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75–163PDF 2012

WHEN REGIMES FALL: THE CHALLENGE OF

SECURING LETHAL WEAPONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 19, 2012

Serial No. 112–163

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., chairman, Henry L. Stimson Center 

(former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs) ................. 6

Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D., senior research fellow for defense and homeland 

security, The Heritage Foundation ..................................................................... 13

Mr. Leonard S. Spector, deputy director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies ................. 21

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement ................................................... 3

The Honorable Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr.: Prepared statement .......................... 8

Steven P. Bucci, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 15

Mr. Leonard S. Spector: Prepared statement ........................................................ 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 44

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 45

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 47

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 48

(1)

WHEN REGIMES FALL: THE CHALLENGE OF 

SECURING LETHAL WEAPONS 

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing will come to order. Today we examine 

the challenge of securing lethal weapons as regimes fall, and the 

cases of Libya and Syria are the primary focus here because they 

highlight this challenge. The Syrian regime could be imploding as 

we speak. 

When we think about the weapons at their disposal, the chemical 

and biological weapons, you think back from what we know in our 

conversations with the Soviets, the former Soviet Union in the 

1980s, they helped put together a very robust program from the 

Syrians. Iran, today, has been helping Syria with this respect, so 

they have long had an active chemical weapons program. We know 

they have mustard gas. We know they have sarin, VX, which is certainly the most lethal of nerve agents. So some of the most dangerous chemicals on the planet have been weaponized, most of it 

to put into artillery shells, and that is why in the proliferation community they call Syria a chemical weapons ‘‘superpower.’’ And the 

question is, what is to be done? 

For months, we have heard from the administration that these 

chemical weapons are secure. But yesterday there was a report 

that weapons were being moved to the field. And one U.S. official 

has said, to quote him, ‘‘this regime has a plan for ethnic cleansing.’’ Now we don’t know exactly what the intentions are with respect to the way they are moving these weapons, but one Syrian 

Ambassador who defected said that he was ‘‘convinced’’ that Assad 

would use these weapons against the population. 

I think there are several possible scenarios here, but one is that 

Assad loses control over his chemical weapons, and the question is, 

if that happens, do they come into the hands of looters, do they 

come into the hands of opposition groups? Are there terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda that are searching for these weapons? AlQaeda’s interest in obtaining chemical and biological weapons is 

pretty well documented. Others believe that Hezbollah could be on 

the hunt for chemical weapons that might fall into their hands. 

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Certainly, they would have the means of obtaining them. Iran also 

has an interest. 

With the scope of Syria’s chemical and biological program, Defense Secretary Panetta testified that the situation in Syria is ‘‘100 

times worse’’ than the challenge of securing weapons in Libya. 

Some are concerned that the administration has been slow to the 

game here, and as we will hear today there are critical steps the 

United States could be taking. 

Reaching out to elements of the Syrian Army that have control 

over the chemical weapons is one of these steps. Let them know 

they will be rewarded if they keep them under wraps. Let them 

know that they could be punished if they do not. And sending the 

same message, frankly, to the opposition. Working closely with regional allies on contingency plans, working with Turkey and Jordan and other countries in the region. Intelligence sharing, military 

training, so that they are in the lead, so they are able to take decisive action should Syria implode. Building up our intelligence gathering network inside Syria, making it clear to any future Syrian 

Government that recognition and support is going to depend upon 

these weapons being controlled and being destroyed, and being prepared to act decisively. One way to do that is to use surrogates. 

But if we know of these weapons falling into hostile hands there 

has to be a plan of action given their lethal nature. 

Given the magnitude of this challenge, it is discouraging that one 

witness with firsthand experience in tackling these kinds of problems will testify that it isn’t just the chaotic situation in Syria that 

presents a challenge, but in his view, our inefficient government 

bureaucracy. In his view, and I am going to quote him, ‘‘years of 

adding more and more offices, ranking positions and staff results 

in a slower and more cumbersome decision process’’ and it impacts 

effectiveness. 

This subcommittee has spent a good amount of time focused on 

loose shoulder-fired missiles, which terrorists have used against 

commercial aircraft in the past. Earlier this year, the top U.S. official charged with tracking them in Libya was pretty blunt, and I 

will quote him: ‘‘How many of these shoulder-fired missiles are still 

missing? The frank answer is: We don’t know and probably never 

will.’’ Well, we know from our experience that they are likely in the 

thousands, and a point of this hearing is to learn from the Libya 

experience. After the Assad regime falls, let us not be hearing from 

the administration that we weren’t very effective securing these 

weapons under what, admittedly, are difficult circumstances. 

And I will now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman of 

California, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

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Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think you have 

summarized well why this hearing is so important. 

As terrible as MANPADs are, as terrible as chemical weapons 

are, nuclear weapons are an entirely different order of magnitude—

and so let me mention Iran. It is so critical that we are able to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons now, so when that regime falls we are not having a hearing not about what happens to 

Syria’s chemical weapons, but what happens to Iran’s nuclear 

weapons. 

We all looked at the short Iranian Spring of June 2009, and we 

all pray for the day, Insha’Allah, when there are 1 million people 

in the streets of Tehran and this regime realizes it has to yield to 

democratic forces. But when that happens, will they have nuclear 

weapons? Instead of fearing that chemical weapons will be used 

against a Syrian population, will we be talking about the possibility of nuclear weapons being used against some city in Iran? Instead of chemical weapons perhaps falling in the wrong hands, will 

we be talking about how many nuclear weapons does Iran have 

and what is going to happen to them? 

The solution is to act now over the next year to prevent Iran 

from having nuclear weapons, rather than to think that the lowrisk approach is to sit back, do nothing or do only as much as won’t 

aggravate the business community, won’t aggravate our European 

and Asian friends. It may be bureaucratically low risk to advocate 

only sanctions within the realm of the conventional, but that may 

be low risk for an individual career. It is not low risk for this country. 

As for Syria, we are of course alarmed that they are moving 

these weapons, and we are alarmed by where they might be used 

or who might get their hands on them. The Libyan MANPADs pose 

a risk to aviation around the world. Some have estimated that Qadhafi had 20,000. We have accounted for and recovered 5,000, and 

that is certainly a risk. 

The State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament 

Fund is a key tool in our emergency nonproliferation efforts, however, funds are limited, and the requested amount for the NDF for 

fiscal 2013 is only $30 million. It was through the NDF that the 

U.S. led much of the effort to secure the MANPADs in Libya, or 

at least secure those that we have been able to secure. I would like 

our witnesses to comment on the effectiveness of this and other 


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governmental programs and particularly whether they are sufficient to deal with the Syria challenge and other challenges. 

Also what should be our contingency plans for preventing Syria’s 

weapons from falling into the hands of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups 

or Iran or Hezbollah? The worst possible outcome is that Assad 

uses these against his people, but perhaps just as dangerous he 

sells them to Hezbollah or Iran in return for weapons he is willing 

to use. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. We will go to Mr. Duncan from South 

Carolina, okay. And Mr. Connolly from Virginia? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am glad we are 

having this hearing. And I want to welcome our panel. I particularly want to welcome Mr. Spector. He and I worked together as 

staffers on the Hill some time ago, and for some reason he has less 

gray hair than I do. I am not quite sure how that happened but 

welcome, Leonard, glad to have you here today. 

According to recent news reports, Syria has begun moving some 

of its chemical weapon stockpiles out of its storage facilities. One 

article chillingly states the situation, Syria never signed the 1992 

Chemical Weapons Convention and is believed to have among other 

things, mustard gas, a sarin nerve agent and even VX. The article 

goes on to say that analysis and officials believe Syria has ballistic 

missiles that can be fitted with chemical warheads, and tens of 

thousands of shoulder-fired missiles terrorists could use to target 

civilian aircraft. The Syrian Government denies that it is moving 

the weapons, though that government’s affiliation with terrorist 

groups question credibility of such a claim. It is unclear what the 

movement of these weapons means. Last Thursday’s Wall Street 

Journal cited the fact that some have said Assad is using the weapons in a high-stakes game of chicken. He may be moving them as 

feint, hoping the threat of a chemical attack could drive Sunnis 

thought to be sympathetic to the rebels, back to their homes or 

from their homes. That is a grisly strategy that shines a light on 

how depraved the regime really is. 

So I look forward to hearing from this panel, Mr. Chairman, and 

the suggestions of our panelists in terms of what are the options 

available to the United States. And I thank the chair. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. 

Let us introduce the distinguished panel of expert witnesses at 

this time. We have Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., chairman 

of the Henry L. Stimson Center. Ambassador Bloomfield served as 

Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs from ’01 

to ’05. From ’08 to ’09, as special envoy he worked to reduce the 

threat from the proliferation of shoulder-fired missiles. Throughout 

a distinguished career dating back to ’81, Ambassador Bloomfield 

has held positions in the Department of Defense, and State, and at 

the White House. 

Dr. Steven Bucci is a senior research fellow for Defense and 

Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation. In three decades 

of service, Dr. Bucci has served as an Army special forces officer 

and top Pentagon official. He has led deployments in Africa, South 

Asia, and the Persian Gulf. On September 11th, he was working 

6

directly for the Secretary of Defense. He is a recognized expert on 

the interagency process. 

And Sandy Spector is the deputy director of the Monterey Institute of International Studies James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He previously served as the Assistant Deputy 

Administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration. He has written several articles on Syria’s chemical weapons program over the last year. 

All of the witness’ complete written testimony will be entered 

into the record, and I will remind each of you that if you can keep 

your oral presentation to 5 minutes that is very much appreciated. 

We will start with Ambassador Bloomfield. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, 

JR., CHAIRMAN, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY 

AFFAIRS) 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 

distinguished members. It is an honor to be invited to testify before 

you. 

As I looked at the agenda for today, one could have talked about 

whether we have the best information on Syria that would be the 

work of an analyst or a journalist. We could have talked about the 

technical aspects of their program, and my fellow panelists are 

probably far more expert than I. The way I looked at it is someone 

who has had the privilege of serving in five administrations doing 

all sorts of jobs, starting my career as the desk officer for Lebanon 

in the Pentagon at a time when they blew up our Embassy twice, 

they blew up the Marines, Hezbollah was formed, and Syria was 

behind a lot of the trouble. And so I have to tell you that in 30 

years I have never taken my eye off Syrian politics. It has a certain 

quality to it that maintains your interest through thick and thin. 

I have also had the opportunity as the chairman of Stimson to 

participate in a study which took seven scholars to Damascus, and 

the week before President Obama was inaugurated I had the opportunity to sit with President Assad and talk to him for over 2 

hours, and probe in my own mind, how does he talk about Iran, 

how does he talk about religious issues, how does he talk about territorial issues with Israel, threat issues? Just to take his pulse and 

get a feel for that was quite interesting. 

Mr. ROYCE. We would like to hear about that. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Well, obviously everything has 

changed. He was trying to say he was ready for peace and no holds 

barred. And Senator Kerry and Chairman Berman, at the time, 

went to Damascus and heard the same message. That has all 

changed. It is by the boards. It is over for the Assad regime. His 

presidency was an accident of history. His older brother was 

groomed to be the leader and he was killed in a car crash, and the 

eye doctor from London came back and was groomed for this position. 

So I have always looked at Syria as somewhat of an oligarchy. 

You have to look at the money, who controls all the businesses, 

who controls the franchise, if you will, who controls the security. 

And that has been mapped out, I am sure. As I looked at this, the 

7

question I asked myself was kind of a Monday morning quarterback question. I am not in the ring trying to solve this problem, 

I am on the outside. So I have great regard for everyone on the inside, let me start with that. 

But the question is, what would you do if it were up to you to 

address this problem? And I can’t get away from the quote that you 

cited, which was mine, and it is not political. It is Republicans. It 

is Democrats. It is Congress. It is the administration. But we used 

to have a much leaner national security bureaucracy where individual big thinkers drove the train. We have gotten away from that 

and we have taken very talented people and we have put them into 

such small silos that they are very territorial, they have very little 

budget—you just mentioned money, Mr. Sherman. And so I posed 

the question to myself, what would an all-star effort look like? And 

I have tried to lay that out in my prepared testimony. 

It involves a lot of excellent offices inside the U.S. Government, 

probably none of which have ever been put into one operation and 

certainly not under the command of a civilian. And I have been 

privileged to talk to our senior leadership at DoD over the years, 

and they always talk about whole of government. Once the troops 

remove themselves from the field of battle the civilians need to 

move in, in a whole of government effort. We talk about that. I am 

not persuaded that we have moved very far toward being able to 

do ‘‘whole of government.’’ And I would commend the Syria example as a great place to try and make it work. It would take a topdown push. It would take principal-level authority from the White 

House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and some of the combatant commands to allow 

certain pieces of their resource pool to be put under a single, unified team effort. 

And I ask this question: What would happen if there were an 

American school in Damascus and 50 young American children 

were abducted and spread out all over the country? I don’t think 

anyone in Washington would stand in the way of an all-points 

dragnet where no one would care whose bureau is in the lead or 

whether it was State or Defense in charge. Everyone would get on 

the same communications net and try to find these children as fast 

as possible. My question is, how important are these chemical 

weapons? If it is that important, can we not simply look past all 

of the lines of authority and resources and pull them into a special 

task force to take on this problem? 

Another point I would like to make and I will stop, is that there 

is no need to wait for the regime to fall. I would like to see the 

logistical aspects of this fused into the political strategy. To take 

Mr. Sherman’s point, Iran may use nuclear weapons against Israel. 

That would be a nightmare. But even if they don’t, it will be a way 

of enforcing what they are doing right now, today, which is exerting radical influence throughout the Levant. And that is what we 

should be mobilizing against. This is a strategic defeat in the making for Iran as well as Syria. I think we should have an all-star 

effort to try to make sure that it comes out that way. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bloomfield follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Bloomfield. 

Doctor? 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN P. BUCCI, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH 

FELLOW FOR DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY, THE 

HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. BUCCI. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate you giving me the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I 

would like to make three main points very quickly and then hit 

some recommendations on possible actions for the United States. 

The first point is that we need to keep in mind, Syria today is not 

Iraq in 2003, and it is not Libya in the last incursion. And I can 

go into details as to why I feel that way during a Q&A if you would 

like, but we cannot use those two events for too much analogous 

lessons because it will lead us down false paths. 

The second point is probably more important. Today there are no 

good military options here. A full-scale effort to control all 50 sites, 

whether we do it before the regime falls or immediately afterwards 

has been pointed out it would take about 75,000 troops to do that. 

By anybody’s definition that is an invasion. And I fear that if we 

try to do something like that we would get a negative response 

from both sides of this conflict if we came into that country. 

The next option that has been bandied about is using air strikes 

to destroy all 50 sites. That is another false trail to go down. The 

amount of collateral damage of an operation like that would be astronomical. The strikes themselves would kill civilians, it would release agent into the air, and frankly, all it would do would be to 

basically unlock the gates to allow people to get into those facilities 

to loot them. 

And the last option, which is the least bad, is to come up with 

some use of special operations forces to possibly go in and do a oneoff operation should there be an imminent potential release of 

chemical weapons against the population or some knowledge of an 

immediate transfer of some of those weapons to people we don’t 

want to have them. You could possibly use SOF there, but again 

that is a very dangerous and tricky thing. And remember, we are 

talking about stuff in these sites that are measured in tons not in, 

go in and come out with a couple of briefcases full of agent. SOF 

going in there is not going to get it all out and they can’t stay there 

and protect themselves. 

The last point is that to do any of these things we have got to 

utilize our friends in the region from the intelligence and the surveillance standpoint, and building a regime around Syria to try and 

monitor anything moving out, we have got to use all their neighbors. Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, everyone has to be involved in 

helping us with this. And then if we do take any action, we need 

to drop Israel out of that equation and really depend on some of 

our friendly Muslim countries in the area, predominantly Turkey 

and Jordan. Perhaps get some of the Gulf states who have some 

pretty good special operations forces, and perhaps get them involved as well. 

If we take any actions at all, they should be the continued 

ramping up of all of our intelligence and surveillance, which I 

would hope the administration is already maxing out today, but we 

14

need to make sure that is happening. We need to be prepared and 

have planned for one of those one-off events if something does 

break and we get intelligence of it that we could go in and try and 

use SOF to perhaps stop that from happening. We need to build 

that security paradigm today with the neighbors, making sure we 

are all on the same sheet of music and we have all come to an 

agreement as to what we are going to do with any WMD that falls 

into anybody’s hands, which one would hope would be to turn it 

over to us for destruction. 

We should warn the Assad regime today, and all of the members 

of the resistance that if they use any of this stuff there is going 

to be some retribution. Specifically and publicly we should warn 

them that anyone who comes into possession of any WMD and 

turns it over to al-Qaeda, Hezbollah or Iran that there would be 

a kinetic response to stop that from happening. 

And then lastly, we do need to plan for some sort of big control 

event, using Muslim forces as I have mentioned, and perhaps, and 

this would be the most U.S. involvement directly, would be the use 

of U.S. special forces, perhaps Army Chemical Corps, Marine Corps 

CBIRF, or even some of the National Guard WMD Civil Support 

teams as potential advisors, so when we send forces in there they 

actually have some technical capability to deal with the things that 

are in those sites. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bucci follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Bucci. 

Mr. Spector? 

STATEMENT OF MR. LEONARD S. SPECTOR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JAMES MARTIN CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION 

STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. SPECTOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Minority 

Member Sherman. It is a pleasure to be here and to speak on these 

issues. 

As I said in my written remarks, I think we need to look at different classes of weapons and try to have a differentiated policy, 

because there is a good deal of variation. We have to worry about 

light arms, heavy arms, weapons of particular interest to terrorists, 

ballistic missiles, and then chemical weapons. And I will just say 

a few words on a number of these. 

I think the biological weapons situation seems to be very opaque. 

No one seems to know if they exist, so I will put those aside for 

the moment, but obviously they would be of great concern. And nuclear weapons and fissile material are not known to be present in 

Syria, but certain sites, however, are suspected of potentially contributing to this and they are still to be fully understood. 

Our goals, I think, in my testimony, very much are similar to 

what we have heard about the importance of maintaining positive 

control, avoiding use and avoiding leakage out of the country. But 

I think one measure that should be implemented immediately, and 

I believe it was noted in the chairman’s remarks as he introduced 

us, was a need to let the guardians, the custodians of these weapons, know that if they stand by the weapons, protect them or hold 

them close that that will be taken as good behavior. It will be recognized in some fashion, and that these forces do not need to worry 

about the fact that they were associated with these weapons, being 

held against them, provided of course there is no use and there is 

sort of holding in place. And in a sense, I think that is one model 

for trying to keep our hands around this, which is to use the experts that they have that may be prepared in this time of turmoil 

to sort of sit tight if they know they will be safe. 

One concern I have had is that as the lines in the country shift, 

a certain of these chemical sites will fall behind the front lines, so 

to speak, and will be under the nominal control at least of the Free 

Syrian Army. I think in settings like this we have to worry about 

how the guardians will behave. Will they run off because they want 

to escape the Free Syrian Army? And again, it is very important 

to give them an understanding that they do not have that to fear. 

Another point that I tried to make in the testimony was the importance of using the moment of recognition as a tool for trying to 

persuade the new Syrian Government to relinquish these weapons. 

This has happened in the past in Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, 

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, with some variation, where this 

leverage that the outside powers have has been used to sort of 

make a precondition. If you want these external support opportunities, you must renounce some of these weapons that are in such 

bad odor, so to speak, internationally. Qadhafi did this both for 

chemical and for nuclear weapons. 

22

So I think we have some good examples of how this tool can be 

used. And therefore, I think the Syrian Government that replaces 

Assad must be pressed to take very similar conditions. It is going 

to be harder for them because these weapons have been part of 

some anti-Israel bulwark that Syria has portrayed itself as representing, but I think we have ways of trying to get our hands 

around this, in particular during the period of turmoil. Finding a 

way to get international monitors, perhaps, at some sites where the 

Free Syrian Army has some control, and starting a process in 

which there is sort of an international coloration placed on the 

chemical weapons so that the default is that the weapons are given 

up and the country signs the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

One matter that hasn’t come up here previously is the issue of 

the Scuds and the legacy of these missiles. There are a couple of 

hundred of them. They are very dangerous from the standpoint of 

Israel. They perhaps even represent a threat to Iran if we have a 

Sunni, anti-Iranian government in Syria. And I think we need to 

be looking for ways to diminish this capability. Again, we have had 

precedents in eastern Europe and with Libya. We were able to persuade countries, at the time that they were getting recognition and 

assistance as the governments were being formed, to renounce 

these weapons that are over a threshold in which we say they are 

capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction. It is also possible 

that these weapons may become targets for the Free Syrian Army 

as symbols of the regime or maybe targeted by others. 

The nuclear legacy is also one we want to deal with. If some of 

these sites that are suspected of having nuclear activities, but 

where the IAEA is not permitted in, we may want to, and we really 

should, press the Free Syrian Army as they gain control of them 

to authorize at least informal inspections by Western specialists, if 

not also by the IAEA until a later time. 

Finally, a few words about the resources. It is not only the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund which is potentially available, 

it is also the Cooperative Threat Reduction monies at the Defense 

Department which could be of extremely valuable use here for control purposes and also for training and sort of bringing the new 

government into sort of the, accept the norms that we all accept on 

the weapons of mass destruction issue. My understanding is the 

Defense Department is not able to use its CTR money in the Middle East at this time, but that they are seeking the certification to 

do so, which I believe would be a very urgent priority. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spector follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Spector. Let me ask a 

couple of quick questions here, first to Dr. Bucci. 

The United States has been reportedly, from what is in the papers, in discussions with Turkey and with Jordan, on contingency 

plans for loose chemical weaponry. Based upon your knowledge, 

having worked with both countries, what are their capabilities in 

this regard and what advantages do they bring? 

Mr. BUCCI. Both have very mature militaries. Turkey, their military is huge, first of all. They definitely have the capability to provide the manpower to do things, and they are actually quite disciplined for a conscript-based army because they are fairly draconian with their methodologies. They could definitely provide the 

bulk of the forces to provide security around any of these sites. The 

problem there is again their Turkish vice Arab and that causes 

some friction. Now they are a Muslim country so that gives them 

certain advantages, but not as much as we sometimes think it 

would. The Jordanians better thought of as far as being fellow 

Arabs, and actually a very, very capable Army, particularly their 

special operations forces. Not near as big and neither of them have 

the kind of technological capabilities of dealing with these weapons 

systems because neither of them has a chemical capability. So from 

a technological standpoint they would have to be augmented by 

some technical experts as they do it, but as far as the military discipline, their positive association with us and experience working 

with us, they could handle this kind of thing very well. But again, 

if you do it in a nonpermissive environment it is going to get dicey 

very, very quickly. 

Mr. ROYCE. I have got a quick question for you though, because 

some years ago when the PKK leader, Ocalan, was being held or 

being protected by Syria, I remember the Turks were very, very 

close to taking military action. And I would anticipate that because 

they have mobilized, because it was only at the last minute that 

the Syrians gave them up because they thought they would be attacked. And my presumption was that the Turkish military would 

have done some due diligence in terms of being prepared to deal 

with chemical weapons given the fact that they were prepared to 

go in. 

Might that cause you to conclude that perhaps they have looked 

at this scenario and might be better prepared? 

Mr. BUCCI. They clearly have a defensive capability. I mean they 

have American protective masks, for instance, so they have the 

very basic capability to operate in a chemical environment. So they 

are not totally neophytes in the area, but I don’t really feel——

Mr. ROYCE. Then let me ask you another question. Last week 11 

Russian warships that we saw that were dispatched to a Syrian 

port, whole battalions of Russian marines aboard. 

I remember a trip I took once to Russia where we listened to the 

gentleman who was called the ‘‘Father of the Plague’’ explain about 

what they had developed in Russia but that some of their scientists 

were missing. And from what we know about Syria’s chemical 

weapons program it seems that some of the advances came with 

Russian assistance, right? 

Mr. BUCCI. Absolutely. 

34

Mr. ROYCE. In the event of a security vacuum in Syria, could the 

Russians play a role with respect to these 50 sites? 

Mr. BUCCI. They hopefully could. My guess is those marines are 

primarily there to protect that port base which is very, very important to the Russian navy. But my guess is there is also some elements in that force that is there to probably clean up some of the 

evidence, if you will, of the Russian collusion with the development 

of this program in the first place. One would hope that the Russians would be willing to cooperate with an international effort to 

keep these things from getting out of hand. But given the Russian 

intransigence in the U.N. as of this morning, I would not put too 

much faith in the Russians being very, very cooperative, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me turn to Ambassador Bloomfield for my last 

question, which goes to the phenomenal amount of information that 

you see on the front pages of the newspapers these days which are 

in the form of leaks about our intelligence operations. And it is 

across the board, everything from the details of those who assisted 

in the capture of Osama bin Laden to the details of the attacks on 

Iran’s computers. 

You served in government in many different positions over the 

years. Are leaks more prevalent and more dangerous these days, 

as it seems to me, given the issues that we are talking about and 

given the things that we keep discovering on the front page? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion they are. 

And it is a function of a cultural change, I would say. Because we 

had so many journalists embedded with our troops going into Iraq, 

there was naturally a far more granular amount of information 

that was clearly revealed about how we do our business. And you 

have journalists now who have suffered in the field. They have 

taken casualties as part of the effort to report on our interventions, 

and they enjoy the high trust of the intelligence community and 

the military. So I just think it is a natural evolution. 

Does that mean I approve of all the leaks? I certainly don’t. 

Somebody is making a judgment that they want it out there for 

some, perhaps, deterrence purposes or to advertise their skill and 

capability. Those judgments should all be made at very high levels. 

This isn’t the first generation of government that has leaked, but 

it is on a higher and more sensitive scale in my opinion. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Let me turn to our ranking member, Mr. 

Sherman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There is a tendency in all of these conflicts for us to think that 

because the bad guys are bad the opponents must be really, really 

good. And there are shades of gray. And because we assume that 

those trying to overthrow the bad regime must be very, very good, 

we don’t bother to use our leverage to get some promises and enforceable promises up front. 

Has any element for the Free Syrian Army or the various groups 

trying to overthrow the Assad regime stated publicly that they are 

committed to Syria signing the Chemical Weapons Convention and 

adhering to it? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Not to my knowledge. 

35

Mr. SHERMAN. And yet we play the critical role for them while 

not asking them to even issue a press release. This is a repeat of 

our desire so much that they be successful that we ask them to do 

nothing that will help us. Assad has these chemical weapons, and 

I think he would use them if he thought they were helpful. Is there 

anything he can do with these weapons that he can’t do with conventional shelling, conventional explosive devices dropped from airplanes? 

He is moving them for some reason. One possibility, he plans to 

use them in a worst case scenario for him, whole areas of his country will be under the control of rebel forces, but is there anything 

he can do with these chemical weapons that he can’t do with more 

conventional weapons? 

Doctor? 

Mr. BUCCI. Well, sir, primarily, I mean you are going to kill people. The chemical weapons would kill them far more efficiently, 

would kill them far faster and would cause a great deal of panic 

among both the opposition forces and the rest of the civilian population. 

There has been some talk about the regime trying to carve out 

a rump Alawite state toward the coast, trying to get the Sunnis to 

move out of that area. Even the threat of something like this could 

cause people to start to move if that is their actual stated intentions. So there is a use for them, a very nefarious use, granted, beyond conventional weapons. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And that is a use that couldn’t be achieved just 

with strategic bombing capacities that the Syrian air force has? 

Mr. BUCCI. You could do it with either one, but the fear factor 

that comes in when you begin using chemical weapons is astronomical and should not be discounted. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Now Assad is moving his chemical weapons. Is he 

moving them to areas of the country that he feels he will always 

control, or there is a lot of discussion he is moving them, is he moving them to protect them and make sure they are not behind the 

lines of the rebels, or is he moving them consistent with future 

use? 

Mr. BUCCI. At this point, sir, I don’t know, and I am not sure 

if our intelligence community knows either. That is what they are 

trying to determine, what exactly is the purpose for this alleged 

movement? And to be honest with you, I am not even sure if the 

movement itself has been confirmed, let alone the intention. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The intention is hard to determine, but we don’t 

even know to which locations he has moved or even, I guess, it may 

be classified, but I haven’t seen any reports indicating he moved 

them from here that is a predominantly Sunni area where he may 

lose control, or he moved them to here that is an Alawite area 

where he is confident he will retain control. 

Ambassador, I see you nodding in agreement with our lack of 

knowledge. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. My only surmise, Mr. Sherman, is that 

he is trying to hang onto power and shoot his way out of trouble; 

it is a failed strategy and everything is in the context of survival. 

It could be a Plan B to take the offensive, but obviously it is something that should be tracked closely and we will never know. 

36

Mr. SHERMAN. Does anyone else have a strategy for comments on 

getting the rebel groups, particularly the Free Syrian Army, to 

agree now when they need us the most to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and otherwise act responsibly toward these weapons? 

Mr. Spector, I don’t know if you had a comment on that. 

Mr. SPECTOR. I thought the leverage was, possibly, greatest when 

they are seeking formal international recognition, but whenever we 

do it, it is going to be difficult because there will be a domestic audience they have to play to as well. So what I was proposing is that 

we sort of start the process de facto during this strange period, the 

interregnum, by trying to get some international oversight at least 

on some of the sites and that creates a sort of atmosphere or environment in which the expected outcome is, yes, they will join the 

treaty and so forth. So I think if you go about this head on it may 

be not quite as effective as a gradual approach, but I am not disagreeing with you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think we sell our support too cheaply when we 

don’t insist on this, Ambassador. And then I realize my time is up. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Congressman, I would just point out 

that in Iraq in 2003, the policy team of which I was a part, part 

of that team decided that anyone who had been affiliated with the 

Baath Party in the regime should not be given a second chance. 

And indeed, the entire Iraqi army was put outside the door, at 

which point all of the competent military talent in the country 

turned against our stabilization effort. 

In Syria, unless we intend to repeat that mistake, not only could 

we be communicating with the opposition, but we should be communicating with people who in a dictatorship aren’t making decisions anyway; so we are not blaming the mid-level of military except for those who are particularly aggressive in shooting up Daraa 

and Homs and places like that. We should be trying to peel off the 

regime as well as the opposition, and so I would say that across 

the board to anyone who has military competency. 

But secondly, I would beg the question of how we message this. 

Those countries are dense with information operations coming from 

adverse sources. Hezbollah, Iran and others broadcast heavily into 

that information space. I am not sure what the U.S. Government 

is doing, but this is an opportunity for us to decide what messages 

should be making the rounds in Syria so people know that there 

are war crimes for the worst offenders, there is salvation for those 

who mark weapons and get in touch with the right places. In other 

words, the technological equivalent of the leafletting and collecting 

effort we did in Iraq before we fired the Iraqi army. 

Mr. SPECTOR. Can I just add a point which is that we haven’t obtained ‘‘nothing’’ at this stage. My impression is we have received 

assurances that the Free Syrian Army won’t use the weapons and 

will try to keep track of them as soon as they gain some control. 

So I don’t think it is a zero kind of commitment on the chemical 

weapon front, but it certainly hasn’t gone as far as your suggestion. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let us go to Mr. Duncan of South Carolina. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the problems 

that the United States has faced in the past is good intel coming 

from the region of the Middle East especially in closed countries. 

37

So Dr. Bucci, based on your experience with intelligence, and honestly, how good is the intel that we are getting or that we have already? How good is it? 

Mr. BUCCI. It is at best, or should be, suspect. We have proven 

in two different situations both in Iraq and then in Libya that our 

intel about weapons of all sorts has been somewhat less than it 

needed to be. Now we are looking at the country of Syria which has 

been even more closed and done more things behind the curtain 

than those other two countries. So our knowledge of exactly how 

many of what type of weapon they have at each site is pretty ethereal. They are doing the best they can. They are working all the 

partners in the region who do have human sources inside those 

countries, and we are trying to milk as much intel out of those 

sources as possible. But anyone who tells you it is complete and 

100 percent accurate is dreaming. It is at best incomplete. I wish 

I could give you a more accurate answer than that and I wish I 

could give you a more positive one, but I think that is about the 

best we are going to do. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is not comforting. It is not comforting us at 

all. 

Mr. BUCCI. No sir, it is not. 

Mr. DUNCAN. In 2007, the Israeli attack on the nuclear facilities 

in Syria took out the reactor. But we are talking a lot about chemical weapons here today in this very, very concerning area, but just 

as concerning should be the nuclear capability and components 

within Syria that could fall in the hands of, say, Iran who is actively searching for a nuclear capability. So can you talk, any of 

you really, but I will address it to Dr. Bucci first, can you talk 

about the centrifuges and any of the ability to enrich uranium and 

other things that are used in the nuclear capacity that weren’t destroyed in ’07? Do we have a handle on what is there and what is 

happening to that technology? 

Mr. BUCCI. We do not have a perfectly accurate handle on what 

was there. To be honest with you, I am guessing what the Iranians 

have today is probably better than what the Syrians had in 2007, 

so I don’t think having a yard sale in Syria is going to bring up 

too much from the equipment standpoint. 

Of more concern is any possible fuel that was left over, just radioactive material that would probably be of less interest to Iran 

but would be of interest to Hezbollah or al-Qaeda for use in a radiological dispersal device, a dirty bomb. That would be a concern 

and we don’t have a good handle on how much of that was left, 

what was destroyed, what wasn’t destroyed during that raid. So 

again, an incomplete picture but there are some things that we 

need to keep track of or be trying to find out before they start 

walking over any borders. 

Mr. DUNCAN. How difficult would it be for Hezbollah to take that 

across the Lebanon border? 

Mr. BUCCI. Into Lebanon, probably not too difficult, sir. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I just want to shift gears here in my remaining 

time and talk about shoulder-fired missiles. Ambassador, you had 

talked about that I think, but do we have a handle on how many, 

I have read different numbers, tens of thousands of shoulder-fired 

MANPADs basically, in Syria. Do we have a handle on where those 

38

are? And do we have an adequate defense for that in this nation 

if those fall into the hands of the terrorists? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Well, sir, on the latter question, we 

don’t. All it takes is one passenger aircraft to trigger a lot of consequences that would be difficult and adverse, as 9/11 did with 

TSA and everything that has happened because of airline security. 

So the best strategy is to try to do our best so that the nightmare 

never happens. 

It has been a long time since I worked in the Pentagon. I was 

there for 8 years. DIA would normally have had a very good laydown of where the weapons stores and sites should be, which units 

would be capable of air defense and what reactions they had to the 

previous encounters with Israel in particular, and so I would expect 

there is a very strong air defense component to their regular military. There may be special forces as well that are Alawite and loyal 

to the regime. 

I personally am not up on the intelligence but that is where I 

would look. I would try to piece together the best map I could, and 

again try to reach out to those individuals at this time and tell 

them how to defect and how to secure them and how to make sure 

that those don’t become a factor in the aftermath. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Yes, we are concerned about Hezbollah and Hamas, 

but what about the Palestinian that would be very capable of using 

a MANPAD due to their proximity to Ben Gurion Airport? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. When you mention the Palestinians, I 

immediately think they are Sunni. And so Damascus gave a home 

to Khaled Meishal, the radical Hamas leader, who then started to 

look around and see that his people were being killed by the regime. They were being shot up. Those were Sunnis being killed by 

the Syrian regime. So I think that there is a potential split there, 

and I don’t know if that is a tactical or even a strategic opportunity 

for the United States, and I am not flagging a desire to try to embrace radical Palestinians. But clearly, you want to peel off radicals 

from each other, and so I would have a political working group 

looking very long and hard about how to exploit that in the information space, to create mistrust. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Connolly from Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And actually if I 

could pick up, Ambassador Bloomfield, on what you were just saying. I mean one of the complications obviously in the Syrian situation is that it is an Alawite-dominated government and military, 

and Sunnis are definitely in a second tier and watched carefully at 

all levels. 

Would it be fair to say that when it comes to chemical weapons 

storage that storage is also very much in the control of the Alawite 

minority? In the power structure, I mean. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Congressman Connolly, I would expect 

so. I go back to Hafez al-Assad, when there was a whole battalion 

of T–72 tanks under tarpaulins sitting outside the apartments in 

Damascus where the regime figures lived. And this was during the 

Muslim Brotherhood episode that led to the Hama Massacre where 

20,000 were killed. The Syrian army would not do the job, so he 

turned to an Alawite army, his brother, this is Bashar’s uncle, 

Rifat, took in the Defense Companies and they moved in under 

39

threat of their own death according to our attache on the scene at 

the time, who witnessed it and said these guys were scared for 

their lives unless they went in and killed everyone and put it down. 

So I would expect there would be extreme loyalty attached to those 

assets. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Following up on that logic, would it also be fair 

to say that until and unless this fracturing among the Alawite 

elite, if ever, or their defeat that control of the chemical weapons 

stockpiles is unlikely in the short term to get in the hands of others 

that worry us too? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I have never lived through a revolution. And when your spouse and kids and relatives are all jumping 

in cars as happened in Iraq, stuffing cash in the trunk and racing 

down for the nearest border, I would not have much comfort about 

any particular——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Chaos ensues and—yes. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. That is right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Saddam Hussein, in fact, Sandy Spector, used 

chemical weapons against his own population. Has either of the 

Assads been known ever to deploy chemical weapons within Syria? 

Mr. SPECTOR. Not that I am aware of, but what they have done 

just recently in terms of the wholesale slaughter in some of these 

cities indicates that they are pretty prepared to take extremely 

harsh and coercive measures. And so you wonder how big a threshold they perceive they would be going over if they were to take this 

additional step. I think there has been enough international focus 

on this to at least etch the threshold a little deeper than it might 

otherwise be, but I don’t think there is any kind of moral compunction. I think it is more kind of practical tradeoffs. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Bucci? 

Mr. BUCCI. Sir, the fact that this regime has been using not just 

small arms and not even just heavy machine guns but, literally, 

anti-aircraft machine guns that one of those shells, I mean it is 

against the Geneva Convention to use those against personnel and 

he is gunning down civilians with them. So the step from that to 

using a chemical weapon against your civilian population, if you 

feel that threatened in your survival as a regime, is a very small 

one for somebody like Assad. So I would not be surprised at all if 

he made the decision to use those chemical weapons against his 

own people unless he gets sufficient messaging to deter him from 

doing it, and if he thinks there is some other way out or some other 

way of survival. It is very likely that we could see the use of those 

weapons against the civilian population of Syria. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, okay. I am hearing both of you say, I 

wouldn’t count on Assad to have some moral compunction or some 

special abstract line beyond which he will not go, because after all 

these are chemical weapons. That is a different order of magnitude. 

But on the international level and here in the West, do we, should 

we have such a line that says, we deplore and we call for your ouster, regime change, based on what you have already done, but if you 

cross that line, what? 

Mr. BUCCI. Sir, I think that is a very thin line and a very artificial one. I think the decision needs to be made; you are either an 

40

abhorrent leader doing war crimes against your population or you 

are not. What color of war crime it is, is a little hard to define. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I understand and sympathize with that point of 

view up to a point, but the consequence of that point of view or the 

logic of that point of view gets us to the point where we stop distinguishing among weapons. And as a matter of fact, under international law we do, we do have a special understanding with respect to chemical weapons. And so conflating these, in looking at 

the horrors of the regime could have an unintended consequence of, 

frankly, diluting the international regime we have created around 

and to control and regulate chemical weapons. 

Sandy? 

Mr. SPECTOR. Yes, my sense is that we were all hesitant to imagine intervention because of the experience in Libya and in Iraq. 

But this is a level of intensity which we would not have seen before, and I think the other side appreciates it also. In other words 

that there is a presumption to be overcome that we are not going 

to intervene, but chemical weapons would overcome the presumption. And I think that is what we want to make clear, and I think 

we are doing it. It has been repeated at least twice in the last week 

by the administration. They haven’t used the word, we are going 

to intervene, but they have said that this is a major red line. So 

I think it is being treated differently, and I——

Mr. CONNOLLY. And should be? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. It should be different. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am asking, and it should be? 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. I think in the political circumstances 

in which we find ourselves after the history of Iraq and Libya, we 

have been sort of hamstrung in terms of doing what we might have 

done otherwise in Syria, so I think treating chemical weapons as 

the next threshold and an important one is appropriate. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, my time is up but I do see Ambassador Bloomfield wanting to also weigh in on this, if the chair 

would so indulge. I thank the chair. 

Ambassador BLOOMFIELD. Obviously, Congressman Connolly, you 

are on to an important point. I share it. There is a difference. The 

tradecraft that any administration would exercise is to make sure 

that they are not setting a special status on chemical weapons that 

sends a message that everything else short of that is somehow 

okay. And so I think one way to differentiate it is to message, first 

of all, we know what you are doing—even if we don’t—and secondly, if there is any use of these banned weapons or major use of 

conventional weapons, I mean Hellfire-type missiles from helicopters, that the people who are actually commanding those units 

will be on the list that ends up in the docket of international law. 

They will never have a life outside of jail, to the end of the earth. 

So you begin to say, if you sit down and just ride it out and if you 

work with us you are not on the list. But if you start to do these 

other things, the list grows. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me conclude by thanking our panel of expert witnesses for their excellent testimony, and also the members of the 

committee. Our staff, I think, would like to follow up with each of 

the three of you, if that is all right, to further explore some of these 

ideas. And I am particularly interested in Ambassador Bloomfield’s 

41

task force recommendations here, and so we will be in touch with 

each of you. But again, we thank you for taking the time and preparing this testimony. 

We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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