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i 

73–428 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–102] 

GOVERNANCE, OVERSIGHT, AND 

MANAGEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR 

SECURITY ENTERPRISE TO ENSURE 

HIGH QUALITY SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, 

AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN AN 

AGE OF AUSTERITY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

DREW WALTER, Professional Staff Member 

TIM MORRISON, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, February 16, 2012, Governance, Oversight, and Management of 

the Nuclear Security Enterprise To Ensure High Quality Science, Engineering, and Mission Effectiveness in an Age of Austerity ..................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, February 16, 2012 ................................................................................. 35 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

GOVERNANCE, OVERSIGHT, AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR 

SECURITY ENTERPRISE TO ENSURE HIGH QUALITY SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 5 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Strategic Forces ............................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Aloise, Eugene, Director, National Resources and Environment, Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 10 

Anastasio, Dr. Michael R., Director Emeritus, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Director Emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ............... 23 

Curtis, Hon. Charles B., Member, National Academies Panel on Managing 

for High Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security 

Laboratories; Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; President Emeritus and Board Member, Nuclear Threat Initiative; 

Former Deputy Secretary of Energy, 1994–1997 .............................................. 9 

Miller, Dr. George H., Director Emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ................................................................................................................... 24 

Robinson, Amb. C. Paul, Director Emeritus, Sandia National Laboratories ...... 26 

Shank, Dr. Charles, Co–Chair, National Academies Panel on Managing for 

High Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security 

Laboratories; Senior Fellow, Howard Hughes Medical Institute ..................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Aloise, Eugene .................................................................................................. 55 

Anastasio, Dr. Michael R. ................................................................................ 75 

Langevin, Hon. James R., on Behalf of Hon. Loretta Sanchez ..................... 43 

Miller, Dr. George H. ....................................................................................... 80 

Robinson, Amb. C. Paul ................................................................................... 91 

Shank, Dr. Charles, joint with Hon. Charles B. Curtis ................................ 46 
Page

IV 

PREPARED STATEMENTS—Continued 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 39 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Letter from Dr. Jeff Colvin and Dr. Roger Logan on Behalf of the University Professional and Technical Employees Union ..................................... 134 

Memorandum for House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee Members ................................................................... 113 

Statement by Ambassador Linton Brooks, Former Under Secretary of 

Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear 

Security Administration (NNSA) ................................................................. 140 

Statement by Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, Co-Director of the Center for 

International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University .................. 144 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 219 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 197 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 171 
(1) 

GOVERNANCE, OVERSIGHT, AND MANAGEMENT OF THE 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ENTERPRISE TO ENSURE HIGH 

QUALITY SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, February 16, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:11 a.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Call the Strategic Forces subcommittee to order. 

Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on 

governance, management, and oversight of the nuclear security enterprise in the age of austerity. 

I also want to thank Mr. Langevin for being here today serving 

in the capacity of ranking member, but Loretta Sanchez was unable to be here today. And, he was expressing to me that the Cannon Tunnel in getting here was closed. And so, it impeded his trip 

here. 

But, we greatly appreciate you taking the time to serve and represent our ranking member in this hearing. 

Everyone here knows that this is a very busy week here on Capitol Hill: budget request week. 

This hearing is not like most of the hearings that are taking 

place however, in that it is not looking directly at a particular 

agency’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

However, it is a hearing that has major implications for the future of the National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, and 

therefore, its budget. 

This hearing will examine longstanding, well-documented, and 

fundamental concerns with the way NNSA manages its labs and 

plants, problems that are unnecessarily costing taxpayers many 

hundreds of millions of dollars each year and impeding NNSA’s 

ability to accomplish its mission. 

In today’s fiscal environment, we cannot afford such inefficiency 

and waste, particularly when we are seeing major cuts to the 

pledged nuclear modernization funding in this year’s budget request. 

In 1999, Congress passed the NNSA Act which split out NNSA 

as a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy, 
2 

DOE, driven by this subcommittee, and in particular by my friend 

Mac Thornberry, who is with us today, and Ellen Tauscher. 

This legislation sought to address major mismanagement and security problems at DOE. In particular, a 1999 report by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board spurred Congress into 

action saying DOE was a ‘‘dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself.’’ 

An earlier report by the Galvin Commission ‘‘revealed a counterproductive Federal system of operation for DOE’s national labs,’’ 

saying, ‘‘The current system of governance of these laboratories is 

broken and should be replaced by a bold alternative.’’ 

The Galvin Commission noted that problems included ‘‘increased 

overhead cost, poor morale, and gross inefficiencies as a result of 

overly prescriptive congressional management and excessive oversight by the Department.’’ And an ‘‘inordinate internal focus at 

every level of the laboratories on compliance issues and questions 

of management processes which takes a major toll on research performance.’’ 

NNSA was created to address these problems and enable the nuclear security enterprise to be more effective, more focused, and 

more efficient. 

Twelve years after the creation of NNSA, the question for this 

hearing is: Has it worked? 

Have these problems been addressed? 

To prepare for this hearing, the committee staff put together an 

overview of the many reports in the past 10 years that have examined NNSA’s management and governance of its labs and plants. 

It is not an exhaustive list. But, it is illustrative of what various 

assessments have determined are NNSA’s administrative problems. 

I ask that the hearing memo prepared by the staff be entered 

into the record for this hearing. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. TURNER. I want to quote from just a few of these myriad 

studies that the staff have reviewed. And here is a finding from a 

2009 assessment by the Stimson Center which was paid for by 

NNSA itself. 

It stated, ‘‘The implementation of the NNSA Act failed to achieve 

the intended autonomy for NNSA within the Department of Energy. The labs now must operate within a complicated set of bureaucratic relationships with both DOE and NNSA. An excessively 

bureaucratic DOE culture has infiltrated NNSA as well.’’ 

And here are a few quotes from the bipartisan Strategic Posture 

Commission’s report in 2009. 

First, ‘‘The Governance structure of the NNSA is not delivering 

the needed results. This governance structure should be changed. 

In the commission’s view, the original intent of the legislation creating the NNSA has not been realized. The desired autonomy has 

not come into being. It is time to consider fundamental changes.’’ 

And also, ‘‘Despite the efforts of thousands of dedicated and competent civil servants, Federal oversight of the weapons enterprise 

needs significant improvement.’’ NNSA ‘‘may have become part of 

the problem, adopting the same micromanagement and unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created to eliminate.’’ 
3 

‘‘The leadership of all three weapons laboratories believes that 

the regulatory burden is excessive, a view endorsed by the Commission. That burden imposes a significant cost and less heavy-handed 

oversight would bring real benefits.’’ 

Reading these reports, the point of criticism about excessive, ineffective, and unnecessary bureaucratic processes and confused and 

redundant management relationships sounds eerily similar to the 

reports that spurred the creation of NNSA in 1999. 

So, the answer is: No, NNSA hasn’t been working as intended, 

and many of the problems remain. 

But we have our witnesses here today to help us understand if 

that answer is correct. 

Our first panel, we have gentlemen representing two distinguished organizations that have spent considerable time examining 

NNSA management and governance of the nuclear security enterprise. 

They are Dr. Charles Shank, Co-Chair, National Academies 

Panel on Managing for High Quality Science and Engineering at 

the NNSA National Security Laboratories, and Senior Fellow, Howard Hughes Medical Institute. 

We also have the Honorable Charles B. Curtis, who is a member 

of the National Academies Panel on Managing for High Quality 

Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories, and Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic International Studies, also President Emeritus and board member Nuclear Threat 

Initiative. And, he has served as the former Deputy Secretary of 

Energy, 1994 to 1997. 

We also have Mr. Eugene Aloise, Director of Natural Resources 

and Environment at the Government Accountability Office. 

Dr. Shank and Secretary Curtis are here to present the results 

of a National Academies of Science study that was mandated by 

this subcommittee in the fiscal year 2010 National Defense Authorization Act. 

In the conference report accompanying that bill, the conferees explained that the study should provide ‘‘an even handed, unbiased 

assessment of the quality of the scientific research and engineering 

at the labs, and assessment of the factors that influence’’ such 

quality. 

I understand that the portion of this study that was recently 

completed, and that we will be discussing today, focuses on the latter: management related factors that influence the quality of 

science and engineering at the labs. 

I will let Dr. Shank and Secretary Curtis speak to their report. 

But I want to highlight a few of their study committee findings. 

First, in the view of their committee, ‘‘the relationship between 

NNSA and its labs is broken, to an extent that very seriously affects the labs’ capability to manage for quality, science, and engineering. There has been a breakdown of trust and an erosion of the 

partnering between the laboratories and NNSA to solve complex 

science and engineering problems. There is conflict and confusion 

over management roles and responsibilities of organizations and individuals.’’ 

The National Academies report also finds that the level of detailed transactional level management and oversight that NNSA 
4 

applies to the labs is causing significant inefficiencies and risking 

the quality of science and engineering at the labs, saying, ‘‘There 

is a perception at the three laboratories that NNSA has moved 

from partnering with the laboratories to solve scientific and engineering problems, to assigning tasks and specific science and engineering solutions with a detailed implementation instructions.’’ 

‘‘This approach precludes taking full advantage of the intellectual 

and management skills that taxpayers’ dollars have purchased. The 

study committee found similar issues in transactional oversight of 

safety, business, security, and operations. Science and engineering 

quality is at risk.’’ 

Our first panel of witnesses also features Mr. Eugene Aloise from 

GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office]. Mr. Aloise and GAO 

have spent decades examining NNSA and DOE defense programs 

before it. 

I understand GAO continues to have major concerns about the 

inconsistency and inaccuracy of NNSA’s management and cost data 

across the enterprise. 

I hope you will help us understand what is causing these chronic 

problems and what actions NNSA or Congress could take to address them. 

Finally, our second witness panel is comprised of three former directors of the NNSA laboratories who have been asked to share 

their direct experiences leading and managing the organizations responsible for carrying out NNSA’s mission within the management 

and oversight, processes, procedures, and structures set up by the 

Federal Government. 

They are Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director Emeritus, Los Alamos 

National Laboratory and Director Emeritus, Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory. 

We also have Dr. George Miller, Director Emeritus, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory, and Ambassador C. Paul Robinson, 

Director Emeritus, Sandia National Laboratories. 

These gentlemen bring a wealth of experience to our witness 

table. And, I hope they will share their experience by reflecting on 

the findings and recommendations of the National Academies report and the GAO. 

I also hope that they will share any concrete, actionable recommendations they have for improving governance and management of the labs. 

Before I pass things over to Mr. Langevin, I would like to say 

that we all need to recognize that, alone, simply moving boxes on 

an organizational chart isn’t going to solve these problems. 

It is going to take leadership, both from the Administration and 

up here on Capitol Hill. As well as a consensus on why NNSA’s 

mission is so important. And what needs to be done to move that 

forward. 

Ranking Member Sanchez and I have agreed to take a hard look 

at these issues over the next few months and work together to help 

address the concerns of the National Academies study group, the 

Strategic Posture Commission, and all of the others. 

I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today. And with 

that, I will turn to Mr. Langevin for his opening comments. 
5 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC 

FORCES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, I just want to say on behalf of Ms. Sanchez that she wanted 

to be here. But couldn’t because of a family emergency, but appreciates the work that the panel is doing and for you being here 

today. 

With that, I’d like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming our 

witnesses: Dr. Shank, the Honorable Charlie Curtis, Mr. Aloise, Dr. 

Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Ambassador Robinson. 

Thank you. 

I am also pleased that we have statements from Ambassador 

Brooks and Dr. Sieg Hecker. 

And Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the letter from Dr. Colvin 

and Dr. Logan, on behalf of the University Professional and Technical Employees union, also be submitted for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

pages 140, 144, and 134, respectively.] 

Mr. TURNER. Without objection. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The impetus for the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization’s request for this National Academies of 

Science study was concerned about safety issues and about the effects of privatization of lab management at Los Alamos National 

Laboratories and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 

Specifically, members were concerned that increased costs of 

management fees and taxes and other associated costs might have 

decreased resources for programmatic work and affected morale. 

In its version of the bill, the House sought a GAO study to assess 

the costs of the transition and the impacts on lab management and 

lab functions including safety, security, and environmental management. 

The final conference report included the NAS [National Academies of Science] study of a broader scope that would examine 

whether the excellence in science and engineering was being preserved at the labs. 

This study now comes over 10 years after the NNSA was created, 

and several years after a change in contracting structure for the 

labs, and offers an opportunity to assess the quality of science and 

management after a period of adjustment to a new contracting 

structure. 

It also comes in the context of strategy based on an updated nuclear posture review and the constraints of a fiscal crisis. 

Today, I hope to hear your insights to inform our oversight, and 

ensure that we retain the unique skills and capability upon which 

nuclear deterrent and nonproliferation efforts depend. 

I would like to touch on three important points. 

First, the need for an effective contract structure, governance 

and management that help attract and retain the quality of scientists and engineers dedicated to public service who underpin a 
6 

safe, secure, and reliable arsenal and contribute to the expertise 

behind successful nonproliferation efforts. 

Second, the need for a process that ensures safety for workers 

and the public. 

And third, the need for transparency, accountability, and clear 

lines of authority. 

First, safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons depend 

on critical scientific skills. And, our labs must be able to attract 

some of the Nation’s best scientists to the labs who want to serve 

their country. 

Maintaining this expertise depends—that demands an interesting and important mission, challenging work, good equipment 

and tools, and good morale including a supportive work environment where scientists are valued and recognized. 

So, the question is does the current structure and oversight provide clear expectations while enabling effective research including 

hypothesis-driven science? 

Does it enable diverging views on potential technical solution? 

And, does it provide stability in employment and opportunities 

for collaboration and success? 

Mission success also demands a work environment that is safe 

for employees and for the public, which brings me to my second 

point. 

This management and oversight responsibility of nuclear weapons research, sustainment, and production cannot be compromised. 

Accidents can and do happen including low-probability, high-consequence events. 

No one expected the massive earthquake and tsunami at the 

Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan or the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion. 

The reactor accidents at Savannah River that were hidden from 

the public for over 30 years, the environmental conditions which 

led to the raid and permanent shutdown of Rocky Flats, and the 

classified data scandals that rocked Los Alamos all resulted in part 

from a structure of flexible requirements and minimal Federal 

oversight. 

Meanwhile, the Department of Labor has now approved more 

than 64,000 cases submitted to the Energy Employee Occupational 

Illness Program for radiation exposure and has paid out, more than 

$6.7 billion in compensation benefits. 

Chairman Turner, and our committee members, and I are committed to the success of NNSA, the Nuclear Complex and its national security mission. 

However, I fear that a nuclear accident, even a minor one, would 

have significant repercussions on the future of the Nuclear Weapons Complex. That is a consequence that we would all like to avoid. 

Third, in an era of budget constraints, we must seek opportunities for improving efficiency across the complex as required, for example, in Section 3123 of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, but also in terms of effective management. 

With the $7.2 billion appropriated for weapons activities in fiscal 

year 2012, and a $7.6 billion request for fiscal year 2013, improving 

accountability and ensuring effective governance must be a priority. 
7 

Questions I have are: Are there clear lines of authority? Does the 

NNSA have sufficient subject matter expertise and consistent data 

necessary to effectively assess performance across the complex? 

Is there sufficient accountability within NNSA from the contractors at the labs? 

Is the structure set up to incentivize savings, maximize investment in programmatic work, perform realistic cost assessments, 

and planning to avoid cost escalation and scheduled delays, set priorities, and enable competition? 

In this context, I’d like to add that I am pleased that the Department of Energy recently decided to resume the practice of making 

performance evaluations of the lab public, increasing transparency 

and accountability. 

With that, I look forward to today’s discussion. I was proud to 

read this statement on behalf of Ms. Sanchez. And again, she values the important work that you all are doing. 

She apologizes that she couldn’t be here. But then again, a family emergency demanded her elsewhere today. 

With that, I thank our guests for being here. And I yield back 

to the chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin on behalf of Ms. 

Sanchez can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mr. TURNER. I thank Mr. Langevin. And also recognize him as 

a former chair of this subcommittee, and appreciate his work with 

the subcommittee. 

We have received written statements from each of these witnesses. And without objection, these statements will be part of the 

hearing record. 

Without objection, I would also like to make part of the record 

a statement we received on this topic from Ambassador Linton 

Brooks, a former administrator for NNSA as well as a statement 

from Dr. Sig Hecker, former director of Los Alamos. 

Both were invited witnesses, but were unable to participate. 

We’ll now turn to our witnesses. We are allotting 3 minutes for 

opening statements. 

If you would summarize the written statement that you have, it 

will allow us to get to questions and the dialogue that we are expecting and hoping with the members. 

And we are going to begin with Dr. Shank. 

Dr. Shank. 

STATEMENT OF DR. CHARLES SHANK, CO–CHAIR, NATIONAL 

ACADEMIES PANEL ON MANAGING FOR HIGH QUALITY 

SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING AT THE NNSA NATIONAL SECURITY LABORATORIES; SENIOR FELLOW, HOWARD HUGHES 

MEDICAL INSTITUTE 

Dr. SHANK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. 

My name is Charles Shank. I have had the privilege of being cochair of the Committee on the Review of the Quality of Management and Science and Engineering Research at the DOE’s National 

Laboratories. And, I am joined here today by the Honorable 

Charles B. Curtis who served with me on this study. 
8 

Our task was to look at the quality of science and engineering 

and management of the three National Security Laboratories: Los 

Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia. 

The study was conducted in two phases. I am reporting on phase 

one, which was management. 

Phase two will be a deep look at some selected areas of actual 

science and engineering activities at the laboratory. 

And conduct of our study, it was done primarily through testimony and observation and looking through documents where the 

committee had broad and deep expertise for this study. 

Our primary mode of gathering occurred with meetings here in 

Washington where we talked to NNSA experts, NNSA members of 

our current executives at the NNSA. 

We also visited all three laboratories. And, we had evaluations 

where people were able to present their views from all levels of 

management. 

There are three major areas of findings. 

The first is looking at the issue of contracts. The contracts have 

existed for more than—many decades in some of the laboratories. 

They were recompeted in 2004. That led to the laboratories moving 

from a public entity, the University of California to an LLC that 

now manages the laboratory. 

The bottom line is that while it is true that all labs have been 

under cost and funding pressure, we did not find a morale crisis 

related to the actions of the new contractors. 

However, we should point out that the costs of the re-competed 

contracts are significantly greater than previous contracting arrangement, primarily due to contractor fees, state taxes, pensions, 

and other increase in costs. 

One area that we would like to identify as a very positive move 

of the laboratories from weapons laboratories to our broadly national security laboratories serving a broad range of agencies as defined in a governance charter among those four agencies. 

We think that that work helps bring the laboratories’ capabilities 

to study scientific issues that are important to the broad set of 

agencies, and be able to, at the same time, maintain capability for 

their laboratories. 

The final issue that I’d like to discuss is the serious issue that 

we identified between the relations between labs and NNSA oversight. The core issue is erosion of trust. And, this has led to transactional management and direct management of the laboratories in 

an overly prescribed formal way which has created a bias, we believe, against experimental work, and a concern by people at the 

laboratories that this could change the nature and character of the 

scientific enterprise there. 

And, in closing, I would like to say that we need to recognize 

that, particularly at Los Alamos where there were problems over 

the last 5 years, extraordinary progress has taken place. 

And, consistent with that increase and accomplishment in their 

operations, we think that consideration should be given to that 

strengthened performance to the point where they no longer need 

the special attention and degree of formality in their operations 

that they currently have. 
9 

Solutions to this problem will require efforts both on behalf of 

the laboratories and the NNSA to establish an atmosphere of trust 

in which one can then begin to think about an oversight. 

When you do oversight on somebody you trust compared to somebody that you don’t trust, there is a very different behavior. And, 

much work needs to be done in that area. 

Thank you for your attention. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Shank and Dr. Curtis can 

be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Dr. Shank. 

Secretary Curtis. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. CURTIS, MEMBER, NATIONAL ACADEMIES PANEL ON MANAGING FOR HIGH QUALITY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING AT THE NNSA NATIONAL 

SECURITY LABORATORIES; SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; PRESIDENT 

EMERITUS AND BOARD MEMBER, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE; FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF ENERGY, 1994–1997 

Dr. CURTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Shank has done a very good job at summarizing our observations. I only wanted to add a few thoughts of my own before the 

committee’s questions as a way of emphasis. 

As we have noted, the new contracting model has certainly added 

costs to Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos, but we did not find 

that the contracting model by itself has impaired science, technology, and engineering competencies. 

But a much larger and more significant threat to these competencies derives from the persistent level of mistrust that pervades the contract and managerial relationship. 

As the subcommittee knows, these managerial relationships have 

been shaped over many years by a tumultuous history of management and oversight failures. 

As a former chairman of the Laboratory Operations Board, which 

we set up to try and address the same issues that the committee 

is pondering today, I’ve had experience with the same frustration 

that the committee members have expressed with how can we 

make this thing get better. 

We think that the current NNSA and laboratory-directed leaders 

have made considerable progress, but much more needs to be done. 

And, we think the peril to science and engineering competencies is 

so great that the stakes are enormously high. 

Now, I want to make a very specific point here. 

I think it is my view, I know shared by the committee members, 

that the conduct of high quality science and engineering inherently 

involves high standards of environmental care and safety. 

Maintaining the public trust demands security and fiscal integrity as well. Indeed, mission effectiveness requires all four: environmental responsibility, safety, security, and sound fiscal controls. 

However, science and engineering quality will surely erode if 

these ends are realized through an imposed operational formality 

that discourages initiative, biases against experimental work, or 

creates an unduly risk-averse environment. 
10 

Our committee strongly believes that NNSA laboratory leadership should work together to rebuild the trust relationship, more 

clearly define boundaries between program planning, direction and 

execution, and reduce the operational formality where possible, 

consistent with maintaining high standards of safety, security, and 

environmental responsibility and fiscal integrity, as Mr. Langevin 

has mentioned. 

A rebalancing though seems clearly required. And this Congress 

has an important role here in its oversight process. 

Oversight, Mr. Chairman, I know is a very difficult slog for the 

committee whose attention is commanded by so many important 

issues. 

But much of the mistrust in this relationship indeed exists in the 

Congress itself who represent the public’s views on the matter. So, 

the Congress needs to work with NNSA leadership and the laboratory directors to kind of rebalance the situation we’re in. 

It is not going to be done quickly. If we try to do it quickly or 

all at once, it will almost surely fail. 

It’s going to take years. But this effort is so important. It is essential to the mission effectiveness of this laboratory. 

So, I commend these recommendations to the committee. And, I 

encourage the committee to continue the hard work of paying attention to this issue. 

Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Dr. Curtis and Dr. Shank can 

be found in the Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary, thank you for those comments. 

As you noted, our hope through these panels is that we know we 

don’t know the answers. We know the questions. 

But with these panels, we know that you guys know the answers. 

And hopefully, we’ll reach them. 

Mr. Aloise. 

STATEMENT OF EUGENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Langevin, members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on 

the governance oversight and management of the security enterprise. 

DOE’s and NNSA’s management of the enterprise has been the 

subject of much criticism, as you mentioned, and DOE’s management of its contracts is on GAO’s high-risk list. 

Although progress has been made, we continue to identify problems across the enterprise ranging from significant cost and schedule overruns on major projects, to ineffective oversight of safety 

and security at NNSA sites. 

We agree that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors is not an efficient use of scarce Federal resources. However 

in our view, the problems we continue to identify in the enterprise 

are not caused by excessive oversight, but rather by ineffective 

oversight by NNSA and DOE. 
11 

And I’ll talk about three of the areas we think better oversight 

is needed: management data, the management of major construction projects, and safety and security across the enterprise. 

Regarding data, NNSA lacks reliable enterprise-wide management data on program, budgets, and cost. Specifically, we have reported the NNSA cannot identify total costs to operate and maintain essential weapons activities, facilities, and infrastructure. 

This means that NNSA does not have the sound basis for making 

decisions on how to effectively manage its programs and projects, 

and lacks data that could help justify future budget requests or target cost savings. The Administration plans to request $88 billion over the next 

decade to modernize the enterprise and ensure basic scientific, 

technical, and engineering capabilities are sufficiently supported, 

and the nuclear deterrent can be safe, secure, and reliable. 

To adequately justify future budgets, NNSA must identify these 

capabilities and determine their cost. Without this data, NNSA 

risks being unable to make fully informed tradeoff decisions in our 

resource-constrained environment. 

Regarding management of its major projects, in numerous reports we have found that NNSA continues to experience significant 

cost and schedule overruns on its major projects, principally because of ineffective oversight and poor contractor management. 

For example, the cost to construct the UPF [Uranium Processing 

Facility] facility at Y–12 has arisen nearly sevenfold to between 

$4.2 billion and $6.5 billion. 

Given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major projects, 

we believe careful Federal oversight is critical to ensure that scarce 

resources are spent efficiently and effectively. 

NNSA’s oversight of safety and security is also being questioned. 

And numerous safety and security problems have occurred across 

the sites contributing in the shutdowns at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Labs. 

Our work showed that the contributing factors to the safety and 

security problems were weak NNSA oversight, and a laboratory 

culture that did not prioritize safety and security in its daily operations. 

In many cases, improvements have been made to resolve these 

problems, but better oversight is needed to ensure that the improvements are fully made and sustained. 

And that concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I’ll start off the questions. 

We have very important issues to discuss here. We appreciate 

your insights and your review of this issue. 

Dr. Shank and Secretary Curtis, your National Academies Study 

Committee found, ‘‘The science and engineering performed by any 

laboratory can only be as good as the people employed. Thus, ensuring that high quality people are attracted to NNSA labs, that 

they are retained, is a necessary condition for the labs to carry out 

high quality science and engineering.’’ 

It seems pretty straightforward. Your report then goes on to say, 

‘‘Assuming that the foundation of good people is available high 
12 

quality science and engineering, then, this requires good facilities 

and adequate resources, and operating processes that do not impede the ability of these scientists and engineers to perform at 

their highest levels.’’ 

So, my question is: Does the National Academies Study Committee believe that those key attributes for ensuring high quality 

science and engineering are in place? 

In other words, do the labs have good facilities, adequate resources, and operating processes that don’t impede high quality 

work? 

Now, the question isn’t asking, you know, do we not have high 

quality people. Because we know that we do. And they are endeavoring, of course, to deliver the highest quality. 

But do these resources reflect the highest quality that we need 

from them and that we need from them in the future? 

Now, I want to also cast my concern in light of recent discussion 

that has occurred between myself and Congressman Markey. 

I am concerned that the impact on the labs’ ability to attract and 

retain world-class scientists is affected by the fact that the current 

state of our facilities are that they are falling apart. 

Congressman Markey just recently sent a letter calling for significant reductions in our support for our nuclear weapons infrastructure. And he went on to say, ‘‘It is insane to modernize and 

replace the uranium and plutonium processing facilities that support the U.S. nuclear deterrent when the plants we have now work 

just fine.’’ 

Now, we have up on the television some pictures of the current 

state of these facilities that Mr. Markey says work just fine. I know 

my current Ranking Member Sanchez and I have discussed how 

dirty and decrepit these facilities appear. 

Also, I know our former chair, Mr. Langevin, has currently, and 

previously, has supported that these facilities need upgraded as 

has every member of this committee. 

I think these pictures which are—I want to emphasize are unclassified photos—illustrates that we have a need for additional investment. 

And I want to ask our panel, the Administration has recently announced that the chemistry and metallurgy research replacement 

facility at Los Alamos would be delayed. 

It is a facility that we hope to attract topnotch plutonium scientists. And, you know, what is the impact of this on the labs’ ability to conduct world-class scientists? 

Dr. Shank, as a world-class scientist yourself, would you be attracted to work in these facilities? Do you believe we need to continue to invest? 

If we are to say to scientists that your work is of the future, 

shouldn’t we be providing them a facility that is a picture of the 

future? 

Dr. Shank. 

Dr. SHANK. I want to be very clear that the first portion of the 

report is talking about management. The second phase of the study 

will be actually looking at those facilities and asking questions and 

resources and capability that to be able to do the work are important. 
13 

Not as a part of the report, but as a scientist, having world-class 

facilities is absolutely essential. But also, you have to have the 

ability to operate those facilities in a way that you can actually get 

work done. 

And, I think that that is where the trust and the erosion of trust 

has really created a problem. And, from the point of view of this 

study, something like plutonium is a very special kind of, very 

high-risk work that requires very special attention to detail. 

It is a piece of the work that goes on in the laboratories, but not 

all of it. 

We need a kind of oversight, but the kind of formality appropriate for the work. 

But certainly as a scientist, speaking as a scientist, one cannot 

actually do the work without superb facilities. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Curtis, your thoughts? 

Dr. CURTIS. As Dr. Shank said, we did not examine the questions 

that are inherent in your statement in this phase. So, let me just 

draw on my past experience as an executive who oversaw these operations. 

If you don’t have a well-invested-in facility, it is very much more 

costly to do work in facilities such are depicted in your pictures. 

Because the risk of misadventure and mistake and accident are so 

consequential to the mission, then you have to maintain an even 

higher operational formality to do work in facilities that are not up 

to high standards. 

So, you have to invest in this infrastructure as well as in the people that you expect to perform against it. 

Mr. TURNER. I invited Congressman Markey to join me, including 

an invitation with our Ranking Member Sanchez, to tour these facilities so that we can see that they are not just fine, and that in 

fact, they do need additional investment. 

We certainly hope that he will join us so that he can himself see 

the need, as these pictures clearly illustrate for investment so that 

they can reflect the quality of the intellectual capital of our scientists. 

And I appreciate both of you acknowledging that. 

I want to skip ahead a little bit, but in Dr. Miller’s written statement on the second witness panel, he mentions that a review by 

NNSA in 2007 showed that the labs were subject to a 113 different 

NNSA and DOE directives that contained a total of 7,752 separate 

requirements. 

This rose to a peak of 160 directives in 2009. It is now down to 

around 131, thanks to some streamlining. 

Dr. Shank and Secretary Curtis, in your opinion, is it possible to 

effectively and efficiently manage labs under such constraints and 

still get high quality science and engineering? 

Is it possible to be innovative which is basically what we are asking of these scientists? 

In your opinion is having hundreds of directives, and many thousands of separate requirements, in the spirit of the model that the 

labs are supposed to be operated under, and that is again to encourage this innovation. 

Your report also says that these layers of rules and regulations 

have created a major aversion to risk. And, that a major byproduct 
14 

of this has been to create a bias against experimental work because 

of the onerous processes sometimes required before running an experiment. 

The bias is problematic because experimental science is at the 

very heart of the scientific method. 

Could you please explain how this aversion to risk impacts the 

ability of the labs to conduct high quality science and engineering 

and perform their mission effectively and efficiently? 

Dr. SHANK. In our testimony that we receive from scientists at 

various labs, one scientist told me that there were so many rules 

and regulations that he could no longer do his work. 

When you get to the point where the majority of your time is 

spent responding to an overly prescriptive environment, that greatly impedes your ability to do the work. 

So, this is a very serious issue. 

I think the key core issue is if the laboratories are not trusted, 

each transaction must be monitored. If a system in which the laboratory has raised its level of capability to create a system of operation, one can then audit the system. 

So, we have a circumstance where the oversight group treats the 

laboratories as if they are not trustworthy. That trust goes both 

ways. It’s the cost of operating in a nontrustworthy environment. 

We have to work to establish trust. Once you do that, you do not 

need thousands of directives. 

Mr. TURNER. Secretary Curtis. 

Dr. CURTIS. Yeah, this is the heart of the question here. And, it 

has got to be frustrating to the committee because as your opening 

statement, Mr. Chairman, pointed out, our observations are not 

new. 

You have had report after report say much the same thing. 

Hopefully, we have added some additional dimension to this discussion. 

When I chaired the Laboratory Operations Board, Dr. Shank as 

a lab director, as a member of that board, we undertook to take out 

of the regulations much of the detail of a requirement. 

As committee knows from other regulatory discussions, you have 

command control regulations. You have performance regulations. 

We tried to make a lot of the regulatory interface based on performance. And we moved to an appendix, a lot of the detail which 

was previously mandatory. 

What we found in laboratory after laboratory is the people in the 

laboratory, and the people in the oversight structure of the department, continued to follow all the detail. Because they didn’t trust 

each other that they would be entitled to modify that detail. 

So, this trust issue, it sounds soft. But it’s very, very important. 

This is never going to get better until we find a way of reducing 

the operational formality, providing greater latitude for innovation, 

for clear boundaries, program planning and execution, and invest 

a level of trust in the people that we trust to provide for this nation’s nuclear deterrent. 

It’s kind of a strange equation that we provide the Nation’s most 

vital secrets. We entrust those to the scientists and engineers that 

we depend upon to perform this vital mission. But then we don’t 

trust them in the execution. 
15 

And, by not trusting them in the execution, we introduce cost, inefficiencies that have been documented time and time again. 

We can do both. We can have safe, environmentally responsible 

work that gives a higher latitude of trust to those that we rely on 

to execute the science and engineering. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Again, I thank the panel for your testimony here 

today. 

So, the GAO and NAS question that I would like to pose to our 

panel, as we all know the safety and surety of the nuclear enterprise is of the utmost importance. And the NNSA plays a vital role 

in ensuring our Nation’s nuclear deterrents. 

So, what can and should be done to strengthen NNSA’s ability 

to perform effective quality assurance? 

Dr. SHANK. I believe that the attention is paid to the work that 

a system be identified and that the labs be held accountable to that 

system. The laboratories have got to raise their level of performance. 

And a much better way to do that would be the laboratories leading the activity and then being audited on the basis of what they 

actually do. Rather than laying out a prescriptive set of instructions which in the end become the end in themselves, rather than 

actually accomplishing the task. 

Nobody wants to operate any laboratory which is not safe and secure, or in violation of any concern about security or act in an irresponsible way with funding. 

But if all your effort is focused on fighting problems of an expectation that you are not trusted, the cost of that overwhelms the 

ability to actually give you the assurance that your project will be 

done in a safe environmental manner. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Curtis. 

Dr. CURTIS. I think that we have tried to lay out in the report 

what we think needs to be done. Those are the three things. 

You have to clearly define boundaries, then adhere to the boundaries, both of the overseer and the executer of these responsibilities. 

We have to make sure that we are doing high standards of safety, environmental responsibility and security, and fiscal integrity 

as we execute this mission. 

But there are ways of rebalancing the method by which we are 

assuring that, that I think will reduce a threat to the high quality 

science and engineering we demand, which we see as a continuing 

threat that if this isn’t fixed, we’re going to lose the capability in 

these laboratories. This has just got to be fixed. 

So, the stakes are very, very high here. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Aloise. 

Mr. ALOISE. Yes, I think we would agree with Dr. Shank and Mr. 

Curtis have said. We, for years, have said that when we are looking for NNSA to change to performance-based oversight rather 

than compliance-based oversight. 

Rather than going in with a checklist and seeing if a number of 

policies and procedures have been issued in a year or the table is 
16 

12 inches away from the wall instead of 18 inches. We should be 

looking at the performance. 

Are the labs doing what we have asked them to do? What the 

Congress and NNSA have asked them to do? 

It should be based on performance. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, to the panel, does the NNSA have the necessary expertise and leadership structure conducive to effective 

oversight? 

Dr. SHANK. My feeling is yes, they do. They have many excellent 

people. 

I think this is a doable circumstance, the environment in which 

they are working, the environment of mistrust. 

And this goes both ways. It is not simply—sorry, I apologize. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. That’s a pretty ominous ring. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SHANK. My wife is in Hawaii and she doesn’t recognize the 

time zone difference. So, I apologize. 

The—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As long as we don’t have to clear the room. 

[Laughter.] 

Dr. SHANK. I do believe there are excellent people there that are 

capable of doing the work. It is how it is structured. How the goals 

are put forward that could in fact make this whole thing work a 

lot better. 

And I think if we work at these fundamental relationship issues, 

that is the core to actually making the whole enterprise work. 

Dr. CURTIS. Let me make just one comment, so we don’t lose 

track of it. 

Tom D’Agostino and Neile Miller and Don Cook at NNSA, at the 

top, have made some very significant changes and progress in addressing this. 

The lab directors, some of whom are sitting behind me, made 

very significant progress when they were in office in addressing 

this. 

It’s just that you are trying to unwind a burdened relationship 

that has been built up over 25 years or more. 

And that is why when NNSA was created you didn’t see the 

change that you were hoping to see, Mr. Thornberry’s initiative, to 

free NNSA from some of the administrative burden from within the 

department. 

So, the culture is deeply embedded. And, it is going to take a lot 

of work to fix that. 

There are very good people on both sides of the equation working 

very hard—highly competent, skilled. You should be proud of them. 

But it’s a hard, hard problem. 

We are dealing with a problem that developed over several decades and it’s going to take a while to undo it. 

Mr. ALOISE. I would just add that in our work we found that the 

NNSA site office people are not properly trained to do the kind of 

oversight they should be doing. And that is a major problem. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. This question is more of the National Academy. 

A number of employees including the unions who provided testimony to the NAS panel, and at least one former lab director, have 

expressed concern that the private for-profit model is harming the 
17 

labs in that many senior scientists have chosen to leave. And production and research is driven by performance-based incentives. 

The NAS report finds that the bureaucratic frustrations that are 

affecting all levels within the labs, ‘‘Are not traceable to the M&O 

[Management and Operating] contractor or contracts themselves, 

and found that the lab directors’ primary objective remains to manage the laboratories in the public interest.’’ 

Do you feel that the criticism of some of these employees that the 

for-profit motive is harming the labs is valid? 

Dr. SHANK. This is a very important concern. It is something that 

we took very seriously. 

We asked the people who made those representations to us, give 

us examples. Give us data. Give us something other than feelings, 

because we cannot produce a report based on feelings. 

So, we asked the question: Are the labs able to hire and retain 

people? 

The retention rates before the contract change and after the contract change were both 4 percent. They have not changed at either 

Livermore or Los Alamos. So, we have not seen a change in retention. 

There is an issue of cost. The cost of the contract is more. 

But that is not the total increasing cost. There were costs due to 

a case in New Mexico having to do with the state gross receipts 

tax, which added $65 million, roughly $100 million for each laboratory. That has had an effect. 

However at the same time that many of these things occurred 

when you changed the contract and the contractors, if you look at 

the actual contracts themselves, they are about the same. 

And so, we could not identify a change in a contract that would 

lead to an issue. 

But we do feel that the people who are running the laboratories 

before and after were the same kind of people, they did the job 

under the old contract, and the new contract. We did not see a difference in their behavior. 

We asked Neile Miller were the incentives such that they were 

so large that they would distort the operational process. The reward for performance, or to some small narrow objective to get fee, 

seemed to be small enough not to greatly influence the lab directors. 

The lab directors themselves told us they are focused on the public interest. And like all lab directors, they are ‘‘A’’ students and 

they want to do as well as they can. 

They want to do the best job they possibly can. But the amount 

of money that is there is not the driving concern. 

So in looking at this issue, we felt for this current set of lab directors and the current environment is not an issue. 

But we do point out in the report that if these fees got to a level 

where it was driving what was going on in the laboratory, it could 

be a serious concern. And we said constant vigilance needs to be 

taken in looking at this to assure that the people who lead these 

labs do operate with the right set of incentives. 

I should point out that Sandia Laboratories, which has a very 

high level of performance, has had a private contractor since its be-
18 

ginning. So, the difference between private and not-for-profit is to 

us not a significant issue in the change. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, next, what pressures, if any, result from a feebased incentive system? 

Dr. SHANK. The question is what—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What pressures, if any, result from a fee-based 

incentive system? 

Dr. SHANK. A fee-based incentive system is designed to reward 

performance. And, a risk could be if the fee is so large and the task 

is not properly defined that you might accomplish the task, get rewarded the fee, and not perform the overall need for function of the 

laboratory. 

A great deal of effort, I know, is involved in making sure that 

those incentives are properly directed. But if not properly directed, 

they could create a problem. 

We did not see a problem that would drive behaviors for fee that 

would distort the actual value of those laboratories for the country. 

But it is a reasonable concern. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. My last question if I could is: Has the privatization of the labs contributed to the loss of senior personnel? 

I know you said that the retention rates were about 4 percent 

both before and after privatization, but what about senior level personnel? 

Dr. SHANK. I believe that some of the labs—one, the move from 

the University of California’s manager to the LLC, they no longer 

were employees of the University of California. And some people 

chose to leave because they were near retirement. 

We asked for a list of significant people that have left the laboratory that affect the laboratory operation for the people who expressed that concern. We were not given information that was different than what we were able to understand. 

We asked that from the labs, the lab directors, and from the people who made the accusations, or that expressed the concerns. We 

could not verify that on a major scale. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to ask about a couple of things. 

Can you explain to me a little more what you mean by a lack 

of trust? 

You know, over the years, a lot of the issues have been securityrelated issues. Where of course there had to be some change in security practices by necessity. 

But is it primarily a chafing under the requirements for security? 

Is it more about money oversight, or research priorities? 

What is that lack of trust—how can you narrow that down a little more to explain from whence it arises? 

Dr. SHANK. There has been a record of performance failures, 

more at Los Alamos than at the other laboratories that created a 

great deal of concern. 

If we look back to some of the things that grow the idea of recompetition, there were issues. I believe an enormous amount of effort 

has taken place, specifically at Los Alamos, to try to upgrade, mod-
19 

ernize their systems, create an attitude of understanding the importance of security, and attention to safety. 

And enormous progress has been made there. 

If you are in an environment where people have failed to live up 

to expectations, it is not surprising that that trust issue will carry 

over into the future. 

We hope that increased performance, the laboratories will earn 

the kind of trust which would then lower the level of formality. But 

some of this has been earned, and some of this is probably as you 

described, chafing under regulations. 

But I believe that some of the mistrust has been earned. But 

there also has to be an opportunity to earn that trust back. 

When you manage somebody that you don’t trust, you put a 

whole set of restrictions and requirements. If you read 7,000 requirements, it is because I really don’t trust what you are doing. 

If I trusted what you are doing, I would begin to look at your outputs, and sample and audit what you do, and have you work with 

national standards as opposed to a step-by-step transactional oversight. 

That has to be earned. That is the salvation of actually making 

this whole system work. It is really fixing that interface and that 

relationship. 

No change in contract will fix that. It really is working at that 

relationship issue. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. One other issue, you mentioned several times 

in your all’s report, LDRD [Laboratory Directed Research and Development]. And I have had lots of debates in this room over the 

years, usually with people on my side of the aisle, about what percentage of a laboratory budget the director could direct according 

to merit. 

Is that a major issue or a small issue? 

Is it symptomatic of this larger question of overregulation from 

NNSA or is that just one of the consequences of this lack of trust? 

That there has not been the amount of discretion that the laboratory directors had in the past to manage new projects. 

Dr. SHANK. There are two issues there. 

There is one, the LDRD, which is an approved program. It’s one 

that remains the key tool for developing new scientists and associated science that is important to the laboratories. 

Recognize that physicists are not trained in weapons design at 

universities. When they come to the laboratory, having an opportunity to work with some very closely associated science, gives 

them an opportunity to develop these scientists. 

And if you look at some examples given in our report where people have worked on LDRD and ultimately became part in leadership, some of the leadership back here probably began with 

LDRD—a very important piece. 

We also point out in the report that a restrictive—changes in the 

budget categories, narrowly defining budget categories, has removed the ability of the laboratory to do what they once did historically—was to have a larger fraction of their budget to actually have 

scientific programs and create a robust core weapons research program. 
20 

That may be a whole range of issues. I don’t know what the motivations are. But they no longer have that additional flexibility. 

So, it is left with LDRD. 

So, LDRD is very important. But the lack of flexibility has come 

from the description of more, what are called B and R codes that 

really restrict what the laboratories can do with the funding. 

So, both of those are issues. 

Dr. CURTIS. I am going to take a little risk in responding to this 

question. I think over the years the Congress has been appropriating money in smaller and smaller packages which restrict the 

latitude of those charged with the administration of the laboratories and programs, to respond to the dynamic and the change in 

their programs as they develop. 

I think at the root of that is that the Congress doesn’t trust the 

administrators, NNSA, and the laboratories sufficiently. 

LDRD is in essence an account that the laboratories administer 

without prior definition or instruction. 

Congress has not liked that for a long time. But they recognize 

the value that it has produced for the laboratories and the conduct 

of this mission. 

But the two things are in tension. 

It is a highly valuable ability for the laboratories to develop talent, to recruit to the laboratories, and to—over time it accomplished their mission. 

But it always makes the Congress uneasy because they are controlling the purse as some view with sufficient direction, as they 

feel they are responsible to do. 

I think the Congress should go the other way. I think they really 

need over time to appropriate in larger packages of money. And 

give more trust, confidence, and latitude to those that they are depending upon to do the job, especially when you are dealing with 

vital national security issues. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the last point, there 

is a glare there, I can’t—Dr. Curtis, Mr. Curtis, Honorable Curtis, 

Dr. Shank, with regards to this issue of B and R codes, is it, what 

does that stand for, B and R? 

Mr. LARSEN. Budget and reporting, B and R codes. Okay. 

Did NAS actually evaluate and conclude that NNSA should not 

be making changes to B and R codes? 

Or are you just saying that’s a problem? 

Did your study make a recommendation or make a conclusion on 

it? 

Dr. SHANK. We heard from the laboratory directors in testimony, 

they no longer had the flexibility to do the kind of research programs they have done historically, because of the narrowly described budget codes—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Did you conclude—— 

Dr. SHANK. I—— 

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. That that was a good thing or bad 

thing or make any decisions—make any determination about that? 
21 

Dr. SHANK. Well, from the perspective of our report, which was 

to look at science and engineering, we saw less science and engineering, fundamental science, taking place at these laboratories 

than maybe you would have seen 15 or 20 years ago, and that has 

come about because of this set of restrictions. 

I think the detailed impact of that is best asked to the next panel 

who will describe what that has meant to them in terms of their 

core research capability. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great, I will do that. 

So, what should we care about the labs doing? Did you conclude 

that? 

Make any conclusions about what we, as members of Congress, 

what should we care about the labs doing? 

Dr. SHANK. Well, I think you should care that they are accomplishing—— 

Mr. LARSEN. I am sorry. 

And what did you conclude in your study? I want to be more 

clear about—so, you are commenting on the NAS study. 

What did the study conclude about what Congress should care 

about what the labs are doing? 

Dr. SHANK. From our study what Congress should care about 

would be that the laboratories be permitted to execute their mission responsibilities in a cost-efficient, safe, environmental, and responsible way. 

Mr. LARSEN. But you also said that one of your recommendations 

is that this committee, presumably Congress, should endorse your 

committee’s recommendation that the maintenance of the stockpile 

remains the core mission of the lab. 

Is that about right? 

Dr. SHANK. Absolutely correct. 

Mr. LARSEN. So, what activities would the labs give up or what 

would become secondary if that were to be the case? 

Dr. SHANK. Well, the maintenance of the stockpile is the core 

issue—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right—— 

Dr. SHANK. In order to actually achieve that issue, we felt the 

new four-agency governance model gave the laboratories the opportunity to develop science and engineering capabilities that they 

would not be able to form under current austerity conditions. 

So, that enables their core activity by being able to work in these 

broader arrangements where you now think of them more in national security laboratories, so they serve national need in a broad 

range of areas. 

But in the end, their primary responsibility, their core responsibility, is maintenance of the stockpile. 

Mr. LARSEN. Perhaps the directors, when they come up here and 

get prepared for the question, and just maybe make it part of your 

testimony about the relationship between the austerity—the lack of 

dollars, or the lack of the dollars you want, and the impact that 

that has on what you want to do versus the management issue. 

If there are some ways we can sort of separate those things a little bit, so we are attacking the right problem. 

Is the management structure between NSA and DOE and the 

labs on target? 
22 

And this gets back to Mr. Thornberry’s work of the late 1990s 

and early 2000s about trying to find just the right relationship. 

You make any recommendations on that to the study? 

Dr. SHANK. We expressed a concern about the relationship. We 

did not make a recommendation how to redefine or reorganize the 

national—or the DOE and NNSA. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Just a moment, Mr. Chairman, sorry—oh, yes, this issue of trust. 

Can you give me some specifics? 

So, I want to talk about trust and the lack of it. But even from 

reading your report, it sounds more like a management discussion 

about trust as opposed to, here are the specific problems. 

Here is who we don’t trust. Here is what we don’t trust. Here is 

why we are not being trusted. 

And it comes across frankly, by complaining about trust as opposed to here are some actual circumstances where we feel we are 

not being trusted or the actions being taken by NNSA show they 

don’t trust us. 

Dr. SHANK. Let me give you an example that really had an impact on me. 

At one of the laboratories a young woman was hired. She was 

setting up her laboratory. Her laboratory required an optical bench, 

which floats on an air cushion. 

She spent a week determining—answering the question whether 

the table would blow up before she would be allowed to inflate the 

table. 

No other laboratory in the country would have that level of formality of operation to require to be able to do that. 

Why did this occur? 

If I trusted the laboratory to be able to have a system in place 

to actually be able to operate facilities without a step-by-step-bystep requirement, exhaustive requirement, it would be quite different. 

Similar work done at one of these national laboratories ought to 

be the same as it was at Bell Laboratories, where I was when I 

grew up as a scientist, or IBM Laboratories today. 

They should be operating the same way. They do not. 

The cost overhead of the excessive formality is a major impact. 

And, the real concern to us when we listen to young people, it really is creating a bias about how long do I need to invest my career 

in experimental work at one of these laboratories because of this 

burden. 

So, we pay a cost for that excessive formality. 

And a way in which, if you trusted the organization, you would 

have a certified system of how you operate the laboratory. And 

you’d audit the system. 

We audit and give orders and instruction for every motion. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Shank, thank you for concluding with that very 

impassioned description. 

You know, from my community, Dayton, Ohio, came the Wright 

Brothers who brought us into human flight. And I can’t imagine 

what the rules and regulations would look like if Government had 

to tell them how they should have done their experiments. 
23 

We might all still be on trains. 

So, gentlemen, thank you so much. 

We are going to turn to our second panel. 

We are very lucky to have Dr. Michael Anastasio, director emeritus, Los Alamos National Laboratory, director emeritus, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory. 

We have Dr. George Miller, director emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. And Ambassador C. Paul Robinson, director emeritus, Sandia National Laboratories. 

We’ll pause for a moment as we have a shift between the first 

panel and the second panel. 

But we are very glad to have them here. 

Gentlemen, we want to thank you all for being here. You have 

prestigious careers as heading the NNSA labs. We appreciate you 

taking the time to share your insight with us. 

And we will begin with Dr. Anastasio. 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL R. ANASTASIO, DIRECTOR 

EMERITUS, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY; DIRECTOR EMERITUS, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Thank you, Chairman Turner, and other members of the subcommittee. 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. And I just want to 

put a disclaimer in that my remarks are going to be my personal 

views and not the views of any of the laboratories or any of the 

other organizations. 

And during my career I have witnessed many historic events and 

dramatic changes in the National Security Enterprise, yet the laboratories’ dedication to mission and quality of science has remained. 

However, the future of an age of austerity, as you pose it, is really—raises significant near-term and long-term challenges to a high 

quality science and engineering mission effectiveness. 

So, I want to spend a minute or two discussing these challenges. 

And then in my written testimony, I have made some modest recommendations. 

I think the first point is the context in which the Nuclear Security Enterprise operates. There’s lots of issues that drive my concerns. 

There was a great bipartisan agreement that was satisfying for 

me with the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010 and the accompanying budget plan, the 1251 report. 

But already the consensus around that is wavering. And inevitably that’s going to lead to differing expectations of the enterprise 

and an inability to set and carry out priorities consistently over 

time. 

And as the financial pressure mounts, that’s going to exacerbate 

these problems. 

Second is that the external entities who peer into NNSA also 

drive concerns, because they generate a significant risk aversion 

within NNSA. When they get criticized from external bodies, they 

become risk-averse. And that manifests itself in a lack of trust of 

the sites. We should make sure that we don’t do anything that 
24 

causes an embarrassment of the NNSA. And, that generates a 

growing focus on compliance at the expense of delivering on the 

mission. 

My experience at Los Alamos, as I think about oversight and 

management, is instructive for me in considering how to handle the 

enterprise-wide problem. 

And at Los Alamos, we were able to increase the effectiveness at 

the laboratory in delivering its mission, while at the same time absorbing over $225 million per year of new costs. 

However, it is going to be hard for my successor to make further 

gains because there is continued growth in unfunded requirements 

and transactional oversight. 

There is an inexorable trend toward ever deeper involvement and 

direction of how activities are done, rather than evaluating the outcomes and see if they meet expectations. 

At the same time, new directives and new interpretations of directives are promulgated from both the NNSA and outside organization like the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, to drive 

down operational risk and demanding more and more paperwork to 

demonstrate compliance. 

And, those who establish the requirements don’t have responsibility for the program. And, those who are responsible don’t really 

know what is going on in the field. 

Safety and security, environmental protection must be paramount. However, we need to have a balanced program and balance 

risks across all activities, so whether that’s mission accomplishment to operational excellence. 

We really need to strengthen that balance across the enterprise. 

And so, let me end with my long-term concern which is for the 

health of science at these institutions. 

And already, we have seen some anecdotal evidence that the environment we are working under is driving away some of our best 

mid-career scientists. And, as we confront the financial pressures, 

I am concerned that it’s going to force program modifications that 

will lead to impacts. 

And, history would suggest that those impacts are going to fall 

disproportionately on science and engineering in order to protect 

the near-term milestones of the program. 

And, if that happens, then we run the risk of losing the capabilities of these world-class organizations. And we may not be able to 

recover. 

So, let me stop there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Anastasio can be found in the 

Appendix on page 75.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you so much. 

Dr. Miller. 

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE H. MILLER, DIRECTOR 

EMERITUS, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members 

of the subcommittee for the opportunity to provide my comments 

on this important issue. And more importantly, thank you for your 
25 

long-term support of this critically important program to the country. 

Based on nearly 40 years of watching this enterprise and leading 

Livermore for the last 5 years, I would like to summarize five main 

points. 

First of all at the top level, there’s a lot of very positive outcomes 

that I think the Congress and NNSA and the country should be 

proud of. 

The laboratories still have extraordinary people, Stockpile Stewardship is working, and we have the capabilities of these laboratories being more broadly applied to the problems facing the country. 

And in fact, Secretary Chu and Mr. D’Agostino have recognized 

the need for governance reform. 

I also believe that right now the U.S. faces enormous challenges 

for which science and technology has the ability to contribute significantly. And, we cannot afford to waste a single precious dollar 

or precious science technology and engineering resource on bureaucratic inefficiency. 

In my view, the laboratories are under severe stress in their ability to perform these missions. And they are increasingly constrained by the manner of the Federal oversight and the way in 

which it is implemented. 

There’s been a lot of discussion this morning already about transactional oversight in which individual activities are monitored 

rather than process oversight, which looks at the system and the 

performance. 

I will give you two ways in which you can look at this. 

At each of the NNSA sites, there are typically more than 100 

Federal officials on site to watch on a daily basis what we do. If 

you go to the Jet Propulsion Lab, it’s less than 30. They have a 

budget approximately the size of Livermore, actually slightly less. 

If you go to the way the—within NNSA, the way naval reactors 

operates, you see only a small number of people. 

Another example is the oversight of our safety, health, and environmental programs. At Livermore the plan for 2012 has more 

than 1,000 audits and inspections in the plan. In addition to that, 

there are hundreds of self-assessments by the laboratory itself. 

To contrast, the best commercial practice is startling. We have 

been on a path at Livermore for several years to implement the 

international standards, both our environmental systems, our safety systems, and our quality control systems. 

The process of maintaining those systems typically requires one 

audit a week and a few people. This, in my view, across the complex amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps upwards 

of $0.5 billion in cost inefficiency. 

As we have said many times this morning in the first panel, and 

I am sure we will talk about it again, in my view, the issue is the 

fundamental breakdown in the relationship between the Federal 

Government and the laboratories—the principal reason that the 

federally funded research and development centers were formed in 

the first place. 

In a very tangible way, I think of this in a sports analogy. 
26 

We are all engaged in the game. And our game is national security. That’s why we do what we do. 

The referees are important. The referee is the contract. But the 

referee is not the game. 

And, I think it is important that we focus on why we are here. 

Trust is often used—I think trust is a good word. But unfortunately, it has a lot of emotional overtones. I think it is important 

to understand when I use that word, what I mean by it. 

And, it’s really a recognition that each of the partners has an important and very distinct role to play. It’s important that we have 

a mutually respectful relationship in which that relationship can be 

borne out and focused on the accomplishment of our job, which is 

national service. 

I think there are a number of positive actions that can take place 

to move us back towards the partnerships that have served the 

country so well. 

Again, my summary, the country is facing major challenges. And 

we cannot afford, in this environment, to waste a single bit of our 

science and technology and engineering talent on bureaucratic inefficiencies. 

I would ask you to think of three things as you summarize this 

hearing. 

We need to work on restoring trust. We need to eliminate transactional oversight. And we need to turn over management of these 

institutions to the organizations that were hired to manage them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the Appendix on page 80.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

Ambassador Robinson. 

STATEMENT OF AMB. C. PAUL ROBINSON, DIRECTOR 

EMERITUS, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES 

Dr. ROBINSON. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to talk 

about an issue that I have been watching for 45 years—— 

There we are. Thank you. 

I’ve been watching this problem for 45 years and it only gets 

worse. It is a system that is truly broken. 

I would like to start at the beginning. 

When the need for a Manhattan Project was seen—Leslie R. 

Groves, the guy who built the Pentagon, and was at the Army 

Corps of Engineers, was asked to be in charge. They knew it was 

going to be a big project. 

He was given advice by the scientific leaders at the time, gee, be 

careful, Governments have no track record, no positive track record 

whatsoever about handling projects of research and development. 

And particularly anything that requires innovation Government 

will slow it down or block it completely. 

They also wisely decided not to draft all the scientists, which was 

one of the suggestions on the table. But in the end, asked if the 

University of California would manage the scientific effort for the 

Government, and that is the GOCO, Government-owned, contractor-operated, was born. 
27 

Now, one of those advisors was James Conant, one of the top 

science advisors to President Truman. He was asked once what can 

our country do to really get those benefits of science from the Manhattan Project, and keep them going forward to propel our country 

in the future? 

He said, I think the best thing that we can do is choose men and 

women of brilliance, back them heavily, then leave them alone to 

do their work. 

Now, if there is anything you cannot accuse this system of, it is 

leaving people alone to do their work. The bureaucratic obstructions that started as with every 5 or 6 years you could see it increasing dramatically under the Atomic Energy Commission, until 

people said, gee, that’s just not working. 

It then became, for 3 years, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and then the Department of Energy, and this 

latest change was NNSA within the Department of Energy. 

How bad has the oversight gotten? 

And, let me use a different word for oversight that is more common, I think, at all three labs. The micromanagement is killing us. 

And, you’re right. People are not ready to do those jobs. And the 

Government keeps growing and growing and growing in size. 

Just look at the plod. They outnumber us enormously now. And 

they seek to find roles to keep busy. 

And this is a surprise. I hope you have heard of this. But to me 

it was one of the biggest wake-up calls I ever had when my first 

laboratory director, Harold Agnew, who was a noted scientist, rode 

in with the bombs at Hiroshima. 

He was a physicist trained by Enrico Fermi. He was appointed 

lab director and was going to do it for 10 years. 

He left early and said I am just completely frustrated. 

He said I know you can’t fire people anymore, but could you 

please just not let them come to work. And the rate of science productivity and the inventions and things that we can harness for the 

security of this country going forward will go up at least a factor 

of three instantly. 

Now that was 30 years ago. It’s gotten a whole lot worse since. 

And, I say in my testimony, it is time you have got to take a tremendously strong action. 

Bureaucracies never reform themselves. The cost structure is just 

enormous for all the overhead activities. 

You are required to do what-if exercises before you can do anything. And, it is frustrating. 

Now, I am pleased to tell you we hit on a wonderful way to make 

sure we are still hiring the best people. We have the professors at 

the best colleges, 33 strategic universities, finding the best students for us and saying, gee, you know, you need to come to Sandia 

and work. 

And, we bring them in. And, they cannot believe the constraints 

that they are being asked to work under. 

I believe—well, one of the big reports that you can now read online was ‘‘Science the Endless Frontier,’’ which was written to summarize after World War II all the great science that had been done 

and accomplished, including in the Manhattan Project. 
28 

It said we’ve got to pay attention to frontier science and move it 

forward if the country is going to maintain its lead. 

Things are at stake over what’s been allowed to happen. And, I 

agree with these gentlemen. I think we are going to lose the capability overall unless major changes come. 

I suggested to you the time when it flourished the best, it was 

under the Department of War, now the Department of Defense. 

They cared about what the answer was, the missions. They are the 

people who have to use those weapons that we design. 

They cared about the answer. No one in the present system 

seems to care about the mission. 

It is, How are you doing all of your trivial chores? That’s what 

we want to look at. 

I believe that it is time to move it to the Department of Defense, 

which is now a civilian institution which was the reason it was not 

placed there originally. And, we have had 60 years of it being a civilian institution. And, I believe the change in leadership would be 

dramatic enough to stop this nonsense and get us on a better path. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Dr. Robinson can be found in the Appendix on 

page 91.] 

Mr. TURNER. Well, thank you all for being frank and specifically, 

the ambassador for his passion there at the end. 

And Dr. Miller, when you presented your testimony you said, 

‘‘presently the NNSA laboratories are under severe stress in their 

ability to perform their vital missions because they are substantially and increasingly constrained by the manner in which Federal 

management and oversight is implemented. 

I believe the impact is well in excess of hundreds of millions of 

dollars of work per year across the complex.’’ 

A 2001 study by DOE’s Lawrence Berkeley National Lab suggested that implementing streamlining of administrative and operational requirements would allow labor reductions and cost 

avoidances between 10 percent and 30 percent in net resource savings would be realized. The resources saved in administrative and 

operational support areas could be immediately applied to critical 

mission and institutional needs. 

This is serious money. And, the money could be going to accomplish the mission as all three of you are focusing on. 

Can you give examples of where you might find these cost savings? 

What do you think Congress could do to change these inefficiencies and what do our other witnesses think? 

I think it is so important that—and when you guys were giving 

your descriptions, you keep going to the issue of the mission. You 

know, everyone is for environmental safety. Everyone is for security and safety in the processes. 

But, innovation and the mission is what is so important. And, if 

we are focusing on one or the other, we are certainly costing the 

ability for innovation. 

Perhaps, we could begin with Dr. Anastasio. 

Ideas of efficiencies, cost savings, and other items that you might 

wish to identify. We are seriously looking at a to-do list for this upcoming bill. And, your participation is so important. 
29 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Well, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would suggest, my experience in the laboratory, when I tried 

to do this internally because of course the laboratories suffer from 

bureaucracies just like everyone else, and to try to meet that challenge internally. 

I found that the only way to attack this problem is to reduce the 

budgets—reduce the dollars available to do indirect activities. 

And you have to enforce that by reducing the number of people 

who are doing that. You can’t just take the money away, because 

then the people have to go do something else. And they will find 

another way to— 

So, it is really—reduce the budget and number of people who are 

engaged in oversight and indirect activities. That doesn’t mean not 

do oversight, because I agree with Mr. Aloise that doing oversight 

a different way is what we really need to do. 

And, not transactional as we have all said, but do it in a performance-based way. And, there are plenty of accountability mechanisms in place already with our new contracts to hold us accountable, because we should be accountable. 

But, do it in a way that doesn’t audit every—and there is just 

so many examples of counterproductive things. 

When we had a computer—security problems at Los Alamos, one 

net result is for many tens of computer systems, we had to write 

many, many hundreds of pages of security plans on how we are 

going to protect those systems. 

And, we spent 18 months writing thousands of pages of documentation. And at the same time, the security threat as we all read 

in the newspaper from cyber is changing every hour. 

So, how could 18 months’ worth of paper, you know, make you 

more secure? Actually, it makes you less secure because the people 

who are writing the documents should be the one who are figuring 

out how to protect us. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Miller, anything you want to add to your previous comment? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, again, I think this is a terribly important issue. 

I agree very much with Mike’s comments. And they are echoed in 

my written testimony. 

Again, the example that I use is the integrated number of Federal onsite—the integrated Federal onsite presence across the complex. If you compare that to any other Federal model, you know, 

Jet Propulsion Lab, applied physics lab at Johns Hopkins, you 

know, the way the Navy Strategic Security Program operates their 

plants, which do high explosives. 

I mean, that is where the huge leverage is in my mind. 

And the way you do it is again, as I suggest, for many of our activities the core environmental activities, the core safety programs, 

the core quality programs, there are international standards to 

which every business in this country, that wants to really stay in 

business, that’s the way they operate. 

And they are process-oriented, rather than transactionally oriented ways of doing oversight. 

Mr. TURNER. Ambassador. 

Dr. ROBINSON. Let me take on the example of safety as well. 
30 

You would think that the labs must be bad performers in safety. 

That’s not the case. 

All of the labs have had excellent overall statistics. They would 

rank better than any industrial organization in similar work. 

And so you ask, well, why is the Department of Energy, which 

kept safety—as I say in my testimony that was a direct violation 

of the NNSA legislation which said nothing was supposed to be 

governed directly from DOE, but through NNSA. 

Safety and security organizations were never given the responsibility of NNSA, but people, not even associated with the mission 

do that. 

Now, the costs of doing safety are enormous. But yet the attention that one would get if you were out in industry or at university 

would be very, very little because your performance was so good. 

So, performance statistics ought to be driving what level of oversight you have earned. It does not within the current system. 

And, the costs go up, not only the costs for doing safety which 

is an end in itself within the Department of Energy, but the lost 

time of people having to—before they can take any experimental 

action, writing for months. 

I did have one other mental picture I wanted you to carry away. 

When we put all of the Department of Energy rules and orders together in a bookshelf—they are bound in documents—it was four 

shelves high and four feet wide of thousands and thousands and 

thousands of pages. 

And we challenge anyone to open up at random, as many times 

as they would like, and read and see if you thought anything contributed to safety from all the effort that had been put together in 

writing those rules and orders. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. That is great, I think, visualization of 

part of the problem. 

Dr. Anastasio, your statement mentions the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, DNFSB, as contributing to the burdensome 

oversight of the NNSA enterprise. 

Would you please explain how could we ensure that DNFSB is 

able to conduct thorough effective and value-added safety oversight 

of nuclear enterprise? 

And, what other thoughts do you have with respect to how to 

remedy that obvious problem? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I think a simple idea in my mind for whether it 

is the DNFSB, or NNSA itself, or DOE, or anybody else who’s imposing new requirements, that we ought to require that those requirements are accompanied ahead of time with a cost benefit analysis. 

Which is, okay, so there is no—everybody is going to want better 

security or better safety and so forth. But a question is how do you 

balance that risk against the risk of not being able to accomplish 

a mission, but a risk of losing the science capability to do your future work. 

So, those are all risks that are all important. And so, a good 

manager, and an effective organization, has to balance all those 

risks against each other. And you have to keep them in balance. 

That’s what a lab director has to do as well as anybody else that 

runs and organization. 
31 

And so, you have to go evaluate to make a change here, how does 

that affect everything else that goes on? And how do I keep all 

these things in balance? 

And right now, the system we have is the people who are looking 

at the operational issues, whether it is the Defense Board or anybody else, you know, are not required to look at that balance. They 

are just required to focus on the one issue that they are responsible 

for. 

And to get that integrated view of the balance, that is the thing 

that is missing. So, requiring some kind of cost benefit study, it’s 

not just about dollars. 

But to force the system to think, what are the impacts? Is it 

worth this extra bit of safety to have this other impact on my effectiveness on executing the program? 

Mr. TURNER. No, I appreciate—one of the things that we can 

never quite capture in a cost benefit analysis is an ‘‘innovation lost 

cost.’’ Because the—— 

Dr. ANASTASIO. And if that—excuse me, Mr. Chairman, and if 

that was in a—you know, we don’t do the cost benefit at all. 

Mr. TURNER. Right. Right. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. And so—— 

Mr. TURNER. Right, so, on a cost—— 

Dr. ANASTASIO [continuing]. Following down that path in my 

mind would—— 

Mr. TURNER. Right—— 

Dr. ANASTASIO [continuing]. Be something that would be useful. 

Mr. TURNER. We want our brilliant people to be doing brilliant 

things, not menial tasks as you have all been pointing out. 

And, I know that that is part of what you have nurtured as directors. And, we certainly hope to use your expertise so that we can 

unleash that innovation once again. 

Turning then to Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’ll just have a few questions and head over to the Navy Posture 

hearing here in a few minutes. 

So, I won’t take my 3 minutes or 5 minutes to whatever we have, 

but thanks for coming. It is good to see you all again, even in this 

circumstance. 

I would note that it was said earlier that there is no morale crisis at—the previous panel said they, in the report, found no morale 

crisis at the labs despite the increasing costs. 

I can tell you the increasing cost causes me a morale crisis. And 

so, we will have to hopefully look into that. 

Yeah, one of the basic questions has to do with the management 

structure. Again, we have dealt with this in the last 2 years or 3 

years, so our last—really focused our hearings on this. 

The NAS didn’t seem to, you know, didn’t seem to say you needed necessarily to change the management structure, the one we 

have been struggling with. Is that part of the issue here or not? 

Or is it changes within it that need to be—— 

Dr. MILLER. Yeah, I mean, I think that each of the different 

management structures that you can consider autonomous—semiautonomous would have an agency (?). 
32 

Each one of those has strengths and weaknesses which I know 

that you will carefully consider. 

My view, the fundamental issue is the one we have been discussing. And that is the internal relationship, you know, which we 

have characterized as trust. That is the fundamental issue. 

If you have that, in my view, any of the relationships can be 

made to work. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. My view also is that we talk about trust. I would 

like to use a different term which is behaviors. It is about the behaviors of people. 

And, I think the National Academy pointed out, if you read the 

contracts we have, the new contracts—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. There is nothing egregious in those contracts. It 

is the way that the people who are involved interpret what the contract says. 

And, they use that interpretation. And it is the behaviors of the 

people that drive behaviors in the workforce inside the laboratory 

who become risk-averse as well. 

And so, it just compounds itself. And, that is the source of the 

problem. 

So, you have to find a way to change the behaviors of people. 

And, if you can’t do that, the structural changes are not going to 

matter. In effect, they will hurt things because I went through a 

process at Los Alamos of changing contracts. And let me say, that 

was very distracting to the workforce. 

You know, it was very distracting to our ability to accomplish 

missions. So, going through that change someone else can evaluate 

whether that was the right or the wrong thing to do. 

But let me say, it was very disruptive. And, it took several years 

for us to get focus back on the fundamental issues. 

So, if you go through change, you better be sure that the outcome 

is going to be worth, you know, the disruption that it causes. 

And for me, unless you tackle the behavioral issues of everybody—and it is not what the leadership says only, it is how does 

that leadership commitment translated down to the workforce at 

the working level, and is there alignment of that whole organization—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Dr. ANASTASIO [continuing]. To accomplish the same thing. That 

behavioral part is key to making these kinds of changes. 

Mr. LARSEN. I will just note Ambassador Robinson’s testimony is 

very clear in seeking a full change in the management structure, 

and taking it out of DOE, putting it into DOD as an independent 

agency. 

So, I will leave it at that. 

And just one last question: One of the recommendations is to rebalance the relationship, sets of principles, and laying them out in 

an MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] between NNSA and its 

laboratories. 

Does something like that not exist now? 

Is there not a defining document that says this is how we will 

relate to each other? 
33 

Dr. ANASTASIO. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. LARSEN. Would it be helpful? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. I think it’s important to have, as Dr. Miller said, 

clear sense of roles and responsibilities that each of us have. 

You know, what is our job? What am I supposed to do? What are 

my authorities? 

What are my responsibilities for as a lab director, as a Federal 

workforce and so forth, and have that clear and then hold each 

other accountable to carry that out. 

I think that is very worthwhile. 

I think it is also true with Congress. And, how is that relationship with Congress? And, what are each of our roles? 

And, I would harken back to a comment someone else made earlier which is the number of budget control levels are also restricting our ability to be effective managers at the sites because budgets are developed at best 18 months ahead of time before you get 

the budget. 

Priorities clearly change in that period of time. And yet, it is very 

hard for us to respond to those changes in priorities. So, there is 

a number of issues like that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TURNER. Gentlemen, before we end the hearing, I have one 

more question that I would like to ask of you that if you would 

please answer in writing in the next week or so to our committee 

staff. And we’ll, of course, provide it to you in writing also, but to 

include it in the record. 

Many studies and reports over the past 10 years, including the 

2009 Strategic Posture Commission, recommended eliminating duplicative NNSA and DOE regulation of any lab functions that are 

already regulated by external bodies, such as health and occupation safety, by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, 

OSHA, and letting these external bodies regulate and oversee those 

regulations. 

I would like to know if you agree, if you see cost savings that 

might be realized by such a move. 

Why hasn’t this done before now? 

And is there anything else that in that question that you see in 

your insight, that we need to know and take into consideration? 

I would like to thank both our first and second panel, both for 

your commitment and dedication to these issues, your time today, 

and what I am sure will be a continued dialogue as we try to struggle with this issue in looking to put together this year’s National 

Defense Authorization Act where we hope to have provisions that 

relate to this issue with your assistance. 

Thank you all. 

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

(39) 

Statement of Hon. Michael Turner 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Governance, Oversight, and Management of the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise To Ensure High Quality Science, 

Engineering, and Mission Effectiveness in an Age of 

Austerity 

February 16, 2012 

Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today’s hearing on 

Governance, Management, and Oversight of the Nuclear Security 

Enterprise in an Age of Austerity. 

Everyone here knows that this is a very busy week on Capitol 

Hill: budget request week. This hearing is not like most of the 

hearings that are taking place this week, in that it isn’t looking directly at a particular agency’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

However, it is a hearing that has major implications for the future 

of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and, 

therefore, its budget. This hearing will examine long-standing, 

well-documented, and fundamental concerns with the way NNSA 

manages its labs and plants—problems that are unnecessarily costing taxpayers many hundreds of millions of dollars each year and 

impeding NNSA’s ability to accomplish its mission. In today’s fiscal 

environment we cannot afford such inefficiency and waste—particularly when we’re seeing major cuts to the pledged nuclear modernization funding in this year’s budget request. 

In 1999, Congress passed the NNSA Act, which broke out NNSA 

as a ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ agency within the Department of Energy 

(DOE). Driven by this subcommittee—and in particular by my 

friends Mac Thornberry and Ellen Tauscher—this legislation 

sought to address major mismanagement and security problems at 

DOE. In particular, a 1999 report by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board spurred Congress into action, saying DOE 

was a ‘‘dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable 

of reforming itself.’’ 

An earlier report by the Galvin Commission ‘‘revealed a counterproductive Federal system of operation’’ for DOE’s national labs, 

saying ‘‘the current system of governance of these laboratories is 

broken and should be replaced with a bold alternative.’’ The Galvin 

Commission noted that problems included ‘‘increased overhead cost, 

poor morale, and gross inefficiencies as a result of overly prescriptive Congressional management and excessive oversight by the De-
40 

partment,’’ and ‘‘inordinate internal focus at every level of these 

laboratories on compliance issues and questions of management 

processes, which takes a major toll on research performance.’’ 

NNSA was created to address these problems and enable the nuclear security enterprise to be more effective, more focused, and 

more efficient. Twelve years after the creation of NNSA, the question for this hearing is: Has it worked? Have these problems been 

addressed? 

To prepare for this hearing, I asked the committee staff to put 

together an overview of the many reports in the past 10 years that 

have examined NNSA’s management and governance of its labs 

and plants. It’s not an exhaustive list, but it is illustrative of what 

various assessments have found over the decade NNSA has been 

in existence. I ask that the hearing memo prepared by the staff be 

entered into the record. 

I want to quote from just a few of these myriad studies the staff 

reviewed. Here’s a finding from a 2009 assessment by the Stimson 

Center, which was paid for by NNSA itself: 

‘‘The implementation of the NNSA Act failed to achieve the intended autonomy for NNSA within the Department of Energy. 

The Labs now must operate within a complicated set of bureaucratic relationships with both DOE and NNSA. An excessively bureaucratic DOE culture has infiltrated NNSA as 

well.’’ 

And here are a few quotes from the bipartisan Strategic Posture 

Commission’s report in 2009: 

‘‘ . . . the governance structure of the NNSA is not delivering 

the needed results. This governance structure should be 

changed . . . In [the Commission’s] view, the original intent of 

the legislation creating the NNSA has not been realized. The 

desired autonomy has not come into being. It is time to consider fundamental changes.’’ 

‘‘Despite the efforts of thousands of dedicated and competent 

civil servants, Federal oversight of the weapons enterprise 

needs significant improvement . . . The NNSA was formed to 

improve management of the weapons program and to shelter 

that program from what was perceived as a welter of confusing and contradictory DOE directives, policies, and procedures. Despite some success, the NNSA has failed to meet the 

hopes of its founders. Indeed, it may have become part of 

the problem, adopting the same micromanagement and 

unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was created 

to eliminate . . . ’’ 

‘‘The leadership of all three weapons laboratories believes that 

the regulatory burden is excessive, a view endorsed by the 

Commission. That burden imposes a significant cost and 

less heavy-handed oversight would bring real benefits 

. . . ’’ 

Reading these reports, the pointed criticisms about excessive, ineffective, and unnecessary bureaucratic processes and confused and 

redundant management relationships sound eerily similar to the 

reports that spurred the creation of NNSA in 1999. So the answer 
41 

to my earlier rhetorical question appears to be: ‘‘No, NNSA hasn’t 

worked as intended, and many of the same problems remain.’’ 

But we have our witnesses here today to help us understand if 

that answer is correct. On our first panel, we have gentlemen representing two distinguished organizations that have spent considerable time examining NNSA management and oversight of the nuclear security enterprise. They are: 

Dr. Charles Shank  Co-Chair, National Academies Panel on Managing for 

High Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories  Senior Fellow, Howard Hughes Medical Institute 

The Honorable Charles B. Curtis  Member, National Academies Panel on Managing for 

High Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories  Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International 

Studies  President Emeritus and Board Member, Nuclear Threat 

Initiative  Former Deputy Secretary of Energy, 1994–1997 

Mr. Eugene Aloise  Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office 

Dr. Shank and Secretary Curtis are here to present the results 

of a National Academies of Science study that was mandated by 

this subcommittee in the FY2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act. In the conference report accompanying that bill, the conferees 

explained that the study should provide ‘‘an even-handed, unbiased 

assessment of the quality of the scientific research and engineering’’ at the labs and an assessment of the ‘‘factors that influence’’ 

such quality. I understand that the portion of the study that was 

recently completed—and that we’ll be discussing today—focuses on 

the latter: management-related factors that influence the quality of 

science and engineering at the labs. 

I will let Dr. Shank and Mr. Curtis speak to their report, but I 

want to highlight a few of their study committee’s findings: 

‘‘In the view of this committee, the relationship between NNSA 

and its [labs] is broken to an extent that very seriously affects 

the Labs’ capability to manage for quality science and engineering. There has been a breakdown of trust and an erosion 

of the partnering between the Laboratories and NNSA to solve 

complex science and engineering problems; there is conflict 

and confusion over management roles and responsibilities of 

organizations and individuals.’’ 

The National Academies’ report also finds that the level of detailed, transactional-level management and oversight that NNSA 

applies to the labs is causing significant inefficiencies and risking 

the quality of science and engineering at the labs, saying: 

‘‘There is a perception . . . at the three Laboratories that NNSA 

has moved from partnering with the Laboratories to solve scientific and engineering problems, to assigning tasks and specific science and engineering solutions with detailed imple-
42 

mentation instructions. This approach precludes taking 

full advantage of the intellectual and management 

skills that taxpayer dollars have purchased. The study 

committee found similar issues in transactional oversight of 

safety, business, security and operations. Science and engineering quality is at risk . . . ’’ 

Our first panel of witnesses also features Mr. Eugene Aloise from 

GAO. Mr. Aloise and GAO have spent decades examining NNSA 

and DOE Defense Programs before it. I understand GAO continues 

to have major concerns about the inconsistency and inaccuracy of 

NNSA’s management and cost data across the enterprise. I hope 

you will help us understand what is causing these chronic problems 

and what actions NNSA or Congress could take to address them. 

Finally, our second witness panel is comprised of three former directors of the NNSA laboratories, who have been asked to share 

their direct experiences leading and managing the organizations responsible for carrying out NNSA’s mission within the management 

and oversight processes, procedures, and structures set up by the 

Federal Government. They are: 

Dr. Michael R. Anastasio 

 Director Emeritus, Los Alamos National Laboratory 

 Director Emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Dr. George H. Miller 

 Director Emeritus, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

Ambassador C. Paul Robinson 

 Director Emeritus, Sandia National Laboratories 

These gentlemen bring a wealth of experience to our witness 

table, and I hope they will share that experience by reflecting on 

the findings and recommendations of the National Academies report and the GAO. I also hope they will share any concrete, actionable recommendations they have for improving governance and 

management of the labs. 

Let me say that we all need to recognize that, alone, simply moving boxes on an organizational chart isn’t going to resolve these 

problems. It is going to take leadership, both within the Administration and up here on Capitol Hill—as well as a consensus on why 

NNSA’s mission is so important and what needs to be done to move 

forward. Ranking Member Sanchez and I have agreed to take a 

hard look at these issues over the next few months and work together to help address the concerns of the National Academies 

study group, the Strategic Posture Commission, and all of the 

others. 

Thank you to all of our witnesses for joining us today—we look 

forward to the discussion. 
43 

Statement of Hon. James R. Langevin on Behalf of 

Hon. Loretta Sanchez, Ranking Member, 

House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Hearing on 

Governance, Oversight, and Management of the Nuclear 

Security Enterprise To Ensure High Quality Science, 

Engineering, and Mission Effectiveness in an Age of 

Austerity 

February 16, 2012 

I would like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming our witnesses, Dr. Shank, The Honorable Charlie Curtis, Mr. Aloise, Dr. 

Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Ambassador Robinson. 

I am also pleased that statements from Ambassador Brooks and 

Dr. Sieg Hecker, and the letter from Dr. Colvin and Dr. Logan on 

behalf of the University Professional and Technical Employees 

union are submitted for the record. 

The impetus for the FY2010 National Defense Authorization’s request for this National Academy of Sciences Study was concern 

about safety issues and about the effects of the privatization of lab 

management at Los Alamos National Laboratories and Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory. 

Specifically, members were concerned that increased costs of 

management fees and taxes and other associated costs might have 

decreased resources for programmatic work and affected morale. 

In its version of the bill, the House sought a GAO study to assess 

the costs of the transition and the impacts on lab management and 

lab functions, including safety, security, and environmental management. The final conference report included an NAS study of 

broader scope that would examine whether the excellence in 

science and engineering was being preserved at the labs. 

This study now comes over 10 years after the NNSA was created 

and several years after a change in contracting structure for the 

labs, and offers an opportunity to assess the quality of science and 

management after a period of adjustment to the new contracting 

structure. It also comes in the context of strategy based on an updated Nuclear Posture Review and the constraints of the fiscal 

crisis. 

Today, I hope to hear your insights to inform our oversight and 

ensure that we retain the unique skills and capability upon which 

our nuclear deterrent and nonproliferation efforts depend. 

I would like to touch on three important points: 

(1) the need for an effective contract structure, governance 

and management that help attract and retain the quality 

of scientists and engineers dedicated to public service who 

underpin a safe, secure and reliable arsenal and contribute the expertise behind successful nonproliferation 

efforts; 
44 

(2) the need for a process that ensures safety for workers and 

the public; and 

(3) the need for transparency, accountability, and clear lines 

of authority. 

First, safety, security, and reliability of nuclear weapons depend 

on critical scientific skills, and our labs must be able to attract 

some of the Nation’s best scientists who want to serve their 

country. 

Maintaining this expertise demands an interesting and important mission, challenging work, good equipment and tools, and high 

morale, including a supportive work environment where scientists 

are valued and recognized. And so I would like to explore these 

questions: 

 Does the current structure and oversight provide clear expectations while enabling effective research, including hypothesis-driven science? 

 Does it enable diverging views on potential technical solutions? 

 Does it provide stability in employment and opportunities for 

collaboration and success? 

Mission success also demands a work environment that is safe 

for employees and for the public, which brings me to my second 

point. 

This management and oversight responsibility of nuclear weapons research, sustainment, and production cannot be compromised. 

Accidents can and do happen, including low-probability, high-consequence events. 

No one expected the massive earthquake and tsunami at the 

Fukushima Daichi power plant in Japan, or the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion. 

The reactor accidents at Savannah River Site that were hidden 

from the public for over 30 years, the environmental conditions 

which led to the raid and permanent shutdown of Rocky Flats and 

the classified data scandals that rocked Los Alamos all resulted in 

part from a structure of flexible requirements and minimal Federal 

oversight. Meanwhile, the Department of Labor has now approved 

more than 64,000 cases submitted to the Energy Employee Occupational Illness Program for radiation exposure, and has paid out 

more than $6.7 billion in compensation benefits. 

Chairman Turner, our Committee members and I are committed 

to the success of NNSA, the nuclear complex and its National Security mission. However, I fear that a nuclear accident, even a minor 

one, would have significant repercussions on the future of the nuclear weapons complex. That is a consequence that we would all 

like to avoid. 

Third, in an era of budget constraints, we must seek opportunities for improving efficiency across the complex, as required, for example, in section 3123 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, but also in terms of effective management. With $7.2 billion appropriated for weapons activities in FY12 and 

a $7.6 billion request for FY13, improving accountability and ensuring effective governance must be a priority. 

 Are there clear lines of authority? 
45 

 Does NNSA have sufficient subject matter expertise and consistent data necessary to effectively assess performance 

across the complex? 

 Is there sufficient accountability within NNSA and from the 

contractors at the labs? 

 Is the structure set up to incentivize savings, maximize investment in programmatic work, perform realistic cost assessments and planning to avoid cost escalation and schedule delays, set priorities, and enable competition? 

In this context, I would like to add that I am pleased that the 

Department of Energy recently decided to resume the practice of 

making performance evaluations of the labs public, increasing 

transparency and accountability. 

I look forward to the discussion today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

(171) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. 1) The NAS study committee said it had examined many previous 

reports and efforts to fix the management relationship. We’ve seen dozens of reports 

in the past two decades talking about the broken management structure, first between DOE and the labs, then between NNSA and the labs. What needs to happen 

to see real, concrete changes that address these recurring problems? Fundamentally, 

can this problem be fixed? What steps should Congress take? 

Dr. SHANK. 1) If we look back at the time when the Laboratories worked best we 

can see the elements for that success. First, we must acknowledge that we need the 

best minds that we can find to assure the Nation’s nuclear deterrent. The GOCO 

model has brought the skills and talents of Industry and Universities to partner 

with the Government to address the challenges that define the mission of the Laboratories. This partnership is fundamentally different than a Government contract 

to provide a service for a fee. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities is the key 

to making this partnership work. The Government defines what needs to be done, 

provides the funding and the oversight. The contractor provides the skills and capabilities that address how the work is to be done. When NNSA moves to highly prescriptive work assignments, it violates the partnering arrangement. Disputes between the NNSA and the Laboratories often go unresolved due to the sensitive nature of the work. In our report we proposed the formation of a committee of knowledgeable individuals to help resolve issues of roles, responsibilities and scientific 

conflict. 

I believe the problem can be fixed. First, Congress and the NNSA could take a 

major step in fixing this situation by clearly defining roles and responsibilities and 

maintaining an interest in how this is working in the Laboratories. Second, by moving to national standards, as described in the answer to Question 7 [Now Question 

99], much of the problem of trust and cost effect oversight of operations could be 

accomplished. 

Mr. TURNER. 2) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ with a broader mission set is well 

under way. The report says that expansion of the labs’ missions to new arenas ‘‘offers the prospect of increasing the Laboratories’ appeal to top-quality scientists and 

engineers while also serving important national security missions. Thus, the quality 

of science and engineering, being preconditioned on attracting high-quality people, 

depends in the long run on successfully making this transition to National Security 

Laboratories.’’ 

 Does the NAS believe the governance and management structure for the labs 

is set up to facilitate this expansion into new, non-nuclear work? How should 

it be changed to better enable this broader mission? 

 Does NAS believe expansion into these new work areas will cause the labs to 

‘‘take their eyes off the ball’’—distract them from their core mission of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile? 

 How does this ‘‘Work for Others’’ (the labs working on programs not directly related to the nuclear weapons mission) support or detract from the mission of 

nuclear stockpile stewardship? 

Dr. SHANK. 2) Our report clearly states that the core mission of these Laboratories 

is maintaining the nuclear deterrent. The complexity of this task has increased over 

the years. The Laboratories can no longer afford to maintain the full range of capabilities to execute this mission. At the same time the Laboratories have created a 

number of unique capabilities that can be quite useful in solving a broad range of 

national problems while maintaining the skill necessary to support the core mission. 

Each of the laboratory directors made a very clear statement that sustaining the 

nuclear weapons stockpile is the core mission and will remain so, even with the opportunity to work on other problems. Some of the Laboratories already have a significant portfolio of work for others that support the core mission. In a world of constrained resources, the broader national security work will be an essential part of 

supporting the core mission. 

Mr. TURNER. 3) Your National Academies of Science report says that the relationship between the labs and NNSA has strayed from the original intent of the labs 
172 

as federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC) that are operated 

through a ‘‘Government-owned, contractor-operated’’ model. Basically, while the letter of the model is still in place, the spirit and the intent of the model have been 

abandoned. Today, Federal employees are being very prescriptive on ‘‘how’’ the labs 

should carry out their work.  The National Academies implies that there are inefficiencies in this management approach, saying ‘‘this approach precludes taking full advantage of the intellectual and management skills that taxpayer dollars have purchased.’’ How 

should we address these inefficiencies? What should Congress do?  The FFRDC construct was created to allow the Federal Government to broadly 

determine ‘‘what’’ work needs to be done while the FFRDC (i.e., the lab) determines ‘‘how’’ to accomplish the work. Does NNSA’s current management and 

governance model for the labs operate in this fashion?  Federal Procurement Policy guidelines (OFPP Policy Letter 84–1) say that the 

Federal Government’s monitoring of FFRDC performance ‘‘shall not be as . . . 

to cause disruptions that are detrimental to the productivity and/or quality to 

the FFRDC’s work.’’ Does the NAS study group believe NNSA’s current management and governance model for the labs operates in the spirit and intent 

of the FFRDC model? Why or why not? 

Dr. SHANK. 3) I have addressed much of the answer to this question in Question 

14 [Now Question 1]. In our report, we point out that roles and responsibilities have 

deteriorated to the point that oversight and operations are blurred. In some cases 

detailed prescriptions on how to do the work are given to the Laboratories by the 

same people doing oversight. In our report, we made recommendations of how Congress could track and maintain a concern about this issue. 

Mr. TURNER. 4) The National Academies study group found ‘‘issues in transactional oversight of safety, business, security, and operations. Science and engineering quality is at risk when Laboratory scientists and engineers are not encouraged to bring forth their creative ideas in partnership with NNSA to solve problems 

vital to our national security.’’ Is the ‘‘transactional oversight of safety, business, security, and operations,’’ noted by the National Academies report needed? Is it adding 

value? Should it be reduced, or modified in some fashion? How? What should 

NNSA’s role be in governing the labs? What should the contractor’s role be? 

Dr. SHANK. 4) Oversight is an important responsibility of the NNSA. When public 

money is being spent, it is important that an oversight process be in place to give 

the public confidence that work is being done in an economical, safe and environmentally sound manner. In the paragraph below I have reproduced part of the answer to Question 7 [Now Question 99]. 

There is a small fraction of the work at the Laboratories where a failure would 

have a high consequence and therefore require a high degree of operational formality. The rest of the work looks like work done in a typical industrial environment. I believe that necessary oversight could be done in manner accomplished by 

other similar institutions. There are widely accepted systems and standards for 

overseeing safety, finance, human resources and facility operations. A straightforward approach would be for the Laboratories to qualify systems in each of the 

operational areas. Then, a vastly reduced number of people could audit the systems. 

A major barrier to accomplishing something like this is to realize that maintaining 

the current oversight apparatus in tact, which has been sized for transactional oversight, will prevent any of the advantages to ensue. Another concern is that a new 

approach needs to be created with the idea there will be failures in the future and 

that whatever system in place must be resilient to single point failures. 

In the above model, the role of the contractor is to assure the maintenance of 

auditable systems for laboratory operations and to partner with the NNSA to execute mission work where roles and responsibilities of the lab and NNSA oversight 

and program direction are clearly delineated. 

Mr. TURNER. 5) The NAS study committee recommends that ‘‘NNSA, Congress, 

and top management of the Laboratories recognize that safety and security systems 

at the Laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no longer need 

special attention. NNSA and Laboratory management should explore ways by which 

the administrative, safety, and security costs can be reduced, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential science and engineering activities.’’ What specific, concrete actions should Congress take to address this recommendation by the 

NAS? 

Dr. SHANK. 5) The improvement in operational performance is apparent for all the 

Laboratories although most dramatically at the Los Alamos Laboratory. The time 

has arrived where oversight can now move to a systems approach described in the 

answer to Question 7 [Now Question 99]. The benefits could be significant in terms 

of cost effectiveness and performance in accomplishing the mission. 
173 

Mr. TURNER. 6) Some current and former employees of the national labs have expressed concern to this committee that, since required by Congress in 2004, the labs 

are now managed to incentivize their managing and operating contractors with fee 

or profit motive—and that this is harming their ability to do world-class research 

and that the labs have shifted away from their original public service culture and 

motivation. But the National Academies report finds that the bureaucratic frustrations that are affecting all levels within the labs, ‘‘are not traceable to the M&O 

contractor or the contracts themselves,’’ and found that the lab directors’ ‘‘primary 

objective remains to manage the Laboratories in the public interest.’’ 

 Does the National Academies study committee believe that the labs can do public service-oriented, world-class research under their current governance-, contract-, and fee-structure? Does the study committee recommend any changes in 

the contracting approach? 

 Do the lab directors need to communicate their public service motivations more 

clearly and consistently to lab employees? Is this a communications and leadership problem, or something deeper? 

 Are such sentiments—that the for-profit motive is harming the labs—pervasive 

throughout the workforce at the labs, or do strong public service sentiments still 

exist? 

Dr. SHANK. 6) Our committee took the issue of private versus public contractors 

and the influence of increased fee following the Congressional action in 2004 very 

seriously. We sought out and listened to current and former employees of the Laboratories. One lab, Sandia has been managed by a private entity since its inception. 

The other two labs are now run by LLC’s. Other than increased fee, the pre and 

post 2004 contracts are very nearly the same. We asked the NNSA if the increased 

fee drove behavior in a way the public interest was at risk. The answer was no. We 

asked the laboratory directors whether fee drove their management decisions and 

they emphatically said no. We looked at turnover of the laboratory population and 

found that it is about 4% annually and that is unchanged before and after 2004. 

We talked with all levels of management and bench scientists to determine whether 

specific concerns could be traced to the contract change. We could find none. We did 

find the formation of the LLC cost each of the labs about $100 million dollars. We 

did find that at about the same time that the contracts changed there were modifications to the benefits of all the Laboratories including the LLC managed labs. We 

found that in the case of Livermore there was a budget reduction that resulted in 

layoffs. We asked concerned laboratory staff members to help us to identify and 

quantify specific issues arriving from the new contracting paradigm to form a basis 

for commenting on the contract changes. We were unable to obtain verifiable information to guide us. We made a comment in our report that the issue of acting in 

the public interest is so important that although we were not able to identify problems, constant vigilance will be required going into the future. 

Mr. TURNER. 7) The NAS study committee said it had examined many previous 

reports and efforts to fix the management relationship. We’ve seen dozens of reports 

in the past two decades talking about the broken management structure, first between DOE and the labs, then between NNSA and the labs. What needs to happen 

to see real, concrete changes that address these recurring problems? Fundamentally, 

can this problem be fixed? What steps should Congress take? 

Dr. CURTIS. 7) The Subcommittee is correct that the management structure/governance of the laboratories is badly broken and that there is a long series of reports 

that have documented this circumstance. Unfortunately, there are no easy corrections to the problem. Fundamentally, we believe that the difficulty arises from an 

erosion of trust on both sides of the contractual relationship between the laboratories and the laboratories’ overseers. To fix this situation will require time and a 

lot of hard work and dedication of all parties. A fundamental rebalancing of responsibilities is required and a greater investment must be made in laboratory management latitude and discretion. 

The Congress needs to be committed to this undertaking and should sustain the 

effort through structured annual hearings which examine the progress that has 

been made and the steps planned for the future. Only through this effort will the 

public trust be maintained and progress assured. 

Mr. TURNER. 8) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ with a broader mission set is well 

under way. The report says that expansion of the labs’ missions to new arenas ‘‘offers the prospect of increasing the Laboratories’ appeal to top-quality scientists and 

engineers while also serving important national security missions. Thus, the quality 

of science and engineering, being preconditioned on attracting high-quality people, 
174 

depends in the long run on successfully making this transition to National Security 

Laboratories.’’  Does the NAS believe the governance and management structure for the labs 

is set up to facilitate this expansion into new, non-nuclear work? How should 

it be changed to better enable this broader mission?  Does NAS believe expansion into these new work areas will cause the labs to 

‘‘take their eyes off the ball’’—distract them from their core mission of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile?  How does this ‘‘Work for Others’’ (the labs working on programs not directly related to the nuclear weapons mission) support or detract from the mission of 

nuclear stockpile stewardship? 

Dr. CURTIS. 8) The evolution of the laboratories to ‘‘National Security laboratories’’ 

is an extremely important development. The Committee strongly supports this evolution, but it recognizes that these laboratories must maintain their essential focus 

on the core mission of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile. At present, we believe that the three laboratories are committed to this core mission and correctly 

see the evolution to a broader concept of National Security service as contributing 

strongly to their ability to execute their core mission responsibility to assure the 

safety, security and effectiveness of our Nation’s nuclear deterrent. There is, of 

course, a risk here that the laboratories might lose focus and become mere contracting entities to various Departments and Agencies. We believe that existing 

NNSA management and the laboratories have done a good job to guard against this 

risk. The current structured collaboration among NNSA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence 

provide an important safeguard against any potential loss of focus. 

Mr. TURNER. 9) Your National Academies of Science report says that the relationship between the labs and NNSA has strayed from the original intent of the labs 

as federally funded research and development corporations (FFRDC) that are operated through a ‘‘government-owned, contractor-operated’’ model. Basically, while the 

letter of the model is still in place, the spirit and the intent of the model have been 

abandoned. Today, Federal employees are being very prescriptive on ‘‘how’’ the labs 

should carry out their work.  The National Academies implies that there are inefficiencies in this management approach, saying ‘‘this approach precludes taking full advantage of the intellectual and management skills that taxpayer dollars have purchased.’’ How 

should we address these inefficiencies? What should Congress do?  The FFRDC construct was created to allow the Federal Government to broadly 

determine ‘‘what’’ work needs to be done while the FFRDC (i.e., the lab) determines ‘‘how’’ to accomplish the work. Does NNSA’s current management and 

governance model for the labs operate in this fashion?  Federal Procurement Policy guidelines (OFPP Policy Letter 84-1) say that the 

Federal Government’s monitoring of FFRDC performance ‘‘shall not be as . . . to 

cause disruptions that are detrimental to the productivity and/or quality to the 

FFRDC’s work.’’ Does the NAS study group believe NNSA’s current management and governance model for the labs operates in the spirit and intent of the 

FFRDC model? Why or why not? 

Dr. CURTIS. 9) Over time, the original ‘‘government-owned, contractor-operated’’ 

model has eroded, shifting more of the operational responsibility to Government 

overseers. The fragmentation of responsibility has also resulted in a fragmentation 

of authority and a lessening of reliance on laboratory management. This is not a 

healthy or cost-effective circumstance. We believe a considerable effort should be undertaken to rebalance the governance system to draw clear boundaries of responsibility and to invest clearer managerial latitude in laboratory managers. We also 

want to emphasize that we believe this can be done, indeed it must be done, while 

maintaining high standards of environmental, safety, and security responsibility for 

the work of the laboratories and while assuring their fiscal integrity. We are not 

arguing in any way for a lessening of these primary public responsibilities. The Congress’ role in this matter is to state clearly that it wishes this rebalancing to occur 

and that it will invest its time and its energies to assure that it is done and that 

it is done well. 

Mr. TURNER. 10) The National Academies study group found ‘‘issues in transactional oversight of safety, business, security, and operations. Science and engineering quality is at risk when Laboratory scientists and engineers are not encouraged to bring forth their creative ideas in partnership with NNSA to solve problems 

vital to our national security.’’ Is the ‘‘transactional oversight of safety, business, security, and operations,’’ noted by the National Academies report needed? Is it adding 

value? Should it be reduced, or modified in some fashion? How? What should 

NNSA’s role be in governing the labs? What should the contractor’s role be? 
175 

Dr. CURTIS. 10) We believe ‘‘transactional oversight of safety, business, security 

and operations’’ is needed and adds value. Our point is that it is out of kilter and 

requires rebalancing which will migrate some greater latitude and responsibility to 

laboratory managers and reduce some of the prescriptive requirements of Government overseers. By placing greater management authority in the laboratories, it will 

be possible to insist on greater management responsibility in the laboratories and,in 

the end, necessary transactional oversight of safety, business, security and operations should actually improve and add greater value. 

Mr. TURNER. 11) The NAS study committee recommends that ‘‘NNSA, Congress, 

and top management of the Laboratories recognize that safety and security systems 

at the Laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no longer need 

special attention. NNSA and Laboratory management should explore ways by which 

the administrative, safety, and security costs can be reduced, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential science and engineering activities.’’ What specific, concrete actions should Congress take to address this recommendation by the 

NAS? 

Dr. CURTIS. 11) The Committee concluded that the ‘‘current contract and fee 

structure’’ has not been shown to impair the work of the laboratories, although we 

recognize that the potential exists. We do believe, however,that the ‘‘system of governance’’ demonstrably puts at risk the laboratories’ ability to provide high quality 

science and engineering and, over time, will surely erode mission accomplishment. 

This is not a problem of communication or leadership. Rather, it is a manifestation 

of a governance system that has relied increasingly on operational formality to assure safety and environmental responsibility, security and fiscal integrity. We found 

that the workforce at the laboratories remains strongly committed to their public 

service duties. However, there is an undercurrent of concern with their ability to 

do experimental work and a concern that oversight of the laboratories by the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Government Accounting Office, the Congress, and 

the management of the laboratories themselves is inclined to be risk-averse at the 

cost of science and engineering quality and innovation. The Committee shares that 

concern and, for this reason, has recommended a concerted effort be undertaken to 

rebalance the governance relationship to remove unnecessary operational formality 

and rebuild trust among the various parties. We believe this rebalancing can and 

must take place while maintaining high standards of safety, environmental control, 

security and fiscal integrity. 

This will take an effort by the Congress as well. We have suggested structured 

oversight of the process of rebalancing of the governance relationship. This is hard 

work and it will take time. It will add to the burdens of the Subcommittee. But the 

efforts must be made; the stakes are very high. 

Much more than cost efficiency is involved. These laboratories are national assets 

of great importance to the future and the security of our Nation. Preserving the excellence of science and engineering quality at the laboratories should be the enduring focus of this rebalancing effort and the oversight required to make it sustaining 

and successful. 

Mr. TURNER. 12) Some current and former employees of the national labs have 

expressed concern to this committee that, since required by Congress in 2004, the 

labs are now managed to incentivize their managing and operating contractors with 

fee or profit motive—and that this is harming their ability to do world-class research and that the labs have shifted away from their original public service culture 

and motivation. But the National Academies report finds that the bureaucratic frustrations that are affecting all levels within the labs, ‘‘are not traceable to the M&O 

contractor or the contracts themselves,’’ and found that the lab directors’ ‘‘primary 

objective remains to manage the Laboratories in the public interest.’’ 

 Does the National Academies study committee believe that the labs can do public service-oriented, world-class research under their current governance-, contract-, and fee-structure? Does the study committee recommend any changes in 

the contracting approach? 

 Do the lab directors need to communicate their public service motivations more 

clearly and consistently to lab employees? Is this a communications and leadership problem, or something deeper? 

 Are such sentiments—that the for-profit motive is harming the labs—pervasive 

throughout the workforce at the labs, or do strong public service sentiments still 

exist? 

Dr. CURTIS. 12) See answer for Question 21 [Now Question 11]. 
176 

1GAO, Department of Energy: Additional Opportunities Exist to Streamline Support Functions 

at NNSA and Office of Science Sites, GAO–12–255 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2012). 2GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies Needed to Improve Security 

and Management Oversight, GAO–08–694 (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008). 3GAO, Nuclear Security: Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained, GAO–09–321 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2009). 4GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Management of the Nation’s Nuclear Programs, GAO–07–36 (Washington, D.C.: Jan 19, 2007). 5GAO, National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on NNSA’s Management and 

Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, GAO–12–473 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2012). 

Mr. TURNER. 13) In your January 31, 2012, report, GAO says: ‘‘In fiscal years 

2007 through 2009, total support costs for NNSA and [DOE Office of] Science sites 

grew from $5 billion to about $5.5 billion (nominal dollars).’’  With GAO having noted the poor quality of NNSA’s cost data, does GAO believe 

that NNSA can fully justify this growth in support and overhead costs?  How much cost savings does GAO estimate could be realized by implementing 

consistent and accurate data across the enterprise?  Does GAO believe this growth in support and overhead costs could be attributed 

to the problems and inefficiencies identified by the National Academies report, 

such as transactional-level oversight of business systems?  What could Congress do to address GAO’s concerns in this area? 

Mr. ALOISE. 13) NNSA’s oversight of sites’ support costs is limited by its data. Because contractors that manage and operate DOE sites classify incurred costs differently from one another (as direct or indirect costs), DOE has long attempted to 

collect comparable data on its sites’ support costs. As we reported in January 31, 

2012, however, DOE’s data for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 may be appropriate 

for understanding sites’ aggregate support function costs but not for comparing the 

costs of individual support functions at sites (e.g., site security, human resources, 

facility maintenance, etc.). As a result, NNSA’s ability to explain apparent trends 

in its sites’ support costs in those years is limited. Changes beginning in 2010 to 

DOE’s data collection approach could eventually improve the quality and usefulness 

of the data. But as we recommended, DOE needs to fully implement a quality control system to ensure it has complete and comparable cost data going forward. Congress could help ensure that DOE is implementing peer reviews or other quality 

control steps and—to help maximize the usefulness of the data—continuing to collect data on both the direct and indirect support function costs at its sites.1

We have not examined the potential cost savings from having consistent and accurate support cost data nor have we examined whether NNSA’s approach to overseeing its contractors has contributed to growth in its sites’ support cost. 

Mr. TURNER. 14) Would GAO be comfortable with an oversight model whereby 

NNSA sets auditable performance standards for the labs, audits to those standards 

once a year, and then holds the contractor accountable for not meeting the standards? Basically, a performance- or outcome-based oversight model rather than the 

current transactional-oversight model? 

Mr. ALOISE. 14) We are supportive of NNSA’s moves toward a more performancebased approach to oversight. For example, in our review of security at Los Alamos 

National Laboratory we recommended that the Administrator of NNSA provide 

meaningful financial incentives in future performance evaluation plans for implementation of this comprehensive strategic plan for laboratory security.2 We similarly recommended providing financial incentives to LLNL’s contractor to sustain security performance improvements.3 However, in our view, effectively evaluating performance, as opposed to compliance or transactions, is likely to be more demanding, 

will require skilled personnel, and needs to be done more than once a year. More 

specifically, our past work has found issues with NNSA’s oversight of security to include staffing shortages at NNSA site offices, inadequate security staff training, and 

lack of comprehensive security data. This has hampered the agency’s understanding 

of the overall effectiveness of its security program.4

We have made similar findings regarding NNSA’s project management. While noting recent actions, we believe that DOE needs to ensure that NNSA has the capacity—that is, the people and other resources—to resolve its project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective measures. This is particularly important 

as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise.5

Mr. TURNER. 15) In its 2007 report, GAO said ‘‘management problems continue, 

in part, because NNSA and DOE have not fully agreed on how NNSA should function within the department as a separately organized agency. This lack of agree-
177 

6GAO–07–36. 

ment has resulted in organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations.’’  Does GAO believe NNSA and DOE have agreed upon—and implemented—a coherent and rational management structure for how NNSA should function within DOE as a ‘‘semi-autonomous’’ agency, as was intended by the NNSA Act?  Does GAO agree with the Strategic Posture Commission, the Stimson Center, 

and others that NNSA is still too tightly integrated with DOE, and the semiautonomy of the NNSA Act was never achieved? 

Mr. ALOISE. 15) GAO last formally audited NNSA’s relationship with DOE in 

2007.6 At that time, we found that NNSA had focused considerable attention on reorganizing its internal operations, but it and DOE continued to struggle with establishing how NNSA should operate as a separately organized agency within the department. Two factors contributed to this situation. First, DOE and NNSA did not 

have a useful model to follow for establishing a separately organized agency in 

DOE. Second, the January 2000 NNSA implementation plan, required by the NNSA 

Act, did not define how NNSA would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. As a result, although some NNSA programs have set up procedures for 

interacting with DOE, other programs have not, resulting in organizational conflict. 

Even where formal procedures have been developed, interpersonal disagreements 

have hindered effective cooperation. 

We recommended that, to ensure that NNSA functions as a separately organized 

agency, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA, should clearly define 

NNSA’s status as a separately organized agency within the department. In his 31 

USC Section 720 response to our report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy stated that 

he did not concur with this recommendation. He stated that elements of the Department and the NNSA had executed memoranda of understanding specifying how certain Department-wide functions would be performed while respecting the statutory 

insulation of NNSA personnel. He also stated that the Department will consider 

issuing circumstance-specific guidance where required to correct misperceptions 

about the effect of the NNSA’s act limitations. Since we received the letter, there 

have been instances where the DOE/NNSA relationship has become less clear. For 

example, DOE recently announced that DOE’s Environmental Management program 

will begin to report to NNSA Administrator, who simultaneously is an Under Secretary for Energy. As a result, we have left this recommendation open and still believe that further clarification of the NNSA–DOE relationship is needed. 

Mr. TURNER. 16) GAO has criticized NNSA’s cost-estimating techniques, particularly with regard to several large, multibillion dollar construction programs NNSA 

is carrying out.  Does GAO believe NNSA’s approach of waiting to baseline costs until a design 

is 90% complete is the best approach?  What are the key reasons for NNSA’s poor record of cost and schedule overruns?  What should NNSA change to improve its cost-estimation approach? 

Mr. ALOISE. 16) NNSA remains on our high-risk list and remains vulnerable to 

fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE has recently taken a number of actions to improve management of major projects, including those overseen by NNSA. 

For example, DOE has updated program and project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess 

project risks, and better ensure project reviews that are timely, useful and identify 

problems early. Although DOE’s responses to our recommendations and its own 

findings have been largely positive, and a number of corrective actions have been 

taken, problems persist as demonstrated by a number of our recent reports which 

are summarized in our February 2012 testimony. However, DOE needs to ensure 

that NNSA has the capacity—that is, the people and other resources—to resolve its 

project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its corrective measures. This 

is particularly important as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. 

In 2010, NNSA announced that project baseline cost and schedule will not be finalized until the total project achieves 90 percent design maturity. NNSA also announced that subproject activities such as advanced procurement and road and utility relocations will begin only when those individual subprojects each achieve 90 

percent design maturity and baseline approval. 

We have not evaluated this policy change but it is at least partly in line with a 

previous GAO recommendation. More specifically, in April 2006, we recommended 

that a DOE major facility design or facility component design have reached at least 
178 

7GAO, Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management Problems Have Led 

to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety Concerns, GAO–06–602T (Washington, D.C., 

Apr 6, 2006). 8GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: New Plutonium Research Facility at Los 

Alamos May Not Meet All Mission Needs, GAO–12–337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar 26, 2012). 

90 percent completion and that technical and safety problems have been satisfactorily addressed before restarting construction.7 We also recommended other management actions to help ensure that the new project baseline will be reliable and 

that controls and accountability are such that contractors will safely and effectively 

complete the project. This recommendation, we note, is consistent with nuclear industry construction guidelines and take a more conservative approach to design and 

construction activities. Having said this, we believe that cost estimation is largely 

a continuous process that involves having a baseline cost estimate in place early 

with a risk adjustment to account for changes in design that will happen until the 

90% design complete level is obtained. We believe that NNSA’s application of 90 

percent design maturity may need to be reviewed for its projects that have prolonged and/or expensive design phases. 

We have recently noted some progress in NNSA’s development of cost estimates, 

finding in March 2012 that the cost estimates for a recently deferred NNSA facility 

were generally well prepared.8 Despite this progress, we still note some weaknesses. 

For example, a high-quality schedule requires a schedule risk analysis that incorporates known risks to predict the level of confidence in meeting a project’s completion date and the amount of contingency time needed to cover unexpected delays. 

Project officials identified hundreds of risks to the project, but we found that these 

risks were not used in preparing a schedule risk analysis. As a result of these weaknesses, we continue to believe that NNSA cannot be fully confident, once it decides 

to resume the project, that the project will be completed on time and within estimated costs. 

Mr. TURNER. 17) The current National Academies report, the 1999 Chiles Commission, and the Strategic Posture Commission have all cited an ability to attract 

and retain world-class scientists and engineers as the critical foundation for having 

a world-class lab.  Do you believe the labs are able to attract world-class personnel today? What 

attracts such people and makes them want to stay?  Have we seen any loss of world-class people already?  How does having modern facilities, labs, and infrastructure play into the labs’ 

ability to attract and retain world-class scientists and engineers? Do you have 

any worries in this regard? Would you care to comment on the recent cancellation of CMRR, and how that will affect the ability of the nuclear security enterprise—and Los Alamos in particular—to both attract and retain world-class plutonium scientists? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 17) The heart of any organization is its people. Understanding nuclear weapons requires a broad, diverse and deep set of scientific and engineering 

skills—such a workforce of world-class scientists and engineers has been the critical 

foundation for the unprecedented successes of these laboratories over many decades. 

World-class personnel are attracted and retained because of a sustained mission 

of national importance, a work environment that fosters innovation and creativity, 

and the availability of tools, facilities and resources that are also world-class. 

As I stated in my testimony before your subcommittee on February 16, 2012, ‘‘An 

aversion to risk and a deterioration of trust, increases in transactional oversight and 

in unfunded requirements, combined with an uncertain policy direction and unstable budget outlook hurt the ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to attract, develop, and retain the best technical staff available. It is very difficult to convince 

top-quality technical staff to join an organization where they are told how to do 

their work and left wondering if there is going to be an opportunity to discover and 

innovate. This has already resulted in the loss of some of the best mid-career scientists from the Laboratories.’’ The increased engagement of members of the local 

NNSA Site Offices in the day-to-day decisionmaking processes of the Laboratory 

(transactional oversight) directly contributes to the frustrations and disenchantment 

of the technical staff. 

The Administration’s budget proposal regarding CMRR certainly affects the morale of laboratory scientists and engineers, especially those working in the field of 

plutonium science. Since the country’s expertise in this field largely resides at Los 

Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, the lack of a safe, modern, world-class facility for 

plutonium science puts our national capability at risk. 

Mr. TURNER. 18) As I noted in my opening statement, in 2009 a Stimson Center 

report said: ‘‘the implementation of the NNSA Act failed to achieve the intended au-
179 

tonomy for NNSA within the Department of Energy. The Labs now must operate 

within a complicated set of bureaucratic relationships with both DOE and NNSA. 

An excessively bureaucratic DOE culture has infiltrated NNSA as well.’’ Also in 

2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said that, ‘‘the original intent of the legislation creating the NNSA has not been realized. The desired autonomy has not come 

into being.’’  Do you believe the intent of the NNSA Act has been implemented? In other 

words, is NNSA truly semi-autonomous from DOE?  Do you believe the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority between DOE 

and NNSA are clear?  What should Congress do to address this? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 18) The NNSA is not in practice a semi-autonomous organization 

within the Department of Energy. The roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority 

are not clear, often leading to inefficiency and ineffectiveness. It is often not clear 

who can actually make a decision but many can keep a decision from being made. 

There have been many assessments that have recommended changes to improve 

the efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA as noted in many of your questions. They 

range from making improvements within the existing structure (I made four such 

recommendations in my testimony before this subcommittee) to starting over with 

NNSA reconstituted as an entirely new independent agency. At a minimum Congress should implement improvements like those below that should put the Enterprise on a better path:  Reduce indirect costs of the Enterprise through oversight of outcomes rather 

than oversight of activities. The existing accountability mechanisms available in 

the current contracts are more than adequate.  Accompany this with cuts in budget/people engaged in oversight and indirect activities starting with the Federal workforce.  Strengthen the balance across mission delivery and operations. New requirements or interpretations of existing ones (by internal or external organizations) 

must be coupled with a cost-benefit analysis.  Reduce the number of congressional budget control levels to increase flexibility 

in execution at the NNSA sites. 

The simplest first step could be eliminating duplicative overhead functions between NNSA and DOE and reducing the staff at the site offices (a good target would 

be a 1-to-100 ratio of Federal to permanent contractor workforce at each site). These 

cost savings should then be reapplied back into the laboratories for programmatic 

activities. 

However, like many others I fear that the record of many unsuccessful efforts by 

well-meaning people within NNSA and DOE over the last decade suggests that it 

is time for a new approach. Reconstituting NNSA as an independent agency may 

be necessary, IF it is structured in a way that the national security leadership, Administration, and Congress all agree on and can successfully implement. 

Mr. TURNER. 19) The 2009 Stimson Center report and the Strategic Posture Commission both concluded that major reform of NNSA was needed. Both groups recommended making NNSA fully independent from DOE. In his statement for the 

record for this hearing, Ambassador Linton Brooks, the former head of NNSA, says 

that major reform is now needed again. Ambassador Brooks says that the Strategic 

Posture Commission concluded that the current governance structure of NNSA ‘‘cannot be effective in the long term. The record of recent years points to no other conclusion.’’ On this conclusion, Ambassador Brooks said: ‘‘I agree. The current ‘semiautonomous’ structure has proven to be too dependent on the personalities of DOE 

and NNSA leadership to be consistently reliable and effective . . . ’’ On whether 

Congress should revisit the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendation to 

make NNSA a wholly independent agency, Brooks says: ‘‘My answer is yes. The 

present system has been tried for a decade by dedicated, hard-working and competent civil servants. It has not lived up to the Nation’s hopes. We can do better.’’ 

 Do you agree with Ambassador Brooks? Do you believe such large-scale change 

is again needed? Why or why not? 

 Would such organizational change fix all of the issues identified by the NAS report, the Strategic Posture Commission, the Stimson Center report, and the 

myriad other reports? In addition to organizational change, what else would 

need to be done to address these problems? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 19) I agree change is required. I would go beyond Ambassador’s 

statement that ‘‘We can do better’’ and say that we must do better. We are facing 

a crisis both in our ability to execute the mission in the near term and in our ability 

to enable success over the long term. 

We can work through the challenges of large-scale change—reconstituting NNSA 

as an independent agency—IF it is structured in a way that the national security 
180 

leadership, Administration, and Congress all agree and can/do successfully implement. 

Any such ambitious change must be accompanied by leadership of the new organization that is committed to the goals of the change and who is empowered to pick 

the Federal workforce and processes they deem necessary to make it happen. 

Mr. TURNER. 20) The NAS study committee recommended that NNSA ‘‘purposely 

free directors to establish strategic science and engineering direction at the Laboratories.’’ What concrete actions would you recommend NNSA and Congress take to 

‘‘free [lab] directors to establish strategic science and engineering direction at the 

labs?’’ 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 20) Establishing the strategic science and engineering direction 

for the lab is one of the most important roles, and a unique role, for the Laboratory 

Director. In my experience of over 9 years as Director at LLNL and LANL it became 

increasing difficult to focus on that role. 

Freeing the lab directors from the minutiae and tactical imperatives of the current practices and behaviors of NNSA would allow for greater focus on strategic 

issues. Implementing the recommendations that I included in my testimony before 

this subcommittee would help. Specifically, the first three recommendations will free 

up the directors:  Reduce indirect costs of the Enterprise through oversight of outcomes rather 

than oversight of activities. The existing accountability mechanisms available in 

the current contracts are more than adequate. 

 Accompany this with cuts in budget/people engaged in oversight and indirect activities starting with the Federal workforce. 

 Strengthen the balance across mission delivery and operations. New requirements or interpretations of existing ones (by internal or external organizations) 

must be coupled with a cost-benefit analysis. 

In addition, the fourth recommendation— 

 Reduce the number of congressional budget control levels to increase flexibility 

in execution at the NNSA sites. 

—will allow more flexible decisions on the funding of emerging scientific and engineering strategic directions. There are two other congressional actions that are also 

key to the strategic health of science and engineering at the labs: 

 Strongly endorse the continuation of Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) at current funding levels 

 Streamline the processes for funding of the labs by national security elements 

other than NNSA (Work for Others). 

Mr. TURNER. 21) Do you agree with the NAS study committee’s recommendation 

to ‘‘rebalance the relationship and the set of principles laying out the boundaries 

and roles of each management structure’’ and memorialize such principles and relationships ‘‘in memoranda of understanding between NNSA and its Laboratories’’? 

What principles of the relationship between NNSA and the labs would you suggest 

be included in such an agreement? What would be a potential enforcement mechanism for such memoranda of understanding? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 21) While I support the recommendation to ‘‘rebalance the relationship and the set of principles laying out the boundaries and roles of each management structure,’’ I do not believe that the idea of an MOU between the Laboratories and NNSA by itself will be effective. I do not see a way to enforce the implementation of such an agreement nor do I see this as resulting in modified behaviors. 

The last decade of effort to structure NNSA led me to believe that we are beyond 

the point where a written agreement, even if it could be agreed to, would have a 

significant positive impact. 

Mr. TURNER. 22) In May 2011, the National Laboratories Directors Council sent 

a paper to Secretary of Energy Chu—at his request—on ‘‘Prioritization of Burdensome Policies and Practices.’’ This paper outlined, from the perspective of the lab 

directors, specific ways DOE could reduce burdensome management policies and 

practices that hamper the ability of the labs to execute their mission. 

 Has DOE been responsive to the recommendations in this paper? Has progress 

been made? Why or why not? 

 Secretary Chu asked for and received similar input from the directors of the national labs in April 2009. Has DOE been responsive to that input? 

 Why do you think we need to continually revisit this same issue every few 

years? Have the recommendations changed over the years? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 22) I cannot comment on DOE actions after my retirement as 

LANL director in May 2011. 

While important, the elimination of burdensome policies and practices is not the 

key issue. Rather it is how those policies and practices are interpreted (and by 
181 

whom) and the consistency of this interpretation over time and across different levels within and across DOE. 

Until there is alignment of the Federal workforce from the Secretary to the newest employee across all elements of the Department as to performance expectations 

for the Laboratories, this will continue to be an unresolved source of ineffectiveness 

and inefficiency. 

Mr. TURNER. 23) Going back to the early 1990s—to the Galvin Commission and 

before—there have been dozens of national commissions, studies, and reports recommending significant reform to the way DOE and NNSA govern and manage the 

labs. Many leaders in NNSA and DOE have tried to carry out reforms, streamlining 

efforts, and initiatives to reduce burdensome policies and practices. But, today, the 

NAS report still finds major problems with the governance and management structure NNSA uses for the labs. Why aren’t we making any progress in improving the 

governance and management structure for the labs? Are these recurring problems 

affecting morale at the labs? Are they impacting the quality of the science and engineering? Are they impacting the labs’ ability to attract and retain world-class people? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 23) The major problems are not a result of the management structure per se, rather the practices (e.g., oversight of activities instead of outcomes) and 

risk-averse behaviors of the bureaucracy. The persistence of these problems continuously degrades the morale and ability to attract and retain world-class scientists 

and engineers. 

The simplest way to frame the path to improvement is to get the bureaucracy out 

of the way and let the M&O contractors do the job they have been chosen to do— 

have the NNSA set the goals for the M&Os to meet, let the M&Os find the best 

way to achieve that, and then hold them accountable for success. 

Mr. TURNER. 24) The NAS study committee identifies a loss of trust between the 

NNSA and its labs as a key problem that is contributing to a poor management relationship and burdensome oversight policies and practices. The NAS report identifies this loss of trust for increased risk aversion at NNSA, which discourages the 

labs from conducting real-world experiments. Do you agree? What is the impact on 

the quality of the science and engineering at the labs—and the labs’ ability to execute their missions—if risk aversion leads to fewer and fewer experiments? Do you 

believe the sustainment of our nuclear deterrent might be at risk because of the 

safety requirements that lead to risk aversion and fewer experiments? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 24) As I said in my testimony before this subcommittee, ‘‘. . . because of the large number of external entities peering into NNSA and its inner 

workings, with disproportionate attention relative to that seen in other parts of the 

Government, a significant risk aversion has developed within the bureaucracy at 

NNSA. This risk aversion has manifested itself in a growing focus on compliance 

at the expense of delivering the mission.’’ 

The burdens of this growing focus on compliance, and concomitant transactional 

oversight, falls most heavily on experimental activities, especially those that are 

classified, involve high explosives, and/or nuclear materials—just those most important to the labs’ mission. These burdens drive up the costs and lengthen the timeframe for execution of experiments, limiting the number that can be accomplished. 

In addition, these burdens can discourage some from even trying to do experiments. 

With less experimental data available, the risk in the conclusions that are drawn 

increases significantly. 

Mr. TURNER. 25) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ is well under way, and that this will 

enable an expansion of the labs’ work solving national security problems for many 

different Federal agencies. Within NNSA, this is called ‘‘work for others,’’ or ‘‘WFO.’’ 

The NAS notes that this evolution is critical to the future vitality of the labs. 

 Does the current governance and management structure facilitate or impede 

WFO work at the labs? 

 What steps could Congress take to make WFO work easier, more efficient, and 

more effective? 

 Do you believe the labs can continue to expand their WFO work and not be distracted from their core mission of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile? As 

lab directors, how did you ensure this continued focus while also broadening the 

work conducted at the labs? 

 In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said the President, ‘‘should assign 

formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories.’’ Do you agree? How would such a structure operate—how should it be designed? 
182 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 25) The WFO activities at the laboratories have been very important for the health and vitality of the science and engineering. These activities 

stress the science and engineering in different ways, driving advancements that 

benefit the core nuclear weapons mission. At the same time they are an invaluable 

tool to attract and retain a world-class workforce. I am very concerned that the current processes that bring this type of work activities to the labs are not functioning 

smoothly. NNSA feels responsible that the WFO activities do not conflict with the 

core mission, for how those activities are executed, that the funding is well managed, and that there are no legacy issues at the conclusion of the activities. The end 

result is that the processes to address these concerns inordinately slow things down 

at every step and are repeated for every potential WFO project. Funding allocations 

are delayed and squabbles about the appropriateness of any activity not directly 

funded by NNSA arise. This can discourage the sponsor agency from considering 

such work in the future to the detriment of the sponsor and the lab. One approach 

to addressing this problem was offered by the Stimson Center report, where umbrella agreements would be put in place between NNSA and each of the other national security agencies that spell out for activities that meet certain requirements 

how they would be carried out. No further approvals would be needed unless they 

do not meet the requirements. This would greatly streamline WFO. 

There would be value in the recommendation of the Congressional Commission of 

involving the other cabinet agencies (and the IC) in the health and vitality of the 

labs’ science and engineering capabilities. An annual review for that group that 

identifies gaps, especially gaps in long-term capabilities relevant to those agencies’ 

mission, and develops plans with the labs to address those gaps would benefit all. 

Mr. TURNER. 26) The labs are operated as federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). The FFRDC construct was created to allow the Federal 

Government to broadly determine ‘‘what’’ work needed to be done while the FFRDC 

determines ‘‘how’’ to accomplish the work. Federal Procurement Policy guidelines 

(OFPP Policy Letter 84–1) say that the Federal Government’s monitoring of FFRDC 

performance ‘‘shall not be as . . . to cause disruptions that are detrimental to the 

productivity and/or quality to the FFRDC’s work.’’ 

 Do you believe NNSA’s current management and governance model for the labs 

operates in the spirit and intent of the FFRDC model? Why or why not? 

 What might Congress do to ensure the FFRDC model is robust and executed 

appropriately? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 26) As I have mentioned earlier, the FFRDC model is not functioning as it was intended. The FFRDC model envisioned an approach where the 

Federal agency selects a contractor with the expertise to execute the mission (an 

expertise not generally available in the Federal Government), provides direction on 

what is to be accomplished, trusts the M&O to manage the work, and holds them 

accountable that it was accomplished. This is not the relationship that is in place 

today between NNSA and the laboratories, rather it is a relationship that is detrimental to the productivity and/or quality of the FFRDC’s work. 

I have previously made a number of recommendations for Congress in my testimony before this subcommittee and in the answer to previous questions for the 

record that can improve the current situation. 

Mr. TURNER. 27) The current National Academies report, the 1999 Chiles Commission, and the Strategic Posture Commission have all cited an ability to attract 

and retain world-class scientists and engineers as the critical foundation for having 

a world-class lab. 

 Do you believe the labs are able to attract world-class personnel today? What 

attracts such people and makes them want to stay? 

 Have we seen any loss of world-class people already? 

 How does having modern facilities, labs, and infrastructure play into the labs’ 

ability to attract and retain world-class scientists and engineers? Do you have 

any worries in this regard? Would you care to comment on the recent cancellation of CMRR, and how that will affect the ability of the nuclear security enterprise—and Los Alamos in particular—to both attract and retain world-class plutonium scientists? 

Dr. MILLER. 27) The most important factor in attracting and retaining world-class 

scientist is the opportunity the Laboratory offers to engage in cutting-edge science 

and technology directed at meeting important national needs. Service to the Nation 

is a shared value that permeates the Laboratory. 

Overall, I believe that we remain able to attract and retain quality people. Our 

retention rate remains high and, for example, the number of post-doctoral fellows 

at Livermore is more than 200, nearly double the number compared to 2 years ago. 

The Laboratory’s post-doctoral fellow program is an important pipeline for new em-
183 

ployees. While the overall statistics are good, there is some anecdotal evidence that 

we are losing a few of our very best people and that others are open to recruitment 

from outside the Laboratory. This is particularly true for some highly sought after, 

specialized skills like computer science and cybersecurity. 

One key concern about attracting and retaining top-notch talent is program stability. Vagaries about future budgets impact people’s thinking about long-term careers at an institution. The laboratories would greatly benefit from a clear and consistent message from successive administrations and congresses that the work of the 

Laboratory is important, together with stable funding. 

Another factor that aided in employee retention in the past was the defined benefit program that was offered when the University of California managed LLNL. 

The retirement system tended to lock employees into the Laboratory after 10 years 

of service. The 401(k) program now offered to new employees establishes no such 

bond. Today’s highly mobile workforce is not advantageous for an institution that 

has to make considerable investment in training and nurturing workforce skills. 

This issue is particularly acute for computer scientists, who have many lucrative opportunities in the San Francisco Bay area. 

More flexibility for the Laboratory director in setting individual salaries and establishing positive work-environment programs within the existing budget envelope 

would help. So would the presence of modern facilities, laboratories, and infrastructure. We need to continually reinvest in facilities and infrastructure, and in times 

of austere budgets, recapitalization tends to suffer. Readiness in Technical Base and 

Facilities (RTBF) funding to LLNL is the lowest in the NNSA complex and we are 

falling behind in basic upkeep of the infrastructure and its related services. At some 

point it will affect the recruiting and retention given it is based on the ability to 

do cutting-edge research! 

The cancellation of CMRR–NF has greater impact on sustainment of the stockpile 

(e.g., LEPs) than plutonium science per se. Much of the plutonium science work is 

small scale. At LLNL, there are opportunities to do cutting-edge work on plutonium 

science using JASPER, diamond anvil experiments at various facilities, Superblock, 

and (in the future) potentially at NIF. Simulations are also an important aspect of 

plutonium science. I am most concerned over where we will be in 5 years when the 

restart of CMRR–NF will be considered as it will then be faced with then budget 

pressures and more needs in the failing infrastructure arena. 

Mr. TURNER. 28) As I noted in my opening statement, in 2009 a Stimson Center 

report said: ‘‘the implementation of the NNSA Act failed to achieve the intended autonomy for NNSA within the Department of Energy. The Labs now must operate 

within a complicated set of bureaucratic relationships with both DOE and NNSA. 

An excessively bureaucratic DOE culture has infiltrated NNSA as well.’’ Also in 

2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said that, ‘‘the original intent of the legislation creating the NNSA has not been realized. The desired autonomy has not come 

into being.’’ 

 Do you believe the intent of the NNSA Act has been implemented? In other 

words, is NNSA truly semi-autonomous from DOE? 

 Do you believe the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority between DOE 

and NNSA are clear? 

 What should Congress do to address this? 

Dr. MILLER. 28) The NNSA Act of 2000 established a separate NNSA organization 

within DOE, consolidating nuclear security programs under an Administrator. According to the Act, NNSA and Contractor personnel are not responsible to any DOE 

employee or agent except for the Secretary of Energy. However, the Act has since 

been amended (updated October 1, 2010), creating the position of Under Secretary 

for Nuclear Security, who serves as NNSA Administrator. Also according to the Act, 

the Under Secretary shall be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 

Secretary; and the Secretary shall be responsible for establishing policy for NNSA. 

Currently, as examples, the NNSA CFO reports to the DOE CFO. NNSA Contracting Officers report to the DOE Office of Procurement. These changes limit the 

autonomy of NNSA and have increased layers of management. The Laboratory is 

also subject to reviews by the DOE Office of Enforcement/Health Safety and Security (OE/HSS) Division, and independent oversight organizations such as the DOE 

Inspector General (IG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). 

While the lack of full autonomy has certainly added to the bureaucratic inefficiency that burdens Laboratory operations, the extent to which NNSA is autonomous, however, does not have much bearing on the fundamental underlying issue, 

which both my testimony and the recent National Academy of Sciences study identify: the lack of trust and partnership in the relationship between DOE/NNSA and 

the national laboratories. Unless this issue is faced and dealt with, organizational 

issues and proposed changes are, in my view, of secondary importance. Changes 
184 

might reduce the bureaucracy somewhat especially in the areas of redundant or 

overlapping layers of oversight, but unless there is a cultural change, it is unlikely 

to make much difference in the long run. 

Mr. TURNER. 29) The 2009 Stimson Center report and the Strategic Posture Commission both concluded that major reform of NNSA was needed. Both groups recommended making NNSA fully independent from DOE. In his statement for the 

record for this hearing, Ambassador Linton Brooks, the former head of NNSA, says 

that major reform is now needed again. Ambassador Brooks says that the Strategic 

Posture Commission concluded that the current governance structure of NNSA ‘‘cannot be effective in the long term. The record of recent years points to no other conclusion.’’ On this conclusion, Ambassador Brooks said: ‘‘I agree. The current ‘semiautonomous’ structure has proven to be too dependent on the personalities of DOE 

and NNSA leadership to be consistently reliable and effective . . . ’’ On whether 

Congress should revisit the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendation to 

make NNSA a wholly independent agency, Brooks says: ‘‘My answer is yes. The 

present system has been tried for a decade by dedicated, hard-working and competent civil servants. It has not lived up to the Nation’s hopes. We can do better.’’  Do you agree with Ambassador Brooks? Do you believe such large-scale change 

is again needed? Why or why not?  Would such organizational change fix all of the issues identified by the NAS report, the Strategic Posture Commission, the Stimson Center report, and the 

myriad other reports? In addition to organizational change, what else would 

need to be done to address these problems? 

Dr. MILLER. 29) I believe the last of these questions is, by far, the most important. 

As I stated in my answer to Question 33 [Now Question 28]): 

The extent to which NNSA is autonomous, however, does not have much bearing 

on the fundamental underlying issue, which both my testimony and the recent National Academy of Sciences study identify: the lack of trust and partnership in the 

relationship between DOE/NNSA and the national laboratories. Unless this is issue 

is faced and dealt with, organizational issues and proposed changes are, in my view, 

of secondary importance. Changes might reduce the bureaucracy somewhat, but unless there is a cultural change to restore trust and partnership approach, change 

is unlikely to make much difference in the long run. 

As for the various proposed changes, each has pluses and minuses. Perhaps more 

important than what the organization is changed to (including a modified form of 

NNSA as an option), there must be the will and follow-through of the new management team to streamline. I believe that most important of all is to focus on the mission—that is why these laboratories exist. From an operation point of view, my written testimony before the committee concluded with three ‘‘Ts’’: restore TRUST, 

eliminate TRANSACTIONAL oversight; and TURN OVER management to the people you hired to manage (the directors of the laboratories). 

Mr. TURNER. 30) The NAS study committee recommended that NNSA ‘‘purposely 

free directors to establish strategic science and engineering direction at the Laboratories.’’ What concrete actions would you recommend NNSA and Congress take to 

‘‘free [lab] directors to establish strategic science and engineering direction at the 

labs’’? 

Dr. MILLER. 30) I strongly concur with two particularly pertinent recommendations made by NAS study committee. It is essential that the laboratory directors be 

able to focus on both the near-term deliverables and the long-term health of the laboratory and the future needs of the mission. 

First, the Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program is absolutely essential to the long-term health of science and technology at the Laboratory. LDRD provides essentially the only funds we have to invest in exploratory research in support of our missions. These investments strive for breakthroughs that 

can make a dramatic difference, and with demonstration of feasibility of the idea, 

the concept can blossom into a program of great interest to a Government sponsor. 

It also is an important tool for attracting, retaining, and getting the best out of topnotch talent. The NAS study recommends ‘‘. . . that Congress and NNSA maintain 

strong support of the LDRD program as it is an essential component of enabling 

the long-term viability of the Laboratories.’’ 

Secondly, it is very hard to effectively manage complex research and development 

programs when the work is fractionated into small work bins with little flexibility 

to balance the effort—using funding for tasks in an overall project area that runs 

more smoothly than anticipated to help along tasks in the same area that prove to 

be more difficult than expected or to perform more basic research and development 

supportive of the overall project goal. In specific, the NAS study recommends ‘‘. . . 

that Congress reduce the number of restrictive budget reporting categories in the 

Nuclear Weapons Program and permit use of such funds to support a robust core 
185 

weapons research program and further develop necessary S&E capability.’’ Investment strategy should precede or even override any drive toward restrictive and less 

agile accounting controls especially in a future-oriented research and discovery operational mission. 

Mr. TURNER. 31) Do you agree with the NAS study committee’s recommendation 

to ‘‘rebalance the relationship and the set of principles laying out the boundaries 

and roles of each management structure’’ and memorialize such principles and relationships ‘‘in memoranda of understanding between NNSA and its Laboratories’’? 

What principles of the relationship between NNSA and the labs would you suggest 

be included in such an agreement? What would be a potential enforcement mechanism for such memoranda of understanding? 

Dr. MILLER. 31) As I have stated in the answer to previous questions, the most 

important issue is trust. If it is a trusted working relationship, this should not be 

much of an issue. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory (an FFRDC managed by Caltech), for example, seem to get 

along fine without roles and responsibilities being an issue. 

Policy guidelines have been established for FFRDCs. As pertaining to the specifics 

of the relationship between the national laboratories and DOE, I believe that language about principles has been suggested by previous committees (e.g., the Chiles 

commission). It is likely not necessary to ‘‘reinvent the wheel.’’ In general, if contentious negotiations are needed to define roles and responsibilities—as well as a complicated enforcement mechanism—something is likely wrong with the relationship 

that will not be fixed by a set of principles. 

Mr. TURNER. 32) In May 2011, the National Laboratories Directors Council sent 

a paper to Secretary of Energy Chu—at his request—on ‘‘Prioritization of Burdensome Policies and Practices.’’ This paper outlined, from the perspective of the lab 

directors, specific ways DOE could reduce burdensome management policies and 

practices that hamper the ability of the labs to execute their mission.  Has DOE been responsive to the recommendations in this paper? Has progress 

been made? Why or why not?  Secretary Chu asked for and received similar input from the directors of the national labs in April 2009. Has DOE been responsive to that input?  Why do you think we need to continually revisit this same issue every few 

years? Have the recommendations changed over the years? 

Dr. MILLER. 32) I was a part of the NLDC effort you mention. Activities have been 

under way to examine existing directives and standards to reduce their number. 

The number of directives and standards affecting management and operation of 

LLNL rose from 137 to a peak of about 160 in 2009; DOE/NNSA governance reform 

efforts have reduced the number to 131. As for DOE Orders and NNSA Policies 

(NAPs), there are currently 845 requirement documents with thousands of requirements. The total is altogether too large and imposes too many non-value-adding requirements that divert precious dollars and attention from the national lab missions. 

One needs to recognize that ‘‘burdensome policies and practices’’ pertains to more 

than numbers; burdensomeness arises from the transactional manner in which they 

are enforced and the duplicative, multi-layered, and poorly aligned governance system that results in considerable cost to the taxpayers through unnecessary effort at 

the laboratories and NNSA. In FY 2011, there were more than 1,300 external audits 

conducted at LLNL. One could shorten the list of requirements, but if myriad offices 

still have say and feel compelled to independently oversee enforcement in a highly 

transactional manner, little will change. Solving issues for the enterprise must be 

the true test, not how many inspectors detail the problem. 

As stated in my testimony, one major step forward would be to use, whenever possible, external standards, certifications and oversight for operational systems and 

eliminate the DOE and NNSA oversight. Many such standards are already in place 

based on the International Standards Organization (ISO) and the DOE/NNSA facilities are already subject to both State and Federal oversight from other organizations. This move would both eliminate redundancy and move to a more process-oriented, results-based operation rather than transactional-oriented system. It would 

also allow a significant reduction in the onsite DOE/NNSA personnel to a number 

more in line with the oversight presence at sites managed by many other Federal 

organizations. 

Mr. TURNER. 33) Going back to the early 1990s—to the Galvin Commission and 

before—there have been dozens of national commissions, studies, and reports recommending significant reform to the way DOE and NNSA govern and manage the 

labs. Many leaders in NNSA and DOE have tried to carry out reforms, streamlining 

efforts, and initiatives to reduce burdensome policies and practices. But, today, the 

NAS report still finds major problems with the governance and management struc-
186 

ture NNSA uses for the labs. Why aren’t we making any progress in improving the 

governance and management structure for the labs? Are these recurring problems 

affecting morale at the labs? Are they impacting the quality of the science and engineering? Are they impacting the labs’ ability to attract and retain world-class people? 

Dr. MILLER. 33) As I stressed in my written testimony, the key underlying problem is a lack of trust and the absence of a true Government–FFRDC relationship. 

Efforts at reform are often undertaken in small steps and in a bureaucratic manner 

that are abandoned or have had little lasting impact. 

In a larger sense, we all share some blame for the current situation: too much 

transactional oversight by a multi-layered DOE organization. This largely started 

as the Cold War ended with Secretary of Energy James Watkins’ concern about implementation of business and safety practices at the laboratories and plants. Improvements were needed but the path taken to oversee implementation of a rigid 

set of improvements (without cost–benefit analyses) started down the path of cost 

inefficiencies and transactional oversight. 

Then, after the implementation of performance-based management at the laboratories and plants, the system steadily evolved from a few top-level measures to performance evaluation plans with more and more measures that DOE/NNSA thought 

necessary to review in increasing detail. This trend was exacerbated by occasional 

bad events, such as the Wen Ho Lee espionage case and the thought-to-be loss (actually a recordkeeping problem) of classified portable computer data storage devices 

at one of the laboratories. The reaction within the Government and in the press was 

very vocal and demanding of immediate changes. This has a lasting effect on trust 

and invariably led to more policy changes, more directives and standards that tend 

to be overly broad, sometimes contradictory, subject to interpretation, and difficult 

and expensive to implement. Increased transactional oversight came with these 

changes. 

Within the laboratories, recurring events bringing broad-brushed blame and disparagement have affected morale in a way that takes time to heal. Rather than 

dealing with the specific issues, the added oversight in each case is burdensome to 

all employees, invariably lowering productivity. The impact on recruitment and retention has not been great to date, but this is a serious concern if a more trusted 

partnership in national security is not restored and precious dollars are drained 

away from the mission work to unnecessary and redundant oversight. 

Mr. TURNER. 34) The NAS study committee identifies a loss of trust between the 

NNSA and its labs as a key problem that is contributing to a poor management relationship and burdensome oversight policies and practices. The NAS report identifies this loss of trust for increased risk aversion at NNSA, which discourages the 

labs from conducting real-world experiments. Do you agree? What is the impact on 

the quality of the science and engineering at the labs—and the labs’ ability to execute their missions—if risk aversion leads to fewer and fewer experiments? Do you 

believe the sustainment of our nuclear deterrent might be at risk because of the 

safety requirements that lead to risk aversion and fewer experiments? 

Dr. MILLER. 34) DOE Orders and NNSA Policies (NAPs) and the resulting oversight decisions are conservative and generally not based on National Standards. The 

focus is on process compliance, and over time, there has been an escalation of 

requirements. Currently there are 845 requirement documents with thousands of 

requirements. 

These requirements are especially pernicious in three ways. First, they can impede the adaption of best operational and business practices widely used in industry 

if they do not exactly conform to an existing Government requirement. Secondly, 

they tend to accentuate overly conservative risk-averse behavior. What often gets 

implemented is the most conservative interpretation of a requirement that does not 

balance costs and risks. The most conservative interpretation could arise in any one 

of the stovepipes that have a say in implementation or become a self-imposed constraint to avoid engaging the issue to avoid an excessive number of bureaucratic 

hurdles and roadblocks. Finally, the necessary extensive paperwork and non-valueadded requirements often add difficulty in conducting research efficiently, adding 

major frustrations to the scientists. 

In addition, there is risk aversion in programmatic decisions (in NNSA and more 

generally, throughout Government and industry) driven by ‘‘fear of failure.’’ Collectively, we have lost sight of the perspective that if every experiment is a success, 

you aren’t trying hard enough. This makes it much harder for the laboratories to 

get funding for programs that attempt to take bold steps that would result in dramatic improvements in capabilities to meet an important national need. Also, when 

there is a setback or lack of progress in a program area at the Laboratory, there 

is a tendency in the system to micromanage the program based on the latest results, 
187 

without looking at the bigger picture and overall progress toward a long-term goal. 

Progress- and strategy-based investment needs to carry the day, and not the everpresent Monday morning quarterback just avoiding the one-day story! 

One wonders whether the highly successful bold choices made at the start of the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (resulting in a million-fold improvement in computing in a decade) and the construction of the National Ignition Facility (now providing the ability to create and 

study in detail the conditions in an operating nuclear weapon in a setting laboratory), would have been made in today’s risk-averse climate. Also, one wonders 

whether they could have succeeded in today’s governance and oversight climate in 

DOE/NNSA. 

Mr. TURNER. 35) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ is well under way, and that this will 

enable an expansion of the labs’ work solving national security problems for many 

different Federal agencies. Within NNSA, this is called ‘‘work for others,’’ or ‘‘WFO.’’ 

The NAS notes that this evolution is critical to the future vitality of the labs.  Does the current governance and management structure facilitate or impede 

WFO work at the labs?  What steps could Congress take to make WFO work easier, more efficient, and 

more effective?  Do you believe the labs can continue to expand their WFO work and not be distracted from their core mission of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile? As 

lab directors, how did you ensure this continued focus while also broadening the 

work conducted at the labs?  In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said the President, ‘‘should assign 

formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories.’’ Do you agree? How would such a structure operate—how should it be designed? 

Dr. MILLER. 35) The NNSA laboratories have very special capabilities that derive 

from their fundamental nuclear mission that can be brought to bear on major challenges facing the Nation. These activities leverage and reinforce the investments 

made in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Currently, LLNL applies its exceptional science, technology, and engineering and its leadership in high-performance 

computing to programs in weapons-of-mass-destruction nonproliferation and 

counterterrorism; the security of cyberspace and space assets in a highly connected 

world; protection of U.S. Armed Forces engaged in unconventional conflicts; energy 

and environmental security; and innovation supporting U.S. economic 

competiveness. In addition, these programs are critical in helping to attract a worldclass workforce to our Laboratory. 

Management of the WFO projects, which exceed 600 in number, encounters red 

tape and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Each project is required by NNSA to have a 

separate Inter-Agency Agreement (IAA), which is submitted to the Livermore Site 

Office (LSO) for approval. Prior to project initiation, the Albuquerque Complex must 

certify availability of funds. Once certified, the LSO Contracting Officer signs the 

document and adds it to the contract. The Office of Management and Budget recommends an Umbrella ‘‘Part A’’ agreement that defines each agency’s roles, responsibilities and accountabilities. Each task order ‘‘Part B’’ would be a Statement of 

Work (SOW) and a fund transfer document. Application of this policy would greatly 

streamline the process. 

In addition to the work for NNSA, the work performed for other Federal sponsors 

would benefit from lower operational costs at the laboratories that could be achieved 

through the streamlined governance and oversight discussed in answer to previous 

questions. This together with fewer impediments to arranging interagency work 

would maximize the value to the Nation from the NNSA laboratories at a time when 

scientific and technological advances are sorely needed to address 21st-century challenges to U. S. security. 

It is important to emphasize that, rather than a distraction, WFO is a valuable 

augmentation to SSP. The work adds depth, breadth, and strength to the laboratories’ capabilities. SSP funding alone is not able to sustain our Laboratory’s technical base; loss of WFO would jeopardize the long-term success of stockpile stewardship and the health of science and technology at LLNL. Many agencies of Government would benefit from access to the entire national laboratory system with the 

correct, efficient business model. 

The size of the SSP is constrained by funding, not by the availability of quality 

personnel at the Laboratory to perform the work. In fact it is very fortunate that 

WFO programs have been able to absorb the decrease in the size of the workforce 

directly supporting the SSP that has transpired (from 1,252 full-time equivalent 
188 

(FTEs) in 2005 to 1,083 in 2011). Otherwise, this talent would have been lost from 

the Laboratory and the many national security missions. 

As for an improved way to ensure multiagency support for and investment in the 

laboratories, this is a complex issue. There are pros and cons for all future arrangements (including consideration of fixes to NNSA). This is not just an executive 

branch issue, appropriations and budget authorization is the responsibility of many 

different committees in Congress. 

There is no easy answer. The Office of Science and Technology Policy has requested IDA’s Science and Technology Policy Institute to address the governance of 

the Federal laboratories, particularly in the context of the future national security 

challenges. I encourage this effort and expect it to consider the extensive recommendations made from a series of national studies in developing recommendations how to best fit the national laboratory into the Federal structure in a way that 

they can maximize their value to the Nation—this must be the gold standard for 

future success in my view. 

Mr. TURNER. 36) The labs are operated as federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). The FFRDC construct was created to allow the Federal 

Government to broadly determine ‘‘what’’ work needed to be done while the FFRDC 

determines ‘‘how’’ to accomplish the work. Federal Procurement Policy guidelines 

(OFPP Policy Letter 84–1) say that the Federal Government’s monitoring of FFRDC 

performance ‘‘shall not be as . . . to cause disruptions that are detrimental to the 

productivity and/or quality to the FFRDC’s work.’’ 

 Do you believe NNSA’s current management and governance model for the labs 

operates in the spirit and intent of the FFRDC model? Why or why not? 

 What might Congress do to ensure the FFRDC model is robust and executed 

appropriately? 

Dr. MILLER. 36) In the written testimony I submitted for the record, I provide 

ample information and data that support my view that the FFRDC construct has 

broken down between DOE/NNSA and the laboratories. I concluded my statement 

with three ‘‘Ts’’: restore TRUST, eliminate TRANSACTIONAL oversight; and TURN 

OVER management to the people you hired to manage (the directors of the laboratories). Unfortunately, I do not know how to restore trust through congressional legislation and that is key for a positive future you and the Nation can depend on for 

solutions to our most vexing problems. 

Mr. TURNER. 37) The current National Academies report, the 1999 Chiles Commission, and the Strategic Posture Commission have all cited an ability to attract 

and retain world-class scientists and engineers as the critical foundation for having 

a world-class lab. 

 Do you believe the labs are able to attract world-class personnel today? What 

attracts such people and makes them want to stay? 

 Have we seen any loss of world-class people already? 

 How does having modern facilities, labs, and infrastructure play into the labs’ 

ability to attract and retain world-class scientists and engineers? Do you have 

any worries in this regard? Would you care to comment on the recent cancellation of CMRR, and how that will affect the ability of the nuclear security enterprise—and Los Alamos in particular—to both attract and retain world-class plutonium scientists? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 37) First, let me address attracting world-class personnel: 

About 20 years ago Sandia created a program we called Strategic University Campuses to directly address our ability to find and hire the most outstanding individuals to our lab. We began with a list of universities where we had in the past sponsored R&D efforts (and thus where an alignment of some relevant technologies already existed, i.e such schools as Cornell and Purdue). We also added some universities based on their having Departments of Excellence in fields that matched our 

Core Competencies (e.g. MIT and Carnegie-Mellon). Finally, we added over time key 

regional universities that had supplied graduates in the past (University of New 

Mexico, Texas A&M, and New Mexico State), or universities that gave us wider access to a wider diversity of women and minority students in science and engineering 

(e.g. North Carolina A&T and UTEP). We periodically would invite the Deans of 

Arts and Sciences and Deans of Engineering to attend a Dean’s Day, during which 

we explained the program’s opportunities and our projected needs for technical staffing. We found enormous enthusiasm for this participation, with the intended effect 

that the faculty at those schools began to identify and ‘‘push’’ the most outstanding 

students in our needed specialties to consider careers at Sandia. In many cases we 

moved early to hire those they identified for summer internships or for Co-Op years 

at our labs. 
189 

We can cite numerous hires over the past 20 years through this effort, where we 

hired ‘‘the top computer science student in decades,’’ or ‘‘the most outstanding electrical engineer or physicist in recent memory.’’ Many prospective grads had made 

perfect scores on the SAT’s were identified to us, and we were nearly always successful in recruiting them to Sandia and have been more than delighted with their 

subsequent development here. We observed that this approach gave real meaning 

to ‘‘affirmative action,’’ as we often were able to improve our diversity with the most 

outstanding academic performers. The Strategic Campus program resulted in our 

appointing our own senior executives to become Campus Executives at these 

schools, where they often serve on university advisory boards or R&D boards. They 

commit to also lead an annual recruiting effort at these universities. Unlike Government labs, where periodic ‘‘hiring freezes’’ are periodically imposed, we fought hard 

to ‘‘never close the door to hiring outstanding candidates,’’ and our staff improvements shows the benefit of all of these multiyear efforts. 

Staff Retention: Once our hires get to know and respect the fact that ‘‘theirs is 

not just a job, or even just careers, but when they are given key responsibilities for 

efforts that are vital to the security and future well-being of the Nation itself,’’ they 

remain here and make major and important contributions. 

Major declines in morale have resulted from more and more burdensome bureaucratic requirements being piled on—particularly those that more often or not waste 

staff’s precious time. These bright people do not hesitate to speak out. The reality, 

that these highly educated and conscientious people should not have to suffer such 

foolishness (as represented by many of the DOE safety and security orders and ‘‘permission slips’’), is taken seriously by those of us who have been responsible for the 

leadership as all three labs will unanimously tell you. As I said in my written testimony, our attempts to reform these ‘‘requirements’’ were almost never successful. 

I would challenge you to ask past NNSA leaders how often we, as well as they, attempted to gain relief; yet it almost never happened. I would wager that this is a 

prime factor in why all of the past NNSA officials, and review groups, have unanimously called for major reform. Without major changes to safety and security efforts—to make them more rational and raise their quality—the adverse consequences to the Nation’s highest security strategies will grow to be truly severe. 

Mr. TURNER. 38) As I noted in my opening statement, in 2009 a Stimson Center 

report said: ‘‘the implementation of the NNSA Act failed to achieve the intended autonomy for NNSA within the Department of Energy. The Labs now must operate 

within a complicated set of bureaucratic relationships with both DOE and NNSA. 

An excessively bureaucratic DOE culture has infiltrated NNSA as well.’’ Also in 

2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said that, ‘‘the original intent of the legislation creating the NNSA has not been realized. The desired autonomy has not come 

into being.’’  Do you believe the intent of the NNSA Act has been implemented? In other 

words, is NNSA truly semi-autonomous from DOE? 

 Do you believe the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority between DOE 

and NNSA are clear? 

 What should Congress do to address this? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 38) Many of the aims for autonomy were designed to eliminate the 

foolish bureaucratic and misguided policies that had grown in over time. Against 

those aims, NNSA has been a failure. The then-Secretary of Energy when the 

NNSA Law took effect opposed many of the provisions, although the reasons for his 

opposition were never stated to the Congress (nor were understood by us). He refused to follow the terms of the NNSA Law: specifically in ‘‘double-hatting’’ both the 

security and safety organizations to take overall responsibility for the NNSA labs 

and plants, despite the direct prohibition against that within the NNSA act. My 

written statement discusses these intentional actions by that Secretary, assigning 

these major authorities exclusively to already poorly-performing DOE organizations 

which had no commitment to the success of NNSA missions. Yet they spend large 

amounts of NNSA funds, and impose onerous requirements on the NNSA labs and 

plants, without consideration of the adverse impacts they have caused to the strategic nuclear weapons programs. I once received a phone call from a very senior 

DOE OFFICIAL, who had recently been appointed, saying he was shocked by the 

Department’s rhetoric, which he had just read, that ‘‘No job is more important than 

the safety of the personnel and the environment.’’ He said, ‘‘While of course protecting employees and the local environment and citizens are important, he had always believed that preserving the strategic future of the United States carried higher importance than anything he could imagine.’’ He then asked me, ‘‘What has happened to the priority of the strategic mission we all used to be devoted to?’’ 

Thus, to summarize, the answer to this question is: ‘‘No. There is no autonomy 

for NNSA. Other DOE Organizations still direct the Labs, and can spend the budg-
190 

ets of the NNSA, without balancing these expenditures against the loss of mission 

effectiveness that these expenditures cause. Unfortunately, such wrong-headed decisions have now become commonplace, rather than exceptions, within the NNSA Programs, and we seldom even hear NNSA or senior DOE officials complaining about 

it. Certainly the GOCO model, where science and technology labs were to have the 

leadership in ‘‘HOW’’ to do their work, with the Government concentrating on 

‘‘WHAT’’ were to be the goals and funding, has been effectively shredded. 

Mr. TURNER. 39) The 2009 Stimson Center report and the Strategic Posture Commission both concluded that major reform of NNSA was needed. Both groups recommended making NNSA fully independent from DOE. In his statement for the 

record for this hearing, Ambassador Linton Brooks, the former head of NNSA, says 

that major reform is now needed again. Ambassador Brooks says that the Strategic 

Posture Commission concluded that the current governance structure of NNSA ‘‘cannot be effective in the long term. The record of recent years points to no other conclusion.’’ On this conclusion, Ambassador Brooks said: ‘‘I agree. The current ‘semiautonomous’ structure has proven to be too dependent on the personalities of DOE 

and NNSA leadership to be consistently reliable and effective . . . ’’ On whether 

Congress should revisit the Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendation to 

make NNSA a wholly-independent agency, Brooks says: ‘‘My answer is yes. The 

present system has been tried for a decade by dedicated, hard-working and competent civil servants. It has not lived up to the Nation’s hopes. We can do better.’’ 

 Do you agree with Ambassador Brooks? Do you believe such large-scale change 

is again needed? Why or why not? 

 Would such organizational change fix all of the issues identified by the NAS report, the Strategic Posture Commission, the Stimson Center report, and the 

myriad other reports? In addition to organizational change, what else would 

need to be done to address these problems? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 39) I strongly support that the opinions of Ambassador Brooks deserve your careful considerations. He is a wise and pragmatic man. (He took over 

the leadership of NNSA in its early years, and knows well all of the problems I outlined in the previous question.) I noted the difficulties he had in ‘‘criticizing his parent organizations or his direct supervisors’’, which was something counter-cultural 

for a career military officer; yet he has come to be quite open about the paralyzing 

effect of having the bureauracy take over control of operations. Unless this is turned 

around, the Government will continue to waste both opportunities to improve our 

national security as well as to waste large sums of money. 

We can indeed do far better, and the past legacy of the Labs demonstrates this. 

The major organizational changes I implored you to consider within my statement, 

were designed to once again allow the Labs to make their maximum contributions 

to the national interest, and be far more effective in terms of important security 

contributions and cost-effectiveness for the taxpayers than has been the case for 

many decades. I urge your action to realize these opportunities for improvement. 

Mr. TURNER. 40) Your written statement recommends eliminating NNSA and 

standing up a new, leaner, more focused agency reporting to the Secretary of Defense. What are the benefits of this approach? What are the challenges? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 40) The principal benefits derive from reporting to an organization 

where there is a high level of trust already in place between the labs and the DOD 

and military services. There is complete alignment between the organizations which 

would be joined together in their highest purpose: to ensure the preservation of peace 

and freedom of these United States for all time. It is hard to articulate any analogous ‘‘purpose’’ for the bureaucracy that has grown to be today’s Department of Energy. For the most part, while the history of their actions would suggest a total disregard for the overarching importance we in the Labs would attach to ‘‘preserving 

the Nation’s security’’, the DOE is seemingly much more strongly motivated by selfpreservation of their own bureaucratic structure and power. 

Immediate benefits of being in DOD would include ‘‘inherent trust relationships 

along with tighter communications between the ‘‘customers and the suppliers.’’ It 

would tear down the artificial boundaries now erected between the Labs and their 

Federal sponsors, and would indeed result in implementation of the original FFRDC 

(federally funded research and development centers) principles. I note once more 

that the DOD has proven itself to be a very successful example of a ‘‘civilian-controlled’’ department. The intended roles of who should determine WHAT, versus 

HOW, would be natural, and not in conflict, as has been too often the case in the 

past. 

Other questions and answers (below) deal with these same points, especially in 

my answer to Question 55 [Now Question 45], where I have provided a longer discussion of the issues and my judgment on a path forward. 
191 

Mr. TURNER. 41) The NAS study committee recommended that NNSA ‘‘purposely 

free directors to establish strategic science and engineering direction at the Laboratories.’’ What concrete actions would you recommend NNSA and Congress take to 

‘‘free [lab] directors to establish strategic science and engineering direction at the 

labs?’’ 

Dr. ROBINSON. 41) I am embarrassed that the NAS did not find that to still be 

the case at Sandia, as there is no question but that the pursuit of strategic science 

and technology was my highest priority, and for my entire management team of 

Vice Presidents, Directors and Managers, for the ten years I served as Laboratories 

Director (1995–2005). It would be an impossible task to lead a complex, multiprogram laboratory with nearly 2,000 Ph.Ds and nearly 8,000 direct employees like 

Sandia (or similarly for LANL or LLNL) without such a highly skilled, hands-on 

management team. We spent much of our time in deeply technical discussions, and 

in strategic and mission planning, problem solving, and in examining alternatives 

and opportunities for major advancements. I can imagine no other approach for advancing the state of the art for scientific discoveries and applying them to meet the 

needs of highly classified missions, even with the harnessing of the best of modern 

computing and communication tools, than having such a closely knit local team with 

constant interchanges. 

The labs have often pointed out that, even after hiring the brightest and best recent graduates with Ph.Ds or other advanced degrees, it takes approximately 10 

years before they can learn and understand past classified advances to a sufficient 

level as to be capable of making independent advances in specific technologies. It 

takes even longer times and a wider set of experiences and learnings before even 

the most talented individuals can be qualified to take on important management responsibilities for multidisciplined programs or projects within the Labs. Thus, it was 

crucial that the senior management devote much effort to ‘‘Succession Planning’’ 

through identifying individuals with the right skills, demeanor, and potential; so we 

could then manage their careers at the laboratory to prepare them with the right 

knowledge and experiences be able to succeed in leadership positions for future complex and multi-disciplined programs and activities. I found that over the years, this 

training is very much akin to having earned Ph.D. equivalencies in at least 5 to 8 

technical fields, before you were qualified to lead major Lab efforts. These enduring 

requirements thus inevitably mean a lifetime career commitment has to be made 

by these individuals to the Laboratories and their missions. Thus, it is in my mind 

nothing short of a tragedy, when the recent contract changes in the GOCO ‘‘parent 

organizations’’ led to immediate budget shortfalls and the resultant large-scale (i.e. 

thousands of) lay-offs—voluntary or involuntary—at Los Alamos and Lawrence 

Livermore in recent years. The tremendous loss of talented people, including a great 

many who were in that process to become future scientific leaders within the Labs, 

has caused major damage. But, just as damaging has been the endless growth of 

useless bureaucratic tasks imposed by the DOE its predecessors, that have discouraged many of the talented scientists and engineers at all ages from continuing their 

‘‘lifetime commitment’’ to the Laboratories’ futures. Many have just ‘‘given up’’ and 

left. I realize my testimony to the HASC may be seen as harsh criticism of the current situation, but against the backdrop which I have just described to you, I hope 

it will be even more apparent to you that these problems must be solved and quickly, (and that such errors not be repeated for the upcoming ‘‘recompetition’’ for the 

Sandia contract, now being formulated and scheduled within the DOE and NNSA.) 

I once again urge you to make very major changes to the ‘‘failed GOCO’’ we now 

all find ourselves caught up in. 

Mr. TURNER. 42) Do you agree with the NAS study committee’s recommendation 

to ‘‘rebalance the relationship and the set of principles laying out the boundaries 

and roles of each management structure’’ and memorialize such principles and relationships ‘‘in memoranda of understanding between NNSA and its Laboratories’’? 

What principles of the relationship between NNSA and the labs would you suggest 

be included in such an agreement? What would be a potential enforcement mechanism for such memoranda of understanding? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 42) You have doubtless heard the simplified description of the desired relationship between the Labs and the Government in a ‘‘GOCO’’ relationship 

(Government-owned and contractor-operated) described as ‘‘the Government should 

decide ‘WHAT’ is to be done, and the Lab decides ‘HOW’ it will be done.’’ A better 

description of how the relationship ought to work is where ‘‘the Lab proposes, and 

the Government disposes.’’ For example, in my service at Sandia, we placed a very 

strong emphasis on Strategic Planning, emphasizing that we needed to plan our research and development efforts, our core competencies, and our detailed annual 

plans and budgets to align with our missions. That provided a basis to ensure that 

we would be addressing the highest priority assignments and opportunities to suc-
192 

ceed in our mission responsibilities, and that all parts of the laboratory would be 

knowledgeable of, and strongly connected to, these mission efforts. An ideal arrangement would be to have the NNSA (or its successor organization) review in detail, 

and discuss and approve the Strategic Plan and its more detailed annual Plan. 

Their approval should be confirmed in writing to note their satisfaction with 

‘‘WHAT’’ is to be done, and they must step back from further management of 

‘‘HOW’’ (or, God-forbid, the ‘‘micromanagement’’ that has increasingly characterized 

the recent decades will continue to grow.) 

Appropriate vs. Inappropriate Organizations: One of the great tragedies that was 

visited upon the Government/lab relationship in recent years (primarily since the 

end of the Cold War) has been the creation of new job titles within NNSA called 

‘‘Program Managers.’’ I used the word ‘‘titles’’ because the classic role for Program 

Managers was not what should have been intended for these individuals, and there 

were no consensus job descriptions of what their duties would or would not be. Over 

time these individuals have increasingly attempted to serve as ‘‘real’’ program managers and to attempt to dictate at a more detailed level the individual budgets and 

tasks for the labs, in the classic sense of ‘‘Government sponsors’’ and their ‘‘contractors.’’ (The DOE in fact most often uses the term ‘‘contractors’’ when referring to 

the GOCOs, which is not at all what was considered of the basis for establishing 

and depending upon GOCOs to lead and operate the efforts of researching, designing, and delivering the designs for U.S. nuclear weapons, nor for the other missions 

of nuclear detection, preventing nuclear proliferation, or combatting nuclear terrorism.) I can assert here that to believe it could even be done in ‘‘a Washington 

detailed-direction and management of these unique high-tech efforts by a Washington bureaucracy’’ was recognized to be an impossibility by the wise leaders who 

created the Manhattan Project and the original GOCO model. They made a clear 

choice to ‘‘put the scientists in charge’’ of the mission, and while they provided close 

support and monitoring of the tasks, but the Government role was never seen to 

be a ‘‘detailed management role’’ but was to exist as a partnership, with each doing 

appropriate tasks: the NNSA staff should be primarily working in close liaison with 

the labs and with other Government entities, such as the White House and the 

NSC, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence agencies, the Congress, and 

the OMB. Today, we would add the Dept. of Homeland Security to the list. 

A startling example of how bad the situation has become at the NNSA, as it has 

been in a self-generated evolution to attempt to pervert the arrangement from the 

original GOCO model to ‘‘a sponsor/contractor relationship’’—in which the Government entity undertakes ‘‘to directly manage the technical programs’’—can be seen 

from recent budget difficulties which have become a very great concern in recent 

years. When the price for developing, manufacturing, and delivering a new Life Extension Program (LEP) for a major nuclear weapons system seemed to be 

unaffordable, one Lab stepped forward to the DOE/NNSA and said ‘‘We would be 

willing to readjust our overall suite of weapons activities—just as we did in the 

past—to accommodate the new tasking by reassigning our people internally from 

lower priority R&D tasks, in order to meet the deadlines required for this important 

deliverable to the DOD, without any additions to our overall budget.’’ The response 

from the NNSA management was, however, ‘‘We have checked with the program 

managers (within the NNSA and DOE) and none of them want to give up any of 

their budgets or change the schedules for their activities at this time. Thus we guess 

we just won’t be able to approve your taking these actions.’’ 

To say that this recent anecdote shows that the roles and responsibilities within 

the current GOCO have fully reached a point of impossibility is truly an understatement. 

I would emphasize that the way in which this HASC question is asked fails to 

recognize the basic problem: the original GOCO contracts were at most a few pages 

in length, but they have grown to be large volumes by today—as the writers mistakenly believed them to be classic procurement contracts, rather than a direct assignment for the mission responsibilities for nuclear weapons RD&D mission to the 

Labs, as their partner institution. Exhaustive contracts are not the answer. 

Thus, while having begun the answer to this question, with what must be 

changed, let me now attempt to write several ‘‘principles’’ which your question 

seeks. I cannot attempt to write ‘‘a complete set,’’ nor do I believe that would even 

be the right approach for what is needed. 

 The Government will return to a simple contract that outlines the mission responsibilities that will return to the Labs/GOCOs for day-to-day management. 

 The scientific and technical directions and the management of the work programs will remain the exclusive responsibility of the Laboratory Director and 

his or her managers. 
193 

 The Federal entity and the Laboratories will work together to mutually develop 

schedules and accompanying budgets for carrying out the mission programs 

within the laboratories.  The performance reviews for the Labs will exclusively focus on how successfully 

the ‘‘What’s’’ have been addressed, and only should there be a case where there 

were very serious shortfalls to have happened in ‘‘How’s’’ of the administrative, 

budgetary, safety, or security performances, would these administrative and institutional issues have any bearing on the judgment of performance. 

Mr. TURNER. 43) Going back to the early 1990s—to the Galvin Commission and 

before—there have been dozens of national commissions, studies, and reports recommending significant reform to the way DOE and NNSA govern and manage the 

labs. Many leaders in NNSA and DOE have tried to carry out reforms, streamlining 

efforts, and initiatives to reduce burdensome policies and practices. But, today, the 

NAS report still finds major problems with the governance and management structure NNSA uses for the labs. Why aren’t we making any progress in improving the 

governance and management structure for the labs? Are these recurring problems 

affecting morale at the labs? Are they impacting the quality of the science and engineering? Are they impacting the labs’ ability to attract and retain world-class people? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 43) This question set truly asks ‘‘the 64 dollar questions’’! Let me 

use my own experience to attempt to address them. When I began at Los Alamos 

in 1967, as a fresh young Ph.D., the ‘‘halo effect’’ (from having succeeded in the accomplishment of the Manhattan Project to produce the devices that ended WORLD 

WAR II) was still very much in evidence. All major decisions were either already 

delegated to the Labs, or else the Atomic Energy Agency leadership would choose 

to meet directly with the lab leaders to discuss new challenges, opportunities, and 

assignments, with the Labs being tasked with several week deadlines to respond to 

what should be done to meet these. Soon after rising further within the Lab management at Los Alamos, I found that, if there were weaknesses in the system, it 

was primarily on the university side of the GOCO, where periodic reviews were carried out by ‘‘large committees of academics’’, who were mostly completely unfamiliar 

with the missions or the work within the Lab, and whose reviews were of a most 

‘‘cursory nature.’’ Worse yet, over time, as the military protests of the late ’60s expanded, the membership of these committees began to include more and more professors who opposed nuclear weapons in general, and stated that the University of 

California should no longer be the responsible institution for overseeing these Labs. 

This internal dissent began to be more and more the focus of the exchanges during 

the university review committee meetings, rather than to analyze the growth of oppressive oversight by the the Energy Research and Development Administration 

(ERDA) as uncontrolled bureaucracies ‘‘exploded’’ on the scene. [Remember that 

ERDA was formed by adding two political layers of Administrators over the top of 

the residual AEC organization, with the disappearance of the five-member Commission that had led the AEC.] 

As one might expect, with political appointees with little if any past knowledge 

of the nuclear weapons missions, or of the advanced science missions, these new Administrators put their focus on the ‘‘new mission’’ of the overall organization—to 

help address the energy crisis and related problems. In particular, with administrative and support organizations then having little contact with or direct management 

from the new top management, the bureaucratic tendencies and initiatives literally 

‘‘ran amuck’’ and ‘‘grew like Topsy.’’ It was at this point when the Department of 

Energy was created, primarily by adding in additional parts to ERDA from other 

agencies, while then placing two additional ‘‘political layers of officials at the top.’’ 

These new officials were ‘‘even more politically focused than those of the past, and 

quickly showed to be even further out of touch with any of the operations, missions, 

or activities’’ of the resultant new Department. Taking advantage of that ‘‘inattention,’’ the DOE bureaucracies then explosively grew in the sizes and greater number 

of divisions within these bureaucracies. The classic approach within all bureaucratic 

groups, ‘‘when they are left to their own devices,’’ took hold, and they began to write 

even more and more detailed Instructions, Orders, and Directives from the ‘‘Washington Headquarters,’’ beginning to enlarge the HQ role to achieve full dominance 

and control over all functions. With the increase in the lengths and numbers of Orders and Directives (which to those of us who had been in the GOCO system prior 

to that seemed like a total waste of human energies by all concerned), it seemed 

that those who were writing these ‘‘larger and larger volumes’’ had almost no knowledge of what either R and D, nor nuclear matters were all about. Certainly, it is fair 

to say that the two parts of the GOCO had grown ‘‘farther and farther apart,’’ and 

communications either became more confused or even nonexistent. By the time of 

the Galvin Committee effort, primarily composed of industrial leaders, completed its 
194 

report entitled ‘‘Alternative Futures’’ (published in February of 1995), these industrial leaders who had examined the situation expressed considerable shock and dismay. Of course even though the Chairman, Bob Galvin, was enormously respected, 

as were the members, the senior officials of Department of Energy neither understood, nor showed any interest in, either taking on the problems described or implementing any of the recommendations to address the multiplicity of problems cited. 

The one enduring change was their recommendation that ‘‘Quality Principles and 

Methods’’ ought to be put into place in both the DOE and the Labs and Plants. This 

was embraced, and did achieve some marked differences in improvements within 

the institutions that voluntarily embraced Quality, but for the Government side 

quality initiatives all too quickly disappeared off their ‘‘attention screens.’’ 

The actions of the U.S. Senate to drive the legislative changes that created the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 1999, was the primary subsequent attempt to respond to the problems that the Galvin Committee cited by reorganizing and improving the deteriorating situation for at least the Nuclear Weapons 

Labs, Plants, and Headquarters. It repeated the goal to recover the principles of the 

previous GOCO arrangement, but as I have exhaustively reported within my written statement for the HASC Strategic Forces Hearing (February, 2012) and elaborated further upon in addressing these QFR’s; the NNSA has failed to meet the 

hopes that all involved with that legislation had for it. Today its responsibilities and 

programs are experiencing very serious difficulties, with the conclusion having been 

reached by almost all associated with the NNSA that major changes are necessitated. 

Mr. TURNER. 44) The NAS study committee identifies a loss of trust between the 

NNSA and its labs as a key problem that is contributing to a poor management relationship and burdensome oversight policies and practices. The NAS report identifies this loss of trust for increased risk aversion at NNSA, which discourages the 

labs from conducting real-world experiments. Do you agree? What is the impact on 

the quality of the science and engineering at the labs—and the labs’ ability to execute their missions—if risk aversion leads to fewer and fewer experiments? Do you 

believe the sustainment of our nuclear deterrent might be at risk because of the 

safety requirements that lead to risk aversion and fewer experiments? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 44) This is a powerful question, and while the issues of ‘‘trust’’ and 

‘‘risk aversion to experiments’’ have received little if any formal attention, they are 

in fact root causes of the manifold difficulties between ‘‘Government organizations’’ 

and ‘‘scientific institutions.’’ Over my 50-year career I have seen the pendulum 

swing only in one direction, toward fewer and fewer experiments, but only part of 

that is good, and that is the reduction in experiment numbers for a given project 

because of computer modeling of each experiment, which allows better analysis and 

hence better predictions of the results of future experiments; so one can ‘‘skip’’ some 

steps that were always done in the past. However, I also see the conflict between 

Washington’s increasing aversion to fund experiments that have any risk of either 

(1) not succeeding, or (2) potential safety risks for personnel engaged in experimental work. There is almost a textbook ‘‘lack of a common understanding’’ between 

those who fund and oversee experiments and those who carry them out. One of the 

greatest scientists of the Manhattan Project was Enrico Fermi, who used to chide 

the scientists during his time at Los Alamos not to forget ‘‘the scientific method,’’ 

which requires experimental observations as the key to scientific advancement—insofar as experimental results either provide support for or evidence against proposed theories. He said ‘‘Always remember it should not be called an experiment unless it has at least a 50% chance of failing.’’ What he meant was that experiments 

should be defined to delineate between opposing views by shedding light on which 

provides the best scientific explanation of what is observed. Thus, one should never 

get caught up in only taking conservative steps by limiting your experiments to 

those that are designed to be successful, rather than to carry out the best test to 

show which theory is ‘‘correct.’’ 

One fundamental conflict in this regard is when the ERDA Headquarters once 

published a document that declared that their new philosophy would be a preference 

to only fund ‘‘Demonstration Projects’’ (as these normally take such ‘‘baby steps’’ in 

pursuit of a goal that they have little if any scientific value). Ever since, this error 

has been repeated often in DOE plans and documents. Nothing could be more in 

conflict with how the Scientific method best works, as one can be misled that by 

taking what some consider the ‘‘preferred path and theory’’ without any basis of 

proof. By only building demonstrations around those initial assumptions, you have 

no basis for understanding what to do next when a demonstration fails. The optimum way to pursue understanding of the operative science for any aim is to carry 

out carefully planned experiments to demonstrate which factors are the driving 

ones, and based on their results, then move up the ladder to more refined tests of 

the hypotheses. 
195 

Nothing could be more fundamental in the ‘‘failures to communicate’’ between 

Washington and the Labs, than this fundamental difference in approaches. It undoubtedly provides the basis for ‘‘distrust,’’ with the parties unable to even communicate sufficiently to decide on a different approach. 

Mr. TURNER. 45) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ is well under way, and that this will 

enable an expansion of the labs’ work solving national security problems for many 

different Federal agencies. Within NNSA, this is called ‘‘work for others,’’ or ‘‘WFO.’’ 

The NAS notes that this evolution is critical to the future vitality of the labs.  Does the current governance and management structure facilitate or impede 

WFO work at the labs?  What steps could Congress take to make WFO work easier, more efficient, and 

more effective?  Do you believe the labs can continue to expand their WFO work and not be distracted from their core mission of sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile? As 

lab directors, how did you ensure this continued focus while also broadening the 

work conducted at the labs?  In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said the President, ‘‘should assign 

formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic and budgetary health of the laboratories.’’ Do you agree? How would such a structure operate—how should it be designed? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 45) Let me note that the first five lines of this question are identical to Question 12 [Now Question 104], that also focuses on the movement to become ‘‘true national security labs,’’ rather than only ‘‘nuclear weapons labs.’’ I will 

attribute this to the ‘‘great minds’’ phenomena. The questions that begin at the end 

of line 5 are quite different, and I will address Question 55 [This Question] here, 

but suggest that there may also be other relevant and useful points in the answer 

to Question 12 [Now Question 104]. 

As the NAS Report points out, Sandia began the focus on wider national security 

issues earlier and is much further along in ‘‘becoming true national security labs.’’ 

That phrase is a goal we wrote in Sandia’s Strategic Plans in the early ’90s, and 

the achievement of which is perhaps my greatest contribution for the years I and 

my successor served as Sandia’s President. Although the trend toward greater support from other national security agencies expanded greatly, 2 years after my retirement the ‘‘Work for Others’’ funding (from agencies such as DOD, IC, HSD, and 

military services) the WFO total finally exceeded the level of funds provided by 

DOE. I take this as evidence that we had reached a condition of being a true national security lab. 

A central criterion in taking on any of this additional work was that it had to 

be synergistic and to either directly rely on, or directly improve the capabilities required for executing the nuclear weapons program responsibilities. For the most 

part, it is my experience that the WFO work has not been subjected to attempts 

at micromanagement by DOE or NNSA. Two years ago, in fact, NNSA publicly embraced the expansion of these Work for Other’s efforts in the national security areas 

as an important factor for the future of the NNSA and the Labs. I believe the importance of the Labs’ contributions overall to the Nation’s security has been significantly enhanced by having expanded our security horizons. In the years since the 

end of World War II the uniqueness which our three Labs demonstrate in being 

large multidisciplined, multiprogram labs has made us more and more unique, while 

almost all large U.S. corporate labs and Government labs have consolidated or 

greatly declined, rather than expanding as the breadth of major scientific technical 

specialties has expanded and broadened. 

When I became Sandia’s President, I asked Lockheed Martin if they would expand 

the membership of Sandia’s Board of Directors to include major figures from the 

wider defense communities, so that our total Board could be judged ‘‘to be even more 

representative of the national interest.’’ They agreed, and we did so, by adding a 

former Secretary of Defense and former Director of CIA, several former flag officers 

at the four-star level, and a well-known defense scientist then at a university, plus 

two other ‘‘outside’’ (i.e. non-Lockheed Martin) board members. We then also created 

a specific National Security Advisory Board, staffed with a former Chairman of the 

JCS and other key military and agency leaders. We similarly expanded an existing 

Intelligence Advisory Board and elevated its membership. All of these made their 

reviews and recommendations to the Laboratory Director and to the Board of Directors, just as did our many academic and engineering review Boards. 

In response to your question about whether the expansion of our responsibilities 

into other national security areas were ‘‘not a distraction from our core missions of 

sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile.’’ General Larry Welch, former Com-
196 

mander to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and former Chief of staff of the Air 

Force, who was and is a member of the Sandia Board of Directors, helped me address that same question when it was asked of me by the Board. He noted that in 

the years in which he commanded SAC, and later when he commanded the full Air 

Force, the direct nuclear weapons portion of their overall budgets that were devoted 

to nuclear weapons was only 10% of the total, but yet there was no question at any 

time that the nuclear defense was by far the most important part of our national 

defense efforts, or that they were given the highest priority for his energies and efforts, as commander. We and the full board mutually agreed that even though 

Sandia was already on a trajectory for the nuclear weapons budget to become only 

half (or less) of our total laboratory budget, there was similarly no question that the 

nuclear weapons efforts at Sandia were of the highest importance among all of our programs, and would always be viewed as such by all of the management and employees, based on its strategic value to the Nation and to the uniqueness of our functions (which exist no where else). 

Finally, on the issue of the structure proposed by the Strategic Posture Commission, their recommendation is a small variation of a similar idea proposed in the Defense Science Board Report on Nuclear Capabilities (reported out in December 2006). 

This later report proposed that a (Government) Board of Directors should oversee an 

independent NNSA (equivalent) and the labs and plants, with the Secretary (or Deputy Secretary of Defense) as the Chairman, the Secretary of Energy as Vice Chair, 

with the heads of Intelligence, Homeland Security, and any other key stakeholders, 

added to the Board. That recommendation, like the similar Strategic Posture recommendations, would bring back many of the advantages of the original Atomic Energy Commission, with political appointees who are ‘‘states-men and -women,’’ who 

are deeply knowledgeable about the missions and/or technology, and who could, together, provide creative approaches and better integration of the advanced technical 

capabilities for the Nation’s overall defense. It is close to, if not the best, solution for 

the future. 

Mr. TURNER. 46) The labs are operated as federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs). The FFRDC construct was created to allow the Federal 

Government to broadly determine ‘‘what’’ work needed to be done while the FFRDC 

determines ‘‘how’’ to accomplish the work. Federal Procurement Policy guidelines 

(OFPP Policy Letter 84–1) say that the Federal Government’s monitoring of FFRDC 

performance ‘‘shall not be as . . . to cause disruptions that are detrimental to the 

productivity and/or quality to the FFRDC’s work.’’  Do you believe NNSA’s current management and governance model for the labs 

operates in the spirit and intent of the FFRDC model? Why or why not?  What might Congress do to ensure the FFRDC model is robust and executed 

appropriately? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 46) The FFRDC construct began and was used extensively during 

World War II, primarily on the premise that neither existing Government organizations nor private commercial organizations already had the means or the capability 

to attract the level of scientific and technical personnel needed to carry out highpriority R and D needs. FFRDCs were usually separate nonprofit organizations created for a specific purpose and for a specific Government agency (the War Department, and later, the Department of Defense), although a small number of FFRDCs 

have since been charted to simultaneously support several agencies (RAND, and 

MITRE.) 

A review of the FFRDC model by the OTA stated that ‘‘GOCOs are not strictly 

FFRDCs,’’ although there are great similarities, and indeed over the years, we at 

Sandia have carried out joint visitation interchanges with particular FFRDCs (at 

their requests) to share methodologies we each use for best ensuring the retention 

of key personnel and maintaining core technical competencies. 

Other highlights from the OTA Notes (available online) that are apropos to this 

question are: (here I have placed some items in Bold/Italics) 

Why Federally Funded Research and Development Centers? 

 FFRDC set up to provide objective assessments of military problems/programs 

of increasing complexity. They have long-term partnership relationships with 

the Federal Government—provides long-term continuity. Federal Government’s 

structure cannot attract needed scientific talent. FFRDCs act as honest-broker, 

so they need insulation from their customers as well as private sector. 

 FFRDCs established as private nonprofit organization separate from the Government—so that they do not experience pressure to conform, from Federal Government or industry. 

 Receive long-term access to information (sometimes classified) from both Federal 

Government and industry (which is why most FFRDCs are independent, non-
197 

profit corporations, than university-sponsored centers—universities’ perception 

that classified information runs counter to open inquiry). 

Benefits 

 FFRDCs maintain intellectual capital better than for-profit (which may need to 

give up talent due to contract win or loss)  FFRDCs can give Federal Government means of integrating proprietary information from multiple for-profit companies 

 Lack of unified Federal Government regulations and policies: 

 no protection for their function 

 regulated by sponsoring agencies without comprehensive policy framework 

 subject to acquisition regulations 

Solved on case-by-case basis 

Assets of research center belong to Federal Government or center? 

How are assets disposed in the event of center closure? 

Results of study accessible to outside the sponsoring agency? 

Please note that today only the Department of Defense strictly has FFRDCs, and 

relocating a restructured NNSA along with the 3 nuclear weapons Labs to the DOD 

would permit such a structure quite naturally. From personnel experiences from the 

exchanges with the senior managers of DOD FFRDCs, I can state for sure that in 

the areas of the language you quoted in this question: sp., fed. gov.’s monitoring of 

FFRDC performance ‘‘shall not be as . . . to cause disruptions . . . detrimental to productivity and/or quality to the FFRDC’s work’’—my conclusion is that the DOD generally has succeeded over the years in those aspects, while, as this whole document 

points out, NNSA within the DOE is failing badly. Thus there are few grounds to 

conclude that the current (DOE/NNSA) management model for the Labs ‘‘operates 

in the spirit of the FFRDC model,’’ rather ‘‘it is quite the contrary.’’ The proven 

track record of DOD ‘‘not to micromanage’’ their FFRDCs, but to remain strongly 

supportive of the FFRDC’s independence in remaining closely interested in the work 

of their FFRDCs, and in depending on them to help the DOD solve its important 

scientific and technical problems, is also suggestive of the way the Labs functioned 

under the Army Corps of Engineers during the Manhattan Project, versus the myriad of problems that have appeared and grown since the AEC was morphed into 

what is now the Department of Energy. This is reminiscent of my February testimony to you where I said (on page 9): 

‘‘Regarding what to do, I kept asking myself, ‘‘Why is it, in the those years 

in which these organizations existed as GOCOs under the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, their successes were so extraordinary and history making, but 

they have now degenerated so badly? The answer as to what might be done 

to fix the current situation almost suggests itself: 

‘‘Why not try going back to the much simpler organizational approach that functioned so well during the Manhattan Project?’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 47) The NAS study committee recommends that ‘‘NNSA, Congress, 

and top management of the Laboratories recognize that safety and security systems 

at the Laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no longer need 

special attention. NNSA and Laboratory management should explore ways by which 

the administrative, safety, and security costs can be reduced, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential science and engineering activities.’’ 

 Does the NAS study committee have any examples of how these costs may be 

‘‘an excessive burden?’’ 

 What evidence did the committee consider in reaching this conclusion? Is your 

conclusion that there are no longer safety risks in nuclear operations at the 

labs? 

Dr. SHANK. 47) Our study did not investigate the safety risks in nuclear operations at the Laboratories. Nuclear operations represent a small fraction of the work 

performed at the Laboratories. Our comments are pertinent to the vast majority of 

the work that looks very much like activities taking place in industry. Members of 

the committee had extensive experience in industrial research laboratories. The 

hundred-plus NNSA staff plus contractors perform oversight at a transaction level 

at each Laboratory. The Laboratories have hundreds of people responding to NNSA 

oversight. The performers of science and engineering work described the large 

amount of time they spend on an excessive formality of operations. To this point, 

several scientists and engineers complained that the burden was so great that it cre-
198 

ated a bias against experimental work. Finally, the sizes of the safety organizations 

at the Laboratories are outsized compared to such operations at industrial laboratories. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 48) Who should have main line of responsibility to ensure nuclear 

safety and security? Is overseeing the safe operation of the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex an inherently Governmental function? If so, should there not be strong 

DOE Headquarters and Site Office oversight functions for nuclear operations and 

their safety? Why/why not? 

Dr. SHANK. 48) Nuclear operations represent a small fraction of the work at the 

Laboratories. We did not form an opinion on safety issues in nuclear operations in 

phase 1 of our study. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 49) A number of employees, including the unions who provided testimony to the NAS panel and at least one former lab director, have expressed concern that the private for-profit model is harming the labs, in that many senior scientists have chosen to leave, and production and research is driven by performancebased incentives. The NAS report finds that the bureaucratic frustrations that are 

affecting all levels within the labs, ‘‘are not traceable to the M&O contractor or the 

contracts themselves,’’ and found that the lab directors’ ‘‘primary objective remains 

to manage the Laboratories in the public interest.’’ 

 Do you think the criticism of some of these employees—that the for-profit motive is harming the labs—is valid? 

 What pressures, if any, result from a fee-based incentive system? 

 Have you heard of any concerns that pressure to meet the fee-based incentives 

have led to any underreporting of safety incidents or any other problems? 

Dr. SHANK. 49) I repeat here the answer to Question 24 [Now Question 6] that 

is very similar. We did not receive any testimony that fee-based incentives led to 

underreporting of safety incidents or any other problems. 

Answer to Question 6: 

Our committee took the issue of private versus public contractors and the influence of increased fee following the congressional action in 2004 very seriously. We 

sought out and listened to current and former employees of the Laboratories. One 

lab, Sandia has been managed by a private entity since its inception. The other two 

labs are now run by LLCs. Other than increased fee, the pre- and post-2004 contracts are very nearly the same. We asked the NNSA if the increased fee drove behavior in a way the public interest was at risk. The answer was no. We asked the 

laboratory directors whether fee drove their management decisions and they emphatically said no. We looked at turnover of the laboratory population and found 

that it is about 4% annually and that is unchanged before and after 2004. We talked 

with all levels of management and bench scientists to determine whether specific 

concerns could be traced to the contract change. We could find none. We did find 

the formation of the LLC cost each of the labs about $100 million dollars. We did 

find that at about the same time that the contracts changed there were modifications to the benefits of all the Laboratories including the LLC-managed labs. We 

found that in the case of Livermore there was a budget reduction that resulted in 

layoffs. We asked concerned laboratory staff members to help us to identify and 

quantify specific issues arriving from the new contracting paradigm to form a basis 

for commenting on the contract changes. We were unable to obtain verifiable information to guide us. We made a comment in our report that the issue of acting in 

the public interest is so important that although we were not able to identify problems, constant vigilance will be required going into the future. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 50) Mr. Shank, in the question and answer session in response to 

the question of whether privatization of the labs contributed to the loss of senior 

personnel, that while conducting the NAS study you asked for ‘‘a list of significant 

people that have left the laboratory that affect the laboratory operation for the people who expressed that concern. We were not given information that was different 

than what we were able to understand. We asked that from the labs, the lab directors, and from the people who made the accusations, or that experienced the concerns. We could not verify that on a major scale.’’ What information were you given? 

Was there information you asked for and were not given? What assumptions were 

made in reaching your conclusions? 

Dr. SHANK. 50) We asked staff that raised these concerns to supply us with the 

names of significant people that left the laboratory and did not receive such a list. 

We asked the Laboratories about the turnover at the laboratories and found that 

it was about 4% annually, before the contract changes, and about that same level 

up to the present. We asked the Laboratories if there was significant loss of key 

personnel and the answer was no. 
199 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 51) What can and should be done to strengthen NNSA’s ability to 

perform effective quality assurance? Does NNSA have the necessary expertise and 

leadership structure that is conducive to effective oversight? 

Dr. SHANK. 51) NNSA has among its leadership and staff the necessary expertise 

and leadership to perform effective oversight. The problem is how the oversight is 

being performed. Our report describes the dysfunctional relationship between the 

Laboratories and NNSA oversight. In the answer to Question 7 [Now Question 99]. 

we talk about moving from costly and burdensome transactional oversight to auditing qualified systems. I repeat below the answer for Question 99. 

Answer to Question 99 given below for completeness. 

To address this question I think it is instructive to understand how we have come 

to the current situation. The response of Congress and the DOE to a series of single 

point failures at Laboratories and production facilities has been to create new structures, orders, and organizations to provide enhanced oversight at all DOE FFRDCs. 

The increase in compartmentalized oversight entities has led to an extraordinary 

burden for the Laboratories. The issue of trust arises because the Laboratories are 

treated as distrusted entities requiring large teams of people overseeing all transactions. This approach is costly, inefficient, and discourages the Science and Engineering Staff. 

There is a small fraction of the work at the Laboratories where a failure would 

have a high consequence and therefore require a high degree of operational formality. The rest of the work looks like work done in a typical industrial environment. I believe that necessary oversight could be done in a manner accomplished 

by other similar institutions. There are widely accepted systems and standards for 

overseeing safety, finance, human resources, and facility operations. A straightforward approach would be for the Laboratories to qualify systems in each of the 

operational areas. Then, a vastly reduced number of people could audit the systems. 

A major barrier to accomplishing something like this is to realize that maintaining 

the current oversight apparatus in place, which has been sized for transactional 

oversight, will prevent any of the advantages to ensue. Another concern is that a 

new approach needs to be created with the idea there will be failures in the future 

and that whatever system in place must be resilient to single point failures. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 52) The NAS study committee recommends that ‘‘NNSA, Congress, 

and top management of the Laboratories recognize that safety and security systems 

at the Laboratories have been strengthened to the point where they no longer need 

special attention. NNSA and Laboratory management should explore ways by which 

the administrative, safety, and security costs can be reduced, so that they not impose an excessive burden on essential science and engineering activities.’’ 

 Does the NAS study committee have any examples of how these costs may be 

‘‘an excessive burden’’? 

 What evidence did the committee consider in reaching this conclusion? Is your 

conclusion that there are no longer safety risks in nuclear operations at the 

labs? 

Dr. CURTIS. 52) I tried to point out in my oral comments before the Subcommittee 

that safety, environmental responsibility, security, and fiscal integrity are essential—indeed primary—public responsibilities. The public’s trust demands their faithful execution and mission accomplishment is critically dependent upon the maintenance of high standards in these critical areas. 

We believe that rebalancing can occur and must occur while maintaining high 

standards of assurance in these systems. What we found was that the current operational formality was creating a bias against experimental work which is the very 

foundation of the scientific process. This situation, if allowed to persist, would assuredly over time detract from science and engineering quality and innovation. 

Your question is an important one. These laboratories do dangerous things. There 

are important safety risks that must be guarded against. Security is essential to be 

maintained as is fiscal integrity and environmental responsibility. If breaches occur, 

the laboratories’ ‘‘permission’’ to do this work on the public’s behalf would assuredly 

be curtailed and their mission impaired. You are right to keep sharp focus on this 

responsibility. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 53) Who should have main line of responsibility to ensure nuclear 

safety and security? Is overseeing the safe operation of the Nation’s nuclear weapons complex an inherently governmental function? If so, should there not be strong 

DOE Headquarters and Site Office oversight functions for nuclear operations and 

their safety? Why/why not? 

Dr. CURTIS. 53) This seemingly straightforward question actually goes to the 

heart of the managerial/governance problems at the laboratories. The Government— 

the Department of Energy and NNSA—have the fundamental responsibility for as-
200 

suring that the work of the laboratories is conducted safely and that security is 

maintained. This duty is best discharged through oversight in much the same way 

the Congress holds departments and agencies responsible for the discharge of their 

public duties but obviously in much greater detail. The primary operational responsibility to ensure nuclear safety and security must reside with the laboratories 

themselves. The problem with the management governance system of our laboratories is that it is highly fragmented and lines are not clearly drawn resulting in 

confusion, frustration, and inefficiencies that prevent both effective oversight and effective operational control. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 54) A number of employees, including the unions who provided testimony to the NAS panel and at least one former lab director, have expressed concern that the private for-profit model is harming the labs, in that many senior scientists have chosen to leave, and production and research is driven by performancebased incentives. The NAS report finds that the bureaucratic frustrations that are 

affecting all levels within the labs, ‘‘are not traceable to the M&O contractor or the 

contracts themselves,’’ and found that the lab directors’ ‘‘primary objective remains 

to manage the Laboratories in the public interest.’’ 

 Do you think the criticism of some of these employees—that the for-profit motive is harming the labs—is valid? 

 What pressures, if any, result from a fee-based incentive system? 

 Have you heard of any concerns that pressure to meet the fee-based incentives 

have led to any underreporting of safety incidents or any other problems? 

Dr. CURTIS. 54) We did not find that the bureaucratic frustrations are traceable 

to M&O contractors or the contracts themselves. However, the potential for concern 

exists and vigilance is advised. From my personal point of view, the danger is that 

the contractor will be mostly concerned with the risk to the contractor’s reputation 

and the risk that some failure could endanger the fee. This, in turn, could result 

in self-imposed operational formality that would be excessive and impair scientific 

and engineering quality. Again, we found no evidence of this, but we must acknowledge the potential exists. 

We did not encounter any evidence that the fee-based incentives have led to 

underreporting of safety incidents or other problems. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 56) What can and should be done to strengthen NNSA’s ability to 

perform effective quality assurance? Does NNSA have the necessary expertise and 

leadership structure that is conducive to effective oversight? 

Dr. CURTIS. 56) NNSA and the Department of Energy have many highly qualified 

and talented individuals. But if the governance system is broken—as we believe it 

is—science quality will erode over time no matter the quality of the individuals involved. 

Moreover, it is generally conceded that the most effective mechanism for assuring 

quality is a disciplined peer review system. The peer reviewers must be drawn from 

a broader universe of experts than is possible to assemble in the Government itself. 

This is always a challenge for governmental intramural research. But it is especially 

difficult to do at the NNSA Laboratories given the highly classified and specialized 

nature of the work. The JASONs provide important assistance to the laboratories 

and other mechanisms have been employed, but it is at best a less than fully developed quality assurance system. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 57) Do you agree with the findings and recommendations of the 

NAS report? Why/why not? 

Mr. ALOISE. 57) While we have not fully evaluated the NAS report, we do agree 

that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors is not an efficient use 

of scarce Federal resources. However, the problems that GAO continues to identify, 

such as cost overruns on major projects, are not caused by excessive oversight but 

rather result from ineffective oversight by NNSA and DOE. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 58) Do you believe NNSA has the tools it needs to conduct effective 

oversight? What changes would GAO recommend to improve efficiency and effectiveness of NNSA’s management and governance of the labs? Specifically, do you think 

the site offices have the necessary training and subject matter expertise to effectively oversee performance, rather than just compliance? 

Mr. ALOISE. 58) In February 2002, NNSA proposed reorganizing its entire operation to solve important, long-standing management issues. Specifically, NNSA proposed a new organizational structure that would (1) remove a layer of management 

by converting existing operations offices to one support office, (2) locate NNSA operational oversight close to laboratories and plants by strengthening its site offices, 

and (3) streamline Federal staff and hold Federal staff and contractors more accountable. 
201 

9GAO–07–36 and GAO–08–694. 

10GAO–12–473T. 11GAO–09–321. 12GAO, Nuclear Safety: Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight 

of Nuclear Facilities and Operations, GAO–09–61 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2008). GAO first 

developed its elements of effective independent oversight of nuclear safety in 1987 when Congress was considering legislation to establish the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Key 

elements include, among other things, independence, technical expertise, and enforcement authority. 

NNSA site offices play a significant role in the day-to-day oversight of NNSA sites 

and contractors. We have, however, in past work found shortcomings in site office 

oversight, particularly in regard to security oversight. For example, we noted both 

security staffing shortages and inadequate security staff training at NNSA site offices.9 In addition, we believe careful Federal oversight of NNSA’s modernization of 

the nuclear security enterprise will be critical to ensure that resources are spent in 

as an effective and efficient manner as possible. GAO agrees that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors’ activities are not an efficient use of 

scarce Federal resources, but that NNSA’s problems are not caused by excessive 

oversight but instead result from ineffective departmental oversight. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 59) What can and should be done to strengthen NNSA’s ability to 

perform effective quality assurance? Does NNSA have the necessary expertise and 

leadership structure that is conducive to effective oversight? 

Mr. ALOISE. 59) Given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major projects, 

safety and security issues, and lack of basic enterprise-wide data, we believe that 

careful and capable Federal oversight is critical to an efficient and effective nuclear 

weapons program. GAO supports NNSA’s efforts to move to more effective, performance-based oversight. As our testimony shows, NNSA’s progress has been mixed.10

Based on our past and ongoing work, we believe important elements of performance 

based oversight include:  Well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and in the field, with a 

thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs;  Contracts with measurable performance targets and financial incentives to meet 

these targets;  Contractor assurance systems that provide detailed information on, among 

other things, achieving performance targets;  Strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors accountable for their performance; and  Vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of safety and security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 60) Self-assessment: The labs conduct a self-assessment for their 

performance evaluation, which is then reviewed by NNSA. Is this the most effective 

model, and how can NNSA improve its ability to conduct oversight without relying 

as much on the lab contractor? 

Mr. ALOISE. 60) For significant areas such as security, DOE and NNSA have 

multitiered oversight requirements and practices that consist of periodic contractor 

self-assessments, Federal site office surveys, and inspections by DOE’s Office Independent Oversight. Contractor self-assessments are vitally important as they are 

conducted by personnel that are most familiar with site operations. Site office survey and independent inspections are important checks on self-assessments. Although this process is sound, we have found that, on occasion, it breaks down when 

site office expertise is not in place. For example, we reported on weaknesses in 

Livermore’s contractor self-assessment program and the NNSA Livermore Site Office’s oversight of the contractor. According to one DOE official, both programs were 

‘‘broken’’ and missed even the ‘‘low-hanging fruit.’’ The laboratory took corrective action to address these deficiencies, but we noted that better oversight was needed to 

ensure that security improvements were fully implemented and sustained.11

In October 2008, we reported that DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security— 

which, among other things, develops, oversees, and helps enforce nuclear safety policies at DOE and NNSA sites—fell short of fully meeting our elements of effective 

independent oversight of nuclear safety. For example, the office’s ability to function 

independently was limited because it had no role in reviewing technical analyses 

that help ensure safe design and operation of nuclear facilities, and the office had 

no personnel at DOE sites to provide independent safety observations.12

Ms. SANCHEZ. 61) Do you believe the public and national security would be best 

served with less oversight of the nuclear labs? 

Mr. ALOISE. 61) No. Given NNSA’s record of weak management of its major 

projects, safety and security issues, and lack of basic enterprise-wide data, we believe that careful and capable Federal oversight is critical and now even more important to sustain recent improvements in security and safety performance, espe-
202 

13GAO–08–694 and GAO–09–321. 14GAO–12–473T. 

cially in light of the tens of billions of dollars that NNSA expects to spend over the 

next decade on modernizing the nuclear security enterprise. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 62) Should NNSA move toward more performance-based oversight? 

If so, how should this be done? 

Mr. ALOISE. 62) Yes, GAO supports NNSA’s efforts and has made a number of 

recommendations to support the agency’s move to more effective, performance-based 

oversight.13 As our testimony shows, NNSA’s progress has been mixed.14 Based on 

our past and ongoing work, we believe important elements of a performance-based 

oversight include:  Well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and in the field, with a 

thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs;  Contracts with measurable performance targets and financial incentives to meet 

these targets;  Contractor assurance systems that contain detailed information on, among 

other things, achieving performance targets.  Strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors accountable for their performance.  Vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of safety and security. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 63) How would you measure adequate nuclear safety? Note that 

traditionally, the quality of worker safety has been measured by the rate of accidents and injuries, where success is reflected by low rates of accidents not necessarily their absence. In contrast, nuclear safety is predicated upon the avoidance 

of accidents. 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 63) Nuclear safety is based on an approach that encompasses 

many layers of defense. For any high consequence event to occur accidently there 

would have to be a failure of multiple layers simultaneously. Adequate nuclear safety would then consist of an adequate number of relatively independent layers 

(where failure in one layer does not cascade into a failure of another layer). Success 

would consist of a low rate of incidents in each of the layers and a low rate of coupling of incidents between layers. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 64) What indicators did you use to measure the avoidance of lowprobability, high-consequence accidents at your nuclear facilities? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 64) I currently have no responsibility for any nuclear facilities 

(However, see Question 63). 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 65) How does the Work for Others support or detract from the nuclear deterrent mission? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 65) Work for Others (WFO) activities executed across the NNSA 

complex supports, in many cases, our primary nuclear deterrence mission. In the 

case of Los Alamos, many nuclear weapons experts assist in WFO activities which 

provides them with additional avenues to develop and use their unique skill sets. 

This outlet is very important since they are doing very little new design or certification work. WFO also contributes to a strong foundation for the laboratory (See 

also Question 66). 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 66) We have seen a significant growth in investment in the labs. 

In that context, what can be done to provide stability in the workforce to ensure 

that we retain the excellence in scientific and engineering quality at the labs? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 66) There has not been significant growth in investment in the 

labs, for example, the current funding of Los Alamos National Laboratory is approximately the same as it was in 2006. 

Excellence in science and engineering at the labs is dependent on the quality of 

the workforce and on the environment in which they work. As I stated in my testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Forces on March 30, 2011 the following elements form a strong foundation for 

the laboratories: 

 A strong national commitment to compelling national security missions; 

 Stable and adequate funding; 

 Diverse and broad cutting-edge scientific programs, which attract the best and 

brightest scientific talent; and 

 Tools, facilities and infrastructure to accomplish the above. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 67) I understand that recent unexpected experiment results have 

been a serious setback to meeting the performance milestones in the National Ignition Campaign, and that this setback has led to management decisions to postpone 

all other experiments on the NIF laser and to reallocate resources from other programs to an accelerated Ignition Campaign. 
203 

 Can you explain to the Committee how the shift from hypothesis-driven science 

to milestone-driven science has NOT been detrimental to the Labs’ science missions? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 67) I am not up-to-date on the status of or the challenges faced 

by the Ignition Campaign. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 68) GAO has criticized NNSA in a long series of reports for not having consistent management data (such as cost accounting data) across all of its sites. 

 Why hasn’t more progress been made in requiring consistent data and bookkeeping? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 68) This is a question best answered by the NNSA. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 69) How do the conclusions of this report comport with your experiences with DOE nuclear safety requirements (i.e., rules, orders, manuals, and standards) for the nuclear weapons complex? 

 Did you find these nuclear safety requirements to be burdensome? Could you 

provide any specific examples of burdensome nuclear safety requirements? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 69) I do not know to which report this question is referring. 

Ensuring the safety of workers, the public and the environment in a way that is 

balanced with mission accomplishment is essential for success of the laboratory and 

the complex. One way to become out of balance is when requirements are put in 

place that can lead to a small reduction in safety risks while significantly increasing 

the risk to mission accomplishment. This led to the recommendation in my testimony before this Subcommittee that ‘‘new requirements or interpretations of existing ones (by internal or external organizations) must be coupled with a cost-benefit 

analysis.’’ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 70) Does the National Laboratories Directors Council, which reports 

directly to the Secretary of Energy, bypassing the NNSA reporting structure, disrupt oversight and contribute to a dysfunctional system where NNSA and the labs 

do not trust each other? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 70) During my tenure as a Laboratory Director on the Council we 

generally addressed DOE-wide issues with the full participation of the NNSA Administrator. This council did not contribute to any lack of my trust of NNSA. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 71) What is your perspective on the recent NNSA governance reform initiative in which the contractors assume more responsibility for oversight of 

compliance with nuclear safety requirements, while Federal oversight focuses on 

contractor systems for ensuring safety? 

 What was the purpose and objectives of your contractor assurance system? 

 What experience did you have with such a self-assessing contractor assurance 

system, and what are the specific advantages and disadvantages of this system? 

 What did your contractor assurance system indicate about the need for more 

or less requirements, about the rigor of compliance with requirements, and 

about the need for more or less oversight? 

 How did you ensure that you had adequately established a balance in priorities 

and resources between your safety programs and your missions? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 71) During my tenure as Laboratory Director at LANL, the contractor assurance system (CAS) was one of the internal tools we used to manage 

the laboratory. The senior management team periodically set a balanced set of internal performance goals that spanned operations (including safety), mission, and 

science. Progress against those goals was monitored through CAS. If progress was 

lacking in an area I was able to see that, to engage the responsible senior manager, 

to make appropriate resources available, and to enlist the entire management team 

as needed for corrective action and resolution. 

Proper Federal oversight should be focused on outcomes and with the Laboratories held accountable for them. It should not be focused on the transactional issues 

of how specific safety requirements are achieved nor of the details of how CAS or 

any other management system works. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 72) How can the operator of facilities/Line Management, DOE as 

owner of the facilities, and the public have confidence that contractor assurance systems are capable of detecting a decline in the safety posture of a facility or operation? 

 How mature was this capability at your laboratory? 

 In the areas of worker safety and high-risk operations such as those at nuclear 

facilities, could you describe how you ensured that performance was maintained 

at least at its previous level if not improved? 

 Could you describe the key measures that you relied on to ensure that you 

avoided nuclear or other high-hazard accidents, and explain why you believe 

that those measures gave you sufficient confidence that the workers and the 

public were and continue to be afforded adequate protection? 
204 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 72) Others should be confident in the Laboratory when established outcomes are being met. If a problem arises there should be clear indications 

that the seriousness of the problem is understood through prompt and appropriate 

actions by the Laboratory and its senior leaders. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 73) Do you believe that your site had a good safety record? 

 What indicators did you use to measure your laboratory’s safety performance? 

What did you compare those indicators against to decide the quality of that performance? And why do you believe that those measures are adequate to evaluate the quality of safety at your laboratories? 

 What indicators do you use to measure the nuclear safety performance of the 

facilities at your lab? What do you compare those measures against? 

 How did/should those measures help you avoid the occurrence of a low-probability, high-consequence accident? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 73) We measured our safety performance against annual goals set 

by the senior leadership team and against the performance of other large institutions with a similar mix of activities to LANL. While I do believe the LANL’s safety 

record was trending in the right direction, I do not have the data at hand to provide 

a more detailed answer to this question. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 74) The laboratories conduct some of the Nation’s most sensitive 

activities, including designing, producing, and maintaining the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons; supporting nonproliferation efforts; conducting efforts for other military or 

national security applications; and performing research and development in advanced technologies for potential defense and commercial applications. 

 How do these different missions complicate oversight requirements? 

 How do they support efficiencies and best use of taxpayer dollars? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 74) Oversight should not be more complicated if there is oversight 

of outcomes, rather than of activities, with those responsible held accountable. 

A broad portfolio of national security science missions supports laboratory efficiency and is an effective use of taxpayer dollars. 

For example, with the funding challenges faced by NNSA, and the Government 

in general, there can be shortfalls in support for scientific capabilities necessary for 

NNSA. As I stated in testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Forces on March 30, 2011, ‘‘In order to mitigate the 

consequences of these shortfalls in support for our scientific capabilities, we have 

consciously found funding from other sponsors that utilize some of the same science 

as that needed by the weapons program, and in that way sustain and enrich our 

capabilities that reside in the more than 2,500 PhDs that are the core of our science 

base.’’ 

In addition, the broad portfolio of national security science programs ‘‘serve to 

both attract top scientists to the Laboratory, and they also build up fundamental 

scientific capability that can then be further leveraged and applied to our core weapons program work.’’ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 75) How would you measure adequate nuclear safety? Note that 

traditionally, the quality of worker safety has been measured by the rate of accidents and injuries, where success is reflected by low rates of accidents not necessarily their absence. In contrast, nuclear safety is predicated upon the avoidance 

of accidents. 

Dr. MILLER. 75) The principles of good safety management are universal; the formality and rigor with which they are applied changes depending on the consequences of potential safety incidents. In my view, good safety management starts 

with the perspective that there is no such thing as an ‘‘accident’’—safety incidents 

are the consequence of breakdown of one or more of the safety systems: failure to 

properly analyze and recognize the hazards, failure to establish or follow proper procedures, failure to properly maintain or employ appropriate safety equipment, or 

human failure. 

The adequacy of a nuclear safety system is judged by rigorous evaluation and 

testing of the analysis of potential hazards, the procedures, the equipment and safety systems, and the people and their training. Evaluation and testing are performed 

by line management, and independently by the responsible managing institution 

and an outside agency. These multiple systems and the multiple levels of evaluation 

provide assurance of the adequacy of the nuclear safety system. Ultimately, in my 

view, the quality of the people doing the work is the most important ingredient. 

They are individually and collectively responsible and in the best position to judge 

the adequacy of hazard analyses, the procedures, the safety systems, and their own 

and their colleagues’ level of training and proficiency. Because nuclear safety is of 

paramount importance, all operations at the Laboratory’s nuclear facilities—and the 

condition of the facilities themselves—are managed in a very formal and robust 
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manner with the rigor expected by all stakeholders. There are multiple layers of 

protection designed to preclude plausible accidents. As I describe in more detail 

below, the way by which we implement and maintain nuclear safety at LLNL provides key indicators and important means to gauge adequacy of nuclear safety. 

Three interrelated features are particularly important: 

 A Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), which must be approved by DOE/NNSA 

before a facility can operate. The DSA describes the required safety systems, 

operating procedures, and personnel training, which provide multiple layers of 

protection against hazards and potential risks identified through thorough analysis. We are legally required to maintain these means for providing nuclear 

safety. 

 Numerous and frequent internal and external audits and assessments, which, 

over the past decade, have clearly demonstrated that the safety systems and 

management programs in place at LLNL nuclear facilities are viable, effective, 

and compliant. 

 Feedback from our nuclear facility workers, who would be the first personnel 

to be impacted by an accident. Based on their feedback, we take steps to resolve 

any concerns before they become potential safety issues. The workers confirm 

daily that overall they have strong confidence that the facility is being operated 

safely. 

Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)—The nuclear risk management process is 

codified in 10 CFR 830, Subpart B. It requires the development of a detailed DSA, 

which must be approved by DOE/NNSA before a facility can operate. The DSA thoroughly analyzes the hazards and potential accidents associated with the facility. 

Based on this analysis, facility safety systems and safety management programs are 

designated to prevent and/or mitigate plausible accidents. NNSA’s acceptance of risk 

for the nuclear facility and approval to operate are contingent on these safety systems and programs being in place; their functionality must be maintained at all 

times by the contractor operating the facility. The operator is legally bound to ensure the operability and reliability of the designated safety systems and does so 

through a rigorous and well-documented maintenance, testing, and inspection program. Likewise, the operator is legally bound to implement formal safety management programs that meet the intent of the approved DSA. 

Audits and Assessments—LLNL nuclear facilities are subjected to numerous and 

frequent internal and external audits and assessments that review the effectiveness 

of the safety systems and management programs as well as their compliance with 

DOE and LLNL requirements. The results of these many assessments over the past 

decade clearly demonstrate that the safety systems and management programs in 

place at LLNL nuclear facilities are viable, effective, and compliant. These results 

are a good measure of the adequacy of our nuclear safety and provide high assurance that our nuclear facilities are being operated safely. Each and every worker 

at LLNL has STOP WORK authority if they sense an unsafe or hazardous situation 

or condition. Typically findings are identified in audits. If it were found that a safety 

management program was broken (i.e., not meeting its intent) or that a safety system was inoperable, by law LLNL would be required to shut down operation of the 

facility until the system or program was restored to proper function. Rather, the 

findings in LLNL audits have been of the type that are informative of potential 

weaknesses and used to continuously improve our programs. The minor nature of 

findings in audits and assessments—and the Laboratory’s timely responsive actions 

to improve—provide perhaps the most reliable measure of the adequacy of our nuclear safety. 

In addition to numerous nuclear-specific audits and assessments, our nuclear facilities also report data on a broader set of environmental, safety, and health 

(ES&H) measures employed by other hazardous facilities at the Laboratory. These 

‘‘conventional’’ ES&H performance measures reflect the adequacy of nuclear safety 

because they are indicative of worker commitment to safety—a required foundation 

to sound nuclear safety. 

Feedback from workers—We gauge the adequacy of our nuclear safety via the 

feedback from our nuclear facility workers. These workers are on the front line in 

close proximity to the hazards. They would be the first to be impacted by an accident and are invariably the first to become aware of a potential safety issue or the 

failure of a mitigating feature. Through frequent meetings and discussions, we gather their feedback to identify and resolve potential issues early before they evolve 

into more significant safety problems. And the workers confirm daily that overall 

they have strong confidence that the facility is being operated safely. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 76) What indicators did you use to measure the avoidance of lowprobability, high-consequence accidents at your nuclear facilities? 
206 

Dr. MILLER. 76) We use a wide variety of indicators to judge the adequacy of the 

implementation of our nuclear safety systems—including standard ES&H measures 

such as injuries and first aid; information gained from informal facility 

walkthroughs observing general housekeeping and work practices and collecting 

worker feedback; and results of line management, institutional, and independent 

oversight evaluations and audits. 

A high-consequence accident is clearly something that must be avoided, and 

LLNL takes very seriously its obligation to the U.S. Government, its employees, and 

neighboring communities to ensure the safe and secure operation of its nuclear facilities. Unlike nuclear reactors, our facilities are not prone to major failure in the 

event of a loss of supporting utilities such as cooling water or facility power. As 

such, the potential accidents at LLNL are more bounded and can be more clearly 

defined than is the case for reactors. These potential accidents are thoroughly analyzed by safety professionals. Based on their results, limitations to allowed operations and mitigating engineered design features (to prevent operational missteps 

from leading to accidents) are established as a set of controls. Safety professionals 

ensure that these controls are consistent with national standards and DOE/NNSA 

orders. The controls are layered so that no single failure significantly raises the 

probability of an accident. Altogether, the set of controls ensure accidents do not 

occur. LLNL staff, as well as Federal oversight personnel, routinely assess the implementation of these controls to ensure robustness. The assessment results inform facility managers of any weaknesses in the implementation of the controls, who use 

the data to ensure that the facility remains far from any risk of a high-consequence 

accident. Any findings are characterized by level of importance or potential safety 

impact, which drives the urgency of resolving the issue and whether or not the operation should continue until the issue is resolved. All assessment findings, observations, and identified opportunities for improvement are captured as actionable items 

that are tracked to closure in a database that is part of our Contractor Assurance 

System. The adequacy of the closure in addressing the perceived need is also reviewed. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 77) How does the Work for Others support or detract from the nuclear deterrent mission? 

Dr. MILLER. 77) LLNL’s engagement in programs and activities across the broad 

range of national security challenges strongly supports our nuclear deterrent mission and vice versa. Because of the core scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities required for our nuclear deterrent mission, the Laboratory can both synergistically and cost effectively support and make key contributions to a broad spectrum of projects and programs sponsored by other Federal agencies. These broader 

national security activities provide additional scientific and technical vitality and 

help to maintain the key capabilities required in our nuclear deterrent mission. Particularly in times of great fiscal constraint the synergism between all of the Laboratory’s projects and programs is key to maintaining a world-class workforce and an 

institution able to address the Nation’s most serious national security challenges. 

These projects (in my view, misnamed ‘‘Work for Others’’) that are part of our 

broad Nation security mission are a key component of our strategy for helping solve 

the country’s most important problems and sustaining science and technology excellence and intellectual vitality at the Laboratory. Pursuit of a broad national security 

mission by the laboratories is a component of NNSA’s Strategic Plan. Support of the 

strategy was also one of the top-level recommendations in the report issued by the 

National Academy of Sciences committee studying the quality of science and engineering and management of the NNSA national laboratories. 

Nuclear security is and will remain the core responsibility of the NNSA laboratories. Because of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Livermore has unique capabilities and facilities that can be brought to bear on the Nation’s most important 

challenges. We have long worked with other agencies (in cases, private industry) in 

the areas of defense and international security, energy and environmental security, 

and economic competitiveness. With the many challenges facing the U.S., expansion 

of these efforts serves the national interest and makes effective use of taxpayer dollars invested in the laboratories. A broader base of national security programs complements the Stockpile Stewardship Program—it is neither a distraction from nor 

a substitute for our principal mission. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 78) We have seen a significant growth in investment in the labs. 

In that context, what can be done to provide stability in the workforce to ensure 

that we retain the excellence in scientific and engineering quality at the labs? 

Dr. MILLER. 78) For the record, LLNL has not seen significant growth; in fact, 

the Laboratory has declined in size from 8846 heads in FY 2004 to 7832 heads in 

FY 2008 to 6670 heads in FY 2012 (beginning of third quarter). The recent growth 
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in NNSA’s budget has roughly stabilized the size of the Laboratory—we currently 

are slightly larger than our nadir in FY 2010 at 6430 heads. 

In my view, the NNSA laboratories are at their best when they are focused on 

very challenging and important mission driven problems whose solution requires 

sustained efforts over time. Having a set of recognized national security missions 

that are focused on our country’s most challenging problems—together with program and financial stability—are the keys to attracting and retaining a high-quality 

scientific, technical, and engineering workforce. 

The Laboratory’s most important asset is its people, and the most important factor in sustaining scientific and engineering excellence is attracting and retaining 

top-notch talent, which requires vigilance and sustained management attention. 

Over the years, we have been able to do so because the Laboratory offers the opportunity to work on problems of national importance and to apply cutting-edge science 

and technology to solve them. Hence, continued investment in the scientific and 

technical capabilities (e.g., high-performance computing) and facilities at the Laboratory is absolutely crucial. Without the cutting-edge facilities and capabilities, we 

will not be able to attract and retain talent; without the talent, we cannot sustain 

scientific and engineering excellence and unaddressed national security challenges 

will increase our collective peril. 

Another key factor in attracting and retaining top-notch talent is program stability. Vagaries about future budgets impact people’s thinking about long term careers at an institution. The laboratories would greatly benefit from a clear and consistent message from successive administrations and Congresses that the work at 

the laboratories is important, together with stable funding. Dedicated to national 

service, our people and their families deserve a commitment of support! 

The presence of modern facilities, laboratories, and infrastructure is also important. We need to continually reinvest in facilities and infrastructure. Recapitalization has suffered in recent years. Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) 

funding to LLNL is the lowest in the NNSA complex and we are falling behind in 

basic upkeep of the infrastructure and its related services. At some point a recapitalization shortfall will affect our ability to do cutting-edge science and engineering. 

Finally, the ability to draw top talent to the Laboratory and sustain scientific and 

engineering excellence depends on sustaining a positive, productive work environment. In my testimony I emphasized that the NNSA laboratories are under severe 

stress in their ability to perform their vital missions because they are substantially 

and increasingly constrained by the manner in which Federal management and 

oversight is implemented. I concluded my testimony with the remark, ‘‘If the government continues down the path of treating the NNSA laboratories as contractors 

rather than trusted partners, engaging in excessive oversight, and treating the 

workforce as replaceable employees rather than exceptional people dedicated to public service, I wonder how much longer the national security laboratories will be able 

to sustain their greatness.’’ The time for leadership and action is now! 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 79) I understand that recent unexpected experiment results have 

been a serious setback to meeting the performance milestones in the National Ignition Campaign, and that this setback has led to management decisions to postpone 

all other experiments on the NIF laser and to reallocate resources from other programs to an accelerated Ignition Campaign. 

 Can you explain to the Committee how the shift from hypothesis-driven science 

to milestone-driven science has NOT been detrimental to the Labs’ science missions? 

Dr. MILLER. 79) As I explain in greater detail below, the National Ignition Campaign continues to make excellent progress on the grand challenge of achieving fusion ignition and burn. There have been no ‘‘recent unexpected experimental results’’ that we characterize as ‘‘a serious setback’’ and I (and recent review committees) see no showstoppers to prevent the team from achieving ignition. Accordingly, 

there has been no decision to reallocate resources to accelerate the campaign. As 

the question recognizes, there is growing appreciation that the setting of calendarspecific milestones in a scientific discovery project as complex as achieving ignition 

can be detrimental. 

The National Ignition Facility (NIF)/National Ignition Campaign (NIC) is a 

mission- driven program that was established to meet important national security 

needs. NIF’s capabilities are required in order to perform experiments to gather 

data about the performance of nuclear weapons as they begin to explode. The data 

is vitally important to validate the computer simulations that we use to assess the 

performance of aging weapons, make changes when necessary, and certify the performance of the those changes. Other types of NIF experiments gather key data 

about material properties at extreme conditions that are input into weapon simulation codes. Finally, data gathered at NIF also answers key questions scientists have 
208 

about the universe, and the achievement of ignition at NIF is a necessary step toward developing fusion power as an essentially inexhaustible source of clean energy. 

Basically, we are working to three inter-related sets of milestones. NIC milestones 

are of two types: those associated with construction and performance of the NIF 

laser system and experimental diagnostics and those associated with experiments 

to achieve ignition. A third set of milestones pertains to experiments in support of 

stockpile stewardship and high-energy-density science. Many types of experiments 

in this third category do not require ignition and these types have figured into experimental plans to date. Achieving ignition is important, because it will enable the 

fielding of a wider range of stockpile stewardship and science experiments to gather 

important data. 

Construction of NIF and bringing it online with its supportive diagnostics and target fabrication capabilities have been spectacular successes. The laser, diagnostics 

systems, target fabrication, and operations are world class and are producing remarkable data of unparalleled quality. The laser system has proved to be remarkably reliable and precise in energy delivery, and this summer, NIF achieved record 

setting levels of power (500 trillion watts) and energy (nearly 1.9 million joules)— 

exceeding design specifications. 

As researchers work toward achieving ignition, NIF is providing spectacular data 

in support of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Most notably, NIF experiments 

provided data that allowed scientists to resolve a previously unexplained anomaly 

in nuclear weapons performance that was one of the factors driving the need for nuclear testing. Successful Stockpile Stewardship-supportive experimental campaigns 

in 2012 focused on gathering data about material properties and the interaction of 

materials with intense radiation at nearly star-like conditions. 

Experiments at NIF continue to make extraordinary progress toward the goal of 

fusion ignition. The work, which is breaking new ground in understanding physical 

processes at conditions never studied in a laboratory before, is very challenging— 

requiring successive steps of conducting experiments, comparing results with simulations, and using the results to improve both the simulation models and the design of targets and next experiments. This is the process by which science progresses. In the last year of experiments, NIC experiments have successfully resolved 

most of the major physics concerns necessary to achieve ignition. Current work is 

focusing on resolving the remaining issues and integrating all of the pieces together. 

Recently two groups reviewed NIF/NIC progress in achieving ignition and announced their findings. Both reports praised NIF and its National Ignition Campaign’s ‘‘outstanding progress’’ to date. As to the specific milestones in the NIC, one 

group expressed concern about achieving alpha heating (a key step toward ignition) 

in FY 2012; the other group wrote, ‘‘These are not simple experiments. They involve 

investigating phenomena well beyond contemporary experience. A deadline imposed 

on an experimental discovery science program to achieve a particular result by a 

particular time at a particular cost is often unrealistic.’’ Both committees reviewed 

plans for future experiments examining key aspects of implosion performance, and 

the path forward was praised in both reports. NNSA and the NIF team have agreed 

on plans for FY 2013 (subject to funding). They include both non- ignition Stockpile 

Stewardship/science experiments and ignition experiments—bearing in mind that 

this is a mission-driven program but that milestones need to respect uncertainties 

in the pace of scientific discovery. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 80) GAO has criticized NNSA in a long series of reports for not having consistent management data (such as cost accounting data) across all of its sites. 

 Why hasn’t more progress been made in requiring consistent data and bookkeeping? 

Dr. MILLER. 80) For questions regarding NNSA’s standards and procedures, I 

would refer you to NNSA for an appropriate answer. Let me simply note that consistent management data across all of the sites is a laudable objective, NNSA has 

collected considerable information on the matter, and working groups are addressing issues. 

I do have a concern and a caution that speak to one of the themes of my testimony: roles and responsibilities. It is clear that NNSA needs clear and consistent 

management data. There is a strong tendency in any bureaucracy to collect reams 

of detailed data and use that data to increase the level of ‘‘micromanagement.’’ 

NNSA needs to collect the data they need to do their job while avoiding the tendency to collect excessive data to increase their level of detailed project and activity 

oversight and management. It is also important to remember that each site faces 

a different set of issues and constraints so that a ‘‘one-size-fits-all solution’’ to data 

management may be difficult to implement (i.e., costly and time-consuming) and 

turn out to be impractical for some sites. 
209 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 81) How do the conclusions of this report comport with your experiences with DOE nuclear safety requirements (i.e., rules, orders, manuals, and standards) for the nuclear weapons complex?  Did you find these nuclear safety requirements to be burdensome? Could you 

provide any specific examples of burdensome nuclear safety requirements? 

Dr. MILLER. 81) Quite frankly, one of the largest burdens of the nuclear safety 

requirements is their impact on the workload of the safety professionals at our Laboratory. It is critically important for facility operators and managers to spend more 

time managing hands-on by walking around rather than managing through paperwork that adds little to assurance of real line safety. At LLNL, the number of oversight personnel is nearly equal to the number of facility staff available to respond 

to their issues. Consequently, the bulk of the work being performed by the facility 

staff centers on responding to issues raised by these oversight personnel instead of 

their being able to work on issues the facility management and those with handson operating experience believe to be important. The facility is forced into a nonvalue-adding, overly strict regulatory compliance approach instead of focusing on 

those issues that will actually increase the margin of safety. This is an example of 

a focus of my testimony—the problem of excessive ‘‘transactional oversight’’ focused 

on detailed compliance rather than ‘‘process oversight’’ directed at critiquing our 

systems for identifying and cost-effectively enhancing nuclear safety performance. 

For the most part, DOE nuclear safety rules, standards and orders are not necessarily problematic in and of themselves. They simply define what must be done 

to operate a nuclear facility safely. In most cases, the orders are reasonable and represent what most operators believe is necessary for safe operations. However, many 

safety rules, standards, and order have become burdensome for one of two principal 

reasons: excessive documentation and/or onerous interpretation. In both cases, the 

result is reduced effort working on issues that the experienced nuclear safety experts within the Laboratory and nuclear facility managers consider to be most important. A prime example of the former case is NQA–1, which is burdensome because it requires, in my view, inordinately extensive documentation. 

Onerous interpretation is the source of the highest level of concern voiced by nuclear facility managers and operators. This arises from several interacting factors: 

loose interpretation of guidelines, oversight by many different personnel with differing agendas and (in many cases) without relevant operating experience, and an 

overly risk-adverse interpretation of how to comply with the order. Those making 

the interpretation are not responsible for executing program work, nor do they have 

the responsibility to pay for the cost of implementation. As such, the resulting decisions are often extremely costly and require excessive manpower to implement. In 

too many cases, the net value to safety is negligible while the costs are significant. 

I have learned from personal experience the negative impact of excessive oversight that initiates excessive documentation. Documentation of processes and procedures and responses to audits and evaluations are best performed by the most 

knowledgeable senior workers and line managers. However, when these critical employees spend the majority of their time in their offices writing, they are not in the 

laboratory or the facility observing work, finding issues, and correcting them before 

they become problems. 

The impact of overly risk-averse interpretation is cumulative, invariably increasing over time. When reviewing the purpose and rationale behind nuclear safety orders, standards, and rules, one finds that the original intent has often been displaced by increasingly onerous interpretation. An example is the Unreviewed Safety 

Question (USQ) process. With the loss of both original intent and an established approach based on precedence, new and constantly-changing interpretations are effectively adding requirement across the complex and diverting USQ from the original 

intent of the process. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 82) Does the National Laboratories Directors Council, which reports 

directly to the Secretary of Energy, bypassing the NNSA reporting structure, disrupt oversight and contribute to a dysfunctional system where NNSA and the labs 

do not trust each other? 

Dr. MILLER. 82) The question engages two distinct issues: dysfunctionality within 

NNSA and engagement of NNSA/DOE with senior management of the laboratories. 

In my view, they are largely decoupled, e.g., the National Laboratories Directors 

Council has essentially nothing to do with dysfunctionality within NNSA. Almost 

the opposite, greater engagement of NNSA/DOE with laboratory managers would 

likely lead to a far more functional governance and oversight system. 

The main point I made in my testimony is that the core issue in governance and 

oversight is the loss of the sense of partnership and mutuality between NNSA/DOE 

and the national security laboratories. There is a lack of trust that prevents the 

Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) model from func-
210 

tioning the way it should. The laboratories and NNSA are engaged in wide-ranging 

activities to address the problem. 

The situation at another FFRDC laboratory is quite different. The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) has a $1.5 billion budget and is managed by the California Institute of Technology for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 

NASA’s governance structure consists of three management councils: an Executive 

Council, a Mission Support Council, and a Program Management Council. Each 

council includes JPL and NASA’s other nine space/research centers as members 

(with 20 to 25 total membership). Moreover, NASA laboratories and research centers are fully integrated into NASA’s organizational structure, directly providing 

input into decisionmaking, and work as valued partners in achieving mission success. Discussions with NASA and JPL personnel have made clear that the working 

relationship was constructive, without major concerns about governance, and providing effective oversight of the laboratories in a much simpler, less costly manner. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 83) What is your perspective on the recent NNSA governance reform initiative in which the contractors assume more responsibility for oversight of 

compliance with nuclear safety requirements, while Federal oversight focuses on 

contractor systems for ensuring safety?  What was the purpose and objectives of your contractor assurance system?  What experience did you have with such a self-assessing contractor assurance 

system, and what are the specific advantages and disadvantages of this system?  What did your contractor assurance system indicate about the need for more 

or less requirements, about the rigor of compliance with requirements, and 

about the need for more or less oversight?  How did you ensure that you had adequately established a balance in priorities 

and resources between your safety programs and your missions? 

Dr. MILLER. 83) I concluded my written statement to the committee with three 

‘‘Ts’’: restore TRUST, eliminate TRANSACTIONAL oversight; and TURN OVER 

management to the people you hired to manage (the directors of the laboratories). 

Reform of NNSA governance of the laboratories must be based on mutual trust— 

that we are truly partners in successfully pursuing our national security mission. 

Without increased trust, it will be very difficult to make substantial improvements 

in NNSA governance of the laboratories and move to more efficient and effective 

oversight. 

There is much to be gained in cost efficiency by eliminating DOE/NNSA transactional oversight in areas such as non-nuclear ES&H, where existing external regulations, regulatory bodies and certification to meeting recognized international 

standards should apply. Nuclear safety is both extremely important and different 

with regard to the existence of external regulations. In spite of this difference, there 

are marked advantages to transform the preponderance of external transactional 

oversight to self-assessment processes and striving for NNSA/DOE and Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board oversight to be more process-oriented (e.g., largely directed at providing a critique of the Laboratory’s self-assessment process). To the 

extent that the ongoing NNSA governance reform initiative succeeds in moving in 

this direction, I think it is a very positive step. 

In the highly specialized area of nuclear operations, we have found that self-assessments by the people closest to the work to be the most effective means for identifying weaknesses and suggesting areas for improvement. Such self-assessment activities can be planned (e.g., appropriately scoped and focused) and executed by personnel who are familiar with the nuclear facility, the nuances of nuclear operations 

and nuclear safety, and the detailed attributes of the site’s safety programs. Assessments performed by less informed third parties not familiar with facility specifics 

often miss the mark and identify issues not pertinent to making changes that would 

tangibly improve nuclear safety. 

The role of the Contractor Assurance System (and/or a nuclear safety adjunct to 

it) is to track findings and the status of responsive actions; it also provides a framework for ensuring that an appropriate variety of processes are being looked at on 

some regular interval. More process-oriented oversight activities conducted by 

NNSA and/or the DNFSB to augment and complement rigorous self-assessment system would constitute an efficient, effective approach to assuring nuclear safety. 

Assessments and oversight of our nuclear facilities over the past decade have 

clearly demonstrated that the safety systems and management programs in place 

at LLNL nuclear facilities are viable, effective, and compliant. They are vital to assuring nuclear safety at LLNL to NNSA/DOE, other stakeholders, and the public; 

changes should strive to make assessment and oversight processes more efficient 

while increasing their quality. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 84) How can the operator of facilities/Line Management, DOE as 

owner of the facilities, and the public have confidence that contractor assurance sys-
211 

tems are capable of detecting a decline in the safety posture of a facility or operation?  How mature was this capability at your laboratory?  In the areas of worker safety and high-risk operations such as those at nuclear 

facilities, could you describe how you ensured that performance was maintained 

at least at its previous level if not improved?  Could you describe the key measures that you relied on to ensure that you 

avoided nuclear or other high-hazard accidents, and explain why you believe 

that those measures gave you sufficient confidence that the workers and the 

public were and continue to be afforded adequate protection? 

Dr. MILLER. 84) As I answered to Question 75, three interrelated features in the 

way nuclear safety is implemented at LLNL provide the basis for having confidence 

in the quality of nuclear safety at LLNL: implementation of safety systems and 

management processes in accordance with a Documented Safety Analysis; frequent 

internal and external assessments and audits to assure that those systems and 

processes are working; and feedback from the experienced nuclear facility workers 

at the Laboratory. Laboratory and NNSA/DOE managers and their staffs fully engage in and interact through the many processes that implementation of nuclear 

safety entails. We need to work in partnership as a trusted team. Such teamwork 

would provide a much stronger basis for assurance that safety systems and safety 

management programs are effective and compliant than reliance on a large system 

to generate and manage compliance data. 

The Contractor Assurance System (CAS) at LLNL is a formal and mature program. CAS provides tracking data to substantiate (and provide assurance) to Laboratory and DOE/NNSA management with a high level of confidence that the nuclear facilities are being operated safely, securely, and in accordance with requirements. The CAS provides information about important safety-system elements such 

as assessments, notifications and reporting, issues tracking and resolution, feedback, and continuous process improvement. 

Consider, for example, audits and assessments of nuclear facilities, which range 

from less formal management observations and inspections to more rigorous management self- assessments to formal audits by external organizations. Each year, 

the Lab develops a detailed Institutional Assessment Plan (IAP) that identifies the 

number and type of assessments that will be performed and which safety management programs and functional areas will be assessed. Each safety management program is assessed no less frequently than once every three years. The breadth and 

depth of these assessments, coupled with the fact that formal planning ensures that 

all safety programs are assessed periodically, provides LLNL management and DOE 

with the confidence that a decline in safety posture will be detected. As I discussed 

in more detail in answer to Question 75, the results of the many assessments conducted over the past decade clearly demonstrate that the systems and processes in 

place at LLNL nuclear facilities are viable, effective, and compliant. These results 

are a good measure and provide assurance of nuclear safety quality. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 85) Do you believe that your site had a good safety record? 

 What indicators did you use to measure your laboratory’s safety performance? 

What did you compare those indicators against to decide the quality of that performance? And why do you believe that those measures are adequate to evaluate the quality of safety at your laboratories? 

 What indicators do you use to measure the nuclear safety performance of the 

facilities at your lab? What do you compare those measures against? 

 How did/should those measures help you avoid the occurrence of a low-probability, high-consequence accident? 

Dr. MILLER. 85) I believe that safety and quality are critical ingredients in everything we do; it is a continuous focus and is as important as breathing. Even one 

injury is too many because it means that a friend or colleague has been hurt. 

While I served as LLNL Director, one of my top priorities was to reorient the safety culture at the Laboratory and focus first on why safety is so important to us and 

then on how to improve it: we focus on safety because we care deeply about the 

health and welfare of our family, friends, and colleagues. Among many steps, my 

actions included emphasizing safety in my interactions with employees, promoting 

safety through Laboratory-wide communications campaigns, encouraging employee 

input on best safety practices, and setting high expectations that all senior managers exhibit leadership in safety. I am pleased that Parney Albright, my successor, 

carries forward this emphasis on safety. 

As an example, I instituted (and Parney continues to hold) Monthly Performance 

Reviews, which are attended by Laboratory senior managers and representatives 

from the NNSA Livermore Site Office. We review progress in all aspects of Laboratory performance, including frank discussion of problems, setbacks, and pending 
212 

issues—with action items assigned. The discussions benefit from high-level statistics 

and trends (including data gathered through the Contractor Assurance System). In 

particular, discussion of safety trends and issues are part of the fixed agenda that 

deals with problems and concerns. 

The leading indicators of safety performance are very positive. The number of 

Total Recordable Cases (TRC) and the number of Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred (DART) are the lowest they have been over the past decade. Since the contract transition at the end of Fiscal Year 2007, both indicators are nearly 100 percent reduced: TRC from 2.59 to 1.31 and DART from 1.00 to 0.52. (In 2010, the average for private industry was 3.5 and 1.8, respectively.) 

Another indicator of a strengthening safety culture is external certification. In 

2011, LLNL received Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series (OHSAS) 

18001 accreditation for its safety management system for integrating safety considerations into work planning and controls. Achieving and maintaining OHSAS 18001 

standards is recognized as an industry best practice. Of course, the Laboratory’s 

strengthened safety culture—marked by improvements in conventional ES&H performance measures and external certification of our safety systems—encompasses 

the workers in LLNL nuclear facilities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 86) The laboratories conduct some of the Nation’s most sensitive 

activities, including designing, producing, and maintaining the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons; supporting nonproliferation efforts; conducting efforts for other military or 

national security applications; and performing research and development in advanced technologies for potential defense and commercial applications. 

 How do these different missions complicate oversight requirements? 

 How do they support efficiencies and best use of taxpayer dollars? 

Dr. MILLER. 86) The preponderance of issues related to burdensome oversight relate to operational aspects of the Laboratory—not mission-related aspects. In addition to daily oversight by the NNSA site office personnel, more than 1,000 audits 

and inspections have been conducted in FY 2012 by the site office, NNSA Headquarters, and DOE. Internally, LLNL performed nearly 300 self-assessments in FY 

2012, of which about 70 percent were driven by requirements. By far, the majority 

of these audits and inspections were in the area of ES&H, followed by security. The 

work performed as part of our NNSA nuclear security mission (stockpile stewardship and nuclear nonproliferation) is the most complex from an operational viewpoint. Much of our work for other federal agencies makes use of operational capabilities and facilities that we have because of the nuclear security mission. 

As I explained in my answer to Question 77, the outstanding capabilities of LLNL 

and the other NNSA laboratories are being and should be used to address a broader 

set of national security issues. We apply our cutting-edge science and technology to 

develop innovative solutions to problems in the areas of defense and international 

security, energy and environmental security, and economic competitiveness. This 

strategy is good for the country and makes best use of taxpayer dollars invested in 

these centers of scientific and technical excellence. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 87) How would you measure adequate nuclear safety? Note that 

traditionally, the quality of worker safety has been measured by the rate of accidents and injuries, where success is reflected by low rates of accidents not necessarily their absence. In contrast, nuclear safety is predicated upon the avoidance 

of accidents. 

Dr. ROBINSON. 87) Throughout my time at Sandia, the primary methodology for 

focusing on what was important with respect to ensuring nuclear safety was 

through applying Probabilistic Risk Assessments, which was originally a Sandia Lab 

creation, although it is now applied worldwide for this and other purposes. It allows 

one to think through the risks and consequences and to determine actions that provide the maximum mitigation for such low probability, but high consequence, risks. 

However, as I am certainly out of date as to current practices at Sandia in metrics 

for nuclear safety, having retired 6 years ago, I have requested help from Sandia 

in answering this and several other questions. 

I will submit these more fulsome answers at a later date. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 88) What indicators did you use to measure the avoidance of lowprobability, high-consequence accidents at your nuclear facilities? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 88) The common tool used is to conduct probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) of various possibilities. This tool was originally developed at Sandia 

National Laboratories—for the evaluation of relative risks to safety of the design, 

construction, storage, transport, and operation of nuclear weapons, and has been 

subsequently applied worldwide for a variety of other safety-related analysis problems. In particular, it has been employed for safety analyses by the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission to ensure that the operation of nuclear power-generating 
213 

plants pose no undue risks to public health and safety. Sandia, in particular, and 

other national laboratories, assist the NRC in the further enhancement and uses of 

the PRA tools. 

Over the past five decades, PRA has become a well-established field and is now 

used by many organizations, to ensure that risks are properly prioritized, in order 

to identify which risks/hazards can have the most impacts on safety of complex systems worldwide. Since in nuclear weapons matters, information related to the identification of any such vulnerabilities are automatically deemed ‘‘classified,’’ these 

will not be discussed here. Sandia would be pleased to provide experts to discuss 

those matters further within an appropriate venue. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 89) How does the Work for Others support or detract from the nuclear deterrent mission? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 89) I believe this question has nearly a complete overlap with previous Question 55 [Now Question 45], where I have written a long and complete answer. I urge you to review that answer. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 90) We have seen a significant growth in investment in the labs. 

In that context, what can be done to provide stability in the workforce to ensure 

that we retain the excellence in scientific and engineering quality at the labs? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 90) Diversity in funding sources that have resulted from the efforts 

within Sandia and the other two Labs to become true National Security labs rather 

than only nuclear weapons labs, have had a remarkable set of outcomes for the institutions. 

First, and directly apropos to this Question, is the increase in the independent 

sources of funds and independent management of now a larger multiplicity of Federal, military, intelligence, homeland security (and even some private) entities have 

provided a greater ability for the Lab managers to ‘‘guide their own organizations 

futures’’ and expand their overall service to the Nation. Of course the greater 

breadth of technical assignments and efforts is making the Labs far more interesting 

research institutions, and due largely to the synergism and the expansion of overall 

capabilities with the growth of ‘‘Work for Others’’ Federal entities (WFO). For example, the level of major breakthroughs and innovations have never been higher. 

(These have very often still provided the critical factors to secure the Nation’s security, and greater reduce the loss of lives in wartime. I would recommend that the 

HASC might task the ‘‘HSCI’’ to review and validate my report (here) on the number and quality of major national security contributions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 91) I understand that recent unexpected experiment results have 

been a serious setback to meeting the performance milestones in the National Ignition Campaign, and that this setback has led to management decisions to postpone 

all other experiments on the NIF laser and to reallocate resources from other programs to an accelerated Ignition Campaign. 

 Can you explain to the Committee how the shift from hypothesis-driven science 

to milestone-driven science has NOT been detrimental to the Labs’ science missions? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 91) I am unaware of any decision to change the direction of the 

National Ignition Campaign as of today. There has been ‘‘a lot of water under the 

bridge’’ since the NIF was first proposed, and admittedly some strong ‘‘overselling’’ 

of the concept, and I was a frequent critic of the effort, almost exclusively on the 

basis that the costs it would require were too great a burden on the nuclear weapons program—the highest priority of all programs—which was already seeing a decrease in funding, higher inflations, and many more unanticipated needs within the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program. For those reasons I have mostly avoided further 

contact with the NIF program since I retired. 

However, the NIF device was completed 3 years ago, and is currently firing laser 

pulses at implosion targets and diagnosing them. I am told by independent reviewers of the NIF and the NIC that the laser engineering and optical train have proved 

to be amazing accomplishments, and the device appears to have met the desired 

specifications on energy per pulse, energy uniformity, spot sizes, and timing. Reviewers have also begun examining the first ignition experiments and report excellent performance of the unique new diagnostics designed and built for the NIF experiments. The experiments are generating fusion neutrons, which are of major importance step to bring up any large physics machine (like large particle accelerators); as when you have a desired signal for the parameter you want to maximize, 

successive variations can often then lead you to maximize the level of that parameter. That is the current stage, and doubtless the careful analysis of the current experiments will shed light on some of the missing physics, and lead to both progress 

toward their September milestone and to elucidation of its prospects for ignition. 

Let me include here a report from a recent review by Dr. Steve Koonin of the NIC: 
214 

‘‘It has long been recognized that achieving thermonuclear ignition in the laboratory is a technical grand challenge undertaking, 50 years in the making. It 

is first, and foremost, a research project, and we all recognize that the goal is 

not necessarily compatible with near-term NIC project milestones and schedules 

as currently driven by programmatic considerations.’’ 

Those statements indicate to me that neither the senior NNSA management nor 

the Lab involved have lost their way. LLNL is truly at the threshold of learning 

new physics that could not have been known prior to actually undertaking the current experimental campaign. While I cannot, nor could anyone (in my opinion), predict where it will yet lead; but after the enormous commitments of funds to get to 

this point, I believe it would make little sense to curtail the funding at this point, 

just because an important milestone has not yet met, regardless of the past histories 

I mentioned above. 

My understanding is that the milestone definition and the September 2012 deadline originated from a review of the program which NNSA/DOE requested be performed by the JASONs (a think-tank of talented university scientists supported 

through a DOD FFRDC (MITRE).) However, the September date arose from making 

predictions that no one could have made with any clarity, as it is the case that important physics is still missing, and that ‘‘Mother Nature will control the process’’ 

in any case. The NIT experimenters are on a good path to elucidate the physical 

processes that are now preventing ignition, and may yet be able to overcome these 

difficulties in future experiments. But I believe the statements of former Under Secretary Koonin (above) are pretty much ‘‘right on’’ in realizing that ultimately ignition in the laboratory is a research goal as well as a programmatic goal, and that 

they understand that, while the milestone was undoubtedly important in getting to 

this point, there is no better plan now than continuing to perform more good experiments! 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 92) GAO has criticized NNSA in a long series of reports for not having consistent management data (such as cost accounting data) across all of its sites.  Why hasn’t more progress been made in requiring consistent data and bookkeeping? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 92) The GAO is swimming upstream against the accepted and successful practices of private institutions across the Nation when attempts to force 

‘‘Government-like’’ accounting systems on these institutions were made. Government 

accounting, in general, is exceptionally bureaucratic, and with the great diversity 

of financial issues for the extant variety of organizations: ‘‘One size does not fit all.’’ 

I believe there is one overarching principle for having successful alignment of accounting and work functions, that does apply to all enterprises, businesses, or even 

Laboratories: ‘‘You should organize your bookkeeping the way you need to run (i.e. 

manage and operate) your business, and never vice versa. When I began my tenure 

as Sandia’s President and Laboratories Director, one condition that was crystal clear 

then was that the home-built software system—which had originated more than 35 

years earlier, had far outrun its usefulness in managing such a large and complex 

enterprise. The symptoms were clear: It was very difficult for anyone to easily find 

out the real costs for almost any function, or even purchased items, because of the 

proliferation of overheads and other ‘‘institutional taxes.’’ After analyzing and discussing the situation with Sandia’s managers at all levels, we learned that the 

staff’s trust in the central accounting had waned to the point that a great many organizations ran their own ‘‘spheres of interest’’ using commercial project management software; so that in reality we had many hundreds of ‘‘independent’’ data systems. After making a decision to turn to commercial Enterprise Management software, we had to choose whether to purchase such software either ‘‘tailored for Government use’’ or ‘‘tailored for business use.’’ A thorough examination of these alternatives showed that the latter was designed to make decisions based on costs for 

a great diversity of work activities, and that still the system was capable of ‘‘rolling 

up costs’’ in any way that one needed to in order to feed into larger/inflexible cost 

accounting budget categories. The choice of the (Oracle) business option product allowed us to also perform much wider benchmarking with many large private laboratories, and to help us identify whether our costs in particular areas were competitive or not. We have used this system for nearly 20 years now with excellent success. This commercial software gave our staff easier systems to learn and to apply, 

and to tailor the operating systems to fit the individual systems to better manage 

each of our functions. 

Lastly, I would appoint that the world’s largest single Government accounting organization DCAS (for Defense Contracts Administration Services) does not, repeat 

not, attempt to dictate a ‘‘one size fits all’’ accounting system for its contractors, but 

rather it conducts an examination of a firm’s books in ‘‘a pre-award audit’’, to determine whether or not the company’s financial bookkeeping meets ‘‘Federal Cost Ac-
215 

counting Standards’’, and DCAS is available to follow the procurement as it progresses to be sure the declared processes are used. This would be a far superior intellectual approach for dealing with cost accounting within DOE organizations and 

its suppliers, taking note that DOE ‘‘contracts out’’ the vast majority of its budgeted 

funds. If I could, I would suggest that this latter DCAS model does fit the model 

most of the reviews have suggested be the simplifying basis for GOCOs, with the 

Government specifying ‘‘What?’’, but not trying to dictate ‘‘How?’’ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 93) How do the conclusions of this report comport with your experiences with DOE nuclear safety requirements (i.e., rules, orders, manuals, and standards) for the nuclear weapons complex? 

 Did you find these nuclear safety requirements to be burdensome? Could you 

provide any specific examples of burdensome nuclear safety requirements? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 93) As I stated above for Question 77 [Now Question 87], I am certainly out of date as to current practices at Sandia in metrics for nuclear safety, having retired 6 years earlier. I have requested help from Sandia in answering this 

question, who replied with this response: For DOE nuclear facilities, the safety requirements are based on 10CFR830 Nuclear Safety Management (primarily Subpart 

B—Safety Basis Requirements). There are numerous DOE orders, standards, and 

guidance documents used by nuclear facilities, which allow for fairly consistent 

management data. We all use the same threshold quantities, develop safety documents based on the same approved safe harbors and development guidance, use 

analysis tools in the approved DOE ‘‘tool box’’, use the same general process for 

managing changes (i.e. unreviewed safety questions), and are periodically assessed 

by the same DOE HQ entity (Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety). If a ‘‘burdensome’’ 

requirement is defined as a requirement providing no or minimal value-added benefit; then we would be hesitant to identify specific examples of burdensome nuclear 

safety requirements. There are specific safety benefits for all these nuclear safety 

requirements. The rigor and scrutiny for a nuclear facility should be higher than 

the average nonnuclear facility since the potential consequences can be significantly 

greater. What we find can be burdensome is the overly conservative interpretation 

(often by external organizations) of what are essentially good requirements. 

Examples: 

 Not being able to use the latest dose conversion factors for initial hazard categorization without doing additional significant analysis. 

 Different interpretations about what is meant by challenging the evaluation 

guidelines. 

 What is the appropriate deposition velocity. 

 Interpretation of the appropriate level of detail for analysis and documentation. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 94) Does the National Laboratories Directors Council, which reports 

directly to the Secretary of Energy, bypassing the NNSA reporting structure, disrupt oversight and contribute to a dysfunctional system where NNSA and the labs 

do not trust each other? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 94) This question is, I believe chasing a ‘‘red herring.’’ There has 

been the practice, ever since I can remember, of past Secretaries of Energy establishing a forum of multiple Laboratory Directors to meet with him/her to discuss 

major issues. These have only occurred quite infrequently, i.e. never on a schedule 

that would even allow these to either substitute for, replace, or even supplement, 

regular meetings of responsible Department officials with the Secretary of Energy. 

Usually, the Lab Directors invited are chosen in order to help prepare for joint briefings (e.g. the Secretary and the Lab Directors) to the Congress, such as the Hearings to discuss the Annual Assessment Memoranda prepared by the Directors and 

transmitted by the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Defense to the President and to both houses of the Congress. In my experience, there never were such 

meetings without the head of the NNSA (and usually one or two others senior 

NNSA officials) present. 

I found the comment from the NAS Review Committee regarding ‘‘a lack of trust’’ 

to be profound and justified, but I do not think any meetings involving the Secretary 

are in any way a factor affecting trust. Rather, I would ascribe the lack of trust to: 

(1) the lack of effective communications across the NNSA and the DOE and its Laboratories, (2) the many overlapping responsibilities of NNSA Program Managers and 

Laboratory officials, and (3) the dysfunctional arrangement of some DOE components who still have absolute rule over some functions within the Laboratories, 

without involvement of the NNSA, and (4) a failure of management and leadership 

of DOE and NNSA to organize and manage the burgeoning oversight offices at 

Headquarters or in the field. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 95) What is your perspective on the recent NNSA governance reform initiative in which the contractors assume more responsibility for oversight of 
216 

compliance with nuclear safety requirements, while Federal oversight focuses on 

contractor systems for ensuring safety?  What was the purpose and objectives of your contractor assurance system?  What experience did you have with such a self-assessing contractor assurance 

system, and what are the specific advantages and disadvantages of this system?  What did your contractor assurance system indicate about the need for more 

or less requirements, about the rigor of compliance with requirements, and 

about the need for more or less oversight?  How did you ensure that you had adequately established a balance in priorities 

and resources between your safety programs and your missions? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 95) At the time I retired from Sandia in January, 2006, the NNSA 

governance initiative was just in its earliest stages. I requested from Sandia their 

views on this subject and they provided the following status comments: 

This new NNSA governance reform initiative has some promise, but would need 

to go much further to create the change needed. This effort is still embryonic; it is 

fair to be skeptical until it is fully implemented. There are still hundreds of detailed 

milestones in the current performance measuring system used by NNSA and hundreds of Federal employees overseeing these. As long as that is the case, the focus 

will be on each small action and transaction that makes a strategic focus almost 

impossible. As long as there are an excessive number of employees in multiple offices conducting oversight (which is the case now) the flexibility to balance safety 

and mission in the most effective way becomes extremely difficult. 

The history at the labs is that their own internal audits and reviews of their systems identify the areas that need improvement. The multiple external audits by 

multiple agencies that often follow the internal audits and reviews seldom add much 

value. In fact, they distract and absorb the time of people who should spend time 

addressing the internal findings. 

There is a clear need for the Government to provide oversight. It needs to be strategic. Right now it is still largely down in the weeds. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 96) How can the operator of facilities/Line Management, DOE as 

owner of the facilities, and the public have confidence that contractor assurance systems are capable of detecting a decline in the safety posture of a facility or operation?  How mature was this capability at your laboratory?  In the areas of worker safety and high-risk operations such as those at nuclear 

facilities, could you describe how you ensured that performance was maintained 

at least at its previous level if not improved?  Could you describe the key measures that you relied on to ensure that you 

avoided nuclear or other high-hazard accidents, and explain why you believe 

that those measures gave you sufficient confidence that the workers and the 

public were and continue to be afforded adequate protection? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 96) I have requested help from Sandia in answering these questions since the contractor assurance system was in its earliest stages when I retired 

in January, 2006. I am certainly out of date as to current practices for contractor 

assurance at Sandia, and I have requested help from Sandia in answering this and 

several other questions. 

Sandia empowers every employee to stop any activity or duty they believe is dangerous. There are no repercussions for protecting themselves and fellow workers. In 

fact, safety is a priority at Sandia because our unique nuclear weapons mission is 

‘‘always/never.’’ A nuclear weapon must always work if authorized by the President 

of the United States. A nuclear weapons must never work at all other times. For 

the ‘‘never’’ part of the analogy, Sandia designs and qualifies unique components 

that are specifically tailored to serve in the role of ‘‘never’’ devices. These stronglinks or weak-links are key to safety, in order to ensure that the respective protections remain in place and functioning, beyond the point at which the ability of the 

system to detonate disappears. Sandia thinks about safety every day because it 

their job. 

Sandia also conducts mandatory training based on the job criteria. Not only does 

Sandia remind their employees to use common sense safety tools like protective 

glasses and ear protectors, but constantly training and retraining on other safety 

concerns is included on such less obvious safety concerns as static electricity or trips 

and falls. 

Let me here cite a few approaches that we developed for dealing with worker safety in the high-risk operations within nuclear facilities. 

The highest combined risk for worker safety and nuclear safety risks were in the 

Pulsed Power facilities: Z Machine, Atlas, etc. The variety of hazards and the seriousness of the risks all ranked very high in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. Line 

responsibility was assigned the responsibility along with their technical program re-
217 

sponsibilities, noting how essential it was for close integration of all experiments 

and operations for maximizing employee safety against the very diverse set of hazards: extremely high radiation levels during pulses, energetic system explosion hazards, extremely high voltages and currents, falling hazards from highly, elevated experimental location, drowning hazards from vessels filled with oil or deionizedwater, and huge magnetic forces during tests of some components. 

Yet, the safety performances—even with this variety of high hazard activities— 

always scored at the top or near to the top of all Sandia facilities. The risk-informed 

safety rules that were in use proved exceptionally successful at the pulsed power 

sites. The quality process structure in place with the key employee and managers 

closed the loop between the employees, whose Health and Safety would be at risk 

(including their very lives), and guaranteed that there was full and first-hand 

knowledge of those risks and the means and controls (structural and controls) that 

were in place to mitigate these hazards. Risk-informed safety regulations were continuously stressed to all employees within these facilities and were shown to improve the already high performance levels of these activities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 97)  Do you believe that your site had a good safety record? 

 What indicators did you use to measure your laboratory’s safety performance? 

What did you compare those indicators against to decide the quality of that performance? And why do you believe that those measures are adequate to evaluate the quality of safety at your laboratories? 

 What indicators do you use to measure the nuclear safety performance of the 

facilities at your lab? What do you compare those measures against? 

 How did/should those measures help you avoid the occurrence of a low-probability, high-consequence accident? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 97) Yes, and provably so. The first written question asked by 

Chairman Michael Turner, which I answered on Feb. 22, 2012, was very similar. 

In my answer I cited that ‘‘when the DOE was formed, the safety performance of the 

DOE laboratories in total was very sound (with the nuclear weapons labs being top 

performers in that set). Yet, the DOE continued to require that even more spending 

be devoted to Safety efforts, even though the statistics on workplace injuries, lost 

workday incidents, and accidental deaths was superior—and by substantial rates— 

to those of U.S. industry in general.’’ Further, I cited the relative performance levels 

for the DOE Labs against appropriate industry-wide levels for: 

(1) lost workday case incidences and lost workday incidences (per se) for comparison to Bureau of Labor Statistics of U.S. Industry; 

(2) fatalities per 100,000 workers for comparison to National Safety Council for 

U.S. Industry; 

(3) motor vehicle accidents per 1 million miles for comparison to National Safety 

Council for U.S. Industry; and 

(4) worker radiation exposures per 100,000 workers for comparison to NRC Commercial statistics. 

In all cases the relative performance levels of the DOE Labs were substantially 

better. 

For more recent data, I requested help from Sandia on current data comparisons 

on similar statistics. Sandia National Laboratories analyzed the data available from 

2006–2011, and these data are shown in the histogram below: 

Analysis of injury and illness rates from the calendar years of 2006–2011 led to 

the following results: 

 Total Recordable Case Rate shows Sandia’s average over the 5 years to be 

1.755 compared to the Industry rate of 3.92 from 2006 through 2010. 

 Sandia’s average Days Away Restricted, Transferred Case Rate was 0.68 compared to 2 for the Industry. 

 The average Days Away Case Rate for Sandia was 0.29 compared to 1.16 for 

the Industry. 

Sandia’s average fatality rate (fatalities per 100,000 workers) from 2006–2011 was 

2.8. The industry average for those 5 years was 3.8. 

Sandia’s motor vehicle accident rate (motor vehicle accidents per one million 

miles) measures injuries from motor vehicle accidents per one million miles. The average rate for the 5-year period is 0.5. The injury rate for the entire population is 

0.8. 

The total effective dose (TED) in rem at Sandia National Laboratories averaged 

.05 for 2006–2011. The average TED at NRC Licensed facilities was 0.1. 
218 

Ms. SANCHEZ. 98) The laboratories conduct some of the Nation’s most sensitive 

activities, including designing, producing, and maintaining the Nation’s nuclear 

weapons; supporting nonproliferation efforts; conducting efforts for other military or 

national security applications; and performing research and development in advanced technologies for potential defense and commercial applications. 

 How do these different missions complicate oversight requirements? 

 How do they support efficiencies and best use of taxpayer dollars? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 98) Let me add to the list of diverse missions ‘‘highly compartmented programs,’’ where very strict access controls must be in place. Although 

such programs have existed within the three Laboratories for at least 50 years or 

more, they have increased in numbers and size over the past decade. Different arrangements were required for the conduct of these programs, because their accesses 

are so strictly restricted by the parent agencies (including those owned by the DOE). 

All it is clearly recognized that the extremely high importance of many of these programs meant there could be no compromises of the existence or nature of these programs due to serious injuries or death resulting from them. Once again our placing 

the responsibility for safety and security as a strict line management function for 

such programs has required greater commitment from managers at all levels to 

carry the responsibility for technical/mission success of these programs simultaneously with responsibility for the environmental and safety and health performances. An exceptional record of success in all aspects of these programs attests to 

the fact, that it is feasible to achieve sound safety and security performances in 

these unique circumstances with a philosophy of strict limitations on the number 

of support staff who can have access. Agreements have been forged at the highest 

levels of DOE and NNSA of how oversight will be carried out, and these represent 

the best of the past practice of a deep, trusting partnership between the Government and the Labs. Compartmented programs within the Labs have demonstrated 

high levels of cost effectiveness as well. The unique requirements to accomplish 

these important programs while greatly limiting the number of staff (because of obvious security concerns) should be the proof that large staffs are not necessary to 

achieve effective results and protect both workers, the public, and the environment. 

There are many other examples, where the capabilities created within the laboratories for one national security program, can instantly be put into use for solving 

unique and critical problems that arise on very short timescales. The emergency request last year by the Department of Defense for Sandia Laboratories to adapt an 

existing launch vehicle and to tailor a ballistic missile defense missile interceptor 

vehicle to intercept and destroy a failed Russian satellite with a large inventory of 

liquid hydrazine on-board (for propulsion gas), before the satellites orbit had decayed to the point of reentering the earth’s atmosphere and crashing into the earth, 

is a recent example of what is possible by harvesting past investment in the Labs 

by many agencies to address other national needs. That mission was a splendid suc-
219 

cess, and demonstrated what can be uniquely accomplished by the concentration of 

multidisciplined scientists and technicians with a diversity of fully-functional facilities within such institutions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. 99) The NAS study committee says the loss of trust has resulted 

in an increased ‘‘aversion to risk,’’ and that ‘‘a major byproduct of this has been to 

create a bias against experimental work, because of the onerous processes sometimes required before running an experiment. The bias is problematic because experimental science is at the very heart of the scientific method.’’ 

How does the NAS study committee think the ‘‘trust’’ that it says has been lost 

could be restored? Please explain how this aversion to risk impacts the ability of 

the labs to conduct high-quality science and engineering and perform their mission. 

Dr. SHANK. 99) To address this question I think it is instructive to understand 

how we have come to the current situation. The response of Congress and the DOE 

to a series of single point failures at Laboratories and production facilities has been 

to create new structures, orders, and organizations to provide enhanced oversight 

at all DOE FFRDCs. The increase in compartmentalized oversight entities has led 

to an extraordinary burden for the Laboratories. The issue of trust arises because 

the Laboratories are treated as distrusted entities requiring large teams of people 

overseeing all transactions. This approach is costly, inefficient, and discourages the 

Science and Engineering Staff. 

There is a small fraction of the work at the Laboratories where a failure would 

have a high consequence and therefore require a high degree of operational formality. The rest of the work looks like work done in a typical industrial environment. I believe that necessary oversight could be done in a manner accomplished 

by other similar institutions. There are widely accepted systems and standards for 

overseeing safety, finance, human resources, and facility operations. A straightforward approach would be for the Laboratories to qualify systems in each of the 

operational areas. Then, a vastly reduced number of people could audit the systems. 

A major barrier to accomplishing something like this is to realize that maintaining 

the current oversight apparatus in place, which has been sized for transactional 

oversight, will prevent any of the advantages to ensue. Another concern is that a 

new approach needs to be created with the idea there will be failures in the future 

and that whatever system in place must be resilient to single point failures. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 100) In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said the President, 

‘‘should assign formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and 

Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic 

and budgetary health of the Laboratories.’’ 

Do you agree? How would such a structure operate—how should it be designed? 

Dr. SHANK. 100) This is not a topic that our committee examined. I do believe all 

of these entities have a stake in the success of the Laboratories. Lowering the barrier for all of the entities to make investments and create facilities in the Laboratories would be a positive step. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 101) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from 

nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ with a broader mission set is well 

under way. The report says that expansion of the labs’ missions to new arenas ‘‘offers the prospect of increasing the Laboratories’ appeal to top-quality scientists and 

engineers while also serving important national security missions. Thus, the quality 

of science and engineering, being preconditioned on attracting high-quality people, 

depends in the long run on successfully making this transition to National Security 

Laboratories.’’ 

Does the NAS believe the governance and management structure for the labs is 

set up to facilitate this expansion into new, nonnuclear work? If so, how should it 

be changed to better enable this broader mission? 

Dr. CURTIS. 101) We do believe that the governance and management structure 

of the laboratories is set up to facilitate the expansion into new, nonnuclear work. 

NNSA has done a good job reaching out to the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence community to help coordinate 

this broader national security agency. This enriched suite of activities at the laboratories has contributed significantly to laboratory recruitment and to the execution 

of the laboratories’ core nuclear weapons responsibilities. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 102) Technology transfer remains a critical tool that can help businesses create jobs and strengthen their competitiveness. I was pleased to see the 

President recently direct our national laboratories to increase the rate of technology 

transfer to the commercial marketplace. Has the increased ‘‘aversion to risk’’ that 
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the NAS study committee found also impacted tech transfer? What steps can Congress take to foster growth in the area of tech transfer? 

Dr. CURTIS. 102) The Committee did not focus specifically on impediments to technology transfer to help business create jobs and strengthen their competitiveness. 

The subject, however, is very important and a matter that the laboratories in the 

past devoted a great deal of attention to. This clearly may be a matter that the Subcommittee would wish to take up with NNSA. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 103) In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission said the President, 

‘‘should assign formal responsibility to the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and 

Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence for the programmatic 

and budgetary health of the laboratories.’’ 

Do you agree? How would such a structure operate—how should it be designed? 

Dr. ANASTASIO. 103) The Commission recommended making organizational 

changes regarding the NNSA—that the NNSA be established ‘‘as an independent 

agency reporting to the President through the Secretary of Energy’’; ‘‘the NNSA, as 

an independent agency, should have a budget separate from any other entity’’ and 

‘‘this budget be reviewed by the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees of the 

House and Senate’’; and that a formal mechanism be established ‘‘for the Secretaries 

of Energy, Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence to approve the NNSA strategic plan and to comment on its budget in 

broad detail before it is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget.’’ 

Given the challenges to date of implementing the NNSA act, an end state that 

results in NNSA as an independent agency is very appealing. As the Commission 

makes clear there are many issues associated with making that model a success, 

such as to whom does this new independent agency report? How is its budget developed within the Administration? How is its budget established by the Congress? 

How is a broad national security mission for NNSA implemented? The Commission 

developed answers to these questions that they could agree with and that they 

thought could be implemented at the time. The answers to these questions are very 

important, but it is essential that the national security leadership, Administration 

and Congress all agree on the answers and they successfully implement all of them. 

Mr. HEINRICH. 104) The NAS report notes that the ‘‘evolution’’ of the labs from 

nuclear weapons labs to ‘‘national security labs’’ is well under way, and that this 

will enable an expansion of the labs’ work solving national security problems for 

many different Federal agencies. Within NNSA, this is called ‘‘Work for Others,’’ or 

‘‘WFO.’’ The NAS notes, and I agree, that this evolution is critical to the future vitality of the labs. 

What steps could Congress take to make WFO work easier, more efficient, and 

more effective? 

Dr. ROBINSON. 104) I am very pleased to address this question, as I openly professed for many years that the nuclear weapons labs, as one of the last bastions of 

defense science and technology, must apply their knowledge to counter any and 

every threat to our Nation’s security. We at Sandia outlined this view as a quest 

to become ‘‘true national security labs.’’ This has now become a reality at Sandia, 

and is progressing at the other two Labs. 

I must be constrained in my discussion of how we have achieved this (due to classification and compartmentation rules). Without breaching security, I can unabashedly say that, just as the technology created by, and at, the Labs did in fact lead 

to ending World War II, our recent technology advances have similarly been so significant as to end modern, recent conflicts. The details of these facts cannot yet be 

revealed today, but I invite you to ask those in command for Lab contributions to 

recent U.S. conflicts, if they believe that our latest contributions, as we had 

achieved with our partners at Los Alamos made the breakthrough which ‘‘won’’ 

World War II, recent technology advances, by one or more of the nuclear weapons 

labs, have been the keys to winning other recent major conflicts. 

I urge you to pursue this issue with vigor, for nothing will convince you more 

readily of the importance of these Labs in protecting America’s future, and cause 

you to award us the autonomy from the Federal bureaucracy to which we have been 

subjected for more than 40 years! I already stressed in my written HASC Statement 

that the DOE has long since lost the recipe for being wise custodians of science and 

technology ‘‘for the national interest.’’ It is that basis that drove my recommendation 

that only major actions by the Congress have a chance to ‘‘save the Labs’’ before 

it is too late. 

The recommendations of the Strategic Commission, the DSB on Nuclear Capabilities, and my own recommendation (in my written statement) to recreate the labs 

(and a modified NNSA) within the Department of Defense—all of these have merit 

to recover these ‘‘national treasures’’ from their current state of mismanagement. In 
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further defense of my own proposal, may I point out that the Department of Defense 

and the Military Services are more committed to the success of the nuclear weapons/ 

national security labs than any other entity is likely to ever achieve. It thus belongs 

there! 

Æ