Improving the Readiness of 

the Army Reserve and National GLlard: 

A Framework for Debate 

FEBRUARY 1978 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

IMPROVING THE READINESS OF THE ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD: 

A FRAMEWORK FOR DEBATE 

The Congress of the United States 

Congressional Budget Office 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

WlIShlngton, D.C. 20402 

PREFACE 

In the past few years, numerous proposals have been put forth 

to devote more resources to improving the readiness of the Army 

reserve components. The array is likely to grow as the Administration completes several studies now under way. Because of the 

importance of Army reserve components. and because acceptance of 

the proposals could mean a substantial increase in the U.S. 

defense budget, Congressional debate on this topic is likely 

to be vigorous. Improving the Readiness of the Army Reserve and 

National Guard, prepared at the request of the Senate Budget 

Connnittee, is intended to provide a framework for this debate. 

Whether this increased spending is aesirable depends on 

what role the Army reserve components should play in an overall 

U.S. defense strategy. That question suggests three others: What 

should be considered in choosing a role for the Armv reserve 

components? Of what value would improved readiness be? And how 

much would improved readiness cost? rhese questions are the focus 

of this study. In accordance with CRO's mandate to provide 

nonpartisan and ob;ective analysis, the study offers no recommendations. 

Robert F. Hale of CBO's National Security and International 

Affairs Division wrote the study under the supervision of John 

E. Koehler and James Blaker. The force projections were done 

by Richard A. Kuzmack of the Mathtec Corporation, and a portion 

of the paper is based on earlier work by the author and Nancy J. 

Bearg. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Michael 

A. "Miller of the Budget Analysis Division, who did part of the 

costing, Martha B. Roberts and Johanna Zacharias, who edited the 

manuscript, and Patricia J. Minton, Nancy J. Swope, and Connie S. 

Leonard, who aided in its production for publication. 

February 1978 

iii 

Alice 'M. Rivlin 

Director 

CONTENTS 

PREFACE . 

SUMMARY 

CHAPTER I. 

CHAPTER II. 

CHAPTER I II . 

APPENDIX. 

INTRODUCTION 

U.S. Reserve Structure 

Costs of All U.S. Reserves 

Scope of the Study .. 

CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING A ROLE 

FOR THE AR~ RESERVE COMPONENTS 

Costs . . . . . . 

Nature of a War . 

Can They Meet the Need: 

The Readiness of the Army Reserves 

ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR THE 

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS . 

A Highly Ready Reserve for 

Use in All Phases of a War 

Emphasis on Early-De~loying Units 

Reserves as a Long-War Hedge 

Summary . . . . . . . 

IMPROVING RESERVE READINESS: 

THE KEY PROPOSALS AND THEIR COSTS 

The Key Resource Proposals .... 

Costs of Key Proposals . . . . . 

Avoiding Cost Increases: National 

Service and the Draft 

Other Proposals . . . . . . . . . 

v 

iii 

ix 

1 

3 

5 

6 

9 

9 

10 

15 

29 

30 

34 

37 

40 

45 

45 

52 

57 

57 

TABLES 

TABLE 1. RESERVE STRENGTHS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1977 . . . .. 4 

TABLE 2. RESERVE COSTS, FISCAL YEAR 1978 

TABLE 3. 

TABLE 4. 

SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH FOR ARMY 

RESERVE COMPONENTS . . . . . . . . 

SUMMARY OF READINESS IMPROVEMENTS 

TABLE S. ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS 

APPENDIX TABLES 

TABLE A. ADDITIONAL COST OF IMPROVING ARMY RESERVE 

COMPONENT REAnINESS .....•. . . . . 

vii 

6 

24 

32 

41 

54 

SUMMARY 

Today the defense force of the United States includes about 

820,000 paid, part-time reservists. Another 950,000 are generally 

not paid but have some reserve commitment. The primary role of 

all these reservists is to help defend this country and her allies 

during a major war. Formalization of the Department of Defense's 

Total Force Policy in 1973 and recent trends in thinking about the 

possible nature of a future war make this role increasingly 

important. 

But the reserves have problems. The difficulties are particularly acute among the Army National Guard and Army Reserves, 

which have about one million reservists (including 544,000 of the 

paid reservists) and are the subject of this study. These Army 

reserves are short of people. 1/ They are also sometimes short of 

equipment, and of time and places to train. As a result, the 

Army reserves today might not be ready to meet the increasing 

demands placed upon them. 

The Congress and the Executive Branch have considered numerous proposals for improving the Army reserves' readiness to 

support the active forces in defeating an enemy. This study 

concentrates on those proposals that require increased resources 

since they are 1 ikely to be of most importance in the budget. 

Suggestions include higher reserve pay to attract more reservists 

and so meet manpower targets, increased full-time assistance by 

ac tive military personnel or civilians to free more reserves for 

training, and more time for training. Taken together, these 

proposals could be expensive, perhaps eventually raising annual 

costs by as much as $750 million, or about 20 percent more than 

the $4 billion the United States will spend on the Army reserves 

in fiscal year 1978. 

The defense capability provided by this 

depends in part on the role assigned to the Army 

would they fight? How many would be needed? 

extra spending 

reserves. Where 

When would they 

1/ Throughout this study Army reserves--with a lower-case "r"--

refers to both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. 

ix 22-746 0 .. 78 .. 2 
enter a war? A major purpose of this study is to formulate 

alternative roles for the Army reserves and discuss their appropriateness by applying three criteria: costs, the nature of a 

war they might help fight, and their ability to fight effectively. 

At the least, the role chosen suggests the relative value of 

the readiness improvements: the more the role demands high peacetime readiness, the greater the payoff from proposed improvements 

in readiness. But the value of the proposals a1 so depends on 

whether they improve readiness enough to meet the demands of the 

role assigned to the reserves. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 

assess this. Readiness is hard to measure. Even more difficult 

is predicting in advance how more resources--such as larger 

numbers of reservists or more training--wou1d improve readiness, 

and whether the improvements could be sustained. This uncertainty 

suggests that trying out the readiness improvements on a limited 

scale might be desirable before investing heavily. 

CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING THE ROLE OF THE ARMY RESERVES 

Costs 

On a man-for-man basis, Army reserves are about five times 

as cheap as active forces. Even with all the readiness improvements discussed in this study, the reserves are unlikely to 

be more costly on a man-for-man basis. Thus the more Army 

reserves that can be included in the active/reserve mix and still 

accomplish the military mission, the cheaper the mix is likely to 

be. How many can be inc 1 uded in the mix? That depend s on 

their effectiveness, which in turn depends on the nature of wars 

they must help fight and whether they can be ready. 

Nature of a War 

Although the Army reserves have many possible jobs, the 

greatest demand on them is to help deter a major war centered in 

Europe, or to help win such a conflict if it should occur. The 

size and structure of the reserves therefore are based in large 

part on assumptions--a1beit highly uncertain--about the nature of 

such a war. The postulated conflict would pit the USSR and her 

all ies among the Warsaw Pact nations against the United States and 

her NATO allies. For the reserves, the most important assumptions 

about this contingency are the warning NATO would have before such 

a war began, its intensity, and its length. Many observers have 

assumed that a war would begin after several weeks of warning. It 

x 
would be intense, at least initially, and probably would not last 

very long, perhaps as little as a few weeks. Against this general 

background, the Army reserves in the past have been seen largely 

as a hedge against the possibil ity that the war would last many 

months. 

The Army reserves are still viewed as insurance against a 

longer war. But recently, trends of thought about the nature 

of the conflict and the strength of the Warsaw Pact forces have 

stressed earlier use of the Army reserves. According to current 

Defense Department assumptions about a war, some Army reserve 

units would be needed in its first few weeks. The Administration's stated objective would be to get all the Army reserves to 

Europe within about three months. These goals suggest the need 

for a good deal of readiness in peacetime, particularly among 

uni ts that must fight or provide combat support within the first 

month or so, 

Reserve Readiness 

Can the Army reserves be sufficiently ready? Without much 

knowledge about the effects of proposed readiness improvements, 

the answer has to be uncertain. A judgment, however, should start 

by considering the reserves' current readiness and how that 

situation may change. 

Standard reports rate the average Army reserve unit as 

marginally ready, which, given today's limited funding, is the 

goal for most reserve units. Yet a marginally-ready rating means 

the unit has major readiness deficiencies. The key, early-deploying Army reserve units have somewhat higher readiness, but 

many of them are still rated marginally ready or not ready. These 

ratings and other indicators of readiness suggest that many 

units would have difficulty deploying and effectively assisting 

the active forces, particularly during the first month or so of a 

NATO/Warsaw Pact war. 

Lack of personnel to man units is a major problem that holds 

down readiness. The paid, or "selected," part of the Army reserves is 8 percent short of its authorized strength and 18 

percent short of what the reserves say they need. Even larger 

shortages exist among the unpaid reserves who would provide combat 

replacements. Nor are personnel problems the only ones. Training 

time is limited to about 38 days a year, and some units lack 

facilities for training. 

x~ 
The readiness of the Army reserves has improved in recent 

years, and it may continue to get better. For example, probably--

even without additional payor bonuses--the numbers of selected 

Army reservists will stop declining and start a gradual increase 

over the next five years, although the numbers are unlikely to 

grow enough to meet the Army's peacetime strength objectives. 

Also, as has been mentioned, the Army reserves may receive additional resources aimed at improving their readiness. 

Nevertheless, there are constraints on readiness--such as 

limits on training time available to part-time reservists--that 

added resources cannot eliminate. Thus the question about whether 

the Army reserves can be ready to deploy and effectively assist 

the active forces, particularly in the first month or so of a NATO 

war, remains unanswered. This uncertainty underscores the desirability of testing the effects of the readiness improvements 

before investing heavily. 

ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR THE ARMY RESERVES 

Different notions about these criteria--costs, the nature of 

a war the reserves might help fight, and particularly, their 

ability to be effective in such a war--suggest three broad choices 

of role for the Army reserves. The United States could seek a 

highly ready reserve capable of assisting in all phases of a war. 

The nation could emphasize the reserves intended for use early in 

a war. Or, the reserves could be limited to acting as a hedge 

against a long war. 

Highly Ready Reserve for Use in All Phases of a War 

This option would increase the size of the Army reserve 

substantially above present levels, with the selected reserves 

attempting to reach their peacetime ob.iective strength of 660,000. 

The larger Army reserve would be intended to provide some reinforcement in the first month or so of a NATO war, with a few units 

deploying in the first weeks. The remaining Army reserves would 

attempt to meet the Administration's objectives that call for 

getting all Army reserves into a NATO war within about three 

months. 

Choice of this option would be consistent with a judgment 

that Army reserves must enter a war early to counter the strength 

of the Warsaw Pact forces, particularly their ability to attack 

quickly and intensely. The option would also be consistent with 

xii 
other possible changes in defense policy--such as prepositioning 

more equipment in Europe for U.S. active forces--which could speed 

up deployment schedules for all U.S. forces, including reserves. 

And this option would be most consistent with the emphasis on the 

reserves stemming from the Administration's Total Force Policy, 

which established the reserves as the initial and primary backup 

for the active forces. 

The readiness improvements offer the highest payoff for 

the Army reserve that assumes this demanding role. But these 

improvements would increase costs. By 1983, depending on the 

scope of the improvements, this approach could increase annual 

spending above current levels by as much as $750 million a year. 

This increased spending would pay the salaries for larger numbers 

of drilling reserves and raise pay and bonuses enough to attract 

more of them. The higher costs would also add to the size of the 

nondrilling reserves, provide additional full-time personnel so 

that reserves can spend more time training, and allow longer 

summer training periods for some reserves. 

Besides higher costs, this option has other drawbacks. 

Perhaps most important, it would invest heavily in readiness 

improvements on the assumption that, with the improvements, the 

Army reserve would be able to contribute substantially early 

in a war. Yet until planners know how ready the reserves can be, 

a more selective option mav be desirable. 

Emphasis on Early-Deploying Reserves 

This second opt ion would emphas ize the earl y-deploying 

reserve units, made up mostly of those units intended to go into 

action within the first month or so of a war. These earlydeploying units would be given the readiness improvements discussed in the first option, including additional reserve personne 1 , bonuses, added full-time assistance, and longer summer 

training periods. Only the early-deploying units would be the 

recipients of these improvements. 

Because not all units would get readiness improvements, this 

approach would lessen the likelihood that the Army reserves could 

meet the Administration's goal of getting all units into a European war within three months. The option therefore represents 

some retreat from the emphasis on the reserves suggested by the 

Total Force Policy. 

xiii 
This option, however, would be consistent with trends in 

strategic thinking that stress a short, intense war. Such a war 

would put a premium on getting some reserves into the conflic t 

within the first month or so. Perhaps more important, this option would provide a large-scale test of how ready reserve units 

could be. 

Such an approach would accomplish the goals outlined above at 

considerably less cost than the first option. The increased costs 

of providing the readiness improvements to the early-deploying 

units would eventually be about $80 million a year in today's 

dollars. 

Reserves as a Long-War Hedge 

Given limited training time and other constraints, getting 

the Army reserves suffic iently ready in peacetime to deploy on 

short notice and effectively assist the active forces may be 

impossible, no matter what steps are taken. This situation would 

argue for relying on the Army reserves only in the later stages of 

a long war. Readiness improvements would yield a lower payoff, 

since the reserves would have time after mobil ization to achieve 

adequate readiness. Thus improvements previously discussed are 

excluded from this option, although some selective improvements 

might still be desirable in the few small units intended for 

early use. 

One response to this role for the Army reserves would be 

to replace early-deploying reserves with active-duty personnel. 

The active forces would be more likely to be ready to fight 

on short notice, making this choice consistent with the notion 

that a NATO war would call for an early U.S. presence. But 

the switch to active forces would increase costs. For example, 

there are about 54,000 selected reservists now assigned to 

reserve units affiliated with active forces; many of these reserve 

units are early-deploying. Replacing these 54,000 selected 

reservists with active forces, and dropping the 54,000 from the 

paid reserves, would eventually increase overall manpower costs by 

about $800 million above their present level. (The choice of 

54,000 is for illustration. Units other than those affiliated 

with active forces might be selected for the switch.) 

Another response would cut the number of Army reservists 

without adding active forces. This action would be consistent 

with a judgment that the early phases of a Warsaw Pact attack 

could be contained with U.S. active forces and manpower supplied 

by our ~ATO allies, and that a smaller Army reserve could achieve 

X1V 
full manpower after mobilization. This action would cut costs. 

If, for example, 54,000 reservists (the number now in affiliated 

units) were eliminated, savings in 1983 could amount to about $140 

mill ion a year. 

The following table summarizes the elements of these three 

options. The choice among them depends on costs and the demands 

of a NATO war, and particularly as on the ability of the Army 

reserves to meet those demands. 

xv 
ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS 

Roles 

1. Highly Ready 

Reserve for 

All Phases 

of War 

2. Emphasis on 

Early-Deploying 

Reserves 

3. Emphasis on 

Reserves for 

Long-Run War 

Fewer Reserves, Replace With 

Active 

Troops 

Fewer Reserves 

Changes to Reserve Resources 

Make numerous changes to 

improve readiness, including 

more reservists, higher pay, 

more full-time support, and 

longer training 

Make changes to improve 

readiness of early-deploying 

units 

No readiness improvements; 

substitute active forces for 

early-deploying reserves 

No readiness improvements; 

reduce size of selected 

reserve by numbers in 

early-deploying units 

Nature of NATO! 

Warsaw Pact War 

Intense war that 

demands heavy U.S. 

presence in first 

few months 

Similar to Role 1 

but emphasis on 

war that ends 

more quickly 

Similar to Role 2 

Similar to Role 2, 

but level of threat 

suggests U.S. active 

forces plus NATO manpower are adequate 

in early stages 

Criteria for Choice 

Can Reserves Be Ready 

to Fight Early? 

Confident that extra 

resources will lead 

to adequate readiness 

Not convinced; desire 

inexpensive test of 

whether extra resources 

will lead to adequate 

readiness 

Reserves unable to 

fight effectively 

early in war 

Same as above 

Costs 

(1983) 

Up as much as 

$750 million 

a year 

Up $80 million a year 

Up $800 million a year 

Down $140 

million a 

year 
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 

The United States currently employs about 820,000 paid 

reservists. These personnel generally hold full-time civil ian 

jobs but serve about 38 days a year as military members. An 

additional 950,000 persons have various reserve commitments but do 

not usually serve in the military during peacetime. The primary 

mission of these paid and unpaid reservists is to help defend this 

country and its allies during a major national emergency. This 

study focuses on the roughly one million reserves--including about 

544,000 of the paid reserves--who are in the Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard. 

In recent years, the role of the Army reserves--and particularly of the paid reserves--has become increasingly more 

prominent. 1/ In 1973, the Department of Defense formalized the 

Total Force-Policy, which treated the active and reserve forces as 

a whole and which formalized reliance on the reserves as the 

initial and primary backup for active-duty personnel. In 1973, 

the United States also ended conscription and placed the Selective 

Service System in a standby status; in a crisis, the time required 

to reinstitute the draft would heighten dependence on the reserves 

by lengthening the time before draftees would be available. Also 

over the last several years, the Army created three additional 

active divisions without increasing the number of its active 

personnel; this was done in part by heavier reliance on the 

reserves. Finally, in recent years, the perceptions of the 

growing strength of our potential enemies have emphasized the need 

for military strength--including reserves--early in a war. 

This increasing prominence of Army reserves is reflected in 

the affiliation program, in which some reserve units are associated with active Army units in peacetime and might be deployed 

with them in the event of war. The Army reserves currently have 

about 54,000 of their 544,000 paid reservists assigned to affiliated units. The numbers in affil iated units may suggest the 

1/ Throughout this study, Army reserves--with a lower-case "r"--

refers to both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. 

1 

22 .. 74Jl 0 .. 78 .. 3 
commitment to getting the reserves into a war earlier than was 

thought necessary a decade ago. 

At the same time that their importance is increasing, the 

Army reserves are having problems which could delay their entry 

into a war. The reserves are short 0 f people. They often lack 

persons with needed military skills. They have suffered high 

turnover. They have limited time to train, and they are sometimes 

short of equipment and places to train. These and other types of 

problems may limit the reserves' ability to mobilize, to achieve 

needed training;, and to deploy to assist the active forces in 

defeating an enemy. In other words, these problems hold down 

reserve readiness. 

These problems, coupled with the growing emphasis on the 

reserves, have prompted the Executive 'Branch and the Congress to 

consider numerous proposals and actions to improve readiness. 

Mirroring the numerous aspects of readiness, these efforts have 

taken many forms: attempts to improve the management of the 

reserves by increasing cooperation between the active and reserve 

forces and by improving the reserves' ability to mobil ize and 

integrate with active forces; attempts to improve the organization 

of the reserves by pruning out nonessential units and revamping 

the size and structure of others; and concern over key intangibles 

that affect readiness, such as morale and leadership. 

Another set of proposals to improve reserve readiness deals 

with the resources provided to the reserves--that is, manpower, 

equipment, and paid time for training. Since these resource 

proposals have important budgetary effects and are most under the 

control of the Congress, they are the focus of this study. Among 

such proposals are suggestions to employ more reservists so that 

all units would be fully manned, to increase reserve pay to attract these added reservists, to provide more full-time civilians 

or military personnel so that the part-time reserves could concentrate on training, to fill reserve equipment needs in order to 

improve the realism of training, and to provide more time for 

training. 

The defense capability added by these readiness improvements 

would depend in part on the role assigned to the Army reserves in 

u.s. strategy. l.fuere would they fight? How many would be needed? 

When must they fight? One purpose of this study is to provide 

a context for evaluating readiness improvements by laying out 

al ternative roles for the reserves. The roles suggest the relative value of readiness improvements. The more the reserves' 

2 
assigned role demands high peacetime readiness, the higher the 

potential return to improving their readiness. 

But the defense capability that would be added by readiness 

improvements also depends on how much reserve readiness is improved and on whether the improvements would allow the reserves to 

meet the demands of their assigned role. Unfortunately, this 

question has no sure answer. It is difficult to measure readiness 

and even harder to predict how much additional resources--such as 

more reservists and better training--would improve readiness. And 

some constraints on the reserves' peacetime readiness--such as 

limits on training time--would not likely be eliminated by additional resources. The uncertainty about how much improvement 

would come from readiness proposals suggests that it would be 

desirable to test before investing heavily. This study develops 

one option that would provide such a test. 

Although this study focuses on the reserves in the Army 

Reserve and Army National Guard, it is useful to begin with an 

overview of the entire reserve structure. 

U.S. RESERVE STRUCTURE 

Table 1 describes the universe of United States reserves. 

Reservists serve in one of three categories: ready, standby, or 

retired. About 1.2 million, or 70 percent, of all reserves are in 

the ready reserve. These are the reserves that are most available 

for call-up. Upon a declaration of a national emergency, up to 

one million ready reservists can be called to active duty for as 

long as two years. 

The ready reserve is in turn divided into two subcategories: 

the selected reserve and the individual ready reserve. The 

819,100 members of the selected reserve include those reservists 

who are paid in units or who are paid for drilling on weekends and 

for attending a two-week summer camp. Almost all selected reservists are assigned to specific units that are intended to assi st 

active forces in a war. The rest of the ready reserve are in the 

individual ready reserve (IRR). Most of the 383,500 IRR personnel 

are not assigned to specific units and are generally not paid. 

In a major war, the IRR pool would be used to fill out active and 

reserve units and later would be a source of combat replacements. 

All 275,300 members of the standby reserve are unpaid and 

cannot be called to active duty unless the Congress gives its 

3 
TABLE 1. RESERVE STRENGTHS AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1977: IN THOUSANDS 

Army National Guard 

Army Reserve 

Navy Reserve 

Marine Corps Reserve 

Air National Guard 

Air Force Reserve 

Total DoD 

Coast Guard Reserve 

Total 

a/ Not reported. 

Ready Reserve 

Selected Individual 

354.7 10.7 } 189.4 149.4 

90.2 106.1 

31.0 45.3 

91.8 0.3 

50.4 63.4 } 

807.5 375.2 

11.6 8.3 

819.1 383.5 

Standby Retired 

Reserve Reserve 

152.8 139.3 

48.7 108.2 

28.8 NR a/ 

44.2 42.0 

274.5 289.5 

0.8 

275.3 289.5 

Total 

996.3 

353.2 

105.1 

292.1 

1,746.7 

20.7 

1,767.4 

explicit approval. Composed mostly of individuals who are completing their reserve obligation after performing a combination of 

active and ready reserve service, their numbers are declining as 

a result of the longer active service associated with the allvolunteer force. In any event, this group has little impact on 

the defense budget and receives little attention in strategic 

planning. 

The 289,500 retired reservists are individuals who have 

qualified for military retirement through length of service 

or through disability. They can be called to active duty in time 

of war or by a Congressional declaration of emergency, but they 

represent a low potential for mobilization. 

Reserves in these three maior categories--ready, standby, and 

retired--can be further divided among seven reserve components. 

Each of the four military Services, plus the Coast Guard, has a 

reserve component. The Army and Air National Guard bring the 

total to seven. The National Guard components grew out of the 

state militia of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During 

peacetime, the' Guard components have the same federal mission as 

4 
other reserve components but are under the control of the state 

governors and are used by them to deal with domestic crises, 

natural disasters, and other contingencies. 

Most reservists are in the Army National Guard or Army 

Reserve--co11ective1y referred to in this paper as the Army 

reserve components or simply as the Army reserves. The Army 

reserves have 56 percent of all U.S. reservists and 66 percent of 

all selected reservists. These Army selected reservists are 

organized into many types of units. The Army National Guard IS 

selected reserves serve in about 3,300 units, including five 

infantry divisions, one mechanized infantry division, two armored 

divisions, 21 separate brigades, four armored cavalry regiments, 

two special forces groups, about 130 separate battalions, and over 

900 other companies and detachments. The Army Reserve has 12 

training divisions, three separate brigades, and about 3,200 

company- or detachment-sized units. 

COSTS OF ALL U.S. RF.~F.RVER 

Reservists do not come free. Table 2 shows how much the 

federal government will spend on reserves in fiscal year 1978. 

The table includes not only costs in the specific reserve appropriations but also costs of active-duty personnel who directly, 

support the reserve and costs of training overhead (that is, 

training and instructional material s) that can be attributed to 

the reserves. In fiscal year 1978, the reserves will cost 

the federal government a total of about S7.8 billion. The Army 

reserves will account for 52 percent of the total costs. 

In addition, several states have established re-enlistment 

and educational bonuses for their National Guardsmen, which 

usually are not associated with the costs of the reserves yet are 

paid for by the taxpayers of the states. Other state support to 

the National Guard includes low-cost loans, administrative support 

from state departments, and construction of training facil ities. 

These state costs may amount to roughly 10 percent of the total 

federal cost. 

Taken together, then, the annual costs for reserves in fiscal 

year 1978 will probably run somewhere between $8 billion and $9 

billion. 

5 
TABLE 2. RESERVE COSTS, FISCAL YEAR 1978: IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 

--~-----------.-.-----------

Army Reserve Air Force 

and Army Reserve and Marine Coast 

National Air National Navy Corps Guard All 

Guard Guard Reserve Reserve Reserve Components 

?ersonne1 1,315 422 217 82 23 2,059 

operations and 

Maintenance al 1,161 1,234 319 17 16 2,747 

Construction ~I 101 55 22 178 

Procurement )!./ 1,099 389 47 40 1,57.5 

Active-Duty 

Support a/ 76 22 217 47 362 

Training 1\ase 

Overhead :=..1 275 203 36 16 530 

Retirement r},,1 '.:.1 4 354 

Total 4,027 2,325 858 202 43 7,805 

(Fiscal Year 1979). 

~I From Five-Year Defense Plan (Fiscal Year 1978). 

:=..1 From Five-Year Defense Plan (Fiscal Year 1978) and training loads supplied by 

the Department of Defense. 

r},,1 CBO proiec tion. Estimates by reserve component are not available. 

~I Not available. 

SCOPE OF THE STUDY 

This study focuses on the two Army reserve components. The 

emphasis on the Army reserves stems in part from their size; they 

contain 66 percent of a11 selected reservists and over half the 

total dollars. The Army reserves also are the source 'of the most 

important budget issues. Unlike the air units, which are generally agreed to be relatively ready, the Army reserves have readiness problems that could requ~re large increases in funding. 

\i]ithin the limits of the Army reserves, this paper concentrates on the broad issue of the role of the reserves and how that 

role affects the need for readiness improvements. Chapter II 

6 
develops the criteria that should determine the role of the 

Army reserves. Based on differing notions about these criteria, 

Chapter III sets out alternative roles for the Army reserves and 

analyzes the value of the readiness improvement proposals within 

the context of these roles. The Appendix examines the details and 

costs of some of the proposals that have been made to improve 

reserve readiness. 

7 

CHAPTER II. CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING A ROLE FOR 

THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS 

Three criteria should be applied to determine the role of 

the Army reserves: costs, the nature of a war they must help 

fight, and their ability to carry out their missions. 

COSTS 

In recent years, both the Congress and the F.xecutive Branch 

have exerted pressure to hold down the costs of defense manpower 

to enable the United States to have a better-equipped military 

within a constant defense budget. Improving the readiness of the 

reserves could drive up manpower costs; so the cost of alternative 

reserve strategies is a key basis for choosing a role for the 

reserves. 

Two questions regarding reserve costs should be considered. 

The first is whether, on a man-for-man basis, the Army reserves 

are cheaper than the active forces. Clearly they are. The 

average selected reservist in the Army reserve will receive 

pay and allowances of about $1,900 in fiscal year 1978, versus 

$10 ,500 for the average active-duty soldier in the Army. Adding 

in other personnel costs, plus the costs of operations and maintenance that include civilian assistants, does not greatly change 

the relative costs. With these added dollars, the cost per 

average selected reservist in 1978 will be $4,200 versus $21,800 

for the average active-duty soldier. Even with the added costs 

of readiness improvements discussed in Chapter III, the reserves 

will still be cheaper. 

The key question, then, is not whether they are cheaper on 

a man-for-man basis but rather how many Army reserves the United 

States can include in its mix of forces and still accomplish the 

military mission. This depends on the nature of a war the reserves must help fight and on their readiness, which are discussed 

below. Clearly, the more reserves in the mix, the cheaper it is 

likely to be. 

9 

22.746 0 • 78 • 4 
NATURE OF A WAR 

Army reserves are used in domestic crises and could be used 

in many kinds of foreign conflicts. The conflict that would 

demand the most of them--and the one that is typically considered 

in planning Army reserve forces--is a ma.ior, non-nuclear war in 

Europe. Such a war would pit the United States and its NATO 

allies against the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies. 1/ Since U.S. 

strategy revolves around the reserves as reinforcements in such a 

war, it is useful to describe how that reinforcement might be 

carried out. Then this section turns to the scenario of a NATO 

war. 

The Concept of Reinforcement 

In the event of mobilization for a major NATO war, the entire 

U. S. force structure--active and reserve--would be alerted, and 

all units destined for employment in Europe would begin a threestage process of preparation, deployment, and, ultimately, reception in Europe. The time spent in each of these stages would 

vary, depending primarily on the type of unit involved and the 

kind of strategic mobility assets--airlift or sealift--that would 

be used to move the unit across the Atlantic. In nearly all 

cases, the preparation phase would take longer for reserve than 

for active units. The sequence call s for assuring that the unit 

is manned, equipped, and trained sufficiently to perform its 

wartime mission prior to deployment. And most reserve units are, 

by design, behind active units in each of these categories. 

Exactly when the Army reserves would enter a war as reinforcements depends on their role, which is the subject of the next 

chapter. To make clearer one possible sequence, this section 

discusses the deployment schedule currently envisioned by the 

Administration. 

The exact schedule is classified. It also changes, depending 

on requirements perceived by U.S. commanders in Europe and on the 

1/ The NATO allies include the United States, Belgium, Britain, 

Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, 

the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and West Germany. 

The Warsaw Pact allies include the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, 

Czechos lovakia, East Germany. Hungary. Poland, and Romania. 

10 
readiness of the various units in the force structure. The 

general pattern, however, can be laid out. Active divisions, 

especially those with much of their equipment already prepositioned in Europe, would be sent first. Because their personnel 

would be airlifted, they could arrive in Europe within the first 

few weeks after the decision to send them. Other active Army 

units would be prepared for movement and be dispatched as soon as 

airlift and sealift resources were available. 

Some small reserve units with support missions would be 

sent at about the same time; they would be needed eariy to make 

the necessary arrangements to receive combat units arriving later. 

Reserve combat units and other support units would probably be 

sent later. Among the first to arrive--perhaps sometime in the 

first month or so of a war--might be the brigades that "round out" 

or provide the third brigade for an active Army division. These 

round-out brigades are part of the Army's affiliation program. 

Under this program, high-priority reserve units are assigned to 

ac tive Army units both to augment the units and to benefit from 

the technical advice available from active soldiers. The Army now 

has about 54,000 of its 544,000 selected reservists in affiliated 

units. This might provide some indication of the numbers of 

reserves likely to deploy in the first few months. 

The remainder of the Army reserves, with the exception of 

some units that would remain in the United States to assist in 

deployment processing, would deploy in later months. In recent 

Congressional testimony, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs stated that the goal is to have all Army 

reserves in Europe within 90 days after mobilization. 2/ This 

is a demanding goal that could be difficult to attain, -particularly for division-size reserve units that must perfect their 

command and control before entering combat. 

Under the Administration's current deployment schedule, 

therefore, the first few weeks after mobilization for a NATO war 

would primarily see the movement of active units; deployment of 

reserve units would be limited to a few sma1l support troops. 

2/ Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, 

Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, 

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (March and April 1977), 

Part 4, p. 2436. 

11 
Reserve combat units would then begin deploying, . probably beginning with those in the affiliation program. Of course, the exact 

timing would depend heavily upon the progress of the war, the 

availability of airlift and sealift, and the readiness of reserve 

units. 1/ 

The NATO Scenario 

The general outline of deployment described above would probably take place regardless of the exact nature of a war, but the 

precise timing of deployment--and the importance of meeting those 

schedules--would depend upon the nature of a war between NATO -and 

the Warsaw Pact. Today, the likelihood of such a confl ict is 

thought to be low aild its nature highly uncertain. Nonetheless, 

assumptions about the nature of such a war are important to choosing a role for the Army reserves. Such assumptions begin with assessments of the overall balance of strength between NATO and the 

Warsaw Pact. 

Analysts disagree on the military balance between the NATO 

allies and the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe--the area considered 

key in a conflict. 4/ Reasons for disagreement include differing 

assessments about whose forces should be counted on each side, 

whether some nonregular forces should be counted, the effectiveness of forces on either side, and assumptions about the timing of 

a war. But a review of these differing appraisals suggests that 

optimistic assessments are optimistic only in comparison with 

4/ 

Reserve units could, of course, be deployed regardless of 

their combat readiness. But there are important military 

reasons for not deploying reserve units until they have 

been judged to be combat effective. The presence of ineffective units in combat could be more detrimental than 

their absence, since their relative ineffectiveness could 

create exploitable gaps along a military front or dilute 

the effectiveness of better units as they try to compensate 

for the reserves I weakness. Thus, in an actual crisis, the 

desire to get forces to Europe rapidly would be balanced 

against the desire to assure that those forces would be 

effective. 

Congressional Budget Office, Assess~ng the NATO/Warsaw Pact 

Military Balance, Budget Issue Paper (December 1977), 

12 
pessimistic ones. Few, if any, assessments demonstrate a clear 

NATO advantage. Plans for the desired total of U.S. forces, including reserves, must be considered with this NATO balance in 

mind. 

How many Army reserves should be included within the total 

depends critically upon both the length of time NATO would have 

to prepare for a Warsaw Pact attack and the length of the war. 

Until recently, a common planning scenario assumed that NATO would 

detect Warsaw Pact preparations for an attack shortly after they 

began, would being mobilizing roughly a week later, and would have 

about three weeks to mobilize prior to the beginning of a conflict. 5/ The war, it is commonly assumed, would be intense 

because of the nature of the Soviet military--a large, powerful 

military structured for rapid advances. Such a war, or at least 

its first phases, might also end quickly--perhaps in just a few 

weeks. The quick end could come in part because the Soviet 

military may have sacrificed a capability to sustain combat 

in favor of a capacity to mount an intense initial attack. 6/ 

This scenario emphasizes the importance of getting reserves 

to Europe within the first month or so, while putting less emphasis on reserves as a backup for a war that lasts many months. 

In recent years, however, this planning scenario has been much 

debated. Although it is still a possibility, different combinations of assumptions' have been suggested that could lead to 

emphasis on different roles for the Army reserves. 

For example, a war might last for many months. Under such 

circumstances, the Army reserves would be needed as a backup. The 

Warsaw Pact--particularly the USSR--has a large pool of reserves, 

numbering in the millions. 7/ Consequently, U.S. reserves would 

5/ Ibid., pp. 21-22. 

6/ Jeffrey Record, Sizing Up the Soviet Army (Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 43-45. 

7/ Since Soviet conscripts, mos t of whom go to the ground 

forces, have a reserve obligation until age 50, the total 

number of Soviet reservists--at least in legal terms--could 

be as high as 25 million. Only about one-sixth of these, 

however, have had military service within the last five years. 

See the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 

Military Balance, 1977-1978 (1976), p. 10. 

13 
probably be needed in a longer war to match the total strength 

levels of the Warsaw Pact. 

Backup for long wars has historically been a key role for 

the Army reserves, and it remains an important one today. Over 

the last several years, however, interest has grown in getting the reserves to Europe faster. This reflects concern over 

the speed of a potential Warsaw Pact strength buildup. 

Many analysts believe that the Warsaw Pact could mobilize 

very rapidly. It has a force structure featuring units--particularly Soviet Category II and III divisions--that are equipped 

fully (or close to it) but manned at low levels. These units 

could be filled out rapidly. This structure, and the relative 

proximity of these units to Europe, have led observers to postulate a rapid buildup once a mobilization began. 

The strength buildup of many Western European forces--

particularly those of the West Germans--would be very similar in 

pattern to the rapid Pact buildup. Entities like the German 

territorial forces could mobilize quickly once a decision to 

mobilize had been made. But it is often assumed that, after the 

Warsaw Pact began mobilizing, NATO would take a few days to muster 

its collective resolve to mobilize. If NATO were delayed in 

starting its mobilization, the Warsaw Pact--in the absence of 

early U.S. support--might be able to obtain enough of an early 

edge in strength to enable it to start the war and attack successfully. For example, if the Warsaw Pact ever gained an overall strength edge of, say, two to one, some analysts believe 

this would enable the Pact to bring enough force to bear at some 

part of the war front to break through NATO's defenses. 8/ This 

concern has emphasized the importance of getting U.S.-forces, 

including Army reserves, into a conflict in the first month 

or so. 

But even the first month or so may not be soon enough. One 

Congressional study asserted a war could begin with as little as 

8/ See Department of Defense, Annual Department of Defense 

Report, Fiscal Year 1976, p. III-IS; and Department of Defense, Annual Department of Defense Report, Fiscal Year 1978, 

p. 94. 

14 
a few days' warning. 9/ And a war could end quickly, perhaps 

in a few weeks. Under these circumstances, the role of the 

Army reserves would be quite limited. At most, only a few small 

support units could be mobilized and deployed in time to have 

any effect on the outcome. 

The great uncertainty about a future war--both its likelihood 

and its nature--suggests that the role of the reserves should be 

determined after considering a variety of possible scenarios. 

Nonetheless, emphasis on a particular scenario does suggest certain roles for the reserves. If, for example, a war began and 

ended in a week or so, the Army reserves would have only a minimal 

role. If a war lasted many weeks or months, the reserves would 

have an important backup role. Increasingly, the Army reserves 

are being thought of as important in the early stages of a war 

that would last at least a month. This emphasis on early participation puts a premium on the peacetime readiness of the Army 

reserves, particularly on the units that must deploy in the first 

month or so. 

CAN THEY MEET THE NEED: THE READINESS OF THE ARMY RESERVES 

How ready can the Army reserves be in peacetime? That 

question has no sure answer, largely because of the difficulties 

in measuring and predicting readiness. A judgment about this 

critical question, however, can be formed by an assessment of 

current readiness and likely future trends. 

Current Readiness 

This study defines reserve readiness as the ability of the 

reserves to mobilize, accomplish any needed training, deploy, and 

assist active forces in defeating an enemy. Readiness thus 

depends both on what enemy the reserves must help fight and on the 

timing of a war. The preceding section showed that, for purposes of planning reserve structure, the reserves are intended 

for use in a major, intense European war. And they may have to 

fight early. Current Administration plans suggest that the 

9/ NATO and the New Soviet Strength, Report of Senator Sam Nunn 

and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett to the Senate Committee on 

Armed Services, 95:1 (January 24, 1977), p. 4. 

15 
Army reserves may have to fight or provide support in the first 

month or so of a war, and the goal would be to get all Army 

reserves into a war within about three months. 

The breadth of the definition of readiness implies that 

it is difficult to measure. The only true test is a war. Fortunately, reserves have not entered a war in large numbers since the 

Korean War. The assessment of the readiness of today's Army 

reserves must therefore rely on indirect measures: readiness 

reports, exercise results, and other indicators. A frank assessment of these measures suggests that many of today's Army reserves 

have readiness problems that would make it difficult for them to 

mobilize, achieve needed training, deploy, and effectively assist 

the ac tive forces, particularly in the first month or so of a 

maj or NATO war. 

Readiness Reports. Readiness ratings for reserve components 

are submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are included in 

part of the Force Status and Identity Report, or FORSTAT. Under 

this system, each military Service reports the readiness of its 

reserves in terms of "C-ratings" for the unit's personnel, equipment, and training, as well as a summary rating for the unit as a 

whole. There are four levels of C-ratings, ranging from "fully 

ready" (C-l) to "not ready" (C-4). A1 though the system has 

important problems that limit its usefulness in accurately gauging 

reserve readiness. it still provides the most comprehensive 

measure of how well a unit could deploy and perform its wartime 

mission. 10/ 

The FORSTAT system shows that. on average, the units of 

the Army reserve components are rated "marginally ready" (C-3). 

Given limitations on personnel and equipment imposed by current 

funding, a rating of marginally ready is the target for most 

reserve units. Such units certainly have some capability to 

fight. but by definition, they have major deficiencies of such 

magnitude as to limit severely their capability to accomplish the 

mission for which they are organized and designed. Moreover I a 

substantial mnnber of units are rated "not ready" (C-4). Although 

most of the more detailed data are classified. information released to the Congress in 1976 showed that 43 percent of all Army 

10/ For a full discussion of these problems, see Congressional 

Budget Office. Reserve Readiness. Staff Working Paper 

(September 1977). pp. 4-33. 

16 
National Guard units and 54 percent of all Army Reserve units were 

rated "not ready." g/ 

A key finding emerging from a review of the FORSTAT readiness 

ratings is that Army reserve units that by reserve standards are 

intended to deploy relatively ear1y--within 60 days of mobilization--show higher readiness than later-deploying units. Nevertheless, a substantial number of these important, early-deploying 

units are still rated as only "marginally ready" or "not ready." 

This suggests they might not be able to deploy and per~orm their 

missions within the 60 days called for by military requirements. 

Readiness also appears to be a function of a unit's size. 

Larger units--divisions and brigades--genera11y have lower readiness because of the difficulty 0 f coordinating their many subunits. This finding suggests that early-deploying units should be 

small if these small units can be integrated into active units and 

meet wartime requirements. 

The C-rating system is not the only readiness report used 

by the Army. The Army also uses the Reserve Evaluation System 

(RES), which includes an evaluation of training readiness conducted by active-duty officers during the reserve unit I s annual 

two-week training period. The RES training ratings have not been 

systematically correlated with the C-ratings that indicate training readiness. Army personnel, however, have indicated that RES 

ratings are often lower than those portrayed by the C-system. RES 

may therefore paint a slightly less encouraging picture of whether 

Army reserves are adequately trained to perform their wartime 

missions. 

Exercises. Although graded combat exercises would also be a 

useful way to assess Army reserve readiness, little data are 

available from such exercises. 12/ But exercises have tested 

11/ Military Posture and H.R. 11500: Department of Defense 

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1977, Hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, 94:2 

(February and March 1976), Part 3, p. 560. 

12/ The Army is currently designing and implementing the Army 

Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP). ARTEP consists of 

a series of misElion-essentia1 tasks designed to evaluate, 

against specific standards, the capabilities required of 

17 
another important reserve capability: their ability to mobilize. 

Mobilization includes all the steps--assembling personnel, getting 

needed equipment, achieving needed training, and moving units to a 

port--that must be accomplished before a reserve unit can deploy. 

In November and December of 1976, the Army conducted an 

extensive test of reserve mobilization--called MobEx76--which 

simulated mobilization of about 590 Army reserve component units. 

MobEx76 revealed serious problems with Army mobilization planning 

and procedures. The exercise suggested that if a war started 

today, many Army reserve component units could not mobilize and 

deploy within 30 days; some might not be able to deploy within 60 

days. MobEx76 revealed a lack of planning for movement of units 

and their equipment, a lack of integration of active and reserve 

computer systems that is vital to speedy mobilization processing, 

a misunderstanding of administrative procedures necessary during 

processing, and a lack of screening to eliminate persons who could 

not deploy because of health or critical civilian jobs. The Army 

has underway a program to correct the problems revealed during 

MobEx76 and plans another mobilization exercise in October of this 

year. 

Although MobEx76 tested the ability of the Army reserve 

components to mobilize, it did little checking of their ability 

to integrate with the active forces in Europe. The exercises that 

will be conducted this October will begin testing this key 

capability. 

Other Indicators. In Congressional testimony last year, 

Administration witnesses identified personnel problems as a key 

factor that constrains readiness. 13/ Indeed, the Army reserve 

components are short of people. --At the beginning of fiscal 

year 1978, the Army reserve components had 544,000 selected 

every type of Army unit. As yet there is little data on 

reserve performance on ARTEP, but the reserves may eventually 

be evaluated by a formal, graded ARTEP every three years. 

For a more thorough description of ARTEP, see Congressional 

Budget Office, Reserve Readiness, pp. 38-40. 

13/ Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense 

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, 

Hearings before the House Committee on Armed Services, 95: 1 

(February and March 1977), Part 5, p. 633. 

18 
reservists versus a fiscal year 1978 authorization of 593,300 and 

a peacetime objective of 660,000. 14/ The Army is also short of 

enlisted men in the nondrilling, individual ready reserve that 

would fill out active units in wartime and would provide combat 

replacements. It now has about 140,000 individual ready reserves, 

a number that the Army expects will decline to about 120,000 by 

the early 1980s as losses of active-duty personnel decline under 

the all-volunteer force. According to one Army estimate, this 

will be more than 250,000 short of their requirement. 15/ 

The Army reserve components are not only short of personnel 

but have also suffered high turnover. In 1976, they lost 33 percent of their enlisted reservists in drilling units. And the 

personnel that do stay often do not work in jobs for which they 

were formally trained. Fully 36 percent of Army enlisted reservists are working outside their "Military Occupational Specialty," a code used to define the jobs in the Army and the 

training they require. 

The Army reserve components are also sometimes short of 

equipment needed to train. In Congressional testimony last year, 

Administration witnesses reported that, relative to their authorized equipment levels, the reserves were short of the following 

key types of equipment: tanks, 898 (35 percent of their authorization); M88 recovery vehicles, 291 (55 percent of authorization); 

8-inch howitzers, 65 (19 percent of authorization); 155 millimeter 

howitzers, 135 (17 percent of authorization), Ml13 personnel 

carriers, 2,403 (67 percent of authorization). ~/ They also are 

14/ The 593,300 is a fiscal year 1978 authorized average strength. 

The 660,000 is based on peacetime objectives stated in Fiscal 

Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research 

and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, and 

Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 2835-37. 

15/ Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 

95:1 (March 1977). Part 5. p. 36. Further studies are underway, and estimates may change. 

16/ Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense 

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, 

Hearings, Part 5, p. 561. Percentages based on total authorizat ions submitted to CBO by the Arrlty reserve components. 

19 
short large amounts of communications equipment. 

all reserve equipment is up-to-date, though the 

working toward that goal. 

Moreover, not 

Services are 

Problems with equipment, coupled with the large numbers of 

new reserves entering each year, place a premium on training 

time. Training time, however, is a scarce commodity for reserves. 

Their monthly weekend drills, plus two weeks of summer training, 

offer them only about 38 workdays per year compared to more than 

200 days for active forces. Furthermore, a substantial part of 

reserve worktime is devoted to administration, inspections, preparation for training, and travel. Army personnel estimate that 

only 22 to 28 of these workdays are spent in mission-essent ial 

training. An independent observer has estimated that as few 

as 14 of the 38 days may be spent in actual, mission-related 

training. ]2/ 

Other problems interfere with training. During the key 

two-week summer training periods in 1976, 25 percent of all 

Army selected reservists did not attend training with their units. 

Of these 25 percent, however, 10 percent received training in 

schools or with other units and 7 percent were new recruits 

awaiting entry into basic training. The other 8 percent were 

excused or no-shows. 

The monthly weekend training periods may suffer even greater 

problems. A greater proportion of weekend training is eaten up by 

preparation and administration. It may be difficult to remember 

where training left off 30 days earlier. And training facilities 

are often inadequate. In 1976, reserve commanders reported that 

43 to 58 percent of all reserve units that require them did not 

have adequate artillery or gunnery qualification ranges within two 

hours' travel time of their weekend base, while 70 percent did not 

have adequate tank qualification facilities. Moreover, units are 

often dispersed, making it difficult for them to train as a unit 

on weekends. According to an article in Army magazine, 20 percent 

of company-size National Guard units are spread among two or more 

towns; 90 percent 0 f the National Guard battalions are spread 

among three or more towns. ~I 

17/ Irving Heymont, "Today's Citizen Soldier: Ready for Tomorrow's War?" Army (January 1974), pp. 16-22. 

181 Ibid. 

20 
The lack of training time and facilities might be ameliorated 

by frequent exercises with active forces. During these .ioint 

exercises, reserves benefit from the technical advice, current 

knowledge, and generally better training facilities possessed by 

the active forces. Relatively few reserves, however, exercise 

with active troops. During fiscal year 1977, the Army held 11 

major exercises involving approximately 23,000 Armv selected 

reserves--or 4 percent of the total number of Army Reserve and 

National Guard personnel. 19/ These numbers seem consistent with 

a rough estimate by Armyofficials that even over a three-year 

period fewer than 10 percent of all reserve units participate in 

an exercise with the active force. 

Nor is the history of Army reserve mobilizations reassuring. 

The lessons of this history must, of course, be viewed with 

caution, since the emphasis on the reserves in recent years may 

have created a more ready reserve. During the Korean buildup, 

however, two National Guard divisions required seven months of 

stateside training before deployment. Upon deployment they were 

rated as 40 to 45 percent combat effective and required another 

seven to eight months of training before entering combat. A 

report by the House Armed Services Committee found serious deficiencies among units recalled during the Berlin Crisis in 1961. 

They were short of equipment, had insufficient numbers of personnel assigned to units, and could not mobilize many who were 

assigned. During the Vietnam conflict only about 37,000 reservists were mobilized. An unpublished report by the General Accounting Office reviewed a sample of these units and found that 17 

percent of all reservists who ~ ... ere called up were totally unqualified for their assigned positions, while 49 percent had deficienc~es in skills or availability for mobilization. There were 

also shortages of equipment. 20/ 

The various indicators discussed in this section show that 

today's Army reserves do have readiness problems. Taken together, 

the problems suggest that the Army reserves would probably have 

19/ These figures are based on Army estimates as of the fall of 

1977 but should still be roughly correct today. 

20/ All references in this paragraph are from Herman Boland, 

"The Reserves," in Studies Prepared for the President's 

Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission) , Volume II (November 1970), pp. IV-2-l to IV-2-30. 

21 22-746 0 • 78 -5 
difficulty mobilizing, achieving needed training, deploying, and 

effectively assisting active forces, particularly in the first 

month or so of a major NATO war. 

Not all the indicators are discouraging, however. Reserve 

readiness has improved in recent years. Most of the detailed 

measures are classified, but Congressional testimony in 1976 

showed that the percentage of Army National Guard units rated 

"marginally ready" (C-3) or better increased from 37 percent in 

1975 to 57 percent in 1976. The percentage of Army Reserve units 

rated C-3 or better rose from 42 percent to 46 percent. 21/ And 

reserve readiness--particularly equipment readiness--has probably 

continued to improve in recent years. 

Also, in early 1974, the Army began affiliating reserve 

units with active units. Under this program the active unit 

assists the reserve unit by providing facilities and technical 

advice, and the reserve unit usually spends its two-week activeduty period with its affiliated active unit. The affiliated 

reserve units are generally early-deploying units and in some 

cases are intended to deploy as an integral part of the active 

unit in case of mobilization. 

Today some eight brigades and about 50 separate battalions 

of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard are affiliated with 

active units. Affiliated units include about 10 percent of 

all Army personnel in the selected reserve. The program is 

expected to grow through the addition of 70 or more smaller units. 

As yet little information exists on the differences in readiness 

between these affiliated units and other units, although the 

information may soon be available when the Army Reserve Evaluation 

System distinguishes between affiliated and other units. 

Future Readiness Trends 

Reserve readiness may continue to improve in the next few 

years. As the introduction pointed out, many factors could 

influence future readiness--management, organization, resources, 

and such intangible factors as morale and leadership. In the 

absence of a theory that predicts how much changes in these many 

21/ Military Posture and H.R. 11500: 

Authorization for Appropriations 

Department of Defense 

for Fiscal Year 1977, 

Hearings, Part 3, p. 560. 

22 
variables influence readiness, trends are suggestive. This 

section discusses trends in two factors that could influence 

reserve readiness--personnel levels and equipment. Congressional 

hearings have emphasized the importance of these two factors. 

Personnel. Lack of adequately manned units makes unit 

training difficult. It may also mean that available reserves 

must spend more time administering rather than training. Lack 

of personnel would also probably delay preparations for deployment. Thus full manning is important to readiness. And, as has 

been noted, the Army reserves are short of selected reservists. 

But CBO projects that selected reserve strengths will soon 

bot tom out and will then begin a gradual increase, even without 

any additional payor bonuses (Table 3). Over the next five 

years, the increase may return the Army reserves to about 97 

percent of their currently authorized strength of 593,300, although they are unlikely to achieve their peacetime objective 

strength of 660,000. The projections are uncertain since only 

limited analysis has been made of how many reserves would enlist 

and stay in under various circumstances. 22/ These projections 

are therefore not sufficiently conclusf-Ve to say the Army's 

selected reserves will IIget well" without added pay, but the 

projections do suggest caution and flexibility in increasing 

reserve pay. Flexibility could be achieved, for example, by 

target ing any added pay on high-priority units to limit costs 

while providing more information on how reserves will respond, and 

by providing the Department of Defense with the authority to vary 

the size of any extra pay in response to changing conditions. 

In reaching these conclusions, CBO projected only enlisted 

strengths. Officer levels, which have not declined significantly 

in recent years, are assumed to remain constant at the'ir current 

level. CBO's projections reflect enlisted loss behavior during 

the period September 1976 to September 1977, the latest 12-month 

period for which data are available. The projections assume that 

the reserves will be able to recruit the same percentage of 18 and 

19-year-olds as in fiscal year 1977; thus the projections reflect 

a downward trend in accessions without prior active-duty military 

22/ The Department of Defense is currently testing the effects 

of a reeenlistment bonus. The results of this test, which 

should be available in early 1978, may provide more information. 

23 
TABLE 3. SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH FOR ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS 

Fiscal Year 

1977 

1978 

1979 

1983 

1985 

1990 

End-Year Strength 

544,000 

537,000 

547,000 

575,000 

579,000 

586,000 

experience ("non-prior-service" accessions) as the number of 18 

and 19 year olds in the U. S. population declines over the next 

decade. 23/ The projections also assume that the reserves will be 

ab le to recruit the same percentage of recent losses from Army 

active duty as they did in 1977. The projections therefore 

also reflect a downward trend in accessions with prior active-duty 

military service ("prior-service" accessions) as Army active-duty 

losses decline under the all-volunteer force. 

These projections may be conservative. The reserves will 

soon get extra full-time recruiters, which may increase accessions. And losses may reduced. Losses of new reservists that 

occur during initial basic training may decline. Also, the 

fraction of non-prior-service reservists who stay in after the end 

of their initial six-year obligation may increase, as the last of 

the draft-induced volunteers leave. And planners are seeking ways 

to reduce losses that occur before the end of the initial six-year 

obligation. Currently only about one-third of all non-priorservice accessions complete their initial obligation. 

On the 

projections 

recruiting. 

see if pay 

other hand, some factors that could cause these 

to be optimistic. Reduced unemployment could hamper 

Personnel might be staying in the reserves just to 

and bonuses will increase and could leave in large 

23/ These non-prior-service people are sent through basic training and sometimes formal training beyond basic training, but 

then go to a reserve unit without 'Serving further time on 

ac tive duty. 

24 
numbers if they do not. Furthermore, these are aggregate projections that may mask problems in particular geographic areas or in 

particular types of reserve units, such as combat units. Nor do 

the projections assume any policy changes. But the Army has 

indicated a desire for policy changes that could make it more 

difficult to reach desired personnel levels. For example, the 

Army wants to increase the proportion of recruits without prior 

military experience, a policy that is discussed more fully in the 

Appendix. 

Equipment. Equipment certainly has an important effect 

on reserve readiness. An adequate amount of modern eqipment 

improves the realism of trainin~. It may also make reserves feel 

their work is meaningful and interesting, thus improving morale 

and retention. 

As with personnel deficiencies, the equipment problems 

of the Army reserves may improve,in the next five years. Administration witnesses have testified that Army reserve components will 

have their authorized levels of major types of equipment by the 

early 1980s. 241 Fulfillment of this promise is not certain, 

however. The Army buys equipment for reserves and actives 

together and, once the equipment arrives, allocates it based on a 

priority list. Many reserve units fall near the bottom of that 

list. Consequently, changes in the needs of higher-priority units 

could, in the absence of increases in Army procurement funds, 

reduce the amount of equipment given to the reserves and so delay 

their "getting well." For example, it is possible that a decision 

may be made to preposition additional equipment in Europe for 

high-priority, active-duty units. Such a decision could reduce 

the equipment that the reserves would actually get. 

How Much Can They Improve: The Key Question 

Although improvements in reserve readiness may be in sight, 

a key question remains. Even with added resources, can the Army 

reserve components achieve sufficient readiness to be able to 

deploy and fight effectively, particularly in the first month or 

241 Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense 

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, 

Hearings, Part 5, p. 561. Funding constraints limit the 

authorized equipment levels for many reserve units to about 

80 percent of wartime requirements. 

25 
so of an intense NATO war? An optimistic answer notes the improvements in reserve readiness in recent years and projects 

continued improvement, especially if readiness improvement proposals are implemented. The pessimistic reply notes constraints 

that added resources are not likely to eliminate: the part-time 

nature of reserve duty that limits the time most reserves can 

devote to tral.nl.ng; recruiting from local areas that makes it 

difficult to get persons with all needed skills, even with 

added paYi and the likelihood that some reserve units are too far 

from active bases to have adequate training facilities for weekend 

drills. The pessimistic reply also notes the major mobilization 

problems revealed in MobEx76; these must be corrected before 

reserve units--even those in a high state of peacetime readiness--

will be able to get into a NATO war in the first month or so. 

Some information is available to help judge between the 

pessimists and optimists. Tests in the 1960s suggested that more 

weekend training would not necessarily result in sustained improvements in readiness. In the 1960s certain reserve units 

were placed in the Selected Reserve Force and drilled up to 18 

weekend days a year (72 drills), versus 12 weekend days today (48 

drills). Some observers judged that units in the Selected Reserve 

Force did achieve higher readiness, but the idea was abandoned in 

1969 because the extra drills caused serious morale and retention 

problems among part-time reservists. 32/ 

Other tests suggest that it will be difficult to sustain 

high readiness in reserve units of battalion-size or larger. 

Maintaining high readiness in battalion-size units (maneuver 

bat tallons typically have 850 to 1,000 member s) requires very 

favorable circumstances and great additional effort, according 

to a study that reviewed tests of readiness improvements--including added drills and more full-time assistance--conducted by 

the Department of Defense in the early 1970s. 26/ The Defense 

Manpower Commission reached a similar conclusio~ 27/ Yet most 

25/ Wallace C. Maga-than, et al., Tailoring of Reserve Component 

Unit Training Assemblies and Unit Manning Levels (General 

Research Corporation, March 1974), Volume I, pp. 5-6. 

26/ Ibid., pp. 7-10. 

27 Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone 

of National Security, Report to the President and the Congress (April 1976), p. 110. 

26 
of the reserve units now among the early-deploying, affiliated 

units are battalions or larger. 

The study that reviewed the tests also noted that generalizations from these tests should be made with caution. Thus the 

tests have not resolved many of the uncertainties. And the 

uncertainties may suggest a gradual approach to implementing 

readiness improvements. For example, the improvements could be 

implemented for selected units, perhaps the early-deploying 

units. This would limit cost increases, while at the same time 

allowing a large-scale test of whether the extra resources would 

lead to adequate readiness. In Congressional testimony last year, 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, 

and Logistics endorsed the idea of a test. 28/ One of the options 

discussed in the next chapter would provide a test. 

28/ Statement of the Honorable John P. White on Military Readiness in the Reserve Components during hearings before the 

House Committee on Armed Services (September 29, 1977; 

processed), p. R. 

27 

CHAPTER II 1. ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS 

Among the numerous proposals to devote more resources 

to the Army reserves to improve their readiness are suggestions 

to employ more reservists, employ more full-time assistants, 

improve training, and add more equipment. These proposals are 

discussed in more detail in the Appendix. 

Evaluation of these proposals presents two major problems. 

One is that readiness improvements are often proposed to the 

Congress without reference to how the Army reserves might be 

used. Without this context it is difficult to determine the 

importance of improved readiness and how much the improvements 

would add to U.S. defense capability. 

The second problem is that even if all the readiness improvements were implemented, it is not clear how much readiness 

would be improved and whether this improvement would be enough to 

allow the Army reserves to assist effectively the active forces in 

the first month or so of a NATO war. Yet one's judgment on this 

issue could have a major influence on the desirable role for the 

reserves and hence on the value of the readiness improvements. 

To address these problems, this chapter describes three 

alternative roles for the Army reserves consistent with differing 

not ions about costs, the nature of a NATO war, and· particularly 

the ability of the reserves to be highly ready in peacetime. The 

first of these roles would emphasize a highly ready Army reserve 

that would be used in all phases of a war. Specifically, it 

would attempt to make SOme reserves ready to fight effectively in 

the first month or so of a NATO war, while also attempting to 

ready all the remaining reserves to enter a war within the first 

three months. Another role would emphasize only the readiness of 

those reserves that must fight early, in the first month or so of 

a war. A third role would rely on the reserves only as a hedge 

against a war that lasted many months. These alternative roles 

suggest the relative value of the readiness improvements; the more 

the reserves I role demands high peacetime readiness, the greater 

the payoff from the readiness improvements. 

But would readiness improve enough to allow the Army reserves 

to carry out their assigned role? Given the uncertainties, 

29 
this question could be answered by a large-scale test that holds 

down costs while determining how much the various proposals would 

increase the readiness of the Army reserves. The second of 

the three alternative roles would provide such a test. 

A HIGHLY READY RESERVE FOR USE IN ALL PHASES OF A WAR 

Under this role the size of the Army reserve would increase. Some units of this larger reserve would be expected to 

assist active forces in the first month of a NATO war.- Those 

intended to deploy in the first two months of a war might in1ude the roughly 10 percent of the Army selected reservists now 

in afH1 iated reserve units. And members of the Army reserves 

would be expected to enter a war within about three months, 

which is the Administration's stated goal for the Army reserves. 1/ 

This option would be consistent with a judgment that a major 

NATO war would be a demanding scenario that would require more 

personnel and that paid reservists could be an increasing part of 

the total force that meets that need. This option would also be 

consistent with several other trends in defense policy. It would 

emphasize the reserves, which has been a theme in recent years 

under the Total Force Policy. This option would also emphasize 

the need for participation of U.S. forces, including Army reserves I early in a NATO war, a policy consistent with concern 

about the ability of the Warsaw Pact to mobilize quickly. Finally, the option would be consistent with a U.S. strategy of 

emphasizing reinforcement of NATO, as outlined in a recent CBO 

study of 11. S. forces for NATO. 2/ This strategy would, among 

other changes, preposition equipment in Europe for three additional U.S. active divisions, thus allowing these divisions 

to get to Europe more quickly in the event of a war. Some of 

1/ Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, 

Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, 

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (March and April 1977), Part 

4, p. 2436. 

2/ Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Air and Ground Conventional 

Forces for NATO: Overview, Budget Issue Paper (January 

1978), pp. 34-39. 

30 
these active divisions may depend on reserves for part of their 

fighting force or at least for support, and the additional prepositioning would speed up deployment schedules for all other 

units, including reserves. This policy of additional prepos 

tioning of equipment would therefore put more pressure on the 

reserves to be ready early. 

A policy emphasizing a highly ready Army reserve, coupled 

with concern about their current readiness, suggests that defense 

capability could be substantially improved by actions to improve 

their readiness. These might include all of the key readiness 

proposals summarized· in Table 4 and discussed in detail in the 

Appendix. These proposals would involve hiring additional paid 

reservists to reach or at least move toward the Army's peacetime 

strength objective of 660,000 selected reservists. Reaching this 

objective would provide full manpower for all reserve units, 

thereby improving team training and readiness for war. The 

proposals would also feature additional pay and bonuses to attract 

these personnel into the selected reserves. Based on CBa projections, achieving a selected reserve of 660,000 members by 1983 

would not only require the educational assistance and re-enlistment bonus authorized by the Congress for fiscal' year 1978, but 

also an additional cash bonus of about $500 per enlistee. Still 

other proposals to improve readiness would attempt to attract as 

many as 50,000 persons a year into the individual ready reserve in 

order to meet Army requirements for wartime fillers for active and 

reserve units as well as to provide adequate numbers of combat 

replacements. And, based on requirements determined in a recent 

Army study, the proposals would provide reserve units with as many 

as 9,200 additional full-time assistants, either active-duty 

military or civilians. 3/ These added full-time personnel could 

ass t in routine paperwork so that reservists would have more 

time to train; the experience of these assistants could also 

improve the quality of training. Finally, the proposals would 

provide longer summer training periods for selected reserves. 

The costs of these added resources could be substantial. 

As the Appendix shows, by 1983 the various readiness improvements 

could increase costs by $400 million to $ 750 million per year, a 

10 to 20 percent increase over the amount the United States now 

spends on Army reserves. Assuming the proposals are gradually 

3/ Department of the Army, Full Time Personnel Requirements 

of Reserve Components (December 31, 1977), p. C-lO. 

31 
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF READINESS IMPROVEMENTS 

Reserve 

Role 

Highly Ready 

Reserve for All 

Phase s 0 f War 

Higher-Cost 

Case 

Lower-Cost 

Case 

Emphasis on 

Early-Deploying 

Reserves 

Emphasis on 

Reserves for 

Long War 

Fewer Reserves, 

Rep1 ace with 

Actives 

Fewer Reserves 

Selected 

Reserve 

660,000 by 

1983 (vs. 

544,000 

today) 

616,000 

by 1983 

15,000 more 

than today's 

levels to 

man ear1ydeploying 

units fully 

54,000 fewer 

than today 

54,000 fewer 

than today 

Personnel Strengths 

Individual 

Ready 

Reserve 

50,000 more 

recruits per 

year 

25,000 more 

recruits per 

year 

No change 

from current 

policy 

No change 

from current 

policy 

No change 

from current 

policy 

32 

Active 

Duty 

No change 

from current policy 

No change 

from current policy 

No change 

from current policy 

54,000 more 

than today 

No change 

from current policy 

(continued) 
TABLE 4. CONTINUED 

Additional 

Pay/Bonuses 

Educational assistance 

and re-en1istment bonus 

in form authorized by 

the Congress plus 

special $500 bbnus 

to achieve 660,000 

strength 

Educational assistance 

and re-en1istment bonus 

in form authorized by 

the Congress 

Same as higher-cost 

case above but only 

for early-deploying 

units 

None 

None 

None 

None 

Additional 

Full-Time 

Assistance 

9,200 more 

civilians or 

military 

4,500 more 

civilians or 

military 

About 1,200 

more civilians 

or military 

for ear1ydeploying units 

None 

None 

33 

Additional 

Summer 

Training 

Three weeks for 

up to 10 percent of all reservists (vs. 

two weeks today) 

None 

Same as 

higher-cost 

case above 
implemented beginning 1.n fiscal year 1979, total costs over the 

next five years could go up. by $1.3 to $2.4 billion over their 

levels if today's spending were maintained. The range of costs 

would depend on the size of readiness improvement programs that 

were chosen. (All costs are in constant 1978 dollars that assume 

no growth in prices or wages beyond 1978.) 

In addition to increasing costs, these readiness improvement 

proposals would have some other drawbacks. Although the proposals 

would probably increase the chance of the Army reserves' fighting 

effectively in the first month or so of a NATO war, it is less 

likely that these proposals--or any other readiness improvements--

would allow many reserves to assist active forces if a NATO war 

began with very little notice, perhaps only a few days, and ended 

1.n a few weeks. 

More important, this role for the reserves assumes that these 

additional resources would improve the readiness of the reserves 

sufficiently so that some could fight effectively in the first 

month or so of a major war, and all could enter within three 

months. As Chapter II pointed out, however, this is an uncertain 

judgment. It may be desirable to hold down cost increases while 

gaining more information about how ready the Army reserves could 

be. This may suggest a more selective option. 

EMPHASIS ON EARLY-DEPLOYING UNITS 

The Congress could choose to emphasize the capacity of the 

Army reserves to participate in the first month or so of a NATO 

war. In this approach, efforts to improve readiness would be 

concentrated on those units designated as early-deploying rather 

than stressing readiness for the entire Army reserve. 

A1 though this option is not a widely discussed strategy for 

the Army reserves, various aspects of its approach are already 

part of recent policy changes and discussions. The Army has 

recently raised the personnel and equipment authorized to ear1ydeploying units from 80 to 100 percent of wartime requirements, 

thus acknowledging the importance of these high-priority units. 

Also, in Congressional hearings on the fiscal year 1978 defense 

budget, General Henry Mohr, Chief of the Army Reserve, underscored 

the need to emphasize early-deployin~ units by stating that 

recruiting and retention incentives--while important for all 

34 
reserve units--were crit ical for early-deploying units. 4/ This 

year's report of the House Committee on Armed Services pointed to 

emphasis on early-deploying units by suggesting that increases in 

full-time support for the reserves might be funded by "a deactivation of existing units of questionable value for utilization early 

in a mobilization." 5/ 

This option would implement the readiness improvement programs described in the Appendix, but only for those in ear1ydeploying Army reserve units. The exact number in these units 

is classified. As a rough approximation this study assumes that 

numbers of reservists in early-deploying units equal the 54,000 

reservists now in affiliated reserve units. 6/ The readiness 

improvements would add paid reservists to these early-deploying 

units to bring them up to their wartime requirements; this would 

require adding about 15,000 additional enlisted personnel to the 

selected reserves. The ear1y-de,p10ying units would also get 

bonuses to attract these added personnel, increased full-time 

support to free more time for training, increased periods of 

active duty for training, and priority assignment of equipment. 

The option to increase numbers in the nondri11ing, individual 

ready reserves would not be implemented, since the major role 

4/ Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, Hearings 

before the House Committee on Armed Services, 95: 1 (February 

and March 1977), Part 5, p. 641. 

5/ Report to Accompany H.R. 5970, 

zation Bill, Fiscal Year 1978, 

7,1977), p. 87. 

Department of Defense AuthoriH. Rept. 95-194, 95:1 (April 

6/ Units in the affiliation program are currently being reviewed, 

and hence this number may change. Eventually most units 

intended to deploy or assist active forces within two months 

after a decision to deploy may be affiliated. But today 

affiliated units are limited to some of the larger units 

intended to deploy within two months; smaller units have not 

yet been added. Thus as of today the 54,000 reservists in 

the affiliated units do not include all units intended to 

deploy or assist active forces within two months; but they may 

represent an unclassified approximation of those intended to 

deploy early, that is, within the first month or so of a 

war. 

35 
of the individual ready reserves would probably come later in a 

war. Table 4 summarizes these changes. 

This option would offer several significant advantages. It 

would provide resources to the reserve units that would be involved in the earliest fightinli!; and, therefore, would be consistent wi th the current strategic emphasis on the importance of 

withstanding an initial blitzkrieg attack by the Warsaw Pact 

forces. By emphasizing improved readiness for the early-deploying 

units, it would be consistent with decisions discussed above to 

reinforce our NATO allies by speeding up deployment of U.S. 

troops. 

Perhaps the greatest advantage of this option is that it 

would test whether additional resources devoted to the reserves 

would enable them to be effective in the first month or so of a 

NATO war. Previous discussion of uncertainty about improvements 

in reserve readiness support the need for such a test, and that 

need has been acknowledged in Congressional hearings by the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and 

Logistics. 7/ Based on the results of the test, it may be desirable to provide readiness improvements to all Army reserve units, 

thereby moving the Army reserves toward the first role discussed 

above, or to limit the reserves' role to acting as a hedge against 

a long war, which is discussed below. 

Another advantage is that this strategy would hold down cost 

increases. Under the previous option, costs of readiness improvements for the whole Army reserve drove up spending in 1983 by 

between $400 million and $750 million. But if the readiness 

improvements were applied only to those in the early-deploying 

reserve units, costs in 1983 would go up by only about $80 million 

above what is being spent now. 8/ 

7/ Statement of the Honorable John P. White on Military Readiness 

in the Reserve Components during hearings before the House 

Committee on Armed Services (September 29, 1977; processed), 

p. 8. 

~/ This cost increase assumes that 15,000 enlisted selected 

reserves would be added to early-deploying units. Costs for 

these added reserves are based on average factors (see footnote 9). All personnel in these early-deploying units would 

36 
This option has some disadvantages. It would not add resources to the later-deploying reserve units, and so would 

not tend to improve their readiness above current levels. This 

may make it more difficult to achieve the Administration's goal of 

getting all reserve units into a major European war within 90 

day·s. Also, emphasis on the early-deploying units may lead the 

I ater-deploying units to regard themselves as "second-class," 

which could reduce their readiness. This problem could be minimized, however, by allowing individual members to apply to join 

the early-deploying units, a competit ion that should insure the 

early-deploying units the best people as well as promoting individual motivation. 

RESERVES AS A LONG-WAR HEDGE 

Chapter II of this paper suggested that given their current 

readiness, many Army reserves would have difficulty in mobilizing, 

deploying, and effectively assisting active forces in the first 

month or so of a NATO war. It may be that even with large amounts 

of additional money, certain constraints on u.s. reserves would 

make most of them unable to meet war requirements during the early 

stages of a NATO war. This judgment would suggest that the United 

States should rely on Army reserves only in the later stages of a 

war that lasts many months. By then the reserves would have had 

time to overcome readiness problems that eX.isted at mobilization. 

This role for the reserves would suggest a low payoff to the 

readiness improvements outl ined in the Append ix. The readiness 

improvements therefore would not be implemented under this option, 

although it might still be desirable to implement a few improvements for some small reserve units that would continue to have a 

role early in a war. 

be authorized three weeks of summer training (see Appendix for 

costing). Early-deploying units would also receive bonuses, 

educational assistance, and full-time assistance discussed 

above; costs of these are assumed to be proportional to the 

total costs for all reserve units, which are estimated in the 

Appendix. The proportionality factor is the ratio of wartime 

strengths in the affiliated reserve' units to total strengths 

in the entire Army reserve. 

37 
Fewer Reserves 

Given this general orientation, the Congress could take two 

directions. The first would be consistent with a judgment that 

the early phases of a Warsaw Pact attack could be contained by 

today's U.S. active forces and the manpower supplied by our NATO 

allies. The U.S. Army reserves--limited to fighting in the later 

stages of a war that lasts many months--would, according to this 

judgment, have time to acquire their full manpower after mobilization. This option would thus save money by accepting lower 

reserve strengths. To illustrate the effects on costs, this study 

assumes that the size of the Army's selected reserves would be 

reduced below today's levels by about 54,000 reservists, the 

number currently assigned to affiliated reserve units that are 

likely to deploy early. The reductions might be accomplished by 

cutting out some lower-priority reserve units rather than by 

reducing the manpower of all units or eliminating the affiliated units. Such an action would reduce costs in 1983 by about 

$140 mill ion. 9 

Although it would reduce costs, this option would contradict 

the notion that a NATO war would demand large numbers of U. S. 

soldiers early. It would represent a retreat from emphasis on the 

Army reserves under the Total Force Policy. And, as was noted in 

Chapter II, relatively little evidence is available as to how much 

additional resources would improve the reserves I readiness. It 

may therefore be reasonable to postpone a far-reaching action such 

as this until more information is available. 

Fewer Reserves, More Active Forces 

A key conclusion of the discussion of strategic roles in 

Chapter II was that many assessments of NATO strength emphasize 

9/ Costs are based on average factors per selected reservist. 

The factor includes drill pay, schooling, travel, and other 

personnel costs. The factor also includes operating costs; 

these assume that operation and maintenance costs in three 

object classifications--supplies and materials, travel and 

transportation of persons, and purchases from industrial 

funds--are proportional to numbers of selected reservists. 

Costs are in constant 1978 dollars that assume no growth in 

wages or prices beyond 1978. 

38 
the need for assistance early in a war. Thus, if the Congress 

judged that the Army reserves are not likely to be ready to fight 

effectively in the first month or so of a NATO war, it may want 

to replace the early-deploying units with active forces. 

To illustrate the effects on costs, this study assumes that 

the 54,000 selected reservists in early-deploying, affiliated 

units are eliminated from the selected reserve. These reserves 

are assumed to be replaced by an equal number of active troops in 

similar units. (The 54,000 number is for illustration; detailed 

study might suggest a different number and might' suggest that 

units other than those in the affiliation program should be 

involved in the switch.) None of the reserve readiness improvements discussed in Chapter II would be implemented, since the 

remaining Army reserves--limited to a role as a hedge against a 

longer war--would have time to achieve higher readiness after 

mobilization. Nonetheless, this option would increase costs. 

Costs for pay and operations in 1983 would go up by about $800 

mill ion above what is now being spent because the added active 

troops would cost more than the reserves they would replace. 10/ 

These cost increases may be conservative. Added costs of recruiting more active troops are not included. The additional active 

troops would also need equipment. The cost increases assume that 

the active troops would get equipment from the selected reserve 

units that were dropped from the force, but some additional 

equipment might be needed. 

In addition to increasing costs, this option would run 

counter to the momentum of the Total Force Policy, which emphasizes reliance on reserves. The option would be consistent, 

however, with the judgment that currently planned levels of 

effective U.S. troops must be available early in a NATO war. Like 

the first two options in this study, then, this one would follow 

the trend in strategic thinking that emphasizes a Warsaw Pact 

attack that occurs with little warning and great strength and is 

decided early. This option should also be a manpower action that 

is consistent with possible policy changes on the equipment side. 

10/ Costs for increased active forces are based on average 

factors that include pay and allowances, operating costs, and 

recurring procurement (mostly ammunition). Costs for decreases in selected reserves are the same as those used above 

(see footnote 9). All costs are in constant 1978 dollars 

that assume no wage or price growth beyond 1978. 

39 
If the Army prepositions more equipment in Europe, as it may 

propose doing, then it would be important to insure that divisions 

deploying to Europe are fully ready from a personnel standpoint. 

If reserves that are planned for early deployment cannot be fully 

ready, then this option of replacing them with active troops may 

be a sensible policy. 

SUMMARY 

This chapter developed three broad roles for the Army reserves (summarized in Table 5). They differ in their notions 

about the nature and demands of a NATO war and in, their costs. 

Perhaps most important, they differ in their assumptions about how 

ready the Army reserves can be, even if the readiness improvement 

programs are implemented. 

In terms of added defense capability, the relative payoff to 

readiness improvements differs depending on the choice of role. 

The highest payoff would arise if the United States desired a 

highly ready Army reserve for use in all phases of a NATO war. 

The lowest payoff from reserve readiness improvements would be 

for Army reserves intended primarily for use later in a war 

that lasts many months, since in this case they would have'time to 

improve their readiness after mobilization. Emphasis on the Army 

reserves early in a war would be a middle-ground option that also 

offers the advantage of a large-scale test of how much the various 

readiness improvements would increase the ability of the Army 

reserves to fight effectively in the first month or so of a NATO 

war. 

40 
TABLE 5. ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS 

Roles 

1. Highly Ready 

Reserve for 

All Phases 

of War 

2. Emphasis on 

Early-Deploying 

Reserves 

3. Emphasis on 

Reserves for 

Long-Run War 

Fewer Reserves, Replace With 

Active 

Troops 

Fewer Reserves 

Changes to Reserve Resources 

Make numerous changes to 

improve readiness, including 

more reservists, higher pay, 

more full-time support, and 

longer training 

Make changes to improve 

readiness of early-deploying 

units 

No readiness improvements; 

substitute active forces for 

early-deploying reserves 

No readiness improvements; 

reduce size of selected 

reserve by numbers in 

early-deploying units 

Nature orNAt07 

Warsaw Pact War 

Intense war that 

demands heavy U.S. 

presence in first 

few months 

Similar to Role 1 

but emphasis on 

war that ends 

more quickly 

Similar to Role 2 

Similar to Role 2, 

but level of threat 

. suggests U.S. active 

forces plus NATO 

manpower are adequate 

in early stages 

Criteria for Choice 

Can Reserves Be Ready 

to Fight Early? 

Confident that extra 

resources will lead 

to adequate readiness 

Not convinced; desire 

inexpensive test of 

Whether extra resources 

will lead to adequate 

readiness 

Reserves unable to 

fight effectively 

early in war 

Same as above 

Costs 

(1983) 

Up $400 to 

$750 million 

a year 

Up $80 million a year 

Up $800 million a year 

Down $140 

million a 

year 

APPENDIX 

APPENDIX. IMPROVING RESERVE READINESS: THE KEY PROPOSALS AND 

THEIR COSTS 

The increasing interest among strategic planners in using 

Army reserves early in the event of a major conflict in Europe and 

a concern with their readiness has prompted a long list of recommendations on how to improve the readiness of the Army reserves. 

Of course, the desirability of the proposals depends on the role 

of the Army reserves, as well as on how much the proposals would 

increase readiness. These questions have been discussed in 

previous chapters; this Appendix describes the proposals in 

more detail and estimates their costs. 

As earlier sections of the study have pointed out, reserve 

readiness could be improved in many ways. This study concentrates 

on those involving increased resources--such as added reservists 

or more full-time personnel--because these remedies are most under 

the control of the Congress and most important in the budget. 

These proposals are discussed first. A subsequent section of this 

Appendix briefly discusses some other changes that might improve 

the readiness of the reserves. 

THE KEY RESOURCE PROPOSALS 

Additional Personnel 

The earlier discussion of reserve readiness pointed out 

general agreement that personnel problems are key. People 

are needed to man selected reserve units. The Army reserves 

entered fiscal year 1978 some 49,000 persons (or 8 percent) below 

the 593,300 selected reserves they are authorized for fiscal year 

1978. Moreover, the reserves' peacetime objectives call for 

660,000 selected reserves. 1/ This was their authorized strength 

1/ Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, 

Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve, 

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings before the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, 95:1 (March and April 1977), Part 

4, pp. 2836-37. 

45 
1n fiscal year 1972, before they suffered the post-draft decline 

1n recruits. 

Projections discussed in Chapter II showed that under 

current policies selected reserve strengths may stabilize and 

then gradually improve in the next few years. This is likely to 

occur because of decreased losses, as the last of the large 

numbers who joined the reserves during the draft era leave. 

On the other hand, this improvement may not occur in all 

geographical areas nor in all units. Even more important, the 

Army has said that it wants to increase the proportion of reserve 

recruits who do not have prior military experience, which could 

hal t or reverse the improvement in strength. 2/ It'urthermore, los s 

rates remain high among reservists (particularly among those 

without prior military experience), making it difficult to sustain 

a large reserve. About two-thirds of all enlisted men who join 

the Army reserves without prior military experience never complete 

their first six-year obligation, and only about 10 percent of the 

initial entrants complete their first obligation and remain longer 

in the reserves. Some of those leaving before completing their 

initial ob1igation--about 10 percent of all such 10sses--do so to 

enlist in the active forces, which may be desirable. But substantial numbers simply leave. Further research is needed on the 

causes and poss ib1e remedies for early losses from the selected 

reserves. 

Re-en1istment Bonus and Educational Assistance 

For all these reasons, an increase in numbers of selected 

reservists, particularly enough of an increase to get back to the 

service peacetime objectives over the next five years, may require 

extra pay. Last year the Congress authorized educational assistance for new reserve enlistees and a cash bonus for reserve 

re-en1istees. The authorization was limited. It expires at 

the end of fiscal year 1978; and even in fiscal year 1978 

the Congress appropriated funds only for a limited test of the 

re-en1istment bonus. This test is currently being conducted 

by the Department of Defense. Further implementation of the 

proposals may be debated again this year. 

2/ Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, Hearings 

before the House Committee on Armed' Services, 95: 1 (February 

and March 1977), ?art 5, p. 441. 

46 
As authorized for this year, the educational assistance for 

enlistees would consist of up to 50 percent of educational expenses, to a maximum of $500 a year and a maximum of $2,000 for 

anyone enlistee. Educational assistance would be available to 

all high school graduates without prior military experience who 

join a selected reserve unit as an enlisted person for at least 

six years and attend a college or training program. The reenlistment bonus would pay $300 per year of re-enlistment, up 

to a maximum of $1,800. The bonus would be available to all those 

enlisted persons in the selected reserve with less than 10 years 

of total reserve service; candidates must have had no prior 

military experience and must re-enlist or extend their enlistment 

for either three or six additional years. Both these bonuses 

would have recoupment provisions that would allow the government 

to recover all or part of the bonus if the reservist did not 

fulfill his commitment. 

The specific form of these bonuses raises important questions. It is not clear whether educational assistance or a cash 

bonus would be more effective as an enlistment incentive. This 

question is currently being addressed by the Department of Defense 

through surveys and by evaluation of state educational assistance 

programs available to National Guard personnel. Another question 

about the form of the bonus is whether it should be limited to 

high school graduates. Although this might cut down on increases 

in accessions, the restriction may improve the quality of reservists. 

A question also arises as to whom the bonuses should try to 

attract. The Congressionally authorized educational assistance 

for new enlistees would be limited to those without experience on 

active duty. This would be in keeping with the Army reserves' 

desire to increase the fraction of these non-prior-service accessions. More non-prior-service accessions would keep the number 

of junior personnel in reserve units large. This may be desirable to avoid a reserve filled with senior personnel who would be 

accustomed to supervising, with few persons accustomed to more 

junior roles. More non-prior-service accessions would also hold 

down costs--at least pay costs--and maintain promotion opportunities because non-prior-service accessions come in at the junior 

paygrades. Non-prior-service accessions, however, have no 

practical experience and only 38 training days a year during which 

to acquire experience. More non-prior-service accessions thus 

could reduce training proficiency. Also the reserves must pay to 

train non-prior-service accessions, and they may become increasingly expensive to recruit as the pool from which most of 

47 
them come--those at ages 18 to 19--declines in the 1980s. These 

factors suggest a careful evaluation of bonus and pay policies to 

insure that the reserves attract a proper mix of those with and 

without military experience. This review may be part of the 

Reserve Compensation System Study now being conducted by the 

Department of Defense. 

The Congressionally authorized version of the re-enlistment 

bonus is also restricted to those without prior military service. 

This restriction appears to have less merit than the same restriction on educational assistance for new enlistees. Whether or 

not they have prior service, re-enlistees will not be junior 

personnel. This appears to be the major reason why the Army wants 

non-prior-service accessions. And re-enlistees without prior 

active-duty experience may well be less qualified than their 

more experienced, prior-service counterparts. 

Although many questions remain about the form of the assistance and bonuses, this study discusses the form authorized by the 

Congress for fiscal year 1978, since it is clearly defined and may 

well be debated again this year. As authorized, the enlistment 

educational assistance and re-enlistment bonus are likely to 

improve recruiting and retention. Unfortunately, little analysis 

is available as a basis for evaluating how much improvement will 

occur. As a rough guide; CBO has projected the effects of the 

assistance and bonus assuming that a 1 percent increase in 

compensation leads to a 1 percent improvement in continuation 

rates or numbers of enl is tments . This assumption is consistent 

with the limited analysis in this area. 3/ Under this assumption 

the combined effect of the educational- assistance for new enlistees and the re-enlistment bonus would boost the Army reserve 

components to a level of about 616,000 by the end of fiscal year 

1983, assuming the bonuses began in fiscal year 1979. Part of 

this increase in strength would come from the larger number of 

enlistments and re-enlistments that the educational assistance and 

bonus would induce. Strength would also increase because more 

people would stay in the selected reserves to avoid having to 

repay part or all of their added pay under the recoupment provisions of the law. This should improve retention, which was 

cited above as a major problem. The projections assume the 

3/ Empirical response of secondary labor market participation 

to the secondary job wage was estimated by Robert Shishko and 

Bernard Rostker, liThe Economics of Multiple Job Holding," 

American Economic Review (June 1976), pp. 298-308. 

48 
recoupment provisions would be enforced; failure to do so would 

probably reduce the improvement in retention. 

If these projections are correct, the educational assistance 

and re-en1istment bonus would not achieve the peacetime objective 

strength of 660,000 selected reservists. The peacetime objective 

may be real ized by the end of 1983, however, if--in addition to 

the educational assistance to new enlistees and the re-enlistment 

bonuses--a $500 cash enlistment bonus were offered. This special 

bonus would be available to high school graduates without prior 

military experience who joined for at least one year in the 

selected reserve as enlisted men. Like the estimates above, this 

estimate of the additional bonus necessary to reach 660,000 

assumes that a 1 percent increase in pay increases en1 istments 

by 1 percent. Even though it is consistent with the limited 

analysis in this area, this assumption must be regarded as uncertain. 

Expansion of the Individual Ready Reserves 

The Army is not only short of selected reservists; it is also 

short of individual ready reserves (IRR). Currently, these IRR 

personnel usually do not drill or receive pay. In the event 

of a major war, though, they would fill out active and reserve 

units and later would provide combat replacements. The Army 

estimates it will be short more than 250,000 individual ready 

reserves by 1982. 4/ This estimated shortfall depends on numerous 

detailed assumptions, including uncertain estimates of combat 

losses in the early days of a major war. To the extent the 

shortfall is valid, though, it may require additional resources. 

The Army is studying a variety of programs to increase 

the size of the IRR. One of the major ones would recruit high 

school or college students, provide them two six-week training 

periods over two summers, and pay them an annual stipend of 

perhaps $200. 5/ In return, these individuals would agree to 

4/ 

5/ 

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978, 

before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 

ations, 95:1 (March 1977), Part 5, p. 36. 

Hearings 

AppropriDepartment of Defense, Manpower Mobilization Requirements: 

Army Individual Ready Reserve Issues (October 1976), pp. 

4-21 to 4-22.· Studies now being completed may recommend 

bonuses and tax exemptions rather than the $200 stipend. 

49 
stay in the individual ready reserve for a period of six years and 

to undergo one two-week refresher training courSe after three 

years. Meeting the IRR shortfall with these individuals could 

require as many as ,)0,000 IRR recruits a year, dependinl?; on how 

much of the shortfall can be met through other policy changes the 

Army is considering. ~/ 

Could these people, who on average would have had no training 

at all for a year and a half, be effective soldiers? The continuing interest in the program suggests the Army feels they would be 

effective. 

Increase in Full-Time Assistance 

In addition to more people, the reserves may need better 

training. Because of their part-time status, reserves now can 

devote only the equivalent of 38 days a year to training. Much of 

this time may be consumed by administrative and recruiting work, 

which could be done by full-time workers. The reserves may 

also need the technical guidance that can best be supplied 

by full-t ime personnel. The Army reserves already have about 

53,000 personnel who provide them support either full time or 

part time. More may be needed. A study recently completed 

by the Department of the Army found a need for 4,500 to 9,200 

additional full-time technicians. According to the study, the 

increase of 4,500 would be the "minimal" needed increase, -while 

the 9,200 additional full-time technicians would provide "adequate" manpower. ]j 

Longer Training Periods 

Another way to improve reserve readiness would be to increase 

the length of training. Since time spent on active duty for 

training is generally the most productive, it might be reasonable 

to extend this period. In Congressional testimony last year, the 

Army National Guard Rureau agreed that a three-week period of 

6/ Ibid., Chapter 4. 

7 Department of the Army, Full Time Personnel Requirements 

of Reserve Components (December 31, 1977), pp. C-1 to C-10. 

The study found that ontima1 technican manning would require 

18,700 additional technicians, but the study group labeled 

this optimistic. 

50 
active duty would clearly produce a better-trained reservist. 

But because of possible reluctance on the part of reservists 

and their employers (as well as increased costs), the Bureau 

indicated they would put a three-week training period to a test 

in 1978. 8/ 

Procurement of Equipment 

As Chapter II pointed out, the Army reserve components 

are currently short of their authorized equipment. The Administration contends that shortages of all key types of equipment will 

be met by the early 1980s. As also pointed out, though, the Army 

buys equipment for both actives and reserves together and then 

distributes it based on a priority list. Many reserve units are 

at the lower end of this list. Thus changes in policy--such as 

preposit ioning addit iona1 equipment in Europe for high-priority, 

active-duty units--cou1d divert part of the new procurement from 

the Army reserves. This means either the timetable for the 

reserves to "get well" would slip, or additional money would have 

to be added for procurement aimed at reserves. CBO has not 

undertaken the detailed analysis that would be necessary to 

identify the added procurement expenditures (if any) that would be 

necessary, under varying assumptions about the needs of active 

duty forces, to fully supply reserve equipment requirements. 

Therefore, no estimates of added procurement costs are included in 

this study. 

Other Proposals 

Although this menu of proposals to improve readiness by 

adding resources is extensive and includes the key proposals that 

can be foreseen now, even it is not complete. There may be 

far-reaching changes in reserve pay proposed by the Reserve 

Compensation System Study, now under way. Moreover, in last 

year's Congressional testimony, the Army reserve components 

suggested a series of proposals not discussed above--inc1uding tax 

exemptions, extra retirement credits, and additional training. 

The Army estimates these proposals would eventually increase costs 

8/ Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization for Military Procurement, 

Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserves, 

and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings, Part 4, p. 2896. 

51 
$160 million a year for the Army reserves alone. 9/ Of course, 

numerous more minor proposals could also affect reserve readiness. 

Incomplete though it may be, the list discussed above could be 

expensive, as the next section suggests. 

COSTS OF KEY PROPOSALS 

Table A shows estimates of the increases over spending 

planned for fiscal year 1978 that would be necessary to pay for 

the key readiness proposals discussed above. All estimates are in 

constant 1978 dollars that assume no price or wage growth beyond 

fiscal year 1978. Increases are limited to the Army reserve 

components and would be higher if the proposals were applied to 

reserve components in the other services. 

Since the size of many of these programs has not been determined, Table A first estimates costs under a higher-cost case, 

assuming programs are fully implemented, and then under a lowercost case, assuming a more modest implementation. 

Higher-Cost Case 

The higher-cost case assumes that the Army reserve components 

would attempt to meet their peacetime objective of 660,000 selected reservists by 1983. In order to do this, the re-en1istment 

bonus and the educational assistance for new enlistees would be 

offered in the form authorized by the Congress for fiscal year 

1978. In addition, a special $500 cash enlistment bonus, discussed above, would be offered. As noted earlier, the effects of 

extra pay are uncertain, but the best estimate in this study is 

that the extra bonuses and educational assistance would move close 

to a strength of 660,000 selected reservists by 1983. 

The bonuses and educational assistance would also move 

in other directions the Army has said are desirable. With them, 

about 58 percent of all accessions in 1983 would have prior 

military service, versus 65 percent in 1977. For reasons discussed above, the Army-reserves desire to move toward fewer 

9/ Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense 

Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978, 

Hearings, Part 5, pp. 1004-8. 

52 
recruits with prior military service. 10/ Also, since the enlistment bonuses would be limited to high school graduates, the 

fraction of non-prior-service accessions who are high school 

graduates would go up from 46 percent in 1977 to about 62 percent 

in 1983. This should improve the quality of the reserve force and 

may improve retention, since high school graduates--at least those 

in the active force--tend to stay in longer. 

In addition to at tempting to meet the peacetime strength 

objectives for the selected reserves, this higher-cost case would 

bring enough recruits into the individual ready reserve by 1983 

to meet the Army's estimate of a shortfall in excess of 250,000. 

This would involve recruiting some 50,000 persons a year. The 

higher-cost case would also provide the 9,200 additional full-time 

technicians called for in a recent study by the Department of the 

Army. This number would bring technicians up to the level deemed 

adequate by the study group. 11/ In addition, the higher-cost 

case would provide a three-week summer camp for 69,000 selected 

reservists, which could be used to provide extra active-duty 

training for all personnel--officers and enlisted--required in 

wartime by the high-priority, affiliated units. 

As Table A shows, by 1983 this higher-cost case would increase annual expenditures on the reserves by about $760 million. 

This would represent a 20 percent increase in money spent on the 

Army reserve components. In 1979 costs would increase by $215 

million, and the total increase over the next five years would 

equal $2.4 billion. Cost increases assume that the bonuses are 

fully implemented at the beginning of fiscal year 1979, which 

results in immediate increases in reserve strengths and hence 

their costs. In particular, the re-enlistment bonus shows a 

large first-year cost as all those with six to ten years of 

reserve service take advantage of the bonus. Beyond 1979 the 

bonus would primarily be of interest to those reaching six years 

of service. Although costs for bonuses, pay, training, and 

operating expenses show a first-year jump that is larger than 

subsequent increases, the other changes--increases in recruits 

into the individual ready reserve, more technicians, three-week 

summer camp--are phased in over five years in equal increments. 

10/ Ibid., p. 441. 

11/ 

Department of the Army, Full Time Personnel Requirements, 

p. C-2. 

53 
TABLE A. ADDITIONAL COST OF IMPROVING ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS: 

SELECTRD FISCAL YEARS, MILLIONS OF CONSTANT 1978 DOLLARS !!:./ 

1979 1983 

Total 

1979-83 

Higher-Cost Case 

660,000 Selected Reserves 

Pay, training, operating b/ 95 275 955 

Bonuses and Other Pay 

Re-enlistment bonus c/ 30 5 60 

Enlistment educational assistance d/ 20 55 210 

Enlistment bonus ($500 Cash) 20 20 95 

50,000 Annual IRR Recruits ~/ 30 245 660 

9,200 Additional Full-Time 

Technicians f/ 15 145 395 

Three-Week Summer Camp for 69,000 ~/ 5 15 40 

a/ 

b/ 

c/ 

d/ 

Total 215 760 2,415 

- - - - - - - - - - - - -'- - - - - - - (Continued) 

Costs assume no wage or price growth beyond fiscal year 1978. 

Costs include added pay for drills, active duty for training, other 

schooling, travel, and other expenses for additional selected reservists plus training costs for additional accessions. Costs are 

based on a detailed model rather than on average factors per reservist. Costs also include an estimate of increases in operating and 

maintenance costs; these assume that operating and maintenance costs 

in three object classifications--suppl ies and material s, travel and 

transportation of persons, and purchases from industrial funds--are 

proportional to average numbers of selected reservists. 

Cos ts as sume that re-enlistee s choose to re-enl ist for three years. 

Costs are net of savings from recoupment. 

Costs assume that all accessions with high school degrees take advantage of the full $500 worth of benefits for four years. Costs 

are net of savings from recoupment. 
TABLE A. (Continued) 

Total 

1979 1983 1979-83 

Lower-Cost Case 

616,000 Selected Reserves 

Pay, training, operating 50 175 595 

Bonuses and Other Pay 

Re-en1istment bonus 30 5 60 

Enlistment educational assistance 15 40 150 

25,000 Annual IRR Recruits 15 125 330 

4,500 Additional Full-Time 

Technicians 10 70 195 

Total 120 415 1,330 

e/ These costs include costs of advertising, recruiting, and entrance 

(AFEES) processing for additional recruits; these estimates are based 

on costs for average recruits into the active Army. Costs also 

include expenses for travel and initial clothing based on average 

rates in the Army reserve components, plus $200 a year per IRR 

recruit. Costs include average costs of training based on average 

factors for recruit training in all services; factors are based on 

data in the Department of Defense report on training for fiscal year 

1978. These costs may be high if selected reserves can assist in IRR 

training. On the other hand, costs ignore any start-up expenses 

associated with opening new training bases. 

f/ These costs assume that the additional technicians have the same 

average cost as the civilian technicians now in the two Army reserve 

components. 

~/ Costs are based on average cost per day of active duty for training. 
The estimates of cost increases include changes in reserve 

pay, training, travel, and other expenses. Cost increases also 

include increases in operating costs. The notes to Table A 

describe the costing methodology more fully. 

Lower-Cost Case 

The lower-cost case in Table A assumes that beginning in 

1979 the reserves would be granted the educational assistance and 

re-enlistment bonuses authorized in 1978 by the Congress, but 

the special $500 cash enl istment bonus discussed above would not 

be offered. Estimates by CBO suggest this would lead to a selected reserve strength of about 616,000 by the end of 1983. This 

would be above the currently authorized average strength (593,300) 

but lower than the peacetime objective strength (660,000). The 

lower-cost case also assumes that only 25,000 recruits are brought 

in each year into the individual ready reserve--the rest of 

any shortfall being met through other policy changes. And only 

4,500 additional full-time technicians are authorized. This would 

bring the total of full-time technicians to the "minimal" acceptable level as determined by a recent Army study. 11/ 

Under the lower-cost case, reserve costs would increase by 

$415 million in 1983. In 1979 costs would go up by $120 million, 

with increases over the next five years totaling $1.3 billion. 

The costs in Table A do not reflect some interactions that 

could influence total costs. For example, annual recruiting 

of 25,000 to 50,000 high school and college students into the 

individual ready reserves (IRR) could interfere with recruiting 

for the active forces or the selected reserves by competing for 

the same recruits. This inteference would be minimal, the Services hope, because most of the students interested in summer-only 

training would not normally join the active Army or the selected 

reserves. To the extent that interference occurs, though, 

costs of recruiting for the selected reserve and active forces 

could go up. On the favorable side of the interactions, some of 

the IRR recruits--once they are finished with their initial, 

full-time training--may join the selected reserves. Although this 

would necessitate more recruits to build up the IRR, it would beef 

up the selected reserve strengths and reduce the need for bonuses. 

12/ Ibid. 

56 
AVOIDING COST INCREASES: NATIONAL SERVICE AND THE DRAFT 

Although they have not been discussed in detail in this 

study, certain alternatives could avoid some of the cost increases 

in Table A while still attracting more reserve personnel. One of 

these would be a draft, perhaps one limited to the reserves. A 

reserve-only draft would pose major problems. It would be highly 

selective. In 1976 all the reserve components took only about 

75,000 recruits without prior military service. Under a reserveonly draft, fewer than 75,000 persons (some would still volunteer) 

would be drafted, probably out of a pool of about 4 million men 

and women who reach age 18 each year. Reserve duty might restrict 

the draftee's ability to move in order to find work or go to 

school, even though the reserves are only a part-time job. For 

these and other reasons, the Department of Defense has indicated 

that it wants to try proposals such as those discussed above 

before considering a reserve draft. 

Another a1 ternative to current policy would implement some 

form of national service that consolidates domestic youth and 

military accession and training programs. While national service 

might be too costly to justify solely on the grounds of defense 

manpower needs, national service could assist the selected 

or individual ready reserves if implemented to solve broader 

social and economic problems. For example, linking domestic 

national service benefits such as training and education grants 

with a requirement for military service could significantly 

assist the reserves in reducing their manpower shortages. 

OTHER PROPOSALS 

As this study has noted, reserve readiness has many aspects. 

This readiness may well be affected by changes other than increases in resources. This section briefly discusses some 

examples of these changes. 

A key to reserve readiness is the relationship between the 

active Army and the reserves. The reserves need the technical 

support and facilities that cooperation can make available. The 

Army has taken important steps toward improving this support 

through the affiliation program. Any further improvements would 

no doubt improve reserve readiness. 

Reserve morale is certainly another key to readiness. Morale may be influenced by changes in some of the resources dis57 
cussed above. For example, improvements in equipment and additional full-time assistance may improve the amount and quality 

of training, both likely influences on reserve morale. Morale, 

however, is certainly also influenced by intangibles not directly 

affected by additional resources--for example, the quality of 

reserve leadership, the attitude of youth toward the military, and 

the cooperation accorded the reserves by employers. 

Improvements in organization could also enhance reserve 

readiness. For example, the Army might be asked to consider 

breaking some large reserve units into units of company size or 

less. It is generally agreed that reserves training 38 days a 

year are more able to maintain skills and integration required of 

a company than they are able to achieve the integration and 

command and control necessary for a larger unit. The switch to 

company-size units would, however, mark a major change in reserve 

pol icy, which now features substantial numbers of larger combat 

units, especially in the National Guard. It would also have to be 

done with care. Active units could absorb some additional compan~es during a mobilization, but too many would disrupt their 

command and control. And some higher-level units may be necessary 

to coordinate peacetime activities and provide reserve officers 

with command opportunities. Nonetheless, to the extent it is 

feasible, the change might substantially increase the probability 

that reserve units--particularly early-deploying units--would be 

able to meet their deployment goals. 

Another way to improve the readiness of early-deploying 

units would be to designate as early-deploying more units that are 

located near active Army bases. This would allow the units to use 

the facilities of the active base as well as increasing their 

chances of benefiting from the technical guidance of active 

personnel stationed at the base. The Congress might also consider authorizing a "variable drilling" concept for these earlydeploying units. This would allow the President to increase the 

number of drills required of the units during periods of high 

international tension, without actually calling up the units. 

This should increase the readiness of the units at the very times 

when they are likely to be called up, though the extra drills must 

be limited in number and duration to avoid retention problems 

caused by attempts to increase drills in the 1960s. 

These ways to improve reserve readiness apart from increases 

in resources are just examples. The process of creating a ready 

reserve must address both addit ional resources and these other 

policy changes. 

58 

o