J-S07034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

THOMAS MICHAEL FRISCH, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1860 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000208-2020

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

THOMAS MICHAEL FRISCH, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1861 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000210-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2023

Appellant, Thomas Michael Frisch, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

guilty plea to two counts of homicide by motor vehicle, two counts of driving 

under the influence (“DUI”), and one count of aggravated assault by motor 
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vehicle.1 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with multiple offenses at docket No.

210-2020, in relation to a collision on April 8, 2020, during which Appellant’s 

vehicle entered the opposing lane of traffic and struck a vehicle head on, 

resulting in the deaths of the two occupants in the vehicle Appellant struck. 

The responding officer noted that Appellant demonstrated multiple indicia of 

impairment. Appellant was taken for a blood test but the facility was unable 

to successfully draw blood from Appellant’s veins and a test could not be 

completed. A urine screen conducted on April 11, 2020, approximately 30 

hours after the accident, showed a positive result for methadone, 

amphetamines, benzodiazepines, and THC. 

At docket No. 208-2020, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with 

multiple offenses in relation to another collision which occurred on May 22, 

2020. On this occasion, Appellant was driving erratically, struck a guard rail,

and collided head on with a vehicle traveling in the opposing lane of traffic, 

resulting in serious injuries to the driver of the other vehicle. The responding 

police officer noted that Appellant displayed several signs of impairment. 

Appellant submitted to a blood test, which showed the presence of fentanyl, 

norfentayl, ketamine, norketamine, trazodone, THC, methadone, and EDDP, 

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3732(a), 3802(d)(2), and 3732.1(a), respectively. 
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the metabolite of methadone. 

On May 3, 2022, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault by motor 

vehicle and DUI at docket No. 208-2020, and two counts of homicide by motor 

vehicle and one count of DUI at docket No. 210-2020. Although the 

Commonwealth agreed to drop certain charges in exchange for the plea, there 

was no agreement as to sentencing. On June 9, 2022, the court imposed 

sentences in the aggravated range to be served consecutively, resulting in an

aggregate sentence of 111 months to 312 months’ incarceration.

2

 Appellant 

filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court denied on June 17, 2022. 

On July 15, 2022, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal at each docket. On 

July 20, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied on 

August 10, 2022. On October 28, 2022, Appellant filed a motion in this Court 

to consolidate the appeals, which this Court granted on November 1, 2022. 

____________________________________________

2 For Appellant’s homicide by vehicle convictions, the court utilized an offense 

gravity score (“OGS”) of 8 based on Appellant’s DUI conviction arising from 

the same criminal incident. This OGS is higher than a conviction for homicide 

by vehicle, without a contemporaneous DUI conviction. See 204 Pa.Code 

303.15 (providing that OGS for homicide by vehicle where DUI conviction also 

results from criminal incident is 8; whereas, homicide by vehicle with no 

additional factors present is 6). Likewise, for Appellant’s aggravated assault 

by vehicle conviction, the court utilized an OGS of 7 based on Appellant’s DUI 

conviction arising from the same criminal incident, which is higher than the 

OGS for aggravated assault by vehicle without a contemporaneous DUI 

conviction. See id. (providing that OGS for aggravated assault by vehicle 

where DUI conviction also results from criminal incident is 7; whereas, 

aggravated assault with no additional factors present is 5).
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Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Is the enhanced sentence imposed on the conviction for

homicide by vehicle and aggravated assault by vehicle 

illegal?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by imposing 

manifestly excessive sentences, and disproportionate to the 

circumstances, both individually and in the aggregate, 

placed at the highest level of the aggravated range of the

sentencing guidelines, by failing to consider the mitigating 

circumstances and analyze or consider the rehabilitative 

needs of [Appellant], impact upon the community and actual 

need for the protection of the public under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b) of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code and by 

disregarding or failing to consider [Appellant’s]

characteristics including his age, serious addiction and 

mental health issues, acceptance of responsibility, and 

expression of remorse?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and impose a 

manifestly excessive sentence, in each case, by running the 

sentences imposed for DUI consecutive to the offenses of 

homicide by vehicle and aggravated assault by vehicle?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6). 

Preliminarily, we note that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Additionally, issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors 

will be deemed waived. Commonwealth v. Castillo, 585 Pa. 395, 403, 888 

A.2d 775, 780 (2005). Regarding preservation of challenges to a sentence, 

our Supreme Court has held:

Where a claim concerns the sentencing court’s exercise of 

discretion in fashioning a sentence, the defendant must 

preserve and present the claim at trial by way of a 

contemporaneous objection and/or a post-trial motion and 

on appeal through the process provided by 42 Pa.C.S. § 
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9781(b) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Where a claim concerns the 

sentencing court’s authority to impose a sentence, it is 

reviewable as of right on direct appeal, without regard to 

preservation of the claim. [A] determination that a claim 

implicates the legality of a sentence ... operates to revive a 

claim otherwise insufficiently preserved below, and is 

reviewable by this Court on permissive appeal.

Commonwealth v. Weir, 662 Pa. 402, 417, 239 A.3d 25, 34 (2020) (internal 

citations omitted). 

In determining whether a claim concerns the legality of the sentence or 

the discretionary aspects of the sentence, our Supreme Court has stated:

[T]he inquiry is whether, assuming the appellant’s claim 

prevails, the result would be that the trial court lacked 

authority to impose the sentence at issue. If so, then the 

appellant’s challenge implicates the legality of his sentence.

Conversely, if the challenge is not to the existence of certain 

authority but to the exercise of that authority, then the 

challenge goes to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, 

not to its legality.

Commonwealth v. Prinkey, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 277 A.3d 554, 563-64 

(2022). The Court further outlined four broad categories of challenges that 

implicate the legality of the sentence:

First, a claim that a sentence was imposed pursuant to a 

facially unconstitutional sentencing statute is a legality 

challenge because, if the claim prevails, the sentence was 

imposed under statutory authority that never lawfully 

existed.... 

The second category encompasses allegations that a 

sentence was imposed without the fulfillment of statutory 

preconditions to the court’s sentencing authority.... Here 

too, a successful challenge means that the court issued a 

sentence that it lacked the statutory authority to impose. In 

other words, if the sentencing statute at issue conditions the 

court’s authority to impose a sanction upon the existence of 
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attendant circumstances, and if those circumstances were 

not present, then the court lacked statutory authority to 

impose the sentence, even though the unfulfilled conditions 

may not raise an issue of constitutional dimension.... 

The third category of legality challenges encompasses those 

claims that allege a violation of a substantive restriction that 

the Constitution places upon a court’s power to apply the 

statutory sentence to the defendant. Here, the linchpin is 

that there is a constitutional barrier to the court’s ability to 

wield the sentencing power granted by a facially 

constitutional statute, not that the trial court exercised its 

statutory power in a way that violated the Constitution. If 

either the United States Constitution or the Pennsylvania 

Constitution places a restriction upon the power of a court 

to impose a particular sentence in certain circumstances, 

and if the appellant’s claim is that those circumstances exist 

in his or her case, then the challenge necessarily sounds in 

legality....

Finally, a sentence is illegal where the statutory support for 

the underlying conviction is void ab initio.... This fourth class 

of legality challenges is distinct from the others inasmuch as 

it implicates the validity of the conviction.

Id. at 562-63 (internal citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant concedes that he raised his first issue for the first time 

on appeal. Nevertheless, Appellant asserts that this issue is not waived 

because his claim involves the legality of the sentence. Specifically, Appellant 

argues that his sentences for homicide by vehicle and aggravated assault by 

vehicle are illegal because the court relied on an OGS which was increased

because of Appellant’s contemporaneous DUI conviction pursuant to 204 

Pa.Code 303.15. Nevertheless, Appellant insists that under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 

3732(b) and 3732.1(b), DUI is not listed as an offense for which the 

Sentencing Commission is permitted to impose a sentencing enhancement
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when that offense is committed in the same criminal incident as homicide by 

vehicle or aggravated assault by vehicle.

3

 As such, Appellant contends that 

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3 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732, which defines the offense of homicide by vehicle,

and provides in relevant part: 

(b) Sentencing.─

(1) In addition to any other penalty provided by law, a 

person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) may be 

sentenced to an additional term not to exceed five years’

confinement if at trial the prosecution proves beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the offense occurred in an active 

work zone.

(1.1) In addition to any other penalty provided by law, a 

person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) who is 

also convicted of a violation of section 1501 (relating to 

drivers required to be licensed), 1543 (relating to driving 

while operating privilege is suspended or revoked), 3316 

(relating to prohibiting text-based communications), 

3325 (relating to duty of driver on approach of 

emergency vehicle) or 3327 (relating to duty of driver in 

emergency response areas and in relation to disabled 

vehicles) may be sentenced to an additional term not to 

exceed five years’ confinement.

(2) The prosecution must indicate intent to proceed 

under this section in the indictment or information which 

commences the prosecution.

(3) The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154 (relating to adoption of 

guidelines for sentencing), shall provide for a sentencing 

enhancement for an offense under this section when the 

violation occurred in an active work zone or the individual 

was also convicted of a violation of section 1501, 1543, 

3316, 3325 or 3327.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732(b). 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the Sentencing Commission exceeded its limited authority by including a DUI 

conviction as an additional factor which increases the OGS for these offenses. 

Appellant asserts that this claim implicates the legality of the sentence 

because it falls into the third category set forth in Prinkey. We disagree.

This Court recently considered a similar issue in Commonwealth v. 

Mont, 266 A.3d 646 (Pa.Super. filed October 22, 2021) (unpublished 

memorandum),4 appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 278 A.3d 300 (2022). In Mont, 

the appellant claimed the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority by 

assigning a disproportionately higher OGS for the offense of possessing a gun 

with an altered manufacturer’s number than that for the offense of altering or 

obliterating marks of identification. On appeal, this Court analyzed whether 

the appellant’s claim implicated the legality of his sentence. This Court noted 

that claims that the sentencing court used the incorrect OGS involve the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing and must be properly preserved. This

Court acknowledged that the appellant was challenging the Sentencing 

Commission’s promulgation of the guidelines rather than the sentencing 

court’s application of the guidelines but found this distinction to be negligible. 

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This language is mirrored nearly verbatim in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1, which 

defines the offense of aggravated assault by vehicle, except that it states that 

a defendant may be sentenced to an additional term not to exceed two years’ 

confinement. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(b). 

4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions filed in 

this Court after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).
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The appellant’s claim, while styled as a challenge to the legality of the 

sentence, was essentially just an argument that the court should have used a 

lower OGS for his crimes. The Mont Court concluded that the appellant’s 

claim was more akin to a question involving the application of the sentencing 

guidelines rather than a challenge to the sentencing court’s authority to 

impose the sentence. As such, the appellant’s claim did not implicate the 

legality of the sentence and was waived for failure to preserve the issue before 

the trial court. 

As in Mont, Appellant claims that his sentence is illegal because the 

Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating the OGS for 

his convictions. Although styled as a challenge to the legality of the sentence, 

Appellant is essentially arguing that the OGS for his convictions should have 

been lower, which does not bring into question the court’s authority to impose 

the sentence. See id. See also Prinkey, supra. Thus, Appellant has failed 

to establish that his first claim implicates the legality of his sentence, and it is 

waived for failure to preserve the issue at the trial court level.5 See Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a); Castillo, supra. 

In his second and third issues combined, Appellant claims the court 

imposed a manifestly excessive sentence by sentencing Appellant to the 

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5 Moreover, we note that the court did not apply a five-year sentencing 

enhancement under Section 3732(b) or 3732.1(b). Rather, the court 

increased the OGS for Appellant’s crimes of homicide by vehicle and 

aggravated assault by vehicle under 204 Pa.Code 303.15. 
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highest end of the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines for each of 

the offenses and ordering that they be served consecutively. Appellant asserts 

that the court based its decision almost exclusively on its perception that 

Appellant lacked remorse due to Facebook posts that Appellant made, even 

though the posts were from two years prior to sentencing when Appellant was 

still under the influence of his addiction. Appellant contends that the court 

failed to consider Appellant’s actions since he made the Facebook posts, 

including accepting full responsibility for his offenses, taking steps to control 

his addiction, writing several letters of apology to the families of the victims, 

and cooperating with the victims’ families in a civil litigation. 

Appellant also asserts that the court further ignored other mitigating 

factors such as Appellant’s age, personal characteristics, and struggle to 

overcome cancer and addiction throughout his life. Appellant insists that the 

court’s only aim was to punish Appellant without giving due consideration to 

Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Appellant further argues that the DUI 

sentences should not have been imposed consecutive to the homicide by 

vehicle and aggravated assault by vehicle charges because the DUI charges 

stemmed from the same conduct as the greater offenses and the OGS’s for 

the greater offenses were already increased by the related DUI convictions.

6

 

Appellant maintains that the sentence imposed does not comport with 

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6 Appellant concedes that DUI does not merge with homicide by vehicle or 

aggravated assault by vehicle. (See Appellant’s Brief at 49 n.9).
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confinement necessary and consistent with the goals of the Sentencing Code, 

and what was necessary to protect the public, reflect the gravity of the 

offense, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Appellant concludes that the 

court abused its sentencing discretion, and this Court should vacate the 

judgment of sentence. We disagree. 

“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an 

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of 

sentencing issue: 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)). 

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise 

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of 

the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 
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Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an 

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal 

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any 

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging 

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112 

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). “A substantial question exists only when 

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s 

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 

2011)). 

“[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that 

the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal 

denied, 629 Pa. 636, 105 A.3d 736 (2014). See also Commonwealth v. 

Trimble, 615 A.2d 48 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding defendant’s claim that court 

failed to consider factors set forth under Section 9721(b) and focused solely 

on seriousness of defendant’s offense raised substantial question). 
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Additionally:

Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose [a] sentence concurrently or consecutively to other 

sentences being imposed at the same time or to sentences 

already imposed. Any challenge to the exercise of this 

discretion does not raise a substantial question. In fact, this 

Court has recognized the imposition of consecutive, rather 

than concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question 

in only the most extreme circumstances, such as where the 

aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature 

of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.

Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (2013) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 

(Pa.Super. 1995) (stating appellant is not entitled to “volume discount” for his 

crimes by having all sentences run concurrently).

Assuming an appellant can invoke our jurisdiction to review the claim, 

this Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the following 

standard:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of 

discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on 

appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its 

discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, bias or ill-will. 

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)). 

“[A] court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the 
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offense and the character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 

A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1148, 125 S. Ct. 2984, 

162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). “In particular, the court should refer to the 

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his 

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. If the sentencing court has the benefit of a 

[pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”)] report, the law presumes the court was 

aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and 

weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors. 

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362 (Pa.Super. 2005).

When considering the propriety of imposing an aggravated range 

sentence, this Court has observed: 

[T]he guidelines were implemented to create greater 

consistency and rationality in sentencing. The guidelines 

accomplish the above purposes by providing a normal for 

comparison, i.e., the standard range of punishment, for the 

panoply of crimes found in the crimes code and by providing 

a scale of progressively greater punishment as the gravity 

of the offense increases.... 

The provision of a “norm” also strongly implies that 

deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts 

about the crime that also deviate from the norm for the 

offense, or facts relating to the offender’s character or 

criminal history that deviates from the norm and must be 

regarded as not within the guidelines contemplation. Given 

this predicate, simply indicating that an offense is a serious, 

heinous or grave offense misplaces the proper focus. The 

focus should not be upon the seriousness, heinousness or 

egregiousness of the offense generally speaking, but, rather 

upon how the present case deviates from what might be 

regarded as a “typical” or “normal” case of the offense under 

consideration. 
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An aggravated range sentence ... will thus be justified to the 

extent that the individual circumstances of [an appellant’s] 

case are atypical of the crime for which [he] was convicted, 

such that a more severe punishment is appropriate. 

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal 

citation omitted). 

Instantly, Appellant’s assertion that the sentence imposed was 

manifestly excessive in conjunction with his claim that the court failed to weigh 

his rehabilitative needs and/or consider mitigating factors raises a substantial 

question. See Raven, supra. Likewise, his sentencing claim that the court 

failed to consider the factors set forth under Section 9721(b) and focused 

solely on the seriousness of his offenses raises a substantial question. See 

Trimble, supra. Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits of these 

sentencing challenges. 

Here, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, defense counsel’s 

arguments, statements from Appellant and his mother, letters written on 

Appellant’s behalf, and a mental health evaluation of Appellant. Thus, we can 

presume that the court was fully aware of and considered mitigating factors 

such as Appellant’s background, history of cancer and substance abuse, and 

his more recent progress in addressing his addiction. See Tirado, supra. 

In its sentencing order, the court explained:

The ... sentence is in the aggravated range due to the court’s 

beliefs and findings in [Appellant]’s [PSI report], further due 

to [Appellant] showing no remorse evident by his Facebook 

posting, repeat pattern of drug induced criminal behavior, 

committing these offenses while pending disposition in 
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Lackawanna County, prior convictions that are not 

calculated in the prior record score, and a lesser sentence 

would depreciate the seriousness of the crimes. 

(Sentencing Order, filed 6/9/22, at 3). 

The court noted that Appellant already had a DUI charge pending when 

he caused the two accidents in this case, which resulted in the deaths of two 

individuals and the serious injury of another. The court further noted that 

immediately following the first accident involving the deceased victims, 

Appellant made a Facebook post blaming the victims for the collision, 

demonstrating a lack of accountability and remorse for his actions even in the 

face of such serious consequences. Further demonstrating Appellant’s lack of 

accountability, Appellant continued to engage in the same criminal conduct

after the first accident, causing another accident resulting in serious injuries 

to another. At sentencing, the court recognized that Appellant’s addiction 

played a big part in his criminal actions but noted that Appellant’s history and 

actions in this case demonstrated a lack of commitment to recovery and 

showed that Appellant poses a risk to the community. The court further 

acknowledged Appellant’s subsequent progress with recovery, reviewed the

letters of remorse Appellant sent to the victims and their families, and 

considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Ultimately, however, the court 

determined that the circumstances of this case warranted a sentence in the 

aggravated range. Although Appellant claims the court should not have 

considered the Facebook posts which Appellant made while under the 
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influence, the record shows the court also considered Appellant’s later 

progress with recovery. On this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

court’s determination that a sentence in the aggravated range was 

appropriate. See Fullin, supra; McNabb, supra. Accordingly, Appellant is 

not entitled to relief on his challenge to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing, and we affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 12/29/2023