Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Gary L Griner

Mishawaka, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shaquille Q. Delaney,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 8, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1601-CR-79

Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior 

Court

The Hon. Jenny Pitts Manier, Judge

The Hon. Elizabeth A. Hardtke, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No. 71D08-1507-

CM-2577

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 2 of 8

[1] On July 18, 2015, Appellant-Defendant Shaquille Delaney and Sharpree 

Jackson were in a relationship and were watching television at Jackson’s house 

along with Jackson’s seven-month-old son, Jackson’s friend Shartesha Suggs, 

and Suggs’s two-year-old daughter. Jackson asked Delaney if he knew where 

her mobile telephone charger was, which he took as accusatory. The incident 

escalated, and eventually Delaney poked Jackson in the face, scratched her in 

several places, ripped her shirt, and shoved her. Appellee-Plaintiff the State of 

Indiana (“the State”) charged Delaney with Class A misdemeanor battery, and 

the trial court found him guilty as charged. Delaney contends that the charging 

information was insufficient to put him on notice of the charge against him and 

that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. 

Because we disagree, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 18, 2015, Jackson lived in her home in Mishawaka and was in a 

relationship with Delaney. That day, Delaney, Suggs, and Jackson’s and 

Suggs’s children were in Jackson’s living room watching television when 

Jackson went upstairs to look for her mobile telephone charger. Jackson could 

not find the charger, and asked Delaney about it because it was “not the first 

time things done came up missing.” Tr. pp. 9-10. Delaney told Jackson that 

she needed to go find it and called her an “idiotic b****.” Tr. p. 10. 

[3] Jackson told Delaney to leave, but Delaney went upstairs instead, apparently 

locating Jackson’s charger. Delaney returned with Jackson’s charger and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 3 of 8

demanded an apology. Delaney began poking Jackson in the face, provoking

her and still demanding an apology. Although Jackson did not fight back, 

Delaney followed her around the house, “restraining [her] and pulling [her] 

down and pushing [her.]” Tr. p. 10. At one point, Delaney tried to grab 

Jackson and ripped her shirt. After a while, Jackson was “all out of breath 

crying and yelling[.]” Tr. pp. 10-11. When Suggs called police and they 

arrived, Delaney threatened Jackson, saying, “I know where you stay” and 

telling her not to say anything. Tr. p. 11. Jackson suffered scratches to her 

arm, face, and neck and her shirt was bloodied. 

[4] On July 20, 2015, the State charged Delany with Class A misdemeanor battery, 

specifically, that “[o]n or about July 18, 2015, in St. Joseph County, State of 

Indiana, Shaquille Quentin Delaney did knowingly touch Shapree L. Jackson 

in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in bodily injury.” Appellant’s 

App. p. 5. On August 8, 2015, a bench trial was conducted, after which the 

trial court found Delaney guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Delaney 

to 180 days of incarceration, with 90 suspended, and ordered that Delaney 

spend 365 days on probation. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Specificity of the Charging Information

[5] Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(a) provides as follows:

(a) The indictment or information shall be in writing and allege 

the commission of an offense by:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 4 of 8

(1) stating the title of the action and the name of the court in 

which the indictment or information is filed;

(2) stating the name of the offense in the words of the statute 

or any other words conveying the same meaning;

(3) citing the statutory provision alleged to have been violated, 

except that any failure to include such a citation or any error 

in such a citation does not constitute grounds for reversal of a 

conviction where the defendant was not otherwise misled as 

to the nature of the charges against the defendant;

(4) setting forth the nature and elements of the offense 

charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary 

repetition;

(5) stating the date of the offense with sufficient particularity 

to show that the offense was committed within the period of 

limitations applicable to that offense;

(6) stating the time of the offense as definitely as can be done 

if time is of the essence of the offense;

(7) stating the place of the offense with sufficient particularity 

to show that the offense was committed within the 

jurisdiction of the court where the charge is to be filed;

(8) stating the place of the offense as definitely as can be done 

if the place is of the essence of the offense; and

(9) stating the name of every defendant, if known, and if not 

known, by designating the defendant by any name or 

description by which he can be identified with reasonable 

certainty.

[6] “The purpose of the charging information is to provide a defendant with notice 

of the crime of which he is charged so that he is able to prepare a defense.” 

Gilliland v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1049, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The State is 

under no obligation to include detailed factual allegations; rather, a charging 

information satisfies due process if it “enables an accused, the court, and the 

jury to determine the crime for which conviction is sought.” Id. at 1061. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 5 of 8

“Errors in the information are fatal only if they mislead the defendant or fail to 

give him notice of the charge filed against him.” Id.

[7] As an initial matter, Delaney acknowledges that he did not object to the 

charging information below and has waived the claim for appellate review. See 

Wilhoite v. State, 7 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Delaney, however, 

seeks to avoid the effects of his waiver by contending that the charging 

information was so defective as to constitute fundamental error. Fundamental 

error is “error so egregious that reversal of a criminal conviction is required 

even if no objection to the error is registered at trial.” Hopkins v. State, 782 

N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ind. 2003). The standard for fundamental error is whether 

the error was so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant that a fair trial was 

impossible. Krumm v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1170, 1181-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

Fundamental error requires prejudice to the defendant. Hopkins, 782 N.E.2d at 

991. 

[8] Delaney contends that the charging information was defective for failing to 

specify the precise nature of the touching he committed or the injury that he 

caused. Such detailed pleading, however, is not required. “[T]o be sufficient, a 

charging information generally needs only contain a statement of the ‘essential 

facts constituting the offense charged,’ as well as the statutory citation, the time 

and place of the commission of the offense, the identity of the victim (if any), 

and the weapon used (if any).” Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 975 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014) (quoting Laney v. State, 868 N.E.2d 561, 566-567 (Ind. Ct. App.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 6 of 8

2007), trans. denied.). “The State is not required to include detailed factual 

allegations in a charging information.” Laney, 868 N.E.2d at 567. 

[9] We conclude that the charging information in this case was not so deficient as 

to constitute error, much less fundamental error. The charging information 

included all of the statutory elements of Class A misdemeanor battery, the time 

and place of the alleged commission, the identities of the defendant and victim, 

the relevant statutory citations, and a list of potential witnesses. Delaney cites 

to no authority that more specificity is required, and our research has uncovered 

none. Delaney has failed to establish fundamental error in this regard. See, e.g., 

Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 662 (Ind. 1983) (concluding that charging 

information was adequately specific even though it did not “disclose either the 

bodily injury suffered by [the victim] or the specific conduct on appellant’s part 

that led to the injury”). 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Delaney contends that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain 

his convictions for battery, specifically that the State did not establish that he 

“knowingly” touched Jackson in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. “A person 

engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware 

of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). When 

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither weigh the evidence nor 

resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 

1995). We look only to the evidence of probative value and the reasonable 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 7 of 8

inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If from that 

viewpoint there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of 

fact could conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

we will affirm the conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 

1993). 

[11] Delaney argues that the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the 

evidence presented at trial was that Jackson was the aggressor and that any 

touching Delaney may have done was incidental or not intended to cause 

injury. While expressing no opinion on whether the trial court could have found 

that Jackson was the aggressor, it did not, and the only question before us is 

whether that finding is supported by the record. We conclude that it is. 

[12] Jackson testified that Delaney became angry when asked about Jackson’s 

telephone charger and, when asked to leave, started poking Jackson in the face 

while following her. Jackson testified that she did not fight back while Delaney 

poked, scratched, pulled, and pushed her and ripped her shirt. Suggs, the

State’s other witness, corroborated Jackson’s version of events, testifying that 

Delaney was pushing and shoving Jackson and “got in her face[.]” Tr. p. 39. 

Suggs also testified that although she did not actually see Delaney “poking” 

Jackson in the face, she did see him “pointing.” Tr. p. 41. Suggs did not see 

Jackson put her hands on Delaney. Delaney testified that Jackson became 

angry when he denied taking her telephone charger and scratched him on the 

arm with a wrist band. Delaney testified that this was the extent of the physical 

conflict between him and Jackson on July 18, 2015. The trial court, however, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1601-CR-79 | June 8, 2016 Page 8 of 8

was not required to credit this testimony and did not. Delaney’s argument 

amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we 

may not do. See Jordan, 656 N.E.2d at 817. 

[13] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.