Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 

on 15 December 1917. He took flying training 

at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned 

to Langley Field, Virginia, in February 1925 

with a subsequent assignment in December 

1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. 

Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the 

strategic thinkers at the school and coined the 

revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber”: 

“A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown 

air force attack will constitute an offensive that 

cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three 

years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, 

Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States 

in January 1941 as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the 

Air Corps in Washington, DC.

He was promoted to lieutenant colonel in July 1941 and colonel in March 

1942. During this time, when he worked in the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff, he coauthored the air-campaign strategy 

known as Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, 

deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan 

should the United States become embroiled in war. The authors completed 

this monumental undertaking in less than one month, just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—and the United States was, in fact, at war.

In June 1942 he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen 

George Kenney as commander of Fifth Air Force’s Bomber Command. In this 

capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing 

missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning firsthand about combat 

conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when aircraft faced opposition by enemy fighter planes and antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action on 5 January 1943 while leading a 

bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. 

He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads, “In the face 

of extremely heavy antiaircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy 

fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against 

shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy 

vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the 

attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and 

intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.” Walker is credited with being one of 

the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.
After you have read this research report, please 

give us your frank opinion on the contents. All 

comments––large or small, complimentary or 

caustic––will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them 

to Air Force Research Institute/AFRI/RIPF, 155 

N. Twining Street, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6026.

The Credibility of America’s

Extended Nuclear Deterrent Eldridge

The Case of the Republic of Turkey

Thank you for your assistance.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

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AIR UNIVERSITY

AIR FORCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

AIR FORCE FELLOWS

The Credibility of America’s 

Extended Nuclear Deterrent

The Case of the Republic of Turkey

William G. Eldridge

Colonel, USAF

Walker Paper No. 18

Air University Press

Air Force Research Institute

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2011
This Walker Paper and others in the series are available 

electronically at the Air University Research Information 

Management System website, http://research.maxwell

.af.mil and the AU Press website at http://aupress.au

.af.mil.

ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: 

distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Eldridge, William G., 1968-

The credibility of America’s extended nuclear deterrent : the case of the Republic 

of Turkey / William G. Eldridge.

 p. cm. — (Walker paper, ISSN 1555-7871 ; no. 18)

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-1-58566-215-9

1. Deterrence (Strategy)—United States. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation—Turkey. 

3. Nuclear nonproliferation—Government policy—United States. 4. Turkey—Military policy. 5. Turkey—Foreign relations—United States. 6. United States—Foreign 

relations—Turkey. I. Title. 

U162.6.E44 2011

355.02’17—dc23

 2011035039
iii

Air Force Fellows

Since 1958 the Air Force has assigned a small number of 

carefully chosen, experienced officers to serve one-year tours 

at distinguished civilian institutions studying national security 

policy and strategy. Beginning with the 1994 academic year, 

these programs were accorded senior service school professional military education in-residence credit. In 2003 these fellowships assumed senior developmental education (SDE), force 

development credit for eligible officers.

The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their 

colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key 

Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force issues. SDE-level 

fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. SDE-level fellows are expected to provide 

advice, promote, and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, and military doctrine strategy to nationally recognized 

scholars, foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The 

Air Force Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows 

are expected to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense and economic and foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow 

is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds 

for research and writing on important national security issues. 

The SDE Air Force Fellows include the National Defense Fellows, 

the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. The Air Force Fellows program also supports a post-SDE military fellow at the Council 

on Foreign Relations.

On the intermediate developmental education level, the chief 

of staff approved several Air Force fellowships focused on career broadening for Air Force majors. The Air Force Legislative 
iv

AIR FORCE FELLOWS

Fellows was established in April 1995 with the Foreign Policy 

Fellowship and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

Fellowship coming under the Air Force Fellows program in 

2003. In 2004 the Air Force Fellows also assumed responsibility 

of the National Laboratories Technologies Fellows.
v

Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . xiii

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Why Turkey? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Argument: It’s All about 

Relationships and Leadership . . . . . . . . . . 5

Research Questions and Methods . . . . . . . . . 5

Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Summary, Conclusions, and 

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

2 WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF AMERICAN 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Political Uses for US Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . 12

A Special Case of Deterrence: 

Extended Nuclear Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Linking Extended Nuclear Deterrence 

and Nonproliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Summary and Cautions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

3 ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR 

DETERRENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC 

OF TURKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Assessing Credibility Elements for 

US Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Assessing Nuclear Weapons Tipping 

Point: Warnings and Indicators . . . . . . . . . 35

Few Warnings and Indicators of Real 

Intentions and Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
vi

Chapter Page

4 IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR 

DETERRENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC 

OF TURKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Addressing Credibility Elements . . . . . . . . . . 51

Adding Weight: Preventing Tipping . . . . . . . . 58

Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS . . 65

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

APPENDIX: US-TURKISH RELATIONS 

TIMELINE POST-WWII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Illustration

Map of Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Tables

1 Elements of credibility for extended 

deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

2 Nuclear weapons tipping point warnings 

and indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

3 Assessing credibility elements for US 

extended deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4 Assessing nuclear tipping point 

warnings and indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

5 Status of relevant nuclear agreements 

for Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

CONTENTS
vii

Foreword

As Iran moves ever closer to a nuclear weapons capability, 

will other area powers such as Turkey decide to acquire their 

own nuclear weapons and embark on a crash nuclear weapons 

program to provide their own deterrent? Or will Turkey’s leaders trust in the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent for 

Turkey’s security? Col William G. Eldridge has explored this 

question in depth. To shore up the United States’ ability to convince the Turks to stay in the nonnuclear category, he recommends keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and bilateral alliances with Turkey strong and, with Turkey, 

establishing a more common vision for the Middle East. He also 

advises reducing trade barriers with Turkey, maintaining and 

even increasing military arms trading and aid, keeping US 

forces in present numbers in Turkey and improving militaryto-military ties, maintaining Turkey as a partner in dual-capable 

aircraft production, and, for now, keeping some US nuclear 

weapons in NATO Europe.

Colonel Eldridge also indicates there is little evidence that 

disarmament trends and the unfortunate misshipment of US 

nuclear weapons at Minot AFB and mishandling of some classified nuclear missile parts to Taiwan in 2007 and 2008 spurred 

Turkish leaders to develop their own nuclear weapons program. 

Turkey currently shows little interest in developing its own nuclear arms or capacity for the same. Turkey appears to be convinced that an obvious US commitment to retaliate against any 

aggressor attacking NATO states is sufficient for its belief in the 

United States’ extended deterrent pledge to Turkey.

Colonel Eldridge recommends three steps to measure the 

credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence: (1) examine the 

case of Turkey for insights on why alliance partners may contemplate proliferation; (2) include Turkey as a partner in building theater missile defenses in the region and fighter aircraft 

and provide political, economic, and military support to offset 

some of Turkey’s regional threats from Kurdish Workers Party 

terrorism, Iraqi instability, Iranian nuclear ambitions, Russian 

energy politics, Israeli-Hamas conflicts, Georgia-Russian frictions, and Greek-Turk conflicts in Cyprus; and (3) watch Tur-
viii

FOREWORD

key carefully for warnings and indicators of any nuclear weapons program to try to counteract it before it can fully develop.

Colonel Eldridge has provided a clearly written, well-researched, 

and timely analysis of a major concern about the United States’ 

extended deterrent capability in a world of emerging nuclear 

weapons states in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. All who 

are concerned about keeping additional states from joining the 

nuclear weapons club will benefit from this study of Turkey 

and the effectiveness of our nuclear umbrella to keep it safe 

and yet a nonnuclear weapons state.

DR. BARRY R. SCHNEIDER

Director, USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air University
ix

About the 

Author

Col William G. Eldridge

Col William G. Eldridge is the commander of the 28th Operations Group (OG), Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. He commands the largest operational B-1 group in the Air Force with 

one operational support squadron and two B-1 bomb squadrons. Colonel Eldridge maintains the combat readiness of the 

28th Bomb Wing bomber force for a multitude of worldwide 

and deterrent roles.

Colonel Eldridge received his commission from the US Air 

Force Academy in 1990. He has served as a B-1 instructor pilot, a B-2 instructor pilot, and an air campaign strategist for 

US Air Forces Central Command. His operational experience 

includes a 40-hour combat mission in the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom and a tour in the strategy division of 

the combined air operations center in Southwest Asia in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

He has served as a squadron maintenance officer, as the director of operations for the 393rd Bomb Squadron, and as the 

commander of the 13th Bomb Squadron at Whiteman AFB, 

Missouri. Prior to assuming command of the 28 OG, Colonel 

Eldridge was assigned to the Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars (WWICS) in Washington, DC.

xi

Abstract

In 2009 the United States completed an 80 percent reduction of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons 

from Cold War highs. Since 1991 the United States has also 

reduced its nonstrategic nuclear weapons by over 90 percent. 

Additionally, the United States removed much of its nuclear 

arsenal from alert status and continues to decrease its nuclear 

weapons stockpiles. However, nuclear weapons may still play 

an important role in deterring an adversary attack against the 

United States as well as providing a nuclear umbrella to allies.

An extended nuclear deterrent for protecting allies may also 

contribute significantly to nonproliferation efforts—the nuclear 

umbrella provides allies an assurance so they do not perceive 

the need to develop nuclear weapons arsenals for themselves. 

This study explores the impact of US nuclear weapon policy on 

the current and future effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey. It concludes that the credibility 

of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey depends on many 

factors and not just the quality and quantity of the US nuclear 

arsenal.

xiii

Preface and Acknowledgments

While assigned as a scholar at the WWICS as part of the US 

Air Force’s SDE program, I became interested in nuclear policy 

and the purpose of nuclear weapons after a B-52 aircraft mistakenly flew with actual nuclear warheads in August 2007, as 

well as a March 2008 incident when US intercontinental ballistic missile parts mislabeled as helicopter batteries were inadvertently shipped to Taiwan. These events resulted in the 

removal of the secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force chief 

of staff, major command organizational changes, and the overhaul of nuclear weapons procedures. As part of the Air Force’s 

corrective actions following these incidents, Air Force leadership called for research and writing on the nuclear enterprise. 

This study supports that call.

I am grateful to the WWICS’s staff, specifically its library 

staff, for creating an environment ideal for research and writing. The WWICS’s International Security Studies director, Dr. 

Robert Litwak, provided outstanding guidance during the topic 

selection. Dr. Kerry Kartchner of the policy division at the Department of State was an excellent research advisor. Also, I am 

indebted to Dr. Gul-Berna Ozcan, also a WWICS scholar, who 

provided many government and think-tank contacts which led 

to interviews cited in this research. Finally, my wife Beth endured multiple readings of this paper and provided much editing assistance.

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Our nuclear umbrella, our extended deterrent, underpins our alliances in Europe and in the Pacific and 

enables our friends, especially those worried about 

Tehran and Pyongyang, to continue to rely on our nuclear 

deterrent rather than to develop their own.

—Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense

28 October 2008

Are US nuclear reduction policies and recent nuclear weapons handling mistakes by the US Air Force weakening the nuclear umbrella and provoking nuclear weapons proliferation by 

encouraging our allies to seek their own nuclear weapons? 

America’s nuclear forces are on a downswing. In 2009 the 

United States reduced its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons by 80 percent of Cold War highs. Since 1991 the 

United States also reduced its nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

by over 90 percent. Similarly, France and the United Kingdom 

reduced their nuclear arsenals, and the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) nations declared that their remaining USowned nuclear weapons were primarily for political purposes.

The US systems dedicated to deliver nuclear weapons are a 

fraction of Cold War numbers. Once numbering over 1,000 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), more than 40 ballistic nuclear missile submarines, and nearly 1,000 bombers, 

there are now only 450 ICBMs, 14 submarines, and 113 bombers. The US nuclear arsenal in Europe has shrunk from thousands of nuclear weapons to a few hundred nuclear gravity 

bombs potentially delivered by small fleets of US and NATO 

dual-capable aircraft (DCA)—fighter aircraft able to deliver both 

conventional and nuclear weapons. In the coming years, Russia and the United States likely will continue negotiations to 

further draw down their nuclear weapons numbers. In the context of nuclear reductions, two incidents of nuclear weapons 

mishandling by the Air Force in 2007 and 2008 cast doubt for 

some on the US military’s competence for reliably sustaining 
INTRODUCTION

2

and executing a nuclear mission.1 Have these incidents, coupled with nuclear inventory reductions, weakened the credibility 

of the US nuclear deterrent?

Despite the apparent downward trajectory of the resources 

and care dedicated to the nuclear mission, nuclear deterrence 

remains a prominent part of US security policy. Nuclear weapons are listed in the National Defense Strategy published in 

June 2008 as a component of deterrence against nuclear attack.2 In a 28 October 2008 address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 

stated that nuclear weapons contribute to achieving two goals: 

to deter nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks on the United 

States or its allies, and to provide a nuclear umbrella or extended nuclear deterrent to US allies in the Pacific and in Europe. This nuclear umbrella causes allies to rely on US nuclear 

weapons for deterrence instead of seeking to acquire their own.3

This study explores the impact of post–Cold War nuclear 

weapon reduction policies and the Air Force’s recent nuclear 

missteps on the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. 

Additionally, it investigates the power of that deterrent to reinforce nonproliferation. Specifically, it examines the case of 

the Republic of Turkey.

Why Turkey?

The US-Turkey relationship is a useful case to measure the 

credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for several reasons. First, it has been an important and long-standing ally of 

the United States. However, Turkey’s occasional rocky relationship with the United States and Europe, coupled with its Islamic identity, causes concern for some on the durability of USTurkish and NATO-Turkish alliances. Examining the case of 

Turkey could provide insights on why longtime alliance partners might contemplate proliferation or might decide to abandon US nuclear protection to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. Lessons from this case possibly could extrapolate to other 

US allies, such as Japan or South Korea. Second, Turkey’s 

proximity to many Middle Eastern security challenges, including Iran’s budding nuclear program, makes it an interesting 

case for studying ways to diminish an ally’s security threats. 
Map of Turkey. (From “Turkey: Administrative Divisions,” Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, University of 

Texas Libraries, accessed 19 March 2009, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/turkey.html.)
INTRODUCTION

4

Third, because of its close relationship with Pakistan (a known 

nuclear proliferator) and its indigenous nuclear technical capabilities, Turkey sits high on the list of nations that could develop 

their own independent nuclear arsenals. Examining Turkey 

may provide methods for studying and discouraging potential 

proliferators, including ways to discern the warnings and indicators of a state on the edge of nuclear weapons “tipping.”

Since the mid-2000s, Turkey began to appear in reports, 

studies, journals, and the press as a potential candidate for 

pursuing its own nuclear program. In a 2006 Foreign Affairs

article, “After Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear,” 

Stephen Rosen used Turkey and Saudi Arabia as examples of 

states that could go nuclear if Iran develops a deployable nuclear weapon.4 On 12 December 2006 a Science Applications 

International Corporation report for the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency stated that Turkey and Japan are two of the 

United States’ extended deterrent challenges.5 In 2008 the 

Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism also listed Turkey and eight 

other countries as part of a group of nations that had expressed 

interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.6 A February 2008 report 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations for the United States 

Senate, “Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the 

Middle East,” listed Turkey, as well as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 

as potential nuclear weapons tippers if Iran successfully builds 

a nuclear weapon.7 Following the report, Turkish newspapers 

began discussing the possibility of Turkey becoming a nuclear 

weapons power.8

Creating additional concern for US policy makers are signals 

that Turkey may be distancing itself from the West. Turkey did 

not open its bases for the 2003 US-led operation against Iraq; 

it has engaged diplomatically with Iran, Syria, and the Palestinian Hamas despite US efforts at times to isolate those regimes; and a 2008 opinion poll reported less than 15 percent of 

the Turkish populace had a positive view of US policies.9 Although US-Turkish relations have oscillated since the end of 

World War II (see appendix), some scholars warn that to prevent further backsliding, secure a strong long-term relationship, and avert Turkey from “going nuclear,” the United States 

must take immediate steps to improve the relationship.10
INTRODUCTION

5

The Argument: 

It’s All about Relationships and Leadership

This research suggests that it is the strength of the US-Turkish 

political-security relationship that is the most important factor 

for ensuring the credibility of the United States’ extended nuclear 

deterrent. In fact, the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella has 

little to do with the type of its nuclear weapons, the number of 

warheads, or the negative image of US nuclear competency 

generated from the Air Force’s nuclear handling missteps. Instead, US credibility depends on Turkey’s perception of its political, economic, and military ties with the United States. It is 

the quality of that broader relationship that will also have the 

greatest influence on whether or not Turkish leaders pursue an 

independent nuclear weapons capability.

Turkey generally measures the strength of its security relationship with the United States through the lens of the reliability of 

bilateral and multilateral security and partnership agreements 

such as NATO and the European Union (EU). Although there 

are many ways to measure the strength of these types of relationships—domestic polls, media tone, treaties, and agreements—

the perception of national leadership is the most important. It 

is the highest level of Turkish decision makers that will decide 

the merits of continued reliance on the US extended nuclear 

deterrent. Undoubtedly, domestic influence and external security threats influence those decision makers, but for Turkey, it 

is the perception of alliance strength that will have the most 

influence on its nuclear proliferation decisions.

Research Questions and Methods

By analyzing Turkey as a case study, this research seeks to 

provide a method for assessing the credibility of US extended 

nuclear deterrence. It addresses several questions: What are 

the most important factors that might influence an ally’s decision to leave the US nuclear umbrella to pursue a nuclear 

weapons program? What is the relationship between extended 

nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation? What are the signs 

that an ally may be contemplating nuclear proliferation? What 

can the United States do to strengthen alliance relationships 
INTRODUCTION

6

and stifle proliferation? How do disarmament and arms reduction policies and nuclear handling errors affect the US 

nuclear umbrella?

To answer these questions, this research relied on primary 

and secondary sources. Primary sources include interviews 

with midlevel Turkish policy makers, policy documents, transcripts of public statements, and interviews with Turkish, US, 

and European political experts. Secondary sources (all unclassified) include scholarly analysis, essays, reports, and articles 

from US, European, and Turkish sources. Interviews for this 

paper reference only the expert’s job title and are not attributed 

to a specific person. Despite the promise of nonattribution, 

some interviewees provided only the official views of their governments; however, most provided important personal insights 

on the health of US-Turkish security relations and on the reliability of US extended nuclear deterrence.

Outline

The following chapters review extended deterrence theory 

and practice and make recommendations to improve the United 

States’ extended nuclear deterrence relationship with Turkey. 

Chapter 2 defines the purpose of nuclear weapons as well as 

deterrence and extended nuclear deterrence. Chapter 3 offers 

ways to measure US-Turkish extended nuclear deterrence 

credibility, and chapter 4 offers policy recommendations and 

suggestions for the Air Force that may help to strengthen that 

credibility. Chapter 5 provides conclusions, policy implications, 

and recommendations that may aid policy development for USTurkish security relationships, provide inputs for NATO nuclear policy debates, and offer considerations for US nuclear 

deployments, arms control, and disarmament policies.

Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

The political uses for US nuclear weapons have become more 

important than their military utility. Since the end of the Cold 

War, the military utility for nuclear weapons has become decreasingly important. However, their political uses—providing 

allies with a security umbrella and discouraging ally prolifera-
INTRODUCTION

7

tion—are increasingly relevant. Therefore, nuclear weapons 

should be designed and deployed primarily to support political 

goals and alliance building. Military utility is a secondary consideration. Prior to altering its nuclear posture, the United 

States should discuss proposed changes with allies who rely on 

extended nuclear deterrence to ensure that their security concerns are acknowledged and addressed.

The reasons that an ally might withdraw from the US nuclear 

umbrella to pursue its own nuclear weapons arsenal are unique 

to each ally. The United States requires a specific understanding and a unique strategy for each ally to ensure the credibility 

of its extended deterrence guarantees. Elements of that credibility include considerations other than just the size and quality 

of the US nuclear arsenal. Other credibility influences include 

alliance strength (including the level and frequency of US-ally 

security consultations), past and present US policies in the ally’s 

region, US-ally trade and military arms transfers, and the local 

presence of US military forces. Allies may prioritize these elements differently. The effectiveness of these elements can be 

measured by monitoring warnings and indicators of an ally’s 

intentions and capacities to acquire nuclear weapons.

For Turkey, alliances play the most important role in influencing Turkish leadership’s considerations for leaving the US nuclear umbrella to pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons program. In the short term, Turkey is unlikely to pursue a nuclear 

weapons program if its leadership perceives that the NATO alliance and US-Turkish bilateral relationships remain strong. 

Of the two relationships, Turkey’s bilateral relationship with 

the United States is more important.

Turkey likely will “tip” if Middle East nuclear proliferation 

becomes widespread and NATO is perceived as ineffective and

if US-Turkish relationships collapse. According to one Turkish 

diplomat, “things would have to get really bad” for Turkey to 

pursue its own nuclear weapons. Despite a rocky history, current NATO-Turkish and US-Turkish relations remain fundamentally sound, but leadership or regional security changes 

could strain those relationships. Factors working against Turkish nuclear weapons proliferation include the lack of support 

by senior Turkish leaders, the high value Turkey places on alliance relationships, the lack of funding for civilian or military 
INTRODUCTION

8

nuclear programs, and Turkish treaty agreements forswearing 

nuclear weapons.

Despite these proliferation disincentives, Turkey will probably 

hedge against falling behind a potential Middle East nuclear 

energy (or nuclear arms) race by developing a civilian nuclear 

power program. As Iran continues pursuing nuclear enrichment 

and possibly a nuclear weapon, Turkey will likely begin to develop a nuclear power program beyond its current research stage. 

Turkish leaders do not fear an attack from Iran, but instead 

they are concerned with the shift in the regional balance of power 

that may result from a nuclear-armed Iran. Hedging with civilian nuclear power provides scientific and engineering expertise 

needed for an aggressive Turkish nuclear program if Iran’s regional influence increases or a broader Middle East nuclear 

arms race begins. Therefore, the United States should continue 

its involvement in Turkey’s emerging civilian nuclear programs 

utilizing the existing 2008 US-Turkish nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement), develop additional cooperation agreements that encourage Turkey to forgo nuclear and spent fuel 

processing, encourage scientific exchanges, and consider financially supporting Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy program.

The credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey is 

best signaled not through US nuclear inventory types or numbers, but by demonstrations of US political, economic, and security relationships with Turkey. Turkey’s most important political 

and security concerns include

•	 credibility of NATO, EU, and US support for Turkish security;

•	 Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorism;

•	 Kurdish activism in Iraq supporting a separate Kurd state;

•	 Cyprus;

•	 relations with Iran and Armenia;

•	 energy security and access; and

•	 economic strength and domestic stability.

A close US-Turkish partnership that addresses these issues 

can strengthen US credibility as a reliable ally. A strong US-
INTRODUCTION

9

Turkish relationship also serves as a disincentive for Turkish 

nuclear weapons acquisition.

The US Air Force can play a role in strengthening US credibility 

and in decreasing Turkey’s probability for nuclear weapons proliferation. The Air Force’s nuclear mishandlings had little effect 

on Turkish perceptions of US extended nuclear deterrence 

credibility. Very few Turkish interviewees recalled either of the 

Air Force’s nuclear mishaps. Additionally, the types and capabilities of US nuclear weapons also have little effect on the 

credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey. However, Turkish representatives prefer the existing US nuclear 

weapons presence in Europe and argue strongly against hasty 

or unilateral changes. They also believe that the United States 

must maintain some nuclear weapons capability. The size and 

composition of that force is a matter for the United States to 

decide, preferably in consultation with Turkish national leaders. Maintaining Air Force and Turkish dual-capable aircraft in 

Europe is important to Turkey. The DCAs are a visible symbol 

of commitment from the United States. Even if US-NATO nuclear weapons employment policies change, then a joint USTurkish DCA still provides an important military sales tie and 

an opportunity for military exchanges. Additionally, the Air 

Force can play an important role in demonstrating a strong 

security relationship with Turkey by maintaining its presence 

at Incirlik Air Base; by continuing bilateral, joint, and NATO 

exercises; and by aiding Turkish antiterrorism operations with 

assistance in command and control, intelligence sharing, and 

direct combat action.

Notes

(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry 

in the bibliography.)

1. DOD, Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear 

Weapons Management Phase I, 13. In March 2008 the US Air Force discovered that in 2006, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) components were 

accidentally shipped to Taiwan. In March 2007 a B-52 bomber crew mistakenly flew actual nuclear weapons from Minot AFB, ND, to Barksdale AFB, LA. 

The B-52 crew believed that the nuclear warheads were removed from the 

missile bodies.

2. DOD, National Defense Strategy, 12.
INTRODUCTION

10

3. Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace,” 3–4.

4. Rosen, “After Proliferation,” 10.

5. Dunn et al., Foreign Perspectives on US Nuclear Policy and Posture, 6.

6. Graham and Talent, World at Risk, 61.

7. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, x.

8. “Saudi Arabia, Turkey Seen as Possibly Joining in a Nuclear Arms 

Race”; Kalyoncu, “Why, When and How Turkey Becomes a Nuclear Power”; 

and Kalyoncu, “How to Handle Turkey’s Legitimate Nuclear Aspirations.” 

9. Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe, 33.

10. Lesser, Beyond Suspicion, 4.
11

Chapter 2

What Is the Purpose of 

American Nuclear Weapons?

The power to hurt—the sheer unacquisitive, unproductive 

power to destroy things that somebody treasures, to 

induce pain and grief—is a kind of bargaining power, 

not easy to use but used often.

What nuclear weapons have been used for, effectively, 

successfully, for sixty years has not been on the battlefield nor on population targets: they have been used for 

influence.

—Thomas Schelling

Recent attempts to justify upgrades or replacements for US 

nuclear weapons systems were criticized for failing to provide a 

sound argument for the purpose of these weapons in a post–

Cold War world.1 With the end of the Cold War, the dominant 

role for US nuclear weapons has become political uses rather 

than military uses. Political uses include discouraging attacks 

against the United States and extended nuclear deterrence. 

Extended nuclear deterrence means using the US nuclear arsenal to deter attacks on allies.

The security umbrella that nuclear weapons provide may aid 

nonproliferation goals—allies protected by US nuclear weapons 

do not perceive the need to build nuclear arsenals of their own. 

Successful extended deterrence depends upon the defender 

state’s credibility of making good with its protection promises.

Many of the elements that have a positive effect on a defender’s credibility are also factors that are disincentives for an ally 

considering nuclear weapons proliferation. One of the more important factors is the day-to-day political relationship between 

the defender and its ally. If allied national leadership perceives 

eroding relationships with its nuclear armed defender, then 

nuclear weapons tipping, or deciding to pursue an indigenous 

nuclear weapon arsenal, becomes more likely.
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

12

This chapter explains the effects of the rise of political uses 

for US nuclear weapons, the special case of extended nuclear 

deterrence, and the linkage between extended nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation.

Political Uses for US Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons can achieve both political and military objectives. After the Cold War, the primary reason for the United 

States to maintain nuclear weapons has become for political 

objectives—for deterrence “bargaining.” The secondary reason—for military targeting—has decreased in prominence.

Political uses for nuclear weapons have existed since they 

were developed, built, and used. After authorizing the nuclear 

attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Pres. Harry Truman believed that nuclear weapons were more important as political 

tools than as military weapons. In 1946 he told his advisors, 

“You got to understand that this isn’t a military weapon. It is 

used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and 

not for military uses. So we have got to treat this differently from 

rifles and cannons and ordinary things like that.”2 A few days 

after authorizing work for a thermonuclear weapon in January 

1950, Truman told his staff, “[W]e had . . . to do it—make the 

bomb—though no one wants to use it. But . . . we have got to 

have it if only for bargaining purposes with the Russians.”3

Nuclear weapons became more militarily useable by growing 

in number from 1,000 weapons in 1953 to over 18,000 by the 

end of Pres. Dwight Eisenhower’s administration. Eisenhower 

still maintained that nuclear weapons were useful for political 

bargaining by the development of better nuclear bombers, the 

ICBM, and the submarine-launched ballistic missile.4 In 1954 

and 1955 Eisenhower and his secretary of state John Foster 

Dulles used threats of nuclear warfare to coerce Chinese leader 

Mao Zedong to end the Quemoy and Matsu crisis and in 1953 to 

aid negotiations to end the Korean War.5 Pres. John F. Kennedy 

and Pres. Lyndon Johnson thought that the military utility for 

nuclear weapons was limited and adopted a strategy of “flexible 

response” in which conventional military forces became more 

prominent in conflict resolution.6
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

13

As the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal grew in the late 1960s 

and 1970s, US nuclear strategy shifted to “no-cities” counterforce attacks against Soviet military forces and then to “mutual 

assured destruction” which targeted “countervalue” targets such 

as cities and industrial centers.7 Despite this apparent shift in 

emphasis to military uses for nuclear weapons, political bargaining—for deterrence—remained the rationale for these “delicate balance of terror” strategies.8 Even though Pres. Richard 

Nixon adopted targeting policies of “balance of terror” and “sufficiency,” both had the objective of deterring a Soviet nuclear 

attack rather than a practical military objective.9 Similarly, Pres. 

Jimmy Carter’s administration adopted a “countervailing” targeting strategy with the goal to match the Soviet Union and ensure “that the Soviets were indeed fully deterred from undertaking 

aggression.”10 During Pres. Ronald Reagan’s terms in office, the 

strategy shifted from countervailing to prevailing in a protracted 

nuclear war.11 However when the Cold War ended, targeting policies and theories began to fade while a renewed emphasis developed on the political uses for US nuclear weapons.

When the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s, US nuclear targeting strategies decreased in prominence while the 

political rationale for maintaining nuclear weapons came to the 

forefront. In 1991 Pres. George H. W. Bush unilaterally ordered 

all nuclear bombers off alert and cancelled several nuclear 

modernization plans.12 In the first US strategy statement after 

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 1991 National Security 

Strategy stated that deterring the Soviets was still the top priority of US nuclear forces, but the document hinted at challenges in targeting:

Despite the threat still posed by the existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, 

the likelihood of their deliberate use by the Soviet state is declining and 

the scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor of their 

use—massive war in Europe—is less likely than at any other time since 

World War II. These developments affect questions of nuclear targeting, 

the alert status and operational procedures of our forces and ultimately 

the type and number of weapons sufficient to ensure our safety and that 

of our allies. We have already begun to make adjustments to our nuclear 

forces and to the policies that guide them in recognition of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and changes in the Soviet Union itself.13

NATO policies also shifted emphasis from military utility to 

political uses for nuclear weapons. The 2004 “NATO’s Nuclear 
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

14

Forces” states that “NATO has radically reduced its reliance on 

nuclear forces. Their role is now more fundamentally political, 

and they are no longer directed towards a specific target.”14

NATO maintains a nuclear weapons sharing agreement permitting the United States to base a few hundred nuclear gravity 

bombs in Europe under the custody and control of the United 

States. The role of these weapons is primarily political.15

Recent nuclear policies continue to emphasize and prioritize 

the political uses for US nuclear weapons over military uses. 

Neither Pres. George W. Bush’s March 2006 National Security 

Strategy nor the DOD’s June 2008 National Defense Strategy

provided a targeting strategy for nuclear weapons.16 Instead, 

both declared counterproliferation and deterrence as their primary role. Underscoring the importance of deterrent uses for 

US nuclear weapons, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in a 

2008 presentation to the Carnegie Endowment for International 

Peace, commented that “as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves 

to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen 

allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their 

security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their 

own.”17 This political goal for the US nuclear arsenal—to serve 

as a tool of nonproliferation—has become increasingly prominent in US nuclear strategy.

The rise of prominence for the political uses of US nuclear 

weapons affects policy decision making in a few ways. First, the 

size and makeup of the US nuclear arsenal can be flexible. After 

the Cold War ended and Russia was no longer perceived as the 

primary adversary for US and NATO nuclear planning, deep nuclear weapons reductions became possible. Because targets and 

target types (military uses) are decreasingly important factors for 

US nuclear force posture, the numbers of weapons and type of 

deployment might be best determined by political objectives, 

bargaining goals, and available logistics infrastructure. Second, 

coordination with allies that may benefit from the nuclear umbrella becomes increasingly important. Any changes to force 

structure should include consultation (bargaining) with allies. 

Otherwise the United States risks weakening an important use 

of its nuclear arsenal—to protect allies. Third, the political rationale for nuclear deployment and force structure decisions may 
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

15

not seem sensible to military planners. For example, a NATO 

nuclear force with US nuclear gravity bombs employed on short–

range dual-capable fighters may not provide the most survivable 

or operationally successful military option for nuclear weapons 

employment. However, the political benefit the weapons provide 

by discouraging nuclear proliferation among allies and by reassuring allies through extending deterrence may be more important objectives than military usefulness.

A Special Case of Deterrence: 

Extended Nuclear Deterrence

As defined by two political scientists, extended deterrence is 

“deterrence of an attack on another party.”18 Using nuclear 

weapons to provide extended deterrence has been called extended nuclear deterrence, which has become one justification 

for the US nuclear arsenal.19 The 2006 National Security Strategy

argues that US nuclear weapons, as a part of a “New Triad” 

that includes both nuclear and conventional capabilities, defenses (such as missile defense), and logistical infrastructure, 

“will better deter some of the new threats we face, while also 

bolstering our security commitments to allies.”20 For extended 

deterrence to work, the defending country’s commitments to 

the ally must be credible.

How a defending nation can offer a credible extended deterrent to an ally has been the subject of several studies, resulting 

in two prominent theories.21 First, early deterrent credibility 

thought, led by political scientist Thomas Schelling, offered the 

commitment theory.22 Schelling’s commitment theory suggested that effective nuclear deterrence required the defending 

nation to provide signals of its commitment. Signaling commitment by troop deployments or by armed intervention shows a 

potential attacker that the defender has strong resolve to act. 

This was the basis for the domino theory in Southeast Asia that 

rationalized US intervention against communist-backed insurgents in South Vietnam would keep the entire region from falling under communist rule. The shortfalls of Schelling’s theory 

became evident: after the United States failed to keep Vietnam 

from becoming a communist country, Southeast Asia did not 
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

16

cascade into communism. Empirical analysis by other political 

scientists also noted shortfalls of his theory.23

The second theory, called inherent credibility, refutes 

Schelling’s commitment theory by suggesting that credibility depends on the defender’s interest in the ally, and it is the strength 

of this interest that determines the effectiveness of deterrence.24

Political scientists Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, two leading deterrence scholars, summarized this theory, stating, “successful 

deterrence is very much more than just a matter of having a favorable military balance, and very much a matter of the nature 

and extent of ties between the defender state and the state it 

wishes to protect.”25 Other political scientists added to the theory arguing that not only are defender-ally ties important but 

the defender’s regional interests are as well.26 Both of these variants of inherent credibility theory offer similar methods of measuring a defender’s commitment to an ally.

By using an empirical expected utility model to examine 54 

cases of deterrence from 1900 to 1980, Huth and Russett concluded that the most important elements of a defender’s credibility for successfully deterring an attack on an ally included

1. trade (economic linkage between the defender and ally);

2. political–military relationship and assistance (arms trading with ally); and 

3. local military balance (defender and ally superiority in 

forces above the attacker).27

They also discovered credibility elements that played a lesser 

role in effective extended deterrence. These elements included 

alliances, the defender’s past behavior, and military superiority. 

The defender’s possession of nuclear weapons had a minor influence on effective deterrence. Huth and Russett concluded, 

“A quest for strategic nuclear superiority is unlikely to be the 

most effective means for providing security to America’s friends 

and allies in a crisis, or to America itself.” Instead, the researchers stated that “an important contribution to effective deterrence may emerge from achievement of a goal that is usually 

sought for other purposes—maintaining and strengthening the 

ties of mutual interest among nation-states in an open global 

economic system.”28 Other researchers found similar results.
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

17

Researcher Vesna Danilovic used a similar mathematical 

model to assess the success of extended deterrence as a function of the importance a defender places on the ally’s surrounding region. Danilovic suggested that “although a particular state 

may not have great significance for a major power, it may still 

be important if it is located in the region of critical strategic 

importance.”29 Using cases from 1895 to 1985, Danilovic tested 

the probability that a defender will extend deterrence against 

an aggressor to an ally and found that “regional stakes as a 

source of inherent credibility of extended threats—is a powerful predictor of the choices that major powers make in their 

conflicts with other nations.”30 Danilovic measured a defender’s 

regional salience using the following elements: alliance bonds, 

diplomatic exchanges, colonial possessions (for cases prior to 

1939), foreign trade, past behavior of the defender (in the region), and costly signals (troop mobilization or display of force).31

These elements of credibility were similar to those used by 

Huth and Russett. As a result of the research, Danilovic offered 

the following policy advice: “In terms of policy implications for 

US post–cold war diplomacy, the analysis indicates that a 

‘micromanagement’ of particular foreign policy issues needs to 

be conducted within the framework of a ‘grand strategy.’ ”32

Political science scholars Curtis Signorino and Ahmer Tarar 

discovered similar credibility elements. However, their conclusions on the most important elements differed.33 Using a different 

and arguably more accurate model, Signorino and Tarar found 

that “military alliances, long-term balance of forces, nuclear 

weapons, military arms transfers, and foreign trade all affect deterrence success.”34 Unlike Huth and Russett, the researchers 

found that the role of nuclear weapons “(1) generally incline the 

defender to assist the [ally]; (2) generally increase the probability 

of deterrence success; but (3) depending on the values of the other 

variables, may increase or decrease the likelihood of war.”35

Each of these theories has limitations when applied to the 

credibility of American extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey. 

First, they predict outcomes for immediate extended deterrence 

which occurs when the attacker begins to seriously consider an 

attack while the other side prepares for retaliation.36 However, 

as defined in this study, extended nuclear deterrence is more 

general and enduring, with the United States maintaining nu-
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

18

clear and military forces to defend Turkey even though no attack is imminent.37 Despite this difference, many of the elements for credibility may still apply for a more general deterrence 

because implementing or strengthening these elements—political, economic, and military ties—requires a long-term strategy. 

In other words, these credibility elements must be in place before a conflict.

All theories tested deterrence against an attacker state. However, in this study the attacker is unknown or may be a nonstate, such as a terrorist organization. These deterrence elements may still apply regardless of the origin of attack. Although 

not inclusive, combining the conclusions and results of these 

studies provides a way to measure the credibility of US extended deterrence for Turkey. Table 1 summarizes these elements from each of the three researchers and applies them to 

this case study.

To summarize, the credibility of extended deterrence depends more on the defender-ally relationship than on the 

strength of the defender’s military or nuclear forces. Measuring 

the strength of this credibility includes many elements, but the 

most important include alliances, foreign policy support, foreign trade, military arms transfers, local military balance, and 

the presence of nuclear forces.

For this study, Turkish policy makers were asked in interviews to rank the applied deterrence elements in order of importance. Many provided the following:

1. Stability of US-Turkish alliances

2. US support for Turkish foreign policies and US interests 

in the Middle East

3. US-Turkish foreign trade

4. US military arms transfers to Turkey

5. Numbers of US forces based in Turkey

6. Status of US nuclear forces

These elements are evaluated in the next chapter to provide 

an assessment of US extended nuclear deterrence credibility 

for Turkey. Addressing and strengthening these credibility ele-
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

19

ments may have a dual purpose—they may also affect Turkish 

leadership thinking about pursuing nuclear weapons.

Linking Extended Nuclear 

Deterrence and Nonproliferation

Although deterrence against an attack on the United States 

plays a prominent role in American nuclear weapons policy, 

the political uses of nuclear weapons also include assurances, 

or security guarantees, to allies for the purpose of deterring an 

attack on them and as a “bargain” to discourage proliferation. 

This use for nuclear weapons has been mentioned in US policy 

documents and statements. The 2006 National Security Strategy, 

in referring to the security provided to allies by the “New Triad” 

argues, “Such security commitments have played a crucial role 

Table 1. Elements of credibility for extended deterrence

Researcher(s) Huth and 

Russett

Danilovic Signorino and 

Ahmer

Combined 

elements applied 

to case study 

Elements Regional alliance 

bonds/diplomatic 

exchanges

Military 

alliance

Strength of 

US-Turkish 

alliances (bilateral, 

NATO, others)

Past defender 

behavior in 

region/costly 

signals

US-Turkish 

foreign policy 

support trends/US 

interest in 

Middle East

Foreign trade Regional foreign 

trade

Foreign trade US-Turkish 

foreign trade 

trends

Arms transfers Military arms 

transfers

US-Turkish 

military arms 

transfers trends

Local military 

balance

Long-term 

balance 

of forces

US forces in 

Turkey trends

Defender 

possesses nuclear 

weapons

Presence of US 

nuclear forces

Created by author based on Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” World 

Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496–526; Vesna Danilovic, “Sources of Threat Credibility,” Journal of 

Conflict Resolution 45, no. 3 (June 2001): 341–69; and Curtis A. Signorino and Ahmer Tarar, “A 

Unified Theory of Extended Immediate Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 

(July 2006): 586–605.
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

20

in convincing some countries to forgo their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby aiding our nonproliferation objectives.”38

Additionally, the National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 

21st Century states, “US nuclear weapons deter potential adversaries from the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction 

against the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies and 

friends. In the absence of this ‘nuclear umbrella,’ some nonnuclear allies might perceive a need to develop and deploy their 

own nuclear capability.”39

One way to measure the US nuclear umbrella’s effectiveness 

as a method of nonproliferation requires examining the potential warnings and indicators revealed by a state considering 

tipping towards developing a nuclear weapons arsenal. Tipping 

indicators have been exhaustively studied and can be divided 

into two categories: intentions and capabilities.40 This section 

provides a review of these warnings and indicators, arguing 

that elements of deterrence credibility can affect them by providing proliferation disincentives.

In offering warnings and indicators of proliferation, researcher Peter Lavoy acknowledges that an acute security 

threat can be a precursor to proliferation, but by itself is insufficient. Instead, Lavoy argues, national leadership plays the 

greatest role, often providing overt signals of proliferation intentions.41 Calling these signals “nuclear mythmaking,” Levoy 

defines them as occurring when national leaders

1. emphasize their country’s insecurity or its poor international standing; 

2. portray this strategy as the best corrective for these problems; 

3. articulate the political, economic, and technical feasibility 

of acquiring nuclear weapons;

4. successfully associate these beliefs and arguments; and

5. convince senior decision makers to accept and act on 

these views.42

Reinforcing Lavoy’s argument, political scientist Etel Solingen 

provides a theory for predicting the proliferation intentions of 

state leadership. In Solingen’s award-winning book Nuclear 

Logics, he explains that the relationship between a ruling re-
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

21

gime and its state is “the most important frontier for understanding nuclear choices and outcomes.”43 Solingen concludes 

that state leaders with economic growth and global economization agendas are less likely to advocate nuclear weapons programs than states that are inward-looking and less engaged in 

the global economy.44

In addition to leadership influence, Lavoy said that technical 

nuclear capabilities such as political and international support, economic feasibility, military employment capability, and 

technical feasibility are important warnings and indicators. 

However, each capability will require influence by the mythmakers for legitimacy.45 Of these capability indicators, Lavoy 

further defines technical feasibility to include scientific training 

and education, procurement, and an increasing role of military 

and intelligence organizations in nuclear efforts.46 Researcher 

Alexis Blanc added the development of fissionable material 

(mining, milling, and refining the nuclear materials for constructing a nuclear bomb), weapons research, and the country’s status with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as additional 

indicators of feasibility.47 Table 2 summarizes these researchers’ warnings and indicators.

Several of these warning and indicator factors may be influenced by the elements of credibility for extended deterrence. 

For example, ensuring the strength of US-Turkish alliances 

may affect how Turkish leadership perceives the seriousness of 

an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. Additionally, if the 

United States remains the predominant military arms exporter 

to Turkey, then this dependence on US arms may increase the 

effort and expense required for Turkey to field its own independent nuclear weapons delivery system. Similarly, strong economic ties between the United States and Turkey may contribute to economic growth, encouraging Turkish leadership to 

remain outward looking in their economic policies, which decreases the likelihood of a Turkish nuclear weapon according 

to Solingen.

Summary and Cautions

The primary role for US nuclear weapons in the post–Cold 

War world is for political uses. Without a dominant adversary, 
Table 2. Nuclear weapons tipping point warnings and indicators

Type Indicator Indicator/Warning Definition Application to Case

Intentions Rise of security threat Major shift in country’s 

security situation such as 

an initiation or acceleration 

of a neighbor’s nuclear 

bomb program

–Iran successfully builds 

nuclear weapon

–Increase in Middle East 

nuclear proliferation

Regime and state 

relationship

–Outward looking: leaders 

advocate economic growth 

and global integration

–Inward looking: leaders 

and populace less dependent on international markets, investments, institutions, more nationalistic

–Regime policies for economic growth

–Regime trends towards 

nationalism

Leadership 

mythmaking

Leadership emphasizes 

security concerns:

–Presents nuclear weapons as a solution

–Public statements, policy 

debates

–Travel patterns (leadership and scientific/program managers)

–Convince others in government to do the same

–Leadership public statements 

and policies on nuclear 

weapons

–Leader/scientific travel 

patterns

Capabilities Technical feasibility –Scientific training/

education

–Procurement

–Military and intelligence 

organizations assist 

nuclear efforts

–Support from other states

–Fissionable material production

–Weapons development

–Turkish investment in nuclear 

research

–Turkish investment in civilian 

nuclear power

–Nuclear support from other 

states (Pakistan/Russia)

–Progress on refining fissionable material

–Weapons development 

progress

Economic feasibility –Capacity to meet financial 

costs

–Capacity for industrial 

spin-off

–Financial abilities

–Civilian nuclear power capability

Political/international 

support

Capacity to manage political 

problems with developing 

nuclear weapons:

–Impact on relations with 

other states

–Effect of alliance commitments on regime stability

–Treaty obligations

–Turkish popular support for 

military nuclear program

–Turkish popular support for 

civilian nuclear program

–Importance of alliances on 

regime stability

–NPT obligations

Military/strategic 

employment 

capability

Capacity to develop 

operational nuclear 

weapons, policies, and 

military operations

–Turkish military capability to 

field, command/control, and 

employ nuclear weapons

Created by author based on Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade,” Nonproliferation Review 13, no. 3 (November 2006): 434–54; and Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 13–17.
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

23

military targeting has become a lesser reason to maintain a 

nuclear arsenal. One of the political uses for US nuclear weapons is extended nuclear deterrence, which is the use of nuclear 

weapons to protect an ally from attack. Deterrence requires 

credibility, which is composed of many elements. The credibility 

of a defender’s extended deterrent may not be based solely on 

the strength of the defender’s military (or nuclear) forces. Instead, credibility elements include the strength of alliances between the defender and ally, the defender’s political and economic support for the ally, trade relationships, and the status 

of military forces, including the presence of nuclear weapons. 

These elements not only contribute to deterrence credibility, 

but may also influence the ally’s decision to pursue its own nuclear weapons arsenal. In other words, ensuring a credible extended deterrent may be a method of preventing proliferation. 

Strong alliances decrease the impact of a rising security threat. 

Additionally, ties between a defender’s and an ally’s economies 

and military may positively influence an ally’s perception of its 

own regime strength, making a decision for building a nuclear 

weapon less likely.

Some of this chapter’s suppositions must be accepted cautiously. The links between extended nuclear deterrence, credibility, and nonproliferation are largely theoretical. Much of the 

theory is based on immediate deterrence against a specific attacker and not on long-term deterrence against an undefined 

foe. Additionally, deterrence success is difficult to measure—

the fact that an attack did not occur may be the result of many 

factors, of which some may never be known. Also, deterrence 

theory focuses on deterring an adversary rather than deterring 

an ally from considering proliferation. Nevertheless, many of 

the elements of credibility and the warnings and indicators for 

nuclear tipping still may provide a useful model for measuring 

the effectiveness of the US protective umbrella for the Republic 

of Turkey and for assessing Turkey’s incentives and capabilities to pursue its own nuclear weapons.

Notes

1. Woolf, Nuclear Weapons in US National Security Policy, 4, 20–22. To address shortfalls in strategic vision, the US Congress commissioned a study 
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

24

on 11 July 2008 to “examine and make recommendations with respect to the 

long-term strategic posture of the United States.” See US Institute of Peace, 

“Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture.”

2. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, 14.

3. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 80.

4. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, 18.

5. Cold War historian Gaddis recounts the conversation between President Eisenhower and his secretary of state John Dulles: “If we defend Quemoy and Matsu,” Dulles told Eisenhower in March 1954, “we’ll have to use 

atomic weapons.” Eisenhower agreed and deliberately let it be known that the 

use of nuclear weapons was under consideration: “I hoped this answer would 

have some effect in persuading the Chinese Communists of the strength of 

our determination.” Gaddis assesses that “Mao Zedong did back down, something he might not have done had it not been for the American nuclear 

threats.” On nuclear weapons influencing the outcome of the Korean War, 

Gaddis comments, “It is clear now, however, that Chinese and North Korean 

exhaustion, together with Stalin’s death in March 1953, brought about the 

[Korean] armistice.” Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 167–68.

6. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority, 19. However, US nuclear inventories 

and delivery systems grew considerably in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, as McDonough states, “to make nuclear deterrence more credible 

and nuclear war, if it indeed took place, more limited.”

7. Ibid., 21.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 23.

10. Ibid., 25.

11. Ibid.

12. Schmitt, “Bush’s Arm Plan.”

13. DOD, National Security Strategy, 1991.

14. NATO, “NATO’s Nuclear Forces,” 5.

15. Ibid.

16. National Security Strategy, 2006; and DOD, National Defense Strategy.

17. Gates, “Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century, Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace,” 4.

18. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” 496.

19. The origin of the term is uncertain. Extended nuclear deterrence is 

mentioned by Weede, “Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance,” 231–54; 

Glaser, “Nuclear Policy without an Adversary;” Rosen, “After Proliferation,” 

9–14; and Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 59. Dr. Bradley Roberts of the Arlington, 

VA–based think tank Institute of Defense Analyses holds regular workshops 

on US extended nuclear deterrence.

20. National Security Strategy, 22. The old triad, a Cold War construct 

developed for nuclear delivery redundancy, consisted of nuclear forces employed using aircraft, submarines, and land-based ICBMs.

21. Danilovic, “Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” 

341–69; and Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” 496–526.

22. Danilovic, “Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” 344.
PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

25

23. Ibid., 346.

24. Ibid., 348.

25. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” 497.

26. Danilovic, “Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” 348.

27. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” 516.

28. Ibid., 524.

29. Danilovic, “Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” 348.

30. Ibid., 365.

31. Ibid., 355.

32. Ibid., 366.

33. Signorino and Tarar, “A Unified Theory of Extended Immediate Deterrence,” 586–605.

34. Ibid., 592.

35. Ibid., 598.

36. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?,” 496.

37. Ibid.

38. National Security Strategy, 22.

39. US Department of Energy and DOD, National Security and Nuclear 

Weapons in the 21st Century, 1.

40. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?,” 54–86; Solingen, 

Nuclear Logics; and Blanc and Roberts, “Nuclear Proliferation.”

41. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade,” 435.

42. Ibid.

43. Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 13.

44. Ibid., 17.

45. Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade,” 437.

46. Ibid.

47. Blanc, “Nuclear Proliferation.”

27

Chapter 3

Assessing US Extended 

Nuclear Deterrence for the 

Republic of Turkey

[On relations between the United States and Turkey]: It is 

not as good as before. There is a chance to make better.

—Turkish Parliament Member (2008)

Help aid the Kurdish issue solution. It is international, 

not just internal. If it is [a] problem for Turkey, if [the] 

United States is not helping, the US loses credibility.

—Turkish GTP (strong Turkey party)

Board Member (2008)

The presence of NATO prevents Turkey [from pursuing 

nuclear weapons]. But that does not mean if NATO loses 

them [nuclear weapons], then Turkey will get them. 

Domestic support is zero.

—Turkish Foreign Minister

(December 2008)

In a 2008 essay for the Turkish paper Today’s Zaman, Turkish author Mehmet Kalyoncu provided a scenario in which Turkey decides to build nuclear weapons.1 He envisioned declining 

US presence and influence in Iraq coupled with an increasingly 

aggressive Iran. While completing a nuclear weapons program, 

Iran increases aggressive rhetoric against Israel, fuels unrest 

in Iraq, and encourages domestic strife in Riyadh, Damascus, 

and Cairo. As a result, the Turkish public pressures the government to address the declining regional security issues and 

criticizes the ruling party for its reliance on Western security 

alliances such as NATO, the United States, and the EU. The 

United States and the EU both fail to provide assistance for a 

Turkish nuclear weapons program, forcing the Turks to turn to 

their old ally Pakistan for assistance.
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Kalyoncu’s fictional scenario includes many of the theoretical 

elements that influence the credibility of an extended deterrent: 

alliances, political relationships, regional issues, and trade. This 

chapter uses credibility elements to evaluate the strength of US 

extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey and assesses the likelihood of Turkey’s pursuing a nuclear weapons 

program. The assessment concludes that the credibility of US 

extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey is currently good but 

possibly eroding. This is occurring not because of nuclear reduction policies, nor due to recent nuclear missteps by the Air 

Force, but because of the perceived weakening of the politicalsecurity relationship between the United States and Turkey.

Some of the factors affecting declining credibility may affect 

Turkish leadership’s decision to pursue its own nuclear weapons program. This research concludes that Turkey currently 

has a low capability to build nuclear weapons but the Turkish 

leadership may enhance that capability by pursuing a civilian 

nuclear power program. Divining the Turkish leadership’s intentions for a nuclear program is difficult—Turkish leaders 

publicly state that they do not favor pursuing nuclear weapons. Turkish midlevel ministers echo those assertions, and the 

Turkish public remains unsupportive of nuclear weapons. 

However, some US reports and political insiders disagree.

Assessing Credibility Elements 

for US Extended Deterrence

Using qualitative analysis, this section assesses the elements 

of extended deterrence credibility as applied to the Republic of 

Turkey as either good (strong relationship with little impact on 

deterrence credibility), cautious (some issues or negative trends 

with some impact on deterrence credibility), or poor (major 

problems that may negatively affect US deterrence credibility). 

From an assessment of these elements, this research finds that 

the credibility of US extended deterrence for Turkey is good but 

requires some maintenance (see table 3).
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Strength of US-Turkish Alliances=Good/Worsening

The strength of US-Turkish alliances is not as strong as in 

previous times. Historically, Turkey’s bilateral relationship 

with the United States has had ups and downs (see appendix). 

In 1952 the United States fully supported NATO membership 

for Turkey and stationed nuclear missiles in Turkey, sharing 

launch control under a “dual-key” procedure with Turkish military crews during the Cold War.2

However, one of the major issues causing Turkey to question 

the value of its US alliance occurred in 1964. After Turkey 

threatened to intervene to assist Turkish Cypriots battling 

Greek Cypriots, Pres. Lyndon Johnson sent the “Johnson Letter” to the Turkish prime minister warning that if the intervention caused a Soviet response, the United States might not 

come to Turkey’s aid.3 In 1975 US-Turkish relations were again 

strained when the United States implemented an arms embargo against Turkey after its military operations in Cyprus 

resulted in a partition of the island.4 Both issues followed the 

United States’ unilateral decision to withdraw its nuclear missiles from Turkey during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Even 

though Turkey was compensated with military aid, the failure 

of the United States to consult with Turkish leaders stressed 

their relationship.5

The end of the Cold War further tested US-Turkish relations. 

In 2008 a member of the Turkish parliament said that the relationship was “not as good as before.”6 His perception possibly 

was based on events surrounding both US-led Gulf Wars in 

1991 and 2003 which cost Turkey financially. Turkey fully 

supported US efforts during the 1991 Gulf War but suffered 

economic losses estimated at $6 billion (US) due to the loss of 

Table 3. Assessing credibility elements for US extended deterrence

Elements Rating Trend

Strength of US-Turkish alliances (bilateral, NATO, and others) Good Worsening

US-Turkish foreign policy support trends/US interest in Middle East Cautious Worsening

US-Turkish foreign trade trends Cautious Improving

US-Turkish military arms transfers trends Good Improving

US forces in Turkey trends Cautious Worsening

US nuclear forces Good Static

Overall Assessment Good
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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inexpensive Iraqi oil imports.7 The Turkish parliament narrowly 

rejected approval for the United States to use Turkey as an invasion route into Iraq at the beginning of the 2003 Gulf War

despite a promise of a multibillion-dollar aid package.8 There 

is also a perception in Turkey that the United States and NATO 

were slow to fulfill their defensive requirements for Turkey in 

1991 and 2003 in case of an Iraqi missile attack.9

The United States has taken steps to repair its relationship 

with Turkey, but more may be required. After meeting with 

Turkish prime minister Tayyip Erdogen in 2007, Pres. George 

W. Bush announced intelligence aid for Turkey’s fight against 

the terrorist-labeled PKK. Shortly after the meeting, President 

Bush sent an agreement for US-Turkish civilian nuclear cooperation to the Congress for approval.10 Maintaining a strong 

US-Turkish bilateral relationship is important since some 

Turks believe this is Turkey’s most important alliance and it 

may be the key factor in preventing Turkey from pursuing its 

own nuclear weapons program.11

NATO also plays a role in Turkey’s perception of US extended 

deterrence. Turkey’s relationship with NATO remains strong 

but may be declining. Turkey is NATO’s second largest military 

force, aiding operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.12 NATO 

serves as an “essential security organization for Turkey” and 

binds it to Europe without EU membership.13 It also provides 

an additional communication link with the United States.14

Even though NATO remains an important security alliance, 

some Turkish officials have expressed dissatisfaction “and a 

feeling that Turkey has given more to NATO than NATO has 

provided Turkey.”15 Some younger Turkish military officers 

have less faith in NATO than older officers who worked within 

NATO during the Cold War.16 These trends led a Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee study to conclude that “Turkish perceptions regarding the trustworthiness and reliability of NATO 

have declined.”17

US-Turkish relations have endured multiple trials and likely 

will survive future trials. Most Turkish officials interviewed for 

this study were optimistic. A Turkish parliament member stated 

that there is a “chance to make [relations] better with the new 

US president.”18 Perceptions of US-Turkish alliance strength 

perhaps are the most important indicator of the credibility of 
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US extended deterrence for Turkey. These perceptions do not 

rely solely on alliance strength. They may change based on how 

effectively the United States and Turkey can resolve, or at least 

tolerate, their diverging approaches to Middle East policy.

Foreign Policy Support Trends/US–Middle East 

Interest=Cautious/Worsening

Since 2003 US and Turkish foreign policies, especially in the 

Middle East, have become divergent, and the trend is worsening. 

Additionally, Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear program, presumably 

to obtain nuclear weapons, further complicates US-Turkish relations because each differs in its approach to the problem. 

Turkey maintains dialogue with Iran while the United States 

has not.19 This difference may be because Turkish leaders do 

not perceive an Iranian nuclear weapon as a security threat. 

Instead, they see it as a threat to the regional power balance.20

Turkey and the United States differ on policy approaches to 

Iran and also on other regional issues. Since the majority election of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2007, 

the new president and prime minister have adopted foreign 

policies of engagement with Iran, Syria, and Sudan, as well as 

with the Palestinian political organization Hamas.21 The AKP’s 

policies of engagement are at odds with the United States’ attempts to isolate or sanction these nations and regimes. Unless 

the United States and Turkey find a more common ground for 

Middle East policies, the differences in approach may damage 

relations between the two allies and negatively affect Turkish 

perceptions of US extended deterrence.

US-Turkish Foreign Trade Trends=Cautious/Improving

Neither Turkey nor the United States depends on the other 

for significant trade volume. Since the 1980s Turkey’s economy 

has become more open and less state-directed, causing export 

levels to dramatically increase.22 As a result, trade levels between the two countries continue to grow. US exports to Turkey doubled from $3.1 billion (B) in 2002 to $6.6B in 2007.23

Additionally, between 1947 and 2007 the United States provided Turkey over $12.5B in economic aid and more than $14B 

in military assistance.24
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However, the United States contributes only a small fraction 

to Turkey’s total imports and exports. In 2007 Turkey’s total 

imports were over $139B, but the US share was only $6B.25 In 

2006 the United States ranked as Turkey’s fifth largest trading 

partner, providing only 4.8 percent of Turkey’s imports.26 Turkey’s major import suppliers include Russia (13.8 percent), 

Germany (10.3 percent), China (7.8 percent), Italy (5.9 percent), the United States, and France (4.6 percent).27 The top 

four US trade items sold to Turkey were iron and steel, cotton, 

aircraft and aircraft parts, and heavy machinery and machinery 

parts.28 Similarly, export numbers are low. The United States is 

not in the top five export partners for Turkey; trade coming to 

the United States is less than 4 percent of Turkey’s total exports. Turkey does not have a free trade agreement with the 

United States and is not in the top 30 importer/exporter nations to the United States.29

Because Turkey and the United States do not depend extensively on each other for economic wealth, foreign trade is not a 

significant factor influencing the credibility of the extended deterrent. Theoretically, because the United States and Turkey 

have a low trade dependency, the United States might be less 

likely to aid Turkey if it is attacked. Despite the low commercial 

trade dependence, military arms trade between the two countries is significant.

US-Turkish Military Arms Transfer 

Trends=Good/Improving

The United States maintains robust arms sales to Turkey with 

about 80 percent of its military’s “dense-industrial activity” 

conducted with the United States.30 In the years from 1950 to 

2007, foreign military sales from the United States to Turkey 

were the third highest among European countries at $12.8B 

(the United Kingdom ranked first at $15.8B, and Germany was 

second at $14.4B).31 From 1998 to 2001, Turkey was the sixth 

largest purchaser of US defense articles and services totaling 

$2B (Saudi Arabia was the largest with $12.6B).32 From 2002 

to 2005, Turkey was the 10th largest receiver of US defense 

goods totaling $1B (the largest was Egypt with $5.8B). In 2005 

Turkey received $1.5B in defense contract agreements from the 
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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United States (Greece was first with $2.1B).33 These purchases 

represent about 10 percent of Turkey’s total expenditures on 

military equipment during the mid-2000s.34

Although not the highest military arms sales partner for the 

United States, Turkey is and has been a significant recipient of 

US military sales, and the trend will likely continue. In 2007 

Turkey signed an agreement to purchase about 100 F-35 Joint 

Strike Fighters. Turkish defense officials expressed specific interest in the “block 4” F-35 version—a DCA able to perform 

both conventional and nuclear missions.35 One Turkish minister remarked in 2008 that Turkey would like “to continue to 

play a part” in the DCA mission as a way to share the burden 

and maintain a voice in NATO nuclear policies.36 Strong military arms sales can add to the credibility of US extended deterrence for Turkey.

US Forces in Turkey Trends=Cautious/Worsening

Despite strong military equipment sales, the numbers of US 

forces stationed in Turkey have steadily decreased since the 

end of the Cold War. Today, the United States maintains a major military presence at only one installation in Turkey—Incirlik 

Air Base (AB)—and deploys fewer than 2,000 military personnel 

throughout the country.37 Even prior to the end of the Cold 

War, US forces in Turkey faced restrictions due to political 

wrangling. In July 1975, shortly after the United States announced an arms embargo against Turkey in response to its 

military intervention into Cyprus, Turkey voided a 1969 defense cooperation agreement and closed 25 US military installations.38 The bases were reopened in March 1976, but under 

Turkish control. In 1980 the United States and Turkey signed 

a bilateral defense and economic cooperation agreement that, 

in some circumstances, requires Turkish parliamentary approval for the United States to use Turkish air bases for reasons other than training.39

By 1984 there were 11 major US military facilities, including 

air bases, naval facilities, and intelligence sites, hosting about 

24,000 American troops and dependents in Turkey.40 The end 

of the Cold War brought drastic reductions. In 1997 the United 

States announced a 40–50 percent reduction in personnel per-
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manently assigned to Incirlik AB as part of a realignment that 

returned more than 800 US military locations in Europe to the 

host nations.41

Exercising its rights under the 1980 agreement, Turkey 

placed restrictions on US use of Turkish facilities and bases for 

operations supporting the 2003 Iraq war.42 Theoretically, the 

reduction of US military presence in Turkey decreases the 

credibility of its extended deterrent. Additional troop withdrawals may cause Turkish leadership to question US dedication to defending Turkey because these reductions remove an 

important indicator of the US commitment to NATO.

Presence of US Nuclear Forces=Good/Static

Turkish policy makers believe that the United States should 

maintain a nuclear arsenal, with the makeup of that arsenal a 

US matter. Turkish officials also strongly support the presence 

of US nuclear weapons in Europe to assist NATO. They maintain that US nuclear weapons are an important political symbol of US commitment to both the NATO alliance and Turkey.43

Summarizing interviews with senior officials, Turkish researcher 

Mustafa Kibaroglu concluded:

Turkish officials consider nuclear weapons more as political weapons 

than as having a significant military value; they do not seriously think 

of contingencies where nuclear weapons could or even should be used. 

Having said that, they do believe in the deterrent value of US nuclear 

weapons stationed in [NATO countries]. The fundamental reason why 

Turkish officials want to keep the [nuclear] weapons [in NATO] has 

more to do with the nature and the scope of Turkish-American relations in particular and Turkey’s place in the Western alliance in general. Turkish officials also see the deployment of these weapons as part 

of the “burden sharing” principle within the Alliance.44

Midlevel Turkish officials assert that US nuclear weapons 

supporting NATO are an incentive for Turkey to not seek a nuclear weapons program. However, one official confided if NATO 

“loses them,” Turkey likely will not pursue its own nuclear 

weapons program since its “domestic support is zero.”45

The mishandling incidents by the US Air Force in August 

2007 and March 2008 had little impact on Turkish perception 

about the strength of the US nuclear arsenal as an extended 

deterrent. Most interviewed were not familiar with the incidents 

or only vaguely recalled the events. Most ministers were more 
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

35

concerned about a paragraph in a 2008 Air Force Blue Ribbon 

Panel report that implied NATO nuclear weapons were not adequately secured.46

Officials interviewed for this study also believe that the current US nuclear arsenal is adequate for extended nuclear deterrence. However, they suggested discussing and consulting 

with allies prior to US changes in policy or nuclear force structure, especially if changes would affect weapons support to 

NATO. They stated that consultations and discussions demonstrate commitment to the alliance and also acknowledge the 

allies’ contributions to alliance burden-sharing.47

Summary: US Extended Deterrent 

Credibility=Good but Cautious

This research assesses that overall US credibility to provide 

an extended deterrent to Turkey is good, but some areas may 

require improvement. First, alliance building and assurance 

activities remain important. Often, alliance building and assurance can take the form of consultations prior to decision 

making to avoid allegation of unilateralism. Second, although 

US-Turkish foreign policies may not ever mesh perfectly, discussion and inclusion may be ways to improve this credibility 

element. Third, any improvements to trade relations, such as 

reducing trade barriers, also may strengthen US-Turkish ties. 

Finally, US military forces assigned in Turkey are an important 

element of credibility and should not significantly decrease. 

Nearly all interviewed stated that Incirlik AB is an important 

symbol of US-Turkish relations. Maintaining or improving 

these elements of credibility may also prove useful in assuring 

Turkish decision makers that pursuing a nuclear weapons 

program is unnecessary.

Assessing Nuclear Weapons Tipping Point: 

Warnings and Indicators

Indicators of nuclear weapons tipping are related to elements 

of credibility; the quality of credibility elements may affect the 

will of an ally to tip. To assess the likelihood of Turkey pursuing a nuclear weapons program, this research rated each of the 
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

36

warning and indicators provided in table 4 as low (limited potential for affecting decision to proliferate), cautious (an area of 

concern), or high (extensive potential for effecting decision to 

proliferate). The short-term probability that Turkey may tip is 

low. However, Turkish decision makers may hedge by building 

a civilian nuclear power program. Indigenously building a nuclear weapon could take Turkey two to 11 years.48 With assistance from a third party, such as Pakistan, the time could be 

much shorter. The complete assessment is depicted in table 4.

Although some high-level Turkish political leaders allegedly 

stated privately that Turkey is considering a nuclear weapons 

program, there is little public acknowledgment and even less 

domestic support for such a program.49 However, due to regional security issues—Iran’s suspicious nuclear program—

Turkish leaders may become more interested in pursuing nuclear hedging capabilities by further developing their civilian 

nuclear program. 

Rise of Security Threat=Cautious

After the Cold War, threats to Turkish security became more 

diverse, but few seem to require Turkey to develop nuclear 

weapons for its defense. However, if Iran develops a nuclear 

weapons capability, Turkish leadership may face pressure to 

hedge against the regional influence Iran could gain from attaining a nuclear-armed status.50 A Turkish minister noted, 

“Politically speaking, it hasn’t been possible to go ahead so far, 

but now because of Iran, the nuclear energy option is on the 

table.”51 In interviews with senior US officials, Turkish officials 

concede that a strong US-Turkish alliance could provide a nonproliferation incentive even if Iran builds a nuclear weapon. 

These officials provided the following insights to a US Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee staff study after a closed-door interview session:

These politicians emphatically responded that Turkey would pursue 

nuclear weapons as well. They stated “Turkey would lose its importance 

in the region if Iran has nuclear weapons and Turkey does not.” Another said it would be “compulsory” for Turkey to obtain nuclear weapons in such a scenario. However, when staff subsequently asked 

whether a US nuclear umbrella and robust security commitment would 

be sufficient to dissuade Turkey from pursuing nuclear weapons, all 

three individuals agreed that it would.52
Table 4. Assessing nuclear tipping point warnings and indicators

Type Indicator Indicator/Warning Application to Case Assessment Trend

Intentions Rise of security 

threat

–Iran successfully 

builds nuclear 

weapon

–Increase in Middle 

East nuclear proliferation

Cautious Increasing 

caution

Regime and state 

relationship

–Regime policies for 

economic growth

–Regime trends 

towards nationalism

Low Increasing 

caution

Leadership mythmaking–Leadership public 

statements and policies on nuclear 

weapons

–Leader/scientific 

travel patterns

Low Steady

Capabilities Technical feasibility –Turkish investment in 

nuclear research

–Turkish investment in 

civilian nuclear power

–Nuclear support from 

other states (Pakistan/Russia)

–Progress on refining 

fissionable material

–Weapons development progress

Low/cautious Increasing 

caution

Economic feasibility –Financial abilities

–Civilian nuclear 

power capability

Low Steady

Political/international support–Turkish popular support for military 

nuclear program

–Turkish popular support for civilian 

nuclear program

–Importance of alliances on regime 

stability

–Nonproliferation 

treaty obligations

Low Steady

Military/strategic 

employment capability

–Turkish military capability to field, command/control, and 

employ nuclear 

weapons

Low No change
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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One minister said that Turkey has no plan to pursue nuclear 

weapons, but that could change if “everybody else [in the Middle 

East] got them.”53

Turkey’s most acute threats are generally regional. First, terrorist attacks from the PKK, which maintains bases in northern Iraq, are the primary threat. Nearly every interviewee for 

this research stated that US assistance to combat PKK terrorism was the best way the United States could strengthen its 

credibility with Turkey.

Second, Turkey is concerned about Iraqi stability. Turkey 

fears that anarchy in Iraq could result in a Kurdish state carved 

from northern Iraq and southeastern Turkey. One interviewee 

stated, “Help aid the Kurdish issue solution. It is international, 

not just internal. If it is [a] problem for Turkey, if [the] United 

States is not helping, the US loses credibility.”54

Third, Turkey is troubled about Cyprus. Disagreement with 

Greece on the future of the split Turkish-Greek populace on 

the island threatens Turkey’s bid for EU membership and 

strains relations with its NATO partners.55

Fourth, Turkey desires good relations with its neighbors, 

specifically Iran, Russia, Armenia, and Syria. It shares a border with eight countries, and many of its neighbors, such as 

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Iraq, and Georgia, provide a wide 

range of security and political challenges for Turkish leaders.

Finally, internal stability, which is closely tied to economic 

stability and energy security, is an important concern for Turkish leaders.56 To most Turks, these issues are more pressing 

than Iran’s nuclear program. These issues also provide avenues for the United States and Turkey to improve their political 

and economic relationships which, in turn, could strengthen 

US extended deterrence and decrease the incentives for a Turkish nuclear program.

To manage these threats and issues, Turkey depends on 

support from NATO, the EU, and the United States. Turkish 

leaders desire strength from these entities because any weakening of these alliances threatens Turkish political and economic security and could encourage Turkish leaders to consider a nuclear weapon program.57
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Regime and State Relationship=Low

The relationship between Turkey’s leaders and its populace 

is becoming increasingly open and democratic. This trend diminishes the possibility of Turkey going nuclear. Since its reelection to a parliamentary majority in July 2007, the AKP has 

pursued reforms that aid economic growth and strengthen democracy. The party’s top priority is joining the EU.58 Turkish 

president Abdullah Gul announced that EU membership was 

the government’s “main agenda.”59 Pursuit of EU membership 

resulted in domestic reforms as early as 2001 when the Turkish Parliament approved constitutional amendments improving the rights of women, eliminating virginity tests for schoolgirls, and abolishing the death penalty during peacetime.60 In 

2004 legislative reforms continued with penal code revisions 

that provided greater protections for women and tougher penalties for torture and honor killings.61 EU membership also provided incentives for Turkish civilian leadership to redefine the 

military’s role in politics by changing the National Security 

Council from a military-led authority to a civilian-led advisory 

group.62 These moves to improve the quality of Turkish democracy have also positively influenced economics.63

Since the 1980s incentives and reforms enacted by the Turkish government changed the economy from state-run to a growing and outward-looking economy. The result was a boom in 

export growth from 2.6 percent of gross domestic product in 

1979 to 8.6 percent in 1990.64 In 1995 Turkey signed a customs union with the EU, contributing to the 6 percent economic growth from 2002 to 2007.65 The successes of its open 

economy are incentives for the AKP to continue these reforms. 

Theoretically, this shift to a more open and economically secure regime may also provide disincentives to Turkish leaders 

considering pursuing nuclear weapons. If Turkish leaders decided to seek nuclear armament, these economic gains could 

be lost because of international sanctions that would undoubtedly follow. In turn, economic hardships could fuel strong public opposition against the government. Currently, it is unlikely 

that the AKP would be willing to pay this high political price of 

going nuclear. AKP leaders have publicly stated that they have 

no interest in developing a Turkish nuclear weapons capability.
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Leadership Mythmaking=Low

There are very few indicators of Turkish leaders engaged in 

“nuclear mythmaking”—signs of advocating a nuclear weapons 

program as a solution to security or political problems. In discussing regional nuclear proliferation, President Gul stated 

that Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy but not nuclear weapons. “We don’t want to see weapons of mass destruction in this region. If it’s in our neighborhood, we definitely 

don’t want to see it, he said.”66 However, some high-level Turkish officials have privately remarked to US officials that Turkey 

may contemplate a nuclear proliferation if Iran continues its 

nuclear program.67 One stated, “Politically speaking, it hasn’t 

been possible to go ahead so far, but now because of Iran, the 

nuclear energy option is on the table.”68 Midlevel ministers, 

however, maintain that proliferation may have to be more extensive in the Middle East before Turkish leadership decides to 

pursue a nuclear program since there is scant domestic support.69 Polls confirm the low support for nuclear weapons. In 

2006 a survey showed that 88.1 percent of Turks wanted Europe free of nuclear weapons.70

Some Turkish mythmaking occurred shortly after the May 

1998 nuclear weapons tests by Pakistan and India. On 18 May 

1998 retired Turkish general Erdogan Oznal stated that “Turkey must develop its own nuclear policy.”71 On 14 March 2000 

Turkish transportation minister Enis Oksuz said, “Our possession of the nuclear bomb will strengthen our security and enhance our deterrence amid this nuclear environment. Having 

such a bomb in Turkey’s hand is security. It provides deterrence.”72 Since then, public rhetoric from Turkish leaders in favor 

of pursuing a nuclear program has been nearly nonexistent.

This could indicate that Turkey’s leadership does not have 

serious intentions for a nuclear weapons program. However, 

they may consider developing civilian nuclear power as a hedge 

or using the threat of tipping as a political bargaining chip. Regardless, Turkey’s technical capabilities for a civilian or independent military nuclear infrastructure remain low.
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Capabilities=Low

Turkey’s current capability for building and operationalizing 

a nuclear weapon is low.73 With scant indigenous capability, its 

leadership would need to rely on another country to quickly 

acquire nuclear weapons. It would take up to two years to develop the infrastructure required to maintain and deploy an 

acquired nuclear weapon; to manufacture its own nuclear 

weapon could take up to 11 years.74

Technical Feasibility=Low/Cautious

Because Turkey’s nuclear program remains in the research 

phase, its technical feasibility to produce its own nuclear arsenal remains low.75 It began nuclear research in 1956 by establishing the Turkish Atomic Energy Commission.76 Since that 

time, Turkey has constructed two research reactors of which 

only one remains operational at Istanbul Technical University 

under the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 

safeguards.77 The Turkish government has attempted to start a 

civilian nuclear power program many times since the mid1960s, but each attempt fizzled because of coups, financial difficulties, or pressure from the United States (see appendix). 

On 28 September 2008, Turkey accepted a bid from Russia’s 

Atomstroyexport for a nuclear power plant. However, financial 

difficulties may postpone construction.78 The United States 

supplies all of Turkey’s fissile material holdings.79 Turkey conducts some uranium mining and refining, but some sources 

claim that no uranium has been produced.80

Despite these indigenous limitations, Turkey has a history of 

contacts with other nations for assistance in nuclear issues. 

Argentina and Pakistan provided or were suspected of providing 

nuclear aid.81 The United States monitored both relationships 

and was seemingly successful in pressuring Turkish leaders to 

curtail them.82 Although Turkey’s nuclear capabilities are low, 

the government continues to pursue a nuclear energy program 

which could provide the experience and knowledge necessary 

for a future weapons program. Additionally, Turkey’s traditional ally Pakistan could be a potential source of nuclear 

weapons expertise if Turkish leadership seriously decided to 

pursue a nuclear weapons program.
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Economic Feasibility=Low

Several of Turkey’s attempts to attain a civilian nuclear energy program were abandoned due to financial difficulties. A 

1976 deal with two Swedish companies to build a nuclear energy reactor collapsed in the 1980s due to disagreements over 

financing and a change in governmental leadership after a military coup.83 Despite progress in 1985, negotiations for a nuclear power plant built by a Canadian company also fell apart 

over financing and payment methods.84 In 1994 Turkey again 

requested bids for a nuclear power plant. A South Korean company won the bid, but financing and domestic opposition 

caused the project to go nowhere.85 Current negotiations with 

Russia for nuclear power aid have also stagnated. Economically, Turkey would require significant amounts of foreign aid 

to fund a civilian nuclear energy program.

Political/International Support=Low

There are several political and international barriers that 

would inhibit Turkish pursuit of a nuclear weapon, causing this 

indicator to be low. First, a decision to build nuclear weapons 

would severely strain Turkish alliances with NATO and the 

United States, as well as jeopardize successful accession into 

the EU.86 Because Turkish military and civilian leaders value 

these alliances, they are significant barriers for nuclear weapons 

proliferations. However, a dramatic change in Turkish government to a regime that adopts isolationist policies and devalues 

these alliances could be a potential warning sign of proliferation. 

Second, Turkish popular support for nuclear weapons is low, and 

support for civilian nuclear power is marginal.87 Low popular 

support for both civilian and military nuclear programs provides a significant proliferation barrier to an increasingly democratic and open Turkish government. Third, Turkey is a signatory to nearly all relevant nuclear agreements (see table 5).

Reaffirming Turkey’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation at the 2007 UN Conference on Disarmament, Ahmet 

Uzumcu, ambassador to the conference, said, “Turkey believes 

that the NPT is still a unique and irreplaceable multilateral instrument, the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime, and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear 
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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disarmament. We should exert every effort to protect its integrity and credibility.”88 Attempts to pursue nuclear weapons 

would require Turkish leaders to withdraw from these agreements, further straining valued alliances and international relationships. There is no indication that Turkish leaders are 

considering withdrawing from any of their international nonproliferation or safeguard agreements.

Military/Strategic Employment Capability=Low

Turkey’s ability to field, control, and employ a nuclear weapon 

indigenously is low. It has the ability to contribute DCAs to 

NATO for its nuclear mission—the Turkish air force maintains 

F-16 aircraft which can deliver either conventional or nuclear 

Table 5. Status of relevant nuclear agreements for Turkey

Agreement

Party to 

Agreement? Significance

NPT Yes (signed 

1969/ratified 

1980)

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nonnuclear-weapon-state 

parties agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. 

IAEA SGA Yes (concluded 

1980)

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards 

Agreement. All nonnuclear-weapon-state parties to the NPT 

are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

IAEA AP Yes (signed 

2000/ratified 

2000)

Additional protocol to IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Provides 

IAEA additional authority to investigate a state’s nuclear 

activities.

CTBT Yes (signed 

1996/ratified 

2000)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

CPPNM Yes (ratified 

1985)

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

CPPNM Amd No Amendment to CPPNM

SQP No Small quantities protocol. Some NPT state parties with small 

quantities of fissionable material have added a small quantities protocol to their safeguards agreements.

CENNA Yes Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident

CACNARE Yes Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 

or Radiological Emergency

CNS Yes Convention on Nuclear Safety

SFM No Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 

and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Reprinted from Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms 

Race in the Middle East, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., February 2008, 45.
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

44

munitions. However, NATO maintains oversight of the nuclear 

policy and posture of its members.89 In 2002 NATO reduced 

readiness requirements for its DCAs from weeks to months.90

Turkey’s only ballistic missile system is its US-supplied Army 

Tactical Missile System with a 560 kilogram payload, but the 

system was designed for conventional payloads.91 With its reliance on NATO’s command structure and the United States for 

potential nuclear weapons delivery systems, Turkey may require years to develop an indigenous employment and command and control capability for its own nuclear weapons.

Few Warnings and Indicators of 

Real Intentions and Capabilities

There are few warnings and indicators that Turkish leaders 

have the intention, or are developing the capability, to pursue 

a nuclear weapons program in the next few years. Turks view 

Iran’s apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons as a spoiler to the 

regional balance of power, not a security threat. Unless nuclear proliferation becomes widespread in the Middle East, it 

is unlikely that Turkey will begin a nuclear weapons program. 

Such a program may also require a change in the open political 

and economic policies endorsed by Turkish leadership since 

the 1980s.

As the government becomes more open and decentralized in 

pursuit of economic improvements and eventual EU membership, the Turkish populace’s lack of support for all things nuclear becomes an increasingly important factor for Turkish decision makers contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons. 

Nuclear mythmaking is low, and no Turkish leader or minister 

publicly endorses a nuclear weapons program.

Privately, high-level leaders suggest that Turkey may contemplate a nuclear program but also admit that they are secure 

under the US umbrella of protection—at least for now. Turkish 

technical, economic, and military capabilities for supporting a 

nuclear weapons program are also low. Finally, political and 

international support remains low. Turkey seemingly values its 

alliances and treaty obligations, making nuclear weapons tipping all the less likely. 
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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Summary and Conclusions

The credibility of America’s extended nuclear deterrent for Turkey is good but could be worsening. Although Turkey remains 

dedicated to NATO and its bilateral relationship with the United 

States, the methods that the United States and Turkey use to deal 

with Middle East issues are divergent. US-Turkish trade, another 

indicator of credibility, is improving, but trade dependence between the two nations is low. An area of caution is the decreasing 

US military presence in Turkey. Offsetting this concern is the robust military arms trade between the United States and Turkey, 

one of the few remaining indicators of US commitment to Turkey’s 

defense. Finally, Turkish leaders maintain that US nuclear forces 

are adequate in providing an extended nuclear deterrent, but 

strongly link their credibility to the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe and to Turkey’s present and future ownership of 

DCAs. US nuclear reductions and the recent US Air Force mishaps seemingly had little effect on the perception of the credibility 

of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey. 

Maintaining the credibility of US extended deterrence may 

prevent Turkish leaders from deciding to pursue nuclear weapons.92 Turkey’s active participation in NATO and its bilateral 

relationship with the United States may reduce the fear that 

regional issues seriously threaten Turkish security. Additionally, Turkey’s pursuit of EU membership may encourage already increasing trends toward open trade and governance.

Overtly, Turkish leaders do not advocate pursuing nuclear 

weapons, nor are they aggressively improving technical, economic, or military capabilities. However, pressure to hedge 

Turkey’s position in nuclear expertise by pursing nuclear energy sources may occur if Iran continues to acquire nuclear 

production elements. Finally, Turkish leaders would have to 

renounce their international commitments to NPTs and agreements to build indigenous nuclear weapons. There is little public support for such a reversal.

Notes

1. Kalyoncu, “Why, When and How Turkey Becomes a Nuclear Power.” 

2. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 63; Cooley, Base Politics, 102; and Gaddis, We Now Know, 264.
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

46

3. Cooley, Base Politics, 114; and Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 27.

4. Cooley, Base Politics, 117; and Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 28.

5. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 30.

6. Unattributed interview with Turkish parliament member (AKP Party), 

11 November 2008.

7. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, 

25; and Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 28.

8. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context, 

16, 70; and Cooley, Base Politics, 132.

9. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, ix.

10. White House, “President Bush and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan 

Discuss Global War on Terror”; and “Bush Seeks Congress Approval for USTurkey Nuclear Deal.”

11. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 

2008.

12. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 39.

13. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 61, 103.

14. Ibid., 65.

15. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 39.

16. Ibid., 40.

17. Ibid.

18. Unattributed interview with Turkish parliament member (AKP Party), 

11 November 2008.

19. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 12.

20. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, x; and 

Roberts, “Extended Deterrence in the Emerging Global Security Environment.”

21. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 79; Burwell, “Evolution of 

US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 25; Migdalovitz, Turkey, 3; 

and Lesser, Beyond Suspicion, 45.

22. Kasaba, Cambridge History of Turkey, 287; and US Department of 

State, “Background Note.”

23. US Department of Commerce, “HS Total All Merchandise—Exports to 

Turkey in Thousands ($ USD).”

24. US Department of State, “Background Note.” 

25. Ibid.

26. US Central Intelligence Agency, “Turkey.”

27. Ibid.

28. US Department of Commerce, “HS Total All Merchandise—Exports to 

Turkey in Thousands ($ USD).”

29. US Department of Commerce, “Existing Free Trade Agreements.”

30. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 27.

31. US Department of Defense, Security Cooperation Agency, “Historical 

Facts Book,” 18–20.
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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32. Grimmett, “US Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major 

Clients, 1998–2005,” 3.

33. Ibid., 4.

34. Gill, SIPRI Yearbook 2008, 239.

35. “Turkey Signs Memorandum of Understanding.”

36. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister for NATO, 8 December 2008.

37. The US Air Force maintains a small presence at seven other facilities 

in Turkey. Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment), “Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2008 Baseline”; and 

Cooley, Base Politics, 259.

38. Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, Political Handbook of the World, 1351.

39. Migdalovitz, Turkey, 16.

40. Cooley, Base Politics, 103.

41. “Number of US Air Force Personnel at Air Base in Turkey Reduced.”

42. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 29.

43. In a report on Eastern European attitudes on US nuclear policy, one 

official stated, “Nuclear modernization is a US decision.” See Dunn et al., 

Foreign Perspectives on US Nuclear Policy and Posture, part I, slide 31. In 

interviews by the author, one Turkish minister stated that reductions of nuclear weapons would be “supported by all.” However, the same minister maintained that NATO should “not change for the sake of change.” Unattributed 

interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 2008.

44. Kibaroglu, “Isn’t It Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?,” 449–50.

45. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 

2008.

46. Unattributed interview with US foreign minister for NATO, 9 December 2008; and Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Review Questions Security over US 

Nukes in Europe.”

47. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 

2008.

48. Estimate provided by Roberts, Blunt, and Hersman, “Trends in Proliferation.”

49. Unattributed discussion with US government official, 16 January 

2009.

50. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 36.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., 41.

53. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 

2008.

54. Unattributed interview with powerful Turkey party (GTP) nongovernmental organization board member, 22 October 2008.

55. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 23.

56. Lesser, Beyond Suspicion, 71.

57. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, Nuclear Tipping Point, 167.

58. Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, Political Handbook of the World, 1353.
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

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59. Kinzer, “US Must Share Power in the New World Order, Says Turkey’s 

Controversial President.”

60. Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, Political Handbook of the World, 1353.

61. Ibid.

62. Cagaptay, “European Union Reforms Diminish the Role of the Turkish 

Military.”

63. Turkey continues to struggle with EU membership. The key issues 

range from Turkey’s refusal to allow Cyprus shipping into its ports to women’s workforce rights and judicial reforms. See BBC, “Q&A.”

64. Kasaba, Cambridge History of Turkey, 287.

65. US Department of State, “Background Note,” 3.

66. Kinzer, “US Must Share Power in the New World Order, Says Turkey’s 

Controversial President.”

67. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 41; and 

unattributed discussion with US government official, 16 January 2009.

68. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 36.

69. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister for NATO, 8 December 2008.

70. Greenpeace, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 6.

71. Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 70.

72. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, Nuclear Tipping Points, 159; and Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 70.

73. For a similar conclusion on Turkish capabilities, see Blanc and Roberts, 

“Nuclear Proliferation,” 40.

74. Roberts, Blunt, and Hersman, “Trends in Proliferation.”

75. Blanc and Roberts, “Nuclear Proliferation,” 39.

76. Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 34.

77. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Nuclear Research Reactors in 

the World.”

78. Karabat, “Turkey Inches Forward in Quest for Nuclear Power”; and 

RIA Novosti, “Turkey to Scrap Tender for Nuclear Power Plant–Paper.”

79. Reaching Critical Will, “Model Nuclear Inventory–2007.”

80. Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 41; and 

Reaching Critical Will, “Model Nuclear Inventory–2007: Turkey.”

81. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, Nuclear Tipping Point, 145.

82. Ibid.; Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 38; and 

Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 37–38.

83. Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 35; and Kibaroglu, 

“Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 35.

84. Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 36–38; and 

Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” 36.

85. Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 39.

86. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 40–41.

87. In a 2006 Greenpeace survey, 88 percent of Turks desired Europe free 

of nuclear weapons. Greenpeace, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 6. For a history of domestic reaction to nuclear power, see Martin, Nuclear Threat in the 

Eastern Mediterranean, 48–53.
ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

49

88. Reaching Critical Will, “Model Nuclear Inventory–2007.”

89. NATO, “NATO’s Nuclear Forces,” 8.

90. Ibid., 13.

91. Arms Control Association, “Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories.”

92. One study concluded, “Based on meetings with Turkish officials and 

US Embassy personnel in Ankara, staff believes the state of United States–

Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO 

will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey’s decision regarding nuclear weapons.” US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 41.

51

Chapter 4

Improving US Extended 

Nuclear Deterrence for the 

Republic of Turkey

The United States should not wait until Iran crosses the 

nuclear threshold before seeking to influence Turkey’s 

nuclear decision-making, and would be wise to take steps 

now to restore the bilateral relationship with Turkey.

—2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report

The United States and Turkey must find a new foundation for their relationship. While the Soviet threat which 

prompted their partnership has ended, the United 

States and Turkey still share many strategic interests, 

including fighting terrorism and ensuring stability in 

the wider Middle East region.

—Frances Burwell (2008)

Strengthening US extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey requires strengthening the overall political relationship between the two countries. This is not an easy task 

since US-Turkish foreign policies appear to be diverging and 

the United States seems to have few levers to influence Turkish 

leadership decision making. This chapter offers options for 

strengthening US-Turkish relations in ways that may ensure 

the credibility of US extended deterrence, which may also provide disincentives for Turkish leaders to pursue a nuclear 

weapons program.

Addressing Credibility Elements

Because Turkish leadership perceives bilateral and international alliances as important guarantors of its security, the 

United States should ensure that these alliances and institutions 

remain effective and meaningful. Failing to consult with Turkish leadership and publicize the dialogue prior to major policy 
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

52

decisions has harmed US-Turkish relations. Removing Jupiter 

missiles from Turkey in 1962, the Johnson letter of 1964, and 

the 1975 arms embargo are still perceived as US slights in contemporary Turkish politics and public opinion.1 However, efforts to include Turkish leadership in alliance decision making 

and joint participation in military operations and procurement 

(burden sharing) may improve the political relationship. Continuing Turkish involvement and leadership in NATO operations, in nuclear and security policy decisions, and in the development of new military equipment, such as the Joint Strike 

Fighter, encourage burden sharing. Burden sharing, in the words 

of one Turkish minister “brings [Turkey] to the top of the group, 

adding political value.”2 Additionally, the United States should 

continue to support Turkey’s bid for EU membership. Failure 

to achieve EU membership could isolate Turkey from the West. 

Conversely, achieving EU membership could strengthen Western ties and may provide another disincentive for nuclear 

weapons proliferation. A US congressional study concluded 

that the closer Turkey is to US and European political and security institutions, the less likely it will be to pursue a nuclear 

weapon.3 Supporting alliances that Turkey values can add to 

the credibility of US extended deterrence.

Keep Bilateral, NATO, and European 

Alliances Strong and Relevant

Alliances may also provide strong levers for the United States 

to discourage Turkish leaders from proliferation. In a joint 

statement with the US secretary of defense, the Turkish minister of defense stated that the “US is important for us as the 

biggest supporter of our NATO membership.”4 If Turkey ever 

seriously considered pursuing nuclear weapons, then any US 

move to change Turkey’s status in NATO could have a strong 

effect on Turkish leaders’ decision-making calculus.

Two important issues require progress in resolving in order 

for Turkey to better strengthen its alliance ties with the EU and 

the United States: Cyprus and Armenia. Relations between the 

island of Cyprus’ two ethnic groups (Greeks and Turks) were 

always tense.5 The United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece worked 

out a power-sharing arrangement between the two groups 
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when Cyprus gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. Following a 1974 Greek military coup on the island, Turkey invaded Cyprus. A UN-monitored partition settled 

the crisis, with Turkish people settling in the north under Turkish military protection and with Greeks in the south. Cyprus 

joined the EU in 2004 even though Turkey maintains control of 

the north. The Cyprus division remains an obstacle for Turkey’s 

accession into the EU and strains its relations with Europe and 

at times NATO.6 The United States should aggressively help 

broker a resolution to the Cyprus issue.

Despite few gains in resolving Cyprus issues, Turkish leaders 

have thawed their tense relations with neighboring Armenia.7

However, a nearly passed Armenian genocide resolution by a 

US congressional committee in 2007 threatened to harm USTurkish relations and make Turkish-Armenian negotiations 

more difficult.8 The proposed resolution condemned the Ottoman Empire for deporting two million Armenians in 1915 and 

killing an estimated 1.5 million deportees.9 The attempted 

resolution greatly strained US-Turkish relations and remains a 

thorny issue.10 Future attempts at a similar resolution could, 

as a US Senate–commissioned report warned, “significantly 

damage United States-Turkey bilateral relations, promoting a 

political estrangement that could impact Turkish perceptions 

of the US security guarantee. Such a development could ultimately affect Turkey’s eventual decision regarding nuclear 

weapons.”11 The United States should find another way to address the Armenian claims or let Turkey and Armenia resolve 

the matter.12

Establish a More Common Vision for the Middle East

US policy makers can expect Turkey to take a more independent approach to foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. 

The Cold War’s end opened Turkey’s access to its eight neighbors. Economic incentives and security issues necessitate that 

Turkish leaders remain aggressively engaged in the region. Although isolation and economic sanctions against adversarial 

Middle Eastern governments may be useful political tools for 

the United States, they can be politically and economically 

costly methods if used by Turkey. As a result, Turkey will po-
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

54

litically interact with the region differently than the United 

States. Additionally, US policy makers can expect the ruling 

AKP to ease domestic policies that restrict public Islamic practices.13 Increased regional engagement (sometimes at odds with 

US policies) and changing religious tolerations may not be signals that Turkey is developing security alternatives away from 

the United States and Europe. Instead, these may be signs that 

Turkish leaders are diversifying Turkey’s foreign policy and attempting to improve its credibility with its populace and Middle 

Eastern nations.14 The United States could use Turkey’s prominent place in the Middle East as a “go-between” for tough issues.15 Turkey played this role before—in April 2007 Ankara 

hosted talks between the United States, the EU, and Iran.16

When Turkey acts as an intermediary between the United 

States and the Middle East, it can improve its bilateral relationship with the United States. A strong bilateral relationship can 

improve the credibility of extended deterrence.

Reduce Foreign Trade Barriers

As a way to strengthen alliance credibility, both Turkey and 

the United States could improve trade relations by decreasing 

trade barriers. According to a 2008 report from the World Trade 

Organization’s office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), 

Turkey maintains high tariff rates on food and agricultural 

products.17 The report also states that the Turkish government 

often does not issue import licenses for some after-sales service 

equipment, distilled spirits, and agricultural goods (such as meat 

and poultry), essentially banning these products from Turkish 

markets. Additionally, the USTR report suggests that the Turkish government could improve intellectual property rights and 

protections for copyright material and pharmaceutical products. Similarly, the United States could reduce trade barriers 

for Turkish goods.

An April 2008 European Commission report listed US tariffs 

on food products, textiles, footwear, leather goods, ceramics, 

glass, and railway cars as significant.18 Some of these goods, 

such as textiles, apparel, and industrial machinery, are important export items for Turkey.19 Altering some of these barriers 

as well as continuing US foreign direct investment to Turkey 
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

55

($2.1B in 2006) may improve the already increasing trade levels 

between the two alliance partners. Although changes to foreign 

trade barriers may not significantly increase US-Turkish economic dependence (in 2008 Turkey was the 31st largest US 

export market, and the United States was Turkey’s fifth), improving trade relations may indirectly add strength to the two 

countries’ political and security relationship.

Maintain or Increase Military Arms Trading and Aid

Turkey already receives a significant portion of its military 

aid, equipment, and training from the United States and NATO 

partners. However, these areas can be improved by broadening 

military exchange programs, expanding NATO exercises, increasing military aid, and adding missions for joint US-Turkish 

development, such as remotely piloted aerial systems. The US 

military shared intelligence in 2007 and 2008 to aid Turkish 

military operations against the PKK. This reportedly had a positive impact on some Turkish decision makers. In 2008 a Turkish parliament member stated that although the United States 

did not directly help fight the PKK, getting intelligence information from the United States should improve the relationship.20

The United States could consider joint direct military action 

against the PKK if Turkey exercised its NATO security guarantees to combat terrorism as the United States did following the 

9/11 attacks. The US branding of the PKK’s Iranian wing as a 

terrorist organization and the freezing of any of its financial assets should also add to the credibility of US protections for Turkey.21 Continuing or increasing military ties is an important 

element of US extended deterrence credibility, and the United 

States should look for ways to improve the connection.

Avoid Additional Reductions in Turkey-Based 

US Military Forces

With its military forces already at a post–Cold War low, the 

United States should avoid further reductions of forces based 

in Turkey. One of the important symbols of US security commitments to Turkey is the presence of US troops on Turkish 

soil. Currently, that presence is concentrated at Incirlik AB 

near Adana, Turkey. Turkish governmental officials support 
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

56

keeping the base at Incirlik. One minister stated that the base 

was “tangible evidence of US-Turkish relations.”22 However, the 

same minister cautioned that the base “will not be as easy to 

use.”23 One noted political analyst reached a similar conclusion: “The United States should therefore not count on being 

able to use Turkish bases, particularly Incirlik for combat missions in the Middle East.”24 Turkish leaders also play a role in 

keeping US forces in the region. To ensure that Incirlik remains 

open, the government should consider easing restrictions on 

Incirlik’s use.

Maintain Turkey as a Partner in Dual-Capable Aircraft 

Turkish officials stated that they would prefer to operate aircraft similar to those used by the US Air Force, preferring types 

that have the potential for dual roles.25 The Turkish air force 

operates military F-16 combat aircraft similar to those operated by the US Air Force.26 Some F-16s have a dual-role capability meaning that they can perform both conventional and 

nuclear missions. Turkish leaders maintain that cooperation 

on the F-16 replacement, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), 

“will bolster our relationship and will serve to strengthen the 

interoperability of our armed forces.”27 Turkey committed $175 

million to the JSF project, and it is now a partner in F-35 development with eight other US allies.28 Block 4 versions of the 

F-35 are scheduled to be dual capable. US-Turkish partnerships in operating the F-16 and developing the F-35, the DOD’s 

largest acquisition program in its history, can signal alliance 

commitment as well as increase military arms dependency. Additionally, Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program may provide the perception that its status is equal to that of other US 

allies. “Even though our participation might be small concerning the project in question,” stated one Turkish minister on the 

F-35 commitment, “I would like to stress the fact that whatever 

the phase we participate in we would like to be and we shall be 

a partner amongst equals.”29 The United States should maintain and encourage Turkey’s participation in DCA programs as 

a way to improve the credibility of extended deterrence even if 

the United States removes its nuclear weapons from Europe.
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57

Keep Nuclear Weapons in Europe—For Now

Until an alternative demonstration of US extended deterrence can be negotiated with Turkish leaders, US nuclear 

weapons stationed in Europe to support NATO missions should 

remain. Although difficult to justify for military reasons, the 

weapons provide an important symbolic and political representation of US commitments to NATO and Turkey.30 They also 

provide a uniquely close method of burden sharing between the 

two countries. Similar to the “trip wire” effect of basing US 

troops in Turkey, nuclear weapons in Europe also provide a 

trip wire by ensuring a US response if the weapons’ security 

becomes threatened. More importantly, the weapons also may 

serve as a disincentive for proliferation. NATO nations hosting 

US nuclear weapons likely will not perceive the need to start 

their own nuclear programs.

For Turkey, nuclear weapons based in Europe also ensure 

that its security concerns are taken seriously.31 Turkish political 

leaders sometimes express the view that Turkey has given more 

to NATO than it has received. By participating in NATO’s nuclear mission with European-based US nuclear weapons, Turkey 

earns an equal voice in the alliance and elevates its importance 

as a bilateral partner with the United States.

If the United States decides to reduce its nuclear weapons 

presence in Europe, it should do so only after negotiations with 

NATO allies, specifically Turkey. It is the lack of coordination 

and negotiation that most harmed the US-Turkish alliance after Pres. John F. Kennedy confidentially decided to remove US 

Jupiter nuclear missiles from Turkey following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.32 Some US policy makers and researchers 

have reported that Turkish leaders are considering an indigenous nuclear weapons program in response to Iran’s apparent 

pursuit of nuclear weapons, and this would become a near certainty if the United States removed its weapons from Europe.33

However, midlevel Turkish ministers were less committed, suggesting that the US nuclear presence in Europe can be substituted with other assurances. One stated that “ultimately, they 

are US weapons. If they disappear, then what is the US’s intent?”34 If the United States reduces or removes its nuclear 

weapons from Europe, then other extended deterrent credibility 
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58

elements may require reinforcement. Additional troop levels, 

joint missile defense operations, and exchanges involving US 

Navy nuclear submarines are possibilities for preserving the 

credibility of US commitments to Turkey’s defense.

Adding Weight: Preventing Tipping

Many of the suggestions for improving credibility could have 

the additional effect of discouraging nuclear weapons proliferation tipping. Encouraging Turkey to forgo the development of 

nuclear weapons requires addressing potential intentions and 

discouraging capabilities.

Discouraging Intentions

Discouraging Turkish interest in pursuing nuclear weapons 

requires decreasing Turkish security threats, avoiding meddling in Turkish internal affairs and monitoring potential Turkish leadership nuclear mythmaking.

The United States should help prevent Turkish security concerns from becoming acute. First, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would remove a potential justification for 

a Turkish nuclear program.35 With its close Iranian ties, the 

Turkish government could play a role in US-Iranian negotiations, which could also strengthen US-Turkish relations. Additionally, working to prevent widespread nuclear proliferation 

in the Middle East removes another reason for Turkish leaders 

to decide to go nuclear. Basing some form of missile defense in 

Turkey, or integrating Turkey into a European missile defense 

system, may also provide a way to decrease potential Turkish 

security concerns as well as increase US military presence on 

Turkish soil—an important extended deterrent credibility element.36 Finally, the United States should find a way to effectively address Turkey’s PKK issues.

Author and researcher Stephen Larrabee recommended 

the following: (1) press the Kurdish government in Northern 

Iraq to cease PKK activities and close bases; and (2) insist that 

northern Kurds arrest and turn over PKK leaders to Turkish 

authorities.37 Both actions would go far, the scholar argues, to 
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59

reducing anti-Americanism in Turkey. PKK terrorism remains 

Turkey’s “most important issue.”38

While the United States can aid with Turkey’s external 

threats, it should remain a supportive bystander in Turkish 

domestic politics. Turkish leadership has adopted economic 

and domestic policies that have resulted in successful economic growth and global integration. Both are characteristics 

of countries that are less likely to choose to proliferate. Any 

perceived meddling by the United States into Turkish politics 

likely would prove counterproductive and could result in fueling fundamentalism and destructive nationalism—characteristics of states more likely to pursue nuclear weapons.39 To reinforce Turkish trends in economic growth and openness, the 

United States could increase incentives for foreign direct investments, support pipeline and energy developments, foster 

tourism, and improve science and technology exchanges.40 Better bilateral trade relations could improve deterrent credibility. 

Additionally, increased trade may lead to increased economic 

security which could further fuel the Turkish government’s 

trend towards a more open economy.

Finally, the United States should monitor Turkish nuclear 

mythmaking—statements by political leaders that accentuate 

security concerns and offer nuclear weapons as a solution. Nuclear mythmaking can be an indicator or warning of proliferation intentions. Leadership’s travels to and scientific exchanges 

with nations that support nuclear weapons proliferation should 

also be monitored. Both these indicators remain low for Turkey. 

Renouncing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the Turkish 

general staff published the following:

We believe that states of the region should terminate their efforts for 

developing such weapons [WMD] and their delivery means and become 

party to the nonproliferation regimes and treaties as soon as possible. 

In this respect, the need for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is of 

paramount importance. Turkey does not possess WMD and does not 

intend to have them in the future. It adheres to all major international 

treaties regarding nonproliferation of those weapons and their delivery 

means where as it actively participates and supports all the works pertaining to non-proliferation in NATO.41

Official rhetoric condemning proliferation could be expanded 

to include joint declarations from both Turkey and the United 
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60

States (or NATO). Such statements could make proliferation 

politically risky for Turkey.

Stifling Capability

Although Turkey maintains a low capability to produce its 

own nuclear weapons, the United States should monitor warning signs of potential changes to those capabilities and offer 

incentives to Turkey to discourage it from acquiring nuclear 

weapons. First, the United States should monitor Turkey’s 

technical feasibility for nuclear arms development. This includes Turkish investment in nuclear research and in civilian 

nuclear power. The “123 Agreement” between the United States 

and Turkey is a good vehicle for the United States to observe 

Turkish nuclear activities through cooperation and nuclear 

technology exchange. Brought into effect on 2 June 2008, the 

agreement established opportunities for US-Turkish exchanges 

in technology, materials, reactors, and components for nuclear 

research and power production.42 The agreement also has an 

added benefit of providing US insight into Turkish nuclear 

knowledge. It should remain in force, and its provisions aggressively exercised.

Second, the United States should watch potential support 

from other nuclear suppliers, particularly Russia and Pakistan. 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s the United States successfully monitored and blocked supposed nuclear technology 

transfers between Turkey, Pakistan, and Argentina.43 Delaying 

exchange agreements or threatening alliance standing may 

prove sufficient levers to discourage proliferation—United 

States concerns delayed the US-Turkish 123 Agreement until 

they were “sufficiently resolved.”44 The United States should 

aggressively monitor and encourage enhanced international 

transparency of nuclear technologies transfers, even between 

allies, and apply international pressure if proliferation occurs.

Third, the United States should monitor Turkish capabilities 

in fissionable materials refining and weapons development. 

These capabilities currently are at low levels, and Turkey is 

party to most UN nuclear agreements allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear research and mining programs.45 The United 

States should recognize Turkey’s compliance with these agree-
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

61

ments and encourage Turkish leaders to continue their advocacy of a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East.

Finally, the United States should maintain close ties with the 

Turkish military and continue to provide military equipment. 

This relationship offers the United States a way to monitor 

Turkish military developments and apply pressure with export 

controls if nuclear weapon capabilities ever emerged.

In addition to technical feasibility, the United States should 

monitor Turkey’s economic capacity to develop nuclear programs. Historically, Turkey’s attempts at starting a civilian nuclear program repeatedly faced financial difficulties. If it became evident that Turkey was pursuing a nuclear weapons 

program, the United States applied economic pressures by reducing or eliminating its foreign direct investments and restricting trade. As a positive incentive, the United States could 

financially aid Turkey’s civilian nuclear program. US financial 

assistance may ensure Turkish nuclear developments remain 

demilitarized by keeping the United States knowledgeable of 

Turkish nuclear technical capabilities.46

The United States also should monitor Turkey’s treaty obligations, specifically under the NPT. Turkish leaders repeatedly 

state their support of the NPT and their desire for a Middle East 

free of WMDs. Going nuclear would require Turkish leaders to 

abandon their UN nuclear pledges, which could damage Turkish leadership credibility, their NATO standing, and bilateral 

relationship with the United States. Because alliance relationships are important to Turkish leaders, any threat of alliance 

damage may prove an effective bargaining lever to prevent Turkey from tipping toward nuclear proliferation.

Summary and Conclusions

Maintaining the credibility of US extended deterrence for 

Turkey requires a complex strategy of addressing Turkish political and economic concerns to demonstrate the strength of 

the partnership. Most importantly, Turkey and the United States 

need to stay actively engaged in their alliances. Unilateral approaches to security issues by either country harm the relationship, while burden sharing and alliance networking make it 

stronger. Conversely, because NATO and potential EU member-
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

62

ship is important to Turkish leaders, it can be an effective lever 

to discourage proliferation. Reducing trade barriers and increasing military arms sales are additional options that the 

United States could utilize to improve its credibility as a Turkish security partner. Additionally, US military forces based in 

Turkey and US nuclear weapons in Europe both remain important symbols of US commitments. Reducing either without negotiating suitable substitutes could weaken US credibility.

The United States should also monitor tipping point warnings and indicators. To mitigate issues that may encourage 

Turkish intentions or capabilities to pursue nuclear weapons, 

the United States should act to stifle the impact of potential 

security threats, such as a nuclear-armed Iran. Keeping Turkey 

as a partner in JSF development, regional missile defense, and 

nonproliferation enforcement while simultaneously avoiding 

meddling in its internal politics may prove effective in reducing 

the potential reasons for a Turkish nuclear bomb. Also, by 

monitoring Turkish technical and economic capabilities, the 

United States could more effectively lead the early application 

of levers to prevent tipping.

Implementing a strategy to improve extended deterrent credibility that also has the benefit of discouraging proliferation requires a thorough understanding of the ally. The next chapter 

offers conclusions and policy implications for applying extended deterrence as a method of nonproliferation that may be 

applicable to other allies.

Notes

1. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 2008.

2. Ibid.

3. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 43.

4. DOD, “Secretary Gates Press Conference.”

5. Banks, Muller, and Overstreet, Political Handbook of the World, 1351.

6. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 57.

7. Gursoy, “Obama Discuses Armenia, Mideast, Afghanistan with Turkish 

Officials.”

8. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 42.

9. US House. Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian 

Genocide Resolution, 2007, sec. 2.
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

63

10. Gursoy, “Turkey Sees Looming Armenian Resolution in U.S. as a Risk 

Factor.”

11. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 42.

12. Gursoy, “Obama Discuses Armenia, Mideast, Afghanistan with Turkish Officials.” President Obama reportedly signals that the United States 

“would refrain from taking any step that would harm these efforts.”

13. Schleifer, “Turkey Votes to Lift Head-Scarf Ban, but Battle Continues.” 

AKP leadership permitted women to wear head scarves to Turkish universities. As Turkish politics become increasingly democratic, it is likely that political leadership will continue to ease restrictions on public displays of Islamic traditions in order to win the votes of a population that is over 99 

percent Sunni Muslim.

14. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 26.

15. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 82.

16. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 45.

17. Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Turkey.”

18. European Commission, United States Barriers to Trade and Investment, 8.

19. US Department of State, “Background Note.”

20. Unattributed interview with Turkish parliament member (AKP Party), 

11 November 2008.

21. Gursoy, “US Brands PKK’s Iranian Wing, PEJAK, a Terrorist Organization.”

22. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 2008.

23. Ibid.

24. Larrabee, Turkey as a US Security Partner, 29.

25. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 2008.

26. Larsen, Future of U.S. Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Weapons and 

Implication for NATO, 75.

27. DOD, “United States and Turkey Sign Memorandum of Understanding.”

28. F-35 Joint Fighter Program Office, “The F-35 Lightning II.”

29. DOD, “United States and Turkey Sign Memorandum of Understanding.”

30. Institute for Defense Analyses, “Extended Deterrence and Assurance 

in the Emerging Global Security Environment, Case Study.”

31. Ibid.

32. Lesser, Beyond Suspicion, 20.

33. Institute for Defense Analyses, “Extended Deterrence and Assurance 

in the Emerging Global Security Environment, Case Study.”

34. Unattributed interview with Turkish foreign minister, 8 December 2008.

35. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, Nuclear Tipping Point, 167.

36. Ibid.

37. Larrabee, “Turkey’s New Middle East Activism,” 82.

38. “News Transcript, Secretary Gates Press Conference with Turkey’s 

Minister of Defense.”

39. Lesser, Beyond Suspicion, 91.
IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

64

40. Burwell, “Evolution of US-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context,” 38–40.

41. Turkish General Staff, “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).”

42. US Department of State, US-Turkey Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear 

Cooperation (123 Agreement).

43. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, Nuclear Tipping Point, 161–64.

44. American Free Press, “Bush Pushes US-Turkey Nuclear Cooperation.”

45. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Chain Reaction, 45.

46. Campbell, Einhorn, and Reiss, Nuclear Tipping Point, 167.
65

Chapter 5

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Extended deterrence is absolutely essential for Turkish 

security and to support Turkey’s decision to renounce 

nuclear weapons.

—Science Applications International

Corporation study, 2006

Conclusions

For the case of the Republic of Turkey, US nuclear reduction 

policies and the US Air Force’s nuclear weapons handling mistakes in 2007 and 2008 did not significantly affect the credibility 

of the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent. Additionally, 

there is little evidence that disarmament trends or the mishandling events have encouraged Turkish leaders to consider developing a nuclear weapons program. Both the intentions and 

capabilities for a Turkish nuclear weapon remain low while the 

credibility of the US promise for extended deterrence remains 

good, but it may be weakening.

The reason that nuclear reduction and nuclear mishandling 

issues may not play prominently in Turkish proliferation decision making likely is due to the character of extended deterrence—the credibility depends on many elements, with the status of US nuclear weapons playing a minor part. Which 

elements an ally values the most depends on that ally’s unique 

security concerns as well as the political relationship established with its protector. For example, South Korea and Japan 

may more highly value the size and type of the US nuclear arsenal dedicated to their protection due to the potential nuclear 

threat from North Korea. Therefore, extended deterrence strategies require a specific approach for those allies.

Turkish leaders value their country’s alliance relationships, 

and its bilateral relationship with the United States is the most 

important. However, Turkey’s NATO membership and its selection to serve as a temporary member on the UN Security Council 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

66

also provide valued alliance bonds. Additionally, the Turkish 

government continues to pursue EU membership and lists this 

as a top priority.1 To maintain a credible nuclear and military 

umbrella over Turkey requires the United States to continue to 

facilitate and encourage Turkish involvement and leadership in 

these and other alliances. Failing alliance credibility may be 

the crucial incentive for Turkish leaders to abandon their nuclear weapons abstinence. For Turkey, the quality and size of 

the US nuclear arsenal plays an important, but much smaller, 

part in deterrence credibility and as a nonproliferation tool.

Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have become 

increasingly more politically useful while their military value 

has diminished. Nuclear weapons remain valuable bargaining 

tools for deterrence and, especially in the case of Europe, as 

symbols of alliance commitment. Nuclear weapons used to extend deterrence to alliances may have an additional benefit of 

discouraging nuclear weapons proliferation by allies. For this 

reason, any change to US nuclear posture, such as basing, 

modernizing, and disarmament, requires close dialogue with 

allies that rely on a nuclear umbrella—especially with those allies capable of acquiring their own nuclear weapons arsenals.

Turkish leaders likely would withdraw from under US extended deterrence and acquire their own nuclear weapons if 

they perceived a collapse of alliance credibility. Currently, the 

warnings and indicators for a Turkish nuclear weapons breakout remain low. Nevertheless, the United States should continually strive to evaluate and, when possible, strengthen the 

elements of extended deterrence credibility. These elements include alliance strength, US policies and practices in the Middle 

East, US-Turkish commercial trade, US-Turkish military arms 

sales, the presence of US military forces in Turkey, and the 

presence of US nuclear weapons in the United States and Europe. In addition, the United States should maintain a durable 

nuclear force with some portion of that force based in Europe 

until other commitment options can be negotiated.

Even if these credibility elements can be improved, US policy 

makers can expect Turkey to hedge against falling behind a 

Middle Eastern nuclear race by pursuing a civilian nuclear 

power program. Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear infrastructure, possibly including nuclear weapons, may upset the Middle East 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

67

balance of power. To remain politically relevant in the region, 

Turkish leaders could decide to pursue their civilian nuclear 

power program more aggressively. A civilian nuclear program 

builds scientific knowledge and improves regional status. For 

example, Armenia invited Turkey to assist in its nuclear power 

plant upgrades despite the historically tense relations between 

the countries.2

Strengthening credibility elements for extended deterrence 

may also affect the intentions and capabilities of an ally considering nuclear weapons tipping. Addressing Turkey’s most 

important security concerns not only adds to alliance credibility, but may also discourage proliferation by removing a 

common cause for tipping: external security threats. Turkey’s 

concerns include

•	 credibility of NATO, EU, and US support for Turkish security;

•	 PKK terrorism;

•	 Kurdish activism in Iraq supporting a separate Kurd state;

•	 Cyprus;

•	 relationships with Iran and Armenia;

•	 energy security and access; and

•	 economic strength and domestic stability.

Although few of these political and security concerns seem 

solvable with nuclear weapons, they may provide fuel for mythmaking rhetoric to justify nuclear weapons proliferation. One 

way to dampen pro-proliferation rhetoric is for the United 

States to remain engaged in Turkish security issues so that no 

issue becomes too grave.

The US Air Force also may be able to contribute to assuaging 

Turkish security issues. First, it is important that the Air Force 

maintain a high level of care and advocacy of US nuclear weapons programs supporting NATO. Although the mishandling of 

mistakes in 2007 or 2008 did not seem to greatly affect Turkish 

perceptions of US deterrent credibility, Turkish officials prefer 

the existing nuclear posture in Europe and oppose unjustified 

changes.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

68

Second, maintaining Air Force and Turkish DCAs in Europe 

remains important to Turkey. The aircraft provide a symbol of 

US commitment to Turkish defense and also represent Turkish 

dedication to a high-visibility NATO mission.

Third, the Air Force should advocate continued military presence at Incirlik AB. The base is an important gateway to the 

Middle East as well as the most visible and tangible US military 

force commitment to Turkish defense. Incirlik AB could provide 

a hub of support for assisting Turkey in its antiterrorism missions including command and control, surveillance, intelligence, and, potentially, combat operations.

Policy Implications

Know Your Ally as Yourself

Effective extended deterrence, including extended nuclear 

deterrence, requires a strategy that considers each ally individually. However, policy makers also need to consider linkages 

in US nuclear arsenal changes—some reductions or force posture changes may be acceptable to one ally but troubling to 

another. Only with a thorough understanding of an ally’s security and domestic concerns can the United States assess the 

credibility of its extended deterrence. The credibility elements 

outlined in this paper may provide a starting template for 

achieving better understanding. Similar studies for Japan, 

South Korea, and Australia likely would shed light on the most 

important reasons that those allies might forsake the US nuclear umbrella for weapons of their own.

A Strong Defense May Be the Best Offense

Turkey faces a variety of security challenges. Most are at 

its doorstep: PKK terrorism, Iraqi instability, Iranian nuclear 

ambitions, Russian energy politics, Israeli-Hamas conflicts, 

Georgian-Russian frictions, Cypriotic Greek-Turk wrangling, 

and Armenian-Turkish tensions. The United States can provide political, economic, and military support to help prevent 

some of these threats from becoming acute by strengthening 

credibility elements of extended deterrence. Since this re-
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

69

quires practicing deterrence without a specific deterrence 

target, alliance building using defensive systems may prove 

to be the best approach. The United States should consider 

adding Turkey as a partner for possible theater missile defense systems and future fighter aircraft. Both countries 

should decrease trade barriers. The United States should 

consider offering financial and technical assistance for Turkey’s budding civilian nuclear power program. Similar defensive approaches may be useful for other US allies. How well 

these approaches may be working could be measured by observing proliferation warnings and indicators.

Watch the High Ground: Monitor Proliferation 

Warnings and Indicators

Warnings and indicators that could lead to nuclear weapons 

proliferation provide a way to measure the effectiveness of US 

extended nuclear deterrence. Similar to credibility elements, 

these indicators and warnings may vary for different countries 

and allies. At the least, the indicators listed in this paper provide a foundation for guiding proliferation monitoring strategies. The signs of proliferation include security threats, the relationship between the ruling regime and its public, leadership 

rhetoric, technical and economic feasibility, third party support, and military capabilities. The ally’s regime and its relationship to its populace require particular attention. Changes 

within a regime from a democratic and outward economic orientation to a regime less democratic and inward looking may 

be indicators of future proliferation. Although not always easy 

to discern, these factors may provide the foundation for proliferation assessments as well as the basis for measuring credibility success.

Notes

1. Gursoy, “Turkey’s PM Erdogan Seeks Leap Forward in EU Entry Bid in 

2009.”

2. “Armenia Invites Nuclear Cooperation.”

71

Appendix

US-Turkish Relations Timeline Post-WWII

BOLD=significant nuclear policy events

1946 USSR demands territorial concessions and 

naval bases from Turkey; Turkey provides final refusal

Feb. 1947 United Kingdom withdraws military assistance from Greece and Turkey

Mar. 1947 Pres. Harry S. Truman asks Congress for 

and receives $400 million in aid for Greece 

and Turkey; Turkish aid goes to its military 

and to build Turkish bases for long-range 

aircraft

1950 Turkey’s Democratic Party (DP) defeats the 

Republican Party (RPP). Prime Minister Adnan 

Menderes governs for three terms until a 

1960 military coup

1950–52 Turkey supports Korean War with 4,500 

troops—the third largest UN contingent

Feb. 1952 Turkey and Greece join NATO; US fully supports Turkish membership

8 Dec. 1953 Pres. Dwight Eisenhower’s “Atoms for 

Peace” address at United Nations

1954 Construction finished on Incirlik AB, near 

Adana, Turkey; US Air Force begins use

July 1955 US-Turkish bilateral agreement to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

27 Aug. 1956 Turkish Atomic Energy Commission 

(TAEC-TAEK) created by Act No. 6821, 

under prime minister to coordinate efforts to build nuclear research reactors 
APPENDIX

72

and training centers and to issue licenses 

for power plants

1957 NATO adopts New Look strategy in which nuclear weapons become the primary method 

for deterring and responding to potential Soviet aggression in Europe

1 May 1959 Construction begins on first research reactor (1 megawatt [MW] pool type, called 

Turkish Reactor-1 [TR-1]) at Cekmece 

Nuclear Research and Training Center 

(CNRTC-CNAEM, formally established in 

1961) near Kucukcekmece Lake outside 

Istanbul

Oct. 1959 Eisenhower administration completes 

agreement with Turkey to base 15 nucleararmed Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles there to strengthen NATO, 

post-Sputnik

27 May 1960 Military coup led by Gen Cemal Gursel justified as a response to alleged corruption and 

increasing authoritarian views by DP’s leaders; National Unity Committee established

Summer 1961 Jupiter nuclear missiles under US control 

begin deployment to Turkey as authorized 

by NATO council; Pres. John Kennedy almost cancels deployment because the 

missiles are obsolete, but Turks protest

1 Jan. 1962 TR-1 commissioned/goes critical, closes 

on 17 September 1977 (now dismantled); 

15 January 1978 construction started on 

5 MW reactor (called TR-2) in same building; went critical on 10 December 1981, 

shut down 22 August 1995, restarted in 

1998 (possible accident in March 1993 

involving release of radioactive contamination in Kucukcekmece Lake)
APPENDIX

73

5 Mar. 1962 Last Jupiter missiles in Turkey become 

operational

14–28 Oct. 1962 Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy 

secretly decides to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the exchange 

for the USSR to remove missiles from 

Cuba; Turks not consulted about missile 

removal but are compensated with military aid including F-104G fighter aircraft

22 Oct. 1962 Turkish crews begin manning Jupiter 

sites under “dual-key” procedures, sharing control with the United States

1–25 Apr. 1963 Jupiter missiles removed from Turkey; 

decision announced in January 1963

1964 “Johnson letter” to Turkish president Ismet 

Inonu: Turkey threatened to intervene in Cyprus to aid Turkish Cypriots battling Greek 

Cypriots. To prevent Turkish intervention, 

Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson sends a letter to 

Turkish prime minister warning him that if 

USSR attacks Turkey to protect the Greek 

Cypriots, the US and NATO may not come to 

Turkey’s defense

1965 Justice Party takes parliamentary power with 

Prime Minister Suleyman Dermirel

NATO working group on nuclear planning 

established; Turkey becomes a group member by lot

Work reportedly starts on nuclear power 

plant proposal; by 1970 a 400 MW 

CANDU plant chosen; proposal called for 

plant operations in 1977

1966 Ankara Nuclear Research and Training 

Center (ANRTC) established; reorganized 

in 1993
APPENDIX

74

Feb. 1967 During NPT negotiations Turkey expresses concern to US Department of 

State about security guarantees to nonnuclear states

28 Jan. 1969 Turkey signs the NPT, not ratified until 

17 April 1980 (possibly due to internal 

political turbulence or military influence); 

safeguards agreement with IAEA signed 

20 October 1981; Additional Protocol 

signed 12 July 2001

12 Mar. 1971 Turkish military intervention (“Generals’ 

Memorandum”) to quell perceived political 

anarchy and violence; military rule with a civilian government from 1971 to 1973

1971 Plans for first nuclear power plant abandoned post-coup—first nuclear power attempt fails; Turkish Electric Authority 

(TEK) established to take over electric 

generation with its Nuclear Power Plants 

division (NPP)

1973 Elections bring Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit 

to power in January 1974

20 Jul. 1974 Turkey intervenes in Cyprus after Cypriot 

National Guard overthrows elected Cyprus 

president; Turk military campaign successful and another ordered on 13 August 1974 

which secures 40 percent of Cyprus and establishes a north-south partition of the island

Oct. 1974 United States implements arms embargo in 

October 1974 but defers implementation until February 1975 for negotiations; viewed by 

Turks as a slap in the face to a loyal ally; in 

late 1974 a new government led by Suleyman Demirel freezes US military activity in 

Turkey until 1978
APPENDIX

75

1975 Turkish government transfers control of Incirlik AB to its military in response to US 

arms embargo by Congress following Cyprus 

incident

June 1976 TAEK licenses Akkuyu site for nuclear 

power reactor; in 1977 negotiations begin with two Swedish companies (AseaAtom and Stal-Laval) for 660 MW boiling 

water reactor; deal collapses in mid1980s from failure to agree on financing 

and a Turkish military coup

Sept. 1977 TR-1 research reactor shut down and dismantled at CNAEM in Istanbul reportedly 

for financial reasons

Oct. 1978 Pres. Jimmy Carter’s administration negotiates new basing deal with Turkey; Turks 

base acceptance of the deal on US aid

11 Mar. 1979 Istanbul Technical University’s research 

reactor (TRIGA Mark-II 250 kilowatt) 

goes critical; construction started on 1 

April 1975; only remaining research reactor in Turkey (IAEA safeguarded)

12 Sept. 1980 Turkish military coup led by Gen Kenan 

Evren (military runs government for next 

three years until elections in November 1983)

1980 Post-coup, nuclear power program abandoned for second time

1980 Turkey and United States sign a bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement 

(DECA) to govern use of Incirlik AB; in some 

cases the DECA requires Turkish parliamentary authorization for US requests to use the 

base for reasons other than training

1981 United States expresses concern about proliferation of nuclear materials with weapons 

implications between Turkey and Pakistan
APPENDIX

76

1982 TAEK-TAEC reconstituted as Turkiye Atom 

Enerjisi Kurumu (TAEK-TAEA) under 

prime minister’s authority: Turkey’s nuclear regulatory agency. It oversees four 

research centers at Cekmece, Ankara, and 

Lalahan Animal Health and Nuclear Research Center

Nov. 1982 Turkish parliament adopts new constitution 

that provides the parliament the right to allow foreign forces in Turkey

1983–93 Turkish prime minister and then-president 

Turgut Ozal improves relations with United 

States; also reforms and improves economy

1983 General Directorate for Mineral and Exploration (MTA-established in 1935) duties expanded to include mining for nuclear fuels (and again in 1994)

Fall 1983 TAEK invites bids for nuclear power 

plants; letters of intent sent to three companies: Canada (655 megawatt electrical 

[MWe]), Germany (990 MWe pressurized 

water), and United States (one or two 1185 

MWe boiling water) at Sinop on Black Sea; 

Sinop location discovered to be unacceptable due to geographic fault lines

1985 Turkey signs nuclear cooperation agreement with Canada; negotiations over financing and payment methods (such as 

build-operate-transfer, suggested but details never settled) for nuclear power plants 

continue until 1993; eventually third attempt for nuclear power abandoned

1986 Nuclear fuel pilot plant at CNAEM begins 

operation: accomplishes uranium refining and conversion to uranium dioxide 

(UO2) and manufactures UO2 pellets
APPENDIX

77

3 May1988 Turkey and Argentina sign 15-year nuclear cooperation agreement hoping to 

duplicate Argentina’s push for fuel cycle 

independence; study 300 MWe PWR (Argos) at Akkuyu

Oct. 1990 Argentina agrees to build a CAREM-25 

small nuclear power plant (9 or 10 MW) in 

1992 for Turkey; former director of TAEK 

Yalcin Sanalan stated it was too small for 

electricity, too big for research, but right 

size for plutonium production; United 

States and others oppose the joint project; Turkey cancels fourth project attempt 

in 1991

1991 Gulf War I (Operation Desert Storm) created 

economic hardships for many Turks: promised US aid never materialized, economic 

losses were estimated at $35-150 billion, 

Turkish general staff resigned after Ozal’s 

pledge to support US, Iraqi oil exports 

through Turkey were cut off as part of UN 

sanctions (estimated cost at $6 billion), 

100,000 troops were deployed along TurkishIraqi border (estimated cost of $300 million), 

Turkey allowed United States to fly sorties 

out of Turkish bases, Turkey provided safe 

haven for Kurds

USSR collapses, Cold War ends

Oct. 1992 TEK sends requests for proposals; Canada responds on 28 October 1992

1994 1994 TEK divides into two companies 

(TEAS and TEDAS); TEAS issues bids for 

consulting services for nuclear plant; Korea wins as cheapest at $350 million 

(US); in March 1996 bids for Akkuyu site 

opened but not released until 17 December 1996 requiring 100 percent financ-
APPENDIX

78

ing; bids delayed multiple times; domestic opposition strong and 24 mayors in 

the region objected, saying it would damage tourism and agriculture—mainstays of 

the local economy; bidding selection slipped 

and operating date slipped from 2000 to 

2003 to 2005

1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 

signed by Turkey (ratified in 2000)

July–Aug. 1996 Turkey concludes $23 billion, 25-year natural gas deal with Iran

June 1997 “Post–modern” Turkish military coup; Islamist government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan replaced by conservative 

government of Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz; 

further interrupted nuclear power contract 

bidding/award

Apr. 1997 Turkey becomes a member of the Missile 

Technology Control Regime

Jan. 1999 Minority government of Bulent Ecevit of 

Democratic Left Party replaces Yilmaz government

Nuclear power plant decision pushed back 

until after elections, but decision never 

made; energy minister Cumhur Ersumer 

said, “If we cannot reach a decision it will 

be interpreted that Turkey has given up 

on nuclear plants forever”; protests in 

January 2000 against the plant; fifth attempt seemingly abandoned in July 2000

1999 Turkish forces apprehend PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan; United States plays role in operation; PKK declares unilateral cease-fire

June 2000 Turkey becomes a member of the Nuclear 

Suppliers Group
APPENDIX

79

July 2000 Additional Protocol for IAEA verification 

ratified

11 Sept. 2001 9/11 attacks on United States; NATO Article 

V applied; Turkey begins assistance to USNATO operations in Afghanistan

3 Nov. 2002 Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins 

parliament, and Tayyip Erdogan becomes 

prime minister

1 Mar. 2003 US invasion of Iraq: seen by Turkey to worsen 

PKK issues; Turkish parliament narrowly rejects use of Turkey as base for the invasion 

despite multibillions in promised aid, possibly due to (1) political damage for newly 

elected AKP party and (2) the belief that a 

better aid deal could be negotiated; Turkish 

public opinion 85–90 percent against the 

war—may have feared repeat of effects of first 

Gulf War including economic hardship and 

PKK resurgence; military may have allowed 

controversy in order to embarrass Ergodan

June 2004 PKK attacks begin again after PKK declared 

unilateral cease-fire in 1999

Dec. 2004 European Union starts accession negotiations 

with Turkey

2005 Turkey allows United States to use Incirlik AB 

as a cargo hub but forbids combat aircraft

Feb. 2006 Turkish energy minister Hilmi Guler announces plans to build up to five nuclear 

power plants, first at Sinop, operational 

by 2012, citing rising oil prices and dependence on Russia

Summer 2006 Turkey sends peacekeepers to Lebanon

2006 South Caucasus gas pipeline opens

Mar.–Apr. 2006 Turkish prime minister Erdogan telephones 

Iranian president to seek access for Turkish 
APPENDIX

80

ambassador to visit 15 British naval and marine personnel captive in Iran

22 July 2007 Turkish elections maintain AKP in power

2007 Turkey takes overall command of Multinational Task Force South in Kosovo

Fall 2007 PKK attack in southeast Turkey kills 40; 

United States tried to dissuade Turkish reaction, called on Kurd regional government to 

take action

10 Oct. 2007 US House of Representatives Committee on 

Foreign Affairs passes a nonbinding resolution (27–21) declaring the 1915 OttomanArmenian incident, which occurred at the 

closing years of the Ottoman Empire, to be 

genocide; greatly damages US-Turkish relations; garners reaction from Turkish prime 

minister, military staff; resolution does not 

go to House for a vote

5 Nov. 2007 Pres. George Bush meets with Turkish prime 

minister Erdogan; meeting considered “milestone in counterterrorism efforts” after agreements for US-Turkish increased intelligence 

sharing in efforts against PKK in northern 

Iraq

21 Mar. 2008 Cypriot president Dimitris Christofias and 

Turkish leader Mehmet Ali Talat meet and 

agree to establish processes for reunifying 

the island, divided since 1974

22 Jan. 2008 President Bush sends Congress an agreement signed by President Clinton on 26 

July 2000 to ensure nuclear cooperation 

between the United States and Turkey

28 Sept. 2008 Russia’s Atomstroyexport offers bid for 

nuclear power plant for Turkey in Akkuyu 

district; it is the only bid received
APPENDIX

81

4 Nov. 2008 Turkish government begins legal procedures for second nuclear power plant in 

Sinop

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Abbreviations

AB air base

AKP Justice and Development Party

AP additional protocol

B billion

CACNARE Convention on Assistance in the Case of a 

Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

CENNA Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear 

Accident

CNS Convention on Nuclear Safety

CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 

Material

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DCA dual-capable aircraft

DOD Department of Defense

EU European Union

GTP Powerful Turkey Party

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT Nonproliferation Treaty

OG Operations Group

PKK Kurdish Workers Party

SDE senior developmental education

SFM Spent Fuel Management

SGA Safeguards Agreement

SQP Small Quantities Protocol

USTR US Trade Representative

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WWICS Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

85

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The Case of the Republic of Turkey

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