Opinion issued September 7, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00325-CR

———————————

JUAN JOSE NAVARRO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1686011

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found appellant, Juan Jose Navarro, guilty of the felony offense of 

violation of a protective order, with two or more prior convictions.

1

 After finding 

true the allegation in enhancement that appellant had been previously convicted of 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.07(a)(3), (g)(2)(A).
2

a felony offense, the trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for sixteen

years. In his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient 

to support his conviction.

We affirm.

Background

The complainant, Raul Navarro, testified that he lives at 1127 Louise Street, 

Houston, Harris County, Texas. Appellant is his son. The complainant has an 

active protective order against appellant, which prohibits appellant from coming to 

the complainant’s house. Appellant knew that he was not allowed to come to the 

complainant’s house.

On August 13, 2020, appellant came to the complainant’s house in the

middle of the night. Appellant “started banging at the window” and “yelling and 

screaming [that] he had lost his [cellular] [tele]phone.” The complainant was 

asleep, and appellant woke him up. Appellant wanted the complainant to get him a 

cellular telephone, and the complainant told appellant to “wait [un]til . . . the 

morning” and he would “go to Wal-Mart or something.” This made appellant mad. 

The complainant called for emergency assistance because he was scared of 

appellant. The complainant was worried that appellant might “break the window”

or the air conditioning unit or that appellant would “come in” in the house and 

“maybe hurt [him].” The complainant’s neighbor also called for emergency 
3

assistance. After law enforcement officers arrived, the complainant unlocked the 

gate to his home for them. The officers found appellant under the complainant’s 

house.

According to the complainant, appellant did not have permission to be at the 

complainant’s house on the night of August 13, 2020, and the complainant did not 

tell appellant to come to his house. Appellant was not allowed at the 

complainant’s house because doing so would “break the protective order.” The 

complainant stated that appellant had “climbed over the gate” at the complainant’s 

house that night.

The complainant noted that sometimes he met appellant at fast food 

restaurants and he would give appellant money so that appellant could buy 

something to eat. And sometimes appellant would call the complainant when he 

needed clothes to be washed. The complainant would “help [appellant] out with 

whatever [he] could” and he felt “bad that [appellant] was hungry.” The 

complainant would meet appellant in public places because he knew that appellant 

could not come to the complainant’s house “on account of the protective order.”

The complainant further testified that he previously had a protective order 

against appellant, which was issued in June 2003 and lasted for two years. The 

protective order prohibited appellant from coming to the complainant’s home. The 
4

complainant stated that he and his wife got the protective order because if they did 

not, they would “be in danger.” The complainant was afraid of appellant.

According to the complainant, appellant came to the complainant’s home on 

July 4, 2003, and the complainant called for emergency assistance. Although 

appellant left the complainant’s home, law enforcement officers eventually located

him, and appellant was charged with the offense of violation of a protective order. 

Appellant was convicted of the offense and “spent some time in the jail.” On 

August 6, 2003, appellant again came to the complainant’s home. The 

complainant called for emergency assistance that day as well.

During the complainant’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a 

copy of a protective order dated June 18, 2003, which states that the complainant 

had applied for a protective order against appellant. In the protective order, the 

trial court finds that the complainant and appellant are members of the same 

family, family violence has occurred, and family violence will likely occur again in 

the future. The trial court also finds that appellant has committed family violence 

and that the protective order is necessary for the “safety and welfare and in the best 

interest” of the complainant and “necessary for the prevention of family violence.” 

Thus, the trial court, among other things, orders that appellant is prohibited, under 

chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, from “[g]oing to or near the residence or 

place of employment or business of [the complainant], specifically,” appellant is 
5

prohibited “from coming within 200 feet of [the complainant’s] place of residence 

located in Harris County at 1127 Louise, Houston, Texas 77009, or any future 

residential or employment address of [the complainant].” (Emphasis omitted.) 

The protective order states that it “shall continue in effect for a period of two 

years.” It is signed by the trial court and appellant.

Houston Police Department Sergeant D. Flores testified that on August 13, 

2020, he was on patrol during the night shift when he responded to a call about a 

suspicious person. The call was received at 12:37 a.m., and Flores arrived at a

house located at 1127 Louise Street in Harris County at 12:41 a.m. The 

complainant came out to the gate of the home and met Flores and the other law 

enforcement officers who had arrived at the scene. The complainant had to unlock

the gate for the officers. He appeared concerned.

Law enforcement officers then searched the complainant’s property to look 

for appellant. Eventually, law enforcement officers found appellant under the 

complainant’s house. After appellant came out from under the house, the officers 

arrested him. Sergeant Flores noted that another law enforcement had “checked 

[appellant’s] record” and found that appellant had an active protective order 

against him, which protected the home located at 1127 Louise Street. The 

complainant provided law enforcement officers with a copy of the protective order 
6

that night. As to appellant, Sergeant Flores testified that appellant “ha[d] an alias 

of Jose Juan Navarro.”

During Sergeant Flores’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a 

copy of a protective order, dated May 29, 2019, which states that the complainant 

had applied for a protective order against appellant. In the protective order, the 

trial court finds that the complainant and appellant are members of the same 

family, family violence has occurred, and family violence will likely occur again in 

the future. The trial court also finds that appellant has committed family violence 

and appellant “has engaged in conduct toward [the complainant] that would be a 

felony if charged.” (Emphasis omitted.) Further, the trial court finds that there 

have been two or more previous protective orders rendered to protect the 

complainant from appellant and those protective orders have expired. Finally, the 

trial court finds that the protective order is for the safety and welfare and in the 

best interest of the complainant and is necessary for the prevention of family 

violence. Thus, the trial court, among other things, orders that appellant is 

prohibited, under chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, from “[g]oing to or near 

the residence or place of employment or business of [the complainant], 

specifically,” appellant is prohibited “from coming within 200 feet of [the 

complainant’s] place of residence located in Harris County at 1127 Louise, 

Houston, Texas 77009, or any future residential or employment address of [the 
7

complainant].” (Emphasis omitted.) The protective order states that it “shall 

continue in effect for [appellant’s] lifetime.” It is signed by the trial court.

As to the May 29, 2019 protective order, Sergeant Flores testified that the 

complainant applied for the protective order against appellant, and it was issued on 

May 29, 2019. The protective order prohibited appellant from “coming within 200 

feet of [the complainant’s] place of residence located in Harris County, 1127 

Louise Street, Houston[,] Texas 77009,” and law enforcement officers found 

appellant at that address on August 13, 2020. (Internal quotations omitted.) The 

May 29, 2019 protective order was “a permanent lifetime protective order,” with 

“no end date.”

Blanca Avilez testified that she is a latent print examiner with the Harris 

County Sheriff’s Office. As part of her job, Avilez reviews “known prints,” also 

known as “inked print[s],” including those found on court judgments. According 

to Avilez, a court judgment “memorializes a conviction from the court,” and it 

often contains a fingerprint. Avilez can determine whose fingerprint appears on a 

court judgment.

On the morning of trial, Avilez took appellant’s fingerprints.2 Avilez then 

compared appellant’s inked fingerprints to the fingerprints on a 2003 jail card. 

According to Avilez, a “jail card” is created “[w]hen a person gets booked into the 

2 A copy of appellant’s inked fingerprints taken by Avilez on the morning of trial 

was admitted into evidence by the trial court.
8

jail system.” It contains “the person’s descriptors, which are things such as name, 

date of birth, SPN number,[3]and sheriff’s office number, along with whatever 

offense they’re being arrested for, along with their fingerprints.”

During Avilez’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of 

the jail card, which is dated August 6, 2003. It lists appellant’s name as “Jose Juan 

Navarro” and includes other identifying information, including a physical 

description of appellant, appellant’s SPN number, and appellant’s social security

number. It also lists the complainant as appellant’s father and lists appellant’s trial 

court cause number as 1187299. Further, it states that on August 6, 2003, 

appellant was arrested for the offense of violation of a protective order. Appellant 

signed the 2003 jail card as “Juan Navarro.” Avilez testified that the fingerprints 

on the jail card were appellant’s fingerprints.

During Avilez’s testimony, the trial court also admitted into evidence a copy 

of a judgment of conviction rendered in trial court cause number 1187299. The 

judgment lists appellant’s name, and states that on August 7, 2003, appellant was 

convicted of the offense of violation of a protective order and the trial court 

3 An SPN number is a unique number assigned to an individual housed in the jail. 

See Degrassa v. State, No. 01-12-00162-CR, 2014 WL 458983, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication); Bundick v. State, 14-12-00568-CR, 2013 WL 1352339, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 4, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication). No two people have the same SPN number. See Degrassa, 2014 

WL 458983, at *1, *4.
9

assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement for ninety days. The judgment 

lists appellant’s arrest date as August 6, 2003. Avilez testified that she was able to 

identify the fingerprint on the August 7, 2003 judgment of conviction as belonging 

to appellant.

Additionally, during Avilez’s testimony, the trial court admitted into 

evidence a copy of another judgment of conviction rendered in trial court cause 

number 1181781. The judgment shows that, on July 11, 2003, “Jose Juan 

Navarro” was convicted of the offense of violation of a protective order, and the 

trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for eight days. The judgment 

lists the date of the offense as July 4, 2003.4 Avilez testified that the copy of the 

2003 jail card, which contained appellant’s fingerprints and which the trial court 

admitted into evidence, also lists appellant’s name as “Jose Juan Navarro.” 

Appellant signed the 2003 jail card with the name “Juan Navarro.”

Standard of Review

We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the

evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether any 

“rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Williams v.

4 Avilez stated that she was unable to identify the fingerprint on the July 11, 2003 

judgment of conviction as belonging to appellant because “[t]here was not 

sufficient ridge detail [in the print on the judgment] for [her] to [be able to] 

compare [it] . . . to the known fingerprint” for appellant.
10

State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role is that of a due 

process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact’s finding of the 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Moreno v. State, 755

S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We defer to the responsibility of the 

fact finder to resolve conflicts fairly in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw 

reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. That said, our 

duty requires us to “ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a 

conclusion that the defendant committed” the criminal offense of which he is 

accused. Id.

We note that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a court must 

consider both direct and circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences that 

may be drawn from the evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007); see also Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2012) (evidence-sufficiency standard of review same for both direct and 

circumstantial evidence). Circumstantial evidence is just as probative as direct 

evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can 

be sufficient to establish guilt. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v. State, 

214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). For evidence to be sufficient, the State 

need not disprove all reasonable alternative hypotheses that are inconsistent with a 

defendant’s guilt. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Cantu v. State, 395 S.W.3d 202,
11

207–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). Rather, a court 

considers only whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable 

based on the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdict. See Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d 

at 13; see also Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 

(“When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder 

resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination.”). 

The jury, as the judge of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, could choose to 

believe or not to believe the witnesses, or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v. 

State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 

626, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).

Sufficiency of Evidence

In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support his conviction for violation of a protective order, with two or more prior 

convictions, because the evidence did not link one of the alleged prior convictions

for the offense of violation of a protective order to appellant. Specifically,

appellant asserts that the State “failed to prove” appellant’s alleged prior

conviction on July 11, 2003 for the offense of violation of a protective order in trial 

court cause number 1181781.
12

A person commits the offense of violation of a protective order, if, in 

violation of an order issued under chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code,5the 

person knowingly and intentionally goes to or near the residence or place of 

employment or business of a protected individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 25.07(a)(3)(A). Typically, the offense of violation of a protective order is a 

Class A misdemeanor offense. See id. § 25.07(g); see also Pullis v. State, No. 

10-13-00135-CR, 2014 WL 31423, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 2, 2014, pet.

dism’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Violation of a protective 

order without the prior convictions is a class A misdemeanor.”). But the offense of 

violation of a protective order constitutes a third-degree felony offense if it is 

shown at trial that the defendant was “previously convicted two or more times of 

an offense” under Texas Penal Code section 25.07. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 25.07(g)(2)(A); see also Ramsay v. State, No. 13-09-00330-CR, 2010 WL 

2967066, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 29, 2010, no pet.) 

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting enhancement for two or more 

prior convictions for violation of protective order).

5 Under the Texas Family Code, “[a] court shall render a protective order as 

provided by [s]ection 85.001(b) if the court finds that family violence has occurred 

and is likely to occur in the future.” See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001, 

85.001(b), 85.022; see also Rogers v. State, No. 09-15-00270-CV, 2017 WL 

2698038, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication).
13

To establish that the defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the 

State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists and 

(2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 

921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Kinnett v. State, 623 S.W.3d 876, 896 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). There is no specific document or mode of 

proof required to establish that a prior conviction exists, and that the defendant is 

linked to that conviction. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921; Kinnett, 623 S.W.3d at 

896. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated:

There is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires that the fact of 

a prior conviction be proven with any document, much less any 

specific document. While evidence of a certified copy of a final 

judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the 

State may prove both of these elements in a number of different ways, 

including (1) the defendant’s admission or stipulation, (2) testimony 

by a person who was present when the person was convicted of the 

specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person, or 

(3) documentary proof (such as a judgment) that contains sufficient 

information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and 

the defendant’s identity as the person convicted.

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921–22 (internal footnotes omitted). “Any type of 

evidence, documentary or testimonial,” may suffice to prove a prior conviction. 

Id. at 922; see also Kinnett, 623 S.W.3d at 896. The fact finder looks at the totality 

of evidence admitted concerning the prior conviction to determine (1) whether 

there was a prior conviction and (2) whether the defendant was the person 

convicted. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 
14

919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (fact finder “must look at the totality of the evidence 

adduced” and “must consider the evidence as a whole, as each piece of evidence 

may provide little meaning if considered in isolation”).

Here, the indictment alleged, as enhancements, that appellant had two prior 

convictions for the offense of violation of a protective order, namely: (1) a 

conviction on July 11, 2003, in trial court cause number 1181781, in County 

Criminal Court at Law No. 13 of Harris County and (2) a conviction on August 7, 

2003, in trial court cause number 1187299, in County Criminal Court at Law No. 

12 of Harris County. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence linking him to the first alleged prior conviction—the July 11, 2003 

conviction for the offense of violation of a protective order.

As evidence relevant to the July 11, 2003 conviction, the complainant 

testified that he lived at 1127 Louise Street, Houston, Harris County, Texas. On 

July 4, 2003, the complainant had a protective order in place against appellant. 

That protective order was issued in June 2003, and it lasted for two years. The 

protective order prohibited appellant from coming to the complainant’s home. The 

complainant stated that he and his wife got a protective order against appellant 

because if they did not, they would “be in danger.” The complainant was afraid of 

appellant.
15

During the complainant’s testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a 

copy of a protective order, dated June 18, 2003, which states that the complainant 

had applied for a protective order against appellant. In the protective order, the 

trial court finds that the complainant and appellant are members of the same 

family, family violence has occurred, and family violence will likely occur again in 

the future. The trial court also finds that appellant has committed family violence 

and that the protective order is necessary for the “safety and welfare and in the best 

interest” of the complainant and “necessary for the prevention of family violence.” 

Thus, the trial court, among other things, orders that appellant is prohibited, under 

chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, from “[g]oing to or near the residence or 

place of employment or business of [the complainant], specifically,” appellant is 

prohibited “from coming within 200 feet of [the complainant’s] place of residence 

located in Harris County at 1127 Louise, Houston, Texas 77009, or any future 

residential or employment address of [the complainant].” (Emphasis omitted.) 

The protective order states that it “shall continue in effect for a period of two 

years.” It is signed by the trial court and appellant.

The complainant further testified that on July 4, 2003, appellant came to the 

complainant’s home, and the complainant called for emergency assistance. 

Although appellant left the complainant’s home, law enforcement officers 

eventually located him, and appellant was charged with the offense of violation of 
16

a protective order. Appellant was convicted of the offense and “spent some time in 

the jail.” See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 920 (explaining “a defendant may . . . be 

linked to prior convictions through the testimony of a witness who personally 

knows the defendant and the fact of his prior conviction and identifies him” and 

concluding witness’s testimony that “he knew [defendant] went to prison for 

aggravated assault in 1989” was “a solid link between [defendant] and the 1989 

aggravated assault” prior conviction (internal quotations omitted)); see also

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 922 (testimonial evidence may suffice to prove prior 

conviction); Arrambide v. State, No. 13-20-00135-CR, 2022 WL 619148, at *4–5 

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 3, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (defendant’s mother testified that she was aware of his 

1995 and 2006 incarcerations and that “he served a ten-year and eight-year 

sentence respectively”); Batts v. State, 673 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 1984, no pet.) (complainant’s testimony standing alone is sufficient to 

support conviction).

The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of a judgment of 

conviction rendered in trial court cause number 1181781. The judgment shows 

that on July 11, 2003, “Jose Juan Navarro” was convicted of the offense of 

violation of a protective order, and the trial court assessed his punishment at 
17

confinement for eight days. The judgment lists the date of the offense as July 4, 

2003.6

Avilez, the latent print examiner with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, 

testified that a copy of a 2003 jail card, which was admitted into evidence, 

contained appellant’s fingerprints. Like the July 11, 2003 judgment of conviction 

that document lists appellant’s name as “Jose Juan Navarro.” The jail card also

includes a physical description of appellant, states that the complainant is 

appellant’s father, and shows that appellant signed it with the name “Juan 

Navarro.” See Martin v. State, No. 14-21-00736-CR, 2023 WL 3115779, at *6 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication) (physical description of named person in record allows 

fact finder to compare physical appearance of defendant with person described in 

record). Sergeant Flores testified that appellant “ha[d] an alias of Jose Juan 

Navarro.”

6 Although the July 11, 2003 judgment of conviction does not contain a fingerprint

clear enough to compare to the known fingerprint of appellant, this is not 

dispositive of our analysis. Cf. Kinnett v. State, 623 S.W.3d 876, 896–97 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (holding jury could have found 

beyond reasonable doubt defendant had prior convictions even though judgment of 

conviction did not contain defendant’s fingerprint); Hall v. State, No. 

06-20-00023-CR, 2020 WL 7268584, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 11, 

2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (overruling 

defendant’s argument evidence was “insufficient to establish that he was the 

person [previously] convicted in cause number CR-16-25700 because the State 

was not able to match his thumbprint to the judgment”).
18

Regardless of the type of evidentiary puzzle pieces the State offers to prove 

the existence of a prior conviction and its link to a defendant, it is the fact finder 

who determines if the pieces fit together sufficiently to complete the puzzle. See 

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. Notably, the fact 

finder considers the totality of the admitted evidence to determine whether there 

was a previous conviction and whether the defendant was the person convicted. 

See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919.

Here, viewing the totality of the evidence admitted in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, as we must when conducting a sufficiency review, we 

conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

(1) appellant’s prior conviction for the offense of violation of a protective order on

July 11, 2003 exists and (2) appellant is linked to that conviction. See Flowers, 

220 S.W.3d at 921–23; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919 (fact finder “must look 

at the totality of the evidence adduced” and “must consider the evidence as a 

whole, as each piece of evidence may provide little meaning if considered in 

isolation”). Thus, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support

appellant’s conviction for the offense of violation of a protective order, with two or 

more prior convictions.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
19

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Julie Countiss

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).