In March 1960 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff UCS) began draw· 

ing up a comprehensive cOllnterinsurgency plan which would unite 

all U.S. and South Vielllamese clements behind a C0l11111On objec· 

tive. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs reversed their past policy 

a nd recommended that the Vi etnamese Army develop a counter· 

insurgency capability over and above th at supplied by the terri· 

torials. Later, in June, the Milit;lry Assistance Advisory Croup 

approved the formation of severa l Ranger battalions to spearhead 

the cOllnterinsu rgency effort, and in September the advisory grollI', 

under its new chief, I.ieutenant General Lionel C. McGarr, super· 
THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1960-196-f 19 

vised the development of the new counterinsurgency plan at the 

Saigon level. Finally, in October, the advisory group recommended 

an immediate 20,000-lI1an increase in th e South Vietnamese armed 

forces structure. 

Efforts to restructure the expanded Vietnamese Army and 

armed forces for the counterinsurgency effort had only mixed 

success. In March 1960 the government of Vietnam approved in 

principle a national planning system without providing for the 

necessary national level direction and control to ensure that the 

system would be implemented and integrated. 

Although the chief of the South Vietnam armed forces J oint 

General Staff (JGS) received responSibility (or the mili tary security 

of the nati on, the tools necessary to fulfill this responsibility were 

either denied him or were made ineffective. Individuals and agencies not directly or fully responsible to the Joint Genera l Staff still 

had direct influence over units and agencies of the Sotuh Vietnam 

armed forces. For example, forty-two key leaders, each responsible 

for pacifica tion within his own sphere of responsibility, reported 

directly to President Diem. These included the thirty-eight province chiefs who by-passed all military authority, three military 

region commanders who by-p'lssed the J oint General Staff and field 

commands, and one field commander. President Diem remained 

reluctant to delegate responsibility or to furnish the means to individuals whereby they might accomplish their missions and insisted on retaining tight control of all civilian and military 

activities. 

On 7 October 1960 President Diem, at the urging of the U.S. 

Ambassador, re-established the Internal Security Council to coordinate governmental actions at the highest level. The Internal 

Security Council would be similar to the U.S. National Security 

Council and act as an executive agent for Diem by issuing orders 

and instructions to the Department of National Defense and other 

government agencies instrumental in carrying out the counterinsurgency campa ign. This setup placed responsibility on the 

Permanent Secretary-General for National Defense for executing 

council decisions. Later, on 3 December, a South Vietnam government decree placed the Civil Cuard under the control of the Department of National Defense. This arrangemelll allowing Military 

Assistance Advisory Group to assume responsibility for training 

and equipping the Civil Guard, with the cost to be borne by the 

International Cooperation Administration, represented a major 

organizational improvement. 
20 DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

COIHllerinsurgt:ncy Plan, 1961 

In August 1960 the U.S. Dep:mments of Defense and State approved the Jes outline plan for counterinsurgency operations in 

Vietn<nll and Laos, and the Coumry Team in South Vietnam proceeded to prepare a m OfC detailed plan based on this initial 

gu idance. The final COllnterinsurgency Pl an was approved on 6 

Fcbruuy 1961 and laid down the basic gu idelines for most future 

U.S. plans and actions. Its objective was to halt the spreading in· 

surgency by reforming and enlarging the military forces of the 

government of Vietnam. In concept, the plan divided most of the 

country into tactical camrai zones supervised by military headquarters of appropriate size and strengt h. Security would be pro-

\·jded by a combination of regular, Ranger, and territorial units. 

The Counterinsurgency Pl an proposed to raise MAP support for 

the Vietnamese armed forces from 150,000 men to 170,000 and to 

support a Civil Guard force of aproximate ly 68,000. The proposed 

20,000-man Army increase was to provide 15,000 spaces for combat forces and 5,000 spaces for logistical support units. 

The major increase in the combat forces called for the activation o r three infantry regiments (about 7,000 spaces) which would 

allow the Vietnamese Army to maintain its cun-em fi eld strength. 

Specific counterinsurgency elements were also strengthened. Onefirth of the increase (about 3,000 spaces) was pledged to expand the 

Ranger units from sixty-five to eighty-six companies. By this time 

all sixty-five existi ng companies had been trained and equipped for 

counterinsurgency operations and '!Jere committed. Equally important, the Vietnamese Special Forces were to be more than 

tripl ed with a 500-man increase. T hese units had been trained by 

U.s. Army Special Forces teams to carry out unconventional warfare operations behind enemy lines and by early 1961 were being 

employed to conduct long-range reconnaissance operations; search 

out, orga nize. and direct anti-Viet Cong elements including ethnic 

and rel igious groups; recruit and orga nize tribal (Montagnard) 

border watchers; and establish intelligence nets along the Cambodian and Laotian borders. In an auempt to cope with the serious 

deficiency in military intelligence, the Counterinsurgency Plan 

proposed establ ishing the equivalent of a U.S. Army military intelligence baualion. The battalion would include a security company, 

an intelligence collecti on company. a linguistic company (interroga lor-translator), and cellular iutel1 ige nce teams designed to support 

tactical intelligence needs or to conduct co·ordinated operations on an area basis. The unit would thus provide a wide range 
THE CRUCIAL YEARS. 1960--1964 " 

oC intelligence support at all echelons for the equivalent of a field 

army. 

Other major additions included two civil affa irs compani es, one 

air support operations cellter at each corps headquarters, twenty-fou r 

air-gro und tea illS to provide bettcr co-ordination for air support, 

and a CH- 34 helicopter squadron to permit the lift of one rifle 

company. T he 5,000 logistical spaces would correct the imbalance 

in support activities. New support units would be organi zed, and 

the logistical system would be restructured to provide regionallogistica l commands to support the tactical commanders in the field. 

These changes would end the inherent problems of the existing 

system that auempted to control all logistical support operations 

from Saigon. 

The COllnterinsurgency Pla n also strove to'strengthen the J oint 

General Staff by creating a JOi nt Operations Staff within the J oint 

Gencral Staff that would have the mission and authority to deve lop 

national pla ns for pacifica ti on and Olher opera Lions. J oim Operations Staff control was to be exercised through subordinate headquarters following normal command channels of the military 

organization. In addition. the plan \·isualized that in areas where 

pacification operations were to be conducted. supreme authority 

would be vested in a senior tacti" ll military commander. All 

agencies, both military and civilian. would be subordinated to this 

commander during the period of operations. 

Prt:5ide'll itil Su pport 

In April 1961, in response to the deteriorating situation in 

Southeast Asia, President John F. Kennedy inaugurated a series of 

actions designed to bolster the Republic oC Vietnam and demonstrate to the world his firm determination to take whatever steps 

were necessary to de£end that country. In April representatives of 

the United States <lnd the Republic of Vietnam signed a tre<llY of 

amity <lnd economic relationships, and the National Security Council, with the chid o( the r\,Jilitary Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, in attendance, took steps to inaugurate a program to assist 

South Vietnam. A special gl'OUP, Task Force Vi etnam, was formed 

initially under the Department of Defense to guide the program; 

later the State Depanment assumed responsibility. A counterpart 

body. Task Force Saigon, consisting essentially of the South Vietnam Country Team, was organi zed to formulate an effective program on the ground level. Although Military Assistance Advisory 
I>EVElOPMENT AND TRAINING 

Group, Vietnilln, was not initi all y included in Task Force Saigon, 

it later ga ined representation. 

Al this time President Diem abolished the system of military 

regions and made his army fi eld command responsibl e for counlerinsurgency operations. This step proved relative ly ineffective, for 

President Diem cominucd to retain tight control of all operations. 

No single military chain of command from the field command to 

lhe units and agencies engaged in counlerinsllrgency operations 

existed ; corps and military district commanders continued to receive their instructions directl y from the President. On II May 

1961 Vice President Lyndon B. J ohnson visited South Vietnam to 

disc llss the matter of increased aid , ... ith the Vietnamese officials. 

One of the conditions for cominucd U.S. aid was to be a reorgani· 

za ti on of the elllire politica l-mil itary setup. President Di em agreed 

but cominued to dominate military operations. 

On 13 i\<fa y 1961 both President Kenned y ;md Secretary of State 

Dean Rusk declared that the Republ ic of Vielllam was to get added 

military and economic assistance and that consideration was to be 

gh'en to the use of U.S. forces, if necessary, to help resist internal 

Communist pressure in Vi etnam. This joint communique was followed on 19 May by President Kenn edy's announcement of his 

Presidenti al Action Program. The program approved the basic 

clements of the i\IAAGV Counterinsurgency Plan and increased 

U.S. financial aid by $1 1 million to support the higher force levels. 

Specifica ll y, the Presidential Action Program authorized the following measures: 

I. MAP support fOI" a 20,000-man increase in the South Vietnam 

armed forces strength ; 

2. augmt!ntation o[ the Military Assistance Ad visory Group to 

ensure effecti\'e impl ementation of the program, to include the 

training of the additional 20,000 troops; 

3. consideration of an increase in the South Vietnam armed 

forces strength beyond the 170,000 limit; 

4. i\fAP support for the entire Civil Guard force of 68,000 men; 

5. expansion of advisory support to the Se lf-Defense Corps; and 

6. provision of more U.S. Spec ial Forces mobile training teams 

to speed up the training of the Vietnamese Special Forces. 

While the Presidemial Acti on Program wa s being implemented, South Vietnam leaders in mid·June 196 1 made their own 

force level proposals. Their request corresponded closely with an 

earlier pro posal by i\filitary Assiswnce Advisory Group on 19 !\<fay 

and outlined the creation of a fifteen-division force totaling 278,-

000 men. This was to be a phased buildup, and as a first step they 

requested two di visions requiring an over-all Vietnamese armed 
THE CRUCIAL YEA RS, 1960-1964 " 

forces increase of 30,000. In consideration of the SOllth Vietnam 

governmen t request, on 4 August President Kennedy announced 

that the United States would support an armed force of 200,000 

men, with the condition that an agreement on the training and 

employment of these additional 30,000 men be reached. No decision was made on the request for a force increase above the 200,000 

level. 

At first, these measures had littl e effect on the situation in the 

field. Activation of new units created by the force increases was to 

be completed by the end of 196 1. However, by the end of August, 

Vietnamese armed forces strength was onl y about 153,000- fa r 

short of the 170.000 goal and farther still from an Army of more 

than 200,000. By Se l}tember it was thus apparent that the Presidential Action Program was in danger of bogging down. Funds 

were slow in havi ng an impact, and both desertions and combat 

operations continued to take a rising toll of available personnel. 

The creation of new units only stretched existing leaderShip and 

personnel resources. Moreover, the government of Vietnam h<ld 

only barely begun to show receptiveness to U.S. proposals and <ldvice for military reorganization, and the danger of defeat loomed 

closer than ever. Thus, in October 1961 , President Kennedy sent 

General Maxwell D. T aylor to South Vietnam to make an on-thespot anal ysis of the situation and establish the basis for new decisions. 

Taylor reported that the South Vietnamese governmem was losing the war through poor tactics and administration. and he recommended increased American support for the territorial (orces, 

an expansion o[ Military Assistance Advisory Group, and the introduction of American logistica l support forces into Vietnam to 

increase the mobil ity of the South Vietnamese Army. During 

Taylor's visit President Di em had asked for a bilateral defense 

treaty with the United States and for the dis»<'ltc h of U.S. combat 

troops to his country, but in November President Kennedy de· 

cided not to commit U.S. forces and instead to bolster the military 

strength of South Vi etnam. 

On 4 December 1961 , however, President Kennedy informed 

President Diem that the United States was ready to participate in 

a sharply increased joint effort with the South Vietnamese government. Referring to a memorandum of understanding previously 

approved by President Diem, President Kenn edy's communica tion 

outlined [undamental new steps in U.S.-South Vietnamese collab· 

oration, including the participation of U.S. uniformed troops in 

operational missions with South Vietnam Army forces and close.. 

Vietnamese consultation with American advisers in planning the 
" DEVELOPMENT AND TRAI:-<I NG 

conduct of security efforts. All forms of aid previously furnished 

were to be increased significantly. The United States would 

spedfica ll y provide the following : 

1. increased airlift to South Vietnamese forces, including helicopters, light aviation and transport ;tircraft. manned as necessa ry 

by U.S. uniformed personnel and under U.S. operational control; 

2. additional equipment and personnel required for air recollnaissance. photography, instrtlclion in the execution of air-ground 

sUpJXlrl techniques, and special intelligence; 

3. small craft and U.S. uniformed advisers and operating pcr· 

sonnel for surveill ance and control of coastal and inland waterways; 

4. expedited training and equipmelll for the Civil Guard and 

Self·Defense Corps to relieve regular forces fTom static missions 

and use them for mobile offensive operations; 

5. necessary personnel and equipment for improving the mili· 

tary and political intelligence systems. beginning at the province 

level and extending upward through the government and armed 

forces; and 

6. additiona l personnel to Military Assistance Advisory Group 

to support the increased U.S. panicipation. 

The subject rece ived further attention at the Secretary of De· 

fense conference held in Hawaii that December. There Secretary 

of Defense Robert S. NcNamara authorized Military Assistance 

Advisory Group to provide an adviser for each province chief and 

advisory teams down LO battalion l~vel for operational units. In 

order to expedite the training of the Civil Guard and the Se lf· 

Defense Corps. new training centers were to be established and ad· 

viser strengths increased. In addition, the need for intelligence 

advisers to improve the margi nal int elligence capabilities of the 

Vietnamese was recognized ; these specialists would assist corps, 

divisions, and province headquarters as well as higher level staffs. 

At that time, the Secretary of Defense indicated that the existing 

U.S. policy did not anticipate the employment of American troops 

aga inst the Viet Cong; however, South Vi etnam was to have the 

highest priority for aid, and lhe United States was to provide 

everything needed to control the rising insurge ncy except combat 

troops. Secretary McNamara also ind icated that money was not to 

be a controlling consideration in planning operati ons. Conferees 

also d«ided that the United States would prepare detailed cam· 

paign plans for submission to the Soulh Vietnam go,'ernment and 

lO the Vietnamese field commanders, and also a border control 

plan. All these measures meant more American personnel so that 

by the end of the year MAAGV strength authorization had again 

been pushed up. 
TI lE CRUCIAL YEARS. 1!JOO-1!J64 25 

U.S. ARM Y AOVISER TRAINS AT n ATIA U O:': Lt:VEL 

U.S. Buildllp) /96/- / 962 

The proposed counterinsurgency program placed equal strcss 

on civic, economic, ;lIld military actions. Civil ian contract technica l 

representatives acted both as instructors and skill ed workers; mo· 

bil e trai ning teams set up courses of instruction for intelligence, 

chemica l, biological, and radiological, and psychological warfare 

activities. Six Vielllamese Army and nine Civil Gua rd training 

centers as well as two division:.1 training areas II'crc programed 

(or completion by September 1962 to provide for increased training requirements resulting from the South Vietn<nll armed forces 

increase of 20,000 men. By September 196 1, three Vietnamese Army 

training centers were in operation and were rece iving American 

personnel to help trai n three recently acti vated Vietnamese Army 

regiments. During 196 1 the most important training activiti es in 

South Vietnam were the training or Ranger units, the Civil Guards 

and the Sel[·Defense Corps; the use of the mobil e training teams; 

the establishment o f a medical training center at Sa igon; the establishment or a Republ ic of Vietnam armed rorces Joil\[ Genera l 

Staff Combat Development and Researth Center: and the trai ning 
J)E". LOP~It::-;T A~D TRAI"'ISC 

SoUTH VIETNAMESE TRool'S BOARDING U.S. ARMV l-h :L1COPTER 

of the Vietnamese Junk Force, for whi ch MAl) fu nds were autllOrized late in 196 1. 

In mid-196 1, the chief of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces 

Joint General Staff authorized MAAGV advisers to accompany 

Vietnamese battalion and company-size units in combat with the 

understanding thill they \\'oll id only observe and advise. This 

authority, with which the Commander in Chief, Pac ific, concurred, 

was intended to permit advisers to help Vietnamese commanders 

in operalion:d, signal, and logistica l mallers; in the establishment 

and operation of aerial supply points; and in communication advice and support. Although armed, the advisers were not to engage 

in aClU al combat except in self-defense. 

The expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces, the determination to authorize MAP support for the Civil Guard and Se lfDefense Corps, and related training and admin istrative problems 

caused a sharp increase in MAAGV strength. The J oint Chiefs of 

Staff authorized a MAAGV increase from a May 1961 base of 740 

personnel, 574 of which were U.S. Army, to 1,904 spaces (to include, I,GOG U.S. Army personnel.) In December 1961 the Commander in Chief, Pacific, requested that the Joint Chiefs augment 

the j'vIAAGV staff by fort),-fi\'e to provide an Aviation Section and a 

Naval Section in the Operation Division. As of 12 December 196 1, 

the ac tual MAAGV strength was 1,062. In addition, 1,209 military 

and civilian personnel were present for dut), and working directly 

rOT Military Assistance Advisory Croup. Vietnam, on classified 

and other miscell aneous projects. Also in Del;ember, two helicopler 

compani es (438 men) arrived in South Vietnam. 

Most U.S. personnel increases occurred during the last three 
T IU: CRUCIAL y[,\RS. 900- 96~ 27 

months of 196 1. creating logistical probl ems that arose primarily 

from a lack of policy guidance regarding fund resources and su pport responsibilities. U.S. TOE. units deployed to South Vietnam 

were support ed by their parent scrvit;es. The expansion of the advisory ef[ort involvi ng American personnel and eq uipmellL assigned 

to South Vietnam units in the field committed U.S. men to field 

communi ca tions and intell igence ope rations and made necessary 

the assignment of add itional U.S. personnel to MAACV. Some of 

the equipment in volved in the bui ldup program was La be included 

in the fiscal year 1962 Military Assistance Program for South Vietnam. Some questi ons also existed concerni ng title to other equipment sent in for use by U.S. forces for which the fund source 

rema ined undeterm ined by the end of 1961. These probl ems. 

coupled with the arrival of American comba t su pport units, made 

cl ear that a single control agency \ \';1S required to guide lhe U.S. 

military cf[ort in the Republic of Vi elilam. 

Establishment 0/ the Military Assistrmce Command, Vietnam 

On 23 November 1961 the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the 

Commander in Chief, Pac ific, to be prepared to establish a unifi ed 

or joint (Arm)'- Nav)'- Air Force) command and develop a suitable 

staff for a Commander. U.S. Forces, Vietnam, with the object of 

increasing U.S. mi litary and economic assistance to the Republic 

of Vi etnam and of increasing American participation in the effort 

to eli mi nate the Viet Congo The Joint Chiefs envisaged that a 

commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam would control all intelligence 

operations. all MAAGV functions ha ving a direct bea ring on Vietnamese armed forces combat ca pabilities. and economic aid relating to counteri nsurgency. The commander of U.S. (orces in 

Vietnam would have the mission of assisting and supporting South 

Vietnam in defeat ing Commu nist insurgency and in d eSlroying the 

Vi et Cong. He would also have full authority over all U.S. assets 

in South Vietnam thal could or should be used in a unified effort 

against the Viet Cong, il nd he \\'ould be the princi\><11 U.S. military 

adv iser and single spokesman for American mil itary affairs in South 

Vietnam. 

As planned by the Joint Ch iefs of Starr. the commander of U.S. 

forces in Vi etnam would have a small joint and specia l staff to 

concentrate on pla nning, operations, and intelligence; a service 

component was to handle the actual troop support; and the Vietnamese armed forces training advisory fun ction \\'as to remain with 

Chief. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, " .. ho would 

also be the Pacific commander in chief's direct representative in 
28 DEVELOI'MENT ANO TRAINING 

planning, programing. and administering th e Military Assistance 

Program. The j oilll Chiefs also wanted a small logistical support 

activity to be established LO back up all clemcllls of the commander 

of U.S. forces in Vietnam as well as a research and development 

center and a J oint Unconventional \Varfare Task Force (to include ComTolled American SOlll"ce, U.S. OperaLion Mission, and 

U.S. Information Service). 

On 8 February, with the approval of President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense i\IcNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Commander in Chief, Pacific, AdmiT,,] Harry D. Felt, established a 

U.S. Military Assist;lIlee Comma nd. ViClIlam (USi\fACV), and designated Lieutenant General Paul D. I-Iarkins (who was promoted 

to general) as comm;mder (CO~I US~IACV). The Commander in 

Chief, Pacific, also set forth terms of reference for the new command. The Commander, U.S. Ii[it ary Assistance Command, Vietnam, as the senior U.S. military commander in the Republic of 

Vietnam, was directly responsible for all U.S. military polic)', operations, and assistance in that C;Ollntry. He was authorized to discuss both American and Vietnamese military operations directly 

with President Diem and olher South Vietnam leaders. The MACV 

commander also had access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the 

Secretary of Defense through the Pacific commander in chi ef. 

However, since the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam was responsible for American political and basic policy matters, the 

MACV commander was to consult with him on those matters. If iI 

difference of view existed, both the MACV commander and the 

U.S. Ambassador could communicate their positions directly to 

\Vashington for decision. Both the U.S. Ambassador and the 

MACV commander were also responsible {or keeping each other 

fully informed, especially on all high-level contacts with the Republic of Vietnam, major military plans, and pending operations. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was also kept separate 

from Military Assistance Advisory Grollp, Vietnam. General Harkins was charged directly with the responsibility for all military 

policy, operations, and assistance in South Vietnam and [or advising the government of Vietnam on alJ malters relative to security, 

organization, and use of the regular and paramilitary forces. The 

Military Assistance Ad visory Croup remained a separate entity still 

charged with the mission of lraining and advising the armed forces, 

and it was subordinate to Military Assistance Command. On 16 

February the Joim Chiefs authorized 216 spaces for the new headquarters which began to function shortly thereafter. 
THE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1960-1964 

Years oj Progress, 1962-1963 

By 1962 many of the measures taken during the past two years 

began to bear fruit. Significa lll ga ins were made in all areas owing 

to the buildup of U.S. advisory and oper<1tion<t\ support forces, 

and the gre<tter strength and effectiveness of both the South Vietnam Army and the territorial unilS. Regul ar force strength grew 

to approximately 219,000, exceeding the 200,000 authorized level. 

The Civil Guard expanded to a total of 77,000 and the Self-Defense 

Corps to 99,500, and a ncw paramilitary force, the Civilian Irregular Defense Grollp (CIDG), was established and, by the end of 

1962, totaled about 15,000. In 1963 MAP supported levels rose to 

225,000 for the Vietnamese armed forces, 86,000 for the Civil 

Guard, and 104,000 for the Self-Defense Corps. 

Sign ificant organizational changes were also made in 1962. 

Separate Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Forces commands 

were established as major subordinate elemems of the armed forces; 

a Joint Operations Ceiller was created at the J GS level to control 

milililry operations of national scope: and South Vietnam was operationally divided into four corps tactical zones (CTZ) and a 

Capital Military District. A field corp headquarters controlled each 

corps tactical zone while a special command ran the more sensitive 

Capital Military District. 

Long-range planning activities also illlensified during 1962 and 

resulted in the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam. The plan, 

in iment and purpose, was conceptually an extension of lhe Counterinsurgency Plan of 1960. Its objective was to provide the government of Vietnam with the military assista nce and equipmem 

necessary to bring tbe insurgency under control, maintain its 

sovereignty, and allow the United States to phase Ollt special military assistance beginn ing in 1964. To atta in its objectives, the 

Comprehensive Plan for SOllth Vietnam depended on the success 

of the developmcnt and implementation of the many supporting 

military plans and programs. Among the most vital were the National Campaign Plan, the Strategic Hamlet Program, and the 

ClOG Program. Incre<lsed military force levels were also critical. 

The Comprehensive Pl an envisaged a pe<lk armed strength of 

575,000 in mid-1963 with a gradual phase-down to 368,000 as the 

governmelll approached its goal of cOlllrolling 90 percent of the 

population. 

Long-ra nge pl<llls were <llso be ing developed .which provided 

for a decrease in the South Vietnamese armed forces structure over 

a five-year period and a reduction of 1,000 U.S. personnel. The 

final plan, called the Accelerated Model Plan, was based on the 
" DEVELOPMENT ANI) TR.AINI NG 

assumption that the Viet Cong insurgency would be suppressed 

by the end of 1964 in the northern and central areas and by 1965 

in the delta; after that, it was assumed, onl y a lil ilary Assistance 

Advisory Group of about 3,000 personnel would be required. 

These plans weTe never to be put into effect. 

Years 0/ Crisis, 196)-1964 

By lhe end of 1962 it appeared that U.S. efforts had been SlICcessful. The buildup of its ad visory and opera tional support 

strength together Wilh its intense emphasis on cOlllllcrinslirgency 

instruction had greatly improved 50mh ViClIlamese armed forces 

operational efficiency, and militar y trends were beginning to favor 

South Vietnam. Over-a ll U.S. military strength had more than 

tripled during the year and now total ed 11 ,326, while the MAAGV 

staff had grown from an authorized strength of 1,949 at the end of 

196 1 to 2.989 (of which 1,138 were designated as fi eld advisers). 

BUl suddenly in 1963 the situation was dramatica ll y reversed and 

U.S. optimism quickly faded. The Buddhist riots during the summer were only a prel ude to the military coup which ousted the 

Diem regime. This even t, in turn, sp..1.rked a period of renewed 

civil unrest and pol itical instability From which the South Vietnam 

government did not begi n to emerge until late 1965. The U.S. 

advisory and assistance ef[ort was caught in the middle. 

General Harkins refused to let his advisers report to their 

assigned units if those units were to be used to quell Buddhist 

riaLS or for olher nonmilitary purposes. When Diem declared 

martial law on 22 August and began mass arrests of Buddhists, a 

resolution was introd uced into the U.S. Senate ca ll ing for the withdrawal of all American forces and halting all aid unless the Diem 

government abandoned its repressive policies. Di em ended Ill:lnial 

law on 16 September, but economic aid was nonetheless at a virtual 

standstill during October. The immediate problem was fi nally 

solved when Diem was killed during the coup of 1- 2 November. 

During the crisis South Vietnam armed forces strength fell by 

approximately 3,000 spaces, down to a total of 216,000 troops, 

while increases of about 11,500 lIl en were made in the Civi l Guard 

and Self-Defense Corps and 3,000 for the Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group. Civil Guard strengt h rose to 85,900, lhe Self-Defense Corps 

remained around 100,000, and the Civili an Irregular Defense 

Group total ed 18,000 by lhe end of the year. The '" home militi,," 

character of th e g:lining units had alwa ys made them popular in 

times of stress. But these statistics obsc ured high desertion rates 

and constant personnel turnover. At the same time, the acti va tion 
TIU: CRUCIA L YEARS. 1960-1964 " 

LoNELY O UTI'OST OF SELF-DEFENSE CORPS 

o( new combat un its within the regu lar Army and th e territorial 

(orces continued unabated. The South Vietnam Army, comprising 

the bulk of the regular forces wit h 192,000 men, was now orga nized 

into 4 corps, 9 div isions, I a irborne brigade, I Special Forces grou p, 

.3 separa te regiments, I terriLQrial regiment, 86 Ranger compan ies, 

and 19 se parate battalions and assoc iated suppon units. American 

military strength also continued to increase and by the end o f 

1963 reached a new high of [fi.2G3. O f this numher 3, 150 were 

assigned to Mililary Assistance Adv isory Group, Vietnam, and 

1.45 1 of these were designated advisory person nel. 

The civil unrest and political instabil ity th;u gripped the Republic of Vietnam from 1963 to 1965 had dis<lsu·ous effects on the 

armed forces whose morale dropped to a new low by mid-1964. 

Two successive cou ps created numerous changes in the command 

structure ·and seriously impaired th e administrative and military 
" OEVELOI'MENT AND TRAI NI NG 

efficiency of the Army. Short tenures prevented commanders from 

ga ining the full support of their tTOOpS, and the confusion was further aggravated by junior officers who openly expressed dissatisfaction and spread discontent among the rank and fil e. In this 

atmosphere there "';IS lillie incenti ve for conducting normal operations, and the war effort ground to a halt. By the end o( 1964 the 

enemy had clearly se ized the initiative, North Vietnamese Army 

units had been committed, and larg'cr Vict Cong units were maneuvering around the ca pital area. Once again the surv iva l of the 

govcrnmclll of South Vietnam was in doubt. 

American response to the deteriorating situation was marked 

by great urgency. The advisory effort was tightened by several 

major organization:1I changes in 1964. On 27 january, Lieutenant 

General William C. Westmoreland was appointed as the first 

Deputy Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command , Vi etnam, 

with his principal concern being the advisory struClUre and all 

(orms of su ppon to the South Vietnamese armed forces. On 15 

May, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, was combined 

with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the military 

support organization was fin all y united with the adv isory effort. 

This consolidation ended duplication of effort, economized on 

personnel, and simplifi ed co·ordination. On 20 june General William C. Westmoreland became Commander, U.S. l\Witary Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

By the time of the Secretary of Defense conference in June 

1964, it was apparent that a fUrlher buildup of U.S. strength was 

necessary to prevent more seri OLls b:Htl efieid rc\'erses. One OUL(ome 

of the conference was the decision to extend the U.S. advisory 

effort down to district level in the seven ke)' provi'Kes surroundi ng 

Saigon. This extension would shore lip South Vi etnam's emergency 

Hop T ac program, a concentrated effort to ensure the security o f 

the critical capital area. To support this and other progTams, by 

mid-Jul y a total of 4.200 morc U.S. troo ps werc 1Il0\ iug to Vict· 

nam. With every increase in the advisory effon, additional log'istical 

and administrati\'c SlippoTl systcms were required, as well as more 

helicopters to SUppOrl the SOllth Vi etnamese Army and U.S. 

agen(;les. 

Another signific<lm decision was thc assignment of the 5th 

Special Forces Group (A irborne) to Vietnam on a permilnent basis. 

As the 1.300 mcn of this unit began to arrive by the end of the 

year. along with the 4,200 additional troops that had been re· 

quested in july. U.S. stre ~th rose to a total of 23,310. 

It was also now apparent that the South Vietnamese armed 

forces levels were still loo low to sa tisfy Somh Victnam's securit y 
THE CRUCIAL YEARS. 1900-1964 " 

needs without sacrificing their own trammg and reorganization 

requirements. To remedy this shortage a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese stud y was made to determine the appropriate force strucLUre required to support the war effort. The study developed two 

proposals: the first provided for an increase of 30,309 men in the 

regu lar forces, 35,387 in the Regional Forces, and 10,815 in the 

Popular Forces. These forces wou ld support only the H op Ta e 

program and arrest Viet Cong operations in a number of other 

high. priority areas. The second propos.1.1 outl ined an increase of 

47,556 in regular forces and the smue increase in the Regional and 

Popular Forces. This increased force was considered adequate for 

substantia l over-all progTess in pacification but would take considerable time to recruit, train, and equ ip, On 23 January 1965 

the first altern ative, with some modifica tion, was formall y approved 

for MAP support. The new force levels were fixed at 275.058 for 

regular forces, 137, 187 for Regional Forces, and 185,000 for Popular Forces. Whether this fin ancial support could be translated into 

II more effecti ve army was another question. 

Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1960-1964 

Poor trai ning or its complete absence was a continual handi ca p 

for all South Vietnam armed forces units. any units had been 

(armed and fill ed out with hastily drafted personnel with no format trai ning who were expected to learn by doing. High desertion 

rates also kept unit personne l in a constant state of flux and made 

unit retraining a pressi ng need, After 1960, owing to increasing 

force levels, the crealion of man y new units, and the need to acquire counterinsurgency c:lp:tbilities. tra ining activities tOok on 

added emphasis. 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, assisted the govern. 

ment of Vietnam by drawing up propo~ed training programs, sugp.eSling specific programs of instrllction. providing on-the-spot 

advice at training centers, and deploying mobile training teams to 

assist in spec ific areas slich as intell igence, psychological warfare, 

communications, civil arTairs, logistics, and medical train ing. 

By June 1960 j'\'lilitary Assista nce Advisory Group. Vietnam, 

instituted a full-sca le cOllnterinsurgency trai ning progTam withi n 

the Vietnamese Army, and by November three Special Forces 

operational detachments were traini ng 1,200 selected military 

leaders of the Vietnamese Army in tactics and techniques of coun· 

teri nsurgency operations. ost of these early efforts were centered 

around the training gi\'en to the newly formed Ranger units by 

U.S. Specia l Forces personnel. In 196 1 a centra lized Ranger Train· 
DEVELOPMENT A~D TRA NG 

ing Center was established at Duc My compl ete with jungle, 

swamp, and mountain schools, and there by February 1962 the last 

of the twenty-one newly activa ted Ranger compani es compl eted 

their training. f\ feanwhile, U.S. Army training teams had been 

conducting on·site training courses for Ranger companies in the 

field. In November 196 1 these courses had been extended from 

three to five weeks, and by February 1962 twenty·seven companies 

had received this instruction ;lI1d the remai nder would finish by 

the end o( the year. At Duc My, individual repl ncements for Ranger units continued to be trained and the school became a center 

for counterinsurgency operations. 

Counterinsurgency tra ining for regu lar Vi etnamese Army units 

received less direc t emphasis. The newly activa ted South Vietnamese Army 9th Infantry Division began a 22-week training program in March 196 1, and in Jul y the 25th Infa ntry Division was 

activated and unden ook a simila r course. Later, in each of the three 

corps tactical zones, Military Assistance Ad visory Crou p established 

a regimental train ing center sta ffed with U.S. advisers and Vietnamese cadres. Vietnamese Army infantry regiments were to be 

rotated through the centers for a seventeen-week refresher course. 

Tra ining proceeded sa tisfactorily th rough 19.62 hut, as noted above, 

bega n to reAect the polit ical and military turbul ence at the end of 

1963. 

During 1964 recruit training was drastica ll y changed_ At the 

beginning of the year plans called for the training of 30,000 recruits at the Quang Trung Trai ning Center, and in January lhe 

advisory group recommended that the programs of instruction for 

basic combat training and advanced individual training be revised 

to eliminate duplication and correspond more closely to counter· 

insurgency requirements. This cxtensive revision was accomplished 

by March for all arms and services. But by now the military situation was seriously deteriorating and mora le was low. 

In Ma y the Vietnam government decision to bring The Vietnam Army strength up to authorizcd force levels resulted in a 

requirement to train some 40,000 recruits during the remaining 

seven ll10lllhs of the year. In liglll of this substantial training increase, Military Assistance Command (M il ita !"), Assistance Advisory 

Croup was combined with Military Assistance Command on 15 

ay 1964) recommended that recru it tra ining be exp.'lnded from 

Quang Trung to four other n:uional train ing centers and to the 

Ranger Training Center at Duc My. T o allo\\· for the increased 

ca pacity at the fOll r national training centers, an emergency COIl -

struction program was immedia tely initia ted for housing. ranges, 

and other facili ties. In add ition, Military Assist:lIlce Command 
TI'IE CRUCIAL YE,\RS. 1900-1961 " 

reluctantly approved a reduction of the recruit training program 

ITom twelve to nine weeks. Without the red uction, it would have 

been impossi ble to accommodate the large number of recruits 

unl ess combat divisions were required to conduct part of the training. The reduced nine·week program began on I June and continued for the remainder of 1964. By then over 45,000 recruits had 

been trained or were in traini ng at these centers. Experience in 

the latter pan of 1964 showed that in itial misgivings over the inadequacy of the nine-week program were well founded . and on 

MACV's recommendation the twelve-week program was readopted 

on 1 January 1965. 

Unit training continued to pose serious problems. In 1963 and 

1964 the increased level of enemy activity made it almost impossible to regToup entire combat units for training despite the increased force levels. Only the Ranger battalions were able to 

complete their initial traini ng and therea fter mai ntai n a con tin· 

uous retraining program usi ng a six-week cycle. For the Vietnam 

Army infantry, initi al plans called for two battalions from each 

corps to be in trai ning at al l times. In January 1964, eight bat· 

talions were in unit tr:lining for a fou r·week cycl e wh ich was ex· 

tended to fi ve weeks in April. However, by May the number of 

battalions undergoi ng training had dropped from eigh t to four 

because of operational requiremems, and by September each corps 

headquarters was finding it difficult to release even a single battalion for formal train ing. 

Field advisers continucd to repon that the low state of traini ng 

was one of the major causes of the low leve l of combat effectiveness. 

In spite of this report, formal infantry battalion training con tinued to sl ide duri ng the yea r IImil, by December 1964, therc was 

only one battalion in training at a national training center. AIlhough 25 infantry battalions had been trained and 8 battalions 

retrained during the year, there still remained 15 that had not 

received any formal unit traini ng. 

Refresher training o{ artillery and armored cavalry units continued throughout 19G4 . In Jul y an illlcllsive retrai ning program 

for divisional 4.2-iIlCh mortar battalions being converted to 105· 

mm. howitzer battalions began :lIld was completed in January 1965. 

Transition training of armored reconna iss., nce troops receiving the 

new J\ f11 3 armored personnel carri ers, begun in April, was completed by November. 

During the yea r Military Assistancc Command also proposed 

new programs of instruction for replacement train ing. operational 

readiness training. leaderShip training, and basic unit trai ning. 

Although a revised basic unit program of instruction (seven weeks) 
" DEVELOPME:"IiT AND TRAINI ..... C 

was adopted and the rev ised program of instruction for leaders 

(seven weeks {or squadron leaders and lell weeks for pia lOon 

leaders) WCIS under consideration, no action was taken on the proposals for replacement or operationa l readiness programs of instruction. 

Combat readiness programs met with even less success. Continued MACV recommendations to establish an effective system of 

comba t readiness u"a ining finally resulted in the publication of an 

implementing directive in September 1964, but this directive had 

little impact and at the end of the year little effective training was 

being accomplished olltside of schools and training centers. 

A ir Support 

Between 1960 and 1964 grea tly increased air support was made 

available to the South Vietnam Army and should have enabled 

them to retain the initiative. However, lack of training in airmobile operations proved a severe handica p. The unfamiliarity of 

both Vietnamese commanders and their MAAGV advisers with the 

capabil ities and limitations of helicopters hindered the effective· 

ness of early helicopter operations. Too often incomplete premission briefings led to poor co-ordination of air-to-air and 

air-to·ground operations whil e all American and Vi etnamese aircraft 

engaged in a mission were airborne. The inability to communica te 

with supporting Vietnamese lighter aircraft, because o( the language barrier and because of differences in communications equipmem , also hampered early oper;Hions. The incompatibility of U.S. 

Army UHF helicopter radios and Vietnamese fighter aircraft VHF 

equipmem necessitated the use of a control aircraft to relay messages 

between the tWO elements in the ail". This method was too cumbersome to support the (ast-moving tactica l situations and often 

messag'es were not retransmiued accurately. The language barrier 

was still a serious problcm even ;l ftCI" compatible equipment was 

installed in late 1962, espec ialty during an operation, when lastminu te changes or adj ustment became necessa ry. English·speaking 

Vietnamese pilots helped to overcome this barrier, but such skills 

were scarce. 

The Vietnamese armed forces unfamiliarity with heliborne operations and other refin ements of modern warfare taxed the already 

overstrained personnel situation or the helicopter companies and 

served to limit their operational (;lpability. U.S. Army flight personnel fo und it necessary to devote va luable time to orienting and 

trai ning Vie tnamese fliers in sllch basic activities :IS loading, offloading, and safety procedures while in flight. Vi etnamese com-
THE CRUC IAL YEARS. 1960-19&t " 

manden had to be instructed on the need of separating troops into 

single aircraft loads to faciliwte loading, and on the need of 

ordering troops to board aircraft with weapons on "s.."lfe." 

Reluctance to off-load from a hovering helicopter and the tendency to bunch lip in the immediate landing zone instead of dispersing rapidly to secure an area often delayed the landing of 

following helicopters and exposed aircraft and personnel to hostile 

fire. U.S. helicopter personnel presumed that Vietnamese reluctance to off-load from a hovering aircraft was the result of depth 

perception errors which made the helicopter appear to be much 

higher off the ground than it actually was; aga in, lack of trai ning 

was the rea l villain. 

The South Vietnam Army provided anillery and mortar support rlre in many helicopter operatiolls, but its inaccuracy and 

ulldependability made it necess.."l ry to halt all fire within a ten-kilometer rad ius of the landing lOne; this ban eliminated va luable close 

fire support to grollnd troops and heli copters at the time when 

they needed it most. Craters created by artillery fire presented 

hazards to heliborne operations, and flight paths into landing zones 

sometimes had to be altered because of the location of Vietnamese 

gu n target lines. On one occasion in early 1963 the South Vietnam 

Army began its artillery preparation of the landing areas too far in 

advance of the aerial deployment and compromised the element of 

surprise. The fire was also employed in such a man ner as to cause 

the Viet Cong to move in toward the landing area instead of away 

from it. 

Vi etnamese fighter escort aircraft, when they lIsed nap."llm to 

clear landing zones, often made the strikes just before the helicopters arrived; the resulting fire and smoke constituted a serious 

hazard to the helicopters. U.S. helicopters pilots also voiced dissatisfaction with the performance of Vietnamese fighter escort for 

various other reasons: speed differences between the 510\\' helicopters and fast fighters; withdraw;lIs of fighter aircraft to an altitude 

of 1,000 feet over the landing or pickup zone, depriving the helicopters of valuable protection at a lime when they were most 

vulnerable to, and most freque ntl y subjected to, hostile fire: and 

fighter aircraft often abandoning helicopters to assist in ground 

opera ti ons. During the third qllarter of calendar yea r 1962. air 

support Hown by Vietnamese pilots was described by the U.S. helicopter personnel as inadequate, inaccurate. un<CFordinated, and 

useless. 

To remedy the situation, the Air Force component command 

of .~. ~Iilitary Assistance Command. Vietnam, in late December 

1962. established standard tactics and procedures to be used by 
" DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINI NC 

fighter aircraft when escorting heli copter formations. Supposedly 

designed to accommodate the nigh t tactics lIsed by the helicopters in 

performing their various missions, the regulations, nevertheless. 

still stipul ated that " ... standard strafing, rockel, napalm or 

bomb attacks will be made immediately prior to helicopter landings .. ," and th al " ... fighters will orbit the landing zOlle at 

an approximatel y 1,000 fect absol ute altitude searching and ava il· 

able to attack on ca ll . ... " A morc successful endeavor was the 

Air-Ground Operations Mobil e Training Team, a joint U.S.-

Vietnamese learn, which tOUTed schools, trai ning centers, and units 

during 1961 to familiarize ground troops and especially cornman· 

ders \\l ilh air opera ti ons. 

Other obstacles stemming from training defi ciencies were com· 

mono Vietnamese confusion in con verting weight estimates from 

the metric system to the avoirdupois weight system sometimes re· 

suited in the overload ing of helicopters. Stringent Vietnamese 

restrictions on night fl ying and the refusa l of loca l air units to fly 

night missions to illuminate landing zone areas also restricted the 

night operational capability of the helicopter units. To overcome 

this difficulty, some helicopter units trained their own crews to 

drop flares and di vcncd valuable aircraft needed elsewhere for 

such tasks. 

Poor intelligence was another handica p. Often Vietnamese 

combat troops took two to three hours to react to an enemy raid 

that required quick action. This lessened the effectiveness o[ airmobile operations in mounting " fire-brigade" type missions, for 

which U.S. Army helicopter units themse lves had a reaction time 

of only one hour. At the end of 1962 plans were underway for 

developing small al ert force operations to cut the time la pse between "alert announcement" and " on target" to less tha n an hour. 

Role of lhe u.s. Army Special Forces 

Before September 1962 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel 

served in South Vietnam on a temporary dUly basis with 1\IAACV 

mobile training tcams to provide train ing for the ViClll amese Army 

and assist in the CIDG Program. As early as 1957 a team from the 

14th Specia l Forces Operations DetachmelH on Okinawa trained 

fifty-eight South Vietnam Army troops at the Commando Training 

Center at Nha Trang. These Vi etnamese troops later became the 

instructors and cadres for the first Vi etnamese Special Forces un its. 

In mid-1960, when the Vietnamese Army established three Ranger 

trai ning centers ;It IJa Na ng. i\: ha Trang. and Song 1\Iao to train 

sixty Ranger companies, U.S. Continental Army Command 
THE CRUCIAL YEARS. 1900-1964 " 

(USCONARC) sent thirty individuals from the 7th Special Forces 

Group to South Vietnam on TDY to set up the training course. A 

nine-man movile training team (four from the 1st Special Forces 

Croup on Okinawa and five from the 25th Infantry Division in 

Hawaii) replaced the earlier team in 1961. Personnel from the 

new mobile training team went to Da Nang and Nha Trang to 

supervise Ranger cadre training and the remainder went to Song 

Mao to support preparations (or the Civil Guard training program. A twelve-man mobile training team from the 1st Special 

Forces Group in turn replaced the nine-man team on I June 196 1 

and afterwards the 1st Group provided other mobile training 

teams to South Vietnam to train Vietnamese Army troops. In Jan· 

uary 1962 the chief o( Military Assistance Advisory Croup, Vietnam, requested an augmentation of sixty·eight Special Forces men 

(twelve officers and fifty-six enl isted men) to advise and assist the 

Vietnamese Special Forces, the Vietnamese border p.:1.trol, and the 

Montagnard units. He proposed to organize the Special Forces 

augmentation into one modified B (command and control) and 

four A (operational) detachments. The Department of Defense 

rejected the proposal at first, owing to increased Special Forces 

commitments in other areas of the world, but finally in September 

approved the principle of placing Special Forces units in South 

Vietnam on a permanent change of station, or permanent status. 

After the arrival in Vietnam of the adva nce Special Forces team 

and its designation as Headquarte rs, U.S. Army Special Forces 

(Provisional), Vietnam, in September 1962, the headquarters remained at Saigon, shari ng administrative tasks with CAS Saigon 

umil 12 February 1963. The new headquarters then moved to 

Nha Trang, a more central location from which to control and 

logistically support the CIDG Program. 

Special Forces strength in Vietnam remained fairly constant 

throughout 1963. starting at 625 in January and reaching 674 by 

the end of June (of which 646 were trained Special Forces personnel). The June totals included 98 on permanent change of station 

at the headquarters, 24 in TDY C detachment at the headquarters, 

524 on TDY in B and A detachments, and 28 with other TDY 

teams-a Civil Affairs Mobil e Training Team and three U.S. Army 

Engineer Control and Advisory teams. In December two U.S. Navy 

Special Technical Advisory teams of one officer and thirteen men 

each began worki ng with the Special Forces in the ClOG Pro· 

gram. And in the foll owing year, as related above, the entire 5th 

Special Forces Grollp arrived in Vietnam. By this time most of 

their training activities centered around the Civilian Irregular 

Defense Group. 
40 U[VELOPMENT ANI) TRAI N I:>:G 

Tht: Civilian Irrt:gular Dt:/t!11se Croup Program 

CAS Saigon originally beg,lIl the ClOG Progra m in December 

1961 as a covert operation to win over and trai n Montagnards 

and other isolated et hnic minority gTOUpS into an allli·Viet Cong 

irregular, paramilitary forcc. The Civil ian Irregular Defen se C roup 

had among other missions thal of collecting intelligence in the 

highl ands of central South Vietnam and in Laos, \ ... here tribal 

affiliations were used extensively to further clandestine acti viti es. 

The program also had a civic aClion aspect, and CAS provided 

medical treatment, medicines. seeds, clothing. and other social 

wel fare goods to will over th e ethn ic groups. After th e U.S. Army 

aSlimcd control over the oven acti vities of th e C IDG I)rogram. 

th e medica l phase of civic action evolved into thc Specia l Forces 

Village Defense di cal Program. 

The ClOG Program rapidly gTew to include overt OIc ti vi ties 

and em braccd ot her paramilitar y groups such as th e republ ican 

youth. Cathol ic )·outh. hamlct militi a, strike fo rces. mountain 

comOlOlndos, trail watchers, fighti ng fathers, and force popula ire. 

Most of th ese orga ni zations ser ved mainl)' to relieve th e South 

Viet n:lm a rmed forccs, the Civil GU<1I'(I, and the Self-Defense Corps 

troops from static defense missions. Therefore, the ·nature of thcir 

activiti cs werc in the Tll ai n ddclISivc: but such groups as thc strike 

forces, mou ntai n commandos. :Ind trailwa tchcrs <1ggTessively sought 

Olll th e Vi ct Cong. Thc strikc forccs and mounta in commandos 

operated agai nst existing cnemy units, whil c th c trail watchers tried 

to prcvcnt infiltration into South Vi etnam. When infiltrating forces 

wcre too 1:lrge for a trailwatchcr group to handl e, it reponed th e 

presence of th e cnem)' to lhe neareSl Victnamese Arm)' corps 

headquarters. 

The U.S. Army Special Forces overtl y elllered into the ClOG 

Program all I Fchruaq' 19£;2 whell sixteen Spedal Forces troops 

began assisting CAS Saigon in lr:li n ing se lected Vi etnamesc in 

spec ial warfare activiti es. By the end of April 1962, sc\·enty-fi ve 

Special Forces men were providing CAS with assistance in trai ning, 

advising, and supponing the V;ll"iOU5 :lnivities of th e progTam. 

fiy April 1962 it was becoming evidem that the expanding 

ClOG Program was stra ini ng th e ca pabilities of CAS Saigon. and 

the commander o( ;\Iilitary Assistance Command in Vietnam recommended th at direct U.S. military support be made avail able. 

In mid-Ju l), the S<.-crctar) of Defense agrced and la ull( ilcd Operation SW!TCIIII'\CK. the oxic lIilme fo r AC\"s assumption of the 

covert aspect of th e ClOG Program. During the transitional period 

CAS Saigon continued supponing the entire prOSTam; after the 
TilE CRUCIAL YEARS, 1960-1964 .1 

ClOG UNIT TRAINING 

takeover CAS W:IS responsible for only the coven aspects of the 

effon, "nd the Army cominucd to provide CAS with Special Forces 

type trnining assist:l ll ce when requested. i\ lilit"ry Assist<lnce Comm:md h,l(l opcr"tional control over the overt "spects of the progr"l11 

throughout the lr"nsitional period. After I Jul y 1963 the bulk of 

the Speci:ll Forces effon together with the ClOG ProgTam feJl 

under complete MACV control. By Ol.:tober 1963 this &'TOLIP 

"mOllnted to 16,084 stri ke fon..e members. 40.765 haml et militi,,-

men, 4.9 12 moullt"in scan ts, :Iud 3,251) border sl.l1"veill"l1ce personnel. 

T errito rial Forces: Cillil Cllard and Self-Defense Cort)s 

Betwccn 1960 nnd 1961 thc Lenitori,,) forces received more 

traini ng but were still slelx hildren of the gTowing South Vi etn:lm 

:lnned forces family. One basic problem was organ iza tional. While 

these units were o per" lionally I.:ontrol1ed by province and district 

offici" ls, training was usually an Army responsibilit y. Nevcnheless, 

beginning in 1960 much elfon was expcnded on strengthening the 

operational c"pabiiit)' o[ the Civil Guard and the Sel(-Defense 
42 DEVELOPME;>:T A~ J) TR /\I ;..' I:-iG 

Corps by improving their training <lnd suppl ying them wit h wea po ns and communications equipmcm. To speed up Civil Guard 

training new unit training (etHe rs were o pened, and the training 

cycle was reduced from twenty-four to twel ve weeks. In ildclitio n, 

joint MAACV-Civjl Guard training teams were formed to instruct both Civil Gu:ml <lnd Self· Defense Corps units at their operational bases. The Se](·Defense Corps. now supported by P 

funds, was reorganized imo squads and pl:noons and underwent 

intensified n ain ing. Training Cflllers were established in twentysix provinces where" six-week program of instruction was offered. 

MAACV's goal was LO have all Self-Ddense Corps units compl etely 

equ ipped and trained by the end of 1962. 

Before 1964 no established recruit training program for the 

Regional Forces (fo rmerly the Civil Guard) had existed. ;"Iany 

units were lilli e more than armed bands o( you ng men; others 

we re private armies and ga ngs "fcderaliled " into the service of the 

government o[ Vietnam. 1\lilitary Assistance Command recommended a plan to tra in 4,000 recruits in 1964 but, al though the 

plan was approved and schcdul ed to begin in April, training fell 

short beca use of recrui ting d ifl iculties. In June the Regional Forces 

began conscripting personnel in order to reach a goal of 14,000 

recruits; however. owing to th e priorit y given to the Vietnam 

Army, few recruits were o btained .mel at th e end of th e year only 

abOLit 2,000 had receivcd trai ning wh il e about 700 were undergo ing training. The reuu it training progn.m of instruction of 

nine weeks was the same as that used in the Vietname~e Army 

training centers. This approach at least a llowed the Regional 

Forces training centers to trai n Vietnamese Army recruits when 

the ir own quo tas fell short. 

Beca use o( fo rce structure increases and oth er demands, Regional Forces unit trai nin g also expanded in 1964. By !\lay the 

number of Regional Forces compan ies ha d risen from 173 to 523 

:lI1d in Novcmber plans \\'ere 1ll:1de to increase this LOlal to 640. 

Objectives for ca lendar YCnr 1964 includcd unit training for all 

new Regional Forccs (·om p:lIlics aml refres hcr training for approximatcly 60 percent o( the exist ing units. By th e end o( the year, 

533 Regional Forces comp:Hlies had heen organiled. of which 494 

were trained, 20 were training, and 19 remained to be trained. 

Of the 533 co mpani e~, 1!1() had com pl eted the fo uf·week refresher 

course and seven were in refresher training. 

'Vith the lowest recruiting priority, the Popular Forces (for. 

merl y the Self·Defense Corps) suffered gr iwe defic ienci es in all 

aspects of trai ning. Po pu lar Forces strength initially felJ far behind 

programed force levels until July 1964. and leadership training 
, lit: Ckl'CI,\ 1. YE.;\kS, 1!l6O-19U-1 

quotas were ne\'er filled during the elllire year. Training had 

been programed for thc year based on :111 :lIlthorized force structure of 110,000. Uut serious training lags developed eady in the 

year owing to the late publica ti on of the 1964 program. d in'iculties 

in recruiting. and the rel uctance of prO\ince chiefs to relinquish 

their units to training ccnters beca use of local security conditions. 

Thus, despite much cmph:lsis by Military Assist:lIlce Command, 

both units and leadership training com inuccl to trail as much as 

GO perccm behind programed le\'els, On October 1!)(j4 ~lilitary 

Assistance Command proposed lhe consolidation of Popular Forces 

traini ng celllers to inlpro\e fac ilities and the conduct of trai ning 

and red uce cost of ma npower and materiel without reducing the 

over.alltraining base C1 1l:ICit y. In additi on, a proposa l was mOlde to 

turn over the training responsibility of the Regional and Popular 

FO I'ces from the Vietnamese Tr:lining Command 10 the national 

Regional and Popular Forces hC:ldquancrs in order to ensure unity 

of eITort. J-I owc \er, :lS yet there was no <Igreelllcllt as to which 

agency should be respomible. 

Civil Affairs 

In the course of a staff visit to SOllth Vietnam in e:lrly 1960 

to determine the assist:m(;e needed in civil .. rf:Jirs activities, a mem· 

ber of the U.S. Army. I)acific. C-5 section determined that ~Iilitary 

Assist<lnce Ad visory Croup, Vietnam, could profitably employ a 

ci"il affairs mobile trai ning team to dc,'elop a civil affa irs cap.lbility 

willi in the Sou th \'ietll;lIn armed fon cs. In :\Iay 1960 the chief o( 

the advisory group requested the te<lm, and two office rs from the 

Civil Arfairs School at Fort Cordon, Georgia, :lrrived in Jul y for 

a ninety-day LOur of duty. The onicers instructcd i\ lAAGV ,md 

ARVN personnel in civil affairs and civic action and advised :lnd 

assisted the MAAC V chief on all as pe(.u of civil aITairs operations 

and activities. 

For va rious reasons, including the unfa vorable altitude of the 

South Vietnamese and lhe fact that the advisory group had no civil 

affairs officer. the succeeding year saw no t:lI1gibl e results develop 

from the team's visit. The next signifi<::uH Stcp C,m1e in i\lay 1961 

when the IA ACV chief requested ;l civil "rfairs mobile tra ining 

team to conduct a lln e}', and to assist the advisory group and the 

Vietnamese Army in developi ng and implementing civic action 

projects ;mel prog'r;lIl1S in a(cord:mcc wit h V.S. pol ides. 

Arri ving in .Jul)', the ci\i l affai rs mobile train ing te,IIl1 was 

composed of tWO onken (one .. public administrator and the other 

a public heal th offi cer) and one enlisted OIciminiSll'ative assiswnt: 
DE ELOP "' :N T A 1"[) T RA I 1"ING 

it worked in VielT1 am from Jul y to December 19fi l and developed 

a compre hensive civic ,tction program for consideration by the 

MAAGV chief and the South Vietnamese. T he mobile tra ini ng 

team also outlined a civil alfa irs orga ni1.;'Ition needed to help bui ld 

security in are;'ls li bemtcd from Viet Cong control anel recom· 

mended actions the Sout h Vietnamese armed forces could take to 

improve economic, soc ial, and politica l development of the peopl e. 

T he program, prepared by the team in d irective form, was sub· 

mitted through the MAAGV Chi ef to the government of South 

Vietnam. T he proposed d irective provided instruction concern ing 

responsibilities; guidance, as well as examples, for civic action 

projects; needs of the population; and training, supply, and neces· 

sary administration. AlLhough Ihe South Vietnam government d id 

not initiate the program immediately, it used the plan as the basis 

for its civic action program. 

Meanwh ile, in August 1961, the MAAGV chie f reported that 

the Vi etnamese Army had conducted twO otherwise successfu l d i· 

vision·size operations wh ich typic;'llJ y devoted inadeq uate attention 

to civil·military co·ordination. He reported that "plans for fol· 

lownp pacifi cation of area made by governmCIlI delega le for ;'Irea 

not adeq uately coordinated and apparem ly incl ude little or no 

integration of military and civil operations. Rather, civil plans 

were separate and not intended to be implemented until operation 

was compl eted." The report, plus the results of the mobile train· 

ing team's survey, indica led a pressing need to improve civic 

action measllres of the Som h Vietnam armed forces if coun terin· 

surgency operations wcre to succeed. 

During the S<l me period and "t the MAAGV Ch ief's request, 

the Departmen t of the Army permitted the South Vi etn"m govern. 

ment to send seventy·fi ve officers to the Civil Aff"irs School ,Il Fort 

Gordon, Georgi". From a Vietnamese point of view, the tl'il ining 

received was not completely s<ltisfOlctory because of the difference 

in stOlff orgOl nization and the school's emphasis on large·scale, mili· 

tary government. At the same time, at the advisory gToup's instiga· 

tion, the Vietnam armed forces instituted for military provi nce 

and district chi efs illl eighteen.week civil affa irs course o[ instruction which proved more closely auuned to South Vietnam's im· 

media te needs. 

Before the mobile tra ining team departed in December 196 1, 

il helped orga nize two ex perimental SOllth Vielllam Army civil 

affairs compan ies. m,ld e a list of projects 10 be accomplished by 

the Vietnam arm :d 10"ces, and briefed top U.S. and Somh Vi etme e mil itary . nel civil ian leaders on the im port,mce and need 

for civic action. As a result of the mobile traini ng teams work, 
THE CRUC I/\L YF..J\RS. 1900-19CH 

planning began that visualized the use of the Self·Dcrense Corps 

in the dual role of village dcrense and civic aclion. Military Assis· 

tance Advisory Group cOlltinll cd co·ordin ati on with the U.S. Opera· 

tion Mission on military civic acti on pl"nning conducted through 

the offices of the Country T eam's Psychological Warbre Subcom· 

mittee. By December 196 1 the i\IAAC V chief added to his sl" ff a 

civil affairs officer who served as Chief, Civil Affairs and Psycho. 

logic,,] Warfare Branch, Organi zation and Training Division. This 

branch was responsibl e for all civil affairs "nd psychologic,,] w"rfare advisory duti es. 

In August 1962. at the request of the Commander, Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, the 97th Civil Affairs Group provided a fi ve·man mobile training team for fi ve weeks to prepare a 

program of instruction fol' a civil affairs course at the South 

Vietnam Army I)sychological Warfare School, and also to prepare 

a training program fol' use by the Vietnamese civil affairs companies. The mobil e training leam improved the Vietnamese civil 

affairs course and launched the training program for the newly 

activated companies. Concurrent with drawing up plans for assignment of this tC;lIn , U.S. advisers convinced the South Vietnamese director of Psychologica l Warf.n·e of the need for more 

civil affairs units, and in September 1962 the SOlllh Vielllam Army 

directed the activation of three civi l affairs companies, one for 

employmel1l in each of the three corps areas. Later in 1962, with 

the fonnation of the IV South Vietnam Army Corps, a fourth 

Vietnamese Arm)' civil affa irs company was authorized. The Vietnam Army officially activated the first three companies on 14 

December 1962. 

On II October 1962 the MAACV chid requested four civil 

affairs mobile training teams (each to consist of nine officers and 

four enlisted men) for 180 days TOY to provide training, advice, 

;wd assistance to SOllth Vi etnamese personnel in conducting programs for "clearing and holding provinces [rom Viet Cong forces." 

Three of the teams arrived on 15 December 1962 and the fourth 

on 5 January 1963. Each South Vietnam Anny corps rece ived one 

team in OI'der to provide spec ializcd assistancc to the Strategic 

Hamiel Program, advise Vietnamese civil afrairs te"ms, assist in 

the medica l civic '.Clion pl'ogram, anclto assist Operations Mission 

fi eld representa ti ves. In June the four mobile training lea rns were 

replaced by a 21 -man team attached to the U,S. Army Special 

Forces (Provisional). Vietnam, for 180 days' TOY to support the 

ClOG Program. In addit ion to these units there were also a 

Medica l Civil Act ion Group and several Engineer Contl'ol and 
IlEVEI.O I' MENT AND TRAI NING 

Advisory detachments active 111 Vietnam and supporting specifi c 

South Vietnam programs. 

In May 1963 the SOllth Vielllam Army reGIJl ed their four civil 

affairs com pani es for re·equipping, reorga nizing, and retraining. 

Their initial experiences were evahl:lted and their concept of operation revised. Dy early July 1963 the units had completed 

retraining and redeployed to the fi eld with forty D teams; each 

provi nce rece ivcd one team and the infa ntry divisions absorbed 

the remai nder. These te;II11S had mixed success, but in general were 

not strong enough LO pmh the more important civil affairs projects, 

such as the Stralegic Ham let Program, that the South Vi etnam 

govel'lllllent was trying to complete. Needless to say, the declining 

fortu ncs of South Vietnam in 1964 also adversely af£eclcd bOlh 

the capabilities and potential of these units. 

At the end of 1964 it appeared that Military Assistance Com. 

mand, Vietnam, had becn too optimistic rega rding the va rious 

training prognulls. Field reports continued to poin t Ollt that poor 

training and a shortage of good junior leaders were still the mai n 

factors behind Solllh Vietnam ;I rmed forces marginal combat ef. 

fecti veness. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, tended to 

become impatient when training prograills were delayed and statistical quotas not mel. Finally the buildup of Viet Cong strength 

and activi ty put too great a strain on the limit ed South Vietnam 

armed forces resources to permit unit rotation through the training centers. Pacification progress and troop retraining were simply 

incompatible with existing force levels. One problem fed upon 

another, and as the silllation deteriorated recruiting became more 

difficult and desertions more common. Major political and military 

decisions \\'ould ha\'e to be made if the train ing situation was 

to impro\'e. 
CHAPTER II I 

The Buildup Years, 1965 -1967 

Background 

The situation al the beginning of 1965 was critical. By taking 

advantage of th e civil unrest ;md polilit:al instability that had 

prevailed since mid-IOG3, the enemy had grown stronger and 

lightened his hold on the COIlIlll"ysidc. Estimates of ellemy strength 

had risen from a total of 30,000 in ~O\CllJhcr 19G3 to 2 12.000 by 

July 1965. The Viet Cong launched their first division-si7c attack 

against the village of l3inh Cia close to Saigon where they destroyed two South Vietnam Army battalions and remained on 

the battlefield for fOUT days instead of follmdng their llSllal hiland-run tactics. North Vietnamese units and reinforcements had 

now joined the hallie and were arriving at a r;He of nearly 1,000 

men per l1l()nth. Both the Nonh Vietnam Army and the Viet Gong 

were now armed with modern weapons sllch as the AK47 assa ult 

rifle, giving them a firepower advamage over the SOllth Vietnam 

Army which was still fighting with Ameri can weapons of World 

War II vintage. Enemy su,ltegy was c"idcmly based on the as· 

sumption that the United States would not increase its involve· 

ment and that, weak as it was, the government of South Vietnam 

would collOlpse from its 011'11 weight if p\L hed hard enough. 

After the deat h of President Diem in November 1963. South 

Vietnam had been controlled b)' a number of co.1.lition govern· 

ments. Each proved inca pable of providing centrali7ed direction 

to the 11';11' effon, ,1IId the pa<:ifica tion prob>Tam ground to a halt. 

The majority of rural areas still remained under Viet Gong control 

or were "contested" in the enemy's favor. The involvement of 

military officials in the pol itical uphea\al, the consequelll wide· 

spread reassignment and adjustments within the military command 

and staff SlrtlClure. ,lIld the setbacks in offensive operations. all 

brought armed forces morale and effeCtiveness to a new low. The 

internal turmoil and collapse of the government also seve rely 

hampercd mobili za tion and recruiting efforts. Almost all combat 

units were be low ;lluhoriled strengt h and desertion rates continued 

to soar. Some paramilitary units l>im ply disbanded and melted 

away: the better South Vielnam Arm)' units wcrt' spending most 

of their energies rC;H.ting to enemy inilialives. Il was ;lpparem 
.. 

that the Somh Vietnam government could not prevent th e enemy 

from taki ng over the country. 

Consideration of and planning for th e illlroduclion of U.S. 

combat fo rces into South Vietnam began in late 19&4. These forces 

were to be used primarily to defend and secure U.S. insta ll ations 

and activities. Further planning received impetus on 7 FebnLary 

1965, when the Viet Cong altacked th e i\ IACV Advisor Compound 

and the Ca mp Holloway airfield at Pl eik u. American fon;es su (· 

(ered 136 casualties and twenly-two aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Three (!:I ys hiler, Viet Cong terrorists destroyed the enlisted 

billets in Qui Nhan causing forty-four more America n losses. These 

events demanded a strong res ponse. 

Obviollsly the waT was entering a new phase for the United 

States. In spite of its c\'cr-i ncreilsing aid and buildup of advisory 

and o perationa l support personnel, it had not been able to reverse 

the deteriorating military siLU:uion. Only new and dec isive action 

on its part could l)I"e\'ent the colla pse of the government of SOllth 

Vietnam. 

Military Assistance Command Advisory £xpallsioll 

In early 1965 the United States met the Challenge with the 

decision to imrod uce U.S. combat forces into 50llLh Vietnam. The 

arrival o f U.S. Marine units a t 1);1 I'\'a ng in i\ larch 1965 W:IS followed by a massive buildup of U.S. forces o\'er the neM three 

yea rs. A pe;lk strength of morc thall 543.000 was reached in i\lay 

1969. While U.S. combat forces undoubtedly prevented the military 

defeat o f th e South Vi el!lam government, American assumption of 

the major combat role has been the subject of much controversy. 

Critics have charged that the United States took th e war away 

from th e Vietnamese and made participa tion in the struggle 

meaningless for them. "Why fight \\'hen th e America ns will fight 

our battles for us?" man y argued. Americ;lI1s have been accused 

of lelling impatience blur their long-range vision for developing 

the Vi etnamese military forces and of bei ng too prone to do the 

job themselves. But, aga in, the claim must be ta ken into account 

that without U.S. comba t intervention, the SOllth Vietnam armed 

forces would have t:eased to ex ist. 

General Westmoreland divided the U.S. effort in South Viet· 

nam into two parts: first, the lactical effort to destroy the Vict 

Cong and Nonh Vietnam Army main force units and. second, the 

effort to help South Vietnam develop a viable government able 

to exercise effcctive control throughout the (OUlllr)'. The two a ims 

were closely related, with the second calling for;l greater emphasis 
THE BUII.DUI' YEARS, 1965-1967 

in establishing security in the villages and hamlets, and in the 

extension of South Vietnam government inAuence and control. To 

hel p accomplish the second objecti\e, se(:tor (province) and sub· 

sec tor (district) advisory teams working with South Vietnam government officials at province and district level bad to be strengt hened 

and expanded, <t nd their efforts focused on specific programs and 

goals, 

Concurrent with U,S, combat force buildup. the advisory effort 

expanded at a rapid pace. Planning for the extension of the advisory program to the subsector level was under U.S. and Viet· 

namese consideration in late 1963 and early 1964, Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, envisaged that advisory teams 

h'ould deal primarily with the paramil itary forces (pol ice and 

pacification cadre) and would supervise most of the unit training, 

advise the distl'il..t chief on operati ons. and assist in operational 

planning. Experimenlal teams were planned for deployment in the 

spring of 1964; if these tealllS were successful the program was to 

be exp.1nded later in the year. Pl an ners raised a number of pos· 

sible objections: some felt th:lt the limited South Vietnamese staff 

at district level would be overwhelmed by ;tdvice .mel advisers: that 

Communist propaga nda portraying the South Vietnam government as a U.S. puppet would be more effective than American 

claims, and that the U.S. military-civilian balance in personnel 

providing pacification advice at the provincial level would be disrupted. In addition, more American personnel in isolated areas 

would mean greater casual ti es. Nevertheless, the commander stuck 

to his decision. 

The pilot teams, each consisting of one officer and one non· 

commissioned officer, began operating in April and May 1964. One 

team was deployed to each of the thirteen districts in the provinces 

surrounding Saigon. At first progress was minimal. There was no 

standard district orgauila ti on and little sim ilarity between districts. 

The government of Vietnam was in the process of building up its 

district staffs and was experiencing its own growing pains. Trained 

talent was at a premium. For the most p.ut district chiefs were 

lert to develop their own organ izations with what limited manpower and talent they cOllld obta in. 

\ Vithin a month encouraging signs began to emerge. Districts 

which had been isolated and remote slo\\'ly became close members 

of the provincial family. As communications improved, some districts became active in provincial affairs. Economic and social bonds 

were m.lde, and military co-ordination was greatly improved. 

Later, as the teams became firmly established, other adv;mtages 

began to emerge. SUppOrl of all types became aV<lilable to the 
50 I)EVELOl'M ENT AN D TRAIl\'ING 

district chief who thereby acquired more prestige; at th e same lime, 

th e U.S. obwined fresh insights imo local cond itions, activiti es, 

requirements, atlitudcs, and aspirations of the people. The pilot 

teams did become in volved in the U.S. Operations Mission and 

the U.S. Informa tion Service areas of interest, but without the 

disruption that had been fea red earlier. Advice and assistance was 

furnished in planning and executing educationa l, econom ic, agricultural, youth, and information pTogTams. In fact, the advisory 

learns in some areas devoted up to 80 percent of th eir energy to 

nonmilitary ma tters. However, usually th e amount of time spent 

was equally divided between milita ry and civil activities. 

Basi ng his action on the gratifyi ng results of th e pilot teams, 

the Secretary of Defen se approved plans to expand the program 

at a conference in Hawaii in June 1964. Pla nning and preparation 

for an additional one hundred teams began immediately. Each 

team would consist of two offi cers and three enlisted personnel. 

The tide of subsecLor adv isory team was derived from th e district's 

military designation subsector. Prospective team locations were 

determined from recommendations submitted by senior advisers 

in each corps area. Terms of reference were developed based on 

lessons learned by the pilot teams; the teams were instructed to 

extend the capabilities of the Operations j\'fission and the Information Service. but onl y jf directed by the ir local representatives. 

To better prepare incoming advisory personnel, a two-week Mili· 

tary Assistance Training Advisor course was esta blished in Sa igon. 

By 1965 the planning and preparations had paid dividends, 

and the deployment of the additional teams was practically compl ete. Most of the advantages claimed by the pilot teams were 

verified and many of those who had Vt')iced strong opinion aga inst 

th e program were WOIl over. The new teams met and overcame 

the same basic problems that the original thirteen had encountered. 

They enthusiastically assumed broad and unfamiliar responsibili· 

ties with very little spec ific guidance. Gu idance was purposely 

genera l and, as was made abundantl y dear, variet y was the only 

consistency at subseClor level. As th e sole U.S. representation 

below provincial level, the team was the sole executor of the U.S. 

effort in th e South Vietnamese countryside. 

By the end of the year many new districts were under consid· 

eration for assignment of advisory teams, and with some locations 

slated to receive U.S. Army Special Forces A detachments. Under 

stud y were ways to determine the best mcans of augmenting tcam 

capabiliti es (operations, training. security, and so forth) and of 

supporting teams with certain hard skilts (intellige nce, engineer, 
THE lIUJI.DUP YEARS. 1965-1967 " 

medical, and other skills). Missions and duties were also under 

revision to better suit the changing situation. 

Also by the end of the year, 169 subsector advisory teams had 

deployed (133 i\IACV and 36 Spcci;.J Forces men), with a total 

strength of about 1,100. Advisory teams were also assigned to all 

forty.three sectors (38 MACV and 5 Special Forces men). Over-all 

field advisory strength rose from 4,74 1 to 5,377 in 1965. It should 

be noted that these individ uals were almost all experienced officers 

and noncommissioned oflicers, and thus represented a commitment 

not refl ected in the bare statistica l dala. 

The program continued to expand over the next several years. 

Although the results achieved were encouraging, continued eval uation and improvements were made. During the same period, the 

U.S. combat buildup genera ted an urgent demand for resources, 

talent, and command attention. Planners had to take care to en· 

sure that the advisory teams were not sl ighted. The program, 

although rela ti vely small, had proved to have a widespread and 

important influence on the war, with the effectiveness of the program depending on quality ra ther than quantity. A major study 

was initiated in June 1966 to evaluate and determine ways to 

improve the effectiveness of the sector and subseclor advisory 

teams. In assessing the program planners analyzed the team composition, team-member tra ining. and the command emphasis neces5.1.ry to improve the program. The followi ng recommendations o[ 

the study were approved by Genera l Westmorel and on I July. 

I. The greatest degree of tailoring of the subsector team 

organiza tion to fit conditions should be encouraged, and the 

composition of all subseclor teams should be eval uated in light 

of additional skills avai lable: the composition should be al tered 

where necessary to suit the situation of each d istrict (psychological 

operations advisers, civil affairs advisers, engineer advisers, and 

so forth). 

2. Special anent ion should be directed to the selection and 

preparatory training of officers designated as subsector advisers, 

including a twelve-week language C(Jurse and a six·week civil affairs adviser course. Mil itary Assistance Command recommended 

that preparatory trai ning courses for subsector advisers be consolidated at one location in continental United States to relieve 

the necessity for extended temporary duty before the assignment 

of future advisers to South Vietnam. 

3. Command emphasis is needed to make the advisory effort a 

priority progra m and ensure that officers assigned as subsector 

advisers not be used to fill other spaces in the command, and that 
52 DEVELOI'MENT AND T RAI N I NG 

officers ser ving as subsector ;uh,jsers serve their full tour in th al 

ca pacity. 

4. Exa(t requirements for helico pt er suppon duoughoUl th e 

COlll1lry for sector and subscctor 'Idvisers should be determined, 

and a special priority allocation of helicopter resources should be 

made to meet those requirements. 

By late 1966, reassign ment of sector and subsector advisory 

personnel was minimal and au thorized only for compelli ng reasons. 

Ceneral Westmoreland was concerned with obtaining stability of 

personnel and wanted every effort made 10 ensure that th ese positions had at least th e minimum degree of continuity. in addition, 

steps were taken to extend selected advisers of unique experi ence 

or qualifica tions up to one year beyond the normal tour length. 

Extensions were to be both voluntary and invol untary. but in 

practice only those willing (0 ha ve their tours ex tended were 

nominated. 

In 1967, with new ad viser requiremellls still being generated, 

analysts undertook a major stud y to exam ine the current advisory 

effort and rev iew the ex isting strength authorizations and requiremen ts that had been identified in th e fiscal year 1968 Sou th Vietnam armed forces structu re. Brigadi er General Edward M. 

Flanagan, Jr., then Train ing Directorate chie( of Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, supervised the stud),; his obj ective 

was to develop th e framework on which an improved advisory 

program could be constructed lIsing the existing organization as 

a point of departure. Further, the stud y was to determine if the 

existing efforts were being properly applied and to recommend any 

reorientation deemed appropriate. The stud y recommendations 

called for a deletion of 1965 advisory spaces from th e MACV 

staff, 940 spaces fTom the seelor advisory chain, and 562 spaces 

from th e tactical advisory chain. The swdy approved elimi nation 

of the spaces from the tactical chain and Military Assistance 

Command, but the sector chain remained illlact. 

A second major swdy undertaken in 1967 was known as Project 

640. This study addressed itself to the absence of any central staff 

agency to co·ordi na te and monitor th e adv isory effort. Past experience had shown that many activities related to th e adv isory and 

militar y assistance effort encompassed man y staff areas of interest 

and that the MACV staff was not appropriately organized to carry 

out its responsibil iti es in these matters. The study thus recommended the establishment of a single sta ff agency to act as the 

focal poilll for the advisory effort. By th e end o( th e yea r, the 

Office of the Chie£ of Staff, ilitar y Assistance Command, ilital"y 

Assistance, (MACMA) had been established under th e supervision 
THE IIUI LI)UI' YEAR S. 1%:.- 1967 " 

of Brigadier General Donnelly P. Bol ton. The misS ion of the 

i'vIilitary Assistance starr was to supervise. co-ordi nate, monitor, 

and eva lua te, in conjllnn ion with appl'Opriille agencies, the joint 

advisory effort and th e Military Assistance Program for the government of Vietnam. 

In the s"l me yea r, 1967, whil e must of the South Vietnam Army 

infantry units were being' employed in a p:lcifica ti on I'ole. ;mother 

significant ex pansion of th e Hch isory efrort took place. On a visit 

to Vietmlln in J anuar y. the .I CS Ch;l ir1l1HIl, General Earle G. 

Whee ler, emphasized the importance of providing physical security 

to the rttnll areas and the need " to insure effective transition of 

this sllbstal1tial portion of ARVN from search·and·destroy or clear· 

and·hold operations to loca l security activities." \Vheeler asked, 

" 's it not esse nti al that these ;\ RV N fo rccs be imblled with the 

vital importance o f their Lask and be rapi dly tra ined for it, and 

would it not be wise to ;lssign Amc riC:lIl omens- as advisors to all 

ARVN local sec lirity detachments of company size :1I1d larger?" 

Subsequent studies indicated til e foll owing advantages would accrue by assigning adv isers to comp:lll y·size un its: 

I. improved combat effectiveness. 

2. enhanced unit effectiveness in win ning' th e will ing support 

of the people to the South Victn<tm g'overnment, 

3. improved uni t c ivic action and psychol ogical wa rf;n e opera· 

tion s, a nd 

4. expedited completi on of the Revol ution:try OevclopmelH 

(pac ifica ti on) process. 

As a result, additional adv iser spaces were requested to provide 

one additional officer and enlisted man for each ball.alion con· 

ducting independent opennions in support of the pacification 

effort, an effort th at U.S. ad visers wcre now indirectly super visi ng 

at al most every level. 

V.S. Army Specht! Forces Advisory Progrtlll1S 

On 1 J an uary 1965, U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietna m was 

orga ni zed into foul' C detachments, fivc 13 detachments, fony.four 

A detachments. and support units. The C detaehmems were as· 

signed to each cor ps Lacti c;! 1 zone to provide command :md control 

for all U.S. Special Forces elcments in the zone, B dewduTIents 

were intermediate con trol elemetHs, and A deta(, hments were sma ll 

teams of twelve to thi n een Illen whieh furn ished the major portion 

of the ad visory suppOrt to th e Ci\'ilian Irregular Defense C roup. 

Although the number of utlits W:IS inneased as the need arose, 

their orga nizational structure remained the same. 
54 DEVU .O I'ME NT AN)) TRAI NING 

In addition to providi ng advisor y support to th e CIDG ProgTarn and to the sectors and subsectors assigned to them by th e 

MACV commander, the U.S. Army Specia l Forces provided advisory support to fi ve other endeavors: th e Apache Force program, 

the fI.'like Force, the Delta Force, the CIDG motivational program, 

and special imelligence missions. 

The Apache Force in vo lved the lise of small, highl y mobile 

teams of indigenous personnel. Teams were commanded by a U.S. 

Special Forces officer, but worked with regul ar U.S. units and 

rema ined under the c;Qlllroi of a U,S. un it commander; their mission was to find and fix enemy for<.:cs until larger and stronger 

units could be brought in. They also secured drop zones and 

landing lOnes, loca ted enemy li nes of communica tion, and provided intelligence to th e U.S. commander. Each team consisted of 

foul' pathfinder, recollna iss<l nce, <lnd combat learns to find th e 

enemy, and th ree ClOG companies to fi x him in pl ace. ' ·Vhen U.S. 

fo rces were committed, the Apache Force came under the operational control of the U.S. commander for th e duration of the 

opera tion. At the end of th e yea r the program had not been 

offic iall y implemented, but troops had been recruited in all foul' 

corps tactica l zones, and ClOG units in th e II Corps Tactical Zone 

were giving this ty pe of SlIppOrL all an inrormal basis to the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Airmobil e). 

Mike Forces were companies of indigenous tribal personnel 

recruited and he ld in reserve by each of the C detachments and at 

th e 5th Special Forces Grou p headquarters at N ha Trang to provide reaction forces in support of CIDG units within the corp 

tactical lOne. These units were not a part of th e Civi lian Irregular 

Defense Group but were recru ited and pa.id by U.S. Army Special 

Forces. 

Delta Forces were simil;w in concept to the Apache units. T he 

fo rce was advised by a U.S. Spec ial Force detachment and consisted of twelve ten-man hun ter-killer teams (each composed of 

two U.S. Speci<ll Forces men ;lnd e ight Vietnamese Special Forces 

vo[ ullleers) and fo ul' South Vietnam Army airborne/ ranger COIllpanics with U.S. Special Forces adv isers down to platoon level. T his 

force was supported by four Vi etnamese Air Force H-34 helicop· 

ters and two Vietnamese C-47 a ircraft. T he mission of the Delta 

Force was to infiltrate Viet Cong controlled territory within the 

borders of South Vie tnam and ga ther inte lligence. The a irborne/ 

ranger elements permitted the force to ex ploit lucrative targets 

immediatel y; these hunter-kill er teams were a lso llsed successfully 

in ga thering target intelligence and in assessing B- S2 air strikes. 
nll': IIUII.DI1 I' n :ARS. 1%~ 1967 55 

The airborne/ ran ger compani es were also used in support of besieged camps, notabl y Plei Me in Pleiku Prov ince. 

The CIDG motivational program consisted of two groups of 

approxi mately fifry Viet Cong defectors recru ited, trai ned, and 

equipped hy U.S. Special Forces; in I and IV Corps Tactica l Zones 

Ihe hrrol.lps moved into ;lreas tmder pClcifi cation, provided their 

own security, performed civic ,",clion, and furnished motivationa l 

indoctrination to t.he indigenous popttl <lt ion . [<lell teClITl had eight 

U.S. Special Forces l'l dvisors. 

FimUicial SUI)pOfl 

Concurrent with the increases in U.S. combat and advisory 

forces, a massive buildup and training program for the Republic 

of Vietmlm armed forces graduall y unfolded. This development 

was consistent with the U.S. basic cOlllmiunent- to crea tc a South 

Vietnamese armed force capable of defending South Vietnam with 

minima l outside l'lssistancc. [n th is respect limited financial reso urces was always a pressing probl em. It was not until mid-1965 

with thc appcarance of the Ky-Thicu regime that a viabl e government existed whic h WilS abl e to effcctivel y promulgate economic 

constraints and enlistment inducements and incentives. Only then 

could force structure plans be instituted with some assura nce that 

means were ava ilable to carry them out. 

Under legislation and polici es in effect before March 1966, 

the Republic of Vietnam armed forces was supported through the 

Military Assistance Prol:olT:t111 . The program was designed to suppon fri endly nations under peacetime conditions and was restricted 

by worldwide ce ilings established by congressional legislation. During this period, dollar ceilings and equipment req uiremcnts rccommended through submission of plans and programs to the Office 

of the Sccret:lry of Defense were not necess;nil y approved. Pro· 

graming (and eventual delivery) of equipment during this era was 

guverned by the ceilings <l lllhori1.cd and the fu nds appropriated. 

The expansion and development of the Sou th Vi etnl'l m Army was 

thus circumscribed by these ce ilings, ;md orten onl y th ose measures which j\'lilita ry Assistance Command felt were most important 

were approvcd. Allhough thesc ce ilings proved to be sufficientl y 

flexible to enable programi ng to correct major deficiencies, cont:n ual price increases and rcpi;lc;emclll of equipment lost in combat 

placed a severe strain on avail able MAP fu nds. Other factors limiting the development of the South Vi etnam Army under the Military AssisLallce Prograln included : 

1. restricti ons governing offshorc (fore ig'n) procurcmclll which 
I)EVELOI'MENT AN D TRAI;-;I:-:C 

were insLitlilcd because of U.S. deficiencies in the international 

balance of P:' YIlICIltS; 

2. legisl;Itive prohibitions on procu rement o[ materiel in anticipation of future appropri:,tions; and the 

3. norlllal practice of supplying older equipment to IAP ret ipi ellls to purify U.S. stocks. 

In March 1966 the suppon of the Republic of Vietnam armed 

forces was tnmsferred from the MAP ;q)propri:,tions to the regu· 

lar defense budget. This measure reduced the str:.in on the limit ed 

MA P funds and :.llowed U.S. and South Vi etnamese military forces 

to be financed th rough a COlli man budget. Since then, funding 

limita ti ons were dependent more on the situati on within South 

Vietnam than in the United States. As a coroll ary. the government 

of Vi etnam defcn ... e budgct was limited by U.S. ceilings placed on 

pi aster ex penditures. Although these cei lings had no direct limit· 

ing effect on improvement of the ;mned forces. inRa tionary trends 

in the economy were a malter of utmost tonccrn when determining 

the force structure. e and higher p.lid troops might mean 

fewer fanners, les~ taxes, and higher fo<xi prices; in this way the 

piaster ce iling limited expansion. The ceil ing also limited U.S. 

troop spend ing within South Vielnalll. 

i\T(lIlj)OWel R eSOllrces 

SOllth Vietnamese manpower W:lS another major problem area 

ill the expansion of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. Diffi. 

culties were caused by an ineffecti ve concri ption program and a 

continuall y high desenion rate. The conscription program dated 

back to SeptemiJer 1957, but Vi etnamese military authorities had 

never made :1I1 y real effort to en force conscription laws, and by 

the end of 1965 an estimated 232.000 youths had been able to 

cvade military ~CT\ice. i\ lorc pressure was noll' pl aced on the 

Sou th Vi etnam government to correct this problem. 

With ex pansion underway in 1964, Iilit y Assistance Com· 

mand, ViCtll:II11 , undertook a manpower resources survey to de· 

termine if suill<."icllt manpowe r was available in areas of South 

Vietnam government control to make up the required military 

forces needed to defeat the insurgency. The sun·c), estimated that 

about 365,000 men were avai lable and qualifi ed for the regular 

forces, and that ;111 additional 800.000 men could meet o ther force 

requiremellls. The survey COllril"lned that the pl;lIlned force goals 

I,·ere not impossible. and the re ... til ts were subsequently used as 

the as ~ for 1Il:lIlpo\\"cr pl anning procurement. 

i\ lanpolI'er procurement was assisted by the promulga tion o f 
51 

more stringe nt draft laws during 1964. On G April the Na t ional 

Publ ic Se rvice Decree declared that all male Vietnamese citize ns 

from twent}' to forty-five years were subj ect to ser vice in the military and civil derense estahlishment. Subscquclll decrees prescribed 

d,."fl Criler!;'! and lengths of sen icc, ;mel another incorporated the 

Region.11 Forces and Poplliar Forces into the regular force (Republic 01 Vielll:ull armed cc~) o rgani/:Hio n. A review of th e 

South Vi etnam p,ovcrnmcnt laws by a represclll<1 li ve of the U.S. 

,'\Ia ti oll;tl Sclen i,'c Se n icc concillded that the <IratI laws were 

adequate, bUl beller cnforcemclll was urgently needed. 

Because of the great concern with manpowe r problems, the 

U.S. (Emba ssy) ,\Jissioll Personnel and Manpower Cumminee was 

es abli~IH.:d in lI ll l 1!lfi4. 'r lle t:oJlHlliuee \\'as ('haired by the 

MACV ./- 1 (Personn el StOlfi" chief) wi th represe ntat io n from other 

U,S. ;lgencies :tnd worked closely wit h a ("Olllltcrpart South VietnaTll ,"oTlllllillct:. The twu groups reLulHlIl cnded a colleni\"e ca ll-up 

of youths aged twellty to twellt y-live fottOll"ed by a strin enf01"(:emelll period. The relOlnmenci:u ion was appro\'ed ;1I1c! in J\ugtlst 

the governmc lH of Vietnam llJ;lde plans for a prelimi nary ca ll·up 

in IV Corps Tauic;tl Zone. The Lest mobili7otlion pointed o ut the 

need for extensil'e prior pl anni ng to include transport:ttion. food, 

:md orielllatioll ror the draftees, and th ese measures were qllit kly 

incor po rat ed into a national pl;HI. A :\Jobilil.a tion Diret"tor:ll c wa s 
" I)EVF. ()I' I~ :'\ · .\ :'0< 11 rR,\I:": ING 

also estahl ishc:ci in August \\'ilhin the l\ finj lr y of Defense to direct 

the call-up and iVlil itary Assistance Command supplied advisory 

supporl. 

A nationwide ca ll.up was condm:ted from 20 October to 2 

l'\ovember. and a one-month enforcemCIll phase foll owed to apprehend ;lIlci indllct draft dodg'crs. Prc-c" II-lIp puhli city emphilsi1.cd 

that th is was the last lime yo uths twenty to twenty-fi ve could 

voluntaril y report and thal th e "tough" measures to apprehend 

and punish ev"ders would follow. In itia l results were gra tirying 

as over 11 ,(;00 constripts were inducted into the regul!ll" forces. 

Careful planning, effective publ icity, and creditability of the en· 

forcement procedures accolllHed for the success. Unfortunately, the 

enforcement phase was less th an sa tisfactory, Its impl ementation 

required th e execution o f del;'liled procedures by province chiefs 

and local officia ls, and this exec ution was not done in ;'I uni form 

ll1a l1ner, The fail ure full)' to enforce th e in itial call-up took th e 

sting out of the program, and subsequ elll draft c;'lils in late No, 

vember and eOlrl)' Decemher bn)uKht fewer re<.- ruiLS than werc 

;'tmicip.ued or n eeded to meet force level go:ds, 

Shortages ill ch';'I ftee quotas made it impossibl e for the Republic 

o f Vi etn am Olrmed forces LO mcet th e proposed force level goa ls 

for 1965, Cen eral Westlllorel;lIld W:lS dis:1 ppoimed and in :1 le ue.' 

LO Ambass<l dor i\ IaxlI'ell 0 , Taylor on Hi Deccmber 1964 summarized his position : 

, ' , it is impcrativc for the GVN 10 :lct now to vigorousl}' enforcc thc 

call-u p: widcly pu blicizc the progr<llll to discharge pcrsonnel who have 

been ill\'olum;II'il y extended , pointing alit the ohligat ion of other 

ci ti zens 10 hear :Inns to Ill:lKe d iscll:lrgcs possible: a(:qu irc sufficient 

personnel lo offsct losscs through di~cha gc :!Clioll and an,.in :Hllhorizcd 

!'orce Ie"els: wKc positi vc action to prepare for further ca ll-up of personne l b y ycar group 10 in creasc the force le"els <l ccording to (:UlTCIll 

plans, 

Although this plea was foll owed by an announcement that draft 

dodgers wou ld l>e rounded LIp, particularly in th e Sa igon :n-e:l, 

the South Vietnam governmel1t h"d taKen no positi ve actio n by 

the end o[ th e ye,n', and it was no t ulllil A pril 19GG th at thc government iss ued a new series or d ecrees to enforce ex istin g clr<lft 

laws <lud provide punishment for dcscrters :I nti th eir act:omplices 

(these n ew measures, which ;II'C discussed Inter in the ch<l ptcr, 

finally did prov ide some rel ief o f the turbulellL manpower situaIbn), 

A second action to incrc:lsc th c 1ll;] llpowcr of th e South Vietnam 

Army was th e initiation of a comprehensivc recruiting c<1mpni p;n 

wh ich included extensive publicity, enlistmcn t honuses, spcci:d 
THE UUILDUI' YE}\RS. 1(J65- 1!lG7 59 

trainin g for rctl'uiters, and accelerated q uotas for unit recrtlltJllg. 

These measures togeth er with the ca1J-up enabl ed the I'egul"r 

forces to exceed their authorized trength levels by the end of 

1964. By mid-1965, howevcr, desertions had eroded all regular 

force increases and by 1966 the problem was still unsolved. 

13ecallse of the urgency of th e manpower situation, in June 

19G6 General Westmoreland d irected that" study be made to fmd 

;1 cOlllprehemive sol ution to th e probl em. The ensu ing study 

warned that if th e current situa tion continued, the rate of manpower consumption would exha llst primary manpower sources by 

mid-1968 and second ary military manpower sou rces by th e end 

ot 1969. Governmen t of Vietnam m;mpower resources still lacked 

ovcr-all centra l direc tion : as a result, th ere were gTOSS imbalances 

ill the manpower pools which supported the di verse and often 

w llOiCliug government progT<lms. The single orga ni zation charged 

with manpower pl anni ng, th e Directorate of Mobiliza tion , was 

a subord inate agenc.:y of the l\ linistry of Defense and orga n izationa ll y was not in a position to exert national control over manpower 

resources. The study concl ud ed tha t a req uirement existed for 

orderl y distribution o( availabl e man power among use rs, ;md that 

a genera l mobilization would be preferable to a partial mobilizatiOll, alth ough the lauer wou ld be better than th e existing haphazard system. The study recommended th e (ormation o( ;1 study 

group of interested agendes (the Embassy, U.S. Agenc.:y for International Development, Military Assista nce Command) to ana lyze 

ava il able dat" 011 man power and materi el resources and to do the 

initial planning required. Afterward, a joillt U.S.- Sollth Vietnamese commission sho uld be established lO anal yze the existing 

government<1 1 structure and d etennine what additional m<1ch inery 

wO ll ld be requi red to acc.:olllplish a gell eral mobiliza ti on. General 

Westmorel;md ;lgreed with the study's recommendations and on 

15 June sent a letter to the U.S. Ambassador supporting its 

proposals. 

General ,,,Testmoreland recognized th;lt the demands on military 

manpower were great an d that there was also a heavy and increasing dema nd (or qualified manpower by the pri vate and govern -

mental senors of South Vietn am. Un-co-ordi nated attempts to 

correct the military problem would have adverse effects on the 

rema ining sectors. While the South Vietnam governmen t had failed 

to organize itse lf to meet the heavy calls on its manpower, solutions. 

demanded that a determin<ltion be made of total manpower assets 

and total req u irements, ;lnd that the two then be bal anced. Aware 

of th e serious implitaLions of total mobilizat ion, ' ·Vestmoreland 

recommended th at a U.S. committee to stud y mobilization be 
00 

established under the directio n of th e Emb ~sy and include USA ID 

and MACV re prcscm :ltion. A jOi llL U.S.- South Vietnamese commission would th en be SC I lip to illlcgrat c the prel iminary aspects 

of th e stud y inlt» a l'Omhincd progT:lm for lIlohjli,ation which 

would be apprupri:.t!: fo r hoth gou :rn11lcntal ;l1l d social structu res. 

\Vhen no action was ta ken o n this pro posa l, C ellc!'a] \ VcslInorcI;md sent in ~lay 1!J{i7 a ~cn d Icu er to the U.S. Amhassador a ll 

th e subject. I-Ie aga in stressed th e need for a mabili/alio n pl an. 

As a result, the ;unbassador established a sped .. ] manpower advisory missio n composed of economic. labor, and management 

specialists from the UnitL-d States. This missio n, in co-ordinatio n 

with the Emb:l~s)r and ;\ Iili(;ll")' As~istan(e Command. dcveloped 

the basic pla nn ing nccess:II'y for mobili zation. Di sc s~ ion s th ell 

bega n with the Vi etnamese government. and o n 21 October 19G7 

laws o utlining plans fo r a partial mobilization were decrced. H owever, there \\'ilS no implementing legiSlatio n ,mel some questio n 

existed as to whet her th e SOllth Vi etnam Aovcrlllnem WilS strollg 

eno ugh 10 ca lTY th e measures ou t. At the time, govern menta l 

sta bil ity was still in critica l t:o nd ition ;md ;ul) thing that might 

threaten that stability or cause th e gO"crnmcnt to be unpo pular 

had to be treated with ca re. 

T he Desertion Problem 

Deserti ons cOlllinucd to be a thorn ), malle r lholl gholll this 

peri od. The ellco uraging gai ns in the manpower siw ;l tio n mad e 

in late 1964 lasted o nl y brieRy owing to th e rising number of 

" una pproved leaves" duri ng I !J65. ~ I il itar), l\ ssist;Ulce Conll11;l nd 

undertook several studies to determine the calise'! for the excessive ly hig h desertio n r.ltes il nd no ted the following comributing 

faclOr:.: 

I. overly restrictive leave policies; 

2. fami ly separa tion ; 

3. lack of comm;l nd attent ion to personll cl m;II1 ;1g"ement and 

soldi er welfare such as pay, ho usi ng. and promotions: 

4. general dissatisfa ction with milit'lr y life: 

5. tolerance of mi litary and civil aut horiti es towa rd descrtion: 

6. apparent publ ic :1Jxllh y toward the war; 

7. increasingly hea vy w mbilt losses; 

8. poor apprehensio n a nd punishment of offenders; :lnd 

9. misuse of certai n Iypes of units (espec ially Range r and 

Popu lar Forces) by hi gher headquaners. 

Desertions wcre cspet ially prevalcnt ill I I I Corps Tactic:.! Zone 

because of the prox imit)" of Sa igon, where a deserter could readily 
Tilt: IIt'lI,llL'P \ :,\~S, 1965 1%7 

lose himse lf. The 

vision alone lost 

qUilrter of 1966, 

neal'by South Victnam Army 5th 

2,510 soldiers through desertion 

" 

Inf:1lltl')' Di· 

in th e first 

To ilttack the rOOls of the desertion problem, i\lililal')' Assis· 

tilllce Command pres$cd man y C:OITc(.tiv(' programs and actions 

during the nex t SC"CI'<l1 years, Among the lIl ore significalll mcasures 

\\'ere the streamlin ing of :H.imin il)trati\ c procedures, l'stablishmclll 

01 all Adjut:ll1t (; cneral's S< ll0ol, a liber:11 :twards policy, impl'ovt.'(1 

lea\e poli(ic~, ilUpro\ed promot ion ~~S lll , b:tltlclield promotions, 

direct :tppointl11ents, ;1I1d improvemcnts in th c st:tndard of living 

for the South Vietnam Army to incl ud e pa y increases and expa n· 

sian of the commissa ry system, a scM.help dcpendellls hOllsing 

program, :tnd \'etcr;lIls rehabilital ion programs, These activities 

had only mi xed l)i1orHerI11 ll c<e~s ;lI1d b), thclllsehe .. represented 

eml ya 1);I1't of lhe J:.l'gt:r prohlem nOled :ll1ove, 

Desertion r:tles tended to be confusiug bcc<l llse th e 50mh Viet· 

Jl<lm goyernmem classified :IS desen ers those indi vidn:tls with less 

th:ln ninety days' service who were :tbsent Wilh011l le:l\'c (A WOL) 

lUore th:lll six (Iiller fifteen) da)'s, and those who were abseil( morc 

th:l n fifteen d.l }!> whil e en route lo :1 new dUl)' st;l ti on, It \\'a~ al~o 

suspected th:l t de!>el'lion and renuiling st:ltistics included some 

persons who had illegally tr:msferred rrom one force to :t more desirable one- for exampl e, from th e South Vietn:tm Army to Ihe 

Popular Forces, i\lilit<lry Assistance Command had proposed sub· 

stanti:ll changes in this approach and recolllmended that :I uniform 

period of thiny days un a uth orized ;JiJsel)('e be the crit erion; after 

tlwt time lhe incl ivicitl:11 would be punished by the COmm:lllc1er 

and a punishment book lIsed to rel.:Ol'd th e action , But Republil.: of 

Vietnam ilrlllcd for(.es were unresponsive to th ese recommenda· 

tions, 

Orders puhlished during 1965 removed:lll effective disciplinary 

restr:lim 10 desertion b)' allowing dese rters to cS<.apc prosec uti on 

by signing a pl edge not to desen again, after which, rat her lh;111 

being jailed, they wcre relllrned to dut)', Uefore this step the armed 

forces l.:od e of Illilit:n') justice had provided strict penalti es for 

desertion in wiIl'time, ranging from six yea rs imprisonment to 

death , The reduc ti on ill seve rit y of punil)hment for dese rti on \\';15 

paniall)' explai ned 11)' the O\'ercroll'ded conditions of Vi etnamese 

jails and Vi etn amese unwillingness to le\ y harsh l>ell:lilies for wh:ll 

was not considered a serio us crime, But desertions from all componenLs of the Vi etnamese :Inned forces had ri ~e n from 73,000 in 

1964 to 11 3,000 ill 19u5 ;md it seemed likely that this lrend would 

continue in 19U6, 

To remed}' this state of :tff:l irs, a series of decrees in April :l nd 
62 J)E\ J.OI' I~::\' T ,\J\' U TIt,\ I :>: I :"G 

Jul y establ ished new pcn:dtics for dese rters a nd their an.ompliLes. 

First offenders would be punished b)' making them " batll el'ield 

la\)oI"CIS" for a minimum of fi\'(: )ca .. ~; all pa y. cleath, ami dis;dJililY 

benefits were forfe ited. lkntlcfield laborers were to perform stich 

duties as rcp<liring rO;lch a nd bricis;cs. transpo ning aJlllllllllilion. 

diggi ng emplacements, burying the dead, setti ng lip tempo ra ry 

camps, and in general performing hard 1;loor dClails. RCPC;ll offenders were LO receive ill( rl'a ~l; d punishment: for a second offense, 

the penal I)' was five to twenty years hard \;Ioor; and if a desert,. 

esca ped while undergoillg punishment. the punishment was dou -

bled for the first offense and was dealh for the second. Civili<lns 

convicted of :liding <lnd :Ibetting dese rters were to be sentenced w 

five years punishment at hard labor. 

Emphasiling the gravity of the descrti on problem ;md the im· 

pol'l<lnce be :!lwched to the nc\\' I;I\'/s, in .July 1966 General \Vest· 

moreland sent :l communique to all advisory pe rsonllel Sla ting his 

conviction that "The prcsent for oper:nions strength of e:.ch unit 

must be raised. The minimum au.eptable numbe r to conduct a 

battaliun operatioll is tOnsidered to he 150 men . The moSl imporo 

tant single impl'Ovemem Ih:!t can be made in the RV NA F to 

achicve this goa l is a solution to the desel'lion problem; and to this 

end, advisory etrort must be foc used." 

After a trip to the Van Kie» National Tndning Center in earl y 

.July, the \\fACV .I- I report ed that as a comcquence of Vietnamese 

armed forces !lew A \VOI. ;mel desertion measures, impl'O\'cmclll 

was evident; no A \VOL's or desertion occulTed in the 2,OOO·man 

C:llnp for th e preceding scve n da)'s. Later, as th e good results of the 

decrees hecame more :lpparCnt, the ACV comm;mdel' conb .... atll. 

lated the Chief, Joint Gencral Staff, for the forceful and enthusiastic 

manner in which the desel'lion problem was being auackcd. nut 

privately, his optimism relll(lined restra ined. 

Throughout the ye:lr th e campaign continucd to thri ve. Posters 

highlightcd th e w nseCiliences of A \VOL and desertion, and letters 

weill to families of all dese rters III'ging their relUl'I1. On 8 August 

another desenion decree granted amnesty to individ u;ds who had 

deserted from onc fortc in order to join another and who were 

serving honorabl), in the force to which th cy had deserted. 

In an effort to assiSl the South Vietnam Arm)' reduce its desertion rate and improve its combat effectiveness. General \Vestmore· 

land directed that U.S. units adopt ('enain Viet nam ArTIly units. 

Close association was planned between the U.S. 1st Infantry Divi· 

.'lion and the South Vietnam Army 5th Division <l nd between the 

U.S. 25th Infantry Division and the South Vietnam Army 25th 

Division. The program was designed to provide U.S. hcl p in CSlab· 
Tin: nU1LlJUI' \'EAM.lI, 196~ I!)6i 

lislllll& adeqLwl 1.: ex(h:lllge a ll<l lOIILlllissa r) lIcrvil'cs, Ln clccting 

adequa te depemlcm hOllsi ng, :111<1 ill t om bined tactical opera ti olls. 

The USMACV also co·operated by prevclIling AIlIt:ritan civil 

alld military :lgelU...ies and contfill.: tors from hiring descl'lers. In 

October 1966, Military Assistance Command published a direcd\'e 

which required U.S. ag-elldes to screen th eir employees for deserters 

and draft eVilders, :lIId whit II spe,ili cd th t: docullIClltation a n in· 

dividual had 10 prcs('1ll hefore he \Va:. hired Since the directive 

did Ilot :Ipply to olher 1\lission age ncies, howevcl , loopholcs sti ll 

existed. To plug these holes, the MACV commander asked th e 

embassy to publish a similar directive which would apply to U,S. 

agencies nOl supcrvised by -' Iilitary Assistance Comllland. 

Throughout 196(1 and 1967 prog-ress was slow and painful. ilut 

through LOlltinued emphasis on th c problem by advisers, together 

wilh th e initiation of programs to attack th e root c:mses 01 deser· 

lion (such progr:ullS, for exam pic, as improving leadership, person· 

nel, managemcnt. personnel services, and training) and strineI' 

cnforcemelll of desertion laws, a certain amount of he:.dwilY was 

made. By the end of 19Gi dese rtions had fallen by about 30 per· 

CClll, and the desertion rale (pCI thous.., nd j had dropped from the 

16,2 of 1966 10 IU.5. 1-lo\\'cl'cl. descrtions (Qntil1l1ed to (ollstiwle 

OIlC flf th e most u-itictl pLoblt'lllS fat ing thc South Vil.lIla1l1 Arlll)" 

Strong and continLloL:s lIleasUl CS eili pit asiling the need lor im· 

provement of leadership, 01 the d:I) ·to·day living ell vironmem of 

Ihe soldi er and his depelldelJt~ :111(11)1 the llll)til'ation :mcl indonri· 

nation of thc cilizen wen: m:md.llOI y if th e fate \\';1:. to be kept to 

:tn acceptable le\'el 

ElOIIOlII' t ,llId SO(;(l1 Imp/otJemelll 

On I I January IUG7, the 1\IACV cOlllmander lIlet \I'j,h his prin' 

cip,,1 Slaff ofliccr:. and (Olllpon{,1lI (Ullllll:lllders tu diSttlss meallS of 

improving SOLlth Vielll:1I1l armed 10n'CS efl'ecliveness. The ne\\' rol e 

of the :SOu,h Victnam Arm)' soldier in the pacification pl'Ogr;:'lll 

(,llIpha si/ed the lIeed to lI11prU\e his lot in life Obviously;, pro· 

gram designed to improve th e lI'ell.being 01 th e peuple would not 

succeed if one of lhc main particip:lIlb \I'as worsc off thllil lhosc he 

was trying to help. At th e til1le of Ihe meet iliA. the four most 

i1l1pol't;mt areas for c.:ollsidera tioll w('le field and g;II'l'i:.oll r.ltions, 

food for South Viclllam Army depcndellts, GUlIonlllcnt:., and 

dependent housing. 

The SOllth Vietnam armed lol'ccs P,I) system did not indude a 

I.Llinn alloll':l11(.e: sub:.istcll('c-in·killd or increased pay I"ould h:lI'e 

imjlrlH'ed the 5),StC111, but \l'hatc\'er mcasurcs lI'cre adupted had til 
64 I)EVt:LOI'MENT ANI) TR.,\I NI NC 

be flex ibl e enou gh to mee t loca l conditio ns. U.S. he lp might be 

extended in several wa ys: one of th e most pr;lCtical was assistancein-kind in th e form of stapl es. The South Vietnam government 

\\'ollid pa y for the items, a nd the United Stat es wo uld use th e money 

for expenses in South Vietnam. CapLUl"cd rice was another 50 uI"ce 

of rations. The MACV commander directed the commanding general of U.S. Army, Vi et nam, to aSS\llll e responsibility for improving 

fi eld ration utilizati on, for ga rrison ration commodities, and fo r th e 

distributio n system. When th e fi e ld ration was issued , 33 piasters 

( •• bOll t 25 cents) was deducted from the soldier's pa y: as this reo 

duction lowered th e food-buying I}()\\'cr of the famil y man, he preferred nOt lO recei ve the ration ;lUd sold it when it was issucd to 

him. Thlls th e United Sta tes H:culIllllended that the ratio n be 

issued free o r charge :md in lieu o r pa y increases. The ga rrison 

ration consisted or certain basic foods distributed thro ug h South 

Vietnam armed ro rces quarlenna stel' depo ts at fi xed prices and locall y proc ured perishables and was supponed thro ugh payro ll 

deductio ns. Only rice was occasio nall y short, ;md U.S. Army. Vielnam, requested tha t th e South Vietnam go vernment ensure that 

sufl'icicm a ll ocatio ns of ri ce be made availabl e to the Vi etn amese 

armed forces. Also noteworthy was the establishmclll for the first 

time, on 2 1 Fe bruary IDGi, of unit messes in regular armed fo rces 

and Reg ional Fo rces company-si/e units. 

U.S. Army. Vietnam . was a lso tasked wilh improving the armed 

forces commissary system with respect lO the usc of dependent food 

purchases and to consolidate the post exch:lIlge and commissa ry 

into OIi C system. By ca rl y i\lilY negotiations fo r U.S. suppOrt of the 

Vietnamese armed fo n es commissa ry s)stem had bee n concl uded . 

The agreement stipul a ted that th e United States would supply 

rice. sugar. canned (ondensed sweetened milk. ca nn ed mea t 01' fish. 

cooking oil , and sa lt (or acceptable substitutes) rol' one year at a 

maximum cost to the United States of $42 million. The food items 

were to be imported into South Vietnam ta x·free. for excl usive 

distri bution thro ugh the armed forces commissary system. No food 

items were amho ri/ed for transfer to other South Vi etnam gO\'efllmelll agencies, but wOlild be sold only to iU'llled forces personnel 

and th eir dependents at a 1,;0 Sl which would be sig nifica ntl y less 

than on the o pen marke l. bill still high eno ugh to produce sunicicnt 

revenue to fund improvements to the system and to allow c\>elllua l 

U.S. withd rawa l, and for its extensio n, if mutua lly cea le. Piaster 

receipts from sal es wOllld remain the property of th e commissa ry 

system and we re nu t aUlho riled 101' an )' o ther South Vi etn am 

govel'l llllc llt agclH )': the governmelH a lso :lg-Ieed to pro vide the 

Un it('<i States with .. lIIomh ly fin ancia l statement. The agreement 
THE Il UILD UI' YEi\M.S. 1!l65- 1967 

contained provisions for COlllinu:ltiOIl of the system after U.S. with· 

drawal, ir mutually agreeable. The formal accord was signed on 26 

May by Commander, U.S. i\ li lil<lry Assistance Command, Victnam, 

,md Chicf, J oint General Stair, at Da Nang. 

The Cantonment Program consistcd of two pans; first, cantonments programed and funded in the government of Vielll am defense budgct (50 percelll govcrnmelll of Vietnam and 50 percent 

U.S. Joint Support Funds) and, second. the U.S .. sponsored cantonment construction plan which provided call1on melllS for the force 

structure increase uni ts of fiscal years 1965, 1966, and 1967. The 

Vietnamese armed forces calHonmelH program was hampered 

somewhat by compctition for limited m .. tcriel, labor. and trans· 

ponation. The major difficulty was the lack of :1 master plan, 

compounded by possible changes in the loca tion of South Vi etnam 

armed forces units panicip::lling in pacifica tion. 

The Vietnamese armed forces Department of Housing Pro· 

gram hild bcen initiated in April 1961 for soldi ers beJo\ ... the grade 

of sergea nt. In 1964 the program was expanded to include all ranks 

and a se parilte Regional FOI'ces program was begun. No Po pul ar 

Forces hOllsi ng existed, since individuals normally resided in their 

own homes. The calenda r year 19Gi governmem of Vietllilill 

defense budget containcd 300 million piasters to complete previolls 

building programs and to construct both officer and enlisted quarters; the houses to be erected with the 1!J6i funds h'ere len-famil y 

units, providing each famil y \ ... ith a livi ng areil 3.5 meters by 10.5 

meters. Spiraling costs were cxpected to limit new construction to 

no more than 3,000 units. On II January 1967 the i\IACV COlll' 

mander assigned the principal U.S. responsibility for the program 

to U.S. Army. Vietnam ..... ,hilc the MACV Directonltc of Construe· 

lion was responsible for co·ord inating policy and programs and for 

funding. 

Force Strllctllre EX/Ja1lSion 

As men tioned briefly in Chapter II . i\ li lilary Assist .. nce Com· 

mand had completed a stud y in the 1:lst half of 1964 acldressi ng 

itself to the Vietnamese armed forces leve ls. The study had proposed two alternati,es: alternative one provided for an increa se of 

~0.339 men in the reglliar fan.·cs. :15.387 in the Regional Forces, 

and 10,8 15 men in the Popular Forces; and alternative twO pro· 

vided for an incrc:lse of 47,55G in the rcgular forces and identical 

increases in the Region:1I and Popular Forces. Alternative Olle was 

appro\'cd, with sollle lllodifiulliulIs. 0 11 2:\ J anuary 1965, and force 

levels were fixed al 2i5,058 for reglll:lr forces, ~i, 8i fOI' the 
Regional Forces, and 185,000 lor the Popul a r Forces. But by 1;\ 

April 1965, with no improvement in (he military or pol itical situation, ahcrnati\(: two increases were also .1!Jp.-oved and th e regular 

force ceil ing rose to 292,305. These increases were used to raise 

the number of South Vielnam Army infa lllry battalions from 119 

(93 in fa ntry, 20 R,lIlger, and 6 airborne) LO 150. T o avoid ,lCtivatiug lIew headquancrs units. one lIew inf'lIltf) battalion was added 

to eac h Vietnam Arllly regimellt (a later adjustl11CIll to 1'19 battalions was madc wheu the activ:ltion of two additional airborne 

ballalions LOok up the spaces of :lbuut three inf:llllry battalions). 

Activation of these units began immediately, alld by Ihe end of the 

yea r twe nty-four were cilher in the li eld or in tfaining areas. 

Pl an ning ;lIld sllId y of th e force structure requirements was a 

COlllinuous ac ti vity. By 5 November 1965, additional increases had 

been requested 10 provide fo r a regular force of 3 11 ,1/58 troops in 

fiscal year 1966 and 325,256 in liscal ye:lr 19m. The ftsc:l1 ye:lr 

1966 increases wc re primarily to fl esh out the existing structure ill 

the areas of cOlllmill1d and control, psychologica l operations, and 

lhe replaccmelll pipeline. Pipeline increases \,'ere needed to reduce 

the tendency to "ftll" units with untl'ilill ed persollnel and allow the 

growing force Structure a longer lllanpOll'el le:ld limc. As tmining 

becamc l1Iorc compl ex, oath longer lead limes and greate r pipelille increa~s would oe necessary. 

Increases for ftsca l yea r 1967 ind uded 3 infantry battalions (to 

replace th ose traded olf for 2 airhol'lle b:llla lions in 1965). I inf. 'lItry regimcnt, I art illery bauery ( 105-mIlL). ~ military police 

compani es, I i\ larinc ba ttalion, 1 civil affairs l.omp;my, 1/ psychologica l warfarc compan ies, 8 1 Region:,l Forces w llIp;mi es (to accommodate the expanding p.1cilication program), and 15,000 spaces 

for the Regional Forces and other augmentations lO increase the 

<.:a pability of ex lill g Vietnamesc armcd forces units. Larger increases were needed, but the manpower siUl:nion would Ilot make 

such increases possi ble. The U.S. Secreta ry of Defense gale his 

verbal approvc for the new ce ilings in Saigon on 28 November 

1965. 

The requested force increases represented th e max imum 

tr ll th thal the manpower base co uld suppOrt. Accessions of 

20,000 per month would be required to attai n and sustai n th ese 

levels: maintenalH c of th ese le\cls past 1969 would ca ll for the 

recovery of signilic:wt manpower resources fWIll Viet Cong COIltrolled area~ or the ('"XIClb ioll of military leflllS of sen icc :md recall 

of I·ClCI'.I Il S. ;\ I;mpower limitations were of (OLll'se qUillit:llive as 

well as quantitative. h \Vas becomi ng increasingly difficult to ob· 

lain ,mcltl'ain abk Jc;tdel'i fm th e r:q)idl)' cX )all{ ~ forces. 
TilE IIt'IU)l'I' YEARS, 1%'; 1967 67 

The formation of new uni u tolHillucd throughout ]!lGG, However, the ge neral manpower shortage was making it difficult to 

sustain this high growth 1:lIe, A IllUl :lIoriullI on the acti"ation of 

new units was fi na ll y called, and th e fiscal I!lGG Vietn amese force 

structure was swbili7.ed ;1 1 a to tal strenglh of u:.l!~,fi45 consisting of 

!l 15,GuO regul ars (277,3G3 Army, 15,R33 N:IV)', 7, 172 i\lari ne Corps, 

and 15,2D2 Air Force). 111.73 I Regional Forces. and 17u,251 

Popular Forces. 

J.imits of xl)(m io" 

Discussions hetween Military A'i~istance Command ;lIld th e 

Joim General Staff on Ihe m:Ulpoll'er sit uation during i\ lay and 

June I!JGG explored the possibility of spe nding unit activa tions 

called for in the fiscal year 1!,67 force structu re, On 30 June General \Vc lr l1o!'cI;lI1c1 wrote the ,1(;."1 (hief lha t Ihe objectives of the 

fiscal year 1967 force structure might nOl he aLtai lwble :md shou ld 

be re·exami ned to afford a more reali.')lil.; :digmn enl of forces as a 

means of increasing comb:lt effecli\ell~s. He cited desertions and 

unauthorized units as major ca uses for the IIns,"t Lisfa clory strength 

siLUiltion, ilnd assened thill il was impcr:llivc for the activation of 

:Idditional units to be suspended for the remainder of I!lGG. Units 

:ullhori/ed for (';111 ) acti\'a lion to meet operational re<l uirements 

were exempted from the sllspension. 

Generill \ Vestmorel:lnd's immediate concern was th e cledining 

present-for.tomb .. t strength of the ViCU1 :lmeSC Army in famry units. 

i\IACV studies ShOh'cd th:ll, as of 28 Febru:lry 1966, Soulh Vielnam 

Army divisions a\"er:lged 90 percent of :nllhori zed strength, and 

h:lttaliom averaged 85 percent. HUL only 62 percent of authorized 

lrell p. th \\':lS heing lIH1slered for (Omha l opcr;niolls in the fie ld. 

There were two m:ljor reasons for this disp:Jrit)'. First, division and 

rcgimel1l:11 nllHln:mders had organized a number of fHi hoc units 

'illch as strike and reac..tion forces. reconnaissa nce :md sccurity 

units. and !'e,-ruiting teams. Second. large numbers of deseners. 

long-term hnspit;11 p:lliell ls. a1l(1 s()l clier~ ki ll ed ill ;tl tion lontillucd 

to be carried on the rolls long a fler the ir names should ha ve heen 

deleted . 

In rev iewing the South Vietna m Army strength problem. pl an-

!lers p;miuilarly Sl.Tutin iled u/l authoriled units. One type of unit 

fOll nd in almost all infa ntr}' regimems W:l~ th e reconnaissance 

compan)'. That a need existed for this kind of unit was indit:olled 

if' :l subseq uent stud)', Appro\al W:lS given to de\elop the OIWlIliz:llion for a legimcm:ti reconllai.)~'llce comp:Hl) which ,'OIlid he 

ilJ(orpnraled into Ihe Iionnal ful't(· lrIiUllre. 
I)E"ELOI'~IE T ~I) TRAJI"I .... C 

In order to give his review efforts a hroader b<lse, \ Vestmol'e· 

land tasked the U.S. Senior Advisol's in eac h of th e fOllr corps 

UKtical zonell and other major armed forces componellls LO in iti ate 

detailed suppOrt of the SotHh Vi etnamese organita tions. Were Lhey 

all being used accord ing to their organ izational mission . did they 

cOlHrihUle clfeni\el)' to th e o\el·all mission, or could they be 

reduced in TOE strength, absorbed into other units, or deleted 

entirely? Replies from the field cited only a few examples of im· 

propel' employment; in some instances such employment was 

ca used by !<It k of proper eq uipment (for in)t;'UKe, ;'I nnored Cars in 

Regional Forces Illcch:m i/ed platoons), and in others it was due to 

local reasons (such as using rcconnaisS:lIlce companies as house· 

keeping units). In J Corps Tauical Zone the Sen ior Adv isor felt 

thaI th e Ranger baU<llions though 1I0t properly employed still werc 

contribu ting to the \\,;11' errOil. In IV Corps T:lctical Zone the only 

sign ific<l nt shortcoming noted \\'a~ th e comillued lise of provisional 

regi lllental rCfOllllaissallce conq);'I nies. The su rvey located quite a 

few units whil h could be deleted emirely or wh ich could be abo 

sorbed into oth er units. There were severa l inadequatel)' tr<li ned 

SCOUl comp-lnies which, if th e)' railed to respond to organilational 

tr:lin ing, "'ere recommended for dele ti on, <.:onvcrsion to Regiona l 

01 Popul ar Forces, or absorption into oth er units. It was also feCOIll ' 

mended that armored un its be absor bed itHo the regul<l f infa lllry 

divisions. But in most cases the U.S. Senior Advisors felt th at as· 

signed Vietnamese Arm)' IInits ,,'ere necessary and contributed to 

the over·all mission. 

In 1967, with the authori/ed force level still frozen a t the fisca l 

ye;lr 1966-67 strength of G:!:l.(i45. planning for fiscal yea r 1968 

force levels began. On 26 April recommended fisca l year 1968 

force levels were submiued and proved substantially higher th an 

th e present ceiling. The fisc;'!l )'e;Ir 1968 program called for a LOtal 

strength of 678,728 with the Vietnamese Army level :It 288,908, 

Regional Forces ;It 186,868. and the Popula r Forces at 163,088. 

\Vhether South Vietnam could support further increases was a 

question mark. 

The devel opment of fiscal ye;tr 19G5 force strlll.:tll1'e was long 

.mel complex. In/l;ttionary lI tld ~. SOllth Vietnam governmelll 

mobiliz:llion policies, th e b;tbn('e of forces, and espec iall y the 

aV<lilability of manpower :Isse ts were considered. The new force 

IC\'e l was ba~ed on an estimated population of 16,500,000; this 

number was considered suOicient 10 \Upport the new le,'els through 

December 1!'J68 bu t projections be}ond that date wcre tenuous. A 

rev iew conducted in late I\ la)' ten littively identified additional 

spaces needed in th e reg u lar force, :1Ilc! th e fiscal ),ear 19fi8 force 
Tilt: JlUlLl>UI' YEARS, 196!H967 " 

level was further increased to 685,739, The most importalll ca lise 

of these increases was the need for additional territorial (Regional 

and I}opular Forces) units in areas recentl y brought under friendly 

comrol. Such expansion also increased the recruiting base, but the 

lag between the growth of the recruiLin g base and the growth of 

the Victnamese Army Il'as considera bl e. Thus the l\ lay review 

aga in addressed the question of whether these increases wcre attain;Ii)le within the pl:mned lime frame, taking into account 

leadership potential, recruiting ca pability, equipment availability 

as well as available manp()\\ter and budgetary limitations. With 

certai n augmentations, the tra in ing base and logistica l supportStructure was considered adequate to support an increase in the 

force structure, but availa ble leadership reso urces we re likel y to be 

severely strained. However, as before, to strain these resourccs 

appeared to be the more desir:tble ;lIternali ve. 

In Jul y 1967 the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked that the revised 

fiscal YC;l r IUG8 force level be reconciled with the earlier estim:ltes. 

l\ lilitary Assista nce Command replied that the strllclllre review had 

considered alternative force struc tures and various mixes of Regional and I}opular Forces <I ud regu lar forces. When examined 

within lhe context of projected U.S. troop deployments, anticipa ted 

enemy :lCtiviti cs, :mel projected operational plans. the April estimate had proved tOO 10\\1. In addition, the fiscal year 1968 force 

levels were based on the assumption that the South Vietnam government wou ld lllobilize its m<lnl)()\\'er in j;lIlu;lry 1968 by lowering 

the dralt <lgc to nineteen, extending tOLlrs by one ye:lr, :1I1d recall ing 

selected reservists. The U.S. Mission had long urged such measures 

and lhe JCS chi ef seemed to view the prospects f:lvorably. Whil e 

the Vietnamese armed forces 1II,1I1power resources would support 

these levels, they were the m:lximmn that could be sustained. The 

armed forces perennial IC<ldership problem could be p:ln iall y 

solved by rClr<lin ing and ca lling up qualified and experienced 

combat leaders, phasi ng unit acti vations O\'er a two·year pcriod , 

and empl o} ing U.S. traini ng tc:nns with new Regional Forces compani es. In the end, the revised fiscal year 19G5 force level was confinned ri nd a force leve l of 685,73U p 03,35G South Vi ewrllIl Arm)" 

16,003 Navy, 7,321 Marine Corps, IG,448 Air Forces, 182,971 

Regional Forces, and 159,640 Popular Forces) W:lS authoril.ed. 

In October EJG7 the Secretary of Defense rlpproved the fiscal 

yt':lr 19G8 force level of 685,739. cOllting('nt upon the impl ementa -

tion of the necessary manpower mobilil.ation measures. nut all 

<lcli v:ltions were to be hand led on a casc·hy,c:lse basis Ulllil a joint 

i\!ACV- JCS activa tion schedule could be de\'elopcd and approved. 

The :lcti va tion schedul e would be dependent on manpower :I\'ail-
70 I)f. f.LOI)~ IE T A N Il T RA I NI NG 

abilit y, recruiting experience. th e continued development of leadership polcmia l, the ma illlcnance of adequate prescl1l-for-operali ons 

strength , th e avail ability of equipment, and the capability of the 

support b;lse. Ag<dn all 18 November the JGS chid was informed 

that 111:111 )' SOlah Vietnalll Army infantry units nill had ex tremely 

low prese nt-for dUly or fi eld strengths. But despite this situation, 

an a(liv.:L lion schedu led fo r the new Army units was approved a ll 9 

December 19Gi. At th e end of 1967 actua l South Vietnam armed 

forces strength was a pproxima tely 643,000. The new units to be 

activated between January and April 1968 made mandatory increased recruiting th ro ugh nell' mobilj,,,tion decrees. 

In January 1967 General Westmore land approved a step which 

he had vetoed olil y lIIolllhs be fore-withdra wa l of ~IAr support 

from unprocillni\'e or inc ffeaive Vi etnamese army forces units. 

The MAP Directorate initiated a program aimed at idemifying unproductive units, and in April it sent a lelter to Chi ef, Joint General StaIr ill fo nn ing him of th e program alld potenti:!! candidates 

to be deprived of support. The U.S. Navy planned to reduce its 

support of the South Vietnam Navy by 57,800 during fiscal )'ea r 

1968 by discolltinuing support fo r two ex-fiShing boats because 

they were not slated to perform an )' mission assigned to the Vietnamese Na vy. Other likely candidates from th e Vietn amese Navy 

werc underwater demolition teams Il ot properl y employed, and a 

light cargo ship which was IIscd in a training role rather than in 

logistic suppon . The South Vi etnam Army also had units nominated to hale J\ \AP support withdrawn. In I I Corps Tactical Zone 

the 22d and 23d Ranger l3aualions and in III Corps Tactical Zone 

th e 5th Arruored C:l\ alry Regiment had ine ffecti ve leadership a nd 

were assiglled inappropriate missions. Restoration of support would 

be contingent upon institution of correcti ve action . Westmoreland 

w:lIlted th e prog ram (ominued wi th a fin al eV:lluation of unpro· 

ductive uu its every .IUlIC and Decembcr; this acti on would g ive 

Vietn amese armed forces lime to take remedi al actions. Curtililing 

SUppOI"l to regimellla l headquan ers compani es cou ld present serious problems, but a possibl e sol ution \\·ollid be to in:tctiv:n e th e 

n'gimellt and use its p.·oducti vc b:lltalions elsewhere. Loss o[ a 

ha u al ion I\':,S not de,il":.blc bu t. if uc("cssa r)" a regiment could lea rn 

to operate with th ree hatta lions instead of the fOlLr that most had. 

Genera l \Vestmorcland stated tha t i\Jilitary Assista nce Command 

I\'as th e admi nistrator of U.S. fllnds and equipmelll and was responsible for ensuri ng producti ve ut ililation of U.S. resources. 

The j eS chief wrOte LO the J\\ ACV command er o n 3 Ma y reo 

q U6ting th,H the loill t (;etlcr:d "ilalf ,1I1d the fA CV staff work 

togeth er to im pr()\c su bsta nd;lrd un its. The ;\I ACV comma nder 
THE Il tJIU>U I' VE,\RS, 196:H%7 71 

concurred and directed the i\IACV staff to co-ord ina te d iret:tly 

with the Joint Ceneral Sta rr in improving subSlandal'd Vi etnamese 

armed forces units as they were identified. Since corrective measures had been initia ted in the 22d and 23£1 Ranger Battalions and 

ill the 5th Armored Cavalry Regimclll, Genera l \ Vestmoreland 

dedded to COlllin tle military assistance to them. but he proposed 

that the units be placed on probation IInti l their effecti veness W<lS 

t:ondusivelyestablished. 

In early August the i\IAP Directorate identi fi ed additiona l 

Vietnamese armed forces units for possible withdrawal of i\ IAP 

support. Eighteen Regional Forces companies, sixteen Popular 

Forces pl atoons, <l nd fourteen Popular Forces squads constituted 

the majority of th e ullsatisfactory or marginal units. Besides these. 

two South VieUl am Army in falllry battal ions, :11l armored cavalry 

regiment, an engi neer batlalion, a recon naissa nce troop, and an 

armored ca r platoon were identified as unsa tisfa ctory. Deficient 

leadership, defective traini ng, obsolete equipment, and meag'er personnel strength caused the low ratings. Defi cient le<ldership wa s 

present in <I ll bm seven instances. One company cOllllllander was 

described as "seldom present" and " preoccupied \I·itll his own 

sa fety and comforl," while another was "absent for a two·month 

peri od due to self·inflicted leg wound. " Obsolete equipment caused 

tWO poor ratings, and low personnel strength appeared in twentysix others. Defecti ve tra ining programs accompanied defi cient 

leadership in almost every instance. Further (orce increases were 

obl'iously contingent on whether Vi etnamese armed forces leaders 

could bring their poorer units up to acceptable standards. 

Territo rial Forces 

During this period both the missions and composition of the 

territori al forces beclll1e stabili zed. T he Regional Forces were 

vol untary units orga n ized , ... ithin a provi nce fo r lise within that 

province and consisted of rifle compani es, river boat companies, and 

suppOrt units. The Popular Forces were vol u ntary locally recruited 

forces, orga nized into squads and pla toons, used primaril y as 

security forces in villages and hamlets. Regional Forces strength 

for fiscal years 1965 ;md 1966 had been se t at 137,187 men organized 

into 759 cOlllp:mies; fiscal yea r 1%7 force structure authorized 888 

companies, an increase of 121 ol'er fiscal yea r 1966, with a strength 

of 155,322 men. The emphasis on revolutiona ry development at 

the Honolulu conference meaJlt that more Region:.! Forces com· 

pani cs would be needed to extend South Vietnam go\'ernment 

influence into recentl y cleared areas or into nat ional priority areas. 
72 DEVELOPMENT I\Nl) TRAINING 

In order to gain lead time. 31 companies were scheduled for 

activa tion before I July, 21 were programed for national priority 

areas, and 10 for corps priority areas. The remaining firty companies were scheduled for activation between Ju ly 1966 and June 

1967. 

Ceneral \Vestmoreland beli eved thal the territorial forces were 

onc o[ the keys to pac ifica tion, but felt they were not receiving 

enough attention from the South Vietnam government. U.S. fin an· 

cial support for continual larger force levels was not enough. The 

Regional and Popular Forces depended on volunteers to swe ll 

their ranks, and often stich ind ividua ls joined on ly to escape the 

morc burdensome service in the regular Army. As Vielllamesc 

armed forces recruiting pressures grew more intense. however. 

competition for manpower increased and territori;d strength decl ined in 1965 and 196G. H igh desertion rates of the terrilOrial 

forces and recruiting rcstrai lllS placed on them by the Joim Genera l Staff in J 966 were the immediate ca uses. These restrictions 

prohibited the Popu la r Forces from recruiting men from t\oJem y 

to twe nty-five years of age; la ter in the year further bans prcvcmed 

them from recru iting those in the seventeen to thirty bracket. To 

make mallers worse. the restrictions were retroactive to 1 J anuary 

1966. making the status of some 17.000 recruits in lhe restricted 

age group illegal. Although these restrictions we re later relaxed in 

September and th e Po pul ar Forces were authorized to reta in the 

recrll its in the retroaClive ca tegor y, the change came too la te to 

compensa te for the losses o( the first nine months. 

The Regional Forces .md Popular Forces command and control 

structure presented another dil emma. T erritorial forces constituted 

approximately 50 percent of the tota l South Vielllam armed forces 

structu re. but. in view of their size, they enjoyed a much smaller 

proportion of sUpporl. They were Car down in priority Cor trai ning, 

equipment, and leadership, resulting in margina l or unsa tisfactor y 

rati ngs in al most every category of their activities. The rOOt of the 

probl em was the cha in o( command. The Regional and Popular 

Forces central headqu.u·ters, whose mission was to command and 

manage th e Regional and Popular Forces units througholit the 

cOllnlry. did not have operational com ro! of th e units (exce pt for 

the seven Regional and Popular Forces nadona! tra ining centers); 

th e actual control of the Regiona l and Popular Forces was exercised 

by corps and divisions through sector commands. 

tn September 1966 the government of Vielnam decided to integra te the separate Regional Forces and Popular Forces headquarters 

at lhe J Oint Genera l Sta ff, corps, division, sector, and subsector into 

the regular military commands at th ese echelons. Two advantages 
T il E II L' ILDU I' \' E/\ IlS. I!lG;; 1%7 " 

ensued from this :.rrangelll cllI: fewer people wele required for 

starr duty, thus releasing person nel for d uty in the fi eld ; "Iso. the 

new arrangement wo uld prov ide more elliciem logistica l support 

of Regional and Po pu!;n' Fones ImiLS. The intcgntioll pl.-.<.cd opera ti ons, administration, :lIl d suppol'l of th e Region:d and Popular 

Forces under the responsible tactical COll llllalldcl') throughou t the 

"!'Ill ed fo rces and (hus provided for a more unified errOrt th ro ugha lit the ch"i u of lOlllln;wd. T he organi/:ttioll "Iso pla<.ed Region,, 1 

and Popul ar Forces troops under th e cOllllTl:l nd of sector and subsector commanders: sim.e these comman ders wc re closely can 

neCled with pacifi ca ti on, it was thought likely that Regional ;lIlei 

Popul ar Forces troops would be L1 sed in the ir proper role of pacifica ti on suppOrt. A new position, th e Chid of Cen tral Agency ;md 

concurrently Deputy Chief of Stall tor Region;d and Popular 

Forces at Joint Gene ral Sta rf of th e Sou th Vieillam armed forces, 

was (a rmed and made I'espollsi blc lor reccJlIllllending policy ,me! 

guidel ines for Ihe Regional ;Iud I'opul;u- FOlces. The reorg'lIlil.a tion 

was to take place in t\\'o !)tages and be I..ompleted h) the end of the 

year. I t was mid- 1967, hOh'e\'er, bdore the neh' command rela tionships h .. d been sorted Oll t and the lIlote ~C:l'i()us problems rCMll\'eo. 

Following the i\ lallila conferell( e. with it!) propos<1I to withdraw 

U.S. troops and Free World Ii litaly ASl> i!)t.1I1ce Fon es from South 

Vietnam with in six months, as the other side withd rew :mel stopped 

in filtra ting. :lnd as thc lel'ei 01 \io1cn~e sltbsided, ;\Iilitary Assistance CoIllIl1:lIld noted th.II Ihe tHn rel'Cl1fe cOllllllnniq ui: d iel not 

provide ror U.S_ mil ita ry advisory pcrM)llllcl to lllai ll after a withdrawa l. In these circumstances. be e~ strengthen ing the tiljli;l11 

components of the mission, it W;I:> t:omidered prudent to consider 

immediate orga n il<llioll and training of a n:lliUlial constabulary 

und er the guidance of i\ lilitar y s~ is ;11l(c Conull.ll ld. Qne suggestion was to d raw upon Regional Fon. e~ and l)opIII<lr Fon.:u a~ a 

ma npower sou rce, while another ILlS IU design.lte the Regional 

Forces as a provincia l pol ice [olte .tnt! Popular n.'~ as a vill age 

police force. Ge neral We!)tmorcland agl ced tbt e;n") org;lIIil.a ti on, 

with MACV a~~ista cc, of a ~(l!l"ta blllar)' was cc~~lr)' to provide a 

force which wou ld not be subject 10 e,\-(o ti .lli() II~. It "ppearcd to 

\Veslllloreland, howcvc r, tll,lt e~t In ili t:ll)' IMn ic ip;llion sho uld 

he terminated as soon as po,,~ iblc. Seleral ;,(h.lIItag:cs \\erc to be 

gai ned from buildi ng on the R<'g ion:d and 1'01'" 1. 11 Forte!) ], ~C:. 

since those fo rces, besides constilUti lig <I II org:mi/cd force, a lrcady 

had an assigned mission which would not be changed su hstalltially 

by conversion: other p;lIamilitary forces ~('lIld be I('aelil) inte1:jra led 

into the program as well. 

T o organi/.e :1 constabu lary Icq llired pl;lIl11ing alld Sind) :md 
IJ E" EI.OI',\[ ~T AN O TRAI NING 

the development 01 a concept 01 organiza tion ;l lId operation. To 

provide the plan n ing ,md development, an interagency study group 

wa s formed . The group compl eted its wor k. in December 1~) 66 ,wei 

recommended that a Rural Constabul ary be formed, utilizing the 

Police Field Force as a base and opening up all llWllpo\\'cr re· 

so urces, including the armcd forces, to recruitmellt. The study 

group also proposed lIsing Popu lar Forces personnel as a recruiting 

h<lse for pacifica tion cadre. General ' VestlllorcJand, however, can· 

ti nned 10 support the concept of converting the Regional and Pop· 

LIlaI' Forces into a territorial constablll;ny and poi nted om the 

uselessness of paci fi cation c<ldre without loca l security su pplied lJy 

a strong popular force 01 its equi valent. 

Th e Civilimt Irregular De/elISe Groul) 

At the begi nning of 1966 onl y 28,430 ClOG personnel were 

enrolled in 200 companies, although a strength of 37,250 was 

au thorized for both fiscal year 196G and 1967, which would have 

allowed a total buildup of 249 companies. 

In 1965 a U.S. study group formula ted ,t detailed plan 1'01' convertin g the majority of ClOG companies to Regional Forces com· 

panies by the end of 1965 and tbe remainder by the end of 1966 

On 15 September 1965, the Joint General StaU had agreed to the 

plan in principle, but recommended til at tbe conversion be vol un· 

tary; the J oint General Staff recognized the desirability of incor· 

porating all military and paramil itary organizations into tlt e South 

Vietnam armed for ces, but recognized that the lUliquc role of 

Civilian Irregul ar Defense Group rema ined valid for the immediate 

future. In concept, as the areas in which CIOG units were opera l· 

ing became more su ited for Regiolild Forces operations, (he ClOG 

units would be converted to Regional Forces. U.S. and South 

Vietnamese Special Forces then would move to other locatiuns and 

recruit and train other ClOG forces. Ge nera l \Vestmore],lIld ITCommended slow and deliberate conversion, with the use of two or 

three camps as pilol models. 

Initiall y, three camps were t.: hosen lor co!l\'ersio!l : Pl ei 00 Lim 

in Pleiku Province, Huon bt Yang ill Darlac Province, and An Phu 

in Chau Ooc Provi nce. Numerous delays ensued before the test 

was completed in August Initial probl em!> centered around the 

disadvantages of con version to the part ici pa ms: redu ced res upply 

capability, since the U.S. Arm)' Spec ial Forces was no IOllg'er sup· 

plying the camp; a decrease in pay to some unmarried personnel 

when converted; and increased pressure on SOllth Vietnam armed 

[orees deserters who had joined the Civilian Jrregular Defense 
Tin: flUILDU l' YEARS. 1965- 1967 75 

Group. When coupl ed with the traditional distrust of the Montagnards for the South Vietnam government, the unpopularity of 

conversion and its temporary suspension in 1966 was not surprising. 

Train ing and Leadership 

Paralleling (he expansion of the South Vietnam armed forces 

massive effon s were tn;"tde to improve the quality of the armed 

forces and training programs represented one of the most effic ient 

ways to bring this about. While th e old adage th at units " learn to 

fight by fighting" is true, fighting alone was not enough. In Southeast Asia it was necessa ry to win (lnd to keep winn ing a complex 

war where set-pi ece baili es often gave only th e illusion of victory. 

Thus. the advisory effort was devoted to (Teating not only an army 

t hat was tactically and techn ically proficient, but a professiona l one 

th at could cope with th e socia l, economic, and pol itica l turmoil in 

which it operated and from wh ich it was derived. 

The grea test obstacle in improving and training the armed 

forces was the lack of qualified leadership at all levels. both officer 

and noncommissioned office r. This deficiency had been a continuing 

source of concern <lnd one which seriously affected all efforts to 

ue<lte an effecti ve combat force. Battalion and company comm<lndel'S were often inexperienced and lacked initiative; few operations 

were conducted in th e absence of deta iled orders. Senior commanders issued directi ves, but f<li! ed to super vise their execution. and 

results were IIsually ilegligible. U.S. advisers continually cited poor 

leadership as the foremost re<lson for u nit ineffectiveness. But with 

the lack of repl<lcements. unsatisf<lctory commanders were seldom 

rel ieved . This siUl<lt ion was an un fortunate by·product of the rapid 

expansion of th e military without a strong base of experienced 

leaders; the shortage of abl e personnel lO occnpy c ivil administr<llive positions only made the milit<lry probl em more severe. 

Looki.lg hack on his C<lreer as Deputy Senior Advisor in n 

Corps Tactic<ll Zone in 1966- 67, Major General Richard M. Lee 

concluded th at the basic problem 

was not a lack of knowledge or training facil ities to do the job expertly. 

but a disinclination of many ARVN officers to take the time and effort 

to trai n their troops carehdly and thoroughly. The Vic tnamese had 

becn intcrmittclllly at war si nce \\Iorld \Val' .II with only an occasional 

respite: many An. VN officers lookcd at the war as a long pull rather 

than on a one·yea r basis, as wc American s tcnded to see Ollr personal 

contributions. Thcy tcnded to ta ke the wcekends off. They were not 

inclined to go in ror the intensil'e traini ng mct hods tha t the US forces 

were accllstomed to at that time. 
DEVt:LOI''\IENT AND TRAI N ING 

Lee \\'cnt on to !,oim Olll that many Vietnamese officers wcre 

not "tTilining ori ent ed" ;md also nOlcd th e class bias of the officer 

corps: 

II appe:lred 10 me that the ARVN officers :I~ a group C:lme from the 

middle amI upper·educa ted cla ~:.cs of Vielll:IITleM: ~oc l" COIll/)1 ised 

primaril y of a lew of the old ari:.locrac),. th e oUiccl' group n C:lled )' the 

Frcnch military during the Indo·China \V:II". and the rising COlli mer- cia1 / busincs:. dassc, fmlll the nl:ljor ili e~. parlielllal'l y S:ligon. While 

there were man y Ollt:.l:tIlding ('xceptiom, urprisi llgl y brgc numhers of 

this offi cer corps ~el' ed to I:ILk ;lgg-reHi\'enc.,s. Ic;)dership :lbi lit)'. and a 

full profes~io l commitment to their profes~i on . This h:Jd a penasi\'c, 

a(h'crse illlllaCl on tra ining:. Considera hle nUlnbers of J\ RV N fiel( 1 offi· 

cers sceme( to prefer I'cal" arC:l a'sigl11 llcllt rather than combat command. Some sought politic;1I jobs (in pro\ inces :111(1 district:.). I rCluct:IlHl y 

<.oncludc, ~o tl1 ;1( they could ;(\ oid the rigors, l)()redolll. :l nd dal1gers o( 

traini ng and combat. and a few (I :.pcc t but C;II1110t pro\'e) [sought] 

10 IISC thei,' positions for pCf,onal (lr c\cn financia l adwllllage. 

Lee ended this ca ndid assc:.smCl1t by suggesting iI dCIllOH:Jt iZ:llion 

of the corps by " integrating and broadening th e onicer base, making it more cgalitari:l1l and opening:' m(';1115 of sought.after npw:lrd 

mobility."' 

Befo re Jul y 1966, efron" to improve le:ldership wcre isolated 

:l nd had met wi th little MICCCSS. That month", Comnl:lnd 1.eadershi p Committce was formed consisting of th e SOlllh Vi etnam .I oint 

Gener:1 1 St:,ff (11:lil'lIl:111 ,111(1 fi\c gelleral onicers. Unde r 1\IACV 

g uidance, the committce: was chargcd with Ihe formulation o f com· 

prehensive progr ,Hn5 to imprO\'e IC:ldcrship quality ,md ~o nnel 

effectiveness througho ut th e Vietl1 :11l1cse Milled forces. Sevcral 

noteworth y "ctions res ulted. A C:lreer TIl"nagement program for 

officers was impl emented wh ich provided for rotation of officers 

betwee n command . st:lrr. and s<.hool assignlll cnts. :Hld the assignment of newly commis5ioned offil.ers to combal imits. The program 

was similar to th e (·:t ·r m:tn:lgel11 ent polic ies of the U.S. Army. 

In l!lfi7 th e 01111. ('1' AIlIIlt:d 1'101I10tio n Procedu rc incorporated 

efficiency reports illlo th e selcction process fo r th e first tim(' :lIld 

opened thc findings of thc bo;1I'(1 to their military :tudi ence; th e 

number o f oOlcer:. cOllsidered, the IIlImber selected, :md lh c po int 

avcragc of cach \\'CI!! all pl lblished. Thal sa me ycar, thc Noncom· 

missioned Officer An nu:tl Promotion Procedure also made full dis· 

closure to the field of thc boa rd 's procecdings :lnd considered 

coJ1lllli s~ d officcrs strictl y on th eir mcrits; unli ke past practice, no consider:llion was gi \'en to ullit nOll<.OIHmissiuned ufficer 

tr gt , a nd imb:tla nces were cOlTetlcd th rough unit tram£crs ",fter 

the promot io n :lntlOI11lCCIllCnt ... had bcen m:tde. A rc\ iscd selection 

process fol' a ll cnd:l11 cc :11 th e Saigon Command ;1 l1d C eller;t1 Staff 
'1' 1-1£ IIUILUUI' \'E,\RS. 1965- 1!Ki7 77 

College was instituted; swdelll select ions were made by the Joint 

Genera l Staff rather than by allocaLing quotas to subordinate comm:lIlds. The current position and promotion potential of candidates 

lI'ould we igh more significantly. A Victll<lllleSe-aulhorcd SII/(II/ VI/it 

Leaders Guide was published con ta ining sections on leadership, 

d iscipli ne, troop leading procedures, <l nd wmp<l n)' <ldministration 

and was iss ued to;'l1l company commanders a nd platoon and squad 
78 Df,VELOI'MENT M~I) TRAI N ING 

RANCE PRACTICE \VITI! NEW M 16 RIFLE 

leaders. A rcvitati7.3tion of the South Vietnam armed forces Inspector General system was a lso undertaken; reforms were patterned 

artcr the U.S. Inspector General system and incorporated personal 

complaint and redress procedures. Military Assistance Command 

provided sixteen Inspector Genera l <tdvisers to assist ,mel monitor 

th e efron. Finall y il comprehensive Personne l Records l\'lanagclllcnt 

Program was implemented in an effort to establish an aCCuTate, reo 

sponsive s)'stem for qualitative and quantitati ve identification of 

all personnel. 

One of the unsatisfactory policies of Vielllilmesc armed forces 

was its commissioning system which hea vily emphasized formal 

education, thereby eliminating th e potential leadership alJilit), in 

the enlisted ranks. ~llil itary Assistance Command strongly urged 

arrangements wherby quali fi ed and deserving enl isted individuals 

might be commissioned from the ranks. The matter was extremely 

sensitive in a land where pol itical and military power wenl hand in 

hand, but finally in 1966 three major steps were t:lken. First, a Specia l Onicer Candidate Training Course was opened for enlisted 

men who had undergone two years of llIilil<lf)' service and had 
THE Il UILDUI' Yf. \I~S, 1%;'- 1%; 79 

achieved the grade of corporill fi rSI !'lass or higher. Six 1:lasses were 

held dming th e yc,lr :mrl a 101:,1 of I.n9 graduates were com· 

missioned as a:.p irams. A second program resulted in the direct 

commissioning of 401 maste r se rgean ts first class in the regular 

force and 100 in the Regional Fones as aspirams. A third pl"ogT:nn 

award ed special battl e fi eld COlllm issions to 1G master sergea llls first 

class in the regulal· forn:~ and 4 in the Reg'ional F()l'ces. Thus by 

the end of the ycar these programs had awarded over 2,OO(J com· 

missions to servicemen from th e ranks and set valuable precedents 

for slH;ceedin g yeilrs. 

T he schools and trai ning centers a lso felt the new demand for 

leadership. Service school curriculums were rev ised 10 provide 

more intense leadership training, especially the Vietnamese 1\·lili· 

tary Academy whkh remained th e primary source (or regular 

officers and whi ch had now been permanently expanded from a 

two·year course to a fOllr·yea r degree.gTa l'l ti ng institution. Officer 

candidate courses as weJ1 as cou rses at bra nch schools were similarly 

broadened to meet the increased requ iremen ts for tr<lined leaders, 

ec hn ic ~, and specialists. 

With U.S. assistance. improvements made in the Command and 

General Staff College consisted of progTam of instructi on rev isions, 

a guest lectu re program, student lecLU re ;wd reseilrch requirements. 

tHClhod ~ of instr ucti on cou rse for instru ctors. and a modern library 

index system. For leaders at th e Saigon level. a Na tional Defense 

College was esta blished in August 19G8 and devoted itsel F to ed uca ting higher ranking military officers and career government civil· 

ians. 

In the Nationa l Training Center, a le:ldershi p development 

pr0gT;H11 was in tegrated inlo the norm:ll Somh Vietnam Army 

recruil traini ng. T he tOP 10 percent o( each SOll th Vi etnam Army 

basic/advanced indi vidua l tr:li ning company was retained at th e 

training celller and given an additional three weeks lr:lining in 

leadership and SI11<111 unit tactics. Upon compl etion, th ese students 

were assigned posi tions as squad and plalOon IC:lders for the next 

two tr:lining cycles. Trai nees who cont inued to excel were then 

selected for either th e Noncommissioned Onicer AGldemy or the 

Onicer Candidate School. 

DUshore Tmillil1g 

In 1965 and 1966 the offshore schooling program began to en· 

counter a great deal uf person nel trouble. The immedia te ca use 

was th e high number of offshore school ing cancellations during th e 

first th ree months of lOGe;; of :1 lOtal of 3GG servicemen scheduled 
80 I)EVEI.O I' ME:\"T 1\:,\D TRA I;\' Il"C 

for offshore schooling, 90 had h:,d th eir 51);"1I..C5 ca ncel ed. The mai n 

reason for the ca ncell ations was lhe l:mgu:Ig'c qll:ll ilicat ion. These 

cance llations in wrn interrupted lhe o rderl y pru'.{l'css of the program a nd created dela ys th aL could nOt be solved hy mere resched· 

uling. Also. when th e matter was reviewed in 19(;6, Mi litary 

Assiswncc Command found lhat little had been done to stud y the 

long-Ierm lise made of these trainees afler they rCllIrned to South 

Vietnam. 

To remedy these ills, th e MACV Training Dircctor:HC developed :1 system encompassing both U.S. :Uld advisory ch:li ns of 

comm:md. or primary impo rtli ll ce was the idcll lifica lion o f c..:<l ndi· 

dales. Advisers and VicUlamcsc armed forces cOlllmand ers we re required to submit jU:>lifica ti on for S<.hooling requests ;md Ihe job 

assignlll ents following its compl etion. Specific respo nsi bilities for 

both th e VieLnamese and the America ns were defin ed in a joint 

MACV- .J GS directi ve. Increased efrorts were also made to improve 

English language instruct ion and testi ng, and a new English lallguage screening lest was developed to suppl ement the English 

language comprehensive level test. The supplementary le:.t was to 

be given six months before allcl1(lance at the course. These mea -

sures proved sllccessfu l and by th e end of the year wel l o\'er no 

percent of th e programed spaces were be ing ut il ized, but continued 

vigilance was necess.ary to ensure tha t the tra ined personnel were 

used in a proper manner. 

SOlllh Vie/lIam Schools 

On 13 December InGG, Plemier Nguyen Cao Ky signed:l decree 

pen mmell t!y cOll\eni ng the Vietnamcse iliLar y Al.ademy frolll a 

two-year to a fo ur-year institution. (M ap 1) Classroom insu'uction 

and clirriculullls wel"c to be pallcnu:d after \VeSl Point. The Ch ie f, 

J oint General Staff, in itia lly o pposed the curriu llum which fea, 

lured electrical and methan ica l ellg'inccri ng and the socia l sciences 

and recommended one which emphasiLed electrical e ngi neering 

with a lower priorit), given to Ill ex hanical a nd civil engi neering. 

The superilllenden t, th e academic dca n, and the U.S. vi~c s at 

th e Vi etnamese i\ lilitary Acadcmy opposed this view and the sc hoo! 

adopted a l."ompro'l, ise l"tlrric ululli. 

On 13 February at the stan of the academic rea r, the se nior 

class of th e Mi litary AC;ldelllY \o!untarily split t\\'o classes: o ne 

moved into the four-year curricu lum , the o ther remaining wi th th e 

two-year program. Uefore I06i, cadets had been graded onl y semiannually in academic studies, ami classes were based largely on 

leclUres, with a minimulIl of o utside stud )' req uired . Beginning in 
SOUTH VIETNAM 

LOCATION Of RVNAF 

ACADEMIES, COLLEGES, ANO SCHOOLS 

1969 

,.------r-. .,..",'~ ..... n •

'! .. 

.......... ~ .... • .... ~"~~l'" TIQII.lL $CMOOL';;-=======~""' tO .e.\Ol.llY 

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COOO .. &IOD. I Tiff eQu(4( ~ _____ , 

&O/II'N'SU""VE • " ..... a: SC"OOI,. 

NATIONAL O('Ui 5( to\.l(<;.( 

AOJUTANT GlN(IIAl «lLl[G( 

_"I(II.II"S1lt1 sellOO\. 

'""'$"O~TUIO" KIfO(k. 

QIIilfI"HQ: Sl;M(lOl. 

" (OI(4l SCMOO\. 

....... ,£.11. IlilElLKi[1fC[ SCOtOOl. 

lOG""" ...... (0( .. (011 ~ 

&It, .. lOtI ..... rUINING ~OOI. 

.nz: CORPS 

MAP J 

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" \ 

t CORPS 

----I " 

Y""9 lou 

DG Lo! 
82 

February, cadets wcre graded daily in mathclll;Jtics and physical 

sciences and gradecl weekly in the soc ial sc iences. The ;lc:ldem ic 

dean held a master's degree from the U.S. Naval !)ostgr:ldu<ltc 

School alld believed strongly in the study and lcaching methods 

used al \Vest Point. Grades \\"t-rc posted weeki)' :md the first resectioning, based on ac;.dcmic sl:mding. occ urred on I April and 

was cont inucd every SIX weeks thereafter. \Vritlcn partial ex:mlS 

were given biweekly or monthly. :lI1 d written ge neral ex;:tlllS were 

gil'ell in I LITle alld :'\O\embcr. Lcuures, the fo rill er mainSla)'. were 

£Towned upon. and cadets were required to stud)' three hours a 

night after all ;neraA'c o f fi\e hOllrs' in:-.lru(tion daily. 

U.S. officer adviser strength waS increased from six to thineen 

LO furnish a II'cll'q ll:dificd advisor to eac h of the eight "1..ldemic deparunellts. (;cncral \\'cstl1lorela llcl strongl), ~uppo rt d the Vietnamese Military Academ)" notin~ in a leller to th e Chief. J oint 

General Swff, that "continued de\'clopmem of the VN~I. \ is o ne 

of the IllO ~l illlportant pnlgT:l111' ( urrentl y ill progTess to provide 

for the future of the Republic of Vietnam. I feel th at it should be 

given high priorit), and continucd command interest and cmphasis." 
THt;. BU ILD U I' YEARS. 196[>-1967 " 

The expansion of the Milita ry Academy illlo <I fo ur-year degreegranti ng instiUllion continucd througho ut the remainder of calendar yea r 1967. Funds were Illade ava ilable for the modifica ti on 

of the academic buildi ng :lIId the purchase of furniture. More than 

570 slide rules were provided from U.S. sources, the sum of $52,000 

was approved t<,> assist in funding the transla tion and priming of 

textbooks, and t ll'O Engl ish language labora tories were made available through the Military Assistance Progra m. Plans for the construction of faculty quarters were ;lIso approved. The academ ic 

college ad va nced in the area of cadet extra instruction, valid 

semester exam inations, department programs of instruction and 

standing operation procedures, and tex tbook selections. The new 

construction program continued to receive em phasis and work 

progressed on the diflicuh task of defin ing the d esign criteria for 

the massive laboratory building. The calendar year 1967 recruiting 

progr am for prospective cadets received special emphasis, including radio and television appeals. This program res ulted in a 49 

percent increase in :Ipplicams over 1966 (416 for 280 spaces). 

In J anu,lry General 'Westmore land approved a stud}' of the 

Command and Ceneral Staff College wh ich d iscussed its chief 

drawbacks: a poor re pulation, poorl y qual ifi ed students, a faculty 

with margi nal qualifica tions, and a lack of tra ining funds. The 

Chief, Joint General Staff, did not acce pt compl ete ly the findings of 

the study and directcd the Central Training Agency (CTA) to make 

a separa te survey. The CTA stud y was compl eted in February and, 

although it differed from the ~IACV study on several major poims, 

' ·Vestmoreland agreed 10 its findings and put its recommendations 

into effect in March. Selecti on of studcnts was centralil.cd al the 

Central Trai ning Agcllq rather than dcl egated to corps, and onl y 

qualified officers wit h ca reer pOlcntial were se lected. Furtherlllore 

the tra ining agency bcgilll assigning recent ViClllamese graduatcs 

cf the U.S. Army COlllm:llld and Gcncral Staff College as instructOI'S and increasi ng the length of th c courses taughl. The college 

continued to improve its prog ram and produced top Vict namese 

gradu'ltes throughout 1967. Othcr collegc suppOrt improvements 

consistcd of iI collegc fi\'e-ycal' plall, a college standing openltion 

procedure, det;li led budget studies for calendar years 1968 and 

1969, ;Uld renovati on of storage and supply facili ties. I-lolli'S of 

instruction that were not pertinent to the sitltinion in South Vietnam were red uced ;me! the courses streamlined. 

Considerablc headw'l}' \\'as mad e in establishing it Na ti onal 

Defense College. A qualified Scnior Advisor and 1I1'0 assistants 

were assigned to work with the JCS Centra l Training Agency as 

wcll as with a USA ID-prov ided civilia n ed ucillor in dcveloping 
I>EVI-:LOPMENT ""-II) TRAI NI NG 

plans for the school. A commiuee of U.S. officers was appo inted to 

work with the Joim Ceneral Staff to expedite Ihe establishment of 

th e school, ,md \Vcstmoreland was optimistic about mecting a 

February 1968 opening dale. Finding qualified persons was difficult, 

but Premi er Ky signed the decree establishing the National Defense College on 23 August 1967 and made funds availa bl e for reo 

habilitation of the site chose n. The faculty th en c:onsisted of t\\'O 

Vietnamese officers, and initially only twO courses were planned: a 

Na tional Defense Course and a Senior Office rs Semina r. The fanner 

lasted ten months, with the student body consisting of twenty senior 

military oOicers (Iieutcnalll colonel, colonel, and brig-Idier general) 

and key governmcnt civilians. The Senior Oflicers Seminar met 

each Saturday and was attended by general officers and very senior 

civilians. The advisory detachment consisted of four officers, one 

non commissioned onice r, two enlisted men, and 111'0 local nationals. 

MAP support funds werc approved by the Commander in Chief, 

Pacific, for procu remel1l of equipment. 

Despite all the effort devoted to building, supporting. and im· 

proving the tr:lining of th e Vietnamese armed forces, th e result was 

still a major question mark at the end of 1967. Certa inly improvements had been made. A temh infantry d ivision had been activated 

and man y combat su ppon and combat service support units 

formed ; training at national :l.Ild corps tra ining centers and the 

military schools had comillued with comparatively few interrup. 

tions. BUl desenion rates were still too high, refresher training 

practically nonexistent, equipment too old, and statistical mea· 

surements of combat effecti veness uIHl'usth'onhy. Only future 

per(ormance in the field would scrve as ,Ill adequate gauge of U.S. 

efforts si nce 1965 and by th e end of 1967 lhat tcst was only months 

away. 
CHAPTER IV 

Vietnamization, 1968-1972 

/3a ckgrolllld 

SOllth Vietnam was the test case for implementing th e N ixon 

doctrine a nd a new U.S. planning :lppmaC'h to Asia. Victnami":llion 

was both a go.1i and the program through which thal goal II'OIi1d be 

achiClcd a t the cadicst practica l time. The conSlilllenl e lemenLS 

of \ ' iclIlamiz<ltion- illlprO\CIllCIlI and modern ization of th e South 

Vietnam anned forces, pacification, and combat operations-were 

insepara bly interwoven, :md the Un ited Sta tes made every eITon to 

maintain and strengthen their 1l00turai interdependence. Within 

the COIllCXI of the situation in Soulh Vietnam, Vielnamizalion refClTed an i>' to th at portion of th e wa r effort engaged in b)' the 

United Slales and did not refer to the LOla I \\'ar effon whith the 

government of Vi etnam had carried as a large and heavy burden 

for SO many years. 

The 1968 T el offensive aimed at infli cting a decisive defeat on 

allied military forces and at sp<lrking popular uprisings aga inst the 

South Vietn<lm government throughout the countr),. In a r"dic,,1 

departure [rom his former strateg),. the enemy brought his forces 

out of their cross-border s;mctuaries. went to unprecedented lengths 

to assemble suppl ies and weapons, and infiltrated his loca l forces 

imo the major cilies :l1ld towns, whil e holding his main forces in 

rese rve to exploit the anticipated uprisings, Llut the local Viet Cong 

units were expended in va in and the regulars fared no better. 

Only in Hue did the enemy succeed in holding oul for more than 

a few da ys; in most are:\s. his guerrill a uniLS and clandestine governments came out into the open only to be quickly destroyed. 

South Vielnamese units. including the territorial forces. stood firm 

and worked side by side with U.S. units to throw the enemy Ollt 

of his objeuive area s. Far from weakening the gO\'enHllelll of Vietnam. the T el attacks gave it a new unity and sense of purpose. It 

had suffered the enemy's worst attacks and survi ved. 

M obi{iuifioll 

The T el otrensive galvanized the Vietnamese mobi lization 

elfOrl. I-laving wea thered the storm, gove rnment offici:ds emerged 
DE\,ELOI'MEI'T AND T RA I:-:l I'G 

with increased confidence and prestige, as well as with an increased 

sense of responsibility. American troop st rengt h was now reaching 

its highest peak, and both Saigon and W<lsh inglon began to feel 

public pressure for U.S. troo p withdraw;'Ils. (t was Tellh:lt ushered 

in the era of Vietnamization. Immediat ely after the o/rensive, 

rescrvists with less than fi ve years of acLi\'c service were made 

SUbject to rec<l ll, <lnd by I April 19G8 ni nctee n-yeOlr olds were being 

drOl ft ed and by I May eighteen·year o lds. Stronger en forcement 

eOon s than ever were exerted as unilS sought to fill their depleted 

ranks, Finally, on 19 J une, the South Victnamese government announced a gencralmobilization and the interim peri od of mobil ization by decree came to an end. Henceforth, personnel in the 

military service would serve;'l n indefinite period as long as a state of 

war existed. All males between the ages of sixteen and fifty would 

be mobilized; those between eighteen and thirty-eight would serve 

in lhe armed forces (incl ud ing the Regiona l and Popul<lr Forces), 

and other age groups would serve in the new People's Self-Defcnse 

Force, a part-time, loca l militia. T he government now had the 

confidence and the stability both to enact ;md enforce these strong 

measu res. 

The general mobilization succeeded in producing large numbers of recruits for the armed forces. During 1968, 80,44 3 mell 

were conscri pted illlo the armed forces and, under pressure of the 

draft, many others volun teered for units and stations of their own 

choosing. An accelerated paci fi cation c<llllpa ign in the closing 

months of the year brought 76.3 percent of the po pulation within 

government security by the end of the )'ear (with 11 .1 percent contested and 12.3 pe rcent still under Viet Congcontl'ol), a proportion 

never before equaled. This increase in turn further enl arged the 

government's reccuiting base and made the continuing ex pansion 

of the armed forces possible. 

Fo rce Str/icll/J'e 

Fon;e structu re plann ing cominll ed, and in March 1968 l\'filitary Assistance Command, Vietnam, submitted new strengt h propos'lls for ' V:lshington approval. The propos:lls recommended a 

suppoJ'l ed force level for the Vietnamese armed forces from the 

fisc'll year 1968 approved level o( 685,739 to a new level of 779, 154-

(including 341 ,869 Army, 211 ,932 Regiona l Forces, and 179,0 15 

Popul ar Forces) in fiscal yea r 1969 and 801,2 15 (355, 135 Army, 

21 8,687 Regiona l Forces, and 179,0 15 Popular Forces) for fiscal 

year 1970. These increases provided for I regimental headquarters, 

2 battalion headqu'lners, 4 inf;'llllry battalions, 15 artill ery bat-
Vl l::r/'lI\ Mll,\ II O~, 1968- 1972 87 

R ANCERS D.: FENI) SA ICON, TET 1968 

tal ions (I05-mm.), 2 armored ca valry squadrons, incre:lses in Reg"jonal and Popular Forces strength. additional logistical units, 

increases in pipeline authorizat ions. and incre:lses in the South 

Vielllam Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force_ The proposed levels 

would further round out and bal ance the fort:e structure and 

make sign ificant progress LOwa rd developing a self-sustai ning force 

capabl e of expanding or contracting its mai n effort to conform to 

shifts in the course of the waL Planning for these levels was done 

within the constra ints of manpower a\'ailability, leadership potential , and innationary pressures. As before, the miljor limiting 

(actor was Inanpoll'er aV<li lability. 

In April 1968 the <lgreemem between the governments of the 

Un ited StaleS and North Vietnam to begin peace talks brought a 

new sense of urgency to the development of the South Vietnam 

armed forces. Since its inception, the armed forces IHld been developed predominantl y as a ground combat force. The United 

StaleS had provided the major part of the air and na va l effort, as 

well as essential general logistical support. But the prospect of an 

immedi ate negotiated withdrawa l of U.S. and North Vietnamese 

forces required a radical departure from this role. 

On 16 April the Deputy Secretary of Derense ordered a plan 

develo ped for gradually shirting the burden of the W;I1' to the 

South Vietnam forces and to support, as qui ckl y as possible and 

to the maximum extent feasibl e. the efforts of the government of 
88 

Vie tn am to en large. improve. :mel modcrni:rc the armed forces. In 

an almost simultaneous acti on, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for 

approval of an immediate force level increase to 80 1.2 15 men 

(regular and Regional and Popular Forces). On 28 i\1a y th e new 

ce iling was approved, bill funds were withh eld pending ;t thorough 

cxaminaLion of South Vietnam ;'t rilled forces needs. 

In late l\I ay the Vic(nami z;l tion pl an requested in April was 

also submitted. Esscmi:dl y it proposed the dissol ution of one Viet. 

namese Army infamry division to suppOrt necessa ry increases in 

naval , air, and logistical suPPOrt uniLS. But th e following month 

the Defense Depanmcill approved onl y the eq ui pment modernization and force structure increases in grollnd comba t unit.s and 

helicopter squadrons cOl'llained in the fiscal year I!JG8 porti on of 

the plan. The Defense Secretary directed that a further review of 

the fiscal year 1969- 70 pol'lions be completed in order to prepare 

two cOlHingencies or " phases." Phase I would be based on American participation in th e war cOllIinuing a t the currcllt Icvc l; Phase 

II would provide for th e developmcnt of a se lf-sufficient South 

Vietnam armed forces ca p:lbl e of coping with the internal insurgency th at would rcmain aftcr a joint U.S.- North Victnamese 

withdr'l\\ral. No consideration lI'as to be givcn noll' to the threat 

of thc renCh'al of extcrna l aggression. 

On 27 August Mil itary Assismnce Command, Vielllam, completed its Phase J Improvement and l\loderni za tion Program. Essentiall y, it provided for ;1Il armcd force of 80 I .2 15, :'IS requested 

by the jCS, and closely resembled th e initi al plan submitted in 

May. The Phase I Improvcmcnt and l\ lodern iza ti on Prog ram was 

based on two asstlmplions--fi l'st, barring a negotiated scul emem, 

that the enemy threat would continue at the current leve l for an 

indefinite period, and, second, assuming comillued U.S. panicip.'!ti on at curreml y appro\'cd Ic\'els, that the SOllth Vietnam a rmed 

forces did not need to be " balanced" since their lack of adequate 

air, naval, and logistica l capability could be off'set by U.S. support. 

The expansion of the armed forces na va l and ail' elemell ts would 

thus be restric ted, ;mel the Army logistical elements would rece ive 

onl y th e minimum numbcr of spaccs required for cfTc'tive support 

of combat units. ~I OS l increases would thus be devoted to ground 

combat forces and would ease problems stennning from artillery 

and armor deficienc ies, unfilled di vision structu res, inadequate 

direci support C<lpabililY, and th e lack of helicopter lift. The Phase 

1 plan was quickly approved on 23 October 1968. 

By September 19G8, armed forces strength stood at 811,509, 

some 10,000 over the allthori/ed force le\'el, and the momentum 

o[ th e general mobilization would soon carry this figure to over 
I~: r:'\ \~ II I. \ n o:-.:. 1!l68- 1!li2 " 

850,000. i\ li lilary Assistance COIll1Jl;Ind conseqllclllly re(Ulllmendcd 

that <ldditionnl units be nuiv<lted. 1\n inucasc in the upported 

force cciling would maxim i/e the bencfits of lil(: Illobili/alion, dcny 

manpower to Viet Cong rcU' uilcrs, and permit iuili<ltioll of long 

le:ld-time tr:lining requ ired to expedite lhe ulli male transili011 

from a Phase I lO a Phase II force SlnlCtllre. l\ l ilil3ry .\ssistance 

Command thus proposed tha t '18,785 morc spaces be allocaled 

and apportioned bctwccn the Regional Forces (:19,000) nn d th e 

pipeli ne (9,785). On 5 November \\';Ishillgton approved this request, nnd the new lorce levels for a l\ lodifi ed Phase I Im provemelll ;lIld Modern ization pl;m rosc 10 ~5 OOO. 

On 8 October Milita ry Assistance Command submi tt ed its plan 

for the balanced Ph a~e 'I Improvemellt and l\ lodernil.a tiOIl lorce 

str ucture. The Phase II plnn called fo r a force of 855,594 with 

substalllial increases induded for th e Vietnamese N;",y and Air 

Force. \Vhile th is plan was bei ng reviewed, on !) November, thc 

l\ IACV commander requested authority to £,0 beyond Phase I and 

movc rapidly toward the Phase II posture. H e considered tb at 

th e Phase J pla n was no longer in line wit h the Silll<ltion in Vietnam and th e politic;II considerations s~oc iatcd with the negotiations bei ng conducted in Paris. At lhe time, the U.S. government 

had suspended lhe ail' offensivc against :\orth Vietnam a nd, \\'i(h 

i1 presidential elect ion bei ng held, th ere were increased expectalions for progress a t th e peacc tnlks. \Vhat \\'"s needed was tlte 

authority to proceed with th e lI ece~sary programing, budge ting, 

and other actions requ ired to provi de man power <lnd cq uipmen t 

for the Phase II structure. The ncw commander of the U.S. i\l ilitary Assistance Command in Vietnam, Ceneral Crc igillon \V. 

Abrams, th erefore recommended immed iate approval of an Ac-

('elerated Plwse [I IJnpro\cmc lH and :'\ locIernil.atioll plan ;mel an 

immediate incrcasc in force levels to 877,895 in order to make 

possible increased tr;lining or pipeline strcngth, with no immed iate 

decrease in the schedul ed expansion of the ground combat forces. 

The combat units could be phased down later once the cmergency 

ha d run its co ursc, The J oint Ch ieh of Sta ff concurred and, except 

for th e section on naval structure, the Deputy Defense Secrcta r y 

approved thc Pha se II plan on 18 Deccmber, rai ill g supported 

fo rce levels to a !lew high of 866,434 ;md req ucsti ng Accelera ted 

Phase II activation schedules as well as pla ns for withd rawal o( 

U.S. units no longer needed a fter equipment tu rno\'C!' to SOUlh 

Vietnamese units. Approv:l 1 of ;1 modifi ed na va l strUCUIrc 011 12 

February 1969 rcs ulted in a total force of 875,790. 

At thc Midway conference in June 19G!l, the SOllt h Viet nam 

governmen t req uested support for furthcr force incre<l ~ and 
90 IH.\' t:LOI'IIE:" r .\:'\1) TIt,,\[:'\ ]XG 

eq uipment modcrn i7;l lio n. At the time, 1lIajor 1I.S. redeployments 

were being announced, enemy acti vi t), was low, a nd bOlh pacifica ti on and mo bili za ti on c trortS were going h'C]1. The proposals 

were paniilily supported by !\lilitary Assistallce Command and 

th e Joint Chiefs of Swff, ;lIld on 12 August the Scncta ry of Dcfe nse approved the "~ Iid \\"ay pad.age" \\'hith raised th e total 

force level for fiscal yea r 1970 to 953,67:1. As before. th e 1:.rgcsl 

increa ses weill to the territorial forces, which cou ld be [f<lined 

quickly and wh ich were needed to provide security for recently 

pac ified O'l reas. On G January 1970, th e Secretary of Defense ;IP' 

proved th e accelera ted activati on of Regio nal Forces and Popular 

Forces units in fiscal year 1970, ~i g the Vielll:lmese armed 

forces level to 986,360. 

During these develo pments, ;1 more thorough slUd y was under· 

taken to determin c the final form of the armed forces o nce U.S. 

troops had withdrawn. Termed Phase III or th e Consolidati on 

Phase of th e Repu blic.: of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement 

and Moderniza tion Program, its main objecti ve was to identify and 

plan for long.range needs lip to fiscal year 1973. In general, these 

needs reflected qualit:nive rath er thall <ju;mtitat ivc improvement 

in the a rmed forces, and under the Phase III plan th e total force 

structure would rise onl y moderately from the !J86,560 Midway 

package for fisca l year 1970 to 1,1 00,000 by th e end of fisca l ye<11' 

1973. l\'fost of the later force increases provided for more combat 

support and comb"t servit:e support units as well <15 for lerritorial 

forces. On 5 June 1970 the Secretary of Defense approved the 

genera l o utline of the Phase III 1'1 <111. :md th ereafter specific items 

of the plan were approved in fisc:1l year increments, underwent 

continual review, and were altered as new needs were identified 

and older ones disappeared. 

By 1972 most o[ the Phase III pl an was compl eted, and both 

U.S. a nd Vietnamese :mllcd forces efforts II·ere concenlrated on 

improvi ng existin g units and mak ing compar:lli vely minor adjustmellls wilhin the over·a ll force structure. The on ly major 

force reorga ni zation occ llrred in 197 1 when ;Ill eleventh inf;lIltry 

division was formed in I Corps T anic:!1 Zone. The canst ill/em 

units, tak en from two oth er dil'isions al1(l lucal territorial forces, 

had lillIe o pportunity to co·o pcrate before the Nort h Vietnam 

Army oncnsive in the spring of 1!)72. ;md this lack may in part 

explain tb e poor performance o f these un its. 

At the beginning of 1972 South Viclllamesc combat strength 

was formida bl e: ;lbout 120 infantry b;lu;llions in II di \' ion s sup· 

ported by 58 artiJ1ery battalions, 19 batta li on·sire <1 rmorcd units, 

and many engineer and sign:1I rorp ·io s. On th e fro nt line \I'ere 
nt; I :-- \~IlL\ 110;';, 1!J68-I!li2 9L 

thiny+sc"l':: n Ranger borde r ddense batlalions (mostl y fonner c loe 

units) and in reserve, t\\'cllty+one Ri,nger baualions and both the 

airborne and the :\larinc di visions. This powerfu l forl..c of almost 

429,000 men (South Vietnam Army :lI1cl :\Jarinc Corp:» was suppa n ed by a Navy of 43,000 men oper;'ling 1.680 cra ft and an Air 

f orce of 5 [,000 men fl yi ng \\"ell over 1,000 aircraft, including aboUl 

500 helicoptcrs. 

The territorial force became stabililcd <I t about 300,000 Regional Forces and 250,000 I)op" lar Forces men, marshaled into 

abOllt 1,679 Regional Fortes companic:; alld 8,35G Popular Forces 

pl;noolls. The Regional Fones £1·0Ilp and later Regional Forces 

battalion headquarters alld admin islrati\'e and direct support 

logistic companies were cre,lted to assist sector and subseCLOr headquarters in managing these b'TolI'ing forces; ho\\"c\er, the trend 

towa rd incorpo rati ng them into la rger units- brigades and di vi· 

sions-was gcner .. lly resisted sllCcessfL ltly. 

Concurrelll with th c post-19G8 ex p:msion of the Viet namesc 

armed forces wcre significant increases in the paramilita ry forces. 

Pacific .. tion personnel (RO, ST, and VIS Gtdres and .. rllled propa· 

g:mda teams) peaked in 197 1, provincial l"cconnaiSS<lI1ce units remained stable, and both the U.S.·employed Kit Ca rson Scouts and 

Civil ian JrregLll:tr Defense Group were slowly phased OLit. The 

bller were evenlLlally either disbanded or converted into bord er 

Regional Forces and Ranger units illld incorpora ted into the 

reg ul ar Army. The greatest ex pansion in supponed levels occurred 

in the National Police forccs which rose from 16,900 in 1%2 to 

11 6,000 and in the local mi litia which rosc from I million in 19G9 

to more th;m 4 million by 1970. It should be noted that the militia 

forces were at best part-time personnel, and dleir organiz;nion, the 

People's Self-Defense Force, rcpresellled an auempt to in volve all 

levels of the population in the war effort , whatever their militiL l"y 

va lue. 

Desertio,lS 

In 19G7 the South Vietnam armed forces desenion rate had 

been reduced to 10.5 per tholls,.'md, but efforts to lower this figurc 

still furth er were unsuccessful. Tr<ldilionall y, desertions had always increased jLl t before the T el holi(l:. ys and 1968 was no exception. As before, the J oint Cenera l Staff asked all commanders 

to co-opera te in minimi zing this practice and tasked the Centra l 

Political Warfare Agc ncy with pllbli ci~ in g ncws repo rts 011 trials 

of deserters by radio, television , newspapers, and magazines. Other 

measures were to make eX;lInples of t)'pica l offenders, 10 impose 
" DEVELOPMENT Ai\'D TRAI:"I I L\'G 

st:vcre sentences, and to hold mobil e courl sessions. In addition, 

the agency pl"cpared spc!:iai l"ilC!io broadcasting <lnd TV programs 

for ser vicemen on Nell' Ycar's Da y. Annual leaves were lO be 

granted on Nell' Yea r's Day only to outstan ding individuals who 

had a number of ch ildren, and units were still cnjoined to remain 

within the established 1) percent leave system. 

These measures no twithsta nding, a considera ble number of 

soldi ers were absent from their un its at the stan of the enemy's T et 

offensive and, in the heavy fighting tha t followed, absenteeism 

rapidly increased . The monthl y desertion rates continued to rise 

to 16.5 per th ousand in J ul y (13,056 desen ers), lhe highest co unt 

of any month si nce mid-196G, and reached an all-time high of 17.2 

per thousand in October. Then, as the fighting su bsided at the 

end of 19G8 and in I !JG9, the desertion rate [ell and again became 

stable at about 12 per th ousa ud. Of course, all these rates were 

norma ll y do ubl ed a nd tripl ed in t he indi vid ual tacti ca l inf<lntry 

un its where most of th e bu rdens o[ war were felt. 

This time the South Vielnam government acted quickly to 

kee p the rate at acceptable levels. On 27 September th e Jo in t 

General Staff dispatched a directi ve establish ing "qu otas" or acce pta ble ma xi mum rates of desertion for all com mands. The 

directive stated that failure to meet th ese stan dards would result 

in th e punishment or relief of command ers. Other measures followed. In October the Joi nt General Staff directed an increase in 

th e award of the Gall a lllry Cross, primaril y for lower ranks in 

combat units to include the Regional and Popul ar Forces, ra ised 

the number of personnel <l uthorized to be on leave from 5 to 10 

percent. and granted a gr<lCIUalion leave of len days to those completing basic training (over and above th e fI £teen days of leave 

authorized annuall y). In :ldditio n, all sectors (provinces), specia l 

sectors, and special zones were told to organize guid ance sections 

to aid personnel on leave and to include transient bill ets, messing. 

and tra nsporta tion arrangements. 

The South Vietnam armed forces :llso partic ipated in the implemelllioll o( th e National Pol icc Records System. T his systcm 

provides (or the establishment of a central fi nger print file with a 

related system for furnishing informa tion on all "wanted" personnel. T he target date (or compl etion of the fmgerpri nting of all the 

men in the South Vietnam armed forces was 3 1 January 19G9. 

T his progr:lm assisted in th e identification and apprehension of 

deserters, especially th ose who deserted to enlist in other units. 

Despite th ese new meaSUres, th e problem of desertion in the 

Vietnamese armed (orces, and particul:lrly within the Army and 

Mari ne Corps, was a matter of contin u ing command conce rn to 
VIETNAi\IIZATION, 1968-1972 " 

Military Assistance COlllllland and the Joint General Staff. SOllth 

Vietnam armed forces gross desenions for 1968 totaled 139,670 

and were Slill the largest single cause of manpO\\rer loss. As a result 

of JGS antidesertion progTalll in 1969, some progress was made 

and the number of deserters d ipped to 123,3 11. In 1970 gross 

desertions were 150,469; however, 23,7 16 returned for a net loss 

of 126,753. This pattern, with no apparent trend, continued in 

197 1. 

Pay and A llollJ(lIICCS 

The low base pay and allow<lllces set for the men in th e armed 

forces had a direct influence on desertions and morale. The base 

pay for si ngle individuals was well below th e ;lverage standard of 

living pay sca le in Vietnam, and in August 1971 si ngle members 

were accolllHing for 65 perccnt of the total desertions in combat 

units. The South Vietnam government bad taken token action 

early in th e yC;tr to provide incelllive pay ror. combat personnel. 

On 9 February th e South Vietnam Prime Minister prescribed a 

temporary special allowance of 100 pi asters (37¢) per day military 

person nel and for the Ministry of Defense civilians who were 

participa ting in operaLions and support missions outside South 

Vietnam . On 8 l'vfarch th e gove rnment increased th e cost of living 

i'lllowa nce fQr regula!' forces and Regional Forces by 100 piasters 

per mOlHh for each service member, his legal wife, and each of 

his slIpported children. T he base pit)' for members of th e Popul ar 

Forces was increased by 100 piasters per month, and the COSt oE 

living a ll owance for his legal wife and eac h oE his supported 

children was increased by a similar amount. 

Recognizing that a subsWntial pay increase was needed for the 

armed forces and government em ployees, iVIilitary Assistance Comma nd, Vietnam, ill co-ord ination with the U.S. Embassy and U.S. 

Agency (or International Development, conducted a study of the 

armed forces pay scales during August 1971. Addressi ng th e grave 

problem of proc urement and retention within the comb:1t infantry 

ba ttalions, Military Assistance Commal1(1 recommended across-theboard percentage increases (28 percent) in base pay, incentive pay 

(or the South Vietn am Army comba t units (4,500 piasters) and 

Regional Forces mobil e battalions (2,000 piasters), and an increase 

in death gratuity pi'lymelHs. Gelleral Abrams submitted the pa y 

proposa l to the Minister of National Defense in September 197 1, 

and th e [ollowing November the government increased tlte cost 

of living allowance for all service members <l nd civil servants by 
1,200 piasters (52.80) per ma n per month ;md authorii'ed incen· 

tive pa)' as proposed by Mil itary Assistance Command. 

Subsequently the Chief, Joint General Staff, sought the i\ IACV 

commander's assisl;ill(.:e in seeking to obtain 4,500 pi;.sters (S II .OO) 

ililclIli ve pay for other ··u:t{ k troops" who were exduded from the 

framework of the new pay measure. In response, Ceneral Abrams 

coullseled that "in determining the best applica tion of the mil itary 

pay raise, primary consider;H ioli was S'iven those IInit ~ (com bat 

infatlll') hatta lions] ('x er elU in ~ gra \c procurcment ;md retention 

problems" and "any deviation to the current list [of authorized 

unitS] would be in LOntr:ldi(t ioli of the stated purpose of the allow· 

ance and in vite re<llI csts for exceptions from other services and 

arms." !-Iowe \'er, on 15 December the South Vietnam government's 

Ministerial Decree 12 15 extended the incenti\'e pay, without the 

MACV commander's sa nction, to reconnaissance comp."'l nies, shock 

compani es, i1 nd SCout comp<1ni es subordinate to the 81st Ranger 

Croup (Airborne) ;mel to cert:.in personnel assigned to the tech· 

nica l directorates_ 

Veteran AOairs 

In the past. poor lI ea tTllent of ,'eterans h;"I(1 onl y exacerbated 

the problem of desenion. Traditionally, the Victnamese armed 

forces carried physica ll y impaired servicemen on the acti\e rolls 

beca use of inadeqllate fa cilit ies for theil' physica l and ,'ocational 

rchabilit<1l ioll ; this pr:H li ce caused a drawdown on unit presentfor·operations strength. The C;It I.ai Project, established i\lay 1967. 

under the joint sponsorship of the i\ linistry of Defense and the 

ini tr y of Veteran Affairs. conducted vocational school training 

for physically imp<l ired personnel before d isch<lrge fl'olll the service. thus prepari ng them more adequately for civilian life. The 

goa l was to n"in aUII..:dl )" Some 1.200 soldiers who, upon successful completion o f their (Olll'se, would be eligible for gainful 

employmen t. In Jul y 1967 the school officially opened with 138 

stud ents enrolled ill eight courses (tailoring, suppl y. mechanics, 

carpentry, plumbing, masonry, typing, and electronics), and in 

December it graduated ninety-five of the origi nal st udents. Place· 

ment of these grad ulltes by the Veterans Affairs Pl acement Oflice 

at first proved ullsa lisf;u to] y: through lhe clforts of Edu(a ti on 

Consuh<lnts, Ltd., ho\\'e\er, man )' of the slllclcllts were b ter pl:tced 

in ri\'ili:tn jobs. 

In a letter to the Ministry of Defense on <1 J anuary 1968, 

General Westmorel and rea ffirmcci his interest in the ph.ccment of 

physica lly impaired South Vi etnam armed forces soldi ers upon 
VIETNAMIZJ\TION, 1968- 19i2 

discharge from th e service. A viable veterans progr<UH was an 

essenli al clement of an eo-eaive ;I nned force. On lfi ,I allll;lry 19G8, 

at a conference held to discliSs the revital ization of the South 

Vietnam government Vete rans Progr:l m, \ Vestmorel:lnd annouliced 

that Military Assist:lllce Comm:llld would :lssumc responsibility for 

advising and assisting the i\ linislr)' of Vetel':l n Affairs in its Vet erans 

Program and oullined fo ur are;ls of concentration : hospita liz:l ti on, 

tiassi fi c;ltion, training, and job placclllc llI. I-Ie :lssigned the mission 

of implementing t'. IACV·s advisory effort to MACV J- I ; th is st;lf£ 

agency, in turn, formed a se pa ra te di vision whose mission W;lS to 

:ld vise th e Ministry of Veteran Affa irs in c;l!Tying out th e objectives 

oml ined by \Vestlll orct and. In .Jul y th is division was re placed 

by the Mobiliza tion and Will' Veterans Advisory Uranch in the 

Advisory Division of t'.l ilitary Assistance Command. 

At first th e advisory effort centered around th e idem ifica Lion 

of reso urces, th e determination of requirements, and the unification of :lll agencies :lflll iated with Mmed forces vete)":l ns :lffairs. 

1)1;lI1s and malerial for th e cond uct of th e comman d survey of 

physica ll y impaired soldiers were prepin ed and made ava il ab le to 

the Ministry of Defense and the t'. li nistry of Veteran Affairs. Finall y. a combined comminee comprised of represelll<ltives from th e 

i\ linisll"y of Defense, t'. linislrr of Vetera n Aft'airs, and Milit .. r y 

Assistance COIllIll:md was org:l llized to formula te plans ;md ad· 

mi nister the over·all program for armed forces ph ysicall y impaired 

sold iers, 111 the arca of hospiwl inuion, ai d was expec led in gelling 

additional hospital beds. Tied close ly with hospitalization was a 

re-emphasis on th e methods and exec uLion of medical cl assifiC:llion 

to ensure precise an d prompt categ'orizing of the indi vidual. When 

vocational tra ining was prescribed, Ihe aCClirate and rapid fi ling 

of occupationa l questionnaires and th e issuance of a securit}' d e:lrance were imperati ve. In th e case of individua ls who desired civil 

employment, ass urance of an ca rl )' rele:lse became essential. l\fil itar), :luthorities fcl l that by joi n ing' the i\ linistry of Defense, 

;'I. linistry of Veteran Affairs, and ;\Iililary Assist;w ce Com mand, cooperation in th ese areas, policies benefic ial to the indi vidual, the 

armed forces, and the nation would be :Issured. 

The development of pri v;lle businesses was di ~c sscd with 

members of the Ind ustri al Developments Uranch of th e U.S. Agency 

fo r In tern ati ona l Oeve loplllCtll \\'110 \\'ere especially kllOlI"lcdgca hl e 

in th is area. It was the ir opinion th at industri al deve lopmcnt pl anning shou ld remai n withi n the sphere of the ,\finish'y of El..On omy, 

si nce its mission was to ex plore \entllre.'> of this naHire. The i\ IACV 

comru,mder agreed \\'itll this position. 

One import ant 5tep rorwa rd was :t SOlll h \ 'ietrlOllll gm'erllmenl 
" DEVELOPMENT ANO TRAININC 

INSTRUCTIO,", AT 0 ,\ NANG VOCATIOI'\A I_ SCIiOOL 

reorga n ization which res ulted in the merger of lhe Ministry of 

Defense and the Minislry of Veteran A([<lirs. The Min istry of 

VCICl'nll Affairs lost its Illill islcri;d st<lLUS and became an integral 

part of the Ministry of Defense wh ich was redesigmllcd l\ Iinistry 

of Defense a nd War Vetcrans. No changes in th e :,dminiSll'ation 

and opcl'(llio li of the dcfllllcllllinistry were anticip.1Ied. 

In the area of job pl:lccmcnl, (h e esta blishment or work ing 

rel<l tio nships and close liaison between the job placement sect ion, 

j\'[inistry of Defense ,mel "Val' Veterans, and U.S.·ViCln:lmeSe 

civilia n and governmcllwl ent erprises opened th e way for lhe 

cmploymem of physic<l ll y imp:,ired soldiers and velera ns. During 

the second quarter of 1908, 'lpproximalcly 1,100 job referra ls a nd 

placemen ts were IUad e. In :In effort lo creMe additio na l empl oyment, the fini try of Defense and \Var Veler;ms studi ed th e feasibility of establishing factories to produce operat ional r:nions, 

ammunition, and items of org::mi za tional eq u ipment. Additiona ll y, 

the rini lry of Defense and \Var Vetera ns, work ing in conjunction 

with the Iin is lry of Economy. pl;lI1ned to utilize approx illla te ly 

1,000 disa bled vet erans as scnu'ity goua rds to relie,·c the R('g:ional 

a nd Popular Forces guarding industrial complexes. These di<;a b1cd 
VIETN,H II:t.,\TION, 1968- 1972 97 

soldi ers would ultimately be discharged froUl the service and hired 

immediately by the industries concerned. 

Le(lders!!it) 

The probl ems of leadership, promotions, and grade were interrelated and deserve special attention. In general, the actu al gTade 

structure of Vietnamese armed forces units was far below the 

authorized level. This condition was most apparent in senior 

command and staff positions and es pecially in the infantry battalions and armored cav;-.lry squadrons. In 1969, for ex;-.mple, 47 

percent of the infalllry battalion commanders were two grades 

below authoriza tion, and lieut ena nts ,mel aspir<lnts (officer candidates) were called upon to assume responsibiliti es beyond their 

ex perience or train ing. A major eO'ort during the year ce lllered 

011 ideillifying and promot ing qualified leaders. Yet, despite an 

increase of 2,653 senior oflicers between Decembcr 1968 and Oct(>ber 1969 (more promotions than in any other year). the regular 

Army still had only 63 percent of its authori zed senior officers 

assigned: R;-.pid for(;e ex p,msion simpl y outpaced officer strength 

increases, and the armed forces suppl ement<li August promotion 

bom'd <lc tions h<ld littl e effect in r<lising the percentage of <lssigned 

senior officers. Additionall y, most offi cers lacked forll1<1l training. 

<llthough the amount of such training conducted <It the Vie tnamese 

armed forces le<lder-producing schools was slowly rising. 

Another major he<ldache which comill ued to plague hath the 

regular and territorial forces was <II'. imb<llance of mid-level officers 

and noncommissiOlled officers grade stnlCtllres. The situation 

stemmed mai nl y from what had been the in<lbilily of the Vietnamese armed forces officer and noncommissioned officer production and promotion systems to keep p<lce with the r;lpid 

tr.obilization. T his probl em W<lS compounded by the bel that 

most of the officer <lnd noncommissioned oflker input had necess<lrily been <I t the bottom of their respective grilde structures. Thc 

armed forces h<ld no l<lrge pool of reserve ofli ccrs or noncommissioned officers from which to draw; when some 1,055 reserve officers 

II'cre l't;:(';llied to acti ve duty in early [968, the pool was almost 

depl eted. The armed forces developed a ;'threc-ye<lr officer and 

NCO realiza tion pl;m" which stipulated <I progressive system oE 

officer and noncommissioned olficer promotions designed to <lchievc 

al least a 90 percem fi ll in <"Ill grades hy the end of 1070. Owing 

in pan to conti nued force structure incre<lses, however, lack of 

eligi ble and qual ified persollnel for promotion and unre;tlistic 

promotion goa ls. all such projectio ~ proved too optimistic. 
A third difficulty was thc length 01 ufliccr assignments. Some 

officcrs had nc\'cr scrved awa y from thc .J GS hc.l<iqu:m ers, while 

oth crs had "ta yed in combat u nits duri ng th eil clll ire scrvice 

l\filitary Assista nce Command , Vietnam, initiated the d evelo pmcllt 

o f a combined Personnel Systems E\'aluatiOiI COll1ll1inee to push 

a ca lcer man agement program, and th e .I oint General Staff fmall y 

i1dopted a limited offtcer rot,uion program which pcrmitted umce rs 

who had served two years in olle lIIlit, Ilpon l'e(lll eS i, to be reas· 

lled to Ino re d esira bl e dUl ics slllh as enlral agem:ies, s("hools. 

or th e J o int General Swfr. The po licy was nOI lull y implemented, 

however, and progress in th e program was slow, 

The most significant breakth ro ugh ill r areer management dis· 

cipline was a pl an for the progressive development of inhll1try o f· 

fi eers. This pla n was the Joil1l C enera l Staff's firsl manpowel 

managemcnt efron concerned with a p .. 1nicular category 01 personnel. It spelled o ut provisions fo r the c" reer management o f 

in famry officers, specified rotation o f d m y assigm llen ts he tween 

remote and more d esirab le arca , and included prov isions for 

a Ilcrnal i ng tOtl rs bct WCCII ('(HIIIIl:lIld and :l ff dUI ),. i\' ewl )' commissioned infantry oflieers were to ser ve their initial lom s with 

comba t units. Educational a iteria for hoth military and civili an 

schools wcre prescribed for the scteClion 01 ciivision, regimen tal. 

ha tt alion, a nd sector commanders, for stan oflicers at all levcls, and 

[or scrvice s<.:l1001 cadrcs, to include thc Command and Stall 

School. The program was basically simil ar lO the U,S, Army's 

program for officcr career managcment. 

Efforts to remcdy the grade strllcture by reforming the promo· 

tion system mel with less success. No major renova tion had oc· 

c urred in th e Vi ctnamese armed forccs oflicer p romotion system 

sincc 1965. btu somc reform took place in 19G8 and 1969. Pro· 

motions wcre centrali zed within Ihe J o inl G eneral Staff for all 

o f th e :lI'Ill ec\ !.crvi(cs. and a se leLliOlI board wa s cOI1 \'e ned an n uall y 

for all officer and noncommissioned oniccr grades. Even though 

we ll·defin cd, promo tion goals were no t met. In April 1970, l\ l il itary 

,\ ssiSlancc Command publ ished a compre hensivc study o f the 

splem :md relO1lllllCndcd major changcs. such as thc cstablishment 

o f separate promotion boards for th e Sout h Vietnam Navy aud 

Air Force. The most serious problcms and recommcndati ons are 

noled bclow. 

I. Too little credi t was g i\'en for tcchnica l skill Ic\eh and 

qualifica ti ons ill th e promotion o f lhe Vielll amcse Air Forrc ,wei 

Navy enlisted personnel. The basic c lig ibili ty criteriOIl for thcil 

promotion was timc ill gr ad e. Promo tion consid erati ons included 

nature o f the unilS to which assigned, tUrlnal training, c\ alulltiull 
VI!:: I NA .\IllATIO:-:, 1968-1912 99 

by commanding offi cers, and awards for meritorious or valorous 

senice, \·Vhile all criteria were signific:uH, none refleClcd the actual 

skill level and degree of qualifica tion each soldier attained. The 

armed forces promotion system therdore did not ensure that the 

men who \\'ere promoted had the skills and qual ifica tions required 

for their grade. This situation crea ted difficulties in man y technic.,1 areas. Personnel allai ning senior noncommissioned officer 

staHlS in the Vietnamese Navy or }\ir Force were frequently reo 

quired to supervise the operation il lid carc of sophistica ted equip· 

ment or to be respo nsibl e for <:omplex and import;lIlt operations. 

1£ the senior noncolllmissioned oUker lacked the skills required of 

his grade, the operational effectiveness of his unit was seri ollsly 

reduced. l\·lilitary Assistance Command recommended that gradeto-skill qualifica ti ons standards be developed, used as minimal 

prerequisites for promotion to [ - 4 :md above, and the degrec of 

qualification be given major weight in the promotion point system 

for the Navy and Air Force. 

2. There were inconsistencies in the promotion system as it 

applied to the Women's Armed Forces Corps (WAFC) personnel. 

While 'VAFC personnel were supposed to be considered with all 

other Vietnamese armed forces personnel in the annual promotion 

selection, WAFC members in some instances wcre appnrcml y considered, selected, nnd listed sepnratcly. Military Assistance Command recommended that all promotion selcction boards be 

instructed to consider them at the same time and under Ihe same 

criteria as other armed forces personnel , and that \VAFC selec tees 

be listed in the consolidated selecti on lists. This nClion would help 

provide rair promotion practices and would furnish correct promotion dates for WAFC selectees. 

3. The manner in which the prere<luisite for eligibility for 

promotion to major (a ninth grade level diploma requ ired) was 

applied caused discontent. The requirement was designed to raise 

the educational level requiremellu for fi eld grade officers without 

penalizing those fie!d grade ofiicers who had already achieved their 

rank without it (the diploma was not required for higher level 

promotion). iVi any onicers believed this policy was ;1Il inequity in 

the system. Mil itary Assislnllce Command recommended that the 

prerequisite he reta ined but that an explanatir>n of its rati onale be 

disseminated and provision made for cducalional level equi valency 

exami nations for personnel desiring to qualify for maJor. Iilitary 

Assistance Command also recommended that the Chief of Staff, 

J oint General Staff, he empowered to waive the educa tional 

requirement in exceptional cases. 

4. There was a need to establ ish se para te Regional Forces and 
100 DEVELOJ'M ENT "NI) TRAINI NG 

regul ar fo rce ba ttl efi eld promotions for noncommissioned officers 

<lnd enlisted men. The existing system a llocated quotas to each 

corps taclica l zone, the Vietnamese Air Force, Navy, Spec ia l Forces, 

airborne, and i\'larille Corps. The fo ur corps tactical zones and 

the Vi etnamese Navy were all oc:llCd qu otas which incl uded Re· 

gional Forces personnel <IS we ll as regular force members. Results 

from 1969 showed th at for the mOst p :lrt fi eld commanders had not 

taken ma ximum ad va ntage of battlefield promotion quotas; during 

th e last six months, for eX<lTllpl c, on ly 32 percent of th e tOlal allocated quota for enl isted men had been lIsed. By far the grea ter 

number of battlefi eld promotions went to th e regular forces. T o 

ensure fair and equitable treatment of Regional Forces personnel, 

it was recOlllmended that tWO separate quotas be gi ven to th e 

designated commanders, one (or t he regular forces and one for 

th e Regional Forces. 

Vietnamese anned forces response to these recommend:ltions 

was slow. 111 September 1971, the Joint General Staff ;uncnded 

the armed forces promotion pOlic ies and adjusted those parameters 

designed to recognize and acce lerate promotions for able leaders; 

they also awa rded extra promotion points to troops ser ving in comba t and combat support units and red uced time in grade req uirements (or ba ttlefield and nonba ltlefield (meritoriolls) promotions. 

1 n conseq li enee, the armed forces f ul fi Heel its 1971 regular officer 

and noncommissioned oOicer promotion goals_ However, sheer 

numbers and acce lerated promotions alone did not necessarily 

ensure th:lt the most effective leader was selected or th:_t the overall leadership W<lS upgraded. I'V!oreovcr, despite signi fi cant emp hasis 

on offi cer fill and promotions. commander{j of manell ver batta lions 

rell1ained generally be low authori/cd gT:ldes. The occupa tion was 

simpl y too dangerous and comb:n operations often eliminated th e 

best commanders. In December 1970, 37 percent (fon y-n ine) oE 

the infalllry batwlions were still commanded by ca pta ins. In 

J anlla ry 197 1, ninety-one of th ese officers were prollloted to field 

ra nk, but increased combat oper:llions and casualties took their 

toll . By 31 i\'[:lY, forty-six of the 133 inf;mtry maneuver lxmalions 

(35 percent) were still commanded by captains; eighty of th ese 133 

commanders had bee n in comm:lnd one year or less, an d fifty-two 

of those for less than six months. 

M (IUd el 

All these forces demanded vast quantities of military equipment, most or which was purcha sed or loaned from th e United 

St:ltes. Deserving specia l attention were the efforts of General 
V I ETN/\I\II ZATIQN, 1968- 1972 101 

'rVestmoreland and his successors to equip the Vi etnamese infantry 

with modern small anns, communica ti ons, and tra nsportCltion 

equipment. In 1964 th e enemy had introduced the AK47, a modern, highl y effecti ve automatic rifle; later he began using a light 

but excell ent series of rocket-propell ed gre'lClde (RPG) launchers 

aga inst both armored and suppl y vchicles. In contrast, th e South 

VietnClm forces were still armed with a variety of World WClr II 

weapons and, in view of the enemy 's rising advantage in fi repower, 

the MACV commander hCld asked th at all South ViemClm Army 

ground combat units be equipped with th e new U.S. lightwe ight 

M l 6 automatic ri fle. as well as with oth er contemporary fi rearms. 

In th e fa ll of 1965 he made an initial urgent request for 170,000 

MI6 riAes (later red uced to 100,000). But although the request was 

approved by th e Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mi litary Assistance Command 

was informed that U.S. forces in South Vietnam would receive 

first priority. After 1965 the increClsi ng U.S. buildup slowly pushed 

Vietnamese armed forces materiel needs into the background. In 

December 1966 the Secretary of Defense directed that the issue 

of ivl1 6's to South Vietnam Army and Republic of Korea (ROK) 

forces be deferred and that the Cl\locations previously planned for 

these forces be redirected to U.S. units. Finally, in March 1967, 

the allocation of 1\'11 6 rifles for South Vietnamese and South 

Korean maneuver elements was re instated, and the first shipments 

of rifles for the South Vietnam Army arrived lhe foll owing month. 

Bm until 1968 th ere were olil y enough to eq uip the airborn e and 

Marine battalions of the Gen eral Reserve. 

In 1968 this situati on bega n to change drastica lly. One new 

development was the end o( lhe America n buildup in South Vietnam and with it a level ing off of U.S. materiel demands. Two 

other developments were the dec isions, first, in 1968 to support the 

more elaborate SOllth Vietnamese <Inned forces structure outl ined 

in the series of Improvemelll and J\'lodcrnization programs and, 

second, in 1969 to Vietnami ze the wal" by having t he Vietn;nn ese 

armed fo rces ass ume all America n combat responsibilities. T he 

resul t was a comprehensive logislic!d effort to suppl y the South 

Vietnamese mi litary forces with superior small arms as quickly 

as possible. By mid-1968 all of the South Vietnamese Army infantry 

ba ttal ions had rece ived the new weapons, along with other contempora ry stn<lll arms- th e new U.S. r\,160 machi ne gun, the M79 

grenade launcher, <lnd the LAW (or light <lntilank weapon). In the 

years that followed, Sou th Vietn<lmese Army combat support units, 

the territoria l fo rces, and the Civilian IlTegular Defense Group 

rece ived idelHic;l 1 equipment. Together, these sm:11 I <lrms gave a 

significam moral e and psyc hologic<l l boost to the South Vietnamese 
102 DE"ELOI·ME.~T ,\;0.;1) TRAIN I NG 

soldi er by allowi ng him to meet the enemy with equal or grealer 

fi repower. The Sland:.rdiz;u ioll of small arms also simpl ified th e 

equally imporl31l1 maners of logistics and maimcnance. 

Before 1968 the South Vi etnamese Army also had severe shortages in crew-served weapons, tactical communica tions cquipmclll, 

and li ght transport vehicles, ilems th at weTC critical to an Army 

composed mostly of fooL soldiers. To overcome these deficiencies, 

Ii l .. ry Assistance Command instituted temporary loan proced ures 

whereby the Vietnamese anned forces highest priority requirements 

were met by temporary transfers from U.S. depots and excess 

slocks. By md-19G8. equipment val ued at approx imately $10 million 

was on loan to the Vietn;lIncse Army a nd included 69 1 y.j-lo n 

truck s, !S88 2!h-ton trucks, 151 ~-LO n trailers, 208 106-mm. recoilless rifles, 100 M60 machine g un mo unts, 4,932 .50-cali ber machine gun moun ts, 18 .50-ca liber machine guns, a nd 177 slIrvey 

sets. O nce the Im provc lllclll and i\·foderniza ti on programs bega n 

to lake effect in 1969, howe\'er, this practice stopped and th e 

Vietnamese armed forces shon ages in these a reas ,."ere rapidly 

made lip. 

After 1969 most armed for<.es materiel needs were sa tisfied from 

existing U.S. StOCKs in South Vietnam. As U.S. units redeployed, 

mOSt of their eq uipme nt aud supplies were turned in, reconditioned, if necessary, by U.S. logistical units, and reisslled to the 

Vietnamese armed forces uni ts as a ppropria te. Req uireme nts th at 

cou ld not be satisfied in this man ner were mct from the I)ac ific 

Comman d supply ;I nc! mai ntenance fac ilities or shipped from 

CONUS sources. This practice was expa nded by th e Vietll<lmi zalion Logistics Program wh ich began in J uly 197 1. I\l ajor o bjectives 

of the new prog ram werc the acceleration of equi pment del iveries 

and the expa nsion of Vietnamese arilled forces secondary item 

slockage. 

Project ENHANCE in i\ lay 1972 began to augment the armed 

forces (ap.1b iliti es as one response to Ihe North Vi et n;llllCse Army 

offcnsi\e in Apri l. The purpose of the project WitS to accelera te 

the del ivery of the residual balancc of fisc:1I year 1972 and 1973 

Phasc III :ISSCLS, replalc all a hn ormal a rmed forces lombat losses 

projected through the end 01 fisca l year 1972, aud provide th e 

armed forces with se lected agllmclll<Hion (·;tpabi liti es. Initially. 

Project ENIIANCE required that largc qu:mtities of materiel be 

delivcred to th e Vielnamctoc armed forces as soon as possible. To 

avoid mcrhllrdeni ng the armed forces with maleriel th;lt it was 

ili-prep,lIed to absorh, utili/e. or maintain, execution of the prob"T";nll was Ielaxed to the CX lelll that lIlt' :\fACV commander was 

amhorile(\ 10 rail f()l'h';lId qUim ti lies 01 materi el that would 011 
\' 11:, 1 ;\i\M II.A"IION , 1968- 19i2 10' 

J\ N" I,; NA~C ~ CI A5SI::S 1'011. NEW EQUII'MENT 

arrival immed iately support or "enhance" the Vi etnamese a rmed 

forces capa biliti es. This shift to a " pull " versus "push" loncept in 

11 0 wily de-emphasized the hig h priorit) assigned I<Ilhe project. But 

the fl exi bility prO\ ided by relaxation of th e required delil'ery date.) 

e lla hied ~lilit.lI') Assist:llltt: (:ollllllalld t(J 1'1111 the program more 

ellicientl y. These efforts were contillucd tlmil the implementation 

01 the ( ease·lire aCtor(\.) carl ) ill 1973 

As th e varielY or equipmellt and slIppl ib gi\'ell to the Viet" 

]Iamese armed forces grew. it betamc a Ill ort " balanced" ;lI\d Lhus 

a 1II0re spcd;lli/ c<i inst itu ti oll (Jne t Ih .. 1IIIIIIb('] 01 illiantl') elllih 

became stahilized, the various / '0 1111>:1 1 rOlllrolJillg lleadquartcrs 

were thell slowl), filled Ollt with l1 ~i l\e , signal, ordnance. and 

logistical support UllilS. The rising lIumbel of ;mill ery battalions 

(from t\\'ellly"nine in June 196810 fift y.eight by 1972) and armored 

cavalry squadrons (from elc\'c lI LO seventeen) h;lS already been 

noted. New clement:; in th e Vietname.)e Arm) inventory were 

Rome 1}low) rOI land"dea l'illg, li5·mlll artill e r)' pi eces nn the 

demilitari zed zone (South \'iCIII:1I11 '5 border with Nort h Vietnam). 

and, ill th e fa ll of 1971. Ihe lirst ballaJiOIl of S medium battlt: 

k~ It ma y he .. deled til<1t , a lthough beyond the MX)pe ot this 

\\ork, th e cx p,tIIsioll 01 Ih e Vi etn amese Navy :met Ail FOIl.:eboth technica l sel'\'iccs- \\'as .!lsu hig hti ht ed lIy th e acquisition of 

\\· h .1I W:h fUI til L \ ' i('U1 :t11l6c c"trcmcl) .)oph istit;u ed equipmclI\ 

TWilling Overview 

T h". te( hni(.d cxpa ll n 01 the 50uth Vietnam ;mneri rOil e ... 

pl.lI(''[ :.,\ 1('. 1\ 1I("1I1 ,ll1d s OIlllH " hOI1I, ,1Il1l Irai n ill!! ft tllCl ~ \ Iil it,n ) 
10< DEVELOI' MENT AND TRAI NI NC 

Assistance Command continuously sought to mai ntain and imprO\fe 

these institutions so that the Vietnamese forces would be morc 

tha n an army on paper. New sc hools and tra ining centers were 

establ ished and exiSling facil ities improved and expanded to upgrade the ir trai n ing ca pacity. Course content was constantly reo 

viewed and revised to ensure it was meeting fi eld requirements; 

Military Assistance Command continued to pay special attention 

to leadersh ip tra in ing. small unit and night operations, marksm;mship trai ning. and ambush and patTol tactics. New courses o f 

instruction, such as the special officer candidate. company commander, regiona l forces officer refresher. and methods of instruction, were established in all schools. At Regional Forces and 

Popular Forces tra ining centers, consolidation programs were 

initiated in order to improve training facil iti es and standardize 

and upgrade trai ning activities. Finally, MAC started programs 

to improve the leadersh ip and cadre in the Vietnamese Army 

training base, and made vigoro us efforts to place combat-experienced soldiers throughout these centers_ 

During 1968 the expansion and improvement of the training 

base enabled the South VietnaIll Army to meN :l 1I o f their tra ini ng 

requirements. Service school inputs rose from 53,000 swdellls in 

1967 to 70,000 by the end of the year. The volullle handled by 

the training celllers was much larger and incl uded some 168,335 

Vietnamese Army and Regional Forces recruits, 19, 174 oes prepa ra tory course students, 22,483 Popular Forces recruits, 13 !leW 

and 13 old infantry battalions (refresher trai ning). 44 new Regional 

Forces heavy weapons platoons, 588 new Popul ar Forces platoons, 

and refresher tra ining for 656 old Popular Forces platoons. With 

enemy activity low and mobil ization efforts sllccessful , this pa(;e 

continued throughollt the following years. 

From 1968 to 1970 U.S. attempts to develop the site and scope 

of the training base also met with success. The service school 

system grew to a tOlal of twent y·six schools offering training in 326 

different cour~es of instruction with a nonn"l c;lpacity of 24,000 

lUd enLS expandable to an emergency (;apadly of 34.000. Training 

centers, including Regiona l and 1'0plI l:lr Forces. R<lIlgcl'. and the 

ten division training cemers, numbered thirty-three and were 

located throughout the cOllntry. These centers provided instruction in a total of thirty-follr diffcrem t:o ur ~e~ and had a normal 

capacity of approxim;'lle]y 65.000 Stud clllS, with an emcrge:lcy 

capacity of abOllt 105.65:,. FOI'Ill;l1 training needs which could not 

be satisfied within the Vielllamesc armed forces systems-pilots 

and operators of complex signal eq uipmelll for example-eonlinuerito be mct by CO:\' US insta ll atiuns 01' by speda] U.S. sen ice 
ETNA~ II ZAT ON. 1968-1972 105 

mobil e training teams in South VieUlam. H ereafter lhe empha sis 

would be on qual ity rather th an quantity. 

In J anuary 1970 the Chid of St aff, U.S. Army, disp:uched a 

special DA trai ning team to SOllth Vietnam headed by Brigadier 

General Donnelly P. Bol ton for the purpose of examining the 

state of U.S. training advice. A month later the team recommended 

severa l measures to strength en the America n trai n ing ad visory 

system. Most importa nt was the matter of personnel, and in th e 

following months th e Departmen t of the Army gave much attenti on to both th e quantity and the q ua lit y of the repl:lcemems it 

W:lS sending to the l\ IACV T raining Oi rector:l tc. By September 

1970 the assigned strength of th e l\IACV trai n ing adv isory element 

rose from 55 to over 100 percent, and by J llne 197 1 ove r 90 percent 

of th e tra in ing advisers were combat experienced. At the end o[ 

th e year the trai ning adv isory clement numbered over 3,500, bill 

th ereafter it decreased until the total withdrawal in l\ larch 1973. 

Other major accomplishments with DA encouragement du ri ng 

this period were the public:l tion of n five·ycn r Vietnamese armed 

forces training program nnd tra in ing budget in 197 1. th e rev ision 

of all nrmed fo rces tr(li ning programs of instruction (over 650), 

and the institution of a "sister service sc hool system" whereby 

si mil<lr U.S. ;11Id Vietnamese Army schools mnin 1ili ned liaison on 

a regular basis. Fin,dly, the prnclice of CetHral Train ing Command 

(CTC) level refresher tfili ning was ended and instead divisions 

institu ted their own annLl al trai ni ng progr:l llls assisted, \\'hen 

necessary, by mobil e trai n ing teams from the T rai ning COIllmand. 

School (lIId T rai nillg Gel/leI Im provemenls 

In April 1971 the J oint General Staff conducted an appraisal 

of all inSll"llCtor positions 10 determine which rcq ui red combatexperienced personn e l, ;111(\ 011 th e basis of its findings dircned 

certa in reallocations. T he !lumber of positions was reduced from 

1,685 to 7 10. and the criteria for the replacemell t of long-tenure 

ollicers in key traini ng ce lll er and service school positions were 

strengthen ed and enforced . . \ s a resllit. 1:18 comb:lt-expericllccd 

instructors were :lddcd during th e ye:J.l" in areas dealing with 

command, opcr<llions, tactics. and weapons. RC('og nizing thai com· 

bat experience al one did l10t gllilr:lnlee a good instl"llctor. the 

Central Training Command introduced a six-week method of 

instruct ion course in June at the Quang Trung Training Center. 

In additi on, a olle-week method of instrll("lion refresher course 

was established :ll th e re llaini ~ lr.l ining (e Ill Cr~ :lIId ill thirtecn 

of the twenty-t hree service schools. The <lppOillt melll of combat-
106 tll':\'El.O I'ME:>:T ,\ :'\'1) TRAll\"I :"G 

experienced sen ior nmllna n(\c1"1) 10 th e key Viewalllcse armed 

forces tf<"lining install;uions :1 ddcd strength and validity to the 

training progr am. (Mal) 2) 

In June \!)i l l\Iili l:1ry Assistance Command bega n :1 series of 

briefi ngs designed to acquaint the faCilI ties of the ViClIlamcsc 

armed forces lI"aining <;cmcrs nnd service schools wit h a proposed 

Training an agc t System. The kcy elcmelH in th e proposal 

was a systematic appro:I(:h to curriu dum development ca lled InSLrtKlionai System Dc\cloptllclll ( ISO). In essellce Instructional 

System Dc"clopJllcllt was an eil-!,Ill.step Illodel for the dc\'e!opment 

of a course of instruct ion. The CentrOll Tr:1i ning Command favored 

the proposal, and on 2; J uly i\ lilit;1 ry t\ssistance COlllm~ln d prcsented a new tll'o-wcek curriculuill development and managemellt 

course to selected members of th e e T C ... wfT, ll b~c qll nl ly, I\ lilitary Assistance Command prepared twent y-one rel:lled draft directives and ma nuals for the Cenlral Training COlilmand; these 

tra ining matcrials werc cssential for th c prope r implemcntation 

of th e T rai n inJ; i\bnagclllelll Systcm and Insu'uclioll:11 System 

Dcvelopment wit hin the armed fon es, The first of eight c;dc nd;11' 

year 197[ classcs in August bega n teac hing starr otliccrs and trai ning m;lI1agers of the service SdlOOls ;md trai nin g CClilers th e 

fundamentals of lSI) tech niqucs, 

By l j J anuary 1072, eight dasses h;ld heen completed and 102 

of ricers had !,...-aduatcd, The Centr;d Train ing Command put toge lher a workable Vietnamese version or InSlruClion:tl Syslem 

Deve lopment ;'Hld, in co-ordin ation wi th l l,S. advisers, supervised 

the system engi neering uf:l pilot program a t th e Vi elllamcse armed 

forces urdn:lI1cc school. The goals for the immcdi:ne fu ture we re 

to complete the instructo r training .'>U thai CTC olfit:er ... could t<l ke 

ol'er the presentat ion of the lurrkulul11 development ;mel Ill:lnagemelll course <l nd cond uct the fi nn ISD lUlIrse entirely in lhe 

Vietnamese I<lngll<lge_ 

A consolidation of lhe tr:l inillg LellterS beg:m in 19iO as .. 

meaS lII'e to increase tr:,ining (cllter cap:H:it)' at the luwcst possiblc 

COSL j\ l ilitary Assistallce COlllln:lnd \\'a~ \i ta!l), conce rned with 

the fa cil ities to upgrade Iratc r splelll ill1prOlel11Ctn progTams COli -

Ileeted with this cOllsolidat ion .mel abo I"itll those Lmprol'emelllS 

planned for servke sc llools_ The 1!J70- i I ;\ Iilila ry Assista nce 

Service Funded i\ l ilitar}' COllstrtlt't iun (~ rll _C O~ ) Program 

a pport ioned 528 million for e~c projeus, A tol:d of twc nty-th ree 

u:nional. Regiol1 :11 l'c~, I'upul:n' Fon e~. and R:ul ger training 

centers \\'crc to be impro\'ed, modCl'lli/cd, cOllsol idat ed into ten 

"nat ional " ce l1 te ~ h) lhe end 01 ~)i:!, The consolicbtioll pl all 
SO UTH VIETNAM 

LOCATION OF RVNAF 

TRAINING CENTERS 

OOCI"'"' 1971 

-, ........ &."'., "-' ~ .. <o , .. ....., 

, .. , .. ....... f .... " ....... e .. , .. ~T~ '"''' " ._, c •• , .. 

O'H:·: :::::T\l CHI LAHG\ '" 

MAP 2 

DONGO. NT(; 

PHU CAT RFTC--------

PL[I MU PFTC ~ 

". "" "' ~ 

\~ 

1. 

L., '" NINH lHUAN 

PrTC 
108 DEVt:LOI'MENT AND TRAINIi\'G 

proceeded on sched ul e and [I\'C Popular Forces training centers 

were closed by the end of th e fil'Sl quarter, 197 1. 

During the second quaner of 197 1, the completion date for 

consolidation was accelerated owi ng to increased Cambodian training requirements, an accelerated constru ction program, and the 

additional training cOlllmilmellls generated by the 357 new Popular 

Forces platoons which had been formed in IV Corps Tactical Zone. 

At the end of December the consol idation program was 92 percent 

complete. Three Popular Forces training centers remai ned active 

aher their designated training term ination d:IIC; however. these 

centers were schedul ed to end all Lr:lin ing during the first two 

weeks of January 1972, and the entire program was targeted for 

completion on 31 Januar)'. By then, thirteen undcnuili7cd c(mers 

had been closed down and the more efficient "N;ltional Training 

Center" system instituted. 

In 197 1, for the lirst time, the Celllral T raini ng Command 

adoptcd a selected graduation systcm for Vietnamese noncommissioned officer and specia list training programs. This move reflected 

the incrcascd interest in quality, and contrasted with the past pol icy 

of gr:ldu:lling every stud ent who "completcd" the course. One byproduct of this ch:lI1ge was thc establishment of slow-lcamer. 

remedial training courses and l'ariOlIs make-up training prognullS, 

all of which were new practices for the Vietnamese armed forces. 

A facilities upgr;!de plan for the centcrs was designed to complement the consol idation progT:lm. i\ linimulll additiOllil1 rilcililics 

werc to be constructed to ;!ccommodate increased tr<tini ng loads, 

existing facilities were to be rehabil itated, and water supply and 

distill ation s)'stems \I'ere to be inswlled. ll)' the end of December 

the trai n ing center upgrade progr:lln was 92 peRent com pl ete with 

total completion expected by the end of the third quartcr of fiscal 

year 1972. 

The MASF/ M ILCON projects for th e service school tota led 

9,3 19,000. The facility upgrade projects ( 7,845,000) consisted of 

rehabilit:ltion and new construction of b:u-racks, classrooms, mess 

halls, kitchen, I:ltrines, r;lIlges, and Olher buildings. \ Vat er upgrade 

projects (S I,474,000) included drilling additional wells, la yi ng 

\I'ater distrib ution lines, buildillg 1I':llcr sLOragc areas. and providing Ilc(cssa ry water pumps. By :H March 19i 1 all faci lilY and wa ter 

upgrade projects were under way. 

During March the \ IACV/ ;\I.\SF i\ lililary COllSlruction Re-

"iew Board "ppro\ ed a proje( t for constructioli of a Vietnamese 

infantry slhool al Ik :ma t Camp (III Corps T :Kti cal Zone) at a 

Pl'ojC( lcd C(hl of i ; million. Because of fund ing rcStric lions and 

higher priorit}' PIOjCllS, th is decision tcmporaril y canceled a pre-
VIETNAMIZ,\TIQN. 1968-1972 109 

vious pl an to form a combined arms school at Bearc;It and construct 

new armor and infantry schools there. 

By August. eight of the twenty·two fac iliti es upgrade proj ects 

were completed as were fi fteen of the eighteen water projects; blue· 

prints for the Bearca t Infantry School had been com pl eted, contract negotiations were in progress. and the notice to proceed was 

received in November 197 1. When 1971 ended the S28 million 

constl"\lction program for twenty-seven installations was 96 percent 

complete in dollar val ue; twenty-two of the twenty-seven projects 

were fmished and the remai ning fi ve were progTamed for completion by the spring of 1972. 

Combi11cd Arms Training 

In June 1971 , with the red uction of both U.S. conven tional and 

adv isory forces, a question arose regarding th c Vietnamese armed 

forces ca pabili ty to cmploy air sup port and effectivel), direct airground operations. The high-intensity combat operations in Laos 

and Cambod ia made it evident that the ;trmed forces staffs needed 

strengthening in pl anning and co·ord in<lting fire support, airmobile 

operations, and logistical suppon . T o ensure tha t this goal received 

proper command emphasis. in August 1971 the MACV commander admonished his U.S. advisers to urge the ir coun terparts to conduct command POSt exercises and wa r games which would include 

exercises in Illulliregimcnt operations at corps level and multibaltalion operations at regiment level. Concurrentl y, the !\"IACV 

commander recommended that the chi ef of the J oint General StaIr 

direct his corps commanders to place command and staff empha$is 

on measures to strengthen ba ttlefield repon ing proced ures. 

In late August a joint combined committee was approved by the 

chief of the Joint General Staff and fo rmed under the supervision 

of the Centr"l Training Command to develop a combi ned :lI"Ins 

doctrin e su itable for the Vietnam environment. Also in Augu$t the 

Vietnamese armor sc hool cond ucted eight hours of combined arms 

training for four airborne bau alions. marking for all service schools 

the start of a program to increase the effecti veness of combined 

arms operations. 

Throughout September the joint committee devoted itself to 

the development of a Combined Arms Doctrinal j' ... lanual, the first 

effort b)' the Vietnamese to produte a formal doctrine. The pro· 

posed draft. suitable for armed forces appl ication on the battlefield 

and for use as a training guide. was reviewed by Chi ef. Central 

Training Command, and <1pproved by Chief, Joim Ge nera l Staff. in 

November. In advance of the document's publication, the Com-
110 

mander. U.S. l\ lilit;u'y AssisLalliC Command, Vietnam, advised field 

clcmcllls that the dO(;lrine \\':lS fonhcoming OIud th;lt ", . proper 

meshing of ail', artillery, n:lval g unfire , inf;ullfY, and armor in a~ · 

cord:.nce with the new dOClriliC " rill do IllILth to Cilhancc RVNAF 

supremacy over the r:\VA/VC. A(hisOls and <.ommanders of each 

US service [arc] expected to give d ) namic suppOrt to the cady 

introduction of this new mocle or lanics on the Southeast Asi:! 

battlefield," 

Distrilnllcd January 1972, the new combined arms handbook 

represented ;l milestone in th e Vietnamese armed rorces prog ress 

and effecti veness. The new tactiral approach was first applied by the 

Vietnamese Airborne Division in mid-December 197 1 during its 

push through Krek to the Chup Rubber Plantatio n. The results 

were fal'o r;lhle and the dil ion aud c.;orps COll1manders indicated 

firm accepl<lIlce of the new doctrine, Since the cease-fire, with lhe 

inactivation o f the separate armor and infalllry schools, and the 

consolidation of these schools at the new Uearcat Combined Arms 

Celller, the Vietnamese armed forl es ('ominued to emphasize this 

approach. 

Middle iUmwgemc IIl Training 

To develop and train Vietnamese armed forces Tlliddle manage· 

ment assets, i\ lilitary Assistance Command tasked the Advanced 

Research flrojects Agency (ARPA), Office of the Sec reL'uy of De· 

fense, with iustilliling a spec iali/cci tr:lining program for key management personnel in communications and seleCted support areas. 

On 15 Der ember 19iO, a one-)'ear Contract was awarded to 13001.-

Allen Applitd Research, In c., 10 implement the ARPA progra m 

and develop the i\ l iddle i\lan:tg-CTIlCllt Training (i\ Ii\ IT ) ProgTilIll 

Cor se lected oUle .. r groups in the Vietnamese armed forces, Ad-

,,:lIlecd courses \I(I'e LO be dc,cloped as follow·oll training LO the 

exist ing armed fon'es basic management lr:lilling course, Program 

Review and Analysis hnpro"emem Systems Evaluation, taught at 

Ihe Vietnamese Logistics l\lanagemelll School. The prog ram was to 

be documented to serve :IS <t pro totype fo r fu ture training progr:nm 

in Vielll:1Il1 01 otlll"r areas with a si mil;lr cul ture, :md from the 

Ol,llSel plans had been made to turn Ihe project over to the 

Vietnamese armed forces as part of Vielnami7.<ttion. 

The spec ific technical fields selened for th e pilot program were 

supply and maintenance, transportation, and communications· 

electronics, On <I March In!. Uooz-Al1en briefed Military Assis· 

tance Command and i\lajor General Ph:lIl Trong Chinh , Chief, 

Celllral Training Command, on th e scope, general COlllenl , and 
I~ :-': .. \)[ I/:\ 11 0:-':, 1968- I!li2 III 

sc hed ule of the prop,r:lIll. T he ;I(h ;tI1(ed cOllrses \\'cre to lun fur 

seven weeks, presented in three cycles, two in Engl ish ;J nd the third 

in Vietnamese. General Ch in h approved the pl an :Illd the fi rst 

course, in comll'lu nitations, beg;J1l 2 1 June 1971 , 

The fi rst supply ;l nd ma nagemen t <..o urse gi\en at the Viet· 

namese Logistic i\ lanagemel1t School :md the first tr;msportation 

course at the tra llsport:ltiorl 5( 11001 Ilcgan all 5 .I Ill y 197 1, cach \\'ith 

(went y students. T he fi rst commun icat ions·elet:lron ic MMT cl ass 

grad uated 9 Augllst 197 1. The su pply mai ntena nce and log'istics 

T classes were completed 2 1 August 197 1. T he remaini ng two 

cl asses for each course grad ua ted on I [ December 197 1, after which 

the program became :1 Vietnamese responsibility, 

A dvflI/ceci T ee/micaf T minillg 

In 1971 progress w:.s also indica ted in the develo pment of the 

techn ica!! y sophisticated and applied production skills, The first 

class in ad vanced engineering (twent y.e ight studellls) began at the 

lHilitary Technic:1I Engineering School, Sa igon, on 7 August 197 1. 

This school had a staff of contrac t uni versilY professors and would 

produce mallY times more grad uate engincers than all of the civilian 

uni ve rsities in Vi ctnam. The engineering course incl uded such 

vital skills as acl v:mce construction, public works, and road .<l nd 

bridge constructi on, 

On 6 September the Vietnamese armed forces opened iI school 

for bridge design. Each class had a ma ximum ca pacity of fourteen 

studems who wcre required to design and supervise the actual 

constructi on of a bridge as part of the curriculum. Gradu ates were 

highly v;ti ued by a coumry whose wat crways and ,ra ter crossings 

pilly a very key role in its economy. 

The armed forces abil ity to operate so phistil:atcd equipment 

was exemplified hy its success in the lmegrated COllllllu nic:ltiOIiS 

System (ICS), The communica ti ons system requ ired trll ined per· 

sonnel in the fi elds of microwave. tropospheri c sc:lller ra d io, fixed 

plant ca lTiers, and th e countrywide di al telephone system, Training 

in suppOrt of this system was conducted in Somh Vietll;J !11 and in 

the United St:ltes. In Vietnam, U.S, civili an contraCl instructors 

taught basic, intermedia te, and ad \'anced elec tronics to operators of 

the system; in the Uniled States, VietIl arncse arlll ed forces sllldcnts 

receivcd speci al tra ining as fixed stati on teclinical co ll ~, dia l 

central office re p.1il'men, and commun ications lr" ffi c managers, 

On 3 February 197 1, the fi rst class of eleven Illicrowave repair. 

men gradu atcd from the ICS training fac il ity loca ted at thc Viet· 

namese armed forces signal school in VUllg Tau, llelwecll February 
112 I)EVELOI'ME~T A ND TRAI NING 

BlI.l l>CE CoNSTII.UCT.ON TR .... I N I NG, ENCINEER SCJI()()L 

and December additional communiGllio ns instruction was progressively transferred to the Vietnamese signa l school from the U.S. 

Crypto-Log Support Center, Saigon, the Vietnamese 60th Signal 

Depot, Saigon, and the U.S. 1st Signal Brigade at Long Binh. 

The first class of the di al control rcp:,ir course graduated at 

Vung Tau on 16 March 197 1. In Aug ust th e ftrst group of third 

echelon cryptogra phic repai rmen com pleted [rai ning. and in September lhe founh echelon radar and switchboa rd repa ir COUfses 

wcre transferred to Vung Tall. I~ )' December th e fourth and fifth 

echelon teletypewriter repair course and the fourth echelon signa l 

repair courses were also being conducted at the Vietnamese signal 

school. The majority of courses were still being conducted by U.S. 

ci\'iii ans at the end of December, but the wrget date for the Vietnamese armed forces to assume the entire les mission was I November 1972. 

Pilot T raillillg for the Soulh Vi elnam Air Force 

Once U,S. red eployment bega n in earneSt, the train ing and 

• 
VIE I :-;.·\M IZAT IQ:"1. 1968- 1972 '13 

STUI>ENTS AT V U:-.:G TAU SIGNAL ScIiOOI. 

buildup of the SOUlh Vietnam Air Force also took on a new importance. While the Army retained jurisdiction over helicopters 

within its sphere. in the South Vietnam governmclll defense organi1:ation these critica l machines were controlled by the Air Force. 

T hus, after 1969 the rapid buildup of the Air Forc~'s rota ry-wing 

arlll necessitated close co·ordination betwcen CONUS trai ning 

schedul es, U.S. Army aviation redeployments, equipmcnt turnover 

procedures, and U.S. Air Force advisory teams. In many cases Vietnamese Air Force pilots and meclwnics served long apprentice 

periods with Army aviation comp:mi es before their own squadrons 

were finally activated. Again the result was impressive. In 1968 the 

Air Force possessed about sevent y- fi ve OULInoded rotary aircra h 

(1-I- 34's) organized into fi,'e squadrons; by the end of 19i2 it 

boasted some 500 new machines in eighteen squadrons, one of the 

largest. costiieSl, ,lIld most modern helicopter fl eets in the world. 

Both U,S. Army and U.S. Air Force CONUS install:llions were 

used extensively to trai n Vietnamese Air f orce pilots. This practice 

made it necessary for all prospective pilots to rece ive extensive 

language training. Engl ish language tf<li ni ng for all Vietnamese 
111 

V""'NA~n~ ' STUOt:NT PI LOTS. FT. Sn:WART, GA. 

helicopter pilots was fin all y compl eted on sched ule Wilh th e last 

STouP leaving fo r the United States in April 1971. CONUS heli· 

copter pilot trai ning was sc hedul ed for compl etion in July 1972. 

At the lime, a total of 1,642 would have been trai ned incl uding 34 1 

who would have received instrument qualifi c:l.lio n tra ining. 

The tota l Vi etn amese Air Force offshore pilot trai ning requirement, incl ud ing he licopter, fi xed.wi ng, and high-performance aircraft, was 3,334. During 197 1, 1,007 studellls de pan ed for offshore 

tra in ing while the remai nder were sched u led to depan for conti nental Un ited States by la y 1972 for eighteen months of trai ning. 

Completion date for th e major portion of th e offshore pilot 

program was Septembe r 19i3. 

Orl-tlle-Jou T millhlg 

Another effort wh ich provided exce ll ent experi ence rOI" th e 

SOllth Vietn<l m Army was tile on-til e-jo b tra in ing progT;ml, actua l1y 

a series or progr<lllls. It began in Ions in response to current Vietnami7 .. , tion pl.mni ng and the new equ ipmcnt being madc available 
VI ET i\ \i\l Z:\T O~, 1968-19i2 115 

SIGNAL TRAININC FOR VIETNAMr..s E, sPQlIsoretJ by l Si Sigllal Brigade. 

under the Improvemen t and l\loderni za ti on plans. In man y cases, 

both Vietnamese Army users and instructors lacked the ability to 

handle the more complex eq uipmem. To overcome this handicap, 

the 1st Logistical Command bega n Operation BUDD\', under the 

direction of r>.ofajor Ceneral J oseph M. Heiser, Jr. BUI)DY was a 

large on-lhe-job lraining effort lIsing Ameri can expertise and equ ipment in the 1st Logistica l Command to tralll Vietnamese personnel. 

In general, U.S. logistical units adopted similar Vietnamese Army 

units :lIld conducted a vari ety of programs to enhance their effectiveness, such as integrated operat ions, training courses, and occasional social events where members could become familiar \\·ilh 

each others activities and problems. The U.S. engi neer and signal 

commands initiated similar efforts. In addition, U.S. logistica l services also supervised a number of SWITCHB,\CK operations, whereby 

a deploying U.S. unit turned over its equ ipment directl y to a newly 

activated Vietnamese Arm)' unit of the same type. Both practices 

proved successrul in speed ing up the Vietnamese armed forces 

Improvement and 1\ lodernil ation programs. and showed tha t U.S. 

service support un its were ca pable of accomplishing extensive train-
"' DE\'ELO 'ME.~T MW TRA I1<\ I:-:C 

ing and ad\·jsory tasks in addition to their primary. functional 

IllISSlon s. 

In most cases, on-th e-job training programs were decentral ized 

and were deve loped on the in itia ti ve of local commanders. Later, 

in 1970, the), bec;lIne 11101'C fOl'll'l aliJ.cd in order to handle the larger 

volume of comb:_t lIppon and combat service support unit activalions. These programs va ri ed in length from a few d:lys to severa l 

mOlll hs to over a yC<l 1" and included instruction for bOlh regu lar 

and territorial officers and enl isted person nel. The objectives of the 

programs varied in scope from improving an indi vidual's existing 

skills to giving him an entirely new ca pability_ Normally on-the-job 

training was used La :lL<luire and refine highly complex technical 

skills, especially the repair and maintenance of electronic equipmcnt and machinery. Personnel in on-tile-job training fell illlo 

[our broad ca tegorics: 

1. trainees detailed to commu te and report on a schedul ed basis 

to a U.S. unit for on-th e-jo b trai ning; 

2. trainees a ttached full time to U.S. units for a specifi ed period 

of trai n ing and, UPOIl completion of the oll-th e-job training cycle, 

returned to Vietnamese units for proper skill utiliza tion ; 

3. tra inees attached to U.S. units for a specified period of training and, upon completion of the Oil-the-job trai n ing cycle, assigned 

to poSitions in the s..1 me or a similar unit, replacing U.S. personnel 

(more trainees would then be au ached for on-th c-job trai ning, and 

this sccluence \ ... ould conti nue until suflicielll men were trained to 

a ll ow thc South Vielll<lll\cse to assume complete res ponsibility for 

th e mission; a new Vietnamcse unit migh t officially be activated 

later); and 

4. Vietnamese personnel trained on the job in the ir present 

units by U.S. mobil e training teams and, upon completion of this 

training, utilized within their current unit. 

Experience showed that the most effcctive on-the-job training 

efforts were in the mechanical fields where students learned by 

watching :'I nd imitating. Effecti veness diminished in programs \\'hich 

req u ired a knowledge of theory and I'el:!ted applications. The expansion potent ia l of the on-the-job trai n ing programs was th us 

restricted only by th e inability of trainees wit h limitcd qualifications to handle complex modern eq uipmen t. The language barrier 

was the second major problem. In many instanccs, lhe Vietnamesc 

language equivalent for ccrta in tcc hnica l terms was too difrerent to 

use without sacrificing a great deal of preciSion and undcrslanding. 
VIETNM.IIIATION, 1968- 1972 117 

Combined O/Jeraliol1s 

For nontechnical combat skills, combined and joilll openllions 

between Vietnamese and U.S. units constiulled a spec ial lype o[ 

on-the-job training. In theory, by opera ting with American units, 

Vietnamese forces would acq uire valuable practical ex perience that 

could not be duplicated in formal training. Before l!J68, th e largest 

org:mizcd effon of this sun was the Combined Acti on Pl'ogn lll run 

by the III Marine Amphibious Force in th e 1I0nhern quaner of 

South Vietnam. i\1(lrinc rifle squads were l1l(lrri ed with Popular 

Forces platoons defend ing cou ntryside hamlets: the two units 

worked together for sC\'eral mOlllhs umil loca l security had improved to the degree th at the marine were no longe r needed. The 

program (lcbieved success (It the local level, but wa s too costl y in 

terms of manpower LO ;tppl ), to th e e!Hire country. 

U.S. Army units had conducted simil(lr typcs of effort since 

1965. but h(ld been unable to pursue them in systematic f(lshion 

owing to th e press ure of comb:tl operations. The first large·scale 

effort occurred [ate in 1966 when U.S. ,lIld Vi etnamese infantry 

battalions were paired and l<tsked to support pacifica lion efforts in 

three key districts close to Saigon in Cia Dinh Province. The endeavor, Operation FAIRFAX, was pushed by Ceneral \Vestmorel:lIld 

who hoped that the three participating U.S. ba tt:llions would inspire the Vietnamese Army (lnd territorial units involved. The U.S. 

battalions came from three different U.S. infn lltry divisions and 

were thus able LO channel consider<l ble U.S. comb<1l support resources into th e operation. In thcory. however, ;111 units- th e U.S. 

and Vietnamese Army infantry battalions and Ihe territorial and 

paramilitary forces und er district (subsector) COlllrol- were to act 

in COJl(;Crt through co·uper;uLon ;tud 1ll1HU<11 reSpeLl. 

Initially the program was beset by co-ordination and control 

difficulties: minor probl ems sometimes became ma jor issues in the 

absence of higher comm:md direct ion. Successful combined opera · 

tions were demonstrat ed thc folloh'ing ye;u' in Ci;, Oinh Province, 

wil en a Vietnamese Ranger group headquarters ;mcl th e 19f1th Light 

Inf<111try Brigade, cOlllmanded by Brigadier Cene ral John F. Freund, 

assumed responsibil ity fo r the direction of the muhicomponent effort. Fin(ll1), in November 19G7. the IO!)th Brigade was wi thdrawn 

leavi ng onl y Ranger and province forces in clwrgc, all early eX(lmple 

of Vietnamiz:nion. 

After Tel 1968 these types of o perations become more common. 

As a rul e, Vi etnamese units remained uude r Vietnamese commanders except in a fcl\' cases where U.S. :lnd Vi etnamese units exchanged or "cross·au:Kh ed" small tal tieal unils (pl atoons or squads) 
'18 I)EVELOI'ME;\'T At\O TRA :-; ~G 

with one <llIOlher. III I Cor ps T act ical Zone, III l\f:tl'in c Amphibiou s 

Force continued its successful Combined Anion PrO&'T,II11 effort 

whil e Lieutenant General Richa rd C. Stilwell, the new XXIV 

Corps commander, weill further :md began illlcgraling all U.S. and 

ViClI1:lIncsc Army tactica l operat ions in his area of responsibility. 

Under his direction, all mu ltibaua lion operations were conducted 

with a mix of U.S. and Vietnamese baual ions acting in concen , but 

not under a un ified ( -Olllln<l lld . Operations were conce ived joimly 

by General Stilwell and Major General T ruong. commanding 

ge nefil] of the 1st Vietnamese Arll1 Y D ivision, and ench COlllributcd 

a sha re of the forces :tgainst common objcClivcs. During these com· 

bined efforts, U.S. brigade and Vietn;unesc regimental commanders 

often established neighboring command posts in the same fire sup· 

port bases and conducted operat ions through close and cOlltinuous 

co·operation. Stilwell and Truong worked close ly lOgether and 

spent mOSt of their days in the same hel icopter altcrnately \'isiting 

U.S. and Vi etnamese units. The psychological and practical effect 

of these visits brought about a complete illlegra ti on of military 

effon and a high degree of co·opera tion between the Vietnamese 

and America n forces. The resul ting· partnership initi:llIy made pos· 

.~ ible sOllie llllclag·e by U.S. commanders ;Il baUidion and brigade 

levels for their Vi etnamese counterparts; later, there was a lillie 

··reverse lend·lease'· in this arra ngement as the seasoned Vietnamese 

commanders were able to pass on their experience to newly arrived 

U.S. le:lders. 

This practice was fully supported by :\l:Jjor Genera l i\ telvin 

ZaiS:lS comm;mding gencral of the U.S. 10l<;t Airborne Division, 

and subsequentl y as St ilwell·s successor in 19&9-iO, when he pushed 

similar methods in the 1st ;\ Iarine and the America l Di\'isions. 

Actually. the Americal Division was well along wit h its combined 

operations program under i\ lajor General Lloyd ll. Roumey and 

the vast improvemcnt in the 2d Victll:llll cse Army Di vision's per· 

formance d:ltes from this period. The Americal Division cst:lb· 

lished COlllmon brigade.regimenwl tactical areas for h·hich the U.S. 

and Vietnamese units lI'ere jointly re~po sihle: in e,u.. h :u·ea U.S. 

brigades and Victn;uuese regiments colloC:l.led their comnl:lnd pOSts 

at the S:l Ill C base (':Imps and cond u(.lcd extcnsi\'e combined opera· 

tions. In II Corps T :lctical Zone. combined opera tions programs 

were begun by Li elllen:lnt General William R. I)eers in early 19&8. 

While the 4th Infantr)' Division guarded the hig·hland approaches. 

Peers sl:Irted a ··Pa ir·Orr" progr:un between units of the I i3d Airborne Brig:lcle and the Vi etnamese 22d and 23d Infantry Divisions. 

La ter the concept was expanded to incl ude Vi e(ll amese artillery and 

other combat support forces, especia ll y newly established units. In 
VIETN,\MIZATlO:-.l. 1968-]9i2 119 

1969 and 1970 these same Vietnamese units replaced Ameri can 

forces, as they deployed from Sou th Vietnam, :llmost on a 

un it-for-unit basis. 

Similar efforts were initialed bter in III Corps Tactical Zone 

by Lieutenam General Julian 1- Ewell, commanding the II Field 

Force, Vietnam. In mid-1969 Ewell began a corps-wide Dong Tien 

or " Progress T ogether" program that paired the 1st and 25lh U.S. 

Infantry Divisions and the 199th Light Infantry Brigade with three 

Vietnamese infantry divisions. Combined operations were most ex· 

tensive between the 1st U.S. and 5th Vietnamese Infa ntry Divisions 

and paved the way for the 5th Division's ass umption of almost all of 

the Big Red One's area of opera tion the following year. Fin:lJl y, on 

the border areas o( II I Corps Tactica l Zone. II Field Force mated 

Vietnamese airborne regiments \I·ith brigades of the 1st Cavalry 

Division (Airmobile); there the airborne units made extensive use 

of the American division's large helicopter resources and became 

proficient in the more sophisticated methods lIsed by U.s. units. In 

retrospect, the Dong Tien effort served as an invaluable training 

prelude to the Cambodian invasion in April 1970 during which the 

Vietnamese III Corps Tactical Zone headquarters put three brigade-size task forces on the road to Phom Penh with minimal 

American assistance. As in other corps tactical zones, such progra ms 

not only served as training ve hicles, but they also provided a tran· 

sitional period during which Vietnamese commanders could grad· 

ually e(lse illlo their new responsibilities (IS the U.S. forces departed. 

Mobile Advisory T ea ms 

With the exception of the Combined Action Program and a few 

other programs, neither on-the-job training nor the combined 

operations programs had any efrect on the territorial units. Yet, as 

U.S. forces deployed from Somh Vietnam and were replaced by 

Vietnamese regular units, the ability of the Regional and Popular 

Forces to provide security for 1)(lcilicalion became more critica l. Up 

to 1968 the territori al forces had been withollt advisers, ;md often 

Military Assistance Command had littl e information on their 

cond ition and employment. \Vith thousands of these units spread 

out over the country an y effort to place permanent advisers with 

them would have been too costl y in terms of U.S. manpower. In an 

effort to begin improving them, General \Vestmoreland was at first 

forced to rely heavily on the initiative of the corps senior advisers 

and the U.S. :'esources available within each corps tacti ca l zone. In 

1967 all U.S. corps headquarters initiated Regional and Popular 

Forces training programs lItili zing mobile traini ng teams composed 
120 DEVELOPMENT AN D TRAI NI"C 

of from three to te ll members who rotated among local Regional 

and ))opul ar units. Their mission varied from conducting one-day 

on-site training to rh'c-\\-eek refresher training programs. The teams 

were given a number of military labels-cornbincd mobile tra ining 

tcams, combined mobil e improvement tea illS, "rcd-c .. tcher" and 

" impact" teams, and Regional Forces compan y training tcams. 

However, these efforts proved too decentrali zed and unco-ordinated 

to deal with what was an extremely difficult problem. 

Encouraged by the limited progress that had been made. Gencral Westmoreland directed a countrywide lest of the Regional 

Forces company trai ning team concept. Basicall y, the concept \ ... as 

similar to the l\'larine Combined Action Program. In practice, a 

team of three. company grade officers and three noncommissioned 

offi cers joined a Regional Forces company at a Vietnamese Army 

tra ining center, assisted in training, and then accompanied the unit 

back to its home base for in-pl ace training and operational missions. 

T he team remained until the unit was capabl e of operating alone, 

usually six: to nine momhs later. The team did not command the 

unit, but Regional Forces commanders were instructed to follow 

the team's dircctions. The Regional Forces company training team 

was in thc business of tra in ing and supervising, not simpl y advising. 

and thus had a more active role than that of the ad visory learns. 

Team members were rccogniled combat leaders with about nine 

months left in the country and some command of the Vietnamese 

language. By lhe end o[ 1967, advisor repons did nOl ·renecl any 

significant improvemcnt in the tel'l'itorial forces. However, thcre 

was general agrecment that the train ing team concept was va lid 

and should be expanded. At a con ference held on 26 OctOber 1967, 

General \Vestmoreland recommended that some 354 new "dvisory 

teams be cre"ted specifically to provide assistance to the Regiona l 

"nd Popul " r Forces. Othcr recommendations call ed for provid ing 

engineer "nd personnel advisers to each of the forty·fo ur provinces. 

What finally evolved were the mobile advisory te"m and the mobile 

"d visory logistics team. These teams formed the nucieus of a ma ssive improvement program th"t addressed all "specLS of the administration, logistica l support, and t<lctica l opera ti ons of the 

terriLOrial units. 

Each mobile ad visory team consisted of twO omcers, lhree en· 

listed men. and a VieUl"mese Army interprcter. Their prim"ry 

mission \Vas to advise and instruct Region,,1 Forces companics and 

Popul" r Forces platoons "nd Regional and Poplliar Forces grOllp 

he"dqu:trtcrs on fi eld fortifica tions, barrier s}'.)tems, indirec t fire 

support. and small unit operations with emphasis on night operations :t nd ambushes, patrols, weapons employmcnt, emergency 
VIETSAM I7.J\T10:-;'. 1968- 19i2 121 

-

.. . 

, -~ 

• 

• 

'. 

medical ca re, and mher topics rel ated to Regional and I'opular 

Fc..rces missions. Uy the end of HIGS the MACV d eployment go .. l 

had been met and the program was judged a success. 

Two significa lll changes were later made in the program centering around personnel proruremenl. Initially, personnel were 

drawn from indi\ icluals in U.S. units \\'11 0 still had ill least six 

months remai ning in Vietnam. In earl y 1£169. however, mobile advisory lea rn members \\'ere assigned directly from the CONUS 

personnel stream to a specific mobile advisory team for a one-year 

tour. Tour stability was important allli :Idvisers could oft en pick 

lip more experience in one or two months in their advisory capacity 

than by se rving six with a U.S. ullit. III order to be beller prepared 

for the assignment, ad visers attended a nell' adviser school established by the U.s. Army, Vi etnam (USA RV), a t Di An. In order to 

make mobil e ad\ isol'Y team dut), more desirable. the second change 

st ipulated that the mobile ad\ i~1") tea m leader and his assistant 

would rece ive command credit for the ir duty. 

The mobile advisur), team (·oIHept was hailed as th e turnin g: 

poilll in improving lhe effeCliveness o( th e terri tori;" forces. and 
122 nE\'EI.O I'M t::\ T A :\ D T KAI :"I :\G 

th e p ro'or:ul1 was (olilinuall) strengt hened during the )cars that 

followed. The deta il ed strunurc (ha nged from time to lime. but in 

ge nera l the tca ms rClllil incd small . dose-knit b"'Oups with nc\\' 

company grade officers, a light wC:l pons noncommissioned uOicer, a 

radi otelephone operator, and an imcrprclcr. Although thc mobil e 

;1(1\ isol' Y tea ms init ia ll y (oll(;clltr:Hcd on working \\·ilh Regio nal 

Forces companies, hiler they operated Wilh the small er Popul ar 

Forces pl atoons, and in the end they became extensions of fir~ t the 

province and then the district ad visory teams. The mobil e ad visory 

teams remained mobil e, however, and were transferred to other 

i'Teas whenever eces~a r) . Since 1970 the mobile ad visory teams' 

success has been period ica ll y reAected in th e rin e performance 

shown by territorial units opera ting independently and with 

minimal outside support. 

The mobile ad visory logistiCS team progam complemented the 

mobile ad visory team and placed major emphasis on improving 

the administrative and logistic SUppOrl procedures of th e Regiona l 

and Popular Forces. The mobil e ad visory logistics le,UIlS' missions 

were to provide on·the·spot administrati ve. supply, and logistics 

training and assistance to Reg ional and Popular Forces units and 

th eir direct suppon logislira l companies and depots. As was the 

Glse \\'ith the mobil e ad \ isory teams, initial personnel resources 

were detailed from USARV resources and la ter replacemelils \\'ere 

obtained throu gh normal MACV channels. The mobile ad"isory 

logistics teams proved to be an effecti ve means of impl'o\ ing the ad· 

min istrative and logistical funCliom of the territorial fo rces and 

con tributed to their high mora le and increased Ina lcric1 indepelldelKe. No longer were th ey the forgollcn stepchildren o( the 

Republic of Vi etnam armed forces. 

How successful were U.S. efforts to impro\'e th e effectiveness of 

th e South Vietnamese Army during th ese rinal )'ears or u.s. in-

\'Olvement? The lest came during' i'\orth Vi etnam's spring offen sive 

(If 19;2. The cOllllllendabl e pe rl onnance on the pan of th e South 

Vie tnamese Army and the tel'l'itorial forces \\'as ampl e evidence 

that U.S. effon had not f:l iled. The Vietnamese Army withstood 

and repelled the viciolls onslallght of lhe enemy. and its sliccess 

instilled :l new se nse of esprit alld national unity thronghout th e 

fOlintry. The polic), of Vi etn ;'lIni7a ti on had nOt only m:'l ci c it possibl e for U.S, milita ry forces to d ise ngage from South Vie tnam , but 

it also helped to cre;ltc :t South Vie tnamese Anll) strollg enough to 

take the ir place. 
CHAPTER V 

Overview 

Ge7lCral 

Although overs hado\\'cd by the morc dramatic actions on the 

baulefields of Vielll;II11 , the U.s. training m ission has been o ne of 

th e most critical aspects of U.S. in volvement in SOllth east Asia. 

From th e begi nning in 1954, th e U.S. mission was to "ad\·jse and 

assist" the gO\'ernmelll of Vietnam in trai ning a military force 

capable of defending the nation. Some of th e more imponam facets 

of this task ha ve heell the establ ishment, development, consolidation, improvement, and support of military service schools and 

tra ining centers, th e development of programs of instruction, and 

assistance in eva luating and planning requircmcms and capabilities. Altho ugh m;my obstacles \\'cre never completely overcome, 

U.S. accompliShment in th e area o[ training ha ve been impressive in 

light of the expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces from a U.S. 

supported force of 150,000 in 1956 to its subsequent authorized 

strength of over one million. In the following pages an attempt will 

be made to summarize th ese accomplishments and at the s.ame time 

to preselll some of the more serious recurring headaches that beset 

the tra in ing effort. 

Trairlitlg Cen ters 

The Vietnamese armed forces school tra ining system expanded 

from one nationa l training center in 1956 to a total of thirty-th ree 

by 1970. This rapid growth was necessary in view of the qualita tive 

and quantitati ve ex pansion of the military forces. In an effort to 

improve tra ining, U.S. advisory te;lIm were assigned to cach training center on an a lmost continual basis. However, he;ldway in this 

area was generall y extremely slow. 

The most signifi cant obstacle to effective training was poor 

leadership at the traini ng CClller Icvel. The mOst highl y qua lified 

officers should have been pl aced in training positions; but tOO often 

th ese P 0slS were filled by officers who were relieved of combat commancts. Their superio rs often reasoned that such offi cers could do 

less damage in th ese positions of seemingly littl e responsibil ity than 
124 DEVt;LOI'MENT ANI) TRAI:\\XG 

as combat officers and. in the shorL run, their logic was probably 

sound. But poor leadership at the top quickly affected lower echelons, starting a cycle of poor training and poor combat effectiveness. 

Although advisers have long noted this deficiency, the Vietnamese 

have been reluctant lO relieve incompetelH ceiller commanders, 

possibly because they lacked suitable replacements. 

The low quality of cadre personnel also impeded the training 

mission. By and large, most cadres were not sufficiently knowledgeable in their subject areas and members lacked any real motivation to develop from a trainee into a combat-ready soldier. 

Perpetuating the inefficient cadre corps was the tradition of "homesteading" cadre personnel for up to five years. Such in breeding 

only worsened a bad situation. Idca~ hecame stagnant and progress 

merely trickled along; modern lechniques and doctrine developed 

and practiced each day by combat units, unless inculcated by the 

advisers, often failed to reach the student, and often even the 

advisers were unaware of current tactics ;Uld techniques. The job 

of providing combat-experienced cadres received milch emphasis, 

and a program was instituted to replace instructors without recent 

combat experience with people fresh from combat units. But 

this policy was not entirely successful because field commanders, 

when levied to support the pro!:,'Tam, often kept their best men 

and sent only marginal personnel. Not surprising, many of the 

replacements lacked the aptitude and motivation for Gldre duty, 

and the duty itself suffered a corresponding lack of prestige. 

Most of the other deficiencies within the training centers were 

by-products of the leadership <1I1d cadre difficulties. Instructional 

techniques were poor: instruction was presented almost entirely 

through the leclLlre method with little emphasis on practical work 

or demonstrations. A strong disregard prevailed for the lise of 

concurrent or integrated training techniques. Instructors appeared 

to look upon lesson plans as something to be covered as quickly as 

possible with no regard for their obligation to impart knowledge 

to their students. Advance preparation was almost nonexistcnt and 

class rehearsals rare. Although methods of instruction courses 

were established, improvement ,vas limited. 

Training management, from the Central Training Command, 

Joint General Staff, to the training center level also left much 

room for betterment. The Central Training Command was reo 

sponsible for training at the national level hilt was an extremely 

passive headquarters with little apparent experience in supervising 

and administering the training command. Army training programs, subject schedules, programs of instruction, and other training literature remained outdated and in dire need o[ revision. 
OVERVIEW 125 

Staffing [or tbe Central Training Command, whose mlSSlon was 

comparable to Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command, 

was in;lueqll;lte. Fur example, in 1970 two ollicns in the Cenu'al 

TTilining COlllm;lIld had toL11 responsibility for de\eloping, reviewing, and upgrading the ['ony progr;UllS wllilh were conducted 

at the trail1ing centers. In addition, these same officers I,'ere tasked 

to review all G50 programs of instruction submilted by the service 

schools. The job proved too great an undertakillg with little 

bf'ing accomplished. 

At the training center level, training management was no 

better'. 'Vhen revised Army training pl'OgTams, subject schedules, 

and other training liter<ltllfe were received, often no real eJfort 

was m;lde in updating and revising lesson plans so that they would 

correspond to the changes made. For example, four-hour blocks 

of instruction would be taught lrom two-hour lesson plans. 

Hardships in such areas as class scheduling, maintenance of 

training records, and make-up training also existed. It was not 

unusual lor t\\'o or three companies to show lip ;It the same range 

at the same time ['or firing. lJldivitiual training records were almost 

nonexistent and renected the cadre's resign;ltion to the fact that 

many tr;linees would receive incomplete training. To make matters 

worse, there was no makc-up training program. 

Night training techniques also receivcd much adverse tTiticism. 

\Vhile the Vietnamese Army programs of instruction empbasized 

night training, the training centers generally did not implement 

the instruction erfc(:tiveiy. This situation was partly dlle to the 

practice of limiting training to a "regular" eight-hour workday 

and partly to the requirement for centers to furnish their own 

night security personnel from the training detachments. 

Although the programs of instruction emphasized specialized 

training, such as night. small unit, and marksmallship training, 

these activities were often too complex for the basic Vieln{lmese 

Army soldier. l\fany blocks of instruction could have been eliminated or at least reduced in length. For example, much of the 

technical material on the functioning o[ the M1G rille was w,lsted 

because the rille WilS rar morc sophisticated than anything the 

trainee had ever encountered before. \Vhat good was it to teach 

him that the rOllnd detonation created 50,000 pounds of pressure 

per square inch chamber pressure? Such in[orTIlation was not really 

relevant to his need to learn 10 fire and maintain his WC<lpon, was 

a waste of time, and took hoLll's of instruction away from more 

valuable subjects. 

The above deficiencies were not the only shortcomings found 

within the training centers nor were they indicative o[ every center. 
'26 

But they were typical. and a lmost ;.1\ troubl e stemmed from th e 

lack of aggressive leadership and of a highly ca pabl c cadre within 

the trai ning cenler b;lse. 

Un it Tl'flinillg 

Unit tra ining was com inuall y emphasized bUI rarely undertaken by th e Vietnamese combat units. In-place unit tra ining was 

virtuall y nonexistent. Vietnamese Army commamlcrs \\'ere normall y required to conduct lhis type of instruction between combat 

operat ions. For the most part, the Vietnamese commanders disregarded this requirement and lIsed th e lime fo r f ('St and recuperalion. The relationship between training and operational effi ciency 

was genera ll y unapprec iated, and continucd emphasis by advisers 

at all levels fail ed to modify th e indifferent altitude toward in· 

place training. 

Refresher tra ining was a lso a re<luirement for mao y years. Under this program, Vi etn amese Army uoits were rotated through 

training centers, usuall y once every two to three years. T ra ining 

sessions lasted from four to fi ve weeks, and unit offi cers and non· 

commissioned oOicers were to accompan y their units while training 

celller instructors prov ided the act ua l instructiOIl . The arrangement was a compl ete fa ilure with the major problem be ing th e 

reluctance of corps and di vision commanders to release combat 

units from operational missions for rdresher training. An other 

handic;1J) was th e :t uituri e of the unit officers ami noncommissioned 

officers who rega rded th e training period as :1 ch:lIlce for rest and 

recuperation. The result was a complete lack of interest in unit 

retra ining. Thus, whil e th e need for unit tra ining was valid, :lIld 

the prog'rams for retra ini ng Vielllamese Arm)' units in tra ining 

cemers by traini ng center instructors was sOllnd, there \\'as need 

for th e whole practice to be re-examined. In an y case, the success 

or any future modifications will be greatl y dependent on a gra ter 

appreciati on of the va lue of tr<"l ining ill a combat en vironment. 

Milita ry Schools 

The Vietnamese armed forces school system, like the trallllllg 

centers, \\'as rapidl y expanded and finall y totilled twenty-fi ve different sc hools. U.S. advisers supervised lhis expansion :lIld were 

assigned to each school to ad visc ;md assist in dc"eloping successful 

lraining programs. NOl smprising. the resulting school system \\'<lS 

p<lu erned aft er thal of the Uniled Sla tes and g;l\'e officer and en-
OVERVIEW 127 

listed instruction :It all levels of responsibility in gene ral, technical , 

:lnd administrative fields. 

The establishment of this system was :I continuous jxocess tied 

closely to the course of the \\'a r. As new requirelll ellls wcre recognized , new schools were established through advisory insistence. 

For example, the N:llional Defense College was established in 

Sa igon in August 1967 in recognit ion of the need to provide training to top military officers Olnd government civil ians for functions 

involving national securit y; the Vietnamese Nation;!l i\ li litary 

Academy \\'as permane ntl y converted from a two-yea r to a fouryear institution in 1967 in order to improve what W:IS the major 

source of regular Army offi cers. 

Through U.S. efforts, South Victn <lm has develo ped a school 

system which is probably Ill1cqll:l]ed anywhere in Asia, But, although this system is functioning <I nc! functioning well, there arc 

still serious problem in eas. Most critica l are the lack of highl y 

qualified supervisors ;md both highly qualified and combatexperienced instructors. Other defi cicncies lie in such areas as 

training management, methods of instru ction , and programs of 

instruction and are sim ila r to th ose ami cting the training camps. 

Summary auti COItelusio1l.l 

Early efforts of the United States revolved around a small nUIlIbel' of ad vise rs, mobil e training tcarns, and thc offshore training 

program, These activities were cnough for the internal situation 

during the 1950s. At first the Americans concentrat ed on crea ting 

a military force which \\'as convention;1i in La ctics and equipment, 

palterned after the standard U,S. orga ni z:'tion, and capable of 

withstanding an invasion from the north . This Army proved incapabl e of coping with an illternal insurgency. Before 1960 its 

organization was lao centralized and its equi pment too heav), to 

counter the rapid growth of the guerrilla war. 

In 1959- 60 the United States real ized that the developme nt of 

a count erinsurgency capability was urgent. Its massive efforts to 

develop this ca pability through lhe lise of Special Forces units, 

mobile training teams, increased adv isory assistance, revised training programs, organiza tional changes and increased combat SUppOrL 

(orces, and materiel aid were extremel), successful and resulted in 

great official optimism by 1963. But the Buddhist uprisings and the 

successful overthrow of the Di em regime in late 1963 led to a com· 

plete deteri ora tion of the armed forces. Only the decision to intl"oduce U,S. combat forces in e:lrly 1965 saved the Republic of 

Vietnam from total military defea t. 
]28 

The years foll owing 1965- wcre dl <l raueri/cd by continuollS 

eITolls to revitali/e the South Vietnam Army with men , money, 

and materiel. Time for tll esc efforts was bought by thc commit· 

ment of large U.S. combat rorce~, ;lIld for" whil e m;my U.S. lead· 

crs fell that American troops could defea t the insorgenL)' ;done. 

;\ Iili(;ltlllg against this vicw were t\l'll seriOIlS probl ems affcctin g 

the buildup and tra ining vi the Vietnamese Army. Fir , by 1967 

the Vi elll amese Army was devoted almost entirely to pacificalion 

security missions and, in the minds of many, had been relegated 

to a secondary role in the conduLt of the war. Vietnamese Army 

units often reflected th is attitude in their over·all lack of elllhu· 

siasil l and ill their willinglless to Ic.lvc most of the figh ting to the 

Americans. This apat hy ended during T el offensive of 1968 when 

the Army's combat perform;mce :llIo\\'c(\ the units to rega in a sense 

of pride :mel purpuse. In retrosped. the Vietnamese Army should 

ha ve been gi\'cn 01 gre;Il('l' ('omb;1l bl lrden hetween IOG5 ;lIld 1968. 

togeth er with Illore U.S. backup support. 

A second problem was also a by-product of the large U.S. 

grou nd presence. By 1966 U.S. forces had been given first priority 

for men, money. and m:llcriel. nd the basic mission of strength· 

ening the Victnamcse :l nncd fan es bce nne a second priorit),. This 

change immediately lowered the qual ity of :ldvisory personnel ;lIld 

the availabilit) of the IHUle lIlo(\<.'1"ll eq uipment for the Viet namese 

Army. By 1966 the high stand<lrds required of adv isory personnel 

were aba ndoned and instead emphilsis was plated on assigni ng the 

best men to U.S. comb:lt forces in 50mh Vi etnam. Qllicers and 

noncommissioned officers began to look upon ad visOly du ty as 

undesirable and ;n'oided sw h dilly if possible: promotions callie 

through assignmellts to U.S. units. not throu gh advisory service. 

Sensing this drop in adviser qua lit y, General Westmorel:md con· 

tinuaU), emphasized the imponanc.e of the a{" isory mission and 

referred to it as the "heart and soll l" of the U.S. effort in Vi etnam. 

Fin;dl y. a ~er c~ of projc( ts were undertaken to maJ...c these positions more aurauivc, and Ihis series pro\ed partial!) successfu l in 

re-establishing the desirability o f advisory duty. 

Thc large sca le of the American imoh'cmenl aft er 1965 also 

pred lldcd extcllsi\c eq uipmelll Iliodernization for the Vi etnamese 

arllled forces lIntil 1968, and the practice of lending equipment 

to the Viem,nncse Arm) h om l 'SAR V stocks s;n isfi ed only certain 

priority needs. Howe\er, once the decision was made to limi t U.S. 

involvement and Vi etnamile the war. the sillla ti on ch;mgeci . Be· 

gi nning in 1969 V.ISt quantities o f materiel became available to the 

Vietnamcse armed forces. most of \\ hidl were supplied by rede· 

ployi ng U.S. units. From l UG!) to 1!l72 AmeriGlIl unit ~ :mel com· 
OVERVIEW 129 

SOUT II V IET/'M M t:St: ARMOR . :\' (;,\"BO[)l ,\ 

mands, together with th e ll.S. <ldv isory net\\·ork. were hCilvil y 

committed to the buildup alld lIlodernil.ation of the ViClnaml:SC 

armed forces. At the same time, the :lrmcd onc~ trainin g basc also 

expanded to Ill ect th e dClllalHis of \ ' icltlalllilOuio n ~(J that its de· 

pe ndence on U.S. training sllpport \\';IS minimal by the end of 19i2. 

While it is diffic ult 10 S:l)' if these I1IC:l ure ~ hotlld ha\e been t:lken 

e .. rlier, it is evident th:l' the), were impi cmelllcd m ccessfllll y OIilC 

the SOlah Vietnamese Arm)' was given g rea ter attention. 

In summary, th e U.S. approach in training ha ~ hee ll slll e~s llll 

despit e the m:ln )' deficiencies ind ic:ltcd . . ~ condudcd c .... lier. lhe 

whole problem revol ves :lrOllnci th e i\\'ail:l hilit)' of qual ified le:!dership. Although Ill:llly le:lde hip ()ur~cs werc c~tabli,hcd and 

continual emph:lsis pl:lceci on the dC\'clopmelll 01 IC:ldership, a 

seriOllS obst:lcle lI'as United Slatc ~ o\\'n o \·crriclin!.\' cl1lph:lsi~ o n 

establishing "rapport" wilh ~ (O unt pan ~ ('\'en al th e ex pense 

of not acnHlIpl ishing its lIli~siun, T oo o tt cn a(h ~ers did no t take 

firm stan ds with the ir cO llntc :l rt ~ o n key issllc~ nor rccollnll cnd 

the relief of ltns:lt isfac lory comma nders for fear thal 1I {h re«I111· 

mendaliolls would reflect badly a ll their own abil ities, Ir more 
'30 DE\'ELOI':'I[:,\ 1' /\ :-\0 TRAI;\IX(. 

adv isers had insisted on the rei ief of ineffective commanders. com· 

mand positi ons would have o pened up, affordi ng incclllive and 

opportunity for the more junior officers to exercise their leadership 

abilil)'. The rapport appro:H.h is dangerous beca use it tends itself 

to the accc ptanc,c 01 su!)sl;md:trd pcrforlll;tI1 t:c hy the ach iscr. In 

all)' futll re sitll ati on where a{h i~cr\ arc deployed under hostile 

conditions, th e emphasis should be on gelling the job done, not 011 

merely gelling alollg Wilh the illdi, idua l being :I{h'isccl. 
Appendix A 

MAJOR R VNAF SCI-IDO LS ANI) TRAINING CENTERS EX ISTING 

AT 1'1-I E END OF 1958 

Na tional Military Academy 

Comm,lI1d and General Staff College 

Quang Trung Replaccmclll Tr:lining Ccmer 

English Langmlge School 

Service sc hools 

Armor 

Artillery 

Infantry 

Engineer 

Quartermaster 

Signa l 

Transportation 

Drivers and Mechanics 

Illlelligence and Psychological Warfare 

Commando 

Medica l Training Cen ter 

Sign:ll Training Center 

Airborne 

Sa."u: .. ,.")fY, Ikvelopm .. nt of the Tnlninr I) jrc(,o,..~t ... IIQ, M,\Cl' ( M.y 19;0). 
Appendix B 

RVNAF ACi\\)EMn:s, COLLE(;ES, ANI) SCII OOLS I 

Gener(ll 

l\loSl of the formal tra ining adlllini~tered by th e CCl1lra l Training Command was conduCled through the m,IIlY and varied milililr)' 

academics, (ollege,>, and S<.hools throughout th e Republic of Vietnam. Some of these instillUioll!) we re rdatil'ely new while olhers 

had existed before the "'filled fol'l'cs of South Vi etnam W;lS established, and no less than four 01 theill- th e Comm:lIld ::lI1d Staff 

COllege. the Noncom mbsioncd Of lit ers Academy. and the Eng'incer 

and l\ledica\ schools-were originally loc<tled in North Vietnam. 

Almost :III of the mOljor SdlOOls h,l\e at olle time or another been 

localed it! and been a pan of the Thu I)ue .\lilil:! r}' School Center. 

This 110l1-deflllllt lenter alld forerunner 01 110 Ic~s than ten s(l1 ools 

was the hub of RVNAF training during the pcriod immed iately 

following the Genna Accords of 1954. In lime, the different schools 

expanded and most mo\'ed to other sites because Thu Duc was 

too slllall to conta in the budding lr:lining base of the new South 

Vietnamese armed forces. These instiwtions ('OlHi nucd to enl;lrge 

their fa cil ities and develop. revise, and updatc their traini ng cur· 

riculums in acconl:mce with thc Clnergence of the nel\' military 

[orce. Also, ncw .sc hools were instiuued to bro:lden the training 

base and develop a well-rounded and h'cll-balanced force- a military force in wh ich all person nel , regardless of specialil)'. could 

rccei ve form;'! I training. A listing of the academics, colleg'es. ;md 

schools togethcr h'ith a brief history of eal:.h follo\\'5 (for locations 

in 1969, see Ap/Jemiix C; for emolhnclll in 19iO, jet! AJ)/Jentlix OJ. 

Vieflwmest: NfI/ia"flt M;film)' IIm(/emy 

The Vietnamese Na tion;'!l i\lililar}, Acadcmy VN~IA) was 

founded in December 1948 in Hue. Under French operation. lhe 

academy w;'!s simpl y :I nine-molllh ()fb(( r tr:lining .'>Chool designed 

to produce infantry platoon leaders. In 1950 it movcd to Dalal 

bccause of better local wea ther and rcmai ncd nnder Frcnch opcra-

'The lI1a~trial in this appendix wat tah·u horn HQ. MAC\'. Commalf(l lIi./OI)'. 

1969, II . \' 1-81- \' 1-92. and Comma"d HiJlo,,>. 1910, II. \' 11-51- \111 -55. 
APJ'ENDIX n '" 

tion until after the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, when 

lhe Vietnamese assumed comrol. In 1955 the American advisory 

effort began, and the curriculum was e:uended to one year and in 

1956 to twO years. In 1959 President Dicm first declared th e acado 

emy to be a full four-year, dq;rcc-gf:l llling. uni versity-level institUlion . Expansion planning and collstnLuion beg:ln, but the 

program floundered because 01 th e conflicti ng short-term dem;lIld 

for junior officers and lack of a qU:llified academic faculty. As a 

result, the academy graduated th ree 3-),eal" classes bllt no <i-year 

classes and, in 1963, reverted to the production of enl ightened pl atoon leaders with two years of tr;liuing_ The concept was simil ar 

to U.S. officer candida te schools throughout 1965_ In December 

1966, Premi er Ky issued a decree which reinstituted a four-yea r 

educational requiremelll, wi~h gradU:lLeS entitled to receive a 

Bachelor of Science degree, and changed th e academy mission to 

the following: 

The Viet namese Nationa l jI,'filitary Academy is re~pon ible fo r tr .. in- ing regu l:u' army officers for Lhe Armed Forces of lhe Republic of Viet- nam who possess :I uni versit y level of imtruction and a firm military 

bad:.ground. 

A VNjI,'IA applicam had to be a citizen between th e ages of 

eighteen and twenty-two, unmarri ed , and a high school graduate 

to !.: considered for accepta nce. Appointlllent LO th e aeadem)' was 

based upon th e results of a two-da y competiti ve academic exam ination and a complete ph ysic:ll eX:lllli l1:ttion. The more highl y qualified students obtained from this competition provided a basis for 

developing the potential of an "el ite" professional corps. Approximately one out of ten applica lHs were accepted. In 1968, for example, out of morc th an 2,500 :lpplicants onl y 270 were accepted 

in the four-year program. The attrition rate ha s been minimal 

since the academy's conversion to :t four-year coll ege, averaging 

from 4 to 5 percent (the approximate average rate for West Point 

as well as the Philippine and Korean Military academics is 30 

percent). At the beginning of 1969, th e :lcadelllY had an enrollment 

of 900 cadets with plans to expand the cnrollment to 1,000 by 

the end of lhe year. 

By 1970 the physica l plant consisted of ten buildings including 

fOllf cadet dormitories, three academic buildings, an academy headquarters, a cadet mess hall. and a cadet club. Under construction 

were faculty quarters, a fourth academi c building, a library, and a 

cadet regimental headquarters. 

The four-year curriculum was 

jecLS and courses in mathematics, 

diverse. 

physics, 

Besides 

history, 

military 

English, 

sublaw, 
". Df.n;t O I';\I[:-' [' ,\ :-'; 1) "' KAI:-' I:->G 

philoso phy, chemistr y. eng lllccring, and surveying (50 IlCrLc lll of 

the academic program was d nolcd to engi neering SCiCIl(CS), th e 

curriculum furnished courses to help soh c some of South Vielnam "s un iC]u c prohlclI!), For c";;lIll ple, a l.:OUI ~c in hamlet planning 

covered everything from where to pill th e village chief's ho use to 

how to drill we lls for Wa le I' ; an o th er co urse conduCled in san itary 

engineerin g: was c~ ll d to illlpro\c th e sanil atioll in haLtll elS 

and villag'cs. 

Subjects were ta ught by th e academy's :.]I·R Vi':AF milit:II"Y faculty of OIpproximiu cly 100 iIlStl"m .. lOl's. Cl asses lI'ere held as seminars 

with small groups of cadets. All cadets had their own textbooks 

which was something ra re in civil ian Vietnamese uni\ ersities. AI· 

though th e VN MA c urriculum was patterned after the U.S. scnice 

academi es, the cadets were exposed to morc cl assroom ho urs than 

the cadets a t \-Vest Point: howe\ er, both p;trtic ipaled in the same 

amount of athletic acti vity. 

In 1969 there \\'ere twelve U.S. military pe rsonnel inlhe VNi\IA 

ach'isory detachmcnt. t\(h isor), clfOl ~ werc geared toward improving th e quality of ellle ring cadets, obtai ning a be tter qual ifi ed staff 

and rand ty, de\'elo ping a bal alll cd I llrrilu llllll, ,tnd supporting th e 

VNl\ IA's physical expimsion . The U.S. Seni or Ad visor no ted th at, 

althoug h re ports a nd comments a bout thc V:-"I ;\ I}\ h .... adu .. le\ ha ve 

been excellent, "the future of th e }\cadem) rests with how we ll it 

can kee p pace with the Changing situatio n alld times. Updating 

textS, expanding fa cilit ies to meet needs, bctlering the fac ulty; 

these are what arc impo rtant." 

In December 1969, th e " West Point " of So uth Vietnam \lImed 

o ut th e first class of ninety-two (adch to graduate from its fo uryear progTam. The e\'elll set th e stage fo r a cruc ial test of o ne of 

the most ambitio us pl ans of Vi cl1lil1uilatio n to d;n c. Dl1I'ing the 

col urf II I !).1.ss- i n-rc\ iew gT;.dua t io n ll ). th e lung·I'01 nge i mportance of the academy graduates was emphasi/cd hy th e prcscnce 

of President Thi eu and a host of LO p politica l and milita r) leaders 

of the country. In his remarks I'resident Thic u told th em " th ey 

must be more than mil itary leaderll" and urged th e gr:ld ua tes LO 

be in th e fo refront of a natio n-building gene ratio n. 

On gradua tio n th ese cade ts were assigned to th e three services 

as fall a h'S: Army 77 cadcts, Air FOlce 10, Navy ;\ Iarine Corps S. 

During lhe period 15- 20 Del.clIl bcl' 1970, 196 C:Hldidates for class 

Ilumber 26 reported to the ,u;adclU ) tor ill ro<e~~ ill g exa lllitl,t tiollS. 

Eight candidatcs were declared unfit for mi li tal')' sen ice lo r Ill edi-

('al rcaSUIIS: 2[,Q pt it'l.'l Y lltd id te~ a nd 11 0 al tcrnatcs ll:ld been 

selected for lhe class. On 24 December, 188 fully qualificd Gmdid,ll(,~ \1"('] e admitted ;t~ new CldCb " I]d fo rm,. I I r .. in i ng (ommelll.cd. 
,\PPE:\mx II 13' 

During 1970 a (aciCl in his sccond ycal' at rh e Vietnamese National 

I\ lilitary t\cldclll} 1I('(;1 111C the first Vjctll;llHcse to be acceptcd for 

entrance LO th c U.S. l\ (jlitary Academy, West Point. 

NaliOllal NOllcommi's'siollc(1 Officer's Academy 

The N:uional Noncommissioned Officers Acadcmy had been 

founded by the french Army in 1951 in Qll:lng Yen Prov ince, 

Nort h Victnam, and had been ca lled the Commando School. After 

the Geneva Accords of 1954, th e school reverted to RVNAF control and moved to I<h:lIl h H oa Provincc in II Corps Tactical Zone 

where its mission \\'<lS changed from n:lini ng commandos to that 

of conducting basic infantry co urses. Uccausc of thc lack of space, 

th e school moved aga in . this time to N ha T rang, and was renamed 

th e Commando and Ph ysical Tr<lining Celllcr with th e ex pan ded 

mission of conducting commando, rcconnaissance. antiguerrilla , 

physica l traini ng, boxi ng. judo. <lnd basic infantry courses. In late 

1958 the sc hool was again redesigna ted :IS the N<ltional Noncommissioned Officcrs Ac.:ademy <ln d received thc ncw mission of training 

sclccted 1l 01lCtH1'1 missioned oHit_ers ill the principlcs of leadership 

<l nd command. In 1967 the aCildemy incor por:lled airmobil e training c.:ourscs illto its curriculum. and in 1968. in ordcr to relievc the 

tr:l ini ng pressure 011 thc Infantry School. conducted :l nd gradu:lted 

four officer candidatc cI:lsscs. This course was discontinued after 

the fOllrth class brrad uated in early 1969. Also in 1969, nine reservc 

noncomm issioned officcrs co urses were conducted :,t I.be academy 

<l nd a tenth class bcgan on I December. 

During 1970, 16,522 students attended th e academy, and significam progTCSs was made in improving facili ti es and upgrading 

tra in ing. A se lf-help prognm provided one SOO-man mess hall and 

175 cight-man mess tablcs; at the samc time construc.:tion continued 

on fifteen studclll barracks. \Vith i\ IACV approval, the aC:ldemy's 

allocation of MI G ri nes was incre<lsed frorn 1,000 to 3,000, th e st udcnt daily (ood allowance was enla rged, and the rcccipt of a favorable contract for civilian supplicd foods made ava il able adcquate 

rations. By May thc 1\11 6 rifl es were issucd. which brought the 

lotal on hand to 3,000, and thc firteen new ba rracks werc compl etcd 

which increascd the capacity from J,320 men to 4,520. Grca ter 

emphasis U)' <1Ch i~ers resulted in Ill;ljor improvcments in the qll:lJity 

of iemlership training and day and night pr;lctic:ll excrcises. Detailed training inspcctions werc c.:ondllctcd by the ARVN staff and 

U.S. advisers. Inspection reports w('re forwardcd th ro ugh ARVN 

dl:lnnels and [allow-up correcti,'e actiuns takCIl. U.S. trai ning 

tcams from the 41h Infantry Di"ision :ll1d 173d Airborne Brigadc 
136 DE\'ELOPME:-:T A~O TRA IN I NG 

visitcd the acadcmy to assist III improvi ng lhe quality of mi ne and 

booiJY-lfi.p training. 

Natio1lal Defense College 

The National Defense College (NDC), one of the Il ewest 

RVNA F St: hools, was established by national decree on 22 August 

1967. Ils dual mission was to eduC:lI e outstanding and high-ranki ng 

milita ry and career government c i\ ilians to become better quali· 

fied to perform important funlli ons rele":1111 to the nalional 

security and to stu dy, pla n, and dcve lop nat ional defense policy. 

The first class, consisting of fifteen onkers (0- 5 and 0-6) and 

six high-ranking <..iv il i<ll1s, assembled 0 11 G I\lay 1968: all twcllly·one 

students compl eted th e co urse and were g'rad uated in April 1969. 

A second (\,ISS of sixteen Illi li l:lr)' ,mel eight t i\ ilians commenced 

on j 1\ 1<1)' 1969. 

The clirriwlum of the Na tional Defense College consisted o( 

an orielltation, len co urses, and se\CII seminars which fell into 

Lince major ca teguries-intern ationa l aff:Lirs, nationa l resources, 

and n:L1ional defense strategy- and an individ ual resea rch proSTam. In addilion, th e college offered ,lIl elective English progn ffi 

and condll cted a unique senior seminal'. In this wee kly senior seminar, key gener .. 1 unicefs :Hld distinguished c:n'eer government offi cials we re in vi ted to he:.r impon ant gllest speakers who lectured 

on sigl1iricam topics. Following the lc<.t \ll"e, th e guest speaker met 

widl the rcgular d ass in a scminar on subjects rela ted to the leclUre. This procedun.: promoted undent:mdi ng ,Il th e highest governmental lcvel, not onl y of th e \ ital topics under discllssion, hut 

also of Ihe role of Ihe coll ege and how it contributed to the 

allaillLllent of national goa ls. 

Comm(l1Id (/1/(/ SI(lU College 

The Command and Starr Coll ege (C&.:SC) was orga nized at 

Hanoi ill 19;,2 \\hell th e Frend l (-" "pedi lionar), Corps established 

a "TaClica l Instructi on Center" with th c mission of trlLini ng mobile 

group, baual ion. and wmpan)' commanders. In latc 1953 the 5<:hool 

was transformed imo th c I\lilit:u') c~e:lI'( h Center with a mission 

of pro,idillg \\·artiIllC olht el"s with a« ·cJerated lra ining. Afl er th e 

Gene\iI Accords, th e coll eges mo\ed from Hanoi to Saigon, was 

redesigll,Ll cd the CotnlH:mci ami (;encral Starr College, ,mel was 

assign ed the mission of trainin g hi p,h-ranking oflit:ers for lhe Vietnamese armed forces. In IOG I the ( ollege again moved, th is time 

to Dalat, where it oCl upied th e iJll lding~ \\'hich had previously 
"P I' DIX U '37 

hOllsed the Vietnamese Na tional Ii litary Academy. During 1962 

and 1963, the courses of instruction had bcen short ened and 

ori cn ted to stress counterinsurgency tcdlll iques. After the relocation to Da la l, the college expanded and ba ttalion staff and baltalion command extension (correspondcnce) courses were add ed 

(lhe batta lion command course was tr;msferr ed to the Infa ntry 

School in 1964 ). In addi tion, the ba u alion commander·s com bined 

arms course, a sixteen-week mo bilization co urse, W<l S inaugura ted 

at the college in December 1965. A CTC slUdy in earl y 1967 resulted in a change in the names of the residence courses, a broadened scope of instr ucti on, il nd lhe preselll name for the college. 

In 1969, as the senior tactica l sc hool in th e country, as a joint 

servi ce instillltion, and as th e on ly institu ti on (other th;1I1 the Nationa l Defense College) tb at a lTered the educa tion <l nd prestige so 

vital to the developi ng nalion, the Conllll<lnd and Staff College 

possessed a fivefold tra in ing mission: 

I. to trai n selected fie ld grade officers for dUly as commanders 

at regimenta l an d seni or sector level or higher and starr officers 

a t division level or h igher; 

2. to trai n se lected capt<l ins <l nd majors for d Uly as b<l lla li on 

commanders, district chiefs, or swff officers at ba ttalion and regimenta l level; 

3. to provid e a limited number of Air Force, Navy, and Marine 

Corps oflicers of com bat arllls and techni ca l services with so und 

knowledge of the armed forces in order to foster a high degTee o[ 

co·ordination in jo int operations; 

4. to conduct an extension course for nonresident, active d uty 

officers in grades from first lieutenant to major; and 

5. LO organize special co urses as directed by the Joint General 

Staff (by th e J GS di rec tive, an offi cer must be il grad u<l te of the 

intenn cdiate course to be eligible [or promOlion to lieutenant 

colonel and of th e advanced course for eligibility for promotion 

to colonel). 

T he curriculum of the coll ege consisted of two separate courses 

o( instruction- a twe nty-week advanced course for majors th rough 

colonels and <I twel ve-week illlermediate course for ca pwi ns and 

majors. T he intermedi ate tra in ing was also offered through a correspondence co urse for first lieuten allls through majors. The curriculum was designed to suppOrt a joint service coll ege, and the 

programs of instruction for cad. course were continuall y revised 

and modifi ed to support th e requiremellls of the armed forces and 

province and district leaders. A cerla in degree of repetition oc· 

curred betwee n lhe two co urses that was bo th necessa ry <Inc! desirable in prov id ing background fundamenta ls, inform:llion 0 11 
'" 

current d evelo pment, and continu ity. Uoth courses cmph<lsized 

combined arms training appropria te to the level of the course, and 

conti nual reorganization of the programs of instruction perm itted 

good cove rage of unconvent ional warf:lrc. cOllllterinslLrgcncy. sector 

a nd territorial secu rity. pacificatioll. political wa rfare, revolution-

;lI"y developmclll, and gene!';'! ] subjcclS dealing with national "nel 

international problems. The gradu;ltion exercise of the Sixth 

Adva nced Command and Sta ff Course took plilee on 19 December 

196!), at the college auditorium and was presided over by th e 

Chief. Central Training Comm:md; ninety-seven stud ents success-

(ully comple ted the course a nd Sf'vcn rililcd. 

Poiilicnl Warfare College 

The history of thc Pol itical 'Na rfare (POLWAR) College bega n 

with the esta blishmem o[ a Psychological W arfare (PSYWAR) 

training celller at Fort Cay 1\l:I i, Saigon. in 1956. Its annual output was 2 12 individuals in 196 I, 884 in 1962, and 940 in 1963. 

In 1964 the training center moved to Camp Le Van Du ret in III 

Corps Tactica l Zone. but th e fac ili ties at the new loca tion were 

so in<ldequa te th<lt student capacity d ecreased from 350 to 80. This 

student output later grew to ISO through sel f.help proj ects, but 

th e 1965 o utput was still below previolls years, wi th only 427 

students gradu ating. 

\Vith th e advcnt o f th e political warfare structure in the armed 

forces. the training cClller was redesignatcd as thc Pol itical \Varfare School in 1965 and in 1966 moved to its prescnt loca tion in 

Dal<lt. About th e samc time, it was upgr ad ed to a college with 

the primary mission of p rovidi ng a two·year college level course 

to train pro fessiona l POLWAR o ffi cers. Political wa rfare cad ets 

were recruited ;md se nt to the Infantry School to receive basic 

trai ning with OCS ca ndidates; upon complet ion of basic training, 

they moved to Dalat to begin their POLWA R tl"<lining. The members of th e first class, grad uated in i\ la y 1969. were assigned to 

POLWA R batlaliOIlS and to A RV N re imcnL~ and RF compani es 

as POLWA R ad visers. 

Othcr missions o f th e college included g iving Branch tr:l ining 

for RVNA F o fliccrs and organiling and directing POLWAR spe· 

cialist training as required. The 1968 quotas for the course at th e 

POLWA R Collegc included 37!J c<ldets rar th e two·year program 

and 475 studcnts in shorter, Lhrec·mr.nh courses for POLWAR 

Bra nch training. 
,\I'I'E;\J)IX n ' 39 

Infuntry o5rllOol 

Originally t:alled the Thu Due e~c rvc Omcers School, the 

Jnfamry School h:1d been est:1blished at Tlw Duc in October 195 1 

along \\·ilh its sister 'i( lux)1 in :'\;1111 ])inh, ;".:orth Vietnam. !Jolh 

schools were origin:.!ly administered by the Frellch Aim)" and 

all instruction look placc in FrclI(h. 111 1952, :1rter the dosing of 

the Nam Dilll! Reser\'e Olh(ers Sthool, the Thl! Dm: school became 

the onl y reserve officer producing s("hool in Vietn:nll. In 1954, 

after the Geneva Accords, the management of the school t: hanged 

from the French to the Vielllamese armed forces. 

In 1955 the Infantry School was given the job of training 

cadres and speci,L1 i::.ts of uther hr:ult hes of the Vietnamese Army 

in addition to the infantry. Its name W:15 then changed to the Thu 

Duc Military School Center and compri::.ed the Infantry, Armor, 

Artillery, E.ngineer, Signal, Ordnance, Transponation, and Administrative schools. In Ouober l!)iil all of these schools, with the 

exception of Infantry and Armor. mo\cd from the Thu Out: ,.rea 

to provide space for the greatly expanded AR \'N Resen·e Officers 

Procurement Program. 

After several name changes associated with its changing mission, the Tim Duc Reserve OOLterS School was officially renamed 

the Infantry School during JlLl y 1!IG4. Aftcr that thc school expanded ulllil , at the end of 1967, it had a Cilp:,city of 3,800 Sllldents. Its training program included the oOker candida te. company commander, RF offic.:er refresher, and methods of instruction 

courses. Following the enem) Tel offcnsi\e in 1968, all courses 

were temporarily call(eled. exccpt for thc t\\·o officer candidate 

cycles. 

In June 1968 a dramatic change O(clIlT(·d in the ~c ool's CUTriculum and training program. To meet increased oUker require· 

ments as a result of the general mniJili7Z1tion, the Gl lXlc ity was 

increased to approximately 6,000 sllldclHS. At the s..1me timc, the 

length of the ollicer candictate program \\':15 decreased from thirt)'-

seven to twenty·four weeks; the first nine weeks consisted of basic 

:mel advanced individual training at the Qu;mg Tnlllg Training 

Center and the rest of the training was conducted at the school. 

Since becoming an officer-producing school in 1952, the Infantry School hilS graduated over 40.900 students as of November 

1969 and continued to be the largest source of officers in the 

Vietnamese armed forces. The impoaance of its mission and the 

success of its graduates made the school notable as one of the most 

important military installations in SOllth Vietnam. 

By 1!)70 the Infantry S( hool Illas beginning to realize the hene-
140 

fits of the specia l construction program to upgrad e fa ciliti es. Nine 

classrooms were constructed and furniture was rccei\'cd to accommodate 200 stud ellts in each of the nine dassraoms. Increased 

em phasis was placed all instr uctor training and th e methods of 

instruction COUfse was revised to crnph asi/ c practical applica tion 

as o pposed to the [celU re system. The first of the new methods 

of instruction courses at the Infantry School gradua ted eightyseven studen ts. 

j"luch headway was also made ill new cOllstruction, rehab ilitation of barr:lcks and messes, dc"elopmclll of special il.cd trai ning 

areas, ;mel compelition among un its. A signal trai n ing area was 

constr ucted fo r m ol'C pr:lCli<:al application in communica tions 

training. T errain models, mock-ups, and bleachers were constructed to improve Ill;,!p re;'!d ing an d weapons trai n ing_ \·Vo rk \\'as 

started o n a mock-up Viet Cong ham let, a physical fit ness comba t 

profic iency test a rea, and a platoon defensive area. A unit compet ition program was implementcd e ncompassing academic scores, 

barracks and unit area inspections, physica l tra ining, march ing, 

and intramura l sports. 

At·tillery School 

Thc R VNAF Artillery Sc hool was an o utgrowth of the French 

Army's Artillery T ra ining CClller of Indochina located in Phu 

Hoa. After thc sign ing of the Geneva Accords, the training center 

was turned over to the Viclllamese :trlned forces and was I'cdcsigllilted the RVNAF Arlillery School. In October 1955 the school 

movcd to the Tllll Dllc i\ lilitary School Ccntcr and sha rcd its 

facilities with th e Engincer School: whcn thc Engineer School 

moved Ollt two yea rs latcr, the Arti ll ery School LOok over th c cntire 

area. With th is additional space, the sc hool was reorga nized and 

the training acti vi ties expanded. In Jul y 1961 the school moved 

aga in, this timc to its presclll location in Due M y. whcre it was 

again I'corg:lnized with its 011'11 adm inistra tive and logistic support. 

Throughout its existence, the school has trai ned artillcry officcrs 

and no ncommissioned offic('rs in the operation an d len~n e 

of all artillery equipment and has also conduc tcd basic and ad· 

vanced unit tr:l inin g ror ARVN artillery ba ttal io ns as they were 

acti va ted under the RV NA F Improvemen t and i\ foderni1atio n 

programs. A four-week coumerb;tttel'Y course was establ ished at 

the school, a long with twO ANj.\fPQ / 4A radar sets and equipmcnt 

in 1969. Then, the ratcd (ilpacit), of th e school was GOO students. 

During December th e stud cnt o~d reached 1,086, severely strai ning faci lities and instructors. Thc overload was a result of the 
,\I'I' E1\'DlX 1\ Ht 

req u iremelll to train additional personnel to fill newl), activated 

un its and units scheduled for :lCtivatio n. Under these oven;ro\,·ded 

conditions, the amoulll of practical work done :ll1d personal supe rvision received was greatl y red uced, adverscl), affecting the qU:llit)' 

of graduates. 

In 1970 several new gu n emplacemellls with concrete personnel shelters and ;ulHllu n ition bunkers we re built in tbe battal ion 

demonstration area :IS a self-hel p projeCl. Ne\\' programs of instruction were prep:lred for a survey oOker course :lnd :l survey 

instructor cou rse. A co py of the U.S. Anillery Advanced Course 

was obtained from Fort Sill, edited to delete unus:l ble portions, 

and given to the direuor of instruction for upgrading the batt alion 

comlll:lnder·s cou rse. In addition, no(ice<l bl e im provements in training and supervision of students took pl ace a fter th e comma ndant 

directed that clas:-.es be inspectt·d da ily an d wr itten re ports sub· 

milled . 

One of the most sign ifi ca lll imprcwe l1lents in train ing occurred 

between April and June 1970. Formerly, IlO attempt was made to 

co-ord inate the tr<linin g of forw;trd observers, fir~ direction cemer 

personnel, and gun crews d uring live fir e exercises. During June, 

sched ules and programs of instruction were com pl eted to <lllow 

these cl<lsses to be cond ucted simulta neously. The concept saved 

ammu nition and training time and released su ppon troop g Ull 

crews to perform mai ntenance. 

A rmor School 

The Armor School W<lS first established by the French Army a t 

the Vietn<llllese I\ l ilit<lry Ac;,demy in D:ll at ill 1!150 and was staffed 

by French officers a nd Vietnamese enl iSled men. In late 1952 the 

school \r<lS dissolved and its fun iOlI~ taken over by the T hu Duc 

Resen ·c Office rs SLllOol. Theil, in February I 95,j. \,'hell the Th u 

Duc Reserve Officers Sc hool bec;une the Th u Duc \Ii lit:tr y School 

Center, th e :lnllor ponion \r:ls ag;li ll estahlished as a separate 

school. Finally. whcn thc other schools o f the trailli ng center 

moved to their new locations in October 1961 , th e .\ rmor School 

became an indepe ndclll entity under the Arillor Command and 

has remai ned so en;,r sinte. 

The mission of th e school \,·as to tra in :mnor personllel in 

the lise and tactics of all annor-type \ehitl es found in the RVN.\F 

inventory. It ;l1 so conducted ba sic ,Inel ad\,:ltlced un it training for 

all newly i1c tl v:llcd A RVN :trillor un its 10 ensure tha t lhey wcre 

combat ready before go ing into lhe fi eld as operational forces. 

On 13 December 1969, constrtll .. tion of a tank gun nery range 
142 

was (ompicted .It Tr:lIlg Bom. The range. ~Ipproximatcly fOrlY 

kilomcters h om th e school, permitl('d Ir .in ce~ to fire main b:lttcries wilhout ha\ing to [I":l\'cl eXLes~ i\ e disl.U1(eS to lank ranges 

und er U.S. or Australian operational control. 

Signal Schoof 

The Sign:d School had bec n origin:l 1J y the COllllllllni<.:alions 

Trai ning Center of th e F]"('llCh AI Illy in IndO<. hin:l and was 10' 

ca led in Cia Dinh . In 1% 4 it heC':l!llc th e ARVN Signal CommUn iC:llions Tr:lining Center and I..onsisted of t\\"o se p;Ir;ne centers 

- th e Signal School in TIlt! Du(', I\' ho~c primary goal was trainin g 

signal officers ror th e Vietn;nnese I\nny and e nlisted men of all 

senri(cs in si!-;na l e{luipmcllllep:l ir. ,md the Si~llal Training Ccnt('l" 

in Vung T au, whose primary mission W:lS training It VNAF 

enl isted men in th e lIse of :l11 1)PCS of fOllllll llni ultiuns equ ipmclll. 

In October ]!)ul the Thu Due portion of the school was traIlS, 

rerred to and consol ida ted with the Vung Tau portion in their 

presellt lQ<.ation. The lon ... olirlated ponion \\:IS design'lted the 

RVNAF Signal School :mel gi\'en the <ombined mission th at had 

previously been assigned bmh ceme rs. In August the school's 

org'lIli/ation expanded to include personnel :llld equipment fo r a 

cryptograph ic facility for training all RVN.\F students in the use 

of the new ci pher eq uipment. 

On 28 Febmar)' l!l70 a large portil)ll of land formerly on upi cd 

by l l.S. elements of the \lung T au Sub·area Command was turned 

over to the Signal School. I.o<.":tted :" lOut 1.000 meters frolll the main 

compou nd, the arca had room for 1.200 people and was complete 

with building!>. The complex was used to bill et th e I.:mgllage 

Sc hool students prep..1ring for ent r;1I1( e into the hTteg r:l ted Com· 

munications System (ICS) tra ining program. In December members or the first fixed station mill"O\\',i\C re pair co urse grad uated. 

The military oH llpa ti onal spec ialt y (:\105) in volved was one of 

the most complex in the IC') proA r<l1ll and \\ ... , ,m'arded only after 

thirteen months of intensive ilhtrunioll w ndl1(ted by the U.S. 

3691h Signal 13alt:Tlion. 

J.{j,leer \jcfloof 

The Engineer School bega n as a training lentcr nC:lr I-Iaiphong . .'\'anIT \ 'i("tl1.trJl. II<-rc th e Fa'lI{h lIIai11l~lilled <In engineer 

(('Illel" wilh the le'lxHl"ihilit) nl imllUft illX ;111(1 lr;li ning Viet· 

namese engincer soldiers. In 1951, in ordel to train Vietn;nncse 

engi neer oflicers, the ('entcr was 1II0n:<I to and bc{amc pan of th e 
AI'I'El"OIX n ,., 

Thu Duc Reserve ORkers School. Three )'ears latcr the 5(:hool was 

turned over to the ViClIl'1Il1C:.e. <lnd thc J' ngineer Trai ning Ce11lCI' 

moved to !lien I-Ioa. In September 1955 it moved back to Thu 

Duc and h'as designated as the l:.ng-i neer School; here the emire 

family of courses in milil:lry engin(-'cring, from basil' trai ning to 

generalized cci uta tion. \\'as de\ eloped and preselilcd. 

Because of the need for ell. panded fatiliLies and more adequate 

training areas, th e school mo\ed to Vung Tau in October 1957. In 

its neh' sileo lIIore sophisti<'al cd (,OIlI".)CS were dc\Cloped, including 

specialized operator courses for illl types of engincer equipmem . 

The student capacity at Vung T<lU wa~ 400 onicers and men . 

In August 196 I th e 5(-hool clo.)ed :md moved to it.:. present location at Phl! Cuong in llinh Duong Provi nce. Classes resumed in 

j anuary 1962. and since then the school has trained officers, onice r 

candidates, 1I 01llOlnm issioncd ofllcers, :l ud enlisted personnel of 

the RVNAF Corps of Engineers in th e techniques. procedures, 

and methods of military engineering'. The training mission was 

based on th e concept of making and development of combat engineers through courses on engineer eq uipment operation, IIrst and 

second echelon maintenance, :md engineer management. 

Because of the post-1965 buildup. the LOOO-stud ent capacity 

of Phl! Cuong became inadequate and the Engineer School developed a fi\e-ye;n' plan to increase its c;lpac it), to 3.000. The Central Training Command's l ' pgrad ing 1)lan considered relocating 

Lh e Engineer School, but Centra l Training Command decided Lo 

keep the school a t the pr(!~ent location <loel expand the fa cilities 

over a five-year period. 

Military Poliel! School 

The l\ lililary Pol ice School was organi/ed as a tr;tining center 

in Da Nang in 1957. th e sa.me ycar thal lhe ARV N Military Police 

Corps was established. Its goa l \\'as conducting basic military police 

training courses at a rate of fi ve 12-week courses every two years. 

Each class consisted of :l pproximately 250 individuals, and graduates were initially assigned onl y to I Corps Tact ical Zone: later, 

assignments were made to units throughout the country. In April 

1962 the center moved to its present site at Vung Tau and was 

renamed the RVNAF Milit ary Pol ice SchooL 

In January 1965 the 5(hool's org:mi/a tion \\'as expanded to incl ude person nel and equipment for a criminal investiga tion 1:lbol':ltory which was responsi bl e for sc ientific anal)'sis of evidence 

submitted by field units :md for the training of criminal in vesti-
144 I)E"ELor~ IE :\''' A:>:n T R,\ I i"I NG 

ga tors. The laboratory did not become operational until much 

]a lcr, however. 

The school rec('ived an approved ex pansion plan for the 1967-

G9 period which permilted trai ning of 500 stud ents at OJ time. This 

1'];111 iJld uded the training of l\ l il il:lI')' ])alice Cor ps junior oflicers, 

noncommissioned ofll cers, and criminal il1\csli g:llors. The school 

al ~ conducted the basic comb:1t naining course fo r a ll recruits 

assigned (0 the Mi litar y ])alice Corps. 

On 28 February 19iO, an 18.000-squarc.mclcr IT"c l was transferred to th e l\filital'Y Police School by U.S. clements of the Vung 

Tau Sub-area Comm:lIld. The la nd adjacent to the school was 

used for riOI (Ol1lral lr:lining, an enla rged IllOLor pool, recreation 

faciliti c~, ;mel a hardst:tIId hel icopter pad. 

Admillislmlive Schools 

In October 1955 the Vietnamese :trilled forces established the 

Military AdminisLr:lIion School :It the Thu Due i\ lilitary School 

Center with thc mission of providing special izcd training in quar. 

term aster, finance nnd administrati on, :md personnel administra· 

tion subjects. In 1958 as the program expanded and student 

ca Jxlc ities were raised, it became necessa ry to reorg:lIlize the sc hool 

into twO sep.:1.rale branches--the fi nancc and Adminislriuion 

Branch and the Quartermaster Branch. The arr;lIlgelllclll pro,'ed 

satisfa ctory until I!J62 \I hen it \\': ~ decided, .. ~ a result of a la<.k 

of space and the rapid ex p:lIlsion of the differcnt hrall( .. hes, to 

di vide the institution into three \cparate schools. The Acljlllant 

General's School was established in t\Jarch I!Hi2 .. nel the QU;lrter· 

master School and Administrati on an d Fin:1 n<.e !khool in July 

1962; :111 three were located in Sa igon where they trained special· 

ists in their respecti ve fi elds. 

TI"(HlSpOrlalio11 School 

The Transportation School dates from 1%4 when a highway 

transport officers basic ("o urse was organilcd :mel condlu;ted at the 

Tim Due Reserve Officers Training Center. Officers were transferred into th is course upon complet ion of their inf:1ntry trai ning. 

In f ebl"uary 1955 the l-fighw:1y Transport Schocl was officia lly 

acti vated as part of the Thu Our Center and t\\'o months latel" 

was madc a separate sc hool under the supen ision of the ne\\"l y 

esta blished Transpon:1tion Command. The school's mission of 

training dri\'ers, orga nilational me( hanics. and noncommissioned 

officers made an exp<1.nsion of facilities ncceSS<II'Y, and in J anuary 
APPENDIX n H5 

1957 the school was tempor<lrily splil. The region:ll driver and 

second echelon mech:l n ic courses moved to the Quang Trung 

Training Center and the rest of the s(;hool remained at Thu Due. 

Finally, in September 1958, the sc hool was consolidated back into 

one location- the Quang Trung Training Center area- fourteen 

kil ometers northwest of Saigon. The school's mission remained 

essentiall y the same :lS when it W<lS establ ished in 1955, but it now 

had an increased traini ng ca pacity of 700 StudCHlS. During 1969 

the school advisory dctachmf'1ll was increased from one to three 

persons. 

o rtl1lllllce School 

The Ordnance School was first established III 1952 as the Materiel Training CeHler ilt Till! Duc. Its mission, like other branchtype schools, wa s to tra in ordnance personnel in their specialty. 

In 1957 it was redesignated as the Ordnance School ;:md retained 

its primary tra ining mission. In 19G I the school WilS sepa rated from 

the Thu Duc CeHler and moved to Saigon where it conducted 

sixty.eighl different courses in ordnance specialities to satisfy 

the growi ng RVNAF demands. 

Medical School 

A small medical school had bee n established III 1951 at Hanoi 

to give the Vi eul<Illl esc medica l baualion under french command 

its fi rst formal medica l training ca pability. The obj ecti\'e of this 

school was to train regul:lr medica l oHicers, pharmacists, and 

dentists. The school moved to S:ligoll in 1954 and, in 1956, was 

combined with the ~'f dical Train ing Center wh ose mission consisted of training enlisted medics (lnd NCO medical special ists. 

The combined institution was 0111ci;1l1 y redesignated the ilitary 

Medical School in 1961. Shonly thereafter, planning was instituted 

to construct a modern fac ility which \\'ollld cn:lbl e the school to 

meet the growing mcdkal requirelllellls of the Sou th Vietnamese 

armed forces. This fa cilil)', constru cted in the Phll Tho area of 

Saigon, was compl etcd and operational in April 1964 and conducted thirt y-fi ve differenL courses in varying medi ca l spec ial li es. 

The enl arged Medical School conducted all baltal ion surgeon 

assistant, medical suppl y, and enlisted formal technical training, 

with the exception of basic medic;,l training of aidmen for Re· 

gional and Popu lar Forces units. It did not provide training for 

physicians or dentists. By 1970, 3,517 sllldenlS h:ld received training. 

The teach ing melhods used a' the school wefe didactic and 
HG !IF.\'U ()J"I~ :,\ r ,\ :'\n I RM"I:\:G 

gradu ates lacked pra<.:tical experiellce. Improvement in tCBehing 

techniques, including additional lise of training aids and group 

dis<-ussioTl. h;lS urged alld plall~ w(.'n: suhmitted to t!xp:lIld th e 

capacity of the school from 1,000 ,ludclllS to 3,000, to include 

additi on;! ! billeting and classroom fadlitics. II was also pro posed 

to establish an R\,NA F lc;uhing hospit;tI Oil the p,Tounds \\·herc 

selected graduates would recei\c advanced training in a controll ed 

teaching environment under smgical, Iabor a lOf)', X-ray. opera ting 

room, and nursi ng special ists. lIowe\'er. as of 19i2 ll11 ny serious 

defic icllcics st ill rC UI.lined. 

M ilitary hltefligellu School 

The RV NAF :\Iilitary Intelligence School was established in 

1955 at historic Fan Cay J\fai in the Saigon- C.ia Dinh arc" with 

the mission of training lhe intelligence platoons and squads of the 

South Vietnamese Army. In 1962 its mission W:lS enlarged to in· 

c1ude training intelligence units of the Regional Forces, but this 

task was withdrawn in OClOber 1!)6i. In 1968 the school instituted 

an aerial intelligence interpreter's w urse and graduated its first 

class in September. The follo\\·jng April lhe combined intelligence 

course seminars were beg un, auendcd by ARVN intelligence personnel and their U.S. t:ounterparts; bter in Jul y, interroga tion of 

prisoners of war and order of battl c courses were also instituted. 

These courses had prel'iollsly been conducted offshore in Okinawa . 

The norma l progr;uned input to the combined intelligence wurse 

was 30 students per dass (15 Vietnamese and 15 Americ;m). The 

progr;III1 's objective was to give all subsector (district) 5-2 personnel a shon , spec ialized intelligence course and this obj ecti ve was 

achieved with the completion of the final class in December. A 

total of 534 officers ,mended the fOllr-day courses and received in· 

struction designed to enhance the exchange of intelligence in· 

formation on it daily basis. 

In 19iO the school enrolled a lOtal of 2.199 students and de· 

veloped three new courses deali ng with collection, intermediate 

intelligence, and intermediate security. The collection course or 

thirty officers assigned to province units was conducted du ring 

January. The first int ermediate officer mid·career course sta rted 

in ~rarch. 

Logistics M fwagemcI1l School 

The RVNAF Logistics J\1;lI1agement School \\las slarted in 1959 

but \\las not officiall y dedicated until March 1960. The mission of 

lhe school was twofold: 
M'I'END IX 1\ 147 

1. to provide high-level logistics instruction for the Viell1amese 

armed forces. 

2. to resea rch, study, and develop logistics organ ization and 

doctrine for the Vietnamese armed forces. 

The school offered three levels of instruction, each designed to 

cover a specific ponion of the over-all logistics system in the Vietnamese arllled forles. Tht, lo i~tics management tourse concentr;lled on preparing selected officers for staff duties. The logistics 

staff officers cOlII'se prepared ortil'ers to work .H the intermediate 

le"el and the supply officers {ourse prepared officers to worK at 

unit level. During IHG9 tWO ne\,' progl'.tlTlS of instructiOIl were 

added: The I)RA ISE (Program Review :md Analysis Improvement Systems Evaluation) tourse and the U.S. Advisor Orientation 

course. Also, the school 's capality grew from 125 to 175 students. 

Army Social Training School 

The Army Social Training School in ~:tigon was established unofficially in October 1952 and provided ba sic and advanced technie d trai ning in soc.i,.l welfare 10 \\1011)(: 11 of the Armed Forces 

Corps (WAFC) officers and noncommissioned officers whose actual 

01' ,lIHidp.ll ed assignment lI'a\ as a Mx ial sen i(-e assistant in the 

RVNAF Social Sen'ice Department. In :tcldition , the school pro· 

vided technical refresher training for civilian kinderganen teachers administered by the Social Se rvice Depanmellt ;md gave other 

appropriate tecilllica l training as directed by the J oint General 

Staff. 

Annett Forces Ltlllgllage School 

The Vi etnamese .\rmed Fones I.allguage 'it hool opened in 

Saigon in June 195(1 with the mission of le:tching Engli~h to Vietnamese who \,'ere progr;uned to :tttend offshore schooling in the 

United States. Its capat it y at that time was about 1,000 students. 

In July 1967 the SC'hool do ubled its input by increasi ng faci lities 

:md operating 0 11 a two·shift basis. The lo('hool"s mi ~~ n wa s then 

expanded to indlldc training of Vietnanlese tramlators for requirements within the country. During the T el offensive of 1968, 

70 pcr(elll of the \t hool's facilities were destro}'ecl: howC\er, new 

f:t cil ilies were obtained and the training ('ominued almost without 

interruption. As the Vietnamese :trmed fon.:e.'O grch' and the requirement for offshure S(. houling inne;l~e . the sc hool cnl:trged 

its facilities ulHil. b) the end 1968. it had a ctparity of 5.000 

students. 
,<S D!::\'ELOI'ME:-.'T A N I) TIlAIN ING 

OUshore tr:linccs who graduated from th e school had an ex-

<.:c ll clH (rated "70 percclll") language ca p .. bililY and .. nended U.S. 

schools without the previ ously required three-l11omh TDY period 

of English schoolin g in CON US. 

An additional f:l e ililY for fhe school \\';1$ established ;u Vung 

TaLI by renovating th e Ki ci Compound building to make possible 

a c:qxlcity of 660 studclHs. The facility was completed on 5 Dccember. a nd th e first class bcg:H1 three days latel". Four hundred 

and sixty-four ARVN Sign:1l Corps sllIdellls entered th e class to 

learn English in preparation for further training in the les 

prO!.>Tam. 

During 1970 the school established a MACV Test Control Office 

to lClHr:tli/ c lontrul. se( u ril)'. and :,dminiSlr:u ion of Engl ish language comprehension :l11d aptitude tests. Before org:mi'-ing this 

onice, the Engl ish Comprehension I.evel (ECL) teSl wa s of len 

compromised, and there was app rox illlalcly a thirty-point drop in 

a slllc1el1t·s ECI.. score hetween the fina l test administercd in 

Vietnam and thc entry test administercd at the Defense L,nguage 

Institute. English I.angu:lge & hool, l.:u:kland Air Force Ib se. The 

Test COlllrol OnLce el iminated test irregularities. forcing students 

to achieve the ECL score required for graduation legitimately. 

Annex I (Dong Khanh) of the lang uage school \\":IS transferred 

tu the Adjutalll (;cner .. l"s Slhool Oil J(j J anuary 19iO, and th e 

c:lpacity of the annex was increased from 420 to 1,000 students. 

Annex 2 (Tan Son Nhllt) commelwcd tra inin g on 19 J a nuary 

1970 for VNAF :lirmen with a capaci ty of 1,080 swdcllls. 

B(/Iu/ School 

The RVN .. \F B:md &hool \\':'5 founded in Saigon in February 

1959. owi ng mainl y to the clrorts of the incumbent bandmaster. 

Originally. it was known as th e .\nll y Band Center ;'Ind shortly 

a fter establishmelll deve loped :t Ir;Iining program of ba sic and 

intennedi:lte courses. In I~JG I it \\";IS n.'IIamed th e RV NAF 1\ l usic 

School :Inc! moved to Tlill Dur where it continued to train 

musicians for th e twenty R VNA F ballds. In December, at the 

requ est of the Sen ior A<-I\ iw r, the English tr:msl:.tioll or the 

Vietnamese school was <- ha nged to ··R VNAF Band School." 

J I/I/iol" M ililm)' Academy 

The first junior milit.u ), SdlOOI was e~tabli ed in Vung Tau 

in 5 under the Frenl h :Illd was l:lIcr relocated to Cia Dinh and 

1\ly Tho. Similar St hools h:ld abo been established in ;\lo ng Cay, 
AI'PE;\"DIX B ' 49 

Hue, Hanoi. Ban Me Thuot. Song Mao, and Thu Dau , all su pported by the French. The RVNAF Junior J\ li litary Academy was 

ac ti vated in 1956 at Vung Tau bringing togeth er at a single location the severa l junior mili tary schools once located in Central 

and South Vietnam. Since 1956 the Junior J\lilitary Academy has 

been supported and admin istered by the governmclll of Vietnam. 

By the end of 1969 the Centra l T raini ng Command provided the 

instructors and facilities, and the Mi nistry of Educa tion established 

the curriculum and the program instruction. 

The mission of the school was to provide second:uy ed ucation 

and military training to the sons of the Vietnamese mililary, 

Regional and Popul ar Forces, and pol ice and village admin istration personnel who had served or had given their li\C~s in the waf. 

The academic year began on 15 September and ended on 30 

June. T he courses taught included an elementary school course, a 

j uniof high school and a senior high sc hool course, and military 

basic training. Ages of the swdents ranged from twelve th rough 

eighteen. 
Appendix C 

RVNAF TRAL"I NG SCHOOL E N ROLLMENTS F OR 1970 

t n c;lIendar year 1970 the Rep ub lic of Vietnam armed forces 

trained 503,740 men in thirty·three n ;llion;II, Regional and Popular 

Forces, and di vision lTai ning cell ters and 87, 197 men in fift een 

technical, [OliT academic, ;md fOllr tomba t arms schools. 

P II.JNCI I',\ L SellOOL El\'1I.01. LM ENTS 1'011. 1970 

& .... , 1't'1>Rn .. ",d In"", A'II .. llnl>lI! I' ~'(~""'R~ 

,\" 5.210 4.939 

Admin & Fin 1.2iO '2< " \~LS 1 t ,2:W 9.622 86 " ,\ rmor 5~'2.) 5,605 107 

,hI) I,il!:> 2.327 

Il ~nd 75 '" 34' 72 

C.&SC '.000 84' M 

.:ngin .. :cr 5.673 6.571 '" Infantr)' 10,762 11,929 

11l 1t'1Iigcllcc 1,52j 2,199 

'

'44 " 

PI,\ 1,400 1,37 1 98 

tog Mgl 81, m 10. 

:'Iii] nog TrJining O r '10 ". 10' 

MI' 1.222 1.908 156 

,\ lcdia1 2,300 3.517 153 

:o..uc .. 2G 65 

:-:CO Ac;1I1 20,%0 16,:'22 79 

01,lnnnct' 2.9HI 2.570 88 

1'01.\" :\1{ 505 '04 60 

Q" 1,:.39 1:136 

Sigllal 8,9J] 5,i02 " ~tldal "'df,lre ::.80 19' '" ,., 

11""S 8,894 1] ,029 '24 ''~1 \ 250 '91 ,. 

w/ue ,,400 1,025 

~---" suu .... ~: IIQ,,\1 \CV, Cum,,,,u,tI J/ulu'"l, I~;f). II, " - 11 - '>6. 
• 

~ 0 

z 

" J; 

~ 0 

~ • .2 

x 0 .- " "0 , 

" • < " , 0.. < 0.. z 

-< ~ 

::; 

" 0 

~ 

;i 

, 

• " " 

"-

:~ C> 

~uun~ ........... g"~"" 

0" ~,6.;;;;$..li3 ~ 

-

... UUUU --, "0 

.~ 

.. ' ........ ~~ .... ;; ..... =-• o '" C> L"j ..., e - ., ... ..,. '" 

. . ~: 

'0 ' , unun 

:: ... ~~:rs;:f.!:!~~ - - ~, "" 1:" 

". . . O. 

2.-: nnnu 1:1 J;,*~;;;~g?~ • _ . _ ' N 

. 

~.; unnn 

,.- :::;!~~~j;:~~ • - - ", ........... '" '" 

, 

~e nnuu :S~ _ ".hOOCO_ ........ - - -

! 

< 

I 

T 

-, 

• I 

1 

; 

" • 

~ , 

: 

I 

ARPA 

ARVN 

CAS 

Cl OG 

CINCPAC 

CII) 

CO)'IUS)'IACV 

CON US 

~I ) 

C&SC 

CTA 

CTC 

CTZ 

OA 

FEC 

ICC 

ICS 

ISO 

JCS 

JGS 

JOC 

AAG 

AAGV 

MAC 

ACi\IA 

i\IACV 

MAil 

i\ IASF/ MILCON 

i\ !Dt\ P 

Mi\ IT 

MTT 

Glossary 

Advan ced Research Projects Agency 

Army of the Repu blic of (South) Viel T1<1m 

COlllrolled Americ<l ll Source 

Cil'ilian Irregular Defense Group 

Comnunder in Ch ief, Pacifi c (U,S, Joint Theater 

Command) 

Counterinsurgency Plan 

Commander, U.S, l'lilitar), Assistance Command, 

Viemam 

Continent al United States 

Consolidated Ilhase of the Repu blic of Viemam 

Armed Forces Impro\'ement and l'lodernilation 

I

l rogram 

Command and Staff College (Vicm:unese) 

Centr<d Trai ni ng Agell c)' 

Ccmral T raiuing Comma nd (Viet namese Joint 

General Staff) 

Corps tactical ~o e 

Departmcnt of the Army 

French Expeditionary Corps 

In ternationa l Control Commission 

Imcgr:ltcd Com rmmi c~ttion~ S}stcm 

Instrllctional System De\c lopmclll 

Joi nt Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) 

Joint General Stafl (Victnamcse) 

Joi rll opera tions cc rHcr 

i\ lilitarv Assist;rncc AdvisQI'Y Group 

;\1i1itary A\Si~la ce Alh'isor}, Group. Vietnam 

Milit:l.T), ~~i rn ce Comma nd 

l\ I il i wr) hs lIl ce Comma ncr. ;\1 i I il Il) t\ssist;rn cc 

l\ iilirary Jh sislancc Command, \ 'ic(11.11ll (a joi nt 

U.S. comma nd) 

:'oJilitar}' Assista nce Progr;l1ll 

l\ lilitary Assista nce Service Funded il liiita r), COIlSit IIction (Program) 

.\Iutua l Ddensc t\ ssistancc I>rogram 

l\ lidd le ~Iana gemcnt Training l~ rogra ) 

i\ lobile tra ining tcam 
' 5< 

NCO 

NDe 

NVA 

oes 

OSO 

I'F 

PULWA R 

PRA ISE 

RO 

RF 

RVN 

RVNAF 

ST 

T OY 

T ERM 

TR I M 

USA ID 

USAR PAC 

USARV 

USCONARC 

US IS 

USI\IACV 

l lSQ;vJ 

UHF 

" HF 

VIS 

VNAF 

V~~ A 

Vr\:\'IC 

VNN 

Vl\:S F 

WAFe 

OEVELOI'MI:.;\"T A:>I D TR .. \ I NI NG 

Noncommissioned office.' 

Nali onal Defense College 

Nort h Vie tnamese Army 

Offi cer GlIld idatc school 

Office of the Secretary of Derem c (U.S.) 

Po pu la r Forces (formerl y Self·Defense Corps) 

Politic:11 wadarc (a form of psychological operations) 

I'rogram Rc \!icw and Anal ysis Impro\cmcllt Systems 

Eva lua tion 

Rural development (formerl)' rcvolmiona ry dc\'cl· 

opment) 

Regional Forces (formerl y Civi l Guard) 

Republic of (South) Vietnam 

Republic of (Sollth ) Vi etnam <l rmcd forces 

Son T ruong (similar to RD cadre) 

T cmpOl'ilry duty 

T empora ry Equipmem Recovery Ii .ss n 

Trai ning Rela tions and Instructions :\Iission 

U.S. Agcncy for Intcrna ti onal Dc\·clopmcnt 

U.S. Army, Pacifi c 

U.S. Army, Vi el nam 

U.S. Contin ent al Arm}' Comma nd 

U.S. In form:ni on Service 

U.S. Mil itary Assista nce Command , ViCUlam 

U.S. Ope rati ons Mission 

Ultrahigh frequcncy 

Vcr}' high frequ ency 

Viet namese Info rmal ion Servicc 

South Vie tnam Air Force 

Soulh Vietnamcse i\ lilil ary Aeadem} 

SOLu h Vit'lll am i'l la rine Corps 

SOUi b ViClIlam N,w }' 

SO\lth Vi ctn am Special Forces 

\V ·~ Armed Forces COI·pS Vi l:l nc~(') 
Index 

AbrJIUS, Cen",ral Creighton W,: 89, 

95- 9-1, 109- 10. Stt llfso United States 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. 

AbscnttS without !ca\'C: 61- 62 

Aca:lcraled Model Plan. U.s.: 29-50 

Ad jutant Ceneral's School: 6 1 

dmjni~tr.Hjon pract ices: 23, 31. 61 . 73. 

120. 122. 127 

Adminiur3tiol\ $Chools: 144 

Adnncro Research I'ro,;,:clI Agency, 

U.s.: 110 

Ad,isc ... and ad\i50ry groups. Set: (Jlso 

by min":, 

in d~ n affairs and ch'ie action : -15-46. 

in " combat units: 17, 24. 26, 35. -16. 

53-5-1. 68. 11 9-22, 129-30 

control of: 27,52-53 

missions assigned: 1- 2. 17. 23. 26, 30. 

50-5. , 58. 62. 75. 78, SO. 95. 109-10, 

120. 123, 126-28 

mobile leams: 11 9-22. 127 

numbers aut horilctl alld a5Signed: 8, 

22, 24, 26-27. 30-31. 39, 45. 48-53. 

55, 75. 82-84, 105, 109. 123. 127 

$Chool for: 121 

teHilorial assignmcnu: N. 46. 49. 

5 1- 52,54, 122 

Agree-menu, intem:uional : 1- 2, 21. 23 

Agricultural programs: 50 

Air ope rations. S~e ,\ imlobilc operations; 

Fighter aircralt sUPI)()rt : Strategic 

air support; Tactica l air support. 

,\irbornc IIrigade, 173d: 11 8 

Airoorne uniu: 9, 13. 54- 55.91 , 100-1 01, 

Aircra"fl' . fixed .... ·ing: 54 

supply to RVN : 24.91 

U.S, 105S('S: 48 

Air·Cround OperatiOIlS Mobile Traillillg 

Team: 38 

Air·ground support. See Tactical air sup· 

port. 

Airlifts. of troops and supplies: 21. 24. 

26. 32. 56 

Airmobile divi$ionl 

151 CaYalry: 54. 119 

10Isi Airbome: 118 

Airmobile operations: 36-38, 109 

Ambush tactia: 104. 120 

Amnesty programs: 62. See II/SO Repatria· 

tion program. 

An Phu; 74 

Apache Force: 54 

Armor School : 109, 110. 141-42 

Armor unil': 9,35,68. 103 

Armon.-d pcr5(lnnel carrier,: 35 

,\ rms and Scr>'ice Directorates: 3 

Army. I)epartment of the, U.S.: H . 105 

Army Social Tnining School: 147 

Artillery fire suppon : " 

Artillery School: 1<iQ-41 

ArlilleT)' uni ts and equipmenl; 9. 13. 3S. 

103, 11 8 

Au.usinations; 17 

AMOCl atc· unit prognm: 62-63 

Band School: 1'18 

Bao I)ai : 8 

Harrier s)"Stems: 120 

Ib u1clletd labore ... : 62 

Jlatllefidd promotions: 100 

ilcarelll Ca mp: 108-10 

Binh Cia : ~7 

lIiolO8ical operations. Stt Chemical. 

biological.radiological operations, 

1Iolton. 1Irigadier Gencral Donnelly P.: 

53. 105 

1Iornber offensiw:; See Sualrgie air l Upport. 

8001.·,\llcn App1i~d Research. Inc,: 110 

Bortler patrol: 39. 41 

Uritlge construction and repair: U, III 
156 

Buddhist uprisings: 30. 127 

BUDDY Operation: 115 

lIulldozers: 103 

8uon Ea Yang: 74 

Cambodia: [- 2. 4. 20. 108-09. 119 

Camp Holloway: 48 

Canada: 1,7 

Camonmem program: 6.5 

Career management: 76.98 

Casuailil"S 

RVN: 23. 50, 67 

U.S.: 48 

Cat La; Project: 94 

Cease-lire acconh: lOll 

Central Highlands: 9, 40, 118 

Central l'olitica] Warlare Agency: 91 

Central Training Command: 83, 105-10. 

124-25 

Chau Doc PrO\'incc: 74 

Chern ical·biologica I·radiologica t opera· 

tions: 25 

Chinh, Major General Phan Trong. 

AR VN: 110-11 

Chup Rubber Plantation: 110 

Ciyil aClion programs: 25, 40, H, 53, 55 

Civil affairs 

mobile training teams: 39, 43-45 

operations and un in: 21, 33, 43--16. 51 

Civil Affairs Croup, 971h: 45 

Civil Affain School, U.S.: 4!l-44 

Civil defense program: 57 

Civit Guard: 8- 10, Ill, 18-20, 22, 24- 26, 

Z9-lIO, 39-43 

Civilian Irregular Defense Groups: 

29-50, 39-41, 45, 53-55, 74-75, 91, 

101 

Civilians 

control of and support by: 19,29,47, 

49,53,86 

government em plo)'ees: 93, 95 

specialists and techniciall5: 4, 12,25-26 

Civil-military liaison: 44 

Clear·and-hold operations: 53 

Collins, General J. Lawton: 2 

Combat Developmellt and Research Cen. 

ter, JGS: 25 

Combat elfecti\'ent:Sil and readiness: 17, 

29-33,35-36,46-47,53,62-63.67,84, 

88, 90, 121-22, 12·1, 126, 128 

Combint:d Action Program: 117- 18, 120 

Combined AmlS Doctrinal Manual: 

109-10 

DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 

Combined arms training: 109-10 

Combined operations: 1]7- 19 

Command and control: 9-]2, 18-22, 

3]-32,4 1-42,66,72-73, 117-]8 

Command and General Staff College, 

U.S. Army: 83 

Command and Staff College: 14. 76-77, 

79, 83, 98, 1~38 

Comm3nd Leadership Committee: 76 

Command post exercises: ]09 

Commander in Chief, Padfic. Su Felt, 

Admiral Harry D,; United Stales 

Pacific Command. 

Commando Training Center: ]2, 38-39 

Commerce, de\'c!opment of: 95 

Commissary system: 6J. 63-65 

Communications equipment and uniu: 

10,18,26,33.36.42,49, 101-{)2, 1()oI, 

II{)-Il. See (J/50 Signal unil$. 

Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam: 

29 

Conscription programs: ]2, 42, 56-58, 

68-70, 85-86. S~~ (Juo Manpower 

procurement, retention and use. 

Constabulary force: 73--74 

Construction programs: 34-35, 83, 108, 

111 

Continental Army Command, U.s,: 

38-39, ]25 

Contractor!, civilian; 63, III 

Controlled American Source: 28,39-41 

Corps, XX IV: 118 

Corps tactical lone!! 

I; 9, 55, 69, 90, 1[8 

II: 9, 54. 70. 75, 118 

Ill : 9.60, 70,108,119 

IV: 45.55,57.68, 108 

Cost ·of·living a]lowances: 93 

Counterinsurgency 

plans and operations: 18-22.24-25.27, 

29-30 

training for: 12, 15-16, 30, 35-36, 127 

Country T eam. U.s.; 8,20-21,45 

Crypto·Log Support Center. U.S.: 112 

Da Nang: 9, 38-39, 48, 65 

Dalat: 14 

Darlac Proyince: 74 

Death gntuitiC$: 93 

Decorations and awards: 92 

Defectors, enemy, Set Repatriation pro· 

grnm. 
INDEX 

Defense, Department of, U.S.: 7, 20-21. 

39. Set (lllo McNamar.l. Robert S. 

Delta t"orce: 54 

Demilitarized zone: 103 

Democratic R.epub]ic of Vietnam. Set 

North Vietnam. 

Department of Housing: 65 

Dependents. welfare of: 60-61. 65--64. 93 

Deputy Chid of Air Staff for Materiel: 

II 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S.: 87,89 

Desertions: 9. 23, 30. 33, '16-47. 59-63. 67. 

72, 74 ,84,91-93 

Oi An : ]21 

Diem, Ngo Dinh : 1- 2, ]0-12, 17, 19, 

22- 23, 28. 30. 47, 127 

Director of Air T echnical Scrvke: ] I 

Director Gencral 01 Administration , 

Budge t, and Comptroller: II 

Director 0 1 Mobilization: 57, 59 

District advisers and staffs: 49-5] 

Dong Ticn Prognm: 119 

Draft: SCt Conscription prognms: Man· 

power procurement. retention and 

usc: Recruiting progr-ams. 

Dra ft evaders: 58,63 

Drop loncs: 54 

Due My: 34 

Dulle,. John Foster: 2. Set also State. 

Department of. U.s. 

Economic assistance program: 25. 50, 50, 

65--65, 95-96 

Education Consullanu, Ltd.: 94 

Educational programs: 50 

Efficiency reports: 76 

Eisenhower. Dwight D.: 1- 2 

EIt."(:troni cs. Set Communications ~uip · 

ment and units. 

EI)·. General I'au]. French Anny: 3 

Employment programs: 96 

Engineer SchOOl: 11 1- ]2, 142--43 

Engineer uniu: 7, 13. 39, 45-46. 50-51. 

103, 111 - ]2, 120 

Eng]ish Language School: 15 

ENHAN(::f; Project: 102 

Enrollment. schools: 150 

Equipment. Set r.fatericl ; Jtf; allo by 

naJllt. 

Ethnic groups: 20. 40 

Ewell. Lieutenant General Ju]ian J.: 119 

157 

E):p;mSIOIl of R\'i\' fOI'('<:5: 19-:W. 2~ ~3 , 

2:.- 26, ~9, 33-:'14, 6:>-71. 8·1. 88-!H , 

~'9 

FAIRFAX Operation: 117 

Fami]ies. Stt Dcpendents, welfare of. 

Fe]t. Admiral Harry D. : 28. See also 

United States Pacific Command. 

f ield Force. II: 119 

Fighter aircraft support : 37-38 

Financial assistance program: 22, 27, 

55-56. S(I(: allo Economic a!-Sistance 

program. 

Flanagan . Brigadier General Edward M .• 

J r.: 52 

Food los.scs. enemy: 64 

Fortifica tions. training in: 120 

France: 1-6. 8, II. 13. 15 

Franco· American Training Relations and 

lnstruct iollt MiSl5 ion: 1-7 .9 

Free World Military Assistance Forces: 

"-reund. " Brigadier General John F.: 117 

Gallantry Cross: 92 

General Reserve: 101 

Genera] Staff: 3, 10-1 1 

Geneva Accords: 1- 2,4.6-7,9 

Gia Dioh Province: 11 7 

Government emplO)'ees: 93, 95 

Grenade launchers: 101 

Guerrilla operations, enemy: 85, 127 

Hamlet militia : 41 

Harkins. General Paul D.: 28. 50. Set 

also United Sta tes Military Assis· 

tance Command. Vietnam. 

Ha ... ·aii: 39 

Hawaii conference: 24, ~2. 50. 71 

Heath. Donald R.: 2. 7. 8", 16, 19. Set 

allo United StatC'S EmbaSl5)·. 

Heiser. Major General Joseph M .. Jr.: 

115 

Helicopter units, U.S. Army: 26, 88 

Helicopters. See auo Aircraft , fixed·wing. 

CH- 34 Choctaw: 21 

Hdicopte~nt inued 

control of: 113 

H- 34: 54, 11 5 

supply by. See Airlift" of troops and 

supplies. 

supply to ARVN: 24.91. 113 

tactical usc: 36-38,52.54 
'58 

Hom t$l~aden": 124 

Honolulu conferenc:oe: , 32. 50, 71 

H otl Ta.c prograrll : 32-53 

HO!Ipilalilation, \'ct('tlIns: 95 

Housing program.: 60-6 1, 63. 65 

Hue: a; 

'",unter·killer tams: 54 

Illumination , bauldield: 38 

Inccrni"c pay: 9'- 94 

India : I. 7 

Indochina. Sell North Viclna.m. 

Industry. dcvclopmenl of: 9,;.-96 

Infantry Brigade. 199th Light: 117. 11 9 

In fantry divisions. Sec /11$0 Troop units. 

mission and training: 4, IS 

numbeT, organilatiOll and strength : 9 

In fantry Di~isions. U.S. Army 

1st:' 62. 119 

4th : 11 8 

2~ (Americal): 118 

25th : 39,62. 119 

Infantry School: 108-09, 11 0, 139-40 

Inflation, cff«u and control: 56. 65, 68 

Information program,: 50, 55, 62. 91-92 

h upcttor Cenera]: 78 

hl$tructors, shorl agc: of and Iraining: 16. 

I05-«i. 12~24, 126-27 

Integrated CommuniOHion. System, U.s. 

Army! 11 1- 12 

Intelligence operation. and reports: 10, 

18,20--21,24-25,21,53,58,40.50,54 

Interoal Security Coullcil: 19 

Ime roational Colllrol Commission: 1,4. 

6-8, 12 

IUlcmational Cooperation Administra_ 

tion: 19 

j ob placcmenu and referrals: 96 

Johnson. Lyndon B.: 22 

joint Chiefs of Staff, U.s.: 2. 18, 20, 

26-28. 55, 69, 88-90, 101 

j oint General Siaff: 19,21,26,62,65,67. 

69-74. 77. 50, 82--84, 9 1-94, 98-100. 

105, 109. 125 

joint Operations Cenler, J GS: 29 

joint Operations Staff, ARVN : 21 

j oint Unconventional Warfare Tul'; 

Force: 28 

junior Military Academy: 148-49 

J unk Force: 2(i 

DEVELOPMENT AND TRA INI XG 

Kcnned)'. j ohn .-,: 21-25.28 

"it Canon Scouu: 91 

Korean War experience: 12 

"rek: 110 

"\. Xguten c..o: 55, SO, 84 

Lauding lones: 54 

LlInguage barrier, o\'ercomillg: 16. 56, 

SO, 11 3, 116 

Lallguage School: 147--48 

La06: 1,4,20,40, 109 

LAW (light alltilallk wcapon): 101 

Leaders, lack of and training: 4, 15- 16, 

25. 46, 63, 66, 69-70, 75--84, 97-100, 

104, 123-24. 126, 129-30 

Lene policics: 60-01. 92 

Lee, Major General Richard M,: 7~7G 

LiaiWIl procedu,,": 5G. 49, 105. 118 

Light antitank .... ·capon (LAW): 101 

Lilies of commuuie-.Hion, enenl)': 54 

Living standard. impro\'ing: 60-61 

Logistical Connnand, lSI: 115 

Logistical Management School: 11 0- 11 , 

146-47 

l.ogist ical Oper.lliOlU and un in 

ARVN: 4-5, 7, 18.20-21, 2G, 55, 69, 73, 

87-88. 103, 109- 11 , 115, 120, 122 

U,S.: 5, 23, 27- 28, 32, 87. 101 

Long Binh : 112 

McGarr, Lieutenanl General Lionel C.: 

18-19. Su tJ/Jo United Slatcs Mili_ 

tary A$Sislancc Adviwry Group, 

Vicmam. 

Machine guns and IIlounlS: 101 - 02 

McNamara. Roben 5.: 24. 28, 32, 40. 50, 

55. 66, 69, 88, 90. 101. Su 02/JO Dc· 

fense, Departmcnt of. U.s, 

Maintenance and repair: 6-7, 110-11 

Management. training in: 110-11 , 125, 

127 

ManeUI'en: 15 

Manila con ference: 73 

Manpower procuT(:mcnt, retention and 

use: ~, 65-72, 74, 85--87, 121. Set 

alJo Conscription programs; Recruit. 

ing prognm .. 

Muksmanship tr.llin ing: 1M, 125 

Maniallaw: 30 

at~ricJ 

enemy: 47 

IOMes, ARVN : 17 ,55 

ftatus, nc-cds and suppl)': 4-7, 24, Z7, 
INDEX 

29, 42, 7, ~5-~ti, 68. iQ. K8 90, 

100-103,115-16.127·,!9 

Medical d"ic action pl"ogu lns; 45 

Mcdi,al School: H 5- lG 

Medkal ser"i<:es: 7. 3'. 40, 51. 95, 12 1 

Mew::s. unit : 64 

Metrk 5)'stem, probJrm of: 38 

Michigan SUIte Uni,·er.!it)·: 4 

Mino ..... "'·e syst<'ms. training in ; III 

Middle Managemenr Training Program: 

11 0-11 

Midwa)' conference: 89-90 

Mike fo rce (mobile lri~:c: force): 54 

Military Academy: ~, 79-83, 127, 

132-35. S~~ tJ/' o Junior Military 

Academ y. 

~lilitilTy Assistance I'rogram: 1- 2. 8, 15, 

18-20,22- 23.26-29, 33, 42,53, 55-56, 

70-il, 84, 128 

Military AS!; iSl:lnce SclVice fund ed Mili· 

tary Construction Program: 106-08 

Military Intelligence School: 146 

Military justir,· S)'stem: 6 1 

Mi litary Polke School: 143- 44 

Military Technical Engineering School: 

111_12 

Militia IInil$: 4, 8, 91. Su a/so Civil 

Guard; Self·Defense Corps: T erri. 

torial fOTtt$. 

:<.linistry of Ddellse (and War VeteT' 

ans): 3, 8, 10-1 1, 19,58-59,93- 96 

Ministry of Econom)': 95-96 

Ministry of the Interior: 10, 18 

Ministry of Veterans Affair.!: 94- 96 

Mobile advisory and training teanl$: 39, 

H-45. 119-22, 127 

Mobilization. S~~ Collscription programs: 

Manpower procurement, retention 

and usc; R<OCTuitillg programs. 

Montagnards: 20, 39-40, 75 

Morale, state of: 31- 32, 34, 47, 122, 

127- 28 

Mortar lire support: 37 

Mortar units: 35 

Motor "ehieJes: 7, 101-02 

Mountain commandOll: ~0-41 

Mutual Defense Assistance Program: 

Napalm. combat U$C: 37 

National Campaign Plan : 29 

Nat ional Defense College: 79,83-84, 127, I" 

159 

National Police: 4, 74, 91-92. S~~ a/so 

Constabulal Y force. 

;>.Iational Public SelVice Decree; 57 

National Sccurity Council, U.S.: 2. 19,21 

National Training Conter: 79. 108 

Nha Trang: 12, 38-39, 54 

Night operations: 13, 38. 104, 120, 125 

NiKon doctrine. See Vietnamiution pro· 

gnm. 

Noncommissioned officers: 98-100. 108. 

See alJo Leade{l, lack or and train· 

ing. 

Noncommissiont'<.l officer.! schools: 14, 79, 

135-~ 

North Africa; 5 

North Vietnam: I, 89. See alJo Viet 

Congo 

North Vietnamt-sc Army: 32. 47, 85, 

87-88,90, 122. See alJo ViC't Congo 

O'Daniel, Lieutenant General John tV.: 

1-3. S~t also United State! Military 

Assistance Advisory Group. Vietnam. 

Officer candidate schoob: 12, 14, 78-79, 

104 

Officers 

assignment policies: 98 

commissioning $)'Slern: 78-79, 127 

grade structure and authorizations: 

97-98, 100 

lack of and train ing. See L.eadC'r.!, lack 

of and training. 

Orhhore 5(hool program: 15-16. 0-44, 

79- 80. 83. 113-14, 127 

Okinawa: 38-39 

On.the·job training: 13, 114- 16 

Or(hlanCe School: 145 

Ordnance uniU: 7. 103 

Organization and force structu re, AR VN: 

4, 8-12, 17- 19, 29-31. 65-75, 86-9 1, 

127 

Pacification program: 21, 46-47, 53, 63, 

73, 86.90. 11 7, 128 

Paramilitary forces: 40, 47,49,91, 11 7 

Pathlinder teams: 54-

Patrol tactics: 104, 120 

Pay and allowanccs: 60-61, 63-6-4. 74, 

93-94 

I'eace negotiations: 87, 89 

Peer.!. Lieutenant General William R.: 

118 

PC'ntaiateral Agretment: I 
160 

Personnel management and $Crvi(C'S: 50, 

G3, 76, 78. 97- 100 

I'enonncl S)'stema Evahl3\ioll Commi u('c 

(joi nt): 98 

Personnd turnover: SO 

I'hnom Penh : 119 

Photography. aerial : 24 

Pilau , training program: UM, 11 2- 14 

)' Ians, enemy: 47. 85 

r lei Do Lim: 74 

I'lei Me: 55 

Pld ku : 9, 48 

Pleiku Pro,-jnce: 74 

Poland : 1 

Politia,1 crisn: 30-'2.17, 127 

Pol;I;0I1 Warfan: College: 138 

Popular f orct t: 'S. 42-'1'. 57. 60. 65-69, 

71-75,86-88,90-9'. 96, HM, 106-08, 

117, 119-22, 15] 

Population. control of. Set: Civilia ns, 

control of and IUpport by. 

POst exchange system : 63-64 

Presidential Action Program. U.s.: 22- 2' 

Prognm Review and Analysis Improve· 

mem SyllC'ml Eval uation : 110 

Programs E\'alu:.tion Office. Laos: .. 

PTOfITcss Together Program: 119 

" roject 640: 52 

Promotion policic.: 60-61. 76-77. 97- 100 

Propaganda. See Ps)'chological operations. 

PsychologiGlJ operations: 33, 45,51, 53, 

66 

Psychological opentions, ~emy: 49 

Psychological Warfa re School: 45 

I'sychological Warfa re Subcommittee. 

U .s,: 45 

Public worb, training in : 111 - 12 

Quang T rung T raining Center: 14, 34, 

lOS 

Quutermaster uniu: 7 

Qui Nhon : 48 

Radar systems: l iZ 

Radio equipment: 36, III 

Radiologica l operat ion .. e Chemica l· 

biological-rad iological operation .. 

Rallien . ~e Repat riation program, 

Ramsey, Ma jor Genenl Lloyd B,: 118 

Ranger train ing centers: 3.5-31,38--39 

Ranger uniu: 17- 18, 20, 25, 3.5-35, 39, 

54-55,60, 68,70--7 1, 91, 1()4, 106, 11 7 

DEVELOPM ENT AN D T RAI NI NG 

Rations: 64 

Reaction forces: 67 

Reeoilleu rilles: 102 

ReCOllOaiuance, :r.erial: 24 

Reoonnaiuancc mis~i olll and uniUl: 20, 

54, 67--68, 9 1. 94 

Records, deficiencies in: 125 

Rccruiting progu rns: 12, 46--47, 55, 

58--59,61, 67,69- 70, 72,74.83,85-86, 

90, 104, See 111'0 COIlS(:ription progu ms; Manpo .... er procurement, re, 

tention and usc, 

Refresher training: 126 

Regional Foro.'s: 33, 42-0, 57. &1--69, 

71- 75,79,86-93, 96, 99-100, 104 ,106, 

119-22, 151 

Religious grou ps: 4, 6, 20 

Repair partl, See Maintenance and repair, 

Repatriation program: 55 

Replacement system: 35, 66 

Republic 01 Korea : 101 

Republic of Vietna m Air f orce: 8-9, II , 

29, 54,67. 69, 87-89, 91, 98-100, 103, 

11 2-14, 15 1 

Rcpublic of Vict nam armc<l forcel: 2- 3, 

9, 151 

Rcpublic of Victnam Aml y (ARVN): 

29-30, 15 1. See IIfJO T roop uniUl, 

Airborne Division : 110 

1st Division: 118 

2d Di\'isioll : 118 

5th Division : 61--62, 11 9 

9th Division : 34 

22d Division: 118 

25<1 Division : 11 8 

25th Division : 34,62 

5th Armored Cava lry Regiment : 70-7 1 

81st Rangcr C rou p: 9'1 

22d and 23d Rangcr Ballalions: 70-71 

60th Sign;r.l Ik pot : liZ 

Republic of Vietnam Mari ne Corps: 8-9, 

17,67 , 69,87-88, 91- 92, 100--101, 15 1 

Republic 01 Vicm am Navy: 8--9, II, 17, 

29,67, 69-70, 87- 89, 89, 91. 98--100, 

103, 15 1 

Research and devdopment center, U,S,: 

28 

Re5ervillS, f CCll II of: 69, 86, 97 

Rc\'olutionary De prn nI : 53, 71 

Rill" 

AK47: 47, 101 

M16: 101, 125 
INDEX 

!toad corutruction and repair: 13, III 

!tome 1'10"': 103 

!totation program: 46, 76, 98, 126 

!tusk, Dean : 22 

Saigon: 9- 11 , 14,25,32,39, 47, 19-50,58, 

60,66, 11 7 

School enrollmcnu: 150 

School sptem: 13- 11, 76, 79-84, 94. 

103-09, 123, 125- 27, 131 

Schools, U.S .. tnining at: 15-16, 43-44 , 

79-80,83. 11'-14. 127 

Scout mriu: 68,94 

Sc,.,ch·and·destroy oper.niolU: 20. 53 

S«rc:rary of Defcnse. SI:I: Mcl';'amara , 

o~rr S. 

Sc:aclary of State, Su ))ullel, John 

Foster; RU$k, ))ean. 

&cretary of State for National Defense: 

8, 10 

5e<:tor and subsector advisers: 50-51 

s«u rity measures <lind units: 4,8, 10, 13, 

18-20.24, 32-33, 4~4 , 49-50.53-55, 

67, 71. 74. 90, 00, 117, 11 9, 125, 

127-28 

Selecti\!: Service Sptern, U.S.: 57 

Self·Defcnsc Corps: 8-10, 13, 18, 22, 

24-26, 29-30, 4()-o13, 45, 86, 91 

Senate, U.S.: 30 

Signal IIripde. h t: 11 2 

Signal School: 111- 12, 142 

Signal uniu: 7, 26. 103, 11 1- 12. Su DUO 

Communications tquipmem and 

units. 

Small ::U1l15 I'rogr.II11 : 101-{l3 

SmD I/ U'lit LI:Ddcrs Guide: 77- 78 

Social ",elf::Ue programs: 40, 63-65 

Song Mao: 38-39 

Spare p::U1S.. Su Main tena nce anti repair. 

Specia l Forccs units: 17.20.22,29,38-39. 

54, 74 , 100 

Special Forces units. U.S.: 17,20,22.", 

38-41, 50-5 1,53-55.74, 127 

1st Group: 12,39 

5t h Group: 32, 39, 54 

i th Group : 39 

14th Detachment: 38 

Specialists, tmining: 4, 12, 2~26. 108, 

111 - 16 

Staffs and sta ff officers: 76, 98. 125 

Slale. Ikparrment of, U.s. : 7,20-21. See 

alJo Dulles, John rwter: Rusk. 

Dean. 

161 

Stilwell. Lieutenant General Richard G.: 

11 8 

StralCgic air support: 89 

Str-negie Hamlet Progra m: 29, 45-46 

Strength. ARVN, periodic: 5-6, 8-9, 18, 

23,29-31. 41, 47, 6~iO. 88-9 1. 123. 

151 

Strike force': 40-41. 54, 67 

Supply operations anti uniu: 7, 110- 11, 

122 

SWITClt8ACK Operation : 40, liS 

Tactical air support : 21. 24, 36-38, 54, 

Tactia, "" ARVN: 23 

Tanio:. M48: 103 

T an k units. Ste Armor units. 

Task Force: Saigon, U,S.: 21-22 

T ask Force Vietnam , U.S,: 21 

Tay Ninh I' rovillcc: 17 

T a)'lor, General Maxwell D.: 23. 58-60. 

Su DUO United States Emba5SY. 

T rdrnia.1 train ing: 111- 12. 127 

Trchnicians. Su Spc<ialislS, training. 

T e1cJlhone communication: 111 - 12 

Teletypewriter repair: 112 

Ternponry Equi pment !teCO\'ery Mis· 

sion: 7-8 

T urilOrial forces: 20.23. 31. 41-43, 54. 

71 - 75.85,90,101. 117, 11 9-22. 151. 

Ste 0/.10 Civi l Guard ; Popular 

.·orecs; Regional .·orces; Self·De· 

fense Corps. 

Ttrritorial tactica l organilation : 20, 22 

Terrori rn : 17 

'l"tl offensive: 85- 86, 91- 92, 11 7, [28 

Thieu, Nguyen Van: 55, 93 

Thu Due Military Schools Center: 14 

T ools. Su l\hintenancc and rrpair. 

T railers. Sec MOlor ,·chicles. 

Tr .. awatehrrs: 40 

Training centers: 25.33- 34,38-39,42 .... 3. 

46,62, ;9,8-1, 10·...00, 12!-27 

Training Comnund: 43 

Training literature: 77-78, IN- 25 

Training progranu: 12-16, 18-19, 22-25, 

33-46, 49-51, 5~5(i, 63. 69, 75-80. 

87, 103-lO. SI!C o/MI School sYSlem. 

Transponation School: III, 144-45 

Transportation sen'icn and ,·ch icles: 7, 

101-02, 110- 11 

Treaties. Sec Agreements, internationa l, 
162 

T I'oop unil5. Set olJO Republic of Vietn 3111 Ann)'. 

comhat dfc:cIL"cncss ",nd readincss: 17, 

29-33, ,a-'6. 46-17. 53, 62-63. 67. 

84,88,90,121-22. 124,126.128 

command and control: 9-12, 18-22. 

31-32.41-42,66,72-73,117-18 

T roop unit$-Continued 

divi$iolli. number, roles and training: 

".9, U 

expansion program: 19-20, 22- 23, 

25-26, 29, 3:J-.H, 65-71. 84, 88-91. 

129 

lcadcnhip in. Sec: uadcl"$, lack of and 

training. 

organ ~ation and force strUCIUTe: 4. 

8-12, 17-19,29-31,65-75.86-91, 127 

l)Crsonm:1 turnover: 30 

replacement and rOla lioll 5),,!I:m: 35. 

46.66,76,98, 126 

mcngth. periodic: 5-6, 8· 9. 18, 23. 

29-3 1,41,47,65-70,88-91, 123, 151 

territorial. Set Territorial forcel. 

unproductil'c usc: 68, 70-71 

Troop units. U.S. 

oombat commitment : 25, 48-53,127-28 

dcplO)lncnl, buildup and withdrawals: 

23-27, 29-30, 32. 39. 56-5 1. 86. 90. 

102. 109. 112, 119. 121 

strcngth. periodic: 30-32,39.48,86 

Trucks. See Motor \·chicleil. ' 

Truman. lIan)' 5.: I 

Truong. M:tior CeI1l:ral Ngo Q"ang: lltl 

Underwater demolition teams: 70 

United StatC$ Agcncy for International 

De\'clopnu:l1I : '1.59-60.83.93.95 

United State, Air Force: 37. II!! 

United Slatel Army, ratilic: 43 

Un itcd StalCs Army, Viclnam: &1-65. 

121-22 

United Slale$ Army Special Forcn (Provi$lon31): 39.-15 

United States Embassy: 5--6. 2S. 57, 

59-60.63,93. ke (lUO linth, Donald 

R.: Taylor, General Ma:twell D. 

United Siaies Forces. Vielnam: 27 

United Stat~'S Information Servict': 2S. ~ 

United States J oinl Support Fund$: 65 

United StateS Marine Corps: 4S. 117-IS 

III Amphibious .·o. ce: 117- 18 

151 Division : l iS 

DEVELO '~fE:-lT i\:,\D TRA IN1="G 

United Statel Military Assi~lilll(c Ad · 

'isory Gruup, Indochina: 1-2 

Unitt:d Statl~ i\liIilll'Y Assistance A,\· 

,isor), Gr()up. Vietnam: 2- 9. 11-16, 

18-19. :1 1-28. 30-34, 39, 42-45. See 

abo lIa.lins. General I'~ul D.: 

McCarr, l.ieUtenlint Genu'al Lionel 

C.: O'I)3niel, U eut"nant Gell"ral 

J ohn W.: \\'illiam~ . Li"u"'narH Gell' 

eral Samuel T . 

Unitet1 Stales .\lilitary ~$islance Com· 

mand. Vi etn3m: 27-29, 33-37. ·10-.01 I. 

43, ".;-46. 48-53. 55-56. 58-63, 65. 

67,69-71 . 73, 76, i8, SO. 86, 88-90. 

93-9:;;. 98-99. 101-06. 110. 119. See 

IlIJO \bl~nu. General Creighton W .: 

WcsunorcJand. General William C. 

Unit~x1 StatCI Mission PCnQnncJ and 

l'ofanpo .... ·cr Committee: 57 

United States Nanl Postgraduate School: 

82 

Ullitcd States Navy: 2" , '9, 70 

United State' Operations Mission: 4, 18. 

28.45,50,69 

United Stale, Paeific Command : 7, 17 , 

26-28,84. 10\!, See (lilo Felt. t\dmiral 

Harry D. 

Unit), of command: IS 

Van Kiep Nalional Training Center: 62 

Vcter:" u, cue 01: 6], -97 

Viel Cong: 6, 16-17, 27. 30. 32-33. !Ii, 

~O. 4~-'l8, 54--55. 66. 85-86. 89. SU 

(l/IO North Vielnamese Army. 

Victnam;lalion Logistics l'rogl<1111 : 102 

Vietnamization program: 85-88. 101, 1]0, 

114,117, 122. ]28-29 

Village OdeniiC Medinl Progr.l1n : of() 

Vocational trllining: 94--95 

Vultg T au: 111 - 12 

War games: 109 

War "'carillc,,: 50, 128 

Water supply S}Slems: 106-08 

Watcrways. control of: 24 

Wcapons, See (l/W by name. 

imprO\'emcllt lind moderniul ioll: 

10Hn 

lraining in: 120-21 

Wclrare. soldier's: 60-61. 63, 78 
~DEX 

W('$tmQrdand. General William C.: 32, 

~8-19, ~2, ~8-63,67-68. 70-72, , 

82-84. 89, 94-95. 101. 10:;, 117. 

] 19-20. 128. Su alJo U .. il(:·d StatC5 

Militaf) Assistance Command, Viet. 

nam , 

Wheeler. G('nera l Earle G, : 53 

Williams, l.icutcnalll G('lIcral Samu('J 

'" 

T .: ]6, 18, Su Q/JO United States 

Militllr)' Assistance Ad_ iJOry Group, 

Vietnam, 

WomCll'S ,\ fmed Forces Corp$: 99 

" ollih programs: 50 

Zail, Major General Meh'in: 1]8 

..:l U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 2000 0 - 434-762 

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