SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

AUDIT REPORT

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 (ASSIGNMENT NO. A-11-009-00)

OFFICE OF AUDITS

NASA’S CHALLENGES TO MEETING

COST, SCHEDULE, AND PERFORMANCE GOALS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

 

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Over its 50-year history, NASA has been at the forefront of science and space exploration 

and is justifiably proud of its numerous scientific discoveries and technological 

innovations. However, many NASA projects cost significantly more to complete and 

take much longer to launch than originally promised. In this era of constrained Federal 

budgets, NASA’s ability to deliver projects on time and within budget is more important 

than ever if the Agency is to maintain a robust portfolio of science and space projects. 

This report examines NASA’s project management practices to better understand the 

Agency’s challenges to achieving its cost, schedule, and performance goals. In 

conducting this review, we interviewed 85 individuals, including the Administrator, 

Deputy Administrator, Associate Administrators, Center Directors, project managers, 

project staff, former NASA Administrators and staff, and external parties. We also 

solicited input from other NASA employees through an internal Agency blog. The 

findings we present in this report are primarily based on our analysis of the input we 

received and additional information from previous studies conducted by NASA, our 

office, the Government Accountability Office, and other organizations. 

Although we make no formal recommendations in this report, we offer our analysis of 

each of four major challenges and, in some cases, note actions the Agency may wish to 

consider to help improve project management. 

Each of the challenges identified in this report would benefit from a more comprehensive 

review. Accordingly, we plan to conduct future audit work in these areas to more closely 

examine them and offer recommendations for management action. 

Final report released by:

Paul K. Martin

Inspector General
REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Acronyms 

EVM Earned Value Management

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office 

GPM Global Precipitation Measurement

GRAIL Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory 

ISS International Space Station

JCL Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

JWST James Webb Space Telescope

KDP Key Decision Point 

LDCM Landsat Data Continuity Mission

MER Mars Exploration Rover 

MSL Mars Science Laboratory

NPD NASA Policy Directive

NPR NASA Procedural Requirements

OIG Office of Inspector General

PDR Preliminary Design Review
SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

OVERVIEW

NASA’S CHALLENGES TO MEETING COST, SCHEDULE, AND 

PERFORMANCE GOALS

The Issue

NASA is an Agency with a unique mission that requires leadership, innovation, and 

creativity to achieve one-of-a-kind, first-of-their-kind technological and scientific 

advances. Over its 50-year history, NASA has been at the forefront of science and space 

exploration and responsible for numerous scientific discoveries and technological 

innovations. For example, since its launch in 1990 the Hubble Space Telescope has 

helped scientists determine the age of the universe, identify quasars, and prove the 

existence of dark energy. Hubble’s successor, the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 

currently scheduled to launch in 2018, will study the birth and evolution of galaxies while 

the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), which successfully landed its Curiosity rover on 

August 6, 2012, will assess whether the Red Planet is or has ever been able to support life 

(see Figure 1). 

Unfortunately, in addition to their scientific accomplishments, these and many other 

NASA projects share another less positive trait – they cost significantly more to complete 

and took longer to launch than originally promised. For example, in 1977 NASA 

estimated that it would complete development of Hubble in 1983 at a total cost of 

$200 million; however, the telescope was not completed until 2 years later at a cost of 

approximately $1.2 billion. More recently, MSL launched 2 years behind schedule with 

Figure 1. Curiosity as it descends to the surface of Mars (left) and composite photo of Curiosity 

looking out over the Martian surface (right).

Source: NASA 
OVERVIEW

ii REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

development costs that increased 83 percent, from $969 million to $1.77 billion. 

Similarly, in 2009 NASA estimated JWST would cost $2.6 billion to develop and launch 

in 2014; however, it is now projected to cost $6.2 billion to develop and launch in 2018. 

Cost increases and schedule delays on NASA’s projects are long-standing issues for the 

Agency. A 2004 Congressional Budget Office study compared the initial and revised 

budgets of 72 NASA projects between 1977 and 2000.1 The initial budgets for 

these projects totaled $41.1 billion, while their revised budgets totaled $66.3 billion, a 61 

percent increase. Moreover, since its first annual assessment of NASA projects in 2009, 

the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has consistently reported on cost growth 

and schedule delays in the Agency’s major projects. For example, in its 2012 assessment 

GAO reported an average development cost growth of approximately 47 percent, or 

$315 million, much of which was attributable to JWST. As GAO noted, cost and 

schedule increases on large projects like JWST can have a cascading effect on NASA’s 

entire portfolio. 

As the President and the Congress work to reduce Federal spending and lower the 

Nation’s budget deficit, NASA’s ability to deliver projects on time and within budget is 

more important than ever. Like most Federal agencies, NASA faces constrained budgets 

for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Agency has received a diminishing proportion 

of the Federal budget – currently about 0.5 percent of the budget compared to a high of 

4.4 percent in 1966 – and its annual funding adjusted for inflation is less than it was in

1994. 

In addition to the challenging fiscal environment, NASA is at a historic crossroad with 

respect to the direction of its major programs. With the Space Shuttle Program ending 

after a 39-year history (Figure 2) and as a new and somewhat undefined path toward 

human space exploration commences, the Agency is undergoing considerable changes in 

mission focus. Despite the Agency’s substantial achievements over the past 50 years, the 

ability to manage science and space exploration projects that meet their intended cost, 

schedule, and performance goals remains elusive. Collectively, these factors both 

necessitate and provide an opportunity for the Agency to reset itself and take positive 

steps toward improving program and project management. 

 

1 “A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration,” September 2004. Available at 

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5772/09-02-nasa.pdf (accessed 

August 24, 2012).
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 iii

Figure 2. The Space Shuttle era ended on July 21, 2011, when Atlantis landed in the early 

morning hours at Kennedy Space Center in Florida.

Source: NASA 

We initiated this review to gain a better understanding of the major challenges NASA 

project managers face in carrying out their duties. The core of our fact-finding consisted 

of interviews of 85 individuals from both inside and outside of the Agency, including the 

current and former Administrators, Associate Administrators, Center Directors, and 

project managers and staff. In addition, we solicited input from the greater NASA 

population via a blog.2 The findings we present in this report are derived primarily from 

our analysis of the information we received from these sources, as well as additional 

information we gathered from reports and studies previously completed by NASA, our 

office, GAO, and other organizations. We anticipate conducting additional work in the 

future that more closely examines the challenges we identified and offers specific 

recommendations for management action. Details of our scope and methodology can be 

found in Appendix A. 

 

2 The Office of Inspector General blog was available on the NASA website from September 15, 2011, 

through October 20, 2011.
OVERVIEW

iv REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Results

Multiple factors underlie NASA’s historical inability to consistently meet project cost, 

schedule, and performance goals. However, based on our interviews with 85 individuals 

involved in all levels of project development, we identified four factors that appear to 

present the greatest challenges to successful project outcomes. 

First, a culture of optimism permeates every aspect of NASA. While essential to

producing the types of unique spaceflight projects NASA undertakes, this optimistic 

culture may also lead managers to overestimate their ability to overcome the risks 

inherent in delivering such projects within available funding constraints. This, in turn, 

can lead to the development of unrealistic cost and schedule estimates. Second, project 

managers indicated that the technological complexity inherent in most NASA projects 

makes it particularly challenging to meet cost and schedule goals. Third, project 

managers stated that they routinely struggle to execute projects in the face of unstable 

funding, both in terms of the total amount of funds dedicated to a project and the timing 

of when those funds are disbursed to the project. Both forms of funding instability can 

result in inefficient management practices that contribute to poor cost, schedule, and 

performance outcomes. Finally, interviewees expressed the belief that hands-on 

experience is the most important factor in the development of a project manager but 

noted a decrease in the number of smaller projects on which aspiring managers can gain 

this experience. They also expressed concern about a declining number of Agency 

personnel with development experience and whether NASA can continue to attract

technical talent. 

These challenges represent real and continuing threats to NASA’s ability to complete 

projects on time and within budget. Although NASA has taken some positive steps to 

improve project outcomes, enhanced effort and strong leadership will be required to 

accomplish meaningful change. In our judgment, clear and consistent leadership by the

President, Congress, and NASA management is an essential first step toward ensuring 

project managers are well positioned to complete projects within cost, schedule, and 

performance estimates. NASA leaders must temper the Agency’s culture of optimism by 

demanding realistic cost and schedule estimates, well-defined and stable requirements, 

and mature technologies early in development. They must also ensure that funding is 

phased appropriately, funding instability is identified as a risk, and project managers are 

appropriately rewarded and held accountable for meeting project cost and schedule goals. 

We discuss each of the four main challenges below in more detail.

NASA’s Culture of Optimism. It was clear from our interviews that a culture of 

optimism and a can-do spirit permeate all levels of NASA, from senior management to 

front-line engineers. According to project managers, this culture is essential to 

overcoming the extraordinary technological challenges inherent in the development of 

unique, first-of-their-kind space systems. However, this same optimism can sometimes 

prevent managers and leaders from making critical assessments of requirements, budgets, 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 v 

and schedules to determine what a project can realistically accomplish within a set budget 

and timetable. To this point, when asked whether their projects had been successful, 

every project manager we interviewed answered in the affirmative, regardless of the 

project’s fidelity to cost and schedule goals.

From our discussions with senior NASA officials and project managers, we identified 

three related ways in which optimism contributes to cost and schedule challenges. First, 

the mindset has manifested itself in a lack of documented success criteria for cost and 

schedule performance in NASA projects. We reviewed plans for seven NASA projects 

and found that while success criteria for each were clearly defined in terms of technical

requirements, none contained any success measures related to cost and schedule 

performance.

Second, NASA’s culture of optimism appears to increase the difficulty of developing and 

maintaining realistic cost estimates. Many interviewees indicated that project managers

and senior NASA leaders are often hesitant to admit they cannot overcome technological 

challenges or meet mission requirements within the funding profile provided. 

For example, NASA initiated the MSL mission soon after the successful development 

and landing of the Mars Exploration Rovers (MERs) (see Figure 3).

3

 Senior managers 

from those projects transitioned into the MSL Project and managed the new project in 

accordance with the “MER culture” 

of success. Program officials told us 

that this attitude contributed to senior 

managers accepting overly optimistic 

cost and schedule estimates generated 

by MSL Project personnel and 

placing less credence on independent 

assessments suggesting the Project 

would need additional funds and 

more time to overcome technical 

challenges. Ultimately, the MSL 

Project missed its first launch window 

in 2009 and experienced a 2-year 

launch delay, which significantly 

contributed to a life-cycle cost 

increase of $900 million.

4

 

3 The Mars Exploration Rovers – Spirit and Opportunity – were launched in June and July 2003, 

respectively, and landed on Mars in January 2004.

4 Due to planetary alignment, the optimal launch window for a mission to Mars occurs every 26 months. 

MSL was scheduled to launch in a window between September and October 2009. However, in February 

2009, because of the late delivery of several critical components and instruments, NASA delayed the 

launch to November 2011.

Figure 3. Artist concept of a Mars Exploration 

Rover on Mars.

Source: NASA 
OVERVIEW

vi REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Finally, many project managers we spoke with mentioned the “Hubble Psychology” – 

an expectation among NASA personnel that projects that fail to meet cost and schedule 

goals will receive additional funding and that subsequent scientific and technological 

success will overshadow any budgetary and schedule problems.5 They pointed out that 

although Hubble greatly exceeded its original budget, launched years after promised, and 

suffered a significant technological problem that required costly repair missions, the 

telescope is now generally viewed as a national treasure and its initial cost and 

performance issues have largely been forgotten. 

An optimistic organizational culture is essential to producing the highly complex and 

unique missions for which NASA is known. However, if not properly tempered this 

culture can lead managers to underestimate the amount of time and money it will take to 

overcome the significant technical challenges inherent in many NASA projects. 

Nurturing the optimism needed to successfully produce an MSL or JWST while guarding 

against overly optimistic cost and schedule estimates is an ongoing challenge for NASA 

that will require Agency leaders to review project requirements, budgets, and schedules 

with a critical eye and find ways to reward project managers who demonstrate successful 

stewardship of NASA’s limited resources.

Underestimating Technical Complexity Increases Cost and Schedule Risk. Project 

managers cited the technical complexity inherent in most NASA projects as a major 

challenge to achieving cost and schedule goals. Five factors explain the inherently 

uncertain nature of estimating costs for the types of space technologies NASA develops. 

First, because NASA projects often involve technologies that are new and unique, many 

development efforts do not have readily available historical data, cost models, lessons 

learned, and other information project managers can use to estimate the effort needed to 

develop the required technologies. Second, NASA projects often involve combining 

several interdependent technologies to accomplish novel missions, and the resulting 

complexities are often difficult to predict. Third, NASA systems generally require more 

testing than other development efforts because, unlike land-based systems, they function 

remotely in space where repair or replacement is extremely difficult or impossible. 

Fourth, because space systems are often one-of-a-kind instruments, NASA cannot 

produce them in sufficient quantities to benefit from manufacturing economies of scale 

where the average cost of a product decreases as quantity increases.

6

 Lastly, according to 

many of the interviewees, the quality and availability of parts and instruments procured 

from some contractors has decreased over time. This affects managers’ ability to 

estimate project costs accurately because a part’s poor quality may not be evident until 

testing has begun, resulting in the need for costly rework or identifying alternative 

suppliers late in development. 

 

5 While not attributable to a particular individual, the term “Hubble Psychology” is well known and used 

extensively throughout NASA.

6 Economies of scale are factors that cause the average cost of producing something to decrease as the 

quantity increase, as each additional unit takes on a share of the startup costs. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 vii

We acknowledge that space development projects are technically complex and their 

development costs difficult to assess accurately at the implementation stage of a project’s 

life cycle when managers are required to produce cost and schedule estimates against 

which their projects will be measured.

7

 Nonetheless, in our judgment NASA can take 

steps to increase the likelihood that its projects will meet cost and schedule goals. 

Specifically, few projects should proceed to implementation unless requirements are 

well-defined and stable and the available resources – mature technologies, schedule, and 

funding – are set.

8

 In addition, critical technologies should be matured to the point where 

a prototype that closely approximates form, fit, and function requirements is 

demonstrated in a relevant environment. Finally, adequate funding should be available to 

meet the project’s requirements and account for its technical risks. 

Funding Instability Can Lead to Inefficient Management Practices. Nearly

75 percent of the individuals we interviewed stated that funding instability was among 

the most significant challenges to project management.9 Funding instability includes 

situations in which a project receives less money than planned or funds are disbursed on a 

schedule different than planned. 

Funding instability can result in inefficient management practices that contribute to poor 

cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. For example, inadequate funding in the early 

phases of a project’s life cycle decreases management’s ability to identify and address 

key risks at project inception. Moreover, in the absence of sufficient funding, project 

managers may have to defer the development of critical technologies to a time when 

integration of those technologies may be more difficult or when the costs of material and 

labor may be greater. In some cases, shifting tasks to later project phases may require 

managers to sustain a workforce longer than originally planned or add shifts in an attempt 

to make up for lost time, both of which can lead to increased costs. For example, an 

independent review of the JWST Project noted that deferred work can potentially result 

in overall costs doubling or tripling due to its impact on other work.10 

 

7 NASA divides the life cycle of its spaceflight projects into two major phases – formulation and 

implementation. Formulation is the period in which Agency personnel, among other tasks, identify how a 

project supports the Agency’s strategic needs, goals, and objectives; assess feasibility, technology, 

concepts, and risk; build teams; develop operations concepts and acquisition strategies; establish high- level requirements and success criteria. The implementation phase is the period in which personnel 

execute approved plans for the development and operation of the project and use control systems to 

ensure conformance to those plans and continued alignment with the Agency’s strategic needs, goals, and 

objectives.

8 GAO’s studies of best practice organizations show the risks inherent in NASA’s work can be mitigated by 

developing a solid, executable business case before committing resources to a new product development. 

This is evidence that (1) the customer’s needs are valid and can best be met with the chosen concept, and 

(2) the chosen concept can be developed and produced within existing resources – that is, proven 

technologies, design knowledge, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product when 

needed. See GAO, “NASA: Assessments of Large-Scale Projects,” (GAO-10-227SP, February 1, 2010).

9 In addition, 75 blog comments cited funding instability as a challenge to project management.

10 JWST Independent Comprehensive Review Panel Final Report, October 29, 2010.
OVERVIEW

viii REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Interviewees noted that funding instability originates primarily from two sources: 

external decisions made by the President and Congress and internal decisions made by

Agency personnel. According to interviewees, shifting space policy priorities from the 

President and Congress and the vagaries of the annual appropriations process are major 

challenges to project management. For example, NASA transitioned from the Space 

Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program to the new Space Launch System Program

in just 6 years. Moreover, since 1959 NASA has received its annual appropriation at the 

start of the new fiscal year only seven times, resulting in weeks- or months-long 

continuing resolutions that generally set funding at the prior year’s level. Although it is 

difficult to quantify the cost and schedule impacts to individual projects, many 

interviewees said starting the fiscal year without an approved budget can force project 

managers to delay work, limits the Agency’s ability to make necessary program changes, 

and prevents the Agency from beginning new projects. 

While external factors may contribute to funding instability, internal Agency decisions 

also play a significant role. For example, if the Agency withholds or delays funding from 

a project, managers must adapt to a more restrictive funding profile and re-plan work. 

This often means moving tasks such as maturing critical technologies and reducing other 

risks into the future, which can lead to cost and schedule increases. 

Moreover, interviewees stated that when highly visible flagship missions such as the 

Constellation Program or JWST experience significant cost growth, NASA leadership 

often takes funds from the budgets of other program areas to cover those increased costs. 

This not only makes it difficult for the managers of the projects that lose funds, but also 

has a ripple effect that increases the difficulty of managing the Agency’s overall 

portfolio. 

Funding instability has been a long-standing feature of the Federal budget and Agency 

processes, and given the current fiscal environment is likely to become even more 

common in the future. We believe that NASA management should increase its efforts to 

determine the extent to which funding instability impacts NASA projects and clarify the 

cause and effect relationship between funding instability and project cost increases, 

schedule delays, and performance problems. Addressing these issues could better 

facilitate the development of effective risk mitigation plans for managing fiscal 

disruptions. 

Limited Opportunities for Project Managers’ Development. Interviewees identified a

number of emerging issues that could affect NASA’s ability to manage its projects 

effectively in the future. First, most project managers and senior officials we spoke with 

said that experience and on-the-job training were keys to a project manager’s ability to 

manage cost, schedule, and performance goals. However, they expressed concern that as 

the number of large flagship missions has increased, NASA no longer has enough small 

missions to provide a training ground for new project managers. Project managers 

described NASA’s small projects as invaluable for developing management skills and 

learning the key elements of project management, including understanding and managing 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 ix

cost, schedule, and performance elements and making appropriate trade-offs among these 

elements when necessary.

Interviewees also expressed concern about a lack of in-house development experience. 

Some expressed the view that as NASA has increasingly relied on contractors to support 

project development, the Agency’s in-house capabilities have declined. Moreover, they 

expressed concern that because NASA contracts the majority of its hardware and 

software development efforts to private industry, NASA engineers spend most of their 

time overseeing contractor efforts rather than building spaceflight components. These 

interviewees believe that as a result NASA engineers have limited opportunities to gain 

practical “hands-on” experience.

Finally, some interviewees fear that NASA will not be able to attract and retain recent 

graduates or experienced engineers who are seeking opportunities to design and build 

hardware and software and integrate systems. The concern is that these individuals will 

instead choose positions in private industry and that as experienced engineers retire, 

NASA will lose these core competencies. 

To overcome the challenges identified in this report, it is critical that NASA continue to 

attract and retain high-quality project managers, adequately train and nurture these 

individuals, and provide them with ample opportunities to hone their skills.

Conclusion 

Over its more than 50-year existence, NASA has made significant achievements 

exploring space, helping understand Earth’s environment, and conducting fundamental 

aeronautics research. However, consistently managing the Agency’s science and space 

exploration projects to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals has remained elusive. 

Given the anticipated funding challenges for all Federal agencies in the years ahead, 

changes to the way NASA develops and manages its projects are imperative. At the same 

time, the Agency is undergoing considerable changes in mission focus, with the end of 

the Space Shuttle Program and the first steps on a new path toward human space 

exploration. Collectively, these factors both necessitate and provide an opportunity for 

the Agency to reset itself and take steps toward meaningful change in the way projects 

are developed and managed. 

To its credit, NASA has taken several steps in the last few years aimed at curbing cost 

growth and schedule delays, and the Agency has pointed to some early indications of 

improved cost and schedule performance for recent projects like the Gravity Recovery 

and Interior Laboratory, Juno, and Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution missions.11 

 

11 The Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory mission launched on September 10, 2011, to study the 

Moon’s interior. Juno launched on August 5, 2011, to investigate the origin and evolution of Jupiter and 

is scheduled to arrive at the planet in July 2016. The Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution mission is 

scheduled to launch in late 2013 to investigate the Martian atmosphere. 
OVERVIEW

x REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Nevertheless, in our judgment NASA needs a “unity of effort” – strong, consistent, and 

sustained leadership by the President, Congress, and NASA management – to meet the 

challenges outlined in this report and achieve more consistent fidelity to cost and 

performance goals. Articulating a clear, unified, and sustaining vision for the Agency 

and then providing the necessary resources to execute that vision is a critical cornerstone 

of success. For their part, NASA leaders must temper the Agency’s culture of optimism 

by requiring realistic cost and schedule estimates, well-defined and stable requirements, 

and mature technologies early in project development. In addition, to the extent possible 

they must ensure that funding is adequate and properly phased and that funding 

instability is identified as a risk and accounted for in risk mitigation strategies. Finally, 

they must be willing to take remedial action when these critical elements are not present. 

Although technological innovation and mission success as defined by scientific 

advancement and discovery are central to NASA’s core existence, an appropriate balance 

must be struck that also recognizes the importance of meeting project cost and schedule 

goals. Accordingly, we believe that NASA needs to find ways to reward managers for 

good stewardship of NASA’s resources as enthusiastically as it does for successful 

technological achievements and to hold managers appropriately accountable for 

mismanagement of resources. With renewed focus on and appropriate recognition of 

technical, cost, and schedule risks and rewards, NASA project managers will be better 

positioned to meet the performance goals expected by Congress and the U.S. taxpayer. 

Management’s Response 

In response to a draft of this report, NASA generally concurred with the challenges we 

outlined and stated that the Agency has implemented a number of performance 

improvement actions. Specifically, the Chief Engineer pointed to an increased 

management focus during the formulation phase, the application of joint confidence 

levels, and a refined life-cycle review process to guard against making commitments 

based on overly optimistic plans. He also stated that NASA now uses Formulation 

Agreements to document agreed-upon expectations between project managers and the 

Agency. 

The Chief Engineer acknowledged that internal and external funding instability impacts 

project management and stated that NASA has implemented a number of reviews and 

agreements to establish expectations with project managers to facilitate open discussion 

and early identification of impacts resulting from changes in funding due to internal 

factors. However, he stated that external changes to funding profiles are more difficult to 

control and the Agency advises project managers to account for continuing resolutions 

and notify stakeholders when external funding decisions are likely to result in negative 

outcomes. The Chief Engineer also agreed with the need for maturing and retaining an 

experienced workforce to lead NASA projects. He pointed out that NASA has been 

recognized for its project leadership training and other knowledge sharing initiatives and 

is targeting early career professionals in its recruitment program. 
OVERVIEW

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 xi

We agree that these initiatives, if properly implemented, could help NASA mitigate the 

challenges we identified in this report. We also agree with the Chief Engineer that 

NASA’s culture of optimism is necessary for the Agency to accomplish the challenging 

tasks it undertakes. 

However, the Agency’s response did not address our primary conclusion regarding the 

need for strong leadership by the President, Congress, and the Agency to address these 

persistent challenges. Without such leadership, it will be difficult for NASA to 

effectively implement the initiatives the Agency has identified, much less overcome the 

long-standing challenges to meeting the cost, schedule, and performance goals of the 

Agency’s science and space exploration projects. 

The Agency’s comments in response to a draft of this report are reprinted in Appendix C.

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background _________________________________________ 1 

Objectives __________________________________________ 9 

RESULTS

Challenges to Meeting Cost, Schedule, and Performance Goals

NASA’s Culture of Optimism _________________________ 11

Underestimating Technical Complexity ________________ 17

Funding Instability ________________________________ 25

Project Manager Development _______________________ 33

Conclusion: Strong Leadership Required to Accomplish 

Meaningful Change ________________________________ 35

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology_______________________________ 39

Review of Internal Controls ____________________________ 41

Prior Coverage ______________________________________ 42

APPENDIX B 

Interviews _________________________________________ 45

APPENDIX C 

Management Comments ______________________________ 49

APPENDIX D 

Report Distribution___________________________________ 52

SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 1 

INTRODUCTION

Background

If it’s been a while since our last failure, people who are looking to us to do great things 

sometimes forget how hard this work is to do. 

– Former NASA Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance 

NASA is an organization with a unique mission that requires leadership, innovation, and 

creativity to achieve one-of-a-kind, first-of-their-kind technological and scientific 

advancements. Supported by investments of $470 billion since its creation over 50 years 

ago, the Agency has been at the forefront of space exploration and responsible for 

numerous scientific discoveries and technological innovations. For example, since its 

launch in 1990 the Hubble Space Telescope has helped scientists determine the age of the 

universe, identify quasars, and prove the existence of dark energy, and more than 6,000 

scientific articles have been published using data gathered by the telescope. Hubble’s 

planned successor, the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), will study the birth and 

evolution of galaxies, while the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) and its Curiosity rover, 

which landed on Mars on August 6, 2012, will assess whether the Red Planet is or has 

ever been able to support life. 

Unfortunately, in addition to their notable scientific accomplishments, many NASA 

spaceflight projects share another less positive attribute – they cost significantly more to 

complete and take longer to develop than originally promised. For example, in 1977 

NASA estimated that Hubble would launch in 1983 at a total cost of $200 million. In 

reality, it took the Agency another 2 years to complete the telescope at a cost of 

approximately $1.2 billion. More recently, MSL launched 2 years behind schedule, 

increasing the Project’s life-cycle costs by 56 percent, from $1.6 billion to approximately

$2.5 billion. Similarly, although in 2009 NASA estimated that life-cycle costs for JWST 

would be $5.0 billion and the Project would launch in 2014, current projections put the 

life-cycle cost of the Project at $8.8 billion with a launch date of 2018. 

Roles and Responsibilities of Project Managers. NASA relies on a cadre of managers

to lead its spaceflight projects. To do their jobs successfully, these managers must 

coordinate with a broad array of Agency officials, outside contractors, and internal and 

external oversight entities. In addition, they must exercise a high degree of technical, 

business, contracting, and management skills to assess the risks, feasibility, and technical

requirements of their projects; develop operations and acquisition strategies; establish 

high-level requirements and success criteria; and prepare plans, budgets, and schedules. 

The likelihood that a project will meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals depends, 

in large part, on the ability of project managers to master these skills and successfully 

balance sometimes competing priorities.
INTRODUCTION

2 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

While these managers play a central role in ensuring that projects stay on course, they 

also operate within a larger Agency management structure that can significantly influence 

the success or failure of their projects. For example, the Administrator establishes the 

Agency’s strategic priorities and is responsible for the successful implementation of 

policies and programs that support those priorities. The Associate Administrators of the 

Aeronautics Research, Human Exploration and Operations, and Science Mission 

Directorates manage their Directorates’ program portfolios; are accountable for the 

success of the projects in that portfolio; and define, fund, evaluate, and oversee the 

implementation of those programs and projects to ensure they meet schedule and cost 

constraints.12 Finally, Center Directors provide resources, workforce, and facilities to 

support the programs and projects housed at their Centers.

NASA’s Project Life Cycle. NASA policy provides overall direction for how project 

managers execute their responsibilities.

13 The policy outlines NASA’s management 

structure; the life cycle for spaceflight projects; the roles and responsibilities of and the 

interrelationships between team members; and management requirements by life-cycle 

phase. NASA has also developed a handbook to aid project managers in implementing 

these high-level requirements. The handbook provides information on best practices to 

assist managers with problem solving and risk management in taking a project from 

concept and design to development and production. 

As shown in Figure 4, NASA divides the life cycle of its spaceflight projects into two 

major phases – formulation and implementation – which are further divided into phases 

A through F.14 Phases A and B consist of formulation and C through F implementation. 

This structure allows managers to assess the progress of their projects at key decision 

points (KDPs) in the process.15 Generally speaking, projects that stay within the 

parameters of their plans and other governing agreements proceed to the next phase. 

Those that deviate significantly from these plans and agreements undergo a Termination 

Review that can lead to cancellation. 

 

12 NASA’s programs are generally composed of a number of individual projects (missions) that support a 

specific goal or objective. For example, the Mars Exploration Program currently consists of the Mars 

Odyssey, Mars Exploration Rovers, Mars Express, Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, and MSL missions. 

13 NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5E, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project 

Management Requirements,” August 14, 2012. 

14 NASA defines formulation as the period in which Agency personnel identify how a project supports the 

Agency’s strategic goals; assess feasibility, technology, concepts, and risk; build teams; develop 

operations concepts and acquisition strategies; establish high-level requirements and success criteria; 

prepare plans, budgets, and schedules; and establish control systems to ensure performance to those plans 

and alignment with current Agency strategies. The implementation phase is the period in which 

personnel execute approved plans for the development and operation of the project and use control 

systems to ensure performance to those plans and continued alignment with the Agency’s strategic goals.

15 A KDP is defined as the point in time when the Decision Authority – the responsible official who 

provides approval – makes a decision on the readiness of the project to progress to the next life-cycle 

phase. KDPs serve as checkpoints or gates through which projects must pass.
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 3 

Figure 4. NASA Life-Cycle Phases

Formulation Approval Implementation End of 

Mission

PrePhase 

A: 

Concept 

Studies

Phase A: 

Concept and 

Technology 

Development

Phase B: 

Preliminary 

Design & 

Technology 

Completion

Proceed to 

Implementation 

Phase

Phase C: 

Final 

Design and 

Fabrication

Phase D: 

System 

Assembly, 

Integration, 

Test, and 

Launch

Phase E: 

Operations 

and 

Sustainment

Phase F:

Closeout

Mission 

Concluded

 

 Preliminary Key Critical

 Design Decision Design 

 Review Point C Review

 (PDR) (KDP C) (CDR)

During formulation Phases A (Concept and Technology Development) and B

(Preliminary Design and Technology Completion), projects develop and define 

requirements, cost and schedule projections, acquisition strategy, and project design and 

complete development of mission-critical or enabling technology. As needed, projects 

are required to demonstrate evidence of technology maturity and document the 

information in technology readiness assessment reports. Projects must also develop, 

document, and maintain a project management baseline that includes an integrated master 

schedule and baseline life-cycle cost estimate.16

The formulation phase ends with a preliminary design review (PDR), during which 

project personnel are requested to demonstrate that the project’s preliminary design meets 

all system requirements with acceptable risk and within cost and schedule constraints and 

establish the basis for proceeding with detailed design. At the PDR, the project is 

required to present full baseline cost and schedules, as well as risk assessments, 

management systems, and metrics. In addition, a Standing Review Board conducts an 

independent assessment of the readiness of the project to proceed to implementation.17 

The formulation phase culminates in management approval to proceed to the next phase, 

which requires passage through KDP C where an assessment of the preliminary design 

and a determination of whether the project is sufficiently mature to proceed to Phase C is 

made. In addition, as part of the KDP C review process cost and schedule baselines are 

established against which the project is thereafter measured.

 

16 The management baseline is the integrated set of requirements, cost, schedule, and technical content that 

forms the foundation for project execution and reporting that is done as part of NASA’s performance 

assessment and governance process.

17 A Standing Review Board is composed of independent experts who provide assessments of the project’s 

technical and programmatic approach, risk posture, and progress against the project baseline and offer 

recommendations to improve performance or reduce risk.
INTRODUCTION

4 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

During Phase C, the project prepares its final design, fabricates test units that resemble 

the actual hardware, and tests those components. A second design review, the critical 

design review (CDR), occurs in the latter half of Phase C. The purpose of the CDR is to 

demonstrate that the design is sufficiently mature to proceed to full-scale fabrication, 

assembly, integration, and testing and that the technical effort is on track to meet 

performance requirements within identified cost and schedule constraints. After the 

CDR, a system integration review takes place during which the readiness of the project to 

start flight system assembly, test, and launch operations is assessed. Depending on the 

results of that review, the project may be approved to continue into Phase D, which 

includes system assembly, integration, test, and launch activities. Phase E consists of 

operations and sustainment, and Phase F is project closeout. 

Cost Increases and Schedule Delays. Cost increases and schedule delays on NASA 

projects are long-standing issues for the Agency. In 2004, the Congressional Budget 

Office compared the initial and revised budgets of 72 NASA projects between 1977 and 

2000.18 The initial budgets for these projects totaled $41.1 billion, while the revised 

budgets totaled $66.3 billion, a 61 percent increase that represented 10.6 percent of 

NASA’s total budget during those years. 

Since 2009, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has made an annual 

assessment of the status of NASA’s major projects. Table 1 shows the average cost 

growth and launch delay of selected NASA projects as reported by GAO in each of its 

assessments.

19 

Table 1. Average Cost Growth and Launch Delay of Major NASA Projects 2009–2012 

Year

Average Development 

Cost Growth 

(millions)

Average Cost Growth 

(percent)

Average Launch Delay 

(months)

2009 $ 49.5 13 11

2010 $121.1 19 15

2011 $ 94.3 15 8

2012* $314.8 47 11

* Excluding JWST, the figures become $79 million, 15 percent, and 8 months, respectively.

Source: NASA Office of Inspector General (OIG) analysis of GAO data

According to GAO, actual average cost growth was even greater than indicated in 

Table 1 because these figures do not capture cost growth that occurred prior to the point 

at which NASA established formal cost and schedule baselines in response to a 2005 

 

18 “A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space Exploration,” September 2004. Available at 

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5772/09-02-nasa.pdf (accessed 

August 24, 2012).

19 The major projects GAO selects to assess may change from year to year. 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 5 

statutory requirement.20 In addition to requiring establishment of cost and schedule 

baselines, the statute also required NASA to report to Congress when a project’s 

development cost is likely to exceed the baseline estimate by 15 percent or more or when 

a milestone is likely to slip by 6 months or more. GAO found that 13 projects for which 

NASA established baselines prior to 2009 experienced an average development cost 

growth of almost 55 percent, with a total increase in development costs of almost $2.5 

billion from their original baselines. 

In its 2012 assessment, GAO reported that the majority of the cost growth in NASA’s 

portfolio was attributable to JWST, with the other projects in the assessment experiencing 

relatively modest cost growth.21 Specifically, 14 of the 15 projects in the implementation

phase at the time of GAO’s assessment experienced average development cost growth of 

$79 million (15 percent) and schedule growth of 8 months from their baselines. When

JWST was included in this calculation, the averages increased to almost 47 percent 

($314.8 million) and 11 months, respectively. 

Cost and schedule increases on large projects like JWST can have a cascading effect on 

NASA’s entire portfolio. For example, the cost growth and schedule delays associated 

with JWST and MSL, which together account for approximately 51 percent or $11.4 

billion of total life-cycle costs for the 15 projects in implementation included as part of

GAO’s 2012 assessment, led the Agency to postpone the next large astrophysics project 

recommended by the National Research Council and may lead to cancellation and 

reconfiguration of the Agency’s other Mars exploration projects. 

The OIG, GAO, NASA, and others have repeatedly cited several fundamental and 

interrelated factors that contribute to poor cost, schedule, and performance outcomes in 

NASA projects. These factors include inaccurate cost estimates, failure to define 

requirements adequately, and underestimating the complexity and maturity of 

technology. In 2009, NASA consolidated the results of 13 reviews and studies performed 

by the Agency, GAO, and the Rand Corporation between 1973 and 2006 in an effort to 

determine the reasons for cost growth in its projects. The Agency’s analysis identified 

the 15 factors set forth in Table 2. 

 

20 National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2005, Pub.L.No.109-155,

42 U.S.C. § 16613(b)(f)(4), “Baselines and Cost Controls.” 

21 GAO, “NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects,” (GAO-12-207SP, March 1, 2012).
INTRODUCTION

6 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Table 2. Reasons for Cost Growth in NASA Projects

Cost Growth Reasons 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 

Inadequate Definitions Prior to Agency Budget Decision and to 

External Commitments X X X X 

Optimistic Cost Estimates/Estimating Errors X X X X 

Inability to Execute Initial Schedule Baseline X X X X 

Inadequate Risk Assessments X X X X 

Higher Technical Complexity of Projects than Anticipated X X X X 

Changes in Scope (Design/Content) X X X X 

Inadequate Assessment of Impacts of Schedule Changes on Cost X X X 

Annual Funding Instability X X 

Eroding In-House Technical Expertise X X 

Poor Tracking of Contractor Requirements Against Plans X X 

Launch Vehicle X 

Reserve Position Adequacy X X 

Lack of Probabilistic Estimating X X 

“Go As You Can Afford” Approach X 

Lack of Formal Document for Recording Key Technical, 

Schedule, and Programmatic Assumptions X 

Source: NASA Advisory Council Meeting: Report of Audit and Finance Committee, Kennedy Space 

Center, February 5, 2009.

NASA’s Efforts to Improve Acquisition Outcomes. Over the years, NASA has taken a 

variety of steps to improve the cost and schedule performance of its projects. In 2006, 

NASA revised its acquisition policies to emphasize the need to gather knowledge on the 

technical and development feasibility of a project and associated cost and schedule 

parameters before making commitments to long-terms investments. In addition, NASA 

codified its Systems Engineering Handbook into a new systems engineering requirements 

document. Taken together, the revised policies require projects to incorporate key 

reviews and decision points that serve as gates through which projects must pass before 

moving to the next stage in their life cycle. That same year, NASA also implemented 

Earned Value Management (EVM), an integrated management control system for 

assessing, understanding, and quantifying the technical progress achieved with project

dollars. Used correctly, EVM can provide project management with objective, accurate, 

and timely data to support effective decision making. A March 2008 study by NASA’s 

Science Mission Directorate found that projects using EVM experienced 19 percent 
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 7 

growth in development costs compared to 31 percent growth for projects that did not use 

this tool.22

In 2007, the Agency implemented a management review process to monitor project 

performance including cost, schedule, and technical issues more effectively and took 

steps to strengthen the accuracy of its cost estimating. More recently, NASA 

implemented a new cost-estimating policy requiring a new analysis method, known as the 

Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level (JCL), that analyzes the probabilities that a 

project will be completed at a certain cost and within a certain schedule. It is intended to 

aid in project management and cost and schedule estimating by enabling the Agency to 

evaluate more accurately whether projects have an executable plan as they proceed into 

development. JCL considers all cost and schedule elements, incorporates and quantifies 

potential risks, assesses the impacts of cost and schedule to date, and addresses available 

annual resources to arrive at development cost and schedule estimates associated with 

various confidence levels. NASA policy requires that projects be budgeted at a level 

supporting a 70 percent probability that the project will be completed at or lower than 

estimated costs and on or before the projected schedule.

23

Although all of these initiatives are positive steps toward achieving improved project 

management, their cumulative effect on project performance is not yet entirely clear.24

Changing National Space Policy. Many of NASA’s major projects are the product of 

policy goals established at the national level by the President and Congress. 

Consequently, throughout its history the Agency’s priorities have been subject to the 

vagaries of both domestic and international politics. For example, the Soviet Union’s 

1961 flight that put the first man in orbit around Earth spurred President Kennedy to 

challenge NASA to land a man on the moon by the end of the decade. This challenge 

and the resulting Apollo Program defined NASA’s early years. In January 1972, 

President Nixon approved development of the Space Shuttle Program, a decision that 

influenced American space exploration efforts for the next 40 years. In January 2004, 

President George W. Bush put into motion a multi-decade effort known as the 

Constellation Program that was to follow the Space Shuttle Program and enable human 

exploration beyond low Earth orbit.25 However, following significant cost and schedule 

overruns and an evaluation by a special committee, President Obama cancelled 

Constellation in February 2010.26 In its place, the President called for development of a 

 

22 “SMD [Science Mission Directorate] Cost/Schedule Performance Study – Summary Overview,”

March 2008, available at http://www.lpi.usra.edu/pss/presentations/200806/16bruno.pdf (accessed 

April 2, 2012).

23 NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 1000.5A, “Policy for NASA Acquisition” (Revalidated March 17, 2010).

24 We plan to conduct additional audit work in the future to evaluate the implementation and effectiveness 

of these efforts.

25 The major components of the Constellation Program were the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, Ares V 

Cargo Launch Vehicle, Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle, and Altair Lunar Lander.

26 Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans Committee, “Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of 

a Great Nation,” October 2009. Available at 

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalReport.pdf (accessed June 20, 2012).
INTRODUCTION

8 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

new heavy-lift rocket to be ready for construction by 2015 with manned missions to Mars 

by the mid-2030s. The President’s announcement generated extensive debate in 

Congress about NASA’s space exploration goals and the next generation of space 

vehicles required to meet those goals. Over the next few months, proposals varied widely 

from preserving Constellation to rebuilding from the ground up a new generation of 

spaceflight vehicles enabling human space exploration beyond low Earth orbit. In 

October 2010, the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 confirmed cancellation of the 

Constellation Program but retained a number of the Program’s components, including the 

Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and the J-2X upper stage engine.

Challenging Fiscal Environment. NASA manages its portfolio of projects in a 

challenging and uncertain fiscal environment. After reaching a high in the late 1960s, 

NASA’s budget has declined as a percentage of the overall Federal budget. As shown in 

Figure 5, fiscal year (FY) 1966 was the high-water mark for NASA when the Agency 

received $5.9 billion or 4.4 percent of the Federal budget. By comparison, NASA’s 

FY 2012 funding of $18.2 billion represents only 0.5 percent of the total Federal budget. 

Similarly, when adjusted for inflation the Agency’s annual funding has been on a nearly 

consistent downward trend for more than 20 years. As the President and the Congress 

work to reduce Federal spending and the country’s budget deficit, NASA is likely to face 

constrained funding levels for the foreseeable future.

Figure 5. NASA Budget as a Percentage of the Federal Budget

0.00%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.00%

4.50%

5.00%

0 

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

195819611964196719701973197619791982198519881991199419972000200320062009

2012*2015*

Percent

$ Bilions

NASA Budget Outlay, nominal NASA Budget Outlay, 2011 dollars

% of Federal Outlay *Budget estimate
INTRODUCTION

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 9 

Objectives

Our purpose in conducting this review was to gain a better understanding of the major 

challenges NASA project managers face in carrying out their duties. The core of our 

fact-finding consisted of interviews of 85 individuals both within and outside of NASA, 

including former and current Administrators, Deputy Administrators, Associate 

Administrators, Center Directors, and project managers and staff in an attempt to identify 

the “root causes” of NASA’s long-standing struggle to meet project cost, schedule, and 

performance goals. We plan to conduct additional work in the future to examine more 

closely the issues we identified and offer specific recommendations for management 

action. See Appendix A for details of our scope and methodology, our review of internal 

controls, and a list of prior coverage. See Appendix B for a list of the 85 individuals we 

interviewed. 

RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 11

CHALLENGES TO MEETING COST, SCHEDULE, AND 

PERFORMANCE GOALS

Multiple factors underlie NASA’s historical inability to meet project cost, schedule, 

and performance goals. However, based on our interviews with more than 80 

individuals involved in all levels of management and project development, we 

identified four factors that appear to present the greatest challenges to successful 

project outcomes. The first three are long-standing issues, while the fourth is of 

more recent origin: 

• Culture of optimism. 

• Underestimating technical complexity. 

• Unstable funding. 

• Project manager development.

Below we examine each of these challenges in turn. 

NASA’s Culture of Optimism Can Result in Unrealistic Projections

NASA does things that have never been done before. We do things that normal people 

wouldn’t even try. We do things that are hard and we hire starry-eyed people. 

 – NASA Project Manager 

It was clear from our interviews that a culture of optimism and a can-do spirit permeate 

all levels of NASA, from senior management to front-line engineers. Although this 

optimistic organizational culture is essential for realizing groundbreaking scientific 

achievement, it can also lead to unrealistic projections about what can be achieved within 

approved budgets and timeframes. In addition, this culture has manifested itself in a 

tendency to view the success of projects primarily in technical rather than cost and 

schedule terms. More specifically, NASA’s optimistic culture contributes to

development of unrealistic plans and performance baselines that fail to account for all

relevant risks. 

NASA’s Culture of Optimism Is Long Standing and Essential to Realizing 

Extraordinary Scientific Achievement. According to project managers, a culture of 

optimism is essential to overcoming the extraordinary technical challenges inherent in the 

development of unique first-of-their-kind space systems. For more than five decades, 

NASA programs have resulted in remarkable technological advances and scientific 
RESULTS

12 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

discoveries. This legacy has fostered a can-do attitude and a culture of optimism about 

achieving successful outcomes that permeates all levels of the Agency. 

NASA’s culture of optimism originated with and has been driven by one of the Agency’s 

greatest achievements – landing the first human on the Moon (see Figure 6). NASA’s 

ability to overcome the technological and scientific obstacles to accomplish this feat has 

become part of the Agency’s culture and 

has helped foster a belief that NASA can 

do anything. In later years, this view was 

reinforced by missions like Voyager 

(launched in 1977 and still operating at 

the edges of our solar system), the Space 

Shuttle, the International Space Station 

(ISS), and the Hubble Space Telescope. 

More recently, NASA projects have 

produced evidence of what may have 

once been habitable environments on 

Mars and of the importance of dark 

matter and dark energy, as well as 

insights into the formation of black holes 

and the structure of the universe from its 

inception. Indeed, it was this can-do 

attitude that enabled NASA to bring the 

ailing Apollo 13 safely back to Earth and 

find a way to fix Hubble’s mirror in 

orbit. 

In short, the optimistic and focused national goals of the Apollo Program, coupled with 

the Program’s generous funding profile, set the foundation for an organizational culture 

that believes nothing is impossible despite significant technical hurdles and other 

challenges. Subsequent accomplishments and technological successes, at significantly 

greater costs than originally estimated, reaffirmed a mindset that project costs and 

adherence to schedule were secondary considerations to achieving operational success. 

Unrestrained Optimism Can Exacerbate Cost, Schedule, and Performance 

Problems. Although optimism encourages innovation, it may also prevent leaders from 

making critical assessments of requirements, budgets, and schedules to determine what a 

project can realistically accomplish within a set budget and timetable. For example, 

NASA initiated the MSL mission soon after the successful development and landing of 

the Mars Exploration Rovers (MERs) Spirit and Opportunity.27 Senior managers from 

the MER mission transitioned to MSL and managed the follow-on project under what 

they described as the “MER culture” of success. This attitude existed not only at the 

 

27 Spirit and Opportunity were launched in June and July 2003, respectively, and landed on Mars in January 

2004.

Figure 6. “Buzz” Aldrin on the Moon beside 

seismic experiment with Lunar Excursion 

Module Eagle in the background.

Source: NASA 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 13

project level but further up the supervisory chain at the program management level. 

Program officials told us that this attitude contributed to senior managers accepting the 

MSL Project’s optimistic cost and schedule estimates and placing less credence on 

independent assessments that suggested the Project would need additional funds and 

more time to overcome technical challenges. Ultimately, the MSL Project missed its first 

launch window in 2009 and experienced a 2-year launch delay, which significantly 

contributed to development costs increasing from $969 million to $1.77 billion and the 

life-cycle costs increasing from $1.6 billion to $2.5 billion.

28

From our discussions with senior NASA officials and project managers, we identified 

three related ways NASA’s optimistic culture contributes to cost and schedule 

challenges: (1) measures of success that do not include cost and schedule factors; 

(2) establishment of unrealistic cost and schedule baselines; and (3) the expectation that 

additional funding will be made available if a project runs “short.” 

Measures of Project Success Do Not Include Cost and Schedule Factors. The Agency’s

long-standing culture of optimism has resulted in a mindset among NASA managers that 

emphasizes technological and operational success over cost and schedule fidelity. For 

example, when asked to define “project success,” nearly all the project managers we 

interviewed responded that a project was successful if it achieved its technical 

performance goals. No manager mentioned controlling cost and schedule growth as 

significant measures of success. Moreover, all described their projects as successful even 

though many had experienced adverse cost and schedule outcomes. 

This mindset has manifested itself in a lack of documented success criteria for cost and 

schedule performance in NASA projects. We reviewed seven project plans and found 

that while success criteria were clearly defined in terms of technical requirements, none 

contained any measures related to cost and schedule performance.29 For example: 

• The project plan for the Landsat Data Continuity Mission, a satellite designed to 

gather global land data and imagery for agricultural, education, business, science, 

and government uses, includes 17 mission success objectives relating to the type 

of data to be acquired and the duration of the satellite’s mission life.

• The project plan for the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2, a satellite designed to 

measure the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, measures success in 

terms of the frequency with which the satellite retrieves carbon dioxide estimates 

and the comparison of these estimates to other space-based and ground-based 

instruments. 

 

28 Due to planetary alignment, the optimal launch window for a mission to Mars occurs every 26 months. 

MSL was scheduled to launch in a window between September and October 2009. However, in February 

2009, because of the late delivery of several critical components and instruments, NASA delayed the 

launch to November 2011.

29 We reviewed plans for the following projects: Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), JWST, Mars 

Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution, Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2, Soil Moisture Active Passive, 

MSL, and Deep Impact Discovery Project.
RESULTS

14 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

• The success criteria for the MSL Project includes the ability to land and navigate 

on Mars, assess the biological environment and geology of the landing region, and

investigate aspects of the planet’s past habitability, as well as the Project’s ability 

to archive the acquired data within 6 months of receipt on Earth. 

• The Soil Moisture Active Passive mission will collect soil moisture and 

freeze/thaw measurements of Earth via satellite to enable climate models that

predict future trends in water resource availability. The project plan states that the 

mission will be considered 100 percent successful if it launches into a near-polar 

sun-synchronous orbit, provides global space-based measurements of soil 

moisture, and records and validates that data. 

To its credit, NASA has taken some steps to include cost and schedule factors in future 

missions’ definition of success. In response to a 2007 GAO report highlighting NASA’s 

lack of emphasis on cost controls and program outcomes, the Agency issued a Corrective 

Action Plan that established a definition of success for its portfolio of projects. 

Specifically, the Agency established that success would be defined as completing its 

portfolio of major development projects within 110 percent of the cost and schedule 

baseline and meeting Level 1 requirements for 90 percent of the major development 

projects.

30,31 NASA is hoping to meet this criteria by FY 2013. 

However, NASA’s definition and stated goals have not yet filtered into the project 

management culture. Consistent with the information gleaned from our interviews, a July 

2011 study by The Aerospace Corporation found that mission success was the only 

criteria by which NASA project managers measured success.32 The draft report, which 

has not been formally issued, encouraged NASA to address this imbalance by 

incentivizing project managers to deliver projects on-cost and on-schedule. While 

conceding that mission success will always be the primary criteria by which NASA will 

be judged, the authors argued that if cost and schedule performance are important to 

NASA, then that ideal must be made part of the Agency’s culture. Ultimately, NASA 

and The Aerospace Corporation could not come to consensus on the recommendation due 

to concerns that providing incentives either as a reward or as punishment for adherence to 

cost and schedule metrics could negatively impact mission success.

Establishment of Unrealistic Cost and Schedule Baselines. NASA’s culture of optimism

appears to increase the difficulty of developing and maintaining realistic cost estimates. 

Many interviewees indicated that project managers and senior NASA leaders are often

hesitant to admit they cannot achieve mission requirements within the funding profile 

provided. One area where this is especially prevalent is in the estimation of projects’ 

 

30 GAO, “NASA Plan for Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of Contract Management,” dated 

October 31, 2007, and updated through January 31, 2008.

31 A Level 1 requirement is a project’s fundamental and basic set of requirements levied by the Program or 

Headquarters on the project.

32 The Aerospace Corporation, “Explanation of Change (EoC) Cost Growth Study Final Results and 

Recommendations,” (Draft Report ATR-2011(5322)-1, July 1, 2011).
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 15

technical complexity. For example, NASA project managers are often overly optimistic 

about the effort required to mature critical technologies or obtain and modify heritage 

technologies – hardware, software, and systems developed for previous projects that are 

adapted for use on new projects – and underestimate the cost and schedule reserves 

needed to address known and unknown risks, optimistically assuming that most risks will 

not materialize. This can result in significant cost, schedule, and performance problems. 

As the National Resource Council noted in 2010: 

A project manager or principal investigator who is personally determined to control 

costs can be of great assistance in avoiding cost growth. People and organizations 

tend to optimize their behavior based on the environment in which they operate. 

Unfortunately, instead of motivating and rewarding vigilance in accurately predicting 

and controlling costs, the current system incentivizes overly optimistic expectations 

regarding cost and schedule. For example, competitive pressures encourage (overly) 

optimistic assessments of the cost and schedule impacts of addressing uncertainties 

and overcoming potential problems. As a result, initial cost estimates generally are 

quite optimistic, underestimating final costs by a sizable amount, and that optimism 

sometimes persists well into the development process.33

The history of cost reserve estimates for the MSL Project helps illustrate this point. 

Between 2002 and 2004, an independent cost assessment team issued eight reports 

analyzing a variety of different scenarios. In four of the reports, the assessment team

questioned the reasonableness of the Project’s 30 percent cost reserve, which was set in 

accordance with Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Project Guidelines, and indicated that a 

reserve level of 50 to 70 percent would be more prudent given the number of project 

participants, the complexity of the mission, the aggressive schedule, and the involvement 

of nuclear material. Similarly, another independent assessment conducted in 2006 as part 

of the Project’s PDR recommended a $105 million increase to reserves to achieve a cost 

confidence level of 70 percent. 

However, Project officials did not follow these recommendations and even cited the 30 

percent reserve level as a positive attribute at the confirmation review. It was not until 

CDR in 2007 that managers admitted reserves were critically low, discordant with the 

Project’s needs, and inadequate by $50–$100 million. NASA management subsequently 

increased the reserve levels and permitted the Project to pass CDR and move to the 

implementation phase while NASA’s internal assessment team indicated that there was 

very little chance it would meet the planned launch date. Indeed, in 2009 the MSL 

Project, having exhausted its budget and reserves, missed the launch window and was 

forced to set a new launch date more than 2 years later that increased Project life-cycle 

costs by $900 million. Similarly, the JWST Independent Comprehensive Review Panel

cited inadequate reserves and a failure to phase the reserves into the project when needed 

as contributing factors to cost increases and schedule delays experienced by JWST. 

 

33 National Resource Council, “Controlling Cost Growth of NASA Earth and Space Science Missions,”

2010. 
RESULTS

16 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Expectation of Additional Funding. Many project managers we spoke with mentioned 

the “Hubble Psychology” – an expectation among NASA personnel that projects that fail 

to meet initial cost and schedule goals will receive additional funding and that subsequent 

scientific and technological success will overshadow budgetary and schedule problems.34 

Within days of its 1990 launch, Hubble was sending out-of-focus pictures back to Earth 

due to a flaw in the telescope’s giant mirror. In a December 1993 repair mission, 

astronauts corrected the problem by adding a camera to the telescope. This and 

subsequent servicing missions extended Hubble’s operational life (see Figure 7), but also 

added billions to the overall cost of the project. Nevertheless, as many of the individuals 

we interviewed noted, 

Hubble is now generally viewed as a national 

treasure and its initial 

cost and performance 

issues have largely 

been forgotten.35 

Based on the Hubble 

experience and that of 

other NASA projects, 

many interviewees 

expressed the belief 

that if a mission provides good science 

data, any previous cost 

and schedule overages 

will be forgiven. 

To its credit, NASA has recently demonstrated an unwillingness to provide additional 

funds to allow an over budget project to proceed to implementation. The Gravity and 

Extreme Magnetism Small Explorer Project was intended to measure the polarization of 

X-rays emanating from black holes and neutron stars. Capped at $105 million in 2009, at 

confirmation review Project managers contended that they could complete the Project for 

$135 million. However, an independent cost estimate found that the Project was likely to 

cost $150 million and that its 2014 launch would be delayed due to development 

difficulties with its primary instrument. Consequently, in May 2012 NASA leadership 

made the decision to terminate the mission. 

 

34 While not attributable to a particular source or individual, the term “Hubble Psychology” is well known 

and used extensively throughout NASA.

35 Hubble development was completed in 1985. However, because of the loss of Space Shuttle Challenger 

in January 1986, launch of the telescope was delayed until April 1990. Since then, five servicing 

missions have upgraded the telescope’s scientific instruments and operational systems, the most recent in 

2009 (see Figure 7). 

Figure 7. Space Shuttle Atlantis’ robotic arm lifts the refurbished

Hubble Space Telescope from its cargo bay on May 19, 2009.

Source: NASA 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 17

Managing an Optimistic Culture. NASA’s optimistic organizational culture is an 

essential element to achieving the Agency’s highly complex missions. However, as 

discussed above, such a culture can also result in overly optimistic cost and schedule 

estimates and minimization of the importance of a project staying within cost and on 

schedule as measures of success. Nurturing NASA’s optimistic culture while tempering 

the effects of over optimism on budget fidelity requires Agency leadership at all levels to 

review project requirements, budgets, and schedules with a critical eye and reward 

project managers who demonstrate keen attention to and stewardship of NASA’s limited 

resources. 

Underestimating Technical Complexity Increases Cost and 

Schedule Risk

We should never attempt to perform system designs until the project requirements 

have been fully developed and understood. . . . Only after the requirements have 

been developed in full should the designers be turned on to design to that 

known set of requirements. 

– Comment Received on OIG Blog

Project managers we interviewed cited the technical complexity inherent in NASA 

projects as a major challenge to achieving cost and schedule goals. As many noted, 

predicting the problems a project may encounter when developing one-of-a-kind, first-oftheir-kind technologies, instruments, and spacecraft, much less anticipating how much 

money will be needed to overcome those problems, presents extremely complex 

challenges. However, as discussed below, we believe NASA could take several actions 

to achieve more accurate cost estimates and help minimize cost growth in Agency 

projects. 

Unique and Complex Technologies. In our judgment, five factors explain the 

inherently uncertain nature of estimating costs for the type of space technologies NASA 

develops: (1) unique, first-of-their-kind technologies; (2) interdependent technologies 

and complex integration issues; (3) increased testing needs; (4) limited quantities; and 

(5) shrinking industrial base and reduced quality of parts. A discussion of each of these 

factors follows. 

Development of Unique, First-of-Their-Kind Technologies. For many non-NASA 

development efforts, historical data, cost models, lessons learned, and other information 

is readily available to help project managers estimate the effort that will be needed to 

develop necessary technologies. However, because NASA projects often involve 

technologies that are new and unique, project managers have significantly less 

information to draw upon in the planning and cost estimating stages of project 

development. This increases the complexity of developing accurate cost and schedule 

estimates for many NASA projects. 
RESULTS

18 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Interdependent Technologies and Complex Integration Issues. NASA projects often 

involve combining several technologies to accomplish novel missions. The complexity 

that may result from the interdependence of these technologies is often difficult to 

predict, and managers may consequently underestimate the effort required for successful 

integration. 

Increased Testing Needs. Unlike land-based systems, many NASA missions and their 

associated instruments function remotely in space. Consequently, if something goes 

wrong the Agency cannot access them easily or at all to attempt repair. As a result, 

NASA performs extensive testing at great expense prior to launch to reduce risk and 

increase the likelihood that its technologies and projects will work as designed. 

Limited Quantities. Because space systems are generally one-of-a-kind instruments, 

NASA cannot benefit from economies of scale.36 In other commercial and government 

development efforts, for example fighter aircraft, producing higher quantities of the 

product causes the average cost of each product unit to fall. However, because NASA

typically develops unique solutions to complex space challenges, the Agency cannot 

benefit from such savings. 

Shrinking Industrial Base and Reduced Quality of Parts. Several project managers we 

spoke with told us they have observed a reduction in the availability and quality of 

contractor-supplied parts and instruments in recent years. They attributed this primarily 

to the overall consolidation of the space industry and the resulting reduction in 

competition. The managers explained that this decrease in quality has affected their 

ability to estimate project costs accurately because a part’s poor quality may not be 

evident until testing has begun, resulting in the need for costly rework or seeking out 

alternative part suppliers late in development. 

In addition to the Hubble example discussed previously, other examples illustrate 

NASA’s tendency to underestimate the costs and level of effort required to develop its 

projects: 

• To meet the science goals of the JWST mission, NASA needed a mirror 6.5 

meters (21 feet 4 inches) in diameter that would work at -400 degrees Fahrenheit 

(see Figure 8). To protect the mirror from the sun and help it maintain this 

temperature, a sunshield composed of five membranes that could be folded and 

then unfurled to the size of a tennis court needed to be developed. In 2006, GAO 

reported that this technology and other associated cooling equipment and 

instrument development were immature.37 Subsequently, the development of 

these technologies was much more difficult and took significantly longer to 

mature than anticipated. 

 

36 Economies of scale decrease cost per unit and increase efficiency as the number of units being produced 

increases. 

37 GAO, “NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Key to 

Addressing Program Challenges,” (GAO-06-634, July 14, 2006)
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 19

Figure 8. Six of the segments that will make up the primary mirror on JWST 

are shown completing cryogenic testing at Marshall Space Flight Center.

Source: NASA 

• As we reported in June 2011, developmental testing for the National Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System Preparatory Project 

identified technical issues and questions of workmanship that caused considerable 

retesting of several of the partner-provided instruments and directly contributed to 

the Project’s $304 million cost increase and 5-year schedule delay.38

• Because of the size and mission requirements of the MSL rover, project managers 

had to develop an innovative method of safely landing and powering the vehicle. 

Previous Mars rovers Spirit and Opportunity used parachutes and airbags for 

landing and solar panels and rechargeable lithium-ion batteries for their power 

systems. In contrast, the spacecraft carrying the MSL’s Curiosity rover first 

descended using a parachute and then rockets further slowed and guided the 

spacecraft before lowering the upright rover on a tether to the surface, much like a 

sky crane. Additionally, the rover has a radioisotope power system that generates 

electricity from the heat of plutonium’s radioactive decay, which greatly extends 

the life of the vehicle but was never before incorporated on a planetary rover. 

Furthermore, MSL project managers had to review and test titanium parts after 

OIG investigators found that a supplier falsely certified that the material complied 

with required specifications. This problem required management to audit more 

than 1,000 hardware items resulting in the identification of 127 suspicious parts 

for further examination. The added oversight and mitigation resulted in additional 

cost to the already over-budget project. 

 

38 NASA OIG, “NASA’s Management of the NPOESS Preparatory Project,” (IG-11-018, June 2, 2011).
RESULTS

20 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Managing Technical Complexity and Cost Uncertainty. We acknowledge that space 

development projects are technically complex and their development costs are difficult to 

assess at the start of implementation when NASA managers are required to establish 

costs and schedule estimates. Nonetheless, in our judgment few projects should proceed 

to implementation unless requirements are well-defined and stable and the available 

resources – mature technologies, realistic schedule, and adequate funding – are set. In 

addition, the project’s critical technologies should be matured to the extent that a 

prototype that closely approximates form, fit, and function is demonstrated in a relevant 

environment.39 Finally, adequate funding should be available to meet the project’s

requirements and account for its technical risks.

Over the years, the OIG, GAO, and others have reported extensively about the cost and 

schedule risks associated with projects that proceed to implementation with unproven 

technologies, inadequate funding, or unstable requirements. Collectively, those reports 

have identified measures that could help achieve more accurate cost estimates and 

minimize cost growth in NASA’s projects, including: (1) maturing technologies prior to 

establishing baseline cost estimates; (2) appropriately funding management reserves to 

match technical risks; and (3) controlling changes to requirements. We discuss each of 

these issues in more detail below. 

Maturing Technologies Prior to Establishing Baseline Cost Estimates. One factor that 

hinders project managers’ ability to make accurate cost and schedule projections is the 

tendency for both internal and external stakeholders to underestimate the effort needed to 

complete a project – especially when establishing a project’s initial cost baseline – in 

order to gain support and funding. According to interviewees, this can result from 

deliberately understated contractor proposals, Agency estimates scrubbed to fit a 

perceived “approvable” budget profile, efforts of commercial lobbyists, and pressure 

from Congress. In an address to the American Astronautical Society Goddard 

Symposium in March 2008, former NASA Administrator Griffin described the problem 

this way: 

[T]here have been many instances where proponents of individual missions have 

downplayed the technical difficulty and risk of their individual mission, or grossly 

underestimated the cost and effort involved to solve the problems, in order to gain 

“new start” funds for [a] particular project. Everyone knows that, once started, any 

given mission is nearly impossible to cancel, so the goal becomes that of getting 

started, no matter what has to be said or done to accomplish it.

According to some interviewees, the “buy-in” decision point – including the initial 

baseline cost estimate – should be commensurate with the level of project complexity. 

Specifically, interviewees noted that although it may be realistic for non-complex 

projects to establish a life-cycle cost estimate and schedule baseline at KDP C, complex 

projects may have too many unknowns to provide an accurate estimate at that point in the 

project’s life cycle. In addition, as previously noted, interviewees said NASA historically 

 

39 For example, testing a representative model or prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory or in a simulated 

realistic environment. 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 21

exhibits a culture in which managers expect that additional funding will be provided for 

technically sound projects despite cost and schedule increases. As a result, some projects 

may proceed with unrealistic life-cycle cost estimates with the expectation that additional 

funds will be made available in the future. 

NASA’s Project Management Handbook discusses the poor outcomes associated with 

baseline cost estimates that do not match the technical complexity of a project:

Unfortunately, on some projects both the cost and schedule are created and locked 

down before the technical scope is understood. This is backward and can lead to buyin. Buy-in, in this context, is an overly optimistic estimate of cost and schedule used 

to try to ensure project initiation and funding. This type of buy-in could ultimately 

lead to either cancellation, because of insufficient resources, or the need for NASA to 

add resources to complete the project. The latter case will drain program resources 

and preclude or delay follow-on missions. This premature lockdown of cost and 

schedule prior to understanding the technical scope can also be imposed top-down by 

the program on the project. Neither is helpful.40

The practice of moving forward prematurely is not exclusive to NASA’s large projects. 

Below are examples of both large and small projects with cost and schedule risks that 

moved into implementation with unproven technologies. 

• A 2011 OIG report found that cost growth and schedule delays in the Advanced 

Radiation Instrumentation Project resulted from cost estimates and schedule 

milestones that were not supported by accurate and complete data.41 Specifically, 

when the ISS Program approved the Project, it did not have a firm proposal from 

the contractor responsible for building one of the replacement instruments. When 

NASA received the proposal 7 months later, the cost of the instrument had nearly 

doubled from the baseline projection. Only after the Project’s PDR did ISS 

Program management completely understand the scope of work required to 

deliver the replacement suite of radiation monitoring instruments, when the 

instruments realistically could be delivered, and how much they would cost. In 

the end, the suite of instruments was delivered 3 years late, cost $10 million more 

than the original $16 million estimate, and did not include all originally planned 

elements. 

• MSL was allowed to proceed into the implementation phase with many key 

technologies, including motor actuators, avionics, and flight software, assessed as 

immature. The project required several design changes to address technical issues 

identified after the CDR of the propulsion system, including an electrical shorting 

of the pins on the avionics processor and a packaging issue that caused a 

disconnect between key components of the system. Because MSL officials 

identified the issue after the propulsion system was completed, the Project had to 

 

40 NPR 7120.5, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook,” February 2010.

41 NASA OIG, “A Review of NASA’s Replacement of Radiation Monitoring Equipment on the 

International Space Station,” (IG-11-027, September 29, 2011).
RESULTS

22 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

rebuild the propulsion system and adopt a new design, which in turn required 

rework and retesting of MSL’s cruise and descent stages.

• One of Glory’s main instruments – the Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor – was assessed 

as an immature critical technology at the PDR. Despite this fact, management 

approved the Project to proceed to the implementation phase. Subsequently, the 

Project experienced numerous issues with development of the sensor, resulting in 

more than a year’s delay in delivery and a cost increase of over $100 million.42

The use of heritage technology frequently poses challenges for NASA projects. While 

the use of heritage technologies can reduce a project’s development costs, the complexity 

associated with required modifications and problems with availability of components 

used on past projects are often underestimated, which can negatively impact a project’s 

cost and schedule. Heritage technologies often require significant modification before 

they are suitable for integration into new projects. Moreover, suppliers of the heritage 

technology may have gone out of business or no longer be able to produce the needed 

technology because of personnel or other organizational changes. Below we discuss 

examples of projects that encountered difficulties using heritage technology. 

• The goal of Dawn’s robotic spacecraft is to study the early solar system by 

investigating two of the largest remaining asteroids, Vesta and Ceres, which are 

located between Mars and 

Jupiter. The Dawn Project 

planned to use the same ion 

propulsion system design 

successfully demonstrated by 

the Deep Space 1 mission, 

which operated between1998 

and 2001.43 However, the 

supplier that provided the ion 

thruster and the power 

processing units for Deep 

Space 1 no longer had the 

capability to produce the 

technology when it was 

needed for Dawn (see 

Figure 9). Consequently, 

the cost of these components 

rose nearly 100 percent from 

 

42 Glory was lost in March 2011 when the fairing protecting the satellite failed to separate from the 

Taurus XL launch vehicle during ascent, causing the spacecraft to fail to reach orbit.

43 NASA’s Dawn mission was launched in September 2007 to rendezvous and investigate the asteroids 

Vesta and Ceres. The spacecraft arrived at Vesta in July 2011 and is scheduled to arrive at Ceres in 

February 2015.

Figure 9. Artist concept of Dawn using its ion 

propulsion engine.

Source: NASA 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 23

the original estimate and the flight hardware was delivered 8 months later than 

scheduled.

• The Kepler Project was the first mission designed to look specifically for Earthsized planets in the “habitable zone” around other stars. To accomplish this 

mission, Kepler was designed with the largest camera ever launched into space. 

Although the Project’s technologies were considered heritage because they had 

flown on previous missions, adapting them to the requirements of the Kepler 

mission proved more difficult than anticipated and contributed to a $78 million

cost overrun and 9-month schedule delay.

• The MSL Project relied on several heritage technologies that ultimately had to be 

redesigned, reengineered, or replaced for use on the Curiosity rover and 

spacecraft. For example, Project officials initially planned to use a heat shield 

composed of a lightweight material that had flown on previous missions. 

However, subsequent testing showed that this material was not suitable for MSL

and the Project had to select a new, less mature technology, which resulted in 

approximately $30 million in cost growth and a 9-month delay in delivery of the 

heat shield.

Appropriately Funding Management Reserves to Match Technical Risk. Reserves are

contingency funding “allocated to and managed by the Program/Project Manager for the 

resolution of problems normally encountered to mitigate risks while ensuring compliance 

to the specified program/project scope.”44 In essence, the purpose of reserves is to cover 

the expense associated with work that managers did not plan for at the beginning of the 

project but that will almost inevitably be needed due to the complexities inherent in 

developing spaceflight projects. The reserve percentage varies from project to project, 

but historically had been limited to 30 percent of a project’s estimated overall 

development costs.

45 Interviewees indicated that many projects begin their life cycle 

with inadequate reserves so that when unanticipated problems arise the projects face cost 

overruns and schedule disruptions. 

Some project managers we spoke with reported feeling constrained about setting reserve 

levels higher than 30 percent even when they believed that the complexity of the project

required such action. For example, as previously discussed, MSL Project managers 

resisted raising reserve levels above the 30 percent mark set by JPL Project Guidelines 

despite several independent cost assessments that recommended reserve levels of 50 to 

70 percent of estimated development costs. In fact, NASA managers commented at the 

 

44 2008 NASA Cost Estimating Handbook, available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/263676main_2008- NASA-Cost-Handbook-FINAL_v6.pdf (accessed August 20, 2012).

45 In 2007, reserve levels began to be based on the amount needed to achieve 70 percent cost confidence 

rather than a set percentage. This requirement was further refined in 2009 with the introduction of JCL 

policy, which required reserves, now referred to as Unallocated Future Expenses, adequate to achieve a 

cost and schedule confidence of 70 percent. 
RESULTS

24 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Confirmation Review that establishing reserve levels above 50 percent would appear to 

be a vote of no confidence in the Project.46

Controlling Changes to Requirements. Interviewees cited scope and requirements 

“creep” as another serious challenge to the ability of project managers to meet cost

estimates. “Creep” occurs when engineers develop instrument functionality or robustness 

greater than the original requirements to increase a system’s technical capabilities. The 

additional work and associated costs can cause a project to exceed its life-cycle cost 

estimate. Although technology enhancements or increased technical capabilities may 

provide for a more robust mission, they often come at a significant cost. For example, 

the Science Mission Directorate added a new design requirement to the MSL at the 

Project’s CDR – the life-cycle stage at which projects should be demonstrating that all 

requirements have been met and the overall design is mature, stable, and ready for 

production. The requirement, a sample cache to collect rocks for a future sample return 

mission, was eventually dropped but not before adding $2 million to an already overbudget project. 

Similarly, changing 

requirements during 

development can 

have a negative 

impact on a project’s

cost and schedule. 

For example, as we 

reported in 

September 2009, 

NASA removed but 

then reinstated after 

the contract had been 

signed a requirement 

for a legacy thermal 

infrared imaging 

capability on the 

Landsat Data 

Continuity Mission 

(see Figure 10).47 

This caused cost 

increases and further 

delays to the project.

 

46 The Science Mission Directorate uses Confirmation Reviews or Confirmation Readiness Reviews to 

present project readiness status, PDR findings, and a recommendation for project progression to 

implementation. 

47 NASA OIG, “The Landsat Program Is Not Meeting the Goals and Intent of the Land Remote Sensing 

Policy Act of 1992” (IG-09-021, September 2, 2009). 

Figure 10. The Thermal Infrared Sensor arrives at the contractor for 

integration on the spacecraft in February 2012.

Source: NASA 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 25

Funding Instability Can Lead to Inefficient Management Practices

NASA needs to set reasonable goals and prepare for the contingency that we will not 

receive the requested funding in the out years. We need to create a doable schedule for 

projects and then meet it. 

– Comment Received on OIG Blog

Nearly 75 percent of the individuals we interviewed cited funding instability as among 

the most significant challenges to project management at NASA.

48 Funding instability 

includes situations in which a project receives less money than planned or funds are 

disbursed on a schedule different than planned. Such instability can cause management 

to delay work and consequently development risks may be identified later in the project’s

life cycle, which in turn can lead to cost increases and schedule delays. Interviewees 

noted that funding instability may result from presidential, congressional, or Agencydirected actions. 

Inefficient Management Practices. According to interviewees, funding instability can 

result in inefficient management practices that contribute to poor cost, schedule, and 

performance outcomes. In general, managers may be forced to invest time and effort 

re-planning tasks to fit unexpected funding profiles, deferring critical tasks to later phases 

of development, or de-scoping or discontinuing lower priority tasks to keep project costs 

within the revised budget profile. When it occurs in the early phases of a project, 

inadequate funding decreases management’s ability to identify and address key risks. For 

example, when planned funding does not materialize, project managers may defer 

development of critical technologies to a time when integration of those technologies 

may be more difficult or when the cost of material and labor may be greater. For 

example, the JWST Independent Cost Review Panel noted that deferred work on that 

Project cost two to three times more than original estimates. In addition, shifting tasks to 

later project phases may require mangers to sustain a workforce longer than originally 

planned or add shifts in an attempt to make up for lost time, both of which can lead to 

increased costs. Furthermore, as some tasks are contingent on completion of other 

deliverables, shifting tasks to later phases can have a cascading effect on a project’s 

master schedule resulting in even higher costs. 

As illustrated in Figure 11, funding instability can create a cycle of perpetual funding 

shortfalls by triggering schedule delays and program inefficiencies, which in turn lead to 

additional cost increases and greater risks. 

 

48 In addition, nearly 18 percent of blog submissions collected for this report cited funding stability as a 

challenge to project management.
RESULTS

26 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Figure 11. Cycle of Funding Instability

Moreover, shortfalls in high-priority projects may lead to cuts in other projects when the 

Agency diverts funds from those projects to the higher-priority projects. For example, 

NASA leadership took funds from the budgets of other programs and projects to cover 

cost overruns and schedule delays in the Constellation Program, JWST, and MSL. This 

reactive approach exacerbates NASA’s funding challenges and puts further strains on 

budgets across the Agency. 

A comment we received on our blog captured the nature of this challenge: 

The single biggest challenge to managing a project at NASA is budget uncertainty. A 

project develops a budget to successfully accomplish the implementation of the 

project and, invariably, through the review process that budget is deemed 

unaffordable and [the] project is challenged to succeed with less. A typical approach 

is for the project to be cut in the near years with the cuts replenished in the out years 

causing the funding profile to be back loaded - the very thing it should not be. Starved 

for resource[s] early, the project is left to make inefficient decisions – take on 

technical risks or defer work - that will come home to roost later. On top of that is the 

annual uncertainty of budget approval - both in amount of budget and timing of 

approval – so at each fiscal year boundary the project is force[d] to consider changes 

to their plan that will impact efficient execution of their plan. After a few years the 

plan the project is executing on looks nothing like the plan – schedule and budget 

wise – the project embarked on at the beginning. Some of that change can be 

considered driven by internal events like technologies not panning out as planned, 

parts issues, etc. but the bulk of it is driven by external forces altering their budget.

Funding Gaps

Schedule Delays/ 

Program 

Inefficiencies

Cost and 

Schedule 

Increases/

Additional Risk

Need for 

Additional Funds

Increased 

Pressure on 

Available NASA 

Budgets
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 27

Sources of Funding Instability. Interviewees noted that funding instability originates 

primarily from two sources: external decisions made by the President and Congress and 

internal decisions made within the Agency. Differing priorities advanced by different 

Administrations, the back-and-forth compromise inherent in the legislative process, and

significant delays in enacting an annual budget affect the amounts of funding NASA 

receives each fiscal year and when those funds are available. Internally, funds may be 

disbursed to projects later than planned in a project’s life cycle (phasing), the amount of 

funds disbursed to the projects can be less than the budgeted amount, or projects may be 

required to make across-the-board reductions so that funds can be shifted to other 

troubled projects. 

External Decisions Made by the President and Congress. According to interviewees, 

shifting space policy priorities from the President and Congress and the vagaries of the 

annual appropriations process present major challenges to project management at 

NASA.

49

Shifting Space Policy Priorities. Like all Federal agencies, NASA’s priorities are subject 

to change based on the election cycle. However, because NASA projects are typically 

developed and executed over multiple years, the Agency is particularly sensitive to 

abrupt changes in its agenda. As the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. 

Space Program noted: 

Clearly, any program that involves goals demanding 5, 10 or even 30 years for their 

achievement must enjoy a solid underpinning of broad, enduring support. The 

alternative is to suffer through a prolonged sequence of projects that are started, 

stopped, and restarted, only to be modified again and again.50

This dilemma is no more apparent than in the twist and turns of NASA’s effort to develop 

a follow-on program to the Space Shuttle. In 2004, President George W. Bush directed 

NASA to retire the Shuttle and develop spacecraft and launch vehicles to return humans 

to the Moon by 2020, with the eventual goal of landing on Mars. However, the resulting 

Constellation Program experienced technical and budgetary issues that resulted in 

significant cost and schedule overruns. Shortly after President Obama took office in 

2009, a special committee found that NASA’s plans for human exploration beyond low 

Earth orbit were “not viable” under the existing funding profile and that major 

components of the Constellation Program would be significantly delayed. Based on the 

committee’s findings, President Obama cancelled Constellation and proposed a space 

policy that emphasized the use of commercial companies to provide transportation to low 

Earth orbit and stressed investment in technologies to enable future human exploration of 

 

49 If an agency’s annual appropriation has not been enacted by the start of the fiscal year, Congress often 

passes a series of stop-gap funding bills known as “continuing resolutions” to fund agencies for several 

weeks or months, generally at the same level as the previous year. Continuing resolutions must be 

passed by both houses of Congress and signed by the President.

50 Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, December 17, 1990, 

http://history.nasa.gov/augustine/racfup1.htm (accessed August 20, 2012). 
RESULTS

28 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

space beyond Earth’s orbit. The policy did not include plans for NASA to develop a 

heavy-lift rocket in the near term. 

Some members of Congress 

disagreed with the 

President’s proposal and 

inserted language in an 

appropriation bill that 

prevented NASA from 

terminating Constellationrelated contracts without 

congressional approval. 

Congress and the President 

reached a compromise in 

October 2010 with the 

enactment of an Authorization Act that gave NASA the 

go-ahead to terminate 

Constellation but preserved 

some of the Program’s major 

components in the form of a 

heavy-lift architecture and a 

multi-purpose crew vehicle 

(see Figure 12) to take astronauts beyond low Earth orbit. 

Even after enactment of this legislation, the Administration and Congress continued to 

debate the relative funding levels and priority that should be given to the heavy-lift 

program versus NASA’s efforts to develop a commercial space transportation capability. 

For example, NASA’s 2012 appropriation contained $406 million to develop a 

commercial crew transportation capability, less than half the $850 million the Agency 

had requested. As a result, NASA revised its commercial crew acquisition strategy and 

announced that there would be a 2-year delay in the operational deployment of the 

capability.

Continuing Resolutions. Since its creation in 1959, NASA has received its annual 

appropriation at the start of the new fiscal year only seven times (see Figure 13). Most 

years the Agency has operated under weeks- or months-long continuing resolutions that 

generally set funding at the prior year’s level. 

Figure 12. The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle being 

assembled and tested at a Lockheed Martin's facility in 

Colorado.

Source: NASA 
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 29

Figure 13. Enactment of NASA Appropriations

According to interviewees, starting the fiscal year without an approved budget can have

both immediate and long-term repercussions for NASA projects. First, when a project 

that was counting on increased funding to accomplish planned tasks is held to the 

previous year’s funding levels, work may be delayed, which can affect the project’s 

ability to stay on cost and schedule. 

Second, continuing resolutions may carry forward language from previous years’ 

appropriations that limit the Agency’s ability to make necessary program changes. For 

example, as previously discussed, a series of continuing resolutions in FY 2011 

perpetuated a restriction in NASA’s 2010 appropriations law that prevented the Agency 

from cancelling the Constellation Program or terminating related contracts. In a January 

2011 letter to Congress, the OIG noted that due to this restriction NASA was spending 

$215 million on Constellation projects that the Agency would otherwise have considered

cancelling or significantly scaling back. 

Third, when operating under continuing resolutions NASA cannot begin new projects. In 

December 2010 testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and 

Transportation, NASA’s Chief Financial Officer discussed the challenges NASA faced 

while operating under a continuing resolution as it attempted to set a new path following 
RESULTS

30 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

cancellation of the Constellation Program.51 In addition, she noted that NASA and the 

Department of Energy could not fund the restart of Plutonium-238 production and 

identified projects in the Chief Technologist’s Office and the Aeronautics Research 

Mission Directorate whose schedules were negatively impacted by continuing resolution 

limitations.

52 

Internal Decisions Made Within the Agency. While external factors contribute to 

funding instability, according to many interviewees internal Agency decisions also play 

an important role. Within the confines set by the Agency’s annual appropriation laws, 

NASA managers decide when and how resources are dispensed. Agency decisions to 

withhold or delay funding from certain projects often force project managers to push key 

project tasks to the future, which can lead to schedule delays and cost increases.

Receiving Less Funding than Requested. If a project receives less money than expected, 

managers must adapt to the more restrictive funding profile and re-plan work. This may 

mean moving tasks – such as maturing critical technologies and reducing other risks – 

into the future. As previously discussed, delaying such tasks may mean that project 

personnel do not identify significant technical and development challenges until later in 

the project’s life cycle, which can lead to cost and schedule increases.

Kepler is an example of a project that suffered cost increases and schedule delays due to 

internal NASA funding decisions. NASA management cut $35 million from the Kepler 

Project’s FY 2005 budget, forcing the cessation of significant work, interrupting the 

overall flow and scheduling for staff and production, and requiring a renegotiation of 

contracts. This 1-year funding shortfall contributed to an overall 20-month delay in the 

Project’s schedule and about $169 million in cost growth. Furthermore, to accommodate 

these increases NASA took money from the Wide-Field Infrared Survey Explorer 

Project, which caused cost increases and schedule delays in that Project – an effect 

discussed in further detail below. 

In addition to receiving an adequate overall amount of funding, projects are also 

dependent on receiving funding at the right times during the project’s life cycle. If 

funding profiles are not synchronized with the required work effort, projects can suffer 

cost growth. Specifically, predictable phasing and receipt of funds can help managers 

direct projects more effectively by optimizing staff schedules, enabling better 

management of funds to cover obligations, and enhancing the ability to track remaining 

margins and reserves more accurately. 

 

51 “Statement of Elizabeth M. Robinson, Chief Financial Officer, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate,” 

December 1, 2010. Available at 

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/503001main_NASA%20testimony%20for%20SCST%20hearing%20on%2012

-1%20FINAL%20(11-30-10).pdf (accessed August 20, 2012).

52 Plutonium-238 is used as a fuel to power electrical systems on NASA missions when solar power is not 

practical, such as for the MSL or missions to the outer planets.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 31

Conversely, unpredictable phasing and receipt of funds can lead to inefficiencies. As 

previously noted, unstable funding may make it difficult for a project to obtain sufficient 

resources to address technological issues in the early project phases. Furthermore, to 

maintain continued operations with limited funding, project managers are sometimes 

forced to shift tasks to later project phases, which may mask cost impacts and increase 

risk. 

For example, an unstable funding stream 

has extended the development schedule 

of the Capsule Parachute Assembly 

System Project associated with the 

Orion space capsule (see Figure 14). 

The Project’s FY 2011–FY 2013 test 

plan included high altitude parachute 

deployment testing to validate models 

and parachute loads. However, because 

the adjusted FY 2012 budget could not 

support these tests, they had to be 

deferred and replaced with lower 

altitude parachute deployment tests. 

Although the lower altitude tests were 

necessary, this change in test sequencing 

means that the Project will need to 

repeat several of the lower altitude tests 

once the high altitude tests are 

completed. Although it is difficult to 

determine at this point the effect this 

will have on cost, it is clear that the 

Project lost the efficiency of performing 

the tests in the preferred sequence and 

that managers will have to repeat some testing later in the development cycle. 

Across-the-Board Cuts to Help Troubled High-Priority Projects. Interviewees stated that 

when highly visible flagship missions like the Constellation Program or JWST 

experience cost growth, NASA leadership often takes funds from the budgets of other 

missions to cover those increased costs. This not only makes it difficult for project 

managers to manage their projects, but also has a ripple effect that increases the difficulty 

of managing the Agency’s overall portfolio. A former NASA official commented that 

paying for overruns on poorly run projects by cutting back or delaying projects that 

stayed within their budgets effectively penalizes the projects that performed well from a 

budget perspective. 

For example, while still in the formulation phase NASA reduced the Global Precipitation 

Measurement (GPM) Project’s budget by approximately $270 million from what was 

planned for FYs 2005 through 2008 to accomplish other goals in the President’s Vision 

Figure 14. Test of Orion’s parachute assembly 

system following release from an Air Force C-17 

cargo plane on February 29, 2012.

Source: NASA 
RESULTS

32 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

for Space Exploration.53,54 As illustrated in Table 3, as a result of these funding cuts the 

acquisition cycle for GPM increased, which in turn caused a 3-year launch delay and cost 

growth in excess of 50 percent for one of the Project’s primary instruments. 

Table 3: GPM Budget and Launch Date Changes Due to Budget Reductions 

(dollars in millions) 

Program 

Operating Plan 

Year

FY 2004 President’s 

Budget Submission

Final Approved 

FY Funding Estimated Launch Date

FY 2005 $44.2 $29.1 June 2010

FY 2006 $99.3 $24.7 December 2012

FY 2007 $155.9 $28.8 June 2013

FY 2008 $143.8 $89.7 June 2013

FY 2005–2008 

Total $443.2 $172.3 3-year launch delay

Similarly, in FY 2012 NASA moved $156 million from other projects within the Science 

Mission Directorate and from the Cross-Agency Support account to cover significant lifecycle cost increases in the JWST Project.

55 Other missions, such as the Wide-Field 

Infrared Survey Telescope, have been postponed to make funding available for JWST.56 

In another example, NASA announced in 2012 that it was pulling out of an agreement 

with the European Space Agency on two future Mars missions and planned to reevaluate 

its Mars exploration strategy to accommodate a more restricted funding profile. 

Managing Funding Instability. Whatever its origin, lack of stable funding creates 

inefficiencies and makes it more difficult for project managers to effectively manage the 

cost, schedule, and performance risks of their projects. However, funding instability has 

been a long-standing feature of the Federal budget and Agency processes, and given the 

current constrained fiscal environment is likely to become even more common in the 

future. Furthermore, interviewees noted that the Agency itself sometimes underestimates 

the cost and schedule needed to complete a project in order to gain initial support and 

funding. 

 

53 The Vision for Space Exploration was a plan announced in 2004 by President Bush in the aftermath of 

the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster. Under the plan, NASA returned the Space Shuttles to flight to 

complete construction of the International Space Station, retired the Space Shuttle Program, and then 

began developing the next generation of crew transportation vehicles for exploration of the Moon and

Mars. 

54 NASA initiated the GPM mission in 2001 to build upon the success of the Tropical Rainfall Measuring 

Mission and provide more accurate measurements of global precipitation. The GPM Project has 

undergone changes in scope and in October 2011, due to instrument development issues NASA replanned the mission with a launch in June 2014.

55 The total amount was split evenly between the Science Mission Directorate and Cross-Agency Support. 

NASA’s Cross-Agency Support funds the operation and administration of Agency-wide services such as 

human capital management, security, and maintenance of real property assets that cannot be directly 

aligned to a specific program or project requirement. 

56 The Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope is a NASA observatory designed to settle essential questions 

in both exoplanet and dark energy research.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 33

Given these issues, we believe that NASA management should increase efforts to 

determine the extent to which funding instability impacts NASA projects and to clarify 

the cause and effect relationship between funding instability and project cost increases, 

schedule delays, and performance problems. In our judgment, squarely addressing these 

issues would facilitate development of effective risk mitigation plans for managing fiscal 

disruptions in NASA projects. In the absence of effective risk mitigation plans, unstable 

funding will likely continue to be a disruptive feature of project management. 

Project Manager Development Opportunities Are Limited

NASA does too few development programs to get people 

the acquisition experience they need. 

 – Comment Received on OIG Blog

Interviewees identified a number of emerging issues that could affect NASA’s ability to 

manage its projects in the future effectively. First, they stated that the limited number of 

small and mid-size projects in NASA’s current portfolio allows too few opportunities for 

Agency personnel to gain experience managing a project’s cost, schedule, and technical 

performance efforts. For example, Explorer and Discovery missions provide less 

experienced project managers the opportunity to lead smaller, lower risk, cost-capped 

missions.57 However, the Agency has sponsored fewer of these missions and spaced 

them farther apart than originally planned. Second, the interviewees expressed concern 

that an increased reliance on contractors to design and build projects has led to a decline 

in Agency personnel with development experience. Finally, interviewees stated that 

NASA engineers are primarily operating as overseers of work performed by contractors 

rather than gaining experience building instruments and spacecraft in-house. As a result,

interviewees fear NASA will have an insufficient number of experienced project 

managers in the future to effectively manage the Agency’s high-priority projects. 

Project Management Development. Agency officials described the role of project 

manager as one of the most difficult jobs at NASA. One summarized the needed skill set 

as requiring the aptitude of a politician and the experience, discipline, and insight to 

know when to ask those with more experience for help. Interviewees cited attributes 

such as technical expertise, leadership skills, interpersonal skills, integrity, experience, an 

understanding of the budget process, and both a programmatic and institutional 

knowledge base as essential elements for a project manager. Additionally, Agency 

officials said project managers must have a good balance of cost, schedule, and technical 

knowledge to make informed decisions when these priorities are in conflict. 

 

57 Explorer missions are small to medium-sized science missions costing up to $180 million, including 

launch vehicle costs, that are capable of being built, tested, and launched in a relatively short time 

interval. Discovery missions are planetary science missions with total costs not to exceed $425 million, 

excluding launch vehicle costs. 
RESULTS

34 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

We found that most of NASA’s current project managers are seasoned professionals: 

80 percent of the project managers interviewed had over 20 years of project management 

experience and 78 percent were formally certified as project managers. Most project 

managers and senior officials we spoke with commented that experience and on-the-job 

training more than formal training are key attributes to enabling personnel to manage the 

cost, schedule, and performance goals of a NASA project successfully. One project 

manager noted that “taking classes will give you the tools, but where you really learn is 

listening to guys – men and women – talk about their experiences, and how they 

overcame their issues; what worked and what didn’t.” Project managers also commented

on the value of mentoring, noting that it was the most important part of their professional 

development. Eighty-three percent of the project managers we interviewed said they 

were mentored either through NASA’s formal mentoring program or informally as they 

progressed through their careers. 

Reduced Number of Small Missions. Interviewees expressed concern that as the 

number of large flagship missions has increased over the years, NASA no longer has 

enough small missions to provide a training ground for new project managers. In 2006 

the National Research Council reported on this issue, stating that NASA’s imbalance of 

small and large science projects would have significant impacts on the ability of the 

Agency to meet its science mission goals.58 

Project managers said the decline in the number of small development projects deprives 

NASA of an important pipeline to train new and rising project managers. Specifically, 

managers described NASA’s small projects as invaluable training grounds for developing 

management skills and learning the key elements of project management, such as 

understanding and managing cost, schedule, and performance elements and making 

appropriate trade-offs among these elements when necessary. For example, a project 

manager for JWST began his career with NASA in 1979 serving as a team member on 

the Hubble Space Telescope Project. After Hubble, he became the project manager for 

the Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment and later the project manager for the Landsat 

Data Continuity Mission prior to becoming the project manager for JWST.

59 Although 

project managers receive training and project management certification, interviewees 

raised a concern that without these smaller projects to develop essential project 

management skills NASA managers will not be adequately equipped to effectively 

manage larger and more complex projects in the future. 

Loss of In-House Development Personnel. Interviewees also expressed concern about 

a lack of personnel with development experience. Some expressed the view that as

NASA has increasingly relied on contractors to support project development, the 

Agency’s in-house technical capabilities have declined. To this point, a project manager 

at Kennedy Space Center noted that there were people with development experience on 

 

58 National Research Council, “An Assessment of Balance in NASA’s Science Programs,” 2006.

59 The Solar Radiation and Climate Experiment, launched on January 25, 2003, provides measurements of 

incoming X-ray, ultraviolet, visible, near-infrared, and total solar radiation.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 35

Apollo who transitioned to the Shuttle Program, but after 30 years of Shuttle operations 

there is nobody with development experience left at the Agency to work on the next 

generation of spaceflight vehicles. 

In addition, interviewees indicated that the skills necessary to manage a project during its 

formulation and development are very different from the skills needed to manage an 

operational project. Several Center Directors noted that it is a common practice to 

change managers when a project transitions from formulation to implementation.

Interviewees also expressed concern that because NASA contracts out the majority of its 

hardware and software development efforts to private industry, NASA engineers spend 

most of their time overseeing contractor efforts rather than building space flight 

components and systems themselves. While much of the Agency’s hardware and 

software development has always been contracted to private industry, interviewees 

expressed the opinion that the proportion of work being performed by private industry is 

becoming increasingly unbalanced. These interviewees believe that as a result NASA 

engineers have limited opportunities to gain practical hands-on experience.

Finally, some interviewees stated they fear that NASA will not be able to attract and 

retain recent graduates or experienced engineers who are seeking opportunities to design 

and build hardware and software and integrate systems. Instead, these individuals will 

choose positions in private industry, and as experienced engineers retire, NASA will lose 

this core capability.

Conclusion: Strong Leadership Required to Accomplish 

Meaningful Change

Over the years, NASA has made significant achievements exploring space, helping 

understand Earth’s environment, and conducting fundamental research in aeronautics 

disciplines. However, consistently managing the Agency’s science and space exploration 

projects to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals remains elusive. Given the 

anticipated funding challenges likely for all Federal agencies in the years ahead, changes 

to the way NASA develops and manages its projects are imperative. At the same time, 

the Agency is undergoing considerable changes in mission focus, with the end of the 

Space Shuttle Program and the first steps on a new path toward human space exploration. 

Collectively, these factors both necessitate and provide an opportunity for the Agency to 

reset itself and take positive steps toward meaningful change in the way its projects are 

developed and managed. 

To its credit, NASA has taken several steps in the last few years aimed at curbing cost 

growth and schedule delays. For example, the Agency has implemented new policies 

requiring probabilistic cost and schedule analysis that produces a Joint Cost and Schedule 

Confidence Level (JCL) to assist managers with cost and schedule estimating while 

enabling the Agency to evaluate more accurately whether projects have an executable 
RESULTS

36 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

plan as they proceed into implementation. NASA believes that this focus on probabilistic 

analysis has helped projects such as the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, Juno, 

and the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution meet cost and schedule goals.60 

Furthermore, in response to a 2007 GAO report highlighting NASA’s lack of emphasis 

on cost controls and program outcomes, the Agency issued a Corrective Action Plan that

established a definition of success that includes completing all development projects 

within 110 percent of the cost and schedule baseline and meeting Level 1 requirements 

for 90 percent of the major development projects in its portfolio.

61,62 NASA is hoping to 

achieve the Corrective Action Plan’s criteria for success by FY 2013 by implementing 

the policies and processes on new projects while tracking and reporting the measures for 

existing projects.63 

Moreover, NASA’s new program and project management policy requires that project 

plans document baseline and threshold values for the performance metrics to be achieved 

at each key decision point (KDP) and mission success criteria associated with the 

program-level requirements that, if not met, trigger consideration of a Termination 

Review.64 Further, project plans are required to document how the project will 

periodically report cost and schedule performance and provide a mitigation and 

corrective action plan in the event the project exceeds development cost estimates. 

Recently, NASA seems to be holding project managers more accountable for meeting 

cost cap agreements as evidenced by its decision in May 2012 to cancel the Gravity and 

Extreme Magnetism Small Explorer mission because development costs were likely to 

exceed the project’s agreed-upon budget. 

In our judgment, meeting the challenges outlined in this report can only be realized 

through a “unity of effort” that includes strong, consistent, and sustained leadership by 

the President, Congress, and NASA management. Clear and consistent leadership from 

the President and Congress is an essential first step toward ensuring that project managers 

are positioned to complete projects within cost, schedule, and performance estimates. 

Articulating a clear, unified, and sustaining vision for the Agency and providing the 

necessary resources to execute that vision is a critical cornerstone of success. 

For their part, NASA leaders must temper the Agency’s historic culture of optimism by 

requiring realistic cost and schedule estimates, well-defined and stable requirements, and 

 

60 The Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory mission launched on September 10, 2011, to study the 

Moon’s interior. Juno launched on August 5, 2011, to investigate the structure and history of Jupiter and 

is scheduled to arrive at the planet in July 2016. The Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution mission is 

scheduled to launch in late 2013 to investigate the Martian atmosphere. 

61 GAO, “NASA Plan for Improvement in the GAO High-Risk Area of Contract Management,” dated 

October 31, 2007, and updated through January 31, 2008.

62 A Level 1 requirement is a project’s fundamental and basic set of requirements levied by the Program or 

Headquarters on the project.

63 NASA’s current set of major development projects were all underway prior to implementation of the 

Corrective Action Plan. These projects will gradually be completed (NASA’s typical timeline for 

development is 4 years) and replaced with projects that will be fully subject to the Plan. 

64 NPR 7120.5E, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,” August 14, 2012.
RESULTS

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 37

mature technologies early in project development. In addition, they must ensure that 

funding is adequate and properly phased and that funding instability is identified as a risk 

and accounted for in risk mitigation strategies. Finally, they must be willing to take 

remedial action – up to and including termination – when these critical project elements 

are not present. 

Although technological innovation and mission success as defined by scientific

advancement and discovery are central to NASA’s core existence, an appropriate balance

needs to be struck that also recognizes the importance of meeting project cost and 

schedule goals. Accordingly, we believe that NASA needs to find ways to reward 

managers for good stewardship of NASA’s resources as enthusiastically as it does for 

successful technological achievements. Likewise, NASA leadership should hold 

managers appropriately accountable for mismanagement of resources. With renewed 

focus on and appropriate recognition of technical, cost, and schedule risks and rewards, 

NASA project managers will be better positioned to meet the performance goals expected 

by Congress and the U.S. taxpayer. 

Management’s Comments and Evaluation of Management’s 

Comments

Management’s Comments. The Chief Engineer generally concurred with the 

challenges we outlined and stated that the Agency has implemented a number of 

performance improvement actions. Specifically, the Chief Engineer pointed to an 

increased management focus during the formulation phase, the application of joint 

confidence levels, and a refined life-cycle review process to guard against making 

commitments based on overly optimistic plans. He also stated that NASA now uses 

Formulation Agreements to document agreed-upon expectations between project 

managers and the Agency.

The Chief Engineer acknowledged that internal and external funding instability impacts 

project management and stated that NASA has implemented a number of reviews and 

agreements to establish expectations with project managers to facilitate open discussion 

and early identification of impacts resulting from changes in funding due to internal 

factors. However, he stated that external changes to funding profiles are more difficult to 

control and the Agency advises project managers to account for continuing resolutions 

and notify stakeholders when external funding decisions are likely to result in negative 

outcomes. The Chief Engineer also agreed with the need for maturing and retaining an 

experienced workforce to lead NASA projects. He pointed out that NASA has been 

recognized for its project leadership training and other knowledge sharing initiatives and 

is targeting early career professionals in its recruitment program. 

Evaluation of Management’s Comments. We agree that these initiatives, if properly 

implemented, could help NASA mitigate the challenges we identified in this report. We 

also agree with the Chief Engineer that NASA’s culture of optimism is necessary for the 
RESULTS

38 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Agency to accomplish the challenging tasks it undertakes. However, the Agency’s 

response did not address our primary conclusion regarding the need for strong leadership 

by the President, Congress, and the Agency to address these persistent challenges. 

Without such leadership, it will be difficult for NASA to effectively implement the 

initiatives the Agency has identified much less overcome the long-standing challenges to 

meeting the cost, schedule, and performance goals of the Agency’s science and space 

exploration projects. 
APPENDIXES

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 39

APPENDIX A 

Scope and Methodology

We performed this review from February 2011 through August 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. 

We conducted interviews across multiple levels of current and former NASA 

management and two parties external to NASA in order to collect opinions and attitudes 

about NASA project management practices and to identify project management practices 

and challenges that contribute to ongoing cost overruns, schedule delays, and 

performance shortfalls. In addition, we reviewed project plans and project management 

criteria to determine compliance with project success criteria, and internal controls as 

they related to the overall audit objective.

For the audit’s survey phase, we conducted structured interviews of four levels of project 

management (project manager, deputy project manager, deputy project manager for 

resources, and head technical representative) on selected projects. The projects were 

selected judgmentally according to geographical location and recommendations from 

NASA Headquarters:

• Global Precipitation Measurement, Goddard Space Flight Center 

• Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory, Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) 

• Landsat Data Continuity Mission, Goddard 

For the audit phase, our approach changed to interviewing only project managers because 

we found in the survey phase that responses between the four levels of project 

management generally were consistent. The change in our approach allowed the team to 

obtain more interviews of a greater number of project managers. Project managers were 

chosen by statistical sampling from the six NASA development Centers: 

• Goddard Space Flight Center 

• Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

• Johnson Space Center
APPENDIX A 

40 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

• Kennedy Space Center

• Marshall Space Flight Center

• Stennis Space Center

The sample universe consisted of 129 former and current NASA project managers, 

regardless of certification. We developed the universe of 129 project managers from lists 

provided by each of the NASA development centers, which we reconciled against the list 

provided by Headquarters to determine accuracy. For selecting project managers for 

interview, we used the attribute sample design with the method of selection being simple 

random sample. Our sample size was determined by using Winstats 1.0 and the universe 

of 129 project managers with an estimated attribute error rate of 10 percent and a desired 

precision or standard error rate of 5 percent. As a result, Winstats 1.0 projected a sample 

size of 41 project managers based on an 80 percent confidence level, with an estimated 

mean of 10 percent and estimated 30 percent standard deviation. 

In addition, we interviewed the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, Associate 

Administrators, Center Directors, a former NASA Administrator, former senior NASA

staff, and external parties. Overall, we interviewed 85 personnel. For a list of 

interviewees, see Appendix B. 

From these interviews, we identified four common themes related to NASA project 

management challenges, as discussed in the report: 

• Optimistic organizational culture. 

• Technical complexity of NASA projects. 

• Unstable funding. 

• Project manager development.

During the course of the audit, we also solicited input from the greater NASA workforce 

via a blog. We received a total of 687 responses via the blog: 243 direct responses, 390 

“thumbs up” (like or agree) responses, and 54 “thumbs down” (dislike or disagree) 

responses to the posted comments. Comments received via the blog were consistent with 

the comments received during interviews with the 41 project managers. 

Use of Computer-Processed Data. In order to identify the universe of project managers 

for this audit, we assessed the reliability of computer-processed data by comparing lists 

of project managers from Headquarters and six NASA Centers. We also analyzed 

Internet generated blog responses via 

http://wwwl.nasa.gov/offices/oig/agencyinput/index.html from September 21, 2011, 

through October 20, 2011. The blog was monitored by OIG personnel for appropriate 

content and duplicate responses. Although we did not test the general or application 
APPENDIX A 

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 41

controls of any of these systems, we compared results and monitored the data, to the 

extent possible, to determine that the data was valid and reliable to support our objectives 

and conclusions.

Review of Internal Controls 

We reviewed NASA policies and procedures related to project management to determine 

NASA’s internal controls for project managers’ responsibilities for monitoring and 

oversight of cost, schedule, and performance requirements. We found that NASA 

Procedural Requirements require projects to have quantifiable and measurable 

performance metrics and to document the success criteria that, if not met, trigger 

consideration of a Termination Review. We found that NASA policy supports technical 

performance success criteria. However, Agency policy does not provide mission success 

criteria that holds projects accountable for cost and schedule performance. In addition,

project plans reviewed supported that mission success is defined in terms of technical 

specifications only. Specific internal controls reviewed included: 

• NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5D, “Space Flight Program and 

Project Management Requirements,” March 6, 2007 

• NASA Interim Directive 7120-97, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project 

Management Requirements,” September 28, 2011, for NPR 7120.5D 

• NPR 7120.5E, “NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management 

Requirements,” August 14, 2012 

• NPD 1000.5, “Policy for NASA Acquisition,” Revalidated March 17, 2010 

• NASA’s GAO High-Risk Corrective Action Plan Executive Summary, 

September 26, 2008 

Project plans reviewed for mission success criteria: 

• Deep Impact Discovery Project

• James Webb Space Telescope 

• Landsat Data Continuity Mission 

• Mars Atmosphere and Volatile Evolution 

• Mars Science Laboratory 

• Orbiting Carbon Observatory–2 

• Soil Moisture Active Passive 
APPENDIX A 

42 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

In addition, for the survey phase we reviewed NASA’s Procurement Management 

Review Reports (formerly Procurement Management Surveys) website by Center and 

year. We reviewed Management Review Reports for Goddard (calendar years 2007 and 

2009) and JPL (calendar years 2005 and 2008) and found no reviews pertaining to 

project management practices of the Global Precipitation Measurement, Landsat Data 

Continuity Mission, or the Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory Projects.

Prior Coverage

The NASA OIG has issued seven reports and GAO has issued 12 reports, listed below, 

related to project management practices. The reports describe significant challenges 

project managers face regarding cost overruns, schedule delays, and ineffective 

management practices of large-scale projects. Two of the GAO reports identified NASA 

and Department of Defense cultural systemic weaknesses in their acquisition processes 

and cost growth in agency projects In addition, we reviewed five reports by other 

entities, such as a Mishap Investigation Board, that we found of particular significance 

regarding project management practices. Unrestricted NASA and GAO reports can be 

accessed at http://oig.nasa.gov and http://www.gao.gov. 

NASA Office of Inspector General

“A Review of NASA’s Replacement of Radiation Monitoring Equipment on the 

International Space Station” (IG-11-027, September 29, 2011) 

“NASA’s Challenges Certifying and Acquiring Commercial Crew Transportation 

Services” (IG-11-022, June 30, 2011) 

“NASA’s Management of the Mars Science Laboratory Project” (IG-11-019, June 8, 

2011) 

“NASA’s Management of the NPOESS Preparatory Project” (IG-11-018, June 2, 2011) 

“Review of NASA’s Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System” (IG-10-023, 

September 21, 2010) 

“The Landsat Program Is Not Meeting the Goals and Intent of the Land Remote Sensing 

Policy Act of 1992” (IG-09-021, September 2, 2009) 

“Final Memorandum on Audit of NASA’s Global Precipitation Measurement Project” 

(IG-08-016-R, March 31, 2008) 
APPENDIX A 

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 43

Government Accountability Office

“NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (GAO-12-207SP, March 1, 

2012) 

“NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (GAO-11-239SP, March 3, 

2011) 

“NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (GAO-10-227SP, February 1, 

2010) 

“NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects” (GAO-09-306SP, March 2, 

2009) 

“High-Risk Series: An Update” (GAO-11-278, February 2011) 

“NASA: Projects Need More Disciplined Oversight and Management to Address Key 

Challenges” (GAO-09-436T, March 5, 2009) 

“High-Risk Series: An Update” (GAO-07-310, January 2007) 

“NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope: Knowledge-Based Acquisition Approach Key 

to Addressing Program Challenges,” (GAO-06-634, July 14, 2006) 

“Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to 

Improve Outcomes” (GAO-06-110, November 2005) 

“NASA: Lack of Disciplined Cost-Estimating Processes Hinders Effective Program 

Management” (GAO-04-642, May 2004) 

“NASA Program Costs: Space Missions Require Substantially More Funding Than 

Initially Estimated” (GAO/NSIAD-93-97, December 1992) 

“Weapons Acquisition: A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change” (GAO/NSIAD-93-15, 

December 1992) 

Other

The Aerospace Corporation: “Explanation of Change (EoC) Cost Growth Study Final 

Results and Recommendations,” Aerospace Report No. ATR-2011(5322)-1, July 1, 2011 

(draft report not publicly available) 

National Resource Council, “Controlling Cost Growth of NASA Earth and Space Science 

Missions,” 2010, available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12946

(accessed August 26, 2012) 
APPENDIX A 

44 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Other (continued)

The Casani Report: “James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Independent Comprehensive 

Review Panel (ICRP),” October 29, 2010, available at 

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/499224main_JWST-ICRP_Report-FINAL.pdf (accessed 

August 20, 2012) 

The Congressional Budget Office, “A Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for 

Space Exploration,” September 2004. Available at 

http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5772/09-02-nasa.pdf

(accessed August 26, 2012) 

Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board: “Report on Project Management in 

NASA,” March 13, 2000, available at 

http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/mars/msp98/misc/MCO_MIB_Report.pdf (accessed 

August 20, 2012) 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 45

INTERVIEWS

The lists below contain the names of those people we interviewed for this audit. The 

positions cited are those held by the interviewees at the time of our interviews. Their 

positions or titles may have since changed.

NASA Headquarters Staff

Interviewee Position

Charles Bolden Administrator

Lori Garver Deputy Administrator

Christopher Scolese Associate Administrator

Jaiwon Shin Associate Administrator for Aeronautics 

Research

Douglas Cooke Associate Administrator for Exploration Systems

William Gerstenmaier Associate Administrator for Space Operations

Michelle Gates Aerospace Technician, Engineer Program 

Management

Lynn Cline Deputy Associate Administrator for Space 

Operations

Kathleen Gallagher Operations Research Analyst, Space Operations

Edward Weiler Associate Administrator for Science

Charles Gay Deputy Associate Administrator for Science

Michael Luther Deputy Associate Administrator for Science

Dan Woods Director, Strategic Integrations and Management

Michael Ryschkewitsch Chief Engineer

Gregory Robinson Deputy Chief Engineer

Center Management

Interviewee Position Center

Robert Strain Center Director Goddard

 Arthur (Rick) Obenschain Deputy Center Director Goddard

 Kelly Ferrell Chief of Staff Goddard

Michael Coats Center Director Johnson

Charles Elachi Center Director JPL

Robert Cabana Center Director Kennedy

Robert Lightfoot Center Director Marshall

Eugene Trinh Center Director NASA Management Office (NMO)

 Norman Schutzberger NMO Oversight NMO

Patrick Scheuermann Center Director Stennis

 Ken Human Associate Center Director Stennis
APPENDIX B 

46 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Former NASA Management

Interviewee Current Position Former NASA Position

Michael Griffin

Eminent Scholar and Professor

Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering

University of Alabama in Huntsville

Administrator

Craig Steidle

Rear Admiral and Visiting Professor

Aerospace Engineering

United States Naval Academy

Associate Administrator for Exploration 

Systems

Alan Stern Director, Florida Space Institute Associate Administrator for Science

External to NASA

Interviewee Position

John Logsdon

Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs at 

George Washington University’s Elliott School of International 

Affairs

Marcia Smith President of Space and Technology Policy Group, LLC

Initial Interviews (by Project)

For initial interviews, we chose three projects and discussions were held with the project 

manager, deputy project manager, deputy project manager for resources, and the 

technical lead. See Appendix A for Scope and Methodology. 

Interviewee Position Project Center

Ardeshir Azarbarzin Project Manager Global Precipitation 

Measurement (GPM) Goddard

Candace Carlisle* Deputy Project Manager GPM Goddard

Jacquelyn Fiora Deputy Project Manager for Resources GPM Goddard

David Ward Mission Systems Engineer GPM Goddard

David Lehman Project Manager

Gravity Recovery 

and Interior 

Laboratory (GRAIL)

JPL

Tom Hoffman Deputy Project Manager GRAIL JPL

Marjorie Raymond Project Business Manager GRAIL JPL

Humphrey Price Project Systems Engineer GRAIL JPL

Phillip Sabelhaus Project Manager

Landsat Data 

Continuity Mission 

(LDCM)

Goddard

William Ochs Project Manager (former) LDCM Goddard

Del Jenstrom Deputy Project Manager LDCM Goddard

Lorrie Eakin Deputy Project Manager for Resources LDCM Goddard

Evan Webb Lead Mission Systems Engineer LDCM Goddard

*Interviewee also selected as part of the statistical sample of project managers. 
APPENDIX B 

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 47

Project Manager Interviews (Statistical Sample)

After initial project interviews were conducted (see “Initial Interviews”), we determined 

for a better representation of Agency Project Management we should interview project 

managers at the six NASA development centers: Goddard (including Wallops), Johnson, 

JPL, Kennedy, Marshall, and Stennis. The statistical sample identified 41 project 

managers for interviews. See Appendix A for Scope and Methodology. 

Interviewee Position Project Center

Preston Burch Associate Director Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Goddard

Candace Carlisle Assistant Engineer Global Precipitation Measurement 

(GPM) Goddard

David Carter

Supervisor Assistant –

Engineer Program 

Management

Ground Network Goddard

Frank Cepollina Associate Director Satellite Servicing Capabilities Office Goddard

Nicholas 

Chrissotimos Associate Director Explorers and Heliophysics Project Division Goddard

Elizabeth Citrin Deputy Associate 

Director Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) Goddard

Roger Clason

Supervisor Assistant –

Engineer Program 

Management

Explorations and Space 

Communication Project Goddard

John Durning Assistant – Engineer 

Program Management James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Goddard

Bryan Fafaul

Supervisor Assistant –

Engineer Program 

Management

GLORY Goddard

Kevin Grady

Supervisor Assistant –

Engineer Program 

Management

Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope 

(WFIRST) Goddard

David Mitchell

Supervisor Assistant –

Engineer Program 

Management

Explorers and Heliophysics Project 

Division (MAVEN) Goddard

Robin Krause Deputy Project Manager GOES-R Ground Goddard

Richard Pickering Deputy Program Manager GOES-R Goddard

Albert Vernacchio

Supervisor Assistant –

Engineer Program 

Management

Space Network Ground Segment 

Sustainment (SGSS) Goddard

Jeffrey Volosin

Assistant Launch and 

Flight Operations

Manager

Explorations and Space 

Communication Project Goddard

Wynn Watson Project Manager Earth Science Mission Operations 

(ESMO) Goddard

Christopher Johnson Project Manager Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) 

Parachute Assembly System Johnson

Kathleen Laurini Project Manager Altair Lunar Lander Johnson

James Lewis Project Manager Low Impact Docking System Johnson

Daryl Peltier Project Manager Space Shuttle Program Flight 

Software Johnson

John Shannon Project Manager Space Shuttle Program Johnson
APPENDIX B 

48 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

Dan Swint Project Manager

NASA Integrated Enterprise 

Management, Aircraft Management 

Module

Johnson

Ralph Basilio Project Manager Orbiting Carbon Observatory II JPL

John Callas Project Manager Mars Exploration Rover JPL

Kent Kellogg Project Manager Soil Moisture Active and Passive JPL

Timothy Larson Project Manager EPOXI (Deep Impact) and Stardust 

Next JPL

Gaylon McSmith Project Manager Mars Odyssey JPL

Glenn Shirtliffe Project Manager Jason-1 JPL

Peter Theisinger Project Manager Mars Science Lab JPL

Philip Varghese Project Manager Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter JPL

Parag Vaze Project Manager Jason-3 and Ocean Surface 

Topography Mission (Jason-2) JPL

Charles Gambaro Project Manager Vehicle Assembly Building Kennedy

Larry Schultz Program Manager Ares/SLS Mobile Launcher Kennedy

Dennon Clardy Mission Manager Discovery New Frontiers Marshall

Michael Kynard Ares Upper Stage Engine 

Element Manager Ares/Space Launch System (SLS) Marshall

Jim Reuter Project Manager Ares/Space Launch System (SLS) Marshall

Jody Singer Deputy Program Manager Space Launch System (SLS) Marshall

Freddie Douglas III Project Manager Office of Safety and Mission 

Assurance Stennis

David Liberto Project Manager AJ-26/RS-68 Liaison Role Stennis

Jay Pittman Chief Range and Mission Management 

Office Wallops

Ronald Walsh Assistant Launch and 

Flight Operations

Range and Mission Management 

Office Wallops
APPENDIX C

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 49

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS
APPENDIX C

50 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 
APPENDIX C

REPORT NO. IG-12-021 51
APPENDIX D 

52 REPORT NO. IG-12-021 

REPORT DISTRIBUTION

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Administrator

Deputy Administrator

Associate Administrator

Chief of Staff

Chief Engineer 

Chief Financial Officer

Associate Administrator for Aeronautics Research 

Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations 

Associate Administrator for Science

NASA Advisory Council’s Audit, Finance, and Analysis Committee 

Director, Goddard Space Flight Center 

Director, Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Director, Johnson Space Center 

Director, Kennedy Space Center

Acting Director, Marshall Space Flight Center

Director, NASA Management Office

Director, Stennis Space Center

Non-NASA Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget

Deputy Associate Director, Energy and Science Division

Branch Chief, Science and Space Programs Branch

Government Accountability Office 

Director, NASA Issues, Office of Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and

Ranking Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Subcommittee on Science and Space

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on Government Organization, Efficiency, and Financial Management

House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
REPORT NO. IG-12-021 53

Major Contributors to the Report: 

Jim Morrison, Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

Ridge Bowman, Director, Space Operations Directorate

Raymond Tolomeo, Director, Science and Aeronautics Research Directorate

Diane Choma, Project Manager

Stephen Siu, Project Manager 

Theresa Becker, Procurement Analyst, Team Lead

Gina Davenport-Brazeau, Auditor 

Gerardo Saucedo, Management Analyst 

Gary Weishaar, Management Analyst

Tiffany Xu, Auditor 

John Womack, Investigator

Arnold Pettis, Data Mining Specialist/Statistician
SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

REPORT No. IG-12-021 

OFFICE OF AUDITS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ADDITIONAL COPIES

Visit http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY12/ to obtain additional copies of this report, or contact the 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits at 202-358-1232. 

COMMENTS ON THIS REPORT

In order to help us improve the quality of our products, if you wish to comment on the quality or 

usefulness of this report, please send your comments to Mr. Laurence Hawkins, Audit Operations and 

Quality Assurance Director, at Laurence.B.Hawkins@nasa.gov or call 202-358-1543. 

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE AUDITS

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Assistant Inspector General for Audits. 

Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC 20546-0001 

NASA HOTLINE

To report fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement, contact the NASA OIG Hotline at 800-424-9183 or 

800-535-8134 (TDD). You may also write to the NASA Inspector General, P.O. Box 23089, L’Enfant 

Plaza Station, Washington, DC 20026, or use http://oig.nasa.gov/hotline.html#form. The identity of 

each writer and caller can be kept confidential, upon request, to the extent permitted by law.