designing a comprehensive 

peace process for afghanistan

Lisa Schirch, 

with contributions from 

Aziz Rafiee, Nilofar Sakhi, 

and Mirwais Wardak

[PEACEW RKS [

PW75_Cover_3a.indd 1 9/13/11 10:27:
Photo taken by members of Peace Studies 

Network of Department of Peace Studies 

(NCPR) from Psychology and Educational 

Sciences Faculty of Kabul University in 2009. 

Used with permission of the National Center 

for Policy Research.

The views expressed in this report are 

those of the author alone. They do not 

necessarily reflect views of the United 

States Institute of Peace, and do not rep-

resent official positions of the United 

States Government.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 75 

First published 2011

© 2011 by the United States Institute of Peace [PEACEW RKS [ About the Report

This report, sponsored by the Center for Conflict 

Management at the U.S. Institute of Peace, draws on 

comparative research literature on peace processes to 

identify lessons applicable to Afghanistan and makes 

recommendations to the international community, 

the Afghan government, and Afghan civil society 

for ensuring a more comprehensive, successful, and 

sustainable peace process. 

Research for this paper was undertaken during five 

trips to Kabul, Afghanistan, and one trip to Pakistan 

between 2009 and 2011. Funding for the research 

in the report came from the Ploughshares Fund 

and Afghanistan: Pathways to Peace, a project of 

Peacebuild: The Canadian Peacebuilding Network. About the Author

Lisa Schirch is director of 3P Human Security, a 

partnership for peacebuilding policy. 3P Human 

Security connects policymakers with global civil 

society networks, facilitates civil-military dialogue, 

and provides a peacebuilding lens on current policy 

issues. She is also a research professor at the Center 

for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite 

University and a policy adviser for the Alliance for 

Peacebuilding.

A former Fulbright Fellow in East and West Africa, 

Schirch has worked in more than twenty countries in 

conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Schirch has 

written four books and numerous articles on conflict 

prevention and strategic peacebuilding. 

PW75_Cover_3a.indd 2 9/13/11 10:27:
Peaceworks • september 2011 • no. 75

CONTENTS

[ Peace processes that include a wider range of voices 

are more likely to lead to success, legitimacy, sustainability, 

and democratic governance. ]

Summary ... 3

From “Peace Talks” to a “Comprehensive Peace Process” ... 5

The Case for a Comprehensive Peace Process ... 6

The “Who” of an Afghan Peace Process: Key Stakeholders ... 8

The “What” of an Afghan Peace Process: A Negotiation Framework ... 12

The “How” of an Afghan Peace Process: Mechanisms for Structuring 

Public Input, Technical Support, and Coordination ... 22

Conclusion and Recommendations ... 33

3

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Summary

■ Current negotiations to end the war in Afghanistan fail to build on lessons learned from 

peace processes in other countries. Exclusion of key stakeholders, especially diverse sectors 

of civil society, and exclusion of key issues underlying the current conflict create a recipe 

for failure. In addition, the exclusive focus on either top-down negotiation between armed 

groups or bottom-up reintegration based on financial incentives is insufficient.

■ Half of all peace agreements fail in part because too few people support them. History 

shows a peace process is more likely to succeed if it includes a wide spectrum of armed and 

unarmed actors. Building a national consensus to transition from war to peace in 

Afghanistan requires participation by diverse stakeholders. 

■ Current negotiations focus on a narrow agenda on conditions for the Taliban to lay down 

their arms and for the United States to leave Afghanistan. This agenda does not address 

significant root causes of the current conflict, such as government corruption and ethnic 

tensions.

■ A comprehensive Afghan peace process would orchestrate work in three areas: developing 

a politically negotiated settlement, increasing legitimacy for the Afghan government, and 

building a national public consensus on the future relations between diverse groups. 

■ An Afghan peace process requires creating, coordinating, and sequencing a set of structured mechanisms, forums, and negotiation tables for participatory deliberation and 

decision making involving diverse stakeholders, regional countries, and all levels of Afghan 

society. A successful peace process combines high-level negotiation with “vertical” processes 

that link high-level negotiations with public dialogue processes in a way that is transparent, 

impartial, and inclusive. 

■ A comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan requires a much more deliberate design 

than currently exists. The hope of a quick and tight negotiation process is as illusory as the 

fantasy that firepower will achieve victory for either side in Afghanistan. 

5

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

From “Peace Talks” to a “Comprehensive Peace Process”

The transition from war to peace in Afghanistan requires much more than high-level negotiations and low-level reintegration efforts. The current negotiation agenda between U.S. and 

Taliban representatives holds potential for establishing conditions for an end to the war. Yet it 

does not lay a foundation for a sustainable peace. The current approach muffles other critical 

conflicts that are obstacles to peace in Afghanistan and the region and overlooks Afghan civil 

society’s capacity to support a national peace process. The June 2010 National Consultative 

Peace Jirga called for the creation of a National Peace Council and a redesign of reintegration 

efforts in the new Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program (APRP). Noting concerns about 

the lack of democratic representation first in the Peace Jirga and later in the National Peace 

Council, civil society leaders continue to flag the exclusion of public interests in current peace 

talks.1 Public participation in a comprehensive peace process is an essential component for 

successful transition from war to a stable peace.2

Half of all peace agreements fail—and once they fail, the underlying conflicts have an even 

greater chance of becoming intractable. In the history of successful transitions from war to 

peace, one lesson is clear: go slow to go fast. Rushed peace processes that limit or exclude public 

participation and interests are more likely to fail than those that build a solid foundation for 

a sustainable peace. Too often international diplomats seem to throw all of their eggs in one 

basket with high-level peace negotiations to achieve a quick settlement. When these efforts 

fail to produce immediate outcomes, the stakeholders return to the battlefield convinced that 

diplomacy was tried and exhausted. Peace agreements thrown together quickly often unravel 

in a way that results in an even longer process, less trust among key stakeholders, more costs to 

the international community, and more death and destruction on the ground. 

The jumble of terminology in Afghanistan fogs the complicated landscape of peace efforts. (For purposes of this report, the definitions found in box 1 are used.) In Afghanistan, the 

concept of “reconciliation” often refers to high-level negotiations between the Taliban, Karzai 

government, and international forces.3

 But in other contexts, such as in South Africa, reconciliation has traditionally referred to a national civil society–led process following official, 

political negotiations. More recently, media reports signal that there are high-level “peace talks” 

under way. Peace talks aim to reach a “peace agreement,” a statement that would lay out the 

conditions and steps for a transition from armed struggle to a politically negotiated process. 

The term “reintegration” refers to low-level disarmament efforts to entice foot soldiers with 

jobs programs and other economic incentives. And at the same time, Afghan civil society calls 

for a national “transitional justice process” with an agenda contrasting from that found in the 

formal peace talks. All of these terms and processes have a place within an Afghan comprehensive peace process.

A “comprehensive peace process” is distinct in that it includes a much wider array of activities, actors, and forums aimed at achieving peace.4

 Comprehensive peace processes are multilevel, dynamic efforts to build a public consensus around a shared future. A peace process 

may or may not lead to a peace agreement. In Afghanistan, for example, a comprehensive 

peace process could help address root causes of the conflict whether or not a peace agreement 

between the country’s armed, political, and ethnic groups ever materializes. Building a national 

consensus on the country’s future among civil society could aid in achieving a political settlement between armed groups. A comprehensive peace process requires a careful look at who

participates in a peace process, what issues are on the table, and how the process is structured. 

In short, a comprehensive peace process requires creating structures for wide participation and 
6

PEACEWORKS 75

6

deep discussion of underlying interests and grievances that fuel conflict. Only a wide and deep

multilevel, sequential process, using principled negotiation techniques, will enable the country 

to build a national consensus on the way forward.5

The pool of human experience in fostering national peace processes in divided countries 

is still shallow. Not enough people are thinking through what a comprehensive Afghan peace 

process, based on lessons learned in other countries, could or should look like. This report seeks 

to fill that void by distilling key elements of designing peace processes from historical case 

studies, and looking at the unique challenges and opportunities for a culturally attuned, comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan. This report first makes the case for a comprehensive 

peace process. It then examines who should be involved in a comprehensive peace process, 

what types of incentives, negotiation strategies, and issues should be brought to negotiation 

tables, and how inclusive mechanisms for public input and mediation, technical support, and 

coordination teams can structure a comprehensive peace process. The final section of the report 

provides policy recommendations for Afghan civil society, the Afghan government, and the 

international community. 

The Case for a Comprehensive Peace Process

Research comparing attempts to transition from war demonstrates the difficulties facing all 

routes to peace. A military victory leading to a durable peace in Afghanistan is extremely 

unlikely. Only a small percentage of wars end because one side wins and another loses. Most 

wars end in stalemate, with neither side claiming victory.6 And of those wars that are won, 

those with a rebel or insurgent victory tend to have more stable outcomes than others.7 Moreover, attempts to end wars by inflicting pain on opponents require a great deal of time and 

destruction of relationships, lives, and infrastructure thereby making it all the more difficult 

to build a sustainable peace after attempts at such an unlikely victory. A survey of research on 

war termination concludes external efforts to push stakeholders to negotiate through violent 

punishment or war rarely work if the stakeholders believe they will not achieve their goals 

through negotiation.8

Box 1. Definition of Terms

Reintegration refers to low-level efforts to offer incentives to disarm and return armed 

individuals to community life.

Reconciliation refers to a process between conflicting groups to understand core grievances and identify mutually satisfying solutions with the goal of ending fighting and normalizing political relationships.

Transitional justice refers to a process of building a culture respectful of human rights by 

repairing justice systems, healing social divisions, and building a democratic system of 

governance.

Peace negotiations or “peace talks” refer to discussions aimed at reaching both reconciliation and a peace agreement.

A peace agreement is a negotiated cease-fire and road map for participatory governance 

in a divided country.

A peace process is a multilevel, multiphased effort involving armed and unarmed stakeholders in a conflict to both bring an end to armed fighting and lay out a sustainable political, economic, security, and territorial agreement. It involves top-level negotiation between 

the armed groups, plus diverse forums for public dialogue and engagement to foster a 

broad consensus on the future direction of the country. 
7

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Current enemy-centric “kill-and-capture” International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

policies endanger negotiation by removing leaders who have a political agenda and maturity 

to make deals. The remaining lower-level leaders of armed insurgent groups tend to be more 

extremist in their views and are more likely to continue fighting at any cost.9 Attempts for the 

international community to financially buy their way out of the war by supporting the Afghan 

and Pakistani governments look equally doomed to fail. Ironically, the international community’s greatest leverage in Afghanistan lies neither in imposing a hurting stalemate onto armed 

insurgent groups nor making military and financial commitments to prop up the Afghan government and Pakistani military and intelligence agencies that the public widely sees as illegitimate. The military and financial “intravenous drip” keeps the current dysfunctional system 

in place, allowing these governments to forgo the hard work of earning public legitimacy and 

consent to govern while simultaneously providing financial incentives for many stakeholders 

to perpetuate the war for their own financial gain. Rather, an international military and financial drawdown from Afghanistan may be the greatest leverage available to the international 

community. A political and financial “hurting stalemate” may be far more effective at creating 

incentives for all sides to enter into earnest negotiations to end the war and to build a durable 

peace than what is achieved by flexing military might.10

Most wars end through peace agreements, but half of these also fail and there is a return 

to war.11 Most of the peace processes in recent history have been deeply flawed in a variety of 

ways, such as excluding all but certain armed groups, failing to make needed structural changes, 

lacking necessary international support, or insufficient attention to the challenge of implementing agreements. Comprehensive peace processes that include international security guarantees, investments in economic development, demilitarized zones, and robust mechanisms for 

addressing conflicts at all levels of society through principled negotiation and mediation have a 

more successful track record.12 Comprehensive peace processes are more likely to lead to positive outcomes than their noncomprehensive counterparts.13 Comprehensive peace processes 

more often lead to these interrelated positive outcomes:

■ Public support. One of the reasons that half of all peace agreements fail is that too few 

people support them. The more people a peace process includes, the more people that 

may support an agreement. 

■ Legitimacy. Peace negotiations that include only armed actors inadvertently legitimate 

the use of arms to achieve political power. A comprehensive and inclusive peace process 

creates a more legitimate outcome and builds public consent for the national 

government. 

■ Sustainability. Comprehensive peace processes more often address a range of driving factors fueling conflict and thus help to prevent the causes of recurring violent conflict. 

Unarmed groups including religious and ethnic or tribal leadership, women, labor unions, 

educators, youth, and other elements of civil society play important roles in ensuring that 

peace agreements address critical issues fueling ongoing violence, such as reforming state 

institutions, and deep-seated public grievances. 

■ Democratic governance. A comprehensive peace process is an exercise in participatory 

deliberation and intergroup dialogue and negotiation. With the help of facilitators and 

mediators and the support of widespread training via local civil society institutions such as 

media programs and religious centers, a comprehensive peace process can teach skills of 

An international military 

and financial drawdown 

from Afghanistan 

may be the greatest 

leverage available to the 

international community.
8

PEACEWORKS 75

how to identify differences and build on common ground. Dialogue models used in a 

comprehensive peace process are strikingly different than those employed in Western-style 

democracies’ competitive politics and hard-fought elections, which have been found to 

exacerbate social and political conflict in divided societies.14 While it may take more time 

to structure a participatory process, the long-term payoff for this participation is that the 

peace process can lay the groundwork for democratic governance. 

These outcomes are directly related to the inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders who raise a 

wide range of issues via a series of interrelated mechanisms for structuring public participation 

in a peace process. The next three sections of this report detail the who, what, and how of an 

Afghan comprehensive peace process. 

The “Who” of an Afghan Peace Process: Key Stakeholders

An exclusive peace agreement reached only between certain armed groups at the top of society 

is insufficient. A sustainable peace requires building a national consensus on how to move the 

country forward. Research comparing successful and unsuccessful peace agreements illustrates 

that civil society engagement is often the critical ingredient to a successful peace process.15

Engaging with armed actors who want to be included in a peace process is also essential, 

as excluding them cements their commitment to using violence as the only communication 

channel.16 Peace processes that include a wider range of voices are more likely to lead to success, legitimacy, sustainability, and democratic governance. A tipping point or critical mass 

of people supporting a peace process for a war-to-peace transition is essential, particularly in 

countries with a weak central government, like Afghanistan. Figure 1 illustrates the key leadership at all levels of the pyramid that must be engaged to build a public consensus.17

Policymakers looking for a quick fix or “good enough” solution face temptations to shortcut the process. A desire for confidentiality, manageability, and security lead some to conclude 

that peace talks require only private negotiation spaces for moderate leaders of armed groups. 

These concerns are valid. A comprehensive peace process should include a track for confidential discussions and should have a design that is both realistic and flexible. Achieving cease-fire 

agreements and developing security arrangements often requires secret negotiations outside of 

the public eye. However, shortcuts cannot build sustainable peace.

Comparative case studies of public peace processes in Guatemala, the Philippines, Mali, 

and South Africa illustrate that manageable mechanisms and models for public input exist. A 

later section of this report details five broad models of public participation in peace processes 

and their relevance for Afghanistan.

Including “Spoilers” and “Terrorists”

It is routine for governments and groups engaged in armed conflict to refuse to negotiate with 

each other and to conclude that “violence is the only language” understandable to their opponents. Yet the history of the post–Cold War era shows most wars end in agreements and at 

some point all sides come to see that negotiation is the only viable option.18 Nelson Mandela 

and the African National Congress, and armed insurgent groups in Guatemala, El Salvador, 

Mozambique, Cambodia, and numerous other countries, were once thought to be parties that 

could not be negotiated with. Yet today there are viable peace agreements in each of these 

countries. Engaging with armed groups is not equal to legitimating their cause.19 Negotiation 
9

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

processes can uncover legitimate grievances buried beneath a group’s radical rhetoric. Addressing these legitimate grievances, which often center on a desire for respect and dignity, is far less 

expensive and more effective than the fantasy of firepower solutions aimed at eradicating the 

group or its ideas. 

Strategies for managing potential spoilers of a peace agreement are necessary. “Spoilers” are 

groups that aim to disrupt any peace agreement either because their interests were not represented or included in the negotiations or because they perceive themselves to benefit more 

from ongoing violent conflict.20 Peace processes often exclude spoilers because they do indeed 

aim to disrupt efforts toward peace.21 The dilemma in any high-level negotiation is whether to 

include potential and manifest spoilers. If the process includes both spoilers, they may make 

it impossible for moderates to make progress in areas where they find common ground across 

the lines of conflict. On the other hand, a peace process that excludes all potential spoilers may 

not have anyone around the table. If so-called spoilers are left out of the process because they 

are more difficult to work with, then they often come back later to disrupt the implementation 

of an agreement. Excluding potential spoilers can increase their commitment to violence by 

removing viable political alternatives. 

Managing spoilers means preparing for the reality that certain stakeholders, including 

some participating in a peace process and those left out of the process, will either not follow 

through on implementation of agreements or will actively attempt to sabotage agreements. 

Developing plans for managing spoilers requires actively engaging with their interests so as to 

shift their perception of the costs of spoiling the process and the benefits from allowing a peace 

process to move forward.

Figure 1. Pyramid of Afghan Stakeholders

Top Level

International, regional and Afghan 

government, political opposition parties, 

and armed opposition groups

National-Level and Community-Level 

Civil Society

District and community development councils, 

peace councils, shuras, tribal leaders, religious 

leaders, women’s groups, victim groups, NGOs, 

universities, labor unions, media professionals, 

artists, young groups, etc.

Addressing legitimate 

grievances, which often 

center on a desire for 

respect and dignity, is far 

less expensive and more 

effective than the fantasy 

of firepower solutions 

aimed at eradicating the 

group or its ideas. 
10

PEACEWORKS 75

The 2001 Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan excluded key civil society interests and the 

Taliban. The process rewarded some warlords from the Northern Alliance with political authorities and impunity for their crimes, which some deem as on par with crimes by the Taliban. 

Many scholars noted the exclusion of Taliban leaders in the Bonn Agreement led to missed 

opportunities for finding a political solution.22

Current negotiations threaten to repeat these mistaken calculations of who to include or 

exclude in discussions about Afghanistan’s future, as they focus on high-level stakeholders 

in the international community, neighboring countries, the Afghan government, and moderate, politically minded Taliban representatives from Quetta Shura. These negotiations exclude some armed groups such as the Haqqani network, deemed too extremist for the process. 

While secret talks between certain politically minded stakeholders may be appropriate at early 

stages, an ongoing process that excludes the voices and interests of potential spoilers lessens the 

chances for achieving a sustainable peace. 

Involving Civil Society 

Including only certain armed stakeholders in a peace agreement creates long-term problems. 

First, it rewards groups who use violence with political influence and even positions of power. 

Second, a peace agreement that excludes public input leaves out the interests and needs of 

other key stakeholders in a society required to achieve a sustainable solution to underlying issues. If key stakeholders are left out, they will lack ownership of the agreement and the political 

will required to implement it. Successful and sustainable peace processes find ways to engage 

both armed groups deemed too extreme for negotiation and unarmed civil society deemed 

irrelevant or unwieldy.23

In addition to those at the top of the pyramid in figure 1, national-level and communitylevel civil society leaders and the general public at the bottom of the pyramid also need spaces 

to represent their interests in a comprehensive Afghan peace process. Civil society organizations 

(CSOs) are groups of citizens not in government that organize themselves on behalf of some 

public interest. CSOs face many of the same challenges as government, such as corruption, lack 

of capacity, and inadequate funding to achieve their goals. As opposed to elements of “uncivil society that fuel violence,” CSOs foster democratic dialogue, tolerance, and trust between groups, 

work in partnership with the state to carry out important public services, and hold the state accountable for its responsibilities to citizens and transparent governance. Stable governance and a 

durable peace require a citizen-oriented state working in partnership with an active civil society 

that has adequate space to hold government to account.24 Civil society organizations (CSOs) 

are groups of citizens not in government that organize themselves on behalf of some public 

interest. As opposed to elements of “uncivil society that fuel violence,” CSOs foster democratic 

dialogue, tolerance, and trust between groups. Civil society works in partnership with the state 

both to complement and supplement its capacity and to hold the state to account for its responsibilities and transparent governance. An active local civil society at the national and community 

levels is an indicator of a functioning and democratic state.25 Given this broader understanding 

of civil society–state relations, the role of CSOs in a peace process is more obvious.

Generating and consolidating a new national narrative or story about a country’s future 

is an essential element of a sustainable peace process. Public dialogue can help to create this 

national consensus on what a shared future looks like. When the public believes that its individual identity, economic, political, and security interests are supported by the nation at large, 

it will support a peace process to make that new reality possible. Media campaigns using teleSuccessful and 

sustainable peace 

processes find ways to 

engage both armed 

groups deemed too 

extreme for negotiation 

and unarmed civil society 

deemed irrelevant or 

unwieldy.
11

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

vision, radio, billboards, and posters to generate public support have been a component of a 

number of successful peace processes. 

During the U.S. civil rights movement, those wanting a more inclusive, respectful society did not set out to kill or wage war against the intolerant Ku Klux Klan (KKK)—a once 

widespread violent white supremacy movement. Instead, Americans prosecuted KKK crimes 

while working to build a national consensus that rejected the ideology of racism, intolerance, 

and violence. While KKK groups still exist today in some areas of the U.S. and racism is still 

widespread, Americans created a strong enough national consensus—from Washington down 

to small towns in middle America—to push the KKK to the margins. The civil society movement, supported by institutions enforcing rule of law, defeated the ideas of the KKK through 

the media, public discussions, and peaceful protest. 

An Afghan peace process cannot accomplish in a few years the kind of social change that 

takes decades or generations, especially without a functioning judicial system to support rule of 

law. The ideas driving the Taliban and other armed Afghan opposition groups, and the culture 

of impunity and corruption in Afghanistan, will take generations to change. However, a comprehensive peace process can build a national consensus to point Afghan society in a direction 

where most stakeholders believe they will achieve more through the political process than the 

battlefield. A comprehensive Afghan peace process could blend models used in other countries 

with Afghan peacebuilding traditions to create an inclusive national agenda to move forward 

collectively and peacefully. 

Afghan civil society is complex. In addition to traditional or tribal structures such as jirgas 

(assemblies) and maliks (leaders), religious leaders and structures such as the Shura-e-Ulama 

(council of religious scholars) play important roles in mediating local conflicts.26 Afghan civil 

society also includes trade unions, universities, artists, media professionals, women’s groups, 

youth groups, and other forms of social structure outside of the state, including local Afghan 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Community Development Councils (CDCs). 

All of these civil society sectors have roles to play in fostering durable peace in Afghanistan.

Researchers on Afghan civil society consistently find that locals define civil society broadly 

as citizens “concerned about the public good as opposed to private or sectarian interests.”27 

Afghan civil society plays active roles in fostering participatory governance and peace, including “breaking through client networks, solving local problems, and creating constituencies for 

peace.”28 Yet civil society activists describe a “war on civil society” carried out by armed opposition groups, the Afghan government, and NATO forces, each of which they say further 

disenfranchises the interests of average Afghans.29

Shallow definitions and understanding of the concept of civil society plague international 

policy. Historically, counterinsurgency manuals advised on how to “pacify” civil society so that 

it withdraws support from armed opposition groups and accepts government authority. Remnants of pacification strategies linger on while newer counterinsurgency guidance in Afghanistan asserts the need for military forces to gain public support and use civil society as “force 

multipliers,” service providers, or implementing partners for donor-designed projects. Citing 

an important surge in Iraqi civil society opposition to armed groups independently accompanying the military surge, U.S. military leaders in Afghanistan look for an Afghan civil society 

equivalent to reduce violence. 

Premised on the belief that tribesmen living in the Pashtun belt make up the majority of 

the insurgency’s recruits, the tribal elder is posited as Afghanistan’s equivalent of an ... 

awakened Iraqi chieftain. It is to him that policymakers will turn when looking to consult ordinary Afghans on plans for reconciliation.30

A comprehensive Afghan 

peace process could 

blend models used in 

other countries with 

Afghan peacebuilding 

traditions to create an 

inclusive national agenda. 
12

PEACEWORKS 75

There are several problems with this tribal strategy. First, tribal leaders are not eager to 

join forces with “a collateral damage prone International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

trumpeting a corrupt central government and a circus of intrusive development projects.”31 

Second, tribal groups sway back and forth between competing external forces and the Afghan 

government, depending on rapidly shifting short-term assessments of what is in their interest.32 Finally, Afghan civil society is much more diverse and complex than suggested by this 

tribal strategy. 

Afghan civil society will best contribute to an Afghan peace process when it is allowed 

space to act independently and when there are adequate civil freedoms to discuss key issues 

driving the conflict in Afghanistan. 

The “What” of an Afghan Peace Process: A Negotiation 

Framework

All stakeholders calculate their interests in supporting continued war versus a negotiated solution—that includes armed groups and government but also business leaders, farmers, drug 

traffickers, military contractors, and ordinary citizens in Afghanistan and in those countries 

supporting international forces. A successful peace process is one in which all stakeholders are 

satisfied that the outcome is better than the alternative of continuing to fight. Stakeholders 

assess their “best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (BATNA) to determine whether to 

continue fighting.33 If stakeholders believe they can achieve more on the battlefield, through 

other means of coercion, or by the continuation of the status quo, they will not negotiate in 

good faith. Stakeholders calculate their BATNA depending on the calculus of the costs and 

benefits, incentives and sanctions for participating or not participating. The “ripeness” of a 

peace process centers on whether the groups in conflict believe they have more to gain from 

peace or continued fighting.34 There is no easy calculus to determine when a group may decide 

to devote energy to a negotiated outcome.35

Box 2 summarizes some of the dilemmas of negotiation.36 The dangers of a negotiated 

agreement in Afghanistan can be significantly reduced with the design of a comprehensive 

peace process involving a more strategic set of incentives, a principled negotiation approach, 

and a wider negotiation agenda. Internationals pushing a settlement may craft an agreement 

that looks good from an outsider’s point of view. Countless think tanks in foreign capitals have 

put forth solutions to Afghanistan’s challenges but the long and messy process of all stakeholders coming to understand each other’s underlying interests through wide consultations and 

public dialogue is necessary for all sides to understand why certain provisions in an agreement 

may be the best possible outcome.37

Negotiation efforts fail in many peace efforts because mid-level diplomats, without comparative experience in successful peace processes, use coercive bargaining to battle and seek 

compromises on the positions of armed groups. To entice armed groups to “give up” their 

fight, all sides continue to pound each other on the battlefield while internationals throw small 

financial incentives at low-level fighters. In practice, this approach does not work. It leads to 

compounding and lengthening the time and costs of a war. Instead, research on successful 

peace processes suggests the need for a more comprehensive understanding of incentives and 

sanctions and a principled or “interest-based” rather than coercive approach to negotiation. 

It also suggests the need to address a wide range of drivers of violence—not just the armed 

groups’ stated public positions and demands—including the key issues of diverse stakeholders 

necessary to build a national consensus.
13

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Using Incentives and Sanctions 

It is common for groups to apply sanctions against each other to physically, economically, or 

politically harm the interests of others. Efforts to inflict pain to opposing groups aim to achieve 

victory or exhaustion in some cases. Pounding on the battlefield or on the airwaves of public 

opinion seeks to make opposing groups reach a “hurting stalemate” where they determine that 

there are more costs than benefits to fighting. 

All armed groups in Afghanistan are still trying to inflict pain on others and boast that they 

are winning on the battlefield, indicating their own reluctance to make conciliatory moves. 

There are high costs to the current approach attempting to impose a hurting stalemate in Afghanistan in hopes of driving armed groups to surrender or negotiate. 

In practice, the use of violent coercion does not have a successful historical track record, 

as detailed earlier in this report. It leads to compounding and lengthening the time and costs 

of a war. Faced with a “lose-lose” option of losing on the battlefield or surrendering without 

incentives that address their interests, many groups will choose to continue fighting. Coercive 

bargaining also carries a failed history. Negotiation efforts fail in many peace efforts because 

mid-level diplomats without comparative experience in successful peace processes use coercive 

bargaining to battle and seek compromises on the positions of armed groups without addressing underlying legitimate grievances or interests.

Instead, research on successful peace processes suggests the need for a more comprehensive 

understanding of both incentives and sanctions and a principled or “interest-based” rather than 

coercive approach to negotiation. It also suggests the need to address a wide range of drivers of 

Box 2. Dangers of Negotiating versus Not Negotiating

Dangers of Negotiating Dangers of Not Negotiating

A negotiation between armed opposition 

groups could

Continued attempts to solve the conflict on 

the battlefield could

endanger progress on human rights and 

women’s empowerment, particularly if 

the negotiations exclude women and 

minorities;

perpetuate further suffering of civilians in a 

war with no end in sight;

foster a culture of impunity by allowing 

perpetrators to go free without accountability for their crimes;

increase the possibility that the insurgency 

will grow stronger over time, making negotiation more difficult in the future;

increase the tensions between ethnic 

groups if power sharing is perceived 

as consolidating Pashtun dominance 

and excluding other ethnic groups from 

political power;

increase the tensions between ethnic groups 

if the war overshadows efforts to address 

interethnic conflict and/or if the Taliban gains 

territory;

pose challenges in monitoring the relationship with al-Qaida;lead to a missed opportunity to brainstorm 

options and conditions for ending the war.

lead to further control by Pakistan over 

Afghanistan, since it is widely believed 

that elements within Pakistan control the 

Taliban.
14

PEACEWORKS 75

violence—not just the armed groups’ stated public positions and demands—including the key 

issues of diverse stakeholders necessary to build a national consensus.

Peace processes depend on a range of incentives to entice armed groups and their supporters to negotiate with their enemies.These include a range of types of intrinsic incentives generated by the stakeholders themselves as well as external incentives offered by external groups 

with an interest in peace.38

■ Externally generated incentives. External incentives are most effective when they work in 

conjunction with internal or intrinsic incentives. External stakeholders can support a peace 

process by assisting with the needed economic and technical elements of implementing a 

peace agreement. However, creating pools of money or financial incentives for key stakeholders to participate in a peace process poses a number of challenges. It can encourage 

local people to feel like they are participating not because they want to, but because they 

are getting paid to participate. This can lower their willingness to put in their own effort 

and make their own sacrifices to ensure that peace is sustainable. It can also lead to the 

idea that the peace process is externally driven and ultimately about making money, taking 

away local leadership and legitimacy. It can also encourage perceptions that there are 

unlimited funds for peace process activities and that involvement in the peace process itself 

is about financial gain. In communities where so-called peace dividends fund small-scale 

projects like building schools or health centers, local populations have in some cases come 

to see peace as having only a financial benefit without an inherent value. These lessons 

learned from other contexts should temper the international community’s eagerness to 

bring an end to the war in Afghanistan by external incentives.

■ Internally generated or intrinsic incentives. When the stakeholders themselves develop their 

own incentives for working toward peace, these tend to be more successful and creative 

than outside efforts. In places where disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 

(DDR) programs have been successful, local civil society helps to design, develop, and 

carry out internally generated incentives. For example, the Somali women of Wajir, Kenya, 

set up a peace prize for the clan chief contributing most to peace. After the first year’s prize, 

other chiefs approached the women to ask for training in mediation and negotiation. These 

incentives represent stakeholders’ efforts to address each other’s core interests by, for 

example, agreeing to share political power or resources. In Afghanistan, internally generated incentives require local stakeholders to understand and address the grievences and 

interests of other groups.

■ Security incentives. Armed groups often continue fighting because to leave the network of 

their group may make them a target for all sides. Developing security guarantees for both 

armed individuals and groups who enter into a negotiation process can serve as a confidence-building measure to encourage others to join the process. While current external 

incentives in Afghanistan do include security guarantees, there is not sufficient research to 

determine whether armed groups trust that they will be safe if they reintegrate.

■ Amnesty incentives. Amnesties are another form of security incentive, insulating leaders 

from a justice process to hold them to account. Victims and human rights advocates note 

that amnesty laws such as the one in Afghanistan create new problems of impunity.

■ Political incentives. Individuals and groups engaged in a civil war seek political access and 

influence. Entering into peace processes can be risky for both groups with and without 

political authority; no one knows if they will come out with the same level of political 
15

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

influence if the process redesigns government structures. Peace agreements often result in 

some form of power-sharing governance to ensure that key stakeholders are content with 

their access to political power, economic resources, and security and maintain a sense of 

their identity. Power-sharing agreements can be risky if they result in forcing together 

groups that are not in agreement about basic principles of governance.39 Since the Taliban 

and other armed opposition groups have not yet articulated a clear political platform, it is 

difficult to assess the possibilities of powersharing at this stage.

■ Economic incentives. All sides calculate the economic costs and benefits of continuing to 

fight or moving toward peace. War brings cover to illicit activities and economic opportunity. A tremendous number of stakeholders on all sides of the conflict financially benefit 

from instability and the continuation of war in Afghanistan. Creating economic incentives 

for peace means making peace more profitable than war. Also, members of armed groups 

may benefit financially from the war, as being a soldier or insurgent is a job, a form of 

employment. But research in Afghanistan illustrates that relatively few insurgents operate 

on purely economic motives.40 Moreover, economic incentives have been relatively small 

compared with the benefits of continued fighting. Efforts to use economic incentives to 

buy off leaders almost always turn out to be a short-term strategy that backfires. Economic 

incentives can work only when a peace process also addresses other core grievances.

■ Identity incentives. While often overlooked, all sides also assess the impact of a peace agreement on their identity and sense of dignity, self-determination, and group autonomy. Those 

groups that fight for identity, religion, or ideology are much more likely to accept any cost to 

continue fighting than those groups that fight for material resources or political power. 

Stakeholders often continue to fight for what they perceive is greater security, economic 

interests, political access, and a dignified identity long after they have felt the pain of war. 

Sometimes this is addressed by allowing groups to retain a sense of ethnic or religious 

identity in a particular territory, which may even be marked symbolically with a separate flag, 

even though the territory belongs to a larger nation in a federal governance system, as with the 

territory controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Army in the Philippines. 

Members of armed groups also benefit from the status of holding a gun, projecting an image of a masculine identity, and earning respect. Leaders of armed groups know they have a 

pathway for promotion through the ranks of their network. Armed leadership also allows them 

to impose order and prevent dissent in their group. Calculating how to address these ego factors via incentives that replace the respect earned from a gun with opportunities for individuals 

to earn respect or at least maintain dignity in another way is also important. 

Comparative experiences in other countries illustrate that internally generated incentives 

are more successful and sustainable than externally generated incentives from the international 

community. At any rate, the effectiveness of any of these incentives builds on the credibility or 

likelihood that the incentives are valid and that others will follow through with their promises. 

“Changing the goal posts” can cause cynicism and detract from moderate leadership’s ability to sway others to participate in a peace process. Skillful mediation is all the more crucial 

when orchestrating a complex set of incentives and sanctions to move groups toward the negotiation table. Ultimately incentives are only the icing on the cake. The real enticement to 

end war comes by addressing the root causes driving violent conflict through the use of principled negotiation. 
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Employing Principled Negotiation to Address Root Causes 

Negotiation, unlike warfare, is not a win-lose game. Stakeholders who take a “win-lose” orientation to peace are unlikely to achieve sustainable outcomes. There are three broad approaches 

to negotiation. Soft negotiation assumes that reaching agreement requires the acceptance of 

concessions, losses, and compromise. Hard negotiation assumes that winning requires making 

threats, demanding concessions, and sticking to strict public positions requiring the other side 

to lose. Successful peace processes require principled negotiation where the goal is to solve 

problems by finding options that meet the basic underlying interests (not public positions) of 

all stakeholders. Principled negotiation aims to create a “win-win” solution that all stakeholders 

can accept.41

Principled negotiation is interest based; it requires each stakeholder to identify their core, 

underlying interests and needs beyond their public positions. An analysis of underlying interests of all sides, beyond their public statements, can assist in finding mutually satisfying 

agreements or outcomes that all sides can live with. Principled negotiation is different from 

positional negotiation where stakeholders make absolutist public positions that make progress difficult. Negotiations based on wholesale compliance have a high risk of failure. It is 

best to avoid preconditions to talks as they make it impossible to even learn about the other 

stakeholder’s interests or to explore creative options for addressing underlying interests. Small, 

unilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs) build trust for more substantial negotiations 

and undermine antagonistic leaders. Hiding underlying interests only delays understanding or 

contributes to conspiracy theories. It may be very difficult for groups to use an interest-based 

approach to negotiation without the help of an outside mediation team coaching them to reality test their BATNA and explore their underlying interests.

For example, with the help of former president Jimmy Carter as a mediator, Egypt and Israel reached a win-win outcome to their negotiations over the Sinai Peninsula, though initially 

both groups had taken a win-lose approach that demanded full ownership of the Sinai for their 

respective sides. But through the process of principled negotiation they came to see that their 

underlying interests were not mutually exclusive. Israel wanted to make sure Egypt’s military was 

not on its border. Egypt wanted to maintain its historic tie to the land. The agreement that the Sinai would be a demilitarized zone under Egyptian control met both sides’ underlying interests.

In Afghanistan, negotiating on underlying interests rather than public positions is essential. For example, Taliban leaders generally talk about achieving a true Islamic and independent 

system but have been vague on their political platform and unclear about their underlying 

interests. It is impossible to negotiate or reintegrate armed opposition groups without knowing 

these interests. When the Taliban were in power, the expression of these interests was grave intolerance of religious and political pluralism and repression of women. It is hard to imagine any 

negotiation with the Taliban if their underlying interest is this type of repression. The Taliban 

also oppose perceived imposition of Western cultural values and development goals aimed at 

“modernization.” The symbol of Western cultural imposition is a provocatively dressed woman 

on a billboard. There is a lot of room for negotiation between this extreme and the demand that 

women wear burqas and that girls not receive education. Many traditional Afghan religious 

and secular leaders do see the benefit of educating girls and including women’s leadership. 

Taliban leaders and religious leaders have permitted development and even activities aimed at 

women’s empowerment when they are locally led and directly benefit the community.

Likewise, the Taliban demand that the United States withdraw immediately and have no 

permanent bases also requires discussion of underlying interests including sovereignty and 
17

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

cultural integrity. Given the history of external countries besieging Afghanistan, there are legitimate and shared concerns about the level of control and presence of outsiders. Discussing 

these underlying interests and ways to address them with creative, mutually satisfying options 

is essential.

Recognizing Three Key Themes in an Afghan Peace Process

Current negotiations in Afghanistan probably focus on “talks about talks.” If they go deeper 

than that, media reports suggest the discussions focus on gaining Taliban agreement to stop 

fighting, securing Taliban recognition of the Afghan Constitution, ending Taliban ties with 

al-Qaida on the one hand, and addressing the Taliban’s insistence that the United States not 

set up permanent bases in the country.42 This agenda leaves out many issues that fuel the 

current conflict. A comprehensive Afghan peace process would orchestrate work in three areas: developing a high-level political settlement between armed groups; increasing legitimacy 

for the Afghan government; and building a national public consensus on the future relations 

between diverse groups. A political settlement without significant progress in the two latter 

dimensions would be unlikely to produce a sustainable peace.43 Figure 2 illustrates these three 

components of a peace process. Box 3 gives a longer list of the overlapping issues in each of 

these dimensions.

Issues between armed groups. High-level reconciliation and low-level reintegration are important 

components of an Afghan peace process. There are many contentious issues between international forces, the Afghan government, and armed opposition groups. The concept of principled 

negotiation and community-level peacebuilding provides a foundation for thinking through a 

more meaningful plan for reintegration and reconciliation between armed opposition groups 

Figure 2. Three Central Themes of an Afghan Peace Process
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and Afghan society. There are many issues requiring discussion between armed groups. Those 

mentioned frequently include the status of forces of armed troops, whether the United States 

will keep permanent bases in Afghanistan, how armed groups take accountability for civilian 

deaths, and issues like drug trafficking and the interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) and how 

this impacts the rights of minorities and women.

There are significant divisions within the international community, within the Afghan 

government, and within armed opposition groups. The international coalition disagrees on 

the level of success they are achieving, with some pulling their troops out for lack of progress. Within the Afghan government, well-intentioned bureaucrats disagree with colleagues 

profiting from the corruption, drug trade, and military conflict. Within the armed opposition 

groups, divisions over whether to negotiate and how to define the ideal outcome of the armed 

conflict are so great that groups kill each other even though they share a common enemy in 

the government and international forces. Armed opposition groups fight for different reasons. 

Some fight against repressive government warlords and government corruption. Some fight to 

avenge the humiliation felt as a result of foreign troops’ house searches, night raids, and bombs. 

Some have simple economic motives to secure basic employment or more greedy, ambitious 

economic motives to profit from the instability.44

When it comes to identifying government corruption or drug trafficking as a key issue in 

the conflict, the international community, some armed opposition groups, and Afghan civil 

society share many similar concerns. If negotiations continue to exclude civil society, armed 

Box 3. Issues Requiring Negotiation and Discussion in a Comprehensive Peace Process

Presence of foreign troops

Presence of permanent bases and status of forces agreements for foreign troops

Process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed opposition groups

Interpretation and versions of sharia

Accountability for civilian deaths

Presence of local militias

External interests in Afghanistan

Balance of power between the central government and the local villages and districts and 

between different ethnic groups to ensure minority rights and protections

Protection of constitutional rights to education, political access, and freedom of expression

Addressing war crimes through memorials to past victims, truth telling and fact gathering, 

accountability of offenders to victims, and victim compensation

Addressing corruption

Addressing crime and drug trafficking

Increasing sense of citizenship and citizen oversight of corruption, crime, drug trafficking, 

the security sector, and other areas requiring public input

Developing a national narrative that addresses diverse groups’ unique historical 

experiences

Building trust and respect between different ethnic and linguistic groups and protecting 

minority rights to foster a national unity and confidence that Afghans support human rights 

and security not just for their own group but for all segments of the population

Respecting and protecting women’s rights
19

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

opposition groups may bring this issue into formal negotiations. This is problematic because 

successful peace processes require structural reforms and it is civil society that can most authentically argue for these reforms. The armed opposition groups are able to appeal to Afghans 

precisely because locals perceive their stated grievances on government corruption and drug 

trafficking as legitimate. The international community and Afghan civil society, on the other 

hand, rightly point a finger at all those in armed opposition groups, the Afghan government, 

and the international community who profit from the ongoing war, recognizing that international funding channeled through corrupt hands lands in the pockets of these war profiteers.45

Another strange alliance occurs when the Afghan government and the armed opposition 

groups all condemn civilian casualties caused by international forces. Official negotiations are 

more like a triangle rather than a line between two sides. In each corner of the triangle, groups 

could find strange bedfellows to address shared interests.

All sides share a concern about the influence of external interests in Afghanistan. International forces are concerned about the influence of Pakistan, Iran, China, and other countries. In 

repeated polls and focus groups,46 a majority of Afghans report a perception that Pakistan plays 

a significant role in supporting the Taliban. The armed opposition groups share a concern with 

Pakistan that India is trying to win favor with the Afghan government. Informal conversations 

with diverse groups of Afghans and Pakistanis reveal that many believe the war in Afghanistan 

cannot be ended without robust regional diplomacy that also includes Pakistan, India, Iran, 

Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, China, and other countries. The public 

widely perceives a lack of sustained diplomatic activity or sufficient economic, political, security, and territorial incentives for countries in the region to participate in such a process. Armed 

opposition groups get support from external bases thus requiring that any peace process include political solutions on all sides of Afghanistan’s borders. 

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed opposition groups 

is also a key issue needing discussion between the leadership of armed groups. The Afghan 

government’s reintegration program, called the Afghan Peace and Reconciliation Program 

(APRP), has competing goals at the local level. On the one hand, ISAF sees it as a component 

of counterinsurgency, to weaken or cause divisions within an insurgency.47 On the other hand, 

civil society groups in Afghanistan see the legitimate role of reintegration to reduce violence 

and foster community reconciliation by addressing key grievances. 

Civil society leaders critique reintegration efforts that rely on “buying off ” or bribing 

armed insurgent groups rather than addressing key local grievances that fuel the insurgency, 

noting financial incentives address the symptoms of the disease but not the disease itself.48

The APRP would be more likely to be successful if it focused on local grievance resolution 

rather than on attempts to buy off insurgents. Ideally, DDR efforts replace the economic and 

security value of a weapon with local security guarantees and economic opportunities. These 

efforts help excombatants save face and address some of their core grievances through the 

creation of internally generated economic, security, political, and identity based incentives 

described earlier in this report. Sustainable DDR requires reconciling relationships, understanding and acknowledging all stakeholder’s interests and basic needs, moving together to 

identify mutually satisfying agreements that all stakeholders can live with, and establishing a 

“good enough” solution.49

Issues facing government legitimacy. Successful peace processes address root causes driving violence. In Afghanistan, corruption and structural problems with the current Afghan 
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government and its approach to drug trafficking and the security sector are key driving 

factors fueling support for armed insurgent groups and preventing the Afghan public from 

supporting its government. In Afghanistan, as in many other countries, structural reforms 

are an essential part of a peace process. Bolstering government legitimacy in Afghanistan 

requires a peace process that addresses corruption, elite control over government, political 

exclusion of women and minorities, and the need for significant structural reforms. 

Research shows that Afghans do identify with and support the concept of an Afghan state 

and representative democracy, though one based on local tradition, culture, and Islamic religion.50 However, Afghans widely perceive Westernized democracy and the rest of the international project in Afghanistan as a self-perpetuating system that fuels the insurgency,51 creates 

an environment for war profiteering,52 and politically disenfranchises most Afghan citizens by 

rewarding warlords with illegitimate political power through armed force rather than provision 

of public services.53 The challenges of nation building in Afghanistan also include significant 

distrust and tensions between ethnic groups that vie for political control and exclude other 

groups.54 Afghan citizens point toward the inadequate quality of and widespread corruption 

within state institutions. Civil society fears that a political pact between warlords, a corrupt 

government, and armed opposition groups would pave the way for more violence and further 

exclude legitimate political leaders who base their support on citizen consent rather than the 

power of the gun. 

National-level civil society organizations are increasingly vocal about their shared concerns 

about the current Afghan government, corruption, and the need for structural reforms. A peace 

process in Afghanistan that excludes civil society may not place as much emphasis on government corruption or structural reforms, as the international community supports the Karzai administration and that government has little interest in putting corruption or structural reforms 

on the negotiation table. While the Taliban or other armed opposition groups may bring the 

issue of corruption to the official negotiation table, this is unlikely to be a central concern given 

other priorities. Afghan civil society groups like Integrity Watch Afghanistan support communities in monitoring and reporting on corruption and promoting transparency.55 Afghan news 

journalists also play an important role in exposing corruption, though threats of retaliation, 

night letters, and killing of journalists create a challenging environment for the news media.56

Afghans’ sense of citizenship and citizen oversight of corruption, crime, drug trafficking, the 

security sector, and other areas require strategies for engaging public interests. 

A successful Afghan peace process will require increasing government legitimacy in the 

eyes of armed opposition groups and civil society by improving government performance in all 

areas of governance. Peace process efforts could focus on reducing widespread corruption and 

increasing the functioning and accountability of government ministries, particularly judiciary 

and police, by creating more effective checks and balances on state power via the constitution 

and guards against abuses of power. 

A peace process also requires strengthening the constitution’s protection of human rights, 

necessitating supervisory or monitoring bodies including civil society representatives. Countless other research reports outline these measures, but few put these issues as central to the 

success of a peace process. Reaching a political settlement in Afghanistan requires putting all 

these issues on the formal negotiation table. National civil society leaders assert “justice is as 

integral to sustainable peace as security.”57 National-level civil society leaders bring concerns 

that a peace process will undermine the Constitution, human rights, and justice. They assert 

that the Bonn Conference in 2001 included some individuals responsible for mass crimes 

Bolstering government 

legitimacy in Afghanistan 

requires a peace 

process that addresses 

corruption, elite control 

over government, political 

exclusion of women and 

minorities, and the need 

for significant structural 

reforms. 
21

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

against Afghan civilians while excluding others. Some of these individuals continue to experience impunity for their crimes, financially benefit from their criminal gain, and participate in 

government. In a joint statement about the peace process in November 2010, civil society leaders wrote, “we are concerned after listening to the speeches of High Peace Council representatives that the privileges/concessions promised to the Taliban should by no means undermine or 

compromise the achievements of the past nine years in terms of civic values and human rights, 

especially women’s rights, enshrined in the Constitution.” 58

These groups expressed concerns regarding the 2007 Afghan amnesty law that protects all 

past and present belligerents from prosecution. They assert the international community virtually ignored the passing of the law and failed to express a commitment to transitional justice 

processes, such as the investigation or prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape, 

and torture. In response, a coalition of twenty-four NGOs called the Transitional Justice Coordination Group organized a “victim’s jirga” to provide a space for recounting personal tragedies 

and war crimes under various regimes.59 These groups note that the concept of justice does 

not necessarily refer to public trials. At the very least, transitional justice would acknowledge, 

document, and verify crimes committed by all sides as a necessary part of public healing and 

transformation from decades of war toward a more stable and peaceful future. Justice, they say, 

requires developing creative mechanisms for holding perpetrators of crimes against humanity 

accountable, particularly ensuring that they are prevented from holding office. Transitional 

justice can include symbolic measures such as naming and shaming offenders for human rights 

violations via a truth-seeking commission, acknowledging victims through documentation, 

real and symbolic reparations, and efforts to foster trauma recovery, institutional reform, and 

reconciliation between groups.60 Civil society advocates a process of transitional justice to address past crimes and a culture of impunity. This concept of transitional justice is missing from 

plans for Afghan peace talks. 

Issues facing national and local civil society efforts to build a national consensus. Building a national 

public consensus requires a peace process design that includes public issues, represented by national civil society groups as well as local-level community input. Local-level civil society faces 

a different set of issues. Local-level conflicts stem from family feuds, land and water disputes, 

tribal and ethnic power struggles, and the impacts of national-level conflict. 

A successful peace process in Afghanistan links with the process of nation building; both 

require addressing the significant distrust and tensions between ethnic groups that vie for 

political control.61 Civil society groups assert the need to develop a national narrative that addresses diverse groups’ unique historical experiences and builds trust and respect between ethnic and linguistic groups. A public discussion also needs to include issues related to protecting 

women’s and minority rights to foster a national unity and confidence that Afghans support 

human rights and security not just for their own group but for all segments of the population. 

Civil society also identifies the design of the peace process itself as a key issue, highlighting the key principles of transparency and inclusion that should inform peace efforts.62 Civil 

society fears that government and armed actors will use negotiation to achieve narrow political goals that will benefit particular ideological, ethnic, tribal, or religious groups and leave 

out others, further fragmenting the country. Noting the importance of overcoming ethnic 

divisions and building trust, many NGOs, media outlets, journalist associations, and other 

forms of civil society have found ways to collaborate to raise jointly identified issues related to 

government reconciliation initiatives. For the public to support and trust a peace process and 
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PEACEWORKS 75

peace agreement, the process needs to be transparent and include civil society concerns, such 

as addressing impunity and transitional justice issues using restorative justice practices and 

building trust between ethnic groups. National-level civil society has a key role in monitoring 

peace efforts to ensure that they respect and do not undermine basic principles of women’s 

rights and justice issues. Civil society leaders look for a just peace process that will uphold 

human dignity and include robust mechanisms for public input. 

The “How” of an Afghan Peace Process: Mechanisms for 

Structuring Public Input, Technical Support, and Coordination

Part of the reason why half of all peace agreements fail is because of too much of an emphasis 

on the signed agreement and not on the process. Transitions from war to peace fail when leaders 

rush the delicate process or leave too many difficult issues vaguely defined. A peace process 

is essentially about creating structured mechanisms for participatory deliberation and decision making involving diverse stakeholders. Peace requires a multileveled process involving 

top, middle, and community levels of society to assess the root causes of the conflict, propose 

creative options for addressing these problems, address basic needs and rights, and develop a 

national consensus for peace. A successful peace process combines high-level negotiation with 

vertical processes that link high-level negotiations with public dialogue processes. Successful 

peace processes rely not on one negotiation table, but on the construction of a sequenced and 

coordinated process with multiple negotiation tables or channels feeding into a central negotiation table. 

Figure 3 illustrates this four-tiered peace process including all stakeholders. Given the regional nature of the conflict in Afghanistan, a regional peace process is an essential component 

Figure 3: Four-tiered Design of a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Regional Diplomacy: Political representatives of international forces, representatives from neighboring counties and 

regional organizations

National-Level Negotiations: Afghan 

government, armed groups, international forces, and representatives from 

diverse civil society sectors

National Afghan Civil Society Assembly: 

Diverse sectors of society such as religious 

leaders, media professionals, labor unions, 

universities, NGOs, women’s groups, etc.

Local-Level Peace Processes: Local 

government, local civil society leaders, and 

local armed opposition groups

Successful peace 

processes rely on 

the construction of 

a sequenced and 

coordinated process 

with multiple negotiation 

tables or channels 

feeding into a central 

negotiation table. 
23

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

of an Afghan national peace process. Like the national process, the regional process should also 

include multiple negotiation tables for addressing the diverse interests of Afghanistan’s neighbors and the international community and for creating confidence-building mechanisms and 

oversight to monitor illegitimate external involvement. At the national-level in Afghanistan, a 

peace process could include both military negotiation tables for armed groups to discuss ceasefires as well as nonmilitary negotiation tables.63 National-level forums could provide communication channels for all armed groups, even those not willing to negotiate directly. Shuttle 

diplomacy and conciliation by respected peacemakers can assist this process. In addition to 

including the Afghan government, regional governments, and political representatives from 

international forces, a comprehensive Afghan national peace process should have opportunities 

for deliberation between national civil society organizations in Afghanistan and neighboring 

countries and mechanisms to include citizens in local community-level peace processes.

Successful peace processes offer opportunities for both direct participation by stakeholders 

and for representative participation to ensure that a process is inclusive yet manageable. Adequate sequencing and spacing of negotiation tables allow the necessary internal discussions 

necessary for leaders to maintain the legitimacy and consent of the people they are representing in the peace process. Where groups are not willing to participate in direct negotiation, 

conciliatory channels are essential for opening up communication aimed at understanding key 

interests and motivations driving groups that support continued fighting. In this way, a peace 

process would include all stakeholders, recognizing that a stable peace requires addressing at 

least some of the core grievances and underlying interests of all groups.

The following section describes a range of public consultation mechanisms for including 

diverse civil society sectors and public input into the peace process in Afghanistan. It then 

describes the type of mediation and technical support needed to coordinate a comprehensive 

peace process.

Drawing on the Five Established Models for Public Consultation

There are five broad models of public participation in peace processes. Each is relevant to the 

design of a comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan. Unlike many other cultures, Afghans have a long tradition of participatory deliberation and decision-making jirgas and shuras

(councils) at the national and local levels and across different regions. Traditionally, these processes include male tribal and village elders and draw on customary law or local interpretations 

of Sharia law rather than the constitution, human rights, women’s rights, or other established 

legal standards. But civil society activists note the need to separate the jirga format—a deliberative process where people gather in a circle to discuss issues—from the notion that a jirga by 

definition excludes women and democratic representatives. Jirga and shura forums can evolve 

to draw on broader legal standards and include more diverse stakeholders. Most of the models 

described below require decisions to be made through modified consensus, as in the jirga or 

shura, where all stakeholders have an opportunity to voice their concerns and issues and decisions are made when there is broad, but not necessarily total, agreement.64

Direct local peace processes and agreements. When the authority to stop a war is not centrally 

located, high-level negotiations cannot create a national cease-fire or political settlements. 

In Mali, civil society initiated direct traditional decision-making processes based on local 

rituals and traditions for dialogue.65 These local processes resulted in local-level cease-fires 

and agreements that enabled previously stymied high-level negotiations to advance. These 
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local- level peace processes can take place simultaneously across a country and involve 

thousands of people. Each locality may work through a similar agenda of issues to identify 

stakeholders’ core grievances and develop local security guarantees, political power-sharing 

deals, and address economic and identity issues. Local communities then are responsible 

for implementing the agreements they make. These local peace processes can help create a 

national consensus that eventually leads to an end to the war. 

Local and traditional Afghan structures for deliberation, consensus building, negotiation, 

and decision making could play a larger role in a comprehensive peace process based on direct 

local participation as was the case in Mali. Relatively new district development assemblies 

(DDAs), community development councils (CDCs), and peace councils complement and 

build on the format of traditional jirgas and shuras but often include more diverse civil society 

sectors. Newer structures include members trained in principled negotiation and mediation 

and include a wider representation of community interests by involving women and people of 

different ages. In some places, women’s shuras or women-led CDCs and peace councils meet 

separately. The CDCs are nongovernmental, voluntary, unpaid, and democratically elected institutions operating across Afghanistan to help prioritize, design, and implement development 

projects such as health centers, irrigation systems, and schools with government funds. CDCs 

work in partnership with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s National 

Solidarity Program (NSP), blending locally owned, cost-effective development projects with 

efforts to increase local capacity for conflict management. Peace councils help communities 

find mutually satisfying solutions to key divisive issues such as corruption and ethnic divisions 

identified in the last section of this report. 

Afghan NGOs have been carrying out peacebuilding capacity-building programs in Afghanistan for the last twenty years.66 These programs address water and land disputes, domestic 

violence, and family issues, as well as conflicts within community development councils over 

setting development priorities. For example, in Sayedabad district of Wardak province, a local 

peace council mediated a dispute among four villages around a water and irrigation project. 

Through the process of mediation, the group agreed to finish the project to provide more effective water distribution to all four villages.67

Local peace councils already exist in many areas of Afghanistan to address local disputes 

over land, water, debts, domestic violence, and other community issues. In some parts of Afghanistan, civil society organizations are already identifying and training local peace councils 

in community grievance resolution processes to assist with conflicts directly related to the 

reintegrees and to leverage both formal and informal justice systems. As part of APRP, they 

help communities cope with reintegration and all of the everyday tensions that accompany real 

reconciliation efforts such as physical security, freedom of movement, economic well-being, 

and access to governance and justice, the five key areas identified as key indicators of human 

security in Afghanistan.68

For example, in a recent case in Helmand province, armed opposition groups agreed to 

stop fighting ISAF, reject out-of-area fighters, remove or show the location of planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs), allow freedom of movement to patrols, and accept ANSF 

checkpoints. In return, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) 

agreed to have all Afghan leads in compound searches, to ensure that there are Afghans 

partnered in all patrols, and to begin short-term cash for work and long-term economic development opportunities. 
25

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

These peace committees could play a central role in local-level peace processes based on 

addressing key grievances through principled negotiation to support a national-level process. If 

carried out across the country simultaneously, local-level negotiations could help build ceasefires, political power sharing, and security guarantees that would result in a more sustainable 

outcome and make a national peace accord possible. A comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan would view these local-level reconciliation processes as a core component of a national peace process. However, it is also conceivable that local-level deals could result in allowing armed groups to retain security responsibilities could prove problematic for a sustainable 

peace at the national level. Local-level peace processes thus need coordination mechanisms to 

ensure complementarity of local and national efforts.

Participation through consultation. In South Africa, local consultations across the country complemented and fed into high-level negotiations. In the Philippines, a National Unification 

Commission held local, regional, and national consultations to identify core drivers of the conflict and lay out alternatives to address them. In Guatemala, a Civil Society Assembly brought 

together representatives of diverse sectors such as labor and agriculture. Mayan communities 

played a major role, resulting in a written agreement recognizing their unique indigenous identity and rights. The agenda in the Civil Society Assembly included topics that had not been 

openly discussed for decades. This assembly created nearly two hundred specific commitments 

included in the final, formal peace agreement.69

These examples illustrate a model of civil society holding separate, broad consultations 

that run in parallel to official negotiations and/or are sequenced and coordinated with an official process (see figure 4). In this “accordion model” peace process, a sequence of small, private meetings and large public meetings move back and forth like an accordion opening and 

closing. A small, select group of key stakeholders negotiates over key issues while large, open 

processes seek input and creative generation of options from the public. 

Civil society consultations may look at the key divisive issues, possible creative solutions, 

and build a national consensus. Civil society’s diversity means that they may reflect the tensions evident between national political leaders. Public consultations can help make progress 

on difficult issues that may be blocking formal negotiation processes by allowing the public to 

deliberate and build consensus on them. 

3rd Round 

District Level 

Dialogue

Processes

2nd Round 

District Level 

Dialogue

Processes

1st Round 

District Level 

Dialogue

Processes

3rd Round 

District Level 

Dialogue

Processes

2nd Round 

District Level 

Dialogue

Processes

1st Round 

District Level 

Dialogue

Processes

National

Negotiation

Process

National

Negotiation

Process

Figure 4. Accordion Consultation Model 

If carried out across the 

country simultaneously, 

local-level negotiations 

could help build ceasefires, political power 

sharing, and security 

guarantees that 

would result in a more 

sustainable outcome and 

make a national peace 

accord possible. 
26

PEACEWORKS 75

A number of different conferences have brought diverse Afghan civil society leaders together to discuss their shared values and concerns.70 But these conferences are not structured 

as an ongoing Afghan civil society assembly tasked with representing diverse constituencies. A 

national-level Afghan civil society assembly, like that held in Guatemala, could play a key role 

in assuring that a wider set of issues makes it onto the formal negotiation agenda. An assembly 

could address some of the key issues affecting civil society, such as women’s rights or concerns 

from victims and human rights organizations about past and present human rights violations 

and the amnesty law. It could also play a key role in a peace process to build structures for 

public consultations on these and other issues such as corruption, ethnic tensions, and how to 

address the Taliban. An Afghan civil society assembly could also serve as a monitoring body 

for the National Peace Council, ensuring transparency and accountability. 

In Guatemala, the international community played a significant role in ensuring that the 

civil society process had sufficient resources both during its deliberation and in the implementation phase. Given that so many peace agreements fall apart during implementation 

challenges, it is important to note that a civil society assembly’s work does not end with an 

agreement. Rather, an assembly ideally continues to monitor a peace agreement and press for 

implementation in the postaccord phase.

Participation by representation. A third type of structure for peace processes includes a process of 

electing a representative group to work out the details of a peace agreement and/or a new constitution. Each group at the official negotiation table represents a group of constituents from a 

certain sector of society. In this type of a process, civil society sectors such as women’s groups, 

religious leaders, human rights groups, and labor unions have a representative participating in 

national-level negotiations. Even in cases where there is no direct election or representatives, 

it is assumed that the core negotiators are representing the interests of their groups. Often 

there is a great deal of conflict within a group. The core negotiator then is negotiating not only 

with other key stakeholders at the negotiation table, but also with the second and third tiers of 

stakeholder constituents whom they are representing, illustrated in figure 5.

In South Africa, a national-level, elected constituent assembly negotiated a new constitution. Religious leadership played a significant role in helping to foster values in reconciliation. 

Human rights groups shaped many of the discussions about accountability and compensation 

for victims. While no side achieved all of its goals, there was a national consensus built that 

moved the country toward a sustainable political solution. 

The benefit of this model is that the key issues of unarmed groups can be directly communicated to other key decision makers. This form of public participation can also incentivize the 

creation of new political parties or organizations that organize themselves to represent others’ 

interests. In the Northern Ireland peace process, citizens elected political parties who were part 

of the multiparty negotiation process. 

The challenge of this model is that there may be great competition for the designated 

seats. Elite and westernized civil society leaders may gain access to the process, but there is the 

question of whether they truly are in touch with diverse civil society sectors and village-level 

interests and perspectives. Effective representation requires agreement among civil society on 

a process to decide who directly represents their diversity. 

After the absence of any women in a number of national peace negotiations, global women’s groups mobilized to pass UN Security Council Resolution 1321, which mandates the 

inclusion of women’s representatives in peace processes. In peace processes in Southern Sudan, 
27

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

for example, women’s groups had a designated seat at the table. There could be a separate 

forum for discussion of the issues and interests important to certain groups, such as women’s 

groups or victims’ groups. These could be a formal or informal women’s negotiation table and a 

victims’ negotiation table, to help build consensus for strategies to assert their specific interests 

and ideas to address them. Representatives from these discussions could then articulate these 

interests at other negotiation tables that include representatives of other interests. 

An Afghan Civil Society Assembly could elect representatives to sit on the National Peace 

Council and represent diverse civil society interests at formal, high-level negotiations. The current Afghan National Peace Council, formed from the Consultative Peace Jirga’s mandate, 

mainly includes representatives from traditional and religious leadership, former Taliban, and 

former Northern Alliance members. The few seats allotted to women and civil society representatives do not represent the breadth of interests and concerns of different sectors.71 It is 

not clear that these civil society members represent a certain constituency or whether they are 

included only to present a token face of civil society.72 The National Peace Council could be the 

central negotiation table, the place where representatives from other negotiation tables, forums, 

or channels come to exchange views. By playing such a role, it could relieve pressure on other 

negotiation tables and make it more likely that a coordinated process could jointly develop 

Figure 5. Representation Model 

Representative

at Negotiation

2nd Tier

Constituent

2nd Tier

Constituent

3rd Tier

Constituent

3rd Tier

Constituent

3rd Tier

Constituent

Taliban

Government 

of

Afghanistan

Negotiation 

Table

Civil SocietyReligous

Leaders

Regional

Countries

International

Community

Civil SocietyWomen’s

groups

Civil SocietyNGOs
28

PEACEWORKS 75

solutions to the armed struggle, the crisis in government legitimacy, and the lack of a national 

public consensus on the future of Afghanistan.

Participation by referendum. In some cases, the public takes part in a referendum on a peace 

agreement developed by a negotiated agreement. Referendums allow the public to either say 

“yes” or “no” to a negotiated agreement. Ideally the news media and social marketing campaigns help educate the public about the contents of a peace agreement before the referendum.

In Northern Ireland and Macedonia, for example, the public had an opportunity to vote in a 

referendum to accept or reject the peace agreement developed by the constituent assembly. 

One of the benefits of public referendums is that it requires the authors of a peace agreement to have a stake in fully explaining it to the public and urging its support. The public, on 

the other hand, has the opportunity to oppose the agreement and at the same time the responsibility for supporting it should the referendum pass.

The Afghan government’s legitimacy gap requires a variety of strategies. Ensuring that the 

public has a vote in any peace deal is one way the Afghan government could increase public 

trust. While other structures for public input into a peace process are necessary, a public referendum on a final high-level agreement could significantly increase the chances that the public 

understands and supports such a deal. 

Participation via media. Afghan journalists and media producers have both the capacity and 

responsibility to supoort peace processes. Mass media can play several roles in supporting 

public participation in a peace process. First, the media has a role in educating the public 

about the contents of a peace agreement before a national referendum. Media entertainment 

formats as well as public service announcements, particularly on the widely available and popular Afghan radio stations, could support a peace process by providing educational materials 

on peacebuilding themes. In Northern Ireland, an international advertising firm developed a 

marketing campaign to support the Good Friday Peace Proposal. The firm conducted quantitative and qualitative research of key public concerns, developed specific advertisements 

to target each segment that would vote in the referendum, and monitored media coverage. 

The marketing campaign included colorful graphic posters, billboards, direct mail brochures, 

Internet ads, and public service announcements for television and radio to foster awareness 

and acceptance of the peace agreement among key constituencies.73 The public eventually approved of the peace agreements in the public referendum, which indicates that the campaign 

had some level of success. 

In Macedonia, a similar multimedia campaign pointed the public to the benefits of the 

peace agreement several months before a public referendum on the agreement. Audience 

identification and segmentation led to individualized messages about the peace agreement. 

The announcements produced in the Macedonian language focused on stability and security 

as the main benefits to Macedonians. The Albanian announcements emphasized extended 

civil rights to the Albanian minority as the result of the agreement. Again, the public referendum favored the agreement. It would be an exaggeration to attribute the positive outcomes of the referendum solely to the impact of the campaigns on public opinion. Such 

causation would be impossible to prove even though the correlation between the campaign’s 

goals and the voters’ intentions is apparent. 
29

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Second, media outlets can undertake polling of public attitudes on issues related to the 

peace process. Polls can help all stakeholders understand where there is consensus and where 

there is great division. 

Third, the mass media can foster public discussion to build a national consensus on a vision for a country’s future. Media outlets can also use two-way programming where audience 

members can, for example, call in to a radio show or send a mobile phone SMS (short message 

service) to discuss or register their opinions on issues relevant to the peace process.74 Afghan 

media should use more dialogue-based public programs to build national consensus on the 

future of the country and to address specific obstacles to peace. If the Afghan public is similar 

to audiences in other parts of the world, a media-savvy and skeptical public wants to make up 

its own mind and participate in constructing a vision of its future rather than having it forcefed through a steady diet of redundant advertisements from international security forces, the 

Afghan government, or the Taliban seeking to manipulate public opinion. In Afghanistan, 

more participatory media programs could empower local people and prompt reflection. But 

fostering participatory, media-based dialogue requires new skill sets to handle the inevitable 

antagonism and diversity when people begin to dialogue. Radio call-in shows, for example, do 

not communicate nonverbal cues people often use in Afghanistan’s rich cultures, thus making 

dialogue and understanding even more difficult. Afghan media professionals should receive 

training in how to facilitate media-based dialogue so as to highlight common ground and 

identify potential solutions developed by audience participation. 

Developing Mediation and Technical Support for an Afghan Peace 

Process

Coordinating a multitiered peace process requires committed teams of internationals, government, and civil society working together. A multidimensional peace process with large 

numbers of stakeholders by necessity requires a mediation team or technical support group 

to coordinate efforts. Outsiders often do not coordinate with each other, creating a sense of 

confusion and redundancy of effort. A peace process is always somewhat chaotic. But it can 

turn into a cacophony if local and international stakeholders all sing from a different sheet of 

music. Ideally, the international community develops a comprehensive strategy and regular 

channels of communication to support a mediation effort, a strategic package of incentives 

and sanctions, and both the shorter-term support to reach a national peace agreement and the 

longer-term support to monitor the implementation of an agreement. Coordination helps to

ensure that all elements of international assistance and intervention in conflict-affected states 

are supportive of a peace process. Coordination in developing and applying a shared strategy 

to prevent certain stakeholders from spoiling the agreement is a common theme among successful processes.75

Using Mediation Teams

Mediators assist stakeholders in achieving a principled negotiation process of identifying underlying grievances, developing a joint analysis of key differences and common ground between stakeholders, and brainstorming creative options for addressing the underlying interests 

of all stakeholders. Mediators assist in this process by bringing cultural insight, authority and/

A media-savvy and 

skeptical public wants 

to make up its own 

mind and participate in 

constructing a vision of its 

future rather than having 

it force-fed through a 

steady diet of redundant 

advertisements.
30

PEACEWORKS 75

or skills and knowledge to help the stakeholders through a process of negotiation. A mediator can test the reality of each side’s perceptions and check for miscommunication and 

misunderstanding. 

Mediation has been an essential component of many comprehensive peace processes, particularly in Africa.76 In South Africa, a technical support team skilled in mediation helped 

key negotiators on all sides develop the skills needed to reach a peace agreement. Armed 

groups are more likely to engage in constructive negotiation efforts if they are familiar with 

the negotiation process and skilled in negotiation techniques. All stakeholders benefit when 

all sides have sufficient negotiation skills. The less prepared a group is to negotiate skillfully, 

the less likely a negotiated outcome is possible. Technical support and capacity building on 

negotiation and the process of mediation for all key stakeholders makes success more likely.77

Denying technical support to an armed adversary is counterproductive. The less a group is able 

to negotiate constructively, the less likely it is that other stakeholders will be able to achieve 

their own outcomes.78

Mediation and technical support teams draw on expertise from a range of contexts and 

peace processes in other countries to assist stakeholders in the negotiation and dialogue process. Ideally there are two mediation teams, with one including insiders/locals that hold extensive social capital networks with diverse stakeholders and the other including outsiders/

internationals with comparative experience with peace processes in other countries.79 These 

teams carry out a number of roles that serve a variety of functions, including the following:80

■ Process designers and planners. Develop proposals for how the peace process will work, with 

various mechanisms for input by diverse stakeholders. Ensure that all stakeholders accept 

the location of meetings, arrange for security and detail protocols at meetings, maintain a 

level of confidentiality, and follow other ground rules to foster respectful interactions. 

■ Trainers. Offer stakeholders conflict-coaching training in negotiation, handling and speaking with news media, and other skills necessary to a peace process.

■ Analysis. Engage in ongoing analysis and assessment of political, social, economic, and 

security dynamics impacting the peace process.

■ Good offices. Provide good offices or access to information related to the conflict needed by 

stakeholders.

■ Envoys. Help identify, communicate with, transmit messages between, and convene diverse 

stakeholders.

■ Models. Demonstrate respect for all stakeholders and constructive communication.

■ Process facilitators. Ensure each stakeholder has adequate and roughly equal time to share 

their perspectives, identify shared grievances, highlight common ground, develop creative 

options, and design next steps together. 

■ Reality testers. Challenge stakeholders to identify their best alternatives to a negotiated 

agreement and consensus on the way forward for the country. Identify the costs of not 

reaching an agreement. 

■ Catalysts. Act as catalysts for new forums, programs, and institutions to foster the peace 

process and ongoing peacebuilding.

■ Sustainers. Provide continuity and sustainability to a long-term, dynamic process.

Armed groups are 

more likely to engage in 

constructive negotiation 

efforts if they are familiar 

with the negotiation 

process and skilled in 

negotiation techniques.
31

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

■ Monitors. Follow the implementation of agreements and offer support, sanctions, and 

incentives where appropriate.

In past peace processes in other countries, mediators succeeded in getting groups to agree 

to a political settlement but left agreements vague in terms of implementation. Exhaustion has 

led many mediation teams to let others “work out the details.” But this endangers the whole 

process. Mediation and technical support teams should remain available during the implementation phase of peace agreements, as so many peace agreements fail because stakeholders are 

unable or unwilling to put agreements into practice.

Given the complexity of stakeholder interests, a comprehensive Afghan peace process is 

more likely to succeed with the help of internal and external mediation and technical support teams. An internal mediation or technical support team could draw from Afghan civil 

society expertise and experience in decades of peacebuilding between political, ethnic, and 

religious groups in Afghanistan. Afghan civil society’s peacebuilding capacity could also support the development of internally generated incentives such as face-saving mechanisms for 

reintegration via grievance-resolution processes. Civil society has a crucial role in helping 

local governments, tribal leaders, and armed opposition groups identify core grievances and 

develop local solutions and written agreements. This internal mediation support team should 

include members from different ethnic groups and those with diverse constituencies. But 

most important, the Afghans on the internal mediation support team should have technical 

expertise in peacebuilding, have demonstrated their personal commitment to interacting with 

all stakeholders, and be people who do not stand to personally gain from the outcome of a 

negotiated agreement. 

Understanding the Structures and Challenges of International Support 

and Coordination

Most successful peace processes receive substantial and ongoing support from the international community. The role of outsiders in a negotiation process is delicate. Internationals may 

be perceived as tainted because of their country’s role. Personality and personal networks may 

also be at play. Some diplomats may have more success than others in playing a conciliatory 

role to move groups toward a negotiation or an agreement. Mediators and technical support 

teams should have legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders. 

International support for peace processes comes in a wide variety of models. In rare cases, 

one international mediator takes the lead and attempts to guide the coordinated effort required for a comprehensive peace process. In most cases a group of states work together in 

either a “Contact Group” such as the Quartet group working with Israelis and Palestinians or 

a more informal and mid-level “Group of Friends” made up of four to six countries that support a mediation team effort related to a peace process. Other forms of international support 

include monitoring implementation of agreements such as the Joint Monitoring Commission 

in Namibia or the Peace Implementation Council in Bosnia that coordinated international 

assistance and support for the region after the Dayton Accords.81

The benefits of these forms of international coordination and support mechanisms are 

that outside countries can bring additional leverage, information, resources, and practical 

help with the coordination. Working together, a group is more likely to be able to put together a strategic package of internal and external incentives and sanctions that complement 
32

PEACEWORKS 75

stakeholders own motivations and interests to move groups toward resolution. Successful 

peace processes often enjoy support from regional countries such as the roles that Mexico 

played in the Central American peace processes and Australia and New Zealand’s roles 

in East Timor’s. peace process. In El Salvador and Guatemala, Mexico’s relationship with 

insurgents made it easier for them to pressure insurgent negotiators while the U.S. pressured governments it had long supported. In Sudanese peace process, the U.K. liaised with 

the North, the U.S. related to the South and Norway used conciliation strategies with both 

North and South.82

But there are also challenges to international coordination. A Group of Friends model, 

for example, has proven most effective when the Group of Friends’ interests align. When 

there are competing interests, conflicts between the Friends can further complicate already 

delicate negotiations. The Group of Friends supporting the Georgia/Abkahz conflict, for example, experienced a great deal of conflict among themselves over their fifteen years working 

together. In situations where the international interests in a peace process diverge, it may be 

necessary to address the conflict between outside groups wanting to foster a peace process; 

even a “mediation among potential mediators.” Furthermore, external countries often have 

few diplomats with comparative experience with comprehensive peace process, so they have 

little technical expertise to share. Furthermore, internal political and budgeting constraints 

in countries wanting to be involved in a peace process can bring conflicting funding schedules with many pouring an overabundance of funds into short-term projects. But the payoffs 

of short-term investments in a peace process may be lost without longer-term support for 

implementation of agreements and consultation mechanisms. The resulting cacophony of 

conflicting and competing interests and actions may actually prove to pose an even greater 

challenge or threat to internal groups aiming to foster peace.83

International coordination efforts in Afghanistan face a maelstrom of challenges. Afghans 

perceive that most internationals such as the United States have their own interests in Afghanistan that may not always align with Afghan interests. Afghanistan’s regional neighbors more 

often play a more menacing role than a constructive one. They may even perceive an “unstable” 

Afghanistan as in their interest and attempt to spoil a peace process. In past peace processes, 

coordination among different groups proved challenging. First, outsiders in the international 

community have different and sometimes conflicting or even competing interests. The United 

Nations and United States have the most investment in the conflict and a desire and responsibility for a role in coordination. Yet both the U.N. and U.S. are seen as a party to the conflict 

by virtue or their support for the GIROA. A number of commentators note the problems with 

a U.N. or U.S.-mediated peace agreement and suggest instead that a more neutral, and preferably Muslim, country may have more success. 

A United Nations team could provide critical technical support and bring comparative 

experience from other contexts. However, the United Nations’ role might best be to support 

other outside mediators or technical support teams from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United 

Arab Emirates, or regional organizations like the Organization of the Islamic Conference 

(OIC) or the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), as these 

may be seen as more acceptable alternatives to UN mediators.84 Canada, Italy, and Germany 

have also invested resources in a potential peace process and countries such as these may be 

able to play the role of a Group of Friends.
33

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Conclusion and Recommendations

A comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan requires a much more deliberate design than 

currently exists. The hope of a quick and tight negotiation process is as illusory as the fantasy 

that firepower will achieve victory. The road to peace in Afghanistan is not short. Maneuvering through Afghanistan’s internal and regional political dynamics is no less challenging than 

five-dimensional chess. 

The Afghan government, Afghan civil society, and the international community should 

draw on lessons learned from other countries to ensure that an Afghan peace process

■ helps all stakeholders recognize the need for an inclusive process and to create mechanisms, 

or even communication channels to hear the interests and concerns of all groups, even 

those deemed irrelevant or extremist;

■ supports the ability of all stakeholders to use principled negotiation to address the root 

causes and underlying interests of each group;

■ assists each stakeholder in assessing and reality testing their best alternative to a negotiated 

solution and helps stakeholders develop internally generated incentives—economic, security, political, and identity-based—so that agreements are more likely to be sustainable over 

the long term;

■ develops internal and external mediation and technical support teams.

Recommendations for the Afghan Government

1. Consult with Afghan civil society in the design of a comprehensive peace process. The Afghan 

government already asks civil society organizations to help build public support for peace 

initiatives. But civil society organizations with long-term expertise in local-level mediation and negotiation processes have not been consulted in the development of government 

reconciliation and peace initiatives.

2. Invest time in training the National Peace Council. Allow internal and external technical 

support teams with extensive experience in peace processes and peacebuilding to share 

skills and conceptual frameworks on principled negotiation and mediation processes.

3. Identify existing incentives and what, if any, negative implications there are to these incentives. 

Determine how to create or redesign internal and external incentives in each of the four 

categories, particularly incentives that can open up new possibilities for persuading key 

stakeholders to pursue peace. Sequence incentives for different stages of the peace process, 

from enticing armed groups to the negotiation table, to staying through difficult issues, 

and finally to implementing a peace agreement.

Recommendations for Afghan Civil Society

1. Develop a diverse and representative Civil Society Assembly. Create an ongoing mechanism 

and forum for identifying key issues and redline interests, such as protection of minority 

and women’s rights. 
34

PEACEWORKS 75

2. Invest time in training and capacity building. Give and receive training from technical 

support teams on principled negotiation and mediation processes.

3. Work with the National Peace Council. Develop and coordinate public consultation 

mechanisms.

Recommendations for the International Community

1. Recognize that current international military and financial assistance creates obstacles to a 

successful peace process. The greatest leverage available to the international community is less 

military and financial investment, not more. Current levels of military and financial 

investments keep the existing dysfunctional system in place, allowing the government to 

forgo the hard work of earning public legitimacy and consent to govern and providing 

financial benefits for the continuation of the war and instability. 

2. Urge support for a comprehensive Afghan public peace process. Consult with a broad range of 

diverse local civil society leaders representative of the various ethnic groups to identify the 

ideal model of public participation in a peace process and how internationals could support this. 

3. Develop strategies for supporting Afghan civil society. The international community’s focus 

on supporting the legitimacy of the current government overshadow and even undermine 

efforts to build an Afghan nation with an active, engaged civil society. Internationals 

could reach out to develop better relationships with diverse civil society leaders in Kabul. 

Afghan-led civil society peacebuilding efforts such as peace councils and dialogue forums 

are low cost, yet plant the seeds for longer-term improved relationships.

4. Deploy more diplomatic staff. Finding a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan and 

the region requires more diplomats. For example, they are important for holding town 

halls to listen to the concerns, ideas, analysis, and points of view of Afghans in all sectors 

of society. Afghans and Pakistanis both desire a diplomatic surge, noting that they did not 

perceive a diplomatic surge to accompany the troop surge. There is a desire to have more 

U.S. policymakers listen directly to Afghan government ministers, parliamentarians, and 

civil society leaders.

5. Invite more Afghan government personnel and civil society leaders to Washington or other foreign capitals to talk with policymakers. Afghans wonder why so few are invited to speak to 

foreign policymakers about the future of their country. They ask how policymakers, who 

they perceive as knowing little about their culture and history, can talk about democracy 

in Afghanistan and then make such big decisions about U.S. policy in Afghanistan 

without listening to Afghans themselves express their analysis and hopes for the future. 

6. Develop a Group of Friends with teams of mediators and peace process technical support capacity. 

Small, well-trained teams who have specialist knowledge, experiences, and skills in working on comprehensive peace processes can advise and leverage the support from other 

sectors of government on behalf of developing a sustainable outcome. Deploy long-term 

support teams of mediators and diplomats to work on complex regional diplomatic initiatives. Ensure diplomats are trained in principled negotiation and mediation to help support a comprehensive Afghan peace process. Few governments have made supporting 

peace processes a priority. Technical support teams from a Group of Friends could provide 

financial support, coaching, negotiation training, and capacity-building measures to all 

The greatest leverage 

available to the 

international community 

is less military and 

financial investment, 

not more.
35

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

groups in an Afghan peace process, including civil society stakeholders. All parties must 

understand the process so that they can work together constructively.

Acknowledgments

I worked with a number of Afghan partners during the course of my research, including Mirwais Wardak of Cooperation for Peace and Unity and Peace Training and Research Organization, Aziz Rafiee of Afghan Civil Society Forum Organization, Nilofar Sakhi of Open Society 

Afghanistan, each of whom also made valuable contributions to this report. I also worked with 

Suraya Sadeed of Help the Afghan Children, former graduate students from Eastern Mennonite University Ramin Nouroozi, Farishta Sakhi, Hamid Arsalan, and Saeed Murad Rahi, 

and Ali Gohar of Just Peace International in Pakistan. Special thanks go to Nicole Birtsch and 

her team at Kabul University’s National Center for Policy Research, including Nargis Sadat 

Asghary and Omar Sadr. I also wish to thank the Ploughshares Fund and Afghanistan: Pathways to Peace, a project of Peacebuild: The Canadian Peacebuilding Network, which provided 

the funding for the research.
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PEACEWORKS 75

Notes

1. Peace Watch Committee, “Afghan Civil Society Statement on Peace and Reconciliation,” April 25, 2011.

2. Catherine Barnes, Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking: South Africa, Guatemala, and Mali

(London: Conciliation Resources, 2002).

3. Michael Semple, Reconciliation in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 

2009).

4. Peter Dixon, “Civil Society and a Comprehensive Peace Process” (conference paper, “Afghanistan: Pathways 

to Peace,” Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2009).

5. See Lisa Schirch, The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2004).

6. Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, New Jersey: 

Princeton University Press, 2004). 

7. Monica Duffy Toft, “Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 

2010): 7–36.

8. Catherine Barnes and Aaron Griffiths, “Influencing Resolution: External Roles in Changing the Strategic 

Calculus of Conflict,” in ACCORD: Incentives and Sanctions in Peace Processes (London: Conciliation 

Resources 2008), 14-17.

9. Thomas Ruttig, The Battle for Afghanistan: Negotiations with the Taliban: History and Prospects for the Future

(Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2011), 5. 

10. Interview with Christian Dennys, UK Defence Academy, June 12, 2011.

11. Barbara Walter, “Bargaining Failures and Civil War,” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (June 2009): 

243–61; Ending War: The Need for Peace Process Support Strategies, Accord Policy Brief (London: Conciliation 

Resources, 2009); and Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, 

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006), 13.

12. Fortna, Peace Time. 

13. Summarized from Public Participation in Peace Processes (London: Conciliation Resources, 2009); Barnes, 

Owning the Process; and World Development Report 2011 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011).

14. A. K. Jarstad and T. D. Sisk, eds., From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 2008).

15. Anthony Wanis-St. John and Darren Kew, “Civil Society and Peace Negotiations: Confronting Exclusion,” 

International Negotiation 13 (2008): 11–36. See, also, Anthony Wanis-St. John, “Peace Processes, Secret 

Negotiations and Civil Society: Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion,” International Negotiation 13 (2008): 

1–9.

16. “Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes” Accord 16 (London: Conciliation Resources, 

2005).

17. John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington, DC: United 

States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

18. See Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton, New Jersey: 

Princeton University Press, 2006). 

19. Guy Olivier Faure and I. William Zartman, eds., Negotiating with Terrorists (New York: Routledge Press, 

2010).

20. Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5−53.

21. Desiree Nilsson. “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War Settlements,” Journal of Peace 

Research (2008): 45.

22. See, for example, Allison M. Coady and Hussein Solomon, “Afghanistan’s Arrested Development: 

Combating Taliban Resurgence with an Eye for Lasting Peace,” South African Journal of International Affairs

16, no. 1 (April 2009): 103–14.

23. Wanis-St. John, “Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society,” 1–9.

24. Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Fragility and Conflict (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation 

and Development [OECD], January 2011).

25. For more on civil society’s roles in peacebuilding, see Lisa Schirch, Civil Society-Military Roadmap on Human 

Security (Washington, DC: 3D Security Initiative, May 2011), and Lisa Schirch, “Security from the Ground 

Up: Civil Society and the Security-Development Nexus,” Journal of International Peace Operation 4, no. 6 

(May 1, 2009).

26. Kanishka Nawabi, Mirwais Wardak, and Idrees Zaman, The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in 

Afghanistan (Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity, July 2007).

27. For more on Afghan civil society, see Mary Kaldor and Marika Theros, Building Afghan Peace from the 

Ground Up (Washington, DC: Century Foundation, 2011); Elizabeth Winter, Civil Society Development in 

Afghanistan (London: London School of Economics’ Center for Civil Society, June 2010); and Susanne 

Schmeidl, “Promoting Civil Society in Afghanistan: Deconstructing Some Myths,” in Petersberg Papers on 
37

Designing a Comprehensive Peace Process for Afghanistan

Afghanistan and the Region, ed. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber (Princeton: Princeton University, Liechtenstein 

Institute on Self-Determination, 2009).

28. Kaldor and Theros, Building Afghan Peace from the Ground Up, 3.

29. Ibid, 14–15.

30. Thomas Kirk, “Afghanistan: Reconciliation Plans, Tribal Leaders and Civil Society,” Small Wars Journal

(January 4, 2011): 5.

31. Kirk, “Afghanistan,” 6. 

32. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla (London: Hurst and Co, 2009).

33. Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin 

Books, 1981).

34. I. William. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford Press, 1989).

35. I. William. Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in International Conflict Resolution 

after the Cold War, ed. Paul C. Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 

September 2000). 

36. Matt Waldman, “Navigating Negotiations in Afghanistan,” Peace Brief no. 52 (Washington, DC: United 

States Institute of Peace, September 2010).

37. Conciliation Resources, Ending War, 2. 

38. See Aaron Griffiths and Catherine Barnes, eds., Powers of Persuasion: Incentives, Sanctions and Conditionality 

in Peacemaking (London: Conciliation Resources, 2009); Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes

(London: Conciliation Resources ACCORD, 2009); and Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, 

“Armed Conflict, Conflict Termination, and Peace Agreements 1989−96,” Journal of Peace Research 34, no. 

3 (January 1, 1997).

39. Sid Noel, ed., From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies

(Ottawa: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005).

40. Sarah Ladbury, Testing Hypotheses of Drivers of Radicalisation in Afghanistan: Why Do Men Join the Taliban 

and Hizb-i Islami? How Much Do Local Communities Support Them? (Afghanistan: Cooperation for Peace 

and Unity, August 2009).

41. Fisher and Ury, Getting to Yes.

42. Susanne Koelbl and Holger Stark, “Germany Mediates Secret US-Taliban Talks,” Speigel International 

Online, May 24, 2011.

43. Kirk, “Afghanistan: Reconciliation Plans,” 5.

44. Ladbury, Testing Hypotheses of Drivers of Radicalisation in Afghanistan.

45. Surendrini Wijeyaratne, Afghanistan: A Study on the Prospects for Peace (Ottawa: Canada’s Council for 

International Cooperation, March 2008), 31.

46. Washington Post/ABC News/BBC/ARD poll based on in-person interviews with a random national 

sample of 1,691 Afghan adults, October 29–November 13, 2010. See also Ladbury, Testing Hypotheses of 

Drivers of Radicalisation in Afghanistan.

47. Stanley A. McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment,” NATO International Security Assistance 

Force, Afghanistan, August 30, 2009. 

48. Matt Waldman, Golden Surrender? The Risks, Challenges, and Implications of Reintegration in Afghanistan 

(Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 2010).

49. OECD/DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (Paris: OECD, 2007) 101; Katrin Kinzelbach and 

Yasmine Sherif, “Security Sector Oversight, Violent Conflict and Peacebuilding,” in Public Oversight of the 

Security Sector, ed. Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert, and Katrin Kinzelbach (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the 

Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008) 341–57.

50. Anna Larson, Deconstructing Democracy in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 

May 2011).

51. “Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN 

Operations” (report, Wilton Park Conference 1022, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 

March 11–14, 2010).

52. See John Tierney, “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan,” 

in testimony to the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government and 

Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, June 22, 2010.

53. Mary Kaldor and Marika Theros, Building Afghan Peace from the Ground Up (Washington, DC: Century 

Foundation Report, March 2011), 12.

54. Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Ethnicising Afghanistan?: Inclusion and Exclusion in post-Bonn Institution 

Building,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004): 707–29.

55. Fighting Corruption From Within: Empowering Citizens to Reduce Corruption in Afghanistan (Kabul: 

Integrity Watch Afghanistan, June 2011).
38

PEACEWORKS 75

56. Farishte Jalalzai. “Mourning Abdul Samad Rohani,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free 

Afghanistan, June 10, 2010.

57. The statement of the one-day conference on justice and reconciliation, Kabul, November 10, 2010.

58. International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (statement at the conference titled “A Common Voice 

for Peace and Reconciliation,” Kabul, April 10−12, 2010).

59. Aunohita Mojamdar, “Afghanistan Peace Jirga’s Unlikely Critics: Victims of War Crimes,” MinnPost.com, 

June 2, 2010.

60. Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), The Action Plan on Peace, Justice and 

Reconciliation (Kabul: AIHRC, 2005).

61. Simonsen, “Ethnicising Afghanistan?”

62. Adapted from a variety of civil society statements, including the one made by ICTJ at the conference, “A 

Common Voice for Peace and Reconciliation”; Mary Kaldor and Marika Theros, “Building Afghan Peace 

from the Ground Up” (Washington, DC: Century Foundation, 2011).

63. Hamish Nixon, Achieving Durable Peace: Afghan Perspectives on a Peace Process (Oslo: Peace Research Institute 

Oslo, United States Institute of Peace, and Chr. Michelsen Institute, June 2011). 

64. This section draws on Conciliation Resources, Public Participation in Peace Processes, and Barnes, Owning the 

Process. 

65. Kåre Lode, as quoted in Conciliation Resources, Public Participation in Peace Processes.

66. Matt Waldman, Community Peace-building in Afghanistan (Kabul: Oxfam International, 2008). 

67. Cooperation for Peace and Unity Annual Report (Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 2008).

68. Peace Training and Research Organization, “Human Security Indicators,” 2011.

69. Rachel Sieder, “Reframing Citizenship: Indigenous Rights, Local Power and the Peace Process,” in 

Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997), 66. 

70. See, for example, the Canadian-funded and led conference in Kabul, April 2010, documented in Afghanistan: 

Pathways to Peace Phase One Summary December 2009–June 2010 (Ottawa: Peacebuild, 2010), and an Italianfunded-and-led process held in Rome, Italy, in 2011 called “Promoting Dialogue and Peace in Afghanistan: 

Strengthening Afghan Civil Society,” documented in Fabrizio Foschini, Towards a More United Voice of 

Afghan Civil Society: Step Two (Kabul: Afghan Analysts Network, May 6, 2011).

71. Patricia Gossman, “Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society,” Peace Brief no. 74, 

United States Institute of Peace, January 10, 2011. 

72. Ramin Nouroozi, Afghan Civil Society Perspectives on the National Consultative Peace Jirga (Washington, DC: 

3D Security Initiative, October 2010).

73. Alan Finlayson and Eamon Hughes, “Advertising for Peace: The State and Political Advertising in 

Northern Ireland, 1988–1998,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 20, no. 3 (2000): 397–412.

74. Gordon Adam. “Could the Media Save Afghanistan?” Prospect Magazine, July 7, 2010, www.spectmagazine.

co.uk/2010/07/could-the-media-save-afghanistan/.

75. Mediation and Peace Processes (New York: International Peace Institute, 2009).

76. Unpacking the Mystery of Mediation in African Peace Processes (Zurich: Swiss Peace, Center for Security 

Studies, and Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 2008).

77. Under current U.S. counterterrorism and material support laws, it is illegal for U.S.-based universities and 

organizations to provide negotiation training to the Taliban or other groups listed as terrorist 

organizations.

78. Conciliation Resources, Ending War.

79. Simon J. A. Mason, Insider Mediators: Exploring their Key Role in Informal Peace Processes (Berlin: SwissPeace 

and Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, 2009).

80. David Lord and Lisa Schirch, Mediation Teams and Peace Support Process (Ottawa: Afghanistan Pathways to 

Peace, 2009).

81. Teresa Whitfield, “Orchestrating International Action,” in ACCORD: Powers of Persuasion: Incentives, 

Sanctions and Conditionality in Peacemaking, ed. Aaron Griffiths with Catherine Barnes (London: 

Conciliation Resources, 2008.) 21.

82. Ibid., 21.

83. Ibid., 22.

84. Matt Waldman and Thomas Ruttig, Peace Offerings: Theories of Conflict Resolution and Their Applicability to 

Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 2011), 4.


About the Inst

itute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe. Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • 

George E. Moose (Vice Chairman), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in 

Residence, American University, Washington, DC • Chester A. Crocker, 

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, 

Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations at Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA • 

John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on 

Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, 

George Mason University, Fairfax, VA • Judy Van Rest, Executive Vice 

President, International Republican Institute, Washington, DC • 

Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership Conference on 

Civil Rights, Washington, DC Members Ex Officio

Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor • James N. Miller, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy • Ann E. Rondeau, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, 

National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

PW75_Cover_3a.indd 3 9/13/11 10:27:
In June 2011, Afghan president Hamid Karzai revealed publicly 

for the first time that the United States and the Taliban have been 

holding secret negotiations. To date, these negotiations have 

focused on a narrow agenda on conditions for the Taliban to lay 

down their arms and for the United States to leave Afghanistan—

and do not address other significant root causes of the current 

conflict, such as government corruption and ethnic tensions. 

Thus, they will be unlikely to lay the foundation for a sustainable 

peace. This report argues that a comprehensive peace process 

in Afghanistan requires a much more deliberate design than 

currently exists, calls attention to Afghan civil society’s capacity to 

support a national peace process, and offers recommendations 

to the international community, the Afghan government, and 

Afghan civil society for ensuring a more comprehensive, successful, and sustainable peace process.

Peaceworks • september 2011 • no. 75

Related Links 

■ Reconciliation in Afghanistan (2009) by Michael Semple 

■ The Kabul Courts and Conciliators: Mediating Cases in Urban Afghanistan

by Zuhal Nesari and Karima Tawfik (Peace Brief, August 2011)

■ NGOs and Nonstate Armed Actors by Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich 

Scneckener (Special Report, July 2011)

■ Afghan Civil Society and a Comprehensive Peace Process by Lisa Schirch 

(Peace Brief, July 2011)

■ Promoting Stability and Resolving Provincial Disputes in Afghanistan by 

Shahmahmood Miakhel and Noah Coburn (Peace Brief, June 2011)

■ Afghan Perspectives on Achieving Durable Peace by Hamish Nixon (Peace 

Brief, June 2011)

■ Missed Opportunities by Caroline Hartzell (Special Report, April 2011)

■ Making Peace in Afghanistan by Minna Jarvenpaa (Special Report, 

February 2011)

■ Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society by Patricia 

Gossman (Peace Brief, January 2011) 

United States Institute of Peace • 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • usip.org 

PW75_Cover_3a.indd 4 9/13/11 10:27: