AIR FORCE 

TRAINING

Actions Needed to 

Better Manage and 

Determine Costs of 

Virtual Training 

Efforts

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2012

GAO-12-727

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-727, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2012 

AIR FORCE TRAINING

Actions Needed to Better Manage and Determine 

Costs of Virtual Training Efforts 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Over the last 20 years, the Air Force 

has sought ways to expand its 

approaches to meeting aircrew training 

requirements, including the increased 

use of virtual training. In 2012, the Air 

Force reduced live flying hours, which 

it estimates will save $1.7 billion in 

fiscal years 2012 through 2016, as part 

of its response to the Secretary of 

Defense’s efficiency initiatives. GAO 

conducted this study in response to 

House Report 112-78, accompanying a 

bill for the Fiscal Year 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act, which 

directed GAO to review the status of 

the military services’ virtual training 

programs. Specifically, GAO assessed 

(1) how the Air Force determines the 

mix of live and virtual training to meet 

training requirements; (2) the extent to 

which the Air Force has an overarching 

organizational framework to guide, 

oversee, and integrate its virtual 

training efforts; and (3) the extent to 

which the Air Force considered costs 

related to virtual training in estimating 

potential savings from its training 

efficiency initiative. To do so, GAO 

analyzed guidance and other 

documents, visited virtual training 

facilities, and interviewed officials from 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

the Joint Staff, and the Air Force. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO recommends that the Air Force 

designate an entity to integrate its 

virtual training efforts, develop a 

strategy to align virtual training 

initiatives and goals, and develop a 

methodology to collect virtual training 

cost data. DOD concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations and identified 

planned actions. 

What GAO Found 

The three lead Air Force major commands—Air Mobility Command, Air Force 

Special Operations Command, and Air Combat Command—all utilize training 

requirements review boards composed of subject-matter experts to determine 

training requirements for specific aircraft. These boards determine which training 

requirements can be completed in live or virtual environments based upon 

factors such as specific combatant command mission requirements and the 

capabilities of fielded simulators and networks. All three commands use a 

combination of live and virtual approaches, but the mix varies by aircraft. For 

example, Air Combat Command specifies that approximately 25 percent of its 

training requirements could be met virtually. The other two commands conduct 

approximately 50 percent of their training virtually. 

The Air Force has taken steps to manage its virtual training efforts, but its 

approach lacks some key elements of an overarching organizational framework 

needed to fully integrate efforts and address challenges. It has reorganized 

offices and undertaken various initiatives intended to enhance existing virtual 

training capabilities, but has not designated an entity to integrate these efforts or 

developed an overarching strategy to define goals, align efforts, and establish 

investment priorities. As a result, major commands have developed their own 

investment plans and standards for acquiring and fielding virtual training 

systems, which are often not interoperable and require costly, time-consuming 

work-arounds to allow personnel to train together and with joint and coalition 

partners. GAO’s prior work has found that a designated entity with the necessary 

authority and resources and an overarching strategy are critical elements of 

managing organizational transformations and meeting long-term goals and 

agency missions. In the absence of an approach that establishes clear 

accountability and a strategy to guide its planning and investment decisions, the 

Air Force will continue to be challenged to guide the efforts of its commands in 

planning for and investing in virtual training, ensure these efforts meet the 

highest priority needs and are synchronized to avoid gaps or future 

interoperability issues, and maximize available resources. 

The Air Force estimated it could save about $1.7 billion in its training program by 

reducing live flying hours and taking other steps, such as increasing the use of 

virtual training, but it lacks a methodology for determining the costs of virtual 

training and therefore did not consider these costs in its estimate. The Air Force 

estimated savings based solely on reductions in live flying hours without 

considering expenses such as those incurred for aircrew to travel to simulators, 

contractor personnel to schedule and operate simulators, and purchase of 

additional simulators. GAO has found that decision makers need visibility over 

financial data to meet agency goals and effectively use resources. Identifying 

virtual training costs is challenging because data is spread across multiple 

program elements in the Air Force’s accounting structure. The Air Force 

completed an initial study in September 2011 that identified some costs related to 

virtual training, but it concluded these data might not be complete. In the absence 

of taking further steps to determine the universe of costs and a means to collect 

and track data, the Air Force will be limited in its ability to make fully informed 

investment decisions about the mix of live and virtual training in the future. 

View GAO-12-727. For more information, 

contact Sharon Pickup at (202) 512-9619 or 

pickups@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Letter 1 

Background 3

Air Force Major Commands Determine Their Mix of Live and 

Virtual Training Based on Various Factors 6

The Air Force Has Not Established an Overarching Organizational 

Framework to Guide, Oversee, and Integrate Virtual Training 

Efforts 9

Air Force Lacks Cost Data for Virtual Training and Did Not 

Account for Virtual Training Costs When Determining Savings 

from Its Flying-Hour Efficiency Initiative 15

Conclusions 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 17

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 26

Tables

Table 1: Virtual Training Networks 5

Table 2: Air Force Virtual Training Roles 10

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

A30 Air Force Director of Operations

A30-CL Air Force Director of Operations-Operational Training

SAF/AAZ Office of Security, Counterintelligence, and Special 

Program Oversight

PEO/SRTI Program Executive Office-Simulation, Training and 

Instrumentation

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

July 19, 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Over the past two decades, the Air Force has sought ways to move 

beyond the use of live flying to meet aircrew training requirements. One 

alternative it has pursued is to increase its use of virtual training, which 

utilizes simulators and information networks to bring together 

geographically separated units in order to conduct training.1

H.R. Rep. No. 112-78 (2011), which accompanied a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, directed us to review the 

status of the military services’ training programs and report the results to 

Virtual 

training allows personnel to replicate required training interactions and 

procedures while reducing fuel costs and avoiding other constraints that 

can affect live training, such as limited access to ranges. Air Force 

leadership considers virtual training to be the cornerstone of its training 

transformation efforts, and the Air Force expects to rely even more 

heavily on virtual training as it fields new aircraft. Further, among the 

initiatives developed in response to the Secretary of Defense’s direction 

to find cost savings through increased department-wide efficiency, the Air 

Force reduced its fiscal year 2012 budget for its flying hour program, 

which funds live training, by $268 million while calling for an increase in 

the use of virtual training.

 

1

Virtual training uses aircraft simulators that replicate the live environment for aircrew 

missions and objectives. Aircraft simulators can be stand-alone or linked to information 

networks. Further details are provided below.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.2

To address these objectives, we met with officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 

Headquarters Air Force, and several Air Force major commands, and 

visited virtual training facilities. Our review focused primarily on virtual 

training systems for manned aircraft from combat air forces, mobility air 

forces, and special operations forces. To determine how the Air Force 

determines the mix of live and virtual training, we analyzed Air Force 

studies and assessments of virtual training technologies and capabilities. 

We also interviewed officials from several major commands and obtained 

and analyzed training-requirement instructions for combat, mobility, and 

special operations aircraft. To determine the extent to which the Air Force 

has developed an overarching organizational framework to guide, 

oversee, and integrate its virtual training efforts, we met with officials from 

the above organizations as well as officials from Joint and Coalition 

Warfighting, Joint Training Integration and Evaluation Center, Navy Air 

Warfare Center, and the four primary centers that facilitate distributed 

mission operations. To determine the extent to which the Air Force 

considered costs related to virtual training in estimating potential savings 

from its training efficiency initiative, we obtained and analyzed the Air 

Force efficiency calculation and compared it with cost-saving estimating 

best practices. We also interviewed officials from the Air Force Defense 

Contracting Management Organization and Headquarters Air Force 

budget office, as well as officials from the major commands listed above. 

More-detailed information about our scope and methodology is provided 

in appendix I.

For this review, we 

assessed (1) how the Air Force determines the mix of live and virtual 

training to meet training requirements (2) the extent to which the Air 

Force has an overarching organizational framework to guide, oversee, 

and integrate its virtual training efforts; and (3) the extent to which the Air 

Force considered costs related to virtual training in estimating potential 

savings from its training efficiency initiative. We are reporting separately 

on the other services.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to July 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 

2

H.R. Rep. No. 112-78 (2011), which accompanied H.R. 1540, a bill for the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

For each of their aircraft, the Air Force lead commands set training 

requirements that aircrews must complete on an annual basis in order to 

maintain combat mission readiness. These training requirements include 

basic tasks such as take-offs and landings and also more-advanced 

tasks, such as air-to-air combat and ground-attack missions. To help 

meet these requirements, the Air Force has developed an approach to 

training that it terms distributed mission operations. This approach is 

intended to train units as they expect to fight, maintain readiness, and 

conduct mission rehearsals in a realistic environment. Distributed mission 

operations utilizes the integration of virtual (e.g., a person training in a 

simulator) and constructive (e.g., computer generated) elements to train 

personnel at geographically separated sites by means of a network. For 

the purposes of this report, we refer to training that includes a simulator 

as virtual training.

The Air Force has four primary centers that facilitate distributed mission 

operations by connecting units and simulators from geographically 

dispersed areas:3

• Distributed Mission Operations Center in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

managed by Air Combat Command;

• Distributed Training Operations Center in Des Moines, Iowa, 

managed by the Air National Guard;

• Warrior Preparation Center in Einsiedlerhof, Germany, managed by 

U.S. Air Forces Europe; and

 

3

Air Force officials stated that although these are the four primary centers, there are 

additional centers that conduct distributed mission operations. For example, Air Force 

Special Operations Command manages a Mission Rehearsal Operations Center at 

Hurlburt Field, Florida. 

Background
 

Page 4 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

• Korean Air Simulation Center in Osan, Republic of Korea, managed 

by Pacific Air Forces.

The Distributed Mission Operations Center functions as the lead 

integrator of virtual systems to conduct theater-level exercises and events 

that include air, land, space, cyber, and maritime virtual assets for Air 

Force, joint, and coalition partners. These large-scale events, known as 

virtual flags, are conducted quarterly and last about 2 weeks. In 2011, the 

Distributed Mission Operations Center trained over 1,400 personnel from 

the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines, and coalition forces through this 

virtual exercise as well as other, small-scale, events.

The Distributed Training Operations Center plans, builds, and manages 

small-scale events to meet the learning objectives of its customers, 

mainly Air Combat Command, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve 

Command. These events are short-term, typically lasting 90 minutes. 

During 2011, the Distributed Training Operations Center conducted over 

4,000 events that trained more than 9,500 personnel, of which at least 60 

percent were active-duty personnel.

The two overseas virtual training centers provide different capabilities for 

the commands they support. The Warrior Preparation Center supports 

training for joint, coalition, and partner-nation forces in the European and 

African theaters. In addition, the Warrior Preparation Center supports an 

Air-to-Ground Operations School and three detachments that provide 

multinational training opportunities. The Korean Air Simulation Center 

operates constructive simulations that support the air operations in Korea 

during U.S. Forces Korea operational-level exercises and supports 

selected exercises for U.S. Forces Japan.

To train its units and personnel, the Air Force conducts distributed 

mission operations using several different internal Air Force and 

Department of Defense (DOD) information networks. Some of these key 

networks, along with their managing organizations, are shown in table 1.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Table 1: Virtual Training Networks

Network Managed by

Distributed Mission Operations Network Air Combat Command

Air Reserve Component Network Air National Guard

Defense Research and Engineering Network High Performance Computing 

Modernization Program

Joint Information Operations Range Deputy Director Joint Force 

Development

Joint Training Enterprise Network Deputy Director Joint Force 

Development

Navy Continuous Training Environment Navy

Missile Defense Agency Classified Network Missile Defense Agency 

Point-to-Point Connections Defense Information Systems Agency

Source: Air Combat Command’s Distributed Missions Operations Center.

These networks differ according to such factors as security restrictions, 

bandwidth capacity, data protocols, and support services.

In May 2010, the Secretary of Defense directed DOD to undertake a 

department-wide efficiency initiative to reduce excess overhead costs and 

to reinvest the resulting savings in sustaining force structure and 

modernization. The Air Force identified a number of areas to improve its 

efficiency, including an initiative, beginning in fiscal year 2012, to 

decrease training costs by reducing its live flying hour program for its 

legacy fighter and bomber aircraft by 5 percent and its Air Force Reserve 

Command F-16 flying hour program by 10 percent.4 On the basis of this 

initiative, the Air Force expects to save a total of $1.7 billion from fiscal 

years 2012 to 2016. The Air Force estimated savings of about $268 

million for fiscal year 2012. In discussing the initiative, the Air Force 

stated that it expected to offset any effect on readiness caused by a 

reduction in live flying hours by increasing its use of simulators.

 

4

Legacy fighter aircraft are the F-15, F-16, and A-10, and legacy bomber aircraft are the 

B-1 and B-52.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Currently, the three lead Air Force major commands—Air Mobility 

Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, and Air Combat 

Command—have similar processes to determine the mix of live and 

virtual training, but the mix of training differs across the major commands, 

and among aircraft within the commands. Air Combat Command is 

responsible for fighters, bombers, and attack aircraft; Air Mobility 

Command is responsible for transport and tanker aircraft; and Air Force 

Special Operations Command is responsible for special-operations 

aircraft. At each command, training-requirement review boards composed 

of subject-matter experts meet to consider broad sets of training issues 

and evaluate training requirements for specific aircraft.

5

While all three lead major commands rely on both live and virtual training 

to meet aircrews’ training requirements, the mix is different for each major 

command, as discussed below.

The boards 

consider factors such as specific combatant command mission 

requirements and the capabilities of simulators and networks that have 

already been fielded, and determine which training requirements can be 

completed in a virtual environment and which need to be completed in a 

live environment. The results of their reviews are reflected in updated 

training guidance for each type of aircraft. In addition, each of the 

commands also establishes requirements to improve, acquire, or upgrade 

training devices to meet mission tasks.

For each aircraft type, Air Mobility Command issues a requirement 

document that specifies the number of times each task or “event” must be 

completed for a pilot or aircrew to be certified as mission ready. The 

document also specifies the percentage of events that can be completed

in a simulator. For example, the C-130 requirement document specifies 

that 50 percent of assault landings may be completed in a simulator and 

100 percent of instrument approaches in a simulator. Although live and 

virtual training requirements vary by aircraft, according to Air Mobility 

Command officials, approximately 50 percent of aircrew training is 

conducted in simulators, including all training related to takeoffs, landings, 

 

5

Air Mobility Command and Air Combat Command refer to their training-requirement 

review boards as “Realistic Training Review Boards” while Air Force Special Operations 

Command refers to its board as a “Simulator and Training System Integrated Product 

Team.” 

Air Force Major 

Commands Determine 

Their Mix of Live and 

Virtual Training Based 

on Various Factors

Air Mobility Command
 

Page 7 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

and instrument approaches.6 Due to limitations in simulator fidelity, 

however, training for some special qualifications such as aerial refueling, 

formation flying, airdrops, and assault landings must periodically be 

conducted live in the actual aircraft. For example, for aerial refueling, 

currently, there are differences between what the fighter pilots see in their 

simulators and what air refueling crews see in their simulators. Because 

the simulators are currently not able to accurately replicate the aerial 

refueling environment, simulated training cannot yet replace live training. 

In developing its virtual training program, Air Mobility Command worked 

with the Federal Aviation Administration to leverage civilian standards, 

which require simulators to respond like the actual aircraft in order to be 

certified for training. Air Mobility Command is currently developing a 

networked distributed training center that would enable more virtual 

training with combat air forces and coalition partners.

As Air Mobility Command does, for each aircraft type Air Force Special 

Operations Command issues a requirement document that specifies the 

number of times each task or “event” must be completed for a pilot or 

aircrew to be certified as mission ready and the percentage of events that 

can be completed in a simulator. Air Force Special Operations Command 

officials stated that the command’s goal is to accomplish up to 50 percent 

of its aircrew training in simulators depending upon the aircraft. For 

example, aircrew training requirements for the AC-130U, a close air 

support aircraft, allows aircrew to accomplish 50 percent of their mission 

tasks in a simulator. Air Force Special Operations Command based its 

simulator certification program on the standards and metrics used by the 

Federal Aviation Administration and Air Mobility Command. Air Force 

Special Operations Command officials stated that simulators provide 

training that might not be available in the live environment, such as 

training for specific locations or adverse weather conditions. Air Force 

Special Operations Command has a stated goal to perform all 

qualification and continuation training events in the simulator, while 

increasing both live and simulator mission rehearsal training.

 

6

Officials noted that percentages can vary due not only to differences in aircraft and 

simulators but also depending on whether the percentages are based on requirements or 

events. Some complex requirements might only have to be performed once or twice 

during each training cycle while other events such as takeoffs and landings have to be 

performed more regularly.

Air Force Special 

Operations Command
 

Page 8 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Air Combat Command also issues a requirement document for each type 

of aircraft on an annual basis. Virtual training requirements vary by 

aircraft, with large aircraft such as bombers generally able to satisfy more 

of their training requirements in simulators than fighters. Beginning in 

fiscal year 2012, Air Combat Command’s training-requirement review 

board revised each aircraft’s training requirements and specified that 

approximately 25 percent of training requirements were to be met using 

virtual training, while the rest of the requirements were to be met using

live training. Prior to this, Air Combat Command training guidance 

specified that virtual training was to be used as a supplement to live 

training, but it did not set a goal or specific percentage requirement for 

virtual training. The virtual training that had been done in those years 

included emergency procedures, instrumentation training, and tactical 

training rather than mission training. With the availability of moreadvanced full mission-training simulators, aircrews are now able to train 

beyond these basic tasks to more-advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground 

combat missions, like suppression of enemy air defenses.

According to Air Combat Command officials, the combat air forces face 

certain challenges that prevent them from conducting the same level of

virtual training as forces from the other major commands. Some 

challenges arise due to differences between unit and simulator locations, 

difficulties coordinating distributed training events, and a lack of simulator 

fidelity. For example, officials stated that there are very few simulators 

collocated with Reserve component units, which means valuable reserve 

component training time can be lost travelling to and from the simulators. 

Officials also noted that the software for some aircraft simulators is two or 

three versions behind the software in the actual aircraft, which could in 

some cases, affect the performance of aircrews in the actual aircraft. In 

addition, fighter simulators cannot replicate the extreme physical effects 

of air combat maneuvers that fighter pilots experience in the actual 

aircraft. Fighter pilots we interviewed stated that unlike flying other aircraft 

such as bombers and transports, fighter pilots must effectively make 

decisions while conducting their missions in a hostile environment and 

maneuvering the aircraft through high-speed and high-gravity maneuvers 

that put stress on the human body. We note that the Navy faces similar 

challenges in conducting virtual training for its fighter aircrews. For 

example, the crews of the Navy’s F/A-18E/F currently conduct 18 percent 

of their training through virtual training and plan to increase this to 32 

percent by 2020.

Air Combat Command
 

Page 9 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

The Air Force has recently taken steps to increase management attention 

over its virtual training efforts, but its approach to virtual training currently 

lacks (1) a designated organization with accountability and authority for 

achieving results and (2) an overarching strategy—key elements of an 

organizational framework that we have found to be critical for successful 

transformations in both public and private organizations.7 In the absence 

of a framework to structure and guide its virtual training efforts, the Air 

Force will continue to face challenges in integrating its virtual capabilities 

and cannot be certain that its efforts align with strategic goals or know 

whether critical gaps or duplication of efforts exist.

According to Air Force leadership, distributed mission operations are the 

cornerstone of the Air Force training transformation. Additionally, in the 

Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training, DOD has emphasized 

comprehensive training that integrates service and joint capabilities.8

 

7

GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations,

The 

Air Force has increased management attention on virtual training efforts 

by reorganizing and creating new headquarters offices and establishing 

working groups, but oversight remains fragmented. For instance, in 

February 2011, the Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation was 

realigned under Headquarters Air Force Director of Operations (A3O) to 

serve as the execution arm for integrating and implementing virtual 

capabilities, resources, and policy. Also, in August 2011, the Air Force 

established the Headquarters Air Force Director of Operations–

Operational Training (A3O-CL) office to provide leadership and support to 

distributed mission operations users across the Air Force. Additionally, in 

February 2012, Headquarters Air Force established a working group, 

composed of subject-matter experts from the Distributed Training Centers 

and the major commands, to address operational challenges within the 

virtual training programs. Issues unable to be resolved in this forum are 

elevated to higher-level working groups including the Headquarters 

Operations Conference, the Modeling and Simulation Steering 

GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003).

8

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel & Readiness, Readiness and 

Training Policy and Programs, Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the 

Department of Defense (Sept. 23, 2010).

The Air Force Has 

Not Established an 

Overarching 

Organizational 

Framework to Guide, 

Oversee, and 

Integrate Virtual 

Training Efforts 

The Air Force Has 

Increased Management 

Focus on Virtual Training 

Efforts, but Oversight 

Remains Fragmented
 

Page 10 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Committee, and finally the Air Force Modeling and Simulation General 

Officer’s Steering Group.

These organizations and working groups have increased management 

focus on virtual training efforts, but the Air Force has not designated an 

organization with accountability and oversight authority necessary to 

integrate all its virtual training efforts, including developing and acquiring 

interoperable virtual training systems and establishing and enforcing 

authoritative standards for simulators, constructive elements, and 

databases. Rather, oversight of standards development, acquisition, 

sustainment, and integration of training systems is fragmented among 

various Air Force organizations, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Air Force Virtual Training Roles

Office Roles

Headquarters Air Force Director of Operations–

Modeling and Simulation (A3O-CM)

Provide modeling and simulation policy, governance, and processes to achieve full 

benefit of modeling and simulation across Air Force.

Headquarters Air Force Director of Operations–

LVC-Operational Training (A3O-CL)

Provide leadership and support, and ensure capabilities are available for live, virtual, 

and constructive operational training and distributed mission operations.

Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation Provide implementation and support of Air Force, Joint, and DOD modeling and 

simulation policy and standards.a

Air Force lead major commands Establish standards, tasks, and formal training requirements for training systems, 

including systems required for distributed mission operation capabilities.

Air Force Materiel Command Execute research, development, test and evaluation, and oversee distributed 

mission operations acquisition, sustainment, and support. 

Air Force Research Laboratory–Warfighter 

Readiness Research Division

Execute the research and development for warfighter training systems.

Aeronautical Systems Center–Simulators 

Division

Execute the acquisition, development, and sustainment of aircraft simulators.

Electronic Systems Center Develop and acquire systems that combine computers, radars, information displays, 

and communication gear.

Air Combat Command Distributed Mission 

Operations Center

Serve as the lead integrator for theater-level distributed mission operations for the 

Air Force, joint forces, and coalition partners.

Office of Security, Counterintelligence, and 

Special Program Oversight (SAF/AAZ)

Serve as accrediting authority for distributed mission operation events and exercises 

to ensure compliance with special-access program policies and procedures.

Source: GAO.

a

The Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation mission directive is currently being revised to 

include its reassignment as an organizational element of Headquarters Air Force, with updated roles 

and responsibilities. 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

In the absence of an organization to guide virtual training efforts, the lead 

major commands have developed their own standards and acquired and 

fielded systems that are not interoperable and often require costly, timeconsuming work-arounds to be able to train together in large, complex 

virtual training exercises. For example, in conducting its quarterly virtual 

flag exercises, the Distributed Mission Operations Center must integrate 

simulators and networks that have been developed to different standards. 

To integrate all the participants into the exercises, the center must 

implement “gateways” that allow dissimilar simulators to translate data; 

develop databases to provide a common constructive environment; and 

link numerous Air Force and DOD networks that have different security 

restrictions, bandwidth limitations, and data transfer protocols.9 According 

to officials, developing and implementing these types of solutions takes 

up to 9 months, and involves significant reliance on contractor personnel. 

The network configuration must be certified for each virtual flag event and 

then it must be disassembled, reconfigured, and recertified for 

subsequent training events. While the Air Force has been developing 

these work-around solutions to allow interoperability among its older 

aircraft simulators, similar solutions will be also be needed for Joint Strike 

Fighter simulators as they are fielded and integrated into distributed 

mission operations. According to Joint Strike Fighter program office 

officials, the programs’ operational requirement document specifies that 

the aircraft and simulators must be interoperable with other aircraft and 

networks, but interoperability is not scheduled to be achieved until later 

blocks in the program’s development. The Air Force’s current Joint Strike 

Fighter simulators are stand-alone and not integrated into distributed 

mission operations. Like other aircraft simulators, the Joint Strike Fighter 

simulators will require complex multilevel security guards and gateways to 

allow them to operate with other aircraft simulators in a distributed 

mission environment.10

 

9

Gateways are information-technology solutions that translate data between simulators 

that were developed using different simulation standards. 

Joint Strike Fighter program officials stated that 

since the types of interoperability challenges that they face are not unique 

but are similar to those of other programs there should not be any unique 

technical barriers that would prevent solutions to these challenges. Air 

10A multilevel security guard is a computer software program that allows a system to 

process information with different security classifications, permits access to users with 

different security clearances, and prevents users from obtaining access to information for 

which they lack authorization.
 

Page 12 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Combat Command is also currently assessing the technologies needed to 

integrate live and virtual training for the Joint Strike Fighter.

Our prior work has found that designating an integration team, vested 

with the necessary authority and resources, is a critical element of 

managing the transformation of an organization.11 We note that the Army 

and the Navy have each designated an organization with centralized 

oversight over standards development, acquisition, sustainment, and 

integration of virtual training systems.12

DOD has called for an approach to training investments that eliminates 

“after-the-fact” interoperability solutions for training capabilities and the 

breaking down of stovepipes to achieve an efficient yet realistic training 

environment.

Further, the Navy has established 

guiding principles and investment priorities to assist decision makers in 

selecting the proper simulator solution for specific training requirements 

and gaps, and to help avoid interoperability issues. One of the principles 

states that simulators intended to interface with other simulators must be 

compatible with the Navy Continuous Training Environment network. A 

Navy training instruction elaborates on this guiding principle by further 

stating, “Interoperability is a key objective for Fleet simulators. Translator 

development is expensive and time consuming, translation slows things 

down (introduces latency), and translation is never perfect. To reduce the 

need for translators to overcome interoperability challenges, Navy 

Continuous Training Environment network technical standards have been 

adopted Fleet-wide and are mandatory for new simulators that will 

integrate into Fleet synthetic training.” 

13

 

11GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, 

Also, in 2011 the Air Force Agency for Modeling and

Simulation developed an Initial Capabilities Document that has been 

approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and that called for 

an organization with contracting oversight that could provide specific 

requirements supporting improved interoperability across the virtual 

GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

12The Program Executive Office—Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) is 

the acquisition and contracting center for live, virtual, and constructive training aids, 

devices, simulations and simulators for the Army. The Naval Air Warfare Center is the 

principal Navy center for research, development, test and evaluation, acquisition and 

product support of training systems.

13Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of 

Training for Department of Defense (Sept. 23, 2010).
 

Page 13 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

training environment.14 However, the Air Force has not yet identified an 

organization to perform this oversight. Without a dedicated organization 

with responsibility and accountability to integrate virtual training efforts, 

the Air Force may continue to face challenges in managing and 

integrating its virtual training efforts, including interoperability issues that 

lead to diminished training quality, fewer training opportunities due to 

lengthy preparation times, and increased costs.

The Air Force is currently pursuing a number of individual initiatives to 

enhance its virtual training capabilities. Among these initiatives are the 

following:

• Air Mobility Command is planning to create and staff a Distributed 

Training Center at Scott Air Force Base in December 2012. The 

training center is initially planned to provide the integration capability 

needed for transport aircraft simulators to conduct distributed mission 

operations on a daily, consistent basis and will also provide the ability 

for these simulators to participate in Distributed Mission Operations 

Center events. Air Mobility Command also has plans to expand the 

center’s capability to include integration of tanker simulators to train 

air refueling virtually.

• The Distributed Training Operations Center has increased its 

capabilities in response to increased user requirements and mission 

requests by adding personnel and expanding event availability. 

Additionally, the Distributed Training Operations Center plans to work 

with the major commands to establish remote capability sites that 

would be networked to the center to increase distributed mission 

operations availability across the Air Force. According to Distributed 

Training Operations Center officials, remote-capability sites have 

already been established for the Air National Guard in South Dakota 

and Pacific Air Forces in Alaska.

• Air Combat Command is in the process of establishing a Distributed 

Training Center at Langley Air Force Base. The training center is 

intended to provide a focal point for scheduling of combat air forces 

 

14United States Air Force Agency for Modeling and Simulation, Initial Capabilities Report 

for Integrating Architecture for Air & Space Live, Virtual, and Constructive Environments 

(IA-ASLVCE) (Sept. 12, 2011).

Individual Air Force 

Initiatives to Enhance 

Virtual Training 

Capabilities Are Not Yet 

Guided by an Overarching 

Strategy
 

Page 14 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

events not involving the Distributed Training Operations Center or 

Distributed Mission Operations Center. It is also intended to provide 

scenario development, focused on training gaps, desired unit 

missions, operational plan missions, and other tactics, techniques, 

and procedures. The training center is expected to be fully operational 

in September 2012.

• Air Force Special Operations Command is in the process of 

establishing a Distributed Training Center at Cannon Air Force Base 

that will focus on virtual training activities for initial and mission 

qualification training and unit-level mission essential tasks.

Our prior work has found that strategic planning is a key element of an 

overarching organizational framework. For example, a leading practice 

derived from principles established under the Government Performance 

and Results Act of 1993 is to improve the management of federal 

agencies by developing comprehensive strategies to address 

management challenges that threaten their ability to meet long-term 

goals.15 We have previously reported that these types of strategies should 

contain results-oriented goals, performance measures, and expectations 

with clear linkages to organizational, unit, and individual performance 

goals to promote accountability and should also be clearly linked to key 

resource decisions.16

 

15Pub. L. No. 103-62 (1993), as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-352 (2011). 

While the Air Force currently has numerous 

individual initiatives underway to enhance its virtual training capabilities 

and is planning to make additional investments, it has not yet developed 

an overall strategy to guide and integrate these efforts. For example, the 

Air Force has not outlined overall goals for its virtual training efforts, 

resource needs, and investment priorities. In the absence of a strategy, 

the Air Force cannot be certain that its individual initiatives are 

synchronized and will address its highest priority needs.

16See, for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Roundtable: The Chief Operating Officer 

Concept: A Potential Strategy to Address Federal Governance Challenges, 

GAO-03-192SP (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2002); Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers 

and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other 

Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002); Defense Business 

Transformation: Achieving Success Requires a Chief Management Officer to Provide 

Focus and Sustained Leadership, GAO-07-1072 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2007); and 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management and 

Integration of DOD Efforts to Support Warfighter Needs, GAO-09-175 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 14, 2008).
 

Page 15 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Air Force officials stated that they are currently developing a Live, Virtual, 

Constructive Flight Plan to serve as their strategy for virtual training. They 

told us the Flight Plan will provide direction to the major commands on the 

handling of operational issues and will establish an internal structure for 

how issues are to be raised and resolved. Officials expect that the Flight 

Plan will be completed by July 2012. Officials stated that a separate effort 

will be undertaken to develop an acquisition strategy for virtual training 

systems. At this point, it is unclear the extent to which these plans will 

contain the necessary elements of an overall strategy that the Air Force 

can use to manage and integrate its planning and acquisition efforts.

In outlining its efficiency initiative related to training, the Air Force 

estimated potential cost savings of $268 million for fiscal year 2012, and a 

total of $1.7 billion for fiscal years 2012 to 2016 by among other things, 

reducing legacy combat Air Force flying hours across the board by 5 

percent.17 The flying-hour efficiency initiative also called for a concurrent

increase in the use of high-fidelity simulators and virtual training to avoid 

any effect on aircrews’ mission readiness from the reduction in live flying. 

However, in estimating costs, the Air Force included the savings 

associated with reductions in live training but not the potential costs 

associated with increases in virtual training that were called for to offset 

the reduction in live training. On the basis of our prior work, cost savings 

estimates should include all significant costs in order to have a

reasonable basis. Additionally, federal internal control standards state 

that decision makers need visibility over a program’s financial data to 

determine whether the program is meeting the agencies’ goals and 

effectively using resources.18

Air Force officials told us that the cost savings associated with the flyinghour efficiency initiative were estimated by multiplying the reductions in 

live training flying hours for each aircraft by the cost per flying hour for 

that aircraft, and then adding the resultant figures for all the aircraft to 

determine total savings. For example, according to numbers provided by 

the Air Force, the live training cost of 1 F-15E flight hour is approximately 

 

17Department of Defense, Department of Defense Efficiency Initiatives, Fiscal Year 2012 

Budget Estimates (Feb. 18, 2011).

18GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999) 

Air Force Lacks Cost

Data for Virtual 

Training and Did Not 

Account for Virtual 

Training Costs When 

Determining Savings 

from Its Flying-Hour 

Efficiency Initiative
 

Page 16 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

$17,449 and F-15E flying hours were reduced by 1,782 hours. These 

amounts were multiplied together to arrive at the Air Force’s projected 

total savings of approximately $31,094,000 for reductions in F-15E flight 

hours. Similar calculations were made for each of the other aircraft that 

had their flight hours reduced and the savings for all the aircraft were 

summed.

The Air Force did not consider any potential costs associated with the 

increase in virtual training in its estimate of cost savings because it has 

not developed a methodology to collect and track information on the cost 

of its virtual training program. According to Air Force officials, some 

training costs could increase as a result of increases in virtual training. 

These costs could include expenses for aircrew to travel to simulator 

locations, additional contractor personnel to schedule and operate 

simulators, and the purchase of additional simulators to meet increased 

demand. Furthermore, according to Air Force officials, identifying virtual 

training costs is challenging because funds to support virtual training and 

distributed mission operations are currently dispersed across multiple 

program elements.19 For example, our analysis identified a portion of 

virtual training funding, specifically distributed mission operations funding, 

in a program element titled “Human Effectiveness Applied Research.” In 

another case, distributed mission operations funding was part of a 

program element titled “International Activities,” under an “Armaments 

Cooperation” subcategory that also included funding for alternative 

energy among other things. In 2011, the Air Force conducted a onetime 

study in an attempt to identify the full cost of its virtual efforts.20

 

19Program elements are primary units of the Future Years Defense Program programming 

and budgeting system.

It found 

that the total investment in virtual capabilities for fiscal year 2012 was at 

least $1.9 billion. Of that, operational training support accounted for 

approximately 50 percent of the annual investment, including the largest 

identified expenditure of $182.3 million for combat air forces distributed 

mission operations. However, the study noted that its efforts may not 

have identified all program elements associated with virtual training and 

therefore further steps would be needed to capture the full value of the Air 

Force’s virtual training investment. As of May 2012, the Air Force had not 

20Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information Dominance and Chief Information 

Officer, Warfighter Systems Integration, Air Force Modeling and Simulation Enterprise 

Management Study (Sept. 12, 2011).
 

Page 17 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

taken any additional steps to develop a methodology for identifying virtual 

training costs. Without a means to collect or calculate its virtual training 

costs, the Air Force lacks the information it needs to make informed 

investment decisions in the future regarding the mix of live and virtual 

training. Furthermore, the Air Force will be unable to determine the 

potential costs associated with its flying-hour efficiency initiative.

In an effort to achieve greater efficiencies in its training program while 

maintaining mission readiness, the Air Force has taken various steps to 

emphasize and increase the use of virtual training. Among other things, 

the Air Force has implemented various initiatives and established 

organizations intended to enhance its virtual training capabilities. 

However, none of these organizations have the authority necessary to 

ensure the integration of the Air Force’s virtual training efforts, and 

oversight remains fragmented. Further, the Air Force lacks an 

overarching organizational framework to guide its current virtual training 

efforts and the additional investments it plans to make. In the absence of 

such a framework, the Air Force faces challenges in managing its current 

inventory of virtual training systems and has experienced delays and 

costs that stem from the lack of interoperability among its simulators and 

networks, resulting in workarounds that are required to compensate for 

these limitations. An overarching management approach, including a 

single entity responsible for coordinating and integrating all virtual training 

efforts, as well as a comprehensive strategy that aligns individual efforts 

with goals and investment priorities, will not be enough if decision makers 

lack visibility over the potential costs of virtual training—especially as they 

consider future changes to the mix of live and virtual training. Until the Air 

Force has a methodology to consistently collect and track its virtual 

training costs and a management framework to coordinate its efforts, it 

will continue to face challenges to planning and conducting its virtual 

training and informing its future investment decisions.

To develop a fully integrated management approach to guide virtual 

training efforts and investments, we recommend the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Air Force to

• designate an entity that is responsible and accountable for integrating 

all of the Air Force’s virtual training efforts, including the development 

and enforcement of interoperability standards across virtual training 

systems, and investment planning; and

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 18 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

• develop an overarching strategy to align goals and funding for virtual 

training efforts across all Air Force major commands. This strategy 

should at a minimum contain elements such as results-oriented goals, 

performance measures, and a determination of resources needed to 

achieve stated goals. In addition, this strategy should show clear 

linkages between existing and planned initiatives and goals.

To improve decision makers’ visibility over the costs related to virtual 

training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the 

Secretary of the Air Force to develop a methodology for collecting and 

tracking cost data for virtual training and use this cost data to help inform 

future decisions regarding the mix of live and virtual training.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it concurred 

with all of our recommendations. In response to our recommendation to 

designate an entity that is responsible and accountable for integrating all 

of the Air Force’s virtual training efforts, including the development and 

enforcement of interoperability standards across virtual training systems, 

and investment planning, DOD stated that the Air Force has taken initial 

steps to designate its Headquarters, Air Force office, AF/A3/5 

(Operations, Plans, and Requirements) as the single entity responsible 

for integrating the Air Force’s virtual training efforts.

In response to our recommendation to develop an overarching strategy to 

align goals and funding for virtual training efforts across all Air Force 

major commands, DOD stated that the Air Force is developing an 

overarching strategy and policy to provide a fully integrated management 

approach to guide its Live Virtual Constructive-Operational Training 

efforts and investments. It further stated that operational level guidance 

will be provided in Air Force Instruction 36-2251, Management of Air 

Force Training Systems and that investment guidance to link virtual 

training to “Readiness” was provided in the Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2014 

Annual Planning and Programming Guidance and Program Objective 

Memoranda Preparation Instructions.

In response to our recommendation to develop a methodology for 

collecting and tracking cost data for virtual training and use this cost data 

to help inform future decisions regarding the mix of live and virtual 

training, DOD stated that the Air Force is taking actions to improve 

visibility related to virtual training to inform decisions regarding the mix of 

live and virtual training. It also stated that the Air Force Instruction 

regarding Management of Air Force Training Systems will provide major 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 19 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

commands with clear guidance to employ consistent methods to collect 

and measure virtual training systems data. DOD said the Aviation 

Resource Management System will be enhanced to provide the capability 

to capture projected and executed aircraft virtual training and cost data to 

provide better oversight and management of virtual training funding. 

Finally, DOD stated that the Air Force is developing a standard 

methodology of accounting and tracking the programming and execution 

of program funds through improved visibility into cost categories 

associated with Live Virtual Constructive-Operational Training. DOD’s 

comments are included in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also provided 

a number of technical and clarifying comments, which we have 

incorporated where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force, and 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. In addition, 

this report will be available at no charge on our website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

Sharon L. Pickup

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

To address our objectives, we met with officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 

Headquarters Air Force, and several Air Force major commands. Our 

review focused primarily on virtual training systems for manned aircraft 

from combat air forces, mobility air forces, and special operations forces. 

Excluded from this review were virtual training programs for unmanned 

aircraft, space, combat support, and combat service support systems. To 

determine how the Air Force determines the mix of live and virtual 

training, we obtained and analyzed training requirement instructions for 

combat, mobility, and special operations aircraft from each of the three 

lead major commands—Air Mobility Command, Air Combat Command, 

and Air Force Special Operations Command. We provided a 

questionnaire and received written responses from the major commands 

on the mix of live and virtual training and the benefits, limitations, and 

challenges of virtual training. We interviewed officials from Air Combat 

Command, Air Mobility Command, Air Force Special Operations 

Command, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, U.S. Air 

Forces Europe, and Pacific Air Forces.

To determine the extent to which the Air Force has developed an 

overarching framework to guide, oversee, and integrate its virtual training 

efforts, we analyzed Air Force studies on virtual training technologies and 

capabilities. We reviewed relevant Department of Defense (DOD) and 

Navy training guidance. We also reviewed our ongoing work related to 

Navy virtual training. We interviewed officials from the Office of the 

Secretary of the Air Force, Headquarters Air Force, the Joint Staff, the 

Department of the Navy, Air Force Major Commands, the four primary 

centers that facilitate distributed mission operations, and joint training 

officials. We visited Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, to observe F-15 and 

F-22 simulator operations at the Mission Training Center. We also visited 

the Distributed Mission Operations Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, 

New Mexico, to observe a distributed training event and the center’s 

capabilities.

To determine the extent to which the Air Force considered costs related 

to virtual training in estimating potential savings from its training efficiency 

initiative, we obtained and analyzed the Air Force efficiency calculation 

and compared it with cost saving estimating best practices. We analyzed 

Air Force budget program elements related to virtual training and 

distributed mission operations. We also analyzed an Air Force study on 

the cost associated with Air Force modeling and simulation efforts. We 

interviewed officials from the Air Force Defense Contracting Management 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Organization and Headquarters Air Force budget operations office, as 

well as officials from the major commands listed above.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to July 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We interviewed officials, and where appropriate obtained documentation,

at the following locations:

• Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Personnel and Readiness

• Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Deputy Chief 

Management Officer

• Joint Staff, J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting

• Headquarters Air Force, Operations Systems Integration (Live, Virtual, 

and Constructive–Operational Training)

• Headquarters Air Force, Operations Systems Integration (Air Force 

Agency for Modeling and Simulation)

• Headquarters Air Force, Operations Integration and Resources

• Headquarters Air Force, Operations Force Management (Force 

Integration)

• Headquarters Air Force, Air Force Financial Management and 

Comptroller, Budget Operations Office

• Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Security, 

Counterintelligence, and Special Program Oversight

• Air Combat Command, Operations and Training

• Air Mobility Command, Operations and Training
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

• Air Force Special Operations Command, Operations and Training

• Air National Guard, Operations and Training

• Air Force Reserve Command, Operations and Training

• U.S. Air Forces Europe, Operations and Training

• Pacific Air Forces, Operations and Training

• Air Force Material Command, Aeronautical Systems Center–

Simulators Division

• Air Force Space Command, Air Force Network Integration Center, 

Cross Domain Solutions Office

• Distributed Mission Operations Center

• Distributed Training Operations Center

• Warrior Preparation Center

• Korean Air Simulation Center

• Joint Strike Fighter Program Office

• Joint Training Integration and Evaluation Center

• Navy Naval Air Warfare Center—Training Systems Division
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 23 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 24 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 25 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 26 GAO-12-727 Air Force Training

Sharon L. Pickup, (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Michael J. Ferren, Assistant 

Director; Russell M. Bryan; Paige A. Muegenburg; Mathew Sakrekoff; and 

Erik S. Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(351655)
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