alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit","provider_url":"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov","author_name":"25005pwpadmin","author_url":"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/author\/25005pwpadmin\/","title":"22-143: In Re EXPEDIA, INC. [ORDER], Nonprecedential - U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"yCQmk3RrLU\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/04-21-2022-22-143-in-re-expedia-inc-order-22-143-order-4-21-2022_1939602\/\">22-143: In Re EXPEDIA, INC. [ORDER], Nonprecedential<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/04-21-2022-22-143-in-re-expedia-inc-order-22-143-order-4-21-2022_1939602\/embed\/#?secret=yCQmk3RrLU\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“22-143: In Re EXPEDIA, INC. [ORDER], Nonprecedential” — U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit\" data-secret=\"yCQmk3RrLU\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n","description":"ORDER Posted: In Re EXPEDIA, INC. [ORDER](pdf) Appeal Number: 22-143 Origin: RIT Nonprecedential To see more opinions and orders, follow this link: Opinions and Orders."}
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 24 2000

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

KENNETH RAY FULLER,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RON CHAMPION and ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF

OKLAHOMA,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 99-6207

(D.C. No. CIV-98-312-L)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining petitioner’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Petitioner Kenneth Ray Fuller appeals from the district court ’s denial of

his habeas petition, filed pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was

convicted of conspiracy to commit unlawful delivery of a controlled dangerous

substance and delivery of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine), and is

serving two, 200-year, concurrent sentences. We have jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. Under the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, petitioner must obtain a certificate

of appealability before his appeal can proceed before this court. See

id. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Petitioner must demonstrate “a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right” before a certificate of appealability can issue. 

See id. § 2253(c)(2). Petitioner also seeks leave to proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis; that request is granted. 

In his habeas application, petitioner claimed 1) prosecutorial misconduct,

2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 3) double jeopardy, 4) insufficient

evidence of conspiracy, 5) excessive sentences, 6) trial court error in refusing to

remove jurors for cause, and 7) trial court error in denying a motion for the jury

to view the premises. The magistrate judge recommended that these issues be

rejected. After objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation and denied the petition.
-3-

On appeal from the district court ’s ruling, petitioner raises and argues the

same seven issues. Our review of the district court’s disposition in light of

petitioner’s arguments and the applicable law convinces us that, for substantially

the reasons set forth in the magistrate judge ’s findings and recommendation, see

R. Vol. I, doc. 18, petitioner has not demonstrated the denial of a constitutional

right. Accordingly, we DENY petitioner a certificate of appealability and

DISMISS this appeal. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court

Wade Brorby

Circuit Judge
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4504

A bill to amend the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, and for other

purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 26, 1994

Mr. STUDDS (for himself and Mr. MANTON) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries

A BILL

A bill to amend the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act,

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as ‘‘The Striped Bass Act of

5 1994’’.
2

HR 4504 IH

1 TITLE I—AMENDMENTS TO THE ATLANTIC

2 STRIPED BASS CONSERVATION ACT

3 SECTION 1. ATLANTIC STRIPED BASS CONSERVATION ACT

4 AMENDMENTS.

5 (a) Section 7(a) of the Atlantic Striped Bass Con6 servation Act is amended by striking ‘‘1986’’ and all that

7 follows through ‘‘1994’’, and inserting in its place ‘‘1995

8 and 1996’’.

9 TITLE II—AMENDMENTS TO THE

10 ANADROMOUS FISH CONSERVATION ACT

11 SECTION 1. ANADROMOUS FISH CONSERVATION ACT

12 AMENDMENTS.

13 (a) The Anadromous Fish Conservation Act (16

14 U.S.C. 757g(a)) is amended by inserting ‘‘, acting through

15 the Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’’ after

16 ‘‘The Secretary’’.

17 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Section

18 7(d) of the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act (16 U.S.C.

19 757g(d)) is amended—

20 (1) by striking ‘‘1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994.’’

21 and inserting ‘‘1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997.’’

Æ
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CHIREX INC.
SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FILED ON FORM 10-Q AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FORM 10-Q
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           1,945
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,007
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     24,613
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 6,291
<PP&E>                                          74,141
<DEPRECIATION>                                  22,324
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 128,407
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           21,752
<BONDS>                                          2,916
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              118
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      92,540
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   128,407
<SALES>                                         67,691
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                68,268
<CGS>                                           51,097
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   67,134
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   873
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  64
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    197
<INCOME-TAX>                                        93
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                104
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       104
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01
        

</TABLE>
#### § 64.2345 Primary advertising classification.

A primary advertising classification is assigned at the time of the establishment of telephone exchange service if the carrier that provides telephone exchange service assigns the classification or if a tariff or State requirement obligates the carrier to provide yellow pages listings as part of telephone exchange service to businesses.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner—Appellee, v. Paul NAGY, Respondent—Appellant.

No. 03-6967.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 14, 2004.

Decided Feb. 20, 2004.

George Alan DuBois, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

*677Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Paul Nagy appeals the district court’s order denying the “Motion to Release Respondent to his Native Country, Romania, at the Government’s Expense.” We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *See United States v. Nagy,*No. CA-98-951-5BO (E.D.N.C. filed May 7, 2003, entered May 14, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
No. 10-10860.

#### Barba de Garza *v.*United States.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
IIA

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4751

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 9 (legislative day, AUGUST 8), 1994

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources

AN ACT

To reauthorize appropriations for the weatherization program

under section 422 of the Energy Conservation and Production Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 That section 422 of the Energy Conservation and Produc4 tion Act (42 U.S.C. 6872) is amended to read as follows:

5 ‘‘AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

6 ‘‘SEC. 422. For the purposes of carrying out the

7 weatherization program under this part, there are author-
2

HR 4751 RFS

1 ized to be appropriated for fiscal years 1995 and 1996

2 such sums as may be necessary.’’.

Passed the House of Representatives August 8,

1994.

Attest: DONNALD K. ANDERSON,

Clerk.
The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge 1

for the District of Nebraska.

___________

No. 96-1587

___________

Tregan P. Albers, Stakeholder, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. *

*

Internal Revenue Service, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

Kenneth E. Schroeder; Norma * District of Nebraska.

L. Schroeder, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellants, *

*

Douglas C. Schroeder; Susan *

J. Keim; Glen R. Schroeder; *

David A. Schroeder, *

*

Defendants. *

___________

 Submitted: December 16, 1996

 Filed: January 6, 1997

___________

Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth and Norma Schroeder appeal from the district court's order 1

granting the United States' motion for disbursement of interpleaded funds

and its order denying their motion to remand the case to state court. The

Internal Revenue Service served Notices of Levy on Tregan P. Albers to

seize rent money he owed for the 1994 crop year on the Schroeders' farm

land, in order to partially
-2-

satisfy unpaid federal tax assessments. Albers filed this interpleader

action in Nebraska state court, and the government removed the case to

federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b). The

Schroeders argue that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the

action, and thus should have remanded it to state court because they are

"Non-resident Aliens," that the IRS assessment and collection actions were

based on "fraud coercion and fear," and that they should be able to contest

their tax liability in this interpleader action. We conclude the judgment

of the district court was correct and that an opinion would lack

precedential value. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.

As we conclude that appellants' appeal is based entirely on

contentions that have repeatedly been rejected as frivolous, we grant the

government's request that we assess $2,000 in sanctions against appellants.

See Fed. R. App. P. 38; see, e.g., United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255,

1256-57 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1300 (1994);

Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990); Becraft

v. Nelson, 885 F.2d 547, 548-50 (9th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

Accordingly we affirm the district court's judgment and impose

sanctions in the amount of $2,000.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT - 32.1

                                  MOSSIMO, INC.

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Mossimo, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K
for the annual period ended December 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I Mossimo Giannulli,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, in accordance with
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1)  The Report, to which this certification is attached as Exhibit -
              32.1, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
              Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition, results of operations,
              and cash flows of the Company.


/s/      Mossimo Giannulli
         ------------------------------------
         Mossimo Giannulli
         Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
         March 12, 2004









A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO THE COMPANY AND WILL BE RETAINED
BY THE COMPANY AND FURNISHED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION STAFF
UPON REQUEST.

THIS CERTIFICATION ACCOMPANIES THE FORM 10-K TO WHICH IT RELATES, IS NOT DEEMED
FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND IS NOT TO BE INCORPORATED
BY REFERENCE INTO A FILING OF THE COMPANY UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1934 (WHETHER MADE BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF THE FORM
10-K), IRRESPECTIVE OF ANY GENERAL INCORPORATION LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN SUCH
FILING.
No. 10-10765.

#### Oriakhi *v.*United States.

C. A. 4th Cir. Certiorari denied.
#### James Williams, *Plaintiff in Error,*vs. The State of Florida, *Defendant in Error.*

143 So. 157.

En Banc.

Opinion filed July 19, 1932.

*William A. Hallowes, Jr., William A. Hallowes III,*and *William T. Harvey,*for Plaintiffs in Error;

*Cary D. Landis,*Attorney General, and *Boy Campbell,*Assistant, for the State.

Terrell, J.

Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the Criminal Court of Record of Duval County on an information charging him with receiving and buying stolen property. He was sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary, to which judgment this writ of error was taken.

It is contended here that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was erroneously denied, and that the alleged stolen property was improperly admitted in evidence.

Section 5138 Revised General Statutes of 1920 (Section 7239 Compiled General Laws of 1927), the authority for the information, is leveled at those who buy, receive or aid in the concealment of stolen money, goods, or property, knowing the same to have been stolen. This Court has repeatedly held that knowledge of the stolen char*226acter of the goods or of circumstances that would put one on inquiry as to their stolen character, is essential to conviction under the statute. Worster vs. State, 82 Fla. 463, 90 So. 188; Winton vs. State, 87 Fla. 104, 99 So. 249.

Under former decisions of this Court the evidence is not sufficient to show knowledge of the stolen character of the goods or to put the defendant on inquiry as to such character. Minor vs. State, 55 Fla. 90, 45 So. 418; Worster vs. State, supra; Franklin vs. State, 66 Fla. 213, 63 So. 418; Stephenson vs. State, 89 Fla. 351, 104 So. 600; Winton vs. State, supra; Knowles vs. State, 86 Fla. 270, 97 So. 716. The evidence in this case at best, raises nothing more than a suspicion. We are also convinced that under the facts here presented the motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence should have been granted. Howard vs. State, 36 Fla. 21, 17 So. 84; Adams vs. State, 55 Fla. 1, 46 So. 152; Tyson vs. State, 87 Fla. 392, 100 So. 254; Kawark vs. State, 19 Ala. App. 279, 97 So. 113.

Reversed.

Ellis, Brown and Davis, J.J., concur.

Buford, C.J., and Whitfield, J., dissent.
<PAGE>


Exhibit 32.2


                        CERTIFICATION OF CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report MIV Therapeutics, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-QSB for the quarter ending August 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Patrick McGowan, as
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to
the best of his knowledge, that:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the
         Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.





/S/ PATRICK MCGOWAN
-------------------
Patrick McGowan
CFO
October 1, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

PENNLYCO, LTD. 

 v. 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

CORPORATION 

 v. 

SOUTHWESTERN ENERGY 

PRODUCTION COMPANY 

PETITION OF: PENNLYCO, LTD. 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 138 MAL 2016 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 19th day of July, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED. 

PENNLYCO, LTD.
Cite as: Opinion No. 95-023 (July 7, 1995) (unpublished)

N ATURAL R ESOURCES ) F ISHING ) C RIMIN AL P ROHIBITION OF M ONOFILIMENT G ILL N ETS D OES N OT A PPLY TO M ULTIFILIMENT N YLON N ETS July 7, 1995

The Honorable John Griffin Secretary of Natural Resources

You have requested our opinion concerning the scope of §4-710(d)(1) of the Natural Resources Article, Maryland Code, which prohibits the use of "any monofiliment gill net webbing of any description to catch fish." Specifically, your question is whether this prohibition extends to a relatively new type of gill net made from twisted or braided nylon filaments.

In a recent memorandum

of advice (copy attached), Assistant Attorney General Thomas A. Deming, Counsel to the Department of Natural Resources, advised that §4-710(d)(1), a criminal prohibition on the use of "monofilament" gill nets, could not sustain a prosecution against someone using a multifiliment

gill net.

We have carefully reviewed the matter and agree with Mr. Deming's analysis and conclusion. Although the use of a multifiliment nylon net may result in a harm comparable to that resulting in the enactment of §4-710(d)(1), this criminal statute is so specific that it simplycannot be construed beyond its terms. The General Assembly may wish to consider amending the

statute to extend its reach to the new type of net.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr. Attorney General

Jack Schwartz Chief Counsel Opinions & Advice
I

103D CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 4647

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the City of Imperial

Beach, California, approximately 1 acre of land in the Tijuana Slough

National Wildlife Refuge.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 24, 1994

Ms. SCHENK introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey to the

City of Imperial Beach, California, approximately 1 acre

of land in the Tijuana Slough National Wildlife Refuge.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE OF LAND IN TIJUANA SLOUGH

4 NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE.

5 (a) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of the Interior

6 shall expeditiously convey to the City of Imperial Beach,

7 California, without compensation, all right, title, and in8 terest of the United States in and to approximately 1 acre

9 of land in the Tijuana Slough National Wildlife Refuge,
2

•HR 4647 IH

1 as depicted on a United States Fish and Wildlife Service

2 map entitled ‘‘T-ball Field, Tijuana Slough National Wild3 life Refuge’’, dated June 1994, for use as a public rec4 reational area.

5 (b) REVERSIONARY INTEREST IN THE UNITED

6 STATES.—Upon any date on which any of the land in

7 which right, title, and interest is conveyed under sub8 section (a) ceases to be used by the City of Imperial

9 Beach, California, for public recreational purposes—

10 (1) all such right, title, and interest shall revert

11 to the Government of the United States; and

12 (2) such land shall be reincorporated into the

13 Tijuana Slough National Wildlife Refuge.

Æ