UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4305

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

MATTHEW LEE CORDERO, a/k/a Matthew L. Cordero, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, 

District Judge. (2:14-cr-00042-JPB-JSK-2) 

Submitted: November 17, 2015 Decided: December 14, 2015 

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Scott Curnutte, CURNUTTE LAW, Elkins, West Virginia, for 

Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, 

Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, 

West Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Matthew Lee Cordero pled guilty to distribution of a 

quantity of oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(C) (2012). The district court determined that Cordero 

was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and sentenced him 

to a within-Guidelines sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, Cordero challenges this sentence, arguing that the 

district court erred in designating him a career offender 

because his two prior New Jersey state convictions for 

possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous 

substance were not punishable by imprisonment for terms 

exceeding one year and therefore are not career offender 

predicates. Cordero also argues that his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. Finding no reversible error, we 

affirm. 

Cordero did not object in the district court to its 

application of the career offender Guideline, and we therefore 

review his challenge for plain error. United States v. 

Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183-84 (4th Cir. 2010). To establish 

plain error, Cordero must demonstrate that (1) the district 

court committed an error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the 

error affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). A “plain” error is one 

that is “clear” or “obvious,” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
3

725, 734 (1993), under “the settled law of the Supreme Court or 

this circuit.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Section 4B1.1(a) of the Guidelines provides that a 

defendant is a career offender if, among other conditions, he 

“has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of 

violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1(a)(3). A “prior felony conviction” is “a prior adult 

federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death 

or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of 

whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and 

regardless of the actual sentence imposed.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 

cmt. n.1. 

We conclude that the district court properly determined 

that Cordero’s New Jersey state convictions were prior felony 

convictions for purposes of the career offender Guideline. The 

convictions were for violations of N.J. Stat. Ann. 

§ 2C:35-5(b)(3), and, as a consequence of these convictions, 

Cordero was eligible to be sentenced to up to five years’ 

imprisonment per count. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:43-6(a)(3), 

2C:44-1(e); State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724, 738 & n.10 

(N.J. 2005); State v. Gardner, 551 A.2d 981, 985 (N.J. 1989); 

see also United States v. Minnick, 949 F.2d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 

1991) (holding New Jersey first-offense conviction for a crime 
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in the third degree was punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year, within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2012)). We reject as without merit Cordero’s contention that 

United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) 

(en banc), undermines this conclusion. See United States v. 

Sellers, No. 14-4568, --- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 7273688, at *4 (4th 

Cir. Nov. 18, 2015); United States v. Kerr, 737 F.3d 33, 35-36, 

38-39 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1773 (2014). 

Cordero thus fails to demonstrate plain error by the district 

court. 

Cordero also argues that his 151-month sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. In reviewing the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence, this court “take[s] into account 

the totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Any sentence within or below a properly 

calculated Guidelines range is presumptively substantively 

reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). Such a 

presumption can only be rebutted by a showing that the sentence 

is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012) factors. Id.

We reject Cordero’s argument because it asks this court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the district court. While 

this court may have weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently 
5

had it imposed sentence in the first instance, we defer to the 

district court’s decision that a 151-month sentence, which is at 

the bottom of Cordero’s Guidelines range, achieved the purposes 

of sentencing in his case. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (explaining 

that appellate courts “must give due deference to the district 

court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, 

justify” the sentence imposed); United States v. Rivera-Santana, 

668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating it was within district 

court’s discretion to accord more weight to a host of 

aggravating factors in defendant’s case and to decide that the 

sentence imposed would serve the § 3553 factors on the whole). 

In light of the “extremely broad” discretion afforded to a 

district court in determining the weight to be given each of the 

§ 3553(a) factors in imposing sentence, United States v. 

Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011), Cordero fails to 

overcome the presumption that his within-Guidelines sentence is 

substantively reasonable. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED