U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

73–791 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–119] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NAVY, MARINE CORPS 

AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION 

PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 20, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 20, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 Navy, Marine Corps and Air 

Force Tactical Aviation Programs ....................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 20, 2012 ........................................................................................ 23 

TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE TACTICAL 

AVIATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Holmes, Maj Gen James M., USAF, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force; and Maj Gen John 

D. Posner, USAF, Director of Global Power Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition ................................................... 19 

Kendall, Hon. Frank, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Office of the Secretary of Defense ......................... 5 

Skinner, VADM W. Mark, USN, Principal Military Deputy Director to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), 

U.S. Navy; LtGen Terry G. Robling, USMC, Deputy Commandant of the 

Marine Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; and RADM Kenneth E. 

Floyd, USN, Director of the Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy ......................... 17 

Sullivan, Michael J., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 10 

Van Buren, David M., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, U.S. Air Force .............................................................................................. 7 

Venlet, VADM David J., Program Executive Officer for the F–35 Lightning 

II Program, U.S. Department of Defense ........................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 27 

Holmes, Maj Gen James M., joint with Maj Gen John D. Posner ................ 112 

Kendall, Hon. Frank, joint with David M. Van Buren and VADM David 

J. Venlet ......................................................................................................... 33 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 29 

Skinner, VADM W. Mark, joint with LtGen Terry G. Robling and RADM 

Kenneth E. Floyd .......................................................................................... 76 
Page

IV 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Sullivan, Michael J. .......................................................................................... 51 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Attachment 1: Prior GAO Reports and DOD Responses ............................... 131 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 135 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 139 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 179 

Mr. Jones ........................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 176 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 177 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 176 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR 

FORCE TACTICAL AVIATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 20, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:27 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. Good afternoon. Our hearing will come to order. 

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Navy, 

Marine Corps and Air Force budget request for tactical aircraft programs for fiscal year 2013. 

We have a number of issues to cover today, but my opening remarks will focus on the F–35 program. The F–35 program is what 

has been called the centerpiece of DOD’s [Department of Defense] 

long-term tactical aircraft planned force structure, with a major 

commitment of the Department’s projected budget dedicated to F– 

35 acquisition and operations. 

To date, significant technology and manufacturing capabilities 

have been demonstrated. Yet, after having already made a major 

commitment of resources to the program, progress in the development and early procurement of the F–35 has fallen significantly 

short of expectations. 

Since the beginning of the final phase of development in 2001, 

the projected cost of the total research and development and procurement program has grown from $233 billion to nearly $400 billion. Compared to the currently approved baseline, full-rate production had been delayed 5 years. 

The committee has supported, and continues to support, the F– 

35 program because of the high priority placed on the program by 

the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force, and the recognition that a 

fifth-generation fighter is required to operate and achieve the effects necessary in the projected future threat environments. 

However, early on in the F–35 program the committee had concerns with the acquisition strategy. In 2005, we disapproved the 

Department’s request for the first procurement funds for F–35s, citing the request as premature, given the maturity of the development program. Each year, we have continued to express concerns 

regarding rushing into procurement too soon and planning an aggressive increase in annual production before required technology 
2 

was demonstrated, design stability was achieved, and flight testing 

was complete. 

Unfortunately, the committee’s and others’ concerns regarding 

the program were well justified. As the Government Accountability 

Office reports, because of delays in research and development, and 

flight testing, the Department of Defense’s projected request for 

procurement of F–35 aircraft through 2017 have been reduced by 

approximately 75 percent compared to the original schedule when 

the program began in 2001. 

Compared to last year, the Department has removed procurement of 179 F–35 aircraft from its budget plan for fiscal years 2013 

to 2017. Expectations for the F–35 program remain very high. 

There has been a significant commitment of this Nation’s resources 

to the F–35 program, with major financial commitments required 

in the future. 

Much of the promised capability of the F–35 has yet to be demonstrated and, consequently, the future performance of the F–35 

acquisition program remains of major concern. Our witnesses have 

an extraordinary challenge and responsibility in the execution of 

the F–35 program, and we appreciate their personal commitment— 

professional commitment to the task. 

Before we begin, let me call on the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Reyes, for his opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, welcome 

this afternoon to this very important hearing. 

Today’s hearing on Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force tactical 

aviation programs will focus on some, as the chairman just articulated, very challenging issues. First among these issues is how to 

keep the F–35 program on track, while we also modernize the rest 

of our tactical aviation fleet. 

However, I think that keeping the big picture in perspective is 

also important. Despite the recent round of proposed reductions, it 

appears to me that the United States will remain the world’s undisputed leader in military aircraft capability for many years to 

come. We retain that lead not just because of the aircraft that DOD 

buys, but also because of the decades of knowledge our aviation industrial base has with respect to building sensors, advanced weapons, stealth capability and other aircraft features that other nations can only hope to some day have available. 

We also retain this lead because of the quality of our personnel, 

both in the air and also on the ground. A final reason we remain 

the preeminent military aviation power is the quality of our training, the quality of which is far beyond anything other nations even 

try to achieve. Simply put, we hold ourselves—as I think we 

should—to a very, very high standard. 

As a result, the challenges that we face in producing, manning 

and maintaining combat aviation capability must be put in the 

proper context. Overall, although I have some reservations about a 
3 

few proposals, I believe that the budget request before the subcommittee will allow the United States to maintain its current 

dominance in the air for the foreseeable future. 

With respect to the topic of the first panel of witnesses here before us, the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, I think it is important to 

keep a few critical issues in mind as Congress considers a way forward. For any major program, there is a constant balance to be 

struck between the urgency of the need for that program, the technical risks of the program and also, of course, the cost of the program. 

For the F–35, I think the need for the program is absolutely 

clear. The aircraft that we build in the next 10 years will be fighting the wars of the future. We have to think about the long term. 

Given the likely dispersion of various antiaircraft systems over the 

upcoming decades, it seems clear to me that unless the United 

States maintains its edge in stealth and other technologies that we 

simply won’t be able to project power, to deter aggression, and protect allies in the future. 

In short, to deter future enemies and win the wars of the future 

we need a large number of fifth-generation fighter aircraft, and the 

F–35 is the only program that we have to accomplish this goal. The 

second and third issues—technical risk and cost—can be summed 

up in the much talked about issue of concurrency, which refers to 

the simultaneous large-scale production and flight testing of the F– 

35 aircraft. 

While many Members are frustrated with the added costs of this 

approach to production and testing, it is important to point out 

that many of the decisions that led DOD to the current situation 

were made more than a decade ago. And significantly, over many 

years these decisions were, to a large degree, underwritten and endorsed by Congress. 

In my view, these decisions cannot now be undone without fundamentally breaking the program. However, much can be done to 

put the program on a better path. DOD has already cut back production of the F–35 dramatically in an effort to reduce the concurrency many Members here are worried about. Of course, this is 

also a limit to how far that F–35 production can be reduced before 

the program’s production effort begins to unravel. 

DOD’s current plan appears to be a good compromise between reducing concurrency and keeping production at a viable rate. While 

I would like to see higher production rates, I think that this plan 

is a responsible one and I intend to support it. 

However, while I support the need for the program, and DOD’s 

concurrent effort to fix the problems that it is encountering, I do 

not believe the F–35 program deserves what is commonly referred 

to as a blank check. This program has changed dramatically. As an 

example, it is important to remember that according to the original 

schedule for the F–35 we should be procuring 200 F–35s in fiscal 

year 2012, but instead we are procuring just 29. 

The program also faces significant challenges in terms of meeting 

critical technology requirements, keeping software development on 

time and on schedule, and reducing production costs. Overall, costs 

must be reduced, development must stay on schedule, and the gov-
4 

ernment and the contractor must work together in a constructive 

manner in order to keep the program on track. 

For the many other programs we will cover in today’s hearing, 

after reviewing the budget proposals I think the aviation programs 

for the Navy and Marine Corps are in relatively good shape. The 

Marines are on track to continue V–22 production at slightly lower 

rates, and continue upgrades to Harriers and F–18s, while also 

continuing to invest in the future, with various unmanned aircraft 

R&D [research and development] efforts. 

The Navy’s aviation portfolio also appears healthy, with fighter 

aircraft, helicopter and UAS [unmanned aerial systems] development and production remaining on track, when compared to last 

year. The Air Force, on the other hand, has proposed some changes 

that I am not yet fully convinced are in the Nation’s best interest. 

Chief among those changes is the decision to mothball a practically new, brand-new, fleet of Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft, each 

of which was procured at a cost in excess of $100 million. Just a 

few months ago, Congress was told that the Global Hawk Block 30 

was a program critical to protecting our Nation, and that they were 

no—that there were no alternatives to achieve its requirements at 

a lower cost. 

We are now being told precisely the opposite, largely based on 

just a few changes to operational requirements which appear to be 

on shaky ground in terms of real-world needs. A change this dramatic, in such a short time, suggests a purely budget-driven decision rather than one that reflects the appropriate balance of budget 

reality and operational requirements. 

Regardless of how the decision was reached, in my view no matter what the future holds, we will need more intelligence gathering 

capability and not less. If the United States does not reduce its 

forces in Afghanistan it will need even more ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] capability to hunt for terrorists and 

deter potential enemies, and give our combat commanders the intelligence they need to properly advise the Commander in Chief. 

Given this high demand for ISR assets, I think a more gradual approach to the Global Hawk program may be required. 

So I look forward to today’s testimony to seek further information on this and many other issues. And with that, Mr. Chairman, 

thank you for calling this hearing, and I yield back my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. We have two panels of witnesses this 

afternoon. The first panel will provide testimony on the F–35 program. The second panel will include Navy, Marine Corps and Air 

Force acquisition and requirements officials to provide testimony 

on their respective tactical aircraft programs. We welcome our witnesses today. 

We have an administrative challenge in our hearing today. We 

just finished a series of votes. In a little more than an hour we expect them to call another series of votes. That will be the last series 

of votes. It will last for roughly an hour. And after that, there is 

an off-the-Hill event that will take at least half of the members 

away from our committee. 
5 

So we will—without objection, your written testimony, of course, 

is a part of the permanent record. We will proceed with your oral 

testimony. We will abbreviate our questions and, with your permission, we will give you questions for the record because there are 

questions which we must have answered in our oversight responsibility. 

We will submit those for the record, and then we will proceed 

with the second panel so that we can get their testimony on the 

record and some abbreviated questions before the expected votes in 

a little more than an hour. 

Panel one, the Honorable Frank Kendall, Acting Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Mr. David M. 

Van Buren, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Vice Admiral David Venlet, a Program Executive Officer for 

the F–35 aircraft program; and Mr. Michael J. Sullivan, Director 

of Acquisition Sourcing and Government Accountability Office. 

Gentlemen, you may proceed. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND 

LOGISTICS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

Mr. KENDALL. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members of the subcommittee, we appreciate the opportunity for the Department to testify today on the Joint Strike Fighter program. I am 

Frank Kendall, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics. 

With me, of course, are Mr. David Van Buren, as you mentioned 

the Air Force acquisition executive, who currently serves as the acquisition executive for the Joint Strike Fighter program; and Vice 

Admiral David Venlet, the Program Executive Officer for Joint 

Strike Fighter. 

I would like to mention that next week Dave Van Buren will depart the Department of the Air Force after 4 years of incredibly 

valuable service in the Air Force’s acquisition leadership. We in the 

Department are tremendously thankful for the contributions Dave 

has made across the board in strengthening Air Force acquisition, 

by bringing strong professional technical management and business 

skills and acumen to everything that he does. 

Dave will be greatly missed, and the Department and I are very 

thankful for his service to the Nation. Vice Admiral Venlet came 

on board to run the Joint Strike Fighter program early in 2010, 

and we are also deeply grateful for his leadership on this program. 

The Joint Strike Fighter is the centerpiece of our future tactical 

aviation capability, and a key to implementing our recently published strategic guidance. Last fall, the Department engaged in a 

strategy and budget review in which everything, and I do mean everything, was on the table. After a careful look at the Joint Strike 

Fighter [JSF] program, the Department determined that we do 

need the JSF, that we need all three variants of the fighter, and 

that we need the planned inventory of 2,443 jets. 

It is essential for the Department to deliver a program that both 

meets these needs and is also affordable. 2011 was a year of strong 

progress in the Joint Strike Fighter test program. The program 

made continued progress in technical and production maturity. 
6 

However, you must recognize that there is still a long way to go 

for JSF. 

The flight test program is approximately 20 percent complete, 

and many of the more challenging elements of flight test are still 

ahead of us. Our focus is reflected in the written testimony. It is 

on managing risk and controlling program production and 

sustainment costs. The JSF program is undergoing the critical 

transition from development to production. 

Historically, this is always a difficult phase for any program, but 

particularly so for a high-performance aircraft. The JSF, however, 

has been more difficult because the program began production very 

early, as was mentioned when we discussed concurrency, well before flight testing had begun. 

This decision resulted in an unprecedented level of concurrency, 

which has subsequently driven the need for significant changes in 

the program. With this year’s budget, I believe we are now set on 

a course for program stability. The JSF program is now operating 

on a baseline that does account for the risk of additional design 

changes. 

The technical baseline review has given us a devolvement program that is realistic and includes margin to deal with unknown 

issues that may, and are likely to, arise. The production adjustments in the fiscal year 2013 budget give us a procurement profile 

that balances production efficiency to concurrency risk and delays 

production ramp-up until testing is more complete. 

The decision to adopt this profile was based, in part, on a quicklook review, which I commissioned last fall, and looked in detail at 

the concurrency risk in the program and the knowledge points that 

we need to achieve to retire that risk. Another step we are taking 

to manage that risk is that for production lots 6 and 7 we have developed a contracting approach that allows us to make event-based 

production commitments. 

Our contracting strategy also provides strong incentives for Lockheed to accelerate the incorporation of concurrency changes and retire concurrency risks as soon as possible, by ensuring that they 

share in concurrency costs starting in the fifth production lot. 

David Van Buren will go into more detail on our contracting approach in his statement. 

In 2012, we are continuing to increase our focus on sustainment 

costs, which will ultimately be the largest element of cost in the 

program. The program office, my staff, and the services began to 

tackle this issue over the last year, carrying out an initial review 

of the O&S, operation and support, costs. This effort focused on flying hours, repair parts, manpower and depot-level repairable items 

and consumables. 

The Air Force is also currently reevaluating its basing plans for 

F–35, another significant cost driver. This year, we will complete 

the business case analysis for sustainment, and take additional action to reduce costs. We will continue to attack Joint Strike Fighter 

operations and support costs throughout the program’s full life 

cycle. 

Let me close by saying that I appreciate the work this subcommittee has done in providing oversight to the Joint Strike 

Fighter program. We deeply appreciate the support you give to the 
7 

men and women of the armed services and to the Department generally day in and day out. 

With your permission, I would like to ask Mr. Van Buren to 

briefly discuss our contracting strategy, and Admiral Venlet to discuss the status of the development and production elements of the 

program. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Kendall, Mr. Van Buren, 

and Admiral Venlet can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. VAN BUREN, ACTING ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION, U.S. AIR 

FORCE 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reyes, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address 

this committee again regarding the F–35. Mr. Chairman, I would 

also like to thank you for your leadership in support of small business forums in which I was privileged to participate while I was 

in my position. 

Events such as these are vital for our national economy. I would 

like to echo Mr. Kendall’s comments regarding the importance of 

the F–35 program. Having been the F–35 acquisition executive 

since 2009, I believe the Department has taken numerous proactive 

steps in the management of the program. 

These modified business strategies over this time period include 

the following: number one, a complete restructure of the remaining 

development fee to be paid only when on-schedule accomplishment 

by the industry team is accomplished; number two, a change from 

a cost-plus incentive fee to a fixed-price incentive fee in LRIP [lowrate initial production] contract number four, which was 2 years 

earlier than had been planned. 

That new contract structure included a 50–50 share line and a 

tight, 120 percent ceiling. Number three, in December of last year 

contracts for Lot 5 were initiated via undefinitized contract actions, 

or UCAs, which will be definitized as fixed-price incentive fee contracts. 

In addition, the government’s cost risk is being mitigated by 

transferring some responsibility for concurrency cost risk to the 

prime contractor for the first time. Number four, the Department’s 

Director of Defense Pricing led an LRIP–5 should-cost review of the 

contractor’s submitted proposal. This effort has proved essential in 

informing Lot 5 negotiations. 

We hope to definitize this contract in the first half of the year. 

Five, the Department is implementing an event-based contracting 

strategy for LRIP Lot 6 and 5 that buys aircraft production quantities based upon development and test progress. First, we will 

award 25 aircraft in Lot 6 out of 31 authorized and appropriated 

in fiscal year 2012. 

Second, we will provide a means to procure anywhere from zero 

to six of the remaining fiscal year 2012 funded Lot 6 aircraft, concurrent with the Lot 7 contract award in 2013. We will link the 

total aircraft quantity ultimately procured in Lot 6 to Lockheed’s 

development performance and concurrency cost risk reduction efforts. 
8 

Number six, the initial Lot 6 contract award for 25 aircraft will 

require a UCA to ensure that the production flow is not disrupted. 

However, the Department does not intend to award the Lot 6 UCA 

for 25 aircraft until essential agreement is reached for Lot 5. The 

Department intends to award the remaining Lot 6 variable quantity aircraft, as well as Lot 7 aircraft, through fully definitized contract actions in fiscal year 2013. 

It is important that the industrial team demonstrate performance and help us to further confidence in the execution and affordability of the program. From my perspective, affordability for both 

production and sustainment of the F–35 has our greatest attention 

to ensure that the warfighters have a force structure that meets 

operational needs. 

Thank you, and I will look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Kendall, 

and Admiral Venlet can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Admiral Venlet. 

STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID J. VENLET, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR THE F–35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Admiral VENLET. Thank you, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and members of the committee for inviting me to appear 

before you today on the F–35. It is my great honor to serve as the 

program executive officer with an outstanding Air Force, Navy, Marine, and international program team and supported by the world’s 

best technical knowledge workforce found in the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center at Dayton, Ohio, and Naval Air Systems 

Command at Patuxent River, Maryland. 

That support, integrated into the daily actions of the joint program office team, made it possible to create the adjusted, realistic 

program plan and is critical to future dependable program performance. The performance of the F–35 industry team for the Department of Defense and our allies in engineering and testing fundamentals, in business fundamentals, and in sustainment will be 

successful to the degree our government technical knowledge workforce remains intimately involved in the program every step of the 

way. 

I carry within me an understanding that what people believe 

about the F–35 is affected, and depends in some measure, upon 

what I believe and what I transparently communicate about the 

program. So let me begin with what I believe about the F–35. 

I believe the F–35 is a critical presence in the combined force 

battlespace. It makes many other systems and capabilities and effects better because of the presence of the F–35 sensors. It is a critical presence in many nations as a powerful combined force capability to act and protect like-minded nations that want their people 

to live safe from aggression in freedom and opportunity. 

I believe the F–35 is a bond of joint strength across all our services. It is a bond of capability and a bond economically across many 

nations that raises the level of technology benefit in our militaries 

and our industries. I believe the F–35 is an assurance of powerful 

effectiveness, it is an assurance of immediate powerful effective-
9 

ness as soon as it is initially fielded, and it is the best possible 

growth platform to incorporate future advances in weapons sensors 

and networks for the next decades ahead. 

It is an assurance for the men and women in all our services, 

and those we are still raising who will volunteer to serve something greater than themselves that they will succeed in every mission and return home safely to their loved ones. With that context, 

it is less what keeps me awake at night and more what makes me 

eager to be at work every day. 

The F–35 has schedule and budget realism now, going forward. 

It is transparent in the discovery and correction of issues arising 

in tests that are typical in all fighter aircraft development. The 

service systems commands are closely involved and contributing to 

the correction of issues in view now and that will arise in remaining tests. 

That creates confidence in delivering required capabilities suitable and effective from the sea and around the world. There is data 

and demonstrated performance in hand that gives confidence the 

F–35 basic design is sound and has clear potential to deliver the 

capability we expect. There is a lot of tests ahead. 

Integrating the systems and sensors and expanding the envelope 

will bring discovery that sound systems engineering will solve. 

There has been very good engine and airframe contractor responsiveness and progress in many areas since we appeared before your 

committee last year. STOVL [short take-off/vertical landing] flight 

tests met plans and expectations, and completed a highly successful initial sea trial aboard USS [United States Ship] Wasp. 

In addition to the impressive stability, control and performance 

of the STOVL in slow flight and vertical landing, the F–35 has 

flown to its maximum speed and hardest turn limits. It is a testimony to the very effective and impressive marriage of engine and 

airframe. 

Three leading program issues occupy my focus for 2012. Technical and cost issues and challenges all certainly exist; all are being 

worked. I mention here what are the critical and significant few 

that, if successfully advanced, will bring beneficial tailwind for the 

entire program and genuine value for the Department and our 

partner nations. 

First, software development and performance, and its dependable 

delivery of capability. Second, concurrency-changing corporation 

improvement and delivery of affordable full service life jets. Third, 

production quality, and its ultimate result on affordable price for 

the U.S. and our allies. 

All three have a common fundamental that will advance the external result and performance, and keep reality clearly in view. 

Systems engineering-based, close-loop analysis and corrective action will be required in steady and committed execution throughout 

the industry team, primes and suppliers. 

Rigorous management control by the joint program office, supported by the service systems commands, will be applied with a development dial-in production, reality and database negotiations and 

focus on affordable delivered capability, which is our only meaningful external result. 
10 

Presently, in the program, performance is all that matters. I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Venlet, Mr. Kendall, 

and Mr. Van Buren can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

And now Mr. Sullivan from the Government Accountability Office. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 

OFFICE 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Good afternoon, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking 

Member Reyes, members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to 

be here today to discuss the status of the F–35 acquisition. 

Everyone is aware of the past history of the program. The chairman related additional costs and schedule growth on this program 

since its inception. Seventy percent cost growth since 2001, a fullrate production date that has been delayed by about 6 years. The 

program has been beset with problems as a result of concurrent development, testing and procurement. 

Rather than dwell on how we got here for this statement, I would 

like to make a few points about what we believe the road looks like 

moving forward. The Department has taken positive steps to restructure the program over the past few years, and we believe the 

new strategy has reduced risk from the effects of concurrency by 

reducing the number of aircraft that we will buy while it is still 

testing. 

The original strategy would have had almost 1,600 aircraft on 

contract by the end of flight testing in 2017. The new strategy has 

reduced that number to 365. While this delays capability to the 

warfighter, it also reduces the risk of incurring additional modification and retrofit cost to the aircraft and to the taxpayer. 

In addition, the revamped test program has gained much momentum in the past year, and has now completed about 20 percent 

of its flight testing. While we are encouraged by these signs of momentum, plenty of risk remains as the program moves forward 

with concurrent testing and production. 

We have identified five areas of concern that we believe are most 

important at this point. First, software development is behind 

schedule. The software complexity on this program has no rival. 

The lines of code now needed to achieve full capability is estimated 

at $24 million, three times that of the F–22 Raptor. And delivery 

of the final block of software—that which gives the aircraft most 

of its advanced capabilities—is still very much at risk. 

Second, engineering changes from flight testing continue to be 

abnormally high for this point in production, which continues to 

put pressure on both development and procurement costs. The program will not know the true cost to produce the F–35 until these 

changes tail off and the manufacturing processes can stabilize. 

Third, funding assumptions for the program now average about 

$13 billion per year for the next 23 years. This, during a time of 

extreme budgetary pressure. Fourth, mission system development 

is only about 4 percent validated at this point, and two critical systems—the helmet-mounted display and the logistic known as ALIS 
11 

[Autonomic Logistics Information System]—are continuing to be 

problematic for the program. 

And fifth, the supplier base for the F–35 is large, global, and 

complex. It will continue to challenge the program’s management 

capacity as production ramps up in the future. The restructured 

program has already calculated the impacts of concurrency on cost 

and schedule so far. 

Cost overruns on the first four annual procurement contracts now total more than $1 billion, $673 million of which is the government’s share. This adds about $11 million to the price tag of each 

of the 63 aircraft purchased under those contracts. In addition, the 

program now estimates the cost to retrofit aircraft produced before 

the completion of flight testing is about $373 million. 

As I said earlier, this retrofit cost will grow as information from 

flight testing creates additional engineering changes that must be 

absorbed by a manufacturing process that is struggling for stability. The planned completion of flight testing is now set for 2017. 

This means four more years of potential engineering changes. 

So we believe the Department has improved the outlook for the 

program to deliver aircraft more predictably in the past 2 years by 

adding time and money, and by reducing near-term purchases of 

the aircraft. However, there are still significant risks owing to the 

F–35’s complexity, remaining concurrency between testing and production, and its requirement for large amounts of funds on an annual basis moving forward. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening statement. I look forward to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much for your statements. 

As is my custom, I will reserve my questions until others have 

had a chance to ask theirs, hoping they will have asked the ones 

I would have asked. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions that I want to include for the record, but I did want to start 

maybe with a question to Mr. Sullivan. You know, given the complexity of the technologies incorporated into the F–35 program, 

would it be reasonable for anyone to think that this program could 

conceivably have a normal testing period? 

And specifically, what are the chances that it won’t be completed 

by 2017, as you just testified to? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think, given the complexity of the technologies 

they are trying to bring together, I would say that probably the 

program has been through most of the—the real tough discovery in 

terms of technologies that they have had to integrate. So as I said 

in my statement, past history has been tough on this program. 

I probably am a little optimistic that they have been through an 

awful lot of that. And I would focus most of the problem now on 

software. I think software—the development of the software that 

they need to make this aircraft fully combat-capable—is still as 

complex as anything on earth, I think it is going to drive the test 

program. The test program still has risk in it, as a result of that. 

The mission systems that are laden with software, as well, are 
12 

driving the test program. The program has to stay on top of software and these mission systems in order to make sure the test can 

complete in a timely fashion. 

It is still very risky, I think. 

Mr. REYES. From your viewpoint and your experience, is there 

any kind of—or is there a way to compare this to past programs, 

for instance the F–22 program? Did it ever, in terms of comparison, 

have the same kinds of challenges and—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, oh yes. I think there are comparisons you 

could make to the F–22. I would say the F–22, in many ways, was 

more complex than this program. I think this program probably 

started with more mature technologies across the board. 

But again, I will go back to the software on this program that 

I think is more complex than the F–22. And I think that typically 

what happens on these big programs, like the F–22 and the JSF, 

if this concurrency that you run into, you have concurrent flight 

testing as you are trying to ramp up production. 

The manufacturing process just are never able to get stable because there is so much information coming in from testing and so 

many engineering changes that are going on. That, on this program, is very similar to what took place on, for example, the F– 

22. 

Mr. REYES. Of the five concerns that you raised, I was mostly 

struck by the supplier base being large, global and complex. Did 

you give those issues to us in rank order of concern, or were they 

just five issues that you have—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They were—you know, I didn’t think of it quite— 

I would say that software is number one. 

Mr. REYES. Number one, right? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is probably in some rank order there. I would 

say that the supplier base is a concern, but maybe the fifth one of 

those. Yes, it is a very complex global system. 

Mr. REYES. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Van Buren, in my district is Barksdale Air Force Base, 

which is a long-range bomber. So I am going to take this opportunity to ask you a couple of questions about that, if it is okay. I 

am encouraged by the support in the fiscal year 2013 budget request to continue development of the long-range bomber. 

I want to help make the Department, make this program, a success, and invite you to stay in touch, as we are very interested in 

what is going on with that. In recent years, we have heard a variety of thoughts from the Air Force on this bomber. It may be 

manned, unmanned, or both; maybe nuclear-maybe conventionalcapable, or both. 

And it will have penetrating capabilities for anti-access environments. It may have a significant intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability. The Secretary of Defense has mentioned 

figures of 80 to 100 aircraft, at a unit cost of $550 million, with a 

target delivery for the mid-2020s. 

He also mentioned the program would allow a streamlined acquisition process. My question is, can you share with the committee 
13 

your level of confidence that a new bomber will be designed in such 

a way to minimize risks and to avoid requirements creep? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. At this particular stage of the development, the 

program is on track. As you well know, sir, many of the details of 

the development activity are classified. What is not classified is the 

overall funding level for the 5-year defense plan is roughly $6.3 billion. 

I have every confidence that the way we are proceeding on this 

would not—taking on too much risk gives the program a much 

higher probability of success in achieving the goals that Secretary 

Gates wrote when he wrote that guidance in the beginning of last 

calendar year. 

So at this particular point, I would have to defer to another 

venue for more details on the program. But I have confidence in 

the way the program is being currently run. 

Dr. FLEMING. You know, 80 to 100 bombers, at $550 million. 

That really sounds good. But, you know, in the past, with the B– 

2 and other programs, we have had requirement creeps which is 

sort of a pejorative, where we start in one direction and we begin 

adding on more capabilities, or attempt to, and then the costs go 

out of sight. 

Do you have reassurance that that is not going to happen in this 

case? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. I believe the Department has been much more 

proactive and disciplined with regard to requirements. As you probably know, I worked on the B–2 for 9 years. I can say that an evidence of that is with regard to the KC–46A tanker which, since 

contract award a little bit more than a year ago, has had zero contract changes due to requirements changes. 

And so I feel good about where we are with the development and 

the stability of our current design approach. 

Dr. FLEMING. And the number 80 to 100, do you agree with that 

number? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. That is the guidance from the Secretary, in 

which we embarked on the program. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay, well, again I would love to stay in touch 

with your office on this. We want to monitor this. Obviously, we 

have an aging B–52 fleet which is a wonderful bomber, but it is 

being flown by the grandsons of the builders. And someday it will 

have to be replaced. And even if we start today, it will be another 

decade at least. 

So we definitely want to keep helping this along to make sure 

it stays on target. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Yes. 

Dr. FLEMING. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. As per committee rules, those present 

at gavel fall are recognized in the order of their seniority on the 

committee. Those arriving after gavel fall, in their order of appearance in the committee. 

Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few questions for 

Assistant Secretary Van Buren. What major weapons systems have 

you successfully procured over the last 10 years? 
14 

Mr. VAN BUREN. I have been in the position in the government 

for 4 years. I would say the procurement of the tanker, the development of the tanker, a success. I would say the JASSM [Joint Airto-Surface Standoff Missile] missile is running well now, after some 

production difficulties. 

I would say that the Project Liberty aircraft, 37 aircraft, were 

procured for the warfighter in a span of 22 months. Of the Predator 

and Reaper, we currently have 120 Reaper aircraft in high-rate 

production. Obviously, the MQ–1/MQ–9 fleets are around the world 

doing ISR missions on a daily basis. Those would be some. 

Mr. RUNYAN. And how many of them have been at cost and on 

time? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Project Liberty was certainly on time, even at 

accelerated rate. The cost-effectiveness of MQ–1 and MQ–9, I 

think, are very, very good. In fact, at certain times the manufacturer has been producing aircraft ahead of schedule. The production of the air vehicles are not a limiting factor. 

And there have been others. BACN [Battlefield Airborne Communications Node], a platform based on the Global Hawk Block 20, 

was a JUON [joint] urgent operational need, which went to field 

in a span of approximately 8 months. 

Mr. RUNYAN. So I just really asked those questions not only for 

the Air Force, but many other branches also. That there is a systemic procurement problem in the Department and throughout 

each branches. And it is, frankly, not being addressed. We kind of 

take it as this is how we are going to conduct business. 

And at the end of the day, our responsibility and the oversight 

that we have to the taxpayers is, I think many of us feel, being ignored. As you said there, even being the on-cost and on-time, that 

list is nowhere near the original procurement list that you gave 

me. 

And it is something that I know needs to be addressed, and I just 

wanted to put that out there. Because it gets frustrating, day in 

and day out. 

I guess, Chairman, I am going to actually yield back so we can 

move on. Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Doctor Kendall, the Department of Defense, DOD, has been the 

catalyst in the development of the unmanned aerial aircraft system, UAS, and it’s certainly its market. The volume of UAS flights 

for commercial and governmental non-military applications could 

equal those being flown by military operations. 

Future growth of the civilian UAS market is dependent on the 

ability of non-military UAS proponents to operate their UAS systems in the National Airspace System. As such, there is a strong 

innovative growth market for testing, research and development. 

Inability to adhere to the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] 

regulatory requirements is the major problem facing the military 

and commercial UAS sector in operating in domestic U.S. space. 

More specifically, flight rule 14 requires a sense-and-avoidance capability. Manned aircraft systems operating with specified FAA- 
15 

controlled—within FAA-specified control areas, or with sense-andavoid equipment, are able to adhere to this rule. 

Since UASs do not have pilots on board or collision and avoidance technology, they are not currently able to adhere to FAA 

rules. Congress has placed the requirement on FAA administrator 

to develop plans to accelerate the integration of unmanned aerial 

systems into the National Airspace System. 

Currently, the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] budget request contains $34.6 million for sense-and-avoidance development to further UAS operations in the National Airspace System. 

Dr. Kendall, do you believe that the FAA has articulated and 

documented the sense-and-avoid technology requirements in sufficient detail to allow the DOD to develop a solution that will allow 

UAS operations in these new airspaces? In other words, is the 

$34.6 million being spent on sense-and-avoid technologies going toward the fulfillment of a documented FAA requirement with a defined acceptable solution? 

Given the current FAA safety of flight requirements, sense-andavoid requirements, and our technological capabilities, how long do 

you think that it might take before we would be able to integrate 

UAS into the National Airspace System, and do you also similarly 

have concerns as to the coordination between DOD and the FAA 

with respect to our National Airspace System and UAS integration? 

Thank you. 

Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Congressman Turner. I am going to 

have to take a lot of that for the record because I wasn’t prepared 

to testify on that today. But I can tell you that we are aware of 

the statutory requirements and the Department is working closely 

with the FAA to address the issues that you described. 

But I am going to have to get the details back to you for the 

record, if that is all right. 

Mr. TURNER. That is fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 135.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mrs. Hartzler. 

VOICE. She is gone. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Oh, she is gone? Okay. She is back. Okay, there 

you go. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry. 

I appreciate the work that you are doing there. I know everyone 

has been kind of frustrated with the development of the F–35 and 

its hitches along the way. I just wanted to clarify, when do you anticipate that they will be operational—2017, is that—— 

Admiral VENLET. The IOCs [initial operational capability] are not 

declared in our program baseline, but the production will proceed 

to deliver a number of jets. The Block 2 initial warfighting capability in our current plan is projected to be released to the fleet for 

all three variants in 2015. And Block 3, in our schedule, will be released to the fleet in 2017. 

There will be the detailed initial operational tests to go on after 

that, but the production will produce a significant number of aircraft with those capabilities in those years. 
16 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. What are the key issues in deficiencies in 

the aircraft and engine manufacture that need to be addressed in 

order to ramp up production? 

Admiral VENLET. The principal benefit we are getting from these 

years of level quantities that Mr. Sullivan spoke about, I believe, 

are a base camp time that are going to bring the benefit of getting 

that supplier base to perform dependably. There is the need to get 

world-class quality aspects to emerge in the aircraft production 

side. 

It is doing much better in the engine side. I don’t have any concerns with the engine production or quality at this point. And I 

don’t have deep, long-term concerns, but it needs to appear quicker 

on the aircraft side. And I believe this range of level quantity in 

this—about 30 for these next couple years—will help that. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. What are contractors and suppliers doing 

to improve, and what time frame are we looking at? 

Admiral VENLET. They are addressing the—particularly, software 

is important to production. We need to produce productionized, 

fleet-releasable software each year because we are accepting production aircraft. So that adds a complexity to the development. 

You just don’t work on your software for the test program. You 

have to do it for production acceptance, as well. So that is being 

worked on. The software also in the off-board system, called ALIS 

that Mr. Sullivan mentioned, that is the ground maintenance information system that is not present in any aircraft system in the 

fleet today. 

It is critical to F–35. Those would be the most important things. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Mr. Sullivan mentioned that some of the 

suppliers are global, and that kind of caught my attention. What 

aspects of the F–35 are being supplied by foreign companies? 

Admiral VENLET. The most visible, when you look at the aircraft, 

is the aft fuselage by BAE [British Aerospace Industry] Systems. 

And there are smaller components—the ejection seat, also, from 

Martin-Baker in the United Kingdom. Turkey is contributing to 

center fuselage to Northrop Grumman. Alenia in Italy is commencing early work on wings, just to name a few of the more significant ones. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. What is the policy of our country towards making sure that our suppliers are American-based? 

Admiral VENLET. That is a very much important part of the program. This program was conceived and initiated with eight other 

partner countries at the outset. And there is not a work-share. 

There is a concept of best value from the source of supply to 

produce the end airplane. 

So I do not speak to industry about sharing the work around our 

partner countries. I speak to them on the basis of the best price 

and the best quality, and leave that to them to deal with. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

There are several additional questions that we need to ask. In 

the interest of time, since there are going to be votes fairly quickly, 

we will ask those questions for the record. 
17 

I just have one request. What we do here seems to fit Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity. I have been here nearly 20 years now, 

and every program—essentially every program—I have watched 

here has run over in both time and dollars, sometimes monstrously. 

I hope that when you are pursuing this program that you will 

keep your records so that when we do a post mortem when it is 

finished it will have a prescription so as how not to do this in the 

future. 

Thank you very much, and now we will take a brief recess while 

we excuse you and we empanel our next set of witnesses. 

Admiral VENLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our subcommittee will come to order again. We 

will now have our second panel of witnesses. Vice Admiral Mark 

Skinner, USN [United States Navy], Principal Military Deputy to 

the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 

Acquisition. 

Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy Commandant of the 

Marine Corps for Aviation; Rear Admiral Kenneth Floyd, Director 

of the Air Warfare Division of the U.S. Navy; Major General James 

Holmes, Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff Operations, Plans and 

Requirements; and Major General John Posner, Air Force Director 

of Global Power Programs. 

Without objection, all witnesses prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. 

And we will now begin the testimony with Admiral Skinner. 

STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION), U.S. 

NAVY; LTGEN TERRY G. ROBLING, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND RADM KENNETH E. FLOYD, USN, DIRECTOR OF WARFARE INTEGRATION, U.S. NAVY 

STATEMENT OF VADM W. MARK SKINNER 

Admiral SKINNER. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is our honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s tactical aviation procurement programs. Testifying with me today are 

Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy Commandant for Marine Corps Aviation, and Rear Admiral Kenneth Floyd, the Navy’s 

Director of Warfare Integration. 

With the permission of the committee, I will keep our oral remarks brief. The fiscal requirement in the Budget Control Act of 

2011 required hard choices to be made. In response, the Department of the Navy deferred procurement of F–35s, P–8s, E–2Ds, 

F/A–18Es-Fs and MV–22s, and terminated the MRMUAS [Medium 

Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System] program and JAGM 

[Joint Air-to-Ground Missile] investment in this President’s budget 

request. 

We are facing tremendous challenges—the budget reductions necessitated by the Budget Control Act, and aging aircraft inventory 

and significant threats. During these austere times, we must per-
18 

sist in modernizing and recapitalizing our naval aviation forces and 

increase our capability through force multipliers such as Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air and using the should-cost/willcost methodology to bring more affordable systems to our 

warfighters. 

Affordability will be our business focus over this FYDP [Future 

Years Defense Program] so we can continue to deliver capabilities 

and meet the warfighters’ needs. With your assistance, we are 

leveraging our buying power with successful multi-year procurements on the F/A–18, B–22 and H–60. And together, we are saving 

the taxpayers over $1.5 billion. 

Last year, we embraced our past history as naval aviation celebrated our centennial. This year, Marine Corps Aviation will do the 

same. New history was also written this past year, when we conducted the first F–35 shipboard operations very successfully aboard 

the USS Wasp. 

We deployed the first EA–18G Growler expeditionary squadron 

to Iraq in November of last year, and then successfully redeployed 

the squadron on short notice to support Operation Odyssey Dawn. 

We commenced E–2D advanced Hawkeye initial operational tests 

and evaluation, while the V–22 fleet reached 130,000 flight hours. 

And we delivered the first P–8 Poseidon and the 500th Super 

Hornet and Growler on cost and on schedule. The Naval Air Systems Command hired 155 wounded warriors into the acquisition 

workforce ranks. We also continued to actively manage our 

TACAIR [Tactical Aviation] inventory. 

The first Hornet will be inducted into SLEP [Shelf Life Extension 

Program] late on this year, and both SLEP and future aircraft procurements must continue on schedule to mitigate the Strike Fighter shortfall with manageable risk through 2028. The Navy will 

transition three Navy F–18 Charlie squadrons to F–18 Echo squadrons. 

And the Marine Corps will reduce their force structure by four 

squadrons and delay the retirement of the AV–8B until 2030. And 

this year, we will begin an analysis of the Super Hornet’s replacement, the F/A–XX, to ensure we have sufficient and viable TACAIR 

forces beyond 2028. 

Thank you, and we welcome your questions on the Department 

of the Navy’s Tactical Aviation Procurement programs. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Skinner, General 

Robling and Admiral Floyd can be found in the Appendix on page 

76.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. They have not supplied us 

with the world’s best microphones. If you will turn them on and 

pull them closer it will be helpful. 

General Robling. 

General ROBLING. Sir, we are going to—that was a dual statement for the Navy and the Marine Corps. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. 

General Holmes. 
19 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES M. HOLMES, USAF, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS 

AND REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE; AND MAJ GEN JOHN 

D. POSNER, USAF, DIRECTOR OF GLOBAL POWER PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR 

FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES M. HOLMES 

General HOLMES. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to provide an update on the Air Force’s tactical, remotely piloted, and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 

aviation programs. 

I am joined this afternoon, as you said, by Major General Posner, 

the Director of Global Power Programs for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in Acquisitions. Today, the Air Force 

is fully engaged in operations across the globe, supporting combatant commander requirements while maintaining our ability to defend the homeland. 

Our airmen continue to excel on the battlefield with exceptional 

results. As you are well aware, the Air Force made cuts in response 

to both new strategic guidance and budget reductions directed by 

the 2011 Budget Control Act. Although we will become a smaller 

force, we are committed to maintaining the agility, flexibility and 

readiness required to engage a full range of contingencies and 

threats. 

We continue to provide the joint force and its commanders unparalleled support for strike and ISR through our weapons system 

programs, and the phenomenal dedication and professionalism of 

our total force airmen. Thank you for your time and for your continued support of our Air Force and our teammates in the Army, 

Navy and Marine Corps. 

And we stand by for your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Holmes and General 

Posner can be found in the Appendix on page 112.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much for your testimony. For 

those who have not testified, thank you for your preparation and 

your willingness to be here to answer our questions. Again, as is 

my custom, I will reserve my questions so others have had a 

chance to ask theirs. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen 

for being here. 

The budget request includes a plan to mothball the current fleet 

of 14 Global Hawk Block 30s as well as the 4 Block 30s that are 

still in production. With these aircraft procured at a cost of more 

than $100 million each, this seems like an odd decision. 

As an aside, from the potential loss of ISR capability, it is DOD 

decisions like this that reflect to people, including Members of Congress, the waste of millions of dollars, and can make it a challenge 

for Members who want to support more defense spending. The committee understands that up until this year the Air Force planned 

to operate both the Global Hawk Block 30 and the U–2 through the 

end of fiscal year 2014. 
20 

My question, General Holmes, is—well, several questions. One, 

why not continue with that plan, and defer a decision on retiring 

the Global Hawk Block 30 fleet? Secondly, are there other options 

beyond putting these brand-new $100 million aircraft into storage? 

Has there ever been a precedent for moving aircraft directly from 

TAC reproduction, literally from the production line, into storage? 

And how much would it cost for the Air Force to continue Global 

Hawk Block 30 through fiscal year 2013 as it was originally 

planned? 

General HOLMES. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. The decisions 

that the Air Force made this year on force structure cuts, we tried 

to balance the force structure, we tried to balance our modernization accounts, our readiness accounts, and then take care of our 

airmen through the personnel accounts. 

Faced with a bill of about $50 billion over 5 years, we believed 

we needed to save about $8.7 billion in force cuts. And the cuts to 

the Global Hawk program account for more than $2 billion of that 

$8.7 billion over the FYDP. We built systems to meet the joint requirement as established by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council, the JROC. 

And in this case, the JROC adjusted that requirement. And the 

requirement is set for sensor capability, for the distance that you 

have to fly to a station, and for the number of caps. The adjustment they made is classified, and we can come talk to you in person in a smaller group and go through that in detail at your convenience. 

But under that new requirement, and under the pressure of the 

fiscal guidance, we believe that it was more cost effective to fly the 

U–2 and not fly both airplanes at the same time. And that we can 

meet the JROC requirement with the U–2 through the FYDP. 

Mr. REYES. So is there any precedent to this decision, other than 

for budgetary issues? 

General HOLMES. Well, with a history degree, Congressman, I 

think there have been times in our high times where we were buying airplanes more than we needed and we sent them almost directly into storage. I can’t think of a recent precedent. 

As we put the aircraft into storage, as you know there are several classes of storage. And the aircraft that we are retiring we 

have programmed to put them initially into Class 1000 storage, 

which means that they are returnable to action if we need to reverse the decision. 

We will make decisions about exactly how many of the aircraft 

that are cut, then we will transition quickly into other forms of 

storage. But we initially programmed to put them into the storage 

class. It is the most easily reversible. And the savings that we 

achieve over the FYDP by retiring the Block 30 Global Hawk are 

more than $2 billion worth. 

Mr. REYES. A little over $2 billion? 

General HOLMES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. REYES. Okay. I have got another question, but I will wait for 

the second round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. Thank you very much. 
21 

We have almost 7 minutes remaining in the vote, so there is time 

for questions from Mr. Critz. And then we may have to give the 

rest of our questions to you for the record. 

I want to apologize for the inconvenience. We do not control votes 

from our level. Thank you all so much for your attendance here 

and your preparation. And be sure that your prepared testimony, 

your oral testimony, and your answers to our questions, will be 

part of a record that will be pored over by a number of people for 

a long time. 

Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Holmes, the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile, 

AMRAAM, production. The AIM–120D missiles experienced significant production delays. And from what I am told, it is mostly due 

to rocket motor production. As a result, the budget request for fiscal year 2013 and beyond has been substantially reduced. 

However, the capability the AIM–120D will bring to the Air 

Force and Navy appears to be very important, given the air-to-air 

threat. Can you give me an update, give us an update, on the production? What steps are being taken to get production back on 

schedule? 

And then when will the Air Force and Navy have this weapon 

in the field? 

General HOLMES. Thank you, Congressman. You are exactly 

right that the AIM–120D is a very important requirement. And 

from an operator’s perspective, it is key to our ability to operate in 

the anti-access and area denial threat that we expect to face in the 

future. 

With your permission, I am going to hand that question off to 

General Posner. 

Mr. CRITZ. Sure. 

General POSNER. Thank you, Congressman. With respect to your 

question, you are exactly right. The AMRAAM has suffered some 

production problems. These problems are specifically related to the 

rocket motor. There has been a very aggressive initiative on the 

part of the companies to try and solve that particular problem. 

I think it is important to note that the front end of the missile, 

the guidance and navigation and all the electronics continuing to 

be built, those production pieces are in storage awaiting mating to 

the rocket motors when those problems in the rocket motor are 

identified and solved. 

Currently, we have 359 missiles versus the 552 that are on contract. So we are about 193 behind. In that regard, the contractor, 

Raytheon, has worked very, very diligently to come up with several 

options to work solutions towards this particular problem. 

They have now provided a plan to recover. We are satisfied with 

the plan, and we will monitor them closely to make sure that the 

performance for the rocket motors matches the plan. We hope to 

solve the problem with the rocket motors quickly. 

It should be a fairly simple matter, once the rocket motors are 

certified as operational, to get them mated to the front ends. And 

we hope to see recovery to the production schedule quickly. 

Mr. CRITZ. Who makes the motors? It is not Raytheon, is it? 

General POSNER. No, sir. That is a subcontractor, ATK. 
22 

Mr. CRITZ. ATK. 

General POSNER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you. 

Well, considering our time allotment, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Thank you very much. And let me 

apologize again for the shortness of the time, and to thank you for 

your preparation. We will have a number of questions for the 

record in our oversight responsibility, and be assured that we will 

be looking at those, and a number of others looking at those, for 

a long time. 

Thank you all so much for your preparation, your attendance 

here. And we now stand in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 20, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 20, 2012 

(27) 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 20, 2012 

(131) 
132 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 20, 2012 

(135) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. KENDALL. The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing standards and 

safety case analyses to develop and field ground and airborne unmanned aircraft 

system (UAS) sense-and-avoid technology. In the short term, the Department is actively engaged with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve incrementally UAS access to the National Airspace System (NAS) through changes to 

policy and procedures. While the FAA has not articulated and documented senseand-avoid requirements, the Department, as a public agency, has the authority and 

proven ability to self certify aircraft and systems for safe operations. The sense-andavoid funding in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 allows 

the Department to continue its Sense and Avoid (SAA) standards and technology 

development. The Department is sharing the results of its SAA standards and technology development with the FAA and other public agencies so that they can leverage our work while developing sense-and-avoid technology requirements for the civil 

community. 

The Department has made measured progress in increasing public UAS access to 

the NAS through the UAS Executive Committee and changes to the FAA’s policies 

and Certification of Waiver or Authorization processes. The Department is also 

working with the FAA on updating the DOD–FAA UAS Memorandum of Agreement 

for Operations of UAS Systems in the NAS to increase access for specific operations, 

particularly for small UAS which make up the predominance of DOD UAS. DOD 

is also currently working with the FAA through the UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee and the Next Generation Air Transportation System Joint Planning and Development Office to develop the congressionally directed FAA Civil/Public UAS NAS 

Integration Roadmap and Comprehensive Plan to safely integrate civil UAS into the 

NAS. The roadmap and plan will provide a timeline for the phased in approach to 

UAS integration into the NAS. [See page 15.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 20, 2012 

(139) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing 

to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ‘‘essential to national security,’’ 

there was no other acceptable capability to meet the requirement, and the Global 

Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to operate than the U–2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months 

ago. Please explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less 

than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated? 

Mr. KENDALL. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be $220- 

million less expensive per year to operate that the U–2. However, the DOD Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation office based this analysis on a high-altitude 

orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the most recent analysis done in 

support of the FY 2013 budget review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U–2 was 

assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the 

cost-per-flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32 thousand per 

hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, 

the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY 2013 budget review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that, in the context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) capabilities, conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. 

The Air Force further determined the U–2, properly resourced, will remain viable 

until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security requirements 

for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8-billion savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest 

Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain 

the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5 

billion. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the Japanese 

Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global Hawk was able to fly into areas 

too risky for manned aircraft (an active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a 

nuclear environment in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this 

transformational capability? 

Mr. KENDALL. The Air Force will continue to address the operational needs of the 

Combatant Commands through the Global Force Management Process. The Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council adjustment affirms the modified high-altitude Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance requirement is sufficient to address 

most future contingencies. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department’s combatant commanders have an insatiable need 

for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one unmet requirement. While 

budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 

30 aircraft out of the active inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal 

to scrap aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters, including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why it is necessary 

to take these assets out of commanders’ hands and instead send them to the desert 

to rust? 

Mr. KENDALL. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that, in the 

context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, properly resourced, will remain 

viable until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. 
140 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

that the U–2 meets the new requirement and the significant reduction in the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 

30, resulting in a $3.8 billion savings, through the FYDP; $1.3 billion, however, was 

needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP, resulting in 

a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5 billion. Finally, some of the $4 billion investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/ 

Multi Platform Radar Technology Insertion Programs, as well as NASA Block 10, 

NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance, and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

programs. 

A modified requirement where the U–2 is sufficient and a reduced budget where 

the Department could no longer afford to keep investing in RQ–4 Global Hawk 

Block 30 drove the retirement decision. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft 

at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of these aircraft have been built and 

are flying operational missions. My understanding is that this budget proposes to 

eliminate the funding for future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these relatively new aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the 

DOD is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these aircraft that 

are currently providing valuable intelligence to the warfighter? 

Mr. KENDALL. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that, in the 

context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, properly resourced, will remain 

viable until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given the 

U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8-billion savings. Although money was saved with 

the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue 

to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings 

to the taxpayer of $2.5 billion. 

Furthermore, the decision to sustain the U–2 leverages $1.7 billion that has been 

invested to modernize the weapon system. The U–2 f1eet in its current state has 

been certified to 75,000 flight hours (2040 and beyond at current utilization rates). 

In addition to the new engines in 1994–1998, the entire fleet has completed new 

power distribution (wiring), 21st century glass cockpit and modern avionics processor upgrades. The U–2s are currently on a 4000-hour programmed depot maintenance cycle included in the budgeted operating costs. 

Finally, some of the $4-billion investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the Block 20 Battlefield Airborne Communication Node and Block 40/Multi-Platform-Radar Technology Insertion Programs, as well as NASA Block 10, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance, and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance programs. 

Mr. BARTLETT. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be necessary to maintain the 

same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If this is the case, how can it be that 

you determined the manned aircraft to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does 

the Global Hawk Block 30 compare to the U–2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis? 

Mr. KENDALL. The operating characteristics of the U–2 are not identical to those 

of the Global Hawk, including operating altitudes, sensor capabilities, stand-off 

ranges, and mission effectiveness. A nominal RQ–4 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is four 

aircraft, and a nominal U–2 CAP is five aircraft. 

The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the point where a true comparison 

of operational costs is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis 

during the FY 2013 budget review using data from previous Air Force and Department efforts. The Air Force Total Ownership Cost database figures in FY 2011 show 

both the U–2 and RQ–4 at $32 thousand per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the RQ–4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only 6 months of representative 

flying hour information in the database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 

Block 30 with the signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensor in 2011. The Air Force began 

flying with this payload in April 2012, and updated costs including SIGINT are not 

currently available. 

Given comparable flying hour costs and the large investment required for the RQ– 

4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5 billion. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How have the Department’s decisions to reduce Block 30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements (increasing the number of si-
141 

multaneous sensors required) contributed to the increased system cost of Global 

Hawk? 

Mr. KENDALL. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30 program was 

based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is to simultaneously execute 

electro-optical/infrared, synthetic aperture radar, limited moving target indicator, 

and signals intelligence missions. 

In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that, in the context of all 

space-based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air 

Force further determined the U–2, properly resourced, will remain viable until at 

least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security requirements for highaltitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Continued investment in RQ– 

4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and 

an alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at considerably lower 

total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership Cost data 

for U–2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per operational hour (that 

is, the cost per hour executing missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U–2. This 

seems to be a much more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How does this 

square with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher? 

Mr. KENDALL. We have looked at costs per operational hour and still find the 

Global Hawk Block 30 and U–2 roughly equivalent. More importantly, the total cost 

of keeping the Global Hawk and continuing the investment was more expensive 

than keeping the U–2. As a result, the Department chose to save $2.5 billion across 

the Future Years Defense Program in a reduced budget environment since the U– 

2 is sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What is the cost comparison for operating U–2 compared to Global 

Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission for each? How much of the 

U–2 fleet is available to perform all ISR missions? 

Mr. KENDALL. The cost per flight hour is the same. The U–2 costs $320 thousand 

per 10-hour multi-intelligence mission and the RQ–4 costs $640 thousand per 20- 

hour single-intelligence mission. There are 27 U–2 ‘‘single seaters’’ of which 3–5 are 

rotating through depot-level maintenance, and two utilized as test birds (capable of 

flying missions but not typically utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are typically 

22 mission-capable U–2 aircraft at any given time. 

Mr. BARTLETT. If the U–2 is extended until 2025, and the system that was slated 

to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for replacing the U–2? How much will 

it cost to modernize and maintain the Cold War-era U–2 for another 15 years? 

Mr. KENDALL. There is no projected U–2 retirement date. The U–2 weapon system, properly resourced, remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements currently tasked by the Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest approximately $60–80 million per year in sustainment and enhancement modifications 

to ensure platform modernization and maintenance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Department’s Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated with the decision 

to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30 program. Please share this 

analysis with the Congress so it can better understand the analytical foundation of 

this decision. Provide a detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both 

sustainment and procurement through 2025. 

Mr. KENDALL. CAPE has provided their analysis, covering the time of the Future 

Year Defense Program (FY 2013–FY 2017), to the House Armed Services Committee 

during a previous briefing in March of this year. This analysis is the most detailed 

and complete information available. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt, American 

taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these decisions cannot be short-sighted or made 

at the expense of our long-term budget or national security needs. Please detail how 

terminating a new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive 

than extending the life of an aging platform, U–2, which will require increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible decision over the next decade. 

Mr. KENDALL. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that, in the 

context of all space based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, properly resourced, will remain 
142 

viable until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given the 

U–2 meets the new requirement and the significant reduction in the Department’s 

budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8-billion savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest 

Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain 

the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5 

billion. Finally, some of the $4-billion investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 Battlefield Airborne Communication Node and Block 40/ 

Multi-Platform-Radar Technology Insertion Programs, as well as NASA Block 10 

aircraft, NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance, and Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance programs. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system. 

Mr. KENDALL. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be $220- 

million less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, the DOD Cost 

Assessment Program Evaluation office based this analysis on a high-altitude orbit 

l,200 miles from the launch base. During the most recent analysis done in support 

of the FY 2013 budget review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U–2 was assumed 

to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact that the cost per 

flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32 thousand per hour, 

per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the 

RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY 2013 budget review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that, in the context of all space-based and airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) capabilities, conventional high altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. 

The Air Force further determined the U–2, properly resourced, will remain viable 

until at least 2040 and is sufficient to meet those national security requirements 

for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30, was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating 1ocations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8-billion savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest 

Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3 billion was needed to continue to operate and sustain 

the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5 

billion. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you please provide us details on how the Global Hawk has 

been used to support operations worldwide over the past year? Please provide both 

classified and unclassified details of how Global Hawk is being used 

Mr. KENDALL. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic aperture radar data and was used in a traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall, 

Global Hawk was successful in Operation ODYSSEY DAWN and in its continued 

support for Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Assessment details can be made 

available at a higher classification. 

In the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) theater, Global Hawk continues to 

support the Combatant Command with both theater and tactical ISR. To date, RQ– 

4 has flown more than 50,000 combat hours in support of USCENTCOM operations. 

In a humanitarian/disaster relief support role, Global Hawk leveraged its range 

and endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti earthquake, Global 

Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours, effectively providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting earthquake damage and the status of 

critical infrastructure, and identifying food/aid drop zones and indicators of mass 

population migrations. Eight missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. 

In Japan, Global Hawk capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 

21 hours. Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40 minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment, supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support, Global Hawk collection focused 
143 

on the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, 

Japan allowed the U.S. Pacific Command to use the Global Hawk within the 20- 

kilometer nuclear engagement zone. Infrared imagery taken directly over the top of 

the reactors allowed engineers to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 

missions and 300 on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30 divestment decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U–2. Can you explain how the 

Department determined these costs? 

Mr. KENDALL. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis during the FY 

2013 budget review using data from previous Air Force and DOD efforts. The Air 

Force Total Ownership Cost database figures in FY 2011 show the U–2 at $32 thousand per hour and the RQ–4 also at $32 thousand per hour. However, costs for the 

U–2 included signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors, but the Air Force did not fly the 

RQ–4 Block 30 with its SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force began flying Global 

Hawk Block 30 with SIGINT sensors in April 2012. Data to determine long-term 

flying hour costs for Global Hawk have not yet been collected. Given comparable flying hour costs and the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose 

to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5 billion. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General Schwartz mentioned Operations and Support costs are 

issue for the Global Hawk program. When the decision was made to retire the U– 

2 a few years back, specific costs (base support, infrastructure and indirect support) 

were allocated to Global Hawk. As a result, these costs have inflated the Global 

Hawk cost per flight hour while the U–2’s cost per flight hour has decreased. Did 

the USAF look at doing an apples-to-apples comparison of costs for both systems? 

If not, why not? 

Mr. KENDALL. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducted an analysis during 

the FY 2013 budget review using data from previous Air Force and DOD efforts. 

The Air Force Total Ownership Cost database figures in FY 2011 show the U–2 at 

$32 thousand per hour and the RQ–4 also at $32 thousand per hour. However, costs 

for the U–2 included signals intelligence (SIGINT) sensors, but the Air Force did 

not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with its SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force began 

flying Global Hawk Block 30 with SIGINT sensors in April 2012. Given comparable 

flying hour costs and the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force 

chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5 billion. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department has committed a significant portion of its planned 

budget for aircraft procurement to the F–35 program. In the case of the Air Force, 

major expenditures are planned on the F–35 while at the same time the Air Force 

seeks to acquire a new airborne tanker and a bomber aircraft. Given the budget environment faced by the Department, are you at all concerned that what you are proposing is doable? 

Mr. KENDALL. I am concerned that future budget projections will make much 

needed modernization efforts unaffordable. My job is to ensure that our acquisition 

programs are as affordable as possible so that the Services have the flexibility and 

available options to make the appropriate decisions in determining how to meet 

their requirements. Therefore, I have directed the incorporation of procurement and 

sustainment affordability targets for all programs. In the case of the F–35 program, 

we are actively addressing the costs due to concurrency. As the program completes 

more testing, we are progressively reducing concurrency risks. This is a direct result 

of a more mature design through incorporation of discovery based design changes. 

Earlier aircraft are open to a greater need for changes, and as succeeding Low-Rate 

Initial Production (LRIP) lots are built, their cumulative requirements for retrofit 

modifications decline. Additionally, the flattening of the production ramp in the 

coming years will minimize the cost of upgrading these early LRIP aircraft. The Department is also pursuing a strategy regarding LRIP 6 and 7 negotiations that 

incentivizes Lockheed Martin to reduce concurrency costs by holding back the purchase of six LRIP 6 jets until the contractor can prove performance. In addition, the 

program and the Department are working diligently to reduce F–35 life-cycle costs. 

Based on maturation of the technical baseline and focused affordability initiatives, 

the Department expects greater accuracy in the O&S portion of the cost estimate. 

Potential areas for reductions include: revised bed-down plans; improved spares 

pricing; detailed reviews of manpower requirements; technical refresh strategies; 

and future Service training requirements, such as the number of annual flight hours 

per aircraft. The cost risks in the tanker and bomber programs have also been addressed, in the case of the tanker, through use of a competitively-awarded fixed 

price contract. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Earlier this year, you labeled the concurrency of the F–35 program 

as ‘‘acquisition malpractice.’’ Why did you choose those words, and what action has 

been taken by the Department taken to address your concerns? 
144 

Mr. KENDALL. The decision to begin production well before testing began was a 

clear departure from well-established principles of sound program management. I 

have taken several steps to improve accountability in the acquisition system, encourage well-informed decisions, and improve the process in order to make sure we 

make better decisions moving forward. I chartered a Quick Look Review that assessed the risks in upcoming production decisions given the high degree of concurrency associated with the F–35 program. Those results aided the January 2012 

Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) initial review of the post Nunn-McCurdy baseline. 

The DAB will continue to conduct annual Interim Progress Reviews to assess how 

risk is being mitigated and provide additional guidance. Additionally, the flattening 

of the production ramp in the coming years will minimize the cost of upgrading 

these early Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft. The Department is also pursuing a strategy regarding LRIP 6 and 7 negotiations that incentivizes Lockheed 

Martin to reduce concurrency costs by holding back the purchase of six LRIP 6 jets 

until the contractor can prove performance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Your predecessor, Dr. Carter, stated that the JSF program—both 

the government and contractor—lost its focus on affordability and that getting back 

that focus is paramount to improving the JSF program as it moves forward. From 

your perspective, did the program lose its focus on affordability? What were the 

main indicators of problems that were overlooked and what finally brought them to 

light? What are the key steps to regaining and sustaining a strong focus on affordability? What initiatives are underway to drive down JSF operations and support 

costs? Assuming the latest projections will show that the JSF will cost more to operate and maintain than legacy fighters, what implications does this have on future 

budgets and how the military services will pay this future bill? 

Mr. KENDALL. I do believe that the F–35 Program—both Government and contractor—lost the focus on affordability. The program was initiated with a high degree of concurrency, and the risks and costs due to concurrency were not accurately 

predicted nor planned. The Department has taken steps to minimize the risks and 

reduce the costs associated with concurrency. We have done this through reduced 

procurement of aircraft while concurrent development and test continues. Additionally, we initiated the transition to fixed-price-type procurement contracts and are 

ensuring that costs associated with concurrency are shared more between the Government and contractor. The F–35 program and the Department are working diligently to reduce F–35 operations and support costs. Based on maturation of the 

technical baseline and focused affordability initiatives, the Department expects 

greater accuracy in the operations and support portion of the cost estimate. Potential areas for reductions include: revised bed-down plans; improved spares pricing; 

detailed reviews of manpower requirements; technical refresh strategies; and future 

Service training requirements, such as the number of annual flight hours per aircraft. Recently, I directed procurement affordability targets that will help ensure 

that, as the F–35 program reaches the point that it is ready for Full-Rate Production; the Department will be able to afford to procure the quantities it needs. 

Similarly, I established sustainment affordability targets that will allow us to 

communicate expectations to the contractor so we can control the cost to operate 

each aircraft, the annual costs to the Services, and how much investment will be 

required over the total lifecycle of the F–35 program. These affordability targets 

and, more importantly, the actual costs that we realize over the coming years will 

provide us a better understanding of whether we can afford to buy, fly, and sustain 

the current total requirement. An affordable F–35 program will allow the Department to replace legacy aircraft with fewer, more capable, multi-role strike fighter 

aircraft well suited to meet the leaner requirements of the new strategic guidance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department took the STOVL off probation after one year. Why 

do you think it was appropriate to end probation? What specifically did the STOVL 

accomplish in 2011 that gives you confidence about its future? What do you feel are 

the primary risks remaining with the STOVL development? 

Mr. KENDALL. Based on the assessment that the F–35B had made sufficient 

progress in development, test, and production, such that no uniquely distinguishing 

issues required more scrutiny than the other two variants of F–35, I believe it was 

appropriate to remove the F–35B from ‘‘probation’’ status. 

Successful F–35B performance ashore and at sea has very positively advanced the 

state of demonstrated capability in 2011. The F–35B is making good progress in 

flight test metrics, resolving technical issues, and meeting performance requirements. 

In October 2011, the F–35B satisfactorily executed a limited demonstration of 

ship suitability when two aircraft completed the initial sea trials on the USS WASP. 

Testing included flight envelope expansion, airborne and deck handling qualities, 

and the aircraft effects on the shipboard environment. The sea trials were very suc-
145 

cessful. Flight deck heating and exhaust jet blast velocity demonstrated satisfactory 

results. 

In 2011, the F–35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program baseline was restructured and resourced with adequate margin to accommodate current 

known and future unknown technical challenges and changes across all variants. 

Anticipated developmental costs associated with unique F–35B technical challenges 

and changes have been addressed in the program restructure. In addition, the Department reduced F–35B production in FY12 to accommodate the time it takes to 

complete engineering solutions, produce the necessary hardware, and assess the 

operational impact of the changes. This reduction in quantity balances the risk of 

retrofit costs with the need to ensure continuity in the engineering workforce involved in assembly of the F–35B in Fort Worth; and to sustain the supplier base 

of F–35B unique parts. 

F–35B weight has changed in very small amounts since January 2011 and remains essentially stable. In addition, engine performance data collected has allowed 

credit for better lift performance and the Vertical Landing Bring Back Key Performance Parameter has maintained consistent positive margin. 

In 2011, the F–35B performed on or ahead of the test plan. Total flights planned 

versus actual were 293/333, and total test points planned versus actual were 2272/ 

2636. Additionally, the F–35B accomplished 268 Vertical Landings, 395 Short Take 

Offs, and 156 Slow Landings. 

The FS 496 bulkhead has been redesigned for production beginning with LowRate Initial Production Lot 4, with fixes identified for retrofit as needed. F–35B fatigue testing (also known as durability testing) resumed in the 1st quarter of 2012. 

The test was halted for new bulkhead fabrication and instrumentation and test article reconstruction in November 2010. 

The redesigned upper auxiliary air inlet door hardware began flight testing in December 2011. Analyses of the results from early test flights are promising. Weather 

and the pace of flights will determine when this is complete. Additionally, ordering 

of modification kits for aircraft retrofit began in parallel with this testing in order 

to gain clearance for fleet STOVL mode operation as soon as possible. 

Airworthiness concerns with the lift fan clutch heating issue have been mitigated 

by the incorporation of a temperature sensor that alerts the pilot to take corrective 

action if a clutch exceeds acceptable temperatures. At the same time, a detailed root 

cause investigation for a permanent fix to eliminate clutch heating is underway. 

The vertical lift propulsion system driveshafts are being custom fitted with spacers to ensure the shaft can accommodate the airframe thermal expansion and contraction. While this is currently a maintenance burden, it eliminates the airworthiness concerns with the current driveshaft design. A new driveshaft that can meet 

the actual aircraft environmental requirements is in the early phases of the design 

process. 

The airworthiness risk associated with roll post actuator heating has been mitigated by insulating the actuator with a thermal blanket. A new actuator design that 

will eliminate the need for a thermal blanket completed critical design review in 

January 2012. 

Our observations and assessments over the past year give us reason to believe the 

basic aircraft designs are sound and will deliver. The remaining development is focused on testing and integration. Software development, coupled with flight test execution, will remain the major focus of the F–35B and the overall F–35 program execution in the coming year and through the completion of SDD. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In the December 2011 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report, we noted 

that F–35 airframe and engine costs increased about $6.2 billion due to a slower 

near-term production ramp. How does this increase compare with the increase in 

costs for expected concurrency modifications if the production ramp were not 

changed from the Department’s position for fiscal year 2012? 

Mr. KENDALL. The $6.2 billion value quoted in the December 2011 F–35 Selected 

Acquisition Report reflects the increase across 30 years of production and inflation 

to include an additional 2 years of production. In the FY 2013–2017 Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP), we are satisfied the recommended production rate is the 

best use of the Department’s funding. 

The concurrency costs for the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot 7 aircraft 

in FY2013 range from $7 million per aircraft, if only the ‘‘must fix’’ changes are incorporated, up to $15 million per aircraft if all changes are incorporated. Importantly, while the deferment of aircraft did result in a unit recurring flyaway cost 

increase of approximately $10 million per aircraft in for LRIP 7, we believe the realignment of the pace of production balances the need for a stable industrial base 

with the realities of otherwise increasing concurrency modification costs and a resource-constrained fiscal environment. 
146 

Mr. BARTLETT. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing 

to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ‘‘essential to national security,’’ 

there was no other acceptable capability to meet the requirement, and the Global 

Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to operate than the U–2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months 

ago. Please explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less 

than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional 

high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined 

the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force 

structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global 

Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 

through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

In September 2011 following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Committee modified the high-altitude ISR requirement where 

the U–2 was deemed sufficient to meet that amended requirement. Coupled with 

the austere budget environment, the Department decided it could no longer afford 

additional investment required for the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. • Requirement: The Air Force further determined the U–2 (which remains viable 

until at least 2040) was sufficient to meet the reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in the RQ–4 is required to field a comparable capability to the U–2 and was determined to be unaffordable. • Budget: The Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011. Additional investment in the RQ–4 is not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and because the U–2 remains operationally viable to satisfy the 

reduced JROC requirements at considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the Japanese 

Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global Hawk was able to fly into areas 

too risky for manned aircraft (an active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a 

nuclear environment in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this 

transformational capability? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Air Force will continue to satisfy the operational needs of 

the Combatant Commands through the Global Force Management Process. The 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment affirms the modified high-altitude ISR requirement is sufficient to address any such future contingency. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department’s combatant commanders have an insatiable need 

for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one unmet requirement. While 

budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 

30 aircraft out of the active inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal 

to scrap aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters, including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why it is necessary 

to take these assets out of commanders’ hands and instead send them to the desert 

to rust? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given that the U–2 meets the new requirement significant reduction in 
147 

the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk 

Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings where $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the 

taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as 

NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. A modified requirement 

where the U–2 is sufficient and a reduced budget where the Department could no 

longer afford to keep investing in RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the retirement 

decision. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that the 

high-altitude ISR requirement structure could be modified. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet these reduced requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was determined to be 

unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted 

given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, 

the U–2, still operationally viable at considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk Block 30 air- craft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of these aircraft have been built 

and are flying operational missions. My understanding is that this budget proposes 

to eliminate the funding for future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these 

relatively new aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the 

DOD is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these aircraft that 

are currently providing valuable intelligence to the warfighter? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to 

divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although 

money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was 

needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted 

in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the 

U–2 leverages $1.7B that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. 

The U–2 fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours (2040 and 

beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new engines in 1994–1998, 

the entire fleet has completed new power distribution (wiring), 21st century glass 

cockpit and modern avionics processor upgrades. The U–2s are currently on a 4000- 

hour programmed depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. 

Mr. BARTLETT. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be necessary to maintain the 

same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If this is the case, how can it be that 

you determined the manned aircraft to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does 

the Global Hawk Block 30 compare to the U–2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The operating characteristics of the U–2 are vastly different than 

those of the Global Hawk including operating altitudes, sensor capabilities, standoff ranges and mission effectiveness. A nominal RQ–4 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) is 

four aircraft, and a nominal U–2 CAP is five aircraft. The Global Hawk Block 30 

has not matured to the point where a true comparison of operational costs is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13 budget 

review using data from previous Air Force and Department efforts. The Air Force 

Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in FY11 show both the U–2 and 

RQ–4 at $32K per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the RQ–4 Block 30 until 

March 2011, so there is only six months of representative flying hour information 

in the database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with the SIGINT 

sensor in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying with this payload in April 2012 and 

expects the RQ–4 flying hour costs to be greater than those for the U–2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the 

Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How have the Department’s decisions to reduce Block 30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements (increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to the increased system cost of Global 

Hawk? 
148 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30 program was 

based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is to execute electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), limited moving target indicator (MTI) 

and signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions simultaneously. No change to the Block 

30 requirement factored into the decision to terminate the program. In September 

2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments 

in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient 

to meet these reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment 

in RQ–4 would have been required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and 

therefore, the RQ–4 was determined to be unaffordable. Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2 is still operationally viable at 

considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership Cost data 

for U–2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per operational hour (that 

is, the cost per hour executing missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U–2. This 

seems to be a much more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How does this 

square with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The total cost of keeping the Global Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ–4 to reach a comparable capability with 

U–2 was more expensive than keeping the U–2. As a result, the Department chose 

to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U–2 is 

sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude ISR requirement, and the 

AF budget reduced to where the Department could no longer afford to keep investing in the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military 

strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be 

modified. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at 

least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased 

investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was 

determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 

was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an 

alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower cost 

over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the 

U–2 is employed at its normal operational distance, shows the U–2 cost is comparable to the RQ–4 cost. The latest actual CPFH data shows that both platforms 

are operating at $32K per hour. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What is the cost comparison for operating U–2 compared to Global 

Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission for each? How much of the 

U–2 fleet is available to perform all ISR missions? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The cost per flight hour is roughly the same. The U–2 costs 

$320K per 10-hour Multi-INT mission and the RQ–4 $640K per 20-hour Single-INT 

mission. There are 27 U–2 ‘‘single seaters’’ of which one is always rotating through 

depot level maintenance, and two utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions, 

but not typically utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are 24 mission-capable U– 

2 aircraft at any given time. 

Mr. BARTLETT. If the U–2 is extended until 2025, and the system that was slated 

to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for replacing the U–2? How much will 

it cost to modernize and maintain the Cold War-era U–2 for another 15 years? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. There is no projected U–2 retirement date. The U–2 aircraft remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements currently tasked by the 

Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest approximately $68 million per 

year in sustainment and enhancement modifications to ensure platform modernization and maintenance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Department’s Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated with the decision 

to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30 program. Please share this 

analysis with the Congress so it can better understand the analytical foundation of 

this decision. Provide a detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both 

sustainment and procurement through 2025. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. In support of the FY13 President’s Budget Request (PBR), the 

USAF analyzed the operational output of both the RQ–4 and the U–2 using existing 

CONOPS for both aircraft and determined that U–2 capability was sufficient for 

operational needs. When analyzed in this context, the U–2 and RQ–4 operating 
149 

costs were nearly equal. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program 

and save a net of $2.5B. The CAPE conducted their own independent cost analysis 

based on three scenarios to come to the conclusion that the U–2 was the more affordable option to meet the newly reduced requirement. The Air Force will defer to 

CAPE to provide Congress the details of their independent cost analysis. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt, American 

taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these decisions cannot be short-sighted or made 

at the expense of our long-term budget or national security needs. Please detail how 

terminating a new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive 

than extending the life of an aging platform, U–2, which will require increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible decision over the next decade. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement and the significant reduction 

in the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the 

decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate 

and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. The total cost of keeping the Global 

Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ–4 to reach a comparable capability with U–2 was more expensive than keeping the U–2. As a result, 

the Department chose to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U–2 is sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable 

through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude 

ISR requirement, and the AF budget reduced to where the Department could no 

longer afford to keep investing in the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: 

In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent 

adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude 

ISR requirements could be modified. The Air Force further determined the U–2, 

which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted given a significant reduction 

in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost 

per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the U–2 is employed at its normal operational 

distance, shows the U–2 cost is comparable to the RQ–4 cost. The latest actual 

CPFH data shows that both platforms are operating at $32K per hour. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system. 

Mr. VAN BUREN. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30, 
150 

which still needed approximately $800M in investment to achieve sensor parity with 

the U–2, was not prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between 

the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the 

U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the 

decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate 

and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you please provide us details on how the Global Hawk has 

been used to support operations worldwide over the past year? Please provide both 

classified and unclassified details of how Global Hawk is being used 

Mr. VAN BUREN. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical, infrared, and 

synthetic aperture radar and was used in a traditional ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall, Global Hawk was successful in Operation Odyssey 

Dawn and in its continued support for Operation Unified Protector. Assessment details can be made available at a higher classification. In the CENTCOM theater, 

Global Hawk continues to support the combatant command with both theater and 

tactical ISR. To date, RQ–4 has flown over 50,000 combat hours in support of 

CENTCOM operations. In a humanitarian/disaster relief support role, Global Hawk 

leveraged its range and endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti 

earthquake, Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours effectively providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting earthquake damage, 

status of critical infrastructure and identifying food/aid drop zones and indicators 

of mass population migrations. Eight missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. 

In Japan, Global Hawk capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 

21 hours. Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40 minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment, supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support, Global Hawk collection focused 

on the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, 

Japan allowed PACOM to use the Global Hawk within the 20 km nuclear engagement zone. Infrared imagery taken directly over the top of the reactors allowed engineers to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300 on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General Schwartz mentioned Operations and Support costs are 

issue for the Global Hawk program. When the decision was made to retire the U– 

2 a few years back, specific costs (base support, infrastructure and indirect support) 

were allocated to Global Hawk. As a result, these costs have inflated the Global 

Hawk cost per flight hour while the U–2’s cost per flight hour has decreased. Did 

the USAF look at doing an apples-to-apples comparison of costs for both systems? 

If not, why not? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis during the 

FY13 budget review using data from previous Air Force and DOD efforts. The Air 

Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in FY11 show the U–2 at 

$32K per hour and the RQ–4 also at $32K per hour. However, costs for the U–2 

included SIGINT sensors, but the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with its 

SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying Global Hawk with SIGINT 

sensors in April 2012 and expects the RQ–4 flying hour costs to become greater than 

those for the U–2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program 

and save a net of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You recently proposed a change in the contracting strategy for the 

fiscal year 2012 and 2013 procurement of F–35 procurement that would provide a 

means to have control on production that is based prime contractor demonstrated 

performance in developmental activities relative to the 2012 plan and concurrent 

risk reduction. Can you describe your proposal, why you think it is necessary, and 

the criteria you would use as a basis for executing the proposed contract strategy? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Department is implementing an event based contracting 

strategy for low rate initial production (LRIP) Lots 6 and 7 that buys aircraft production quantities based upon development and test progress. This strategy provides 

a means to have control on production that is informed by demonstrated development performance against the 2012 plan and concurrency cost risk reduction. The 

Department will request Lockheed Martin provide a consolidated proposal for LRIP 

Lots 6 and 7 based on an innovative structure. First, we will award 25 aircraft in 

Lot 6, out of 31 authorized and appropriated in FY12. Second, we will provide a 

means to procure from 0 to 6 of the remaining FY12-funded Lot 6 aircraft concurrent with the Lot 7 contract award in 2013. Lastly, we will link the total aircraft 

quantity ultimately procured in Lot 6 to Lockheed Martin’s development perform-
151 

ance and concurrency cost risk reduction efforts. The Department will decide to 

award the additional aircraft based on progress expected in 2012, as planned and 

resourced in the development program Integrated Master Schedule. This schedule 

is executable, appropriately resourced, includes sufficient margin for issues that are 

normal in a development program, and has been agreed to by both Lockheed Martin 

and the F–35 program office. Specific decision criteria include, but are not limited 

to, the following: 1) Planned 2012 System Engineering Technical Reviews for Block 

3 software 2) Lockheed Martin progress improving concurrency change incorporation, both forward into production and back it post delivery modification engineering 

3) Planned 2012 progress in F–35A, F–35B, and F–35C durability testing 4) Planned 

2012 progress in flight test 5) Planned 2012 line replaceable units (LRU) qualification Currently appropriated FY12 funding is necessary to implement this contracting strategy. The variable quantity of up to 6 additional Lot 6 aircraft will be 

paid for with the FY12 funds originally authorized and appropriated for their purchase; however, these funds will not be obligated on contract until FY13. The Department intends to award Lot 7 aircraft and the Lot 6 variable quantity aircraft 

through fully definitized contract actions in FY13. The initial Lot 6 contract award 

for 25 aircraft will require an Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) to ensure production flow is not disrupted. However, the Department does not intend to award 

a UCA for the 25 aircraft in Lot 6 until essential agreement is reached for Lot 5. 

We believe our plan for negotiations for LRIP 6 and 7 will allow us to control production quantity based on the performance of the development program. It is important that Lockheed Martin demonstrate performance and help us to establish the 

confidence that the F–35 is a stable and capable platform. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What is the status of the lot 5 negotiations for the fiscal year 2011 

buy of F–35s? What are the major issues under negotiation? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The contract for the low rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 5 aircraft is still being negotiated. We expect the negotiations to be completed by late 

spring 2012. Due to the sensitive nature of the negotiations, we are not able to provide any details of the negotiations. The Government negotiators are working to find 

the right balance between best value for the taxpayers and adequate profit for Lockheed Martin and its shareholders. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, the Congress has provided funds for 21 Global 

Hawk Block 30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of these aircraft have been built and are flying operational missions. My understanding is that 

this budget proposes to eliminate the funding for future Global Hawk Block 30s and 

to mothball these relatively new aircraft, four right off the production line. The 

Global Hawk system was only declared operationally ready 8 months ago. Just 7 

months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing to the Congress that the 

Global Hawk system was ‘‘essential to national security.’’ Can you explain why the 

DOD is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these aircraft that 

are currently providing valuable intelligence to the warfighter? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to 

divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although 

money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was 

needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted 

in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the 

U–2 leverages $1.7B that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. 

The U–2 fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours (2040 and 

beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new engines in 1994–1998, 

the entire fleet has completed new power distribution (wiring), 21st century glass 

cockpit and modern avionics processor upgrades. The U–2s are currently on a 4000- 

hour programmed depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Secretary, nine Global Hawk Block 30s are currently supporting counterterror operations in three combatant commands. While budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft 

out of the active inventory seems short-sighted, when they are being used to support 

the warfighter. Can you explain the rationale for grounding and storing these air-
152 

craft when there is a demonstrated need by our combatant commanders for their 

capabilities? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. It is understood by the Air Force that this hearing question was 

directly posed to Maj Gen Posner, Director of Global Power Programs Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition. The Witness Panel did not include the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Air Force. In September 2011, 

the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in 

military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR force structure 

could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable 

until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these reduced force structure requirements. Approximately $800M is required to field 18 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft 

with comparable sensor capability to the U–2. Additionally, some of the $4B investment made in the Block 30 program will continue to benefit the Block 20 BACN 

and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS 

and Navy BAMS. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you describe the scope of the F–35 software program relative 

to other currently fielded fighter aircraft, whether the software schedule, based on 

the new technical baseline review schedule, is being met, and whether needed capabilities are being included in software deliveries? 

Admiral VENLET. The scope of F–35 software is unprecedented. Taken solely in 

terms of quantity, it is a large departure from previous fighter aircraft. The F–35 

is projected to utilize 9.3 million source lines of code (MSLOC) on board the aircraft 

in its final configuration. By comparison, the FA–18E/F (Block II with AESA radar) 

has approximately 6.6 MSLOC onboard, and the F–22 has approximately 5.5 

MSLOC. The main differences in F–35 scope compared to legacy aircraft are tri-variant commonality, fully integrated software suite (FA–18 is federated), Helmet 

Mounted Display System complexity, broader mission capability (compared to F–22), 

increased number of data links, and multi-level security. Additionally, the F–35 significantly expands on the capabilities of legacy aircraft. In addition to on-board software, the F–35 will have approximately 14.8 MSLOC of ground-based software to 

support training systems, off-board mission planning, autonomic logistics and 

ground based support equipment, and another 4.5 MSLOC of non-deliverable software to operate labs, test stations, trainers, simulators, and flight test support. 

Relative to the 2011 re-baseline, Block 1B (supporting Low-Rate Initial Production 

(LRIP) 3 aircraft) software delivery to verification test is approximately 3 months 

behind schedule with only 75 percent of the fully planned content across the air system being provided. LRIP 4 software content (Block 2A) is currently estimated to 

be 3 months behind plan. Recommendations for the F–35 software program put forward by the 2010 Technical Baseline Review have been implemented (e.g. additional 

lab testing capacity, added resources for software rework and integration). In addition, over the past 6 months, Lockheed Martin has introduced several process and 

organizational initiatives to improve its software development and address current 

schedule pressure. Some of these initiatives have long-term implementation paths 

requiring deep changes, although we are already seeing positive indications from 

the efforts to date. 

Prompted by the program office, Lockheed Martin initiated action to track software development by capability to facilitate early warnings on capability at risk. 

Block 2A is being closely monitored on a capability by capability basis, with assigned JPO counterparts to ensure government input on prioritizing needed capabilities. These teams are actively working through all contracted Block 1B and 2A 

capabilities to support the final Block 2A release to flight test. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What is the status of the software for the logistics system to support F–35 maintenance so that the desired operational capabilities can be achieved? 

Admiral VENLET. The current Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) 

software release (1.0.2E3) provides basic aircraft maintenance and mission planning 

capabilities for both System Development and Demonstration (SDD) and Low-Rate 

Initial Production aircraft. The follow-on release (1.0.3), which is already developed 

and laboratory tested with Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) testing 

completed, constitutes the first instance of the integrated sustainment support solution. This release has been delayed and changes are being incorporated to address 

the findings from the IV&V. Introduction of the updated ALIS release to SDD flight 

test sites is projected for the third quarter of CY 2012 and to operational sites in 

the first quarter of CY 2013. After this release is fielded, the program has two additional major software releases (2.0 and 3.0) on schedule to bring ALIS to full requirements capability. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Secretary Gates put the Marine Corps F–35B on probation due to 

concerns over deficiencies in development. Secretary has removed the probation. 

When will all of the recommended fixes to the F–35B be complete and tested? 
153 

Admiral VENLET. The principal STOVL issues of concern in January 2011 were: • FS 496 Bulkhead Crack • Auxiliary Air Inlet Buffet Door Vibration • Lift Fan Drive Shaft • Lift Fan Clutch Heating • Roll Nozzle Actuator Heating 

Fixes tested and implemented are as follows: 

• FS 496 Bulkhead Crack 

Æ Redesigned for production beginning in Low Rate Initial Production 

(LRIP) Lot 4 for F–35B, with fixes identified for retrofits as needed Æ Fatigue test (AKA durability testing) resumed on January 19, 2012 Æ Durability testing (2nd life) will be complete in December 2014 Æ Depot retrofits are planned to begin in 2012 and conclude in 2016 • Auxiliary Air Inlet (AAI) Buffet Door Vibration 

Æ Redesigned upper AAI Door hardware began flight test in December 2011 Æ Early test flight results are promising; testing will complete in 2012 Æ New door design will be placed into production in October 2013, with a 

first delivery forecast for March 2014 Æ Retrofits on existing aircraft are planned for 2012 through 2014 • Lift Fan Drive Shaft 

Æ Custom fitted spacers are being used to accommodate the airframe thermal expansion and contraction (interim solution) Æ Qualification testing of new design will be completed by January 2014 Æ New design will be broken into production in LRIP Lot 7 Æ Retrofits will be accomplished by attrition. The current driveshaft with 

class spacers as an interim solution allows safe operations throughout 

the flight envelope. The new driveshaft will save weight, cost, and maintenance workload, but does not warrant early replacement. • Lift Fan Clutch Heating 

Æ Interim solution is heat monitoring sensor; alerts pilot when acceptable 

temperature is exceeded Æ Detailed root cause investigation for permanent fix is underway Æ Testing for optimal spacing will be complete in August 2012 Æ JPO has not determined when the production break-in will occur (if required); retrofits will occur by attrition • Roll Nozzle Actuator Heating 

Æ Airworthiness risks mitigated by insulating actuator with thermal blanket Æ Critical design review for new design was completed in January 2012 Æ Quality testing of the improved actuator will be completed December 

2012 

Æ New design will begin production break-in in LRIP Lot 7 

Æ Retrofits will be accomplished through attrition 

Mr. BARTLETT. We understand that significant development problems occurred 

with the helmet mounted display, potentially affecting the concept of operation of 

the F–35. Will you be able to resolve the issue and when will the helmet mounted 

display be fully tested? 

Admiral VENLET. There are three main technical issues identified affecting the operation of the GEN II Helmet Mounted Display System (HMDS). The technical 

issues are jitter, data latency, and acuity. The HMDS program has been modified 

to incorporate technical changes which are intended to solve these three issues. Accordingly, we are tracking a HMDS program risk which tracks the burn down of 

these issues. The program office plans to complete a Critical Design Review in late 

2012 for these improvements. To further reduce risk, the program has developed a 

second helmet using legacy technology to ensure there is capability prior to Operational Testing. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The November 2011 Quick Look Review of F–35 Joint Strike 

Fighter Concurrency recommended that further decisions about F–35 production be 

event driven, based on the achievement of sufficient test data demonstrating design 

maturity and well-controlled processes for executing and minimizing design changes 

across concurrent production. Going forward, what action does the program plan to 

take to minimize risks of flight test and production concurrency and the associated 

government exposure to additional costs on future procurement contracts? 

Admiral VENLET. The program is taking several actions to minimize our exposure 

to additional costs on future procurement contracts. From a contracting perspective, 

we have introduced cost-sharing for concurrency changes that are discovered and 

known prior to a Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) period of performance. This applies initially to the LRIP 5 period of performance and is a 50–50 share ratio with 
154 

Lockheed Martin. In System Design and Development, we are implementing an incentive fee directly related to the reduction in span time between a declared deficiency and its corresponding implementation on the production line. By shortening 

the span time to implement a change, we will minimize the number of aircraft that 

will have to be modified in the future. 

During the Quick Look Review, the flight testing remaining and those areas that 

exhibit potential for discovery (such as transonic roll-off, high angle-of-attack, and 

buffet) that might have concurrency impact if there is discovery were deeply analyzed. The test program is executing the plan of record and has capacity to add test 

points to allow for refly and discovery if additional test is necessary to resolve anomalies. 

The program is proactively participating in the concurrency change process. JPO 

engineers participate with their Lockheed Martin counterparts in Engineering Review Boards, convened on a weekly basis to review and approve all change requests 

and culminating with the implementation of the change in the production line after 

final approval by the Configuration Control Board. 

The program office is working with Lockheed Martin to improve the end-to-end 

change implementation process. The program office, working with Lockheed Martin, 

is collecting and tracking metrics to capture change attributes to gain visibility and 

transparency into the change process. Using data-driven metrics will allow a more 

in-depth understanding of how deficiencies are reported and the span time required 

to formally cut changes into production. This understanding will improve management control by identifying process anomalies that will become candidates for mitigation. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Are the F–35 production aircraft currently being delivered by the 

contractor on schedule and with the capabilities prescribed in the respective Lot 

contract? 

Admiral VENLET. No. The F–35 Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) delivery 

schedule was re-baselined in September 2010. Current LRIP aircraft are being produced and delivered from the factory to the flight line in Forth Worth approximately 

1 month behind the re-baselined schedule. Once delivered to the flight line there 

is an additional average 6-month delay to Government acceptance (DD–250). The 

additional 6-month delay is caused by: • Maturation of the final finishes processes; • Traveled work to field operations (including planned Block 1B modifications for 

the first six LRIP 3 aircraft); • Quality issues; • Maintenance and repair of aircraft subsystems, and • Reconciliation and approval of major variances. 

Since award of the LRIP contracts, the System Design and Development (SDD) 

program was also re-baselined. As a result of the re-baseline and the adjusted timing of capability delivery, some of the capabilities that were expected to be qualified 

in SDD and delivered to production aircraft are not available. This has prevented 

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics from delivering F–35 production aircraft to the originally contracted capabilities. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In his acquisition decision memorandum of March 28, 2012, the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics tasked the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, in collaboration with the Navy, 

Air Force, Joint Program Office, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Logistics 

and Material Readiness) to develop a plan that identifies and quantifies opportunities to reduce operating and support costs. From your perspective, what are the primary drivers of F–35 support costs, and how is the F–35 development program addressing these issues? 

Admiral VENLET. The largest sustainment cost drivers are Unit Level Consumption (primarily depot-level repairable and consumable) and Manpower. The Joint 

Strike Fighter Program Office (JSFPO) is performing a review of contractor manpower requirements to assess their reasonableness and realism relative to achievable ramp up, steady state scope, and appropriate skill mix. An additional area of 

investigation continues to be the ground rules and assumptions associated with how 

the Services plan to operate F–35 to ensure that the design of the F–35 air system 

and sustainment solution is maximized to drive efficiencies. 

The JSFPO is currently implementing an affordability strategy that includes a 

formal F–35 Affordability Management Plan (AMP). The AMP is focused on: reducing the costs of support products such as support equipment, spare parts and training devices; baselining requirements with the Services and leveraging increased efficiency opportunities; and addressing reliability and maintainability. 

The JSFPO is executing the second phase of a formal Business Case Analysis 

(BCA) and Targeted Affordability Program (TAP). Phase 1 of the BCA and TAP pro-
155 

duced sustainment labor rates and labor mix recommendations that were captured 

in the FY11 annual estimate. Additionally, the analysis produced alternatives for 

aircraft utilization, deployment planning, and squadron manning that were included 

in the cost reductions. 

The 2012 phase 2 BCA and TAP efforts will build on the FY11 work and focus 

on the following: 

• BCA—ALIS, Depot Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul & Update (MRO&U) planning, support equipment, software management and training. 

• TAP initiatives—Matching Life Cycle Cost Estimate fee assumptions and labor 

rates to the Phase 1 BCA findings, Manpower Basis of Estimate’s, ALIS and 

Training labor rates, Spare Parts Unit Database deep dive, Global asset pooling, and contract structure/incentive fees (initial focus on Supply Chain Management). 

Mr. BARTLETT. As you know, the JSF program has had a host of problems over 

the past years resulting in significant cost growth, schedule slips, and, most importantly, delays in fielding capabilities to the warfighter. From your observations, 

what have been the primary causes to the JSF’s development problems and challenges to date? Has the F–35 Joint Program Office been receptive to your past advice and recommendations for establishing a knowledge-based acquisition process? 

What future steps can the Department take to ensure the JSF program does not 

repeat its mistakes from the past and achieve a more predictable and successful outcome? What steps can be taken to place bounds on the programs and to help improve management and oversight of the program? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. JSF development problems and challenges can largely be traced to 

its extremely risky acquisition strategy, poor decisions at key junctures, and a management environment that was slow to acknowledge and address problems. JSF officials adopted a ‘‘single step’’ acquisition strategy to develop and acquire full combat 

capabilities on a very aggressive, risky schedule with substantial concurrency 

among development, testing, and production activities. The JSF program started 

system development before requisite technologies were ready, started manufacturing 

test aircraft before designs were stable, and moved to production before flight tests 

adequately demonstrated that the aircraft design met performance and operational 

suitability requirements. The late release of drawings—and continuing high rate of 

changes—resulted in a cascading of problems in establishing suppliers and manufacturing processes, which led to late parts deliveries, delayed the program schedule, 

and forced inefficient manufacturing processes to workaround problems. These 

issues are lessening now but the impacts are still felt in higher costs, late deliveries 

of test and production aircraft, and a much-delayed development test schedule. 

As part of its June 2010 Nunn-McCurdy certification to the Congress, DOD provided a root cause analysis for cost and schedule growth that identified similar factors. Specifically, the analysis cites a very aggressive and concurrent development 

schedule, unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, flawed and over-optimistic assumptions, and management’s reluctance to accept unfavorable information, slowing 

down the ability of the contractor and government to recognize and respond to problems. 

For a number of years, the Department had not been very receptive to our findings and recommendations. Starting in 2001 with a debate about the initial business 

case for the F–35, defense officials have often non-concurred with our recommendations and, even when somewhat agreeable, did not usually fully implement them. 

For example, while officials generally acknowledged the merits of knowledge-based 

acquisitions and agreed that the JSF strategy was very risky, they chose to continue 

moving forward with the intent to manage the risks. They did not delay development start even though technologies were not ready and did not delay or reduce procurement when designs were not stable nor manufacturing processes mature. This 

attitude started changing ca. 2009 after internal reviews leading into 2010 restructuring. Attachment 1 provides a listing of our recommendations since 2001 and the 

department’s response to those recommendations [see Appendix pages 131–132]. 

Over the last two years, JPO and OSD management have been significantly more 

receptive to our findings and recommendations than in previous years. This is a welcome change. Defense officials lately recognized numerous technical, financial, and 

management shortcomings and significantly restructured the program, making 

changes we support and, in quite a few cases, had earlier recommended. Restructuring actions were supported by a comprehensive, bottoms-up systems engineering 

review, which is a key knowledge-based practice. This recognized the need to spend 

more time and money to fix design and manufacturing processes and more thoroughly flight test aircraft before accelerating production further. Also, an OSD concurrency study corroborated our concerns about the immature design and the con-
156 

currency costs DOD is incurring as a result of the highly risky acquisition strategy 

not in compliance with knowledge-based practices. 

A new and sustained focus on affordability, effective implementation of restructuring actions, successful mitigation of design and manufacturing risks identified by 

independent panels, and more active and involved oversight by OSD and military 

services should lead to more predictable and achievable outcomes. Regaining and 

aggressively pursuing affordability—both in terms of the investment costs to acquire 

the JSF and the continuing costs to operate and maintain it over the life-cycle— 

will be very challenging, but is paramount to future success. Restructuring actions 

include the adoption of more realistic cost and schedule estimates, a more robust 

flight test program, and directed implementation of critical improvements needed in 

the aircraft and engine manufacturing and supplier management processes. Officials 

need to hold the line on annual procurement quantities and only ramp up production rates upon firm and confirming evidence from test results and performance indications that the production process is mature. 

Implementing the ‘‘system maturity matrix’’ we recommended in March 2010 

would provide a forcing tool to help senior defense officials and the Congress make 

annual budget and aircraft quantity decisions based on actual progress in building 

and testing the aircraft. The matrix is designed to provide criteria and conditions 

for comparing documented test and manufacturing results to expected progressive 

levels of demonstrated weapon system maturity in relationship to planned increases 

in future procurement quantities. This would help justify a ramp up of procurement 

quantities and corresponding funding levels leading up to full-rate procurement, 

now planned for 2019. 

OSD’s F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Concurrency Quick Look Review, dated Nov. 29, 

2011, makes a similar recommendation. The report determined a lack of confidence 

in design stability and concurrency costs of required fixes supported serious reconsideration of procurement and production planning. It recommends that further decisions about F–35 concurrent production be event driven, based on the achievement 

of sufficient test data to support increased confidence in design maturity and of a 

well-controlled process for executing and minimizing design changes across concurrent production. 

If the program’s development costs continue to grow under the cascading effects 

of late drawings, design changes, and labor inefficiencies, the Department or Congress may need to consider, at some point, the idea of limiting any additional funding for development. The current funding levels of the F–35 are already testing the 

limits of realism. Any additional cost growth during development should be absorbed by the program, rather than add to the taxpayer’s burden. 

Mr. BARTLETT. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring of the 

program for the past 2 years. In testimony last year before this Subcommittee, you 

said that GAO supports these actions. Do you still support the restructuring efforts, 

including the most recent ones added by the Secretary in January 2012? Have you 

seen concrete examples of improvements from these actions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, we still support the restructuring actions, although we continue to be concerned about the viability of future annual funding rates. Starting 

in January 2010, restructuring actions by the Department have placed the JSF on 

a more achievable course, albeit a lengthier and more expensive one. The Department has progressively lowered the production ramp-up rate and cut near term procurement quantities; fewer aircraft procured while testing is still ongoing lowers the 

risk of having to modify already produced aircraft. The new development flight test 

schedule is more realistic and better resourced, using more conservative assumptions about fly rates and test point achievements and providing for more flights and 

more test assets. This has paid off with relatively good test flight performance in 

2010 and 2011. Undergirding restructuring actions was the technical baseline review done by the program office—a needed and comprehensive systems engineering 

review of the entire program that identified numerous disconnects in functions and 

information. In addition, several positive accomplishments by the prime contractor 

may spur improved future performance. Lockheed Martin implemented an improved 

and comprehensive integrated master schedule, loaded the new data from restructuring, and completed a schedule risk assessment, as we recommended several years 

ago. Also, DCMA and program officials believe that Lockheed has made a concerted 

effort to improve its earned value management system in compliance with federal 

standards. Initial reviews of the new procedures, tools, and training indicate that 

the company is on track to have its new system and processes approved in 2012. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As you know, the JSF acquisition program is expected to still require over $300 billion to complete the acquisition. 

How do you view affordability as a challenge for the program? 
157 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Overall program affordability—both in terms of the investment 

costs to acquire the JSF and the continuing costs to operate and maintain it over 

the life-cycle—remains a major risk. The long-stated intent that the JSF program 

would deliver an affordable, highly common fifth generation aircraft that could be 

acquired in large numbers could be in question. Total U.S. investment in the JSF 

is now estimated at $395.7 billion to develop and procure 2,457 aircraft over several 

decades and will require a long-term, sustained funding commitment. As the JSF 

program moves forward, unprecedented levels of funding will be required during a 

period of more constrained defense funding expectations overall. As the program 

continues to experience cost growth and delays, projected annual funding needs are 

unprecedented, averaging more than $12.5 billion a year through 2037. The Air 

Force alone needs to budget from $6 to $11 billion per year from fiscal year 2016 

through 2037 for procurement. At the same time; the Air Force is committed to 

other big-dollar projects such as the KC–46 tanker and a new bomber program. 

In addition, current JSF life-cycle cost estimates are considerably higher than the 

legacy aircraft it will replace; this has major implications for future demands on 

military operating support budgets and plans for recapitalizing fighter forces. The 

most recent estimate by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation 

projects total U.S. operating and support (O&S) costs of $1.1 trillion for all three 

variants based on a 30-year service life and predicted usage and attrition rates. Defense leadership stated in 2011 that sustainment cost estimates of this magnitude 

were unaffordable and simply unacceptable in this fiscal environment. Our military 

services and the international partners have all expressed concerns about long-term 

affordability. The program has undertaken efforts to address this life-cycle affordability concern, however, until DOD can demonstrate that the program can perform 

against its cost projections, it will continue to be difficult for the U.S. and international partners to accurately set priorities, establish affordable procurement rates, 

retire aged aircraft, and establish supporting infrastructure. 

Mr. BARTLETT. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring of the 

program for the past 2 years. In testimony last year before this Subcommittee, you 

said that GAO supports these actions. Several actions seem the same or similar to 

GAO’s recommendations from years ago. What are some of these and why did the 

Department not previously implement your recommendations? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Several actions are similar: 

Our March 2008 report criticized the ‘‘Mid-Course Risk Reduction’’ effort that cut 

flight test assets and reduced the number of development flights. We recommended 

that DOD revisit this effort to address our concerns about testing, use of management reserves, and manufacturing deficiencies. Instead, DOD replenished management reserves from within the program baseline and did not revise its plan, nor fix 

the problems. Consequently, management reserves were again depleted. Recent restructuring actions since 2010 added more test resources, increased the number of 

flight tests, and extended the schedule, effectively reversing the mid-course plan. 

Also in 2008, we determined that the program cost estimate was not reliable and 

likely underestimated and recommended that a new comprehensive independent 

cost estimate and schedule risk assessment are needed. We reiterated these concerns in subsequent reports, including the need to make a better projection of lifecycle operating and support costs. DOD’s joint estimating team did provide better 

cost estimates in the interim, but it was not until this year (and after a NunnMcCurdy cost breach) that a comprehensive independent cost estimate for the program to completion were completed. The CAPE’s independent cost estimate and a 

new estimate by the JPO supported a new acquisition program baseline that is substantially larger than the previous baseline and which delays key milestones. The 

CAPE also provided a new estimate of military construction costs and projected 

O&S costs of $1.1 trillion over 30 years given certain assumptions. 

Since 2006, we have consistently warned against procuring quantities of aircraft 

much ahead of testing results and the demonstrated ability of the manufacturing 

process to produce at higher rates. For example, in 2009 we reported on the risks 

posed by DOD plans to further accelerate procurement and to do so on cost reimbursement contracts. DOD responded that planned procurement rates were efficient 

and feasible and also declined to establish a firm plan for transitioning to fixed-price 

contracts. We were gratified when Defense leadership substantially reduced near 

term procurement, decreased ramp rate from one year to the next, and awarded the 

first fixed-price production contract. DOD has now reduced near-term procurement 

3 times in the last 3 years in recognition of the need to stabilize design and fix deficiencies found in testing before ramping up production. 

More recently, we recommended comprehensive schedule risk assessments, independent software studies, and moving to fixed-price contracts for production. The 
158 

Department implemented the latter in its first stage of restructuring ca. February 

2010 and recently completed the first two. 

For years, program leadership was slow to recognize problems and was generally 

unresponsive to other DOD organizations as well as us. For example, the CAIG and 

DOT&E also warned against cutting flight test resources. Rather than implementing ours and other recommendations, defense officials usually acknowledge the 

concerns, but stated they were managing the risks. 

Mr. BARTLETT. DOD has been engaged in a comprehensive restructuring of the 

program for the past 2 years. In testimony last year before this Subcommittee, you 

said that GAO supports these actions. Going forward, what critical challenges remain for the program from a cost and schedule standpoint? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As I stated at the hearing, I see 5 areas of concern moving forward. 

These are: software development; continued engineering changes emanating from 

flight test; funding assumptions that average about $12.5 billion per year through 

2037; mission systems development, most significantly the helmet mounted display; 

and the contractor’s ability to manage a large, global supply chain. Contract cost 

overruns, delayed aircraft deliveries, and continued concurrency costs are expected 

to continue for several more years. The program has not yet demonstrated a stable 

design and manufacturing processes capable of efficient production. Engineering 

changes are persisting at relatively high rates and additional changes are likely as 

testing continues. There is risk of future cost growth from test discoveries driving 

changes to design and manufacturing processes. Until manufacturing processes are 

in control and engineering design changes resulting from information gained during 

developmental testing are reduced, there is risk of more cost growth. Manufacturing 

processes and performance indicators show some progress for improved performance. Even with the substantial reductions in near-term procurement quantities, 

DOD is still investing billions of dollars on hundreds of aircraft while flight testing 

has years to go. 

Software development and integration—essential to JSF capabilities—will continue to be major factors driving JSF costs and schedule. JSF software development 

is one of the largest and most complex projects in DOD history, and it has grown 

in size and complexity, and is taking longer to complete than expected. Developing, 

testing, and integrating software, mission systems, and logistics systems are critical 

for demonstrating the operational effectiveness and suitability of a fully integrated, 

capable aircraft and pose significant technical risks moving forward. In attempting 

to maintain schedule, the program has deferred some capabilities to later blocks. 

Deferring tasks to later phases of development adds more pressure and costs to future efforts and likely increases the probability of defects being realized later in the 

program, when the more complex capabilities in these later blocks are already expected to pose substantial technical challenges. 

Going forward, Lockheed Martin’s and Pratt & Whitney’s abilities to manage an 

expanding global supplier network are fundamental to meeting future production 

rates and throughput expectations. DOD’s Independent Manufacturing Review 

Team in 2009 identified global supply chain management as the most critical challenge for meeting production expectations. The cooperative aspect of the supply 

chain provides both benefits and challenges. The international program structure is 

based on a complex set of relationships involving both government and industry 

from the United States and eight other countries. Overseas suppliers are playing 

a major and increasing role in JSF manufacturing and logistics. For example, center 

fuselage and wings will be manufactured by Turkish and Italian suppliers, respectively, as second sources. In addition to ongoing supplier challenges—parts shortages, failed parts, and late deliveries—incorporating international suppliers presents additional challenges. In addition, the program must deal with exchange rate 

fluctuations, disagreements over work shares, technology transfer concerns, different accounting methods, and transportation requirements that have already 

caused some delays. Also, suppliers have sometimes struggled to develop critical and 

complex parts while others have had problems with limited production capacity. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Regarding manned and unmanned intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance programs, has the Navy completed a comparative analysis of life 

cycle cost and operational effectiveness of manned and unmanned systems like the 

P–3, P–8 and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance aircraft? 

Admiral SKINNER. The P–3 aircraft has been flying for over 50 years and is the 

baseline for measuring Life Cycle Cost and Operational Effectiveness of Navy’s new 

ASW/ISR platforms (P–8 and BAMS). Predicted cost and effectiveness was fully 

evaluated during the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), completed for P–8 in 2002 and 

BAMS in 2003. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Program had assumed cost savings in production and operations and maintenance because of Global 
159 

Hawk program shared overhead, training, basing costs, and other operations and 

sustainment costs. In addition, there is the possibility of a break in the production 

line, with Global Hawk Block 30 termination, given the current BAMS production 

schedule. Do you know what these costs will be? 

Admiral SKINNER. With regard to operations, maintenance, training, and basing 

costs, the BAMS UAS Program as reflected in the President’s Budget request for 

FY13 accounts for the cost of continuing as a Navy-only acquisition. BAMS operations, maintenance, training, and basing are independent of the Global Hawk support structure. The procurement cost estimate is similarly based on proceeding without concurrent USAF Global Hawk production. At Milestone B, the BAMS Program 

was estimated forward without shared savings, assuming a transition of the Q4 production line from Air Force RQ–4 UAs in FY13 to Navy-only quantities of MQ–4C 

UAs in FY14. Since the estimate assumed stand-alone production, a decision to continue Global Hawk production beyond FY13 could have resulted in savings of up to 

$150M across the FYDP. Those savings did not materialize because Global Hawk 

Block 30 production was terminated. The estimate did assume savings based on 

reuse of existing tooling and special test equipment; these efficiencies will still be 

captured since the necessary equipment will transition to Navy custody as required 

to support the ongoing BAMS UAS acquisition. The residual risk to production continuity is related to terminating Global Hawk Block 30 after Lot 10, since this invalidates the BAMS UAS estimate of a seamless production transition from USAF 

RQ–4B Global Hawk to MQ–4C BAMS UAS. A production break created by Air 

Force Global Hawk Block 30 termination is estimated to cost approximately $42 million. This value assumes that NATO AGS awards as scheduled and the resulting 

gap requiring coverage is 3.5 months. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you describe the Navy and Marine Corps program and funding of unmanned aircraft vehicle sense and avoid programs to further operation of 

unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace System? 

General ROBLING. The Marine Corps’ Ground Based Sense-And-Avoid (GBSAA) 

initiative is in direct support of Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 

(VMU–2) based at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point. Current Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) regulations limit DOD unmanned aircraft (UA) operations to 

Restricted Airspace unless the UA are operating under a Certificate of Authorization (COA) issued by the FAA. Currently, FAA internal guidance requires visual observers or chase planes as a condition for approving a COA for an 11 miles transit 

to the nearest Restricted Area. The result is reduced training opportunities due to 

the inability to directly access training areas from its home station. While ground 

embarkation and transport of VMU–2 aircraft and equipment into local Restricted 

Areas has been employed as an alternate solution, this method is costly, time consuming, and increases wear on all components. The Cherry Point GBSAA program 

was funded by the OSD (AT&L) UAS Task Force as a solution to VMU–2 training 

deficiencies, and as a charter initiative to demonstrate capabilities in support of 

DOD National Airspace System UAS integration efforts. If approved for use, the 

system will utilize an existing radar feed to sanitize narrow corridors of airspace 

between Cherry Point and local Restricted Areas to allow the safe airborne transit 

of VMU–2 unmanned aircraft. All GBSAA equipment has been installed at MCAS 

Cherry Point, certified by DOD for its intended use, and has been demonstrated in 

an operationally relevant environment using trained USMC operators. Discussions 

are ongoing with the FAA regarding this system providing a sense-and-avoid capability as a condition of FAA granting the required COA. OSD provided $3.1 million 

of RDT&E funding (FY 2012–FY 2012) for this effort. Formal requirements development based upon the demonstrated Cherry Point capability, other DOD airspace integration efforts, as well as anticipated USMC future operational needs are underway in support of resourcing decisions. Specific information on US Navy sense and 

avoid programs can be provided by appropriate Navy staff. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your statement you note that F–35B and F–35C initial operational capability (IOC) dates have not been determined by leadership but you describe capabilities for IOC such as 10 F–35B aircraft with software block 2B for the 

Marine Corps, and 10 F–35C aircraft with software block 3F for the Navy. Based 

on the current F–35 development and procurement schedule, can you estimate what 

year the F–35B and F–35C will be declared IOC? 

General ROBLING. The IOC date for the F–35B and F–35C has not yet been determined by the CMC or CNO. The Navy and Marine Corps require Service specific 

operational capabilities as defined in the F–35 Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD) prior to considering declaration of IOC. Achieving these capabilities are event 

driven and dependent upon the progress of the re-baselined JSF Program. Based on 

the current JSF Program Office development plans we anticipate an F–35B IOC in 
160 

2015 and an F–35C IOC at the completion of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in 2018. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you describe the Navy and Marine Corps program and funding of unmanned aircraft vehicle sense and avoid programs to further operation of 

unmanned aircraft systems in the National Airspace System? 

Admiral FLOYD. The Navy is funding on the order of $175M for development and 

hardware procurement efforts associated with integrating the Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance (BAMS) aircraft into the National Airspace System (NAS). These efforts include the BAMS Program development of a Pilot-in-the-Loop Due Regard capability providing a first generation Sense-and-Avoid system to be deployed operationally in international airspace beginning in FY 2015. The Navy is also leading 

a Central Test Evaluation and Investment Program (CTEIP), developing a DODwide common Modeling and Simulation and Test & Evaluation infrastructure for 

UAS programs. Additionally, the Navy is working in coordination with NASA, the 

FAA, and other Services in the development of standards and procedures for integrating UAS into the NAS. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your statement you note that F–35B and F–35C initial operational capability (IOC) dates have not been determined by leadership but you describe capabilities for IOC such as 10 F–35B aircraft with software block 2B for the 

Marine Corps, and 10 F–35C aircraft with software block 3F for the Navy. Based 

on the current F–35 development and procurement schedule, can you estimate what 

year the F–35B and F–35C will be declared IOC? 

Admiral FLOYD. Not at this time. F–35B and F–35C IOC will be based on the development and test program performance (in addition to how the Department of the 

Navy defines IOC as discussed in your question above). The Department is pleased 

with the F–35 progress in 2011, but we require more definition in the program 

schedule, to include operational test dates, before targeting a timeline with a specific IOC date. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing 

to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ‘‘essential to national security,’’ 

there was no other acceptable capability to meet the requirement, and the Global 

Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to operate than the U–2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months 

ago. Please explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less 

than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated? 

General HOLMES. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional 

high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined 

the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force 

structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global 

Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 

through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

In September 2011 following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Committee modified the high-altitude ISR requirement where 

the U–2 was deemed sufficient to meet that amended requirement. Coupled with 

the austere budget environment, the Department decided it could no longer afford 

additional investment required for the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. 

• Requirement: The Air Force further determined the U–2 (which remains viable 

until at least 2040) was sufficient to meet the reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in the RQ–4 is required to field a comparable capability to the U–2 and was determined to be unaffordable. 
161 

• Budget: The Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011. Additional investment in the RQ–4 is not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and because the U–2 remains operationally viable to satisfy the 

reduced JROC requirements at considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the Japanese 

Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global Hawk was able to fly into areas 

too risky for manned aircraft (an active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a 

nuclear environment in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this 

transformational capability? 

General HOLMES. The Air Force will continue to satisfy the operational needs of 

the Combatant Commands through the Global Force Management Process. The 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment affirms the modified high-altitude ISR requirement is sufficient to address any such future contingency. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department’s combatant commanders have an insatiable need 

for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one unmet requirement. While 

budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 

30 aircraft out of the active inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal 

to scrap aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters, including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why it is necessary 

to take these assets out of commanders’ hands and instead send them to the desert 

to rust? 

General HOLMES. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given that the U–2 meets the new requirement significant reduction in 

the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk 

Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings where $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the 

taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as 

NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. A modified requirement 

where the U–2 is sufficient and a reduced budget where the Department could no 

longer afford to keep investing in RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the retirement 

decision. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that the 

high-altitude ISR requirement structure could be modified. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet these reduced requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was determined to be 

unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted 

given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, 

the U–2, still operationally viable at considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of these aircraft have been built 

and are flying operational missions. My understanding is that this budget proposes 

to eliminate the funding for future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these 

relatively new aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the 

DOD is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these aircraft that 

are currently providing valuable intelligence to the warfighter? 

General HOLMES. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to 

divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although 

money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was 

needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted 

in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the 

U–2 leverages $1.7B that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. 

The U–2 fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours (2040 and 

beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new engines in 1994–1998, 

the entire fleet has completed new power distribution (wiring), 21st century glass 
162 

cockpit and modern avionics processor upgrades. The U–2s are currently on a 4000- 

hour programmed depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. 

Mr. BARTLETT. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be necessary to maintain the 

same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If this is the case, how can it be that 

you determined the manned aircraft to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does 

the Global Hawk Block 30 compare to the U–2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis? 

General HOLMES. The operating characteristics of the U–2 are vastly different 

than those of the Global Hawk including operating altitudes, sensor capabilities, 

stand-off ranges and mission effectiveness. A nominal RQ–4 Combat Air Patrol 

(CAP) is four aircraft, and a nominal U–2 CAP is five aircraft. The Global Hawk 

Block 30 has not matured to the point where a true comparison of operational costs 

is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13 

budget review using data from previous Air Force and Department efforts. The Air 

Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in FY11 show both the U– 

2 and RQ–4 at $32K per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the RQ–4 Block 

30 until March 2011, so there is only six months of representative flying hour information in the database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with the 

SIGINT sensor in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying with this payload in April 

2012 and expects the RQ–4 flying hour costs to be greater than those for the U– 

2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for 

the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of 

$2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How have the Department’s decisions to reduce Block 30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements (increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to the increased system cost of Global 

Hawk? 

General HOLMES. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30 program was 

based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is to execute electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), limited moving target indicator (MTI) 

and signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions simultaneously. No change to the Block 

30 requirement factored into the decision to terminate the program. In September 

2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments 

in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient 

to meet these reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment 

in RQ–4 would have been required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and 

therefore, the RQ–4 was determined to be unaffordable. Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2 is still operationally viable at 

considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership Cost data 

for U–2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per operational hour (that 

is, the cost per hour executing missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U–2. This 

seems to be a much more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How does this 

square with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher? 

General HOLMES. The total cost of keeping the Global Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ–4 to reach a comparable capability with 

U–2 was more expensive than keeping the U–2. As a result, the Department chose 

to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U–2 is 

sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude ISR requirement, and the 

AF budget reduced to where the Department could no longer afford to keep investing in the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military 

strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be 

modified. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at 

least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased 

investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was 

determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 

was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an 

alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower cost 

over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the 
163 

U–2 is employed at its normal operational distance, shows the U–2 cost is comparable to the RQ–4 cost. The latest actual CPFH data shows that both platforms 

are operating at $32K per hour. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What is the cost comparison for operating U–2 compared to Global 

Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission for each? How much of the 

U–2 fleet is available to perform all ISR missions? 

General HOLMES. The cost per flight hour is roughly the same. The U–2 costs $320K per 10-hour Multi-INT mission and the RQ–4 $640K per 20-hour Single-INT 

mission. There are 27 U–2 ‘‘single seaters’’ of which one is always rotating through 

depot level maintenance, and two utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions, 

but not typically utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are 24 mission-capable U– 

2 aircraft at any given time. 

Mr. BARTLETT. If the U–2 is extended until 2025, and the system that was slated 

to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for replacing the U–2? How much will 

it cost to modernize and maintain the Cold War-era U–2 for another 15 years? 

General HOLMES. There is no projected U–2 retirement date. The U–2 aircraft remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements currently tasked by the 

Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest approximately $68 million per 

year in sustainment and enhancement modifications to ensure platform modernization and maintenance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Department’s Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated with the decision 

to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30 program. Please share this 

analysis with the Congress so it can better understand the analytical foundation of 

this decision. Provide a detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both 

sustainment and procurement through 2025. 

General HOLMES. In support of the FY13 President’s Budget Request (PBR), the 

USAF analyzed the operational output of both the RQ–4 and the U–2 using existing 

CONOPS for both aircraft and determined that U–2 capability was sufficient for 

operational needs. When analyzed in this context, the U–2 and RQ–4 operating 

costs were nearly equal. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program 

and save a net of $2.5B. The CAPE conducted their own independent cost analysis 

based on three scenarios to come to the conclusion that the U–2 was the more affordable option to meet the newly reduced requirement. The Air Force will defer to 

CAPE to provide Congress the details of their independent cost analysis. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt, American 

taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these decisions cannot be short-sighted or made 

at the expense of our long-term budget or national security needs. Please detail how 

terminating a new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive 

than extending the life of an aging platform, U–2, which will require increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible decision over the next decade. 

General HOLMES. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement and the significant reduction 

in the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the 

decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate 

and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. The total cost of keeping the Global 

Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ–4 to reach a comparable capability with U–2 was more expensive than keeping the U–2. As a result, 

the Department chose to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U–2 is sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable 

through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude 

ISR requirement, and the AF budget reduced to where the Department could no 

longer afford to keep investing in the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: 

In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent 

adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude 

ISR requirements could be modified. The Air Force further determined the U–2, 

which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified re-
164 

quirements. Continued increased investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted given a significant reduction 

in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost 

per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the U–2 is employed at its normal operational 

distance, shows the U–2 cost is comparable to the RQ–4 cost. The latest actual 

CPFH data shows that both platforms are operating at $32K per hour. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system. 

General HOLMES. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30, 

which still needed approximately $800M in investment to achieve sensor parity with 

the U–2, was not prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between 

the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the 

U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the 

decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate 

and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you please provide us details on how the Global Hawk has 

been used to support operations worldwide over the past year? Please provide both 

classified and unclassified details of how Global Hawk is being used 

General HOLMES. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical, infrared, and 

synthetic aperture radar and was used in a traditional ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall, Global Hawk was successful in Operation Odyssey 

Dawn and in its continued support for Operation Unified Protector. Assessment details can be made available at a higher classification. In the CENTCOM theater, 

Global Hawk continues to support the combatant command with both theater and 

tactical ISR. To date, RQ–4 has flown over 50,000 combat hours in support of 

CENTCOM operations. In a humanitarian/disaster relief support role, Global Hawk 

leveraged its range and endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti 

earthquake, Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours effectively providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting earthquake damage, 

status of critical infrastructure and identifying food/aid drop zones and indicators 

of mass population migrations. Eight missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. 

In Japan, Global Hawk capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 

21 hours. Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40 minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment, supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support, Global Hawk collection focused 

on the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, 

Japan allowed PACOM to use the Global Hawk within the 20 km nuclear engagement zone. Infrared imagery taken directly over the top of the reactors allowed engineers to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300 on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30 divestment decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U–2. Can you explain how the 

Department determined these costs? 
165 

General HOLMES. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis during the 

FY13 budget review using data from previous Air Force and DOD efforts. The Air 

Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in FY11 show the U–2 at 

$32K per hour and the RQ–4 also at $32K per hour. However, costs for the U–2 

included SIGINT sensors, but the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with its 

SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying Global Hawk with SIGINT 

sensors in April 2012 and expects the RQ–4 flying hour costs to become greater than 

those for the U–2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program 

and save a net of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General Schwartz mentioned Operations and Support costs are 

issue for the Global Hawk program. When the decision was made to retire the U– 

2 a few years back, specific costs (base support, infrastructure and indirect support) 

were allocated to Global Hawk. As a result, these costs have inflated the Global 

Hawk cost per flight hour while the U–2’s cost per flight hour has decreased. Did 

the USAF look at doing an apples-to-apples comparison of costs for both systems? 

If not, why not? 

General HOLMES. The Department of Defense conducted an analysis during the 

FY13 budget review using data from previous Air Force and DOD efforts. The Air 

Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in FY11 show the U–2 at 

$32K per hour and the RQ–4 also at $32K per hour. However, costs for the U–2 

included SIGINT sensors, but the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with its 

SIGINT sensors in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying Global Hawk with SIGINT 

sensors in April 2012 and expects the RQ–4 flying hour costs to become greater than 

those for the U–2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program 

and save a net of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you describe the Air Force’s program and funding of unmanned aircraft vehicle sense and avoid programs to further operation of unmanned 

aircraft vehicles in the National Airspace System? 

General HOLMES. The United States Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) 

are developing near term Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA) and long term 

Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) solutions to further remotely piloted aircraft 

(RPA) access to the National Airspace System (NAS). However, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) has not yet defined performance parameters for critical flight 

safety aspects including FAA Part 91 Code of Federal Regulations requirements for 

‘‘well clear’’ and ‘‘see and avoid’’. Currently, Air Force/DOD GBSAA and ABSAA solutions are being developed to meet DOD’s interpretation of flight safety requirements. The Air Force is working prototypes of both systems and continuing research 

in human factors systems and terminal area operations. Funding Summary: Required/Programmed ($M) 

GBSAA funding data: FY09–FY11: $4.7/$4.7; FY12: $4.175/$4.175; FY13: $1.07/ 

$1.07; FY14: $ .1/$ .1 

The first prototype GBSAA system is expected to be operational by Fall 2012 and 

is currently being tested at Gray Butte range (near Edwards AFB) and Cannon 

AFB. Once the proof of concept and prototype are validated, the system will be fielded and installed at these RPA bases to facilitate access to the NAS: Grand Forks 

AFB, Ft Drum (Syracuse), Beale AFB, Anderson AFB Guam, and Southern California Logistics Airport. 

Funding Summary: Required/Programmed ($M) 

ABSAA funding data: FY09–FY11: $28/$28; FY12: $9/$9; FY13: $19/$19; FY14: 

$45/$45 

ABSAA is a multiphase program. Common ABSAA Phase 1(a) provides the foundation for autonomous ABSAA capability for Global Hawk, Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance (BAMS) and other medium altitude RPA. A program completion 

timeline is not yet available. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In your statement you describe a decreased fighter force structure 

of 1,900 total fighter aircraft as ‘‘an increased risk’’ to carry out the National Military Strategy, compared to last year’s 2,000 fighter aircraft inventory as ‘‘some 

risk.’’ Please describe the increased risks in terms of meeting military objectives. 

What actions is the Air Force taking to reduce this risk? What actions can the Congress take to reduce this risk? 

General HOLMES. The Budget Control act drove the Air Force to assume more risk 

to meet fiscal guidance. The new strategy states the force ‘‘will no longer be sized 

to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.’’ As a result, reduced demand 

on the force, combined with the assumption of increased risk, requires fewer aircraft. Increased risk means objectives may take longer to accomplish, and the force 

may have higher potential losses. The Air Force is constantly assessing how to bal-
166 

ance risk across all of its portfolios so as to best utilize its resources and assets 

while optimizing needed combat capability. As far as actions Congress can take, 

fully funding the President’s Budget helps reduce uncertainty and therefore risk. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Just 7 months ago, Deputy Secretary Carter certified in writing 

to the Congress that the Global Hawk system was ‘‘essential to national security,’’ 

there was no other acceptable capability to meet the requirement, and the Global 

Hawk was $220M cheaper per year to operate than the U–2. Then the recommendation to terminate Block 30 is a complete reversal of the USAF position just 7 months 

ago. Please explain how an asset can be critical to national security and cost less 

than the alternative, but just 7 months later be terminated? 

General POSNER. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional 

high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined 

the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force 

structure. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global 

Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 

through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

In September 2011 following the Nunn-McCurdy certification, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Committee modified the high-altitude ISR requirement where 

the U–2 was deemed sufficient to meet that amended requirement. Coupled with 

the austere budget environment, the Department decided it could no longer afford 

additional investment required for the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. • Requirement: The Air Force further determined the U–2 (which remains viable 

until at least 2040) was sufficient to meet the reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment in the RQ–4 is required to field a comparable capability to the U–2 and was determined to be unaffordable. 

• Budget: The Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011. Additional investment in the RQ–4 is not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and because the U–2 remains operationally viable to satisfy the 

reduced JROC requirements at considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Global Hawk was the first intelligence asset to the Japanese 

Earthquake/Tsunami Relief effort and first to Libya, and by all accounts it performed very well. In both of these cases, the Global Hawk was able to fly into areas 

too risky for manned aircraft (an active Surface to Air Missile site in Libya and a 

nuclear environment in Japan). How will the USAF compensate for losing this 

transformational capability? 

General POSNER. The Air Force will continue to satisfy the operational needs of 

the Combatant Commands through the Global Force Management Process. The 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council adjustment affirms the modified high-altitude ISR requirement is sufficient to address any such future contingency. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Department’s combatant commanders have an insatiable need 

for ISR. Intelligence data is routinely the number one unmet requirement. While 

budget pressures require tough choices, the decision to pull 18 Global Hawk Block 

30 aircraft out of the active inventory seems short-sighted. I question the proposal 

to scrap aircraft currently providing intelligence support to our warfighters, including those purchased as recently as last year. Can you tell me why it is necessary 

to take these assets out of commanders’ hands and instead send them to the desert 

to rust? 

General POSNER. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 
167 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given that the U–2 meets the new requirement significant reduction in 

the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk 

Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings where $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the 

taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as 

NASA Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. A modified requirement 

where the U–2 is sufficient and a reduced budget where the Department could no 

longer afford to keep investing in RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30 drove the retirement 

decision. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that the 

high-altitude ISR requirement structure could be modified. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet these reduced requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was determined to be 

unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted 

given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, 

the U–2, still operationally viable at considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Congress has provided funds for 21 Global Hawk Block 30 air- craft at a cost of approximately $4 billion. Fourteen of these aircraft have been built 

and are flying operational missions. My understanding is that this budget proposes 

to eliminate the funding for future Global Hawk Block 30s and to mothball these 

relatively new aircraft in favor of a Cold War-era system. Can you explain why the 

DOD is poised to waste the $4 billion we have already spent on these aircraft that 

are currently providing valuable intelligence to the warfighter? 

General POSNER. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to 

divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although 

money was saved with the decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was 

needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted 

in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Furthermore, the decision to sustain the 

U–2 leverages $1.7B that was has been invested to modernize the weapon system. 

The U–2 fleet in its current state has been certified to 75,000 flight hours (2040 and 

beyond at current utilization rates). In addition to the new engines in 1994–1998, 

the entire fleet has completed new power distribution (wiring), 21st century glass 

cockpit and modern avionics processor upgrades. The U–2s are currently on a 4000- 

hour programmed depot maintenance (PDM) cycle included in the budgeted operating costs. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. 

Mr. BARTLETT. A recent CSBA report said that eight manned aircraft with otherwise identical characteristics to a Global Hawk would be necessary to maintain the 

same orbit as three unmanned Global Hawks. If this is the case, how can it be that 

you determined the manned aircraft to be the most cost-efficient solution? How does 

the Global Hawk Block 30 compare to the U–2 on a cost-per-ISR-hour basis? 

General POSNER. The operating characteristics of the U–2 are vastly different 

than those of the Global Hawk including operating altitudes, sensor capabilities, 

stand-off ranges and mission effectiveness. A nominal RQ–4 Combat Air Patrol 

(CAP) is four aircraft, and a nominal U–2 CAP is five aircraft. The Global Hawk 

Block 30 has not matured to the point where a true comparison of operational costs 

is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13 

budget review using data from previous Air Force and Department efforts. The Air 

Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database figures in FY11 show both the U– 

2 and RQ–4 at $32K per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the RQ–4 Block 

30 until March 2011, so there is only six months of representative flying hour information in the database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ–4 Block 30 with the 

SIGINT sensor in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying with this payload in April 

2012 and expects the RQ–4 flying hour costs to be greater than those for the U– 

2. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for 

the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program and save a net of 

$2.5B. 
168 

Mr. BARTLETT. How have the Department’s decisions to reduce Block 30 quantities while at the same time increasing requirements (increasing the number of simultaneous sensors required) contributed to the increased system cost of Global 

Hawk? 

General POSNER. The Air Force decision to terminate the Block 30 program was 

based upon a reduced requirement rather than an increased requirement. The requirement for the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft is to execute electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR), synthetic aperture radar (SAR), limited moving target indicator (MTI) 

and signals intelligence (SIGINT) missions simultaneously. No change to the Block 

30 requirement factored into the decision to terminate the program. In September 

2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments 

in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient 

to meet these reduced force structure requirements. Continued increased investment 

in RQ–4 would have been required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and 

therefore, the RQ–4 was determined to be unaffordable. Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2 is still operationally viable at 

considerably lower total cost over the FYDP. 

Mr. BARTLETT. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership Cost data 

for U–2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per operational hour (that 

is, the cost per hour executing missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U–2. This 

seems to be a much more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How does this 

square with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher? 

General POSNER. The total cost of keeping the Global Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ–4 to reach a comparable capability with 

U–2 was more expensive than keeping the U–2. As a result, the Department chose 

to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U–2 is 

sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude ISR requirement, and the 

AF budget reduced to where the Department could no longer afford to keep investing in the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: In September 2011, the DOD 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military 

strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be 

modified. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains viable until at 

least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased 

investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was 

determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 

was not warranted given a significant reduction in the Department’s budget and an 

alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower cost 

over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the 

U–2 is employed at its normal operational distance, shows the U–2 cost is comparable to the RQ–4 cost. The latest actual CPFH data shows that both platforms 

are operating at $32K per hour. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What is the cost comparison for operating U–2 compared to Global 

Hawk? What is the difference in the cost per mission for each? How much of the 

U–2 fleet is available to perform all ISR missions? 

General POSNER. The cost per flight hour is roughly the same. The U–2 costs 

$320K per 10-hour Multi-INT mission and the RQ–4 $640K per 20-hour Single-INT 

mission. There are 27 U–2 ‘‘single seaters’’ of which one is always rotating through 

depot level maintenance, and two utilized as test birds (capable of flying missions, 

but not typically utilized for that purpose). Thus, there are 24 mission-capable U– 

2 aircraft at any given time. 

Mr. BARTLETT. If the U–2 is extended until 2025, and the system that was slated 

to replace it is cancelled, what is your plan for replacing the U–2? How much will 

it cost to modernize and maintain the Cold War-era U–2 for another 15 years? 

General POSNER. There is no projected U–2 retirement date. The U–2 aircraft remains viable until 2040 and meets all sensor requirements currently tasked by the 

Combatant Commands. The Air Force will invest approximately $68 million per 

year in sustainment and enhancement modifications to ensure platform modernization and maintenance. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Department’s Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation (CAPE) performed a detailed cost analysis associated with the decision 

to terminate and mothball the Global Hawk Block 30 program. Please share this 

analysis with the Congress so it can better understand the analytical foundation of 

this decision. Provide a detailed cost assessment including the basis of costs for both 

sustainment and procurement through 2025. 
169 

General POSNER. In support of the FY13 President’s Budget Request (PBR), the 

USAF analyzed the operational output of both the RQ–4 and the U–2 using existing 

CONOPS for both aircraft and determined that U–2 capability was sufficient for 

operational needs. When analyzed in this context, the U–2 and RQ–4 operating 

costs were nearly equal. Given comparable flying hour costs, and given the large investment required for the RQ–4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30 program 

and save a net of $2.5B. The CAPE conducted their own independent cost analysis 

based on three scenarios to come to the conclusion that the U–2 was the more affordable option to meet the newly reduced requirement. The Air Force will defer to 

CAPE to provide Congress the details of their independent cost analysis. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Given our alarming and unsustainable national debt, American 

taxpayers expect and deserve that Congress will make the difficult decisions to restore fiscal responsibility. However, these decisions cannot be short-sighted or made 

at the expense of our long-term budget or national security needs. Please detail how 

terminating a new cutting-edge platform, Global Hawk Block 30, is less expensive 

than extending the life of an aging platform, U–2, which will require increased investments in coming years is a fiscally responsible decision over the next decade. 

General POSNER. In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was 

not prudent given the U–2 meets the new requirement and the significant reduction 

in the Department’s budget. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the 

decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate 

and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. Finally, some of the $4B investment made in Block 30s will continue 

to benefit the Block 20 BACN and Block 40/MP–RTIP programs, as well as NASA 

Block 10 aircraft, NATO AGS and Navy BAMS. The total cost of keeping the Global 

Hawk Block 30 and continuing the investment to improve the RQ–4 to reach a comparable capability with U–2 was more expensive than keeping the U–2. As a result, 

the Department chose to save $2.5B across the FYDP in a reduced budget environment since the U–2 is sufficient to meet the requirement and remains viable 

through 2040. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council reduced the high-altitude 

ISR requirement, and the AF budget reduced to where the Department could no 

longer afford to keep investing in the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30. Requirement: 

In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent 

adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional high-altitude 

ISR requirements could be modified. The Air Force further determined the U–2, 

which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements. Continued increased investment in RQ–4 was required to field a comparable capability to U–2 and was determined to be unaffordable. Budget: Continued, increased investment in RQ–4 was not warranted given a significant reduction 

in the Department’s budget and an alternative system, the U–2, is still operationally viable at a considerably lower cost over the FYDP. Additionally, the actual cost 

per flying hour (CPFH) data, when the U–2 is employed at its normal operational 

distance, shows the U–2 cost is comparable to the RQ–4 cost. The latest actual 

CPFH data shows that both platforms are operating at $32K per hour. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature one-third the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally well in theater for a five-decade-old manned system. 

General POSNER. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that con-
170 

ventional high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further 

determined the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to 

meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced force structure. Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30, 

which still needed approximately $800M in investment to achieve sensor parity with 

the U–2, was not prudent given there is no difference in the operating costs between 

the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the 

U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global 

Hawk Block 30, resulting in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the 

decision to divest Global Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate 

and sustain the U–2 through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you please provide us details on how the Global Hawk has 

been used to support operations worldwide over the past year? Please provide both 

classified and unclassified details of how Global Hawk is being used 

General POSNER. In Libya, Global Hawk provided electro-optical, infrared, and 

synthetic aperture radar and was used in a traditional ISR role with dynamic responsiveness due to its enhanced duration/dwell time and the ability to fill gaps between other ISR collects. Overall, Global Hawk was successful in Operation Odyssey 

Dawn and in its continued support for Operation Unified Protector. Assessment details can be made available at a higher classification. In the CENTCOM theater, 

Global Hawk continues to support the combatant command with both theater and 

tactical ISR. To date, RQ–4 has flown over 50,000 combat hours in support of 

CENTCOM operations. In a humanitarian/disaster relief support role, Global Hawk 

leveraged its range and endurance as an ISR first-responder. Following the Haiti 

earthquake, Global Hawk executed a response mission in 12 hours effectively providing initial situational awareness information, highlighting earthquake damage, 

status of critical infrastructure and identifying food/aid drop zones and indicators 

of mass population migrations. Eight missions were flown, satisfying 2,621 targets. 

In Japan, Global Hawk capitalized on its range and endurance to be overhead in 

21 hours. Imagery products were provided to the Secretary of State within 40 minutes of request. In addition to infrastructure damage assessment, supply route analysis, and real-time monitoring of evacuation support, Global Hawk collection focused 

on the Fukushima nuclear power plant. Because it is a remotely piloted aircraft, 

Japan allowed PACOM to use the Global Hawk within the 20 km nuclear engagement zone. Infrared imagery taken directly over the top of the reactors allowed engineers to frequently monitor core temperature levels. In 21 missions and 300 on-station hours, Global Hawk collected more than 3,000 images. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Regarding medium altitude manned and unmanned intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance programs, has your office completed a comparative 

analysis of life cycle cost and operational effectiveness of manned and unmanned 

systems such as the MC–12 aircraft and the Predator and Reaper UAVs? 

General POSNER. Such a study has not been completed. The Air Force inventory 

of ISR assets is envisioned to be complementary. Although there is some degree of 

overlapping capability among these assets each one brings unique capabilities to the 

force mix. The ISR force includes the space based assets as well as the manned and 

unmanned airborne platforms. We are continually evaluating costs and capabilities 

in a constrained fiscal environment but there is not an effort to evaluate manned 

vs. unmanned platforms because each of these classes of assets brings complementary capabilities to the force mix. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The cost savings estimates for termination of Global Hawk Block 

30 did not fully consider additional costs to the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program, which was going to benefit from a shared production line, training and common basing. 

Further, in citing cost savings of $2.5 billion in termination of the Global Hawk 

Block 30 program, the Air Force doesn’t provide comment on the loss of operational 

capability. 

Global Hawk Block 30s are currently flying operational missions in Central, European, and Pacific Commands. These aircraft will be returned to the U.S. by the end 

of this year and stored. The Global Hawk has significant range and endurance advantages over the U–2. The Global Hawk has near real-time sensor relay on all its 

aircraft, versus a limited number of U–2 aircraft capable of beyond line-of-sight intelligence data relay. What operational costs and risks are assumed with the termination of the Global Hawk Block 30? 

General POSNER. The Air Force has provided resources to cover the cost of the 

line closure. The actual cost increases are variable and dependent on the length of 

time the line is closed. The Department of Defense continues to work with the Air 

Force, the Navy, and the prime contractor to capture the impact of termination. In 
171 

September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent 

adjustments in military strategy and determined that the high-altitude ISR requirement could be reduced. The Air Force further determined the U–2, which remains 

viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet these modified requirements. As 

a result, there will be no impact to warfighting capabilities and peacetime support 

will be managed by the current Global Force Management Process. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Air Force reduces its procurement in the budget request from 

48 to 24 Reaper UAVs, from that projected last year. Why is this being done? 

General POSNER. There are multiple planning factors that changed for the MQ– 

9 program between the FY12 PB and the FY 13 PB. First, the current attrition 

rates of both the MQ–1 and MQ–9 are lower than the Air Force originally estimated 

in FY12 PB. The original estimate was based on MQ–1 data. We have since accumulated significant flight hours on the MQ–9 system with significantly lower than forecast losses. The Air Force modeling experts have since applied actual MQ–9 data 

and updated the estimate. Specifically, the Air Force projected it would lose 77 MQ– 

9s across the FYDP but now projects it will only lose 11. Additionally, the MQ–1 

fleet is now planned to be operational until at least FY23 instead of retiring in 

FY17. These factors, coupled with the FY12 MQ–9 buy which delivers 48 aircraft 

in FY14, enable the Air Force to achieve 65 combined MQ–1/9 Combat Air Patrol 

(CAPs) by 3QFY14 and sustain them with the production profile contained in the 

FY13 PB. The FY13 PB production profile eases the strain on the aircrew training 

pipeline and enables orderly and efficient aircrew force structure management as 

the Air Force transitions to an all-MQ–9 medium altitude RPA fleet. The lower attrition rate allows for a lower production rate of 24 aircraft per year while still 

reaching the 65 CAP capabilities on time, in FY14. Ultimately, the FY13 PB is the 

best way to meet Air Force requirements in this budget-constrained environment. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In late February, the Air Force informed the committee that it 

planned to cancel the Light Air Support (LAS) contract effective March 2, 2012. 

What is the new way forward to meet the requirement of 20 LAS aircraft for the 

Afghanistan Air Force? 

General POSNER. The Air Force decided to issue an amendment to the Light Air 

Support (LAS) Request for Proposal (RFP) to both offerors. Air Force officials have 

met with both original offerors, Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) and Hawker 

Beechcraft Defense Corporation (HBDC), individually to review the amended RFP 

changes line-by-line. Both will have time to submit comments on the draft RFP 

amendment, after which the Air Force expects to release the final amended RFP on 

approximately April 30. While the decision process will be event-driven, the Air 

Force targets a source selection decision in early calendar year 2013. This would 

allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third quarter 2014. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

Mr. KENDALL. The F–35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain any capability 

to send video to a ground station. Video Down-Link, similar to the capability recently added to legacy platforms, is a candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. 

Within the F–35 POR, there is the capability to send an image over the three 

datalinks (Link 16, Variable Message Format and Multifunction Advanced 

DataLink). A ground station properly equipped to receive information over these 

datalinks could receive a still image from the F–35 in this manner. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

Mr. KENDALL. Infrared pointer (‘‘sparkle’’) capability is not an F–35 Program of 

Record capability. This capability is being considered as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

Mr. KENDALL. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-Optical Targeting 

System, has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54 degrees in Wide FOV and 1.49 degrees 

in Narrow FOV. It can provide an additional 4x virtual zoom through digital processing. The FOV can be slewed circularly around the aircraft’s horizon and from 10 

degrees above the relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing visi-
172 

bility throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and external stores 

masking. The program of record for the F–35 includes an AN/A49 E–21 external 

missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6 (centerline station) of the STOVL 

and CV variants. The external gun pod is a fixed, forward-firing system. The gun 

is not stored internally on the STOVL and CV variants (there is an internal gun 

on the CTOL variant) due to Service-specific mission requirements for increased fuel 

capacity and mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to the centerline carriage location (station 6) which is currently only designed to carry the gun pod and 

therefore has no impact on the specified F–35B or F–35C weapons carriage capability. 

Based on the December 2011 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the cost per 

flight hour is $31,923 (BY 2012). This cost is based on total system costs, such as 

mission personnel, contractor support, depot overhaul, training, etc. that cannot be 

allocated to specific subsystems. Consequently, the cost per flight hour of the gun 

cannot be specifically identified. 

The cost per flight hour estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter is built upon a variety of mission profiles and weapons load configurations. Additional limitations to 

annual aircraft flight hours (other than cost) are the ability to generate sorties 

based on personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability. 

The program is in the midst of a 2-year ‘‘should cost’’ effort on the O&S cost. This 

effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12 months, the program will complete an F–35 Business Case Analysis (BCA) and the results from the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer in refining the current F–35 support strategy. 

The BCA will also identify the best mix of existing Service/Partner Organic capabilities with that of the Industry team to develop the optimum long term best value 

F–35 support solution. The Services, working in concert with the program office, will 

continue to analyze options outside of the program office’s purview to reduce operating costs, such as reviewing basing options and the sequencing of those actions, 

unit level manpower/squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help drive 

down sustainment costs. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4 followon development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4 follow-on 

development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting System (EOTS) 

in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to ¥145 degree looking aft. The azimuth 

field of view is 60 degrees in either direction, for a total of 120 degrees. The gun 

was not put internally because the USN/USMC felt it was more important to have 

1,100 lbs more bring-back potential for boat operations that to have an internal gun. 

There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons when carrying a gun pod. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

Admiral VENLET. The F–35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain any capability to send video to a ground station. Video Down-Link, similar to the capability 

recently added to legacy platforms, is a candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F–35 POR, there is the capability to send an image over the three 

datalinks (Link 16, Variable Message Format and Multifunction Advanced 

DataLink). A ground station properly equipped to receive information over these 

datalinks could receive a still image from the F–35 in this manner. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

Admiral VENLET. Infrared pointer (‘‘sparkle’’) capability is not an F–35 Program 

of Record capability. This capability is being considered as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 
173 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

Admiral VENLET. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-Optical Targeting System, has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54 degrees in Wide FOV and 1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an additional 4x virtual zoom through digital 

processing. The FOV can be slewed circularly around the aircraft’s horizon and from 

10 degrees above the relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing visibility throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and external stores 

masking. The program of record for the F–35 includes an AN/A49 E–21 external 

missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6 (centerline station) of the STOVL 

and CV variants. The external gun pod is a fixed, forward-firing system. The gun 

is not stored internally on the STOVL and CV variants (there is an internal gun 

on the CTOL variant) due to Service-specific mission requirements for increased fuel 

capacity and mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to the centerline carriage location (station 6) which is currently only designed to carry the gun pod and 

therefore has no impact on the specified F–35B or F–35C weapons carriage capability. 

Based on the December 2011 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the cost per flight hour is $31,923 (BY 2012). This cost is based on total system costs, such as 

mission personnel, contractor support, depot overhaul, training, etc. that cannot be 

allocated to specific subsystems. Consequently, the cost per flight hour of the gun 

cannot be specifically identified. 

The cost per flight hour estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter is built upon a variety of mission profiles and weapons load configurations. Additional limitations to 

annual aircraft flight hours (other than cost) are the ability to generate sorties 

based on personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability. 

The program is in the midst of a 2-year ‘‘should cost’’ effort on the O&S cost. This 

effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12 months, the program will complete an F–35 Business Case Analysis (BCA) and the results from the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer in refining the current F–35 support strategy. 

The BCA will also identify the best mix of existing Service/Partner Organic capabilities with that of the Industry team to develop the optimum long term best value 

F–35 support solution. The Services, working in concert with the program office, will 

continue to analyze options outside of the program office’s purview to reduce operating costs, such as reviewing basing options and the sequencing of those actions, 

unit level manpower/squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help drive 

down sustainment costs. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer this question. 

Mr. JONES.When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer this question. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We have not conducted the work necessary to answer this question. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

Admiral SKINNER. The F–35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain any capability to send video to a ground station. Video down-link (VDL), similar to the capability recently added to legacy platforms, is a candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F–35 POR, there is the capability to send an image over the 

three datalinks (Link 16, Variable Message Format (VMF) and Multifunction Advanced DataLink (MADL)). A ground station properly equipped to receive information over these datalinks could receive a still image from the F–35 in this manner. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 
174 

Admiral SKINNER. Infrared pointer (‘‘sparkle’’) capability is not an F–35 Program 

of Record capability. This capability is being considered as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

Admiral SKINNER. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54 degrees in Wide FOV and 

1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an additional 4x virtual zoom through 

digital processing. The FOV can be slewed circularly around the aircraft’s horizon 

and from 10 degrees above the relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing visibility throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and external 

stores masking. The program of record for the F–35 includes an AN/A49 E–21 external missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6 (centerline station) of the 

STOVL and CV variants. The external gun pod is a fixed, forward-firing system. 

The gun is not stored internally on the STOVL and CV variants (there is an internal gun on the CTOL variant) due to service specific mission requirements for increased fuel capacity and mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to the 

centerline carriage location (station 6) which is currently only designed to carry the 

gun pod and, therefore, has no impact on the specified F–35B or F–35C weapons 

carriage capability. Based on the December 2011 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report 

(SAR), the cost per flight hour is $31,923 (BY2012). This cost is based on total system costs, such as mission personnel, contractor support, depot overhaul, training, 

etc. that cannot be allocated to specific subsystems. Consequently, the cost per flight 

hour of the gun cannot be specifically identified. The flight hour profile that the JSF 

costs are built upon is representative of a variety of mission profiles and weapons 

load configurations. Additional limitations to annual aircraft flight hours (other 

than cost) are the ability to generate sorties based on personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability. The program is in the midst of a two-year ‘‘should cost’’ effort on 

the O&S cost. This effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12 months, the 

program will complete an F–35 Business Case Analysis (BCA) and the results from 

the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer in refining the current F–35 support strategy. The BCA will also identify the best mix of existing Service/Partner 

Organic capabilities with that of the Industry team to develop the optimum long 

term best value F–35 support solution. The Services, working in concert with the 

program office, will continue to analyze options outside of the program office’s purview to reduce operating costs; such as reviewing basing options and the sequencing 

of those actions, unit level manpower/squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help drive down sustainment costs. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

General ROBLING. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in block 4 follow 

on development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

General ROBLING. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in block 4 follow on 

development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

General ROBLING. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting System 

(EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to ¥145 degrees looking aft. The 

azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either direction, for a total of 120 degrees. 

The gun was not put internally because the USN/USMC felt it was more important 

to have 1,100 lbs more bring-back potential for boat operations than to have an internal gun. There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons 

when carrying a gun pod. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

Admiral FLOYD. The F–35 Program of Record (POR) does not contain any capability to send video to a ground station. Video down-link (VDL), similar to the capa-
175 

bility recently added to legacy platforms, is a candidate for Block 4 Follow-On Development. Within the F–35 POR, there is the capability to send an image over the 

three datalinks (Link 16, Variable Message Format (VMF) and Multifunction Advanced DataLink (MADL)). A ground station properly equipped to receive information over these datalinks could receive a still image from the F–35 in this manner. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

Admiral FLOYD. Infrared pointer (‘‘sparkle’’) capability is not an F–35 Program of 

Record capability. This capability is being considered as a Block 4 Follow-on Development candidate. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

Admiral FLOYD. The internal targeting pod, known as the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), has a field of view (FOV) of 3.54 degrees in Wide FOV and 

1.49 degrees in Narrow FOV. It can provide an additional 4x virtual zoom through 

digital processing. The FOV can be slewed circularly around the aircraft’s horizon 

and from 10 degrees above the relative horizon to 90 degrees below the horizon, providing visibility throughout the lower hemisphere subject to airframe and external 

stores masking. The program of record for the F–35 includes an AN/A49 E–21 external missionized gun pod to be mounted on station 6 (centerline station) of the 

STOVL and CV variants. The external gun pod is a fixed, forward-firing system. 

The gun is not stored internally on the STOVL and CV variants (there is an internal gun on the CTOL variant) due to service specific mission requirements for increased fuel capacity and mission range. The missionized gun pod attaches to the 

centerline carriage location (station 6) which is currently only designed to carry the 

gun pod and, therefore, has no impact on the specified F–35B or F–35C weapons 

carriage capability. Based on the December 2011 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report 

(SAR), the cost per flight hour is $31,923 (BY2012). This cost is based on total system costs, such as mission personnel, contractor support, depot overhaul, training, 

etc. that cannot be allocated to specific subsystems. Consequently, the cost per flight 

hour of the gun cannot be specifically identified. The flight hour profile that the JSF 

costs are built upon is representative of a variety of mission profiles and weapons 

load configurations. Additional limitations to annual aircraft flight hours (other 

than cost) are the ability to generate sorties based on personnel, equipment, and aircraft availability. The program is in the midst of a two-year ‘‘should cost’’ effort on 

the O&S cost. This effort will continue through 2012. Over the next 12 months, the 

program will complete an F–35 Business Case Analysis (BCA) and the results from 

the BCA will assist the Program Executive Officer in refining the current F–35 support strategy. The BCA will also identify the best mix of existing Service/Partner 

Organic capabilities with that of the Industry team to develop the optimum long 

term best value F–35 support solution. The Services, working in concert with the 

program office, will continue to analyze options outside of the program office’s purview to reduce operating costs; such as reviewing basing options and the sequencing 

of those actions, unit level manpower/squadron size and discrete sustainment requirements. In addition, the program has identified a number of Affordability Initiatives to help drive down sustainment costs. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

General HOLMES. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4 followon development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

General HOLMES. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4 follow-on 

development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

General HOLMES. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting System 

(EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to ¥145 degree looking aft. The 

azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either direction, for a total of 120 degrees. 

The gun was not put internally because the USN/USMC felt it was more important 
176 

to have 1,100 lbs more bring-back potential for boat operations that to have an internal gun. There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons 

when carrying a gun pod. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to send video to a ground station (e.g. 

JTAC with a video receiver)? 

General POSNER. Full Motion Video is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4 followon development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. When will the aircraft be able to Mark a target or Match Sparkle with 

Infra-Red energy? 

General POSNER. An IR Marker is a candidate for inclusion in Block 4 follow-on 

development, approximately 2020. 

Mr. JONES. What is the field of view of the internal pod? 

Why was the gun not put internally? With the gun attached, what affect does that 

have on carrying weapons? 

What will it cost per hour to fly? 

Besides cost, is there any limitations to the number of hours the aircraft can fly 

annually? 

General POSNER. The field of view of the Electro Optical Targeting System 

(EOTS) in elevation is +5 degrees looking forward to ¥145 degree looking aft. The 

azimuth field of view is 60 degrees in either direction, for a total of 120 degrees. 

The gun was not put internally because the USN/USMC felt it was more important 

to have 1,100 lbs more bring-back potential for boat operations that to have an internal gun. There are no current limitations on the program of record SDD weapons 

when carrying a gun pod. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. The Air Force has announced its intention to reduce the number of 

bases that will receive the Air Force variant of the F–35 in order to reduce 

sustainment costs. Does the Marine Corps intend to reduce the number of air stations that all will receive the F–35B? Has the announced list of Marine Corps Air 

Stations scheduled to receive F–35Bs changed in anyway? 

General ROBLING. The Marine Corps completed the Environmental Impact Studies EIS for JSF East Coast and West Coast basing in December 2010. The EIS’ optimized the Joint Strike Fighter beddown locations and validated the 4 CONUS air 

stations we currently have are sufficient and any decrease in the number of air stations would have a detrimental effect on the surrounding populations, operation, 

and mission readiness. In addition to participating in Joint JSF training at Eglin 

AFB, the Marine Corps plans to execute a rolling JSF transition of 4 air stations 

starting in 2012 with MCAS Yuma, AZ, followed in sequence with MCAS Beaufort, 

NC, MCAS Miramar, CA, and MCAS Cherry Point, NC. The transition is designed 

to retain operational capability of our legacy aircraft, optimize MilCon efficiencies, 

and distribute the F–35 aircraft to support the training and deployments of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. In your combined opening statements, you focused on the importance of the Legacy Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suites (CAPES) program for our F–16 Block 40s 

through 52s fleet. While I agree that these programs are key to keeping these aircraft relevant until the F–35 replaces them, my concern is on the Block 30 inventory 

in the Air National Guard, particularly those that maintain the Aerospace Control 

Alert (ACA) mission. 

The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey is currently the only Air National Guard 

Fighter Wing flying ‘‘Little Inlet’’ Block 30s. I am sure you both know that I have 

consistently pushed the Air Force and Air National Guard to replace those aging 

aircraft with some next generation fighter. 

With that said, my concern has to do with the issue of ‘‘fleet commonality.’’ 

Since the Air Force has proposed to re-classify or retire one entire Block 30 ‘‘Big 

Inlet’’ squadron, are there any plans to shuffle the Air National Guard fighter jet 

inventory with those F–16s to ensure ‘‘fleet commonality,’’ specifically for the 177th 

so they are no longer the ‘‘odd man out’’? 

Additionally, can both or one of you commit to providing me and my staff with 

a briefing by the end of April 2012 to alleviate my concern that the 177th will not 

succumb to future combat AOR limitations based on their current iron inventory 
177 

and to address where the 177th fits into the roadmap to receive updated or next 

generation fighters? 

General HOLMES and General POSNER. The Air Force addresses force structure 

holistically across all of its components and missions which include the Air National 

Guard. The Air Force’s oldest F–16s remain viable through the end of this decade, 

and as airframes retire newer airframes will flow to support the Total Force. The 

Air National Guard leadership has been and will continue to be active participants 

to determine the best way forward and, as force structure and strategic basing decisions are made, the Air Force will be happy [to] brief you and your staff. Aircraft 

will be moved as necessary to ensure mission requirements are met to support the 

National Military Strategy. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The Department of Defense (DOD) has been the catalyst in the development of the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) market. The volume of UAS 

flights for commercial and governmental non-military applications could equal those 

being flown for military operations. Future growth of the civil UAS market is dependent on the ability of non-military UAS proponents to operate their UAS’ in the 

National Airspace System (NAS). As such, there is a strong innovative growth market for testing, research and development. Inability to adhere to FAA regulatory requirements is the major problem facing the military and the commercial UAS sector. 

More specifically, Flight Rule 14 requires sense and avoid. Manned aircraft systems 

operating with specified FAA control areas or with sense and avoid equipment are 

able to adhere to this rule. Since UAS’ do not have pilots on board or collision and 

avoidance technologies, they are not currently able to adhere to FAA rules. Congress 

has levied the requirement on the FAA Administrator to develop plans to accelerate 

the integration of unmanned aerial systems into the National Airspace System. Currently the NDAA budget request contains $34.6 million for sense and avoid technology development to further UAS operations in the National Airspace System. Dr. 

Kendall, do you believe that the FAA has articulated and documented the sense and 

avoid technology requirements in sufficient detail to allow the DOD to develop a solution that will allow UAS operations in these new airspaces? In other words, is the 

$34.6M being spent on sense and avoid technologies going towards fulfilling a documented FAA requirement with a defined acceptable solution? Given the current 

FAA safety of flight requirements, sense and avoid requirements and our technological capabilities, how long do you anticipate it will take before we will be able 

to integrate UAS into the National Airspace System? 

Mr. KENDALL. The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing standards and 

safety case analyses to develop and field ground and airborne unmanned aircraft 

system (UAS) sense-and-avoid technology. In the short term, the Department is actively engaged with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to improve incrementally UAS access to the National Airspace System (NAS) through changes to 

policy and procedures. While the FAA has not articulated and documented senseand-avoid requirements, the Department, as a public agency, has the authority and 

proven ability to self certify aircraft and systems for safe operations. The sense-andavoid funding in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 allows 

the Department to continue its Sense and Avoid (SAA) standards and technology 

development. The Department is sharing the results of its SAA standards and technology development with the FAA and other public agencies so that they can leverage our work while developing sense-and-avoid technology requirements for the civil 

community. 

The Department has made measured progress in increasing public UAS access to 

the NAS through the UAS Executive Committee and changes to the FAA’s policies 

and Certification of Waiver or Authorization processes. The Department is also 

working with the FAA on updating the DOD–FAA UAS Memorandum of Agreement 

for Operations of UAS Systems in the NAS to increase access for specific operations, 

particularly for small UAS which make up the predominance of DOD UAS. DOD 

is also currently working with the FAA through the UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee and the Next Generation Air Transportation System Joint Planning and Development Office to develop the congressionally directed FAA Civil/Public UAS NAS 

Integration Roadmap and Comprehensive Plan to safely integrate civil UAS into the 

NAS. The roadmap and plan will provide a timeline for the phased in approach to 

UAS integration into the NAS. 

Mr. TURNER. There is no doubt that 5th generation fighters are complex but critical to ensuring air dominance in any theater. In 1992, the F–22 program unit cost 

was estimated to be $125M. There are some estimates, including a GAO study to 
178 

suggest that the F–22 unit costs were $177M per aircraft. There are some in the 

aerospace industry who would suggest that one of the reasons the F–22 fly away 

costs were so high were due to the Air Force’s ability to capture on economies of 

scale. Initially, the Air Force wanted to procure 750 advanced tactical fighters. The 

total number procured of which the last one being delivered this year was 187. In 

all manufacturing sector, there is an economy of scale to be achieved in the area 

of quantities of production. Currently, the F–35 is being built at a rate of 2 aircraft 

per month while the capacity is 18–20 aircraft per month. Based on the economies 

of scale, this would suggest that we are paying a higher capital per unit cost per 

aircraft. While I understand the significant budget constraints which have been 

placed on the services, I also have a responsibility to ensure that the American tax 

payer gets the best available weapon system at an affordable cost. We may not be 

able to afford a production schedule of 20 F–35s per month but there should be 

some ‘‘sweet spot’’ in defining yearly quantities produced. What actions is the Department currently taking to determine this ‘‘sweet spot’’ and ensuring this does not 

become another F–22? What production rate would you like to see to ensure we reduce the per unit cost of this airplane? 

Mr. KENDALL. We have reduced Low-Rate Initial Production rates to reduce concurrency with development and test until the design maturity improves. While 

ramping to Full-Rate Production quickly would optimize the production learning 

curve, it would likely not lead to the lowest unit costs in the long-term due to required changes, modifications, and retrofits. The procurement rates for the next few 

years are a balance designed to continue to exercise the global supply chain and 

manufacturing processes while at the same time avoid procuring too many aircraft 

that will have to be retrofitted and modified following continued discovery of 

changes. I believe our current strategy provides that appropriate balance. As the 

program continues with testing, we are progressively reducing concurrency risks. 

Concurrency should begin to recede significantly in the 2015 timeframe, and we anticipate entering Full-Rate Production in the 2019 timeframe. At that time, we anticipate that the annual production rates, which will include U.S and foreign buys, 

to be at economies of scale that result in more affordable unit costs. 

Mr. TURNER. Numerous GAO reports highlight that the Department of Defense 

continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air defense and its capabilities to do so. There are not enough existing suppression aircraft to meet overall 

requirements. While the Navy is currently procuring the EA–18G Growler as the 

electronic attack variant of the F/A–18 services, the Growler is the only electronic 

attack aircraft being procured by any service at this time. If the Air Force is called 

to fight a peer competitor in the electronic warfare arena, do you believe there are 

sufficient resources available? What is the Air Force’s plan to mitigate resource limitations on the electronic warfare arena? 

Mr. KENDALL. The Department would utilize all the assets of the joint force in 

a conflict with a peer competitor, not just Air Force resources. As outlined in the 

Department’s 30-Year Aviation Plan released in March 2012, DOD is acquiring 5th 

generation fighter/attack aircraft while maintaining sufficient legacy aircraft inventory capacity, in addition to investing in enabler capability and capacity such as 

electronic warfare. While the FY 2013–FY 2042 aviation plan meets the national 

military strategy of the United States, the Department continues to assess risk and 

the optimum investment strategy as part of the FY 2014 budgetary and capabilities 

review process. 

The Department’s joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) forces, including EA– 

18G, are a portion of the Joint concept of operations to counter enemy air defenses. 

The Air Force’s electronic attack contributions to joint AEA forces include EC–130H 

Compass Call, Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer, and self-protection capability for strike forces. The combination of electronic protection capability for airplanes, radars, and weapons systems that use the electromagnetic spectrum coupled 

with stealth capability—like those of the F–22, F–35, and the B–2—creates an effective integration of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities that will help mitigate the 

challenges and enhance the joint effort in suppressing enemy air defenses. 

Mr. TURNER. Numerous GAO reports highlight that the Department of Defense 

continues to face a gap between its need to suppress enemy air defense and its capabilities to do so. There are not enough existing suppression aircraft to meet overall 

requirements. While the Navy is currently procuring the EA–18G Growler as the 

electronic attack variant of the F/A–18 services, the Growler is the only electronic 

attack aircraft being procured by any service at this time. If the Air Force is called 

to fight a peer competitor in the electronic warfare arena, do you believe there are 

sufficient resources available? What is the Air Force’s plan to mitigate resource limitations on the electronic warfare arena? 
179 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Department would utilize all the assets of the joint force 

in a conflict with a peer competitor, not just Air Force resources. As outlined in the 

Department’s 30 Year Aviation Plan released in March 2012, DOD is acquiring fifthgeneration fighter/attack aircraft while maintaining sufficient legacy aircraft inventory capacity in addition to investing in enabler capability and capacity such as electronic warfare. While the fiscal year 2013–2042 aviation plan meets the national 

military strategy of the United States, the Department continues to assess risk and 

the optimum investment strategy as part of the fiscal year 2014 budgetary and capabilities review process. The Department’s joint Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) 

forces, including EA–18G, are a portion of the Joint concept of operations to counter 

enemy air defenses. The Air Force’s electronic attack contributions to joint AEA 

forces include EC–130H Compass Call, Miniature Air Launched Decoy Jammer and 

self-protection capability for strike forces. The combination of electronic protection 

capability for airplanes, radars and weapons systems that use the electromagnetic 

spectrum coupled with stealth capability—like those of the F–22, F–35 and the B– 

2—creates an effective integration of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities that will 

help mitigate the challenges and enhance the joint effort in suppressing enemy air 

defenses. 

Mr. TURNER. It would appear as though the Air Force has a history of maintaining the integrity of source selection and have had a number of problems in this area. 

The selection of Boeing to build the next generation of Air Refueling tankers marked 

the end of a procurement process that dragged on for nearly a decade. More recently, the Air Force informed the committee that it planned to cancel the Light Air 

Support (LAS) contract. The Secretary of the Air Force said that the Service Acquisition Executive was not satisfied with the quality of the documentation supporting 

the award decision. This was after the Air Force had expressed confidence in the 

merits of the contract award. The Defense Business Board has also been critical of 

the Dept of Defense’s acquisition corp. The board has suggested the Pentagon should 

either ‘‘professionalize’’ the acquisition corps or ‘‘civilianize’’ program leadership. 

What specific steps is the Air Force taking to ensure we don’t have a repeat of the 

KC–X tanker procurement or the Light Air Support contact? 

Mr. VAN BUREN. The Air Force continues its steadfast commitment to ‘‘Recapture 

Acquisition Excellence.’’ In 2011 we completed the Acquisition Improvement Plan 

(AIP) chartered in 2009. This was the largest and most significant acquisition reform launched by the Air Force in the last decade. The AIP completed more than 

170 process improvements and of particular interest to your question, concentrated 

on improving our source selection process by strengthening source selection governance, improving source selection training, requiring Multi-functional Independent 

Review Teams, establishing on-call source selection augmentation, identifying/tracking personnel with source selection experience, updating the acquisition planning 

process, and simplifying the source selection process. Success was evident in the fact 

that during 2011, the Air Force accomplished 209,500 contracting actions with only 

one sustained protest. Furthermore, in November 2011, Secretary Donley approved 

a follow-on effort to AIP called Acquisition Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) 

2.0, which will further our efforts to improve the capabilities of our acquisition 

workforce. Among other efforts, CPI 2.0 continues improving our source selection 

process by re-engineering the competitive award process, implementing a more effective contract award process and increasing source selection experienced personnel. 

Once the LAS report is finalized and released, we will incorporate any lessons 

learned into our CPI 2.0 effort. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

Mr. CRITZ. The AF uses a mix of tactical aviation assets to meet both service specific goals and national goals and objectives. Many of the aircraft in the AF fleet 

are aging and require significant O&M investments. Increased O&M costs cut into 

the service’s ability to procure new F–35. That is, reducing O&M costs will free up 

funds for the procurement of next generation aircraft like the F–35. For legacy tactical aviation aircraft, outdated materials and components must be replaced to sustain mission availability and reduce O&M costs. Rather than manufacturing replacement parts and components in a manner for which they were first fabricated, 

which now has become increasingly more expensive and sometimes not even possible, the AF should be looking to leverage advances from the commercial aviation 

world when it comes to maintaining its existing aging fleet of tactical aviation assets. For example, through their influence on platform weight and cost, materials 

are a key driver of legacy aircraft viability and the affordability of sustained operations of the aging aircraft fleet. The vast majority of material used in legacy air-
180 

craft aerostructures is aluminum. Optimizing aluminum performance and affordability within the existing fleet of aircraft is critical to meeting readiness, sustainability, and affordability requirements. 

1. Can you explain those efforts the AF is undertaking to leverage past investments made by the commercial aerospace industry and the domestic aluminum industry to sustain its fleet of aging tactical aviation aircraft? 

2. Is the AF working directly with those elements of industry that have strong 

material expertise, strong design capabilities, and strong advanced manufacturing 

processes to sustain the AF’s fleet of aging tactical aviation aircraft? 

3. To what extent are elements such as the AF Research Laboratory and AF Air 

Logistics Centers working with industry to address platform costs, platform performance and life cycle costs? 

Mr. KENDALL. [The information referred to was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. CRITZ. The AIM–120D missile has experienced significant production delays, 

mostly due to rocket motor production. As a result, the budget request for Fiscal 

Year 2013 and beyond has been substantially reduced. However, the capability the 

AIM–120D will bring to the Air Force and Navy appears to be very important, given 

current air-to-air threats. 

1. Can you provide an update on the status of AIM–120D production? 

2. What steps are being taken to get production back on schedule? 

3. When will the Air Force and Navy get this weapon in the field? 

General POSNER. 1. As of 31 March 2012, 364 AIM–120D out of 552 contracted 

have been delivered (¥188 to contract). Deliveries of the Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs) are on schedule with 209 delivered out of 200 contractually required. 

In addition, Raytheon Missile Systems is continuing to produce guidance sections 

(front end of missile; 95% of work content) at rate with 201 awaiting rocket motors. 

No AIM–120D All Up Rounds (AURs) have been delivered since November 2011, 

due to the current challenges with rocket motor production. 

2. Rocket motors are the sole reason the AIM–120D program is experiencing production delays, but several promising actions are being taken to get production back 

on schedule. First, in 2009, a second rocket motor source (Nammo) started qualification for the AMRAAM program. Qualification is on track and the first rocket motors 

are expected in July 2013. Second, an ATK (casing) and Nammo (propellant) Limited Production Configuration (LPC) is being qualified as a near-term solution to the 

rocket motor production issue. Qualification is on track and rocket motors are expected in July 2012. Third, ATK (currently the sole-source provider of AMRAAM 

rocket motors) is continuing to investigate the root cause of the rocket motor failures and is implementing process improvements. ATK’s goal is to resume rocket 

motor production in June/July. Raytheon is pursuing all three options at the same 

time, and the AIM–120D could return to the contracted delivery schedule as soon 

as February 2013. 

3. The planned fielding date of the AIM–120D is 1QFY14. Dedicated operational 

testing is on track to begin in June 2012. 

Æ