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90–434 PDF 2003

OPEN FORUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF

LAW IN CHINA

ROUNDTABLE

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

DAVID DREIER, California

FRANK WOLF, Virginia

JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

DAVID WU, Oregon

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State*

GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce*

LORNE CRANER, Department of State*

JAMES KELLY, Department of State*

JOHN FOARDE, Staff Director

DAVID DORMAN, Deputy Staff Director

* Appointed in the 107th Congress; not yet formally appointed in the 108th

Congress.

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

STATEMENTS

Seyet, Kaiser, the Uighur American Association, Woodbridge, VA ..................... 2

Marsh, Terri, human rights attorney, Washington, DC ....................................... 3

Cooper, Timothy, Worldrights, Washington, DC ................................................... 5

Huang, Ciping, given by Wei Wu, the Wei Jingsheng Foundation, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 6

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Seyet, Kaiser ............................................................................................................ 22

Marsh, Terri ............................................................................................................. 23

Cooper, Timothy ....................................................................................................... 25

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Ciping Huang, executive director, Wei Jingsheng Foundation and human rights chair, Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS), Washington, DC ................................................... 28

Prepared statement of Kery Wilkie Nunez, Washington, DC .............................. 31

(1)

OPEN FORUM ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE

OF LAW IN CHINA

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA,

Washington, DC.

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m.,

in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde [staff

director] presiding.

Mr. FOARDE. On this beautiful fall afternoon, we do not have as

many of our staff colleagues as we like. I am sure that some will

come along in the next few minutes to join us.

But on behalf of Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa, the chairman

of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China [CECC], and

our co-chairman, Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, as well as the

individual Commission members, I would like to welcome all of

you, and particularly our four panelists, to this issues roundtable

of the CECC.

Today’s roundtable is conducted in the ‘‘Open Forum’’ format. We

try to do this once or twice a year to permit people who have things

to say about issues in our mandate on human rights and on the

rule of law in China the opportunity to speak for about 5 minutes,

offer us a written statement for the record, and then, as we do with

our other roundtables, and also hearings, have a chance for us to

ask questions and hear answers from the individual speakers.

We have four speakers today representing a variety of points of

view and issues. I will introduce them all, and then individually before they speak. We will let you go for about 4 minutes, then I will

tell you that there is 1 minute left. That is your signal to wrap up

your presentation.

Inevitably, it is hard to say everything that you want to say in

5 minutes, because it is not a very long time. But we will try to

give you the opportunity during the question and answer period to

catch up any of the issues that you wanted to mention and did not

have the opportunity in your main statement.

Our speakers this afternoon are Mr. Kaiser Seyet from the

Uighur American Association, Ms. Terri Marsh, a human rights attorney, Mr. Timothy Cooper from Worldrights, and our old friend

Huang Ciping from the Wei Jingsheng Foundation, who had travel

problems this afternoon and is probably not going to be able to join

us in person, but a colleague is going to read her statement for her

into the record. We welcome you and thank you for doing that.

2

Let us go right to the statements then. We normally work wall

to window, so we will ask Mr. Kaiser Seyet from the Uighur American Association to begin, please.

STATEMENT OF KAISER SEYET, THE UIGHUR AMERICAN

ASSOCIATION, WOODBRIDGE, VA

Mr. SEYET. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and

gentlemen. Thanks for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the

Uighur community in the United States.

My topic today is ‘‘Escalating Refoulement of Uighur Refugees.’’

The Uighur American Association is deeply concerned about the

rising number of peaceful Uighur dissidents being returned to the

People’s Republic of China [PRC] from other countries.

Although media attention has raised concerns about the deportation of Tibetan refugees from Nepal and caused governments to act,

no such attention has been paid to the escalating phenomena of

peaceful dissidents being returned from Central Asian states and

Pakistan under pressure from the Chinese Government.

Before the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

[SCO] Chinese diplomats would bring accusations of criminal

wrongdoing against Uighur refugees and seek their deportation.

Wanted posters in Chinese and the local language were posted on

the streets in many cities.

The pressure employed against the refugees and their place of

refuge can be summed up with this excerpt from a 1996 internal

Chinese Communist Party document.

Limit the activities of outside ethnic separatist activities from many sides. Bear

in mind the fact that Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are the home bases for

the activities of outside separatist forces. Through diplomacy, urge these countries

to limit and weaken the activities of separatist forces inside their border. Take full

advantage of political superiority to further develop the bilateral friendly cooperation with these countries. At the same time, always maintain pressure on them.

Considering the ethnic separatism activities outside the border, carry out all necessary dialog and struggle. Strengthen the investigation and study outside of the

border. Collection information on the related development directions of events, and

be especially vigilant against and prevent, by all means, the outside separatist

forces from making the so-called ‘‘Eastern Turkestan’’ problem international.

The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document Central Committee

(1996) No. 7. Record of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the maintenance of Stability in

Xinjiang.

When the SCO was formed, official contacts started in the Central Asian war on terrorism. At that point, the campaign against

‘‘East Turkestan separatists’’ had not been internationalized, but

dissidents quietly continued to be arrested and returned to face imprisonment, torture, even death, just for leaving the People’s Republic of China.

After the events of September 11, 2001, and the beginning of the

U.S. war on terrorism, Chinese Government officials began to

equate the peaceful expression of thought with terrorism. In many

official Chinese Government statements, terrorism, and separatism

appear side by side as crimes to be fought.

The criminalization of peaceful ideas is not condoned by the U.S.

Constitution, nor any international body or agreement, yet such a

tactic is used to repress dissidents in countries that neighbor the

3

People’s Republic of China. The entire process should be viewed as

an extension of the Chinese Government police state.

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or

Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that ‘‘no State Party

shall expel, return (‘‘refouler’’), or extradite a person to another

state where there are substantial grounds for believing that he

would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’’

The Uighur American Association recommends that the U.S.

Government, in its official dealings with Central Asian states, including Pakistan, Nepal, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, reinforce

the ideal of the rule of law, namely the principle of nonrefoulement with regard to people escaping persecution and oppression from the People’s Republic of China; raise concerns about the

treatment of refugees and their rights as guaranteed under the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights; raise the issue for forced

repatriations, the abuse of human and civil rights before the proper

U.N. bodies; and press for meaningful reform and change within

the People’s Republic of China such that so many do not feel compelled to flee their homeland.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Seyet appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much for your statement.

Next, we would like to hear from Ms. Terri Marsh, a human

rights attorney. I understand you are here representing Falun

Gong.

Ms. MARSH. Yes.

Mr. FOARDE. Please.

STATEMENT OF TERRI MARSH, HUMAN RIGHTS ATTORNEY,

WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. MARSH. Thank you. Thank you for having me here.

The talk is entitled, ‘‘The Rule By Law in China Today’’ and its

impact on Falun Gong.

According to Jerome Cohen in his ‘‘The Plight of the Criminal

Defense Lawyers’’ presented to this Commission on July 26, 2002,

China’s entire criminal process is in need of radical reform.

In his view, ‘‘A radical, long-run political restructuring would be

necessary to bring the PRC’s criminal process into compliance with

even minimal international standards.’’

A cursory look at Professor Jerome Cohen’s piece allows us to see

that there are basically two problems that he identified. On the one

hand, he notes how the practice of criminal law in China itself violates the body of law, that is, the Constitution, the penal code, prison law, police law, and so on.

One example would be that interrogation of arrested persons and

torture is, of course, prohibited by both the Constitution in China

and by police law, and nonetheless it is fairly commonplace in

China for persons who have been arrested, and most notably Falun

Gong practitioners, to be tortured.

On the other hand, and in addition to the violation of Chinese

law, the People’s Republic of China typically promulgates administrative orders, notices, regulations, explanations, and the like

which create exceptions to the already drafted rules of law.

4

These exceptions put disfavored classes—for example, Falun

Gong—at a disadvantage for securing the rights the state acknowledges that they have. Again, examples abound. I welcome you to

look at the printed copy of my statement.

Just to mention one, which is supported by a handout that is outside. Falun Gong practitioners are denied access to legal counsel by

an announcement which was promulgated by the Judicial Bureau

of Beijing City. There are lots more examples, some of which I will

turn to in a few moments.

These two types of defects in China are highlighted, although not

in reference to China per se, by Ronald Dworkin in his landmark

book, ‘‘A Matter of Principle,’’ in chapter 2, where he distinguishes

between two conceptions of the rule of law, both of which are conspicuously absent in China.

The rule-book conception, and I am just going to read you a

quote from Dworkin at this point, insists that

The power of the state not be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance with rules which are explicitly set out in a public rule-book, which is, of

course, available to everyone.

The government, as well as ordinary citizens must play by these rules until they

are changed in accordance with further rules about how they ought to be changed,

which is also to be set forth in the rule-book.

This narrow conception is not concerned with substantive justice,

but rather with rules.

There is a second formulation also highlighted by Ronald

Dworkin in chapter 2 of ‘‘A Matter of Principle.’’ The second formulation permits us to further evaluate state law to see if it is

consistent with minimal international standards of law, but more

importantly it allows us to distinguish, for example, between a rule

of law, and then the rules promulgated, for example, by the Nazis

during World War II.

This latter formulation additionally illustrates how, in fact, what

is packaged in China as a rule of law is in fact a rule by law.

I will just give you some examples in China of how this works.

For example, in terms of promulgation of orders, notices, and whatnot which create exceptions which prevent people from benefiting

from the existing law, we know that by order of former President

Jiang, the police arrested Falun Gong practitioners in April 1999

without any legal basis.

Then the former president himself defined the crimes retroactively by trying to persuade the French newspaper, Figaro, that

Falun Gong is, indeed, an evil cult.

Then in October, the legislative branch passed out the infamous

anti-cult law to legitimate the illegal arrests by outlawing Falun

Gong.

Finally, the Supreme People’s Court, instead of ruling on cases,

expounds on the nature of Falun Gong by issuing a notice declaring, at the behest of Jiang, that Falun Gong is indeed an evil cult.

So we can see from this that Falun Gong practitioners are guilty

prior to their trials.

I guess I should apologize a little bit for failure to utilize my time

well.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Marsh appears in the appendix.]

5

Mr. FOARDE. That is all right. We can come back to other points

that you have during the question and answers.

Next, let us call on Mr. Timothy Cooper from Worldrights. Perhaps you would tell us a little bit about your organization as you

get started. It is very interesting. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY COOPER, WORLDRIGHTS,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. COOPER. I will, indeed. I want to express my appreciation to

the Commission for allowing non-governmental organizations

[NGOs] to come before it to testify on critical issues of human

rights in China.

I am representing here today the family of Dr. Wang Bingzhang,

who was recently sentenced to life imprisonment in China on

charges of espionage and terrorism. They extend their appreciation

to this Commission and wish that, in fact, they could be here to

testify.

Dr. Wang Bingzhang is known as the father of the overseas

democracy movement. He has been associated with it, in fact pioneered it, some 20 years ago. He was trained as a lung surgeon.

He studied at McGill University, earned his Ph.D. there in coronary arterial research. He decided not to practice medicine, and

famously stated that ‘‘medicine can only cure a few patients, but

cannot cure the disease of a nation.’’

He ventured into Vietnam in June 2002, to meet with a number

of labor leaders associated with the ever-rising labor movement inside China. He went there to, in effect, try to make a marriage, a

union if you will, between the pro-democracy movement and the

labor movement inside China, to marry the head of the democracy

movement with the body politic of the labor movement, a reasonable strategy in light of the need to amplify the numbers committed to the pro-democracy movement in China.

Once in Vietnam, he did, in fact, meet with a labor leader in the

town of Mongcai, which is on the border of Vietnam and China.

After that meeting was complete, they noticed that they were being

followed.

They went back to their hotel to retrieve their baggage so that

they could depart that area of the country as soon as possible. They

were, at that point, accosted in the hotel lobby by plainclothes Vietnamese police—or people who posed as Vietnamese police—and

were taken into a van under false pretenses.

They were told they were being taken to the police station in

Mongcai, but in fact were taken to the outskirts of town, to the

Beilun River, which cuts between China and Vietnam, where a

boat was waiting for them.

They were beaten, particularly Dr. Wang Bingzhang, taken on

board this boat, and taken over to the China side where they were

met by an entirely new group of individuals, about 10 men.

There had been about 10 men in the lobby, most of whom spoke

Vietnamese, 2 of whom spoke Chinese, most interestingly. They

were greeted by this new set of people.

It was noted that one of the original captors had a picture of Dr.

Wang Bingzhang in his possession that he proudly showed to the

6

others to confirm Dr. Wang Bingzhang’s identification, and they

were handed over to this new group.

They were then blindfolded, bound, and taken to a hotel for

about a week where a $10 million ransom was demanded of the

three Chinese dissidents. No stranger idea, I think, could be put

out there than a kidnapper demanding such a high ransom from

Chinese dissidents. If one is associated in any way with the Chinese democracy movement, one understands clearly that it is virtually penniless.

Having no money, the dissidents offered the contact numbers,

their cell phone numbers, for their family and relations back in

America, France, and elsewhere. Those individuals were never

contacted.

About a week later, the new captors took them to a temple,

bound, still gagged, and left them. Mysteriously, several minutes

later, the Chinese police arrived and said, ‘‘We are here, we are

rescuing you.’’ But instead they were immediately detained. They

were never released. In fact, from that point on, they met a new

form of detention.

They were then held incommunicado for about 51⁄2 months while

the Chinese Government emphatically denied that they had any information whatsoever about their whereabouts.

Finally, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi were released, but Dr. Wang

Bingzhang was put on trial for espionage and for terrorism.

He has denied his association with any of those activities. He declared himself wholly innocent. In fact, when the United Nations’

Arbitrary Detention Committee looked at this case, they came to

the same conclusion, that the Chinese Government had offered no

proof whatsoever that Dr. Wang was associated in any way with

either espionage or terrorism.

Indeed, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention declared

that the Chinese Government had arbitrarily detained these individuals, that the detention was a violation of international norms,

and that Dr. Wang Bingzhang should be released.

Speaking on behalf of the family, we implore the U.S. Congress

to pass a joint resolution on his behalf. It is high time that the

United States stood behind a man who has committed most of his

adult life, certainly the best years of his life, to the cause of human

rights and democracy in China. We would simply ask that the Congress look at this issue and determine its resolve, and pass a resolution on his behalf. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Cooper.

Our friend and frequent contributor to our open forums, Ms.

Huang Ciping, cannot be with us because of travel problems, so her

colleague is going to read her statement.

But would you introduce yourself for the record, please?

STATEMENT OF HUANG CIPING, GIVEN BY WEI WU, THE WEI

JINGSHENG FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. WU. Yes. Ladies and gentlemen. I am speaking on a statement of Huang Ciping on behalf of the Wei Jingsheng Foundation

and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars.

7

The topic of the speech is ‘‘No Press Freedom in China After

SARS.’’ Early last spring, the Chinese press got unexpected world attention because of SARS. World opinion had increased hope for Chinese press freedom. The sad reality is that China has not gained

more press freedom since SARS.

In June 2003, the Chinese Communist Party criticized more than

10 newspapers and magazines. Afterward, some sensitive articles

had to be killed before publishing. The prohibited topics included

SARS, the North Korean nuclear crisis, the nuclear submarine explosion, and the Zhou Zhengyi corruption case in Shanghai.

Also, in the summer the government clearly stated prohibition to

discuss certain issues, such as modifying the Constitution, political

reforms, and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement.

China has a long way to go toward real press freedom. The root

of the problem lies in the system, which has been there for over

half a century under the CCP rule. The following facts are some

of our highest concerns.

First, there is no real private press in China and no independent

journalism under the one party system of the CCP. The registration of a publication is very complicated. The government, at any

time, can easily crush a newspaper if it violates government regulations, or just displeases some officials.

Second, Internet censorship. In China, many Web sites are

blocked. The government has over 300,000 Internet police, 50,000

of them work directly for the National Security Department.

Liu Di, a Chinese college student, has been detained for months

because of some essays she published in a chat room. One-third of

all foreign mails went through inspections beyond even targeted

mails, and phone tapping is public knowledge in China.

Third, brave journalists and liberal editors often get in trouble,

and some are put in prison just because they report the truth or

speak from conscience. In fact, Chinese journalists are the direct

victims under the Chinese Communist rules. Many of them have

lost their freedoms, or even lives.

Fourth, to survive, one must speak the Party’s tongue. Keep the

same tongue with the Party, is the first rule for all Chinese journalists.

Fifth, China has been reported to be the second worst country for

freedom of press and speech. The biased, misleading, even false information serves only the Chinese Government’s agenda. On sensitive issues, only the government has the right to decide if the

news can be made public.

Sixth, the Chinese people do not trust the news if it is presented

by the Chinese Government. Chinese people do not have faith in

the Chinese Government. They know that their government cheats.

Chinese people usually rely on the BBC, Voice of America, Radio

Free Asia, or other overseas media.

Finally, foreign investment and Internet will not bring free press

to China. On one hand, many argue that foreign investment will

bring freedom, including freedom of the press to China. On the

other hand, the Chinese Government pointed out that the news

media is a special enterprise that does not allow the rule of ‘‘who

invests in it owns it.’’

8

The government specifically stated that the news media is a

State enterprise which applies to all newspapers. A similar idea

applies to the Internet. The Internet and advanced computer technology has become the tool for government monitoring and suppression of dissent.

It is a shame that U.S. companies such as Yahoo! cooperate voluntarily with the Chinese Government. It is more a shame for

Western companies to work closely with the Chinese Government

to create the ‘‘Golden Shield’’ which helped make the Chinese Government policing of the Internet the best in the world.

Here, we urge the freedom- and democracy-loving American people and the U.S. Congress to examine these issues and to prevent

moneymaking deals when the price is the Chinese people’s human

rights and freedom.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Huang Ciping appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Wu Wei, on behalf of

Huang Ciping.

Thanks to our other panelists this afternoon. It is very important

for the Commission, and the Commission staff, particularly, to get

to know people who are working on human rights issues for prominent NGOs and to hear the information that you have, and the arguments that you have put together.

So, having an open forum like this is particularly useful. The

transcript of it is widely circulated among the commissioners, and

we appreciate your spending the time not only to come this afternoon, but to prepare.

I am going to give you just a minute to catch your breath while

I mention a couple of administrative matters.

Our next major public event of the full Commission is a hearing

on September 24 entitled, ‘‘Is China Playing By the Rules: Free

Trade, Fair Trade and WTO Compliance.’’ This hearing will look

into the commercial rule of law and WTO compliance part of our

mandate.

The hearing will be on Wednesday, the 24th at 10:30 a.m. in the

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 419. Chairman Jim Leach

will preside.

In addition, on Monday, September 22 at 2:30 p.m., we will have

an issues roundtable on ‘‘Internet Freedom and Free Flow of Electronic Information in China.’’ I do not have a room to tell you yet,

but please continue to consult the CECC Web site at www.cecc.gov.

On the Web site, you can sign up for our mailing list if you want

to get e-mails with these announcements from us.

Also, our statute requires that we file a report on the activities

of the Commission and on human rights and the development of

the rule of law in China every year. The report, formally, is due

on October 9 every year, but for reasons of scheduling we try to release it a little earlier than that.

Again, this year, we hope to release it at a press conference on

October 2, which I believe is a Wednesday, right? Yes, a Wednesday. Again, I do not have a room for you yet, but we are working

on that. We will make a public announcement about the availability of the annual report.

9

Of course, it will be available in PDF format on our Web site for

you to download freely during the year if you should need it again.

I would like to go now to the question and answer session and

allow each of our speakers to amplify their thoughts a little bit,

and perhaps answer some questions I have jotted down here while

listening to your testimony.

Perhaps I would start with Mr. Kaiser Seyet, please. Can you

give me an idea for the record of the amount of cross-border travel

that there is between the Xinjiang area where Uighurs mostly live

and the surrounding countries?

For example, some of the ones that you mentioned. Is it a common thing, in other words, for people legally and normally to cross

borders to trade, or to visit family? Does that happen?

Mr. SEYET. It is not very common. All cross-border visits are for

business, for travel, or to see friends or family. This is all controlled by the Chinese Government.

Mr. FOARDE. So if you were a Uighur and you wanted to travel

across border to one of the neighboring countries to, say, trade, you

would need to get an exit permit, is that what you are saying, from

the Chinese Government?

Mr. SEYET. Yes. You would have to have a passport and exit permit.

Mr. FOARDE. So the Chinese Government can restrict the numbers of passports that are issued, for example, to Chinese nationals

of Uighur nationality, and also control the exit permits.

Mr. SEYET. Yes. Recently, the Chinese Government published

that they made it easier for people to apply for passports and exit

permits, but they have special rules and laws for the Uighur minority to get passports.

For most people, if you are under 40, it is very hard to get a

passport across borders. Usually, from what I know, to get a passport usually takes 2 years from application to approval.

During these 2 years, the Chinese Government is going to check

your background, if you have had any political problem or any

other problems against the government, or anything.

Mr. FOARDE. Would the same questions be asked of a Chinese

national of the Han nationality who might be living in Xinjiang

Uighur Autonomous Region?

Mr. SEYET. I do not think they have the same problem because

the separatism and terrorism campaign only focuses on the Uighur

nationality. I do not think the Chinese people have as hard a problem as the Uighurs.

Mr. FOARDE. So at least as far as you know, if a Han person

wished to get a passport and an exit permit to visit a neighboring

country for trade, that would also be much easier than it would be

for a Uighur, is that correct?

Mr. SEYET. Yes.

Mr. FOARDE. All right.

Do you or your organization have any specific evidence of specific

Uighurs that have been sent back from neighboring countries after

they had gone across the border to ask for political asylum or shelter, or refuge of any sort?

Mr. SEYET. Yes, sir. We contacted some people who returned

from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan, and also Amnesty

10

International reported such things documented on their Web site

that we can provide to you.

Mr. FOARDE. So you have names and places? That would be very

useful for us to have that information. If you could provide it, it

would be very, very useful.

Mr. SEYET. I will.

Mr. FOARDE. Can you give me an idea, generally, what happens

to people when they are brought back to China after having been

expelled from the country that they have gone to?

Mr. SEYET. Usually they are held in a private, very secret place.

Nobody knows what jail they are in. The Chinese authorities do not

inform their relatives or friends. They torture them and ask what

they did outside China.

Mr. FOARDE. But, again, do you have specific reports of that sort

of behavior happening?

Mr. SEYET. Yes.

Mr. FOARDE. All right. We would be interested in seeing that as

well.

Mr. SEYET. Also, Amnesty International has a report on the torture, and some of them are sentenced to death. Some disappear

without any information. We do not know if they are alive or dead.

Mr. FOARDE. And their families have not been in touch with

them. Have they been able to get legal representation, as far as

you know?

Mr. SEYET. I do not think they can get legal representation.

Mr. FOARDE. No lawyers, you think.

Mr. SEYET. No.

Mr. FOARDE. This is, unfortunately, not an unusual practice.

Let me ask a couple of final questions. Did the people that you

are knowledgeable about who went home after being expelled forcibly from the third country, did they try to apply formally for asylum in the third country or did they try to contact the U.N. High

Commissioner for Refugees when they were abroad?

Mr. SEYET. Some of them applied in the third country for asylum. Some of them applied to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. During this time, there was intense pressure from economic

and political forces in central Asian countries, those central Asian

governments helped transfer those people who were requesting

asylum.

So, from 1999, most Uighur people thought they could seek asylum in Pakistan, India, Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan, but because of

Chinese Government pressure, all of them were handed over to the

Chinese Government and they were brought back to China.

Uighur refugees do not ask for U.N. help because that takes a

lot of time. In those neighboring countries they do not have status,

they do not have a source of income. So, the Chinese Government

finds it very easy to find them and take them back to China. Also,

those countries are helping the Chinese Government to send them

back to China.

Mr. FOARDE. Let me ask a final question. You mentioned in your

statement the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. We are all very

interested in this group and how it may be operating in practice

across a broad array of issues, not just the human rights issues

that we are interested in in the Commission.

11

But do you have any evidence that there are formal agreements

that have been reached between the Chinese Government and the

governments of the neighboring countries that are part of the SCO,

under that umbrella, to automatically send back potential asylum

seekers to China?

Mr. SEYET. On the SCO, they have contacts. When they formed

the SCO, they say it is to address economic, political, and other

border issues. They especially mentioned whether those countries

were going to stand against terrorism and separatism? They are required to send over people and give the names to the Chinese Government, and their country can give them back names of terrorists.

So, there is like a cooperation.

Mr. FOARDE. At least there is a statement about cooperation.

Mr. SEYET. Yes, a statement.

Mr. FOARDE. But do I understand you to say that, as far as you

know, there is no formal agreement between the Chinese Government and any other government on this, no formal treaty or other

bilateral agreement, just the statements that have been in public,

SCO documents?

Mr. SEYET. I think there are statements in SCO documents.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. That is very useful.

Let me turn to Mr. Cooper, if you do not mind. Dr. Wang

Bingzhang’s case, of course, has been a case of great concern to the

Commission and to our commissioners. I think when you see our

forthcoming annual report, you will see a serious discussion of his

case.

But I have some questions, just for the record, that will help us

with facts. When did Dr. Wang leave China? Did he emigrate to

Canada directly, or how did that work?

Mr. COOPER. Yes, that is correct. I think he left at the end of the

1970s and emigrated, as you say, to Canada, and then went to New

York shortly thereafter in 1982, I believe. 1981, 1982.

Mr. FOARDE. Other than the circumstances of the kidnapping, detention, and subsequent arrest and trial of Dr. Wang, is there any

hard evidence that the PRC authorities were informed in advance

of the plans of Dr. Wang and his confreres to go to this place and

consult with the labor leaders? Is there any evidence that somebody leaked that information?

Mr. COOPER. Well, I think there is certainly evidence that somebody leaked that information by virtue of the fact that he ended up

being accosted in a hotel room and carted across the border river

into China. How that happened, I do not think we will ever be able

to say with a 100 percent degree of certainty.

I think it is fair to say, however, that in light of the unholy terror that an alliance such as the one that I described between the

labor movement and the pro-democracy movement would have been

struck in the minds of Chinese authorities, I think they would have

stopped at virtually nothing to put a stop to the incipiency of that

idea, that endeavor.

Mr. FOARDE. You anticipated my third question, which is basically, why would the PRC go to so much trouble for a small group

of dissidents? I think the answer is that it is potentially a much

larger group. In fact, I think it is correct to say that one of the

things that worried the Party and government structure in the

12

spring of 1989 was that you had this potential marriage between

intellectuals, students, and workers.

Mr. COOPER. That is right.

Mr. FOARDE. The only other part of the equation that makes the

Chinese authorities even more anxious, I guess is the polite word

to use, is when you have religious groups involved as well.

Mr. COOPER. We have had ample witness of it in recent years,

I am afraid to say.

Mr. FOARDE. I assume, and we have all assumed, that the plainclothes men that detained Dr. Wang and his group in Vietnam and

got them across the border were security agents of some sort. But

is there any formal evidence of that? I mean, anybody declaring

themselves or showing an ID card, or anything like that?

Mr. COOPER. Yes. We have looked at that as closely as we can.

All we can say for certain, is that two of the members of that security force in plainclothes spoke with Chinese accents, one Mandarin

and another provincial accent right across the border. So, that is

as close as we can say that they were linked to China.

But I think it is sufficient to say that that group then took them

to the Chinese group of captors within 15, 20 minutes, and that the

boat was waiting for them, that the van was outside the hotel, and

there was an elaborate planning process through which this kidnapping occurred.

That took a degree of planning and sophistication that I think

required sufficient funds and ample intelligence to suggest, as the

ultimate life imprisonment of Wang Bingzhang rightly suggests,

that there was a commitment on the part of the Chinese authorities to get this man, to bring him into China, and then to secure

his confinement for here and ever after.

Mr. FOARDE. Do you have any sense that the type of meetings

that Dr. Wang was having, or trying to have, along the border

there with PRC-based activists, whether they be labor or other

types of activists, is fairly common? In other words, is that happening a lot? There would be a group, in other words, conceivably

of security agents paying special attention to the border area for

that reason?

Mr. COOPER. Not to my knowledge. This was, I think, a rarified

example of cutting-edge activism. I do know that there have been

cases of cross-border kidnappings in Korea in the northern areas,

but this was the first time, to my understanding, that a Chinese

dissident had ever been taken from a third country and carted back

into China.

Mr. FOARDE. My understanding is that there is a fair amount of

cross-border kidnapping for ransom, but it is a purely criminal conduct or enterprise, not related to anybody’s political beliefs.

Mr. COOPER. Yes. Hence, the idea that there might be perceived

to be some legitimacy in describing those actions as kidnapping.

But the fact remains, no family member was ever contacted about

a ransom demand. That, I think, dispels that theory.

Mr. FOARDE. This is the first time that I personally had ever

heard of any activities by overseas-based democracy activists trying

to work through Vietnam to have this sort of contact with people

based in the PRC. So, I agree that there is not much evidence that

it is common.

13

All that suggests that there was a leak of some sort, and this

was kind of an organized, state security operation to grab these

people, snatch them, and take them across the border into someplace where they could be put into police custody.

Mr. COOPER. To say it succinctly, I think he was sold out and set

up. I think that’s the only explanation for how this came about in

such a calculated and efficient manner.

Mr. FOARDE. One thing that I wondered a bit about the U.N.

Special Rapporteur’s report, is whether they were privy to any formal PRC court documents or transcripts in making their decision.

Mr. COOPER. Yes. That is an interesting question. Not to my

knowledge. I have seen the material that the PRC sent to the Arbitrary Detention Committee, and there was no information about

that.

Mr. FOARDE. There was just a formal response, not a copy of a

court transcript or anything.

Mr. COOPER. A formal response from the Chinese Embassy, I

think, in Geneva, the Chinese mission in Geneva. It is possible

there is a deeper layer there that I did not see, but I can say that

I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. FOARDE. It is probably a good conclusion no matter what, but

it would be interesting to know if they had based that conclusion

on anything else.

Mr. COOPER. Have you seen the rapporteur’s report?

Mr. FOARDE. Yes. Yes.

Mr. COOPER. All right. You have seen it.

Mr. FOARDE. I have not read it personally word for word.

Mr. COOPER. I have copies of it if you need it.

Mr. FOARDE. I have skimmed it. We have been studying it very

carefully at the staff level at the Commission.

Mr. COOPER. All right. Very good. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. This is very useful. We are all looking at what we

might do for Dr. Wang. Just one last question. What is Dr. Wang’s

nationality at the moment?

Mr. COOPER. Well, that may be an area of legal contention and

concern. I think it is safe to say that he is a permanent U.S. resident.

Mr. FOARDE. So he has a green card.

Mr. COOPER. Right.

Mr. FOARDE. Meaning his nationality stays as PRC, but he has

permanent residence in the United States.

Mr. COOPER. That is correct.

Mr. FOARDE. Well, as you know, as somebody who used to do this

as both a consular officer and a diplomat for the United States

abroad, the legal basis for making representations about detainees

is much stronger when it is your own national and when both countries are parties to either a bilateral consular convention or the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

It is more difficult when the detainee is a permanent resident,

but still retains the nationality of another country, for example, in

this case, China. But there is a moral basis on which to ask for

help, and particularly when family members and relatives are U.S.

citizens.

The State Department frequently goes in and says, ‘‘Look, we

recognize that this man is not our national and that we may not

14

have a legal right to have access to him or to demand anything

under the Vienna Convention. But he is a long-time permanent

resident, he has friends, family, and relatives who are U.S. citizens.’’

There is a relationship, and therefore we feel we have good cause

to ask about his whereabouts and ask for access, and the other

things that you might ask for for a citizen. I think that has been

done in the case of Dr. Wang, unfortunately not successfully. But,

very useful. All right.

Let me go on to Ms. Marsh. First, a comment, then a question.

Your initial presentation talked very eloquently about the problem

of the Chinese authorities violating the PRC law and Constitution,

as well as international human rights standards and norms.

I just wanted to comment that this theme is something that you

will see woven throughout our forthcoming annual report, because

it is, at a high level of abstraction, one of the chief problems from

a rule of law point of view.

In many cases, the PRC has good laws, sometimes state-of-theart laws. But, on the one hand, the ability of individuals to enforce

their rights is very limited, if present at all. At the other level, the

authorities frequently just ignore, look the other way, or have the

exceptions that you talked about carved out of these things.

I would like to ask a question that you alluded to a little bit, but

it would be useful to have your views on it in a broader way.

What, in your mind, accounts for the virulence of the PRC Government’s reaction against Falun Gong since, let us say, April

1999?

Ms. MARSH. That is actually not an easy question to answer. I

have certainly heard lots of explanations from various people closer

to the situation than I. My sense is that the principles upon which

Falun Gong is based—those are compassion, truthfulness, and forbearance—I think probably, especially the compassion, are very

much at odds with the need for the PRC to control the population

through the state-run media, the propaganda machines.

There are all sorts of ways, some of which were certainly mentioned in my talk, that China uses to control the people in China.

You cannot control people who prefer compassion, truthfulness, and

tolerance to advancing up the political ladder.

You cannot control people who are willing to be arrested and tortured. My understanding is, from the study I have done of the Cultural Revolution, of Tiananmen, and then this, is that if Mao

Zedong starts the Cultural Revolution and somebody did not like

it, no matter high up he was—and there are many examples—they

were just arrested and tortured. So, many high-ranking officials of

the Communist Party were tortured. They are not alive any more.

There are so many in house detention.

So, to me, it was just not possible for Jiang Zemin and the Communist Party to maintain control over China with all these people

liberating themselves with these noble principles.

And it is sad, because these are the principles, to me, that are

really constitutive of our humanity. These are the best that we can

be. So to see those principles trampled upon because of a need to

control people, it is very sad.

15

Mr. FOARDE. Is it not also true that, at least in the early 1990s,

there was both formal and tacit government support for Falun

Gong.

Ms. MARSH. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Mr. FOARDE. And a great number of government officials, members of the People’s Liberation Army, and what have you, were

practitioners of Falun Gong at some level?

Ms. MARSH. Yes. It was so popular. I mean, that is what is so

amazing to me, is that members of the Politburo, Jiang Zemin’s

family.

I mean, everybody—this is what I have been told—was practicing

Falun Gong, because it is based on ancient traditions of China, the

gigong practice. It comes from an ancient cultivation practice and

it really resonates in China. So, everybody was practicing it.

There were awards given to Li Hongzhi, the different Chinese research societies were constantly acclaiming his books, they were

the most popular books being read in China. Everybody was out

there in the morning doing the exercises.

In fact, for about 2 years—1997 to 1999—Jiang Zemin, who I

think almost single-handedly started this persecution, although it

certainly garnered support from elsewhere, told the Public Security

Bureau to investigate Falun Gong, thinking that doing so would

produce what he wanted. They did an enormous investigation and

they said, ‘‘No, there is nothing wrong. They are fine. They do not

break the law, they do not do this. . .’’

So, it was popular. Through the ordinary sort of legal channels,

Jiang could not stop it. That is why I think you had so many exceptions and all these notices and administrative orders, and so on

and so forth.

Mr. FOARDE. So do I understand you to say that, as far as you

know, the investigation into Falun Gong by the senior Chinese

leadership predated the March 1999 demonstration?

Ms. MARSH. Absolutely. Jiang Zemin had 2 years in which he

was trying, through legitimate channels, to stop and stifle Falun

Gong, and it did not work. Then he gave a speech in April 1999

before the Politburo and basically just said, ‘‘This is what is going

to happen. We are going to get rid of Falun Gong, because they are

a threat.’’ He connected them to the West and to the United States,

and all this kind of silly language. People opposed him.

And I do not know these Chinese names, but the Premier [Zhu

Rongji], I think, himself was totally on the other side, and met with

the practitioners and said, ‘‘Do not worry, this is not going to happen, you are not going to be banned.’’

But then Jiang Zemin, I think he had some high-ranking person

in the Chinese Communist Party arrested and tortured badly. Then

all of a sudden the Premier became silent and everybody became

quiet because of memories of the Cultural Revolution. I mean,

there is fear. I wonder myself, how would I fare under torture?

Mr. FOARDE. It is a very difficult question. Certainly if you look

at any of the harrowing, but great books that have been written

about Cultural Revolution experiences, it is very difficult for me as

an individual, and I am sure a great many people, to understand

how you would tolerate such treatment. It is very difficult.

16

Let me ask you. If the particular anti-Falun Gong campaign was

associated with Jiang Zemin, is there any reason to believe that

the new leaders that have now arisen and been installed by the

Party would either have less interest in a very aggressive persecution of Falun Gong, or possibly even would see the campaign as

something that belongs to the old regime and try to back away

from it?

Is there any hope of that?

Ms. MARSH. That is also a very difficult question and I am hardly

an expert on politics in China. But it seems to me that it is conceivable that, if we could find a face-saving way to stop the persecution—I mean, the United States would have to play an active role

in this—in which we could somehow approach the new regime and

not force them to retract everything, because they are probably not

prepared to do that, but find some way to just kind of stop talking

about it. Just, let us stop talking about it and just let the people

out, and so on, and so forth. That is a possibility.

But my worry or my concern is, Jiang Zemin is still powerful.

There is so much inter-political—I mean, I am reading the ‘‘Tiananmen Papers’’ now, and it is just so complicated as to who

is what and who is on which side, and so on. Jiang still does exert

some power.

So, I think there needs to be some waning of his power, and perhaps that will happen. I know he is not popular with the Chinese

people, but that does not seem to matter.

Mr. FOARDE. So it is hard to say whether or not there is any

hope.

Ms. MARSH. It is hard for me to say. There might be persons

wiser than me who can say. But I know that I was personally trying to talk to some of the aides in Congress. Again, this was about

6 months ago. Senator Biden’s chief aide, and I think he was also

Senator Kerry’s aide.

I was suggesting that we might at least look into a face-saving

way to stop the persecution, because obviously face-saving is so important in China. To have to say, ‘‘Well, we made a mistake,’’ I

think that might be expecting too much.

Mr. FOARDE. Or we did it because the Americans forced us to do

it.

Ms. MARSH. Right. Something. Very, very sorry. Something to

save face, but to stop it. I did file this lawsuit against former President Jiang and against quite a few other officials, so I am very

close to the details of the persecution.

It is very hard to know completely with your heart, your mind,

and your soul to know that this is going on every single day, every

single minute of the day, and just go about your business. It is

hard. It is very hard.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you so much. This is very useful.

Ms. MARSH. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. Let me turn to a question or two to Mr. Wu Wei.

Again, I do not want to put you on the spot because I know you

are standing in for Ms. Huang. So, if you do not feel comfortable

answering a question, by all means tell me and we will save it for

her for the next time, because I am sure we will be seeing her frequently, as we always do.

17

But I did want to go back into the themes in the statement about

SARS and about the lack of freedom of the press, and how that in

many ways exacerbated the seriousness of the SARS crisis last

spring.

Some medical experts say that SARS may, in fact, come back this

fall. There is even more concern because, just in the last couple of

weeks, local authorities in several places in Guangdong have permitted the sale, again, of civets and other animals that have been

associated with new and different types of retroviruses, including

the SARS virus.

So my question really is, given that they have just had this experience where the government was very embarrassed because the

epidemic spread very rapidly, and it was the lack of information

that made it spread so widely and the suppression of information

that was already available to journalists, is it more likely or less

likely that, if SARS has a resurgence this fall or this winter, that

the same sort of repressive muzzle will be put on journalists that

want to report the facts about outbreaks and what have you?

Mr. WU. Yes, sir. Well, let me start to tell you a personal story.

A friend of mine who is an Italian student was in China, in Beijing,

studying Chinese back in the spring of this year.

He and his Chinese friend did not know about SARS until the

day when he received an e-mail from his family in Italy, and phone

calls as well, to question about, what is going on in Beijing on the

SARS issue? So, he certainly woke up.

He went to the Internet and checked, I suppose, English or

Italian language online newspapers and discovered the SARS crisis. He went back to his Chinese friend and told them about the

SARS crisis in China. None of his Chinese-educated friends, college

students, believed him. So, that is the degree of censorship and

brainwashing in China, in Beijing, among the top university students.

Now, your question is about the future, I guess, what is going to

happen this fall?

Mr. FOARDE. Will there be the same type of restriction on reporting SARS information?

Mr. WU. There is no crystal ball. We cannot predict that. But we

can say, in fact, the new Chinese leadership is the same as we saw

before. That is, they have tightened, again, the information circulation. So I suppose and I expect the Chinese news media to not be

reporting on SARS, as they did during the spring.

Mr. FOARDE. So it is more likely that we will see more of the

same instead of learning the lesson.

Mr. WU. I suspect so, sir.

Mr. FOARDE. Unfortunate, indeed.

Kaiser Seyet, Terri Marsh, Timothy Cooper, Wu Wei, thank you

for spending your time with us this afternoon.

If you would like, since we have a couple of minutes, I would invite you to make a final statement to sum up the things that you

would like the people who read the record to remember.

Maybe we would start with Mr. Seyet, if you would like.

Mr. SEYET. You asked me how long it takes Uighur people to get

a passport. Just for example, for my family, I have been here in

the United States for 61⁄2 years. My parents started applying for

18

a passport 6 years ago and they have not gotten anything from the

government.

My mother is just a housewife. She does not do anything political. My dad is an electrical engineer and has nothing to do with

politics. But it is because I am active here politically, so they have

not gotten a passport yet.

The second thing, about SCO, China has been pressing very hard

on Central Asian countries. It is like, in Central Asian countries,

China does not hesitate going to the addresses and arresting people

by themselves. It is like a part of the Chinese terrorism police can

go there. Sometimes they can arrest people by themselves and take

them to China.

The Uighur refugee problem is worse in Europe. People have

been denied seeking asylum and have been returned due to Chinese Government pressure. We would like the U.S. Senate and

House to pass a resolution to help Uighur refugees.

If they do not give asylum, just do not give them back to China.

China is also a member of the Security Council. They are not obeying the Convention on Refugees as a signatory. So, we would like

to mention this to the Chinese Government to press and to not to

torture and take them back and execute them. Thank you very

much.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. Very useful.

Terri Marsh.

Ms. MARSH. Well, first, I would like to say that Mike

Jendrzejczyk. I cannot pronounce his name.

Mr. FOARDE. Mike Jendrzejczyk. The late Mike Jendrzejczyk, unfortunately.

Ms. MARSH. The Washington director of Human Rights Watch/

Asia said, ‘‘Cloaking the campaign against Falun Gong in rhetoric

about the rule of law does not give any great legitimacy to China’s

crackdown on Falun Gong.’’ He urges that the ban and the crackdown be lifted and everybody be released immediately.

I would supplement his remarks by urging everyone, not only the

Commission, who knows quite well in this area, but the U.S. Government and the U.S. Department of State, I would single out the

Administration, the Bush Administration, the U.S. Department of

Justice, that all of us need, together, to do what we can to stop the

persecution in China and to do what we can to seriously promote

a rule of law in China as opposed to a rule by law.

I think that by permitting China to continue to cloak the rule by

law in a rule of law, we really foster an environment for the cultural revolution, for the tragedy of Tiananmen Square and for the

latest crackdown against Falun Gong. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much. Also very useful.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Again, I want to express my appreciation to the

Commission, and to you in particular, for taking the time to listen

to the dire case of Dr. Wang Bingzhang. I would like to remind the

Commission that, even at this very hour, he sits in solitary confinement in a 4×4 cell. He is not going anywhere. He is facing life in

prison for crimes he did not commit.

19

The Chinese Government offered no evidence whatsoever to

prove their case that he committed any act of espionage, any act

of terrorism. There was simply no evidence provided at all.

The accusation, for instance, that he attempted to organize the

bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Thailand was utterly refuted

when an AP reporter called the Terrorism Department of the Thai

Government and asked whether or not they had even heard of Dr.

Wang Bingzhang, and they said, ‘‘Absolutely not.’’ We do not know anything about these charges, anything about

these suspicions. These were fabricated, trumped up charges that

have no bearing to reality in any way, shape or form.

The United Nations probed this case. They determined that Dr.

Wang Bingzhang did not have any knowledge of the charges

against him, did not have the right to legal counsel or the right to

review his own arrest and detention, and that after the date of his

original detention, he did not benefit from the right of the presumption of innocence, the right to adequate time and facilities for

his own defense, the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial jury, and on and on it goes.

There is no question that he was run roughshod, that he was set

up by, we assume, the Chinese authorities, since that is where they

would most liked to have seen him, and that he has been denied

all justice under law and under universal principles.

So, again, we implore the U.S. Congress to take to heart his case,

to take to heart the separation from freedom that Dr. Wang

Bingzhang knows, and to support him via a Congressional resolution to exert all due influence on China to free him at the earliest

possible date. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wei, if you had a word or two on behalf of Huang Ciping and

the organization, please go ahead.

Mr. WU. Yes, sir. I would like to raise two issues. The first, is

the U.S.-based high-tech companies are transferring high-tech technology to China, and by doing so are helping the Chinese Government to increase the degree of information censorship.

Second, I would like to remind Members of Congress that political reform and democratization in China is related to U.S. national

security interests. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. That will conclude then, for today, our Open Forum.

We will try to do another one of these probably after the first of

the year.

We will have our next activity on Monday the 22nd. As I said,

I do not have a room yet. But as soon as I do, we will send out

an announcement.

Thank you all for coming this afternoon, and to our speakers for

sharing their views and information with us. Good afternoon, all.

(Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m. the open forum was concluded.)

(21)

A P P E N D I X

22

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KAISER SEYET

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

ESCALATING REFOULEMENT OF UYGHUR REFUGEES

The Uyghur American Association is deeply concerned about the rising number

of peaceful Uyghur dissidents being returned to the People’s Republic of China. Although media attention has raised the deportation of Tibetan refugees from Nepal

and caused governments to act, no such attention has been paid to the escalating

phenomena of peaceful dissents being returned from Central Asian states and Pakistan under pressure from the Chinese government.

Before the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Chinese

diplomats would bring accusations of criminal wrongdoing against Uyghur refugees

and seek their deportation. Wanted posters in Chinese and the local language have

been posted on the streets in many cities. The pressure employed against the refugees and their place of refuge can be summed up with this except from a 1996 internal

Chinese Communist Party Document:

‘‘Limit the activities of outside ethnic separatist activities from many sides.

Bear in mind the fact that Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the homebases for the activities of outside separatists forces. Through diplomacy, urge

these countries to limit and weaken the activities of separatist forces inside

their border. Take full advantage of our political superiority to further develop

the bilateral friendly cooperation with these countries. At the same time, always

maintain pressure on them. Considering the ethnic separatism activities outside

of the border, carry out all necessary dialog and struggle. Strengthen the investigation and study outside of the border. Collect the information on related development directions of events, and be especially vigilant against and prevent,

by all means, the outside separatist forces from making the so-called ‘‘Eastern

Turkistan’’ problem international.’’

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document Central Committee (1996)

No.7 Record of the Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of

the Chinese Communist Party concerning the maintenance of Stability in Xinjiang

When the SCO was formed, official contacts started in the Central Asian war on

terrorism. At that point, the campaign against ’East Turkistan separatists’ had not

been internationalized, but quietly, dissidents continued to be arrested and returned

to face imprisonment, torture and even death, just for leaving the peoples Republic

of China.

After the events of September 11, 2001 and the beginning of the U.S. war on terrorism, Chinese government officials began to equate the peaceful expression of

thought with terrorism. In many official Chinese government statements, terrorism

and separatism appear side-by-side as crimes to be fought.

The criminalization of peaceful ideas is not condoned by the U.S. Constitution nor

any international body or agreement, yet such a tactic is used to repress dissent in

countries that neighbor the PRC. The entire process should be viewed as an extension of the Chinese government Police State.

The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that ‘‘no State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or

extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing

that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’’ The principle of nonrefoulement is a basic right of all people that flee tyranny and oppression and clearly,

according to the annual U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report, the People’s Republic of China abused the rights of citizens accorded under their constitution. Abuses included instances of extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment

of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. Such compelling evidence from the U.S.

State Department merits attention to safeguard the human rights of people escaping oppression in the People’s Republic of China.

The Uyghur American Association recommends that the U.S. government, in its

official dealings with Central Asian states, including Pakistan, Nepal, Kazakhstan

and Kyrgyzstan,

23

1Since 1999, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom has Designated China as a country of particular concern. See, e.g., Report Of The United States Commission On International Religious Freedom, 25 (May 2002).

• Reinforce the ideal of the rule of law, namely, the principle of non-refoulement

with regard to people escaping persecution and oppression from the People’s Republic of China;

• Raise concerns about the treatment of refugees and their rights as guaranteed

under the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights;

• Raise the issue of forced repatriations, the abuse of human and civil rights before

the proper U.N. bodies, and

• Press for meaningful reform and change within the People’s Republic of China

such that so many do not feel compelled to flee their homeland.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRI MARSH

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

THE RULE BY LAW IN CHINA TODAY

According to Jeremy Cohen in his ‘‘The Plight of Criminal Defense Lawyers,’’ presented to this commission on July 26, 2002, China’s entire criminal process is in

need of radical reform. In his view, a ‘‘radical, long-run political restructuring would

be necessary to bring the PRC’s criminal process into compliance with [even] minimal international standards.’’ A cursory look at the problems Professor Cohen identifies reveals at least two types. On the one hand, the practice of criminal law in

China itself violates the body of Chinese law, which includes but is not limited to

the Constitution, the Penal Law, Prison Law, and Police Law. For example,

although both the Constitution and Police law prohibit interrogation to produce (enforced and hence false) confessions, police interrogation and torture is a fairly common practice in China, as illustrated in many of the Country Human Rights Reports

published by our Department of State. Specific instances described include torture

by electric shock and the shackling of hands and feet; confinement of practitioners

in mental hospitals; use of excessive force in detaining peaceful protesters; the death

of more than 200 practitioners while in police custody with many of their bodies

bearing signs of severe beatings and torture.; and the cremation of bodies before relatives examine them. See, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices—China (2000) Available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/

2000/eap/684.ht1

On the other hand, in addition to Chinese violations of their own legal codes, the

second type of problem identified by Professor Cohen has to do with the promulgation of rules, in the form of administrative orders, articles of legislation, notices promulgated by all sorts of entities and bodies, including even the courts. These create

exceptions to the already drafted rules of law which put some disfavored group or

class at a disadvantage in securing the rights the State acknowledges they have.

In Jerome Cohen’s piece, of course the disadvantaged are all of those accused of

crimes, especially those accused of political crimes, and all of those trained to defend

those accused of crimes—the criminal defense bar. In spite of the so called right to

counsel afforded to all citizens, the People’s Republic of China promulgated an exception for Falun Gong. As indicated in an announcement promulgated by the Judicial Bureau of Beijing, (see appendix), this notice as a practical matter denies all

Falun Gong practitioners their constitutional right to legal counsel. Similarly, long

after Falun Gong practitioners had been unlawfully arrested in China, the ‘‘anti

cult’’ law was passed retroactively by the People’s Congress to eradicate the practice

by the label of evil cult. To up the anti even further, a third rule was promulgated

in the form of a notice by the Supreme Court. It states that all persons who practice

Falun Gong practice an evil cult. By such a notice, the Supreme Court has undermined not only the independence of the judicial branch of government, it has also

undermined its modus operandi and raison d’etre—to hear cases and render rulings.

Before trial, with or without a trial, if you practice Falun Gong in China, you are

guilty as charged. With or without an attorney, the deck is stacked.

The two above referenced types of problem identified by Professor Cohen are referenced in Ronald Dworkin’s A Matter of Principle (1985 Harvard University Press).

Chapter two, ‘‘Political Judges and the Rule of Law,’’ is especially relevant since it

distinguishes between two definitions of the ‘‘rule of law.’’

There is the rule-book conception, which insists that the ‘‘power of the state not

be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance with rules explicitly set

24

out in a public rule book available to all The government as well as ordinary citizens must play by these public rules until they are changed, in accordance with further rules about how they are to be changed, which are also set out in the rule

book.’’ Id at 11. Those who subscribe to this view tend to care less about substantive

justice—are the rules fair, do they protect individual rights, is it feasible to believe

that such rules will in deed is enforced. As narrow a conception as this is, there

is not question that China has indeed violated the rule-book definition of the rule

of law, not only during the Cultural Revolution, the tragedy at Tiananmen, but also,

and most notably now during the latest persecution of Falun Gong. Those just stated above as well as those stated below are examples of this formulation.

There is a second formulation, which permits us to further evaluate state law to

see if it is consistent with even minimal international standards of law and, thereby

permits us to distinguish between a rule of law, and the rules promulgated by, for

example, the Nazis in WWII. This latter formulation additionally illustrates how in

fact what is packaged in China as a rule of law, is in fact and indeed a rule by

law.

In this second more expanded formulation of a rule of law, Dworkin observes that ‘‘Citizens have moral rights and duties with respect to one another and political

rights against the State as a whole. This formulation insists, ‘That these moral and

political rights be recognized in positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the

demand of individual citizens through courts and other judicial institutions.’ Id, p.

12. This second conception requires more—including a judicial branch which operates independent of legislative and executive branches; an array of due process

rights such as oversight of the judicial process itself, right to a fair trial, right to

cross examine one’s accusers etc. And of course a right for all to secure the rights

the State acknowledges they have. In this formulation, the promulgation of new

rules to deprive Falun Gong practitioners of their constitutional and legal rights

itself signals that we are dealing with something other than the rule of law in

China today.’’ As a China expert noted recently, what appears as a rule of law in China is in

fact a rule by law. Unlike the former, the latter is characterized by the state’s use of the law itself to disfavor groups, to single out groups for unfair punishment, or,

as in China and Nazi Germany, to oppress, torture, exterminate or eradicate groups

or classes of persons in ways that shock the conscience and cause one to wonder

anew—how can we be so noble and so base, and all be of the same human stock?

Actually it’s important to note that a rule by law is nothing new in China. It was

used to create and implement the Cultural Revolution. It was used to stifle the student democracy movement stated at Tiananmen. It is used to squash labor movements, any and all criticism of the government. Most notably and most recently it

is used to deprive all persons who subscribe to the principles of Falun Gong of the

right to think for themselves, the right to a moral conscience, the right to religious

freedom, to freedom of speech, to assemble freely and peacefully, to appeal illegal

laws of their legislature and farcical rulings of their courts. It is used and continues

to be used to torture persons who refuse to relinquish any of the aforementioned

rights not for 1 day, or two days, but endlessly for years on torture devices which

can only bring tears to the eyes of those who truly contemplate what they are.

But in its latest guise, it is especially troubling and pernicious. In the very beginning of the persecution of Falun Gong, it appears visibly and clearly when (1) By

order of former President Jiang, the police arrest Falun Gong practitioners without

legal ground, (2) The former president himself defines the crimes retroactively, by

trying to persuade the French newspaper Figaro, that Falun Gong, a peaceful meditative form of cultivation, is instead an evil cult, (3) By executive order, the legislative branch passes the infamous anti cult law to legitimate the illegal arrests by

outlawing whatever range of meanings are referenced by the over broad and unconstitutionally vague phrase ‘‘evil cult,’’ and (4) When the Supreme Court instead of

ruling on cases, expounds on the nature of Falun Gong by issuing a notice declaring,

at the behest of former President Jiang, that indeed Falun Gong is an evil cult, and

therefore even before or without a trial, all who espouse its principles are guilty of

criminal acts. Not very different from the Nazis forcing Jews to wear the yellow triangle to identify themselves as enemies of the state, and hence not deserving of the

rights afforded its genuine members.

Its beginning is replicated in its implementation. In early June 1999, former

President Jiang gave a speech to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party wherein he creates the Office 6/10, a Gestapo organization

mandated to usurp proper functions of all three branches of government, of important sectors of civil society, as well as private sector businesses and associations.

Officials of this office are stationed in the appeals office where they are known to

beat up FLG practitioners who attempt to file an appeal in accord with rights afVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:20 Nov 18, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 90434.TXT China1 PsN: China1
25

forded to all citizens by the constitution. Officials of this office are stationed in

schools, police stations, hospitals, mental hospitals, detention centers, labor camps,

re-education centers. They issue the orders to doctors to force feed Falun Gong practitioners who refuse to admit that their spiritual beliefs are corrupt. They order the

prisons’ guards to place Falun Gong practitioners in cells with the most violent

criminals where they are beaten if not to death then to near death regularly. They

are stationed above the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and instruct Ambassador staff,

and those working abroad how most effectively to expand the persecution to those

who practice Falun Gong here in the United States. Most pertinent herein, they too

promulgate rules and the rules they promulgate are not only inconsistent with

standards of common sense, decency, and morality, but they are also rules established and promulgated to systematically, efficiently and effectively persecute Falun

Gong practitioners and eradicate the practice utterly from the mainland of China,

once and for all.

Finally, there are the sham show trials. According to an eyewitness of one such

trial, after the government’s only witness admitted he’d never met or heard of the

defendant before the onset of his trial, the Judge without any evidence whatsoever

still found him guilty as charged.

According to Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director of Human Rights Watch’s

Asia Division, ‘‘cloaking this campaign in rhetoric about the ‘rule of law’ doesn’t give

any greater legitimacy to China’s crackdown on Falun gong . . . The official ban

. . . should be lifted; the government’s pronouncement that it is a true cult and that

it must be suppressed must be rescinded. All Falun Gong members in detention, formally charged, or sentenced to labor camps for peaceful activities should be released

immediately.’’ Id.

I would supplement those remarks by suggesting that we do all we can to promote

the rule of law in China. That this Commission continues to do it can. Because a

rule by law is dangerous not only for the harm it wreaks internally, but because

as long as the rule by law is the norm, such atrocities as the Cultural Revolution,

the tragedy at Tiananmen, and most unfortunately and notably the genocide it now

perpetrates against Falun Gong will continue under the cloak of a rule of law.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY COOPER

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

THE KIDNAPPING, DETENTION, SUMMARY TRIAL, AND SENTENCING OF

DR. WANG BINGZHANG

Distinguished representatives of the Congressional-Executive Commission on

China: My name is Timothy Cooper, and I am the executive director of Worldrights,

a non-governmental organization dedicated to human rights advocacy worldwide. I

have the honor today to speak to you about the shocking case of Dr. Wang

Bingzhang, who was recently kidnapped, detained, summarily tried and sentenced

to life in prison in China for crimes he did not commit. Unable to attend these hearings today, Dr. Wang’s family, including his parents, brother, sisters and children,

wish to convey their appreciation to this commission for its interest in Dr. Wang’s

dire and deeply troubling circumstances. For at this very hour, he languishes in solitary confinement in a Chinese prison cell, facing the prospect of living out the rest

of his life in a 4×4 foot cell.

In many ways, Dr. Wang’s story mirrors that of the thousands of other wellknown and lesser well-known political prisoners, who have also confronted the brutal ire of the Chinese government for standing up for universal principles and world

rights in the face of severe and sustained oppression, more frequently than not at

the expense of their own freedoms, their own rights, and yes, even their own lives.

But in other ways, Dr. Wang’s case is uniquely situated. The government’s calculated treatment of Dr. Wang appears to mark a new nadir in the annals of political

oppression in China. Indeed, it is Dr. Wang’s family’s contention that the deliberate

and unconscionable actions taken against him by the Chinese government crossed

an important moral and political divide that should raise a series of red flags in

the West and around the world about the direction China’s human rights policies

may be headed.

It is for this reason that the U.S. government—the world’s champion for the

human rights—should not and must not turn a blind eye to the fate of Dr. Wang.

Having himself stood tirelessly, if not heroically, for the civil and political rights of

1.2 billion of his own people in China for over 20 years as an exiled Chinese citizen

and a permanent U.S. resident, we believe that it is morally incumbent upon the

26

United States—and in particular the United States Congress—to stand with Dr.

Wang in his greatest hour of need.

In June 2002, Dr. Wang and his two companions, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi, flew

to Vietnam to meet with mainland Chinese labor leaders in order to explore possible

venues for cooperation between the overseas pro-democracy movement and the rising labor movement. The strategic concept was to marry the head of the democracy

movement with the body politic of the fledgling labor movement. Such a powerful

marriage of political convenience would undoubtedly strike unholy terror in the

hearts of Chinese authorities. It is therefore understandable that the Chinese government would stop at nothing to try to thwart the development of such a potentially potent strategic alliance.

On June 27, 2002, Dr. Wang, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi were abducted from their

hotel lobby by about ten men, posing as Vietnamese policemen, only a short time

after meeting with a labor leader in the border town of Mongcai. According to Yue

Wu and Zhang Qi, two of the men spoke with Chinese, not Vietnamese, accents.

Told that they were wanted for questioning at the police station, they were taken

to an awaiting van. Soon they realized they were not being driven into town, but

out-of-town.

They arrived at the Beilun River, where Dr. Wang was forcibly removed from the

van and beaten because he refused to board a boat that stood waiting for them.

Forcibly taken aboard, they were escorted across the river and into China. Once on

shore, the leader of the group revealed a picture he had with him of Dr. Wang. With

satisfaction, he compared the picture with Dr. Wang’s face. He had found his man,

all right.

Later, a new band of men arrived and took charge. This time they were all Chinese. Dr. Wang and the others were blindfolded and taken by car to a nearby hotel,

where the ‘‘kidnappers’’ demanded a ten million dollar ransom. Naturally, Dr.

Wang, Yue Wu and Zhang Qi carried no such sum. They provided their captors with

family contact information, including all cell phone numbers. But no family members were ever contacted. No ransom was ever demanded.

After being detained in the hotel with papered windows for about a week, Dr.

Wang and his companions were taken to a Buddhist temple near Fangchenggang,

in remote Guangxi province. There their ‘‘kidnappers’’ abandoned them, still bound

and without warning. Moments later, the Chinese police arrived—in the words of

the Chinese authorities—‘‘to rescue’’ them.

But Dr. Wang, Yue Wu, and Zhang Qi found only continued detention. The three

were kept in police custody until the following day when they were transferred to

separate detention centers. There they were held incommunicado for over 5 months.

All the while, the Chinese government denied any knowledge whatsoever of their

whereabouts.

In December, the government finally announced that it was, indeed, holding Dr.

Wang and his two companions. Dr. Wang was charged with ‘‘espionage’’ and terrorism.’’ The others were set free. Yue Wu returned to Paris in December and Zhang

Qi was placed under house arrest until her return to the United States in March.

Meanwhile, Dr. Wang was summarily tried in a 2-hour, closed trial. His lawyer

received the case only a week or so before the trial and stated that he had no experience in such cases. In February, Dr. Wang was sentenced to life in prison for his

alleged crimes of ‘‘espionage’’ and ‘‘terrorism,’’ though no evidence was ever offered

by the Chinese government to support its outrageous allegations. All the while, Dr.

Wang has maintained his innocence. His appeal was later rejected and Dr. Wang

was taken into solitary confinement, where he has remained ever since.

In July 2003, however, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human

Rights issued Opinion No 10/2003, regarding the case of Dr. Wang, Yue Wu and

Zhang Qi. In its written opinion, the UN’s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention

concluded that, among other things, the detention of Dr. Wang, Yue Wu and Zhang

was arbitrary and a violation of international law. It noted that during Dr. Wang’s

first 5 months in detention, he ‘‘did not have knowledge of the charges, the right

to legal counsel, or the right to judicial review of the arrest and detention: and that,

after that date, he did not benefit from the right to the presumption of innocence,

the right to adequate time and facilities for defense, the right to a fair trial before

an independent and impartial tribunal, the right to a speedy trial and the right to

cross-examine witnesses.’’ Nor did the U.N. find any basis for China charges of ‘‘espionage’’ and ‘‘terrorism.’’

It concluded its opinion by calling on China to take ‘‘the necessary steps to remedy the situation of Wang Bingzhang and bring it into conformity with the standards and principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’’ In

other words, it called on China to free him.

27

Representatives of the Commission, Dr. Wang was trained as a lung surgeon. He

earned his Ph.D at McGill University in coronary-arterial research. Yet, he chose

to devote the best years of his life to promoting human rights and democracy for

the people of China, famously stating that ‘‘Medicine can only cure a few patients,

but cannot cure the disease of a nation.’’ Now—in ill health himself, suffering from

depression, gastritis, varicose veins and Phlebitis, without the benefits of Western

medicine, he faces the prospect of an interminable prison sentence in a 4×4 ft. cell

for crimes that he did not—could not—commit.

But as much as he requires medical assistance, Dr. Wang also requires the generous assistance of the U.S. Congress. Dr. Wang’s family respectfully requests that

this Congress pass a joint resolution on his behalf, calling on the Government of

the People’s Republic of China to release him on medical grounds at the earliest possible date, and to abide by the legal opinion rendered by the United Nations in his

arbitrary detention case. We believe such a resolution would reaffirm America’s

commitment to human rights in China and honor a man who has dedicated his life

to the freedom and human rights of so many others.

Thank you.

28

1 Attachments 1 through 5 appear on the Commission’s Web site (www.cecc.gov) in Chinese.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CIPING HUANG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WEI JINGSHENG

FOUNDATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHAIR, INDEPENDENT FEDERATION OF CHINESE

STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS (IFCSS)

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

NO PRESS FREEDOM IN CHINA AFTER SARS

My name is Ciping Huang. Today, I am making a statement on behalf of the Wei

Jingsheng Foundation and the Independent Federation of Chinese Students and

Scholars, regarding the current news media and information channels being controlled by the Chinese government.

Early last spring, the China press got unexpected world attention because of

SARS. The initial cover-up by the government resulted in terrible consequences including panic and many deaths in China. However, only after the disease spread

overseas and caused an international outcry, was the Chinese press loosened and

allowed to give out the number of deaths and related health information, trustworthy or not. As a result, kindhearted people around the world have an increased

hope for Chinese press freedom. As an old saying said: a loss may turn out to be

a gain; the SARS storm might bring a positive reform to the Chinese press.

Of course, the world should welcome each step of progress toward democracy and

freedom, no matter how small the step might be, if only it is a sincere step. However, people must be wary of illusions or wishful thinking. Without a systematic

guarantee in China, any step forward could be easily taken away by the government.

The freedom of the Chinese press has long been a goal that Chinese people have

pursued. During the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement, many young people

sacrificed their lives for this goal. For a short few days, the Chinese people thought

they gained that freedom, only be crushed by tanks and the government propaganda

machine later on. Now there are still many people both on the China mainland and

abroad struggling hard to get even one private newspaper or magazine published

in China. So far, has anything changed? The only one real voice to be heard in

China is the voice from government. Non-governmental approved voices are cut and

muted.

The sad reality is: China has not gained more press freedom since SARS.

Even during the seeming opened crack of reporting on SARS, very little attention

was given to the Chinese government’s decree to ‘‘severely punish the rumor spreaders.’’ Several dozen people were arrested for spreading the news about SARS.

In June 2003, the Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department

criticized more than 10 major well known newspapers and magazines, such as

<Beijing Communication>, <Three-United Life Weekly>, <Finance> etc. The cited

issues included SARS and the reporting on corrupted officials. After this criticizing,

some ‘‘sensitive articles’’ had to be ‘‘killed’’ before publishing. Especially those articles reporting on Doctor Jiang (who first appealed to open truth on SARS) got tight

censorship by the government and many articles were cut. Due to the new regulations, SARS reporting is not a free topic but has a very clear and disciplined line

that the most journalists have no guts to cross. The forbidden topics also include:

the North Korea nuclear crisis, the nuclear submarine 361 explosion case, and Zhou

ZhengYi, the top corruption case in Shanghai. (See attachment 1.) 1

In recent months, the government has had more meetings to call for ‘‘The Reform

of China Press and Publication.’’ The proposals included cutting the number of totally controlled newspapers, clarifying the ‘‘Party’s disciplines’’ and emphasizing the

purpose of propaganda etc. However, as Cai YongMei, The executive editor of Hong

Kong’s <Open> magazine (Kai1Fang4) analyzed: ‘‘I think the government doesn’t

want to lose the control of media. Light issues and non-sensitive topics might get

loosened, but serious topics, or those they think are principal issues will be held as

tightly as before.’’ (See attachment 2.)

Last month, the veil over this ‘‘reform’’ was finally lifted. The Chinese government

finally decreed their detailed regulations without a sign of real reform. These regulations demonstrated further the hard-line face of the central government that tries

to make a successful and strict control over the news media. In particular, the reguVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:20 Nov 18, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 90434.TXT China1 PsN: China1
29

lations ask for strict censorship, and include dismissing and appointing the leaders.

(See attachment 3.)

Also in the summer, the Chinese news media and universities and academic/research institutes received notices from the government clearly stating prohibitions

to discuss certain issues, in particular modifying the constitution, political reforms,

and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement.

We want to emphasize that China has a long way to go toward real press freedom. The root of the problem lies in the system, which has been there for over half

a century under the Chinese Communists’ rule. The following facts are some of our

highest concerns. The problems still exist after SARS.

1. There is no real private press in China and no independent journalism under

the Chinese Communists’ one-party leadership.

So far, except for some pointless papers and local small magazines (e.g. equivalent

to ‘‘how to do make-up’’), China doesn’t have a single newspaper or magazine owned

by a non-government agent or company. The registration of a press is a very complicated and strict step. The government at any time can easily crush a newspaper

or magazine agent/company if it violates the government regulations, or even just

displeases some officials.

2. Internet Censorship is a serious abuse of the basic human right of ‘‘right to

knowledge.’’

If you are in China and open ‘‘Google’’ or ‘‘Yahoo!,’’ you won’t be able to find many

web sites that you can see in other countries. Since August 31 this year, Chinese

government shutdown the search machine ‘‘Google’’ in China again. Just before

every political event, Internet become one more place for the Chinese Communists

to tight their ‘‘strict strike’’ control. According to latest report by Central Agency,

the government has 300,000 people policing the Internet, including 30,000 professional work for the National Security Department, to monitor and filter news and

e-mails, to shutdown web sites and to give warnings to people who make ‘‘undesirable’’ web pages or posts on the Internet. Unless technically specially handled, Emails from dissidents such as me are often rerouted through the police bureau before reaching the intended recipients, and are often rejected and even be confiscated

without acknowledgement. In some cases, the recipients are harassed, or interrogated by the secret police. It surely is amazing that while this government has

failed to control ‘‘forbidden pornographic materials’’ on the Internet, it is able to put

a pretty good handle on the dissident voices and even just plain news.

The censoring not only applies to the news and articles posted in foreign web

sites, but also to local people who join ‘‘chat rooms.’’ Liu Di, a 19 year old college

girl, has been detained for months because of some words and essays she posted in

a chat room.

Yet, this type of the censorship is just part of the integral policing system in

China. As the other side of traffic, I was told by a friend whose sister worked to

examine the mails from overseas that one-third of all mails went through inspection, beyond even ‘‘targeted mails.’’ In addition, phone tapping is common and public

knowledge in China, and is not just applied to the dissidents and activists.

3. Brave journalists and liberal editors often get in trouble, and some are put in

prison just because they report the truth or speak from conscience.

While over all, Chinese people are the victims of the Chinese Communists’ propaganda machine; Chinese news media workers are the direct victims. In the last 5

decades, many of them lost their freedom or even lives for it. One of my friends,

Wu XueCan, who was an editor for People’s Daily, was put in prison and tortured

after the 1989 Tiananmen movement for his effort to bring truth to the people.

Many liberal editors and reporters got laid off or even put in prison for reporting

on corrupted officials, on the common people’s suffering, or just expressing (or even

just allowing) a different view from the government. They make a long list. Here,

I want to mention a few:

(a) Gao Qinrong, a journalist who reported about corruption on the irrigation

system flaw in ShanXi Province, received 13 years in prison. (Attachment 4 is

an article written by Yu Jie, an established scholar in China, about Gao.)

(b) Qi YanChen, editor, was prosecuted for ‘‘spreading anti-government messages via the Internet’’ by submitting articles to places such as the pro-democracy electronic newsletter VIP reference. He was sentenced 4 years.

(c) Teng ChunYan, an American citizen and a Falun Gong practitioner, received 3 years in prison for serving as a source on Falun Gong for news organizations.

(d) An Jun was the founder of the China Corruption Monitor. His writings

were used as evidence of anti-state activities and he was sentenced 4 years. (InVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:20 Nov 18, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 90434.TXT China1 PsN: China1
30

terestingly enough, An’s verdict was not announced until April 19, 2000, the

day after the U.N. high commission on human rights failed to pass a US sponsored resolution to condemn Chinese human rights abuses.)

(e) Jiang QiSheng, journalist and political dissident, just finished 4 years jail

time in May for his pro-democracy articles including an essay to honor June 4

victims.

(f) Huang Qi, Internet publisher and web host, is still in prison for publishing

stories about human rights abuses, governmental corruptions, and June 4

Tiananmen.

(g) Yang ZiLi, etc. (4 youths), was sentenced lately (after SARS) for academic

discussion.

4. To survive one must to speak the Party’s tongue.

It is very common for editors to have to cut some ‘‘sensitive sentences’’ when they

review articles in newspapers or magazines. The most sensitive parts are not pornography issues, but those related to the political issues. There is no evidence for

a change in this situation.

From very reliable channels, I know that the editors working in newspapers and

magazines can only have part of their own minds, if they care about their life or

their family’s future. They consistently have meetings to ‘‘listen to the government’s

opinion,’’ that usually announce some ‘‘important regulations’’ of how to report certain sensitive events. ‘‘Keep the same tone with Party’’ is the first rule for all journalists in China. Some of my editor friends say that they don’t have their own

tongue but the Party’s tongue.

5. China has been rated ‘‘the second worst country for freedom of press and

speech.’’ The bias, misleading, even false news serve for Chinese government’s agenda.

On sensitive issues, only the government will have the right to decide if the news

can be opened to the public, and when and how. For example, the unemployed workers’ unrest in Northeast China will be suppressed in any newspaper with the ‘‘reason’’ of ‘‘not disturbing the stability of the country.’’ Early this year, in my home

town, Hefei City, when thousands students took to the streets to protest the wrongful deaths of their fellow students, no reports appeared for days in the official news

media even though the city residents knew something happened because of the paralyzed traffic and angry crowd.

Government events cannot be revealed on time without the Party’s control. Most

of them become ‘‘top secrets.’’ The Chinese people have little chance to know what

their ‘‘people’s government’’ does or will do. Even foreign correspondents based in

China cannot get timely news—they face routine surveillance and need special permission for leaving their city of residence.

For important world events, even though some city people can watch the news

from foreign satellite broadcasts (not very easily), most will be influenced by the

media controlled to report only the news the government wants people to believe.

For example, the reporting of the Iraq war was totally biased—Saddam became a

‘‘hero’’ in the reports. Of course, this case is only one of many illustrating how the

controlled news media has been misleading many Chinese people in an effort to realize the government’s own agenda. Dislike and even hate of America is on the

agenda. One of the most noticeable expressions is that the news media becomes the

government’s tool to fan up ‘‘nationalism.’’ Many more examples can be found that

cover almost all important world events, such as the North Korea Nuclear crisis,

Taiwan across the Strait, and the American pilots being shot down in HaiNan,

China.

6. The Chinese people don’t trust the news if it is presented by the Chinese government.

Chinese people do not have faith in the Chinese government. They always know

that their government cheats. They do not trust the government and what it says.

Yet, for fear of their lives, their freedom, and their families, most people could not

and do not dare to voice their hope for a free press.

During the beginning period of SARS, Chinese people, especially those living in

the big cities such as Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai, relied on the news sent by

their overseas relatives. Some of my friends who worked in the USA told me that

they were very busy looking for SARS news and were sending it immediately back

to China so that their family members would have a timely updated true picture

of the cases.

Those people who don’t have overseas relatives usually rely on BBC, Voice of

America, Radio Free Asia, or other overseas media since they have less confidence

31

1Kery Wilkie Nunez is a Falun Gong practitioner and a legislative director for a national

Latino organization in Washington, DC.

on their own government’s report. Everybody knows the phrase ‘‘In China, we only

have one voice.’’

After SARS, Chinese people still do not have confidence in the government media,

especially on political issues or other important issues.

Attachment 5 is an article on the subject that was by an overseas Chinese that

returned to China.

7. Foreign Investment and Internet will not bring free press to China.

Many foreigners, especially foreign investors, argue that their investment will

bring freedom including press freedom to China. The Chinese government has also

quietly encouraged such kind of notion, including making academics and Western

politicians believe in it. On the other hand, Chinese government rightly pointed out

that ‘‘the News Media is a special enterprise that does not follow the rule of ‘who

invests in it, owns it.’ ’’ The government specifically stated that ‘‘the news media is

a State enterprise’’ which applies to all the newspapers.

Similar ideas apply to the Internet. The Internet and advanced computer technology have become the tools for government monitoring and suppression of dissidence. It is a shame that a US company like Yahoo! has voluntarily cooperated

with the Chinese government’s requirements and made the guarantee to filter contents disliked by the government. It is more a shame for Western companies to work

closely with the Chinese government to create the product ‘‘Golden Shield’’ which

blocks information transfer and tracks addresses and messages to help make state

policing the best in the world. (For detail about ‘‘Golden Shield,’’ please visit an article on DaJiYun at: http://www.dajiyuan.com/gb/2/5/6/n188071.htm.) What is the

difference between doing these things and the exporting of high military technology

to China a few years ago?

Here we urge the freedom and democracy loving American people and the US

Congress to examine these issues and to prevent these moneymaking deals on the

price of Chinese people’s human rights and freedom.

To summarize our statement, there is no press freedom in China, even after

SARS. The support and effort from the outside world will always be necessary and

important. But first, we must know the real picture and what is really happening

in China. Any credence or wishful belief of press freedom coming soon in China is

not only concluding a wrong judgment, but also might hurt the people who have

been and will be sacrificing their lives for China’s press freedom. The Wei Jingsheng

Foundation and IFCSS wish you can carefully evaluate the situation based on valid

facts and continuously push the Chinese government for the better.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KERY WILKIE NUNEZ1

SEPTEMBER 8, 2003

THE PERSECUTION OF FALUN GONG IN CHINA

Thank you for the opportunity to submit a written comment on the persecution

of Falun Gong in China. In particular, I would like to discuss the detention and torture of American citizen Charles Lee.

Dr. Charles Lee traveled to China in January of 2003. The moment he stepped

off the plane, he was detained and beaten by Chinese authorities. He was later

rushed through a show trial and ‘‘sentenced’’ to 3 years in prison for a crime he did

not commit. On a previous business trip to China, Charles considered tapping into

a local cable to expose the human rights violations against Falun Gong practitioners. He never considered sabotaging any TV or radio equipment (which is what

he was accused of). Nor did he ever do a broadcast.

From a 95-page letter that Dr. Lee managed to get to the U.S. Consulate only

by means of an 8-day hunger strike, as well as from information provided by the

U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, we understand that Dr. Lee has endured severe abuse

while in prison.

He was forced to wear smelly winter clothes on unbearably hot days; he was deprived of sleep for 3 days; he was handcuffed in a very painful position for over 72

hours. Police intentionally tightened the handcuffs into his flesh to make it more

painful, leaving scars on his wrists. He was also handcuffed for 130 hours while trying to write his appeal to the Court. At least twice, he was force-fed (a type of torVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:20 Nov 18, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 90434.TXT China1 PsN: China1
32

ture that has resulted in the death of many Falun Gong practitioners). The Chinese

authority intentionally left the tube in his body for 4 hours to torture him. And

worst of all, the Chinese authority put tremendous pressure on Charles’ elderly parents (his mom had leukemia) in an attempt to break Charles’ will. Charles didn’t

want his parents to witness his suffering, as he was very concerned about their

health.

To understand why any Falun Gong practitioner would risk his or her life to

broadcast human rights violations in China, one must first understand how China

controls the media and fabricates lies to deceive the viewer into accepting the regime’s viewpoint. China uses its state-controlled media—print, radio, propaganda

shows, Internet blockade, etc.—to spread lies about a very peaceful spiritual practice

that has brought millions good health and inner peace. According to an article of

July 23rd in The Washington Post, entitled ‘‘China’s Spiritual Outlaws,’’ China

makes accusations and uses the word ‘‘cult’’ in describing Falun Gong in order to

sow confusion, suspicion, and indifference among outsiders. The article explains that

Falun Gong does not meet the definition of cult. ‘‘It does not coerce obedience, brainwash its members, gouge them for money or compel worship of its founder, Li

Hongzhi. It doesn’t wear down their egos, then build them up in the new image of

the spiritually transformed.’’ Yet, China’s state-controlled media spreads rumors to

the contrary, meanwhile the books are banned from the public.

Meanwhile, the government pressures everyone in society (professors, companies,

schools, neighbors, family members, etc.) to report on Falun Gong practitioners.

Some Chinese people are deceived by the media and are misled to believe that they

should report on their neighbors if they practice Falun Gong. What they don’t know

is that they are reporting on innocent people who may be sent to a torture camp.

Torture of Falun Gong practitioners is well documented in the free world. Yet, there

is no way to educate the Chinese public about this, as a person may lose his life

for distributing a flier.

Recently, we learned that Chinese authorities forced an abortion on a Falun Gong

practitioner in her seventh month of pregnancy simply because she refused to give

up her beliefs. She was restrained while an abortion-inducing drug was given to her.

While abortion is relatively common in China, most Chinese citizens probably don’t

know about this baby, which struggled in its mother’s womb for 40 hours before it

died. Afterwards, the mother struggled to deliver the dead baby.

Perhaps a small dosage of truth would affect the views of a seemingly indifferent

populace. In fact, Falun Gong’s broadcast’s in China has allowed many Chinese citizens the opportunity to see both sides of the story and follow their own conscience.

However, no one should have to risk his or her life to tell a story. It is my hope

that, with the guidance of the CECC, the United States will play a key role in improving information exchange in China. I also hope that the rescue of Dr. Charles

Lee and other Falun Gong practitioners from China will become a priority for the

U.S. How the U.S. treats human rights issues will send a very important message

to China’s new leadership.

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