U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

75–215 PDF 2012

S. Hrg. 112–559 

SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING TRUST 

AND CONFIDENCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 23, 2012 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

HOLLY A. IDELSON, Senior Counsel 

JASON M. YANUSSI, Senior Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

RICHARD H. HOUGHTON, Minority Deputy General Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PATRICIA R. HOGAN, Publications Clerk 

LAURA W. KILBRIDE, Hearing Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 4 

Senator Brown .................................................................................................. 14 

Senator Johnson ............................................................................................... 18 

Senator Portman .............................................................................................. 20 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 22 

Prepared statements: 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 35 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 38 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 40 

Senator Landrieu .............................................................................................. 41 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2012 

Mark J. Sullivan, Director, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 6 

Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 8 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Edwards, Charles K.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Sullivan, Mark J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 42 

APPENDIX 

Letter of Support from the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association ....... 53 

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from: 

Mr. Sullivan with attachments ....................................................................... 55 

Mr. Edwards ..................................................................................................... 113 

(1) 

SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING 

TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:31 a.m., in room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Landrieu, Collins, Brown, 

Johnson, Portman, and Moran. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. The hearing will come to order. 

Good morning, and thanks to those who are here, particularly Director Mark Sullivan of the U.S. Secret Service agency, and 

Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector General of the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). 

Over its nearly 150-year history, the Secret Service has built an 

extraordinary reputation for selfless and skilled devotion to the important and dangerous work its agents do: Protecting the President 

of the United States and other high officials of our government, as 

well as foreign leaders who visit the United States. 

That great reputation, was, sadly, stained last month when 11 

Secret Service employees engaged in a night of heavy drinking in 

Cartagena, Colombia, which ended with them taking foreign national women back to their hotel rooms. 

We have called this hearing as part of our Committee’s responsibility to oversee the functions of the Federal Government, particularly those within the Department of Homeland Security, including 

the U.S. Secret Service. 

There are three things we hope to accomplish today and in our 

Committee’s ongoing investigation. 

First, we want to get the facts about what precisely happened in 

Cartagena and where the Secret Service’s own investigation of 

Cartagena stands today. 

As has widely been reported, the misconduct involved 11 agents 

and officers who arrived in Cartagena the morning of Wednesday, 

April 11, and were off duty the rest of the day. 

The men went out—in groups of two, three, and four—to four different nightclubs that evening. After considerable drinking, they 

returned to their rooms at the El Caribe Hotel with women they 

had met at the clubs—some of whom were prostitutes—and regVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Oct 16, 2012 Jkt 075215 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\75215.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
2 

istered the women as overnight guests according to hotel rules. The 

Secret Service subsequently learned that another individual engaged in similar conduct in Cartagena, the night of Monday, April 

9. All of the agents and officers held security clearances, and two 

were in supervisory positions. 

If one of the agents had not argued with one of the women about 

how much he owed her, the world would never have known this 

sordid story. 

But the world does know this sordid story, and that is why the 

Secret Service, the Inspector General (IG), and we must do everything we can to learn the truth, as best we can. Our purpose is not 

to diminish the U.S. Secret Service but, quite the contrary, to help 

restore its credibility which our Nation, indeed the continuity of 

our government, so clearly depends upon. 

Second, as part of that search for truth and lessons to be learned, 

we need to know if there were warning signs that misconduct had 

become a pattern among traveling Secret Service agents, in the 

years before Cartagena, that should have been seen and stopped. 

It is hard for many people, including me, I will admit, to believe 

that on one night in April 2012, in Cartagena, Colombia, 12 Secret 

Service agents—there to protect the President—suddenly and spontaneously did something they or other agents had never done before, that is, go out in groups of two, three, or four to four different 

nightclubs or strip clubs, drink to excess, and then bring foreign 

national women back to their hotel rooms. 

That lingering disbelief led our Committee to send a series of 

questions to the Secret Service to determine if there was any evidence in their records of patterns of previous misconduct. We have 

begun to review the agency’s answers and have found individual 

cases of misconduct over the last 5 years that I would say are troubling, but do not yet find evidence at all sufficient to justify a conclusion of a pattern or culture of misconduct. 

But the Secret Service disciplinary records, of course, only take 

us so far. They only include cases where misconduct was observed, 

charged, and/or adjudicated. 

We can only know what the records of the Secret Service reveal 

and what others, including whistleblowers, come forward to tell us. 

Thus far, the Committee has received a relatively small number of 

calls from people outside; whistleblowers. But thus far they, too, 

have not provided evidence of a pattern of misconduct by Secret 

Service agents similar to what happened in Cartagena. 

However, we have not concluded our oversight of this matter, nor 

has the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General. And, 

therefore, in this public forum, I would ask anyone who has information about the conduct of the Secret Service employees over the 

years that they believe is relevant to our investigation to contact 

our staff at the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee here at the U.S. Capitol. 

Today’s Washington Post reports, based on multiple anonymous 

sources that, ‘‘sexual encounters during official travel had been 

condoned under an unwritten code that allows what happens on 

the road to stay on the road.’’ The article also contends that this 

tolerance was part of what was called the ‘‘Secret Circus’’—a mockVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Oct 16, 2012 Jkt 075215 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\75215.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
3 

ing nickname the employees apparently use when large numbers of 

agents and officers arrive in a city. 

One of the men implicated in Cartagena has told associates that 

a senior security supervisor had advised agents to follow loose 

guidelines when spending time with women they met on the road: 

One-night stands were permitted as long as the relationship ended 

when the agent left the country. This Washington Post article, 

which, again, I say was based on anonymous sources—though the 

article contends there were multiple sources—obviously encourages 

people’s worse suspicions about a pattern of conduct existing within 

the Secret Service and needs a response from Director Sullivan, 

hopefully this morning. 

In addition, as I mentioned, our initial review of the Secret Service agency’s disciplinary records for the last 5 years, which is what 

we requested, shows some individual cases of misconduct which are 

troubling but are not evidence yet of a pattern of misconduct. 

These records do reveal 64 instances—again, over 5 years—in 

which allegations or complaints concerning sexual misconduct were 

made against employees of the Secret Service. Most of these complaints involved sending sexually explicit emails or sexually explicit 

material on a government computer, although three of the complaints involved charges of an inappropriate relationship with a 

foreign national woman, and one was a complaint of nonconsensual 

sexual intercourse. And, of course, either this morning or in our investigation, we would like the Secret Service response to those as 

we need to know more about them. 

Thirty other cases over 5 years involved alcohol, almost all relating to driving while under the influence. I hasten to say that these 

complaints involve a very small percentage of the thousands of people who have worked at the U.S. Secret Service during the last 5 

years. And I also want to say that discipline was imposed in most 

of the cases. Nonetheless, it is important for us to know how those 

complaints were handled and whether, looking back, they should 

have been warnings of worse to come. 

We want to know what reforms the Secret Service is implementing to make sure that what happened in Cartagena never 

happens again. 

I know Secret Service Director Sullivan has already made some 

changes, such as increasing the no alcohol before reporting for duty 

rule from 6 to 10 hours and banning foreign national women explicitly from hotel rooms. 

But I also want to hear what the Secret Service is doing to encourage people to report egregious behavior when they see it—to 

ensure that no code of silence exists among agents and officers. 

Finally, let me put this in a larger context. In the last several 

days, the Secret Service has been called on to provide protection for 

a large number of world leaders who were attending both the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the G–8 summits 

in the United States. The presidential campaigns of 2012 are ongoing, and the Secret Service needs to protect the candidates and secure two large national conventions. And, of course, ultimately, and 

most importantly, the President and Vice President of the United 

States and their families need protection every day. 

4 

That is why the Cartagena scandal has to be dealt with head on 

and quickly. The credibility of the Secret Service is too important 

and its mission too critical to our country to leave any questions 

about Cartagena and what preceded it unanswered. 

I want to personally thank Secret Service Director Sullivan for 

his cooperation with our investigation and also to thank him because he has worked very hard and fast since he learned of the crisis to investigate it and try to restore the credibility of the Secret 

Service. 

Director Sullivan, I look forward to your testimony, as I do to 

yours, Inspector General Charles Edwards. 

Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin my 

remarks today by stating my strong belief that the vast majority 

of the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service are professional, 

disciplined, dedicated, and courageous. They do a difficult job extraordinarily well. 

The honorable conduct of the many true professionals of the Secret Service stands in stark contrast to the misconduct that occurred in Colombia last month on the eve of the President’s visit 

there. The timing makes the appalling behavior all that much more 

troubling not only to me but also to the majority of Secret Service 

personnel both past and present. 

I will not dwell on the details of the incident since they have already been so widely reported and I am sure will be discussed by 

Director Sullivan today. The behavior is morally repugnant, and I 

certainly do not want to downplay that fact. My concerns, however, 

go far beyond the morality of the agents’ actions. 

First of all, this reckless behavior could easily have compromised 

the individuals charged with the security of the President of the 

United States. And, second, the facts so far lead me to conclude 

that, while not at all representative of the majority of Secret Service personnel, this misconduct was almost certainly not an isolated 

incident. Let me discuss both of these concerns in a bit more detail. 

It is basic ‘‘Counterintelligence 101’’ that Secret Service personnel and others holding sensitive positions of trust in the U.S. 

Government should avoid any situation that could provide a foreign 

intelligence, security service, or criminal gangs with the means of 

exerting coercion or blackmail. Yet two of the primary means of entrapment—sexual lures and alcohol—were both present here in 

abundance. 

While the preliminary investigation has shown that none of these 

men had weapons or classified material in their hotel rooms, they 

still could easily have been drugged or kidnapped or had their liaisons with these foreign national women used to blackmail them, 

thereby compromising their effectiveness and potentially jeopardizing the President’s security. They willingly made themselves potential targets not only for intelligence or security services, but also 

for groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC) or drug cartels. 

There is absolutely no excuse for, or factor that can mitigate, 

such recklessness. The Secret Service, to its credit, has tightened 

5 

up its regulations and oversight to try to ensure that this never 

happens again. 

Second, the facts suggest to me that this likely was not just a 

one-time incident. 

If only one or two individuals out of the 160 male Secret Service 

personnel assigned to this mission had engaged in this type of serious misconduct, then I would think it was an aberration. But that 

was not the case; there were 12 individuals involved—12. That is 

8 percent of the male Secret Service personnel in-country and 9 

percent of those staying at a particular hotel. 

Moreover, contrary to the conventional story line, this was not 

simply a single, organized group that went out for a night on the 

town together. Rather, these were individuals and small groups of 

two and three agents who went out at different times to different 

clubs, bars, and brothels, but who all ended up in compromising 

circumstances. 

In addition, and perhaps most troubling, two of the participants 

were supervisors—one with 22 years of service and the other with 

21 years. That surely sends a message to the rank-and-file that 

this kind of activity is somehow tolerated on the road. 

The numbers involved, as well as the participation of two senior 

supervisors, lead me to believe that this was not a one-time event. 

Rather, the circumstances unfortunately suggest that different 

rules apply on the road, and they suggest an issue of culture. 

And it may well be a culture that spans agencies. The Secret 

Service and the Department of Justice Inspector General are continuing to investigate yet another Secret Service agent and at least 

two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) personnel who entertained 

female foreign nationals in the Cartagena apartment of one of the 

DEA agents. 

Moreover, the evidence thus far in that investigation suggests 

that was not a one-time incident. 

And, of course, the original reports out of Colombia also alleged 

misconduct by about a dozen members of our Armed Forces. 

Again, I want to emphasize that the vast majority of our law enforcement and military personnel are real heroes, and I deeply appreciate the dangers that those deployed overseas face every day. 

Given this apparent question of culture, however, I am pleased 

that the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General will 

be examining the culture of the Secret Service to see if there is 

something systemic that led to these incidents. And the Director 

himself has convened a task force. I will follow these developments 

closely. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I do want to join you in recognizing that 

Director Sullivan and the Acting IG have acted in a forthright and 

open manner with this Committee over the past 6 weeks as we 

have attempted to better understand the ramifications and causes 

of this scandal. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins, 

for your opening statement. 

Director Sullivan, we thank you for being here, and we would 

welcome your testimony at this time. 

6 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan appears in the Appendix on page 42. 

TESTIMONY OF MARK J. SULLIVAN,1 DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET 

SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, 

Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I 

appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the facts 

surrounding the misconduct of U.S. Secret Service employees in 

Cartagena, Colombia, the immediate actions taken by the agency 

to ensure the protective mission was not compromised, the results 

to date of the agency’s internal investigation into this matter, and 

the actions that have been put into place thus far. 

The last several weeks have been a difficult time for the U.S. Secret Service, and I would like to begin by talking about the outstanding men and women who serve in our organization. The overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in this agency 

exemplify our five core values of justice, duty, courage, honesty, 

and loyalty. On a daily basis, they are prepared to lay down their 

lives to protect others in service to their country. And it is precisely 

because of these longstanding values that the men and women of 

this agency are held to a higher standard. 

Clearly, the misconduct that took place in Cartagena, Colombia, 

is not representative of these values or of the high ethical standards we demand from our nearly 7,000 employees. I am deeply disappointed and I apologize for the misconduct of these employees 

and the distraction that it has caused. 

The men and women of the U.S. Secret Service are committed to 

continuing to live up to the standards that the President, the Congress, and the American people expect and deserve. From the beginning of this incident, we have strived to keep Members of Congress and our committees of jurisdiction up to date as information 

became available. While my written testimony provides an overview of our findings to date, I am committed to keeping you informed as our review continues. 

Immediately upon learning of the allegations of misconduct, I directed Secret Service supervisory personnel in Cartagena to initiate 

an investigation and conduct preliminary interviews of any Secret 

Service employee alleged to be involved in this incident. Once the 

preliminary interviews had taken place, I ordered all 11 people alleged to be involved in misconduct to immediately return to the 

United States. 

The prompt removal of these individuals enabled us to make necessary replacements and adjustments to the staffing plan in advance of the President’s arrival in Cartagena. On Saturday, April 

14, the morning after their return to the United States, these 11 

individuals were interviewed by our Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), which acts as our agency’s internal affairs component. At the conclusion of these interviews, all 11 individuals were 

placed on administrative leave, their security clearances were suspended, and all of their equipment was surrendered pending the 

outcome of this investigation. As the investigation progressed, a 

12th person was implicated. At this point, administrative action 

has been taken relative to all 12 individuals. 

7 

In addition, during the course of our internal investigation, we 

had one individual self-report an incident unrelated to the misconduct that occurred at the El Caribe Hotel. This individual, too, 

has been placed on administrative leave pending the investigation 

and their clearance has been suspended. 

During the course of the investigation, we confirmed that none 

of the 12 individuals had received a briefing regarding their protective assignment prior to the misconduct taking place. We also confirmed that none of the 12 individuals had any sensitive security 

documents, firearms, radios, or other security-related equipment in 

their hotel room. 

Since the beginning of this investigation, we have been transparent and forthcoming with the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). I have instructed our Office 

of Professional Responsibility to cooperate fully with DHS Acting 

Inspector General Edwards as his office conducts its own comprehensive review of the matter. 

As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, while the overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in our agency 

exemplify the highest standards of professionalism and integrity, I 

want to ensure that this type of misconduct that occurred in 

Cartagena, is not repeated. As a result, a number of enhancements 

to existing codes of conduct, in addition to some new policies, have 

been put in place as detailed in my written statement. 

I have also established a Professionalism Reinforcement Working 

Group to look at the efficacy of our employment standards, background investigations, disciplinary actions, ethics training, and all 

related policies and procedures. Director John Berry from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Director Connie Patrick 

from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center are co-chairs 

of this group. 

I am confident that this review will provide us with an objective 

perspective on our organizational practices, highlighting both areas 

where we excel and identifying areas where we may improve. 

The U.S. Secret Service is an organization that maintains deep 

pride in the work it does on behalf of our Nation. Throughout our 

147-year history, the agency has demanded service with honor and 

distinction by its agents, officers, and administrative professional 

and technical staff. All employees are expected to adhere to the 

highest standards of personal and professional integrity and recognize that the success of our agency’s mission depends on the strong 

character and sound judgment of our people. 

One of the greatest privileges I have is swearing in new agents 

and officers. It gives all of us a tremendous sense of pride to witness a new generation take that same oath we took many years 

ago. That pride comes for all of us from being part of a special organization with a history of dedicated people who serve our country 

honorably. 

Over the past several weeks, we have been under intense scrutiny as a result of this incident. To see the agency’s integrity called 

into question has not been easy. Through it all, the men and 

women of the U.S. Secret Service have demonstrated professionalism and integrity in their daily work. 

8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards appears in the Appendix on page 50. 

Just this past weekend, the agency successfully completed security operations for the G–8 in Maryland and the NATO summit, 

which included the gathering of more than 40 world leaders from 

four continents, in the city of Chicago. Concurrent with these 

events, we continue the planning for similar large-scale security operations for the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida, and the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte, North 

Carolina, later this summer. All of this comes on top of exceptional 

work carried out every day in field offices around the country and 

throughout the world. 

Today, as I testify before you, the men and women of this organization are protecting world leaders, presidential candidates, former 

presidents, numerous embassies in Washington, DC, conducting 

criminal investigations, keeping American citizens and financial institutions safe from financial fraud, and preparing for the Presidential Inauguration. They are overall making a positive impact on 

their community. 

I am grateful to them for what they do every single day, and my 

sincere hope is that they are not defined by the misconduct of a few 

but, rather, by the good work that they perform with character and 

integrity. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I will be 

more than happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director Sullivan. 

And now the Acting Inspector General of the Department of 

Homeland Security, Charles Edwards. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS,1 ACTING INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. EDWARDS. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate 

this opportunity to update you on the Inspector General’s actions 

to review and monitor the U.S. Secret Service’s investigation of the 

incident in Cartagena, Colombia, involving Secret Service employees’ interactions with Colombian nationals on April 11 and 12. Our 

role began almost immediately after the incident when, on April 

13, Director Sullivan and I discussed the events. We have since remained in regular contact. Director Sullivan has repeatedly stated 

to me his commitment to conduct a thorough investigation. His actions so far have demonstrated that commitment, and the Secret 

Service has been completely transparent and cooperative with OIG 

inspectors and investigators since our team started its work. 

On April 26, I instructed our Assistant IG for Inspections and 

the Acting Assistant IG for Investigations to review the Secret 

Service’s handling of its internal investigation regarding the incident in Cartagena. The next day, our Assistant IG for Inspections 

and the Acting Deputy Assistant IG for Investigations met with officials from Secret Service’s Office of Professional Responsibility 

(RES), which is conducting the internal investigation, and briefed 

them on the objectives of our review. 

9 

Our Assistant IG for Inspections has assembled a nine-person review team, led by a veteran chief inspector and augmented by 

three OIG criminal investigators. 

On May 2, this team met with RES officials and began part one 

of our three-part review. In part one, we are evaluating the adequacy of Secret Service’s response to the incident in Cartagena; the 

adequacy of the scope, methodology, and conclusions of its internal 

investigation; and the sufficiency of the corrective actions already 

implemented or planned. 

We are in the process of interviewing Secret Service personnel 

responsible for coordinating the agency’s response to the incident 

and conducting its investigation as well as personnel within the Office of the Director, the RES, those in charge of field operations, 

and the office responsible for security clearances. 

We will review all records, documents, and other materials related to the Secret Service’s internal investigation, including RES’s 

standards for inspection and investigation. We will review protocols 

for advance teams, the Secret Service Code of Conduct, and disciplinary processes and records. 

Our field work for part one of our review is currently taking 

place in Washington, DC. We have started meeting with RES staff 

members who interviewed the Secret Service employees who were 

in Cartagena at the time of the incident. We have also started reviewing the records that resulted from RES interviews of nearly 

200 Secret Service employees who were associated with the President’s visit, as well as 25 employees of the Hilton and El Caribe 

hotels in Cartagena. 

Besides, we plan to interview Special Agent-in-Charge Paula 

Reid, who had on-site responsibility for the Secret Service’s 

Cartagena detail. We also plan to interview Director Sullivan. 

We will review the Secret Service’s report on its internal investigation as soon as it becomes available. Contingent upon our receipt of that report, our goal is to complete the first phase of our 

review and report our findings by July 2. 

Immediately thereafter, we will begin part two of our review, 

during which we will determine whether certain workplace conditions and issues have promoted a culture within the Secret Service 

that could have contributed to the Cartagena incident. We will examine the Secret Service’s recruiting, vetting, and hiring practices. 

We will also examine the Secret Service’s Equal Employment Opportunity and Merit System Protection Board cases, communications within the agency, its administration of awards and discipline, training, and any other programs that might cast light on 

the organizational culture of the Secret Service. This portion of our 

work will include site visits to the Miami and other field offices. 

The third phase of our review will examine the Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) between the Secret Service and our office. 

We will evaluate changes in both Secret Service and Office of Inspector General investigative capabilities since the MOU was created in 2003 and determine whether changes are necessary. It is 

likely that we will conduct this phase concurrently with phase two. 

We will report our findings on both phases two and three later this 

year. 

10 

Finally, I would like to stress that the value of the Secret Service’s efforts to date in investigating its own employees should not 

be discounted. It has done a credible job of uncovering the facts 

and has taken swift and decisive action. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, and I 

would be happy to answer any questions that you or the Committee 

Members may have. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Edwards, for your 

testimony and for what you have been doing. 

We will start with 7-minute rounds of questions for each of the 

Senators here. 

Director Sullivan, you have told us that you were shocked by the 

behavior of the 12 agents in Cartagena, and I believe you were. 

And you have felt confident that their behavior was not a common 

occurrence within the ranks of the Secret Service. 

I wanted to ask you, after reading the Washington Post story 

today, whether you have that same confidence. In other words, can 

you give us your first reaction to what is contained in that story? 

And, obviously, most damningly, ‘‘Current and former agency employees say that sexual encounters during official travel had been 

condoned under an unwritten code that allows what happens on 

the road to stay there.’’ 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator. I absolutely feel the same 

way about the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service and the 

culture after reading that article. When I read that article, it cited 

numerous anonymous sources. I guess what I would ask is that if 

people do have information, I want them to come forward with that 

information, either to our Office of Professional Responsibility or to 

the DHS IG. But the thought or the notion that this type of behavior is condoned or authorized is just absurd, in my opinion. I have 

been an agent for 29 years now. I began my career for 7 years in 

Detroit. I was on the White House detail twice. I have worked for 

a lot of men and women in this organization. I never one time had 

any supervisor or any other agent tell me that this type of behavior 

is condoned. I know I have never told any of our employees that 

it is condoned. 

So I feel as strongly now as I did before I read that article. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Mr. Edwards, let me ask you, because at 

least some significant part of the conclusions drawn—again, generally without attribution—in the Washington Post article today 

are based on conversations with some of the 12, perhaps all of the 

12 agents involved in the Cartagena scandal. Are you intending to 

interview any or all of them about what happened? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. Yes, we are going to be interviewing all 12. In fact, this afternoon, we are going to be interviewing two of those individuals. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Well, that is very important and very encouraging news because obviously you are conducting a formal Inspector General investigation, and, therefore, if they repeat the allegations they have made to the newspaper, presumably you will 

find out whether they are credible or not and report to us and to 

the public as your investigation goes on. 

Director Sullivan, let me ask you, with respect to your own investigation thus far and the individuals alleged to have behaved imVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Oct 16, 2012 Jkt 075215 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\75215.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

properly, were they asked whether they had engaged in similar 

conduct on other occasions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, they were. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And what was their answer? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Their answer was they had not. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. They had not. And just for the record, 

were they under oath when they were interrogated? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe they all gave a signed oath to that, but 

I will have to get back to you on that, Senator. I am not sure if 

they were under oath. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I would appreciate that. 

I know they all were offered the opportunity to take a polygraph 

test, and it would be of interest to me whether during that test 

they were also asked whether they had ever been involved in similar behavior. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, and there are some—we did use every investigative tool we had, including polygraph interviews, talking to 

other people, looking at records, and thus far, we have not found 

that this type of behavior was exhibited by any of these individuals 

before. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Were the Secret Service personnel questioned during your own investigation asked whether they considered their conduct acceptable for some reason? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, this was a question an awful lot of us have 

asked ourselves over the last month and a half, and I believe when 

many of these people were interviewed, I do not think they could 

explain why they exhibited the behavior that they did. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. For instance, some people have tried to 

explain and understand why such risky, really irresponsible behavior would be carried out by Secret Service agents on assignment 

and have said perhaps they were influenced by the fact that prostitution was legal in Colombia. I take it that would not matter so 

far as the Secret Service is concerned because whether prostitution 

was legal or not—they, by their behavior, would run the risk of 

compromising the security of the President of the United States because who knows who they are with on those occasions. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator Lieberman, absolutely. You know, there 

is no excuse for that type of behavior from both a conduct perspective and from a national security perspective. That type of behavior 

was just reckless. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Understood. Over the past 5 years, based 

on our review of the disciplinary records that we have so far gone 

over, which you provided to the Committee in response to our question, there appear to have been five cases that are directly relevant 

to what happened in Cartagena and, therefore, potentially noteworthy: Three allegations involving inappropriate or undocumented 

contact with a foreign national woman, one allegation of contact 

with a prostitute, and one allegation of nonconsensual sex. 

Director Sullivan, are you aware of these cases? And if so, can 

you tell us what was involved and how the agency handled them? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I believe so, sir. First of all, any type of misconduct we take extremely seriously and we investigate it to the 

end limit. The one I believe you are talking about with the nonconsensual sex was investigated by law enforcement, and after 

12 

doing an intense investigation on that, decided not to go forward 

with any charges on that one. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And may I ask, if it is appropriate, 

whether the complainant was somebody within the Secret Service, 

in other words, a fellow employee, or someone outside, a citizen? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Somebody who was outside the organization, Senator. The other three with the foreign national contact, again, all 

of those were investigated and the appropriate administrative action was taken on those three. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Did any of those have characteristics 

similar to what happened in Cartagena, that they were women or 

prostitutes that they picked up. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, nothing to do with prostitution. I believe 

these were women that they had contact with, but nothing like this 

situation we are referring to now. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Were these long-term relationships, to the 

best of your understanding, or just people they met when they were 

on assignment in a foreign location? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. At least one of them, I believe, Senator, was somebody who they had met and they continued with the contact via 

email. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And, finally, what about the one case that 

we have seen in the record of contact with a prostitute, which I 

gather occurred right here in Washington? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Back in 2008, an individual was involved 

with prostitution and was separated from our agency a month 

later. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Was that individual on duty at that time? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I take it this was not somebody he 

met during the course of his work, but he was caught in a sting. 

Is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. As I understand it, he solicited an undercover police officer. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will continue to talk about those 

cases. Thanks for being so responsive. My time is up. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Sullivan, it is my understanding that all of the Secret 

Service personnel involved, with the possible exception of one agent 

who may have used another agent’s name, registered the women 

at the hotel’s front desk using their real names and using the women’s real names. Is that accurate? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, it is, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. That fact made your investigation easier in 

terms of tracking down the women, but it also seems to reinforce 

the claim that this kind of conduct has been tolerated in the past. 

In other words, it suggests to me that the agents were so unconcerned about being caught or about the impropriety of their actions 

that they did not even seek to conceal it. 

What is your reaction? Do you think that the fact that they followed the rules of the hotel in registering the women, they used 

their real names, they used the women’s real names, suggests that 

they were not really worried about being caught? 

13 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I have tried to figure this out for a 

month and a half what would ever possess people to exhibit this 

type of behavior. Again, I will tell you that I do not think this is 

indicative of the overwhelming majority of our men and women, as 

you mentioned before, Senator. But I just think that between the 

alcohol—and, I do not know, the environment—these individuals 

did some really dumb things. And I just cannot explain why they 

would have done what they would do, but I will tell you that I do 

not believe they did it because they believed that this type of behavior would be tolerated. We have a zero tolerance for this type 

of behavior. But I cannot figure out why they did what they did. 

Senator COLLINS. What troubles me about this is, again, I will 

go back to the fact that this was not a case where these 12 men 

together were out on the town in the same club bringing back 

women from that one source. They went out on the town in small 

groups, in some cases two or three or individually; yet each one of 

them comes back to the hotel, makes no attempt to conceal the fact 

that they are bringing foreign national women into the hotel, actually register them at the front desk, they do not try to conceal their 

actions in any way. That suggests to me that they were not worried 

about being caught, that they did not think there would be consequences if they were caught. Otherwise, wouldn’t you expect that 

they would try to conceal their actions? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, when I was first apprised of this situation, I was dumbfounded—that people on an assignment protecting 

the President in a foreign country could have acted in this manner, 

it was a very easy decision for me to say we need to bring them 

back here. And, again, Senator, I have no excuse for those actions. 

All I can tell you is that we acted quickly and brought them back 

here and initiated our investigation. 

Senator COLLINS. Let me turn to another but related issue. When 

you discovered what had happened, you updated some of the training manuals. In late April, you issued a directive that clearly says 

that the laws of this country apply to Secret Service personnel 

while abroad. And I give you credit for issuing that to make it crystal clear. But wasn’t your guidance, as I look through your adjudication guidelines and the eligibility for access to classified information, isn’t it already pretty clear in those guidelines that this 

kind of behavior would not be acceptable? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, absolutely. We put these new enhanced 

guidelines out. I have been accused of being draconian for putting 

them out, and maybe they are. I think, again, I go back to the overwhelming majority of our men and women. I do not think that our 

men and women need these guidelines because we have men and 

women of character and integrity. But what I wanted to make sure 

is even if there is one individual out there who just did not understand it, we wanted to make sure we reached these individuals. 

But you are absolutely right. There are adjudicative guidelines 

out there. People are aware of what those adjudicative guidelines 

are. We are a professional organization. We travel around the 

world. Over the last 6 years, we have done 37,000 trips around the 

world, and we have had no situation like this one before. And, 

again, I am confident this is not a cultural issue, this is not a systemic issue with us. We make decisions every single day. Our emVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Oct 16, 2012 Jkt 075215 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\75215.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14 

ployees make some really critical decisions that, again, the overwhelming majority of the time they make good decisions. On this 

particular trip, we had some individuals who made very bad decisions. That is why it is very important for us to have a strong Office of Professional Responsibility and to have a good relationship 

with the Inspector General, because when those individuals, which 

are in the minority, make bad decisions, when they make bad 

choices, when there is misconduct or misbehavior, we are going to 

act appropriately. 

Senator COLLINS. I guess the point I was trying to make is, as 

I read these guidelines, it specifically refers to engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal in that country 

but illegal in the United States. So there is no doubt that officially 

this kind of behavior was already prohibited prior to your issuing 

the directive on April 27, correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Edwards, in just the few seconds I have 

left, are you conducting an independent investigation of what occurred in Colombia? Or are you simply reviewing the investigation 

that Director Sullivan and his staff are conducting? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Senator. I am deeply troubled, just as 

you are, and we are doing a comprehensive review. In that what 

I mean is we are reviewing the investigation that is done by Secret 

Service. At the same time, we are also doing some independent 

interviews ourselves. We also want to talk to the people who are 

interviewing the personnel. We have done 23. We have also sat in 

on about six of the interviews that were conducted. 

In order for us to get a comprehensive report—I do not have the 

personnel to go interview all 200 of them, but we are doing a random sampling of them to make sure that our review and investigation is independent and transparent. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is critical that the 

IG do a completely independent investigation, not just a review of 

the agency’s investigation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. I agree with you. 

I know this will require a commitment of personnel by you, Mr. Edwards, but I think it is so important to get to the bottom of this 

event, to get to the truth of it so that we can find out exactly what 

happened. And the aim here is, of course, to restore confidence to 

the Secret Service, which most of whose members obviously deserve 

it by their work. So I agree with that. 

The Members of the Committee, as is our custom, will be called 

in order of appearance, and in that regard, Senator Brown is next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Sullivan, thank you. Mr. Edwards, thank you for attending. 

Mr. Sullivan, listening to your testimony, you said you were not 

aware that this has happened before, and that is evidenced by 

some of the investigations you have done in your long history in 

the Secret Service. Is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator. 

15 

Senator BROWN. And you are still trying to figure it out, is something you also said. Is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. As far as figuring this type of behavior—— 

Senator BROWN. Yes, the most recent event. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. And you are making changes, doing ethics training, changing policy. Is that also correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. And you have said many times a majority of the 

folks serving in the agency—and I would agree—do wonderful 

work. They have many missions. They have served with great pride 

and resourcefulness over, I believe, 147 years of service. Is that 

also a fair statement? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator. 

Senator BROWN. I know you have set out new guidelines, and you 

indicated on your own, you just said that they were draconian, as 

a matter of fact, and you hate to do them, but you feel it is necessary. And I would ask, do you also trust the men and women now 

that are serving, notwithstanding this individual incident? Do you 

trust them in their sacrifice and service in the job that they are 

doing right now? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. The reason I am asking these questions is because I know there is potentially a new policy to send a GS–15 supervisor from the Office of Professional Responsibility, which you 

indicated also that is a member of the internal affairs division of 

the agency, to go and basically baby-sit these agents when they are 

going overseas and doing their duty. So I am a little bit confused 

as to why we would be sending a $155,000 additional person to basically baby-sit people that—you say this has not happened before, 

you have changed policy, you have made draconian changes, and 

you trust the men and women, yet we are going to be sending 

somebody to oversee that they are, in fact, following your policies. 

I am not quite sure how that makes financial sense, and re-establishes the so-called trust that you have in the agency. Could you 

answer that, please? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. And, again, I was accused of being draconian for putting these out, but we did feel that it was important 

to get these out. 

As far as the GS–15 from the Office of Professional Responsibility going out, he or she will have an assignment. I have heard 

them referred to as a ‘‘baby-sitter.’’ They are not. They are there 

to be a working agent. However, one of the things we did find on 

this particular trip was that when we did have this situation we 

had to look at, the person we needed to rely on was the special 

agent in charge of the Miami Field Office, who did an outstanding 

job. And my preference would have been for her to continue to 

work on the upcoming visit. We do need to have supervision on 

these type of—— 

Senator BROWN. Yes, but you already have supervision. You have 

agents, you have agents in charge of agents, and you have other 

agents in charge of those. You already have a chain of command, 

and it seems like you are now going to insert an internal affairs 

person to basically—you can call it a ‘‘baby-sitter,’’ or you can call 

16 

it somebody just overseeing what is happening. I am just going on 

your testimony where you said you have made changes, you trust 

these people, this is an aberration, it is not something that habitually happened, you had no knowledge, and yet we are going to 

spend the time and effort and are going to take somebody away 

from doing another job to be there just in case something like this 

happens. I am wondering if you think it is a little bit overkill. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, Senator, and maybe I am doing a bad job of 

explaining this. We have a group of agents who go out, and they 

are called a jump team. On this particular jump team, we had 53 

agents. This jump team was led by two GS–14s who were two of 

the individuals who were involved in this incident. 

What we have done now is we have replaced those two GS–14 

supervisors with two GS–15 supervisors. One GS–15 is going to 

come from the field, more than likely will be a GS–15 special agent 

in charge of a field office, and then the other one will be a GS–15 

from our Office of Professional Responsibility. They are not there 

to be a baby-sitter. They are going to have an assignment. But if 

a situation does come up, they will be there to resolve that situation. 

Senator BROWN. Is this on every mission that we do now? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. This will be for every foreign trip. 

Senator BROWN. For every foreign trip. And how many foreign 

trips do we actually conduct per year? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I would have to give you the numbers for 

that. 

Senator BROWN. Around, approximately? Is it 10? Is it 100? Is it 

200 or 500? Give me just an approximation. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. So far this year we have done about 200 trips or 

so, but this is only for a presidential or a vice presidential visit. 

Senator BROWN. And how many of those? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I would have to get you the number. 

Senator BROWN. If you could because, once again, you are restructuring—you are changing the entire structure, putting higher 

paid people, GS–15s in position. They should be doing the job regardless of the GS level that they are at. And then, changing and 

having someone there to oversee and be there, an agency that you 

trust, I am still not quite—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I do trust our people, but we are talking 

about protecting the President here, and I believe supervision is 

very important. And, clearly, on this particular trip, supervision 

was lacking. And if we have to put GS–15s on a particular trip, 

then that is what we are going to do. 

Senator BROWN. OK. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We are going to see how it goes, and if we believe 

we can go back to the way we had it before, we will do that. But 

the one thing I want to make clear, these people are not there to 

baby-sit, and these GS–15s from our Office of Professional Responsibility are going to be the individuals who are going to be giving 

an ethics briefing at the beginning of a trip and a Code of Conduct 

briefing on a trip. 

Senator BROWN. How often do they get the ethics briefings? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. They get those throughout their career during 

training, and there is an annual requirement—— 

17 

Senator BROWN. So an annual ethics briefing, and how about 

polygraphs every 10 years, I understand? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No. They get a polygraph at the beginning of their 

career when they come on, and then after that we do 5-year background updates. Some of our individuals, depending on what type 

of position they hold, either internal or external to the organization, they get polygraphs throughout their career as well. 

Senator BROWN. And what is the average, about every 5 or 10 

years. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, not all of our employees get polygraphs 

every 5 years. 

Senator BROWN. How about these particular individuals that 

would have been doing the job that they were doing? How often 

would they get a polygraph? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Unless they are in a specialized position where 

that was required, they would not have taken another polygraph 

once they got their initial polygraph. 

Senator BROWN. So it could have been 10 or 20 years for some 

of these people. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator BROWN. Do you think maybe we should review that policy and have folks—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is part of what we are looking at now. 

Senator BROWN. Do you think we would have actually found out 

about this if we did not have an argument regarding price? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I do think we would have, Senator. 

Senator BROWN. How do you think we would have found out? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that somebody on this jump team would 

have reported that. 

Senator BROWN. Well, if, in fact, you believe the Washington Post 

article, this is something that has been happening for quite a 

while, and yet you have never heard of it. We are getting two different stories. So I would hope that, Mr. Edwards, in your investigation we can find out what the truth is and deal with the people 

that are not adhering to the policy and deal with it accordingly. I 

agree with you, Mr. Sullivan. I think there are some amazing men 

and women serving in our Secret Service. You know, taking a bullet for the President is the ultimate form of sacrifice that an agent 

could make, and protecting our President and Vice President is the 

most important thing that any individual in our government can 

do, quite honestly. And I know there are some fine ones out there, 

and, unfortunately, I agree with the Chairman, the image is 

stained. And that is why I also appreciate your appearances before 

us and your efforts to be open and forthright. I thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, if I may, I would just like to respond 

back to the Washington Post article. Again, that referenced numerous anonymous sources there, and you had talked about waste and 

mismanagement earlier. You know, there was an allegation at the 

beginning of this about misconduct in El Salvador, and a lot of people took that and ran with it because it was reported on the news. 

I took that allegation very seriously, and I sent our Office of Professional Responsibility down to El Salvador for almost a week. 

18 

We spent thousands of dollars to send those people down there. 

We interviewed 28 to 30 people. We went to four hotels where our 

agents stayed. We talked to every hotel manager. We talked to 

every security director for those hotels. We talked to seven or eight 

of the contract drivers who our agents used. We talked to the police 

chief. We talked to the owner of a nightclub where this incident 

was alleged to have occurred. We were unable to prove any of these 

allegations. We spoke to the Regional Security Officer (RSO) who 

conducted his own investigation down there. 

So all I would say is that when you read about it in the paper 

from an anonymous source, it is very difficult for us to investigate 

that type of an allegation. I would say, again, we would like to 

know who, when, where, and why, and the names of people, as well 

as who these people are who are condoning it. And I will just tell 

you, sir, that is not the organization I know that we would condone 

such behavior. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Director. Thank you, Senator 

Brown. Senator Johnson, you are next. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Sullivan 

and Inspector General Edwards, thanks for testifying today. 

First of all, I have great respect for the Secret Service, and this 

is an incredibly sad episode, and this hearing is all about how do 

you restore credibility. I am also sad to say—I agree with Senator 

Collins—based on the facts of this case, it is hard to believe that 

this is just a one-time occurrence. I wish I could believe that, but 

it is just hard to believe. 

I have a couple of questions. Let us go back to the polygraphs 

that Senator Brown was asking about. 

I think I heard you earlier say that the polygraphs were offered 

to these agents. Was that not a requirement? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I believe we ended up doing about 14 or 15 

polygraphs. 

Senator JOHNSON. But, again, was it not a requirement? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, they have the option to refuse a polygraph. 

Senator JOHNSON. What kind of constraints did you find in your 

investigation? What constraints are there in trying to get to the 

facts of this based on just worker protections? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, sir, going back to the polygraph, in some 

cases, the polygraphs helped a couple of people keep their job, and 

those particular individuals who refused to take the polygraph, we 

were able to come up with other information that refuted what 

they were saying. So for us not giving a polygraph did not really 

impact the way this investigation was conducted because we were 

able to prove the allegation without using the polygraph. 

Senator JOHNSON. Again, as we talked in our closed-door briefing, my concern is that additional information starts coming out, 

other stories come out month after month after month, and we 

need to get this behind us. I would imagine you have the exact 

same concern. 

In your investigation, what are you doing to make sure that we 

do not hear of another instance 2 or 3 months out? Specifically, 

19 

what are you doing to ensure that does not occur other than just 

your belief that you have faith in your agents? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, sir, we put together this Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group with Director Berry and Director Patrick. The Inspector General is going to be taking a look at our investigation. Last June, a governmentwide Viewpoint survey, when 

asked if they would report an incident of unethical behavior, I believe nearly 60 percent of our employees responded that they would 

report it. We want to improve that number until it is 100 percent. 

We want to encourage our employees that if they see unethical behavior or misconduct, we want that to be reported to us. 

Senator JOHNSON. Forty percent is a very high percentage that 

would not report. I guess that is my concern when you hear the 

story of ‘‘what is done on the road stays on the road.’’ My guess 

is that within the Secret Service there is a pretty high level of esprit de corps, possibly even a code of silence. And so barring utilization of polygraphs that are required, how do you really get to the 

bottom of this? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, I go back to leadership, that the leadership 

that we have on these trips, the leadership that we have in our organization, that they encourage our people and make sure that people know that there is not going to be retribution or that there is 

not going to be any negative impact for them to report this type 

of behavior. 

Senator JOHNSON. But you had leadership on these trips, and 

these things occurred. So, again, how do we get to the bottom of 

it? Is there some mechanism where we can require polygraphs, I 

hate to say it, of the 7,000 members of the Secret Service to actually get this episode behind us. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, one of the things that we have looked at is, 

do we need to increase the use of polygraph. We have a very aggressive and a very good polygraph program. All of our agents are 

polygraphed when they first come on the job. We do 5-year updates 

for every single employee that we have. Every employee we have 

maintains a top security clearance. But we are taking a look at further use of polygraph. 

Senator JOHNSON. What questions specifically in these types of 

episodes would be asked in a polygraph test? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think that is something we would have to take 

a look at. There would be two different polygraphs we are talking 

about here. There would be the national security polygraph and 

then there would be the character issue polygraph. And for each 

one there would be two or three relevant questions that would be 

looking for our polygraphers to ask the employees. 

Senator JOHNSON. So in the polygraphs that were administered 

voluntarily, was a more general question asked or were only questions asked related to this specific episode? In other words, did you 

ask those individuals that were polygraphed, ‘‘Have you ever participated in this type of behavior in the past?’’ 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That type of question I believe was asked in the 

pre-test, but, again, sir, I would be more than happy to get you answers to the exact questions that were asked. 

Senator JOHNSON. I would like to know whether that question 

was asked and whether the question was also asked, not only 

20 

under oath but also in the polygraph, ‘‘Are you aware of any other 

type of behavior by somebody else within the service?’’ 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We will be happy to get that for you. 

Senator JOHNSON. To me, those are the types of questions that 

really do need to be asked almost universally if we are going to get 

to the bottom of this. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. OK. 

Senator JOHNSON. In terms of taking disciplinary action, up to 

and including discharge, do you feel constrained in your employment policies of actually being able to take the necessary steps? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. I believe we did a very swift and comprehensive investigation, and we took the appropriate action when 

we felt that we had enough information to take that action. 

Also, not only in this type of an investigation but any investigation we do, when it comes to an employee, we want to make sure 

that we protect the rights that they have. But, again, we want to 

make sure that whatever decision we make is going to be the right 

one and it is one that cannot be refuted. 

Senator JOHNSON. We have had a number of agents retire but 

now are trying to get back in the Secret Service or they are challenging the dismissal. What are the numbers and what is the status on that? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right now, our numbers contradict what was in 

the Washington Post article. We have two employees who had originally said that they were going to resign that have now come back 

and said that they are going to challenge their resignations. And 

so now we will look to revoke their security clearance. 

Senator JOHNSON. Well, I am basically out of time. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Senator 

Portman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN 

Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Senator Collins, for holding the hearing and, more importantly, for 

being on top of this situation from the start. I know that you share 

the concern of our colleagues to be sure this is fully investigated 

and the necessary reforms are put into place. Thank you, Mr. Director, and the Acting IG for being here and for your testimony. 

And, Director Sullivan, thanks for your 29 years of service and for 

your willingness to take some swift actions and also to be transparent, as the Acting IG said, with him and to be honest with us 

up on the Hill as we have asked questions over these past few 

weeks. 

As is the case with the Chairman, I am a former protectee, and 

I was in a Cabinet level role as U.S. Trade Representative on a 

number of foreign trips where I had Secret Service protection. And 

earlier, Director Sullivan, you talked about the five core values of 

the service: Justice, duty, courage, loyalty, and honesty. And I will 

say that my experience is that the men and women who protected 

me exemplified those values. And it is precisely because of my high 

regard for the character and professionalism of those men and 

women and for the importance of the Secret Service—and really its 

central role in the continuity of our very governmental system— 

21 

that I am so concerned about what happened and so deeply troubled by the incident that is the subject of this hearing today. 

We all have a role to fully investigate this as a result, and we 

all have a role to be sure that this kind of risky and unprofessional 

behavior does not occur again by putting in place new protocols to 

try to restore the trust and confidence of the American people. 

So my questions are really about, going forward, what do we do. 

Again, I think you took some appropriate, swift actions. I think it 

was appropriate to remove the Secret Service personnel from Colombia, as you did immediately. I think that some of the immediate 

actions you have taken with regard to this incident are appropriate. I have to agree with my colleagues that it may not be an 

isolated incident given the fact that there were supervisors involved among other aspects of this, and so I would like to talk 

about what should be done in the future. 

I have been interested in the discussion today about the guidelines that are currently in place, and it is my view that either because they are specifically written or because they are understood, 

it is not as if there were not adequate guidelines. I will read you 

from a couple of your guidelines. One is the Code of Conduct, which 

says that the Secret Service employees shall not engage in amoral, 

notoriously disgraceful conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the 

government. Standards of conduct also specify that the absence of 

a specific published standard of conduct covering an act tending to 

discredit an employee or department does not mean such an act is 

condoned. So even if it is not specifically identified in terms of what 

happened in Cartagena, certainly it would fall into this general category. 

Also, under your rules of conduct with regard to security clearances, it says that ‘‘Contact with a foreign national, if that contact 

creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, is inappropriate.’’ The guidelines 

also warn ‘‘against conduct, especially while traveling outside the 

United States, which may make an individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, or country.’’ 

So it seems to me, you can write all the guidelines you want, but 

if the culture does not reinforce, again, the five core values we 

talked about and the integrity and professionalism that I certainly 

saw in my experience with the Secret Service, it will not be successful. 

So we have talked a little bit about the Professional Reinforcement Working Group. It seems like that is a good step forward. 

What else would you recommend, Director Sullivan and IG Edwards, in terms of looking from to ensure that this kind of an incident never happens again? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator. One of the things we did was 

to look backwards. We looked at our discipline over the last 51⁄2

years, and when I look at that, it is under 1 percent of our population is involved in some type of disciplinary action, and that just 

gives me reason to believe that this is not part of the culture, and 

being part of this organization for 29 years and never seeing anything like this before in my life, I just believe very strongly that 

this just is not part of our culture. 

Senator PORTMAN. Director, how many personnel do you have? 

22 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Close to 7,000. 

Senator PORTMAN. And on this jump team, there were 53 individuals, but how many U.S. Secret Service personnel were on the 

Cartagena trip in total? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We had about 200 people on the trip. At the time 

of this situation we had about 175 people who were in Cartagena. 

Senator PORTMAN. And how many foreign trips had the Secret 

Service been involved with? You talked about over 200 this year 

alone. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, and over the past 7 years, we have done 

about 2,700 since—— 

Senator PORTMAN. Two thousand, seven hundred foreign trips? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator PORTMAN. And this kind of an incident has not been reported before? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, sir. But, again, moving forward, I think that 

with the Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group, we are 

going to look at various areas. We have broken it up into three different areas. There is going to be a Subcommittee on Workforce 

Management, and we are going to take a look at how we hire, our 

performance management, accountability, discipline, and the security clearance process. We are also going to take a look at our operational environment and have the subcommittee look at our traditions, look at our operations, compare ourselves to other law enforcement and military organizations, take a look at the role of our 

high standards—that there is no margin of error within our culture—and look at our workforce programs, ombudsman programs, 

employee assistance program, and diversity program. And we are 

also going to take a look at our ethics communication training and 

professional development. 

We do want to ensure that the men and women of this organization are not just better but the best, and that is the goal of that 

subcommittee. 

Senator PORTMAN. Well, thank you, Director Sullivan. My time 

has now expired. Again, I appreciate your 29 years of distinguished 

service, and, Mr. Edwards, I appreciate the way you have worked 

seamlessly with the Secret Service. I know you have a lot of other 

responsibilities at the Department of Homeland Security, including 

other law enforcement responsibilities. I am sure some of the best 

practices there are also helpful, as the Director has said in part of 

this review. Thank you for your testimony today. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Portman, thank you. Senator 

Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. 

Those of us who serve in the Senate are privileged to serve with 

a retired Navy admiral. His name is Barry Black. He is Chief of 

Chaplains, formerly from the Navy Marine Corps, and now the 

chaplain for the U.S. Senate. He oftentimes encourages those of us 

who are privileged to serve here to ask for wisdom, whatever our 

faith might be. And so we try to do that in different ways. 

23 

As I was thinking about this hearing and preparing for this hearing, I actually took a few minutes to go back and read one of the 

most famous passages in the New Testament, from the Book of 

John, and the setting is one that I think most people will recall, 

where a woman had been accused of adultery, and she was being 

surrounded by a group of men. The man involved in the adultery 

was nowhere to be seen, but she was surrounded by a group of men 

who held stones in their hands. And Jesus was close by, and the 

Pharisee said to Jesus, Look, what do you think should happen to 

this woman? And He was bending down, writing stuff in the dirt, 

and He just kind of ignored them. And after a while they said, 

Jesus, we are talking to you. What do you think should happen to 

this woman? The laws of Moses say that she should be stoned and 

her life taken from her as a result of her sins. 

Jesus kept writing in the dirt, and all He said was, ‘‘Let those 

of you who are without sin cast the first stone.’’ That is all He said. 

And one by one, the men holding the stones from oldest to youngest 

dropped their stones and walked away. And the woman was left 

there standing in the middle of this circle, and the only person still 

there was Jesus. And He said to her, ‘‘Woman, where are your accusers?’’ And she said, ‘‘They have gone away.’’ And He said to her, 

‘‘Your accusers have gone, and I am not going to accuse you either.’’ 

But then He added, ‘‘Go and sin no more.’’ 

Nobody here is going to lose their life because of what they did 

down in Colombia. They have lost their jobs. They have lost their 

reputation. They have harmed the reputation of a wonderful agency. 

How many men and women serve in the Secret Service today? 

Roughly how many? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, just under 7,000. 

Senator CARPER. And if you go back in time, any idea how many 

tens of thousands might have served in the Secret Service? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Tens of thousands. I do not have the exact number, but a lot of people have come before us who we have built this 

organization upon. 

Senator CARPER. One indiscretion of the nature that has been reported in Colombia, one indiscretion is one too many. Eleven or 12 

are 11 or 12 too many. And the folks who have done these things 

have not just ruined their careers, they helped spoil the reputation 

of the tens of thousands of people who have served and continue 

to serve in the Secret Service. 

Having said that, none of us is without sin, and the key here for 

us is to figure out what went wrong, to make sure that those who 

have misbehaved are punished, and then make sure that we have 

put in place the kind of policies and safeguards to ensure that this 

kind of thing does not happen again. 

Are you convinced, Mr. Edwards, that is what we have done? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Can you repeat your question again, sir? 

Senator CARPER. The role here for us, and I think for you, and 

certainly for Mr. Sullivan, is to ensure that we have found out the 

facts, provided appropriate punishment for those who have misbehaved, and to put in place the policies and the safeguards to ensure that this kind of thing does not happen again. Are you satisfied with the steps that have been taken meet that test? 

24 

Mr. EDWARDS. Absolutely, sir. I will make sure that we do a complete review and provide recommendations to Director Sullivan to 

implement and make sure that this never happens again. 

Senator CARPER. What further needs to be done, and what is the 

appropriate role for the Congress? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I owe it to the Secretary and to Congress for me 

to do an independent review and be transparent and accountable 

with the recommendations and report to you what else can be done. 

I am still in the process of doing my review, so I do not have any 

findings yet. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Sullivan, could you just respond to those 

questions as well, please? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. We cannot ignore what happened in 

Cartagena, but, again, I go back to the overwhelming men and 

women in this organization doing an outstanding job every single 

day. And my goal right now is to make sure that they know that 

we have confidence in them and that we believe in them and that 

we know that this is not indicative of their character. 

What I would ask is that we continue to get your support, and 

I appreciate the complimentary things that you have said about 

our men and women today. We have a very challenging year that 

we are in the middle of right now. As I mentioned to you, we just 

finished up the NATO summit and the G–8. But I would ask for 

your continued support. I would ask for you to continue to believe 

in what this organization is all about. And I would ask that you 

just continue to believe in us and know that we are going to do everything we can do to make sure that we rebuild our reputation 

and do the right thing for the people that we protect and serve. 

Senator CARPER. I will just close with this. You just mentioned 

‘‘do the right thing,’’ and some of the best guidance I ever received 

in my life is ‘‘to figure out the right thing to do and just do it.’’ Just 

do it consistently, not the easy thing, not the expedient thing, but 

to do the right thing. And I would just say to you and Mr. Edwards 

in your capacity to ensure that you do the right thing. 

The other thing I would say, all of us make mistakes. God knows 

I have. I am sure my colleagues have as well and will make others 

in the future. Having said that, some of the best advice I ever got 

was actually from my father who essentially said, talking about my 

work in life, he said, ‘‘If it is not perfect, just make it better.’’ And 

everything I do I know I can do better, and I think that is true of 

the behavior of all of us and it is certainly with the behavior of 

folks who work and have worked and will work in the future at the 

Secret Service. If it is not perfect, make it better. That should be 

our goal. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Carper. 

We will do a second round insofar as Members have additional 

questions. 

Would either or both of you like to take a 5-minute break, or are 

you OK to go forward? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am fine, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. 

25 

Inspector General, let me just ask you, if you have not said it already—maybe I missed it—generally speaking, what kind of time 

schedule are you putting yourself on? I know it is hard to do deadlines here, but you have three parts. Am I correct to say that your 

first focus is going to be the review and insofar as possible independent investigation of what happened in Cartagena? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. The first part, I need to look at is the investigation, how it was done, the scope and methodology, the questions asked, whether it is closed-ended or open questions, and look 

at it; and now, after listening to you and Senator Collins, for me 

to go back and redo all of the 200. Originally, I was planning on 

getting this done by July 2, but I am going to go back and revisit 

that because I truly want to try to come up with an independent 

investigation on the first part. 

The second part is looking at the culture. This misbehavior or 

this risky behavior, what is the cause for that? What is the type 

of corrective action that was taken? What kind of vetting process 

and ethics training was offered? So, to get an idea of that, I need 

to do a comprehensive inspection on that, and I plan to have that 

done by fall. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So at this point, it is fair to say that if 

you do the kind of independent investigation of Cartagena that we 

are talking about, you are probably not going to be able to do it 

by early July, but hopefully you will have it by the end of the summer? We are not holding you to that, but is that a reasonable goal? 

Mr. EDWARDS. I am going to put all my additional resources and 

make sure that this is a top priority and get this done. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Edwards, in response to the questions that our Committee 

sent you, you indicated that you found in the IG case files some 

record of an incident, 10 years ago actually, where approximately 

five Secret Service agents were disciplined for partying, and here 

I am quoting, ‘‘partying with alcohol with underage females in 

their hotel rooms’’ while on assignment at the 2002 Olympics. And, 

of course, this is of significance as we try to determine whether 

there was further evidence of the kind of misconduct that occurred 

at Cartagena. 

Do you know at this point whether this is a credible report? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, sir. We received a hotline complaint 

on April 20. This was referring to the February 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. There were five Secret Service agents that 

were sent home after police responded and found them partying 

with alcohol with underage females in their hotel rooms while on 

assignment. This was investigated by the Secret Service at that 

time, and I think the outcome of that was many of them have left 

the agency now, but since we received a hotline complaint, I have 

an obligation to look into it. So we are looking into it. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. This is important. This actually came in 

relatively recently over the hotline that you maintain, which is an 

Internet hotline? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. You might want to mention what the address is. Do you know it offhand? 

Mr. EDWARDS. It is oig.dhs.gov. 

26 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you are beginning to investigate that. 

Director Sullivan, do you have awareness of that incident? I 

know you were not Director of the agency at that point. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, as far as I know, there were three individuals who were involved in that particular incident. I believe that 

those individuals were gone within a very short period of time after 

that incident. Again, I go back to the fact that it does not represent 

the overwhelming majority of our people, but like any allegation 

that comes to our attention, we are going to investigate it, and we 

are going to take the appropriate disciplinary action. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That leads me to ask this question. I assume from everything you have said that the seriousness of that 

behavior is not affected by the fact that it occurred within the 

United States as opposed to outside in Colombia, and it occurred 

presumably with young women who were not prostitutes, that the 

behavior was unacceptable for Secret Service personnel. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, again, as I understand the allegation, it was 

underage individuals, and that would bring into account the seriousness of the allegation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. In fact, probably in Utah it was a crime. 

I am not asking you to opine on that, but—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. Senator, I have not looked at that case, and 

I would be more than happy to. And, again, we will cooperate fully 

with the IG. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So leave this case during the 2002 Olympics aside. Just to clarify, we are focused on these matters, unfortunately, because of what happened in Cartagena, Colombia, outside 

of the United States. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Am I correct in presuming that the Secret 

Service would be just as concerned if you found that agents on assignment somewhere here in the United States were bringing back 

women who were not foreign nationals but who they had just met 

somewhere to their rooms while on assignment protecting somebody? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. I think anything that is going to compromise our mission we are going to be concerned. And, again, if 

we receive an allegation of that, we are going to investigate. We 

want our people to live up to the standards of our organization. 

And this was just handed to me by staff. I guess these women in 

the Utah case were under the age of 21, not under the age of 18. 

I am not sure what, if any, State-specific legislation was there, but, 

again, I will be more than happy to get the particulars for you. But 

what I do know is that those employees were gone pretty quickly. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But just to make the point, the concern 

that we have expressed, Senator Collins quite explicitly, and what 

we are worried about is that an agent with the responsibility to 

protect the President and Vice President could be compromised by 

being involved in a casual sexual relationship while on assignment 

on the road. So, ultimately, it does not matter whether it happens 

in Cartagena, Colombia, or Chicago, Illinois. True? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Let me come to just a final question 

quickly. Senator Portman read from some of the Code of Conduct 

27 

for the Secret Service, and then the general rules more governmentwide, if you will, for anybody seeking a security clearance, and 

they are really quite explicit about what is expected. The security 

clearance rules caution against contact with a foreign national ‘‘if 

that contact create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.’’ The guidelines also 

warn ‘‘against conduct, especially while traveling outside the 

United States, which may make an individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country,’’ and that is a really pretty high standard. 

What becomes of these guidelines, the Secret Service’s own Code 

of Conduct and the general governmentwide rules for people who 

have security clearances? In other words, were the agents, including those involved in this misconduct in Cartagena, were they required to study these guidelines? Were they given training sessions 

in them? In other words, anybody in their right mind as a Secret 

Service agent, if they faced reality, would have known that what 

they were doing in Cartagena that night was just outrageously unacceptable and irresponsible. But assuming for a moment they 

weren’t in their right mind, do you think they were adequately on 

notice of these rules of conduct that this behavior was unacceptable? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I do. We are talking about two different 

issues here. You have Codes of Conduct, and then you have the security clearance issue. I will talk about Code of Conduct first. 

Code of Conduct with us starts from the recruitment process. 

From the very beginning when we hire somebody to come work for 

us, the first thing we talk to them about is character and integrity. 

That is part of our background investigation. That is part of the 

conversation that we have with the employee. That is part of our 

polygraph. That goes right through their initial training. From 

their first day on the job and through their orientation, we talk 

about our Codes of Conduct. That is also reinforced when they go 

through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. It is reinforced again when they go to our training facility in Beltsville, 

Maryland. About a week or two before the agent or officer graduation, I myself and the Deputy Director meet with each class for 

about an hour and a half. The first thing we talk about is character, and we tell these individuals that the thing that separated 

them from the others was their character and their integrity. 

When they go back into their field office, they have to annually 

certify that they have read our Code of Conduct, that they understand our Code of Conduct, and that is done with their supervisor. 

And in between, as they go through the organization, they attend 

our various training classes, whether it is a supervisory training 

class or an in-service training class, or when they get into upper 

management, we continue to talk about our Code of Conduct. 

As far as the security clearance issues, as you know, Senator, we 

have adjudicative guidelines where this is all spelled out. As a matter of fact, on the passport that we travel on, it is indicated on the 

passport that you will abide by the rules and regulations of the organization and of the United States. 

28 

So, Senator, I do believe that it is pretty clear, I think, to anybody in our organization. It is a common-sense thing to me and a 

moral thing to me that people understand what the expectation is. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that answer. I hope you 

will take a fresh look at it, notwithstanding everything you have 

said, to make sure that you are drilling all these values that are 

important to the Secret Service, that are on paper, that you have 

updated since Cartagena in a constructive way, so that the next 

time a Secret Service agent or group of them think about doing 

something like they did in Cartagena that night, that a light will 

go off in their heads and they will conclude the risk is too high. 

Probably in the short run, the memory of Cartagena and the dishonor brought on the agents there will be so fresh that this will 

not happen. But human nature being what it is, over a period of 

time—we need to have rules and procedures for drilling those rules 

into personnel that go on for a much longer period of time, to a 

time when what happened in Cartagena may not be as fresh in the 

minds of future Secret Service agents. 

My time is well up. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Sullivan, initially, you did not have information about 

these women. Initially, you did not know whether they were prostitutes or foreign agents or members of a terrorist group or working 

for a drug cartel. Is that correct? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. So was there a sweep done of the hotel rooms 

to see whether the women involved had planted any electronic surveillance equipment? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, one of the things we tell all of our people 

on a foreign trip is never trust that your room is safe. We did not 

do any type of a sweep on any of these rooms that were used by 

these agents and officers. 

Senator COLLINS. I would understand that there was no sweep 

before the incident, but when you first learned of the incident, was 

there any order given to do a sweep of the rooms that the women 

had been in? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Other than a visual sweep, there was no type of 

electronic sweep that was made. There was a visual sweep. People 

went through the rooms. But as far as any type of electronic sweep, 

Senator, there was not. 

Senator COLLINS. Have you now been able to definitively conclude that the women were not associated with foreign agents, that 

they did not work for drug cartels, that they were not involved in 

human trafficking, that they were not working for FARC, for example, or other terrorist groups? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. One of the first things we did, Senator, was to get 

the names of all the women. We had their country identification 

number. We provided those names and identifiers to some of our 

various partners out there who could verify for us if there was any 

connection with any type of criminal activity or criminal organization as well as any type of intelligence concerns that we may have. 

All of the information that we have received back has concluded 

that there was no connection either from an intelligence perspective or a criminal perspective. 

29 

We have also been able to interview, I believe, all but two 

women. I think we have interviewed nine or ten of the women, 

working with the local police in Colombia and, again, that, from all 

appearances in those interviews, has backed up the information 

that we have been able to derive from these checks we have done. 

Senator COLLINS. It is somewhat ironic that we can be relieved 

that the women for the most part were simply prostitutes. That is 

a rather strange thing for us to take comfort in in this case, but 

obviously, it would have been more troubling if they were foreign 

agents or associated with drug cartels or other criminal gangs. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, Senator. Again, our investigation has pretty 

much confirmed that these women did not know who these individuals were, and were not aware that they worked for the Secret 

Service. 

Senator COLLINS. I want to return to an exchange that you had 

with Senator Johnson. I believe during that exchange you referred 

to a governmentwide survey that asked certain Federal employees 

whether they would report ethical misconduct. Did I understand 

correctly that you said that 60 percent of the Secret Service personnel who were interviewed for this survey said that they would 

report ethical misconduct and 40 percent, approximately, said they 

would not? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, Senator, I think it was something like 58 or 

60 percent said they would. I think there was about 18 or 19 percent who said they would not. And then I think there might have 

been the remaining percentage who just were indifferent towards 

it. 

Senator COLLINS. Doesn’t that suggest a broader problem? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I think that is a number that we need 

to raise up. I think that is something that we need to work on. I 

do not know if that presents a problem. I want to look at that. That 

is part of the theme that I have talked to Director Berry from OPM 

about because I would like to see that number increase. 

Senator COLLINS. From my perspective, when you combine the 

facts of this case, the fact that the agents made no attempt to conceal their identities or the fact that they were bringing these 

women back to their hotel rooms, a survey in which fewer than 60 

percent of the Secret Service personnel said that they would report 

ethical misconduct, the fact that this was not, as I said in my opening statement, a group of individuals who just got swept up into 

a situation but, rather, smaller groups who engaged in the same 

kinds of misconduct, to me that just spells a broader problem with 

culture in the agency. And I say that with the greatest respect for 

the vast majority of people working for the Secret Service who do 

extraordinary work and so courageously. But that does not mean 

that there is not a problem. 

So my final question to you today is: If I finally become successful in convincing you that there is a broader problem here with culture or with unacceptable behavior being condoned when agents 

are on the road, what actions would you take to address this problem that you are not taking now? How would you change the culture of an agency? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, I am hoping that I can convince you that 

it is not a cultural issue. 

30 

Senator COLLINS. I know, but—— 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Again, Senator I look at the number of cases—one 

of the things I know as the Director is that on any given day, I potentially am going to have an employee who is going to get into 

some type of an incident. It might be a serious one. It might not 

be a big one at all. But, again, I just keep going back to under 1 

percent of our investigations have some type of misconduct. But 

that is why I do feel very optimistic about this Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group. We have over 45 senior executives 

throughout the Federal Government, from the military, from other 

law enforcement, and from non-law enforcement—I do want to be 

very open with them, I want to be transparent, and I want them 

to take a hard look at us. But, again, it is my opinion that the overwhelming majority of the men and women of this organization are 

part of a great culture. 

I think the thing that makes our organization what it is is our 

culture. I think that we have a culture of hard-working people that 

are committed, that work hard every single day. And, when I was 

out at the NATO summit in Chicago, Senator, I walked around and 

I must have talked to a couple hundred agents out there. And I can 

tell you that there is nobody who is more disappointed by this behavior, who is more upset with this behavior, than our men and 

women. But I have 100 percent confidence in our men and women, 

and I just do not think that this is something that is systemic within this organization. 

Senator COLLINS. Are there any additional actions that you 

would be taking if you felt that there was a systemic problem? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, again, I think that we would have more 

training. I think training is a big thing, and I think you can never 

do enough training, and training is something that we try to be 

very proactive with. But I think we just need to continually drill 

into our people what the result is going to be of a bad decision. 

And, quite frankly, Senator, I do think that the action we have 

taken for these bad decisions, I think that sends a pretty strong 

message to the men and women of this organization that this will 

not be tolerated. 

Senator COLLINS. I know I promised you that was my last question, but I do have just one final question. You stated earlier that 

you feel that this incident in Colombia would have become public 

even if there had not been the dispute over money. What is your 

basis for feeling that the incident would have become public, particularly in light of this survey? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We had almost 200 people there, and, again, it 

just goes back to how confident I am in the men and women of our 

organization. And we are talking about a pretty significant event 

here. We are talking about 11 individuals, now 12 individuals, who 

took part in this misconduct. And I just believe—and I have a lot 

of faith in our men and women—that somebody would have reported this misconduct because this just goes beyond the pale. And 

I truly do believe that they would have made a complaint either 

to our Office of Professional Responsibility or to the DHS IG. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

31 

So I understand, if I can put it this way, that both your own 

faith in the Secret Service, which is a result of your own experience—I know you have been an extraordinary Secret Service agent 

and leader yourself. What happened in Cartagena happened. You 

do not have to have the suspicions that most others have that it 

is hard to believe that this was the only case. But to some extent, 

I think while you maintain your faith in the Secret Service, going 

forward I think you have to assume that it was not the only case. 

What I believe you are trying to do is to put in place rules and procedures to make sure to the best of your human ability that it 

never happens again. And I was thinking about a slogan that we 

talk about a lot in the field of domestic counterterrorism, which 

started in New York, ‘‘See Something, Say Something.’’ 

This is not easy. Those numbers that you mentioned, Senator 

Collins, point to about a little less than 60 percent saying they 

would definitely report misconduct by a fellow Secret Service employee, there is a natural tendency in organizations either not to 

want to get your colleagues in trouble or in a sense to not want 

to get yourself involved in a controversy. But in the end, as we saw 

here, what suffers is a great organization. And I just hope all the 

personnel of the Secret Service have learned that and that you will 

try to put in place rules and procedures that will continue to telegraph that message for years and years after you and others leave 

the agency. 

As Senator Portman mentioned, I was a protectee during the 

2000 presidential campaign. I had nothing but the highest regard 

and really gratitude for the Secret Service details that were with 

me and my family. They were people of honor, of great discipline. 

They were so obviously committed to protecting our safety and security. 

And so like you, I think, when this story came out, I was just 

heartbroken. And then I was angry at the people who did this. And 

I think we have to preserve those feelings and not be at all defensive here, because this is like a wound to a body and we have to 

get in it, find out what happened, clean it out, let it heal, and then 

make sure that you particularly put in place rules and procedures 

that will make sure that this great body, if I can continue the metaphor, will never be subject to being wounded again in this way. 

I appreciate very much the presence and the testimony of both 

of you. I appreciate what you have done, both of you, since this incident became public. The Committee is going to continue to conduct its own investigation and work with both of you to make sure 

that we achieve the objectives that I know we all have, which is 

to restore total public trust and confidence in the Secret Service 

agency so that it can fulfill its critical missions at the highest levels of honor and excellence, which has been the norm over its history. We want it to be the norm in the years ahead. 

Senator Collins, would you like to add anything? 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Sullivan, in reflecting on the many conversations that 

we have had and listening to you today, I cannot help but think 

that because you personally are such an outstanding individual, 

completely ethical, dedicated, courageous, everything we would 

want the head of the Secret Service to be, and because in your caVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:03 Oct 16, 2012 Jkt 075215 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\75215.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
32 

reer you did not happen to see this kind of behavior, that it is very 

difficult for you to accept that this happened. And I urge you to try 

to put that aside because if there is a problem, if the Washington 

Post story today is correct, you cannot be confident that this has 

not happened before and that it will not happen again, unless a 

very clear message is sent that the rules are not different when 

agents are on the road. They are exactly the same rules that apply 

in their home towns. And I think that is a very important message 

for you to send regardless of your sense of disbelief that this could 

have happened. 

And I just want to close my remarks today by thanking the brave 

men and women of the Secret Service, of law enforcement, and of 

the military who do put their lives on the line for us and who do 

perform such dangerous jobs so extraordinarily well in the vast majority of cases. But if we ignore or downplay what happened here, 

it can be like a cancer. It can spread and cause the entire agency 

to be tarnished, if you will. 

So I hope that you will continue not only your no-holds-barred 

investigation and the disciplinary actions which are so clearly warranted in this case, but that you will also take a really hard look 

at what procedural changes and training changes need to be made, 

because I continue to believe that the problem is broader than you 

believe it to be. But I thank you for your leadership and your cooperation. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. 

Director, did you want to add something? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Chairman, Senator, again thank you very much 

for your time, and I just want to make sure that—I hope I have 

not given you the impression that this is something that we have 

not taken seriously or that I am going to ignore. This cannot be ignored. And hopefully everyone has seen with the action that we 

have taken that we will not tolerate this type of behavior. And as 

I said, moving forward, I do want to take a hard look at our organization, and that is why I have been so aggressive with bringing in 

these outsiders. I know this is something that internally, we may 

not be the best individuals to do it and that we do need to bring 

outside people in to take a look at our organization. And as I said 

before, we are not looking to just be better; we are looking to be 

the best. But I do believe in the men and women of this organization. I do believe that they, too, want to make us not only better 

but the best. I appreciate your support, and I look forward to continuing to work with you on this, and I value the relationship. Also, 

I value the opportunity that we have had to be able to talk to you 

about this both here and offline. 

But I will tell you that this is a great organization with great 

people, and if there are any issues we need to resolve, we are going 

to resolve them. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Mr. Edwards, do you want to add 

anything? 

Mr. EDWARDS. Chairman, I want to give you my commitment 

that we are going to do a comprehensive review and an independent investigation and report back to you on the findings and 

recommendations as soon as possible. 

33 

I just want to repeat the Web site for our hotline. It is 

oig.dhs.gov, and we also have an 800 number. It is 800–323–8603, 

both anonymous and people with their names can submit their allegations or any issues, and we will respond accordingly. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Excellent. Thank you. The record of this 

hearing will remain open for 15 days for any additional questions 

and statements. 

With that, again I thank you. The hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(35) 

A P P E N D I X 


75215.001
36 


75215.002
37 


75215.003
38 


75215.004
39 


75215.005
40 


75215.006
41 


75215.007
42 


75215.008
43 


75215.009
44 


75215.010
45 


75215.011
46 


75215.012
47 


75215.013
48 


75215.014
49 


75215.015
50 


75215.016
51 


75215.017
52 


75215.018
53 


75215.019
54 


75215.020
55 


75215.021
56 


75215.022
57 


75215.023
58 


75215.024
59 


75215.025
60 


75215.026
61 


75215.027
62 


75215.028
63 


75215.029
64 


75215.030
65 


75215.031
66 


75215.032
67 


75215.033
68 


75215.034
69 


75215.035
70 


75215.036
71 


75215.037
72 


75215.038
73 


75215.039
74 


75215.040
75 


75215.041
76 


75215.042
77 


75215.043
78 


75215.044
79 


75215.045
80 


75215.046
81 


75215.047
82 


75215.048
83 


75215.049
84 


75215.050
85 


75215.051
86 


75215.052
87 


75215.053
88 


75215.054
89 


75215.055
90 


75215.056
91 


75215.057
92 


75215.058
93 


75215.059
94 


75215.060
95 


75215.061
96 


75215.062
97 


75215.063
98 


75215.064
99 


75215.065
100 


75215.066
101 


75215.067
102 


75215.068
103 


75215.069
104 


75215.070
105 


75215.071
106 


75215.072
107 


75215.073
108 


75215.074
109 


75215.075
110 


75215.076
111 


75215.077
112 


75215.078
113 


75215.079
114 


75215.080
115 


75215.081
116 


75215.082
117 

Æ 


75215.083