IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 27, 2013 at Knoxville

EDWARD PAVWOSKI v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Maury County

No. 18352 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge

No. M2012-01004-CCA-R3-HC Filed - February 28, 2013

The petitioner, Edward Pavwoski, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of

habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2009 Maury County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded

convictions of two counts of rape and six counts of incest. Because the petitioner has failed

to state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which NORMA MCGEE

OGLE and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ., joined.

Edward Pavwoski, Whiteville, Tennessee, pro se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; John H. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On August 20, 2009, the petitioner entered pleas of guilty to two counts of rape

and six counts of incest in exchange for a total effective sentence of 20 years’ incarceration.

On April 25, 2012, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the

evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel at trial, that his convictions violated principles of double jeopardy, and

that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. On April 30, 2012, the habeas

corpus court entered an ordersummarily dismissing the petition for failure to state cognizable

grounds for habeas corpus relief. The court noted that although some of the petitioner’s

claims were cognizable grounds for post-conviction relief, the one-year statute of limitations

for filing a post-conviction petition had expired.
In this appeal, the petitioner claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief on

grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that his guilty pleas

were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, that he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel at trial, and that his convictions violate double jeopardy principles.

“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a

question of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. State,

21 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Our review of the habeas corpus court’s decision is,

therefore, “de novo with no presumption of correctness afforded to the [habeas corpus]

court.” Id. (citing Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 205 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tenn.

2006)).

The writ of habeas corpus is constitutionally guaranteed, see U.S. Const. art.

1, § 9, cl. 2; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15, but has been regulated by statute for more than a

century,see Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). Tennessee Code Annotated

section 29-21-101 provides that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any

pretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may prosecute a writ of

habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.” T.C.A. §

29-21-101 (2006). Despite the broad wording of the statute, a writ of habeas corpus may

be granted only when the petitioner has established a lack of jurisdiction for the order of

confinement or that he is otherwise entitled to immediate release because of the expiration

of his sentence. See Ussery, 432 S.W.2d at 658; State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326

(1868). The purpose of the state habeas corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely a

voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968).

A void conviction is one which strikes at the jurisdictional integrity of the trial court. Archer

v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993); see State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d

284, 287 (Tenn. 1979); Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

We agree with the habeas corpus court that the petitioner has failed to state a

cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief. The petitioner’s claims that his guilty pleas were

not knowingly and voluntarily entered, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel,

and that his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy, even if true, would render the

judgments voidable rather than void. See Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 163-64; Passarella, 891

S.W.2d at 627; see also Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 255-56, 258. Moreover, “[t]he law is

settled beyond question that habeas corpus . . . proceedings may not be employed” to

challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Gant v. State, 507 S.W.2d 133, 136

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1973). Because the petitioner failed to state a cognizable ground for

relief, summary dismissal was appropriate.

Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

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JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE

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