1

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEF

Addressing Côte d’Ivoire’s Deeper Crisis

BY THIERNO MOUCTAR BAH

A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

◆ Côte d’Ivoire will need to overcome its deep social divisions to attain stability.

◆ To reverse the politicization of the military, security sector reform must extend beyond conventional standards and build a force based on the concept of the “Army-Nation” (i.e. the military serving the nation).

◆ Côte d’Ivoire’s peace, security, and development are closely linked to its neighbors, necessitating a subregional strategy for overcoming its ongoing crisis.

HIGHLIGHTS

NO. 19 / MARCH 2012

No one holding the highest office would ever agree to 

leave power and submit to the will of the electorate.

The resolution of Côte d’Ivoire’s traumatic postelection standoff did not mean the end to the country’s troubles, however. If Côte d’Ivoire is to achieve 

stability, it must still address a deeper crisis—one that 

has festered for more than a decade. The roots, consequences, and implications of this crisis are manysided. They stem from an explosive mix of ethnic, 

religious, and land rivalries that have led to a de facto 

division of the country since 2002.

At its core, this crisis is about national identity—what does it mean to be Ivorian in this nation of 

22 million inhabitants? Côte d’Ivoire has long welcomed and benefitted from West African immigrants, 

who have worked the coffee and cocoa plantations in 

the South, generating billions of dollars in exports for 

what was once the economic engine of West Africa. 

Many of these estimated eight million immigrants 

ONGOING FRAGILITY

The May 2011 inauguration of Alassane Ouattara as President of Côte d’Ivoire culminated a tumultuous 5-month transition of power. The unwillingness 

of the incumbent candidate, Laurent Gbagbo, to cede 

power following his electoral defeat eventually led to 

armed conflict between military forces who supported 

Ouattara and those loyal to Gbagbo. This resulted in 

an estimated 3,000 deaths and the involvement of 

forces from the United Nations Operation in Côte 

d’Ivoire (UNOCI). Thousands of rapes, kidnappings, 

and fear of retribution compelled over a million people to flee the country’s commercial capital, Abidjan.

The Ivorian crisis, moreover, has further significance for Africa. If Laurent Gbagbo had been allowed 

to steal the election, a dangerous pattern would have 

been reinforced (building on similar cases in Kenya 

and Zimbabwe) just as presidential elections in Africa 

have become increasingly common and competitive. 
2

and their descendants have lived in the country for 

decades. Still, they are not recognized as citizens. Nor 

is a path to citizenship available to them.

This is the key issue that Côte d’Ivoire must 

come to terms with if it is to move from its current 

polarized environment to reunification and stability. 

If national identity is not fully addressed, other efforts 

taken to stabilize the country will prove futile.

One evident repercussion of the social fragmentation is a fractured security sector. Divisions between 

the national army and the former rebel forces (and 

Ouattara supporters) from the North have become 

entrenched over the years. There is also the need to 

recover from the disintegration of military professionalism. During the electoral crisis, the Ivorian military 

became a partisan actor, throwing its support behind 

losing candidate Laurent Gbagbo.

Now that a new president, whose legitimacy has 

been validated both at home and abroad, has taken 

Dr. Mouctar Thierno Bah, a Military Historian, was a Professor at the University of Yaoundé (Cameroon) from 1976 

to 2009. He has authored numerous books and articles on 

armies, conflict, and issues of security and peace in Africa.
3

office, Côte d’Ivoire requires support in all sectors 

so that it can address the tremendous challenges it 

faces. But what can be done to rebuild, reunite, and 

stabilize this country, including the 47 percent of the 

population that supported Gbagbo?

The stakes are high. Côte d’Ivoire’s stability is 

vital to all of West Africa, which is struggling to recover from the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone 

as well as a legacy of coups across the subregion. The 

infrastructural damage caused by the post-election 

violence combined with the economic stagnation 

of the past decade have had far-reaching economic 

impacts for all of West Africa.

ROOTS OF TOLERANCE

Côte d’Ivoire’s crisis is grounded in its geography and history. The country shares borders with five 

states—Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Liberia. Its name, which translates as Ivory Coast, dates 

back to the period of initial contact with Europeans. 

Domination by France extended from 1883 to 1960, 

during which time it developed in the forest-rich 

coastal South an economy based on coffee and cocoa, 

resulting in the concept of a “useful Côte d’Ivoire” 

that marginalized the North.

While maintaining a one-party political system, 

President Félix Houphouët-Boigny led Côte d’Ivoire 

for 33 years with wisdom and prudence, managing 

to avoid the ethnic conflicts and coups that befell 

neighboring countries. He effectively integrated the 

nation’s disparate regions into a cohesive economy 

such that Côte d’Ivoire became a symbol of prosperity 

and stability. The Ivorian economy doubled in size 

between 1960 and 1980. 

The progressive accumulation of wealth fostered improved communication and urbanization, 

helping to make Côte d’Ivoire a multi-ethnic melting pot, symbolized by the city of Abidjan and its 

five million inhabitants. The country welcomed immigrants from all over the subregion, mainly from 

Burkina Faso, who now account for almost 20 percent of the population. Most immigrants became an 

integral part of the agricultural sector. Local populations, including landowners, however, considered 

immigrants non-natives and marginalized them, 

diminishing their social status.

Houphouët-Boigny’s message of peace and social 

harmony is his most important legacy. Offering land 

to immigrants in exchange for labor on plantations 

and ensuring that members of all ethnic groups were 

represented in positions of power fostered a culture of 

tolerance that persisted throughout his time in power. 

He likewise established a Foundation for Peace, and 

UNESCO named its annual peace prize after him.

Houphouët-Boigny, however, did not endow 

his country with the institutions needed to ensure 

stability after he died in 1993. His political party, 

as in all single-party governments, became ossified. 

Côte d’Ivoire thus faced dire straits derived from 

an undefined process of succession at the end of 

a reign that lasted too long. This was reflected in 

growing levels of corruption and an economy that 

saw a 35 percent contraction in per capita incomes 

between 1979 and 1999.

This institutional fragility set the stage for a military coup in December 1999 led by General Robert 

Guéï. Elections in 2000 intended to legitimize Guéï’s 

rule were discredited when two leading candidates, 

including Alassane Ouattara, were disqualified over 

questions of their parents’ citizenship. Even so, Guéï 

came in second in the elections, leading him to declare them invalid and himself the victor. Subsequent 

riots and attacks on the presidential palace forced 

him to flee.

As the only other major candidate whose name 

appeared on the ballot, Laurent Gbagbo won the 

most votes and was eventually declared president. 

Another coup attempt in 2002 precipitated an aggressive security operation against regions with large 

immigrant populations, causing widespread displacement. The resulting polarization quickly evolved into 

a rebellion and a North-South split of the country. 

A United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation was 

deployed to monitor the ceasefire line.

Although Gbagbo began his political career as 

a democratic reformist, his 10-year reign was fraught 

with intolerance of political dissent, fomenting of 

“Houphouët-Boigny’s message of 

peace and social harmony is his 

most important legacy”
4

ethnic division, manipulation of religious and citizenship tensions, and violence. Despite numerous peace 

agreements to unify the country, Gbagbo’s vitriolic 

rhetoric against immigrants persisted. Citing logistical challenges and voter eligibility disputes, partisan 

officials continually postponed elections slated for 

2005, the end of Gbagbo’s legal mandate. The delays 

enabled Gbagbo to cling to power for 5 more years, 

setting the backdrop to the 2010 elections.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS

As in many sub-Saharan African countries, 

ethnic, regional, and religious divisions have been 

exploited by certain Ivorian politicians over the 

past decade to mobilize a stronger base of support. Five main groups dominate. The Sénoufo, 

Malinké, and Mandé in the North, the majority 

of whom are Muslim, account for roughly 40 percent of the total population. Meanwhile, the Krous 

and Akans in the South, who for the most part are 

Christians, comprise approximately 50 percent of 

all inhabitants. Some 50 other ethnic groups make 

up the remaining 10 percent of the population. 

Immigration on a massive scale has significantly 

highlighted the division between native groups 

in the south and nonnative groups in the North, 

the principal target being the 4 million-strong 

Burkinabé community.

These divisions are not, per se, the catalysts 

of violence, since no atavistic hatred among the 

various ethnic and religious components of the 

population is felt. Rather, certain underlying factors, such as land disputes in the cocoa-producing 

areas, are parlayed onto an intercommunal level, 

poisoning relations.

Unfortunately, the social consensus forged by 

Houphouët-Boigny broke down soon after he died and 

ambitious political entrepreneurs began to fan identity-related tensions. By the late 1990s, this acrimony 

became widespread and public resources were increasingly allocated for political favors rather than to address 

mounting social issues, such as massive unemployment.

It is in this context that the notion of “Ivoirité,” 

distinguishing between “true Ivorians” and nonindigenous immigrants, was theorized. Ivoirité was used to 

exclude Alassane Ouattara, a former prime minister 

under Houphouët-Boigny, from the race to succeed 

the long-time president following his death. More 

generally, Ivoirité barred legitimate aspirations to 

citizenship among northern communities and exacerbated intercommunal tensions.

MILITARY FACTOR AND IMPLICATIONS

The army is an institutional pillar of any nation. Houphouët-Boigny, however, distrusted that 

institution, especially following the coup that overthrew President Kwame Nkrumah in neighboring 

Ghana in 1966. While Houphouët-Boigny sought to 

ensure that internal balances were maintained within the Ivorian Army, he was unwilling to provide it 

with significant assets. He favored the Gendarmerie, 

established an independently organized Presidential 

Guard, and placed the country under the security 

shield of France. This resulted in the formation of 

a military with no obligation to defend the constitution and state institutions. Indeed, it paved the 

way for the dominant and negative role the military would play in Ivorian politics after HouphouëtBoigny’s death, underscored by the military coup in 

December 1999 against Houphouët-Boigny’s successor, President Henri Bedié. A rebel movement 

dubbed the New Forces subsequently took control 

of the entire northern part of the country, with five 

Zone commanders setting themselves up as veritable 

proconsuls. Meanwhile, the national army did nothing to show itself as truly republican in nature. It 

had become ethnicized during the 1990s, especially 

within the Presidential Guard, to the detriment of 

the rule of law and national cohesiveness. 

The 5-month standoff following the 2010 elections was ultimately resolved when the New Forces 

defeated the Gbagbo loyalists with support of the 

UN peacekeeping force that neutralized heavy 

weapons being used against civilians. In this morass, 

a number of different armies, including both regular 

and parallel forces, were involved, including an estimated 5,000 Liberian mercenaries. Motivated by 

the desire for easy profits, often under the influence 

“a military with no obligation to 

defend the constitution”
5

“the United Nations certification 

of the results of the presidential 

elections in Côte d’Ivoire is an 

important precedent”

of drugs, and feared for possessing magical powers, 

these mercenaries committed atrocious crimes. 

Dozons, traditional hunters from the North, were 

also implicated in several post-election massacres.

THE BREAKDOWN OF STATE STRUCTURES

A central lesson from Côte d’Ivoire is that a 

failed electoral process almost always has disastrous 

consequences for a society. It simultaneously elevates the risk of conflict and a new cycle of coups 

d’état. Such was the case following the flawed 

2000 elections in Côte d’Ivoire—and then again 

in 2010.

As elections are the means through which power 

in a democratic society is authorized and legitimated, 

it is during these junctures that the independence of 

state bodies, such as electoral commissions and constitutional courts, is most critical. A lack of independence of such institutions is a root cause of much 

political violence and instability.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the politicization of the Commission Électorale Indépendante (CEI), for example, 

was starkly evident in its unwillingness to address challenges to voter lists, securely distribute electoral material and collect ballots, and announce results of the 

2010 elections in a timely manner. The Constitutional 

Council’s immediate rejection of Ouattara’s victory, 

which even the CEI had validated and the UN Security Council endorsed, fostered further uncertainty that 

led to the violence that soon engulfed the country. 

The tarnished independence of these electoral bodies, 

which grew less reliable over Gbagbo’s decade in power 

as he filled them with loyalists, created an environment in which heavy weapons became the inevitable 

method to settle election-related disputes. 

NEW INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Côte d’Ivoire’s electoral crisis was preceded by 

a long decline perpetuated by strong-willed political 

leaders who operated with limited checks and balances and therefore could freely exploit ethnic and 

regional divides. Overcoming this vulnerability in 

the future will require establishing institutions that 

can constrain powerful politicians who may wish to 

pursue radical or extraconstitutional actions. Specifically, a vigorous legislature is needed to serve as 

a counterweight to the long dominant executive 

branch. The prevailing status quo in Africa, of a 

centralized state under the orders of a monarch-like 

president, must be overcome.

The new parliament must have the authority 

to create a new constitution, oversee security sector reform, and pursue decentralization policies that 

promote balanced development and participatory democracy. In fact, a strong, independent parliament 

could rejuvenate Côte d’Ivoire’s political leadership 

by providing the third postindependence generation 

with opportunities to focus their talents and ideas for 

the benefit of the society. This generational renewal 

will also help deescalate engrained bitterness and 

political polarization. The decision by the opposition party (largely composed of Gbagbo loyalists) to 

boycott the parliament is a lost opportunity to reduce 

this divisiveness. 

Closely linked to creating an effective parliament is establishing a credible, capable, and independent CEI. This is imperative in order to assure 

all parties that they have a viable, legal means 

through which they can compete for power. The 

high stakes of elections require independent structures that operate both upstream and downstream in 

the electoral process.

This matter is so central that if domestic structures are too fragile or politicized to play this role 

effectively, then the engagement of outside bodies, such as the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) and the UN, should 

be considered. The United Nations certification 

of the results of the 2010 presidential elections in 

Côte d’Ivoire is an important precedent in that regard. While this approach has obvious drawbacks, 

these are less costly than the armed intervention 

that ensued—a point underscored by the violence 

that surrounded disputed electoral processes in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo and Senegal 

subsequent to the Ivorian crisis. 
6

B U I L D I N G A U N I F I E D A N D R E P U B L I C A N 

SECURITY FORCE

Security sector reform is key to normalizing 

Côte d’Ivoire. Even though he achieved victory 

through the enforcement capacity of the New 

Forces, Ouattara must find a way to extricate himself from the military spiral. Given that he also 

received support from the UNOCI and French 

peacekeeping forces, he must provide reassurance 

that he is not the candidate parachuted in by the 

former colonial power. From this perspective, the 

creation of a unified and republican army must be 

a priority for his administration.

Ouattara must focus on restoring professionalism 

in the army and other security sector bodies while 

at the same time depoliticizing them. Every president since Houphouët-Boigny has altered the ethnic 

composition of the military to favor his own ethnic 

group.1 By putting an end to this destructive cycle, 

Ouattara would demonstrate by his actions that he is 

committed to reunification.

Removing paramilitary threats, particularly 

in the west of the country, is also among the most 

pressing challenges. This requires a solution that is 

more multifaceted than a traditional demobilization, 

disarmament, and reintegration approach. Vigorous yet flexible training must provide government 

security personnel with the skills necessary to forcefully stamp out illegal armed groups, most of whom 

are generally young traditional hunters patrolling 

their areas of origin but also include militia and foreign mercenaries. Incentivized social rehabilitation 

projects for ex-combatants and close consultation 

with relevant local chiefs and leaders are necessary 

components.

The plan of quotas, using elements from opposing armies to recast the army, is doomed to fail. 

Rather, objective recruitment, including of youth 

who have not taken part in past conflicts, and a 

selection process that is based on intellectual and 

professional competences, is the ideal formula the 

government should use to rebuild the Ivorian armed 

forces. The fight against the culture of impunity is 

also an imperative.

However, security sector reform must exceed 

conventional standards. It is important to eliminate 

the seeds of division in society that contaminated the 

armed forces. Ultimately a new ethic and a new vision of the security architecture must be promoted, 

inspired by the concept of the Army-Nation as the 

guarantor of harmonious civil-military relations. Senegal is a valuable model in this regard. In addition to 

its mission of defense, the armed forces in Senegal 

play a key role in natural disaster response and national infrastructure efforts. Replicating these principles in Côte d’Ivoire could help repair civil-military 

relations and regain sociopolitical stability. 

RECONCILIATION AND PEACE

To advance a unifying theme of peace, President 

Ouattara has established an 11-member Commission 

of Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation inspired by 

the South African model. While the South Africa 

experience will doubtless prove helpful, Ivorians will 

have more to gain by reflecting on their own realities, 

cultures, and historical background.

The Commission should draw from mechanisms of conflict resolution and restoration of 

peace used in the traditional kingdoms and communities of Côte d’Ivoire. Adopting many of these 

time-honored practices, including palavers and 

parenté à plaisanterie, or kinship joking, whose cathartic function is to defuse intercommunity tensions, can give political decisionmakers and mediators modalities to neutralize conflict rhetoric and 

promote a culture of peace. This was the creed of 

Houphouët-Boigny.

A central feature of any reconciliation strategy 

will be to renegotiate the notion of citizenship in a 

more inclusive way and banish the concept of “Ivoirité.” Côte d’Ivoire is a multiethnic society largely 

shaped by immigration. This must be recognized in 

the laws governing citizenship. Any other approach 

is exclusionary and would hinder national reconciliation while sowing the seeds for future instability.

In this process of reconciliation and pacification, women will have a fundamental role. First, 

by virtue of their sheer numbers—women make 

“the plan of quotas . . . to recast 

the army is doomed to fail”
7

up more than half the population of the country. 

Beyond this is their natural affinity towards peace. 

Throughout this crisis, there was not a single report 

of a woman who took up arms. On the contrary, 

women were raped, harassed, and killed in great 

numbers by both sides.

The role of women in transethnic family networks also constitutes a real advantage in mending 

the torn social fabric. Examples of interethnic marriages among the political elite are numerous and significant. Guillaume Soro, a prime minister under both 

Gbagbo and Ouattara, is a Sénoufo from the North 

married to a Bété woman from the Southeast. Gbagbo 

himself, to expand his political sphere of influence, 

took a Dioula woman from the North as his second 

wife. More iconic is the case of Henriette Diabaté, an 

Agni from the Southwest, whose husband from the 

North was minister of state under Houphouët-Boigny. 

A renowned historian, Diabaté was awarded the title 

Grand Chancellor of the National Order, which sends 

a strong signal to Ivorian women. Such matrimonial 

alliances that cross ethnic lines are plentiful in Côte 

d’Ivoire, and not only among the elite. The children 

from such marriages cannot be placed in strict ethnic 

and regional categories.

In order for peace and democracy to take root, 

a proactive strategy that targets the nation’s young 

people is also needed. Côte d’Ivoire has an advantage in this regard in that it can build on a long 

legacy of tolerance from the Houphouët-Boigny 

years. The goal must be to educate young people in 

a way that encourages a harmonious integration of 

all of the country’s communities into national life. 

This is especially important since people under 15 

years of age account for 43 percent of the population. They were also an important playing card for 

the Gbagbo regime, which relied on detribalized, 

urban youngsters whom it had indoctrinated and 

who were prone to violence.

Such tendencies, though, are not irreversible. 

An educated, responsible class of young people can 

find its place in the political arena and make sound 

contributions to the country’s reconstruction, particularly if they are afforded education and employment opportunities. However, they need to be given 

tangible hope for a better tomorrow and supported 

and encouraged to create social networks that cultivate a civic spirit and tolerance.

SUBREGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Côte d’Ivoire borders five countries and cannot, therefore, conceive of any national security 

strategy without taking into account the subregional context.

Consider the Mano River Union, established 

in 1973 between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, 

with Côte d’Ivoire joining in 2008. This union has 

experienced severe crises and is seen as the “underbelly” of West Africa, with two civil wars in Sierra 

Leone (1991–2002), a tragic civil war in Liberia 

(1990–2003), a political-military crisis in Côte 

d’Ivoire from 1999 to 2011, and violent social upheavals, military repression, and ongoing criminal 

activity in Guinea.

The Mano River Union, then, is a problematic 

zone where yesterday’s child soldiers, now adults, 

join together in mercenary groups to continue 

their transboundary criminal activities, threatening the stability of the subregion. A concerted 

strategy, bolstered by renewed political will that 

entails joint action to demilitarize the “infernal 

triangle,” the Liberia-Guinea-Côte d’Ivoire border 

zone, and coordinated cross-border development, 

is needed among the countries of the Mano River 

Union to neutralize mercenaries, implement security sector reform, and impose peace in this subregion of enormous resources.

The Ouagadougou-Abidjan axis is another strategic linchpin to stability given the deep geographic 

and historical bonds and size of the Burkinabé diaspora in Côte d’Ivoire. The authorities of both capitals are therefore duty-bound to cultivate harmonious 

relations between their two countries. Ouagadougou 

should work with Abidjan to help control migratory 

flows into Côte d’Ivoire, improve border security, and 

initiate economic and social development programs 

in remote border areas.

“Côte d’Ivoire is a 

multi-ethnic society largely 

shaped by immigration”
8

AFRICA CENTER FOR 

STRATEGIC STUDIES

Director: Ambassador William 

M. Bellamy (Ret.)

National Defense University

300 Fifth Avenue, Building 21

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

Phone: + 1 202-685-7300

Web site: www.africacenter.org

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN DAKAR

Deputy Regional Manager: 

Claude Toze 

Phone: 221 33 869 61 60

Email: TozeC@ndu.edu

AFRICA CENTER 

REGIONAL OFFICE 

IN ADDIS ABABA

Regional Manager:

Brad Anderson

Phone: 251 11 517 4000 

Email: AndersonBG@state.gov

AFRICA SECURITY BRIEFS

Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Phone: + 1 202-685-6808

Email: Sieglej@ndu.edu

The Africa Security Briefs series presents research and analysis 

by ACSS experts and outside scholars with the aim of advancing 

understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, 

and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of 

the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. For more information on ACSS, visit the Web site at 

http://www.africacenter.org.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) supports the 

development of U.S. strategic policy toward Africa by providing highquality academic programs, undertaking policy-relevant research and 

analysis, and fostering awareness of and open dialogue on U.S. strategic 

priorities and African security issues. Toward these aims, the ACSS 

is committed to building networks of African, American, European, 

and international military and civilian leaders and articulating African 

perspectives to U.S. policymakers.

AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

http://www.africacenter.org

Peace in Côte d’Ivoire will also not take 

root without close and loyal cooperation with its 

neighbor to the east, Ghana. Indeed, both countries share a border that arbitrarily divided the sizable Akan community, who are members of what 

was once one of the most prestigious kingdoms in 

Africa, the Ashanti. Ghana has welcomed a large 

number of Ivorian refugees. It is imperative, therefore, that the new authorities in Abidjan work 

proactively with Accra to reassure these refugees 

that they are welcome to repatriate and essential 

to rebuilding the country. In October 2011, President Ouattara made such an appeal when signing 

a tripartite agreement with Ghana and the United 

Nations High Commission for Refugees to jointly 

facilitate refugee return to Côte d’Ivoire. In addition, Ghana, a peaceful neighbor that has embarked on a path of sustained economic development and democratization, could provide Abidjan 

with guidance and expertise on its recovery.

In other words, peace, security, and development in Côte d’Ivoire are inseparable from that of 

its neighbors.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is important to calm souls, to 

restore trust in Côte d’Ivoire’s institutions, and 

to bring divided communities together around a 

collective project aimed at achieving shared and 

united development. As for its tremendous natural riches, and the proven skills of its human resources, Côte d’Ivoire can, with responsible and 

reassuring leadership, take up the challenge and 

regain its role as a catalyst for West African development. The task, however, is large and will 

require patience and self-denial. It is imperative 

that government leaders avoid conveying any sense 

of triumph and be proactive in overcoming the inevitable obstacles.

NOTE

1

 Ragnhild Nordås, “Identity Polarization and Conflict: State 

Building in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana,” paper prepared for the 49th

International Studies Association Convention, San Francisco, 

CA, March 26–29, 2008.

ISSN 2164-4039