# Den Europæiske Unions C 229/2013

| | ISSN 1977-0871
  doi:10.3000/19770871.C_2013.229.dan |
| --- | --- |
| Den Europæiske Unions
  Tidende | C 229 |
| | |
| Dansk udgave | Meddelelser og oplysninger | 56. årgang8. august 2013 |

ISSN 1977-0871

doi:10.3000/19770871.C_2013.229.dan

Den Europæiske Unions

Tidende

C 229

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

56. årgang8. august 2013

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| Informationsnummer | Indhold | Side |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Meddelelser |
| | MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2013/C 229/01 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger til udkastet til Kommissionens forordning om anvendelse af artikel 107 and 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte | 1 |
| 2013/C 229/02 | Udkast til Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. .../... af 17. juli 2013 om anvendelse af artikel 107 og 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Indhold

Side

II   Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2013/C 229/01

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger til udkastet til Kommissionens forordning om anvendelse af artikel 107 and 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte

de minimis

1

2013/C 229/02

Udkast til Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. .../... af 17. juli 2013 om anvendelse af artikel 107 og 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte (
  1
  )

de minimis

1

1

| | IV   Oplysninger |
| --- | --- |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2013/C 229/03 | Euroens vekselkurs | 10 |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE |
| 2013/C 229/04 | Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri | 11 |
| 2013/C 229/05 | Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri | 11 |
| | OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE |
| | EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| 2013/C 229/06 | EFTA-staternes oplysninger om statsstøtte ydet i henhold til den retsakt, der er nævnt under punkt 1j i bilag XV til EØS-aftalen (Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 800/2008 om visse former for støttes forenelighed med fællesmarkedet i henhold til traktatens artikel 87 og 88 (Generel gruppefritagelsesforordning)) | 12 |
| 2013/C 229/07 | Ingen statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1 | 16 |
| 2013/C 229/08 | Ingen statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1 | 17 |
| 2013/C 229/09 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol om statsstøtte for så vidt angår finansieringen af koncerthuset og konferencecentret Harpa | 18 |
| 2013/C 229/10 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol for så vidt angår statsstøtte i forbindelse med eventuel støtte til Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA) | 31 |

IV   Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2013/C 229/03

Euroens vekselkurs

10

OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE

2013/C 229/04

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

11

2013/C 229/05

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

11

OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

2013/C 229/06

EFTA-staternes oplysninger om statsstøtte ydet i henhold til den retsakt, der er nævnt under punkt 1j i bilag XV til EØS-aftalen (Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 800/2008 om visse former for støttes forenelighed med fællesmarkedet i henhold til traktatens artikel 87 og 88 (Generel gruppefritagelsesforordning))

12

2013/C 229/07

Ingen statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1

16

2013/C 229/08

Ingen statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1

17

2013/C 229/09

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol om statsstøtte for så vidt angår finansieringen af koncerthuset og konferencecentret Harpa

18

2013/C 229/10

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol for så vidt angår statsstøtte i forbindelse med eventuel støtte til Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA)

31

| | V   Øvrige meddelelser |
| --- | --- |
| | ANDET |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2013/C 229/11 | Offentliggørelse af en ansøgning i henhold til artikel 50, stk. 2, litra a), i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer | 43 |

V   Øvrige meddelelser

ANDET

Europa-Kommissionen

2013/C 229/11

Offentliggørelse af en ansøgning i henhold til artikel 50, stk. 2, litra a), i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer

43

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| | (1)   EØS-relevant tekst |

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(1)   EØS-relevant tekst

1

| DA | |
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DA

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II Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/1

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Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger til udkastet til Kommissionens forordning om anvendelse af artikel 107 and 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte

2013/C 229/01

Interesserede parter kan fremsætte bemærkninger senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen af forordningsudkastet til:

| Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for Statsstøtte |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| E-mail: stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu |

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for Statsstøtte

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

E-mail: stateaidgreffe@ec.europa.eu

Sagsnr.: HT.3572 — SAM — de minimis review

Teksten findes på webstedet:

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_second_de_minimis/index_en.html

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| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/1 |
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8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/1

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UDKAST TIL KOMMISSIONENS FORORDNING (EU) Nr. .../...

af 17. juli 2013

om anvendelse af artikel 107 og 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2013/C 229/02

EUROPA-KOMMISSIONEN HAR —

under henvisning til traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde, særlig artikel 108, stk. 4,

under henvisning til Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 994/98 af 7. maj 1998 om anvendelse af artikel 92 og 93 i traktaten om oprettelse af Det Europæiske Fællesskab på visse former for horisontal statsstøtte (1),

efter offentliggørelse af et udkast til denne forordning (2),

efter høring af Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Statsstøtte, og

ud fra følgende betragtninger:

| (1) | Statslig finansiering, som opfylder kriterierne i artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (»traktaten«), udgør statsstøtte og skal anmeldes til Kommissionen i henhold til traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3. I medfør af artikel 109 i traktaten kan Rådet imidlertid bestemme, at visse former for støtte er fritaget for denne anmeldelsespligt. I henhold til artikel 108, stk. 4, i traktaten kan Kommissionen vedtage forordninger vedrørende disse former for statsstøtte. Ved forordning (EF) nr. 994/98 besluttede Rådet i henhold til artikel 109 i traktaten, at de minimis-støtte udgør en sådan form for statsstøtte. De minimis-støtte, som er en støtte, der ydes til den samme virksomhed over en given periode, og som ikke overstiger et vist nærmere fastsat beløb, anses derfor for ikke at opfylde alle kriterier i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og er derfor ikke omfattet af anmeldelsespligten. |
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(1)

Statslig finansiering, som opfylder kriterierne i artikel 107, stk. 1, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (»traktaten«), udgør statsstøtte og skal anmeldes til Kommissionen i henhold til traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3. I medfør af artikel 109 i traktaten kan Rådet imidlertid bestemme, at visse former for støtte er fritaget for denne anmeldelsespligt. I henhold til artikel 108, stk. 4, i traktaten kan Kommissionen vedtage forordninger vedrørende disse former for statsstøtte. Ved forordning (EF) nr. 994/98 besluttede Rådet i henhold til artikel 109 i traktaten, at de minimis-støtte udgør en sådan form for statsstøtte. De minimis-støtte, som er en støtte, der ydes til den samme virksomhed over en given periode, og som ikke overstiger et vist nærmere fastsat beløb, anses derfor for ikke at opfylde alle kriterier i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og er derfor ikke omfattet af anmeldelsespligten.

| (2) | Kommissionen har i adskillige afgørelser præciseret begrebet støtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1. Kommissionen har også bekendtgjort, hvordan den forholder sig til et de minimis-loft, under hvilket traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, ikke finder anvendelse, første gang i sin meddelelse om de minimis-støtteordninger (3) og senere i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001 (4) og Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006 (5). På baggrund af erfaringerne med at anvende forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006 forekommer det hensigtsmæssigt at revidere nogle af de betingelser, der var fastsat i denne forordning, og erstatte den med en ny forordning. |
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(2)

Kommissionen har i adskillige afgørelser præciseret begrebet støtte som omhandlet i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1. Kommissionen har også bekendtgjort, hvordan den forholder sig til et de minimis-loft, under hvilket traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, ikke finder anvendelse, første gang i sin meddelelse om de minimis-støtteordninger (3) og senere i Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001 (4) og Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006 (5). På baggrund af erfaringerne med at anvende forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006 forekommer det hensigtsmæssigt at revidere nogle af de betingelser, der var fastsat i denne forordning, og erstatte den med en ny forordning.

| (3) | Det er hensigtsmæssigt at fastholde loftet på 200 000 EUR for den de minimis-støtte, som en enkelt virksomhed kan modtage pr. medlemsstat over en periode på tre år. Dette loft er fortsat nødvendigt for at sikre, at enhver foranstaltning, der falder ind under denne forordning, ikke påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og/eller fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Det er hensigtsmæssigt at fastholde loftet på 200 000 EUR for den de minimis-støtte, som en enkelt virksomhed kan modtage pr. medlemsstat over en periode på tre år. Dette loft er fortsat nødvendigt for at sikre, at enhver foranstaltning, der falder ind under denne forordning, ikke påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne og/eller fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene.

| (4) | Ved anvendelsen af traktatens konkurrenceregler forstås ved en virksomhed enhver enhed, uanset juridisk status og finansieringsmåde, der udøver en økonomisk aktivitet (6). Domstolen har fastslået, at alle enheder, som kontrolleres af samme enhed (de jure eller de facto), skal betragtes som en del af én samlet virksomhed (7). Af hensyn til retssikkerheden og for at mindske den administrative byrde bør denne forordning indeholde en udtømmende liste med klare kriterier, der gør det muligt at bestemme, hvorvidt to eller flere enheder skal betragtes som en del af én samlet virksomhed. Kommissionen har ud fra de veletablerede kriterier for definitionen af »tilknyttede virksomheder« i definitionen af SMV'er i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 800/2008 (8) udvalgt de kriterier, der er hensigtsmæssige i forhold til denne forordning. De kriterier er allerede velkendte for de offentlige myndigheder og bør i betragtning af denne forordnings anvendelsesområde finde anvendelse på såvel SMV'er som store virksomheder. |
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(4)

Ved anvendelsen af traktatens konkurrenceregler forstås ved en virksomhed enhver enhed, uanset juridisk status og finansieringsmåde, der udøver en økonomisk aktivitet (6). Domstolen har fastslået, at alle enheder, som kontrolleres af samme enhed (de jure eller de facto), skal betragtes som en del af én samlet virksomhed (7). Af hensyn til retssikkerheden og for at mindske den administrative byrde bør denne forordning indeholde en udtømmende liste med klare kriterier, der gør det muligt at bestemme, hvorvidt to eller flere enheder skal betragtes som en del af én samlet virksomhed. Kommissionen har ud fra de veletablerede kriterier for definitionen af »tilknyttede virksomheder« i definitionen af SMV'er i bilag I til forordning (EF) nr. 800/2008 (8) udvalgt de kriterier, der er hensigtsmæssige i forhold til denne forordning. De kriterier er allerede velkendte for de offentlige myndigheder og bør i betragtning af denne forordnings anvendelsesområde finde anvendelse på såvel SMV'er som store virksomheder.

| (5) | For at tage højde for, at virksomheder i vejgodstransportsektoren gennemsnitligt er små, er det hensigtsmæssigt at fastsætte et loft på 100 000 for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport for fremmed regning. En integreret tjeneste, hvoraf den reelle transport kun er ét element, såsom flyttetjenester, post- eller kurertjenester eller affaldsindsamlings- og affaldsbehandlingstjenester, bør ikke betragtes som en transporttjeneste. I betragtning af overkapaciteten inden for sektoren og de transportpolitiske mål med hensyn til trafiktætheden på vejene og godstransporten bør denne forordnings anvendelsesområde ikke omfatte støtte til virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport for fremmed regning, til køb af transportkøretøjer. I betragtning af udviklingen i personbefordring ad landevej er det ikke længere hensigtsmæssigt at anvende et lavere loft for denne sektor. |
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(5)

For at tage højde for, at virksomheder i vejgodstransportsektoren gennemsnitligt er små, er det hensigtsmæssigt at fastsætte et loft på 100 000 for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport for fremmed regning. En integreret tjeneste, hvoraf den reelle transport kun er ét element, såsom flyttetjenester, post- eller kurertjenester eller affaldsindsamlings- og affaldsbehandlingstjenester, bør ikke betragtes som en transporttjeneste. I betragtning af overkapaciteten inden for sektoren og de transportpolitiske mål med hensyn til trafiktætheden på vejene og godstransporten bør denne forordnings anvendelsesområde ikke omfatte støtte til virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport for fremmed regning, til køb af transportkøretøjer. I betragtning af udviklingen i personbefordring ad landevej er det ikke længere hensigtsmæssigt at anvende et lavere loft for denne sektor.

| (6) | På baggrund af de særlige regler, der gælder for primærproduktion af landbrugsprodukter, fiskeri og akvakultur, samt risikoen for, at støttebeløb, der ligger under loftet i denne forordning, ikke desto mindre vil kunne opfylde kriterierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, i disse sektorer, bør denne forordning ikke finde anvendelse herpå. |
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(6)

På baggrund af de særlige regler, der gælder for primærproduktion af landbrugsprodukter, fiskeri og akvakultur, samt risikoen for, at støttebeløb, der ligger under loftet i denne forordning, ikke desto mindre vil kunne opfylde kriterierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, i disse sektorer, bør denne forordning ikke finde anvendelse herpå.

| (7) | I betragtning af lighederne mellem forarbejdningen og afsætningen af landbrugsprodukter og ikke-landbrugsprodukter bør denne forordning finde anvendelse på forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter, forudsat at visse betingelser er opfyldt. Hverken de nødvendige aktiviteter på bedriften for at forberede et produkt til det første salg, f.eks. høst og tærskning af korn og forpakning af æg, eller det første salg til forhandlere eller forarbejdningsvirksomheder bør betragtes som forarbejdning eller afsætning i denne forbindelse. Domstolen har fastslået (9), at når Unionen ved lovgivning har indført en fælles markedsordning i en given landbrugssektor, har medlemsstaterne pligt til at afstå fra enhver foranstaltning, der kan underminere eller fravige en sådan ordning. Denne forordning bør derfor ikke gælde for støtte, hvis størrelse fastsættes ud fra prisen for eller mængden af produkter, der indkøbes eller bringes på markedet. Den bør heller ikke finde anvendelse på støtte, der er betinget af, at støtten deles med primærproducenter. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

I betragtning af lighederne mellem forarbejdningen og afsætningen af landbrugsprodukter og ikke-landbrugsprodukter bør denne forordning finde anvendelse på forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter, forudsat at visse betingelser er opfyldt. Hverken de nødvendige aktiviteter på bedriften for at forberede et produkt til det første salg, f.eks. høst og tærskning af korn og forpakning af æg, eller det første salg til forhandlere eller forarbejdningsvirksomheder bør betragtes som forarbejdning eller afsætning i denne forbindelse. Domstolen har fastslået (9), at når Unionen ved lovgivning har indført en fælles markedsordning i en given landbrugssektor, har medlemsstaterne pligt til at afstå fra enhver foranstaltning, der kan underminere eller fravige en sådan ordning. Denne forordning bør derfor ikke gælde for støtte, hvis størrelse fastsættes ud fra prisen for eller mængden af produkter, der indkøbes eller bringes på markedet. Den bør heller ikke finde anvendelse på støtte, der er betinget af, at støtten deles med primærproducenter.

| (8) | Denne forordning bør ikke finde anvendelse på eksportstøtte eller støtte, der begunstiger indenlandske produkter frem for importerede. Den bør navnlig ikke gælde for støtte til finansiering af etablering og drift af distributionsnet i andre medlemsstater eller tredjelande. Støtte til dækning af udgifter til deltagelse i varemesser eller til undersøgelser eller konsulenttjenester, der er nødvendige for at lancere et nyt eller et eksisterende produkt på et nyt marked, betragtes normalt ikke som eksportstøtte. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Denne forordning bør ikke finde anvendelse på eksportstøtte eller støtte, der begunstiger indenlandske produkter frem for importerede. Den bør navnlig ikke gælde for støtte til finansiering af etablering og drift af distributionsnet i andre medlemsstater eller tredjelande. Støtte til dækning af udgifter til deltagelse i varemesser eller til undersøgelser eller konsulenttjenester, der er nødvendige for at lancere et nyt eller et eksisterende produkt på et nyt marked, betragtes normalt ikke som eksportstøtte.

| (9) | Denne forordning bør ikke finde anvendelse på kriseramte virksomheder, eftersom de ikke ydes finansiel støtte til kriseramte virksomheder, hvis der ikke foreligger en omstruktureringsplan. Der er derudover vanskeligheder forbundet med at bestemme bruttosubventionsækvivalenten for støtte til virksomheder af denne type. Der bør af hensyn til den retlige sikkerhed opstilles klare kriterier til at fastslå, om en virksomhed i denne forordning anses for at være kriseramt, uden at disse kriterier forudsætter en vurdering af alle de særlige forhold i en virksomheds situation. |
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(9)

Denne forordning bør ikke finde anvendelse på kriseramte virksomheder, eftersom de ikke ydes finansiel støtte til kriseramte virksomheder, hvis der ikke foreligger en omstruktureringsplan. Der er derudover vanskeligheder forbundet med at bestemme bruttosubventionsækvivalenten for støtte til virksomheder af denne type. Der bør af hensyn til den retlige sikkerhed opstilles klare kriterier til at fastslå, om en virksomhed i denne forordning anses for at være kriseramt, uden at disse kriterier forudsætter en vurdering af alle de særlige forhold i en virksomheds situation.

| (10) | Den treårsperiode, der skal tages i betragtning ved anvendelsen af denne forordning, er glidende i den forstand, at man, hver gang der ydes ny de minimis-støtte, skal tage hensyn til den samlede de minimis-støtte, der er ydet i det indeværende og de to foregående regnskabsår. |
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(10)

Den treårsperiode, der skal tages i betragtning ved anvendelsen af denne forordning, er glidende i den forstand, at man, hver gang der ydes ny de minimis-støtte, skal tage hensyn til den samlede de minimis-støtte, der er ydet i det indeværende og de to foregående regnskabsår.

| (11) | Når virksomheder er aktive inden for sektorer, der er udelukket fra denne forordnings anvendelsesområde, såvel som inden for andre sektorer eller aktiviteter, bør denne forordning finde anvendelse på de andre sektorer eller aktiviteter, forudsat at medlemsstaterne ved hjælp af egnede midler, såsom ved at holde aktiviteterne adskilt eller ved at udskille omkostningerne, sikrer, at der ikke ydes de minimis-støtte til aktiviteterne i de udelukkede sektorer. Det samme princip bør finde anvendelse, når virksomheder er aktive inden for sektorer med et lavere de minimis-loft. Såfremt det ikke kan sikres, at aktiviteterne inden for de sektorer, hvor lavere de minimis-lofter gælder, ikke modtager støtte ud over de lavere lofter, bør det laveste loft finde anvendelse på alle virksomhedens aktiviteter. |
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(11)

Når virksomheder er aktive inden for sektorer, der er udelukket fra denne forordnings anvendelsesområde, såvel som inden for andre sektorer eller aktiviteter, bør denne forordning finde anvendelse på de andre sektorer eller aktiviteter, forudsat at medlemsstaterne ved hjælp af egnede midler, såsom ved at holde aktiviteterne adskilt eller ved at udskille omkostningerne, sikrer, at der ikke ydes de minimis-støtte til aktiviteterne i de udelukkede sektorer. Det samme princip bør finde anvendelse, når virksomheder er aktive inden for sektorer med et lavere de minimis-loft. Såfremt det ikke kan sikres, at aktiviteterne inden for de sektorer, hvor lavere de minimis-lofter gælder, ikke modtager støtte ud over de lavere lofter, bør det laveste loft finde anvendelse på alle virksomhedens aktiviteter.

| (12) | Denne forordning bør fastsætte regler, der sikrer, at det ikke er muligt at omgå de maksimale støtteintensiteter fastsat i specifikke forordninger eller Kommissionens afgørelser. Den bør også fastsætte klare kumulationsregler, der er lette at anvende. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Denne forordning bør fastsætte regler, der sikrer, at det ikke er muligt at omgå de maksimale støtteintensiteter fastsat i specifikke forordninger eller Kommissionens afgørelser. Den bør også fastsætte klare kumulationsregler, der er lette at anvende.

| (13) | Denne forordning udelukker ikke, at en foranstaltning eventuelt ikke skal betragtes som statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, af andre grunde end de i denne forordning nævnte, f.eks. fordi foranstaltningen er i overensstemmelse med de markedsøkonomiske principper, eller fordi foranstaltningen ikke omfatter overførsel af statsmidler. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Denne forordning udelukker ikke, at en foranstaltning eventuelt ikke skal betragtes som statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, af andre grunde end de i denne forordning nævnte, f.eks. fordi foranstaltningen er i overensstemmelse med de markedsøkonomiske principper, eller fordi foranstaltningen ikke omfatter overførsel af statsmidler.

| (14) | For at sikre gennemsigtighed, ligebehandling og effektivt tilsyn bør denne forordning kun finde anvendelse på de minimis-støtte, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalent kan forudberegnes præcist, uden at det er nødvendigt at foretage en risikovurdering (»gennemsigtig støtte«). En sådan præcis beregning kan f.eks. foretages i forbindelse med tilskud, rentetilskud, begrænsede skattefritagelser eller andre instrumenter, der omfatter en øvre grænse, som sikrer, at det gældende loft ikke overskrides. En sådan øvre grænse betyder, at så længe det præcise støttebeløb ikke eller endnu ikke er kendt, skal medlemsstaten antage, at beløbet svarer til grænsen, for derved at sikre, at det loft, der er fastlagt i denne forordning, ikke overskrides, når der ydes støtte med flere forskellige støtteforanstaltninger, samt for at kunne anvende kumulationsreglerne. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

For at sikre gennemsigtighed, ligebehandling og effektivt tilsyn bør denne forordning kun finde anvendelse på de minimis-støtte, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalent kan forudberegnes præcist, uden at det er nødvendigt at foretage en risikovurdering (»gennemsigtig støtte«). En sådan præcis beregning kan f.eks. foretages i forbindelse med tilskud, rentetilskud, begrænsede skattefritagelser eller andre instrumenter, der omfatter en øvre grænse, som sikrer, at det gældende loft ikke overskrides. En sådan øvre grænse betyder, at så længe det præcise støttebeløb ikke eller endnu ikke er kendt, skal medlemsstaten antage, at beløbet svarer til grænsen, for derved at sikre, at det loft, der er fastlagt i denne forordning, ikke overskrides, når der ydes støtte med flere forskellige støtteforanstaltninger, samt for at kunne anvende kumulationsreglerne.

| (15) | For at sikre gennemsigtighed, ligebehandling og korrekt anvendelse af de minimis-loftet bør alle medlemsstater anvende den samme beregningsmetode. For at lette en sådan beregning bør støttebeløb, der ikke udbetales som kontante tilskud, omregnes til bruttosubventionsækvivalent. Bruttosubventionsækvivalenten for andre former for gennemsigtig støtte end tilskud eller for rateudbetalt støtte beregnes på grundlag af de gældende markedsrenter på støttetidspunktet. Med henblik på en ensartet, gennemsigtig og enkel anvendelse af statsstøttereglerne bør de gældende markedsrentesatser i denne forordning svare til de referencesatser, der er fastsat i meddelelsen fra Kommissionen om revision af metoden for fastsættelse af referencesatsen og kalkulationsrenten (10). |
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(15)

For at sikre gennemsigtighed, ligebehandling og korrekt anvendelse af de minimis-loftet bør alle medlemsstater anvende den samme beregningsmetode. For at lette en sådan beregning bør støttebeløb, der ikke udbetales som kontante tilskud, omregnes til bruttosubventionsækvivalent. Bruttosubventionsækvivalenten for andre former for gennemsigtig støtte end tilskud eller for rateudbetalt støtte beregnes på grundlag af de gældende markedsrenter på støttetidspunktet. Med henblik på en ensartet, gennemsigtig og enkel anvendelse af statsstøttereglerne bør de gældende markedsrentesatser i denne forordning svare til de referencesatser, der er fastsat i meddelelsen fra Kommissionen om revision af metoden for fastsættelse af referencesatsen og kalkulationsrenten (10).

| (16) | Støtte indeholdt i lån bør betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er blevet beregnet på basis af de gældende markedsrenter på støttetidspunktet. For at forenkle behandlingen af mindre lån af kort varighed bør denne forordning indeholde en klar regel, der er enkel at anvende og tager hensyn til såvel lånebeløbet som varigheden. På grundlag af Kommissionens erfaringer kan lån, der er sikret ved sikkerhedsstillelse for mindst 50 % af lånet, og som ikke overstiger 1 000 000 EUR med en løbetid på fem år eller 500 000 EUR med en løbetid på ti år, anses for at have en bruttosubventionsækvivalent, der svarer til de minimis-loftet. |
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(16)

Støtte indeholdt i lån bør betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er blevet beregnet på basis af de gældende markedsrenter på støttetidspunktet. For at forenkle behandlingen af mindre lån af kort varighed bør denne forordning indeholde en klar regel, der er enkel at anvende og tager hensyn til såvel lånebeløbet som varigheden. På grundlag af Kommissionens erfaringer kan lån, der er sikret ved sikkerhedsstillelse for mindst 50 % af lånet, og som ikke overstiger 1 000 000 EUR med en løbetid på fem år eller 500 000 EUR med en løbetid på ti år, anses for at have en bruttosubventionsækvivalent, der svarer til de minimis-loftet.

| (17) | Støtte indeholdt i kapitaltilførsler bør ikke betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, medmindre det samlede beløb i forbindelse med den offentlige kapitaltilførsel holdes under de minimis-loftet. Støtte i form af risikokapitalfinansiering i form af egenkapital- eller kvasiegenkapitalinvesteringer, jf. (de nye retningslinjer for risikokapitalfinansiering), bør ikke betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, medmindre den pågældende kapital holdes under de minimis-loftet for hver enkelt virksomhed. |
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(17)

Støtte indeholdt i kapitaltilførsler bør ikke betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, medmindre det samlede beløb i forbindelse med den offentlige kapitaltilførsel holdes under de minimis-loftet. Støtte i form af risikokapitalfinansiering i form af egenkapital- eller kvasiegenkapitalinvesteringer, jf. (de nye retningslinjer for risikokapitalfinansiering), bør ikke betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, medmindre den pågældende kapital holdes under de minimis-loftet for hver enkelt virksomhed.

| (18) | Støtte indeholdt i garantier bør betragtes som gennemsigtig, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er blevet beregnet på grundlag af de minimumspræmier, der er fastsat i Kommissionens meddelelse for den berørte type virksomhed. Kommissionens meddelelse om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte i form af garantier (11) angiver f.eks. årlige præmieniveauer, over hvilke en statsgaranti ikke anses for at udgøre støtte. For at forenkle behandlingen af kortvarige garantier, der skal sikre op mod 80 % af relativt små lån, bør denne forordning indeholde en klar regel, der er enkel at anvende og tager hensyn til såvel størrelsen på det lån, der ligger til grund for garantien, som garantiens varighed. Denne regel bør ikke finde anvendelse på garantier for underliggende transaktioner, der ikke udgør et lån, såsom garantier for aktietransaktioner. Hvis garantien ikke overstiger 80 % af det underliggende lån, det garanterede beløb ikke overstiger 1 500 000 EUR, og garantiens varighed ikke overstiger fem år, kan garantien anses for at have en bruttosubventionsækvivalent, der svarer til de minimis-loftet. Det samme gælder, hvis garantien ikke overstiger 80 % af det underliggende lån, det garanterede beløb ikke overstiger 750 000 EUR, og varigheden ikke overstiger ti år. |
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(18)

Støtte indeholdt i garantier bør betragtes som gennemsigtig, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er blevet beregnet på grundlag af de minimumspræmier, der er fastsat i Kommissionens meddelelse for den berørte type virksomhed. Kommissionens meddelelse om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte i form af garantier (11) angiver f.eks. årlige præmieniveauer, over hvilke en statsgaranti ikke anses for at udgøre støtte. For at forenkle behandlingen af kortvarige garantier, der skal sikre op mod 80 % af relativt små lån, bør denne forordning indeholde en klar regel, der er enkel at anvende og tager hensyn til såvel størrelsen på det lån, der ligger til grund for garantien, som garantiens varighed. Denne regel bør ikke finde anvendelse på garantier for underliggende transaktioner, der ikke udgør et lån, såsom garantier for aktietransaktioner. Hvis garantien ikke overstiger 80 % af det underliggende lån, det garanterede beløb ikke overstiger 1 500 000 EUR, og garantiens varighed ikke overstiger fem år, kan garantien anses for at have en bruttosubventionsækvivalent, der svarer til de minimis-loftet. Det samme gælder, hvis garantien ikke overstiger 80 % af det underliggende lån, det garanterede beløb ikke overstiger 750 000 EUR, og varigheden ikke overstiger ti år.

| (19) | For lån eller garantier på mindre beløb eller med en kortere varighed end dem, der er anført i betragtning 16 og 18, bør bruttosubventionsækvivalenten beregnes ved at gange forholdet mellem det reelle beløb og det maksimale beløb, der er anført i betragtning 16 og 18, med forholdet mellem den reelle varighed og fem år og derefter med 200 000 EUR. Således vil et lån på 500 000 EUR i 2,5 år for eksempel anses for at have en bruttosubventionsækvivalent på 50 000 EUR. |
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(19)

For lån eller garantier på mindre beløb eller med en kortere varighed end dem, der er anført i betragtning 16 og 18, bør bruttosubventionsækvivalenten beregnes ved at gange forholdet mellem det reelle beløb og det maksimale beløb, der er anført i betragtning 16 og 18, med forholdet mellem den reelle varighed og fem år og derefter med 200 000 EUR. Således vil et lån på 500 000 EUR i 2,5 år for eksempel anses for at have en bruttosubventionsækvivalent på 50 000 EUR.

| (20) | På grundlag af en anmeldelse fra en medlemsstat kan Kommissionen undersøge, om en foranstaltning, der ikke består i ydelse af et tilskud, et lån, en garanti, et kapitalindskud eller risikokapitalfinansiering i form af egenkapital- eller kvasiegenkapitalinvestering, medfører en bruttosubventionsækvivalent, som ikke overstiger de minimis-loftet og derfor kan falde ind under denne forordnings anvendelsesområde. |
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(20)

På grundlag af en anmeldelse fra en medlemsstat kan Kommissionen undersøge, om en foranstaltning, der ikke består i ydelse af et tilskud, et lån, en garanti, et kapitalindskud eller risikokapitalfinansiering i form af egenkapital- eller kvasiegenkapitalinvestering, medfører en bruttosubventionsækvivalent, som ikke overstiger de minimis-loftet og derfor kan falde ind under denne forordnings anvendelsesområde.

| (21) | Kommissionen har pligt til at sikre, at statsstøttereglerne overholdes, og i overensstemmelse med samarbejdsprincippet i artikel 4 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Union bør medlemsstaterne lette udførelsen af denne opgave ved at træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre, at den samlede de minimis-støtte, der i henhold til de minimis-reglen ydes til en enkelt virksomhed, ikke overstiger det samlede tilladte loft. |
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(21)

Kommissionen har pligt til at sikre, at statsstøttereglerne overholdes, og i overensstemmelse med samarbejdsprincippet i artikel 4 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Union bør medlemsstaterne lette udførelsen af denne opgave ved at træffe de nødvendige foranstaltninger for at sikre, at den samlede de minimis-støtte, der i henhold til de minimis-reglen ydes til en enkelt virksomhed, ikke overstiger det samlede tilladte loft.

| (22) | Før medlemsstaterne yder nogen form for de minimis-støtte, bør de kontrollere for deres medlemsstat, at de minimis-loftet ikke overstiges med den nye de minimis-støtte, og at de andre betingelser i denne forordning er overholdt. |
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(22)

Før medlemsstaterne yder nogen form for de minimis-støtte, bør de kontrollere for deres medlemsstat, at de minimis-loftet ikke overstiges med den nye de minimis-støtte, og at de andre betingelser i denne forordning er overholdt.

| (23) | For at sikre, at medlemsstaterne har nøjagtige, pålidelige og fuldstændige oplysninger, som kan give garanti for, at ny de minimis-støtte ikke kommer til at overstige det loft, som gælder for den virksomhed, der modtager støtten, bør det kræves, at medlemsstaterne opretter et centralt register over de minimis-støtte, der indeholder oplysninger om al de minimis-støtte ydet i overensstemmelse med denne forordning af enhver myndighed i den pågældende medlemsstat. Det bør stå medlemsstaterne frit for at udforme deres register og vælge den mest hensigtsmæssige mekanisme for at oprette det i overensstemmelse med deres forfatningsmæssige og administrative struktur, forudsat at de sikrer, at alle medlemsstatens offentlige myndigheder har adgang til registeret for at kunne kontrollere størrelsen af den de minimis-støtte, som hver virksomhed har modtaget. Medlemsstaterne bør have tilstrækkelig tid til at oprette et sådant register. |
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(23)

For at sikre, at medlemsstaterne har nøjagtige, pålidelige og fuldstændige oplysninger, som kan give garanti for, at ny de minimis-støtte ikke kommer til at overstige det loft, som gælder for den virksomhed, der modtager støtten, bør det kræves, at medlemsstaterne opretter et centralt register over de minimis-støtte, der indeholder oplysninger om al de minimis-støtte ydet i overensstemmelse med denne forordning af enhver myndighed i den pågældende medlemsstat. Det bør stå medlemsstaterne frit for at udforme deres register og vælge den mest hensigtsmæssige mekanisme for at oprette det i overensstemmelse med deres forfatningsmæssige og administrative struktur, forudsat at de sikrer, at alle medlemsstatens offentlige myndigheder har adgang til registeret for at kunne kontrollere størrelsen af den de minimis-støtte, som hver virksomhed har modtaget. Medlemsstaterne bør have tilstrækkelig tid til at oprette et sådant register.

| (24) | Indtil en medlemsstat har oprettet et centralt register, og registret dækker en periode på tre år, bør medlemsstaten meddele den pågældende virksomhed beløbet for den de minimis-støtte, der er ydet, og støttens karakter af de minimis-støtte, og bør udtrykkeligt henvise til denne forordning. Før ydelsen af en sådan støtte skal den pågældende medlemsstat desuden indhente en erklæring fra virksomheden om anden de minimis-støtte omfattet af denne forordning eller andre de minimis-forordninger, som denne måtte have modtaget i løbet af det pågældende regnskabsår samt de foregående to regnskabsår. |
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(24)

Indtil en medlemsstat har oprettet et centralt register, og registret dækker en periode på tre år, bør medlemsstaten meddele den pågældende virksomhed beløbet for den de minimis-støtte, der er ydet, og støttens karakter af de minimis-støtte, og bør udtrykkeligt henvise til denne forordning. Før ydelsen af en sådan støtte skal den pågældende medlemsstat desuden indhente en erklæring fra virksomheden om anden de minimis-støtte omfattet af denne forordning eller andre de minimis-forordninger, som denne måtte have modtaget i løbet af det pågældende regnskabsår samt de foregående to regnskabsår.

| (25) | For gøre det muligt for Kommissionen at føre tilsyn med anvendelsen af denne forordning og påvise mulige konkurrencefordrejninger bør det kræves, at medlemsstaterne giver grundlæggende oplysninger om støttebeløb ydet i overensstemmelse med denne forordning på årsbasis. Hvis medlemsstaten har oplyst Kommissionen om, hvor alle de oplysninger, der skal gives i rapporten, er gjort offentligt tilgængelige, behøver medlemsstaten ikke at indgive rapport til Kommissionen. |
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(25)

For gøre det muligt for Kommissionen at føre tilsyn med anvendelsen af denne forordning og påvise mulige konkurrencefordrejninger bør det kræves, at medlemsstaterne giver grundlæggende oplysninger om støttebeløb ydet i overensstemmelse med denne forordning på årsbasis. Hvis medlemsstaten har oplyst Kommissionen om, hvor alle de oplysninger, der skal gives i rapporten, er gjort offentligt tilgængelige, behøver medlemsstaten ikke at indgive rapport til Kommissionen.

| (26) | Under hensyn til Kommissionens erfaringer og især den hyppighed, hvormed det generelt er nødvendigt at revidere statsstøttepolitikken, bør forordningens anvendelsesperiode begrænses. Såfremt forordningen ikke bliver forlænget ved gyldighedsperiodens udløb, bør medlemsstaterne have en tilpasningsperiode på seks måneder for den de minimis-støtte, der var omfattet af denne forordning — |
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(26)

Under hensyn til Kommissionens erfaringer og især den hyppighed, hvormed det generelt er nødvendigt at revidere statsstøttepolitikken, bør forordningens anvendelsesperiode begrænses. Såfremt forordningen ikke bliver forlænget ved gyldighedsperiodens udløb, bør medlemsstaterne have en tilpasningsperiode på seks måneder for den de minimis-støtte, der var omfattet af denne forordning —

VEDTAGET DENNE FORORDNING:

Artikel 1

Anvendelsesområde

1.   Denne forordning finder anvendelse på støtte til virksomheder i alle sektorer med undtagelse af:

| a) | støtte til virksomheder inden for fiskeri og akvakultur, som er omfattet af Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 104/2000 (12) |
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a)

støtte til virksomheder inden for fiskeri og akvakultur, som er omfattet af Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 104/2000 (12)

| b) | støtte til virksomheder inden for primærproduktion af landbrugsprodukter |
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b)

støtte til virksomheder inden for primærproduktion af landbrugsprodukter

| c) | støtte til virksomheder inden for forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter i følgende tilfælde:






  i) | når støttebeløbet fastsættes på basis af prisen for eller mængden af sådanne produkter, som indkøbes hos primærproducenter eller afsættes af de pågældende virksomheder |
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c)

støtte til virksomheder inden for forarbejdning og afsætning af landbrugsprodukter i følgende tilfælde:

i)

når støttebeløbet fastsættes på basis af prisen for eller mængden af sådanne produkter, som indkøbes hos primærproducenter eller afsættes af de pågældende virksomheder

| ii) | når støtten er betinget af, at den helt eller delvis videregives til primærproducenter |
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ii)

når støtten er betinget af, at den helt eller delvis videregives til primærproducenter

| d) | støtte til aktiviteter, der er knyttet til eksport til tredjelande eller medlemsstater, dvs. støtte, der er direkte forbundet med de eksporterede mængder, etablering og drift af distributionsnet eller andre løbende udgifter i forbindelse med eksportvirksomhed |
| --- | --- |

d)

støtte til aktiviteter, der er knyttet til eksport til tredjelande eller medlemsstater, dvs. støtte, der er direkte forbundet med de eksporterede mængder, etablering og drift af distributionsnet eller andre løbende udgifter i forbindelse med eksportvirksomhed

| e) | støtte, som er betinget af, at der anvendes indenlandske produkter frem for importerede |
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e)

støtte, som er betinget af, at der anvendes indenlandske produkter frem for importerede

| f) | støtte til kriseramte virksomheder som defineret i artikel 2, litra e). |
| --- | --- |

f)

støtte til kriseramte virksomheder som defineret i artikel 2, litra e).

2.   Hvis en virksomhed er aktiv inden for en af de sektorer, som er nævnt i stk. 1, litra a), b) eller c), samt i andre sektorer, der falder ind under denne forordnings anvendelsesområde, finder denne forordning anvendelse på støtte, som ydes til de andre sektorer eller aktiviteter, forudsat at medlemsstaterne ved hjælp af egnede midler, såsom ved at holde aktiviteterne adskilt eller ved at udskille omkostningerne, sikrer, at der ikke i henhold til denne forordning ydes de minimis-støtte til aktiviteterne i de udelukkede sektorer.

Artikel 2

Definitioner

I denne forordning forstås ved:

a)   »landbrugsprodukter«: de i bilag I til traktaten opførte produkter med undtagelse af fiskerivarer og akvakulturprodukter, der er opført i bilag I til forordning (EU) nr. (endnu ikke vedtaget; se Kommissionens forslag KOM/2011/416) om den fælles markedsordning for fiskerivarer og akvakulturprodukter

b)   »forarbejdning af landbrugsprodukter«: en operation, hvorved et landbrugsprodukt omdannes til et andet landbrugsprodukt, undtagen aktiviteter på bedriften, der er nødvendige for at forberede et animalsk produkt eller et planteprodukt til det første salg

c)   »afsætning af landbrugsprodukter«: opbevaring eller udstilling med henblik på salg, udbydelse til salg, levering eller enhver anden form for markedsføring, med undtagelse af en primærproducents første salg til forhandlere eller forarbejdningsvirksomheder og enhver aktivitet til forberedelse af et produkt til et sådant første salg. En primærproducents salg til den endelige forbruger betragtes som afsætning, hvis det finder sted i særskilte lokaliteter, der er indrettet til dette formål

d)   »en enkelt virksomhed«: er i henhold til denne forordning alle enheder, mellem hvilke der består en af følgende former for forbindelse:

Enheder, mellem hvilke der via en eller flere andre enheder består en eller flere forbindelser som nævnt ovenfor, betragtes også som en enkelt virksomhed

e)   »kriseramt virksomhed«: en virksomhed, der opfylder mindst en af følgende betingelser:

Ved anvendelse af litra e) anses en SMV, som har eksisteret i mindre end tre år, ikke for at være kriseramt, medmindre den opfylder betingelserne i nr. iii).

Artikel 3

De minimis-støtte

1.   Støtteforanstaltninger, der opfylder betingelserne i denne artikels stk. 2 til 8 og artikel 4 og 5, anses for ikke at opfylde alle kriterierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og er derfor ikke omfattet af anmeldelsespligten i traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3.

2.   Den samlede de minimis-støtte ydet af en medlemsstat til en enkelt virksomhed som defineret i artikel 2, litra d), må ikke overstige 200 000 EUR over en periode på tre regnskabsår.

Den samlede de minimis-støtte ydet af en medlemsstat til en enkelt virksomhed som defineret i artikel 2, litra d), der udfører vejgodstransport for fremmed regning, må ikke overstige 100 000 EUR over en periode på tre regnskabsår. De minimis-støtte må ikke anvendes til køb af transportkøretøjer.

3.   Hvis en virksomhed udfører vejgodstransport for fremmed regning og andre aktiviteter, for hvilke loftet på 200 000 EUR gælder, finder loftet på 200 000 EUR anvendelse på virksomheden, forudsat at medlemsstaten ved hjælp af egnede midler, såsom ved at holde aktiviteterne adskilt eller ved at udskille omkostningerne, sikrer, at støtten til vejgodstransportaktiviteter ikke overstiger 100 000 EUR, og at der ikke anvendes nogen form for de minimis-støtte til køb af køretøjer til vejgodstransport.

4.   De minimis-støtte ydes på det tidspunkt, hvor virksomheden har opnået retten til at modtage støtten i henhold til den gældende nationale ordning.

5.   De i stk. 2 fastsatte lofter gælder uanset de minimis-støttens form eller formål, og uanset om medlemsstatens støtte finansieres helt eller delvis med EU-midler. Treårsperioden fastlægges på grundlag af de af virksomheden anvendte regnskabsår i den pågældende medlemsstat.

6.   De i stk. 2 fastsatte lofter angives som et kontant tilskud. Alle anvendte tal skal være brutto, dvs. før eventuelt fradrag af skat eller andre afgifter. Hvis støtten ydes som andet end tilskud, er støttebeløbet støttens bruttosubventionsækvivalent.

Støtte, der udbetales i flere rater, tilbagediskonteres til sin værdi på det tidspunkt, hvor den blev ydet. Den rentesats, der anvendes til tilbagediskonteringsformål, er den gældende tilbagediskonteringssats på tidspunktet for støttens ydelse.

7.   Hvis det de minimis-loft, der er fastsat i stk. 2, overskrides ved tildelingen af ny de minimis-støtte, kan denne nye støtte ikke drage fordel af denne forordning.

8.   I tilfælde af fusioner eller overtagelser skal der tages hensyn til al hidtil ydet de minimis-støtte til enhver af de fusionerende virksomheder ved fastlæggelsen af, om en eventuelt ny de minimis-støtte til den nye eller den erhvervende virksomhed overstiger loftet, uden at anfægte lovligt tildelt de minimis-støtte før fusionen eller overtagelsen.

Hvis en virksomhed deles i to eller flere selvstændige virksomheder, skal den de minimis-støtte, der blev ydet inden delingen, tilregnes til den virksomhed, som havde gavn af den, hvilket i princippet er den virksomhed, som overtager de aktiviteter, som de minimis-støtten blev anvendt til. Såfremt en sådan tilregning ikke er mulig, skal de minimis-støtten fordeles proportionelt på grundlag af den bogførte værdi af de nye virksomheders egenkapital.

Artikel 4

Beregning af bruttosubventionsækvivalenten

1.   Denne forordning finder kun anvendelse på støtte, hvis bruttosubventionsækvivalent kan forudberegnes præcist, uden at det er nødvendigt at foretage en risikovurdering (»gennemsigtig støtte«). Særligt støtteforanstaltninger som omhandlet i stk. 2 og 6 betragtes som gennemsigtig støtte.

2.   Støtte i form af lån betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis:

| a) | lånet er sikret ved sikkerhedsstillelse for mindst 50 % af lånet, og lånet hverken overstiger 1 000 000 EUR (eller 500 000 for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en løbetid på fem år eller 500 000 EUR (eller 250 000 EUR for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en løbetid på ti år. Hvis et lån tegner sig for mindre end dette beløb og/eller ydes over en periode på mindre end henholdsvis fem eller ti år, beregnes bruttosubventionsækvivalenten af lånet som en tilsvarende andel af det gældende loft, der er fastsat i artikel 3, stk. 2, eller |
| --- | --- |

a)

lånet er sikret ved sikkerhedsstillelse for mindst 50 % af lånet, og lånet hverken overstiger 1 000 000 EUR (eller 500 000 for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en løbetid på fem år eller 500 000 EUR (eller 250 000 EUR for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en løbetid på ti år. Hvis et lån tegner sig for mindre end dette beløb og/eller ydes over en periode på mindre end henholdsvis fem eller ti år, beregnes bruttosubventionsækvivalenten af lånet som en tilsvarende andel af det gældende loft, der er fastsat i artikel 3, stk. 2, eller

| b) | bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er beregnet på grundlag af den gældende referencesats på støttetidspunktet. |
| --- | --- |

b)

bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er beregnet på grundlag af den gældende referencesats på støttetidspunktet.

3.   Støtte indeholdt i kapitaltilførsler betragtes kun som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis det samlede beløb for den offentlige kapitaltilførsel holdes under de minimis-loftet.

4.   Støtte indeholdt i risikokapitalfinansiering i form af egenkapital- eller kvasiegenkapitalinvesteringer betragtes alene, hvad målvirksomheden angår, som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis den pågældende kapital holdes under de minimis-loftet for hver enkelt virksomhed.

5.   Støtte i form af garantier betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis:

| a) | garantien ikke overstiger 80 % af det underliggende lån og det garanterede beløb hverken overstiger 1 500 000 EUR (eller 750 000 for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en varighed på højst. fem år eller 750 000 EUR (eller 375 000 EUR for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en varighed på højst ti år. Hvis det garanterede beløb er mindre end dette beløb og/eller garantien ydes over en periode på mindre end henholdsvis fem eller ti år, beregnes bruttosubventionsækvivalenten af garantien som en tilsvarende andel af det gældende loft, der er fastsat i artikel 3, stk. 2, eller |
| --- | --- |

a)

garantien ikke overstiger 80 % af det underliggende lån og det garanterede beløb hverken overstiger 1 500 000 EUR (eller 750 000 for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en varighed på højst. fem år eller 750 000 EUR (eller 375 000 EUR for virksomheder, der udfører vejgodstransport) med en varighed på højst ti år. Hvis det garanterede beløb er mindre end dette beløb og/eller garantien ydes over en periode på mindre end henholdsvis fem eller ti år, beregnes bruttosubventionsækvivalenten af garantien som en tilsvarende andel af det gældende loft, der er fastsat i artikel 3, stk. 2, eller

| b) | bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er beregnet på grundlag af minimumspræmier, der er fastsat i en meddelelse fra Kommissionen (14) eller |
| --- | --- |

b)

bruttosubventionsækvivalenten er beregnet på grundlag af minimumspræmier, der er fastsat i en meddelelse fra Kommissionen (14) eller

| c) | metoden til beregning af garantiens bruttosubventionsækvivalent er forinden blevet godkendt af Kommissionen efter at være blevet anmeldt til denne i henhold til enhver forordning, som Kommissionen har vedtaget på statsstøtteområdet, og som er gældende på det pågældende tidspunkt, og den godkendte metode udtrykkeligt tager sigte på den type garantier og underliggende transaktioner, der er omhandlet i denne forordning. |
| --- | --- |

c)

metoden til beregning af garantiens bruttosubventionsækvivalent er forinden blevet godkendt af Kommissionen efter at være blevet anmeldt til denne i henhold til enhver forordning, som Kommissionen har vedtaget på statsstøtteområdet, og som er gældende på det pågældende tidspunkt, og den godkendte metode udtrykkeligt tager sigte på den type garantier og underliggende transaktioner, der er omhandlet i denne forordning.

6.   Støtte indeholdt i andre instrumenter betragtes som gennemsigtig de minimis-støtte, hvis instrumentet indeholder en øvre grænse, der sikrer, at det gældende loft ikke overskrides.

Artikel 5

Kumulation

1.   De minimis-støtte, der ydes i henhold til denne forordning kan kumuleres med de minimis-støtte, der ydes i henhold til Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 360/2012 (15) op til de lofter, der er fastsat i sidstnævnte forordning. Den kan kumuleres med de minimis-støtte, der ydes i henhold til andre de minimis-forordninger op til det i artikel 3, stk. 2, fastsatte loft.

2.   De minimis-støtte må ikke kumuleres med statsstøtte til de samme støtteberettigede omkostninger eller kapital, hvis en sådan kumulering vil medføre en støtteintensitet, der er højere end den, der er fastsat for de enkelte specifikke tilfælde i en gruppefritagelsesforordning eller afgørelse vedtaget af Kommissionen.

Artikel 6

Tilsyn og indberetning

1.   Medlemsstaterne opretter et centralt register over de minimis-støtte inden den 31. december 2015. Det centrale register indeholder oplysninger om hver støttemodtager (herunder hvorvidt det er en lille, mellemstor eller stor virksomhed, og i hvilken erhvervssektor (NACE-koden på divisionsniveau (16)) den har sin hovedaktivitet), datoen for ydelsen af støtten og bruttosubventionsækvivalenten for hver enkelt de minimis-støtteforanstaltning, der er ydet af enhver myndighed i den pågældende medlemsstat. Dette register omfatter alle de minimis-foranstaltninger, der ydes i henhold til denne forordning fra 1. januar 2016 og fremefter.

2.   Stk. 3 finder anvendelse, indtil en medlemsstat har oprettet et centralt register og registret dækker en periode på tre år.

3.   Når en medlemsstat har til hensigt at yde de minimis-støtte til en virksomhed i overensstemmelse med denne forordning, giver den virksomheden skriftlig meddelelse om det potentielle støttebeløb (udtrykt i bruttosubventionsækvivalent) og støttens karakter af de minimis-støtte med udtrykkelig henvisning til denne forordning og angivelse af dens titel og referencen i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende. Når der i henhold til denne forordning ydes de minimis-støtte til forskellige virksomheder på grundlag af en ordning, og det individuelle støttebeløb er forskelligt fra virksomhed til virksomhed, kan den pågældende medlemsstat vælge at opfylde denne forpligtelse ved at meddele virksomhederne et fast beløb svarende til det maksimumbeløb, der kan ydes i henhold til ordningen. I dette tilfælde skal det faste beløb lægges til grund ved fastslåelsen af, om det i artikel 3, stk. 2, fastsatte loft er nået. Inden medlemsstaten yder støtten, indhenter den desuden en skriftlig erklæring eller en erklæring i elektronisk form fra virksomheden om al anden de minimis-støtte omfattet af denne forordning eller andre de minimis-forordninger, som denne har modtaget i det indeværende og de to foregående regnskabsår.

4.   Medlemsstaten kan først yde ny de minimis-støtte i henhold til denne forordning, når den har kontrolleret, at støtten ikke medfører, at det samlede de minimis-støttebeløb, som er ydet den pågældende virksomhed, kommer til at overstige det loft, der er fastsat i artikel 3, stk. 2, og at alle reglerne i artikel 1 til 5 er overholdt.

5.   Medlemsstaterne samler og registrerer alle oplysninger om anvendelsen af denne forordning. Registeret skal omfatte alle de oplysninger, der er nødvendige for, at det kan fastslås, at betingelserne i denne forordning er opfyldt. De registrerede oplysninger om individuel de minimis-støtte opbevares i 10 regnskabsår regnet fra det tidspunkt, hvor støtten blev ydet. De registrerede oplysninger om en de minimis-støtteordning opbevares i 10 år fra det tidspunkt, hvor der sidst blev udbetalt individuel støtte i henhold til ordningen. På Kommissionens skriftlige anmodning giver medlemsstaterne inden 20 arbejdsdage eller inden for en længere frist, der måtte være fastsat i anmodningen, Kommissionen alle de oplysninger, denne finder nødvendige for at kunne vurdere, om betingelserne i denne forordning er opfyldt, især hvad angår det samlede de minimis-støttebeløb, som en virksomhed har modtaget i henhold til denne forordning og andre de minimis-forordninger.

6.   Medlemsstaterne aflægger hvert år rapport til Kommissionen om anvendelsen af denne forordning. Rapporterne skal omfatte:

| a) | den samlede de minimis-støtte, der i det foregående kalenderår er ydet i den pågældende medlemsstat i henhold til denne forordning, opdelt efter støttemodtagernes erhvervssektor og størrelse (lille, mellemstor eller stor virksomhed) |
| --- | --- |

a)

den samlede de minimis-støtte, der i det foregående kalenderår er ydet i den pågældende medlemsstat i henhold til denne forordning, opdelt efter støttemodtagernes erhvervssektor og størrelse (lille, mellemstor eller stor virksomhed)

| b) | det samlede antal modtagere af de minimis, der i det foregående kalenderår er ydet i den pågældende medlemsstat i henhold til denne forordning, opdelt efter støttemodtagernes erhvervssektor og størrelse (lille, mellemstor eller stor virksomhed) |
| --- | --- |

b)

det samlede antal modtagere af de minimis, der i det foregående kalenderår er ydet i den pågældende medlemsstat i henhold til denne forordning, opdelt efter støttemodtagernes erhvervssektor og størrelse (lille, mellemstor eller stor virksomhed)

| c) | enhver anden oplysning om anvendelsen af denne forordning, som Kommissionen måtte kræve, hvilket skal meddeles nærmere i god tid, inden rapporten skal indgives. |
| --- | --- |

c)

enhver anden oplysning om anvendelsen af denne forordning, som Kommissionen måtte kræve, hvilket skal meddeles nærmere i god tid, inden rapporten skal indgives.

Den første rapport indgives senest den 30. juni 2017 og gælder for kalenderåret 2016. Hvis medlemsstaten har gjort alle de oplysninger, der skal gives i rapporten, offentligt tilgængelige, behøver medlemsstaten ikke at indgive rapport til Kommissionen. Kommissionen offentliggør hvert år en sammenfatning af oplysningerne i de årlige rapporter, herunder det samlede de minimis-støttebeløb, som hver medlemsstat har ydet i henhold til denne forordning.

Artikel 7

Overgangsbestemmelser

1.   Enhver individuel de minimis-støtte, der blev ydet mellem den 2. februar 2001 og den 30. juni 2007, og som opfylder betingelserne i forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001, anses for ikke at opfylde alle kriterierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og er følgelig fritaget fra anmeldelsespligten i traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3.

2.   Enhver individuel de minimis-støtte, der blev ydet mellem den 1. januar 2007 og den 30. juni 2014, og som opfylder betingelserne i forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006, anses for ikke at opfylde alle kriterierne i traktatens artikel 107, stk. 1, og er følgelig fritaget fra anmeldelsespligten i traktatens artikel 108, stk. 3.

3.   Ved denne forordnings udløb kan de minimis-støtte, der opfylder forordningens betingelser, fortsat ydes i en periode på seks måneder.

Artikel 8

Ikrafttræden og anvendelsesperiode

Denne forordning træder i kraft den 1. januar 2014 og anvendes fra den 1. januar 2014 indtil den 31. december 2020.

Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.

Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 17. juli 2013.

På Kommissionens vegne

[...] [...]

Formand

---

(1)  EFT L 142 af 14.5.1998, s. 1.

1

(2)  EUT C 229 af 8.8.2013, s. 1.

2

(3)  EFT C 68 af 6.3.1996, s. 9.

3

(4)  Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 69/2001 af 12. januar 2001 om anvendelse af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på de minimis-støtte (EFT L 10 af 13.1.2001, s. 30).

4

de minimis

(5)  Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 1998/2006 af 15. december 2006 om anvendelse af traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på de minimis-støtte (EUT L 379 af 28.12.2006, s. 5).

5

de minimis

(6)  Sag C-222/04, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze mod Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA et al., Sml. 2006 I, s. 289.

6

Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze mod Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA et al.

(7)  Sag C-382/99, Nederlandene mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2002 I, s. 5163.

7

Nederlandene mod Kommissionen

(8)  Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 800/2008 af 6. august 2008 om visse former for støttes forenelighed med fællesmarkedet i henhold til traktatens artikel 87 og 88 (EUT L 214, 9.8.2008, s. 3).

8

(9)  Sag C-456/00, Frankrig mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2002, s. I-11949.

9

Frankrig mod Kommissionen

(10)  EUT C 14 af 19.1.2008, s. 6.

10

(11)  EUT C 155 af 20.6.2008, s. 10.

11

(12)  Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 104/2000 af 17. december 1999 om den fælles markedsordning for fiskerivarer og akvakulturprodukter (EFT L 17 af 21.1.2000, s. 22).

12

(13)  Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1060/2009 af 16. september 2009 om kreditvurderingsbureauer (EUT L 302 af 17.11.2009, s. 1).

13

(14)  For øjeblikket Kommissionens meddelelse om anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 87 og 88 på statsstøtte i form af garantier (EUT C 155 af 20.6.2008, s. 10).

14

(15)  Kommissionens forordning (EU) nr. 360/2012 af 25. april 2012 om anvendelse af artikel 107 og 108 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på de minimis-støtte ydet til virksomheder, der udfører tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse (EUT L 114 af 26.4.2012, s. 8).

15

de minimis

(16)  I henhold til artikel 2, stk. 1, litra b), i og bilag I til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1893/2006 af 20. december 2006 om oprettelse af den statistiske nomenklatur for økonomiske aktiviteter NACE rev. 2 og om ændring af Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3037/90 og visse EF-forordninger om bestemte statistiske områder (EUT L 393 af 30.12.2006, s. 1).

16

---

IV Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/10

---

Euroens vekselkurs (1)

7. august 2013

2013/C 229/03

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | amerikanske dollar | 1,3305 |
| JPY | japanske yen | 129,21 |
| DKK | danske kroner | 7,4571 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,85955 |
| SEK | svenske kroner | 8,7261 |
| CHF | schweiziske franc | 1,2321 |
| ISK | islandske kroner | |
| NOK | norske kroner | 7,8995 |
| BGN | bulgarske lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjekkiske koruna | 25,978 |
| HUF | ungarske forint | 299,52 |
| LTL | litauiske litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lettiske lats | 0,7025 |
| PLN | polske zloty | 4,2170 |
| RON | rumænske leu | 4,4330 |
| TRY | tyrkiske lira | 2,5713 |
| AUD | australske dollar | 1,4878 |
| CAD | canadiske dollar | 1,3868 |
| HKD | hongkongske dollar | 10,3197 |
| NZD | newzealandske dollar | 1,6826 |
| SGD | singaporeanske dollar | 1,6868 |
| KRW | sydkoreanske won | 1 486,17 |
| ZAR | sydafrikanske rand | 13,2109 |
| CNY | kinesiske renminbi yuan | 8,1416 |
| HRK | kroatiske kuna | 7,4975 |
| IDR | indonesiske rupiah | 13 683,68 |
| MYR | malaysiske ringgit | 4,3301 |
| PHP | filippinske pesos | 58,258 |
| RUB | russiske rubler | 43,9480 |
| THB | thailandske bath | 41,831 |
| BRL | brasilianske real | 3,0641 |
| MXN | mexicanske pesos | 16,8685 |
| INR | indiske rupee | 81,4960 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

amerikanske dollar

1,3305

JPY

japanske yen

129,21

DKK

danske kroner

7,4571

GBP

pund sterling

0,85955

SEK

svenske kroner

8,7261

CHF

schweiziske franc

1,2321

ISK

islandske kroner

NOK

norske kroner

7,8995

BGN

bulgarske lev

1,9558

CZK

tjekkiske koruna

25,978

HUF

ungarske forint

299,52

LTL

litauiske litas

3,4528

LVL

lettiske lats

0,7025

PLN

polske zloty

4,2170

RON

rumænske leu

4,4330

TRY

tyrkiske lira

2,5713

AUD

australske dollar

1,4878

CAD

canadiske dollar

1,3868

HKD

hongkongske dollar

10,3197

NZD

newzealandske dollar

1,6826

SGD

singaporeanske dollar

1,6868

KRW

sydkoreanske won

1 486,17

ZAR

sydafrikanske rand

13,2109

CNY

kinesiske renminbi yuan

8,1416

HRK

kroatiske kuna

7,4975

IDR

indonesiske rupiah

13 683,68

MYR

malaysiske ringgit

4,3301

PHP

filippinske pesos

58,258

RUB

russiske rubler

43,9480

THB

thailandske bath

41,831

BRL

brasilianske real

3,0641

MXN

mexicanske pesos

16,8685

INR

indiske rupee

81,4960

---

(1)  Kilde: Referencekurs offentliggjort af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

---

OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE

| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/11

---

Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

2013/C 229/04

I overensstemmelse med artikel 35, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1224/2009 af 20. november 2009 om oprettelse af en EF-kontrolordning med henblik på at sikre overholdelse af reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik (1) er der truffet afgørelse om et fiskestop, jf. nedenstående skema:

| Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning | 4.7.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Varighed | 4.7.2013 til 31.12.2013 |
| Medlemsstat | Portugal |
| Bestand eller bestandsgruppe | BFT/AE45WM |
| Art | Almindelig tun (Thunnus thynnus) |
| Område | Atlanterhavet, øst for 45° V, og Middelhavet |
| Fiskerfartøjstype(r) | — |
| Løbenummer | 16/TQ40 |

Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning

4.7.2013

Varighed

4.7.2013 til 31.12.2013

Medlemsstat

Portugal

Bestand eller bestandsgruppe

BFT/AE45WM

Art

Almindelig tun (Thunnus thynnus)

Område

Atlanterhavet, øst for 45° V, og Middelhavet

Fiskerfartøjstype(r)

—

Løbenummer

16/TQ40

---

(1)  EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 1.

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| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/11

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Oplysninger fra medlemsstaterne om lukning af fiskeri

2013/C 229/05

I overensstemmelse med artikel 35, stk. 3, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1224/2009 af 20. november 2009 om oprettelse af en EF-kontrolordning med henblik på at sikre overholdelse af reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik (1) er der truffet afgørelse om et fiskestop, jf. nedenstående skema:

| Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning | 4.7.2013 |
| --- | --- |
| Varighed | 4.7.2013-31.12.2013 |
| Medlemsstat | Det Forenede Kongerige |
| Bestand eller bestandsgruppe | SAN/2A3A4. og forvaltningsområder
  SAN/123_1, _2, _3, _4, _6 |
| Art | Tobis og dermed forbundne bifangster (Ammodytes spp.) |
| Område | EU-farvande i IIa, IIIa og IV og EU-farvande med forvaltningsområder for tobis 1, 2, 3, 4 og 6 (undtagen farvande inden for 6 sømil fra Det Forenede Kongeriges basislinjer ved Shetlandsøerne, Fair Isle og Foula) |
| Fiskerfartøjstype(r) | — |
| Løbenummer | 17/TQ40 |

Dato og klokkeslæt for lukning

4.7.2013

Varighed

4.7.2013-31.12.2013

Medlemsstat

Det Forenede Kongerige

Bestand eller bestandsgruppe

SAN/2A3A4. og forvaltningsområder

SAN/123_1, _2, _3, _4, _6

Art

Tobis og dermed forbundne bifangster (Ammodytes spp.)

Område

EU-farvande i IIa, IIIa og IV og EU-farvande med forvaltningsområder for tobis 1, 2, 3, 4 og 6 (undtagen farvande inden for 6 sømil fra Det Forenede Kongeriges basislinjer ved Shetlandsøerne, Fair Isle og Foula)

Fiskerfartøjstype(r)

—

Løbenummer

17/TQ40

---

(1)  EUT L 343 af 22.12.2009, s. 1.

---

OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/12

---

EFTA-staternes oplysninger om statsstøtte ydet i henhold til den retsakt, der er nævnt under punkt 1j i bilag XV til EØS-aftalen (Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 800/2008 om visse former for støttes forenelighed med fællesmarkedet i henhold til traktatens artikel 87 og 88 (Generel gruppefritagelsesforordning))

2013/C 229/06

DEL I

| Støtte nr. | GBER 8/13/F&U |
| --- | --- |
| EFTA-stat | Norge |
| Region | Alle regioner i Rumænien | Regionalstøttestatus |
| Støttetildelende myndighed | Navn | Innovasjon Norge |
| Adresse | Postboks 448 Sentrum |
| 0104 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Støtte nr.

GBER 8/13/F&U

EFTA-stat

Norge

Region

Alle regioner i Rumænien

Regionalstøttestatus

Støttetildelende myndighed

Navn

Innovasjon Norge

Adresse

Postboks 448 Sentrum

0104 Oslo

NORWAY

Websted

http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/

Støtteforanstaltningens navn

Den norske finansieringsordningen 2009-2014

Green Industry Innovation Programme ROMANIA

Nationalt retsgrundlag (henvisning til den nationale officielle publikation)

Prop. 1 S (2012-2013) Utenriksdepartementet, side 85-95

http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/prop/2012-2013/prop-1-s-20122013.html?id=703276

Weblink til støtteforanstaltningens fulde ordlyd

http://www.norwaygrants-greeninnovation.no

Foranstaltningens art

Ordning

Ja

Ad hoc-støtte

ikke relevant

Varighed

Ordning

12.3.2013 til 30.4.2016

Berørte sektorer

Alle sektorer er støtteberettigede

Alle sektorer

Type virksomheder, der modtager støtte

SMV

Ja

Store virksomheder

Ja

Mikrovirksomheder

Ja

Ngo'er

Ja

Støttebeløb

De planlagte årlige udgifter i henhold til ordningen

Samlet beløb (2013-2016) 21 768 200 EUR

Støtteinstrument (art. 5)

Tilskud

Ja

DEL II

| Generelle formål | Formål | Maksimal støtteintensitet i % eller maksimalt støttebeløb i NOK | SMV – bonus i % |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Regional investerings- og beskæftigelsesstøtte
  (art. 13) | Ordning | Støtteintensiteten i bruttosubventionsækvivalent må ikke overstige det regionalstøtteloft, der gælder for det pågældende støtteberettigede område i Rumænien på det tidspunkt, hvor støtten ydes | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| Investerings- og beskæftigelsesstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder
  (art. 15) | | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder | |
| Støtte til miljøbeskyttelse
  (art. 17-25) | Investeringsstøtte, der sætter virksomheder i stand til at gå videre end fællesskabsstandarderne for miljøbeskyttelse eller øge miljøbeskyttelsesniveauet, hvor der ikke er vedtaget fællesskabsstandarder
  (art. 18)
  Anfør specifik reference til den relevante standard | 35 % | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| | Støtte til erhvervelse af nye transportmidler, der går videre end fællesskabsstandarderne eller øger miljøbeskyttelsesniveauet, hvor der ikke er vedtaget fællesskabsstandarder
  (art. 19) | 35 % | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| | Støtte til tidlig tilpasning til nye fællesskabsstandarder for små og mellemstore virksomheder
  (art. 20) | 15 % for små virksomheder og 10 % for mellemstore virksomheder, hvis gennemførelsen og afslutningen finder sted mere end tre år før den dato, hvor standarden træder i kraft (10 % for små virksomheder, hvis mindre end tre år) | |
| | Støtte til miljøinvesteringer i energibesparende foranstaltninger
  (art. 21) | 60 % | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| | Støtte til miljøinvesteringer i højeffektiv kraftvarmeproduktion
  (art. 22) | 45 % | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| | Støtte til miljøinvesteringer til fremme af energi fra vedvarende energikilder
  (art. 23) | 45 % | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| | Støtte til miljøundersøgelser
  (art. 24) | 50 % | 20 % for små virksomheder
  10 % for mellemstore virksomheder |
| Støtte til konsulentbistand til små og mellemstore virksomheder og til små og mellemstore virksomheders deltagelse i messer
  (art. 26-27) | Støtte til konsulentbistand til små og mellemstore virksomheder
  (art. 26) | 50 % | |
| | Støtte til små og mellemstore virksomheders deltagelse i messer
  (art. 27) | 50 % | |
| Støtte til forskning, udvikling og innovation
  (art. 30-37) | Støtte til forsknings- og udviklings-projekter
  (art. 31) | Grundforskning
  (art. 31, stk. 2, litra a)) | 100 % | |
| | | Industriel forskning
  (art. 31, stk. 2, litra b)) | 50 % | 10 % for mellemstore virksomheder
  20 % for små virksomheder
  Dertil kan lægges en bonus på 15 % op til en maksimal støtteintensitet på 80 %, hvis betingelserne i art. 31, stk. 4, litra b), er opfyldt |
| | | Eksperimentel udvikling
  (art. 31, stk. 2, litra c)) | 25 % | 10 % for mellemstore virksomheder
  20 % for små virksomheder
  Dertil kan lægges en bonus på 15 % op til en maksimal støtteintensitet på 80 %, hvis betingelserne i art. 31, stk. 4, litra b), er opfyldt |
| | Støtte til tekniske gennemførlighedsundersøgelser
  (art. 32) | 75 % (industriel forskning) og 50 % (eksperimentel udvikling) for SMV
  65 % (industriel forskning) og 40 % (eksperimentel udvikling) for store virksomheder | |
| | Støtte til små og mellemstore virksomheders udgifter til industrielle ejendomsrettigheder
  (art. 33) | Støtteintensiteten må ikke overstige intensiteten for støtte til forsknings- og udviklingsprojekter
  (art. 31, stk. 3-4) | |
| | Støtte til unge innovative virksomheder
  (art. 35) | 1 mio. EUR | |
| | Støtte til innovationsrådgivning og innovationssupportydelser
  (art. 36) | 200 000 pr. modtager inden for en periode på tre år | |
| | Støtte til lån af højt kvalificeret personale
  (art. 37) | | |
| Uddannelsesstøtte
  (art. 38-39) | Særlig uddannelse
  (art. 38, stk. 1) | 25 % | 10 % for mellemstore virksomheder
  20 % for små virksomheder |
| | Generel uddannelse
  (art. 38, stk. 2) | 60 % | 10 % for mellemstore virksomheder
  20 % for små virksomheder |

Generelle formål

Formål

Maksimal støtteintensitet i % eller maksimalt støttebeløb i NOK

SMV – bonus i %

Regional investerings- og beskæftigelsesstøtte

(art. 13)

Ordning

Støtteintensiteten i bruttosubventionsækvivalent må ikke overstige det regionalstøtteloft, der gælder for det pågældende støtteberettigede område i Rumænien på det tidspunkt, hvor støtten ydes

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Investerings- og beskæftigelsesstøtte til små og mellemstore virksomheder

(art. 15)

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til miljøbeskyttelse

(art. 17-25)

Investeringsstøtte, der sætter virksomheder i stand til at gå videre end fællesskabsstandarderne for miljøbeskyttelse eller øge miljøbeskyttelsesniveauet, hvor der ikke er vedtaget fællesskabsstandarder

(art. 18)

Anfør specifik reference til den relevante standard

35 %

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til erhvervelse af nye transportmidler, der går videre end fællesskabsstandarderne eller øger miljøbeskyttelsesniveauet, hvor der ikke er vedtaget fællesskabsstandarder

(art. 19)

35 %

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til tidlig tilpasning til nye fællesskabsstandarder for små og mellemstore virksomheder

(art. 20)

15 % for små virksomheder og 10 % for mellemstore virksomheder, hvis gennemførelsen og afslutningen finder sted mere end tre år før den dato, hvor standarden træder i kraft (10 % for små virksomheder, hvis mindre end tre år)

Støtte til miljøinvesteringer i energibesparende foranstaltninger

(art. 21)

60 %

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til miljøinvesteringer i højeffektiv kraftvarmeproduktion

(art. 22)

45 %

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til miljøinvesteringer til fremme af energi fra vedvarende energikilder

(art. 23)

45 %

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til miljøundersøgelser

(art. 24)

50 %

20 % for små virksomheder

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

Støtte til konsulentbistand til små og mellemstore virksomheder og til små og mellemstore virksomheders deltagelse i messer

(art. 26-27)

Støtte til konsulentbistand til små og mellemstore virksomheder

(art. 26)

50 %

Støtte til små og mellemstore virksomheders deltagelse i messer

(art. 27)

50 %

Støtte til forskning, udvikling og innovation

(art. 30-37)

Støtte til forsknings- og udviklings-projekter

(art. 31)

Grundforskning

(art. 31, stk. 2, litra a))

100 %

Industriel forskning

(art. 31, stk. 2, litra b))

50 %

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

20 % for små virksomheder

Dertil kan lægges en bonus på 15 % op til en maksimal støtteintensitet på 80 %, hvis betingelserne i art. 31, stk. 4, litra b), er opfyldt

Eksperimentel udvikling

(art. 31, stk. 2, litra c))

25 %

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

20 % for små virksomheder

Dertil kan lægges en bonus på 15 % op til en maksimal støtteintensitet på 80 %, hvis betingelserne i art. 31, stk. 4, litra b), er opfyldt

Støtte til tekniske gennemførlighedsundersøgelser

(art. 32)

75 % (industriel forskning) og 50 % (eksperimentel udvikling) for SMV

65 % (industriel forskning) og 40 % (eksperimentel udvikling) for store virksomheder

Støtte til små og mellemstore virksomheders udgifter til industrielle ejendomsrettigheder

(art. 33)

Støtteintensiteten må ikke overstige intensiteten for støtte til forsknings- og udviklingsprojekter

(art. 31, stk. 3-4)

Støtte til unge innovative virksomheder

(art. 35)

1 mio. EUR

Støtte til innovationsrådgivning og innovationssupportydelser

(art. 36)

200 000 pr. modtager inden for en periode på tre år

Støtte til lån af højt kvalificeret personale

(art. 37)

Uddannelsesstøtte

(art. 38-39)

Særlig uddannelse

(art. 38, stk. 1)

25 %

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

20 % for små virksomheder

Generel uddannelse

(art. 38, stk. 2)

60 %

10 % for mellemstore virksomheder

20 % for små virksomheder

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| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/16

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Ingen statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1

2013/C 229/07

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden har konstateret, at følgende foranstaltning ikke udgør statsstøtte efter EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1:

| Vedtagelsesdato | : | 10. april 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Sag nr. | : | 69933 |
| Beslutning nr. | : | 144/13/KOL |
| EFTA-stat | : | Norge |
| Støtteforanstaltningens navn (og/eller navnet på den støttemodtagende virksomhed) | : | Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd |
| Foranstaltningens art | : | Ingen støtte |
| Navn og adresse på den støtteydende myndighed | : | Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd |
| Bjørns gate 1 |
| 5008 Bergen |
| NORWAY |

Vedtagelsesdato

:

10. april 2013

Sag nr.

:

69933

Beslutning nr.

:

144/13/KOL

EFTA-stat

:

Norge

Støtteforanstaltningens navn (og/eller navnet på den støttemodtagende virksomhed)

:

Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd

Foranstaltningens art

:

Ingen støtte

Navn og adresse på den støtteydende myndighed

:

Bergen Kirkelige Fellesråd

Bjørns gate 1

5008 Bergen

NORWAY

Den autentiske udgave af beslutningen (renset for fortrolige oplysninger) findes på EFTA-Tilsynsmyndighedens websted:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/17

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Ingen statsstøtte i henhold til EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1

2013/C 229/08

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden har konstateret, at følgende foranstaltning ikke udgør statsstøtte efter EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1:

| Vedtagelsesdato | : | 10. april 2013 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Sag nr. | : | 70521 |
| Beslutning nr. | : | 145/13/KOL |
| EFTA-stat | : | Island |
| Støtteforanstaltningens navn (og/eller navnet på den støttemodtagende virksomhed) | : | Påstået statsstøtte til Landsbankinn gennem afkald på et forventet afkast af offentlige midler |
| Retsgrundlag | : | EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1 |
| Foranstaltningens art | : | Ingen støtte |
| Sektorer | : | Finansielle tjenesteydelser |

Vedtagelsesdato

:

10. april 2013

Sag nr.

:

70521

Beslutning nr.

:

145/13/KOL

EFTA-stat

:

Island

Støtteforanstaltningens navn (og/eller navnet på den støttemodtagende virksomhed)

:

Påstået statsstøtte til Landsbankinn gennem afkald på et forventet afkast af offentlige midler

Retsgrundlag

:

EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1

Foranstaltningens art

:

Ingen støtte

Sektorer

:

Finansielle tjenesteydelser

Den autentiske udgave af beslutningen (renset for fortrolige oplysninger) findes på EFTA-Tilsynsmyndighedens websted:

http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/state-aid-register/

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| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/18

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Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol om statsstøtte for så vidt angår finansieringen af koncerthuset og konferencecentret Harpa

2013/C 229/09

Ved beslutning nr. 128/13/KOL af 20. marts 2013, der er gengivet på det autentiske sprog efter dette resumé, indledte EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. De islandske myndigheder er blevet underrettet ved kopi af denne beslutning.

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden opfordrer hermed EFTA-staterne, EU-medlemsstaterne og interesserede parter til inden for en frist på en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse at fremsende deres bemærkninger til den pågældende foranstaltning til:

| EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| --- |
| Registrering |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

Registrering

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Bemærkningerne vil blive videresendt til de islandske myndigheder. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

RESUMÉ

Sagsforløb

I september 2011 modtog EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden (tilsynsmyndigheden) en klage over den islandske stats og Reykjavik kommunes angivelige subsidiering af konferencetjenester og restaurant- og cateringtjenester i koncerthuset og konferencecentret Harpa. Tilsynsmyndigheden fremsendte efterfølgende to anmodninger om oplysninger til de islandske myndigheder, som de besvarede.

Beskrivelse af foranstaltningen

I 2004 lancerede den islandske stat og Reykjavik kommune et udbud om offentligt-privat partnerskab med henblik på opførelse, projektering og drift af et koncerthus og konferencecenter på 28 000 kvadratmeter. Efter at det mest fordelagtige tilbud var blevet valgt, begyndte opførelsen af koncerthuset og konferencecentret Harpa. Pga. det økonomiske sammenbrud i Island blev opførelsen af Harpa sat i bero i 2008. Kort tid efter blev Reykjaviks borgmester og uddannelsesministeren enige om en aftale, som betød at staten og Reykjavik kommune fortsatte opførelsen af projektet uden den private partner. Bygningen blev officielt åbnet den 20. august 2011.

Det har været hensigten, at Harpa skal huse forskellige tjenester og aktiviteter. Både det islandske symfoniorkester og den islandske opera har indgået langsigtede kontrakter om brug af bestemte faciliteter i Harpa. Derudover kan der afholdes konferencer i Harpa, som rummer fire konferencesale af forskellig størrelse. I Harpa afholdes også en række andre kulturbegivenheder såsom. pop- og rockkoncerter med både islandske og udenlandske kunstnere. Andre aktiviteter i Harpa som f.eks. catering, restauranter, en musikbutik og en møbelforretning bliver drevet af private virksomheder, som lejer lokaler i Harpa. Disse lokaler udlejes til de private aktører på markedsvilkår og har været genstand for et offentligt udbud, hvor de mest fordelagtige tilbud blev valgt.

Harpa er fuldt ejet af den islandske stat (54 %) og Reykjavik kommune (46 %), som betaler betydelige årlige bidrag i overensstemmelse med deres andel i projektet. Siden åbningen har Harpa genereret et betydeligt årligt underskud, som er blevet dækket af den islandske stats og Reykjavik kommunes budgetter.

Bemærkninger fra de islandske myndigheder

Ifølge de islandske myndigheder involverer finansieringen af Harpa ikke statsstøtte, eftersom de har sikret, at der er adskilte regnskaber for de forskellige aktiviteter i koncerthuset og konferencecentret. De islandske myndigheder har underbygget disse påstande ved at fremsende to rapporter fra to revisionsvirksomheder, som omhandler de adskilte regnskaber for de virksomheder, som er involveret i driften af Harpa. De islandske myndigheder fremsendte også en prisanalyse, hvori de har sammenlignet priser mellem sammenlignelige konferencefaciliteter i Reykjavik på baggrund af størrelse og kapacitet. De islandske myndigheder fastholder derudover, at konferencevirksomheden bidrager positivt til andre aktiviteter i Harpa, og at omkostningerne for de andre aktiviteter vil være betydeligt højere uden konferencevirksomheden.

Statsstøtte

Indrømmelse af fordel ved hjælp af statsmidler

Eftersom den islandske stat og Reykjavik sammen dækker Harpas årlige underskud ved hjælp af årlige bidrag fra deres budgetter, er der tale om statsmidler, jf. artikel 61 i EØS-aftalen.

Tilsynsmyndigheden finder, at såvel opførelsen som driften af infrastruktur udgør en økonomisk aktivitet i sig selv, hvis den infrastruktur, som der er tale om, anvendes eller vil blive anvendt til at forsyne markedet med varer eller tjenesteydelser (1). Nogle af de aktiviteter, der finder sted i Harpa, især konferencer, teaterforestillinger, rock- og popkoncerter osv. kan tiltrække et betydeligt antal kunder i en konkurrencesituation med private konferencecentre, teatre og spillesteder. Tilsynsmyndigheden finder derfor indledningsvis, at de firmaer, der er involveret i driften af Harpa, for så vidt som de udøver erhvervsvirksomhed, er at betragte som virksomheder.

Desuden mener tilsynsmyndigheden, at den offentlige finansiering af opførelsen af Harpa kan udgøre en økonomisk fordel og dermed støtte, eftersom projektet ikke ville være blevet realiseret uden en sådan finansiering. Derudover indrømmes de firmaer, der er involveret i driften af Harpa, en fordel pga. de indtægter, som staten og kommunen giver afkald på ved ikke at kræve noget udbytte af deres investering i koncerthuset og konferencecenteret, for så vidt som de omtalte firmaer udøver erhvervsvirksomhed som f.eks. afholdelse af konferencer eller andre kulturbegivenheder. Tilsynsmyndighedens foreløbige vurdering viser således, at det ikke på noget plan (opførelse, drift eller brug) kan udelukkes, at der er tale om en selektiv økonomisk fordel.

Konkurrenceforvridning og påvirkning af samhandelen mellem parterne

Eftersom markedet for afholdelse af internationale arrangementer som f.eks. konferencer og events er åbent for konkurrence mellem facilitetsoperatører og tilrettelæggere af arrangementer, der generelt er involveret i aktiviteter, som er genstand for samhandel mellem EØS-stater, kan det antages, at der vil ske en påvirkning af samhandelen. I denne sag er det endda endnu mere sandsynligt, at der vil ske en påvirkning af samhandelen mellem visse nabo-EØS-stater på grund af konferencebranchens karakter (2). Tilsynsmyndigheden finder derfor indledningsvis, at foranstaltningen truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke handlen i EØS.

Støttens forenelighed

Ifølge artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), i EØS-aftalen, således som den fortolkes af tilsynsmyndigheden og er udbygget af Europa-Kommissionen under den tidligere artikel 87, stk. 3, litra d), i EF-traktaten, som nu er artikel 107, stk. 3, litra d), i TEUF, kan støtte til fremme af kulturen og kulturarven betragtes som forenelig med EØS-aftalen, når den ikke ændrer samhandels- og konkurrencevilkårene i EØS i et omfang, der strider mod de fælles interesser. De islandske myndigheder har tilkendegivet, at det primære formål med den pågældende foranstaltning har været at fremme kulturen ved hjælp af opførelsen af et koncerthus, der både kunne huse det islandske symfoniorkester og den islandske opera. Tilsynsmyndigheden har accepteret, at opførelsen og driften af en facilitet til symfoniorkester og opera pga. det kulturelle formål kan betragtes som støtte til fremme af kulturen.

Tilsynsmyndigheden accepterer, at en infrastruktur som Harpa også kan bruges til at huse forskellige kommercielle aktiviteter som restauranter, caféer, butikker, konferencer og rock- og popkoncerter. For at undgå konkurrenceforvridning skal der imidlertid træffes forholdsregler, som sikrer, at der ikke finder krydssubsidiering sted mellem de kommercielle aktiviteter og de subsidierede kulturelle aktiviteter. Tilsynsmyndigheden kan ikke se, at de islandske myndigheder har truffet de nødvendige forholdsregler, som sikrer, at en sådan krydssubsidiering ikke kan finde sted. Efter at have foretaget sin foreløbige vurdering har tilsynsmyndigheden følgelig sine tvivl om, hvorvidt opførelsen og driften af Harpa kan betragtes som forenelig med artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), i EØS-aftalen.

Konklusion

På baggrund af ovenstående har tilsynsmyndigheden besluttet at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol nr. 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol for så vidt angår finansieringen af koncerthuset og konferencecentret Harpa. Interesserede parter opfordres til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.

I overensstemmelse med artikel 14 i protokol nr. 3 kan al ulovlig støtte kræves tilbagebetalt fra modtagerne.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 128/13/COL

of 20 March 2013

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential State aid involved in the financing of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre

(Iceland)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’),

HAVING REGARD to:

The Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

The Agreement between the EFTA States on the establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Article 4(4) and Articles 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 19 September 2011, the Authority received a complaint, dated 13 September 2011 (Event No 608967), concerning the alleged subsidising by the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík (‘the City’) of conference services and restaurant/catering services in the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre (‘Harpa’) (3). |
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(1)

On 19 September 2011, the Authority received a complaint, dated 13 September 2011 (Event No 608967), concerning the alleged subsidising by the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík (‘the City’) of conference services and restaurant/catering services in the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre (‘Harpa’) (3).

| (2) | By letter dated 14 October 2011, the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities (Event No 609736). By a letter dated 30 November 2011 (Event No 617042), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information. |
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(2)

By letter dated 14 October 2011, the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities (Event No 609736). By a letter dated 30 November 2011 (Event No 617042), the Icelandic authorities replied to the request and provided the Authority with the relevant information.

| (3) | The case was the subject of discussions between the Authority and the Icelandic authorities as well as the lawyer representing the holding company responsible for Harpa’s operations, at the package meeting in Reykjavík on 5 June 2012. Shortly after the meeting, the Authority sent a follow up letter, dated 9 July 2012 (Event No 637627), to the Icelandic authorities inviting them to provide information on certain outstanding issues. |
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(3)

The case was the subject of discussions between the Authority and the Icelandic authorities as well as the lawyer representing the holding company responsible for Harpa’s operations, at the package meeting in Reykjavík on 5 June 2012. Shortly after the meeting, the Authority sent a follow up letter, dated 9 July 2012 (Event No 637627), to the Icelandic authorities inviting them to provide information on certain outstanding issues.

| (4) | By letter dated 21 August 2012 (Event No 644771), the Icelandic authorities submitted additional information. By letter dated 27 September 2012 (Event No 648320), the Icelandic authorities submitted a memorandum concerning the separation of accounts as well as a statement from the accounting firm PWC. |
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(4)

By letter dated 21 August 2012 (Event No 644771), the Icelandic authorities submitted additional information. By letter dated 27 September 2012 (Event No 648320), the Icelandic authorities submitted a memorandum concerning the separation of accounts as well as a statement from the accounting firm PWC.

| (5) | Finally, the Icelandic authorities submitted information by e-mail dated 11 February 2013 (Event No 662444) and by letter dated 7 March 2013 (Event No 665434). |
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(5)

Finally, the Icelandic authorities submitted information by e-mail dated 11 February 2013 (Event No 662444) and by letter dated 7 March 2013 (Event No 665434).

2.   The complaint

| (6) | The complainant has alleged that unlawful State aid is being provided by the Icelandic State and the City to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The complainant referred to the State budget for the year 2011 where the Ministry of Finance allocated ISK 419 400 000 to the operation of Harpa and additional ISK 44 200 000 for building costs and maintenance. The Municipality’s budget foresaw a substantial allocation of funds to the Harpa project for the year 2011 amounting to a total of ISK 391 526 000. Furthermore, the Municipality contributed a substantial amount to the project in the years 2009-2010. |
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(6)

The complainant has alleged that unlawful State aid is being provided by the Icelandic State and the City to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The complainant referred to the State budget for the year 2011 where the Ministry of Finance allocated ISK 419 400 000 to the operation of Harpa and additional ISK 44 200 000 for building costs and maintenance. The Municipality’s budget foresaw a substantial allocation of funds to the Harpa project for the year 2011 amounting to a total of ISK 391 526 000. Furthermore, the Municipality contributed a substantial amount to the project in the years 2009-2010.

| (7) | The complainant claims that the contribution from both the Icelandic Government and the City is partly being used to subsidise the conference service and the restaurant/catering services in the music hall and conference centre. The contributions in question are fairly high and according to the complainant, there is no transparency in how they are being used. The complainant maintains that this State aid affects the market for the conference business in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) as a whole and is not limited to competitors on the Icelandic market. It therefore constitutes an infringement of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement. |
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(7)

The complainant claims that the contribution from both the Icelandic Government and the City is partly being used to subsidise the conference service and the restaurant/catering services in the music hall and conference centre. The contributions in question are fairly high and according to the complainant, there is no transparency in how they are being used. The complainant maintains that this State aid affects the market for the conference business in the European Economic Area (‘EEA’) as a whole and is not limited to competitors on the Icelandic market. It therefore constitutes an infringement of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement.

| (8) | The complainant provided the Authority with extracts from the Icelandic State budget for the year 2011 as well as an extract from the City’s budget for the same year. Furthermore, the complainant provided a purchase agreement for Harpa and general information on the conference market in Iceland. However, the complainant noted that due to the lack of transparency it was difficult to gather detailed information on the obligations of the Icelandic State and the City to contribute funds to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa as well as information on Harpa’s business model and on the separation of accounts. |
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(8)

The complainant provided the Authority with extracts from the Icelandic State budget for the year 2011 as well as an extract from the City’s budget for the same year. Furthermore, the complainant provided a purchase agreement for Harpa and general information on the conference market in Iceland. However, the complainant noted that due to the lack of transparency it was difficult to gather detailed information on the obligations of the Icelandic State and the City to contribute funds to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa as well as information on Harpa’s business model and on the separation of accounts.

3.   Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre

3.1.   Background

| (9) | In 1999, the Mayor of Reykjavík along with representatives of the Icelandic Government announced that a concert and conference centre would be constructed in the centre of Reykjavík. In late 2002, the Icelandic State and the City signed an agreement regarding the project and the following year the company Austurhöfn-TR ehf. was founded with the purpose of overseeing the project. |
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(9)

In 1999, the Mayor of Reykjavík along with representatives of the Icelandic Government announced that a concert and conference centre would be constructed in the centre of Reykjavík. In late 2002, the Icelandic State and the City signed an agreement regarding the project and the following year the company Austurhöfn-TR ehf. was founded with the purpose of overseeing the project.

| (10) | In 2004, the Icelandic State and the City initiated a public-private partnership (‘PPP’) bid concerning the construction, design and operation of the concert hall and conference centre. There were four companies that bid for the contract. In 2005, the evaluation committee of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. concluded that the offer from Portus ehf. was the most favourable one and subsequently the Icelandic State and the City entered into a contract with Portus ehf. for the construction and operation of a concert and conference centre (4). The construction of Harpa began on 12 January 2007. |
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(10)

In 2004, the Icelandic State and the City initiated a public-private partnership (‘PPP’) bid concerning the construction, design and operation of the concert hall and conference centre. There were four companies that bid for the contract. In 2005, the evaluation committee of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. concluded that the offer from Portus ehf. was the most favourable one and subsequently the Icelandic State and the City entered into a contract with Portus ehf. for the construction and operation of a concert and conference centre (4). The construction of Harpa began on 12 January 2007.

| (11) | Due to the financial collapse in Iceland in October 2008, the construction of Harpa was put on hold. However, shortly after the collapse, the Mayor of Reykjavík and the Minister for Education reached an agreement which entailed that the State and the City would continue with the construction of Harpa without the private partner. After an amended and restated project agreement was concluded, the construction project continued (hereinafter referred to as ‘the project agreement’) (5). On 20 August 2011, Harpa was formally opened. The building is 28 000 square meters and is located at Austurbakki 2, 101 Reykjavík. |
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(11)

Due to the financial collapse in Iceland in October 2008, the construction of Harpa was put on hold. However, shortly after the collapse, the Mayor of Reykjavík and the Minister for Education reached an agreement which entailed that the State and the City would continue with the construction of Harpa without the private partner. After an amended and restated project agreement was concluded, the construction project continued (hereinafter referred to as ‘the project agreement’) (5). On 20 August 2011, Harpa was formally opened. The building is 28 000 square meters and is located at Austurbakki 2, 101 Reykjavík.

| (12) | Harpa is meant to accommodate various services and operations. Both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera have entered into long-term contracts for the use of certain facilities within Harpa. Moreover, Harpa accommodates conferences and there are four conference halls of different sizes. Harpa also houses various other events such as pop and rock concerts with both Icelandic and foreign artists. |
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(12)

Harpa is meant to accommodate various services and operations. Both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera have entered into long-term contracts for the use of certain facilities within Harpa. Moreover, Harpa accommodates conferences and there are four conference halls of different sizes. Harpa also houses various other events such as pop and rock concerts with both Icelandic and foreign artists.

| (13) | Other activities in Harpa such as catering, restaurants, a music shop and a furniture shop are operated by private companies who rent the facilities. According to the Icelandic authorities, these facilities are leased on market terms and were subject to public tenders, where the most favourable offers were accepted. |
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(13)

Other activities in Harpa such as catering, restaurants, a music shop and a furniture shop are operated by private companies who rent the facilities. According to the Icelandic authorities, these facilities are leased on market terms and were subject to public tenders, where the most favourable offers were accepted.

3.2.   The ownership and corporate structure of Harpa

| (14) | Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre is owned by the Icelandic State (54 %) and Reykjavík City (46 %) and therefore constitutes a public undertaking. The entire Harpa project has been overseen by Austurhöfn-TR ehf. which is a limited liability company, established by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Icelandic State and the City in order to take over the construction and running of the Harpa project (6). |
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(14)

Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre is owned by the Icelandic State (54 %) and Reykjavík City (46 %) and therefore constitutes a public undertaking. The entire Harpa project has been overseen by Austurhöfn-TR ehf. which is a limited liability company, established by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the Icelandic State and the City in order to take over the construction and running of the Harpa project (6).

| (15) | Until recently there were several limited liability companies involved in Harpa's operations, namely: Portus ehf., which was responsible for Harpa real estate and operations, and Situs ehf., which was responsible for other buildings planned in the same area. Portus had two subsidiaries: Totus ehf., which owned the real estate itself, and Ago ehf., which was responsible for all operations in Harpa and leased the property from Totus. Situs also had two subsidies: Hospes ehf., which would have owned and operated a hotel which is to be constructed in the area, and Custos ehf., which was to own and operate any other buildings in the area. |
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(15)

Until recently there were several limited liability companies involved in Harpa's operations, namely: Portus ehf., which was responsible for Harpa real estate and operations, and Situs ehf., which was responsible for other buildings planned in the same area. Portus had two subsidiaries: Totus ehf., which owned the real estate itself, and Ago ehf., which was responsible for all operations in Harpa and leased the property from Totus. Situs also had two subsidies: Hospes ehf., which would have owned and operated a hotel which is to be constructed in the area, and Custos ehf., which was to own and operate any other buildings in the area.

| (16) | However, in order to minimise operational costs and increase efficiency, the board of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. decided in December 2012 to simplify the operational structure of Harpa by merging most of the limited liability companies involved in its operations into one company. The State and the City therefore founded the company Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. which is to oversee all of Harpa's operations. Simplifying the infrastructure of Harpa is a part of a long-term plan to make Harpa’s operations sustainable. |
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(16)

However, in order to minimise operational costs and increase efficiency, the board of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. decided in December 2012 to simplify the operational structure of Harpa by merging most of the limited liability companies involved in its operations into one company. The State and the City therefore founded the company Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. which is to oversee all of Harpa's operations. Simplifying the infrastructure of Harpa is a part of a long-term plan to make Harpa’s operations sustainable.

| (17) | The following chart explains in broad terms the organisational structure of Harpa after the changes to its corporate structure entered into effect (7): |
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(17)

The following chart explains in broad terms the organisational structure of Harpa after the changes to its corporate structure entered into effect (7):

Image

3.3.   The financing of Harpa’s operations

| (18) | As previously noted, Harpa is fully owned by the Icelandic State and the City through Austurhöfn-TR ehf. The obligations of the State and the City are regulated by Article 13 of the project agreement from 2006 (8). The annual payments of the State and the City are covered by their respective budgets. According to the State budget for 2011, the annual State contribution was expected to amount to ISK 424,4 million. For the year 2012, the expected amount to be contributed by the State was ISK 553,6 million. In the year 2013, there is expected to be an increase in the public funding of Harpa as the City and the State have approved an additional ISK 160 million contribution. All public contributions to Harpa are borne in accordance with the participation in the project, i.e. the State pays 54 % and the City 46 %. The contributions are also indexed with the consumer price index. |
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(18)

As previously noted, Harpa is fully owned by the Icelandic State and the City through Austurhöfn-TR ehf. The obligations of the State and the City are regulated by Article 13 of the project agreement from 2006 (8). The annual payments of the State and the City are covered by their respective budgets. According to the State budget for 2011, the annual State contribution was expected to amount to ISK 424,4 million. For the year 2012, the expected amount to be contributed by the State was ISK 553,6 million. In the year 2013, there is expected to be an increase in the public funding of Harpa as the City and the State have approved an additional ISK 160 million contribution. All public contributions to Harpa are borne in accordance with the participation in the project, i.e. the State pays 54 % and the City 46 %. The contributions are also indexed with the consumer price index.

| (19) | In addition to the contribution provided for in the State and the City’s budgets, the Government and the City have undertaken an obligation to grant a short-term loan for the operation of Harpa until long-term financing necessary to fully cover the cost of the project is completed. As from 2013, the total amount of the loan was ISK 794 million with an interest rate of 5 % and a 200 bp premium. The Icelandic authorities have however announced their intention to convert the loan into share capital in the companies operating Harpa (9). |
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(19)

In addition to the contribution provided for in the State and the City’s budgets, the Government and the City have undertaken an obligation to grant a short-term loan for the operation of Harpa until long-term financing necessary to fully cover the cost of the project is completed. As from 2013, the total amount of the loan was ISK 794 million with an interest rate of 5 % and a 200 bp premium. The Icelandic authorities have however announced their intention to convert the loan into share capital in the companies operating Harpa (9).

| (20) | The State and the City allocate funds on a monthly basis in order pay off loan obligations in connection with Harpa. Since the project is meant to be self-sustainable, the profits must cover all operational costs. The funds from the owners are therefore, according to the Icelandic authorities, only meant to cover outstanding loans (10). |
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(20)

The State and the City allocate funds on a monthly basis in order pay off loan obligations in connection with Harpa. Since the project is meant to be self-sustainable, the profits must cover all operational costs. The funds from the owners are therefore, according to the Icelandic authorities, only meant to cover outstanding loans (10).

| (21) | According to the project agreement, there is to be a financial separation between the different companies involved in the operation of Harpa and between the different operations and activities: |
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(21)

According to the project agreement, there is to be a financial separation between the different companies involved in the operation of Harpa and between the different operations and activities:

| (22) | 13.11.1 | The private partner will at all times ensure that there is financial separation between the real estate company, the operation company, Hringur and the private partner. Each entity shall be managed and operated separately with regards to finances. |
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(22)

13.11.1

The private partner will at all times ensure that there is financial separation between the real estate company, the operation company, Hringur and the private partner. Each entity shall be managed and operated separately with regards to finances.

| (23) | 13.11.2 | The private partner will at all times ensure that there is sufficient financial separation, i.e. separation in book-keeping, between the paid for work and other operations and activities within the CC. The private partner shall at all times during the term be able to demonstrate, upon request from the client, that such financial separation exists. |
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(23)

13.11.2

The private partner will at all times ensure that there is sufficient financial separation, i.e. separation in book-keeping, between the paid for work and other operations and activities within the CC. The private partner shall at all times during the term be able to demonstrate, upon request from the client, that such financial separation exists.

| (24) | The operations of Harpa are divided into several categories: 1. the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra; 2. the Icelandic Opera; 3. other art events; 4. conference department; 5. operations; 6. ticket sales; 7. operating of facilities; 8. management cost. All these cost categories now fall under Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. and the revenue and costs attributed to each of these categories are included in the budget under the relevant category. Common operational costs such as salary, housing (heating and electricity) and administrative costs are divided among the categories according to a cost allocation model (11). |
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(24)

The operations of Harpa are divided into several categories: 1. the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra; 2. the Icelandic Opera; 3. other art events; 4. conference department; 5. operations; 6. ticket sales; 7. operating of facilities; 8. management cost. All these cost categories now fall under Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. and the revenue and costs attributed to each of these categories are included in the budget under the relevant category. Common operational costs such as salary, housing (heating and electricity) and administrative costs are divided among the categories according to a cost allocation model (11).

| (25) | According to the projected annual account of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. for the year 2012, the company was expected to sustain a significant operating loss corresponding to a total negative EBITDA of ISK 406,5 million. The conference part of Harpa's operation was run at a negative EBITDA of ISK 120 million in 2012 and the same goes for ‘other art events’ (negative EBITDA of ISK 131 million). The projected annual accounts and earning analysis for the year 2013 also foresee a considerable operating loss, a total negative EBITDA of around ISK 348 million, with both the conference activities and ‘other art events’ operating at a loss (12). |
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(25)

According to the projected annual account of Austurhöfn-TR ehf. for the year 2012, the company was expected to sustain a significant operating loss corresponding to a total negative EBITDA of ISK 406,5 million. The conference part of Harpa's operation was run at a negative EBITDA of ISK 120 million in 2012 and the same goes for ‘other art events’ (negative EBITDA of ISK 131 million). The projected annual accounts and earning analysis for the year 2013 also foresee a considerable operating loss, a total negative EBITDA of around ISK 348 million, with both the conference activities and ‘other art events’ operating at a loss (12).

| (26) | As previously noted, the operation in Harpa is now overseen by a single company, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., which is devoted to making the Harpa project as profitable as possible. According to the Icelandic authorities, the overall aim is to make the operations gradually sustainable. Nevertheless, Harpa has since its opening been operated with an annual deficit that has been covered over the budgets of the Icelandic State and Reykjavík City (13). According to projections submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the conference activities in Harpa are expected to become gradually sustainable and by the year 2016 the authorities project that Harpa’s conference operations will run at a positive EBITDA of ISK 3,5 million (14). However, by the year 2016 the ‘other art events’ are still expected to run at a negative EBITDA of around ISK 93 million. |
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(26)

As previously noted, the operation in Harpa is now overseen by a single company, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., which is devoted to making the Harpa project as profitable as possible. According to the Icelandic authorities, the overall aim is to make the operations gradually sustainable. Nevertheless, Harpa has since its opening been operated with an annual deficit that has been covered over the budgets of the Icelandic State and Reykjavík City (13). According to projections submitted by the Icelandic authorities, the conference activities in Harpa are expected to become gradually sustainable and by the year 2016 the authorities project that Harpa’s conference operations will run at a positive EBITDA of ISK 3,5 million (14). However, by the year 2016 the ‘other art events’ are still expected to run at a negative EBITDA of around ISK 93 million.

4.   Comments by the Icelandic authorities

| (27) | The Icelandic authorities argue that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa does not involve State aid since they have properly ensured that the companies keep separate accounts for the different activities within the concert hall and the conference centre. |
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(27)

The Icelandic authorities argue that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa does not involve State aid since they have properly ensured that the companies keep separate accounts for the different activities within the concert hall and the conference centre.

| (28) | The Icelandic authorities have claimed that revenues from conference and concert activities have been accounted for separately from other activities, while costs had not been accounted for separately up until now. The Icelandic authorities have acknowledged the need for accounting for conference activities separately from concert activities, as well as costs associated with these activities, and they aimed at having such a separation functional in January 2012. |
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(28)

The Icelandic authorities have claimed that revenues from conference and concert activities have been accounted for separately from other activities, while costs had not been accounted for separately up until now. The Icelandic authorities have acknowledged the need for accounting for conference activities separately from concert activities, as well as costs associated with these activities, and they aimed at having such a separation functional in January 2012.

| (29) | Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities claim that there is now a sufficient separation of accounts. In order to validate this claim, they have put forward statements from two accounting firms, PWC and KPMG. According to PWC, the separation of accounts for the companies involved in the operation of Harpa is sufficient. The profits are attributed to the relevant operational category and the common operational costs are divided between all operational categories. According to the report from KPMG, the property management team of Harpa has divided the building’s square meters based on function and usage and the related costs are allocated accordingly. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities claim that there is now a sufficient separation of accounts. In order to validate this claim, they have put forward statements from two accounting firms, PWC and KPMG. According to PWC, the separation of accounts for the companies involved in the operation of Harpa is sufficient. The profits are attributed to the relevant operational category and the common operational costs are divided between all operational categories. According to the report from KPMG, the property management team of Harpa has divided the building’s square meters based on function and usage and the related costs are allocated accordingly.

| (30) | With regard to the conference operations, according to the Icelandic authorities, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. is not itself active on the conference market. The company however leases conference rooms either to one-off conference organisers or to specialised conference businesses. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have noted that that there are no competing conference centres in Iceland capable of hosting large-scale conferences like Harpa. According to the Icelandic authorities, the conference business positively contributes to other activities in Harpa. If Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. would not operate the conference business, the costs other activities would have to carry would be considerably higher. In order to show that the conference aspect of Harpa is not being subsidised, the Icelandic authorities submitted a pricing analysis from KPMG where they compared the prices of comparable conference facilities, based on size and capacity. According to KPMG’s analysis, the price for a full day, the price per guest and the price per square meter are on average much higher for the facilities in Harpa than for comparable facilities offered in competing conference facilities. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

With regard to the conference operations, according to the Icelandic authorities, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. is not itself active on the conference market. The company however leases conference rooms either to one-off conference organisers or to specialised conference businesses. Furthermore, the Icelandic authorities have noted that that there are no competing conference centres in Iceland capable of hosting large-scale conferences like Harpa. According to the Icelandic authorities, the conference business positively contributes to other activities in Harpa. If Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf. would not operate the conference business, the costs other activities would have to carry would be considerably higher. In order to show that the conference aspect of Harpa is not being subsidised, the Icelandic authorities submitted a pricing analysis from KPMG where they compared the prices of comparable conference facilities, based on size and capacity. According to KPMG’s analysis, the price for a full day, the price per guest and the price per square meter are on average much higher for the facilities in Harpa than for comparable facilities offered in competing conference facilities.

| (31) | Lastly, the Icelandic authorities maintain that the financial contributions from the State and the City are fully allocated for payment of outstanding loans and are not used in order to subsidise the conference hosting aspect. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Lastly, the Icelandic authorities maintain that the financial contributions from the State and the City are fully allocated for payment of outstanding loans and are not used in order to subsidise the conference hosting aspect.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement

| (32) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

| (33) | ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(33)

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between contracting parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (34) | In the following chapters the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre will be assessed with respect to these criteria. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In the following chapters the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre will be assessed with respect to these criteria.

1.1.   State resources

State resources

| (35) | According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

According to Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, a measure must be granted by the State or through State resources in order to constitute State aid.

| (36) | At the outset, the Authority notes that both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (15). Consequently, the state for the purpose of Article 61(1) covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the City level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies. Furthermore, municipal resources are considered to be State resources within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement (16). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

At the outset, the Authority notes that both local and regional authorities are considered to be equivalent to the State (15). Consequently, the state for the purpose of Article 61(1) covers all bodies of the State administration, from the central government to the City level or the lowest administrative level as well as public undertakings and bodies. Furthermore, municipal resources are considered to be State resources within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement (16).

15

16

| (37) | Since the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík cover jointly the annual deficit of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa by annually contributing a certain amount from their budgets, State resources are involved. Furthermore, the converting of loans into share capital also entails a transfer of State resources since the State and the City would forgo their entitlement to receive a full repayment of the outstanding loans. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Since the Icelandic State and the City of Reykjavík cover jointly the annual deficit of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa by annually contributing a certain amount from their budgets, State resources are involved. Furthermore, the converting of loans into share capital also entails a transfer of State resources since the State and the City would forgo their entitlement to receive a full repayment of the outstanding loans. Therefore, the first criterion of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement is fulfilled.

1.2.   Undertaking

Undertaking

| (38) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (17). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (18). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods and services on a given market do not constitute undertakings. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61 of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an advantage upon an undertaking. Undertakings are entities engaged in an economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed (17). Economic activities are activities consisting of offering goods or services on a market (18). Conversely, entities that are not commercially active in the sense that they are not offering goods and services on a given market do not constitute undertakings.

17

18

| (39) | The Authority is of the opinion that both the construction and operation of an infrastructure constitute an economic activity in itself (and are thus subject to State aid rules) if that infrastructure is, or will be used, to provide goods or services on the market (19). In this case, the conference hall and concert centre is intended for e.g. hosting conferences as well as music, culture and ‘other art events’ on a commercial basis, i.e. for the provision of services on the market. This view has been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Leipzig/Halle case (20). Consequently, in infrastructure cases, aid may be granted at several levels: construction, operation and use of the facilities (21). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Authority is of the opinion that both the construction and operation of an infrastructure constitute an economic activity in itself (and are thus subject to State aid rules) if that infrastructure is, or will be used, to provide goods or services on the market (19). In this case, the conference hall and concert centre is intended for e.g. hosting conferences as well as music, culture and ‘other art events’ on a commercial basis, i.e. for the provision of services on the market. This view has been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Leipzig/Halle case (20). Consequently, in infrastructure cases, aid may be granted at several levels: construction, operation and use of the facilities (21).

19

Leipzig/Halle

20

21

| (40) | As previously noted, Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre hosts concerts by the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra, the Icelandic Opera, various other art events as well as conferences. In the view of the Icelandic authorities, only the conference aspect of Harpa’s operation constitutes an economic activity. All other activities should therefore be classified as non-economic. However, the Authority has certain doubts in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

As previously noted, Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre hosts concerts by the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra, the Icelandic Opera, various other art events as well as conferences. In the view of the Icelandic authorities, only the conference aspect of Harpa’s operation constitutes an economic activity. All other activities should therefore be classified as non-economic. However, the Authority has certain doubts in this regard.

| (41) | Some of the activities taking place in Harpa, notably conferences, theatre performances, popular music concerts etc., can attract significant numbers of customers while they are in competition with private conference centres, theatres or other music venues. Therefore, the Authority takes the view that the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre and the companies involved in its operation, in so far as they engage in commercial activities, qualify as an undertaking (22). The companies involved in the operation of Harpa must be regarded as vehicles for pursuing the common interest of its owners, that is to support cultural activities in Iceland. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Some of the activities taking place in Harpa, notably conferences, theatre performances, popular music concerts etc., can attract significant numbers of customers while they are in competition with private conference centres, theatres or other music venues. Therefore, the Authority takes the view that the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre and the companies involved in its operation, in so far as they engage in commercial activities, qualify as an undertaking (22). The companies involved in the operation of Harpa must be regarded as vehicles for pursuing the common interest of its owners, that is to support cultural activities in Iceland.

22

1.3.   Advantage

Advantage

| (42) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on the recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must confer an economic advantage on the recipient.

| (43) | Regarding the financing of the construction of Harpa, State aid can only be excluded if it is in conformity with the market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’) (23). According to the Icelandic authorities, the State and the City had initially hoped that a private investor would finance the realisation of the project. However, due to the financial crisis, it became impossible to carry out the project without public funding. The direct grant by the State and the City is thus claimed to be necessary, as without it there were not enough funds to finance the project. The Authority therefore considers, at this stage, that the public financing of the construction of Harpa would constitute an economic advantage and thus aid, since the project would admittedly not have been realised in the absence of public funding and the participation by the State and the City was essential to the Harpa project as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Regarding the financing of the construction of Harpa, State aid can only be excluded if it is in conformity with the market economy investor principle (‘MEIP’) (23). According to the Icelandic authorities, the State and the City had initially hoped that a private investor would finance the realisation of the project. However, due to the financial crisis, it became impossible to carry out the project without public funding. The direct grant by the State and the City is thus claimed to be necessary, as without it there were not enough funds to finance the project. The Authority therefore considers, at this stage, that the public financing of the construction of Harpa would constitute an economic advantage and thus aid, since the project would admittedly not have been realised in the absence of public funding and the participation by the State and the City was essential to the Harpa project as a whole.

23

| (44) | It follows from the Authority’s decisional practice that when an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system that ensures that the commercial activities are not financed through State resources allocated to the non-profit making activities must be in place (24). This principle is also laid down in the Transparency Directive (25). The Directive does not apply directly to the case at hand. However, the Authority is of the opinion that the principles of operating economic activities on commercial terms with separate accounts, and a clear establishment of the cost accounting principles according to which separate accounts are maintained, still apply. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

It follows from the Authority’s decisional practice that when an entity carries out both commercial and non-commercial activities, a cost-accounting system that ensures that the commercial activities are not financed through State resources allocated to the non-profit making activities must be in place (24). This principle is also laid down in the Transparency Directive (25). The Directive does not apply directly to the case at hand. However, the Authority is of the opinion that the principles of operating economic activities on commercial terms with separate accounts, and a clear establishment of the cost accounting principles according to which separate accounts are maintained, still apply.

24

25

| (45) | As described in Section I.3 above, the operations of Harpa are divided into several categories, e.g. hosting the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera as well as other art events and conferences, which can be divided into economic and non-economic activities (i.e. cultural activities). The Icelandic authorities have however not properly ensured, through either amending the organisational structure of Harpa or by other administrative action, that there is a clear and consistent separation of the accounts for the different activities of the concert hall and conference centre. Simply dividing the losses associated with the operation of the building and common administrative costs between the different activities of Harpa, both the economic and non-economic, based on estimated usage and other criteria cannot be seen as a clear separation of accounts under EEA law. This situation therefore may lead to cross-subsidisation between non-economic and economic activities. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As described in Section I.3 above, the operations of Harpa are divided into several categories, e.g. hosting the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera as well as other art events and conferences, which can be divided into economic and non-economic activities (i.e. cultural activities). The Icelandic authorities have however not properly ensured, through either amending the organisational structure of Harpa or by other administrative action, that there is a clear and consistent separation of the accounts for the different activities of the concert hall and conference centre. Simply dividing the losses associated with the operation of the building and common administrative costs between the different activities of Harpa, both the economic and non-economic, based on estimated usage and other criteria cannot be seen as a clear separation of accounts under EEA law. This situation therefore may lead to cross-subsidisation between non-economic and economic activities.

| (46) | Additionally, an advantage is conferred on the companies involved in the operation of Harpa in the form of foregone profits when the State and the City do not require a return on their investment in the concert hall and conference centre, in so far as those companies engage in commercial activities, such as the hosting of conferences or ‘other art events’. Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement effectively represents an expense for the undertaking. If a State- and municipally-owned undertaking is not required to generate a normal rate of return for its owner this effectively means that the undertaking benefits from an advantage whenever the owner foregoes that profit (26). |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Additionally, an advantage is conferred on the companies involved in the operation of Harpa in the form of foregone profits when the State and the City do not require a return on their investment in the concert hall and conference centre, in so far as those companies engage in commercial activities, such as the hosting of conferences or ‘other art events’. Any business owner or investor will normally require a return on its investment in a commercial undertaking. Such a requirement effectively represents an expense for the undertaking. If a State- and municipally-owned undertaking is not required to generate a normal rate of return for its owner this effectively means that the undertaking benefits from an advantage whenever the owner foregoes that profit (26).

26

| (47) | The Authority considers that the announced conversion of loans, in the amount of ISK 904 million, could also constitute an advantage, should the conversion not be concluded on market terms. However, since the Authority has not received a detailed description of the loan conversion agreement it is not in the position to assess whether an advantage is present or not. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority considers that the announced conversion of loans, in the amount of ISK 904 million, could also constitute an advantage, should the conversion not be concluded on market terms. However, since the Authority has not received a detailed description of the loan conversion agreement it is not in the position to assess whether an advantage is present or not.

| (48) | The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded at any level (construction, operation and use). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The preliminary assessment of the Authority thus shows that an economic advantage cannot be excluded at any level (construction, operation and use).

1.4.   Selectivity

Selectivity

| (49) | In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must be selective. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In order to constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 6l of the EEA Agreement, the measure must be selective.

| (50) | The Icelandic authorities provide funding to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The funding is used to cover the losses stemming from the different activities within Harpa, including economic activities such as the hosting of conferences. This system of compensation, under which cross-subsidisation may occur, is not available to other companies that are active on the conference market in Iceland or elsewhere. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Icelandic authorities provide funding to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa. The funding is used to cover the losses stemming from the different activities within Harpa, including economic activities such as the hosting of conferences. This system of compensation, under which cross-subsidisation may occur, is not available to other companies that are active on the conference market in Iceland or elsewhere.

| (51) | In light of the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the companies involved in the operation of Harpa receive a selective economic advantage compared to their competitors on the market. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In light of the above, it is the Authority’s preliminary view that the companies involved in the operation of Harpa receive a selective economic advantage compared to their competitors on the market.

1.5.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

Distortion of competition and effect on trade between contracting parties

| (52) | The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between the contracting parties to the EEA Agreement to be considered State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (53) | According to settled case law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (27). The State resources allocated to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa, in order to cover their losses, constitute an advantage that strengthens Harpa’s position compared to that of other undertakings competing in the same market. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to settled case law, the mere fact that a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade is considered to be sufficient in order to conclude that the measure is likely to affect trade between contracting parties and distort competition between undertakings established in other EEA States (27). The State resources allocated to the companies involved in the operation of Harpa, in order to cover their losses, constitute an advantage that strengthens Harpa’s position compared to that of other undertakings competing in the same market.

27

| (54) | As the market for organising international events is open to competition between venue providers and event organisers, which generally engage in activities which are subject to trade between EEA States, the effect on trade can be assumed. In this case, the effect on trade between certain neighbouring EEA States is even more likely due to the nature of the conference industry. Moreover, the General Court has recently, in its Order concerning the Ahoy complex in the Netherlands, held that there was no reason to limit the market to the territory of that Member State (28). |
| --- | --- |

(54)

As the market for organising international events is open to competition between venue providers and event organisers, which generally engage in activities which are subject to trade between EEA States, the effect on trade can be assumed. In this case, the effect on trade between certain neighbouring EEA States is even more likely due to the nature of the conference industry. Moreover, the General Court has recently, in its Order concerning the Ahoy complex in the Netherlands, held that there was no reason to limit the market to the territory of that Member State (28).

28

| (55) | Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Therefore, in the preliminary view of the Authority, the measure threatens to distort competition and affect trade within the EEA.

1.6.   Conclusion with regard to the presence of State aid

Conclusion with regard to the presence of State aid

| (56) | With reference to the above considerations the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

With reference to the above considerations the Authority cannot, at this stage and based on its preliminary assessment, exclude that the measure under assessment includes elements of State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Under the conditions referred to above, it is thus necessary to consider whether the measure can be found to be compatible with the internal market.

2.   Compatibility assessment

Compatibility assessment

| (57) | The Icelandic authorities have not put forward any arguments demonstrating that the State aid involved in the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa could be considered as compatible State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Icelandic authorities have not put forward any arguments demonstrating that the State aid involved in the financing of the companies involved in the operation of Harpa could be considered as compatible State aid.

| (58) | Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Support measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for a derogation under Article 61(2) or (3) or Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement and are necessary, proportional and do not cause undue distortion of competition.

| (59) | The derogation in Article 61(2) is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Further, the aid under assessment in this case cannot be considered to qualify as public service compensation within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The derogation in Article 61(2) is not applicable to the aid in question, which is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. Further, the aid under assessment in this case cannot be considered to qualify as public service compensation within the meaning of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | The EEA Agreement does not include a provision corresponding to Article 107(3)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Authority nevertheless acknowledges that State aid measures may be approved on cultural grounds on the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement (29). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The EEA Agreement does not include a provision corresponding to Article 107(3)(d) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Authority nevertheless acknowledges that State aid measures may be approved on cultural grounds on the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement (29).

29

| (61) | On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest. The Authority must therefore assess whether granting aid to the various activities in Harpa can be justified as aid to promote culture on the grounds of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

On the basis of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, aid to promote culture and heritage conservation may be considered compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the EEA to the extent that is considered to be contrary to the common interest. The Authority must therefore assess whether granting aid to the various activities in Harpa can be justified as aid to promote culture on the grounds of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement.

| (62) | It should be noted that the principles laid down in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement have been applied to cases somewhat similar to the case at stake (30). The Icelandic authorities have stated that the primary objective of the measure in question was to promote culture through the construction of a concert hall that could house both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Similar multipurpose cultural centres already exist in most other European cities. Harpa is to be Iceland’s national concert hall, providing a necessary cultural infrastructure that was missing in Iceland and it will act as the focal point for the development and advancement of those performance arts in Iceland. The concert centre will therefore contribute to the development of cultural knowledge and bring access to cultural educational and recreational values to the public (31). |
| --- | --- |

(62)

It should be noted that the principles laid down in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement have been applied to cases somewhat similar to the case at stake (30). The Icelandic authorities have stated that the primary objective of the measure in question was to promote culture through the construction of a concert hall that could house both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Similar multipurpose cultural centres already exist in most other European cities. Harpa is to be Iceland’s national concert hall, providing a necessary cultural infrastructure that was missing in Iceland and it will act as the focal point for the development and advancement of those performance arts in Iceland. The concert centre will therefore contribute to the development of cultural knowledge and bring access to cultural educational and recreational values to the public (31).

30

31

| (63) | In view of the above, the Authority considers that, given its cultural purpose, the construction and operation of a Symphony and Opera facility would qualify as aid to promote culture within the meaning of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. However, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted to subsidise conference and other art events, on a commercial basis, can be justified under Article 61(3)(c) and this aid must therefore be assessed separately. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In view of the above, the Authority considers that, given its cultural purpose, the construction and operation of a Symphony and Opera facility would qualify as aid to promote culture within the meaning of Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. However, the Authority has doubts as to whether aid granted to subsidise conference and other art events, on a commercial basis, can be justified under Article 61(3)(c) and this aid must therefore be assessed separately.

| (64) | Concerning necessity, proportionality and whether the measure is likely to distort competition, the Authority has the following observations. As previously noted the main reason for constructing Harpa was the apparent need for a suitable concert hall to accommodate both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Given the scale of the project it is understandable that an infrastructure such as Harpa would also be used to house various commercial activities such as restaurants, coffee shops, stores, conferences and popular concerts. However, in order not to distort competition, safeguards must be put in place to ensure that there is no cross subsidisation between the commercial activities and the heavily subsidised cultural activities. This can be achieved by either tendering out facilities for the commercial activities, thereby ensuring that the economic operator pays market price for the facilities and does not benefit from cross subsidisation, or by sufficiently separating the economic activities from the non-commercial activities by establishing a separate legal entity or a sufficient system of cost allocation and separate accounts that ensures a reasonable return on investment. The Icelandic authorities have already taken the former approach with regard to the restaurants, catering services and shops within Harpa. The same approach has however not been taken with regard to the hosting of conference and ‘other art events’ which are currently overseen by a company owned by the State and the City, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., and run at a considerable negative EBITDA. The Authority therefore cannot see that the Icelandic authorities have put the necessary safeguards in place to ensure that cross subsidisation does not occur between the cultural and the purely commercial activities within Harpa. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Concerning necessity, proportionality and whether the measure is likely to distort competition, the Authority has the following observations. As previously noted the main reason for constructing Harpa was the apparent need for a suitable concert hall to accommodate both the Icelandic Symphony Orchestra and the Icelandic Opera. Given the scale of the project it is understandable that an infrastructure such as Harpa would also be used to house various commercial activities such as restaurants, coffee shops, stores, conferences and popular concerts. However, in order not to distort competition, safeguards must be put in place to ensure that there is no cross subsidisation between the commercial activities and the heavily subsidised cultural activities. This can be achieved by either tendering out facilities for the commercial activities, thereby ensuring that the economic operator pays market price for the facilities and does not benefit from cross subsidisation, or by sufficiently separating the economic activities from the non-commercial activities by establishing a separate legal entity or a sufficient system of cost allocation and separate accounts that ensures a reasonable return on investment. The Icelandic authorities have already taken the former approach with regard to the restaurants, catering services and shops within Harpa. The same approach has however not been taken with regard to the hosting of conference and ‘other art events’ which are currently overseen by a company owned by the State and the City, Harpa — tónlistar- og ráðstefnuhús ehf., and run at a considerable negative EBITDA. The Authority therefore cannot see that the Icelandic authorities have put the necessary safeguards in place to ensure that cross subsidisation does not occur between the cultural and the purely commercial activities within Harpa.

| (65) | Consequently, following its preliminary assessment, the Authority has doubts whether the proposed project could be deemed compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, at this stage at all three levels of possible aid (construction, operation and use) in accordance with the above. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Consequently, following its preliminary assessment, the Authority has doubts whether the proposed project could be deemed compatible under Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement, at this stage at all three levels of possible aid (construction, operation and use) in accordance with the above.

| (66) | At this stage, the Authority has not carried out an assessment with respect to other possible derogations, under which the measure could be found compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In this respect, the Icelandic authorities have not brought forward any further specific arguments. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

At this stage, the Authority has not carried out an assessment with respect to other possible derogations, under which the measure could be found compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. In this respect, the Icelandic authorities have not brought forward any further specific arguments.

3.   Procedural requirements

Procedural requirements

| (67) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, ‘[t]he EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until th[e] procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by constructing and operating Harpa, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities did not notify the aid measures to the Authority. Moreover, the Icelandic authorities have, by constructing and operating Harpa, put those measures into effect before the Authority has adopted a final decision. The Authority therefore concludes that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3. The granting of any aid involved is therefore unlawful.

4.   Opening of the formal investigation procedure

Opening of the formal investigation procedure

| (69) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, is of the opinion that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre — within the context of the project as outlined above — might constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, as outlined above, the Authority has doubts as regards the compatibility of the potential State aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and the Icelandic authorities, the Authority, after carrying out the preliminarily assessment, is of the opinion that the financing of the companies involved in the operation of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre — within the context of the project as outlined above — might constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. Furthermore, as outlined above, the Authority has doubts as regards the compatibility of the potential State aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (70) | Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure.

| (71) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute aid.

| (72) | The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the Harpa project on relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the Harpa project on relevant markets.

| (73) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Icelandic authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision.

all documents, information and data

| (74) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted already to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

| (75) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication, |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication,

Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The financing and operation of the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority has doubts as regards the compatibility of the State aid with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

Article 2

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is initiated regarding the aid referred to in Article 1.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month from the notification of this Decision.

Article 4

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide, within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the measures under the State aid rules of the EEA Agreement.

Article 5

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 6

Only the English language version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 20 March 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Jf. Kommissionens afgørelse i sag SA.33618 (Sverige) finansiering af multiarenaen i Uppsala (EUT C 152 af 30.5.2012, s. 18) afsnit 19.

1

finansiering af multiarenaen i Uppsala

(2)  Jf. sag T-90/09, Mojo Concerts og Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie mod Kommissionen, Rettens kendelse af 26. januar 2012, afsnit 45, offentliggjort i EUT C 89 af 24.3.2012, s. 22.

2

(3)  For the purposes of this Decision, ‘Harpa’ will refer to the building itself and its facilities.

3

(4)  Project agreement between Austurhofn-TR ehf. and Eignarhaldsfelagid Portus ehf, signed on 9 March 2006.

4

(5)  Amended and restated project agreement between Austurhofn-TR ehf. and Eignarhaldsfelagid Portus ehf, signed on 19 January 2010.

5

(6)  Further information on Austurhöfn-TR ehf. can be found on their website: http://www.austurhofn.is/

6

(7)  Information available online at: http://en.harpa.is/media/english/skipur-1.jpg

7

(8)  As amended and restated in 2010.

8

(9)  The Icelandic authorities have not yet outlined the particulars of this arrangement.

9

(10)  See memorandum issued by the Director of Harpa, dated 24 September 2012 (Event No 648320).

10

(11)  See report by KPMG, dated 7 February 2013 (Event No 662444).

11

(12)  Ibid.

12

(13)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Harpa’s losses mostly stem from high real estate taxes.

13

(14)  The key factor in this revenue growth is the expected increase in the conference business.

14

(15)  See Article 2 of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings (OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17), incorporated at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

15

(16)  See the Authority’s Decision No 55/05/COL, Section II.3, p. 19 with further references, published in OJ L 324, 23.11.2006, p. 11 and EEA Supplement No 56, 23.11.2006, p. 1.

16

(17)  Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979, paragraphs 21-23 and Case E-5/07 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund v EFTA Surveillance Authority [2008] Ct. Rep. 61, paragraph 78.

17

Höfner and Elser

Macroton

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

EFTA Surveillance Authority

(18)  Case C-222/04 Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA [2006] ECR I-289, paragraph 108.

18

Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze

Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze SpA

(19)  See the Commission Decision in Case SA.33618 (Sweden) Financing of the Uppsala arena (OJ C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 18), paragraph 19.

19

Financing of the Uppsala arena

(20)  Case C-288/11 P Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v The European Commission, 19 December 2012, paragraphs 40-43, not yet published.

20

Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle

The European Commission

(21)  See the Commission Decision in Case SA.33728 (Denmark) Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen (OJ C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 6), paragraph 24.

21

Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen

(22)  See the Commission Decision in Case N 293/08 (Hungary) Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries (OJ C 66, 20.3.2009, p. 22), paragraph 19.

22

Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries

(23)  See the Commission Decision in Case SA.33728 (Denmark) Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen (OJ C 152, 30.5.2012, p. 6), paragraph 25.

23

Financing of a new multiarena in Copenhagen

(24)  ESA Decision No 142/03/COL regarding reorganisation and transfer of public funds to the Work Research Institute (OJ C 248, 16.10.2003, p. 6, EEA Supplement No 52, 16.10.2003, p. 3), ESA Decision No 343/09/COL on the property transactions engaged in by the Municipality of Time concerning property numbers 1/152, 1/301, 1/630, 4/165, 2/70, 2/32 (OJ L 123, 12.5.2011, p. 72, EEA Supplement No 27, 12.5.2011, p. 1).

24

(25)  Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings (OJ L 318, 17.11.2006, p. 17), incorporated at point 1a of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

25

(26)  Case C-234/84 Belgium v Commission [1986] ECR I-2263, paragraph 14.

26

Belgium

Commission

(27)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] Report of the EFTA Court p. 76, paragraph 59; Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission [1980] ECR 2671, paragraph 11.

27

The Government of Norway

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris

Commission

(28)  Case T-90/09 Mojo Concerts BV and Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie BV v The European Commission, Order of the General Court of 26 January 2012, paragraph 45, published in OJ C 89, 24.3.2012, p. 36.

28

Mojo Concerts BV and Amsterdam Music Dome Exploitatie BV

The European Commission

(29)  See for example paragraph 7 (with further references) of the Authority’s Guidelines on State aid to cinematographic and other audiovisual work, available at the Authority’s webpage at: http://www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

29

(30)  See Commission Decision in Case N 122/10 (Hungary) State aid to Danube Cultural Palace (OJ C 147, 18.5.2011, p. 3) and Commission Decision in Case N 293/08 (Hungary) Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries (OJ C 66, 20.3.2009, p. 22).

30

State aid to Danube Cultural Palace

Cultural aid for multifunctional community cultural centres, museums, public libraries

(31)  See Commission Decision in Case SA.33241 (Cyprus) State support to the Cyprus Cultural Centre (OJ C 377, 23.12.2011, p. 11), paragraphs 36-39.

31

State support to the Cyprus Cultural Centre

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| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/31

---

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol for så vidt angår statsstøtte i forbindelse med eventuel støtte til Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA)

2013/C 229/10

Ved beslutning nr. 136/13/COL af 27. marts 2013, der er gengivet på det autentiske sprog efter dette resumé, indledte EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. De norske myndigheder er underrettet ved fremsendelse af en kopi af beslutningen.

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden giver hermed EFTA-staterne, EU-medlemsstaterne og interesserede parter en frist på en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse til at fremsende deres bemærkninger til den pågældende foranstaltning til:

| EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| --- |
| Registrering |
| Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

Registrering

Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Bemærkningerne vil blive videresendt til de norske myndigheder. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

RESUMÉ

Baggrund

Uddannelse i Norge er obligatorisk for alle børn i alderen 6 til 16 år og stilles til rådighed gennem et system med gratis offentlige skoler. I 2006 besluttede de norske myndigheder som led i kundskabsfremmeinitiativet »Kunnskapsløftet«, at alle norske skoler skulle fokusere på evnen til at tilegne sig viden om et givet emne ved hjælp af informations- og kommunikationsteknologi. På den baggrund ændrede de norske myndigheder uddannelsesloven og pålagde amterne at give eleverne det nødvendige trykte eller digitale undervisningsmateriale gratis.

I maj 2006 bevilgede den norske regering 50 mio. NOK til udvikling og anvendelse af sådanne digitale undervisningsressourcer. I juni 2006 fremsendte undervisningsministeriet en opfordring til amterne til i fællesskab at søge om de disponible midler. I august 2006 besluttede de ansvarlige for uddannelse i 18 af de 19 amter at iværksætte det tværkommunale samarbejde og oprette NDLA som et samarbejdsorgan mellem amterne efter § 27 i loven om lokalforvaltning.

De deltagende amter indgav derefter en anmodning om midler til undervisningsministeriet, som ydede 30,5 mio. NOK til projektet under forudsætning af, at den ansvarlige retlige enhed varetager amternes forpligtelse i henhold til initiativet, at den pågældende enhed ikke udøver økonomisk aktivitet, og at køb af digitalt undervisningsmateriale og udviklingen af tjenester finder sted i overensstemmelse med reglerne for offentlige indkøb.

Derefter tildelte amterne 21,1 mio. NOK (2008), 34,7 mio. NOK (2009), 58,8 mio. NOK (2010) og 57,7 mio. NOK (2011) til projektet. Disse midler blev dels finansieret ved hjælp af den regelmæssige kommunale finansiering af undervisningsaktiviteter, dels ved hjælp af ovennævnte supplerende midler, som undervisningsministeriet havde stillet til rådighed for amterne til dette specifikke projekt.

Beslutning og Domstolens dom

Den 12. oktober 2011 vedtog Tilsynsmyndigheden ved beslutning nr. 311/11/COL, at foranstaltningen ikke udgjorde statsstøtte som omhandlet i EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1 (i det følgende benævnt »beslutningen«). Den 9. januar 2012 anlagde sagsøgeren sag til prøvelse af beslutningen, og EFTA-Domstolen annullerede ved sin dom af 11. december 2012 beslutningen (1).

Vurdering af foranstaltningen

Forekomst af statsstøtte

Efter dommen nærer Tilsynsmyndigheden tvivl om, hvorvidt NDLA udøver en økonomisk aktivitet. Tilsynsmyndigheden ønsker navnlig yderligere oplysninger om overgangen under initiativet fra projektfasen til den formelle etablering af NDLA som et samarbejdsorgan mellem amterne efter § 27 i loven om lokalforvaltning.

Tilsynsmyndigheden vil desuden have yderligere oplysninger om, hvorvidt ændringen af retlig status indvirkede på beslutningsprocessen. Tilsynsmyndigheden skal navnlig fastslå, i hvilket omfang NDLA kan udvide sine aktiviteter uden samtykke fra de deltagende kommuner eller endog mod deres vilje, og om den nuværende situation er forskellig fra situationen før den formelle etablering.

Desuden vil Tilsynsmyndigheden foretage en nærmere undersøgelse af finansieringen af NDLA, både med hensyn til projektfasen og efter den formelle etablering.

Tilsynsmyndigheden skal også have fastslået nærmere, hvordan parametrene for de offentlige indkøbsprocedurer, som NDLA benytter til at købe varer og ansætte personale, er fastsat.

Endelig ønsker Tilsynsmyndigheden yderligere oplysninger om foranstaltningens virkninger for konkurrencen og samhandelen.

Støttens forenelighed

Ud fra de foreliggende oplysninger kan Tilsynsmyndigheden ikke på dette stadium konkludere, om foranstaltningen er forenelig. Tilsynsmyndigheden har derfor brug for yderligere oplysninger herom.

Konklusion

På baggrund af ovenstående har Tilsynsmyndigheden besluttet at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure i overensstemmelse med artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. Interesserede parter opfordres til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 136/13/COL

of 27 March 2013

opening the formal investigation procedure into potential aid to the Nasjonal digital læringsarena (NDLA)

(Norway)

THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY (‘THE AUTHORITY’)

HAVING REGARD to:

The Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 61 to 63 and Protocol 26,

The Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘SCA’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the SCA (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | By letter dated 15 April 2010 Den Norske Forleggerforening, the Norwegian Publishers Association (‘NPA’), sent a complaint alleging that illegal State aid has been granted to the Nasjonal digital læringsarena (‘NDLA’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 16 April 2010 (Event No 553723). Following a telephone conference on 15 July 2011 the complainant provided additional information by email on the same day (Event No 608593). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

By letter dated 15 April 2010 Den Norske Forleggerforening, the Norwegian Publishers Association (‘NPA’), sent a complaint alleging that illegal State aid has been granted to the Nasjonal digital læringsarena (‘NDLA’). The letter was received and registered by the Authority on 16 April 2010 (Event No 553723). Following a telephone conference on 15 July 2011 the complainant provided additional information by email on the same day (Event No 608593).

| (2) | By letter dated 2 July 2010 (Event No 558201), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 9 August 2010 (Event No 566179), the Norwegian authorities requested an extension of the time limit for sending a response. The request for an extension was granted by the Authority by letter dated 12 August 2010 (Event No 566397). By letter dated 9 September 2010 (Event No 568942), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. In addition, discussions between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities regarding the case took place at a meeting in Norway on 13-14 October 2010. Additional information from the Norwegian authorities was sent to the Authority by letter dated 1 December 2010 (Event No 579405). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By letter dated 2 July 2010 (Event No 558201), the Authority requested additional information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 9 August 2010 (Event No 566179), the Norwegian authorities requested an extension of the time limit for sending a response. The request for an extension was granted by the Authority by letter dated 12 August 2010 (Event No 566397). By letter dated 9 September 2010 (Event No 568942), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. In addition, discussions between the Authority and the Norwegian authorities regarding the case took place at a meeting in Norway on 13-14 October 2010. Additional information from the Norwegian authorities was sent to the Authority by letter dated 1 December 2010 (Event No 579405).

| (3) | The Authority considered that further information was necessary and sent another request for information by letter dated 4 February 2011 (Event No 574762). The Norwegian authorities replied to the information request by letter dated 7 March 2011 (Event No 589528). Upon request the Norwegian authorities provided further clarifications by emails 2 May 2011 (Event No 596402) and 12 August 2011 (Event No 608596). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Authority considered that further information was necessary and sent another request for information by letter dated 4 February 2011 (Event No 574762). The Norwegian authorities replied to the information request by letter dated 7 March 2011 (Event No 589528). Upon request the Norwegian authorities provided further clarifications by emails 2 May 2011 (Event No 596402) and 12 August 2011 (Event No 608596).

| (4) | On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL deciding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA (hereafter: the Decision). On 9 January 2012 the applicant brought an action against the decision and by its judgment dated 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled the decision (hereafter: the Judgment) (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL deciding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA (hereafter: the Decision). On 9 January 2012 the applicant brought an action against the decision and by its judgment dated 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled the decision (hereafter: the Judgment) (2).

2.   The complaint

| (5) | The complainant is the Norwegian Publishers Association, which represents i.a. companies which are or could be active in the development and distribution of digital learning material. The complaint concerns the Norwegian government’s and the county municipalities granting of funds as well as the transfer of a content management system to the NDLA. The NDLA is an entity which has been founded as an inter-county cooperation body by 18 Norwegian municipalities (3) in order to develop or purchase digital learning material with a view to publishing the material on the internet free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The complainant is the Norwegian Publishers Association, which represents i.a. companies which are or could be active in the development and distribution of digital learning material. The complaint concerns the Norwegian government’s and the county municipalities granting of funds as well as the transfer of a content management system to the NDLA. The NDLA is an entity which has been founded as an inter-county cooperation body by 18 Norwegian municipalities (3) in order to develop or purchase digital learning material with a view to publishing the material on the internet free of charge.

| (6) | The complainant submits that the NDLA has four main areas of activity: firstly, the NDLA develops and supplies learning resources for the upper secondary school; secondly, the NDLA procures learning resources from third party suppliers; thirdly, the NDLA ensures the quality of learning resources; and fourthly, the NDLA develops and manages the content management system which operates the website through which the digital learning material is published (these activities are hereafter also referred to as ‘purchase, development and supply of digital learning materials’). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The complainant submits that the NDLA has four main areas of activity: firstly, the NDLA develops and supplies learning resources for the upper secondary school; secondly, the NDLA procures learning resources from third party suppliers; thirdly, the NDLA ensures the quality of learning resources; and fourthly, the NDLA develops and manages the content management system which operates the website through which the digital learning material is published (these activities are hereafter also referred to as ‘purchase, development and supply of digital learning materials’).

| (7) | The complainant submits that the granting of funds to the NDLA for the purchase, development and supply of digital learning material constitutes illegal State aid to the NDLA. In that regard the complainant emphasises that — in his view — the NDLA is not an integrated part of the public administration but rather an undertaking within the meaning of State aid rules. The complainant recalls that according to established case law an undertaking is an entity which is engaged in economic activities. The complainant suggests that according to the ECJ case law an economic activity is an activity, which could, at least in principle, be carried out by a private undertaking in order to make profits. Then, the complainant argues that any entity, which carries out an activity which could be carried out to make profits, is engaged in an economic activity. The complainant further submits that there was a market for digital learning material prior to the activities of the NDLA and that the NDLA competes at present with private undertakings offering digital learning resources. The complainant claims that on this basis the development and supply of digital learning resources constitutes an economic activity. The complainant further suggests that the other activities of the NDLA are closely linked to the development and supply of digital learning resources and are therefore also to be considered as economic in nature. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The complainant submits that the granting of funds to the NDLA for the purchase, development and supply of digital learning material constitutes illegal State aid to the NDLA. In that regard the complainant emphasises that — in his view — the NDLA is not an integrated part of the public administration but rather an undertaking within the meaning of State aid rules. The complainant recalls that according to established case law an undertaking is an entity which is engaged in economic activities. The complainant suggests that according to the ECJ case law an economic activity is an activity, which could, at least in principle, be carried out by a private undertaking in order to make profits. Then, the complainant argues that any entity, which carries out an activity which could be carried out to make profits, is engaged in an economic activity. The complainant further submits that there was a market for digital learning material prior to the activities of the NDLA and that the NDLA competes at present with private undertakings offering digital learning resources. The complainant claims that on this basis the development and supply of digital learning resources constitutes an economic activity. The complainant further suggests that the other activities of the NDLA are closely linked to the development and supply of digital learning resources and are therefore also to be considered as economic in nature.

| (8) | Furthermore, the complainant argues that the funds offered by the Ministry of Education and from the county municipalities to the NDLA for the purchase of digital learning material from third party suppliers also constitute State aid. Finally, the complainant submits that the fact that the State also made its content management system available to the NDLA free of charge — according to the complainant — also amounts to State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Furthermore, the complainant argues that the funds offered by the Ministry of Education and from the county municipalities to the NDLA for the purchase of digital learning material from third party suppliers also constitute State aid. Finally, the complainant submits that the fact that the State also made its content management system available to the NDLA free of charge — according to the complainant — also amounts to State aid.

| (9) | The complainant notes that the measure has not been notified. He continues to argue that Article 59(2) EEA is not applicable and concludes that — in the absence of a notification — the Norwegian State has granted State aid contrary to State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

The complainant notes that the measure has not been notified. He continues to argue that Article 59(2) EEA is not applicable and concludes that — in the absence of a notification — the Norwegian State has granted State aid contrary to State aid rules.

3.   Background

3.1.   
  The educational system in Norway

| (10) | Education in Norway is mandatory for all children aged from 6 to 16 and is provided through a system of free public schools. This system is divided into a compulsory elementary school (age 6 to 13), a compulsory lower secondary school (age 13 to 16), and the upper secondary school (age 16 to 19). |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Education in Norway is mandatory for all children aged from 6 to 16 and is provided through a system of free public schools. This system is divided into a compulsory elementary school (age 6 to 13), a compulsory lower secondary school (age 13 to 16), and the upper secondary school (age 16 to 19).

| (11) | In 2006 the Norwegian authorities decided in the course of the ‘Knowledge Promotion Initiative’ (Kunnskapsløftet) that all Norwegian schools were to emphasise certain basic skills in all subjects. One of these skills is the ability to learn a given subject by using information and communication technology. This requirement was introduced in the national curricula for pupils in the 10-year compulsory school (i.e. school for grades 1 to 9) and for pupils in the first year of upper secondary education (i.e. school for grades 10 to 12) and apprenticeships. Under the Norwegian Education Act (4) the county municipalities are responsible for meeting these requirements. Furthermore, in 2007 the Norwegian authorities amended the Education Act and obliged the county municipalities to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

In 2006 the Norwegian authorities decided in the course of the ‘Knowledge Promotion Initiative’ (Kunnskapsløftet) that all Norwegian schools were to emphasise certain basic skills in all subjects. One of these skills is the ability to learn a given subject by using information and communication technology. This requirement was introduced in the national curricula for pupils in the 10-year compulsory school (i.e. school for grades 1 to 9) and for pupils in the first year of upper secondary education (i.e. school for grades 10 to 12) and apprenticeships. Under the Norwegian Education Act (4) the county municipalities are responsible for meeting these requirements. Furthermore, in 2007 the Norwegian authorities amended the Education Act and obliged the county municipalities to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge.

| (12) | It should be noted that until that time, pupils in Norwegian upper secondary school (grades 10 to 12) had to purchase their learning material themselves based on the choice of learning material designated by the schools in compliance with the national curricula (5). Under the new Education Act, county municipalities are obliged to provide all learning material, i.e. digital learning material as well as physical learning material such as books, to pupils free of charge (6). |
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(12)

It should be noted that until that time, pupils in Norwegian upper secondary school (grades 10 to 12) had to purchase their learning material themselves based on the choice of learning material designated by the schools in compliance with the national curricula (5). Under the new Education Act, county municipalities are obliged to provide all learning material, i.e. digital learning material as well as physical learning material such as books, to pupils free of charge (6).

| (13) | The obligation of providing digital and physical learning material for free constitutes a considerable financial burden for the Norwegian county municipalities. In view of these additional costs, the Norwegian government decided already in 2006 to provide additional funds. The provision of these funds is laid down in a revised State budget which was adopted in May 2006:
  ‘The Government aims to introduce free teaching material for secondary education. At the same time, it is desirable to encourage the use of digital learning materials in secondary education. As part of the efforts to bring down the cost for each student through increased access to and use of digital teaching aids, the Government proposes to allocate NOK 50 million as a commitment to the development and use of digital learning resources.
  Counties are invited to apply for funding for the development and use of digital learning resources. Applications from counties may include one, several, or all secondary schools in the county, and may include one or more subjects. The objective of the grant is to encourage the development and use of digital learning resources, and to help reduce students' expenses for teaching aids.
  The funds can be used for the provision or for local development of digital learning resources. The funds shall not be used for the preparation of digital infrastructure for learning. The intention is to give priority to applications that involve inter-county cooperation.’ (7) |
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(13)

The obligation of providing digital and physical learning material for free constitutes a considerable financial burden for the Norwegian county municipalities. In view of these additional costs, the Norwegian government decided already in 2006 to provide additional funds. The provision of these funds is laid down in a revised State budget which was adopted in May 2006:

‘The Government aims to introduce free teaching material for secondary education. At the same time, it is desirable to encourage the use of digital learning materials in secondary education. As part of the efforts to bring down the cost for each student through increased access to and use of digital teaching aids, the Government proposes to allocate NOK 50 million as a commitment to the development and use of digital learning resources.

Counties are invited to apply for funding for the development and use of digital learning resources. Applications from counties may include one, several, or all secondary schools in the county, and may include one or more subjects. The objective of the grant is to encourage the development and use of digital learning resources, and to help reduce students' expenses for teaching aids.

The funds can be used for the provision or for local development of digital learning resources. The funds shall not be used for the preparation of digital infrastructure for learning. The intention is to give priority to applications that involve inter-county cooperation.’ (7)

| (14) | In June 2006 the Ministry of Education submitted an invitation to the county municipalities to jointly apply for the available funds of NOK 50 million. The letter describes the objectives and the concept of the initiative as follows:
  ‘The Ministry of Education has the following objectives for the initiative:






  — | To increase access to and use of digital learning materials in secondary education. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(14)

In June 2006 the Ministry of Education submitted an invitation to the county municipalities to jointly apply for the available funds of NOK 50 million. The letter describes the objectives and the concept of the initiative as follows:

‘The Ministry of Education has the following objectives for the initiative:

—

To increase access to and use of digital learning materials in secondary education.

| — | To develop secondary schools and school owners’ competence as developers and/or purchasers of digital learning materials. |
| --- | --- |

—

To develop secondary schools and school owners’ competence as developers and/or purchasers of digital learning materials.

| — | To Increase the volume and diversity of digital teaching materials aimed at secondary schools. |
| --- | --- |

—

To Increase the volume and diversity of digital teaching materials aimed at secondary schools.

| — | Over time to reduce students' expenses for teaching aids. |
| --- | --- |

—

Over time to reduce students' expenses for teaching aids.

[...]

The funds can be used to purchase digital learning resources and to locally develop digital learning resources.’ (8)

| (15) | In August 2006 the heads of education of the 19 Norwegian county municipalities met to discuss the possibility of a joint application for the funds in question based on the requested inter-county cooperation. While the municipality of Oslo decided not to participate in a cooperative project, the other 18 municipalities decided to enter into the inter-county cooperation and to set up the NDLA to manage the process. Each of these municipalities subsequently adopted the following resolution:
  ‘The County Council passes a resolution for the following counties, Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, Nordland, Nord-Trondelag, More og Romsdal, Oppland, Rogaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Sor-Trondelag, Telemark, Troms, Vest-College, Vesold and Østfold, to establish an inter-county cooperation body, the NDLA, with its own Board in accordance with §27 of the Local Government Act. The purpose of this collaboration is to facilitate the purchase, development, deployment and organisation of digital learning resources for all subjects in upper secondary education. The result shall be free digital learning material that facilitates active learning and sharing...’ (9) |
| --- | --- |

(15)

In August 2006 the heads of education of the 19 Norwegian county municipalities met to discuss the possibility of a joint application for the funds in question based on the requested inter-county cooperation. While the municipality of Oslo decided not to participate in a cooperative project, the other 18 municipalities decided to enter into the inter-county cooperation and to set up the NDLA to manage the process. Each of these municipalities subsequently adopted the following resolution:

‘The County Council passes a resolution for the following counties, Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, Nordland, Nord-Trondelag, More og Romsdal, Oppland, Rogaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Sor-Trondelag, Telemark, Troms, Vest-College, Vesold and Østfold, to establish an inter-county cooperation body, the NDLA, with its own Board in accordance with §27 of the Local Government Act. The purpose of this collaboration is to facilitate the purchase, development, deployment and organisation of digital learning resources for all subjects in upper secondary education. The result shall be free digital learning material that facilitates active learning and sharing...’ (9)

| (16) | Subsequently, an application for the State funds was submitted to the Ministry of Education, which in April 2007 granted the funds under a number of conditions:
  ‘The Ministry requests further that the counties jointly identify a responsible legal entity that will take care of the counties’ responsibility for digital learning resources under this initiative. Such an entity can be e.g. a corporation, an inter (county) municipal corporation or a host (county) municipality but it cannot itself engage in economic activity.
  [...]
  The Ministry expects that the purchase of digital learning materials and development services are performed in accordance with the regulations for public procurement. The development of digital learning resources by county employees is to be regarded as an activity for its own account, provided that the counties do not gain any profits from this activity. The development by people who are not county employees must be regarded as the purchase of services and should be evaluated based on the rules and regulations for public procurement in the usual way.’ (10) |
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(16)

Subsequently, an application for the State funds was submitted to the Ministry of Education, which in April 2007 granted the funds under a number of conditions:

‘The Ministry requests further that the counties jointly identify a responsible legal entity that will take care of the counties’ responsibility for digital learning resources under this initiative. Such an entity can be e.g. a corporation, an inter (county) municipal corporation or a host (county) municipality but it cannot itself engage in economic activity.

[...]

The Ministry expects that the purchase of digital learning materials and development services are performed in accordance with the regulations for public procurement. The development of digital learning resources by county employees is to be regarded as an activity for its own account, provided that the counties do not gain any profits from this activity. The development by people who are not county employees must be regarded as the purchase of services and should be evaluated based on the rules and regulations for public procurement in the usual way.’ (10)

| (17) | Following the approval of the funds the Ministry of Education transferred over a period of three years NOK 30,5 million (NOK 17 million in 2007, NOK 9 million in 2008 and NOK 4,5 million in 2009) to the participating municipalities for the NDLA project. |
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(17)

Following the approval of the funds the Ministry of Education transferred over a period of three years NOK 30,5 million (NOK 17 million in 2007, NOK 9 million in 2008 and NOK 4,5 million in 2009) to the participating municipalities for the NDLA project.

| (18) | Besides, following the amendment of the Education Act in 2007, the county municipalities were compensated for the obligations to provide (physical and digital) learning material through an increase in the county municipal grant scheme. This compensation was based on the estimated costs of providing learning materials in all subjects. The compensation amounted to NOK 287 million in 2007, NOK 211 million in 2008, NOK 347 million in 2009 and NOK 308 million in 2010. |
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(18)

Besides, following the amendment of the Education Act in 2007, the county municipalities were compensated for the obligations to provide (physical and digital) learning material through an increase in the county municipal grant scheme. This compensation was based on the estimated costs of providing learning materials in all subjects. The compensation amounted to NOK 287 million in 2007, NOK 211 million in 2008, NOK 347 million in 2009 and NOK 308 million in 2010.

| (19) | The participating municipalities decided to use part of these funds for the NDLA project. The county municipalities allocated NOK 21,1 million (2008), NOK 34,7 million (2009), NOK 58,8 million (2010) and NOK 57,7 million (2011) to the project. |
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(19)

The participating municipalities decided to use part of these funds for the NDLA project. The county municipalities allocated NOK 21,1 million (2008), NOK 34,7 million (2009), NOK 58,8 million (2010) and NOK 57,7 million (2011) to the project.

| (20) | The EFTA Court emphasised that it is apparent from the case file that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act (11). |
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(20)

The EFTA Court emphasised that it is apparent from the case file that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act (11).

| (21) | There are currently two other projects concerning digital learning in Norway. Firstly, the municipality of Oslo has applied for a similar grant for its own project (Real Digital). Secondly, the Ministry of Education itself is working on a similar project (Utdanning). |
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(21)

There are currently two other projects concerning digital learning in Norway. Firstly, the municipality of Oslo has applied for a similar grant for its own project (Real Digital). Secondly, the Ministry of Education itself is working on a similar project (Utdanning).

| (22) | The municipality of Oslo does not participate in the NDLA project and has submitted an application for funding for its own project called Real Digital. The Norwegian government accepted the application from Oslo and granted NOK 13,5 million to the municipality of Oslo over a period of two years (NOK 8 million in 2007 and NOK 5,5 million in 2008). It should be noted that the funds provided to the municipality of Oslo are not subject to the complaint at hand. |
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(22)

The municipality of Oslo does not participate in the NDLA project and has submitted an application for funding for its own project called Real Digital. The Norwegian government accepted the application from Oslo and granted NOK 13,5 million to the municipality of Oslo over a period of two years (NOK 8 million in 2007 and NOK 5,5 million in 2008). It should be noted that the funds provided to the municipality of Oslo are not subject to the complaint at hand.

| (23) | The Ministry of Education has decided to provide its own system for access to digital learning material. In that regard the Ministry can both develop digital learning material and/or acquire such learning material from third party suppliers. The Ministry acknowledges that there might be areas where the activities of the Ministry of Education might overlap with the activities of the NDLA. In its letter stating the conditions of the grant the Ministry of Education reserved itself the right to reallocate funds originally earmarked for the NDLA to the Ministry’s own project. The relevant funds provided to the Ministry of Education are not subject to the complaint at hand. |
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(23)

The Ministry of Education has decided to provide its own system for access to digital learning material. In that regard the Ministry can both develop digital learning material and/or acquire such learning material from third party suppliers. The Ministry acknowledges that there might be areas where the activities of the Ministry of Education might overlap with the activities of the NDLA. In its letter stating the conditions of the grant the Ministry of Education reserved itself the right to reallocate funds originally earmarked for the NDLA to the Ministry’s own project. The relevant funds provided to the Ministry of Education are not subject to the complaint at hand.

3.2.   
  National legal basis for the measure

| (24) | The legal basis for the funds paid by the Ministry of Education to the NDLA is the State budget resolution of the Stortinget in combination with the delegation of competence to the Ministry of Education to approve applications for grants. The legal basis for the grants from the county municipalities to the NDLA is budget resolution of the participating county municipalities. |
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(24)

The legal basis for the funds paid by the Ministry of Education to the NDLA is the State budget resolution of the Stortinget in combination with the delegation of competence to the Ministry of Education to approve applications for grants. The legal basis for the grants from the county municipalities to the NDLA is budget resolution of the participating county municipalities.

3.3.   
  Recipient

| (25) | The NDLA is organised as an inter-county cooperation body under Article 27 of the Local Government Act. This provision stipulates that municipalities or county municipalities may join forces to solve mutual tasks. The cooperation should take place through a board appointed by the relevant municipal or county municipal boards. The board may be empowered to adopt decisions concerning the operation and organisation of the inter municipal cooperation. Moreover, the provision stipulates that the articles of association of such cooperation shall determine the appointment and representation in the board, the area of activities, whether the participating municipalities shall make financial contributions, whether the board may enter into loan agreements or in other ways make the participating municipalities liable for financial obligations and, finally, how such cooperation shall be abolished. |
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(25)

The NDLA is organised as an inter-county cooperation body under Article 27 of the Local Government Act. This provision stipulates that municipalities or county municipalities may join forces to solve mutual tasks. The cooperation should take place through a board appointed by the relevant municipal or county municipal boards. The board may be empowered to adopt decisions concerning the operation and organisation of the inter municipal cooperation. Moreover, the provision stipulates that the articles of association of such cooperation shall determine the appointment and representation in the board, the area of activities, whether the participating municipalities shall make financial contributions, whether the board may enter into loan agreements or in other ways make the participating municipalities liable for financial obligations and, finally, how such cooperation shall be abolished.

| (26) | Participation in such cooperation is only open for municipalities and county municipalities. Neither the State nor other State entities or private parties can participate. The cooperation must be sincere in the sense that the law prohibits that the competence to govern the cooperation is delegated to one municipality. This is so since municipal tasks and obligations shall remain the responsibility of each municipality (12). |
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(26)

Participation in such cooperation is only open for municipalities and county municipalities. Neither the State nor other State entities or private parties can participate. The cooperation must be sincere in the sense that the law prohibits that the competence to govern the cooperation is delegated to one municipality. This is so since municipal tasks and obligations shall remain the responsibility of each municipality (12).

3.4.   
  Amount

| (27) | As indicated above, so far the county municipalities have transferred NOK 21,1 million in 2008, NOK 34,7 million in 2009 and NOK 61,6 million in 2010 to the NDLA project. In 2010 the county municipalities allocated NOK 58,8 million to the project and in 2011 this amount was NOK 56,9 million. |
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(27)

As indicated above, so far the county municipalities have transferred NOK 21,1 million in 2008, NOK 34,7 million in 2009 and NOK 61,6 million in 2010 to the NDLA project. In 2010 the county municipalities allocated NOK 58,8 million to the project and in 2011 this amount was NOK 56,9 million.

3.5.   
  Duration

| (28) | The NDLA project is not subject to a limited duration. |
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(28)

The NDLA project is not subject to a limited duration.

4.   The Decision

| (29) | On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL holding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. The Authority found that the NDLA was not to be considered as an undertaking because it did not carry out an economic activity. |
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(29)

On 12 October 2011 the Authority adopted Decision No 311/11/COL holding that the measure did not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. The Authority found that the NDLA was not to be considered as an undertaking because it did not carry out an economic activity.

| (30) | In that regard the Authority, firstly, noted that, according to established case law and decision practice, in setting up and maintaining the national education system the State fulfils its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields (13). The Authority observed that the purchase, development and supply of learning material is inextricably linked to the provision of teaching content and is thus an inherent part of the actual teaching itself. In that regard it noted that the learning material forms both the basis and the framework for teaching and that the development of learning material is closely linked to the curriculum which is also established by the public authorities. |
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(30)

In that regard the Authority, firstly, noted that, according to established case law and decision practice, in setting up and maintaining the national education system the State fulfils its duties towards its own population in the social, cultural and educational fields (13). The Authority observed that the purchase, development and supply of learning material is inextricably linked to the provision of teaching content and is thus an inherent part of the actual teaching itself. In that regard it noted that the learning material forms both the basis and the framework for teaching and that the development of learning material is closely linked to the curriculum which is also established by the public authorities.

| (31) | Secondly, the Authority pointed out that, for a service to be considered as non-economic, it must be provided based on the principle of national solidarity, which means that the activity must be funded by the public purse and not through remuneration. In other words, there should be no connection between the actual costs of the service provided and the fee paid by those benefiting from the activity (14). In that regard the Authority concluded that this requirement was fulfilled because the NDLA is entirely funded by the State and distributes the developed or purchased learning material free of any charge. |
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(31)

Secondly, the Authority pointed out that, for a service to be considered as non-economic, it must be provided based on the principle of national solidarity, which means that the activity must be funded by the public purse and not through remuneration. In other words, there should be no connection between the actual costs of the service provided and the fee paid by those benefiting from the activity (14). In that regard the Authority concluded that this requirement was fulfilled because the NDLA is entirely funded by the State and distributes the developed or purchased learning material free of any charge.

| (32) | Thirdly, the Authority noted that in cases in which the activity in question is carried out by entities other than the State itself, the recipient of the funds (public or private) must be subject to the control of the State to the extent that the recipient merely applies the law and cannot influence the statutory conditions of the service (i.e. the amount of the contributions, the use of assets and the fixing of the level of benefits) (15). In that regard the Authority noted that the participating municipalities have established the NDLA as an inter-county cooperation body in accordance with Article 27 of the local government act, referred to above. In view of the above, the Authority concluded in its Decision that the NDLA did not carry out an economic activity. Consequently, the NDLA did not act as an undertaking and the funds which the county municipalities transferred to it did not constitute State aid. |
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(32)

Thirdly, the Authority noted that in cases in which the activity in question is carried out by entities other than the State itself, the recipient of the funds (public or private) must be subject to the control of the State to the extent that the recipient merely applies the law and cannot influence the statutory conditions of the service (i.e. the amount of the contributions, the use of assets and the fixing of the level of benefits) (15). In that regard the Authority noted that the participating municipalities have established the NDLA as an inter-county cooperation body in accordance with Article 27 of the local government act, referred to above. In view of the above, the Authority concluded in its Decision that the NDLA did not carry out an economic activity. Consequently, the NDLA did not act as an undertaking and the funds which the county municipalities transferred to it did not constitute State aid.

5.   Judgment in Case E-1/12

| (33) | On 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled Decision No 311/11/COL. The EFTA Court concluded that the Authority did not carry out a sufficient examination into several issues and should have opened the formal investigation procedure. |
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(33)

On 11 December 2012 the EFTA Court annulled Decision No 311/11/COL. The EFTA Court concluded that the Authority did not carry out a sufficient examination into several issues and should have opened the formal investigation procedure.

| (34) | Firstly, the EFTA Court noted that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant to Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act. According to the EFTA Court it remains unclear how this change in the legal and organisational status may have changed the decision-making process and the source of funding (16). |
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(34)

Firstly, the EFTA Court noted that the NDLA was active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established as an inter-county cooperation body pursuant to Article 27 of the Norwegian Local Government Act. According to the EFTA Court it remains unclear how this change in the legal and organisational status may have changed the decision-making process and the source of funding (16).

| (35) | Secondly, the EFTA Court stated that it remains unclear whether the legislation imposes the obligation to provide the services free of charge on the counties or on the NDLA (17). According to the EFTA Court this circumstance raises serious difficulties with regard to the application of the principle of solidarity. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Secondly, the EFTA Court stated that it remains unclear whether the legislation imposes the obligation to provide the services free of charge on the counties or on the NDLA (17). According to the EFTA Court this circumstance raises serious difficulties with regard to the application of the principle of solidarity.

| (36) | Thirdly, the EFTA Court stated that there are aspects related to the autonomy of the NDLA which remain unclear. First, the EFTA Court noted that it is unclear, how the decisions to expand the NDLA’s activities were taken and by whom (18). Furthermore, the EFTA Court pointed out that Article 8 of the Articles of Association of the NDLA states that ‘the board (of the NDLA) has the competence to impose financial obligations on the participants (19).’ Moreover, it follows from the judgment that the annulled decision lacked information as regards the autonomy of the the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedure through which it purchases goods on the market and hires staff (20). |
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(36)

Thirdly, the EFTA Court stated that there are aspects related to the autonomy of the NDLA which remain unclear. First, the EFTA Court noted that it is unclear, how the decisions to expand the NDLA’s activities were taken and by whom (18). Furthermore, the EFTA Court pointed out that Article 8 of the Articles of Association of the NDLA states that ‘the board (of the NDLA) has the competence to impose financial obligations on the participants (19).’ Moreover, it follows from the judgment that the annulled decision lacked information as regards the autonomy of the the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedure through which it purchases goods on the market and hires staff (20).

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of State aid

| (37) | According to Article 61(1) EEA ‘[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(37)

According to Article 61(1) EEA ‘[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

1.1.   
  State resources

| (38) | A measure is financed by the State or through State resources, if it results in a burden on the budget of a public authority or on a public or private undertaking provided that the measure is imputable to the State (21). In the case at hand the financing of the project results in a burden on the budget of the counties and of the Ministry of Education and Research. Consequently, the measure is financed by the State within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

A measure is financed by the State or through State resources, if it results in a burden on the budget of a public authority or on a public or private undertaking provided that the measure is imputable to the State (21). In the case at hand the financing of the project results in a burden on the budget of the counties and of the Ministry of Education and Research. Consequently, the measure is financed by the State within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA.

1.2.   
  Advantage to an undertaking

| (39) | As mentioned above, the Authority concluded in its previous decision that the county municipalities’ provision of free, and in this case digital learning material for pupils in the national elementary and secondary school system to be a part of the State's fulfilment of its duty in the educational field and hence a non-economic activity provided under the principle of solidarity as such material is fully funded by the State. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

As mentioned above, the Authority concluded in its previous decision that the county municipalities’ provision of free, and in this case digital learning material for pupils in the national elementary and secondary school system to be a part of the State's fulfilment of its duty in the educational field and hence a non-economic activity provided under the principle of solidarity as such material is fully funded by the State.

| (40) | However, in its judgment the EFTA Court addressed several aspects relating not to the nature of the activity as such but rather to organisational aspects of the NDLA, its financing and autonomy, which should have led the Authority to open a formal investigation procedure. |
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(40)

However, in its judgment the EFTA Court addressed several aspects relating not to the nature of the activity as such but rather to organisational aspects of the NDLA, its financing and autonomy, which should have led the Authority to open a formal investigation procedure.

| (41) | The EFTA Court noted that the Articles of Association of the NDLA foresaw that the formalised cooperation would enter into force on 1 July 2009 (22). At the same time, the EFTA Court noted that the county municipalities resolutions of August 2006 foresaw that the inter-county cooperation would enter into force on 1 January 2010 (23). In view of the above and taking into account that the NDLA was already active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established, the EFTA Court found that the Authority should have investigated the effects of the organisational changes and legal status of the NDLA may have affected its decision making process and the sources of its funding and how it may have changed over time (24). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The EFTA Court noted that the Articles of Association of the NDLA foresaw that the formalised cooperation would enter into force on 1 July 2009 (22). At the same time, the EFTA Court noted that the county municipalities resolutions of August 2006 foresaw that the inter-county cooperation would enter into force on 1 January 2010 (23). In view of the above and taking into account that the NDLA was already active as an ad hoc cooperation before it was formally established, the EFTA Court found that the Authority should have investigated the effects of the organisational changes and legal status of the NDLA may have affected its decision making process and the sources of its funding and how it may have changed over time (24).

| (42) | The Authority’s Decision described the project phase of the NDLA; the Authority thus acknowledges that the information in the case file does indeed suggest that the NDLA entered into force on 1 July 2009 and thus six months earlier than originally foreseen in the resolutions which the county-municipalities had adopted several years earlier. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Authority’s Decision described the project phase of the NDLA; the Authority thus acknowledges that the information in the case file does indeed suggest that the NDLA entered into force on 1 July 2009 and thus six months earlier than originally foreseen in the resolutions which the county-municipalities had adopted several years earlier.

| (43) | The complainant has not alleged that the NDLA in its project phase, i.e. before its entry into force as a inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, did engage in any other activities than what it has done after its formal establishment Nevertheless, the EFTA Court points out that the lack of information about how the county municipalities organised their cooperation to comply with their obligations to provide learning material in the NDLA project phase may have an impact on the classification of the activities as non-economic. For that reason the Court emphasised that the Authority should have carried out an investigation on the effects of the change in legal status on the decision making process in the NDLA (25). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The complainant has not alleged that the NDLA in its project phase, i.e. before its entry into force as a inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, did engage in any other activities than what it has done after its formal establishment Nevertheless, the EFTA Court points out that the lack of information about how the county municipalities organised their cooperation to comply with their obligations to provide learning material in the NDLA project phase may have an impact on the classification of the activities as non-economic. For that reason the Court emphasised that the Authority should have carried out an investigation on the effects of the change in legal status on the decision making process in the NDLA (25).

| (44) | In that regard it is the Authority’s understanding that prior to the formal establishment the project was managed by the ‘forum for the county municipalities Heads of Education’ (hereafter: FFU) (26), which appointed board members to carry out delegated tasks in the project phase. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

In that regard it is the Authority’s understanding that prior to the formal establishment the project was managed by the ‘forum for the county municipalities Heads of Education’ (hereafter: FFU) (26), which appointed board members to carry out delegated tasks in the project phase.

| (45) | After the NDLA had been formally established and according to §7(2) of the Articles of Association the forum of the counties’ Heads of Education became the Supervisory Board which remains responsible for the overall management. The forum of the counties’ Heads of Education appoints the Management Board management board. According to §7(1) of the Articles of Association the Management Board is composed of five members with one member of the FFU and at least one representative of the training regions (i.e. Northern Region, South Western Region and Eastern Region. According to §8 of the Articles of Association, the task of the Management Board is to ensure that the NDLA is able to perform its duties under §2 of the Articles of Association, namely to ensure that (1) that digital educational materials are available to users free of charge, (2) that secondary school is characterised by collaboration and sharing (3) that students and teacher actively participate in teaching and learning, (4) that academic institutions and networks across the country are a driving force in the development of excellent digital learning material and (5) that the market provides content and services for students and teachers needs. Furthermore, the Management Board has the authority to incur financial obligations on the participants in that regard. However, §7(2) of the Articles of Association explicitly states that the Management Board only exercises its authority on the basis of delegation decisions of the Supervisory Board and that the Supervisory Board may instruct the Management Board and overrule its decisions. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

After the NDLA had been formally established and according to §7(2) of the Articles of Association the forum of the counties’ Heads of Education became the Supervisory Board which remains responsible for the overall management. The forum of the counties’ Heads of Education appoints the Management Board management board. According to §7(1) of the Articles of Association the Management Board is composed of five members with one member of the FFU and at least one representative of the training regions (i.e. Northern Region, South Western Region and Eastern Region. According to §8 of the Articles of Association, the task of the Management Board is to ensure that the NDLA is able to perform its duties under §2 of the Articles of Association, namely to ensure that (1) that digital educational materials are available to users free of charge, (2) that secondary school is characterised by collaboration and sharing (3) that students and teacher actively participate in teaching and learning, (4) that academic institutions and networks across the country are a driving force in the development of excellent digital learning material and (5) that the market provides content and services for students and teachers needs. Furthermore, the Management Board has the authority to incur financial obligations on the participants in that regard. However, §7(2) of the Articles of Association explicitly states that the Management Board only exercises its authority on the basis of delegation decisions of the Supervisory Board and that the Supervisory Board may instruct the Management Board and overrule its decisions.

| (46) | The Authority requests the Norwegian government and any interested third parties to explain whether they consider the NDLA to be an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. In particular they are asked to explain in more detail how the counties cooperated in the NDLA project phase and, in particular, to clarify at what time the NDLA entered into force and whether this entry into force of the municipal cooperation affected the decision making process and the sources of the NDLA’s funding. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities are invited to elaborate on the nature, practice and use of inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, including whether such cooperation is considered separate legal entities or not under Norwegian law. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority requests the Norwegian government and any interested third parties to explain whether they consider the NDLA to be an undertaking within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. In particular they are asked to explain in more detail how the counties cooperated in the NDLA project phase and, in particular, to clarify at what time the NDLA entered into force and whether this entry into force of the municipal cooperation affected the decision making process and the sources of the NDLA’s funding. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities are invited to elaborate on the nature, practice and use of inter municipal cooperation under Article 27 of the local government act, including whether such cooperation is considered separate legal entities or not under Norwegian law.

| (47) | The Authority moreover requests the Norwegian authorities to explain to what extent the change in legal status effected the decision making process, in particular, to what extent the NDLA can expand the scope of its activities without the consent of the participating municipalities or even against their will, and if the present situation differs from the situation prior to the formal establishment of the NDLA on 1 July 2009 (27). The Authority also invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more detail the funding of the NDLA, both in its project phase and after the formal entry into force up to and including 2012 (28). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority moreover requests the Norwegian authorities to explain to what extent the change in legal status effected the decision making process, in particular, to what extent the NDLA can expand the scope of its activities without the consent of the participating municipalities or even against their will, and if the present situation differs from the situation prior to the formal establishment of the NDLA on 1 July 2009 (27). The Authority also invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more detail the funding of the NDLA, both in its project phase and after the formal entry into force up to and including 2012 (28).

| (48) | The EFTA Court also found that it was unclear from the Decision whether the obligation to provide digital learning material free of charge falls upon the county municipalities or upon the NDLA (29). The EFTA Court noted that in the annulled Decision, the Authority ‘refers to the Norwegian legislation and states that it obliged the counties to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge’ (emphasis added) (30). The EFTA Court further noted that in the assessment on the autonomy of the NDLA, the annulled decision states that the NDLA cannot decide on charging fees to the end consumer ‘... since the legal framework obliges the NDLA to provide its services free of charge’ (emphasis added) (31). The judgment also refers to that the Authority at the oral hearing explained that it is the counties which bear the statutory obligation to offer this service free of charge and that they had decided to offer this service jointly through the NDLA (32). |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The EFTA Court also found that it was unclear from the Decision whether the obligation to provide digital learning material free of charge falls upon the county municipalities or upon the NDLA (29). The EFTA Court noted that in the annulled Decision, the Authority ‘refers to the Norwegian legislation and states that it obliged the counties to provide the pupils with the necessary printed and digital learning materials free of charge’ (emphasis added) (30). The EFTA Court further noted that in the assessment on the autonomy of the NDLA, the annulled decision states that the NDLA cannot decide on charging fees to the end consumer ‘... since the legal framework obliges the NDLA to provide its services free of charge’ (emphasis added) (31). The judgment also refers to that the Authority at the oral hearing explained that it is the counties which bear the statutory obligation to offer this service free of charge and that they had decided to offer this service jointly through the NDLA (32).

| (49) | In the view of that the EFTA Court considered the above mentioned statements in the decision to represent an implicit contradiction (as it was not clear who was the client of the NDLA), the Authority notes that the notion of ‘legal framework’ is wider than that of ‘legislation’. The reference to the legal framework encompasses not only the statutory obligation in national law (such as the Education Act), but also resolutions (such as the resolutions passed by the county municipalities in August 2006), as well as administrative acts (such as the April 2007 award of funding by the Ministry of Education) and the Articles of Association of the NDLA. The Authority does therefore not consider the above mentioned statements to contain any implicit contradiction. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

In the view of that the EFTA Court considered the above mentioned statements in the decision to represent an implicit contradiction (as it was not clear who was the client of the NDLA), the Authority notes that the notion of ‘legal framework’ is wider than that of ‘legislation’. The reference to the legal framework encompasses not only the statutory obligation in national law (such as the Education Act), but also resolutions (such as the resolutions passed by the county municipalities in August 2006), as well as administrative acts (such as the April 2007 award of funding by the Ministry of Education) and the Articles of Association of the NDLA. The Authority does therefore not consider the above mentioned statements to contain any implicit contradiction.

| (50) | However, based on the EFTA Court’s judgment the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more details how the obligation to provide free learning material has been imposed on the county municipalities in the Public Education Act, and how the county municipalities involved in the NDLA have fulfilled this obligation through the NDLA cooperation as set out in the Articles of Association. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

However, based on the EFTA Court’s judgment the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to explain in more details how the obligation to provide free learning material has been imposed on the county municipalities in the Public Education Act, and how the county municipalities involved in the NDLA have fulfilled this obligation through the NDLA cooperation as set out in the Articles of Association.

| (51) | Finally, the Court found that the decision did not contain sufficient information on the possibility of the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which it purchases goods and hires staff (33). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Finally, the Court found that the decision did not contain sufficient information on the possibility of the NDLA to set the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which it purchases goods and hires staff (33).

| (52) | The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more detail on how the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which the NDLA purchases goods and hires staff are set. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more detail on how the parameters for the public procurement procedures through which the NDLA purchases goods and hires staff are set.

| (53) | Consequently the Authority expresses doubts as to whether the NDLA, wholly or partly, before or after its formal entry into force, may be considered as an undertaking under the EEA State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Consequently the Authority expresses doubts as to whether the NDLA, wholly or partly, before or after its formal entry into force, may be considered as an undertaking under the EEA State aid rules.

1.3.   
  Selectivity

| (54) | It is established case law that a measure is selective if it derogates from the common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who are otherwise in the same legal and factual situation (34). In that regard the Authority notes that if the NDLA were to be considered as an undertaking, the funding of it would be selective since other operators would not benefit from a similar funding. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

It is established case law that a measure is selective if it derogates from the common regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who are otherwise in the same legal and factual situation (34). In that regard the Authority notes that if the NDLA were to be considered as an undertaking, the funding of it would be selective since other operators would not benefit from a similar funding.

1.4.   
  Effect on competition and trade

| (55) | It is established case law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared with other companies (35) and if the recipient is active in a sector, in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (36). In that regard the Norwegian authorities noted that the relevant geographic market for provision of learning materials made to fit the national Norwegian curricula should to a great extent be limited to Norway, so that the effects on cross-border trade are not significant. The Authority cannot at this stage and based on the information at hand conclude on the effects of the measure on competition and trade. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

It is established case law that a measure distorts or threatens to distort competition in a way that affects trade between Contracting Parties if it strengthens the position of the recipient compared with other companies (35) and if the recipient is active in a sector, in which trade between Contracting Parties takes place (36). In that regard the Norwegian authorities noted that the relevant geographic market for provision of learning materials made to fit the national Norwegian curricula should to a great extent be limited to Norway, so that the effects on cross-border trade are not significant. The Authority cannot at this stage and based on the information at hand conclude on the effects of the measure on competition and trade. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard.

2.   Compatibility

| (56) | The Norwegian authorities submitted that if one were to view the funding of the NDLA as State aid, then it would qualify as a compensation for a service of general economic interest under Article 59(2) EEA. However, based on the information at hand the Authority cannot at this stage conclude on the compatibility of the measure. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The Norwegian authorities submitted that if one were to view the funding of the NDLA as State aid, then it would qualify as a compensation for a service of general economic interest under Article 59(2) EEA. However, based on the information at hand the Authority cannot at this stage conclude on the compatibility of the measure. The Authority therefore invites Norway to provide further information in that regard.

3.   Conclusion

| (57) | Based on the information submitted by the complainant and by the Norwegian authorities, and taking into account the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority has doubts as to whether the grants to the NDLA constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts regarding the compatibility of the measure with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Based on the information submitted by the complainant and by the Norwegian authorities, and taking into account the judgment of the EFTA Court, the Authority has doubts as to whether the grants to the NDLA constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA. Furthermore, the Authority has doubts regarding the compatibility of the measure with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (58) | Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Given these doubts and the impact of potential State aid on the investments of private operators it appears necessary that the Authority opens the formal investigation procedure. Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to initiate the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3.

| (59) | The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measures in question are compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement or that they do not constitute State aid.

| (60) | The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the measure on the relevant markets. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The opening of the procedure will also enable interested third parties to comment on the questions raised and on the impact of the measure on the relevant markets.

| (61) | In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

In light of the foregoing considerations, the Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, hereby invites the Norwegian authorities to submit their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measures within one month from the date of receipt of this Decision.

| (62) | Further, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Further, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this Decision to the potential recipients of the aid immediately.

| (63) | The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. Moreover, according to Article 15 Part II of Protocol 3, the powers of the Authority to order the recovery of aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. This period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded. Any action taken by the Authority with regard to this unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Authority would like to remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully put at the disposal of the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. Moreover, according to Article 15 Part II of Protocol 3, the powers of the Authority to order the recovery of aid are subject to a limitation period of 10 years. This period begins on the day on which the unlawful aid is awarded. Any action taken by the Authority with regard to this unlawful aid shall interrupt the limitation period.

| (64) | Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the EEA Supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication, |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Attention is drawn to the fact that the Authority will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the EEA Supplement of the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European. All interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure, provided for in Article 1(2) of part I of Protocol 3 is initiated regarding the potential State aid to the NDLA.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the notification of this Decision.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide within one month from notification of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the nature and compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English version of this Decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 27 March 2013.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Oda Helen SLETNES

President

Sabine MONAUNI-TÖMÖRDY

College Member

---

(1)  Sag E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening (endnu ikke offentliggjort).

1

Den norske Forleggerforening

(2)  See footnote 1.

2

(3)  Norway is divided into 19 municipalities, all of which participate in the NDLA project with the exception of the county municipality of Oslo. Participants are therefore the municipalities of Akershus, Aust-Agder, Buskerud, Finnmark, Hedmark, Hordaland, Nordland, Nord-Trøndelag, Møre og Romsdal, Oppland, Rogaland, Sogn og Fjordane, Sør-Trøndelag, Telemark, Troms, Vest-Agder, Vestfold and Østfold.

3

(4)  Act of 17 July 1998 No 61 relating to Primary and Secondary Education and Training (The Education Act).

4

(5)  As the national curricula set out the objectives for the learning outcome of all classes, the content of the learning material must respect the objectives of the national curricula.

5

(6)  Sections 3-l and 4A-3 of the Education Act states that the county municipality is responsible for providing pupils with the necessary printed and digital teaching material as well as digital equipment free of charge.

6

(7)  Translation made by the Authority.

7

(8)  See footnote 7.

8

(9)  See footnote 7.

9

(10)  See footnote 7.

10

(11)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 117 (not yet published).

11

Den norske Forleggerforening

(12)  NOU 1996:5 pkt. 8.1.2.

12

(13)  Case 263/86 Humbel [1988] ECR 5383, para. 18; Case E-05/7 Private Barnehagers Landsforbund [2008] EFTA Ct. Rep. 64, para. 82; Commission decision No 118/2000 France — Aide aux clubs sportifs professionels, OJ C 333, 28.11.2001, p. 6.

13

Humbel

Private Barnehagers Landsforbund

France — Aide aux clubs sportifs professionels

(14)  Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-2493, para. 47; Case C-160/91 Poucet [1993] ECR I-637, paras. 11 and 12.

14

AOK Bundesverband and Others

(15)  Case C-160/91 Poucet [1993] ECR I-637, para. 15 and 18; Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01 and C-355/01 AOK Bundesverband and Others [2004] ECR I-2493, paras. 46-57; Case C-218/00 Cisal die Battistello Venanzi [2002] ECR I-691, para. 31-46. These cases concern health and social insurances. However, the fact that the Commission explicitly refers to these cases in the context of professional services indicates that the assessment can be generally applied (see Commission Communication ‘Report on Competition in Professional Services’ of 9.2.2004 (COM(2004) 83 final, Fn. 22).

15

Poucet

AOK Bundesverband and Others

Cisal die Battistello Venanzi

(16)  See footnote 11.

16

(17)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 123 (not yet published).

17

Den norske Forleggerforening

(18)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 127 (not yet published).

18

Den norske Forleggerforening

(19)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, paras. 128-130 (not yet published).

19

Den norske Forleggerforening

(20)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 131 (not yet published).

20

Den norske Forleggerforening

(21)  Case C-482/99 France v Commission (Stardust) [2002] ECR I-4397, para. 52.

21

France

Commission (Stardust)

(22)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, para. 115 (not yet published).

22

Den norske Forleggerforening

(23)  The EFTA Court refers to the submission from Norway dated 9 September 2010, p. 3.

23

(24)  See footnote 11.

24

(25)  See footnote 11.

25

(26)  The Norwegian wording is: ‘Forum for fylkesutdanningssjefer’.

26

(27)  See footnote 11.

27

(28)  See footnote 11.

28

(29)  Case E-1/12 Den norske Forleggerforening, paras. 121-123 (not yet published).

29

Den norske Forleggerforening

(30)  The EFTA Court seems to refer to para. 12 and footnote 4 of the annulled decision according to which ‘Section 3-1 and 4A-3 of the Education Act states that the county municipality is responsible for providing pupils with the necessary printed and digital teaching material as well as digital equipment free of charge.’

30

(31)  The EFTA Court refers to para. 45 of the annulled decision in para. 121 of the Judgment.

31

(32)  See footnote 17.

32

(33)  See footnote 20.

33

(34)  Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline [2001] ECR I-8365, para. 41; Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P Commission and Spain v Gibraltar and UK (Gibraltar corporate tax) [2011] not yet published, para. 36.

34

Adria-Wien Pipeline

Commission and Spain

Gibraltar and UK (Gibraltar corporate tax)

(35)  Case 730/79 Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, [2005] ECR, 2671, para. 11.

35

Holland

(36)  Case 102/87, France v Commission (SEB), [1988], 4067, Case C-310/99, Italian Republic v Commission, [2002] EC R I-289, para. 85, Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), [2003] ECR, I-7747, para. 77; Case T-55/99, Confederación Espanola de Tranporte de Mercancias (CETM) v Commission, [2000] ECR II-3207, para. 86.

36

France

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

Confederación Espanola de Tranporte de Mercancias (CETM)

Commission

---

V Øvrige meddelelser

ANDET

Europa-Kommissionen

| 8.8.2013 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 229/43 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

8.8.2013

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 229/43

---

Offentliggørelse af en ansøgning i henhold til artikel 50, stk. 2, litra a), i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 om kvalitetsordninger for landbrugsprodukter og fødevarer

2013/C 229/11

Denne offentliggørelse giver ret til at rejse indsigelse mod ansøgningen, jf. artikel 51 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012 (1).

ENHEDSDOKUMENT

RÅDETS FORORDNING (EF) Nr. 510/2006

om beskyttelse af geografiske betegnelser og oprindelsesbetegnelser
   (2)

»ANTEP BAKLAVASI«/»GAZİANTEP BAKLAVASI«

EF-Nr.: TR-PGI-0005-0781-10.07.2009

BGB ( X ) BOB ( )

1.   Betegnelse

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«

2.   Medlemsstat eller tredjeland

Tyrkiet

3.   Beskrivelse af landbrugsproduktet eller fødevaren

3.1.   Produkttype

| Kategori 2.4. | Brød, wienerbrød, kager, kiks og andet bagværk samt konfekturevarer |
| --- | --- |

Kategori 2.4.

Brød, wienerbrød, kager, kiks og andet bagværk samt konfekturevarer

3.2.   Beskrivelse af produktet med betegnelsen i punkt 1

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« er et sødt bagværk fremstillet af lag af filodej fyldt med semuljefløde og Antep-pistacienødder og sødet med sirup.

Afhængigt af den varetype, der markedsføres (tør eller frisk), skal den gennemsnitlige procentdel af de grundlæggende råvarer være som følger (med ± 3 % udsving):

| | Normal (frisk) | Tør |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Dej | 25 % | 30 % |
| Antep-pistacienød (Antep fıstığı) | 10-11 % | 10-11 % |
| Semuljefløde | 12-13 % | — |
| Almindeligt smør | 15-20 % | 20-25 % |
| Sirup | 35-36 % | 35-36 % |

Normal (frisk)

Tør

Dej

25 %

30 %

Antep-pistacienød (Antep fıstığı)

10-11 %

10-11 %

Semuljefløde

12-13 %

—

Almindeligt smør

15-20 %

20-25 %

Sirup

35-36 %

35-36 %

Forskellen mellem tørre og friske »baklava« er, at førstnævnte ikke indeholder semuljefløde.

Beskrivelse af »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«:

| | Aroma: Kommer fra Antep-pistacienødder (antep fıstığı) og almindeligt smør; |
| --- | --- |

Aroma: Kommer fra Antep-pistacienødder (antep fıstığı) og almindeligt smør;

| | Farve: Overfladen af »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« er gyldengul og den underste del er mørkegrøn på grund af Antep-pistacienødderne (Antep fıstığı); |
| --- | --- |

Farve: Overfladen af »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« er gyldengul og den underste del er mørkegrøn på grund af Antep-pistacienødderne (Antep fıstığı);

| | Konsistens: Oversiden er halvsprød på grund af dejlagene. Undersiden er sirupsagtig; |
| --- | --- |

Konsistens: Oversiden er halvsprød på grund af dejlagene. Undersiden er sirupsagtig;

| | Form: Produktet bør skæres ud før bagning. Stykkerne kan antage forskellige former, men de er som regel lige, korte og rektangulære, har shuttle- (diamant) eller amulet- (trekantet) form, har firkantede eller gulerodslignende former (lange trekantede skiver fra midten til yderkanten af en rund bakke). |
| --- | --- |

Form: Produktet bør skæres ud før bagning. Stykkerne kan antage forskellige former, men de er som regel lige, korte og rektangulære, har shuttle- (diamant) eller amulet- (trekantet) form, har firkantede eller gulerodslignende former (lange trekantede skiver fra midten til yderkanten af en rund bakke).

3.3.   Råvarer (kun for forarbejdede produkter)

Ingredienser i »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«:

| — | Antep-pistacienød (Antep fıstığı): Brugen af Antep-pistacienødder er obligatorisk for »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«. Hjemmehørende i Gaziantep- provinsen er Antep-pistacienødder et registreret landbrugsprodukt i Tyrkiet. De er mørkegrønne med en gennemtrængende aroma. Ifølge produktspecifikationen er der fem typer af disse nødder, og de er lange, ovale eller cirkelformede og mørkegrønne. De har et proteinindhold på mellem 21,77 % og 23,77 % og et fedtindhold på mellem 56,27 % og 59,89 %. Antep pistacienødden kan være groft eller fint snittet; |
| --- | --- |

—

Antep-pistacienød (Antep fıstığı): Brugen af Antep-pistacienødder er obligatorisk for »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«. Hjemmehørende i Gaziantep- provinsen er Antep-pistacienødder et registreret landbrugsprodukt i Tyrkiet. De er mørkegrønne med en gennemtrængende aroma. Ifølge produktspecifikationen er der fem typer af disse nødder, og de er lange, ovale eller cirkelformede og mørkegrønne. De har et proteinindhold på mellem 21,77 % og 23,77 % og et fedtindhold på mellem 56,27 % og 59,89 %. Antep pistacienødden kan være groft eller fint snittet;

| — | Almindeligt smør: 99,9 % rent smør fremstillet af mælk og uden salt og andre tilsætningsstoffer; |
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Almindeligt smør: 99,9 % rent smør fremstillet af mælk og uden salt og andre tilsætningsstoffer;

| — | Semuljefløde (der kun anvendes til det »normale« (friske) produkt): Mælk koges til 105-108 °C, og der tilsættes semuljefløde (100 g semulje til 1 l. mælk). Blandingen opvarmes til 100 °C, indtil den størkner, hvorefter den afkøles; |
| --- | --- |

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Semuljefløde (der kun anvendes til det »normale« (friske) produkt): Mælk koges til 105-108 °C, og der tilsættes semuljefløde (100 g semulje til 1 l. mælk). Blandingen opvarmes til 100 °C, indtil den størkner, hvorefter den afkøles;

| — | Mel: Fremstillet af hård hvede |
| --- | --- |

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Mel: Fremstillet af hård hvede

| — | Stivelse: Hvedestivelse |
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Stivelse: Hvedestivelse

| — | Sirup: Fremstillet af sukker eller sødestof (for diabetikere). Næsten 350-360 g sirup tilsættes 1 kg af baklavablandingen. Honning bør ikke anvendes. |
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Sirup: Fremstillet af sukker eller sødestof (for diabetikere). Næsten 350-360 g sirup tilsættes 1 kg af baklavablandingen. Honning bør ikke anvendes.

| — | Æg: Tre æg til 1 kg mel (til tilberedning af dejen); |
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Æg: Tre æg til 1 kg mel (til tilberedning af dejen);

| — | Salt: 10 g stensalt til 1 kg mel (til tilberedning af dejen); |
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Salt: 10 g stensalt til 1 kg mel (til tilberedning af dejen);

3.4.   Foder (kun for produkter af animalsk oprindelse)

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3.5.   Specifikke etaper af produktionen, som skal finde sted i det afgrænsede geografiske område

Tilberedning af dejen, fremstilling af baklavaen og bagning.

3.6.   Særlige regler vedrørende udskæring, rivning eller emballering osv.

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« kan markedsføres i vægt eller mængde i bakker eller pakninger. Hvis den markedsføres i en pakning, kan papæsker bruges, men disse skal være foret med aluminiumsfolie eller tilsvarende vandtæt materiale. En seddel med serveringsanbefalingen »Isıtarak servis yapınız« (»lunes før servering«) kan lægges ind i æsken.

3.7.   Særlige mærkningsregler

Hvis »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« sælges i tør form, skal ordet (»kuru«) være anført på emballagen.

Mærkater med udtrykkene »BGB« og »Antep Baklavası« eller »Gaziantep Baklavası« skal være anbragt på den synlige side af emballagen, samt følgende logo:

Image

4.   Præcis afgrænsning af det geografiske område

Produktionsområdet omfatter hele Gaziantep-provinsen i det sydøstlige Anatolien. Provinsen grænser op til Syrien mod syd, til Birecik og Halfeti mod øst, til Adiyaman mod nordøst, til Khramanmaras mod nord, til Osmaniye mod vest og til Hatay mod sydvest.

5.   Tilknytning til det geografiske område

5.1.   Det geografiske områdes egenart

Gaziantepprovinsen er centrum for dyrkningen af pistacienødder i Tyrkiet. Pistacienødder benævnes antep fıstığı (»Antep pistacienødder«) i Tyrkiet, idet byen Gaziantep har givet navn til det tyrkiske ord for »pistacienødder«.

Produkter fremstillet af Antep-pistacienødder har været tilberedt og konsumeret i Gaziantep i århundreder.

Bageres erfaring:

Baklava-dejen tilberedes, den rulles ud, så den bliver tynd, der sprøjtes stivelse ind i mellem lagene, lagene anbringes på bakken, fløden og Antep-pistacienødderne fordeles på dejen, og baklavaen skæres ud i lige store stykker, den olieres med almindeligt smør, den bages, og der tilsættes sirup, hvilket alt sammen kræver stor dygtighed. »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« bør tilberedes og bages af bagere, der har erhvervet disse færdigheder i Gaziantep-området.

5.2.   Produktets egenart

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« adskiller sig fra andre baklava ved sin lyse gyldne farve, dens konsistens, dens sammensætning og den mørkegrønne underdel. Den vigtigste forskel ligger dog i antep-pistacienøddernes og smørrets smag og aroma.

Tilberedelsen af »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« kræver stor dygtighed.

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«'s ry kommer af kombinationen af de mange ingredienser og den særlige form for manuelle bagning, der anvendes af erfarne bagere. Før spisningen er det duften af rent smør, der er den dominerende. En veltilberedt baklava smelter straks i munden. Disse er de vigtigste særlige egenskaber ved »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«.

5.3.   Årsagssammenhængen mellem det geografiske område og produktets kvalitet eller egenskaber (for BOB) eller produktets særlige egenskaber, omdømme eller andre kendetegn (for BGB)

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« fra Gaziantep er blevet værdsat siden det 19. århundrede for sin særlige produktionsmåde, ingrediensernes særlige karakter og de erfarne bageres manuelle bagning. Adskillige berømte familier har traditionelt fremstillet »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« gennem flere generationer siden 1870'erne.

Den vigtigste råvare er Antep-pistacienødden (antep fıstığı), der er et registreret landbrugsprodukt i Tyrkiet. Dens komprimerede smag og aroma bevares i det endelige produkt, og den er årsag til den mørkegrønne farve på den underste del af »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası«.

»Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« er optaget i bøger om Gaziantep og det tyrkiske køkken og i ministeriet for kultur og turismes brochurer om Gaziantep.

Gaziantep folklorundan notlar (notater om Gaziantep folklore), en bog der i 1959 blev skrevet af Cemil Cahit Güzelbey, en forsker fra Gaziantep, nævner (s. 86), at »pistacienødder anvendes af producenter af baklava«. I bogen fortælles også en historie (s. 87) om en tur til Gaziantep, som den tyrkiske sundhedsminister foretog. Under middagen og efter at have fået serveret suppe med pistacienødder, ris med pistacienødder, baklava med pistacienødder og endelig is med pistacienødder, spurgte han for sjov, om han kunne få et glas vand uden pistacienødder.

I 2001-udgaven af Frommer’s Turkey travel guide (Lynn A. Livine, 2001; John Wiley & Sons) anføres det, at Gazianteps berømteste produkt er områdets skønne baklava. Med mere end 500 baklava-bagerier i byen, »er en »baklava crawl«, især under pistacienøddehøsten i september, ikke til at komme uden om«.

I Cooking the Turkish Way (Kari Cornell, 2004) anføres det (s. 14) ligeledes, at »den østanatolske by Gaziantep er kendt for sine pistacienødder og for sin sirupsøde baklava«.

Henvisning til offentliggørelsen af varespecifikationen

(Artikel 5, stk. 7, i forordning (EF) nr. 510/2006 (3))

Den tyrkiske regering har indledt den nationale indsigelsesprocedure med offentliggørelse af ansøgningens om anerkendelse af »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep Baklavası« som BGB i Den Tyrkiske Republiks Statstidende nr. 26505 af 27. april 2007.

Den fulde ordlyd af varespecifikationen kan ses på det tyrkiske patentinstituts websted:

http://www.turkpatent.gov.tr/portal/default_en.jsp?sayfa=172 (klik på »Antep Baklavası«/»Gaziantep baklavası«).

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(1)  EUT L 343 af 14.12.2012, s. 1.

(2)  Erstattet af forordning (EU) nr. 1151/2012.

(3)  Se fodnote 2.

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