SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly 

$2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its 

Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to 

Other Agencies

September 8, 2011
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

September 8, 2011

Executive Agencies: 

This report discusses the results of a performance audit of the implementation and sustainability of the 

U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan. This report includes two recommendations to the Department of 

State’s Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs.

When preparing the final report, we considered comments from the Secretary of State’s Special 

Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Department of State’s Bureau of Resource 

Management, and the Department of Homeland Security. The Special Representative for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan concurred with the report’s recommendations and identified planned actions to resolve 

them. The Bureau of Resource Management stated that it did not object to one of our 

recommendations; it did not address the other. The Department of Homeland Security did not 

comment directly on the recommendations. These comments are reproduced in appendices V-VII, 

respectively. 

A summary of this report is on page iii. This performance audit was conducted by the Office of the 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and the Department of State Office of 

Inspector General under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, the Inspector General 

Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008. 

 

 

Steven Trent 

Acting Special Inspector General 

 for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Harold Geisel 

Deputy Inspector General 

U.S. Department of State

 Office of Inspector General 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page ii

List of Addresses

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

The Honorable Leon Panetta

Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Ryan C. Crocker 

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

The Honorable Eric H. Holder, Jr.

Attorney General

The Honorable Tom Vilsack

Secretary of Agriculture

The Honorable Gary Locke

Secretary of Commerce

The Honorable Kathleen Sebelius

Secretary of Health and Human Services

The Honorable Janet Napolitano

Secretary of Homeland Security

The Honorable Ray LaHood

Secretary of Transportation

The Honorable Timothy F. Geithner

Secretary of the Treasury

Dr. Rajiv Shah

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

Robert O. Blake Jr.

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian 

Affairs Department of State

Dr. S. Ken Yamashita

USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan
Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction 

and 

State Office of Inspector 

General

SIGAR Audit-11-17& State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Sept. 2011

The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly 

$2 Billion, and State Should Continue to Strengthen Its 

Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to 

Other Agencies 

What SIGAR and the Department of State OIG Reviewed

In 2009, President Obama announced a new, comprehensive U.S. strategy for Afghanistan aimed at disrupting, 

dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda. A key element of the strategy is the expansion of civilian-led efforts to build 

Afghan governing capacity at all levels, improve the rule of law, and initiate sustainable economic growth. A significant 

increase or “uplift” in U.S. civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan supports this effort. In addition to significant 

infrastructure and security costs, it costs the U.S. government between about $410,000 and $570,000 to deploy one 

employee to Afghanistan for 1 year. Despite this cost, no agency has comprehensively assessed the cost of establishing 

and sustaining the civilian uplift or the mechanisms in place to ensure uplift funds are used appropriately. SIGAR and 

State OIG jointly conducted an audit to (1) determine the number of personnel and associated costs of the civilian 

uplift, (2) evaluate State’s mechanisms to transfer funds to other agencies to support civilian uplift personnel, and 

(3) assess the costs of sustaining and supporting the civilian presence in Afghanistan and State’s plans to address these 

costs. To address these objectives, we collected data from all agencies that have deployed uplift personnel, 

interviewed officials from these agencies, and reviewed inter- and intra-agency documentation. We conducted work in 

Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan, from October 2010 to July 2011, in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

What SIGAR and the Department of State OIG Found 

Since early 2009, U.S. agencies have nearly tripled the number of civilians deployed to Afghanistan under Chief of 

Mission authority at a cost of nearly $2 billion. The number of U.S. civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan 

increased from 320 in early 2009 to 1,040 personnel by June 2011. As the primary agency responsible for funding the 

civilian uplift and providing safe and functional working and living conditions for all agencies, the Department of State 

(State) incurred the majority of the $1.7 billion obligated to support the uplift, in addition to security costs. 

Congress authorized State to transfer funds to other agencies to support operations in and assistance for Afghanistan, 

and SIGAR and State OIG found that State has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that State funds transferred to other 

agencies are used for their intended purposes. The Foreign Affairs Manual indicates that obligations should be 

supported by evidence of binding agreements in writing between U.S. agencies regarding the use of funds. In addition, 

government-wide internal control standards highlight the importance of agency monitoring to ensure funds are 

expended for their intended purposes. However, we found that State had neither established formal mechanisms with 

other agencies regarding their use of civilian uplift funds nor monitored how agencies spent funds and instead relied on 

informal communications such as emails and meetings. As a result, this increased the risk that funds would not be 

spent for their intended purpose. In one instance, we determined that the Department of Transportation 

(Transportation) did not know whether $3.5 million in State transfers were authorized for training or other purposes, 

and as a result Transportation cancelled plans to utilize the funding. 

State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian presence in 

Afghanistan, and State faces significant challenges in planning to address these costs. First, the U.S. military’s 

withdrawal from Afghanistan will likely lead to cost increases for State due to key military security functions that State 

will assume. Second, a legislative proposal to standardize pay and benefits for all civilians deployed to Afghanistan 

could also result in increased costs for civilian agencies. Third, the opening of two consulates in Afghanistan could 

increase costs due to security and housing requirements. Although officials in State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian 

Affairs have started planning to address the costs of supporting and sustaining the civilian presence in Afghanistan, they 

face a number of planning challenges, such as budget uncertainty and the absence of details on the expected size of the 

civilian presence in Afghanistan in coming years.

What SIGAR and the State OIG Recommends

SIGAR and State OIG are making two recommendations to the State Department’s Bureau of South and Central Asian 

Affairs to ensure that uplift funds are used for their intended purpose and to recover $3.5 million in unused funds from 

Transportation. State agreed to implement formal agreements with agencies receiving transfers, and State indicated 

the agreements will include reporting requirements and return of unused funds. State and Transportation officials have 

indicated the $3.5 million in unused funds will be returned to the U.S. Treasury. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil or 

State OIG Public Affairs at (202) 663-0380 or burgess@state.gov

SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page iii
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ................................................................................................................................................... 2

The Number of Civilian Employees Assigned to Afghanistan Has Increased by 

720 Since 2009, at an Estimated Cost of Nearly $2 Billion..................................................................... 5

State Has Not Developed Formal Agreements to Transfer and Oversee Funds 

Provided to Other Agencies .................................................................................................................11

The Cost of Supporting and Sustaining the Civilian Presence in Afghanistan Will 

Likely Increase, and State Faces a Number of Related Planning Challenges .......................................13

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................15

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................16

Agency Comments on a Draft of This Report..............................................................................................16

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................18

Apppendix II: Costs to Deploy One Person to Afghanistan for One Year ..................................................21

Appendix III: Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Obligations 

and Estimated Expenditures For Afghanistan......................................................................................24

Appendix IV: Department of State's Total Expenditures and Unliquidated 

Obligations through January 2011 for the Afghanistan Civilian Uplift.................................................25

Appendix V: Comments from the Secretary of State’s Special Representative for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan .....................................................................................................................27

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State’s Bureau of Resource 

Management and the SIGAR and State OIG Response ........................................................................30

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security....................................................35

 TABLES 

Table 1: Estimate of Costs to Deploy a Civilian Employee to Afghanistan for One 

Year......................................................................................................................................................... 4

Table 2: Actual and Projected Civilian Uplift Personnel Deployed to Afghanistan, 

by Agency and Fiscal Year....................................................................................................................... 6

Table 3: Agency Expenditures, Projected Expenditures, and Unliquidated 

Obligations to Directly Fund the Deployment of Civilian Uplift Personnel in 

Afghanistan ($ in thousands), by Fiscal Year.......................................................................................... 8

Table 4: State Transfers to Agencies Providing Civilian Employees to Support the 

Uplift ($ in thousands).........................................................................................................................10

Table 5: USAID Transfers to the Department of Commerce for the Civilian Uplift 

($ in thousands)....................................................................................................................................11

Table I: Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Obligations and 

Estimated Expenditures for Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 through Fiscal Year 

2011 (To-March 2011)..........................................................................................................................24
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page v 

Table II: Department of State’s Total Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations 

Through January 2011 for the Afghanistan Civilian Uplift ...................................................................25
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page vi

ACRONYMS 

Commerce Department of Commerce

CSCS Capital Security Cost Sharing

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOJ Department of Justice 

DS State Bureau of Diplomatic Security

FS Foreign Service

FY Fiscal Year

GS General Schedule of the Civil Service

HHS Department of Health and Human Services 

ICASS International Cooperative Administrative Support Services 

OBO State Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations

RM State Bureau of Resource Management

R&R Rest and Recuperation

RRB Regional Rest Break

SCA State Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SRAP Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

State Department of State 

State OIG Department of State Office of Inspector General

Transportation Department of Transportation 

Treasury Department of Treasury 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USFOR-A U.S. Forces-Afghanistan
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 1 

The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State 

Should Continue to Strengthen Its Management and Oversight of the Funds 

Transferred to Other Agencies 

In 2009, President Obama announced a new comprehensive U.S. strategy for Afghanistan aimed at 

disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al-Qaeda and denying its access to safe havens. A key element of 

the strategy is the expansion of civilian-led efforts to build Afghan governing capacity at all levels, 

improve the rule of law, and initiate sustainable economic growth, primarily through agricultural 

development. This effort has been supported by a significant increase, or “uplift,” in U.S. civilian 

employees deployed to Afghanistan, from 320 personnel in January 2009 to over 1,200 authorized 

positions as of May 31, 2011. Although the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Embassy in Kabul 

play lead roles in funding and overseeing the uplift, it is an interagency effort, drawing personnel 

primarily from State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but also the 

Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Justice (DOJ), Treasury, Transportation, Commerce, Health and 

Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security (DHS). State and USAID are the only two agencies 

directly funded by Congress for uplift positions. Congress also authorized State to use appropriations to 

transfer funds to other civilian agencies to support operations and assistance for Afghanistan. State 

transfers funds to seven civilian departments under this authority.1

In February 2010, State’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul may 

face challenges in sustaining the additional personnel deployed under the civilian uplift and, therefore, 

should evaluate the affordability of the civilian uplift.

 The Department of Defense (DOD) 

also plays a key role in supporting U.S. civilians by providing life support to civilians deployed to field 

locations and providing a secure environment for civilians. 

2

 In October 2010, the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported on the types and number of personnel provided to 

implement the civilian uplift and the extent to which the life and operational support needs of these 

personnel had been met.3

Although the civilian uplift is a key component of the President’s strategy in Afghanistan, no agency has 

conducted a comprehensive assessment of the costs of establishing and sustaining the uplift. SIGAR and 

State OIG jointly conducted this audit to (1) determine the number of personnel and associated costs of 

the civilian uplift, (2) evaluate State’s mechanisms for transferring funds to other agencies to support 

In that audit, SIGAR raised several concerns, including the difficulty that the 

U.S. government may encounter in sustaining the civilian uplift at current levels. 

 

1 Public Laws Numbers 111-32, 111-117, and 111-212 authorize the Secretary of State to transfer funds to any 

department or agency of the United States, upon the concurrence of the head of such department or agency, to 

support operations in and assistance for Afghanistan and to carry out the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act 

of 1961. 

2 Report Number ISP-I-10-32A.

3 See SIGAR Audit-11-2, U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan is Progressing but Some Key Issues Merit Further 

Examination as Implementation Continues, October 26, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 2 

civilian uplift personnel, and (3) assess the costs of sustaining and supporting the civilian presence in 

Afghanistan and State’s plans to address these costs. 

To address our objectives, we obtained data from civilian agencies that deploy personnel to Afghanistan. 

Specifically, we requested that they identify the number of Afghanistan-based positions authorized as 

part of the uplift and the number of personnel who filled these positions in fiscal years (FY) 2009, 2010, 

and 2011.4

 We also collected data from the agencies regarding expenditures and obligations to support 

civilian uplift employees deployed to Afghanistan. We examined State processes to transfer funds to 

other agencies and identified factors that could affect the cost of sustaining the civilian uplift, such as 

life support services provided to U.S. civilians by the U.S. military and coalition partners. Finally, we 

interviewed key officials from each of the agencies involved. See Appendix I for a complete discussion 

of our scope and methodology. 

BACKGROUND

In March 2009, President Obama outlined a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan.5

 In support of this 

strategy, U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)6

The uplift is intended to help the Afghan government build capacity to govern effectively at the national 

and sub-national level. For the purposes of this report, civilian uplift personnel are defined as 

U.S. government civilian employees

released the United States 

Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan in August 2009, and 

the Secretary of State signed the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy in February 

2010. These documents outlined broad U.S. reconstruction goals to improve security, build Afghan 

governance capacity, enhance rule of law, and lay the foundation for sustainable development. To 

achieve these goals, the President announced that the United States would send additional troops to

help secure Afghanistan, particularly in the more unstable eastern and southern regions of the country. 

To complement the increased military presence, the new strategy also called for a substantial increase 

in the number of civilian personnel and associated resources for civilian-led assistance efforts. 

7 deployed to Afghanistan under Chief of Mission authority8 after 

January 2009 to support the campaign for Afghanistan. The 320 employees in place before the uplift are 

referred to as “base” employees. 

 

4 For fiscal year 2011, State and USAID provided the number of filled positions as of March 2011, while other 

agencies provided projections of the number of positions expected to be filled by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

5 The U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan refers to the strategy announced in a March 27, 2009 speech, and reiterated in 

a December 1, 2009, speech delivered by President Obama. 

6 U.S. Forces-Afghanistan is the functioning command and control headquarters for U.S. forces operating in 

Afghanistan, and is intended to ensure effective integration and coordination between U.S. and coalition forces.

7 Contractor personnel were included in our accounting of uplift personnel only if they were filling civilian uplift 

positions. Third-party contractors were not included in uplift counts. However, costs incurred from contractors to 

support the civilian uplift were included in the cost estimation. 

8 According to National Security Decision Directive 38, the Chief of Mission, also referred to as U.S. Ambassador to 

a certain country or other specified entity, has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of 

all U.S. government executive branch employees in that country, except for Voice of America correspondents on 

official assignment and employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. See 22 U.S.C. § 3927. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 3 

State and USAID are the primary U.S. government agencies charged with conducting foreign policy and 

implementing the U.S. government’s foreign assistance strategy and, therefore, are the key 

implementing agencies of the civilian uplift in Afghanistan. Congress authorized State to use 

appropriations to transfer funds to other civilian agencies to support operations and assistance for 

Afghanistan. In addition, Congress authorized USAID to fund other agencies’ uplift positions, and USAID 

has used this authority to fund one Commerce uplift position. 

According to State officials, the Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul formulates personnel and 

associated budget requirements needed to fulfill the U.S. government’s nonmilitary strategy for 

Afghanistan reconstruction. Officials at State’s Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) review 

the Embassy’s requirements and coordinate within State and with other civilian agencies to determine 

the personnel numbers for State bureaus and other agencies. These officials, in consultation with senior 

leadership in other departments, determine the final staffing needs and authorize positions in Kabul and 

in the field to support the U.S. government strategy for reconstruction in Afghanistan. After staffing 

targets are determined, SCA officials work with officials from the other department to determine the 

funding levels required to deploy the uplift personnel. SCA works closely with the Office of the 

Secretary of State’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) to manage and oversee 

the civilian uplift. SRAP is responsible for coordinating across the U.S. government to meet U.S. strategic 

goals in the region. 

Typically, the U.S. government spends between $425,926 and $570,998 to support the deployment of 

one U.S. government civilian to Afghanistan for a 1-year assignment. Actual agency costs vary 

depending on factors such as the salary level of the deployed employee, fees for life support services at 

the Embassy and in the field, and individual agencies overtime policies. These costs are broken down in 

table 1 and described in more detail in appendix II. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 4 

Table 1: Estimate of Costs to Deploy a Civilian Employee to Afghanistan for One Year

Cost Items Cost Range a

A) Salary and Benefits:

 

Salary - planning assumptions for a civil service position and for a 

Foreign Service position $110,000 - $122,733

Salary for training period a $9,441

 Danger pay-35% of base pay b $38,500 - $42,957

 Post differential-35% of base pay b $38,500 - $42,957

 Sunday differential-5% of base pay b $5,500 - $6,137

 Overtime compensation $22,000 - $30,683

 

Special differential-20% of base pay (only for a Foreign Service 

Positions) $22,000 - $24,547

 Benefits-28% of base pay $30,800 - $37,009

 

Separate maintenance allowance of the base pay (only for 

Foreign Service positions) $12,516 - $17,300

 R&R and RRBs budgeted for a position in Afghanistan $5,785 - $21,000

Total salary and benefits range (The range indicated is not the total sum of all 

the line items in this table because some categories are not applicable to 

certain positions).

$266,300 - $310,216

B) Other direct expenses for the position:

 Mandatory Afghanistan training costs (including per diem) $10,432 c

 Deployment travel $25,000 - $48,983

Medical evacuation $28,120

 

International Cooperative Administrative Support Services 

(ICASS)

$37,000 - $150,000

 Housing (non ICASS housing and infrastructure costs) $45,000 d

 Department of Defense (DOD) civilian life support in the field $ 36,000 - $48,701

 Capital Security Cost Sharing $1,626 - $22,657

 Field life support kits $15,000 

Total other direct expenses (The range indicated is not the total sum of all the 

line items in this table because some categories are not applicable to certain 

positions). 

$159,626 - $242,657

Total Cost Estimate Range for One Position $425,926 - $570,998

Source: SIGAR analysis based on information provided by State and USAID.

Note: This model does not take into consideration the agencies’ headquarters staff support costs for the agencies’ Afghanistan 

positions in Washington D.C. or the 15 days transitional leave/expenses for employees departing Afghanistan. 

a Based on State and USAID Afghanistan Position Planning Tools. b Calculated based on the salary range mentioned above.

c Based on USAID data. State’s training costs are not broken down on a per person basis.

d USAID pays for housing through ICASS in Afghanistan.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 5 

In addition to the costs detailed in the table above, the U.S. government incurs costs to support civilians 

in Afghanistan that cannot be calculated on a per person basis. These include, for example:

• Security: In addition to certain security costs charged on a per person basis, State’s Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security (DS) provides security for civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan.9 DS 

officials estimated that the total expenses for security in Afghanistan from fiscal year 2009 

through March 2011, was approximately $491 million. 

• Infrastructure of the U.S. Mission Compounds: State has obligated over $700 million for housing 

and office space required to support uplift personnel. 

THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ASSIGNED TO AFGHANISTAN HAS INCREASED BY 720 

SINCE 2009, AT AN ESTIMATED COST OF NEARLY $2 BILLION 

The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan represents a significant investment of resources. The number of 

civilian employees deployed or assigned to deploy to Afghanistan has increased by 720, from 320 in 

January 2009 to a total of 1,040 through the end of fiscal year 2011, at a cost of nearly $2 billion.10 State 

and USAID account for the majority of uplift personnel, contributing a combined 74 percent of uplift 

personnel through fiscal year 2011. Uplift personnel are implementing multiple programs to advance 

governance, rule of law, and development—key objectives of the U.S. effort for Afghanistan 

reconstruction. According to agency officials, agencies plan to continue deploying additional personnel 

throughout fiscal year 2012. 

U.S. Government Agencies Are Projected to Deploy at Least 720 Additional Personnel by the 

End of Fiscal Year 2011 

Agencies have increased the number of uplift personnel assigned to Afghanistan each fiscal year since 

2009, increasing the number of personnel by 720 for a total of 1,040 in fiscal year 2011. Table 2 depicts 

the number of U.S. civilian personnel supporting the U.S. uplift in Afghanistan in fiscal years 2009 

through 2011, by agency. 

 

9 The U.S. military and foreign coalition partners also provide secure environments for civilians deployed to field 

locations in Afghanistan. DOD officials said security is provided without seeking reimbursement from State or 

other agencies. 

10 SIGAR and State OIG also had increases in personnel in Afghanistan due to increased spending on programs and 

operations. However, State does not include increases in SIGAR and State OIG personnel and associated costs in 

the uplift counts and costs. The figure of 1,040 personnel reflects the summation of State’s actual civilian uplift 

deployment as of March 31, 2011, and other agencies projected civilian uplift deployment as of the end of fiscal 

year 2011. However, the total number of personnel at post fluctuates weekly due to factors such as personnel 

rotations, personnel deployed on details, or rest breaks. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 6 

Table 2: Actual and Projected Civilian Uplift Personnel Deployed to Afghanistan, by Agency and Fiscal 

Yeara 

Department FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011

State 77 315 309

USAID 62 199 222

DOJ 0 62 78

USDA 0 44 59b

DHS 0 11 25

Transportation 0 1 13

Treasury 11 10 12

Commerce 0 1 1 

HHS 0 1 1 

TOTALc 150 644 720

Source: SIGAR and State OIG analysis of data provided by each agency. 

a The personnel numbers shown in this table are in addition to the 320 base positions in place before January 2009. State and 

USAID figures represent actual positions filled as of the end of FY 2009 and 2010, and actual positions filled as of March 2011 

for FY 2011. DOJ figures reflect the number of positions filled as of end of the first quarter of each fiscal year. All other 

agencies reflect actual positions filled at the end of FY 2009 and 2010, and projected positions filled by the end of FY 2011. 

While SIGAR and State OIG Afghanistan personnel and costs increased due to overall U.S. government operations and programs 

in Afghanistan, these organizations’ personnel counts and associated costs are not included in this report. 

b USDA FY 2011 personnel counts include 14 positions that USDA originally considered base positions and funded through direct 

USDA appropriations in FY 2009 and 2010. However, in FY 2011, USDA officials reported that their appropriations for these 14 

positions, as well as Washington, D.C. based support staff has been reduced to zero. USDA had not yet reached its allotment of 

uplift positions funded by State and will use State funds to continue to fund the deployment of the 14 personnel, in addition to 

other uplift personnel. c The total shown for each year is cumulative. For example, the total for FY 2011 includes filled uplift positions in FY 2009, 2010, 

and 2011. 

As of fiscal year 2011, State and USAID personnel comprise 531 uplift personnel, or 74 percent of the 

720 uplift personnel. As of fiscal year 2011, State accounted for 43 percent and USAID accounted for 31 

percent of uplift personnel deployed to Afghanistan. State and USAID are engaged in a variety of 

programs to advance governance and rule of law, such as mentoring Afghan government officials at the 

national and sub-national levels. USAID also manages development programs, including the Local 

Governance and Community Development program

State and USAID Account for over 70 Percent of the Civilian Uplift

11 and vouchers for increased production in 

agriculture. 

 

11 The Local Governance and Community Development program assesses community needs and implements local 

stability initiatives and maintains these initiatives through Afghan-led community development programs. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 7 

Prior to the civilian uplift, State had the largest civilian presence in Afghanistan. State has also 

experienced the largest increase of any agency. Specifically, State increased its civilian personnel 

deployed to Afghanistan from 192 in January 2009, to 501 in March 2011—an increase of 309 personnel. 

State has an additional 81 authorized full-time equivalent positions for the civilian uplift as of 

May 31, 2011, but the positions are currently unfilled. According to State officials from the Bureau of 

South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), they will continue to place additional civilian personnel in these 

positions through fiscal years 2011 and 2012. 

USAID had the second largest presence of any agency prior to the start of the uplift. USAID personnel 

increased from 85 in January 2009 to 307 as of March 2011, an increase of 222 personnel. USAID has an 

additional 80 authorized positions for Afghanistan that are currently unfilled. According to USAID 

officials, they will continue to place additional U.S. civilians in these positions in fiscal years 2011 and 

2012. 

As of June 2011, the other seven civilian agencies with a presence in Afghanistan accounted for an 

increase of 189 personnel, or approximately 26 percent of the total civilian uplift. These agencies 

provide personnel at the request and direction of the Chief of Mission in Afghanistan and State officials 

in Washington in order to meet the mission’s strategic goals. The Chief of Mission determines the 

number of authorized civilian uplift positions in consultation with each department. 

The Remaining Seven Civilian Agencies Account for a Total Increase of 189 Personnel, or approximately 

26 Percent of the Uplift

DOJ accounted for an increase of 78 personnel, or 11 percent, of the total civilian uplift. The majority of 

these uplift personnel are employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration who work on mentoring 

and training Afghan law enforcement entities in an effort to promote the rule of law. In addition, they 

provide leadership and guidance in the conduct of bilateral counternarcotics investigations and 

operations. USDA has deployed 59 civilian uplift personnel as of June 2011, representing eight percent 

of the total civilian uplift. These employees primarily mentor Afghan government officials at the Ministry 

of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. The remaining five agencies account for approximately seven 

percent of the total civilian uplift. DHS personnel advise, mentor, and train Afghan border, customs, and 

related entities to enforce Afghan customs and immigration law. Treasury places technical experts at 

Afghan government ministries where they provide assistance in four areas: strengthening budget and 

financial accountability, combating economic crimes and corruption, building internal audit capacity and 

increasing non-tax revenues, and achieving debt relief and improving debt management. Transportation 

personnel advise officials at the Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation on issues such as civil 

aviation law and surface transportation planning. HHS personnel work on health programs, such as 

programs to strengthen maternal and child health services in Afghanistan. Finally, Commerce personnel 

assist with efforts to promote Afghanistan’s economic development and trade. 

The U.S. Government Obligated nearly $1.7 Billion through Fiscal Year 2011 to Support the 

Deployment of Uplift Civilians and to Provide Facilities and Services that Benefit Base and 

Uplift Employees 

The U.S. government obligated nearly $1.7 billion from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011 to fund 

the civilian uplift, as well as to provide facilities and services that benefit both base and uplift 

employees. The U.S. government has expended approximately $880 million of this $1.7 billion to 

support the civilian uplift; about $782 million in additional funds has been obligated, but not yet 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 8 

expended. The $1.7 billion does not include additional costs for security in Afghanistan, which State’s 

Bureau of Diplomatic Security has estimated was $491 million to support both base and uplift personnel. 

Table 3 depicts all agency expenditures and obligations for fiscal years 2009 through 2011. 

Table 3: Agency Expenditures, Projected Expenditures, and Unliquidated Obligations to Directly Fund 

the Deployment of Civilian Uplift Personnel in Afghanistan ($ in thousands), by Fiscal Year

Agency FY 2009

Expendituresa 

FY 2010

Expendituresb 

FY 2011

Projected 

Expendituresc 

Unliquidated 

Obligationsd

(as of FY 2011)

Total

State $116,445 $265,532 $69,262e $778,748e $1,229,987

USAID 3,873 66,777 169,293 - 239,943

DOJ 1,601 73,141 27,723 - 102,465f

DHS 0 14,337 23,804 - 38,141

USDA 2,300 10,664 19,329 - 32,293

Treasury 995 3,995 6,428 3,786 15,204

Transportation 0 78 2,719 - 2,797

Commerce 0 52 706 - 758

HHS 0 567 500 - 1,067

TOTAL $125,214 $435,143 $319,764 $782,534 $1,662,655

Source: SIGAR and State OIG analysis of expenditure and obligation data provided by each agency. 

Notes: Figures are rounded. A dash (-) indicates that no data were provided. a

For FY2009, all agencies provided data on actual expenditures, except for DOJ, which reported obligations.

b For FY2010, all agencies provided data on actual expenditures, except for DOJ, which reported obligations.

c For FY2011, State reported actual expenditures through January 2011. Treasury reported obligations. DOJ reported actual 

obligations through March 31, 2011, which do not reflect the total DOJ obligations expected to occur in FY 2011. All other 

agencies provided data on projected expenditures for FY 2011. 

d

Unliquidated obligations are funds that have been obligated, but not yet expended. State and Treasury were the only agencies

that reported unliquidated obligations. e

Actual expenditures and unliquidated obligations for SCA as of January 14, 2011, and Overseas Building Operations as of 

February 2, 2011.

f

DOJ totals reflect obligations in each fiscal year. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 9 

From January 2009 through the first quarter of 2011, State obligated $1.2 billion toward the civilian 

uplift effort.

State Obligated $1.2 Billion to Directly Fund the Deployment of Uplift Personnel through the First 

Quarter of Fiscal Year 2011, and Spent an Additional $491 Million in Diplomatic Security Costs in 

Afghanistan 

12 It also spent an estimated $491 million on security costs for operations in Afghanistan.13

State funds the civilian uplift primarily through SCA, and SCA reimburses other State bureaus that incur 

costs to support the uplift effort.14 The State Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) and DS 

also receive direct appropriations to fund activities related to security and infrastructure in Afghanistan. 

State (excluding DS) expended $451 million through January 2011 to support the uplift efforts and has 

unliquidated obligations of an additional $779 million in funds to support the uplift.15

OBO received appropriations, as well as transfers from other State bureaus, totaling $945 million to 

construct office, housing, support and temporary facilities in Kabul and consulates in Herat and 

Mazar-e-Sharif. The bureau’s funding came primarily from the Embassy Security, Construction, and 

Maintenance appropriation, but State SCA and DS also transferred $62 million and $41 million, 

respectively, to OBO. Of these funds, OBO expended $75 million and obligated an additional 

$623 million, leaving $247 million unobligated. OBO is using these funds to provide accommodations 

and office space for the continued growth in staffing. For example, OBO includes developing permanent 

buildings for classified and unclassified office space, housing units, and support facilities. To provide 

space during this construction, non-permanent housing has been recently completed and 896 nonpermanent desks are expected to be completed this September. The consulates in Herat and 

Mazar-e-Sharif are temporary facilities housed in pre-existing buildings that will provide space for 

100 desks (Herat) and 37 desks (Mazar).

 (See appendix IV.) 

DS estimated that it obligated $491 million for security operations in Afghanistan from the beginning of 

fiscal year 2009 through March 2011. Security expenses include the provision of physical security 

infrastructure (such as blast walls), the Embassy guard force, salaries for DS personnel, security for 

ground transportation, and security equipment such as armored vehicles. DS does not develop budgets 

on a country-by-country basis and does not distinguish between base and uplift personnel when 

providing security for U.S. civilians. Therefore, these costs represent an estimate of costs to provide 

security to base and uplift personnel in Afghanistan since the start of the civilian uplift. The DS 

estimated costs are presented in a separate schedule (see appendix III). 

In addition to funding State’s internal bureaus, SCA transferred approximately $250.4 million to seven 

U.S. agencies participating in the civilian uplift. Table 4 depicts funding transfers from State to these 

agencies for the purpose of funding costs associated with the deployment of personnel to Afghanistan. 

 

12 State OIG analysis of financial data provided by the Bureaus of Resource Management (RM) and SCA, as of 

January 14, 2011. Also included are OBO’s reported expenses and unliquidated obligations as of February 2, 2011.

13 State OIG analysis of financial data as provided by DS, March 2011. 14 Other bureaus within State (except for the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Overseas Buildings Operations) 

are reimbursed by SCA for their contributions towards the uplift effort. 

15 Of the $449 million of outlays by SCA, $262 million were SCA reimbursements to other bureaus within the 

department for their assistance with the uplift effort. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 10

Table 4: State Transfers to Agencies Providing Civilian Employees to Support the Uplift 

($ in thousands) 

Agency FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011a TOTAL

DOJ $74,660 $25,469 $47,239 $147,368

DHS 15,290b 4,948 18,264 38,502

USDA 8,700 15,350 15,861 39,911

Treasury 4,950 4,315 4,780 14,045

Transportation 3,700 1,372 4,024c 9,096

HHS 622 0 500 1,122

Commerce 0 0 402 402

TOTAL $107,922 $51,454 $91,070 $250,446

Source: State OIG and SIGAR analysis of State data. 

a FY 2011 transfers are through May 31, 2011, and do not necessarily reflect the total of transfers that will occur in FY 2011. FY 

2011 transfers include funds that were originally transferred in FY 2010, but were unexpended and unobligated in that year and 

made available for agencies in FY 2011. 

b $7 million of these transferred funds were transferred to DOD by DHS to support the Border Mentor Task Force Contractor 

program, and not to support DHS direct hire uplift personnel. DHS officials expect an additional $7-$9 million to be transferred 

in FY 2011 for this program and not for DHS direct-hire personnel. c $1,305,000 represents an expenditure transfer whereby SCA obligated for the transfer to Transportation and the intragovernmental payment and collection system collected for the services provided.

Since May 2009, USAID has obligated almost $240 million to deploy civilian uplift personnel.

USAID Has Obligated an Estimated $240 Million to Support USAID uplift personnel in Afghanistan from 

May 2009 through Fiscal Year 2011

16 USAID 

expects to spend an additional $321 million in fiscal year 2012 to deploy and support both base and 

uplift personnel. We estimate that USAID will spend at least $232 million of this $321 million to deploy 

uplift personnel, with the remainder spent on base employees. Consistent with its authority, USAID also 

funds one Commerce uplift position and has provided Commerce with $1 million since fiscal year 2009 

for this position (see table 5). 

All agencies other than State and USAID projected to spend approximately $193 million through fiscal 

year 2011, using funds transferred by State. Most of the expenses for these agencies are related to 

salaries and benefits; therefore, agency expenditures correlate with the number of civilian uplift 

personnel. For example, DOJ has more civilian uplift personnel deployed to Afghanistan than any other 

agency besides State and USAID. As such, DOJ has obligated over $100 million in funds transferred from 

State to support its uplift personnel—more than half of the expenditures and obligations of the other 

non-State and non-USAID agencies. The majority of DOJ’s obligations were for the Drug Enforcement 

Administration, which provided the majority of DOJ uplift personnel. The Drug Enforcement 

All Other U.S. Agencies Projected Expenses of Approximately $193 Million through Fiscal Year 2011

 

16 USAID provided costs for all USAID personnel and did not separate costs by civilian uplift personnel. We 

calculated the cost for USAID civilian uplift personnel by estimating the average cost per person deployed per 

month, and we calculated the share of costs related to uplift personnel by determining the number of months 

each individual was deployed to Afghanistan in each fiscal year. For a complete explanation of our methodology, 

see appendix I. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 11

Administration also received State funding for specialized services, such as support for aviation 

resources, vehicles, and specialized investigative units. 

DHS projects to spend $38 million, the second highest projection of any agency other than State and 

USAID. State transfers to DHS included $7 million for the Border Mentor Task Force contractor 

program;17

USDA projects to spend $32 million through fiscal year 2011, the third highest projection of any agency 

other than State and USAID, and has the second most uplift personnel of any agency other than State 

and USAID. The majority of USDA personnel are deployed to field locations, where support costs are 

lower due to reduced ICASS charges. 

these funds were not used to support DHS uplift personnel. DHS officials expect to use an 

additional $8-$9 million in fiscal year 2011 for the Border Mentor Contract. DHS officials told us they 

transferred this $7 million to DOD, which administers the contract. DHS also received $1.2 million from 

State for the purpose of funding rental vehicles for DHS personnel in Afghanistan. 

Table 5 depicts the transfer from USAID to Commerce for the purpose of funding costs associated with 

the deployment of the Commerce uplift employee to Afghanistan. 

Table 5: USAID Transfers to the Department of Commerce for the Civilian Uplift ($ in thousands)

Agency FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011a TOTAL

Department of Commerce 0 500 500 1,000

Source: Department of Commerce

a Commerce officials noted FY 2011 funds had not been transferred as of May 17, 2011, but $500,000 in funds are expected 

before the end of FY 2011. 

STATE HAS NOT DEVELOPED FORMAL AGREEMENTS TO TRANSFER AND OVERSEE FUNDS 

PROVIDED TO OTHER AGENCIES 

State has not developed formal agreements with agencies, such as memoranda of understanding, to 

establish how transferred funds may be used, and State does not consistently monitor agencies’ use of 

transferred funds. According to State’s Foreign Affairs Manual,18 obligations should be supported by 

documentary evidence of binding agreements in writing between U.S. agencies regarding the use of 

funds. Additionally, government-wide internal control standards highlight the importance of having 

systems in place for ensuring that funds are spent for their intended purpose.19

17 The Border Mentor Program is managed by DHS. Border Mentors are provided by a contractor using a DOD 

administered contract. DHS officials told us Border Mentors are skilled former Customs and Border Protection 

employees who advise, coach, and mentor the Afghan Border Police, Afghan Customs leaders and their 

subordinates. 

 State commonly uses 

formal agreements regarding the transfer of funds with other agencies and foreign governments. For 

example, State has memoranda of understanding with DOD and foreign coalition partners regarding the 

provision of life support for U.S. civilians located at DOD and coalition controlled field locations in 

Afghanistan. State also has memoranda of understanding with DOD regarding DOD reimbursements to 

State for the provision of communications and security services to the Afghan Major Crimes Task Force. 

18 U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 4—Financial Management, Section 080, Administrative 

Control of Funds. See 4 FAM 082.6(1), citing 31 U.S.C. § 1501. 

19 Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, November 1999, U.S. Government Accountability 

Office. 

 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 12

Moreover, USAID has a memorandum of understanding with Commerce for the funding of the one 

Commerce uplift position. This memorandum includes provisions for the appropriate use and 

monitoring of funds.20

The supplemental appropriations act of 2009 authorized State to transfer funds to agencies to support 

operations in and assistance for Afghanistan.

 However, we found that State does not follow these best practices when 

transferring funds to other agencies to fund their uplift personnel in Afghanistan. 

21

However, SCA has used a largely informal process for transferring these funds and ensuring that funds 

are used as intended. For example, SCA officials told us they rely on e-mail communication and verbal 

discussions with agency officials to communicate how funds can be spent. These officials also stated 

that they have held group meetings with agencies to discuss appropriate uses of the transferred funds, 

which Office of Management and Budget officials attended. Furthermore, SCA made explicit in its 

financial plan submitted to Congress that it would transfer funds to support uplift personnel. SCA 

officials told us that they review agencies’ spending proposals before approving any transfers and that it 

is the agencies’ responsibility to monitor and report to State on their own use of transferred funds. SCA 

officials told us that they did not use a more formal mechanism to transfer funds, such as a 

memorandum of understanding, because they were advised by officials in State’s Bureau of Resource 

Management that they were not needed. According to SCA, these officials indicated that SCA’s financial 

plan together with email and verbal communications adequately communicated State’s intent in 

transferring the funds to other agencies. In commenting on a draft of this report, State’s Bureau of

Resource Management stated that appropriated funds were intended to be transferred expeditiously to 

other agencies, and that State did not seek an oversight role in how other agencies budgeted for the 

deployment of uplift personnel. 

 Within State, SCA transfers the funds to other agencies. 

SCA officials stated that the legislation is vague, but told us that they and the Office of Management and 

Budget determined the intent was to authorize the transfer of funds to support the costs of uplift 

personnel only. SCA has transferred funds to agencies primarily for the purpose of funding civilian uplift 

personnel and not to support programs, with some exceptions. For example, in fiscal year 2011, State 

approved a DOJ request for funding that included training for Afghan authorities. 

We found that this informal process is not sufficient for ensuring that funds are used for their intended 

purpose, and that the use of formal written agreements between State and agencies that receive State 

transfers would improve accountability of funds used for the civilian uplift. For example, in one 

instance, we learned that State approved a transfer to Transportation in fiscal year 2009 of $3.7 million 

intended to support the deployment of Federal Aviation Administration uplift personnel, as well as to 

provide for training and equipment to Afghan officials. Transportation encountered difficulties and 

delays in recruiting and deploying qualified personnel to Afghanistan and therefore did not expend or 

obligate much of the transferred funds it received. In May 2010, Transportation programmed 

$3.5 million of the $3.7 million to pay for projects including equipment and air traffic control training for 

the Afghan Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. According to State, new Transportation staff came 

on board in January 2011, and State officials instructed Transportation officials that transferred funds 

should only be used for personnel costs. However, State officials were referring to funds transferred in 

fiscal year 2011, and not funds from fiscal year 2009. Transportation officials indicated the new 

personnel did not have access to their predecessors’ emails that contained the original State guidance

and were unaware that fiscal year 2009 State funds had been approved for equipment and training. As 

a result, Transportation stopped plans to use the remaining $3.5 million from fiscal year 2009 for 

20 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Agency for International Development and the United 

States Department of Commerce to Transfer Funds, signed May 27, 2010. 

21 P.L. Number 111-32. 

 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 13

equipment and training, even though State originally approved a portion of the $3.7 million for these 

purposes. These officials also noted that they would have preferred to have a memorandum of 

understanding with State outlining how transferred funds could be used because they were not privy to 

email or verbal exchanges that may have occurred between State and former Transportation officials. 

They added that State required memoranda of understanding for similar funding transfers to support 

operations in Iraq, and they were surprised that State did not continue to follow this practice for 

Afghanistan. 

As a result of our inquiries, Transportation officials conferred with State officials and determined that 

State’s funds should be returned to the United States Treasury. However, as of August 2011, 

Transportation had not yet returned the funds. Without more formal mechanisms in place to transfer 

funds and to monitor their use, State places uplift funds at the risk of not being used for their intended 

purpose, as occurred in the case of Transportation’s transferred funds. 

THE COST OF SUPPORTING AND SUSTAINING THE CIVILIAN PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL 

LIKELY INCREASE, AND STATE FACES A NUMBER OF RELATED PLANNING CHALLENGES

State and other agencies are likely to experience increased costs related to an expanded civilian 

presence in Afghanistan, and State faces challenges in planning for these contingencies. The U.S. 

military’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, targeted for 2014, will likely lead to cost increases similar to 

those experienced by State after the U.S. military withdrew from Iraq. A legislative proposal to 

standardize pay and benefits for civilian uplift personnel from all agencies could also result in increased 

costs for civilian agencies, which have not consistently provided the same level of benefits that State 

accords its employees. Finally, the opening of two new consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, 

Afghanistan could increase costs. Although SCA officials have initiated planning to address these 

matters, they face a number of planning challenges. 

The U.S. Military’s Drawdown Will Likely Result in Increased Costs Related to U.S. Civilian 

Personnel

The military drawdown in Afghanistan will likely result in increased costs for State, similar to those 

experienced with the U.S. military drawdown in Iraq. U.S. military combat forces have been scheduled 

to start withdrawing from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011 and complete the U.S. military withdrawal 

by 2014, with combat forces withdrawing at a steady pace as Afghan security forces assume control of 

security operations nationwide. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq suggests that this process will 

present significant challenges for State, including increased costs associated with assuming some of 

DOD’s previous security responsibilities. A 2009 State OIG report indicated that the U.S. military’s 

withdrawal from Iraq could result in additional costs for State, such as providing convoy security for fuel, 

food, and other supplies.22 In 2010, State echoed these concerns, reporting that it would need to 

perform certain tasks in Iraq that had been performed by DOD, such as convoy security, clearing travel 

routes, recovering killed and wounded personnel, recovering damaged vehicles and downed aircraft, 

and monitoring private security contractors. State’s Undersecretary for Management also noted in an 

April 7, 2010, letter to DOD that State would have “a critical need for logistical and life support of a 

magnitude and scale of complexity that was unprecedented in the history of the Department of State.”23

 

22 Performance Evaluation of Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military Presence 

in Iraq, Report Number MERO-A-09-10, August 2009.

 

23 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, CWC Special report 3, Special Report on Iraq 

Transition Planning, July 12, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 14

State officials confirmed to us that they expect their costs to increase as the military pulls out of 

Afghanistan.

A Legislative Proposal to Standardize Pay and Benefits for All Civilian Employees Deployed to 

Afghanistan May Result in Increased Costs for Civilian Agencies

A legislative proposal to standardize personnel policies for civilians deployed to certain locations, 

including Afghanistan, could result in increased costs for civilian agencies. Civilian employees deployed 

to Afghanistan, regardless of agency (except for those under the command of the U.S. military), fall 

under the direction and supervision of the U.S. Chief of Mission in Afghanistan; however, civilians are 

compensated under different pay systems, including the General Schedule and Foreign Service systems. 

A report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that two deployed civilians with 

comparable salaries who work under different pay systems could receive different overtime pay 

because the overtime rate is determined by the employee’s pay system and grade/band level.24

Congress is considering legislative language that may be included in the FISCAL YEAR 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act requiring all agencies operating in Afghanistan to standardize pay and 

incentive policies. State officials confirmed that, while this proposal would not increase the costs of 

supporting State employees in Afghanistan, it could raise costs for other U.S. agencies that receive State 

transfers and, therefore, State would need to increase the amount of transfers. The legislation would 

authorize State to require all agencies deploying personnel to Afghanistan to provide the same 

allowances and benefits as State prescribes for its employees on duty in combat zones. Executive 

agencies would also be required to grant employees stationed in combat zones up to 10 workdays of 

recuperation leave for each rest and recuperation trip. 

 

Additionally, this report noted that rest breaks and leaves, which vary between civilian agencies, result 

in different costs from agency to agency. For example, while it is State’s policy to provide for up to three 

rest and recuperation breaks depending on the duration of the employee’s assignment, USDA foreign 

service officers deployed to the field do not receive the same breaks. 

New Consulates Could Increase Costs for State

According to officials in OBO, State modified plans for the development of two temporary consulates in 

Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif to accommodate an increase in personnel due to the civilian uplift. Embassy 

management officials noted that two consulates were established in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif in 2011, 

and OBO has developed temporary facilities to initially house the consulates. According to OBO, the 

temporary Herat consulate was to have 20 desks and 30 beds; however, the plans were modified to 

accommodate 100 desks and 70 beds due to the civilian uplift. Similarly, the temporary Mazar-e-Sharif 

consulate was to have 20 desks, but the plans were redesigned to accommodate 37 desks. According to 

SCA officials, State has not yet determined whether permanent consulates will be established in Herat 

and Mazar-e-Sharif. However, OBO officials told us these temporary consulates may be replaced by 

permanent consulates. If established, these posts could represent substantial additional costs for State. 

For example, according to an official at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, State would have to pay for supplies 

and services, including food, motor pools, vehicle repair, air traffic control at the airport, crash and 

rescue, medical evacuation, and hospital services, among many others. The State official said that these 

items would likely constitute a significant cost increase. 

 

24 See GAO-09-562. Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide Timely and Accurate Compensation 

and Medical Benefits to Deployed Federal Civilians, U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 26, 2009. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 15

State Has Initiated Plans to Address Costs of the Civilian Presence in Afghanistan, but Faces 

Planning Challenges 

SCA officials indicated that they have been planning “in earnest” for the past 6 months to address the 

costs of supporting the civilian presence in Afghanistan; however, they face a number of planning 

challenges. SCA officials told us that they have developed budget plans through fiscal year 2013 to 

support the costs of the anticipated civilian presence in Afghanistan. Because these plans were predecisional, we were unable to assess them. SCA officials also told us that, because of the similarities in 

the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, they regularly consult their colleagues who were responsible for 

transition planning in Iraq. Lessons learned from Iraq demonstrate the importance of careful planning. 

For example, the Commission on Wartime Contracting found in a report on DOD-to-State transition 

planning that planning for State’s operations in Iraq during the military drawdown and after the U.S. 

military exit had not been sufficiently detailed.25

While initial budget planning has occurred, SCA officials said that they face a number of challenges in 

developing a longer-range, robust plan. First, they stated that uncertainty over their budget and that of 

other civilian agencies makes planning difficult. The current emphasis on reducing the federal deficit 

increases the likelihood that spending, including the budgets of agencies involved in the uplift, will be 

reduced in coming years. An overall budget reduction could negatively affect the U.S. government’s 

ability to implement its strategy in Afghanistan. Officials at agencies currently receiving transferred 

funds from State to support their uplift personnel consistently told us that they would have to scale back 

or discontinue their operations in Afghanistan if the State funding were eliminated. For example, HHS 

and USDA officials noted they would have to completely eliminate their presence in Afghanistan if they 

did not receive State transfers. However, in commenting on a draft of this report, officials from State’s 

Bureau for Resource Management noted that, at least for fiscal year 2012, State is not likely to face 

challenges from a budget standpoint. State has requested funding for Afghanistan operations through a 

new funding title referred to as Overseas Contingency Operations, which is intended to reflect the 

shared security missions of State and DOD and includes funding for extraordinary and temporary costs 

that exceed the requirements of a normal embassy in a non-conflict zone. According to the bureau, 

Congress is likely to fully fund this request for the coming fiscal year. 

Second, SCA officials also said that, while they have some ability to plan for the costs of the civilian 

presence in Afghanistan, a number of key policy decisions have not yet been made, complicating their 

planning efforts. For example, SCA officials do not know exactly when the civilian presence in 

Afghanistan will peak, how large the civilian presence will be at its high point, and when and how quickly

the number of civilians deployed to Afghanistan will decrease. These decisions will have to be made at 

the highest levels of government. On June 23, 2011, Secretary Clinton noted in a testimony before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the civilian uplift had reached its height. However, the 

Secretary did not specify whether agencies would continue to deploy personnel to fill uplift positions 

that are authorized but unfilled and did not provide details on when the uplift would start to decrease. 

CONCLUSION

The U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan has come at considerable cost to the U.S. government. Our 

analysis shows that the U.S. government has incurred nearly $2 billion to fund the uplift and that the 

cost of maintaining a civilian presence in Afghanistan is likely to increase. However, State has not always 

 

25 Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, CWC Special report 3, Special Report on Iraq 

Transition Planning, July 12, 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 16

taken the steps necessary to safeguard these funds against improper use, such as developing formal 

agreements with funded agencies that specify the intended use of the funds and allow for monitoring. 

In addition, State faces a number of challenges in planning to support and sustain the civilian presence 

in Afghanistan in the coming years. Given the uncertain budget environment and the lessons learned 

from the transition in Iraq, it will be important for the most senior decision makers in the U.S. 

government to reach agreement on the role of U.S. civilians in Afghanistan in a timely manner. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

To improve the management and planning of the U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan, we are making two 

recommendations to State’s Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs to: 

1. Implement formal agreements, such as memoranda of understanding, with all agencies that 

receive State transfers to fund their uplift personnel to ensure funds are used for their 

intended purposes. These agreements should clearly detail the approved uses of funds and 

provide for the monitoring and oversight of the expenditure of funds.

2. Ensure that the Department of Transportation returns the $3.5 million in funds that were 

unused to State or the U.S. Treasury.

AGENCY COMMENTS ON A DRAFT OF THIS REPORT

State and DHS provided comments on a draft of this report. These comments are reproduced in 

appendices V-VII, respectively. Transportation officials told us that its comments were incorporated 

into State’s comments. DOJ, DHS, USDA, Treasury and Commerce also provided technical comments, 

which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

State provided two sets of comments, one from SRAP, which commented on behalf of SCA, and one 

from the Bureau of Resource Management.

• SRAP concurred with all the recommendations and identified steps to implement them. 

Specifically, SRAP indicated that beginning in FISCAL YEAR 2012, SCA plans to implement 

memoranda of agreement with agencies that receive State transfers. SRAP noted that the 

memoranda will require agencies to report details of their spending, and to make plans to 

return unused funds, if any. SRAP also indicated that the details of the memoranda are 

currently being developed. Additionally, SRAP noted that State and Transportation/Federal 

Aviation Administration have agreed to return $3.5 million in funds to the United States 

Treasury. 

• State’s Bureau of Resource Management provided additional information on funding for the 

civilian operations in Afghanistan in FISCAL YEAR 2012 and outlined its perspective on some of 

the issues we raise in this report. Most notably, while the bureau did not object to our 

recommendation to establish formal agreements with agencies receiving transferred funds, it 

indicated that the legislation originally appropriating funds for the civilian uplift was expressly 

intended to avoid binding and formal agreements with recipient agencies. It also indicated that 

State did not request or seek an oversight role in how other civilian agencies budgeted for their 

staffing efforts. Therefore, the bureau suggested that formal written agreements with other 

agencies had been unnecessary. We disagree with this characterization of the legislation, as 

well as the bureau’s conclusions regarding the need for binding agreements. The legislation 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 17

originally appropriating funds for the civilian uplift states that the Secretary of State may 

transfer funds to any other agencies’ appropriations, upon the concurrence of the head of the 

agency, to support the agencies operations in Afghanistan or assistance to Afghanistan. The 

accompanying House Committee report also clearly addresses the Secretary’s authority to 

transfer funds to other agencies to support their operations in Afghanistan. While neither this 

act nor the committee report specifically require agreements with other agencies, nothing in 

the law or the accompanying House Committee report indicates a clear intent to avoid formal 

agreements. As we discuss in this report, it is a government-wide best practice to institute 

written agreements when transferring funds. Moreover, a formal written agreement is an 

effective means of establishing the concurrence of the head of the other agency, as required 

under the appropriations act. Furthermore, SRAP intends to implement our recommendation 

to use formal agreements with other agencies in FISCAL YEAR 2012. 

In its comments, DHS did not comment on the recommendations but noted that it remains committed 

to continuing its work in Afghanistan to minimize terrorist threats, build governing capacity, improve the 

rule of law, and initiate sustainable economic growth. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 18

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of the performance audit of the implementation and sustainability of the 

U.S. civilian uplift in Afghanistan conducted jointly by the Office of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction and the State Department Office of Inspector General. The objectives of the 

audit were to (1) determine the number of personnel and associated costs of the civilian uplift to date, 

(2) evaluate State’s mechanisms for transferring funds to other agencies that deploy civilian uplift 

personnel, and (3) assess the costs of sustaining and supporting the civilian presence in Afghanistan and 

State’s plans to address these costs. 

This audit was limited to costs associated with the deployment and necessary support of civilian 

personnel deployed to Afghanistan after January 2009 to support U.S. goals for Afghanistan. The uplift 

does not include the 320 “base” positions that were in place prior to the uplift. 

To identify the number of civilian uplift personnel deployed to Afghanistan, we requested the U.S. 

departments and agencies to identify their uplift positions created in addition to their recognized base 

Afghanistan positions that existed prior to the civilian uplift. We then requested agencies to provide us 

with personnel data regarding the civilian uplift positions that were actually filled in fiscal years 2009, 

2010, and 2011. U.S. departments and agencies typically staff their positions on a 1-year rotation. In 

some cases, U.S. departments and agencies filled uplift positions with personnel deployed to 

Afghanistan on a long-term temporary duty basis, and these personnel were included in our analysis;

some uplift positions were filled by personal service contractors, and these positions were included in 

our counts. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel counts 

include 44 employees on personal services contracts with the U.S. government for the purposes of filling 

permanent direct hire positions. Our audit did not include short-term temporary duty personnel 

deployed to Afghanistan who were not filling a permanent position and did not include third-party 

contractors who provided support functions. We did not include Department of Defense (DOD) civilians 

because the civilian uplift was intended to increase the presence and role of civilian agencies in 

Afghanistan. 

To determine the costs the U.S. government incurs to deploy one civilian employee to Afghanistan for 

1 year, we obtained data from the U.S. departments and agencies that deploy these uplift civilian 

personnel. We calculated the cost model from actual data on costs directly attributed to the 

deployment of one civilian personnel to Afghanistan, including salaries, benefits, training, deployment 

travel, and costs for using the mission’s services at post that fall under International Cooperative 

Administrative Support Services (ICASS)—a system that the U.S. government uses to provide and to 

share the cost of common administrative support at diplomatic missions and consular posts overseas,

life support and life support kits in the field, housing, and Capital Security Cost Sharing. U.S. agencies 

that establish a civilian presence at the U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan pay fees, on a per person 

basis, to State to provide new, safe, secure, functional diplomatic and consular facilities and to replace 

vulnerable facilities currently occupied by the mission. 

In table 1, we calculated the cost ranges based on actual budget planning data information gathered 

from State and USAID. We used average salary, benefit, travel and support costs as used by State and 

USAID to calculate yearly costs for these categories. The table is presented in a range to reflect 

differences in cost estimations used by State and USAID. Personnel costs vary depending on whether 

personnel are deployed to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul or to field locations. Additionally, State uses 

different planning assumptions for Foreign Service and civil service personnel. The table is not additive 

because not all categories apply to all positions. The planning model does not necessarily incorporate 

all potential costs associated with the deployment of personnel for 1-year; for example, this model did
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 19

not take into consideration the agencies’ home offices staff support costs for the agencies’ Afghanistan 

positions in Washington D.C. However, the range represents typical costs for the deployment of one 

employee for 1 year to Afghanistan. 

State was the lead agency for the civilian uplift in Afghanistan and incurred the majority of the costs 

(over 70 percent) of all participating agencies. To determine State’s costs associated with the uplift, we 

performed the following:

• obtained a list of the fund accounts used for the civilian uplift initiative from the Bureau of 

South and Central Asian Affairs and requested and obtained the total obligations and associated 

expenditures and unliquidated amounts for each of the funds identified, covering the period 

January 2009 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

• summarized the financial data by grouping Budget Object Classification codes into major 

expense categories including salaries and benefits, training, travel and transportation, 

information technology, and housing. 

• obtained and compiled obligation information from two State bureaus (Overseas Buildings 

Operations and Diplomatic Security (DS)) from fiscal year 2009 through February and March 

2011, respectively. DS did not distinguish operations in Afghanistan as directed toward base or 

uplift personnel positions and, therefore, did not separate costs between these two activities. 

• identified and accounted for transfers between the various State bureaus supporting the uplift 

of civilian personnel, to prevent any double counting of costs. 

Additionally, we identified and summarized all fund transfers made by State to other federal agencies, 

for the purpose of funding the agencies’ civilian personnel deployed in Afghanistan, covering the period 

October 1, 2008 through March 3, 2011. We also tested 100 percent of the transactions by tracing each 

to its source documentation (Treasury’s Government Wide Accounting system). We also reviewed the 

procedures State follows in executing the transfer of funds to other agencies.

In addition, we obtained and reviewed, for reasonableness, the estimated and projected costs for the 

Afghanistan civilian uplift efforts for fiscal years 2011 and 2012, as developed by participating State 

bureaus based upon their assumptions and calculations.

We also reviewed policies and procedures, as well as other relevant laws, regulations, and standards, 

including appropriation laws that provided funding for the civilian uplift initiative in Afghanistan. This 

included a review of selected sections of the Foreign Affairs Manual and the Foreign Affairs Handbook, 

in addition to the Government Accountability Office’s internal control standards and other guidance 

documents. 

In addition, we interviewed State officials from the Bureaus of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) who 

are responsible for overseeing the civilian uplift initiative in Afghanistan to obtain information on civilian 

personnel deployed to Afghanistan and the costs to implement and sustain the increase of civilian 

personnel in Afghanistan for fiscal years 2009 through 2012. We also interviewed officials from the 

Bureau of Resource Management, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Foreign Missions, the Bureau 

of Overseas Buildings Operations, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs to identify their costs associated with the civilian uplift initiative in Afghanistan.

Because State reimburses DOD for the provision of life support and security to civilians deployed to 

provincial reconstruction teams, we incorporated the costs associated with this support in our analysis. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 20

To evaluate State’s internal controls for managing the uplift, we examined State processes regarding the 

transfer of funds to other agencies, and the use of those funds by agencies. 

We conducted our work in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, Afghanistan, from October 2010 to August 2011 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit was 

conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction and the 

Department of State Office of Inspector General under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as 

amended, the Inspector General Act of 1978, and the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 21

APPPENDIX II: COSTS TO DEPLOY ONE PERSON TO AFGHANISTAN FOR ONE YEAR

It typically costs the U.S. government between $425,926 and $570,998 to deploy a civilian employee to 

Afghanistan for a 1 year tour. Costs vary due to differences in salary, travel expenses, and whether an 

employee works in the Embassy or in field locations. This estimated range does not include agencies’ 

headquarters support costs for Afghanistan positions, 15 days of transitional leave or home leave if the 

employee will be deployed for another year-long tour in Afghanistan, and any other expenses that the 

deploying agency may incur in the process of transitioning the employees back to their previous jobs 

within the government, if applicable. 

We constructed the total cost range estimate for deploying one position to Afghanistan based on the 

following expenses: 

• Salaries: Civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan are compensated for their work either by 

the U.S. government Civil Service General Schedule (GS)26

• Danger Pay: Danger pay is additional compensation above basic salary for service at designated 

danger pay posts where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm 

or imminent danger to all U.S. government civilian employees. The U.S. government sets the 

danger pay level for Afghanistan at 35 percent of base salary (based on a standard 40 hour 

workweek) prorated for the number of days while deployed in Afghanistan. Danger pay 

compensation begins on the day of arrival in Afghanistan (the employee must be in country for 

4 hours or more to qualify) and ceases on the day of departure for both permanent or 

temporary employees deployed to Afghanistan.

or the Foreign Service (FS) schedule. 

U.S. agencies told us that they prefer to deploy civilians with considerable background 

experience to Afghanistan. Therefore, agencies typically deploy civilians at the higher end of the 

U.S. government pay scale (GS 14 and FS 1). In budget planning, State uses the amount of 

$110,000 as base salary for either the civil service or the foreign service positions, and USAID 

uses the amount of $122,733 as base salary for their Afghanistan positions in general.

• Post Differential: Post differential is additional hardship pay over basic salary for employees 

deployed to serve at foreign areas where conditions or the environment differ substantially 

from conditions or the environment in the continental United States and warrant additional 

compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. State provides post differential for 

civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan at the maximum level of 35 percent of base salary. 

All civilian employees assigned for a 1 year tour, detailed, or on temporary duty to Afghanistan 

must spend 42 consecutive days at post before the post differential is activated; the differential 

is retroactive to the day the employee arrived at post.

• Sunday Differential: The U.S. government provides full-time civilian employees in Afghanistan 

with additional compensation for hours of work on Sunday, as it is the start of the regular 

workweek at the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan. Sunday premium pay is equal to 25 percent of the 

employee’s rate of basic salary for each of the 8 hours of Sunday work, which means 5 percent 

of base salary. 

• Overtime: The U.S. Office of Personnel Management defines overtime pay as pay for hours of 

work officially ordered or approved in excess of 8 hours in a day or 40 hours in an administrative 

workweek. Civilian employees in Afghanistan are entitled to overtime compensation depending 

 

26 Civil service uplift employees would earn regular base pay, including locality pay adjustments for their duty 

station in the United States. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 22

on their position and level of apointment. USAID sets its personnel overtime at the rate of 

25 percent of base salary. State sets overtime at 20 percent of base salary. USDA follows U.S. 

Mission policy and allows for civilians working in Kabul to work 35 hours of overtime per pay 

period and for civilians working in the field in Afghanistan to work 45 hours of overtime per pay 

period. The overtime compensation rate is an employee’s base salary and an additional 

percentage based on the employee’s GS level. 

• Special Differential:27

• Separate Maintenance Allowance: The U.S. government provides this allowance to assist a 

Foreign Service employee in meeting the additional expenses of supporting family members 

located outside the employee's foreign post of assignment. The U.S. government applies this 

allowance to Foreign Service employees working in Afghanistan. The maximum amount used to 

plan a position’s budget in Afghanistan is $17,300 for State and $12,516 for USAID. 

A special differential is additional compensation for substantial amounts 

of extra work expected to be performed by Foreign Service direct hire generalists and is paid in 

lieu of overtime pay. State sets this differential at 20 percent of base salary for foreign service 

direct hire generalists. The dollar amount that State uses for budget planning is $22,000. 

• Deployment Travel: The U.S. government pays for civilian employee travel to Afghanistan, 

primarily including airfare, hotel, meals and shipment of household effects. State estimates this 

cost at $25,000; USAID estimates it at $48,983.

• Mandatory Afghanistan Training: State requires all civilian employees deployed to Afghanistan 

to attend Foreign Affairs Counter Threat training (at the cost of $3,895) and Afghanistan 

Familiarization training (at the cost of $960). Civilian personnel deployed to locations outside of 

the U.S. mission in Kabul receive extra training, including the Afghanistan Provincial 

Reconstruction Team Orientation (at the cost of $960) and the Interagency Integrated CivilianMilitary Training Exercise for Afghanistan (at the cost of $5,880). Some individual departments 

and agencies require additional specialized training for their employees deployed to Afghanistan; 

for example, Department of Justice civilian employees attend specialized training for their job 

assignments in Afghanistan. 

• Rest and Recuperation (R&R) and Regional Rest Breaks (RRB): The U.S. government provides 

civilians deployed to Afghanistan designated rest breaks after they have spent a certain number 

of days in country. For R&R, the government pays travel costs for employees to return home for 

22 days, including travel time. For RRB, the government pays to transport employees to 

regional locations for quick breaks, including 5 days of paid administrative leave and no more 

than a total of 7 days, including travel time. There are two options for taking these types of 

leave during a 1-year deployment: three R&Rs or two R&Rs and three RRBs. State estimates 

$21,000 per year for the cost of these breaks, while USAID estimates $5,785.

• International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS): ICASS is the principal means 

by which the U.S. government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support 

at its diplomatic and consular missions overseas. U.S. government agencies operating in 

Afghanistan pay ICASS charges for each of their civilian employees to benefit from services 

provided by the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan, such as motor pool operations and vehicle 

maintenance, travel services, mail and messenger services, and reception and telephone system 

services. ICASS fees range from $100,000 to $150,000 per person.

• Residential Housing for Uplift Personnel: State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations 

provides housing for the uplift personnel in Afghanistan. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Near 

 

27 3 FAM 3139.4.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 23

East Asia and South and Central Asian Affairs Bureaus provided Overseas Building Operations 

(OBO) $41,616,000 to accommodate uplift personnel in Afghanistan. State budgets $45,000 for 

housing (non ICASS housing and infrastructure costs) for a single position in Afghanistan.

• DOD Life Support in the Field: U.S. Force-Afghanistan provides security for uplift personnel 

located in the field in Afghanistan. DOD charges State $3,044 each month (or $101.47 per day) 

for each civilian deployed to a DOD-controlled provincial reconstruction team in Afghanistan. 

• Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS): The U.S. agencies that establish a civilian presence at the 

U.S. diplomatic mission in Afghanistan pay fees, on a per person basis, to State to provide new, 

safe, secure, functional diplomatic and consular facilities and to replace vulnerable facilities 

currently occupied by the mission. The CSCS program charges the departments and agencies for 

each authorized or existing position in the U.S. diplomatic facilities and for each projected 

position above current authorized positions in new Embassy compounds. State estimates the 

CSCS costs for a Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is processed) at $22,657, 

Non-Controlled Access Area (where sensitive information is not processed) at $8,803, and for 

Non-Office Areas, such as housing, at $1,626.

• Field Life Support Kits: The U.S. government issues kits to civilians deployed to work at field 

locations in Afghanistan, which include key life support supplies, such as satellite phones and 

protective equipment. State estimates the cost of these kits as $15,000.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 24

APPENDIX III: DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY OBLIGATIONS 

AND ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES FOR AFGHANISTAN 

The Department of State’s civilian uplift effort has been funded primarily by three department bureaus: 

South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), and Diplomatic Security 

(DS). We summarized DS’s reported estimated expenses and unliquidated obligations for operations in 

Afghanistan. DS’s outlays are presented separately from SCA and OBO’s outlays, as they represent cost 

estimates, not actual costs, and are not specific to the civilian uplift. 

Table I: Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security Obligations and Estimated Expenditures 

for Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2009 through Fiscal Year 2011 (To-March 2011)a

Type of Expense FY 2009 

Obligationsb

(includes ULOs)

FY 2010 Obligations

(includes ULOs)

FY 2011 

Obligations

(thru March 2011)

(includes ULOs)

Total Costs

Personnel Comp & Benefits $10,137,920.44 $15,686,866.02 $17,350,118.39 $43,174,904.85 

Travel and Transportation 167,032.81 10,651,413.29 922,626.49 11,741,072.59 

Housing (excluding 

transfers to OBO)

 - -- 3,639.10 3,639.10 

Telecommunications and 

Information Technology 

(IT)

75,805.46 238,303.48 110,238.09 424,347.03 

Training 2,172,262.00 4,423,203.00 960.00 6,596,425.00 

Security (DS funded) 2,741,906.38 140,474,566.85 48,068,537.90 191,285,011.13 

Other Contract Services c 58,605,954.01 172,860,041.12 2,377,249.42 233,843,244.55 

Other Miscellaneous 

Expensesd

1,029,895.21 2,480,380.28 305,811.49 3,816,086.98 

Totals $74,930,776.31 $346,814,774.04 $69,139,180.88 $490,884,731.23 

Source: State OIG analysis of financial data as provided by DS, March 2011.

Note: This schedule represents total estimated costs of Diplomatic Security in Afghanistan (FY 2009 – March 2011) a

DS neither distinguishes costs for either civilian uplift or base personnel nor does it track costs by country. OIG requested DS 

to provide estimates of their costs for Afghanistan for the period FY2009 thru March 2011. b

FY09, FY10, & FY11 data represent when the dollar amount was obligated. DS provided the date of the original obligation and 

the amount of the obligation intended for Afghanistan. DS did not provide clear details as to the amount spent – or dates when 

spent – and any amount that remains unliquidated for Afghanistan. c

The Other Contract Services Category incorporates Budget Object Codes (BOC) 2589 (Other Contract Services Not Otherwise

Classified). BOC 2589 covers various miscellaneous contractual services. 

d

For example: grants, miscellaneous supplies, office equipment and furnishings, and utilities. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 25

APPENDIX IV: DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S TOTAL EXPENDITURES AND UNLIQUIDATED 

OBLIGATIONS THROUGH JANUARY 2011 FOR THE AFGHANISTAN CIVILIAN UPLIFT

The Department of State’s civilian uplift effort has been funded primarily by three department bureaus: 

South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA), Overseas Building Operations (OBO), and Diplomatic Security (DS). 

The SCA bureau serves as the primary conduit for uplift funding and, accordingly, reimbursed the other 

bureaus involved for services or personnel provided in support of this effort. These reimbursements are 

reflected in the financial records of the SCA bureau. We identified the relevant funds and projects 

associated with the uplift for both SCA and OBO and summarized the reported expenses and 

unliquidated obligations in the table below. We noted that air transportation (Air Wing) and OBO 

Project costs (under Housing) combined accounted for 75 percent of SCA’s and OBO’s financial 

commitment.

Table II: Department of State’s Total Expenditures and Unliquidated Obligations Through January 2011 

for the Afghanistan Civilian Uplifta

Type of 

Expenseb

FY 2009 

Expenses 

FY 2010 

Expenses 

FY 2011 

Expenses 

Total 

Expensesc

Total 

Unliquidated 

Obligations

Total Expenses & 

Unliquidated 

Obligations

Personnel 

Compensation 

& Benefits 

$3,424,338.34 $50,625,779.81 $24,646,690.72 $78,696,808.87 $35,083,628.34 $ 113,780,437.21 

Travel and 

Transportation

Air Wing

8,926,006.58 102,853,128.14 27,711,609.54 139,490,744.26 67,435,574.58 206,926,318.84 

Travel and 

Transportation 

– Other 

816,986.82 4,170,668.51 989,412.03 5,977,067.36 20,813,885.37 26,790,952.73

Housing & 

Offices – OBO 

Projectsd

53,024,618.80 20,841,799.76 1,402,091.17 75,268,509.73 622,841,587.16 698,110,096.89 

Housing – 

Other 

3,557,932.26 3,238,436.96 256,967.50 7,053,336.72 32,401.19 7,085,737.91 

Telecommunications and 

Information 

Technology (IT)

15,935,355.43 55,495,438.19 3,693,693.34 75,124,486.96 2,931,275.13 78,055,762.09 

Training 217,741.11 7,435,104.00 88,623.99 7,741,469.10 478,244.21 8,219,713.31 

Security 

(SCA funded)

 220,046.68 521,498.41 673,511.61 1,415,056.70 947,464.99 2,362,521.69 

Other Contract 

Servicese

 

29,717,051.10 10,115,263.19 6,685,628.62 46,517,942.91 15,284,808.73 61,802,751.64 

Other 

Miscellaneous 

Expensesf 

 605,235.84 10,234,562.98 3,113,814.64 13,953,613.46 12,899,014.32 26,852,627.78 

Totals $116,445,312.96 $265,531,679.95 $69,262,043.16 $451,239,036.07 $778,747,884.02 $1,229,986,920.09 

Source: State OIG analysis of financial data provided by the Bureaus of Resource Management (RM) and SCA, as of January 14, 

2011. Also included are OBO’s reported expenses and unliquidated obligations.

a

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) expenses are presented in a separate table as DS did not distinguish costs between 

uplift and base personnel. b

Inter-agency transfers are not included in this table. c

Expenses include amounts that SCA reimbursed other bureaus within State. Neither SCA nor RM identified whether these 

transferred funds have since been spent, are obligated, or are still available – except for OBO which reported their expenses. 

Transfers from SCA to DS were excluded as DS supplied their own financial data.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 26

d

OBO’s projects include: New Office Annex/Housing and Temporary Facilities in Kabul; Consulate Herat, and Consulate Mazar-eSharif.

e

This incorporates Budget Object Code 2589 (Other Contract Services Not Otherwise Classified), which covers various 

miscellaneous contractual services, such as training, personnel compensation, International Cooperative Administrative 

Support Services (ICASS) payments, housing, and contract labor. f

Examples of these costs include: grants, misc. supplies, office equipment & furnishings, utilities, & heavy duty equipment.
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 27

APPENDIX V: COMMENTS FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE’S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR 

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

MEMORANDUM 

TO: OIG - Harold W. Geisel 

SIGAR- Herbert Richardson 

FROM S/SRAP-Daniel Feldman 

SUBJECT: Draft SIGAR Report on Afghanistan Civilian Uplift 

I appreciate the opportunity to review and provide comments on the Draft Report, 

"The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State 

Needs to Strengthen its Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to 

Other Agencies. " 

SJGAR's draft report declares (pg 13) that State has not provided sufficient 

processes to ensure that interagency transfer funds are used for their intended 

purposes by the receiving agencies, but provided only one example of a problem to 

docwnent this assertion. The report cites a May 2010 Department of 

TransportationlFederal Aviation Administration (DOTIFAA) " reprogramming" 

effort to allocate $3.5 million in funds for Afghan infrastructure and improvement 

projects not authorized by State. 

In fact, State did provide the FAA with guidance on what its expectations were 

\\~th respect to the use of that ftmd ing. Dtuing the first year of the inter-agency 

support, a nLUnber of non-personnel support requests were approved by the SCA 

bureau for supported agencies, including DOTIFAA, allowing for f1exibility in O,e 

use of the initial supplemental li.mds for the inter-agency effort. DOT/FAA was 

allocated approximately $3.7 million in late FY2009 for the inter-agency support 

of the civilian uplift. The FAA requested the funds in order to place three (3) 

additional full-time aviation experts in country to mentor Ministry of Transport and 

Civil Aviation (MOTCA) management and technical personnel in aviation 

disciplines, specifically aviation safety oversight, airport certification , and air 

tranic control training programs ($2.2 million), and for training/computer 

equipment and other support equipment ($ 1.5 million) for MOTCA technical 

personnel to organize and build their Afghanistan civil aviation technical expertise 

United States Department of Stat< 

WlIShington, D. C 20520 

August 4, 201 1 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 28

-2-

and infrastmcture. The Department of State did not at any time prohibit the use of 

2009 funding transferred to FAA for equipment and training for MOTCA 

personnel. 

The FAA lk1d difficulty hiring for the Uuee positions and have only recently begun 

their uplift activities. Since 2009, the FAA has expended/obligated very little of 

those original available ftmds. When new FAA staff came on board in January 

20 II , they were told by State persolmel tlk1t interagency transfer funds were only 

to be used for civilian uplift and not for other purposes. The new FAA Manager 

gave direction to halt any obligations of the monies. The new FAA staff was 

unaware tilat State did originally approve some the funding for activity outside of 

the hiring of persolmel. We have clarified the situation with DOT/FAA, and the 

decision was made to return $3.5 million in funds to the United States Treasury. 

SCA is in discussion now with DOTIF AA on the mechanism by which the funds 

will be returned. 

To prevent any miscommunication with federal agencies receiving uplift funding, 

SCA plans to implement an MOA for FY20 12 inter-agency transfers tl,at ,,~II 

specify via an attached agency request and approval notification the approved use 

of funds. Tllis MOA will also require agencies to report details of their spending 

to date at the beginning of the 4th quarter of the fiscal year, along with any plans to 

return excess funds. A fUlliI report at the end of U,e fiscal year ,, II detail tl,e use of 

tlle funds transferred. Tllis will fonnalize the infonnal initial and interim reporting 

process already in place and add a final reporting reqttirement that can infonn the 

decision process in the next year. The specifics of the MOA are being discussed 

now. 

Given that there is only one example to support tile conclusion that State Needs to 

Strengthen its Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other 

Agencies, and that one example involved no misuse of monies (as our comments 

demonstrate), we request that the title of the report be changed to reflect the 

report's contents. An alternate title such as "The U.S. Civilian Uplift in 

Afghanistan Has Cost Nearly $2 Billion, and State Is Strengtherting its 

Management and Oversight of the Funds Transferred to Other Agencies" would be 

accurate. 

CC: SCA: Robert Blake 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 29

Approved: S/SRAP: Dan Feldman, Deputy 

Drafted: NEA-SCAlEX: B. Wilson, 72 181, 08/0312011 

Cleared: SRAP: JArzt - ok 

NEA-SCAlEX: LLorullan - ok 

NEA-SCAlEX: LRichter - ok 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 30

APPENDIX VI: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S BUREAU OF RESOURCE 

MANAGEMENT AND THE SIGAR AND STATE OIG RESPONSE

United States DCI)artmcnt 01" State 

fIi:I hil1.~/HH. D.(', _"'0520 

AuguS! 23. 2011 

UNCLASSIFIED 

M EMORANDUM 

TO: OIG - Harold W. Geisel 

FROM: RMlEX - Philip 1. Schlaller 

;.yt ?j'> 

I ..c-'/ 

SUBJF.CT: Draft Report on The U.S. Civihul1 Uplift in Afghanistan Has Co.w Nearly S2 

Bi//;Ol(, and Slure Needs IU Sln:nglhen its I\lfcmag.:menl cmd OV(:rj'ight u/,h(1 Flll1ds THJJ1jjt:rJ"ed 

10 Olher Agencies (SIOhR Audit-II -17 and State OIO·AUD-003) 

The Bureau of Resoure!; Management, Orflce or Budget aDd Planning (RM/I:W) 'Ippredates the 

opportunity to review and comment on the draft OIGlSfGAR report " The u.,s', Civilian Uplift in 

Afghanistan Her.'; e mf Nearly 52 billion, and Stale Need,' to ,S'lrenKlhen ;/,0; Managemenl and 

Oversight oflhe Funds Trall.~f rred 10 Other Agencies." RMlIJP has worked closely with the 

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, other Department of Siale bureaus an.d offiees and 

the Ofticc of Management and Budget on the planning and execution of fund s to support U.S. 

civi lian dlorrs in Afghani!>tan. The continut!d support of this effort remains among the 

Department's highe.st prioritie . 

The COITUllcnts below ~durcss specific assertions in the report gcnnanc to RM/BP's 

responsi bilities for budget ronnulation and ..:xccution of Stale Department appropriations. 

particularl y Ihe Diplomatic and Consul ar Programs account that has bome many t)f costs cited in 

the report. 

The report'.s assertiou that the "Civilian Uplift" -- compri.sil)g tbe increase of 320 to J040 

personnel- has cost " neltrly $2 billion'" is misle .. ding and not adequately supported by the 

analysis in tbe report. 

A.s outlined on pages 7-9 of the draft rcport, the $ 1,662.7 million in obligations represcnt'S the 

total obligations in..::urred by the Department of Stare and othl!r civilian agencies over FY2009-

FY201 I to suppon the civilian presence in Afghanistan. including "base" and "uplil1" 

cnlployces. Not only is- this amount $.3 37 million less than the amount cited in the report's title. 

it docs not clearly Jjstinguisb between the 'fi xed' costo; of the U.S. Mission to Arghanistan's 

personnel, security and faci lili es and the ' variablc' costs driven only by the growth in staffing 

sine. FY2009. Of the $1.230 million in DOS coSL. cited on page 25, S698.1 million is associatec 

with "Housing and Offices" funded by ORO, yet thc rcpon docs not clearl y slate how OIG and 

SIGAR linked such costs to only "civilian uplifi.'· pel'sonnd. Util izing iht! 'COSI rangt!' ciled on 

Table 1 would indicate !.hat the growth 01' 720 positions (1040 less 320) yields annual cost'S of 

$41 1 million (\vithout adjusting for one-time expenses), and a hICc~ycar cost ofSl. 2 billion. In 

contmst, the repon properly recognizes that Diplomatic Security operations to protect diplomatic 

"S'-e-e-"S"'ig-a-r--,I 

d St t 

~~G a e 

Comment 1 

UNCLASSIFIED 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 31

2 

faci lities and personnel cannot reasOIHlhly be allocated between <base' versus ' uplifl' posilions. 

and thus chamctcrizc:s those obligations separdtely. RM/RP res}'Icctfully sugges.ts the fo llowing 

clari fi cations in associated analysis and findings. 

• Revise the auribut io n or"civilian uplift" costs to include only those dircctly anribuH~ble 

to the increase of720 positions ciled in the I"t:port. 

o Revise refert:nces of Hnearly $2 billion" to align with specific amounts cited in the report

either costs of the " civilian uplin·t 01' (he total cost of civilian operations. 

• Updatc dtation on Table 3 ol" 'FY2011 Projected Expenditures" to reflect "FY20 J I 

Actual Expenditures Ql >~ (per footnote), or revise to rcOccl more recent Q3 date). and 

project accordingly, 

T be report's cbaractcri7.ation of the. transfer and oversight of funds prt)\!idtd to other 

agencies provides constructive recommendations, but oc~ n ot account for the unique 

circ um ~ta nces of tbe interagency ' civilian uplift' and the C"Xtcnsil'c communication between 

the f)epartm ent of State and other ~gencies uo utiliza tion of these funds. 

As noted in previous conununications regarding tbis audit, the interagency transfer authority was 

a special authority lo r the Diplomatic and COIl.'mlar Prognuns appropriation that was developed 

in the t:ontcxt ofthc:: FY2009 Supplemental budget request. In the process of developing that 

supplemental during the FaJl and Winter of2008. a number of civilian agencies developed 

specific proposals to slippon Embassy Kabul's request for additional c ivilian expertise. The 

Depanment of State and other agenc..:ies originally believed that each agency would submit a 

separate appropriation request as part or an interagency supplemental. 

However, given the range of agenc ies and potentia l appropriations subcommittees of juris diet inn. 

OMB dctcnnined that the most effecti\'e .lpproach would be to consolidate the associated 

funding under a single existing appropriation. along with authority to expeditiously trullsfe r the 

funds to the receiving agenc.:ies. The Department ofSmte did not request or seek an oversight 

role in howlllher civilian agencies budgeted for their statling efTorts, as the Dt::partment 

recognized that each agency has unique personnel authorities and cost structures. The 

Depanment of State, OMB. and other agencies agreed tbat thc::ie transfers would he based upon 

the justification submitt ed to Congress with the FY2009 supplemental and subsequent 

nmifications. 

The specific D&CP appropriation provision enac ted in P.L. lll·32 W.1S intended to enable a 

non-cxpcndirure transfer offunds to the th~r i1gencies to allow them to cover the costs ofthdr 

operations in Afghanistan. Because {he Ot:partment of 'tate sought to transfer 12QJ1.ill2Hit~ ror 

the funds to the other agencies. the language specifically did not refer to "expenses" nor did lli ~a 

categories of allowable expenses or require any tylX of agreement with the other ageneil!s, This 

language was exprc$..<ily intended to avoid "binding agreemt;nts" and " formal agreements" 

suggested as models on page 12 of the report. Uti li zation of the non.expenditure trnl,\sfer .n l~o 

provided other agencies with lhe greatest Ilt:xibility under their own legal authorities, 

Accordingly, the Depanment of State did not rC4ucst establishment of signed MOlJs in 

conncction with the execution o f the authority because the justi fications and spending plan 

submincd to Congress for these funds clearl y articulated how each agency would be usi ng the 

transferred reSOim.:es:, 

=:-::-===--,1 

See SIGAR 

and State 

OIG 

Comment 2 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 32

) 

The om~c ofM;u'3gttnCm and Hudgct and the Department of Slate's appropriJl;OnS 

sub\:<.>mn,inccs have ~cc;,'ed regu la, updates on the al\ocation~ "ffunds lransfcm...J und~r the 

FY 20L!9 and FY 2010 lraIl,fcr auth.\lT;t;cs for AfshnniSlnn, which ha,'c nol dumge<l 

:>U~tanlivdy from the original fonnulation in 2009, The detailed accounting nfthese resources 

outlined on pages 8-10 of tile r.:port indicale~ tbat Stale and other age"cies have carefully trocked 

the x~lIIion of these resources ov<.'1" the la" Ih,ee years. 

RMJBI' docs n-cogni'.Ge thaI the increasing "nnmlalizatiun" orlhis autllority may warrant the 

institution (, emU'" formalitc..l mct:hanisms to ,woid potential c"<JnfUS:Oll between agtncic"S on 

how the Ot:partment of State has justified thc>c ,,,WilKeS 10 COl1£.1'.'ss. We note that in lru:cit~-d 

example uribe 1)epartment ofTmnsportation. Ihe expenses inclll'TCd are witbin the scope ..,fthe 

transfer autoority and thcrcfon: w.;;rc not an "'improper usc" of "improperly oblig:ucd" II.S 

suggested in the report (page 16). even if Wme of the n<pen""," " "Crt: not contemplated in (he 

initial communications octween State and Trnnspmtatioll. 

While RMIllP does not objCl:t to TttOlnmendat;ons that the Department "rSt:l!C should cstabli>l\ 

fom!al MOUs for (U!urc transfers, RM/Bf' respectfully sugge~ts the follo .... ·i0l: cbrifications in 

a.'i,<;ociakd anal)"'is and findings. 

• Revise discussi()n ()f "bc:st prnc1ices" to more 3C(;urnTely reneet Ihe origjnal 

c,i,,:umstanc.;;s and inTent of the speeifi~ I,,:nsfc'l" authority. as outli"....! above. 

• Stnkc references 10 an ",mproper'" obJtgauon or Use of funds by The Department of 

'I·ranspor~'tion. 

The rep<>r' ,",,,cunudy u",,'''.rizcs the plannin g cba ll enges for the i~jlian prcsenct in 

Afgb~ ;s t.tln, but overlook.. spt<:ific teps tMkCD by tbe f}cpanmcnt of State 10 add re .. 

f~l~rc fundin g eOnN ro S, 

The report reasonably statcs that the civilian upHt will fa~ e futun: cballengcs associated wilh the 

drn ..... down of US mi!itary forces. neW pay and benclit proposals, thc e~tablishmcm of new 

oonsuMes outside of Kabul, and mhcr policy unNrtainties. Ho ..... ever. in discU:oISing budl>~t3ry 

concern. for FY2013. the rcport docs !lOt address the D<:partnt~nt'~ FY2012 Budget request. 

FY2012 represents the li"t year since FY200~ th,lt thc Department docs not expe.:t to ha"" 

supplemental funds to support ils Afghanisl<ln operntions. 

In r~ognition of this transition, Til" FY2012 Budget requested the majority of Afghanis!"'! 

operational funding fo r seA lU!d DS within a new Overseas Comi'lScncy Operatinns (OCO) 

title, along with funding for SIGAR. and ongoing operations in Iraq and Pakistan. The oeo 

concept represents limding lor The shared national security missions oftbe Dep.lrtment of 

Defen", and Department ,,[State, demonstrating a whck ofgovcmment approach to funding 

programs and oP<'['"Jtion~ in connict lones. OCO includes those extraordinary and tempo['"~ry 

COSI~ that exceed the reqni"'m~1!ts of a normal embassy in non-conllict ~onc. Inis criteria i, 

similar to thut oevdo)lcd by Ill.; Departmcnt of Defense, aoo like lJO)),lhe Uepartment of 

State's OCO r~'<Iuc st was presentw in separate chapters nfThe President"s B"dge! and 

Dcpal1(l1cnt of STaTe Congressional lludget Ju.tifications. 

",,,",,,,",,,,,,n 

See SIGAR and 

~_te OIG 

r--umment 3 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 33

4 

The Departmem Of SI,II("', FY2012 OCO Illldget "."quests S99I.H millinn in operalio",,1 fuoding 

for Afghani>1an. including: S757.5 million for SeA. $18<1.9 minion for OS. and S44.4 milli"n ror 

SIGAR (f Y2012 CW. pp 770·775). The SCA requesl includes the projcctoo ongoing COSIS of 

the 'civili:m upl iii.' including the interagency transf", authority. The "'gular 'base' budget 

includes ao.Iditional [u!lds r,,, SC,\ and 1)S opcmtions. Initial congressional reaction 10 the 

Depanment (lfStutc oco !\.'~ucst ha~ been positiv(". The House ofRepresenmtivcs 

approprialions sub<;Qmmiltce for State ~nd USAI!) in FY2012 fully funded the OCO I\."qucst in 

ils f'Y2012 bill (~xcept lor ,hifli"g a Paki'l"n l'rogrum 10 bOb). and OCO funding was 

specifically prot~ct"" in re""m debt ceiling n~got ations. 

RMIBP requests that the repon irn:lud~ the ."Uov.ing clarifications: 

• The Department ofStatc and OMU ha"e requested the maj.."ily..,f fY2012 Afghani~lan 

<>peroti..,,,,,l co~1l;.. including the 'civilian uplift·, 10 be fund~d through II new ~o\"erscas

Comingency Opcrntion" title based On criteria similar 10 that used by DOD. 

• This prop"""l has bee11 well n.wvcd by Congress. mitil>al;ng concerns ahouI dramat; 

reductions in FY2012 funding. 

• The Department ofSIale intends 10 continue lIsi ng OCO as a key element in its FY201)

planning for military to civilian Iran.it;on in A fgh""iSlan. 

",,,,o",";--' I 

See SIGAR 

and Slale OIG 

Comme nt 4 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 34

SIGAl{ and Stat..: OIG Comm\:£1!s on State's Bureau of R..:sourue U1agement Leller 

1 As noted on page 9 of this report, OBO otTicials indicated the funds arc to provide accommodations and 

office space for the continued growth in sLaffing in Afghanistan. Th~refore, we d~tennined that these funds 

can be directly attributable to the civilian uphll. 

2. This report compiks all costs IISsocialed with th..: civilian uplift, including costs incurred for the 

dcployment of employees, as well as seeurit}' and infrastructure costs. Table I reflects typical costs tbat 

agencies incur 10 deploy om: ~mployc:e to Afghanistan for I yeur. Appendix II prov d~s more d~lail of these 

costs. As noted on pagl: 5 of this report, some costs cllnnol be calculated on a pt:r person basis, but can be 

IIttributed 10 thc civilian uplift. Thesc costs 1IT1: refledcd in table 3 and appendix IV. Therefore, multiplying 

the number of uplift positions by the per pe!1;on range does not fully capture Ihe cost oflhe civilian uplift, 

which we have calculated to be at least $1.7 billion. The fi gure of nearly $2 billion takes into account the 

almost $500 million that State's l3 ureau of Diplomatic Secunt}' estimates it expended to cover se.::unty costs 

in Afghanistan from fiscal Yl:ar 2009 through the first quarh:r of fiscal )'I:ar 20l1. 

3. Title XI of P.L. 111 -32 regllrding Diplomati .. and Consular Programs was clear thai the Sendary of State 

may Iransfer fund~ to any other agencies' appropriations, upon the concurrence of the head of the agency, to: 

(I) support the othcr agenc)"s operations in Afghanistan; (2) support the other ageoc)"s assislance for 

Afghanislan; or (3) carry oullhe provisions of Ihe }<'oroign Assistance A .. I of 1961, as amended. The 

accompanying 1·louse Comminel: report also .. learly addresses the Secretary's aUlhority 10 transfer funds 10 

other ageneics 10 support their operations in Afghanistan. While neithcr Ihis act nor Ihe eommittce report 

sp<:<.:ifi .. al1y refer to expenses or re(luire agreements with other agencies, nolhing in the law or Ihe 

accompanying 1·louse Comminee report indicates a clear inl\:£1tto IIvoid binding or formlllllgreem\:£1\s. As 

we discuss on page 11 of this report, a written, IOrmal agreement between agencies is a gove11lment-wide best 

practi .. e for ensuring thai funds are spent for their intended purposes. !I.'\oreover, a \'Tillen, formal agre<...-menl 

is an effective means of establishing the concurrence of the head of tbe ()Iher agency, as required under the 

appropriatiom acl. Wc also note that SCA has concurred Witll our recommendation and w ill implemcnt 

memoranda ofunder!!landing for fiscal year 2012 interagency transfer!! Ihat will require agcncie~ to report 

details of their spending along wilh plans to return excess fund~. 

We have revised our discussion regarding the Department ofTmnspnrtation's use of SLate transferred fund~ 

to reflcet that they wcre not improperly obligated. 

4. We have add..:d language on page 15 of this r<...-port regarding the Ovel1iellS Contingen .. y Operations fundin g 

lind its rekvancc 10 our discussion ofbudgct uncertainly. 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 35

APPENDIX VII: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. I'kp."mt.U .. f !t .. mtl."d s..,.rity 

Wl$hingtOn. IX :wn8 

Homeland 

Security 

August 1,2011 

Mr. Albert H. HlU'ltinglon III 

Acting Assistant Inspector General for Audits 

Special Inspt."Ctor General for Afghanistan Rel'onstruction 

400 Army Navy Drive 

Arlington, V A 22202 

Re: Draft Report SIGAl{ Auditll · 17, ''The U.S. Civilian Uplift in Afghanistan Has Cost 

Nearly $2 Billion, and State Needs to Strengthen its Management and Oversight Oflhe 

Funds Transferred to Other Agencies" 

Dear Mr. Huntington: 

Thank you for the ~~po~~t):' ~ .. !yy~ .... : ?nd comment on this drjl.t): rs;por. Th ~ lJ.S. Qcpartm.cnt 

of flOriidand Security CDHS) appreciates the SpCl'iallnspcetor General for Afghanistan 

Rel:onstruction's work in planning and conducting its review and issuing this report. 

The Department is pleased 10 note the report's acknowledgement of its role helping the Chief of 

Mission of the U.S . Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan meet thc mission's slnltegic goals. 

Specifically, the DHS mission in Afghanistan is to support the bTiJader U.S. civil ian and military 

mission of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al·Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and its 

extremist allies who threaten the Sl'1::ur1ty of the U.s. Homeland . DI·IS is fu lfilling this mission 

by providing oorder, customs, investigative, and immigration expertise to the Afghan Border 

Police (Afghan Customs Department, Afghan MinislI)' of Transportation and Civil Aviation), the 

Afghan Ministry of Interior·Criminal lnvestigation Division, and the Afghan Min.istry of Finance 

in order to help them: 

I) deny terrorists illicit flUld ing and illicit contraband sources: 

2) enforce a secure oorder; 

J) increase revenue flows to thc Afghan government; and 

4) improve cross, border conunerce and fal:ilitate legitimate trade and travel. 

The DHS mission is aligned with the Integrated Civilian· Military Campaign Plan. which works 

to rt.'<iul:C the infiltra tion of insurgents and illicit goo(h and improve (ross·border trade. OIlS 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 36

also supervises aimosI50 contract Border Mentors who supporl the DHS mission across 

Afghanistan. DIIS ultimately seeks to transition responsibility for these dutics to thc Afghan 

government as its capacities grow. 

Even though this reporl docs not contain specific reeonunendations for DHS, the Department 

remains conunitted to continuing its work with the U.S. Dcparlment ofStnte and other relevant 

stakeholders in minimizing the terrorist threats in Afghanistan and effom to build Afghan 

governing capacity, improve the rule of law, and initiate sustainable economic growth. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft report. Technical 

comments have been submilled under separate cover. We look forward to working with you on 

future Homeland Security issues. 

Sincerely. 

\ l ~ , ~~ I.cru~ Director 

lkpartmental GAO/OIG Liaison Ollice 

2 
SIGAR Audit-11-17 & State OIG AUD/SI-11-45 Civilian Uplift Page 37

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-034A and OIG 11-AUD-3003).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan. 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

Reports and Testimonies SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

publically released reports, testimonies, and 

correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

Abuse in Afghanistan allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

Reconstruction Programs reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

2530 Crystal Drive 

Arlington, VA 22202 
State OIG’s Mission The Office of Inspector General conducts independent 

audits, inspections, and investigations that advance the 

missions of the Department of State and the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. OIG provides leadership to: 

• promote integrity, efficiency, effectiveness, and 

economy; 

• prevent and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and 

mismanagement; 

• identify vulnerabilities and recommend 

constructive solutions; 

• offer expert assistance to improve Department and 

BBG operations; 

• communicate timely, useful information that 

facilitates decision-making and achieves 

measurable gains; and 

• keep the Department, BBG, and the Congress fully 

and currently informed. 

Obtaining Copies of the U.S. To obtain copies of State OIG documents at no cost, go to 

Department of State OIG’s OIG’s Web site (http://oig.state.gov/lbry/index.htm). State 

Reports and Testimonies OIG posts all released reports, testimonies, and 

correspondence on its Web site. Redacted reports may also 

be requested by following procedures stipulated in the 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

To Report Fraud, Waste, and To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting a 

Abuse in U.S. Department of potential criminal case, abuse, or fraud contact OIG’s 

State hotline: 

Web: http://oig.state.gov/hotline/index.htm

Email: oighotline@state.gov 

Mail:

Office of Inspector General

HOTLINE

P.O. Box 9778 

Arlington, Virginia 22219 

Phone: 202-647-3320 or 800-409-9926 

Congressional and Public Congressional Liaison:

Affairs Tom Burgess 

Director of Congressional and Public Affairs 

Office of Inspector General 

(202) 663-0380 

(202) 663-0390 (fax) 

burgesst@state.gov